

DAS FREIE WORT? THE STRUCTURING OF EAST AND WEST GERMAN PRESS
CULTURE DURING THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET OCCUPATIONS

By

Robert J. Williams

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
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History

Chair:



Richard Breitman, Ph.D.



Eric Lohr, Ph.D.



Max Paul Friedman, Ph.D.



Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences

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For Nicole, Oliver, and Liam

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation charts a course that begins with U.S. and Soviet wartime propaganda programs and ends with the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Its focus rests on the interplay between the newspaper policies of the occupation powers, the coverage of news in each zone of occupation, the personalities that coordinated and created newspaper contents, and popular German responses to the postwar press by considering four publications born of the occupation era: the Red Army's *Tägliche Rundschau*, the U.S.-run *Die Neue Zeitung*, the American-licensed *Frankfurter Rundschau*, and the Socialist Unity Party's (SED) *Neues Deutschland*. It assesses the participation of Germans in the reconstruction of their media by considering both those who were active in the postwar press and those who read and interacted with the press. It argues that popular German participation was an inherently political act, one that eventually led to the creation of a shared political life in the West that came not just from above, but also through interaction with the printed word. In addition, this study analyzes the imposition of structures on the development press cultures in the two German republics, including the SED-led sovietization of the press and the reactive and defensive use of information media by the United States during the early cold war.

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bureaucracy of the early U.S. occupation of Germany. Elke Vogel, Robert Luther, Elke Hauschildt, and Sven Schneidereit at the Bundesarchiv gave so much of their time while spent my days and weeks in Lichterfelde. I am very appreciative of their assistance and the thoroughness of their knowledge of their collections.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADN	Allgemeine Deutsche Nachrichtendienst
AMZON	American Zone of Occupation
AP	Associated Press
BDO	Bund Deutscher Offiziere
CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands
CFM	Council of Foreign Ministers
CIC	Counter Intelligence Corps
CPSU(b)	Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik)
DANA	Deutsche Allgemeine Nachrichten Agentur
DENA	Deutsche Nachrichten Agentur
DISCC	District Information Services Control Command
DNB	Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro
DP	Displaced Person
ECA	Economic Cooperation Administration
ERP	European Recovery Program
FDGB	Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GlavPURKKA	Main Political Administration of the Worker-Peasant Red Army (Glavnoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie Raboche-Krestyanskoi Krasnoy Armii)
HICOG	High Commission for Occupied Germany
ICD	Information Control Division
IMT	International Military Tribunal
ISD	Information Services Division
KPD	Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands
LDPD	Liberal-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands
NACP	National Archives and Records Administration, College Park
NKFD	Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland
NSDAP	Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei
OMGUS	Office of the Military Government (U.S.) in Germany

OWI	Office of War Information
P & PW	Publicity and Psychological Warfare Branch
PG	Parteigenosse
POW	Prisoner of War
PWB	Psychological Warfare Branch
PWD	Psychological Warfare Division
RM	Reichsmark
SA	Sturmabteilung
SAPMO-BArch	Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv
SBZ	Sowjetische Besatzungszone
SD	Sicherheitsdienst
SED	Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force
SMAD	Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
TASS	Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (Telegrafnoye agentstvo Sovetskovo Soyuz)
UP	United Press
USFET	United States Forces in the European Theater
USPD	Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
ZK	Zentralkomitee (of the KPD)
ZS	Zentralsekretariat (of the SED)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

During the Allied occupation, separate groups of Germans received and modified two newspaper cultures. The first of these believed the press could be the “sharpest weapon” in the struggle for socialism if it acted as a collective propagandist, agitator, and organizer.¹ The second had a Tocquevillean view of media, and trusted that newspapers facilitated the broad associational life necessary to decentralized democratic states.² Both press cultures were subject to the restrictions of the military occupations, but still they provided audiences with essential, albeit filtered, information on the events and trends of the day. More important, they transmitted the linguistic, cultural, and political cues that became common to the early East and West German states, and so played integral roles in the development of the simultaneously progressive and atavistic narratives of the early postwar era.

This dissertation charts a course that begins with U.S. and Soviet wartime propaganda programs and ends with the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR). It situates newspapers within the larger dynamics that led to the political cultures of the two German states by focusing on the interplay between the newspaper policies of the occupation powers, the coverage of news in each zone of occupation, the personalities that coordinated and created newspaper contents, and popular German

¹ Zentralkomitee (ZK) der Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED), Abteilung Agitation, *Unsere Presse – die schärfste Waffe der Partei. Rededispotion für die erste Mitgliedversammlung der Grundorganisationen der SED im Monat Februar 1952* in Stiftung Archive der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO-BArch)-Bibliothek No. 3/669 and Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, “Where to Begin” *Iskra* 4 (May 1901) as in Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Moscow, *Lenin: Collected Works*, Vol. 5/45 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), 13-24.

² Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. II, trans. George Lawrence (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 513-516 and 518-519.

responses to the postwar press. While many newspapers receive consideration, the analysis rests on the histories of four publications born of the occupation era: the Red Army's *Tägliche Rundschau*, the U.S.-run *Die Neue Zeitung*, the American-licensed *Frankfurter Rundschau*, and the Socialist Unity Party's (SED) *Neues Deutschland*. Of these four, the *Tägliche Rundschau* and *Die Neue Zeitung* were the most similar. Both were occupation newspapers and the putative mouthpieces through which the Soviets and Americans, respectively, hoped to "reeducate" Germans and make them sympathetic to their programs. The *Frankfurter Rundschau* was the first U.S.-licensed, German-run newspaper in AMZON and a constant, albeit troubled, advocate for German democratic development throughout the occupation. Finally, *Neues Deutschland* exhibited tendencies that became common in GDR propaganda as well as introduced much of the rhetoric common to the early cold war era. Despite having a common mission, that is, the construction of German political culture in the wake of Nazi dictatorship, each newspaper had distinct perspectives that reflected the visions of their staff, the occupiers, and segments of the broader German public.

Historical Problems of German Press

Culture Through 1945

The reconstruction of the German press was a primary goal of the U.S. and Soviet military occupations. Both believed that postwar German media should redirect political culture toward acceptable ends and overcome the stunted development of Germans' relation to their press. To a certain degree, this latter perspective was valid. German newspapers' ability to exercise freedoms of expression had been inconsistent since the Napoleonic occupation. At times, pre-Nazi German press culture had been relatively diverse and reasonably independent from state interference, even throughout much of the Imperial era. Following the Nazi rise to

power and the passage of the February 28, 1933 Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of the People and State and the October 4, 1933, *Schriftleitergesetz* (“Editor’s Law”), the door had closed on the press freedoms guaranteed by the Weimar Republic. All publications and writers fell under the eye of the Propaganda Ministry (*Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda*).³ Additional acts compelled German newspaper editors to join the Nazi Press Chamber (*Reichspressekammer*) and obligated newspapers to make exclusive content agreements with the state-controlled *Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro* (DNB).⁴ Direct closures and bans of hitherto independent publications made the National Socialist’s *Eher Verlag* the dominant publishing house in Germany, such that it controlled almost more than four-fifths (83%) of the considerably smaller newspaper market.⁵

The effects of supplication to the whims of the state were less obvious to both the Allies and to some non-Nazi German press professionals. Widespread journalistic and editorial self-censorship contributed to the degeneration of German press culture. Even those individuals who believed they walked a fine line between defiance of and support for the Nazi line of the day tacitly bolstered the Nazi propaganda effort simply by working for a state-approved newspaper.⁶

³ Hale, *Captive Press*, 83 and Humphreys, *Media and Media Policy*, 22.

⁴ Humphreys, *Media and Media Policy*, 23.

⁵ By 1945, the number of newspapers fell from approximately 4,000 daily and weekly publications to a pitiful 950, of which 350 (36.8%) were Nazi Party organs. Humphreys, *Media and Media Policy*, 23.

⁶ On reporters and the Nazi state, see Hale, *Captive Press*, op cit.; Norbert Frei and Johannes Schmitz, *Journalismus im Dritten Reich* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1989); and Robert Gellately, *Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), esp. vii, 47, and 53-56.

No case illustrates better the gradual corruption of the democratic German press than that of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*.⁷ Born in the shadows of 1848, the *Frankfurter Zeitung* saw itself as the “lynch-pin in the German liberal-democratic tradition.”⁸ A Jewish-owned publication, this newspaper captured Hitler’s attention in *Mein Kampf*, wherein he described it as too intellectual, “the Gorgon of the *Judenpresse*” and proof of a “Jewish world conspiracy.”⁹ Its downfall began with a series of loans to the *Frankfurter Zeitung*’s publishing house, Societäts-Verlag, which allowed Carl Bosch’s Imprimatur GmbH to assume control of the newspaper and related publications in 1934.¹⁰ Wendelin Hecht assumed operational control of the publishing house and modified its business practices.

Within a few years, Societäts-Verlag publications increased their readership within Frankfurt; none more so than the weekly *Illustrierte Blatt*, which locals knew best for printing “Nazi propaganda articles of a comparatively subtle but extremely vicious type.”¹¹ Societäts-

⁷ Modris Ecksteins, “The Frankfurter Zeitung: Mirror of Weimar Democracy,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 6:4 (1971), 3-28.

⁸ Leopold Sonneman established the *Frankfurter Zeitung* in 1856. Ecksteins, “Frankfurter Zeitung,” 4.

⁹ Ecksteins, “Frankfurter Zeitung,” 5. Hitler argued that the *Frankfurter Zeitung*’s rejection of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* were “the best proof that [the “Protocols”] are authentic.” Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 279.

¹⁰ Soon after, Bosch became the chairman of I.G. Farben and then president of the then-Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft (Kaiser Wilhelm Institute) . He bought Imprimatur from the Ullstein family in 1924. Helmut Stadler, *Siegfried Kracauer. Das journalistische Werk in der “Frankfurter Zeitung” 1921-1933* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2003), 37, n57; Günther Gillessen, *Auf verlorenem Posten. Die Frankfurter Zeitung im Dritten Reich* (Berlin: Wolf Jobst Siedler Verlag, 1986), esp. 44-60 111-198; and Belfrage, 6871st DISCC, 12th Army Group, to Commanding Officer, 6871st DISCC, attention Major Chesnutt, “Frankfurt German Newspaper,” no date [July 1945], 2, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (NACP), Record Group (RG) 260, Entry 253, Box 195. Hereafter, please note that the format for National Archives Sources will read as follows: Record Group/Entry number/Box number/folder number or name (if applicable), e.g., RG 260/253/195.

¹¹ Cedric Belfrage, 6871st DISCC to Commanding Officer, 6871 DISCC, Att. Col.

Verlag also became profitable. Within four years, Bosch's initial 7 million Reichsmark (RM) investment yielded a 12 million RM profit.¹² Tellingly, Imprimatur sold Societäts-Verlag at a considerable loss. In late 1938, Propaganda Ministry officials informed Hecht that he must sell the property, and soon thereafter the publishing house passed to the Herold Verlagsanstalt, a subsidiary of Eher Verlag for a mere 2.95 million RM. A few months later, Eher Verlag's head, Max Amann, gave the *Frankfurter Zeitung* to Hitler as a birthday present.¹³

Despite changes in ownership, many *Frankfurter Zeitung* editors and journalists believed they published relatively neutral material that aligned with the paper's democratic traditions. This belief developed into a myth that "the FZ followed the Party line less zealously than other papers."¹⁴ There is some modest support for this claim. When interrogated by the U.S. Army, some German POWs claimed they found informed and politically neutral news "between the

Chesnutt, "Subject: Kurt Simon," August 11, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175. Sales of the *Illustrierte Blatt* increased from approximately 10,000 copies per issue to more than two million copies by the end of the 1930s. Belfrage, "Frankfurt German Newspaper," no date [July 1945], 2-3, NACP RG 260/253/195.

¹² Total assets were approximately 80 million RM. Belfrage, "Frankfurt German Newspaper," no date [July 1945], 2-3, NACP RG 260/253/195.

¹³ 'Eher Verlag commonly used front organizations to purchase independent newspapers, including the Vera Verlagsanstalt GmbH to obtain financial control of the *General Anzeiger* in 1936. Belfrage, "Frankfurt German Newspaper," no date [July 1945], 4, NACP RG 260/253/195. There is some dispute when *Societäts-Verlag* passed into Nazi hands. Wilhelm Hollbach claimed the transfer occurred in 1934. Max Amann, the head of Eher Verlag, stated that it happened no later than 1936. However, Rebecca Boehling states that the transfer occurred in 1938. Other sources suggest that Hecht sold the paper in April 1939. See Belfrage, "Frankfurt German Newspaper," no date [July 1945], 2, NACP RG 260/253/195; Rebecca Boehling, *A Question of Priorities: Democratic Reforms and Economic Recovery in Postwar Germany* (New York: Berghahn Books, 1998), 127; Ecksteins, "The Frankfurter Zeitung," 28; Cedric Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction* (New York: Cameron and Kahn, 1954), 138; Hale, *Captive Press*, 290; and 6871st DISCC, "Subject: Kurt Simon," August 11, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

¹⁴ Belfrage, "Frankfurt German Newspaper," no date [July 1945], 2, NACP RG 260/253/195; Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 101-103, 138; and Gillessen, *Auf verlorenem Posten*, 509-512.

lines” of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*.¹⁵ What these POWs and the paper’s editors and journalists failed to understand was that “resistance” at the *Frankfurter Zeitung* was acceptable to the Propaganda Ministry because it contributed to an international campaign that hoped to minimize anti-Nazi sentiment abroad.¹⁶ The newspaper was far from independent, and not just because it relied upon DNB news bulletins and followed Propaganda Ministry guidelines. Even if the *Frankfurter Zeitung* had “the appearance of candor,” the fact that it published controlled content and had little room to maneuver made the newspaper “much more dangerous than the Nazi press” because it gave Nazi propaganda a veneer of respectability.¹⁷

Some original content in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* reflected Nazi doctrine. In one of the paper’s last issues, the editor Rudolph Kircher opined,

The original fight for our national rights has become ... the fight for our mere existence. There may be different opinions about the juridical situation and about conflicting political claims, but whoever has to face the question of life and death need no longer indulge in intellectual arguments. He must merely decide whether he wishes to live or to die.¹⁸

¹⁵ Office of War Information, Surveys Section, “Anti-Nazi Prisoners’ Views on Books for Post-War Germany,” April 6, 1945, 6, NACP RG 226/16/1419/124085. Certain American observers of the German press realized that “independent” newspapers like the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and Berlin’s *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* were part of a larger Nazi plan to create the illusion of free speech in Germany. See, for example, Dorothy Thompson, “Signals from Germany,” *Foreign Affairs* 22:2 (1944), 190.

¹⁶ Belfrage, “Frankfurt German Newspaper,” no date [July 1945], 3, NACP RG 260/253/195 and Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 141. Also see the testimony of Hans Fritzsche at the IMT as in “One-Hundred and Sixty-Sixth Day: Friday 28 June 1946,” *The Trial of Major German War Criminals: Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany 20 June to 1 July 1946* [10 of 10], vol. 17, ed. H.M. Attorney General (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1946), 304 or Gillessen, *Auf verlorenem Posten*, 111-198, 287-328 and 409-456.

¹⁷ Thompson, “Signals,” 189 (*italics in original*) and OSS, Research and Analysis Branch, “Interview by Hans Meyerhoff with Dr. Hollbach, Acting Mayor of Frankfurt a/M,” 23 April 1945, NACP RG 226/19/128/XL 9520.

¹⁸ Rudolf Kircher, *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 29 August 1943 as in Thompson, “Signals,” 192.

Kircher dismissed western liberation propaganda and railed against the British for using “the power of the Empire, the United States, and the Soviet Union” to obstruct Germany on the international stage and for forcing a “fight on an Anglo-Saxon and Bolshevik front.”¹⁹ At the same time, he praised “Lord Vansittart for continually revealing the real truth,” that is, the Allied plans for “extermination” of the German people.²⁰ U.S. wartime surveys indicated similar rhetoric, which in time led the Americans to conclude “the political difference between the FZ and other papers ... was small” by the onset of the Second World War.²¹

The end for the *Frankfurter Zeitung* came in September 1943. There are two popular explanations for its closure: Hitler shut down the *Frankfurter Zeitung* because Herbert Küsel wrote a less-than-flattering story on Nazi “hero” Dietrich Eckart, or he did so because the paper’s name offended his “sensibilities.”²² While the latter seems plausible, it is also too simple. As for the former explanation, it is true that the Gestapo arrested Küsel and incarcerated him for four days, but such retaliatory actions were not extraordinary.²³ In truth, Hitler closed the newspaper

¹⁹ Kircher, *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 29 August 1943 as in Thompson, “Signals,” 193.

²⁰ Kircher, *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 29 August 1943 as in Thompson, “Signals,” 193; Aaron Goldman, “Germans and Nazis: The Controversy over ‘Vansittartism’ in Britain during the Second World War,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 14:1 (1979), 159-161; Sir Robert Vansittart, *Black Record: Germans Past and Present* (London: H. Hamilton, 1941), esp. 12-39.

²¹ Belfrage, “Frankfurt German Newspaper,” no date [July 1945], 3, NACP RG 260/253/195.

²² Eckart participated in the Beer Hall Putsch of 9 November 1923, and died from a fatal heart attack in December 1923. For Hitler’s decision to close the newspaper because he did not like the name, see Dominic Boyer, *Spirit and System: Media, Intellectuals, and the Dialectic in Modern German Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 113, which references Hale, *Captive Press*, 289.

²³ At about the same time, Walther Dirks wrote a critical piece on the *Reichsmusikkammer* (the Reich Music Chamber). For this, the Reich Press Chamber removed his name from their list of acceptable journalists. In another case, Franz Taucher, a journalist in the cultural department of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, wrote a story that praised socialist youth. For his punishment, the Propaganda Ministry transferred Taucher and five colleagues to the

because it brought no “real benefit” to the National Socialist cause.²⁴ As the Second World War entered its fourth year, the *Frankfurter Zeitung* had outlived its usefulness as an international propaganda tool.²⁵

Reporters, editors, and publishers of other hitherto independent newspapers who remained active during the Nazi era had compromised themselves to one extent or another. It seems reasonable, therefore, to question whether the German press changed during the postwar era. Part of the answer lies in the structural and conceptual impositions of U.S. and Soviet media cultures, both of which provided German press professionals an opportunity to work within a structure that disallowed the use of Nazi-era tropes in their work and which required content that accorded with the limitations of a postwar world increasingly dominated by the liberal democratic and socialistic political cultures. The other part of the answer lies in the intentions of those Germans who played an active role in the media of the immediate postwar period. Many, but certainly not all, sought to reform the press to fit a new mould.

Were the press norms of the Allies something new in Germany? The answer is not altogether clear. Postwar German press culture did not follow a would-be *Stunde Null*, and media in both the East and West German states exhibited elements analogous to the press forms of old. What then is the lesson of the postwar German press? Is it the history of free West

Völkischer Beobachter. Gillessen, *Auf verlorenem Posten*, 468-472 and 495 and Bremen Interrogation Center, Enclave Military District, “Final Interrogation Report: Arps, Ludwig,” 4 August 1945, 4, NACP RG 226/16/1641/141731.

²⁴ Joseph Goebbels, *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels. Teil II, Band 8: Aufzeichnungen April – Juni 1943*, edited by Elke Fröhlich (Munich: K.G. Saur, 1987/1993), entry for 10 May 1943, 261-262.

²⁵ Belfrage, “Frankfurt German Newspaper,” no date [July 1945], 3, NACP RG 260/253/195; Boehling, *A Question of Priorities*, 127; and Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 140-141.

German newspapers and the controlled, Marxist-Leninist press culture of the GDR? For that matter, was the early postwar press simply an exercise in cultural-political imposition by the United States and the Soviet Union? As this study will show, assessing the early postwar press allows for consideration of the interactions of multiple motivations, impositions, and innovations on both sides of the *Zonengrenze*. The history of postwar German press development has the particular distinction of mirroring the struggle for political identity in the wake of Nazism, while at the same time serving as the discursive site for the ideological battles that led to the cold war. Therefore, this work will indicate the ways by which the birth of Germans' postwar press cultures emerged through the imposed, unique, and slightly dynamic postwar visions of the Soviet and American occupiers, the experiences and expectations of non-Nazi and anti-Nazi press professionals, and the desire of these three groups – German, Soviet, and American – to construct a medium appropriate to the political realities that emerged after 1945.

This study assumes that both German states rested on claims of popular support, sufficient participation by citizens in postwar political life, and a shared desire to orient Germans away from the political, cultural, and social conditions that allowed for the rise of Nazism. The differences between the press cultures of East and West Germany are obvious, but their incompatibility was not so great as to make comparison irrelevant.²⁶ East and West German press cultures developed parallel to and in reaction to one another, and so this study allows for consideration of some of the “surprising parallels, multiple interactions, and mutual projections” in the development of both German states, and informs understanding of the social-cultural nature of postwar division and the postwar “informal competition for people’s hearts and

²⁶ On the GDR as a “participatory dictatorship,” see Mary Fulbrook, *The People’s State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).

minds.”²⁷ It avoids the pitfalls of many broad and comparative studies, which often lose focus on individual and specific developments through too much “enthusiasm” for comparison, and adds to the relative dearth of comparative studies on German political, cultural, and social developments after the Second World War.²⁸

As shown by several edited collections and narrow studies on topics as diverse as postwar antisemitism to gendered debates on housework and family relations, it is possible and worthwhile to conduct comparative research on postwar German developments.²⁹ Significant examples include Jeffrey Herf’s well-known study on Germans’ “divided memory” of the Nazi past. Herf’s analysis of each Germany’s “multiple restorations,” that is, the “continuities that link German political traditions of the Weimar era and the anti-Nazi emigration to the period after 1945,” demonstrates clearly that the nature of postwar political reform was such that the crimes of the past “did not fit into any optimistic theory of history or postwar policy of

²⁷ Konrad H. Jarausch, “Beyond Uniformity: The Challenge of Historicizing the GDR,” in idem (ed.), *Dictatorship as Experience: Towards a Socio-Cultural History of the GDR* (New York: Berghahn, 1999, 2004), 10-11.

²⁸ Ronald J. Granieri, *The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949-1966* (New York: Berghahn, 2003), x.

²⁹ See, for example, Christoph Kleßmann, Hans Misselwitz, and Günter Wichert (eds.), *Deutsche Vergangenheiten: eine gemeinsame Herausforderung. Der schwierige Umgang mit der doppelten Nachkriegsgeschichte* (Berlin: Links Verlag, 1999); Arnd Bauerkämper, Martin Sabrow, and Bernd Stöver (eds.), *Doppelte Zeitgeschichte. Deutsch-deutsche Beziehungen, 1945-1990* (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 1998); Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb, *Anti-Semitism in Germany: The Post-Nazi Epoch since 1945* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1997); or Carola Sachse, *Der Hausarbeitstag: Gerechtigkeit und Gleichberechtigung in Ost und West, 1939-1994* (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2002); Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanies* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997); Uta G. Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); and Konrad H. Jarausch, *After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995*, trans. Brandon Hunziker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, 2006).

reconstruction.”³⁰ Herf’s analysis also moved the state of scholarship beyond long-standing contentions that early postwar Germans suppressed collective memories of Nazi crimes and the Holocaust through an innate, social-psychological “inability to mourn.”³¹

In an equally important comparative study on the appropriation of American cultural norms by East and West German youths, Uta Poiger provides a framework for understanding the ways that Germans appropriated and oftentimes rejected the foreign character of occupier culture.³² Her assessment that the ways by which each German state reacted socially and politically to American cultural forms led to the “(re)constructions of German identities in the two state” is an important contribution to scholarship, and her analysis of Germans’ cultural critiques of “Americanism” indicates the persistence of several pre-1945 trends, including the dismissal of American culture and unease with African-American culture and female sexuality.³³ As Poiger’s work makes clear, any study on popular political development in the two Germanies requires a consideration of the influences of the postwar occupiers.

For more than a decade, there has been a growing body of scholarship on the “Americanization” and, to a lesser extent, “Sovietization” of German political and popular cultures. In the case of the latter, early studies focused on Sovietization tended to argue in favor of top-down processes that imposed Soviet-style norms on GDR citizens. Recent studies place such arguments into doubt.³⁴ In the larger body of work on “Americanization,” there have been

³⁰ Herf, *Divided Memory*, 2-3, 393.

³¹ Cf. Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, *The Inability to Mourn: Principles of Collective Behavior*, trans. Beverley R. Placzek (New York: Grove, 1967, 1975).

³² Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels*, op. cit.

³³ Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels*, 1 and, e.g., 6, 16-19, 86-87, and 224.

³⁴ See, for example, Judd Stitzel, *Fashioning Socialism: Clothing, Politics and Consumer Culture in East Germany* (Oxford: Berg, 2005), esp. 8-10.

significant shifts from earlier works that forwarded theses on American exceptionalism to significantly refined pieces that interrogate the ways “America” at once imposed liberal democratic modernity in Germany, as well as elicited beneficial and reciprocal cultural-political relations between the U.S. and Germany.³⁵

Notions of imposition remain a constant in studies on postwar German media. The major issues stressed by this sub-field include the degree to which postwar German media reflected Allied wishes, their basic reception by the German people, histories of individual media organs, and the press as a mirror of political life in the two Germanies. Occupation officials wrote several of the more influential early studies of the postwar press. Perhaps as a result, these works suffer from occasional factual errors, lack of access to additional archival material, and an insufficient historical perspective.³⁶ Recent studies correct some of these problems. Peter

³⁵ See, for example, Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels*, op cit.; Michael Ermarth (ed.), *America and the Shaping of German Society, 1945-1955* (Oxford: Berg, 1993); Kaspar Maase, *Bravo Amerika: Erkundungen zur Jugendkultur der Bundesrepublik in den fünfziger Jahren* (Hamburg: Junius Verlag, 1992); Frank Trommler and Elliot Shore (eds.) *The German-American Encounter: Conflict and Cooperation between the Two Cultures, 1800-2000* (New York: Berghahn, 2001); Junker (ed.), *United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War. Volume I*, op cit., esp. 371-650; Wolfgang-Uwe Friedrich (Ed.), *Germany and America: Essays in Honor of Gerald R. Kleinfeld* (New York: Berghahn, 2001), esp. 12-22 and 76-228; or Alexander Stephan (ed.), *Americanization and Anti-Americanism: The German Encounter with American Culture after 1945* (New York: Berghahn, 2005); Jürgen Habermas, “Letter to America,” *The Nation* (16 December 2002), 15-16; or Habermas and Jacques Derrida, “Nach dem Krieg: Die Wiedergeburt Europas,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 31 May 2003.

³⁶ Hurwitz, *Die Stunde Null der deutschen Presse*, op cit. or Peter de Mendelssohn, *Zeitungsstadt Berlin. Menschen und Mächte in der Geschichte der deutschen Presse* (Frankfurt, a.M.: Ullstein, 1959, 1982). Other important early studies include Walter A. Mahle and Rolf Richter, *Communication Policies in the Federal Republic of Germany: A Study carried out by the Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Kommunikationsforschung* (Paris: UNESCO, 1974); Günter Raue, *Im Dienste der Wahrheit: Ein Beitrag zur Pressepolitik der sowjetischen Besatzungsmacht, 1945-1949* (Leipzig: Karl-Marx-Universität, 1966); Rüdiger Liedtke, *Der verschenkte Presse: Die Geschichte der Lizenzierung von Zeitungen nach 1945* (Berlin: Verlag für Ausbildung und Studien in der Elefanten Press, 1982); and Kurt Lang, “Images of Society: Media Research in Germany,” *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 38:3 (1974): 335-351.

Humphreys' study of West German media policy, for example, adequately sets the history of the West German press into a larger process by which West Germans arrived at democracy through a review of Allied press policies, individual newspapers, and post-1949 developments in print journalism and broadcasting.³⁷ Humphreys unfortunately relies too heavily on the inadequate concept of *Stunde Null* and his broad focus makes difficult appreciation for the role played by the occupied population in shaping their press. Larry Hartenian's similarly broad study of media under American occupation does not suffer from the same problems.³⁸ In Hartenian, the reader encounters thorough and detailed descriptions of the various mechanisms of media control instituted by the U.S. Military, an analysis of German public response to the various media campaigns and policy announcements of the American occupiers, and the use of these mechanisms by the U.S. to forward pro-American messages.³⁹ Like Humphreys, Hartenian condense his analysis of press and radio development, thereby minimizing specificity, underemphasizing the role of the print press, and granting too much consideration to the recollections of some former U.S. press officials.⁴⁰

Case studies of newspapers offer nuanced assessments of the influence of the occupation-era press on the cultural, social, and political future of the two Germanies. Norbert Frei's 1986 study of U.S. licensing policies and the *Südost Kurier* more than adequately addresses American press policies, occupation-era Bavarian politics, and Germany's pre-1945 ideological and

³⁷ Humphreys, *Media and Media Policy*, 65-66 and 295.

³⁸ Larry Hartenian, *Controlling Information in U.S. Occupied Germany, 1945-1949: Media Manipulation and Propaganda* (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2003).

³⁹ Hartenian, *Controlling Information*, 270-271.

⁴⁰ For example, Hartenian relies on the memories of Hans Habe, the founding editor of *Die Neue Zeitung*, which influences his analysis that the U.S. intended to start an anti-Soviet campaign as early as March 1946. Hartenian, *Controlling Information*, 130-132.

institutional structures on the development of one newspaper.⁴¹ Frei places considerable agency in the hands of non-Nazi and anti-Nazi Germans, thus avoiding claims that AMZON information control policies and bureaucracies allowed the U.S. to establish a means for long-term manipulation of press content and critique.⁴² Finally, his claim that U.S. press programs were among the most successful reeducation initiatives of the postwar era is certainly an attractive proposition, but one cannot demonstrate this convincingly without comparison.⁴³

Jessica Gienow-Hecht's study of *Die Neue Zeitung* is one of the most insightful works on the postwar AMZON press.⁴⁴ Building on a combination of archival records, memoirs, and interviews, she argues that the success of American cultural diplomacy in bringing about a liberal-democratic political culture is less a result of American intentions and more the product of efforts undertaken by this newspaper's German émigré staff. *Neue Zeitung*'s German émigré editors and reporters attempted to impart *Kultur* throughout their paper, consequently transmitting "democratic" ideals to readers.⁴⁵ Even so, her claim that this linkage of traditional German cultural values, Americana, and democratic messages ultimately influenced the rest of the American-licensed press remains unproven.⁴⁶

⁴¹ Frei, *Amerikanische Lizenzpolitik*, op. cit.

⁴² Frei, *Amerikanische Lizenzpolitik*, 17-18 and Hartenian, *Controlling Information*, 8.

⁴³ He admits that his study is more interested in the German point of view, and is limited to records available at the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in the early 1980s. Frei, *Amerikanische Lizenzpolitik*, 20.

⁴⁴ Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, op cit.

⁴⁵ Gienow-Hecht, 5, 12-29, and 60-68.

⁴⁶ Gienow-Hecht, 169-172.

Despite the recent growth of studies focused on GDR media, the state of scholarship on early East German newspapers is thin.⁴⁷ Moreover, understanding public responses to the press in the Soviet zone is difficult, largely because the SED cared little about such things in the years before the establishment of the *Institut für Meinungsforschung*.⁴⁸ Of the few excellent studies on the development of the GDR press, the majority focus on control and censorship.⁴⁹ These works heighten scholarly understanding of the fact that, like other forms of expression, newspapers remained under the control of the state through surveillance, hiring practices, and the selective

⁴⁷ Better recent works include Gunter Holzweißig, *Zensur ohne Zensor. Die SED- Informationsdiktatur* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1997); Daniela Berghahn, *Hollywood Behind the Wall: The Cinema of East Germany* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); or Corey Ross and Karl Christian Fuhrer (eds.), *Mass Media, Culture and Society in Twentieth-Century Germany* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). There have also been several works on late-GDR newspaper culture, including Michael Meyen, *Denver Clan und Neues Deutschland: Mediennutzung in der DDR* (Berlin: Christoph Links, 2003), which focuses on East German opinions of the GDR's media in the 1980s, or Beate C. Giliar, *The Rhetoric of (Re)Unification: Constructing Identity through East and West German Newspapers* (New York: Peter Lang, 1996), which compares rhetoric published in several East and West German papers in the period immediately surrounding reunification. Other exceptions include works that look at the content of East German newspapers, like *Neues Deutschland*, to understand political life in the GDR. See, for example, Jochen Meiners, *Die doppelte Deutschlandpolitik. Zur nationalen Politik der SED im Spiegel ihres Zentralorgans "Neues Deutschland" 1946 bis 1952* (Frankfurt, a.M.: Peter Lang, 1987).

⁴⁸ The *Institut für Meinungsforschung beim ZK der SED* (The Central Committee of the SED's Institute for Opinion Research) did not exist until late-1964/early-1965. See Patrick Major, "Introduction," in Patrick Major and Jonathan Osmond (eds.), *The Workers' and Peasants' State: Communism and Society in East Germany under Ulbricht, 1945-1971* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 1-19, 7.

⁴⁹ Holzweißig, op cit.; Simone Barck, Christoph Classen, and Thomas Heimann, "The Fettered Media: Controlling Public Debate," in Konrad Jarausch (ed.), *Dictatorship as Experience*, 213-240; Dominic Boyer, "Censorship as a Vocation: The Institutions, Practices, and Cultural Logic of Media Control in the German Democratic Republic," in *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45 (2003): 511-545; and idem, *Spirit and System: Media, Intellectuals, and the Dialectic in Modern German Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 127-159.

dissemination of information.⁵⁰ In an important study on censorship and the East German press, Peter Strunk clarifies the often-opaque world of censors and sheds light on the personalities, motivations, and events that shaped the occupation press under Soviet rule.⁵¹ His goal was to construct an overall sketch of press and censorship development, and it is here that he succeeded. Again, however, there are areas in which his work falls short due to its ambitious attempt to cover a great number of newspapers under Soviet licensure.

In slight contrast, Kristen Benning's study of the SED Party organ, *Neues Deutschland*, provides an extraordinarily detailed analysis of the expectations SED functionaries had for their press.⁵² Benning begins his study by referencing the fact that many in the party leadership were aware of the flaws of historical communist newspapers, such as the Weimar-era *Rote Fahne*, that is, the fact that they were unreadable to any but the most faithful of Party members. He argues that the SED struggled to find a happy medium between a party newspaper and a popular tabloid (an *Allgemeine*-, or more typically, a *Generalanzeiger*).⁵³ With considerable clarity, Benning notes that the SED saw their idealized and popularized political newspaper as consistent with an idealistic Marxist-Leninist vision of a press that engaged the "better" political sensibilities of the people. Unfortunately, he relies too much on the belief that Lex Ende, then the paper's editor-in-

⁵⁰ Barck, et al., 214. For SED control over press information, see Michael Minholz and Uwe Stirnberg, *Der Allgemeine Deutsche Nachrichtendienst (ADN): Gute Nachrichten für die SED* (Munich: K.G. Saur, 1995).

⁵¹ Peter Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren. Medienkontrolle und Propaganda untersowjetischer Besatzungsherrschaft in Deutschland* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1997).

⁵² Kristen Benning, *Die Geschichte des SED-Zentralorgans "Neues Deutschland" von 1946 bis 1949: die Waffenlieferanten 'im Kampfe gegen die Reaktion und ihre Verwirrungsmanöver'* (Münster: Lit Verlag, 1997).

⁵³ Benning, *Geschichte des SED-Zentralorgans*, 6.

chief, drove newspaper policy independent of the SED elite, including the newspaper's putative underwriters Wilhelm Pieck, Otto Grotewohl, and Walter Ulbricht.

Political Participation and the Press

This dissertation emphasizes the participation of Germans in the reconstruction of their media by considering both those who were active in the postwar press and those who read and interacted with it. On the one hand, this dissertation argues that popular German participation was an inherently political act, one that eventually led to the creation of a shared political life that came not just from above, but also through interaction with the printed word. The widespread political apathy that characterized the years immediately after 1945 made this challenging, as did the fact that the occupying powers restricted German participation in political life. Consequently, this study assumes that political participation includes forms of engagement with events as presented by the media in structured and unstructured ways. It was quite common, for example, for occupational authorities in the U.S. zone to receive detailed letters in opposition to or in support of specific policy announcements. Even greater numbers wrote general letters to the editors of various publications, a remarkable development that broke with the traditions of the past.⁵⁴

On the other hand, this dissertation shows the ways by which East German media was at once antagonistic and inaccessible for the mass of non-communist Germans in the Soviet zone of occupation. A review of the Soviet zone press and its practices shows that those communists who worked with the Soviets were bound to a narrow, atavistic worldview that promoted a “politics of hate” and the benefits of alignment with the Soviet Union, and therefore sought to

⁵⁴ Jessica Christiane-Elisabeth Gienow, “Cultural Transmission and the U.S. Occupation in Germany: The *Neue Zeitung*, 1945-1955.” PhD dissertation, University of Virginia, (1995), 162.

antagonize the western Allies and obtain control over the German population from the outset of the occupation.⁵⁵ This stance had a number of effects, not the least of which led to the intensification of the “war of words” between media outlets on both sides of the zonal divide after late 1946. Moreover, it contributed to the corruption of historical memory and superficial reckoning with the past that became characteristic of the East German state.

On both sides of the zonal divide, work with and in reaction to the press played an important role in the development of political consciousness at the individual and societal levels. When an individual chose to work for a newspaper, whether as a journalist, editor, publisher, secretary, or printer, she or he engaged with postwar realities at a level deeper than that of disengaged citizens. Interactions of this sort played a significant role in the development of FRG and GDR press culture, and also informed and reflected the political developments that followed May 1945. Most of these press professionals received their journalistic educations during the imperial era or the Weimar Republic. Others, though, were too young and seemingly entered the profession because it offered opportunities to earn a living, make sense of the postwar world, or participate in the reconstruction of the German state, society, and culture. In the SBZ/GDR, there were also those compelled to participate through schemes like the “People’s Correspondents Movement” (*Volkskorrespondentenbewegung*), which hoped to ensure a high level of interconnectedness (*Massenverbundenheit*) between the party and the people while it trained future journalists to write in accordance with the expectations of the party-state.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ On the politics of hate, see Richard Bessel, “Hatred after War: Emotion and the Postwar History of East Germany,” *History and Memory* 17:1/2 (2005), 195-216.

⁵⁶ For more on *Massenverbundenheit* and *Volkskorrespondenten* see Ellen Bos, “Das Prinzip ‘Massenverbundenheit’ der Presse in der DDR. Rekonstruktionsversuch der Entwicklungen von 1949 bis 1985,” in Rolf Geserick and Arnulf Kutsch (eds.), *Publizistik und Journalismus in der DDR. Acht Beiträge zum Gedenken an Elisabeth Löckenhoff* (Munich: K.G. Saur, 1988): 151-172, esp. 156-159; Ellen Bos, *Leserbriefe in Tageszeitungen der DDR. Zur*

Many political and cultural leaders of the two Germanies not only voiced their visions for their state's political future through newspapers, but also found entry into postwar life by establishing and participating in postwar press operations. Successful examples include the future first *Bundespräsident* Theodor Heuss, who was one of three founding publishers for Heidelberg's *Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung* in 1945, and Paul Wandel, who had been editor-in-chief of the KPD's *Deutsche Volkszeitung* before becoming president of the SED's Central Administration for Public Education (*Zentralverwaltung für Volksbildung*) and then the GDR's Minister for Public Education (*Minister für Volksbildung der DDR*). Rudolf Herrnstadt, who played a significant role in shaping the content and form of the SBZ/GDR press, eventually became subject to dismissal from a prominent position in the SED after the June 1953 uprising. There were even unusual cases, such as that of Stefan Heym, who had worked in the U.S. Psychological Warfare Division and was a founding member of *Die Neue Zeitung* before he moved to the GDR where he became a celebrated, if notorious critic of the East German state.

Chronicling and Assessing the Occupation Press

Following Eric Hobsbawm, scholars must not mistake “editorials in select newspapers with public opinion.”⁵⁷ This is particularly wise advice when one considers the controlled nature of media during the occupation era. As much as possible, this study relies heavily on public opinion data as well as a great many memoirs and reports in the press. To avoid mistaking official histories of the press for the actual historical development of media life in the postwar

“*Massenverbundenheit*” der Presse 1949-1989 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1993); and Dominic Boyer, *Spirit and System: Media, Intellectuals, and the Dialectic in Modern German Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 123-127.

⁵⁷ Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, 11.

Germanies requires the utilization of a great number of bureaucratic and governmental correspondence. In the East German case, the records of the *Zentrale Druckerei- und Einkaufsgesellschaft m.b.H.* (Zentrag), and substantial collections of individual SED party records, which one can find at the Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO-BArch), have proven invaluable to my analysis of the eastern press. While approved memoirs in the GDR are far from perfect sources, they do allow some insight into the historical development of the press in the SBZ as well as the perspectives of the individual authors. In the case of the western press, records maintained by the American occupying powers and the post-1949 civilian Office of the High Commissioner contain astoundingly detailed records of not just the press of the American zone, but also of the press in the Soviet zone of occupation. Additional sources include internal SED Party publications, published memoirs and document collections, a rare collection of “letters to the editor” of the *Neue Zeitung*, and interviews with former press officers from the American zone of occupation, amongst other relevant materials.⁵⁸

This dissertation consists of two sections. The first encompasses chapters one through seven, and outline the origins of the postwar German press and this study’s four principal newspapers. Following brief discussions on the role of media in political and civil society from the American and Soviet perspectives, chapter one centers its analysis on the official means of press control in the early US and Soviet occupation of Germany and introduces the labyrinthine bureaucracies and shifting press policies of the two occupying powers in the dynamic first year

⁵⁸ Access to internal records of the two surviving newspapers, *Neues Deutschland* and the *Frankfurter Rundschau* would likely open further avenues to research. Unfortunately, access to such records remains at the discretion of each newspaper’s owners and was unavailable for the dissertation portion of my study. The same scenario holds largely true in the case of Soviet occupation records as held at the Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF or State Archive of the Russian Federation).

and a half of the occupation. Chapters two and three outline the development of press policies in each zone and the development of the "experimental press," that is, the short-lived but influential newspapers of the late-war and the early occupation newspapers that remained throughout the period of direct military occupation.⁵⁹ The occupation-controlled zonal press is the subject of chapters four and five. Specifically, chapter four assesses the Soviet *Tägliche Rundschau*, while chapter five considers its American analog, *Die Neue Zeitung*. Chapter six turns to the licensed, theoretically apolitical German-owned press in the American zone. Its subject is the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, a newspaper that continue to exist in present-day Germany, but which had the dubious distinction of being both the first licensed newspaper in American-occupied Germany and, in the eyes of the occupiers, a reputation as the most troublesome. Finally, section one concludes in chapter seven with a study of the origins of the SED's *Neues Deutschland*.

The second section of this dissertation takes as its subject the press' treatment and response to important events. Each chapter overlaps chronologically and covers the major developments in the occupation of Germany between 1946 and 1949. It begins in chapter eight with a discussion of east and west press treatments on the immediate history of the Holocaust, the question of German guilt for the crimes of the Second World War, and the legacies of the Nazi past before, during, and after the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. In doing so, it provides an overview not just of the ways by which the occupied press covered these topics, but it also provides new insight into the important question of the roles played by anti-communism and anti-fascism in curtailing the development of meaningful confrontations with the past after the Second World War. Chapter nine focuses on international political

⁵⁹ Because the SED state exercised control over the newspapers of so-called "above-party" (*überparteilich*) organizations, for example, the Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund's *Der Freie Bauer*, I do not consider GDR organizational press organs in this study.

developments and the role of foreign policy in shaping the press. Beyond presenting the angry debates that characterized the Conference of Foreign Ministers meetings, the launch of the Marshall Plan, and the start of the Berlin Blockade, this chapter outlines the pressures brought to bear on the reputations of the United States and the other western powers in the press of both zones of occupation. Chapter ten switches its focus by taking into consideration the ways by which the spread of communism influenced the almost continual reorganization of media in the American and Soviet zones, and how the redeployment of the press to meet the demands of the cold war informed the press cultures of the nascent East and West German states. Finally, the concluding chapter assesses the first years of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. It considers the roles played by newspapers in the early domestic life of the two Germanies and argues that the trends established during the military administration of Germany not only influenced press and political culture after 1949, but also continued to redefine the ways by which Germans interacted with media and their collective senses of self.

CHAPTER 2

EXPERIENCES WITH THE PRESS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AMERICAN AND SOVIET PRESS POLICIES

Early occupation-era press and cultural policies in both the American and Soviet zones of occupation in Germany were often *ad hoc* because directives from Washington and Moscow proved too lofty for on-the-ground realities.⁶⁰ This was especially true in the American zone, where informational control personnel often found themselves negotiating with their commanders on how best to control and shape the press during the occupation.⁶¹ Competing entities in U.S. information control organizations argued for the maintenance of official military government newspapers at the sake of an independent press, while others believed Germans would reject occupation programs without the development of independent media. Failure to resolve this basic debate led to a number of haphazard, but nevertheless influential, news media

⁶⁰ Henry P. Pilgert, *Press, Radio and Film in West Germany, 1945-1953* (Bonn: Historical Division, Office of the Executive Secretary, Office of the US High Commissioner for Germany, 1953), esp. 14-17 and 43-70; Harold Hurwitz, *Die Stunde Null der deutschen Presse. Die amerikanische Pressepolitik in Deutschland, 1945-1949* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1972); Norbert Frei, *Amerikanische Lizenzpolitik und deutsche Pressetradition: die Geschichte der Nachkriegszeitung Südost Kurier* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 86), esp. 22-24; Peter J. Humphreys, *Media and Media Policy in West Germany: The Press and Broadcasting since 1945* (Oxford: Berg, 1990); Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*; Hartenian, *Controlling Information in US Occupied Germany*; David Pike, *The Politics of Culture in Soviet-Occupied Germany, 1945-1949* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992); Norman Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), esp. 9-24, 318-352, and 398-405; Peter Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren. Medienkontrolle und Propagandapolitik unter sowjetischer Besatzungsherrschaft in Deutschland* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1996); and Christian Kanig, "Reeducation through Soviet Culture: Soviet Cultural Policy in Occupied Germany, 1945-1949," doctoral dissertation, Indiana University, 2010.

⁶¹ Robert Williams, "Interview with Gene Mater, former member of 7th Army Psychological Warfare Team, 6871 DISCC," February 24, 2006.

projects in the first year of the American military occupation. In the Soviet zone, there was a high degree of dislocation between the various propaganda groups attached to the three main armies. These problems resolved themselves rather quickly after the June 6, 1945 reorganization of the occupational Red Army into the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (*Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland* or SMAD), which almost immediately forwarded a series of decrees that opened press opportunities to variously approved political parties and politicized groups like the *Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund* (FDGB) and Berlin's *Magistrat*. Even so, the press of the early Soviet zone often emerged at the last minute and with little consideration of the needs of the local population.

The American Perspective on Press Control

Successive U.S. governments generally eschewed the use of formal propaganda and press control before Germany declared war on the United States in late 1941.⁶² The first shift followed President Franklin D. Roosevelt's decision to order the creation of the Office of War Information (OWI) on June 13, 1942. OWI served as an official information outlet for the U.S. government to foreign and domestic press concerns and provided an opportunity for William J. Donovan, the

⁶² Notions of press freedom are entrenched in the U.S. Constitution. The first amendment states that the US Congress cannot restrict "the freedom of speech, or of the press," amongst other social goods. U.S. Constitution, "Amendment 1: Freedom of Religion, Press, Expression," Ratified: December 15, 1791. Nowhere is preservation of a free press stated better than in Tocqueville's astute analysis that American democracy desires to present a wide variety of views and messages that provide necessary ideological and political cohesion to an otherwise atomized collective and create social and political "associations" in a healthy democratic society. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. II, trans. George Lawrence (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 577-578. Before 1942, the only official US propaganda agency was the Committee on Public Information, also known as the "Creel Committee," which President Woodrow Wilson charged with boosting domestic support for the war and creating wartime propaganda for Europeans during the First World War. See Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961* (New York: St. Martin's, 1997), 1 and James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, *Words that Won the War: The Story of the Committee on Public Information, 1917-1919* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939).

chief of the newly created Office of Strategic Services (OSS), to begin championing “psychological warfare” in U.S. government circles.⁶³ Operational control of U.S. wartime propaganda operations became the responsibility of several organizations including OSS and the U.S. Army. In addition, both the British and the Americans cooperated through joint Anglo-American psychological warfare units, notably the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) and the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD). PWB emerged under the direct order of General Dwight D. Eisenhower in November 1942 and was part of Allied Force Headquarters in the Mediterranean Theater. It engaged in “trial and error” experiments on the demoralization of enemy forces.⁶⁴ PWD was a later creation and part of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) in London.⁶⁵

Tasked with the conduct of psychological warfare operations against Germans on European soil, PWD culled members and took orders from the British Army, Ministry of

⁶³ Hixson, *Parting the Curtain*, 2-3. For a better and less sensationalistic overview of OSS activities during the Second World War, see the essays in George C. Chalou (Ed.), *The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II* (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 1992).

⁶⁴ Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.), Information Control Division [hereafter: OMGUS, ICD], “History: 8 May 1945-30 June 1946,” 12, NACP RG 260/118/454/“History.” See also, for example, Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., *US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins*, rev. ed. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002): 8-18 or Christopher Simpson, *The Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare, 1945-1960* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994): 25-26.

⁶⁵ In November 1943, Eisenhower ordered the creation of the Publicity and Psychological Warfare (P&PW) Branch, headed by Brigadier General Robert H. McClure, in London. This branch changed its name to G-6 in February 1944. SHAEF discontinued G-6 on April 13, 1944 and, in its place, created two separate divisions: the Public Relations Division, headed by Brigadier General Thomas J. Davis and PWD, under the control of McClure. Both based themselves out of SHAEF headquarters. To add to the confusion, PWB continued to operate out of the Allied Command Headquarters in the Mediterranean. In short, both the PWB and PWD operated simultaneously, and there was considerable overlap in their activities and staffs. See OMGUS, ICD, “History: 8 May 1945-30 June 1946,” 12, NACP RG 260/247/69/“History.”

Information and Political Intelligence Department, and various U.S. intelligence services and the U.S. Army.⁶⁶ It had four general tasks: to engage in psychological warfare, to improve morale and influence compliance with Allied directives in friendly occupied nations, to coordinate press activities in liberated states, and to control information media in occupied Germany.⁶⁷ Through early 1945, its operational policies followed regulations found in U.S. War Department *Field Manual 27-5*, which forbade media “disrespectful of the United States,” and the *Army/Navy Manual for Military Government*, which guided the development and maintenance of press and speech freedoms in occupied areas.⁶⁸ PWD operatives also heeded General Eisenhower’s order for the initial cessation of German-run press activities out of a concern that they might give “license to racialists, pan-Germans, Nazis, and militarists.”⁶⁹

PWD and its “Sikeboys” utilized German-language leaflets and newsheets in their operations.⁷⁰ In mid-August 1944, PWD Sergeant Stefan Heym created the first of many

⁶⁶ “An Outline of US Government Information Activities in Europe before and after V-E Day,” NACP, RG 260/118/455/ “Misc. Memos on Missions and Opns.”; OMGUS, ICD, “History: 8 May 1945-30 June 1946,” 1-32, NACP RG 260/247/69/“History.”; and Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 15-18.

⁶⁷ See, for example, Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 15-18 and OMGUS, ICD, “History: 8 May 1945-30 June 1946,” 1, NACP RG 260/247/69/“History.”

⁶⁸ United States Army and Navy, *Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs*, 22 December 1943, FM 27-5, OpNav 50E-3, I: 9:c, 13 and Franz B. Gross (Grosz), “Freedom of the Press under Military Government in Western Germany (1945-1949): The Origin and the Development of the New German Press,” Doctoral Dissertation, Harvard University (1952), 3.

⁶⁹ James P. Warburg, *Unwritten Treaty* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946), 169 and Gross, 6-7. It is interesting to note that PWD operations in Northern Italy were dramatically different than the German case, insofar as PWD allowed the continued publication of certain newspapers Allied Force Headquarters, Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB), “Press Plan for Northern Italy,” April 20, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/205.

⁷⁰ Ulrich M. Bausch, “Good-bye, Swabian Authorities! Culture and the Public in Württemberg-Baden during the Rule of the American Information Control Division,” in German Historical Institute (ed.), *Conference Papers on the Web: The American Impact on Western Europe: Americanization and Westernization in Transatlantic Perspective* (Washington, D.C.:

newssheets, the *Front Post*. Emblazoned with the logo, “The Strong Man Need Not Fear the Truth” (*Der Starke braucht die Wahrheit nicht zu fürchten*), the *Front Post* conveyed American self-assuredness through hand-picked news reports that could simultaneously inform, confuse, and demoralize enemy troops.⁷¹ PWD followed up on the *Front Post* with the smaller *Feldpost*, which they occasionally delivered via hollow artillery shells.⁷² After a while, PWD replaced the *Feldpost* with *Mitteilungsblätter*, “newsletters” designed for German civilians. The first newsletter was a meager pamphlet called *Die Neue Zeitung*, which appeared on November 27, 1944. Soon after, PWD changed *Die Neue Zeitung*’s title to the neutral, slightly obvious *Mitteilungen* (“Notices”).⁷³ These newsletters “developed naturally into newspapers” that conveyed occupation-specific messages after VE day.⁷⁴

PWD established two separate operational divisions in early 1945: the 6870th District Information Services Control Command (DISCC), which oversaw media operations in Bavaria, and the 6871st DISCC, which executed press policies in Hesse, Württemberg-Baden, and the Bremen Enclave.⁷⁵ The 6871st DISCC was the more effective of the two teams. It utilized Press

German Historical Institute, 1999), 16.

⁷¹ The line, “*Der Starke braucht die Wahrheit nicht zu fürchten*,” is from the works of Ernst Moritz Arndt. Peter Hutchinson, *Stefan Heym: The Perpetual Dissident* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 45-46.

⁷² “Interview with Hans Habe, former chief editor of the 12th Army Group Newspaper and later editor of the *Neue Zeitung*, presently editor of the *Muenchener Illustrierte*,” January 23, 1950, NACP RG 260/118/459 and Eva-Juliane Welsch, “Die hessischen Lizenzträger und ihre Zeitungen,” Doctoral Dissertation, Fakultät für Kulturwissenschaften of the University of Dortmund (2002), 20 and Hutchinson, *Stefan Heym*, 45.

⁷³ William E. Daugherty, “News Sheets as Weapons of War” in William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz (eds.) *Psychological Warfare Casebook* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1958), 556-562.

⁷⁴ “Interview with Hans Habe,” NACP RG 260/118/459.

⁷⁵ Cf. Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 22. See Earl F. Ziemke, *The US Army in*

Reconnaissance Teams to ascertain the publishing capabilities of a given region, Press Control Teams to aid in the establishment of media operations, and elements of the Publicity and Psychological Warfare (P&PW) branch to create and disseminate Allied-acceptable newspapers to the occupied population. The most important of these groups were Hans Habe's 12th Army P&PW group and the Press Control Team of James Chesnutt, Eugene Jolas, and Cedric Belfrage. While the former coordinated and published "overt" U.S. occupation newspapers, the latter established the first German-run newspaper of the occupation, the *Aachener Nachrichten*, and several other licensed German newspapers after July 1945. Their very different perspectives and experiences shed light on a central question in the early development of the postwar press: should Germans have the right to control their media? Habe's largely-émigré German team felt the occupied populations needed to undergo a lengthy, organized period of reeducation, while Chesnutt's Anglo-American group felt German press freedoms were necessary first steps for democratic revival.

U.S. policymakers had hoped to introduce a "free" German-run press in three phases. The first phase followed the guidelines established by SHAEF Law No. 191 and Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067, and enforced the prohibition of all forms of German media.⁷⁶ From

the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1975), 366; Kurt Koszyk, *Geschichte der deutschen Presse* (Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1986), 41; Norbert Frei, *Amerikanische Lizenzpolitik und deutsche Pressetradition. Die Geschichte der Nachkriegszeitung Südost-Kurier* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1986), 23-25; Twelfth Army Group, "History of 6871st District Information Services Control Command, 15 February through 15 July 1945," 1-2 ad 4, NACP RG 260/253/91; and OMGUS, ICD, "History: 8 May 1945-30 June 1946," 13, NACP RG 260/247/69/"History."

⁷⁶ Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) issued Law No. 191 in November 1944. In June 1945, SHAEF amended the law to include the prohibition of television broadcasts and the distribution of materials printed and recorded under National Socialist rule. OMGUS, ICD, "History: 8 May 1945-30 June 1946," NACP RG 260/247/69/"History." For the original version of the law, as well as its first amendment of 12 May 1945, please see *Germany, 1947-1949: The Story in Documents* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1950):

November 24, 1944, through mid-summer 1945, the Americans forced the cessation of German public expression on the premise that they were creating a blank slate from which to reconstruct an appropriate, balanced, and apolitical media. In some cases, this step was unnecessary because the capture of a city had shattered its media infrastructure days or even weeks before the Allies assumed control.⁷⁷ In towns where media continued to operate, PWD units rapidly and effectively closed down all Nazi operations based on intelligence lists of local printing presses, newspaper offices, radio transmitters, and movie theaters.⁷⁸

The second phase involved seizing supplies that would prove crucial to the launch of American-controlled newspapers, broadsheets, and pamphlets for the German population.⁷⁹

Original plans presupposed that select German personnel would control newspapers, with PWD

594. See also Hartenian, *Controlling Information*, 25-26. Scholars have devoted a great deal of ink to the inadequacies of JCS 1067, the debates surrounding American policy in occupied Germany, and the shift toward democratization in Germany. See, for example, John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968); Michael Wala, "'Ripping Holes in the Iron Curtain': The Council on Foreign Relations and Germany, 1945-1950" in *American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany, 1945-1955*, eds. Jeffrey M. Diefendorf, Axel Frohn, and Hermann-Josef Rupieper (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 1-20; John Gillingham, "From Morgenthau Plan to Schuman Plan: America and the Organization of Europe," in *American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany*, op cit., 111-134; or Carolyn Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), esp. 14-70.

⁷⁷ Such was the case of the newspaper industry in Aachen and Bad Reichenhall. In Berlin, the situation was considerably different because the Red Army had occupied the city for more than two months before the other Allies had an opportunity to enter the city. See, for example, Norbert Frei, *Amerikanische Lizenzpolitik*, 29-30 or Peter de Mendelssohn, Press Sub-Section to Lt. Col. F.N. Leonard, "Recommendation for Press Operations in the US Sector, Berlin," July 17, 1945, 1-2, NACP RG 260/253/201.

⁷⁸ "History of 6871st DISCC," 5, NACP RG 260/253/191.

⁷⁹ OMGUS, ICD, "History: 8 May 1945-30 June 1946," 2-3, NACP RG 260/247/69/"History."

Press Control Units exercising pre-publication censorship.⁸⁰ Target cities included Hamburg, Munich, Frankfurt, Hannover, Cologne, Nuremberg, and fifteen other municipalities.⁸¹ At the same time, SHAEF and PWD published “overt” (so-called because they advertised their status as the property of the U.S. military) German-language newspapers, which were the responsibility of the 12th U.S. Army Group. Early overt newspapers published three forms of articles: stories on Allied policies and intentions in Germany; news and editorials designed to evoke public guilt for Nazi crimes; and general world news, which the U.S. hoped would broaden Germans’ understanding of international developments.⁸²

The third and final phase of early press policy would consist of a “gradual transition” away from Allied-controlled media and toward German-owned publications.⁸³ After May 1945, and under the influence of Law No. 191, PWD issued four directives to transition “from activities calculated to reduce the enemy’s will ... to operations designed to assist the military,

⁸⁰ SHAEF, PWD, First Draft: “Appendix A: Chapter IV, Press and Publications Control,” in “Psychological Warfare Division Cooperation with Military Government. Text of Discussions Conducted by Offices, G-5, SHAEF,” January 29, 1945, NACP, RG 260/253/214.

⁸¹ These cities were Essen, Mannheim, Kiel, Münster, Freiburg, Lubeck, Koblenz, Saarbrücken, Bremen, Kassel, Würzburg, Stuttgart, Augsburg, Düsseldorf, and Karlsruhe. SHAEF, PWD, First Draft: “Appendix A: Chapter IV, Press and Publications Control,” in “Psychological Warfare Division Cooperation with Military Government. Text of Discussions Conducted by Offices, G-5, SHAEF,” January 29, 1945, NACP, RG 260/253/214.

⁸² PWD often recycled stories for other publications in the US zone of control. See, for example, OMGUS, ICD, “History: 8 May 1945-30 June 1946,” 3, NACP, RG 260/247/69/”History”; “Ihr sollt es wissen!” *Hessische Post*, May 5, 1945, 2; “Ihr sollt es wissen!” *Braunschweiger Bote*, May 4, 1945, 2 as in NACP RG 260/253/188.

⁸³ Many in PWD felt that this transition took too long and believed there were many Germans able to participate in a renewed, democratic German press. Hartenian, *Controlling Information*, 37-45.

political, and economic operations of the occupying forces.”⁸⁴ The first appeared on May 22, 1945, and articulated the following goals:

- To maintain and deepen the mood of passive acquiescence and acceptance of orders now prevalent; and so to facilitate the completion of the occupation of Germany;
- To stimulate food production and to undertake any other special campaigns required by Military Government; and
- To take the first steps in re-education by (1) arousing a sense of collective responsibility for Germany’s crimes, and (2) providing the facts which expose the fatal consequence of Nazi and militaristic leadership and German acquiescence therein.⁸⁵

The severity of this directive led to pessimism among those PWD operatives who had hoped to allow for the rapid rebirth of a liberal-democratic German media.⁸⁶ Directive No. 1 had a very short life. Six days later, PWD concluded that it “had produced the desired shock” and issued Directive No. 2, which sought to “stimulate and reawaken among anti-Nazi writers and journalists” a sense of duty and self-confidence through the provision of facilities and modes of expression.⁸⁷ Like its predecessor, Directive No. 2 emphasized “the provision of hard, unemotional information on war guilt,” but it differentiated “between the active guilt of the criminal” and “the passive guilt of the people as a whole,” the latter of which required atonement through “hard work, national restitution, and a change of heart.”⁸⁸ This policy lasted through 28

⁸⁴ OMGUS, ICD, “History: 8 May 1945-30 June 1946,” 6-7, NACP RG 260/247/69/”History.” There was an amendment to Law No. 191 on May 12, 1945, which led to the inclusion of additional forms of media subject to closure and Allied control.

⁸⁵ OMGUS, ICD, “History: 8 May 1945-30 June 1946,” 7, NACP RG 260/247/69.

⁸⁶ Hartenian, *Controlling Information*, 35-45 or Hurwitz, *Stunde Null*, 72.

⁸⁷ PWD, “Directive No. 2 for Information Control Services,” May 28, 1945, NACP RG 260/118/459; OMGUS, ICD, “History: 8 May 1945-30 June 1946,” 7, NACP RG 260/247/69 and Hartenian, *Controlling Information*, 44-45.

⁸⁸ PWD, “Directive No. 2,” May 28, 1945, NACP RG 260/118/459.

June, when PWD promulgated Directive No. 3 to encourage the publication of “free, independent, and democratically inclined” newspapers by “acceptable non-Nazi Germans.” The broader goal of this directive sought to establish public dialogue through the provision of “basic facts and themes of Allied aims in the past war and the future peace.” It sought to act as a palliative to the “present unhealthy [German] state of mind,” which the Americans believed was prone to “bewilderment and political apathy” in the spring of 1945. Finally, and of perhaps greatest practical significance, Directive No. 3 abandoned pre-publication censorship.⁸⁹

The last directive followed the Potsdam’s Conference’s call for a free press in Germany, as long as it did not risk the security of the occupation. It took U.S. Press Control officers more than a month to determine how best to follow the Potsdam Program.⁹⁰ In the end, they focused on those sections that emphasized the basic purposes of the occupation and the need for democratic renewal.⁹¹ General Dwight D. Eisenhower clarified these goals publicly on August 6, 1945, stating, “Our aim [in Germany] is not merely a negative one. ... We shall assist you to rebuild your life on a democratic basis. ... You can redeem yourselves, both at home and in the eyes of the world, through your own efforts.”⁹² All of these points found expression in Directive No. 4, which allowed for licensed newspapers media that “did not violate military security,

⁸⁹ OMGUS, ICD, “History: 8 May 1945-30 June 1946,” 8, NACP RG 260/247/69/“History.”

⁹⁰ Directive No. 4 went into effect on 4 September 1945, whereas Potsdam concluded on 2 August 1945.

⁹¹ Specifically, sections §II.A.3.ii, II.A.3.iii, II.A.3.iv, II.A.6, and II.A.10. OMGUS, ICD, “History: 8 May 1945-30 June 1946,” 7-8, NACP RG 260/247/69/“History” and “Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, August 1, 1945,” as in United States Department of State Publication No. 9446, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1985), 56-57.

⁹² OMGUS, ICD, “History: 8 May 1945-30 June 1946,” 8, NACP RG 260/247/69 or Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, Chief, Psychological Warfare Division, “Press Release,” May 25, 1945, NACP RG 260/247/73.

constitute Nazi or militarist propaganda, incite to riot ... [or] create division between or to further disrespect for the Allied occupying powers or the United Nations.”⁹³

Unlike British, Russian, and French policies that allowed for the licensing of individuals and political parties, the Americans hoped to elicit an “above-party,” nonpartisan press, and so issued multiple licenses for the same newspaper to a group of individuals who represented a broad spectrum of political, religious, and ideological perspectives. Licensing and publication of a few newspapers began in late summer 1945. Pulp restrictions limited these newspapers to a press run of two or three issues per week. The number of publications grew over the second half of 1945, such that by November PWD had published eighteen official German-language newspapers in AMZON.⁹⁴ Overall, these newspapers enjoyed a wide audience and had a total circulation of 3.8 million copies per issue by August.⁹⁵ If one accepts PWD’s claim that four to five persons read each copy of a particular issue, then the majority of AMZON inhabitants read an official news organ during the early occupation.⁹⁶ At the least, U.S. military surveys and

⁹³ OMGUS, ICD, “History: 8 May 1945-30 June 1946,” 8, NACP RG 260/247/69.

⁹⁴ There is some confusion over the number of overt newspapers published between April and November 1945. Pilgert, for example, claims that there were only ten, while Hartenian and Matz contend that there were twelve such publications. Finally, Gienow-Hecht notes a number of thirteen newspapers. However, as indicated by an interview with Hans Habe and the research of Franz Grosz, it appears that there were 18 such publications, though PWD published only ten at any one time. Cf. Pilgert, 15; Hartenian, *Controlling Information*, 50; Elisabeth Matz, *Die Zeitungen der US-Armee für die deutsche Bevölkerung 1944-1946* (Münster: CJ Fahle, 1969), 169; Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 22; Albert Norman, *Our German Policy: Propaganda and Culture* (New York: Vantage, 1951), 31; Gross (Grosz), “Freedom of the Press,” 13-14; and Hurwitz, “Interview with Hans Habe,” 23 January 1950, 1, NACP RG 260/118/459.

⁹⁵ Pilgert, *Press, Radio and Film*, 15.

⁹⁶ SHAEF’s newsprint allocation policy presupposed that one copy satisfied the needs for five people. As Gienow-Hecht notes, this trend continued through at least March 1946. Gross, “Freedom of the Press,” 25 and Jessica Christiane Elisabeth Gienow, “Cultural Transmission and the US Occupation in Germany: The *Neue Zeitung*, 1945-1955,” doctoral dissertation, University

interview reports suggest that overt newspapers sold immediately and satisfied a basic desire for news after a considerable period of media deprivation during the last months of 1945.⁹⁷

With the decline of the overt press came the rise of German-controlled, U.S.-licensed newspapers in AMZON. By December 1945, there were 23 licensed newspapers in AMZON with a total circulation of over 300,000 copies per issue.⁹⁸ By the middle of the following year there were 35, two of which were in Frankfurt, with a total circulation of 4,177,200 copies per issue.⁹⁹ Finally, following the passage of Military Government Regulations No. 1 and 3, which in early May 1949 ended licensing restrictions, there were 59 licensed newspapers in what had been the American zone.¹⁰⁰

The U.S.-controlled *Deutsche Allgemeine Nachrichten Agentur* (DANA) was the sole source of news for the licensed press. DANA began operations on June 29, 1945 at the same Bad Nauheim site as the 12th Army Group. Its original staff included two U.S. Army lieutenants, four soldiers, and seven OWI newspapermen, monitors, or German-language specialists; all tasked with the creation of a German news file for occupation troops.¹⁰¹ Within two weeks, four

of Virginia (1995): 155-156, f4.

⁹⁷ Gross, "Freedom of the Press," 14.

⁹⁸ OMGUS, ICD, "History: 8 May 1945-30 June 1946," 22, NACP RG 260/247/69.

⁹⁹ OMGUS, ICD, "History: 8 May 1945-30 June 1946," 22-24, NACP RG 260/247/69.

¹⁰⁰ In addition, there were 53 British-licensed newspapers and 17 French-licensed newspapers, or 129 licensed publications on the eve of the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany. Newspapers from Berlin are exempt from this list because the nine West Berlin licensed newspapers, three of which were US license holders, remained bound to US licensing restrictions through 1953.

¹⁰¹ OMGUS, ICD, "The German News Service (DANA – Deutsche Allgemeine Nachrichten Agentur)," *Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS) No. 25*, January 5, 1946, 5, NACP RG 260/250/157. On the planning and operations of DANA, see J.A. Jones, SHAEF, PWD to Colonel Paley, "Plan for Establishing a News Section," April 6, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/201 or Eugene Jolas, *Man from Babel*, ed. Andreas Kramer and Rainer Rumold

of DANA's thirteen members had established themselves as correspondents in Frankfurt, Hoechst, Munich, and Wiesbaden. At the same time, DANA began to process approximately 3,000 words of content per day, most of which appeared in the English-language *News of Germany*, which provided news to occupation authorities throughout the zone.¹⁰²

By law, all licensed American zone newspapers had to pay DANA five percent of their income for the news service. Its first "customer" was the licensed *Frankfurter Rundschau*. Anticipating more licensed newspapers, DANA increased its staff in mid-August and established a "German Desk" as an adjunct to its "English Desk." The sole task of the German Desk was to rewrite the English file and send the translations to licensed publications. Within weeks, DANA established separate functional news bureaus in Munich, Wiesbaden, and Frankfurt, negotiated with the French and Soviet military governments to receive news from the other occupation zones, and began to transmit content throughout AMZON via Hellschreiber.¹⁰³ DANA also increased its staff with the hire of three German journalists as part of a journalistic training

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 228-223.

¹⁰² "The German News Service," *ICIS No. 25*, January 5, 1946, 5, NACP RG 260/250/157.

¹⁰³ A combination of a Morse receiver and an early dot-matrix printer, Hellschreibers, or Feldhellschreibers, were teleprinters used by German newspapers and radio stations after their invention by Rudolf Hell in 1929. German media outlets preferred to use a landline-based system. The German military adapted a wireless system in the early 1930s. Military applications of the Hellschreiber occurred first during the Spanish Civil War, and then the Second World War. In the early postwar era, use of the Hellschreiber was prevalent not just in the western German press, but was also the preferred means of communication for the Reuters News Agency. For more on the significance of the Hellschreiber, see UNESCO Commission on Technical Needs in Press, Radio, Film, *Report on the Commission on Technical Needs in Press, Radio, Film Following the Survey in Twelve War Devastated Countries* (Paris: United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation, 1948-1950), 74; Friedrich L. Bauer, "Appendix 5: The Tiltman Break," in B. Jack Copeland (ed.), *Colossus: The Secrets of Bletchley Park's Codebreaking Computers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 370.

program. Finally, by December 1945, it employed 131 people – 40 U.S. military or civilian personnel and 79 German employees, including 26 correspondents.¹⁰⁴

DANA experienced rapid growth, but it had a credibility problem. Through the end of 1945, German newspaper editors remained convinced that the DANA news file was merely another form of press control akin to the offerings of the Nazi-controlled *Deutsche Nachrichten-Büro* (DNB).¹⁰⁵ This influenced their willingness to use the service exclusive of other content. While indices of popular opinion through December 1945 indicated widespread demand for international news, the licensed press tended to focus much of their coverage on local news as well as cultural and literary discussions.¹⁰⁶ Publishers' opinions of DANA began to change in early 1946, thanks in part to their expectation that DANA would soon fall under German control. American dissatisfaction with the early licensed press and the "marked immaturity" of DANA's selected journalists delayed this transfer by several months, however, and it was not until June 1946 that the Military Government began procedures for the licensing of the news service to German civilians.¹⁰⁷ Following a "pre-licensing" period, Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, the director of the ICD, presented a press license to the five-member *Vorstand* of the newly named *Deutsche Nachrichten Agentur* (DENA) on October 26, 1946.¹⁰⁸ Even after the

¹⁰⁴ "The German News Service," *ICIS No. 25*, January 5, 1946, 5-7, NACP RG 260/250/157.

¹⁰⁵ It is interesting to note that PWD planners purposefully chose the acronym DANA for the occupation news service because the initials of its predecessor, the OWI's German News Service (*Deutsche Nachrichten Dienst*) used the initials DND, which was too similar to DNB. Ziemke, *The US Army in the Occupation of Germany*, 371.

¹⁰⁶ "The German News Service," *ICIS No. 25*, January 5, 1946, 7-8, NACP RG 260/250/157.

¹⁰⁷ John Stuart, Jr., Chief, Press Liaison Section, DENA and Alfred Jacobson, Press Liaison Officer, DENA, "DENA History," November 5, 1948, 1 and 3, NACP RG 260/255/224.

¹⁰⁸ The US licensed DENA as a cooperative agency similar to the Associated Press (AP)

transition, the Americans maintained a staff of eight Information Control officers at Bad Nauheim and in the bureaus to “assist” DENA in culling news stories and verifying each story’s conformity with U.S. Information Control policies.¹⁰⁹

The Information Control Division (ICD) succeeded PWD and oversaw all media and cultural program in U.S. occupied Germany. It began its work four days after the cessation of conflicts in Europe as a special staff division of the Headquarters of the European Theater of Operations, which on July 1, 1945 became the Headquarters of United States Forces in the European Theater (USFET). Following the dissolution of SHAEF on July 13, 1945, PWD dissolved into separate British and American services. The British occupation government formed its own Information Services Control Branch, and the Americans formalized two organizations – ICD, which ran operations, and the Information Control Service, which ran policy and planning operations. General McClure, the former head of PWD, became chief of both U.S. information control organizations. As before, ICD relied upon the 6870th and 6871st DISCCs to execute policy.

or the Netherlands’s *Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau* (ANP), both of which represent a multitude of different news agencies in their given country. DENA culled news from a vast number of sources, including the AP, Reuters, the United Press, the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS, or *Telegrafnoye Agentsvo Sovyetskovo Soyuz*), as well as a variety of independent US newspapers, e.g., *New York Times*, and magazines like *Life*. On the corporate level, DENA mirrored a parliamentary body. One licensee of each licensed newspaper served as a member of DENA and voted in the company’s general assembly, or governing body. The general assembly, in turn, elected a five-member *Vorstand* to serve as the executive authority of the agency. A secondary group of trustees, the nine-member *Aufsichtsrat*, exercised financial and quality control over the members of the *Vorstand*. See Stuart and Jacobson “DENA History,” November 5, 1948, 2-3, NACP RG 260/255/224.

¹⁰⁹ Stuart and Jacobson “DENA History,” November 5, 1948, 6-7, NACP RG 260/255/224; Pilgert, *Press, Radio, and Film*, 17; and Hartenian, *Controlling Information*, 157-164.

ICD activities overlapped with those of PWD through late 1945. It was not until December 11, 1945 that ICD became an official part of the Office of Military Government (U.S.) in Germany (OMGUS) with two main divisions, the Staff Group and the Operating Group.¹¹⁰ The staff group's three branches – Plans and Directives, Intelligence, and Administration and Personnel – oversaw media operations in Germany. The Operating Group had four branches, the most important of which was the Press Control branch. Its mission was to control and reconstitute the German press, disseminate public information, and create policies for the conduct of newspapers. Finally, the two DISCCs and their Berlin analog became separate ICD divisions attached to the Military Governments of the five U.S.-occupied regions in Germany, including quadripartite Berlin.¹¹¹ This organizational arrangement remained largely intact through 1949.

¹¹⁰ OMGUS became an official office on October 10, 1945. The successor organization to SHAEF, the United States Forces, European Theater (USFET), preceded OMGUS as the occupational authority in the American zone of Germany. USFET continued performing various military and occupational government duties in the American zone until the European Command (EUCOM) replaced it on 17 March 1945. Sadly, most Anglophone scholarship does not spell out these transitions in a clear manner. A notable exception is Bryan T. van Sweringen, “Variable Architectures for War and Peace: US Force Structuring and Basing in Germany, 1945-1990,” in *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945-1990. A Handbook. Volume I: 1945-1968* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 217-218. Yet, as Gienow-Hecht notes, there is some debate over the date upon which ICD joined OMGUS. Norbert Frei, for example, notes 10 December 1945, while Hansjörg Gehring carelessly uses Edward Breitenkamp's date of 15 February 1946. Yet, as indicated in Lucius Clay's memoir and as written in the official internal history of ICD, the Information Control Division “discontinued as a separate staff division of USFET [United States Forces, European Theater] and ... transferred to [OMGUS]” on 11 December 1945. See Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 22, n24; Frei, *Amerikanische Lizenzpolitik*, 24 and 25, n10; Hansjörg Gehring, *Amerikanische Literaturpolitik in Deutschland 1945-1953. Ein Aspekt des Reeducationsprogramms* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1976), 25-27; Edward Breitenkamp, *The US Information Control Division and its Effects on German Publishers and Writers, 1945-1949* (Grand Forks, N.D.: University Station, 1953), 7; Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1950), 60 (in German edition, page 70) and OMGUS, ICD, “History: 8 May 1945-30 June 1946,” 15-16, NACP RG 260/247/69/“History.”

¹¹¹ The Information Services Control Section coordinated information control activities in

Soviet Perspectives on Press Control

Unlike the Americans, the Soviets had considerable experience using newspapers and contemplating the active role of the press in shaping society. Soviet newspaper culture mirrored that in the West only insofar as both forms aspired to integrate the public into the political and social life of the state. In ways similar to the press under National Socialism, Soviet newspapers did not seek to create a diverse polity, but rather homogeneous political activism in service to the state. Unlike the Nazis, Soviet and later SED thinking on the press emphasized collective action and the redemptive potential of each citizen. More important, the Soviets relied on printed media in ways perhaps greater than did the National Socialists owing to the highly centralized nature of the Soviet party-state and their belief that newspapers were among the “sharpest weapons” in the struggle for communism.

Communist belief in the central and transformative power of the press developed in parallel to the rise of Bolshevism. As early as 1901, Lenin had argued that newspapers were necessary for the creation and maintenance of a Marxist revolutionary party due to the “frequency and regularity with which a newspaper is printed and distributed,” which in turn allowed for the repetition of important themes necessary to further a common understanding with the public.¹¹² Political newspapers written in a common language would, in principle,

Berlin after the US entered the city in July 1945. The five American military governments under OMGUS were the Military Governments for Bavaria, Württemberg-Baden, Greater Hesse, Bremen Port Command, and the Berlin District. OMGUS, ICD, “History: 8 May 1945-30 June 1946,” 15-16, NACP RG 260/247/69/“History.”

¹¹² Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, “Where to Begin” *Iskra* 4 (May 1901) as in Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Moscow, *Lenin: Collected Works*, Vol. 5/45 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), 13-24 and Zentralkomitee (ZK) der Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED), Abteilung Agitation, *Unsere Presse – die schärfste Waffe der Partei. Rededispotion für die erste Mitgliederversammlung der Grundorganisationen der SED im Monat Februar 1952* 4-5, Stiftung Archive der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO-BArch)-Bibliothek No. 3/669.

“transform diverse local movements” into a united whole and provide a forum of expression to a “politically conscious” general population.¹¹³ Lenin declared,

The role of a newspaper, however, is not limited solely to the dissemination of ideas, to political education, and to the enlistment of political allies. A newspaper is not only a *collective propagandist* and a *collective agitator*, it is also a *collective organizer*. In this last respect it may be likened to the scaffolding around a building under construction, which marks the contours of the structure and facilitates communication between the builders, enabling them to distribute the work and to view the common results achieved by their organized labor. With the aid of the newspaper, and through it, a permanent organization will naturally take shape that will engage not only in local activities, but in regular work and will train its members to follow political events carefully, appraise their significance and their effect on the various strata of the population, and develop effective means for the revolutionary party to influence these events.¹¹⁴

The model Soviet press had its start not in Moscow, but in Vienna when Ukrainian and Russian Social Democrats established *Pravda* in 1908. Four years later, the Bolsheviks released their own *Pravda* in Russia, and followed it with a swathe of other newspapers and leaflets in regions throughout the western Russian Empire.¹¹⁵ As Jeffrey Brooks has shown, the number of publications increased after the November 7, 1917 revolution but it took several more years for the Bolsheviks to realize that messages of “democracy, imperialism, dialectic, class enemy, and

¹¹³ Lenin, “Where to Begin,” 13-24.

¹¹⁴ My emphasis. Lenin, “Where to Begin,” 13-24 and ZK der SED, *Unsere Presse*, 4-5, SAPMO-BArch Bibliothek Nr. 3/669.

¹¹⁵ Lev Trotsky was the editor of Vienna’s *Pravda*. Before this, he had published a monthly periodical entitled *Pravda*, which ran from 1904 to 1906. See Brian McNair, *Glasnost, Perestroika and the Soviet Media* (London: Routledge, 1991), 30-32 and 31, n7; Bertrand M. Patenaude (Ed.), *A Wealth of Ideas: Revelations from the Hoover Institution Archives* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 54; and Christopher Read, *Lenin: A Revolutionary Life* (London: Routledge, 2005), 95-96. See also Roy Bainton, *A Brief History of 1917: Russia’s Year of Revolution* (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2005), 279; and V.I. Lenin, “Confusion: Once More about Annexation,” *Pravda* 31 May 1917 as in V.I. Lenin, *The Revolution of 1917: From the March Revolution to the July Days*, vol. 2 (New York and Whitefish, Mont.: International Publishers Co. and Kessinger Publishing, 1929 and 2005), 91-92.

socialism” failed to appeal to the general reader. Lack of success in the newspaper market failed to persuade Soviet publishers and propagandists to amend their rhetoric. Instead, they decided to retain elite, ideologically specific phrasing, thus making the press an important medium only for those able to grasp the new language of the Soviet system.¹¹⁶

Under Stalin, the press published an abundance of material on Soviet literature and culture, as well as stories and messages that created distinct social-political cults of “honor and dishonor” that served as behavioral and ideological guides for the masses.¹¹⁷ In 1923, Stalin built upon the Leninist model, noting that the press was the “Party’s sharpest and most powerful weapon” because it allowed for “contact with the masses.” In terms of real progress, he referenced the increased circulation of all newspapers within the Soviet Union.¹¹⁸ Stalin followed this with a *Pravda* article on “The Press as a Collective Organizer,” in which he claimed that the Central Committee hoped to both “speak to” and “converse with” the people, and ordered journalists and editors to mediate the “organizational connection between the Party and the working class, between the state and the most remote parts of our country [and] in improving and enlivening the press itself.”¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶ Jeffrey Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin: Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 5 and 11-13.

¹¹⁷ Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin*, 106-158.

¹¹⁸ Stalin claimed that in 1922, there were only 280 newspapers with an inflated “semi-artificial” circulation of 2.5 million copies. This increased to 528 newspapers with a “less artificial” circulation of two million copies per issue. “Organisational Report of the Central Committee of the R.C.P. (B.) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] and Joseph V. Stalin, “Reply to the Discussion on the Central Committee’s Organisational Report, April 19,” in “The Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.)” in Stalin, *Works*, vol. 5 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953), 206 and 240, respectively. See also ZK der SED, *Unsere Presse*, 4, SAPMO-BArch Bibliothek Nr. 3/669.

¹¹⁹ The ostensible purpose of this article was to refute the claims of those like Press Department official Sergei B. Ingulov, who argued that the Central Committee of the Russian

Stalinist press culture emphasized flexible, somewhat incongruous presentations – a phenomenon that became common to the press of the occupation era and in East Germany. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the shifting treatments of Nazi Germany in the Soviet press before 1941. Rhetoric against National Socialism as another enemy of the Soviet system had begun to appear in the early 1930s, although it rarely rated the front pages of *Pravda*.¹²⁰ Nevertheless, anti-Nazi news coverage fell into decline by the middle of the decade and eventually became almost absent after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in late-August 1939.¹²¹ The surprise attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 changed everything. Stalinist journalists and propaganda officials began campaigning earnestly for domestic support for the war by vilifying the Germans for starting another global conflict. The most acerbic anti-Nazi and anti-German denunciations appeared in articles written by Ilya Ehrenburg and Konstantin Simonov in the Red Army's *Krasnaya Zvezda*. While Ehrenburg and Simonov wrote scathing columns on Nazi atrocities in the Ukraine and other parts of the Soviet Union, the bulk of writings supported chauvinistic themes of a "Great Fatherland War."¹²² Constructed

Communist Party hoped only to dictate propaganda to the "workers." Stalin, "The Press as a Collective Organiser," *Pravda* May 6, 1923 as in Stalin, *Works*, vol. 5, 286-288. Emphasis in original. See also Matthew Lenoe, "NEP Newspapers and the Origins of Soviet Information Rationing," *Russian Review* 62:4 (2003), 634, n67.

¹²⁰ Karel Berkhoff, *Motherland in Danger: Soviet Propaganda during World War II* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012), 10-11.

¹²¹ Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin*, 152-158.

¹²² Ilya Ehrenburg and Konstantin Mikhailovich Simonov, *In One Newspaper: A Chronicle of Unforgettable Years* (Madison, Conn.: Sphinx Press, 1985); Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin*, 167-179; Amir Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 164-165; David Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), 150; and Catherine Merridale, *Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945* (New York: Macmillan, 2006), 188-189.

differentiations between good, healthy Soviet-Russians and bad, degenerate Germans accompanied the reassertion of "Soviet" nationalism. The phraseology of this rhetoric was eerily similar to that used by the Nazis in their defamation of the Soviet peoples, and provided little room for distinction between the Nazis and the rest of the German people. Nevertheless, some Soviet journalists attempted to shed light on the nature of Nazi crimes against Jews. Multiple articles in the pages of the Yiddish-language *Eynikat* recounted the destruction of Jewish communities across German-occupied Soviet territories, such as Ukraine. There were also occasional articles in the Russian-language Soviet press, including articles by Ehrenburg in *Krasnaya Zvezda*. Nevertheless, the Stalinist regime often suppressed discussion of atrocities related to the Holocaust in the Soviet Press.¹²³ An exception to this policy was the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, which Ehrenburg and several of his Soviet journalistic colleagues established in 1942 in an attempt to elicit international support for the Soviet Union's fight against Nazism.¹²⁴ There is little doubt that his role in this organization and the nature of his writings prompted Hitler and Goebbels to reference Ehrenburg as proof of Soviet ill intentions.¹²⁵

¹²³ Berkhoff, *Motherland in Danger*, 116-166, esp. 160-166.

¹²⁴ Co-founders included Shakne Epshtein, the editor of *Eynikeyt*, and Solomon Lozovsky, the head of the Soviet Information Bureau or Sovinformburo (*Sovetskoye informatsionnoye byuro*). On the history of the EAK see Alexander N. Yakovlev, *A Century of Violence in Soviet Russia*, trans. Anthony Austin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 202-204; Hiroaki Kuromiya, "World War II, Jews, and Post-War Soviet History," *Kritika* 3:3 (2002): 521-531; Joshua Rubenstein and Vladimir Naumov (Eds.), *Stalin's Secret Pogrom: The Postwar Inquisition of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee* (New Haven and Washington, DC: Yale University Press and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2008).

¹²⁵ Ilya Ehrenburg, *The War, 1941-1945* (Cleveland: World Publishing, 1965), 32; Maxim D. Shrayer (Ed.), *An Anthology of Russian-Jewish Literature: Two Centuries of Dual Identity in Prose and Poetry. Volume I: 1801-1953* (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 181; and Michael H. Kater, *Hitler Youth* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 241-242.

Tellingly, the Soviets reproached Ehrenburg in spring 1945 for insufficiently distinguishing between “good and bad Germans.” Soviet defamation of Ehrenburg’s character did not limit itself to Europe east of the Curzon Line. The second issue of the official Red Army German-language newspaper, the *Tägliche Rundschau*, included a translation of a April 14 *Pravda* article in which Central Committee Propaganda Chief Georgii Alexandrov criticized Ehrenburg for writing articles that suggested Soviet hostility to the German people.¹²⁶ This was but a sign of a significant shift in official Soviet attitudes towards the Germans in the latter stages of the war – a development that likely owed itself to several factors, including Stalin’s antisemitism and inability to make up his mind on how best to solve the “German question.”¹²⁷ It also reflected newfound Soviet optimism on the possibility that the German people might reform their political society under Soviet guidance; thus giving credence to Stalin’s declaration that “Hitlers come and go, but the German people, the German nation remains.”¹²⁸

Press control in Soviet-occupied Germany grew out of the activities of the Seventh Section of the Main Political Administration of the Worker-Peasant Red Army (*Glavnoe politicheskoe upravlenie raboche-krestianskoi krasnoi armii*, or GlavPURKKA), which

¹²⁶ G. Alexandrov, “Genosse Ehrenburg vereinfacht!” *TR*, 16 May 1945; Pike, *The Politics of Culture*, 12; and Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 264-265.

¹²⁷ Norman Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), esp. 9-28; Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 23-25; or Wilfred Loth, *Stalin’s Unwanted Child: The Soviet Union, the German Question, and the Founding of the GDR*, trans. Robert F. Hogg (New York: St. Martins/MacMillan, 1998).

¹²⁸ Stalin, “Order of the Day of the People’s Commissar of Defence of the USSR. No. 55,” February 23, 1942, as in Stalin, *On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1946), 48; Sergej Tjulpanow, *Deutschland nach dem Kriege (1945-1949). Erinnerungen eines Offiziers der Sowjetarmee* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1987), 20; Pike, *Politics of Culture*, 12; and Roberts, *Stalin’s Wars*, 116.

controlled the Red Army's "political education" and all propaganda programs for the German masses and military.¹²⁹ Created in 1940, GlavPURKKA's original purpose was to prepare propaganda for Soviet troops in case of a future war against an unknown aggressor.¹³⁰

Immediately after the Nazi attack, GlavPURKKA established the Seventh Section, which developed political and military propaganda for the German military. Its ranks included several German émigré communists and German-speaking Red Army officers culled from universities and media outlets across the Soviet Union. By mid-summer 1941, each Red Army front had its own "Seventh Section," which distributed the German-language *Fronte-Illustrierte* across Wehrmacht lines.¹³¹ They followed this publication with *Nachrichten* ("News") and the Arthur Pieck-led *Das freie Wort*, which went to German POWs in 1941 and 1942.¹³²

Even before the turnabout at Stalingrad, some Seventh Section operatives made use of the anti-Nazism of some captured Wehrmacht officers. These officers underwent an intensive reeducation program at a number of antifascist schools (*Antifaschulen*) throughout the Soviet Union.¹³³ The first *Antifaschule* began operations in May 1942 under the direction of philosophy professor Nikolai Janzen at Camp No. 74, Oranki.¹³⁴ After the Battle of Stalingrad,

¹²⁹ Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 16-17; Peter Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren. Medienkontrolle und Propagandapolitik unter sowjetischer Besatzungsherrschaft in Deutschland* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1996), 13; and Naimark, "The Soviets, the German Left, and the Problem of 'Sectarianism' in the Eastern Zone, 1945 to 1949," in *Between Reform and Revolution: German Socialism and Communism from 1840 to 1990*, eds. David E. Barclay and Eric D. Weitz (New York: Berghahn, 1998), 424.

¹³⁰ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 13.

¹³¹ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 14

¹³² Arthur Pieck was the son of Wilhelm Pieck. Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 14.

¹³³ Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 17; Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 15; and Smith, *War for the German Mind*, 107-115.

¹³⁴ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 15 and Smith, *War for the German Mind*, 108.

GlavPURKKA transferred the Oranki *Antifaschule* to a larger central location at Camp No. 27 (Krasnogorsk) and opened a second school at Camp No. 165 (Talica). *Antifaschule* students attended four- to six-months of coursework for a total of 900 hours of instruction, of which approximately 150 were mandatory seminars on the essential texts of Marxist orthodoxy. Instructors would buttress these lessons with discussions of *Mein Kampf*, amongst other Nazi and German works, in an attempt to prove that Hitler had always planned to attack the Soviet Union and launch another global conflict. At “graduation” *Antifaschule* students would swear an oath to fight for the “Fatherland ... until the shame and disgrace of fascist barbarism has been expunged and Hitler’s fascism exterminated.”¹³⁵

Coinciding with antifascist training, the KPD-in-exile established the *Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland* (NKFD), which among other things forwarded a series of quixotic guidelines for the occupation of Germany and engaged in Soviet-approved propaganda campaigns against German troops and civilians. NKFD propagandists followed directives established by its leadership in Moscow, that is, Erich Weinert, Anton Ackermann, Wilhelm Florin, Wilhelm Pieck, and Walter Ulbricht. These propagandists designed and carried out a great number of propaganda campaigns, perhaps the most famous one was a 1944 leaflet of a picture of *Germania* stabbing Hitler with her sword, below which was the well-worn Nazi phrase, “Germany Awake!” (*Deutschland erwache!*).¹³⁶ Other media operations played important roles as well. Personnel under the direction of Fred Oelßner worked day-and-night in the German Department at Radio Moscow preparing material for the radio program *Freies Deutschland*,

¹³⁵ Smith, *War for the German Mind*, 111-114.

¹³⁶ Eric H. Boehm, “The ‘Free Germans’ in Soviet Psychological Warfare,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 14:2 (1950), 288.

while staff under Rudolf Herrnstadt printed the newssheet *Freies Deutschland*.¹³⁷ Herrnstadt's *Freies Deutschland* focused on the futility of the German war effort, news of the war on the Eastern Front and its impact upon Germans, and the successes of the Red Army. As would become common in the early occupation era, this newspaper avoided discussions of "communism" and exaggerated acceptable German nationalistic values.¹³⁸ At least in the latter stages of the war, *Freies Deutschland* also devoted some coverage to Nazi crimes against Jews, including the fate of those sent to Majdanek and Auschwitz.¹³⁹ NKFD estimates suggest they distributed millions of copies of *Freies Deutschland* across the front, and it soon replaced *Das freie Wort* and the *Nachrichten* as the sole source of news for German POWs in Soviet camps.¹⁴⁰

The work of the "Union of German Officers" (BDO) complemented that of the NKFD.¹⁴¹ Within the BDO were the former German 6th Army Commander, General Friedrich Paulus and

¹³⁷ In 1944, Herrnstadt moved onto other projects. His replacement at *Freies Deutschland* was Lothar Bolz. Peter Grieder, *The East German Leadership, 1946-73: Conflict and Crisis* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 54 and 115; Birgit Petrick, *Freies Deutschland – die Zeitung des Nationalkomitees Freies Deutschland* (Munich: Saur Verlag, 1979), 58-59; Foitzik, *Sowjetisches Militäradministration*, 197; and Arthur Lee Smith, *The War for the Mind: Re-Educating Hitler's Soldiers* (New York: Berghahn, 1996), 12-13 and 35-36. Please note that there was a similar publication using the title *Freies Deutschland* written by the KPD-in-exile in Mexico City. See Jeffrey Herf, "East German Communists and the Jewish Question: The Case of Paul Merker," *Journal of Contemporary History* 29:4 (1994), 630; idem., *Divided Memory*, e.g., 24 and 42; and Grieder, *East German Leadership*, 26.

¹³⁸ Boehm, "The 'Free Germans'," 286-288; Petrick, *Freies Deutschland*, 268-270; Herf, *Divided Memory*, 24; and Smith, *The War for the Mind*, 12-13.

¹³⁹ Although Ehrenburg's articles, for example, occasionally mentioned the Nazi-led "mechanized murder" of Jews, Soviet propaganda policy limited his focus on specifically Jewish victims of Nazism and required that he write in a way so that the victims appeared in print as the "Soviet" people. See Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin*, e.g., 173-174 and 189-190. On *Freies Deutschland*, see Herf, *Divided Memory*, 24.

¹⁴⁰ Boehm, "The 'Free Germans'," 288 and Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 15-16.

¹⁴¹ Estimates of the NKFD's success vary. However, reports from July 1944 suggest that as many as 90% of captured German soldiers of the *Heeresgruppe Nord* agreed to join the NKFD's "Union of Free Officers." See OSS memorandum for Col. Donovan, "Russia: Anti-

one of his divisional commanders, Walter von Seydlitz, both of whom the Red Army had captured at Stalingrad. Down the chain of command were “converts” like Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel, the great-grandson of Otto von Bismarck.¹⁴² In addition to distributing and creating German-specific propaganda, BDO *Frontbevollmächtiger* often delivered prepared speeches via loudspeaker, and always concluded their oratory with the NKFD’s “25 Articles for the Termination of the War” and an appeal to their co-nationals to overthrow the Nazis.¹⁴³ BDO did not operate independently of the Seventh Sections or the Red Army. Each word it printed or annunciated received the review and approval of the Seventh Section.¹⁴⁴

Such was the state of Soviet and NKFD propaganda efforts through March 1945. As it became increasingly clear that the German people were never going to start a popular uprising against the regime, the Soviets began to push aside the KPD in exile. The heads of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Bulgarian communist Georgii Dimitrov and the former Baltic sailor Aleksander Paniushkin, convinced Soviet Foreign Minister Viacheslov Molotov and Stalin’s then-trusted advisor Georgii Malenkov to place GlavPURKKA in full control of the propaganda effort.¹⁴⁵ While Molotov

Nazi Propaganda on the Baltic Front,” no date (mid-1944), NACP RG 226/21/404/L 46818; Einsiedel, *I Joined the Russians*, op cit.;

¹⁴² Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 17; Einsiedel, *I Joined the Russians*, esp. 80-95; Earl Ray Beck, *Under the Bombs: The German Home Front, 1942-1945* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1986), 77; Peter Steinbach, “The Conservative Resistance,” *Contending with Hitler: Varieties of German Resistance in the Third Reich*, ed. David Clay Large (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 94; Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 45.

¹⁴³ OSS, “Russia: Anti-Nazi Propaganda on the Baltic Front,” no date (mid-1944), NACP RG 226/21/404/L 46818

¹⁴⁴ Michael Petrowitsch Sokolow, *Erinnerungen*, no date [post-1967], 1, in Bestand: *Erinnerungen*, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1837.

¹⁴⁵ Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 18.

and Malenkov granted KPD men auxiliary roles in the publication of newspapers and allowed certain members of the three KPD *Initiativgruppen* (“initiative groups”)¹⁴⁶ opportunities to suggest candidates for local government posts, Dimitrov and Paniushkin stuck to a position that made the KPD peripheral to Soviet occupation planning.¹⁴⁷

Under Seventh Section control, early occupation propaganda media included leaflets, broadsheets, loudspeaker addresses, speeches, and the convocation of public meetings in local communities. By the end of April, they began printing German-language newssheets.¹⁴⁸ One month later, they replaced the newssheets with four *Frontzeitungen*, Red Army Divisional newspapers. Two of these, Dresden’s *Tageszeitung* and the Mecklenburg-distributed *Deutsche Zeitung*, failed to see the end of summer 1945. The *Tägliche Rundschau*, which was the first *Frontzeitung*, became the official organ of the Soviet Occupation Government, while the Berlin Kommandantura’s *Berliner Zeitung* became the property of Berlin’s municipal government, the *Magistrat*, in June 1945.

In May and June 1945, an additional seventy propaganda officers arrived in Germany, as well as 70 KPD party members and 300 *Antifaschule* graduates. One of the most important groups that arrived in Germany at that time consisted of ten “front school” instructors, including

¹⁴⁶ The Soviets created three KPD *Initiativgruppen* – *Gruppe Ackermann*, *Gruppe Ulbricht* and *Gruppe Sobottka* – to accompany the three Red Army Fronts into Germany. Their task was to aid in locating politically reliable local leadership and act as advisors to the Red Army. They flew from Moscow variously at the end of April and beginning of May 1945 to begin their work. The Ulbricht Group accompanied the First Byelorussian Front into Berlin, while Ackermann’s Group went to Saxony with the First Ukrainian Front and Sobottka’s accompanied the Second Byelorussian Front into Silesia and then Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Though there are many descriptions of the *Initiativgruppen*, one of the more thorough is Dieter Marc Schneider, “Kommunalverwaltung und –verfassung,” *SBZ Handbuch*, op cit., 297-300.

¹⁴⁷ Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 18.

¹⁴⁸ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 37. Cf. Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 18.

the prominent *Antifaschule* director and Soviet Front propagandist Colonel Sergei Tiulpanov.¹⁴⁹

While some of these new arrivals aided the Red Army as it established local governance structures, many more assisted in the development of overt press operations – a task made difficult by two masters, the Red Army command in Germany and the International Department of the Central Committee in Moscow.¹⁵⁰

When SMAD became an official entity on June 9, 1945, Marshall Zhukov redefined the Soviet occupation authority's role in Germany: it would supervise the unconditional surrender, administer the Soviet Occupation Zone (SBZ), and execute quadripartite agreements on military, political, and economic questions in Germany.¹⁵¹ The following day, 10 June, Zhukov reorganized the First and Second Byelorussian Fronts and the First Ukrainian Front into the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany, which headquartered in Potsdam and was under the day-to-day command of General Vasily Sokolovskii. Simultaneously, Stalin assigned the former NKVD deputy commissar General Ivan Serov in charge of the civilian occupation authority, which resided in Karlshorst.

Of SMAD's many departments, most of which mirrored the twelve directorates of the Allied Control Council, the most important for the purposes of this study was that in charge of

¹⁴⁹ Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 19.

¹⁵⁰ For the periods under discussion, the International Department was under the control, first, of Dimitrov and Paniushkin, and then Andrei Zhdanov and Mikhail Suslov. Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 19-20.

¹⁵¹ Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 20-21; Befehl Nr. 1 über die Organisation der militärischen Administration zur Verwaltung der sowjetischen Okkupationszone in Deutschland, 9 June 1945; Statement by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic on Control Machinery in Germany, 5 June 1945

propaganda and censorship in the SBZ.¹⁵² In June, Zhukov appointed Arkady Sobolev to head the Political Section, which would supervise propaganda and censorship. Soon thereafter, Zhukov made Vladimir Semenov the Political Advisor, thus effectively replacing Sobolev and further complicating the question of who controlled propaganda operations in the Soviet zone. There was no central administration to monitor censorship or dictate press policies for several more months.¹⁵³ Local military commanders continued to assume responsibility for censorship and publishing operations in their immediate spheres of control and neither Sobolev nor Semenov had much in the way of direct power over SBZ media despite the fact that German-run newspaper operations had begun in mid-June 1945.¹⁵⁴ On August 18, 1945, Zhukov issued Order No. 29, which established the development of the Propaganda and Censorship Administration. Although this administration officially became part of SMAD on 5 October 1945, after the approval of the council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union, it began directing and organizing Soviet and German media almost immediately after its formation.¹⁵⁵

Many personnel in the Propaganda and Censorship Administration came from the Seventh Section and faced pressure from both SMAD authorities and the Central Committee of the CPSU.¹⁵⁶ In addition to coordinating propaganda activities and engaging in active censorship

¹⁵² There is some discrepancy in the number of departments within SMAD. Naimark, for example, notes twenty departments, which mirrored the twelve departments of the Allied Control Council. Foitzik, on the other hand, notes nineteen departments in July 1945, but twenty-four in August. Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 22-23 and Foitzik, *Sowjetisches Militäradministration*, 101.

¹⁵³ Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 20 and 22-23.

¹⁵⁴ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 27.

¹⁵⁵ Befehl des Obersten Chefs der Sowjetischen Militäradministration in Deutschland, Nr. 29, 18 August 1945; Pike, *Politics of Culture*, 94; Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 23, 322; and Foitzik, *Sowjetisches Militäradministration*, 101-102, n17.

¹⁵⁶ Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 22.

of German media, this administration shaped many Soviet policies in the SBZ, if not the direction of the future East German state, through at least early 1947.¹⁵⁷ It was also one of the largest divisions in SMAD. Officially, it had ten departments, 150 senior officers, and approximately 1,500 Soviet staff by 1946. It received additional powers through a series of SMAD orders, including 1945 Orders 19 and 90, which gave it control over the licensing of publishing houses in the SBZ, and Orders 124 and 126, which made all former press centers the legal property of SMAD.¹⁵⁸ At its head sat Colonel Sergei Tiulpanov. Tiulpanov was well educated, spoke fluent German, and was quite friendly with several of the more important KPD émigrés, including Paul Wandel, Anton Ackermann, Wilhelm Pieck, and Walter Ulbricht.¹⁵⁹ He was also apparently fond of the then-East Zone Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) leader Otto Grotewohl, whom Tiulpanov later considered the “only figure of stature within the SED leadership.”¹⁶⁰ In the minds of many SBZ-German politicians, he was simply “The Colonel,” an affable figure who wielded considerable influence. Behind closed doors, though, he shaped the ideological conditions for German political development in the SBZ perhaps more than any figure other than Stalin.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁷ Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 22, 322 and Kristen Benning, *Die Geschichte des SED-Zentralorgans “Neues Deutschland” von 1946 bis 1949. Die Waffenlieferanten “im Kampfe gegen die Reaktion und ihre Verwirrungsmanöver”* (Münster: Lit Verlag, 1997), 14.

¹⁵⁸ The departments were as follows: press, radio, censorship, information, political parties and communal institutions (*gesellschaftliche Organe*), unions, literature, music and visual arts, youth work, and contacts/connections. Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 323; Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 27-28; Benning, *Geschichte des SED-Zentralorgans*, 15-16; and Pike, *Politics of Culture*, 364-365.

¹⁵⁹ Tiulpanov attended the Leningrad Pedagogical University and spent a year in study at the University of Heidelberg. Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 322-325, 331-332 and Tjulpanow, *Deutschland nach dem Kriege*, 19 and 325.

¹⁶⁰ Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 331.

¹⁶¹ Indeed, he forced the removal of Andreas Hermes as the Christian Democratic Union

At the same time that Zhukov reorganized the Red Army into the Group of Occupational Forces in Germany, he issued Order No. 2, which allowed acceptable German political parties to operate and initiate newspaper programs.¹⁶² The next day, on June 11, 1945, the KPD became the first political party to receive SMAD's approval. They announced their reformation with the publication of an *Aufruf* ("appeal") to the German people and two days later re-published the *Aufruf* in the first issue of their *Deutsche Volkszeitung* ("German People's Newspaper"). With an initial press run of 100,000 copies per issue and a sales price of 20 pfennig per copy, the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* enjoyed the rare position of being one of the only German voices in the Soviet occupation for approximately one month.¹⁶³

The *Deutsche Volkszeitung* was the dominant political party organ in Berlin, thanks in no small part to SMAD's active support. By November 1945, its distribution more than doubled to 350,000 copies per issue, while that of its political competition remained markedly constant at 100,000 to 150,000 copies.¹⁶⁴ Censorship of the KPD newspaper was more lackadaisical than

(CDU) Party Chairman in December 1945, and his behind-the-scenes maneuverings were perhaps most responsible for the forced union of the SPD and the KPD into the Socialist Unity Party (SED). See, for example, Tjulpanow, *Deutschland nach dem Kriege*, op cit.; Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 318-352; Foitzik, *Sowjetische Militäradministration*, 200-296; Pike, *Politics of Culture*, 267-268; Dirk Spilker, *The East German Leadership and the Division of Germany: Patriotism and Propaganda, 1945-53* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 123-124 and 181; or Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 29-31. On Hermes, see for example, Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution, and Reconstruction. Volume I: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952*, trans. Louise Willmot (New York: Berghahn, 1995), 363-364.

¹⁶² Befehl Nr. 2 des Obersten Chefs der Sowjetischen Militärischen Administration, 19 June 1945, §1, 2, and 3.

¹⁶³ Peter de Mendelssohn, Press Control Officer, "Notes on the Development and Present Situation of the Berlin Press," 14 September 1945, 4-5, NACP RG 260/253/201.

¹⁶⁴ *Das Volk* and *Der Morgen* distributed 150,000 copies per issue, per day, while the CDU's *Neue Zeit* was only 100,000. In comparison, the *Tägliche Rundschau* distributed 600,000 copies. The distribution of *Das Volk* increased to 250,000 copies by early 1946, which placed it

thorough, as one might expect, given that the KPD operated under ideological guidelines similar to those of the Soviets and sought to utilize *Deutsche Volkszeitung* as a mouthpiece in the “struggle” for German social-political development.¹⁶⁵ The paper’s ideological orientation, combined with the KPD reliance on Soviet authorities, influenced the rhetoric of the newspaper to such a degree that its tone often exceeded the mandates and spirit of Soviet directives, while nevertheless benefiting from SMAD support and that of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

On June 15, 1945, the SPD received Soviet permission to reconstitute itself and resume political activities in the SBZ. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the newly conceived Liberal Democratic Party of Germany (LDPD) only began political activities on 26 June and 5 July, respectively.¹⁶⁶ Each non-communist political party navigated layers of occupation bureaucracy, beginning with their submissions of separate applications to register the party and publish a party newspaper at the office of the Berlin *Magistrat*. They then waited an indeterminate length of time for a summons to SMAD headquarters in Karlshorst, where they discussed their party programs and other aspects of their political organization. Following this, they waited for another summons to meet with the Berlin commander. After additional discussion and “interrogation,” the Berlin commander verbally informed the political party

in a distant second position to the *Deutsche Volkszeitung*’s 400,000 copies per issue. Fliess, “Berlin Newspaper Circulation,” November 17, 1945, NACP RG 466/176/6 and Benning, *Geschichte des SED-Zentralorgans*, 33.

¹⁶⁵ Benning, *Geschichte des SED-Zentralorgans*, 7 and ZK der SED, *Unsere Presse – die schärfste Waffe der Partei*, op cit., SAPMO-BArch-Biblio. No. 3/669.

¹⁶⁶ It is interesting to note that the creation of the LDPD proved so inauspicious an occasion that most of the Berlin public had no idea that the party existed for almost two weeks after its founding. The first they learned of it was through an article in the 18 July 1945 issue of the *Berliner Zeitung*. On the LDPD, see Martin McCauley, “Liberal Democrats in the Soviet Zone of Germany, 1945-47,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 12:4 (1977): 779-789, esp. 783

representatives that they had permission to reform their respective party and could publish a newspaper. They never received a written document or license from SMAD.¹⁶⁷

Given this haphazard arrangement, it took quite some time for the other three parties to launch their newspapers. The first to appear was the SPD newspaper, *Das Volk*, which launched on July 7, 1945. Its editor-in-chief was Otto Meier, a future member of the SED's *Zentralsekretariat* (ZS) and former SPD Deputy to the Prussian Diet.¹⁶⁸ The CDU's *Neue Zeit* appeared on 22 July, under the editorship of the former director of the Weimar-era *Institut für Zeitungswissenschaft* Emil Dovifat. The final party newspaper to appear was the LDPD's *Der Morgen*, which began publication on 3 August. Its publisher was LDPD Deputy Chairman Wilhelm Külz and the editor-in-chief was Wilhelm John, a former Hugenberg Concern journalist.¹⁶⁹ Unlike other party newspapers, Soviet censors interfered directly in the naming of the LDPD newspaper, changing it from *Freies Deutschland* to the considerably neutral *Der Morgen* at the last moment before publication.¹⁷⁰

With the exception of the KPD's *Deutsche Volkszeitung* and the CDU's *Neue Zeit*, the latter of which utilized the popular large format through August 5, 1945, each party publication used the small, Berliner format.¹⁷¹ Although the non-communist party press had smaller print

¹⁶⁷ First Lt. G.M. Konecky, Press Control, [Berlin], "Semi-Weekly Report #1: Conversation with the Editor of *Das Volk*," 11 July 1945, 1-2, NACP RG 260/253/206.

¹⁶⁸ Konecky, "Conversation with the Editor of *Das Volk*," July 11, 1945, 1, NACP RG 260/253/206.

¹⁶⁹ Mendelssohn, "Development and Present Situation," September 14, 1945, 3-8, NACP RG 260/253/201.

¹⁷⁰ Mendelssohn, "Development and Present Situation," September 14, 1945, 4, NACP RG 260/253/201

¹⁷¹ The *Neue Zeit* originally printed in a larger format, but SMAD demanded they change to the Berliner format on August 5, 1945. Nine days later, SMAD's official newspaper, the *Tägliche Rundschau*, switched from the Berliner format to the larger format. Then, on August

runs, they sold at the same 15-pfennig price as the *Volkszeitung* and solicited advertising.¹⁷²

Finally, each had to use SMAD-approved sources and underwent censorial review each evening before going to print.¹⁷³

Shared Experiences and Shared Intentions

Despite pretenses to the contrary, neither the Americans nor the Soviets had precise visions on how to shape the postwar German press. Each undertook slightly haphazard press programs throughout the first half of 1945, and each hoped their media would lead to the pacification of the enemy, decrease confidence in the Nazi regime, convey Allied intentions, and impart “war guilt” upon the population as preconditions for the development of appropriate postwar Germany. That said, both the Americans and the Soviets expected their controlled occupation press to do more than simply convey messages. They hoped their newspapers would provide a model for the conduct, content, and form of Germany’s future journalistic culture. Neither attained this goal, but neither did they wholly fail.

Beginning in 1945, hopes for the German press always seemed to fall short of reality in the eyes of the American occupiers. Their experiences in the launch of *Aachener Nachrichten* left many dissatisfied with the state of German media culture, and so they pursued a military-run press for several months in the early occupation and deferred licensing other German publishers

23, the KPD- and Soviet-controlled *Berliner Zeitung*

¹⁷² Mendelssohn, “Development and Present Situation,” September 14, 1945, 8, NACP RG 260/253/201. The *Deutsche Volkszeitung* increased its price in August 1945 in order to recover costs for using the more expensive large format. See *Deutsche Volkszeitung* Verlagsleitung an das ZK der KPD, “Betrifft: Verkaufs- und Abonnementspreis der DVZ,” 24 August 1945, fiche 1/5, Bestand: Walter Ulbricht, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA NY 4182/919.

¹⁷³ Mendelssohn, “Development and Present Situation,” September 14, 1945, 8, NACP RG 260/253/201 and Konecky, “Conversation with the Editor of *Das Volk*,” July 11, 1945, 2-3, NACP RG 260/253/206.

until late-July 1945. At the same time, U.S. military newspapers often revived many of the modes deemed unacceptable by the members of the PWD and its successor, the ICD.

Nevertheless, in their attempts to rein in the aspirations of their operatives, PWD and ICD also modified their expectations and relaxed their standards for the licensed German press.

The Soviets also supported German-run initiatives during their formal occupation of eastern Germany, but they denied individual licensing of German-run press operations. They remained wary of political interests seeking to reestablish themselves and their newspapers until at least late-May 1945. Therefore, early occupation Soviet press offerings generally mirrored military government newspapers in the U.S. Zone. Like overt U.S. newspapers in the American zone, official Soviet newspapers aspired to become journalistic models to the Eastern zone press. Whereas the U.S. newspapers hoped to provide a model of “objective” apolitical journalism, Red Army newspapers were instead archetypes for the subjective coverage of news and how best to make a newspaper the *schärfste Waffe* of political life in the SBZ. Although Soviet newspaper projects promoted Soviet ideology, many sold well throughout throughout the entire period of the occupation. By establishing standards for acceptable discourse, they, like their American zone analogues, played key roles in setting a path for postwar German press development.

CHAPTER 3

EARLY PRESS EXPERIMENTS

Beyond the legacies of the Weimar era and U.S. and Soviet occupation policies, postwar German press cultures had their origins in late-wartime and early-occupation press and propaganda campaigns. Many of the individuals involved in these early press programs went on to establish and guide press policy in both the Soviet and American zones of occupation. In time, the zonal press deviated from the models established by of the experimental press through the introduction of new forms and modes of discussion unique to the postwar climate. Nevertheless, these “experiments” set the foundations and motivations that drove occupation-era press culture and the ways by which readers programs and the ways by which German readers and publishers shaped their views of the postwar era.

The Aachen Experiment

When the U.S. military captured the Rhenish city of Aachen (*Aix-la-Chapelle*) in October 1944 they found little evidence of the city’s Carolingian heritage, much less its legacy as a western German industrial and rail hub.¹⁷⁴ Artillery shells had destroyed many of Aachen’s buildings and its utility services, and the population had decreased to a mere 11,139 persons. As the civilians fled, so too did many military and local governmental personnel, leaving the city a social-political vacuum wherein the only suitable local leaders were minor civil servants and a few incarcerated Weimar-era politicians.¹⁷⁵ Despite these problems and the fact that fighting to

¹⁷⁴ Aachen Cathedral’s Palatine Chapel was the site at which Holy Roman Emperors received the title, “King of the Germans.” It also houses Charlemagne’s burial vault and the Carolingian throne.

¹⁷⁵ Headquarters, Third United States Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,

the immediate east of the city continued, PWD launched the first postwar German newspaper in this most unlikely of places.¹⁷⁶

Closing Aachen's publishing and press operations proved to be relatively simple since Nazi media policies had largely decimated the region's publishing infrastructure. Following the passage of the Reichstag Fire Decree and the *Schriftleitergesetz*, Aacheners lost four of their five non-Nazi newspapers between 1933 and 1934. This allowed for the growth of the NSDAP *Westdeutsche Beobachter* throughout Gau Cologne-Aachen and increased the influence of Aachen's only "independent" newspaper, the *Aachener Anzeiger Politisches Tageblatt*.¹⁷⁷ While the former was a Nazi party organ, the latter remained operational thanks to its historical importance within Aachen and because its five-man *Kommanditgesellschaft* agreed to and followed the conditions imposed by National Socialist press legislation.¹⁷⁸

"Counter Intelligence Bulletin No. 3," October 23, 1944, 28, NACP RG 260/894/142.

¹⁷⁶ By mid-January 1945, the front was still a mere 12 km from the adjoining town of Baesweiler and 35 km from Aachen's city center. See Major Ray K. Kraft, PW Detachment, Ninth United States Army to CC, PWD et., 9th US Army, "Problems of Military Government – Baesweiler," 18 January 1945 as in Harold C. Deutsch, H & HQ Detachment, OSS, European Theater of Operations to Dr. William L. Langer for Carl Schorske and Eugene Anderson, February 20, 1945, NACP RG 226/19/92/XL 6630.

¹⁷⁷ Financed in 1926 by Robert Ley, head of the *Deutsche Arbeitsfront* (German Labor Front), the weekly *Westdeutsche Beobachter* became a daily publication in 1933 and the official governmental newspaper throughout the Gau. By confiscating the Cologne SPD's *Rheinische Zeitung*, closing several Aachen newspapers and forcing Party members into subscriptions, it had a 200,000-copy press run by 1943. JICAME, "Intelligence Report: Propaganda to Germany," August 3, 1944, NACP RG 226/19/147/XL 10757 and S/Sgt. William Wilkow, Psychological Warfare, "In Re: Newspaper for Aachen," no date (likely November 1944), NACP RG 260/1488/1144.

¹⁷⁸ In 1934, the Nazis required owners of independent newspapers to form limited liability partnerships, or *Kommanditgesellschaften*. The owners of the *Politisches Tageblatt* agreed to this condition with seemingly little protest. Sgt. Charles Haimoff, PW Combat Team, First U.S. Army, "Johann Cerfontaine, former publisher of the Aachen *Politisches Tageblatt*," December 16, 1944, NACP, RG 260/1488/1144; Cedric Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction* (New York: Cameron and Kahn, 1954), 2-3; and S/Sgt. William Wilkow, Psychological Warfare, "In

Although much of Aachen lay in ruins, the facilities of the *Politisches Tageblatt* suffered minimal damage. PWD personnel felt confident they could restore the plant to working order within a matter of days. Their confidence increased when they located considerable stores of ink, paper, and printing supplies, as well as a willing publisher in the person of Johann Cerfontaine.¹⁷⁹ Cerfontaine was the controlling owner of the *Politisches Tageblatt* and had almost five decades of newspaper publishing experience. He claimed to have opposed Nazism, received a strong personal recommendation from the publisher of a Weimar-era Catholic newspaper, and had employed a half-Jewish housekeeper during the Nazi era. Of greater significance, he had remained in Aachen and seemed willing to help the Allies.¹⁸⁰

By any rational definition, Cerfontaine was not “anti-Nazi.” Born in France, he came to Germany as a young man and established his publishing credentials at the Imperial German War Ministry during the First World War.¹⁸¹ After moving to Aachen, he became managing director of the *Politisches Tageblatt* and then purchased 15.5% of the shares of the newspaper in 1934.

Re: Newspaper for Aachen,” no date (likely November 1944), NACP RG 260/1488/1144.

¹⁷⁹ These supply caches were in the *Tageblatt* plant, the offices of the *Heinrich Kutsch Buchdruckerei*, the ruins of the *Westdeutsche Beobachter*, and in the basement of a destroyed UFA movie house. Wilkow, PWB, “INRE Newspaper in Aachen, Ct’d.,” November 7, 1944, NACP RG 260/1488/1144; Sgt., Francis Siedler, PW Combat Team Rep., Aachen, to Lt. Albert H. Salvatori, Chief of Operations, PW Combat Team, First U.S. Army, “Operations in Aachen on 16 and 17 December 1944,” no date, NACP, RG 260/1488/1144 and Cedric Belfrage to C.D. Jackson and Luther Conant, “Aachen Daily Report,” January 13, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/188.

¹⁸⁰ American authorities seemed to believe that the latter fact was proof of Cerfontaine’s inner opposition to Nazism. Wilkow, Psychological Warfare, “In Re: Newspaper for Aachen,” no date (likely November 1944), NACP RG 260/1488/1144 and Tenenbaum to Jackson, PWD/SHAEF, Headquarters, PW Combat Team, 1st US Army, “Mr. Cerfontaine, co-owner of Aachen newspaper plant,” December 15, 1944, NACP RG 260/1488/1144.

¹⁸¹ Haimoff, PW Combat Team, First US Army, “Johann Cerfontaine, former publisher of the Aachen *Politisches Tageblatt*,” December 16, 1944, NACP RG 260/1488/1144.

He joined the SA that same year.¹⁸² Then, in 1937, he joined the NSDAP. Fortunately for him such details were of little concern to the Americans in late 1944. Because Cerfontaine admitted his membership in these organizations, PWD concluded that he was a nominal Nazi who only joined out of necessity.¹⁸³ Consequently, in November 1944, he began assisting PWD in preparations for the publication of Allied leaflets and broadsheets.

To assist Cerfontaine, PWD recruited six locals.¹⁸⁴ First among them was Heinrich Hollands, a 67-year-old Social Democratic typesetter who “sat out” most of the years between 1933 and 1945. Qualified and likeable, Hollands had a grandfatherly demeanor that evoked romantic notions of a pre-Nazi “aristocracy of labor.”¹⁸⁵ Born in 1877, he became a printing apprentice after completing primary school in Rees. After training in Berlin, Hamburg, and Leipzig, he became a wartime censor at the *Dortmunder Anzeiger*. After the war, he became a typesetter and corrector for various Aachen publications and headed the German Workers Union in Aachen between 1919 and 1924. He retired in 1935 but returned to work in September 1944 to supplement his pension and to substitute for a sick friend at the *Politisches Tageblatt*.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸² Haimoff, “Johann Cerfontaine,” December 16, 1944, NACP RG 260/1488/1144; Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 2-3, 29-31; and Tenenbaum to Jackson, “Mr. Cerfontaine, co-owner of Aachen newspaper plant,” 15 December 1944, NACP RG 260/1488/1144.

¹⁸³ Wilkow to Chief of Operations, P&PW, First U.S. Army, “Salaries for persons employed at Politisches Tageblatt,” no date (likely mid- to late-December 1944), NACP RG 260/1488/1144.

¹⁸⁴ Wilkow, PWB, “INRE Newspaper in Aachen, Ct’d.,” November 7, 1944, NACP RG 260/1488/1144.

¹⁸⁵ Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 31. For more on Hollands's amicability, see also *idem*, 52-53 or Tim Aronson, *A Personal history of the Marburg Newspaper Conference* (Marburg, October 22, 1945), 7 and 11, RG 260/1488/1144.

¹⁸⁶ “File: Heinrich Hollands,” no date, no author (likely November 1944, authored by PWD personnel), RG 260/1488/1144 and Belfrage, Press Control Officer, 6871 DISCC, “Field Officers Report – Aachener Nachrichten” no date (mid-1945), NACP RG 260/253/196.

While local Germans restored the newspaper plant, PWD Staff Sergeant William Wilkow asked permission of SHAEF to establish what he hoped might become “the first free and decent German newspaper, printed in Germany and written and printed by Germans.” This one-page sheet would cover world and local news, military government regulations, and advertisements for labor.¹⁸⁷ Wilkow also suggested the newspaper would have use as a recruitment tool and as an adjunct to wartime propaganda operations, should the Allies airdrop the Aachen publication behind enemy lines.¹⁸⁸

Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, the chief of PWD, quickly approved Wilkow’s proposal. As General McClure prepared to send a military censor and Press Control Unit to Aachen, SHAEF’s Chief of Staff decided that any publication printed in an occupied area “must be and will be a Military Government project.”¹⁸⁹ For the time being, the 12th Army Group in Luxembourg continued preparations to publish and distribute their *Mitteilungen* throughout the *Landkreis*.¹⁹⁰ Although the drafting of these newssheets occurred in Luxembourg, the US

¹⁸⁷ Wilkow, “INRE Newspaper in Aachen, Ct’d.,” November 7, 1944, NACP RG 260/1488/1144.

¹⁸⁸ Wilkow, PWB, “INRE Newspaper in Aachen, Ct’d.,” November 7, 1944, NACP RG 260/1488/1144 and SHAEF, PWD to Chief of Staff, “Establishment of a German Newspaper in Aachen under Allied Control Supervision,” November 15, 1944, NACP RG 260/253/205.

¹⁸⁹ Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, Chief, PWD to Chief of Staff, SHAEF, “Establishment of a German Newspaper at Aachen under Allied Control Supervision,” November 15, 1944, NACP RG 260/1488/1145 and Wilkow, “INRE Information Sheet Aachen,” no date (November 1944), NACP RG 260/1488/1144. Underlined in original.

¹⁹⁰ Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 15-16 and Rudy G. Abrahams, Chief Printer, Headquarters, Twelfth Army Group, Publicity & Psychological Warfare to Chief of Operations, P&PW [Publicity and Psychological Warfare] Det., 12th Army Group, “Printing Reconnaissance,” December 12, 1944, NACP RG 260/1488/1144.

military co-opted Cerfontaine and his staff to provide materials, location, funding, and means of distribution.¹⁹¹

SHAEF allowed PWD to resume plans to release a local publication in mid-December. Cerfontaine's name again appeared at the top of the list of potential publishers, thanks in part to a U.S. Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) conclusion that he was not a risk to the occupation, and to his promise to finance the newspaper.¹⁹² The Americans' Pollyannaish view of Cerfontaine began to change after the arrival of a new PWD team on January 10, 1945.¹⁹³ This group, which was under the authority of James Chesnutt and included Eugene Jolas and Cedric Belfrage, conducted additional interviews of Aacheners and requested another CIC review of Cerfontaine's past. On January 13, they rejected Cerfontaine candidacy. They issued a decree that he have "no connection, no matter how remote" with any future newspaper, and requisitioned all *Tageblatt* properties, including the newspaper plant and Cerfontaine's apartment.¹⁹⁴ Within minutes of

¹⁹¹ Other German personnel included Peter Meesen (setter/printer), Wilhelm Kempen (printer/laborer), Maria Türks and Hubertine Prüm (cleaning staff), Josef Lejeune (laborer), Elisabeth Lutterbach (bookkeeper/typist), and Stefanie Mittelmeyer (writer/translator). Although PWD expected the Aachen city government to pay their salaries, Cerfontaine accepted responsibility for this task. See Wilkow, "INRE Information Sheet Aachen," no date (November 1944), NACP RG 260/1488/1144.

¹⁹² Wilkow to Chief of Operations, P&PW, First U.S. Army, "Salaries for persons employed at Politisches Tageblatt," no date (December 1944), NACP RG 260/1488/1144; Tenenbaum to Jackson, "Mr. Cerfontaine, co-owner of Aachen newspaper plant," December 15, 1944, NACP RG 260/1488/1144; and Wilkow, "Salaries for persons employed at Politisches Tageblatt," no date (likely mid- to late-December 1944), NACP RG 260/1488/1144.

¹⁹³ Belfrage, Press Control Officer, 6871 DISCC, "Field Officers Report – Aachener Nachrichten" no date [mid-1945], NACP RG 260/253/196.

¹⁹⁴ Luther [Conant], SHAEF, PWD to Jim [Chesnutt], January 27, 1945, 1-2, NACP RG 260/1488/1145; Belfrage, "Aachen Daily Diary," January 14, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/188; and Major James Chesnutt, Press Control Leader, PWD Press Control Team, P&PW Sec. 9th U.S. Army to Commanding General, 9th Army, attention P&PW Officer, "Situation Report, 'A' Operation," January 13, 1945, NACP RG 260/1488/1144.

Cerfontaine's dismissal, Hollands received an offer to become the paper's general manager.¹⁹⁵ After making a plea on Cerfontaine's behalf, he accepted the position and returned to work.¹⁹⁶

PWD screened three candidates for the paper's editor in chief. The first was Peter Mennicken, a professor at the Aachen Technische Hochschule. PWD believed he was "too intellectual and professorial."¹⁹⁷ The second was Hilde Bogner, who PWD agreed was a fine journalist and more than qualified. They rejected her because "German traditional prejudice" precluded the possibility of giving a woman the job.¹⁹⁸ Their last candidate was Otto Pesch, a partially paralyzed former Wehrmacht soldier who had contracted diphtheria while on the Eastern Front in 1942. Raised in the newspaper industry, the teenage Pesch worked at his father's SPD newspaper before 1933.¹⁹⁹ Although he lacked direct editorial experience, Pesch wrote well and identified with the political ideals of German social democracy.

¹⁹⁵ There was another candidate, but his story of anti-Nazism did not convince PWD authorities. PWD felt Hollands's "record was clean, his profession of beliefs convincing, and his experience of the business and of management more than adequate." Moreover, they decided that they were faced with a choice "between an experienced publisher who is suspect and a man whose technical knowledge may be faulty but whose political philosophy is right." They decided that "the latter is the best bet." Belfrage, "Field Officers Report – Aachener Nachrichten" no date (mid-1945), NACP RG 260/253/196; "Text of Press Release, Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Chief Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF," May 25, 1945, NACP RG 260/247/73; Chesnutt, "Situation Report," January 13, 1945; Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 30-31; Belfrage to C.D. Jackson and Luther Conant, "Aachen Daily Report," January 13, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/188; and Belfrage, "Aachen Daily Diary," January 14, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/188.

¹⁹⁶ Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 31-32 and Belfrage, "Aachen Daily Diary," January 14, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/188.

¹⁹⁷ PW Combat Team, First U.S. Army, "Case History of Otto Pesch, possible candidate for editorial position and summary of editorial setup," December 14, 1944, NACP RG 260/1488/1144.

¹⁹⁸ PW Combat Team, "Case History of Otto Pesch," December 14, 1944, NACP RG 260/1488/1144.

¹⁹⁹ After his father fell subject to political arrest in 1937, the state drafted Pesch into the Wehrmacht. Following the onset of his paralysis, he returned to Aachen and lived with relatives

With a publisher and editor in hand, PWD scavenged the town's ruins for a portable generator and secured a line to SHAEF headquarters in London to begin receiving the Allied Press Service's "German News File."²⁰⁰ They coordinated distribution with the 12th Army Group, which continued to disseminate their *Mitteilungen* in areas not covered by the *Aachener Nachrichten*'s small, 12,000 copy per issue press run.²⁰¹ Finally, they agreed on a font, which was a rather easy task given the meager supply of typesets and occupation laws that forbade the *Fraktur* fonts common to German publications before 1941.²⁰²

Hollands's German staff played a vital role in the creation of the *Aachener Nachrichten*, but PWD controlled the content and form of the newspaper. In line with mandates that the *Aachener Nachrichten* utilize western fonts, the division began to institute measures to revise German press culture. Some of these changes were temporary necessities, such as the decision to omit the names of the paper's staff out of fear of reprisals. Others were the product of caution, including a decision to disallow Hollands from writing a standard editorial in the first issue.

until the U.S. Army captured the town. PW Combat Team, "Case History of Otto Pesch," December 14, 1944, NACP RG 260/1488/1144.

²⁰⁰ Hitherto, electrical power to the plant was intermittent. They also had difficulties receiving the "German News File" due to a faulty transceiver. See Belfrage, "Aachen Daily Report," January 13, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/188 or Belfrage, "Aachen Daily Diary," January 15, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/188.

²⁰¹ Headquarters, Ninth United States Army, PW Detachment, "Distribution of the 'Mitteilungen' and the 'Nachrichten'," January 23, 1945, NACP RG 260/1488/1144. See also Belfrage, "Aachen Daily Diary," January 16, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/188.

²⁰² Belfrage, "Aachen Daily Diary," January 17, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/188. Hitler and Reichsschatzmeister Schwarz decreed that the use of *Fraktur* and Gothic typefaces was non-Aryan and Jewish in 1941, thus effectively ending their use in media and in school writing programs. The transition to cleaner, straight fonts occurred over time. By 1944/1945, many newspapers had more Grotesk typefaces than those for Antiqua or Latinate letters. For a discussion of the transition from Grotesk to Latinate, see Joseph Wulf, *Literatur und Dichtung im Dritten Reich. Eine Dokumentation* (Gütersloh: Sigbert Mohn, 1963), 330-333.

Others still emerged out of a belief that the western Allies alone should have the authority to direct the reeducative function of German media.²⁰³

On January 23, 1945, a censorial inspection approved all of the paper's articles but for a brief on the partial resumption of electrical power and a story on the dismissal of eight former Nazis from the city administration. While the Military Government removed the first piece out of concern that it would raise false hopes, the decision not to print the second story came largely from Aachen's city hall. Aachen's provisional mayor, Franz Oppenhof, felt the story would embarrass him and other officials, and so he appealed to the Military Government, which chose not to "stir things up" and suppressed the article.²⁰⁴

The *Aachener Nachrichten* reached its public five-and-a-half hours late the next evening.²⁰⁵ Distributed by the Aachen postal system and by military transports, it was "an austere four-page sheet" with stories on Allied victories on the eastern and western fronts, a proclamation by General Eisenhower, Churchill's speech on unconditional surrender, and some local news.²⁰⁶ The paper's anonymous introduction was self-congratulatory to a point, and

²⁰³ PWD supplied the paper with Reuters and Associated Press pieces from the OWI London file on the premise that such a plan would encourage "factual reporting." Belfrage, "Field Officers Report – Aachener Nachrichten" no date (mid-1945), NACP RG 260/253/196.

²⁰⁴ Oppenhof had been the director of the Nazi-controlled Veltrup armaments work in Aachen. He was not an NSDAP member but his factory manufactured parts for *Wehrmacht* infantry weapons and the V-S rocket program. His administration included at least one member of the NSDAP. Chesnutt, "Situation Report, 'A' Operation," January 23, 1945, NACP RG 260/1488/1144; Belfrage, "Aachen Daily Diary," January 23, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/188; "Faces in the Wallow," *Time*, March 26, 1945; Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*, 181-183; Arthur David Kahn, *Experiment in Occupation: Witness to the Turnabout, Anti-Nazi War to Cold War, 1944-1946* (University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004), 36 and 80; and Saul K. Padover, *Experiment in Germany: The Story of an American Intelligence Officer* (London: Phoenix House, 1946), 222.

²⁰⁵ Belfrage, "Aachen Daily Diary," January 24, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/188.

²⁰⁶ PWD used the Aachen postal system and military vehicles for distribution to outlying

praised both the Allies and the paper's German staff for freeing Aacheners from "twelve years of servitude." This piece also acknowledged that the exigencies of the ongoing war necessitated the maintenance of "certain controls," warned the reader that difficulties lay ahead, and urged everyone to cooperate with occupational authorities in order to secure a better future for the German people.²⁰⁷

The first issue sold so quickly that PWD hurriedly printed an additional 2,000 copies the following day and secured distribution to the local prison and Displaced Persons camp.²⁰⁸ Many Aacheners began submitting subscription requests, if only because it reminded them of Weimar-era publications.²⁰⁹ Yet, the *Aachener Nachrichten* did not sell out its first two issues. Inadequate advertising and competition with the 12th Army Group's *Mitteilungen* led to the sale of only 464 out of 600 copies of the first issue in Eilenberg, for example.²¹⁰ The paper also failed to sell out in Stolberg (Rheinland), where a bookkeeping oversight led to the loss of 1,000

communities. Belfrage, "Aachen Daily Diary," January 16, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/188; "History of 6871st District Information Services Control Command, February 15, 1945 through 15 July 1945," NACP RG 260/253/191; and Wilkow to Chesnutt, "Distribution," 23 February 1945, NACP RG 260/1488/1145.

²⁰⁷ "Zum Geleit," *Aachener Nachrichten*, January 24, 1945; PWD, "Draft for Press Release: Germans Publish Non-Nazi Newspaper," NACP RG 260/1488/1144; and Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 54.

²⁰⁸ PWD, "Interrogation of German Civilians," January 28, 1945, NACP RG 226/16/1320/115720; Belfrage, "Aachen Daily Diary," January 25, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/188; Wilkow to Commanding Officer, Press Control Team 1, "Distribution *Aachener Nachrichten*," January 25, 1945, NACP RG 260/1488/1145.

²⁰⁹ PWD, "Interrogation of German Civilians," January 28, 1945, NACP RG 226/16/1320/115720.

²¹⁰ The 12th Army Group distributed the *Mitteilungen* on the evening of Tuesday, January 23, 1945. E.W.A. [Ernest W. Adler] to PWD Press Control Team No. 1, P&PW, 9th Army, January 27, 1945, NACP RG 260/1488/1145.

copies.²¹¹ Second issue sales improved dramatically, largely because most of the outlying towns requested additional copies.²¹² Two weeks later, local demand was so high that Hollands began to post broadsheets of each issue on local buildings and *Litfaßsäulen* (advertising pillars) for those unable to secure a copy.²¹³

Initial reports suggested that readers generally liked the newspaper.²¹⁴ When asked, many respondents felt the inaugural issue's introduction had been "moving, coming from the heart, [and] speaking for all of them who had been waiting and waiting for this day when the first German free newspaper would be published."²¹⁵ Even Allied policy announcements conveyed "a certain feeling of stability" not found in the US Army's *Mitteilungen*.²¹⁶ The size of the newspaper was agreeable and "practical," and several respondents liked the fact that the

²¹¹ E.W.A. to PWD Press Control Team No. 1, P&PW, 9th Army, January 27, 1945, NACP RG 260/1488/1145.

²¹² Most towns requested 25-50 more copies, but Bardenberg requested an increase of 150 copies, and Kohlscheid an additional 400. Even so, Alsdorf failed to sell 500 copies because its mayor received packets for his town and for Schauffenberg. Corporal Ernest W. Adler, PWD Press Control Team No. 1 to Major J.G. Chesnutt, PWD Press Control Team No. 1, P&PW, 9th Army, "Result of weekly collection and inquiry trip," February 5, 1945, 1-2, NACP RG 260/1488/1145. On the stylistic improvements of issue No. 2, see Peter de Mendelssohn, London News Room, SHAEF, PWD to Luther Conant, Press Section, "Appraisal of *Aachener Nachrichten* No. 2," February 9, 1945, NACP RG 260/1488/1145.

²¹³ Military Government in Aachen looked unkindly upon posted broadsheets because they encouraged crowds. SHAEF, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, "G-5 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 2," 28 February 1945, NACP RG 226/16/1426/124538.

²¹⁴ Belfrage, "Aachen Daily Diary," January 25, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/188.

²¹⁵ Belfrage, "Aachen Daily Diary," January 25, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/188 and Wilkow, Psychological Warfare to Commanding Officer, PW Press Control Team 1, "Aachener Nachrichten," January 26, 1945, NACP RG 260/1488/1145.

²¹⁶ Intelligence Section, "Interrogation of German civilians," January 28, 1945, NACP RG 226/16/1320/115720

Aachener Nachrichten was a local newspaper.²¹⁷ Tellingly, no respondent mentioned the word “propaganda.”²¹⁸

These reports gave SHAEF headquarters a false sense of confidence in the *Aachener Nachrichten*’s readability and lack of “propaganda smell.”²¹⁹ Others did not feel the same way. Some British PWD operatives objected to its insufficient grammar, dull appearance, and less-than-inspired presentation of news.²²⁰ They also believed it contained too few stories capable of stimulating “German individualism and long-suppressed tastes,” had news “which are not of the slightest interest to Germans now out of the war,” and smacked of PWD propaganda designed to “depress the German soldier.”²²¹ Given the paper’s lack of refinement, British PWD felt it might make the Germans assume that the Allies hoped to disseminate crude propaganda through the guise of an independent newspaper. Not that they objected to such an approach; they just hoped PWD could at least “achieve the pretence of writing German.”²²²

²¹⁷ This was largely an urban sentiment. Rural respondents were seemingly unimpressed by the local quality of the *Nachrichten*. Wilkow, “Aachener Nachrichten,” January 26, 1945, NACP RG 260/1488/1145 and PWD, “Interrogation of German civilians,” January 28, 1945, NACP RG 226/16/1320/115720.

²¹⁸ Wilkow, Psychological Warfare, Company G, 2nd ECAR, to Commanding Officer, PW Press Control Team 1, “Aachener Nachrichten,” January 25, 1945, NACP RG 260/1488/1145.

²¹⁹ Lt. Commander D. [Donald] McLachlan, RNVR, Special Operations Section, SHAEF, PWD to General McClure, “The Aachen Paper,” January 29, 1945, 1, NACP RG 260/1488/1145.

²²⁰ R.H.S. [Richard H.S.] Crossmann, Deputy, SHAEF, PWD to Mr. Luther Conant, “The Aachen Paper,” January 29, 1945, 2, NACP RG 260/1488/1145 and McLachlan to McClure, “The Aachen Paper,” January 29, 1945, 1-3, NACP RG 260/1488/1145.

²²¹ McLachlan to McClure, “The Aachen Paper,” January 29, 1945, 1-2, NACP RG 260/1488/1145.

²²² Crossman to Conant, “The Aachen Paper,” January 29, 1945, 2, NACP RG 260/1488/1145.

PWD Intelligence Section also obtained opinions from several non-Nazi German POW newspaper editors and journalists. In a rather detailed criticism, a former cultural editor of an Essen newspaper objected to the “primitive” layout of the second issue and the anonymity of its publishers and journalists.²²³ Like other critics, he noted cases of poor grammar and improper word selection, e.g., the decision to use *angefordert* instead of *angeordnet* or *verlangt* in a story about the Military Government having “ordered” an investigation into a dynamite-laden “*Kraftwagen*” (instead of *Fahrzeug*, *Automobil* or *PKW*). Of greater concern was the noticeable lack of a “well-devised news policy,” as shown by the printing of trifles on the English birthrate and stories on airline service. In his conclusion, the Essen reviewer declared that the paper, because of its failings, could not engender a “positive attitude towards the world.”²²⁴

Aacheners also noted several structural and administrative shortcomings, not the least of which was the fact they often received the newspaper hours or even days late.²²⁵ Some complaints were rather general, including the lack of a short story and a desire to see more local news.²²⁶ Others felt the price of 20 pfennig was too high.²²⁷ A Stolberg city official requested

²²³ SHAEF, PWD, Intelligence Section (Rear Echelon), “Comments of Former German Newspaper Man, Now Prisoner of War, Regarding *Aachener Nachrichten*,” February 27, 1945, NACP RG 260/1488/1145.

²²⁴ PWD, Intelligence Section, “Comments of Former German Newspaper Man,” February 27, 1945, NACP RG 260/1488/1145.

²²⁵ The paper was often a few hours late in coming off the press, although by February 27 the *Aachener Nachrichten* finally printed an edition on schedule. Belfrage, “Aachen Diary,” 27-28 February 1945, NACP RG 260/253/188. Through mid-February, local curfews and a lack of power and transport led to a situation whereby a majority of those in outlying areas received the newspaper up to two days after the publication date. Wilkow to Commanding Officer PW Press Control Team 1, “Public Opinion Survey on *Aachener Nachrichten* No. 3,” February 10, 1945, NACP RG 260/1488/1145.

²²⁶ Belfrage, “Aachen Daily Diary,” January 25, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/188. Hollands’s poor grammar was a constant problem for the paper’s audience. In the fifth issue of 21 February, for example, he insisted that the front-page headline use the dative case after the

the announcements from municipal mayors because “this used to be done by the *Westdeutsche Beobachter*.”²²⁸ Similarly, some readers hoped to see *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* (OKW) reports, which Nazi papers printed on a regular basis.²²⁹ Perhaps unsurprisingly, many readers felt discussions of Nazi crimes received too much attention.²³⁰

Beyond criticisms and complaints, two topics received considerable discussion over the course of the paper’s first weeks in print. Several suburban readers reacted angrily to stories on “luxuries” such as the 2,500 grams of bread given to Aacheners and began petitioning their local leaders to address the unfair benefits enjoyed by those living in the city.²³¹ Over time, the Military Government normalized rations throughout the greater *Landkreis*.²³² The second topic centered on the purging of former Nazi officials and party members. By January 31, PWD had convinced SHAEF to publish such reports, provided that the *Nachrichten* omit the names of

verb “wegen,” while Pesch argued for the use of the genitive case. Hollands won the argument and the headline read “Nazi-Verbrecher erhalt zehn Jahre Gefängnis wegen falschen Angaben” instead of “... wegen falscher Angaben.” Readers of the paper “generally agreed ... that the genitive should have been used.” See Belfrage, “Aachen Diary, 12-23 February 1945, NACP RG 260/253/188 and Peter de Mendelssohn, Allied Press Service, United States Army to Luther Conant for Gene Jolas, Aachen, “Style of ‘Aachener Nachrichten’,” March 9, 1945, 1, NACP RG 260/1488/1145.

²²⁷ PWD, Intelligence Section, “Interrogation of German civilians,” January 28, 1945, NACP RG 226/16/1320/115720.

²²⁸ PWD, “Interrogation of German Civilians,” January 28, 1945, NACP RG 226/16/1320/115720.

²²⁹ Wilkow to PW Press Control Team 1, “Aachener Nachrichten,” January 26, 1945, NACP RG 260/1488/1145.

²³⁰ PWD, “Interrogation of German Civilians,” January 28, 1945, NACP RG 226/16/1320/115720.

²³¹ Suburban and rural residents received only 2,250 grams per person. PWD, “Interrogation of German civilians,” January 28, 1945, NACP RG 226/16/1320/115720.

²³² SHAEF, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, “G-5 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 2,” February 28, 1945, NACP RG 226/16/1426/124538.

those who assisted the occupation.²³³ In the third issue of February 7, the front page contained two full columns to twenty-seven dismissed civil servants.²³⁴ One week later, the *Aachener Nachrichten* reported on the firing of an additional seven, including the janitor of a local school.²³⁵ At least a few readers pitied the janitor, who “somehow could not escape joining the Nazi party unless he was willing to lose his livelihood.”²³⁶ Many Aacheners concluded that *Bonzen* (roughly, “fat cats”) had remained in higher political offices by hiding behind the removal of lower-level Nazi party members. One Aachener went so far as to exclaim, “If democracy means that the same old system is allowed to rule with the very same *Bonzen*, then I am against democracy.”²³⁷ In another sign of diminished confidence in the occupation government, one elderly woman asked a PWD interviewer if he was “going to sit back now and let the big Nazis rule in Aachen, satisfied that you have thrown out the Nazi janitors?”²³⁸

The newspaper’s coverage of dismissed Party members incurred the particular wrath of the city’s provisional mayor, Franz Oppenhof, and local religious leaders. As the former director of the Nazi-owned Veltrup armaments works, Oppenhof perhaps had reason to dispute the claim that he fired these men and women because they were all “active” Nazis.²³⁹ By becoming a “collaborating” mayor under American occupation, he had placed himself at considerable risk

²³³ The Bishop of Aachen, Johannes van der Velden, was the exception to this rule. Major James Chesnutt, “Editorial Procedure,” January 31, 1945, 1, NACP RG 260/1488/1145.

²³⁴ Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 61 and *Aachener Nachrichten*, February 7, 1945.

²³⁵ Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 62 and *Aachener Nachrichten*, February 14, 1945.

²³⁶ S/Sgt. William Wilkow to Commanding Officer, PW Press Control Team 1, “Public Opinion Survey on Aachener Nachrichten No. 3,” February 10, 1945, NACP RG 260/1488/1145.

²³⁷ Wilkow, “Public Opinion Survey,” February 10, 1945, NACP RG 260/1488/1145.

²³⁸ Wilkow, “Public Opinion Survey,” February 10, 1945, NACP RG 260/1488/1145.

²³⁹ Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 65.

for retaliation by hard-line Nazi elements. Ultimately, SS men operating under Himmler's order assassinated Oppenhof at his home on 25 March 1945.²⁴⁰ Foreshadowing the actions of several West German politicians in the coming years, he requested that the newspaper submit all future stories concerning local governmental affairs to his office for review. Similarly, the Roman Catholic Bishop, Johannes van der Velden, who had recommended some of the dismissed employees to the Military Government, informed a PWD operative that "he intends to have his home sullied no more by the *Nachrichten*" because the publishing of the names of the dismissed was detrimental to his reputation.²⁴¹ Regardless, the newspaper staff and PWD refused to bow to local political and religious pressures and continued to expose Nazis and the crimes of their regime. In time, the average reader came to accept these stories as part of the postwar order and the start of Allied denazification efforts.²⁴²

From the U.S. perspective, the newspaper had to publish stories that engaged appropriate political thinking, both as a precursor for the development of a German state acceptable to international norms and as a palliative to what the occupational authorities believed was political inertia among non-Nazi Germans. With the exception of an insignificant study indicating a shift in favor of SPD positions by early 1945, the typical Aachener seemed to suffer from a "paralyzed political imagination" in the months after November 1944.²⁴³

²⁴⁰ Klaus Schwabe, "American Occupation Experiences in Aachen before Germany's Surrender," *Aachener Geschichtsvereins* (2000) at *Historisches Institut der Rheinisch-Westfälischen Technischen Hochschule Aachen*, <http://www.histinst.rwth-aachen.de/default.asp?documentId=89>, last accessed January 25, 2008.

²⁴¹ Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 65.

²⁴² SHAEF, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, "G-5 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 2," February 28, 1945, NACP RG 226/16/1426/124538.

²⁴³ A survey of 136 Aacheners in January 1945 found that 46% identified with the SPD, 29% the KPD, 14% the DVP, and only 11% with the Center Party. This was a striking lack of

As the war neared its end, Aacheners became increasingly more confident in their personal and collective ability to participate in postwar political life. In mid-March 1945, for example, a group of Aacheners petitioned President Roosevelt to ask that he consider the benefits of creating an independent Rhineland-Westphalia. They came upon this idea after reading of debates on the future of the Rheinland in late-winter issues of the *Aachener Nachrichten*, and premised their petition on the claim that only an independent and democratic Rhineland could overcome Germany's past and provide security against both "Prussians" and "Communists."²⁴⁴ Would they have written the President of the United States without the *Aachener Nachrichten*? Perhaps. However, one should not discount the fact that its publication motivated their appeal and indications of willingness to cooperate with occupying forces.

Given the realities in which it operated, the *Aachener Nachrichten* was a moderately successful business. Over a short period, its circulation increased from 12,000 copies per issue to more than 52,000.²⁴⁵ By March 1945, some in SHAEF cheekily referred to the newspaper as

support for the Center, which controlled the plurality of votes in Weimar-era Aachen. Given the small sample and the fact that Aachen's population was significantly smaller in 1945, the survey's results were not necessarily representative of Aacheners as a whole. Belfrage, "Aachen Daily Diary," January 15, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/Box 188 and Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, "Political Preferences in Aachen," *European Political Report* II:9 (March 2, 1945), 1, NACP RG 226/19/91/XL 6507.

²⁴⁴ The group of petitioners was an unusual lot. One, Josefine Kilgus, described herself as a "professional personal problems consultant" driven by a need to "lend the benefit of her advice to the wider public rather than merely to individuals as in the past." Another, Werner Taute, was an optician, three were textile factory owners, one was the wife of a textile man, and the last, Hans Schefer, was acting police chief of Aachen. Belfrage to Major Miller, Information Control Officer, "Aacheners' Petition to Pres. Roosevelt," March 20, 1945, NACP RG 260/1488/1145 and Wilkow, no title, [Memorandum on Petition], March 14, 1945, NACP RG 260/1488/1145.

²⁴⁵ Belfrage, "Field Officers Report – Aachener Nachrichten" no date (mid-1945), NACP RG 260/253/196.

“the biggest money-making enterprise since [the] *San Francisco Examiner*.”²⁴⁶ Its influence grew in relation to its financial successes. Within months, PWD had established a journalism and publishing training academy at the newspaper’s offices. There, students received training in the writing of articles and the mechanics of newspaper printing, as well as coursework in anthropology, sociology, economics, and the history of German constitutionalism from 1866 through 1933.²⁴⁷ It is difficult to determine if U.S. information policies affected the long-term political development of *Aachener Nachrichten* readers, however. Although Hollands received the first U.S. Information Control License on 27 June 1945, this measure was largely symbolic since it occurred twelve days after Aachen became part of the British Zone of Control.²⁴⁸

The U.S. Military Government learned two lessons from the Aachen experiment. Local PWD operatives saw the newspaper as proof that cooperation with politically-acceptable German media professionals “pays off because the community as a whole comes to recognize that we mean what we say,” while their superiors believed it confirmed “that German newspapermen

²⁴⁶ Luther [Conant], SHAEF, PWD to Jim [Chesnutt], 14 March 1945, 1, NACP RG 260/1488/1145.

²⁴⁷ First Lt. John O. Kearney, CAC to Lt. Col. James G. Chesnutt, Chief, Press Section, DISCC 6871, “Report on the Aachener Nachrichten Journalism Course,” 12 July 1945, NACP RG 260/1488/1145 and Kearney, CAC thru Major Chesnutt to Commanding Officer, DISCC 6871, PWD, SHAEF, “Proposal for the Establishment of a School of Journalism in Aachen,” 3 May 1945, NACP RG 260/1488/1145.

²⁴⁸ Belfrage, 6871st DISCC, 12th Army Group, Press Detachment, Frankfurt, a/M, “Report on Activities in Paris,” 16 June 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175; Headquarters, 6871 DISCC, Plans and Operations Section, “News Letter,” No. 12, 17 July 1945, 8-9, NACP RG 260/246/63; or United States Group Control Council, Information Control Service, “Special Report,” 16 July 1945, 5, NACP RG 260/247/75. Hollands’s career was short-lived. In 1948, with the approval of the British Military Government, Cerfontaine purchased and reacquired control of the newspaper. Earlier, in June 1945, Pesch left his role as Chief Editor and became head of the “suburban” division of the paper. O’Kearney to Chesnutt, 20 June 1945, NACP RG 260/1488/1145.

were not accustomed to writing straight news.”²⁴⁹ The latter claim stemmed from the paper’s tendency to place editorials in random positions on the page, thus confusing readers who “often were unable to tell which was news and which was opinion.”²⁵⁰ This became a common American criticism of the German press, which deviated significantly from established Anglo-American norms. The Aachen case persuaded the occupiers to pursue the temporary publication of “overt” U.S. Army publications in the hopes that such media would be a model for the future German press and conform to the information policies of PWD. In other words, PWD felt that German media must undergo a long period of journalistic reeducation, acknowledge the crimes of Nazism and German complicity, and reacquire “faith in news” before they could publish their own newspapers.²⁵¹

“Overt” Occupation Newspapers

under U.S. Control

The most vocal advocates of journalistic reeducation by example were in the Publicity & Psychological Warfare group assigned to the U.S. 12th Army in Luxembourg. Responsible for the production of *Mitteilungen*, they believed that only they could design a newspaper that fulfilled PWD and military goals for the pacification and reeducation of the German public. Hampered by orders that limited *Mitteilungen* to a twice-weekly run, a layout that did not mirror that of a newspaper, and orders that these publications contain no material of any “entertainment

²⁴⁹ “Text of Press Release, Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Chief Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF,” 25 May 1945, NACP RG 260/247/73 and OMGUS, ICD, “History: 8 May 1945-30 June 1946,” 19, NACP RG 260/247/69/“History.”

²⁵⁰ OMGUS, ICD, “History: 8 May 1945-30 June 1946,” 19, NACP RG 260/247/69/“History.”

²⁵¹ OMGUS, ICD, “History: 8 May 1945-30 June 1946,” 19, NACP RG 260/247/69/“History.”

value, the average issue focused on reports of official announcements, denazification measures, and curfew regulations.²⁵² By April 1945, PWD policies shifted away from an almost exclusive focus on convincing the enemy of Allied intentions or the failures of Nazi leadership, and towards messages of austerity and collective German guilt for the crimes of the Nazi state. This shift, combined with official disappointment in the Aachen experiment, prompted the 12th Army Group to begin pushing the boundaries of their directive by printing *Mitteilungen* in a format similar to that of a standard newspaper.²⁵³ Soon thereafter, P&PW abandoned *Mitteilungen* for overt, local German-language Army Group newspapers.

Overt newspapers were sites for a series of experiments on how best to convey “lessons” to German readers and newspaper professionals. Beyond replacing Nazi-Deutsch with “good German,” these publications sought to distinguish between “honest and objective” news and “editorial color,” emphasized international over regional developments, promoted the non-sentimental treatment of German history, and hoped to restore newspapers to active sites for public discussion.²⁵⁴ By adhering to an internal maxim of “no editorializing of the news,” PWD believed it could “rebuild a credit of faith in [German] news reporting.”²⁵⁵ PWD officials failed to realize that the staff of the 12th Army Group newspapers had little interest in creating bland

²⁵² “Meeting of PWD/PW Representatives of Army Groups held in General McClure’s Office,” January 13, 1945, 1, NACP RG 260/253/215.

²⁵³ Harold J. Hurwitz, Historian, ISD, “Interview with Hans Habe, former chief editor of the 12th Army Group newspaper and later editor of the *Neue Zeitung*, presently editor of the *Muenchener Illustrierte*,” 23 January 1950, 1, NACP RG 260/118/459. See also, for example, 1st Lt. Edward A. Tennenbaum, PW Detachment, Ninth United States Army to Commanding Officer, PW Detachment, Ninth US Army, “Die Mitteilungen,” 30 January 1945, NACP RG 226/19/92/XL 6632.

²⁵⁴ Colonel J.H. Hills, Assistant Chief of Division, Headquarters, United States Forces European Theater, Information Control Division, “Control of the German Press: A Study of Nazi Methods in Relation to Democratic Objectives,” 22 September 1945, 6, NACP RG 260/1140/20.

²⁵⁵ Hills, “Control of the German Press,” 6-7, NACP RG 260/1140/20.

newspapers that deviated greatly from German press traditions. Instead, P&PW personnel hoped to revive several Weimar-era press characteristics, including the need to “entertain” as a means of reeducating the German population.

The first overt military government newspaper appeared in Cologne on 2 April 1945. Edited in Luxembourg but printed in Cologne, the *Kölnischer Kurier* began as a stark four-page weekly for the Rhenish audience not serviced by the *Aachener Nachrichten*.²⁵⁶ PWD distributed each of the free 304,000 copies (one copy for every ten inhabitants) in its first run.²⁵⁷ After printing the *Kurier*’s first issue, the 12th Army Group moved its headquarters to Bad Nauheim, a resort town near Frankfurt. In late April, they launched the *Frankfurter Presse* before settling into a routine whereby they would identify appropriately conquered German cities, create copy in Bad Nauheim, and send that by jeep to a designated printing plant.²⁵⁸ Using this method, the 12th Army Group established eighteen newspapers over the course of the late-war and early occupation, although they never published more than ten at the same time. With the notable exception of Berlin’s *Allgemeine Zeitung*, which had its own editorial staff, only eight editors were responsible for the mockup and editing local newspapers in the American zone.²⁵⁹

At the center of this enterprise was an émigré Hungarian U.S. Army Captain, Hans Habe. Born János Békessy, Habe rose to international prominence in 1935 when, as a reporter for

²⁵⁶ “History of 6871st District Information Services Control Command, February 15, 1945 through 15 July 1945,” NACP RG 260/253/191 and Hurwitz, “Interview with Hans Habe,” 23 January 1950, 1, NACP RG 260/118/459. Summer 1943 air attacks destroyed the offices of the family-owned *Kölnische Zeitung*. It operated out of Bonn for a time, before returning to Cologne at the end of the war. For more, see JICAME, “Intelligence Report: Propaganda to Germany,” 3 August 1944, 1-4, NACP RG 226/19/147/XL 10757.

²⁵⁷ “History of 6871st District Information Services Control Command, February 15, 1945 through 15 July 1945,” 5, NACP RG 260/253/191.

²⁵⁸ Hurwitz, “Interview with Hans Habe,” 23 January 1950, 1, NACP RG 260/118/459.

²⁵⁹ Hurwitz, “Interview with Hans Habe,” 23 January 1950, 1, NACP RG 260/118/459.

Vienna's *Der Morgen*, he discovered that Hitler's family name was Schicklgruber.²⁶⁰ An incessant self-promoter, Habe later claimed that this discovery delayed the *Anschluß*.²⁶¹ During the early war, he served with the French military until the Germans captured him. He later fled to the United States, where he became an author. His first Anglophone novel, *A Thousand Shall Fall*, was a critical success that won him a movie studio contract. The novel appeared in U.S. cinemas in 1943 as *The Cross of Lorraine*. Soon after publishing *A Thousand Shall Fall*, Habe became a lecturer at West Point, where he remained until the Army drafted him in 1942.²⁶² The next year, he began teaching German-speaking émigrés psychological warfare tactics at Camp Sharpe in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania before moving to the western front in late 1944.²⁶³

As early as his days at Camp Sharpe, Habe's penchant for custom-tailored Army uniforms, watch chains, dyed hair, and gaudy gold rings struck many as arrogant.²⁶⁴ In his quasi-memoir, Cedric Belfrage repeatedly and sarcastically referred to the "Hungarian geniuses" behind the *Frankfurter Presse* and the arrogant "Mr. Veidt," a "distinguished newspaper man

²⁶⁰ Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 18-20.

²⁶¹ Hans Habe, *Ich stelle mich* (Vienna: Kurt Desch, 1955), 100-123; Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 20; and Gienow-Hecht, "Art is Democracy and Democracy is Art: Culture, Propaganda, and the *Neue Zeitung* in Germany, 1944-1947," *Diplomatic History* 23 (Winter 1999), 25-26.

²⁶² Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 21. See also, Hans Habe, *A Thousand Shall Fall* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1941) and Tay Garnett (Dir.), *The Cross of Lorraine*, (U.S.A.: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1943), 90 min.

²⁶³ Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 21 and Habe, *Ich stelle mich*, 389. Camp Sharpe was a German POW Camp during the Second World War.

²⁶⁴ See this description of Habe at Camp Sharpe in Leon Edel, *The Visible Past: A Wartime Memoir* (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 22-23. See also the recollections of PWD sergeant Peter Weidenreich (later Wyden) as in Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 21.

[sic] formerly connected with a paper in Vienna.²⁶⁵ These tendencies did little to raise Habe's esteem in the eyes of the OSS, who had earlier referred to him as "reactionary and anything else but democratic."²⁶⁶ Yet, PWD and OSS needed men like Habe to achieve success in Germany, and they came to trust that he was a true anti-Nazi who hoped to revitalize the Germany of *Dichter und Denker* by aligning the political life of Germans to western-democratic political ideals. In Habe's opinion, the newspaper was ideal to appeal to the finer sensibilities of non-Nazi Germans due to its dynamism and its potential to establish a degree of political-cultural dialogue between the occupiers and the occupied.²⁶⁷ He felt austere factual presentations were counterproductive and believed firmly in the need to "sell" democracy through content that appealed to readers' passions.²⁶⁸ His models for such a press were not in New York or London, but in the elite cultural newspapers of the Weimar era, e.g., the *Frankfurter Zeitung* or *Berliner Tageblatt*. With the reintroduction of the familiar and the oversight of appropriate personal, then, the press could simultaneously inform, reeducate, and appeal to a fickle and potentially distrustful reading public.

Behind the scenes at the 12th Army Group newspapers, as with his later project, *Die Neue Zeitung*, Habe relied on émigré German-speaking colleagues whose aesthetic and cultural outlook mirrored his own.²⁶⁹ At each newspaper, he assigned German-speaking émigré

²⁶⁵ Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 15-16. Others shared this view. See for example Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *In a Cold Crater: Cultural and Intellectual Life in Berlin, 1945-1946*, trans. Kelly Barry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 155-156

²⁶⁶ Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 18.

²⁶⁷ Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 24.

²⁶⁸ Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 24 and Hurwitz, "Interview with Hans Habe," 23 January 1950, 2, NACP RG 260/118/459.

²⁶⁹ Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 21 and Robert Williams, "Interview with Gene Mater, former member of 7th Army Psychological Warfare Team, 6871 DISCC," 24

personnel to editorial positions, for example, Peter Wyden (née Weidenreich) at the *Frankfurter Presse* or Hans Wallenberg of the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, as well as to technical positions, such as the head printer, Max Klieber.²⁷⁰ A review of PWD personnel files shows that many of those brought into press operations under Habe included many familiar names of the later West German press, for example, Hans Wallenberg, as well as at least one cultural luminary of the future DDR, Stefan Heym.²⁷¹ That Habe employed so many émigré German speakers in his company owes itself less to the great reeducative successes of his projects and more to the limited resources of PWD. As Habe himself stated, the Army depended “upon those boys I trained at Camp Sharpe” and had to “accept our idea of a German press.”²⁷²

Because each newspaper shared editors and fell under Habe’s general control, much of their content overlapped.²⁷³ One sees, for example, slight variations of essentially the same article on the deaths of Mussolini and Hitler.²⁷⁴ Similarly, all newspapers included a great many articles designed to evoke a sense of “collective guilt” amongst the Germans. These pieces

February 2006.

²⁷⁰ Hurwitz, “Interview with Hans Habe,” 23 January 1950, 1, NACP RG 260/118/459 and Hans Habe, *Im Jahre Null: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Deutschen Presse* (Munich: Desch Verlag, 1966), 53.

²⁷¹ See P&PW “Activities Report for the Month of June 1945,” 3 July 1945, 9, NACP RG 226/19/168/XL 12505. For more on Heym and his activities during the war and occupation as well as his reasons for coming to the United States, see Hutchinson, *Stefan Heym*, op cit., 7-8, 16-31, and esp. 43-47.

²⁷² Habe, *Im Jahre Null*, 52-53.

²⁷³ Hartenian, *Controlling Information*, 51.

²⁷⁴ e.g., “Hitler und Mussolini sind tot,” *Kölnischer Kurier*, 5 May 1945; “Adolf Hitler ist tot – Mussolini hingerichtet: Berlin erobert – In Italien ergab sich eine Million,” *Hessisches Post*, 5 May 1945; or “Adolf Hitler ist tot – Mussolini hingerichtet. Deutsche Sudarmee ergibt sich – Rundstedt gefangen. Berlin gefallen – Goebbels begeht Selbstmord?” *Braunschweiger Bote*, 4 May 1945 as in NACP RG 260/253/188/“AG Newspapers.”

focused on the systematic torture of concentration camp victims and used indicting titles such as “You shall know!” to draw attention to Nazi-led genocides and the German state’s crimes against humanity.²⁷⁵ However, there was enough difference between the publications that one cannot simply dismiss a given newspaper as redundant. For example, unlike its sister publications, the *Frankfurter Presse* incorporated a letters-to-the-editor column in May 1945.²⁷⁶ This feature met with considerable public reaction and many readers took advantage of the opportunity to vent their frustrations and views to the occupiers, even if their opinions never made it to print. Similarly, although Habe and his staff tried to pepper all 12th Army Group newspapers with editorials and articles written by respected German cultural authorities, they would occasionally reserve special pieces for particular publications, such as the reprint of Hermann Hesse’s “Letter to a Young German” in the inaugural issue of Berlin’s *Allgemeine Zeitung*.²⁷⁷

As with the *Aachener Nachrichten*, local occupation newspapers received a mixed public response. On the one hand, readers were eager for news. Following the release of the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, for example, ninety percent of surveyed readers reported keen interest in a

²⁷⁵ e.g., “Ihr sollt es wissen!,” *Braunschweiger Bote*, 4 May 1945 or “Torturen waren systematisch. Weitere erschreckende Enthüllungen über die deutschen Konzentrationslager – Dreizehn ‘leichtere’ Folterungen. Tod durch Erstricken, Tod durch Operation, Tod durch Verhungern,” *Ruhr-Zeitung*, 19 May 1945 as in NACP RG 260/253/188/“AG Newspapers.” See also Hartenian, *Controlling Information*, 55-57.

²⁷⁶ Luther Conant to Hans Habe (Draft) 14 May 1945, 2, NACP RG 260/253/215. See also Hartenian, *Controlling Information*, 57; Matz, *Zeitungen der US-Armee*, 53-56 or Hurwitz, *Stunde Null*, 92-97.

²⁷⁷ Herman Hesse, “Brief an einen jungen Deutschen,” *Allgemeine Zeitung* 9 August 1945. For a content analysis of the original 1919 version of Hesse’s “Letter,” see Joseph Mileck, *Herman Hesse: Life and Art* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 79-80. Please note that the *Allgemeine Zeitung* was the only 12th Army Group paper with a thrice-weekly press run. Most appeared only twice a week.

story on the dropping of the atomic bomb.²⁷⁸ Some even thought the *Allgemeine Zeitung* was a reincarnation of the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* and reported enthusiasm over the reappearance of their favorite paper.²⁷⁹ Other publications “sold out in a jiffy” and experienced high demand for additional copies of each issue.²⁸⁰ On the other hand, when presented with a licensed German-run publication after mid-1945, most readers abandoned military government offerings for the licensed postwar press.

Germans who read local overt publications began engaging with, discussing, and establishing the groundwork for discussion on the legacies of Nazism. A particular example of such engagement came in June 1945 when all of the 12th Army Group papers published articles by Thomas Mann and Franz Werfel.²⁸¹ In line with PWD’s policy on collective guilt, each author argued that there were uniquely German problems that led to the rise of Nazism. Werfel, who wrote two months before his death, argued that the “German problem” was symptomatic of a widespread moral collapse that had begun with the popularization of the works of Fichte and Schopenhauer. Because philosophical Romanticism shaped at least part of the worldview of modern *Deutschtum*, German culture helped make possible the crimes of the Holocaust and other brutalities. Consequently, Werfel argued that the whole of the German people should recognize

²⁷⁸ Information Services Control Section, US HQ Berlin District, Survey Section, “Semi-Weekly Report No. 10a,” 11 August 1945, NACP RG 260/247/75.

²⁷⁹ Survey Section, “Semi-Weekly Report no. 10a,” 11 August 1945, NACP RG 260/247/75.

²⁸⁰ Habe, *Im Jahre Null*, 53. See, for example, Headquarters, Third United States Army, G-5 Section, “Historical Report for May and June 1945,” 5, NACP RG 260/636/259; Habe, *Im Jahre Null*, 53; or P&PW, “Activities Report for the Month of June 1945,” 3 July 1945, 3, NACP RG 260/253/215.

²⁸¹ Headquarters, 12th Army Group, P&PW, “Report No. 12: Semi-Weekly Summary of Intelligence,” 19 June 1945, 3, NACP RG 260/253/215.

and atone for their complicity in the crimes of Nazism.²⁸² Mann, for his part, acknowledged a degree of personal responsibility for National Socialism and noted that all Germans bore an equal or greater amount of blame for the crimes and excesses of the years between 1933 and 1945. He dismissed the claims of those who swore they had been unaware of the racial crimes of the Nazi state and other violations of human rights, and further rebuked the Bishop of Münster, Clemens August Graf von Galen, for casting the Allies as enemies rather than liberators.²⁸³ To address the sins of the past and to restore their position as good-standing members of the international community, Mann urged all Germans to undergo a process of collective purification through cooperation with the Allies.²⁸⁴

The response to these articles was sudden, voluminous, and largely negative. Many readers dismissed Werfel as merely an “émigré” who had defamed the whole of the German people by misclassifying them as Nazis. They made pointed declarations that it was easy for “one who had the opportunity to emigrate” to claim that he or she is different than “wicked Germans” and posited that if *Deutschtum* constituted guilt, “then [Germans are] in the good company of Goethe, Schiller, Wagner [!] and Beethoven, not to mention all Americans of German origin.”²⁸⁵ There was considerably less criticism of Mann, but at least a few readers

²⁸² See also Lionel Bradley Steiman, *Franz Werfel: The Faith of an Exile, from Prague to Beverly Hills* (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1985), 149.

²⁸³ Beth A. Griech-Polelle, *Bishop von Galen: German Catholicism and National Socialism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 132.

²⁸⁴ Thomas Mann, *Essays. Band 6. Meine Zeit 1945-1955*, edited by Hermann Kurzke and Stephan Stachorski (Frankfurt, a.M.: Fischer, 1997), 375 and P&PW, “Report No. 12,” 19 June 1945, 3, NACP RG 260/253/215.

²⁸⁵ P&PW, “Report No. 12,” 19 June 1945, 3, NACP RG 260/253/215.

objected his slight of Bishop von Galen and cited U.S. non-fraternization policies as proof of the wisdom of Galen's words.²⁸⁶

The issue of war guilt continued to be a considerable propaganda challenge for these newspapers, as well as for their licensed German-run competition. Surveyed Germans consistently reported that they wanted the press to assume three features: concise reporting, economic discussions, and fewer stories about concentration camps because they "lack dignity."²⁸⁷ However, the publication of guilt-inducing articles also compelled some readers to proffer suggestions on how best to punish Nazis. Notable examples included recommendations that former Nazis bear a particular visual stigma such as the wearing of a swastika, that they receive food rations equivalent to those given to their victims, or that the Allies force them to work in the reconstruction of Germany and other "liberated" countries.²⁸⁸ Regardless, the palpable rejection of notions of collective guilt compounded Germans' lack of trust in the overt newspapers, which "discerning Germans" already considered to be mere propaganda and a weak replacement for German-run newspapers.²⁸⁹

PWD hoped to provide one newspaper copy for every five adults in the U.S. and British zones of control. In short time, their total circulation increased to three million copies per issue by May 1945 and peaked at more than 4.6 million copies by June.²⁹⁰ That same month, the U.S.

²⁸⁶ P&PW, "Report No. 12," 19 June 1945, 3, NACP RG 260/253/215.

²⁸⁷ Survey Section, "Semi-Weekly Report no. 10a," 11 August 1945, NACP RG 260/247/75. See also Hartenian, *Controlling Information*, 52-65 or Hurwitz, "Interview with Hans Habe," 23 January 1950, 3, NACP RG 260/118/459.

²⁸⁸ P&PW, "Report No. 12," 19 June 1945, 3-4, NACP RG 260/253/215.

²⁸⁹ SHAEF, PWD, "Weekly Intelligence Summary for Psychological Warfare #37," 11 June 1945, 3, NACP RG 260/1140/14.

²⁹⁰ United States Group Control Council [USGCC], Information Control Service, "Special Report," 16 July 1945, 4, NACP RG 260/247/75; "History of 6871st District

ceded control of the *Braunschweiger Bote*, *Ruhr Zeitung*, and *Kölnischer Kurier* to the British, which allowed P&PW to launch three additional newspapers and reduce the total circulation of all overt organs to slightly more than 3.76 million copies per issue.²⁹¹ There was less need to flood the market with a potential surplus of print by this point, as PWD had established an effective distribution system using the remnants of the German postal system and the facilities of former newspaper distributors. Sales of overt organs were also profitable, as PWD had begun charging up to 20 pfennig per issue for most of their publications.²⁹²

Local overt newspapers were never more than a stopgap on the path to the return of a German-run press. Several Press Control Teams and General Lucius Clay had long supported a rapid transition to German-controlled media and began an arduous process of recruiting and reviewing potential candidates for the publication of German-run newspapers in late spring 1945. PWD also faced U.S. domestic pressure to return the press to German control.²⁹³ Some in PWD argued for the retention of at least one overt publication to publicize the U.S. perspective and to remind German publishers “that we retain the machinery for replacing them.”²⁹⁴ No group was

Information Services Control Command, February 15, 1945 through 15 July 1945,” 6, NACP RG 260/253/191.

²⁹¹ The *Braunschweiger Bote* fell under British control on 8 June 1945, the *Ruhr Zeitung* on 16 June, and the *Kölnischer Kurier* on 16 June. P&PW, “Activities Report for the Month of June 1945,” 3 July 1945, NACP RG 226/19/168/XL 12505.

²⁹² USGCC, “Special Report,” 16 July 1945, 4, NACP RG 260/247/75. See also Matz, *Zeitungen der US-Armee*, 37-46; Hurwitz, *Stunde Null*, 79-86; Hartenian, *Controlling Information*, 50-51.

²⁹³ On 10 May 1945, Elmer Davis, Chief of the Office of War Information (OWI), announced that the U.S. planned to continue subtle and overt propaganda campaigns in Germany. In response, many American journalists, editors, and editorial writers began calling for a German-owned press. OMGUS, ICD, “History: 8 May 1945-30 June 1946,” 18-19, NACP RG 260/247/69/“History.”

²⁹⁴ USGCC, “Special Report,” 16 July 1945, 4, NACP RG 260/247/75.

more anxious about the transition to German control than P&PW, which was undergoing the bureaucratic and organizational shift from their wartime role as “Sike Boys” to that of peacetime members of the Publications Operations Section of the Information Control Division (ICD). Habe’s team rejected the notion that German-controlled media could sufficiently promote democratic ideals. Therefore, they chose to operate under the assumption that a complete changeover from overt military publications to licensed, German-run publications would not occur until at least six months to one year after the cessation of conflicts.²⁹⁵ Yet, six licensed German-run newspapers had already begun circulating in the western military district alone and, with the exception of the licensed *Wiesbadener Kurier*, each replaced a 12th Army Group newspaper. The decline of local overt publications continued through 11 November, when the last local overt newspaper, the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, closed operations in Berlin, leaving the capital’s congested media market in the hands of the U.S.-licensed newspaper *Der Tagesspiegel*, the British-controlled *Der Berliner*, and a host of Soviet-run and licensed publications.²⁹⁶

Red Army Newspapers

Despite years of experience in the creation of antifascist propaganda for Wehrmacht audiences, it was not until March 1945 that the Soviets began crafting a clear vision on how best to run an occupation, much less on how to provide news material to the occupied population.²⁹⁷

To the credit of the Soviet propagandists, Seventh Section operatives seemed genuinely

²⁹⁵ Headquarters, 6871st DISCC, “Immediate Plans for Press Section Operations,” 27 September 1945, NACP RG 260/1488/1142.

²⁹⁶ By mid-November 1945, there were five Soviet-licensed newspapers and one Military paper in Berlin – *Tägliche Rundschau* (Red Army), *Deutsche Volkszeitung* (KPD), *Berliner Zeitung* (Berlin Magistrat), *Das Volk* (SPD), *Der Morgen* (LDPD), and *Neue Zeit* (CDU). Peter J. Fliess, US Headquarters, Berlin District, “Memorandum No. 10: Statistics on Berlin Newspaper Circulation,” 24 November 1945, NACP RG 466/176/6.

²⁹⁷ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 18

convinced that “in the battle of ideas, violence is a bad adviser.”²⁹⁸ The first significant Soviet press operations in occupied Germany were newssheets that utilized the form of newspapers. These publications reprinted essential propaganda material and Red Army occupation directives, of course, but little in the way of news. These *Nachrichtenblätter* appeared in April 1945 and assumed rather obvious titles such as Zossen’s *Nachrichten* (“news”).²⁹⁹ Each was under the control of the larger Red Army Fronts and a host of smaller military units that controlled intact printing facilities.³⁰⁰ Their circulation generally varied between 10,000 and 200,000 copies per issue, although the First Belorussian Front’s *Nachrichten für die deutsche Bevölkerung* had a press run of 300,000 copies.³⁰¹ Most were poster-sized at 16.5 inches by 23.4 inches (DIN-A2), which made them ideal for posting on Litfafaßäulen or to walls. Because they focused on conveying occupation ordinances and only carried select news items culled from the wires of the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) and the Soviet Information Office (Sovinformburo), their news value was minimal. Germans were eager for news of any sort, however, and these publications sold “like hot cakes.”³⁰²

In May 1945, *Frontzeitungen* (Red Army Divisional Newspapers) followed *Nachrichtenblätter*. Initial Soviet plans called for the creation of two zonal newspapers, one for Prussia and the other for Silesia, but an order of 1 May 1945 mandated the development of four

²⁹⁸ Prof. [Alexander] Kirsanow, Abschrift: “Rede am 15.5.1975 an der Karl-Marx-Universität, Leipzig,” 15 May 1975, 4, in Bestand: Zentrage, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA 63/1197.

²⁹⁹ This newspaper was under the control of the Eighth Infantry of the Red Army. On its staff was a young German-émigré Red Army lieutenant, Stefan Doernberg. Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 37.

³⁰⁰ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 18.

³⁰¹ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 37 and Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 19.

³⁰² Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 37-38.

broadly regional, but not necessarily zonal newspapers.³⁰³ Two appeared in Prussia, and one apiece in Saxony and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.³⁰⁴ The Red Army placed each of these newspapers in the hands of the Seventh Sections attached to the three main Red Army Fronts. The first *Frontzeitung* was the *Tägliche Rundschau*, and appeared on 15 May under the authority of the First Belorussian Front. Its editor in chief was Mikhail V. Sokolov.³⁰⁵ Six days later, Marshal Zhukov's First Belorussian Front gave Berliners a second newspaper, the *Berliner Zeitung*, and made it the news organ of the Berlin *Kommandantura*.³⁰⁶ Its editor-in-chief, Alexander Kirsanov, soon replaced M.V. Sokolov at the *Tägliche Rundschau*. Outside Berlin, the Second Byelorussian Front published a joint Red Army-KPD newspaper, the somewhat popular but short-lived *Deutsche Zeitung*, a "Front Newspaper for the German People" on 20 May. Its editor was Colonel Mikhail Petrovich Sokolov, who later moved to the *Tägliche Rundschau*.³⁰⁷ While the editors for the *Deutsche Zeitung* worked in Stettin (present-day

³⁰³ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 38.

³⁰⁴ Printing sites were to include Berlin for the Prussian newspapers, Dresden for Saxony, and Stettin for Silesia. Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 38.

³⁰⁵ Mikhail Vassily Sokolov is not identical with Mikhail Petrovitch Sokolov, the editor of the *Deutsche Zeitung* in 1945 and the 1951 editor of the *Tägliche Rundschau*. M.V. Sokolov stepped down from his duties with the *Tägliche Rundschau* by 27 May, and Zhukov replaced him with A. Kirsanov, the editor of the *Berliner Zeitung*. Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 43; Klaus Hesse, "Unsere Druckerei – Ergebnis der sozialistischen Entwicklung der Arbeiter- und Bauernmacht in der DDR. Band I – 1945 bis 1966," edited by the Betriebsparteiorganisation der SED der Druckerei Neues Deutschland, no date (likely early 1980s), 7, Bestand: Zentrage, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA 63/1200; and "Michael Petrowitsch Sokolow," 23, Bestand: Erinnerungen, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1837.

³⁰⁶ Foitzik, *Sowjetische Militäradministration, 1945-1949*, 197; and Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 40.

³⁰⁷ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 39 and Karl Krahn, "Quellen der Aktionseinheit über die Teilnahme von SPD-Genossen am Widerstandskampf in Stettin," 16, in Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, Bestand: Erinnerungen: Krahn, Karl. SAPMO-BArch, SgY 30/1329.

Szcecin, Poland), printing occurred in Greifswald. From there, the Soviets flew it 80 kilometers to Mecklenburg-Vorpommern for distribution.³⁰⁸ Finally, the First Ukrainian Front published the *Tageszeitung für die deutsche Bevölkerung* in Dresden beginning on May 22, 1945.³⁰⁹ Its editor in chief was Major Vladimir Ruban, who had been Kirsanov's deputy in the Seventh Section until May 18.

Each front organ had press runs of 100,000 to 150,000 copies per issue, appeared daily except on Mondays, contained a great many proclamations of military government law, and relied upon news from Soviet-approved sources.³¹⁰ Outside observers saw the *Frontzeitungen* as "very indifferent job[s]." ³¹¹ In part, these papers' lack of refinement seems to owe itself to the absence of centralized control over each publication. This situation led to unusual work arrangements in which some newspapers relied heavily upon the participation of KPD-émigrés, while others merely used émigrés as support staff. For example, the early leadership of the *Tägliche Rundschau* was almost entirely Soviet-Russian, although it relied heavily on German staff. The twenty-member staff of Dresden's *Tageszeitung* included five Germans led by Fred Oelßner.³¹² Mecklenburg-Vorpommern's *Deutsche Zeitung* witnessed a certain degree of power sharing between its editor in chief, M.P. Sokolov, and members of Gustav Sobottka's *Initiativgruppe*, particularly the German Affairs editor Karl Raab.³¹³ As a result, it tried to

³⁰⁸ Krahn, "Quellen der Aktionseinheit," 16, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1329.

³⁰⁹ Foitzik, *Sowjetische Militäradministration*, 198 and Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 38.

³¹⁰ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 38 and 42.

³¹¹ Mendelssohn "Development and Present Situation," 14 September 1945, 3, NACP RG 260/253/201.

³¹² Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 39 and Broszat and Weber, *SBZ-Handbuch*, 455.

³¹³ Krahn, "Quellen der Aktionseinheit," 16, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1329; "Aus der Erinnerungen des Genossen Karl Raab," 36, and Karl Raab, "Mein Lebenslauf," 1984, 157,

balance between operating as a Red Army “Front newspaper” and an organ of the KPD, thus countermanding Dimitrov’s earlier decision to remove many propaganda responsibilities from the hands of émigré KPD members.

The *Deutsche Zeitung*’s Raab was well prepared to work with the Soviets. He had worked for Sepp Schwab during the war as the deputy-editor-in-chief of Moscow Radio’s German Affairs section. This position afforded him a place in Gustav Sobottka’s *Initiativgruppe*.³¹⁴ Between December 1944 and February 1945, he and his comrades in the other *Initiativgruppen* received Soviet-led training on the VII World Congress of the Communist International, the Brussels and Bern Party Conferences, and the Manifesto of the NKFD, among other topics. Part of this training required attendance at lectures on the “new democratic culture policy” for occupied Germany and lengthy discussions on future agriculture policies, public education, and local politics. In his later life, Raab remembered fondly Edwin Hoernle’s assessment of the problems of German “*Kultur*” and Paul Schwenk’s lectures on municipal governance.³¹⁵ Immediately before his departure to Germany in the last week of April 1945,

in Bestand: Erinnerungen: Raab, Karl. SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1233/1 and “Michael Petrowitsch Sokolow,” 2, Bestand: Erinnerungen, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1837. See also Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 38-39 and 49-50 and Martin Broszat and Hermann Weber (Eds.), *SBZ-Handbuch. Staatliche Verwaltungen, Parteien, gesellschaftliche Organisationen und ihre Führungskräfte in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands 1945-1949* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1993), 455.

³¹⁴ The group included Gustav Sobottka, Fritz Grünberg, Willi Bredel, Karl Raab, Herbert Hentschke, Rudolf Herrnstadt, Fritz Kahmann, Bruno Schramm, Oskar Stephan, and Anton Switalla. See Broszat and Weber, *SBZ-Handbuch*, 455.

³¹⁵ “Aus der Erinnerungen des Genossen Karl Raab,” no date (possibly 1984), 32, in Bestand: Erinnerungen: Raab, Karl, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1233/1.

Raab attended a final meeting on the finer points of occupation policy, which was led by Wilhelm Pieck and Georgii Dimitrov.³¹⁶

Sobottka's group arrived in Pomerania on May 6, 1945. From there, Raab moved to various locations before landing in Stettin on May 9, where he received orders to work with Seventh Section Major Vladimir Mulin to launch a newspaper for the region between Stettin and Wittenberg.³¹⁷ Mulin and Raab worked together for more than a week until M.P. Sokolov assumed control of the operation sometime around 19 May. While Mulin went on to other tasks, Raab continued to play an integral role in the mock-up of the paper and selected many of its first articles. The first issue of the *Deutsche Zeitung* reflected the degree to which the newspaper was both a Soviet and a German communist publication. The first page greeted readers with a massive picture of the signing of the German capitulation and the joint declaration of the three Allies. It also contained an article by a member of the KPD in Stettin, Karl Krahn. Krahn's article, "What Should Happen Now: A German on the Defeat of the Nazi Regime and the Role of the German People," described the final days of the war in Stettin and the ways by which Nazi "scorched earth" policies led to the deaths of hundreds of Germans.³¹⁸ Another article by *Antifaschule* graduate and former NSDAP member Bernhard Bechler followed up on Krahn's theme by noting the scale of the German military defeat at the hands of the Red Army.³¹⁹

³¹⁶ "Aus der Erinnerungen des Genossen Karl Raab," no date (possibly 1984), 32, in Bestand: Erinnerungen: Raab, Karl, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1233/1.

³¹⁷ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 39-40 and "Aus der Erinnerungen des Genossen Karl Raab," SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1233/1.

³¹⁸ "Aus der Erinnerungen des Genossen Karl Raab," 36-37, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1233/1 and Krahn, "Quellen der Aktionseinheit über die Teilnahme von SPD-Genossen am Widerstandskampf in Stettin," 13-16, SAPMO-BArch, SgY 30/1329.

³¹⁹ "Aus der Erinnerungen des Genossen Karl Raab," 36-37, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1233/1

The *Deutsche Zeitung* published only sixteen issues between May 20 and June 10, 1945, and its Dresden cousin, the *Tageszeitung*, closed its doors on August 1. Despite their short lives, these newspapers were valuable training grounds for the future leadership of occupation media and provided a political education for future leaders of the East German state. On the last day of the *Deutsche Zeitung*, Raab traveled to Berlin to discuss the reconstitution of the KPD with Ulbricht, Sobottka, and other *Genossen*. Twenty-four hours later, he returned to Schwerin to resume press operations for the now-KPD *Deutsche Zeitung*.

Raab's colleagues during May and June went on to play crucial roles in the occupation and early East German state. Krahn became editor-in-chief of the Mecklenburg-Vorpommern KPD/SED newspaper *Volksstimme* and later ran the Foreign Affairs section of *Neues Deutschland*.³²⁰ Bechler became Interior Minister of Brandenburg in 1946.³²¹ Many of the Red Army personnel also moved on to better roles in the occupation. M.P. Sokolov became the head of the SMAD publishing house, SWA-Verlag in late 1945 and then editor-in-chief of the *Tägliche Rundschau* in 1951.³²² In 1946, Major Mulin became the head of the Radio Section in SMAD's Propaganda Administration and supervised operations at *Berliner Rundfunk*.³²³ Career advancement was not unique to the *Deutsche Zeitung*, of course. Soon after the resumption of

³²⁰ Cf. Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 40 and Krahn, "Quellen der Aktionseinheit über die Teilnahme von SPD-Genossen am Widerstandskampf in Stettin," 18, SAPMO-BArch, SgY 30/1329.

³²¹ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 40.

³²² "Michael Petrowitsch Sokolow," 23, Bestand: Erinnerungen, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1837.

³²³ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 39 and Michael Kubina, "'Was in dem einen Teil verwirklicht werden kann mit Hilfe der Roten Armee, wird im anderen Teil Kampffrage sein.' Zum Aufbau des zentralen Westapparates der KPD/SED 1945-1949" in Manfred Wilke (ed.) *Die Anatomie der Parteizentrale. Die KPD/SED auf dem Weg zur Macht* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1998), 454-455.

political life in the SBZ, the *Tageszeitung*'s Fred Oelßner became chief of the KPD's and then SED's Agitation-Propaganda Department (*Agitpropabteilung*), while Ruban became deputy-editor-in-chief at the *Tägliche Rundschau* where, as during the war, he worked under Kirsanov through 1947.³²⁴

The Unusual Case of the Berliner Zeitung

The *Berliner Zeitung* was uniquely an occupation government newspaper, a KPD/SED party organ, and a popular press.³²⁵ Soon after the printing of the *Tägliche Rundschau*, the Seventh Section of the First Byelorussian Front decided it was appropriate and necessary to create a paper for the large population of Greater Berlin. For this task, they chose the head of the Seventh Section of the First Ukrainian Front, Colonel Alexander Kirsanov. When Kirsanov arrived in Berlin on 17 May, he held a midnight meeting with General S.F. Galadshev, the head of the First Byelorussian Front's Political Administration.³²⁶ After what seems to have been the briefest exchange of pleasantries, Galadshev informed Kirsanov that he had to launch the *Berliner Zeitung* within two days, that is, on 20 May. To assuage Kirsanov, Galadshev offered

³²⁴ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 39-40.

³²⁵ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 88. The British military's overt publication *Die Welt* is a possible exception to this claim. The British published *Die Welt* out of Hamburg between 1946 and 1950 as an official military government newspaper. They then sold it to Axel Springer in 1953. For a history of *Die Welt*, see Heinz-Dietrich Fischer, *Reeducations- und Pressepolitik unter britischem Besatzungsstatus. Die Zonenzeitung "Die Welt" 1946-1950. Konzeption, Artikulation und Rezeption* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1978).

³²⁶ Though Galadshev's name appears on occasion in the archival record in reference to Ulbricht and Kirsanov, few studies mention him directly. Indeed, the only secondary works which reference him are Walter Görlitz, *Griff in die Geschichten: Menschen und Ereignisse aus 250 Jahren* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1979), 158; Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 40; Wolfgang Zank, "Als Stalin Demokratie befahl," *Die Zeit* 25 (1995), 42-; and Roger P. Reese, *The Soviet Military Experience: A History of the Soviet Army, 1917-1991* (London: Routledge, 2000), 133-136. Erich Kuby reported this exchange between Kirsanov and the unnamed-Galadshev following a 1965 interview with Kirsanov. See Kuby, *The Russians and Berlin*, 323.

him a small print shop, a handpicked editorial staff that had undergone several weeks of German-language training, and two “antifascists who really want to help.”³²⁷ Flabbergasted, Kirsanov convinced the General to grant him more time. Galadshev agreed and stated, “Start with the first *BZ* on 21 May.” That was the end of the conversation. Kirsanov began hurriedly piecing together a newspaper out of the small space granted to him in the office of the Political Division in Karolinenhof.³²⁸

Kirsanov encountered problems when he met with the editorial staff. The “antifascists,” Herr Kindler and Herr Grindel, “refused to cooperate.” And so, he dismissed them from their duties, but not until after the paper began publication.³²⁹ Kirsanov also had to find means to receive news stories. For this, he enlisted the aid of a former DNB employee, who promptly “requisitioned” a Hellschreiber. There was also the matter of finding print supplies and a trained staff; a matter that resolved itself after Walter Ulbricht’s *Initiativgruppe* rounded up twenty-five KPD journalists, editors, and publishers to assist him. Although this group included two future leaders of the KPD/SED press, that is, Rudolf Herrnstadt and Fritz Erpenbeck, the story of Fritz Kroh is perhaps the best example of how Kirsanov managed to bring the paper to press in such a short time.³³⁰

³²⁷ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 85-86; A.W. Kirsanow, “Wie begann die *Berliner Zeitung*. Ein Beitrag für die Chronik des Berliner Verlages aus der Feder des ersten Chefredakteurs und Gründers der Berliner Zeitung,” March 1973, 1, in Bestand: Zentrag: Betriebsgeschichte: Berliner Druckerei, KMW, DK, EGG, NOWA, ID, DAN, ALB, Zwickau, Ruchenbach, SD, 1945-90, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA DY 63/1203.

³²⁸ Kirsanow, “Wie begann die *Berliner Zeitung*,” March 1973, 1, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA DY 63/1203.

³²⁹ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 86 and Kirsanow, “Wie begann die *Berliner Zeitung*,” March 1973, 3, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA DY 63/1203.

³³⁰ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 86 and “Politische Kurzbiographie des Gen. Fritz Kroh,” Bestand: Erinnerungen: Kroh, Fritz, no date, 2, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA SgY 30/0514.

Before 1933, Kroh had been one of several publishing specialists at the KPD's *Rote Fahne*. After he returned to Germany from Paris in 1936, the Nazis arrested him. He was a prisoner at several sites throughout Germany and was at Sachsenhausen by 1945. On April 20 of that year, two days before the Red Army liberated the camp, the S.S. rounded up Kroh and 45,000 other Sachsenhausen detainees and forced them to march toward the Baltic Sea. 6,000-7,000 people lost their lives in this march, but Kroh managed to survive and found himself in Frauenmark (Mecklenburg) on May 1, 1945. He traveled to Berlin, and arrived at Spandau prison on May 10 with a group of former concentration camp internees who had gathered there in search of medical and material aid. After a few days at Spandau, he learned that his old friend Walter Ulbricht was in Berlin. Two days later, Ulbricht arrived. Before Kroh could answer Ulbricht's first question, "How are you?," he received a second, "Can you begin working immediately?" Kroh replied that he needed to recover but would begin work as soon as possible. After a few days rest, Ulbricht sent a car for Kroh, which promptly brought him to the *Berliner Zeitung*'s publishing house at Prinzenstraße 80 in Kreuzberg.³³¹

Like other members of the foundational staff of the *Berliner Zeitung*, Kroh scavenged the city for materials with which to publish the newspaper. On the evening of May 20, he realized the paper had insufficient typefaces for its masthead. In his memoir, he took particular pride in having scoured the buildings of the former press district until he "found a nice, fat *Fraktur*."³³² The next morning, the staff printed the first 100,000 copies of the four-page, 10 pfennig-per-issue *Berliner Zeitung*. Later that day, the four-page newspaper greeted the Berlin public with

³³¹ Fritz Kroh, "Nach sieben Jahren KZ: Verlagsleiter der *Berliner Zeitung*," no date, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA SgY 30/0514. Kroh notes a publishing location at Prinzenallee 80, which he claimed was in Friedrichsfelde. However, there is not a Prinzenallee in Friedrichsfelde, though there is a Prinzenstraße in the heart of the old Berlin press district.

³³² Kroh, "Nach sieben Jahren," no date, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA SgY 30/0514.

the headline “*Berlin lebt auf!*” (“Berlin revives”).³³³ Thanks in no small part to its low price and a desire for the stability of print news during the turbulence of the early Soviet occupation, readers bought every available copy of the *Berliner Zeitung*. It proved so popular that Kirsanov had to increase temporarily the press run to 200,000 copies per issue by 11 June 1945.³³⁴

In its short life as a Red Army newspaper, the *Berliner Zeitung* utilized the small, Berliner format typical of Weimar-era newspapers. Its name suggested a lineage to famed Ullstein newspapers of similar titles.³³⁵ Of course, the newspaper was anything but an Ullstein publication and far from independent of Soviet control. While the original location of the *Berliner Zeitung* was away from the constantly prying eyes of the Seventh Section, it soon moved its offices to the Soviet-controlled building at Lindenstraße 41, which housed the Red Army censorship division and the Red Army’s TASS-Sovinformburo news collection agency.³³⁶ At the same time, its printing division moved closer to the Mitte so it could share the former

³³³ “Berlin lebt auf!,” *Berliner Zeitung*, 21 May 1945 and Walter Ulbricht, *Die Geschichte der neuesten Zeit. Die Niederlage Hitlerdeutschlands und die Schaffung der antifaschistisch-demokratischen Ordnung* (Berlin: Dietz, 1955), 71.

³³⁴ Like the *Tägliche Rundschau* and the political party newspapers, it followed Weimar Berlin tradition and appeared every day but Monday. It is interesting to note that this larger press run failed to make the *Berliner Zeitung* profitable. Its overhead expenses, including salaries and equipment and material costs, far exceeded its income under direct Soviet control. Paper restrictions later lowered this level of distribution to a figure of 150,000 to 200,000 copies by the end of August. Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 87; Mendelssohn, “Development and Present Situation,” 14 September 1945, 4, NACP RG 260/253/201; and Kirsanow, “Wie begann die *Berliner Zeitung*,” March 1973, 3, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA DY 63/1203.

³³⁵ The Ullstein family acquired the first *Berliner Zeitung* in the late-nineteenth century. They also published a midday publication, the *B.Z. am Mittag* as well as a *Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung*.

³³⁶ Mendelssohn, “Development and Present Situation,” 14 September 1945, 3-4, NACP RG 260/253/201. The Soviet News Agency (SNB) did not appear until July 1945. Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 43.

printing facilities of the *Völkischer Beobachter* with the *Tägliche Rundschau*.³³⁷ The Soviets made no great secret of their control of the newspaper. Through the end of June, each issue the *Berliner Zeitung* included a notice in Cyrillic script that it was a Red Army newspaper.³³⁸

Readers were well aware that this paper was far from an authentic *Berliner Zeitung*, but its emphasis on local news and employment advertisements made it seem familiar. This was in large part a product of staffing. Typical for many high Red Army officers, Kirsanov had many duties, not the least of which included establishing a news agency for the Soviet zone.

Consequently, he was not a “hands-on” editor for the *Berliner Zeitung*. The mock-up of the paper fell into the laps of Kirsanov’s deputy-editor, Major Josif Feldmann, Herrnstadt, or the other assistant editor, Gerhard Kegel.³³⁹ Because Feldmann often was busy assisting Kirsanov, Herrnstadt and Kegel managed to produce a paper that, at least in its style, appeared “German.”

Soon after the four Allied Powers signed the June 5, 1945 quadripartite agreement, SMAD discontinued publishing overt newspapers with the exception of the *Tägliche Rundschau*.³⁴⁰ Over the course of the succeeding two weeks, both the *Berliner Zeitung* and the

³³⁷ Kirsanow, “Wie begann die *Berliner Zeitung*,” March 1973, 3, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA DY 63/1203 and Mendelssohn, “Development and Present Situation,” 14 September 1945, 3, NACP RG 260/253/201.

³³⁸ This notice also appeared in the *Tägliche Rundschau*.

³³⁹ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 86. Kegel had been a Red Army Military Intelligence Operative who worked in the German Foreign Ministry. He fled to Red Army lines in 1945. Earlier, while under assignment at the German Embassy in Warsaw, Kegel likely had a loose association with Rudolf Herrnstadt, who also acted as an operative for Red Army Military Intelligence at the time. Following the Nazi invasion of Poland, Kegel moved to the German Embassy in Moscow, where provided the Soviets with intelligence on the state of German-Soviet trade negotiations in 1940. On 21 June 1941, Kegel reported to Proskurov that Germany would attack the Soviet Union the following day, 22 June. This report apparently had no impact on Stalin. See David E. Murphy, *What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 14-19 and 62-64.

³⁴⁰ Kirsanow, “Wie begann die *Berliner Zeitung*,” March 1973, 4, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA

Tägliche Rundschau absorbed personnel from Dresden's *Tageszeitung*. Then, on June 22, SMAD transferred publishing control of the *Berliner Zeitung* to Berlin's *Magistrat* and its Red Army-underwritten publishing house, the *Verlag der Stadt Berlin*.³⁴¹ Tellingly, the Soviets left the *Magistrat* staff few means to publish a newspaper. In fact, they received only four typewriters and some office furniture.³⁴²

The editor in chief of the new *Berliner Zeitung* was Rudolf Herrnstadt, a Silesian-born former correspondent of the *Berliner Tageblatt* who had also been an operative for Red Army Military Intelligence and editor of the Soviet émigré publication, *Freies Deutschland*. Herrnstadt's particular experience with Nazism differed from that of many of his colleagues in the KPD. In the wake of the Nazi rise to power, he fled first to Warsaw where he engaged in espionage for the Soviet Union. Following the Nazi invasion of Poland, he fled to Moscow. After his purge from the SED leadership in 1953, many Party members falsely claimed that Herrnstadt had been insufficiently "marxist." He was a convinced communist and a loyal "party man." Unlike many of his comrades in the KPD/SED, he was Jewish, and most of his family became victims of the Holocaust sometime after their deportation to Łódź in 1941.³⁴³ Under

DY 63/1203.

³⁴¹ Cf. Benning, 36, which notes the date of transfer as 17 June. While it is true that Otto Winzer announced that the *BZ* would become an official newspaper of the city of Berlin on 17 June, Kirsanov did not hand over control of the editorial duties of the paper until 22 June. Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 87 and Kirsanow, "Wie begann die *Berliner Zeitung*," 4, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA DY 63/1203.

³⁴² Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 87.

³⁴³ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 14; Benning, *Geschichte des SED-Zentralorgans*, 36; Grieder, *East German Leadership*, 54; Mendelssohn, "Development and Present Situation," 14 September 1945, 3-4, NACP RG 260/253/201; and Georg Joel, Advocate, Tel Aviv to Rudolf Herrnstadt, 9 May 1946, in Bestand: Sozialistische Einheitspartei. Zentralkomitee, ZPKK, fiche 3/4, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA DY 30/IV 2/4/388.

Herrnstadt, the *Berliner Zeitung* reflected the *kämpferisch* spirit of the overt KPD/SED Party press yet also attempted to address the causes of fascism.

By most accounts, Herrnstadt was a rather successful editor. Under his leadership, the newspaper sold rather briskly. Following SMAD's decision to limit the CDU's *Neue Zeit* to the smaller, unpopular Berliner format, the *Berliner Zeitung* appeared in the larger, popular *Grossformat* on 23 August 1945. This improved its sales and profits, and the paper did so well that by mid-October its assets exceeded 786,000 RM. By November, it distributed 300,000 copies per day, except Mondays.³⁴⁴ By the year's end, it had made more than 500,000 RM in profits.³⁴⁵ Tellingly, the *Berliner Zeitung* earned the enmity of other Soviet district newspapers. As early as late-August 1945, the KPD publishers of the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* began complaining over the high sales and low price of the *Berliner Zeitung*, and requested that the Central Committee of the KPD "consult with the relevant authorities at the *BZ*."³⁴⁶

The Western Allies did not know what to make of the *Berliner Zeitung*. This is not to say that they saw the *Berliner Zeitung* as competition. In fact, while they acknowledged that the newspaper had the occasional good article or editorial, the Americans felt it was "on the whole rather dull and uninteresting."³⁴⁷ Newspaper sales in the American sector of Berlin supported this assessment. When asked which newspapers they read on a daily basis, only 10% of US-sector Berliners said the *Berliner Zeitung*; as compared to 18% who claimed they read the British

³⁴⁴ Source: Heinrich von Schweinichen, Editor of *Der Tagesspiegel*, "Berlin Newspaper Circulation," 17 November 1945, 1, NACP RG 466/176/6.

³⁴⁵ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 87.

³⁴⁶ *Deutsche Volkszeitung* Verlagsleitung an das ZK der KPD, "Betrifft: Verkaufs- und Abonnementspreis der DVZ," 24 August 1945, fiche 1/5, Bestand: Walter Ulbricht, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA NY 4182/919.

³⁴⁷ Mendelssohn, "Development and Present Situation," 14 September 1945, 4, NACP RG 260/253/201

Der Berliner and 26% who read the *Allgemeine Zeitung*.³⁴⁸ Nevertheless, the Americans and British sought to resolve the *Berliner Zeitung*'s status as an unlicensed, public publication controlled by KPD Party members. The Soviets did little to help. In three-power talks on the possibility of establishing a quadripartite Berlin newspaper, the Allies agreed that such a publication would replace each occupier's overt military press in the city. The Soviets refused to cease production on their *Tägliche Rundschau*, however, because they believed that its status as a zonal newspaper warranted an exception to this plan. To complicate matters further, they also demanded that the *Berliner Zeitung* have a place on the four-power paper's advisory board. Subsequent protests over the imprecise status of the *Berliner Zeitung* prompted the Soviets to issue press license No. 388 to Herrnsstadt and Kegel on 12 February 1946. Two months later, they removed the newspaper from the ostensible control of the *Magistrat*, which made the newspaper little more than another cog in the developing German communist press monopoly.³⁴⁹

³⁴⁸ "Newspaper Questionnaire of 30 Oct 45," in General Summary of Public Opinion Surveys, October 1945-March 1946, NACP RG 260/1172/85.

³⁴⁹ One could argue that this did not formally occur until 1953, when the SED placed the *Berliner Zeitung* under the control of the local Berlin Party leadership. Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 88.

CHAPTER 4

A “DAILY REVIEW” AND THE BIRTH OF THE OVERT ZONAL PRESS

Despite obvious differences, the Soviet *Tägliche Rundschau* and the American *Die Neue Zeitung* shared several features.³⁵⁰ In addition to enjoying first-choice supplies, massive reservoirs of funding, and relatively large staffs, both hoped to serve as models for the future German-run press while simultaneously acting as mouthpieces for the dissemination of the social, political, and cultural norms of each occupier’s nation state. Interestingly, both newspapers also merged media styles. In *Die Neue Zeitung*, one sees the influence of the Weimar-era press and domestic US newspapers. The *Tägliche Rundschau* similarly aspired to be a great source for cultural discussion, but evinced stronger shades of party-state newspapers like *Pravda* or *Izvestiia*, as well as German political party newspapers such as *Vorwärts*. Finally, both were the products of wartime propaganda campaigns, and so included at least some of the rhetoric common to early postwar attempts to breed a high degree of public goodwill towards the occupying powers and to force public acknowledgement and atonement for Nazi crimes.

This chapter focuses on the *Tägliche Rundschau*, the first occupation newspaper with a zone-wide distribution. It appeared every day of the week but for Mondays between May 15, 1945 and the end of June 1955.³⁵¹ Its official purpose remained markedly static throughout its life: it was and remained an advocate for the Soviet perspective in Germany. As others have

³⁵⁰ Each of the four occupying powers published official military government newspapers for zone-wide distribution to the German population. The Soviets had the *Tägliche Rundschau*, the Americans *Die Neue Zeitung*, the British controlled *Die Welt*, and the French *Nouvelles de France*.

³⁵¹ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 40.

noted, the *Tägliche Rundschau* hoped to be more than a cudgel, despite the occasional heavy-handed article.³⁵² More important, the early *Tägliche Rundschau* was “a competent, well-made, informative and interesting newspaper,” whose editors wrote “in good, clear German.”³⁵³ To their credit, the Red Army and SMAD made no great secret of the fact that their paper represented a Soviet perspective, although they eventually removed the words “Red Army” from the paper’s masthead. What the readers did not know was that the Soviets relied heavily on its German staff to publish an ultimately successful newspaper.³⁵⁴

The Creation of the “Tägliche Rundschau”

The *Tägliche Rundschau* navigated few bureaucratic hurdles before its first printing. On May 1, the Soviets decided they should publish a German-language newspaper. Two weeks later, they launched the *Tägliche Rundschau*. Their first task was finding a suitable location. With few facilities from which to launch press operations in Berlin, Red Army troops under the

³⁵² As Peter Strunk hinted, one can gain insight into the ways by which the Red Army tempered its propaganda. For its first four issues, the *Tägliche Rundschau* was a “Front Newspaper for the German Population” (*Frontzeitung für die deutsche Bevölkerung*), before it became a “Daily Newspaper of the Red Army Command for the German Population” (*Tageszeitung des Kommandos der Roten Armee für die deutsche Bevölkerung*). On June 19, it became a “Newspaper for the German Population” (*Zeitung für die deutsche Bevölkerung*) and remained so until January 1, 1947, when it became just another “Newspaper for Politics, Economics, and Culture.” Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 41. See also Kuby, *Russians and Berlin*, 321.

³⁵³ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 57 and Peter de Mendelssohn, “Notes on the Development and Present Situation of the Berlin Press,” September 14, 1945, 3, NACP RG 260/253/201.

³⁵⁴ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 48. See, for example, Grigorij Weiss, “Ich war wieder Journalist” in ... *Einer neuen Zeit Beginn. Erinnerungen an die Anfänge unserer Kulturrevolution 1945-1949*, eds. Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED und vom Kulturbund der DDR (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1980), 557-564. esp. 559; Weiss, *Am Morgen nach dem Kriege. Erinnerungen eines sowjetischen Kulturoffiziers* (Berlin: Verlag der Nation, 1981), e.g., 11, 45, 62-65, or 226-227; and Weiss, “Damals in Berlin,” 3-79, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1838.

command of Lieutenant-General S.F. Galadshev, appropriated the least damaged site, the ruins of the *Völkischer Beobachter* plant on Zimmerstraße.³⁵⁵ Walter Ulbricht provided the Soviets with eight men to assist in the cleaning and preparation of the site. When they arrived at the plant, each “got palpitations.” The building had no windows, its doors were on the ground, and “the yard was full of crud and paint.”³⁵⁶ Conditions inside were even worse. Grigorii Lvovitch Weißpapier, aka, Weiss, the soon-to-be managing editor of the *Tägliche Rundschau*, described the noticeable lack of a staircase, a constant draft, and much of the press machinery buried “under rubble, dead bodies, and debris.”³⁵⁷ The presses even contained the final unreleased issue of the *Völkischer Beobachter*, which quoted Goebbels, “Anything is possible in this war, and we will never capitulate.”³⁵⁸ It is not difficult to imagine the victors’ grinning before they threw the issue in the bin and began setting the machines to working order.

On May 12, four days after his first group of men arrived at the plant, Ulbricht provided the Soviets with a small troupe of KPD press professionals, which included Fritz Apelt, Grete

³⁵⁵ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 40. Galadshev was the Political Chief of the First Byelorussian Front and had been involved in coordinating policy in Soviet-occupied Poznan in early 1945. See Roger Reese, *The Soviet Military Experience: A History of the Soviet Army, 1917-1991* (London: Routledge, 2000), 133-136. The paper’s editorial offices were initially at the same Lindenstraße 41 (Köpenick) building that housed the Soviet Censorship Bureau, the SMAD news bureau, and the original offices for the *Berliner Zeitung*. Soon after situating themselves at Lindenstraße, the editorial offices moved to a closer location, Göhrener Straße 11, which was only 5.4 kilometers from the Zimmerstraße plant. Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 40 and Mendelssohn, “Notes on the Development and Present Situation,” September 14, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/201.

³⁵⁶ Willi Baumbach, “Vom schweren Anfang,” 10, in *20 Jahre Druckerei Tägliche Rundschau: 20 Jahre Arbeit für die sozialistische Presse* (Berlin: Druckerei Tägliche Rundschau, no date), ed. Druckerei Tägliche Rundschau as in Bestand: Zentrage, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA DY 63/2318.

³⁵⁷ Weißpapier shortened his name to Weiss in 1949. See Schivelbusch, 200, n87.

³⁵⁸ Weiss, *Am Morgen nach dem Kriege*, 39.

Lode, Fritz Gäber, Arthur Mannbar and Rudolf Herrnstadt.³⁵⁹ At about the same time, Soviet and German technical workers cannibalized Berlin's remaining press resources, traveling first to Lankwitz and then to the former Ullstein printing factory in Tempelhof.³⁶⁰ Three days later, in the early morning of May 15, the paper's founding staff and Red Army soldiers traveled through Greater Berlin to distribute free copies of the "still wet with printer's ink" *Tägliche Rundschau*.³⁶¹

The Paper and Its Content

The first issue of the *Tägliche Rundschau* presented the important information of the day. On the right side of the front page was an announcement on food rations; to the left, a piece explaining the purpose of "Die Zeitung der Roten Armee in Berlin" – a headline that contrasted slightly with the paper's claim as a *Frontzeitung für die deutsche Bevölkerung*.³⁶² It was here that the newspaper introduced its goal "to bring the German people the truth about the Red Army and the Soviet Union, to help them to find the right path in the present political situation, to eliminate the last vestiges of Hitlerite barbarism, and to apply all energies to the rapid restoration of normal life."³⁶³ Curiously, the article reflected upon the thorny subject of the Soviet soldiers' animosities toward Germans. Noting that Red Army men and women felt a sacred (*heiligen*)

³⁵⁹ Herrnstadt left after a few days to begin work at the *Berliner Zeitung*. Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 48.

³⁶⁰ The Red Army men were a Major Idlis and Sergeant Boris Smertenko. The Germans included Willi Baumbach and two unnamed men. Willi Baumbach, "Vom schweren Anfang," 10-11, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA DY 63/2318.

³⁶¹ Kuby, *Russians and Berlin*, 322.

³⁶² "Die Zeitung der Roten Armee in Berlin" and "An die Bevölkerung der Stadt Berlin," *TR*, May 15, 1945.

³⁶³ "Die Zeitung der Roten Armee in Berlin," *TR*, May 15, 1945, and Kuby, *Russians in Berlin*, 323.

hatred for “Hitlerite war criminals,” the paper distinguished between the crimes of the Nazis and those “German people who [were] enslaved by Hitlerite despots.”³⁶⁴ It also included selections from Stalin’s July 3, 1941 radio address, in which he claimed that the Soviet Union would find “loyal allies in the peoples of Europe and America and the German people enslaved by fascist despots.”³⁶⁵ The article acknowledged that Stalin was wrong on this last count, but it still attempted to convince readers that the “Red Army came to Germany as victors, but not as oppressors (*Unterdrückeren*)” and that the *Tägliche Rundschau* would prove this by providing “the truth about the Red Army and the Soviet People.”³⁶⁶

“Truth” and the rapid restoration of normalcy were constant themes of the early *Tägliche Rundschau*.³⁶⁷ In its attempt to achieve these lofty goals, the paper often presented readers with a welter of Soviet- and Russocentric material. The first issue included articles on the final military actions of the Red Army in Germany and the eleventh meeting of the Soviet parliaments.³⁶⁸ Subsequent issues emphasized everyday Soviet life and the virtues of Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist culture, ideology, and political practice.³⁶⁹ These articles were more than just

³⁶⁴ “Die Zeitung der Roten Armee in Berlin,” *TR*, May 15, 1945.

³⁶⁵ “Die Zeitung der Roten Armee in Berlin,” *TR*, May 15, 1945 and Stalin, “Broadcast to the People of the Soviet Union, July 3, 1941,” *Soviet Russia Today* (August, 1941), 8-10.

³⁶⁶ Pike, *Politics of Culture*, 13 and “Die Zeitung der Roten Armee in Berlin,” *TR*, May 15, 1945. Western audiences are perhaps familiar more with General Eisenhower’s earlier and almost identical November 1944 claim that the United States had arrived “as conquerors, but not as oppressors.” See, for example, Michael R. Beschloss, *The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler’s Germany* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), xv or Roger Ernest Olson, *Don’t Call Me a Hero* (Victoria: Trafford, 2002), 357.

³⁶⁷ “Die Zeitung der Roten Armee in Berlin,” *TR*, May 15, 1945.

³⁶⁸ “Abschließende Operationen der Roten Armee” and “Elfte Tagung des Sowjetischen Parlaments,” *TR*, May 15, 1945.

³⁶⁹ The most exaggerated cases occurred on important anniversaries, such as the sixteen-page November 7, 1945 issue, which celebrated the Bolshevik Revolution, the heroic

blind expressions of chauvinism. They reflected a widespread belief that the defeat of the capitalist-fascist Nazi state vindicated the superiority of Marxism-Leninism. As Alexander Kirsanov, the longest-serving editor-in-chief of the *Tägliche Rundschau*, declared, “We Marxist-Leninists, on the basis of our scientific worldview, could better assess [German] development with a historical perspective.” Again quoting Kirsanov, “we Russians knew very well the ideology and mindset of German fascism [but] the fascists ... had a totally wrong idea about Soviet ideology, communist ideology, and about our social order.”³⁷⁰ Thus, the Soviets saw it as their duty to instigate dialogue on where and how Germans had gone astray, and in doing so begin to reorient German worldviews away from Nazism.

These positions informed the exposition of a second prominent theme, that of German redemption through cooperation. The paper rarely presented German-Soviet cooperation as one-sided or tried to pander to “everyday” Germans by portraying them as victims of Svengali-like masters. Rather, it emphasized the possibility that Germans could claim a place amongst the peaceable nations of the world after a sustained period of guidance and through the development of better governmental and societal institutions. Again, one can see traces of these emphases in the first issue of the *Tägliche Rundschau*. Below the introductory article, the editors included a bold-faced and bracketed translation of segments from Stalin’s victory speech of May 9, 1945.³⁷¹

The selection included Stalin’s praise for the Red Army’s “Great Victory of our people over

accomplishments of Lenin and Stalin, and social-political developments after 1917. *TR*, November 7, 1945.

³⁷⁰Kirsanow, “Abschrift: Referat Prof. Kirsanow. Rede. Veranstaltung am 15.5.1975 an der Karl-Marx-Universität, Leipzig,” May 15, 1975, 2, as in Bestand: Zentrarch, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 63/1197.

³⁷¹ “Die Zeitung der Roten Armee in Berlin,” *TR*, May 15, 1945 and Pike, *Politics of Culture*, 13.

German imperialism.” It then juxtaposed Hitler’s claim that Germany would “destroy Russia, so that she will never rise again” with the Nazi state’s utter defeat, a defeat that did not call for the complete destruction or dismemberment of Germany.³⁷²

This treatment reinforced broader Soviet information campaigns that sought to convince Germans of the truth in Stalin’s now-famous dictum that “Hitlers come and go, but the German people and the German state remain.”³⁷³ Taken from Stalin’s February 23, 1942 “Order of the Day,” the Soviets resurrected this previously ignored message in April and May 1945, plastering it on walls, columns, and windows throughout eastern Germany and Silesia.³⁷⁴ It made its appearance in the same issue of the *Tägliche Rundschau* that sacrificed Ilya Ehrenburg to the altar of public relations. This piece was a reprint of Grigorii F. Alexandrov’s April 14 *Pravda*

³⁷² Stalin, “[Untitled speech,] 9. Mai 1945,” *TR*, May 15, 1945. A better and complete translation of the speech appears in Stalin, “Ansprach des Genossen J.W. Stalin an das Volk,” *Über den Grossen Vaterländischen Krieg der Sowjetunion*, 3rd ed. (Moscow: Verlag für Fremdsprachige Literatur, 1946), 98.

³⁷³ Pike, *Politics of Culture*, 12-13. For discussions on this message in postwar popular memory as well as the context under which it appeared, see, for example, Kuby, *The Russians and Berlin*, 263; Roberts, *Stalin’s Wars*, 116; Walter Laqueur, *Russia and Germany: A Century of Conflict*, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1965, 1990), 249; Atina Grossmann, “Pronatalism, Nationbuilding, and Socialism: Population Policy in the SBZ/DDR, 1945 to 1960” in *Between Reform and Revolution: German Socialism and Communism from 1840 to 1990*, eds. David E. Barclay and Eric D. Weitz (New York: Berghahn, 1998), 444; Grossmann, “A Question of Silence: The Rape of German Women by Occupation Soldiers,” in *West Germany under Construction: Politics, Society, and Culture in the Adenauer Era*, ed. Robert G. Moeller (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 41; Naimark, *The Russians in Germany*, 76; Robert G. Moeller, *War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 53; Spilker, *East German Leadership*, 64; or Allen Welsh Dulles, *Germany’s Underground* (Cambridge, Mass.: Da Capo, 1947, 2000), 171.

³⁷⁴ Roberts, *Stalin’s Wars*, 116 and Laqueur, *Russia and Germany*, 249. It is interesting that although the Soviets gave little thought to this statement at the time of its utterance in 1942 and through the final months of the war, it at least influenced certain post-Stalinist Soviet political leaders, notably Nikita Khrushchev. See, for example, Nikita Khrushchev, *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev. Volume 3: Statesman (1953-1964)*, ed. Sergei Khrushchev, trans. George Shriver (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), 462 and 464, n28.

article in which the Propaganda Chief of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) excoriated Ehrenburg for publishing works that demanded the prosecution of “the entire population of Germany.” Alexandrov recalled Stalin’s words of February 23, and dismissed rumors of the pending extermination of all Germans for the sins of the Nazis.³⁷⁵

The editors of the *Tägliche Rundschau* hoped that messages of Soviet benevolence would elicit broad participation in reconstruction efforts and forestall any possible resistance. There were a great number of articles on “anti-Fascists” working with the Soviets to initiate land reform in fall 1945, for example.³⁷⁶ These messages began to dwindle in number by winter 1945/46, as political considerations forced a shift to topics that promoted the potential merger of the SPD and the KPD.³⁷⁷ As before, the newspaper couched its arguments in hopeful terms that attested to the Soviets’ desire to assist in the shifting of German political development away from fascism and to democratic rule.

Articles on symbiotic Soviet-German friendship often contained a fair share of obfuscation. Several issues in November 1945 included testimonies of German POWs who declared that Soviet Prison of War camps were comfortable and that they received good treatment at the hands of their captors.³⁷⁸ For those few with relatives returning from capture on the Eastern Front, such accounts undoubtedly smacked of falsehood and propaganda. Moreover, ingrained and developing perceptions of Soviet soldiers proved a constant early impediment to

³⁷⁵ G. Alexandrov, “Genosse Ehrenburg vereinfacht!” *TR*, May 16, 1945. See also Pike, *The Politics of Culture*, 12; Roberts, *Stalin’s Wars*, 264-265; and Naimark, *The Russians in Germany*.

³⁷⁶ See, for example, ICIS #12, Week Ending September 29, 1945, 13-14, NACP RG 260/250/157.

³⁷⁷ In the *Tägliche Rundschau*, this campaign began earnestly in the first week of January 1946. See “ICIS # 26, Week Ending 12 January 1946,” 19, NACP RG 260/250/157.

³⁷⁸ ICIS # 21, December 1, 1945, 13, NACP RG 260/250/157.

the success of Soviet propaganda and media messages. Years of Nazi propaganda had forwarded visions of the Soviet troops as a Mongol horde intent only on expressing their animalistic impulses, and such impressions received little benefit from the brutal actions of some Red Army troops in the conquest and early occupation of Germany. For no group was this perhaps more the case than for German women, the vast majority of who experienced little in the way of benevolent treatment at the hands of arriving Red Army troops.³⁷⁹

The experiences of eastern Germans with the Soviet military undermined printed claims of benevolence. Unsurprisingly, the *Tägliche Rundschau* generally ignored the subject of Red Army behavior in any direct way, although it did occasionally dismiss civilian complaints by juxtaposing the behavior of Red Army troops to those of the Nazis. To take just one example, General Nikolai Bersarin, the commander of troops in Berlin, reacted to growing German discontent with the Red Army by stating, “I have seen nothing in my life like the bestial way German officers and soldiers pursued the peaceful population [of the Soviet Union]. All of the destruction you have here in Germany is nothing in comparison.”³⁸⁰ This was a legitimate subject for discussion in the postwar era, but encouraging the interrogation of differences between Soviet and Nazi-German military practices in ways that were meaningful was a dangerous proposition. Instead, the *Tägliche Rundschau* printed declarations to the effect that the German people admired the “chivalric behavior” (*ritterlichen Benehmen*) of Red Army men. It also praised the activities and legacies of the Supreme Soviet, Soviet athletes, and on February

³⁷⁹ For an excellent discussion of Russian brutalities and the experiences of both Red Army regulars and German women, see Oleg Budnitskii, “The Intelligentsia Meets the Enemy: Educated Soviet Officers in Defeated Germany, 1945,” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 10:3 (Summer, 2009): 629-682

³⁸⁰ *TR*, May 22, 1945 and Naimark, “The Russians in Germany,” in *Origins of the Cold War: An International History*, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1994, 2005), 184.

23, 1946, that is, on “Red Army Day,” celebratory articles on the founding and great legacy of the Red Army.³⁸¹ In a final move of unabashed cynicism, the *Tägliche Rundschau* began publicizing stories in late 1946 on alleged rapes in the American zone in an attempt to deflect attention events that took place in their sphere of control.³⁸²

Personnel

The first editor in chief of the *Tägliche Rundschau* was the relatively unknown Colonel Mikhail Vassily (M.V.) Sokolov. German and US archives contain very little information on M.V. Sokolov, perhaps because he rarely came to work.³⁸³ Indeed, some US occupation officials thought “M.V. Sokolov” was a pseudonym for Sergei Tiulpanov.³⁸⁴ Regardless, the editor in

³⁸¹ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 53 and *TR*, 8 June 1945, January 17, 1946, and February 21 and 23, 1946.

³⁸² *TR*, October 19, 1946, November 2, 1946, November 10, 1946 and July 1, 1946; Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 103; and Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels*, 44. There were, of course, many reports of US soldiers raping German women and girls. In contrast to the Soviets, however, the crimes committed by the Americans were fewer in number and in the scale of their brutality. See Anni P. Baker, *American Soldiers Overseas: The Global Military Presence* (Westport, Con.: Greenwood, 2004), 44-45; Alice Kaplan, *The Interpreter* (New York: Free Press, 2005), 153-155; Sieglinde Reif, “Das ‘Recht des Siegers.’ Vergewaltigungen in München,” in *Zwischen den Fronten. Münchner Frauen im Krieg und Frieden 1900-1950*, ed. Sybille Kraft (Munich: Buchendorfer, 1995): 360-371; and Maria Hohn, *GIs and Frauleins: The German-American Encounter in 1950s West Germany* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).

³⁸³ Indeed, there is little mention of his actual doing anything beyond requisitioning six Philips radios and giving a speech to potential newspaper reporters. Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 43 and 48; Kuby, *Russians and Berlin*, 323; and Weiss, *Am Morgen nach dem Kriege*, 71.

³⁸⁴ Tiulpanov, for his part, did not arrive in Berlin until August 1945. Nor, for that matter, was M.V. Solokov the same person as the later *Tägliche Rundschau* editor-in-chief, Mikhail Petrovitch (M.P.) Sokolov; a claim which appears in several earlier studies of the postwar press and guidebooks on the Soviet occupation. In 1945, M.P. Sokolov was editor-in-chief of the *Deutsche Zeitung*, then head of the SMAD publishing house, SWA-Verlag through 1948. He became editor-in-chief of the *Tägliche Rundschau* in 1951. See Peter de Mendelssohn, *Zeitungsstadt*, 511-512; Kuby, *Russians and Berlin*, 321; Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 43, n42; Tjulpanow, *Deutschland nach dem Kriege*, 19; Broszat and Eber (Eds.), *SBZ-*

chief who brought shape to the newspaper was Colonel Alexander Kirsanov, the founding editor of the *Berliner Zeitung*, who transferred to the *Tägliche Rundschau* in July 1945.³⁸⁵ Kirsanov knew German, had lived in Berlin for five or six months between 1932 and 1933, and had returned to Germany a TASS correspondent in the mid- to-late 1930s.³⁸⁶ During the war, he was a battalion commander in the First Ukrainian Front, then head of the Third Byelorussian Front's Seventh Section, where he served with two of his future *Tägliche Rundschau* subordinates, Vladimir Ruban and Nikolai Bernikov.³⁸⁷ Outwardly affable, Kirsanov by all accounts was intensely dedicated to his work. Perhaps the characterization offered by Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel, who worked at the *Tägliche Rundschau* in 1948, best sums up the differing opinions of the man: "His [Kirsanov's] originality, simplicity and breadth of nature can evoke admiration just as much as the sinister watchfulness which seems to hide behind his bearish familiarity and

Handbuch, 61; the entry for "Michael Petrowitsch Sokolow" in Helmut Müller-Engbergs, Jan Wielgohs, and Dieter Hoffmann, *Wer war wer in der DDR? Ein biographisches Lexikon* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2000) at http://www.stiftung-aufarbeitung.de/service_wegweiser/personen_detail.php?ID=2293&OVERVIEW=1; and "Michael Petrowitsch Sokolow," 23, Bestand: Erinnerungen. SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1837.

³⁸⁵ The exact date of Kirsanov's assumption of the role of Editor-in-Chief of the *Tägliche Rundschau* is uncertain. Kirsanov noted only that soon after beginning operations at the *Berliner Zeitung*, Seventh Section ordered him to assume command of the *Tägliche Rundschau*. Nevertheless, after finally publishing the name of the editor-in-chief in the 30 May 1945 edition, the *Tägliche Rundschau* continued publishing Sokolov's name through the end of July. Moreover, Kirsanov ceded his editorial position to Herrnstadt on June 22, 1945, and one can presume that this was, at the latest, the point when he became editor of the *Tägliche Rundschau*. See Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 43-44; and Kirsanow, "Wie begann die *Berliner Zeitung*. Ein Beitrag für die Chronik des Berliner Verlages aus der Feder des ersten Chefredakteurs und Gründers der *Berliner Zeitung*," March 1973, 4, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA DY 63/1203; and Mendelssohn, "Notes on the Development and Present Situation," September 14, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/201.

³⁸⁶ Kirsanov's German may have been less than perfect, however, as he still required translations of articles to Russian. Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 43-44.

³⁸⁷ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 43.

small, quick eyes inspires fear.”³⁸⁸ Despite his ability to intimidate subordinates, he was also quick to praise his staff.³⁸⁹ Moreover, like many officers in the upper ranks of the Soviet occupation, he was educated and had a face that exuded “energy and an advanced intellect.”³⁹⁰

When Kirsanov assumed the reins of the *Tägliche Rundschau*, the newspaper’s operations had grown to include six separate news divisions: Foreign Affairs, Domestic Affairs, Economic Affairs, Culture, Letters to the Editor, and General News. Operational control fell largely to the newspaper’s various editors, especially Weißpapier.³⁹¹ Like Kirsanov, Weißpapier had worked for TASS. He was also a special correspondent for Soviet trust newspapers in Kuznetskstroï, Magnitostroi and the Uralmash Plant in Yekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk).³⁹² He began the war as a sub-lieutenant in a “Shooting and Construction Company” (*Schützen- und Bau-Kompanie*) of the Red Army, and then became a Political Officer in GlavPURKKA in 1945. One of the first higher press officials to arrive in Berlin to prepare for the launch of the *Tägliche Rundschau*, Weißpapier began his service as the head of the foreign and domestic affairs divisions. In short time, he became the paper’s economic affairs editor, before moving up to the position of *Chef vom Dienst* and Editorial Secretary (*Sekretär der Redaktion*) in late 1945. These

³⁸⁸ Einsiedel, *I Joined the Russians*, 260. Also in Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 44.

³⁸⁹ e.g., Einsiedel, *I Joined the Russians*, 271.

³⁹⁰ Bernt von Kügelgen as in Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 44.

³⁹¹ As anti-Semitic purges became the Soviet order of the day, Weißpapier shortened his name to Weiss in 1949 to attempt to disguise his Jewish heritage. Schivelbusch, *In a Cold Crater*, 200 n87.

³⁹² Peter Theek, “Vorwort” in Weiss, *Am Morgen nach dem Kriege*, 6-8 and Grigorij Lwowitsch Weiss, “Damals, in Berlin,” 3, as in SAPMO-BArch, ZPA SgY 30/1838.

experiences and a healthy dose of ego often led him to criticize many of his *Tägliche Rundschau* colleagues for not being “Masters of the Word.”³⁹³

Weißpapier’s work ethic was typical of many second-generation Soviet elite. He and Alexander Dymschitz, the *Tägliche Rundschau*’s 1945 cultural editor and eventual SMAD cultural officer, received their education at the German Reform School and the Institute for Art History in Leningrad, the latter of which earned the nickname “Institute for Intimidated Intelligentsia” (*Institut der eingeschüchterten Intelligenz*).³⁹⁴ Both Weißpapier and Dymschitz had foppish reputations – no great surprise given that they were fond of wearing white gloves in the mid-summer heat.³⁹⁵ Like many educated Propaganda Administration officials, Weißpapier saw no contradiction in believing he was both an intellectual and a loyal Red Army man who actively desired interaction with the German people in order to reeducate them and bring them in line with the Soviet worldview.

Higher occupation officials contributed occasional articles to the paper. At times, they did so pseudonymously, such as when Tiulpanov submitted “letters” under his *nom de plume*, “S. Thun,” or when Kirsanov and others wrote using the names “N. Orlow,” “Nesterow,” or “O. Schmidt.”³⁹⁶ These articles did more than mislead the German reader. Other newspapers in the

³⁹³ Theek, “Vorwort,” 8.

³⁹⁴ Schivelbusch, *In a Cold Crater*, 37 and Weiss, “Damals, in Berlin,” 29-31 as in SAPMO-BArch, ZPA SgY 30/1838. For Dymschitz’s career, see Hartmann, *Sowjetische Präsenz im kulturellen Leben der SBZ und frühen DDR 1945-1953*, 167-174.

³⁹⁵ Schivelbusch, *In a Cold Crater*, 37 and Weiss, “Damals, in Berlin,” 30-31 as in SAPMO-BArch, ZPA SgY 30/1838.

³⁹⁶ On “S. Thun,” see S. Thun, “Das Ergebnis der Wahlen zum Dritten Volkskongreß,” *TR*, May 29, 1949 and Tjulpanow, *Deutschland nach dem Kriege*, 133n. See also A. Thun, “Die praktischen Aufgaben für deutsch-sowjetische Freundschaft,” *TR*, July 9, 1949. For “N. Orlow,” “Nesterow,” and “O. Schmidt,” see Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 43. The use of the latter name, “Schmidt,” also may have appeared in the pages of the SED’s *Neues Deutschland*. See Lex Ende

SBZ often quoted from or reprinted pieces written by “N. Orlow.”³⁹⁷ Indeed, the SED Central Committee met to discuss “Orlow’s” writings in the early 1950s and the U.S. government referenced “N. Orlow” in intelligence assessments of the early GDR.³⁹⁸

In many ways, the *Tägliche Rundschau* built itself on the shoulders of its native German personnel. One of Weißpapier’s replacements as Foreign Affairs editor was a young German-born Red Army lieutenant, Stefan Doernberg.³⁹⁹ Doernberg’s Jewish-born parents had fled to the Soviet Union in 1935, and Stefan joined the Red Army after the German attack in 1941. He

and *Neues Deutschland*, “Manuskripteingang für Nr. 96 Wahlbeilage,” 16 August 1946, 10, in Fond: Lex Ende. Arbeitsmaterialien und Materialsammlung aus seiner Tätigkeit als Chefredakteur beim “ND.” Zeit: Juli 1946-Juli 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4070/5. Cf. Verband der Deutschen Presse im FDGB, “Bericht über die 1. Mitglieder-Versammlung am 7. April 1946 in Ratskeller des Schöneberger Rathauses,” April 7, 1946, 19, in Fond: Lex Ende. Materialsammlung aus seiner Mitgliedschaft beim Deutschen Presseverband. Zeit: April 1946 – Febr. 1950, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4070/7.

³⁹⁷ The editors of *Neues Deutschland* seemed to know that “N. Orlow” was a high Soviet official. See “SED Informationen, Friedensvertrag-Reparationen, abgeschlossen am 10. Juli 1948,” July 10, 1948, 6, Fiche No. 3, in Bestand: Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands. Zentralkomitee. Propaganda, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/9.03/8; Deutscher Volksrat, Sekretariat – Abteilung II. Pressestelle, Pressehinweise, “Berlin, den 25. August 1949,” August 25, 1949, in Presseschau des Deutschen Volksrats, 1949, in Bundesarchiv, Abteilung DDR, DA 1/262; N. Orlow, “Unerfreuliche Ergebnisse,” *TR*, July 17, 1947; HICOG, Eastern Element, Berlin to Department of State, Washington, D.C., “N. Orlow Reviews Objectives and Assesses Preliminary Results of Unity Campaign,” in Foreign Service Post of the Department of State, US High Commission for German, Berlin Section, Eastern Affairs Division, Security – Segregated General Records, NACP RG 466/168/1/351.2, which notes the republication of a November 18, 1951, “N. Orlow” article from the *Tägliche Rundschau* in the pages of the November 20, 1951 edition of *Neues Deutschland*; N. Orlow, “Über die friedliche Vereinigung Deutschlands,” *TR*, November 18, 1951; or N. Orlow, “Über die friedliche Vereinigung Deutschlands,” *Neues Deutschland* (hereafter, *ND*) November 20, 1951.

³⁹⁸ ZK der SED, “Bericht über die Besprechung am 26.1.51 über die Artikel von Orlow in der *Täglichen Rundschau* vom 20. und 21. Januar 1951, Ende: 12:15 Uhr” January 26, 1951, 269-283, Fiche No. 4, in Bestand: Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands. Zentralkomitee. Kultur, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/9.06/299 and HICOG, Eastern Element, Berlin to Department of State, Washington, D.C., “N. Orlow Reviews Objectives and Assesses Preliminary Results of Unity Campaign,” November 26, 1951 in NACP RG 466/168/1/351, 2.

³⁹⁹ Doernberg followed Weißpapier’s first replacement, Viktor S. Pestov, after Pestov became deputy editor in chief of the *Tägliche Rundschau*.

became a founding reporter at the *Tägliche Rundschau*, and rose fast to the position of Foreign Affairs editor. At the same time, he was a correspondent for Moscow Radio and took correspondence courses in history at Lomonosov University in Moscow. Doernberg later received his doctorate, rose to the position of Director of the East German Institute for Contemporary History and became a scholarly celebrity in the East German state.⁴⁰⁰

In May 1945 came the first attempt to build the German staff. Roughly 200 German “writers, journalists, painters, actors, and musicians” attended a recruitment session in Wilmersdorf, curious about the prospect of employment with the Soviet occupiers. Tellingly, the announcement for the session appeared in the same issue as an elaborate memorial to Carl von Ossietzky, Kurt Tucholsky, Stefan Zweig, and others. Indeed, as Weißpapier claimed, the Soviets chose a location in Wilmersdorf as much for the fact that it survived the bombings as for its traditional community of “the creative intelligentsia.”⁴⁰¹

M.V. Sokolov stood before this gathering and announced the “three basic principles of cultural policy in the Soviet zone”: the relentless fight against Nazism; the need for German participation in the “spiritual rebirth of the nation”; and exposure to the realities of Soviet and world cultures after years of fascist deprivation. The skeptical audience overwhelmed Sokolov with questions. One of the more distrusting attendees was “an exotic looking German,” who wore sunglasses, a bow tie, and possessed a stark red beard, who shouted, “Tell us, when will the trucks roll in? When do [we] go to the cattle cars and then to Siberia?” The speaker dared

⁴⁰⁰ Entry for “Doernberg, Stefan,” in Helmut Müller-Engbergs, Jan Wielgoths, Dieter Hoffman, and Andreas Herbst (Eds.), *Wer war wer in der DDR. Ein Lexikon ostdeutscher Biographie* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2006), online at http://www.stiftung-aufarbeitung.de/service_wegweiser/personen_detail.php?ID=403, last accessed March 4, 2008. For more see Dorpalen, *German History in Marxist Perspective*, 522.

⁴⁰¹ “Der Faschismus hat sie gemordet,” *TR*, May 27, 1945; Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 48; and Weiss, *Am Morgen nach dem Kriege*, 71.

Sokolov to “Do what you plan, but torture us no longer.” The hall became silent, but Sokolov assured the man that the Soviets did not need to force Germans to work at the newspaper. “Red beard” asked to leave, and Sokolov responded, “Nobody chases you away, [and] nobody holds you back.”⁴⁰² The meeting continued, but at the end of the day the *Tägliche Rundschau* managed to recruit only a few of the 200 Germans in attendance.

Their relative lack of success at Wilmersdorf led the Soviets to abandon mass recruitment schemes. Over the next few months and years, most non-Soviet journalists of the *Tägliche Rundschau* were German POWs who returned from *antifa* schools or journalists who came to the paper’s offices of their accord.⁴⁰³ In mid-summer 1945, the news division editor Sigismund Epstein managed to recruit a few journalists.⁴⁰⁴ Epstein claimed publicly that he was willing to hire any German man or woman who had not been a member of the Nazi Party, but this was not strictly true.⁴⁰⁵ American officers in Berlin determined that he utilized a network of reporters established by Alfred Gerigk, a journalist for the CDU’s *Neue Zeit* and a former affiliate of the Nazi-controlled *Deutscher Verlag*.⁴⁰⁶

⁴⁰² Weiss, *Am Morgen nach dem Kriege*, 71-73.

⁴⁰³ Weiss, *Am Morgen nach dem Kriege*, 73-74.

⁴⁰⁴ Epstein transferred to the *TR* after the dissolution of Dresden’s *Tageszeitung*. Mendelssohn, “Notes on the Development and Present Situation,” September 14, 1945, 2-3, NACP RG 260/253/201.

⁴⁰⁵ Mendelssohn, “Notes on the Development and Present Situation,” September 14, 1945, 2-3, NACP RG 260/253/201.

⁴⁰⁶ Mendelssohn, “Notes on the Development and Present Situation,” September 14, 1945, 2, NACP RG 260/253/201. Gerigk’s term with the *Neue Zeit* proved short-lived. By April 1946, he was merely a freelance journalist within Berlin. However, this change in status did not prevent him from being a founding member of the Soviet-sponsored *Verband der Deutschen Presse im FDGB*, the “German Press Association” that was under the FDGB. See *Verband der Deutschen Presse im FDGB*, “Bericht über die 1. Mitglieder-Versammlung,” 19, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4070/7.

Epstein's relationship with Gerigk was not an isolated case. The *Tägliche Rundschau* often violated Four-Power Occupation policies that prohibited hiring former Nazis and fellow travelers. Of its first four German secretaries, one had worked for the *Pariser Zeitung*, the Nazis' occupation newspaper in Paris, while the other had been a stenographer at the Nuremberg Party rallies. When asked if she wanted to work for the *Tägliche Rundschau* out of political convictions, the *Pariser Zeitung* secretary replied, "I am no Communist and you're not going to turn me into one either, but I'm hungry." She became the newspaper's senior secretary.⁴⁰⁷ Similarly, the reporter Theodore Schulze-Walden had unsuccessfully tried to join the NSDAP and had been editor in chief of the *Dresdener Neuesten Nachrichten* throughout the entire Nazi period. After the Soviet victory, he assisted the Red Army in the publication of Dresden's *Tageszeitung* before moving to the *Tägliche Rundschau* in mid-summer 1945.⁴⁰⁸

The Soviets also forgave some journalists for being members of the Nazi Party and some of its most nefarious organizations. The case of Hans Walter Aust is the most egregious example of this phenomenon in action. A former *Der Volkswirt* and *Das Schwarze Korps* journalist, Aust was also a member of the SD (*Sicherheitsdienst*). In 1942, he was arrested for allegedly questioning the nature of Hitler's relationship to Eva Braun. He joined the *Tägliche Rundschau* almost immediately after the Wilmersdorf meeting.⁴⁰⁹ In his memoir, Weißpapier praised Aust

⁴⁰⁷ Kuby, *Russians and Berlin*, 322.

⁴⁰⁸ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 49. Schulze-Walden eventually became a well-known radio commentator in the GDR. Weiss, "Damals in Berlin," 19, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1838 and "Michael Petrowitsch Sokolow," 25, in SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1837.

⁴⁰⁹ Weiss, "Damals in Berlin," 68-69, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1838; Lothar Machtan, *The Hidden Hitler*, trans. John Brownjohn (New York: Basic, 2001), 224; and Kuby, *Russians and Berlin*, 322. See also Herf, *Divided Memory*, 188; Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 49; David Kaufman, "The Nazi Legacy: Coming to Terms with the Past," in Peter James (ed.), *Modern Germany: Politics, Society and Culture* (London: Routledge, 1998), 127; or Maurice J. Goldbloom, "Central Europe: East Germany, Political Developments," *American Jewish*

for his excellent reporting, proud demeanor, and loyalty to the “German working people.” Weißpapier was so thoroughly smitten that he expressed pity that Aust could not “continue with journalism” during the two years of his incarceration under the Nazi state. Aust’s past was no great secret, however. One morning in 1946 or 1947, Aust ran into Weißpapier’s office looking gaunt and scared. He brought with him a stack of anonymous cards and letters, all of which threatened him with death for his Nazi past. Rather than dismiss Aust outright, the newspaper provided him with personal security and a “comfortable little villa” in Rahnsdorf.⁴¹⁰

Politically unacceptable hires occasionally benefit the newspaper in surprising ways. In a twist that was possible only during the early postwar occupation, a former staffer of Goebbels’s *Das Reich* likely saved the newspaper’s leadership from probable retribution at the hands of the Kremlin. The story involved the top proofreader (*Korrektor*) at the *Tägliche Rundschau*, a man who had worked for the *Vossische Zeitung*, *Berliner Anzeiger*, and *Das Reich*. This *Korrektor* remained unexceptional until mid-January 1946 when the journalist Margarita Karlowna Mikhailova wrote an article on Lenin in anticipation of the January 21 anniversary of his death. The editors had approved the article and sent it to the publisher for printing. Soon thereafter, the *Korrektor* burst from his office and informed the editors that the article included claims that still-alive Politburo members had died. The editors stopped the presses and rewrote the story.

Yearbook 70 (1969), 382.

⁴¹⁰ Weiss, “Damals in Berlin,” esp. 67-71, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1838. In time, Aust left the *Tägliche Rundschau* to assume editorial control over the GDR policy journal *Deutsche Außenpolitik*. He was also central to the internal SED campaign to prevent the full publication of W.E.B. Du Bois’s 1958 lecture at Humboldt University. Herf, *Divided Memory*, 188; Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 49; Kaufman, “The Nazi Legacy,” 127; and Hamilton Beck, “Censoring Your Ally: W.E.B. Du Bois in the German Democratic Republic,” in David McBride, Leroy Hopkins, and C. Aisha Blackshire-Belay, *Crosscurrents: African-Americans, Africa, and Germany in the Modern World* (Columbia, S.C.: Camden House, 1998), 197-232 212-213.

Weißpapier, in a particular underestimation, declared, “Had this error not been noticed, it would have been very bad for many of us.”⁴¹¹

Exceptions aside, most of the paper’s German personnel were convinced communists. The self-taught *Arbeiterkorrespondent* Karl Grünberg, for example, had been an editor for the KPD’s *Rote Fahne* and the author of the novel *Brennende Ruhr*. After the Nazis burned his books in May 1933, Grünberg spent some time at Sonnenberg prison.⁴¹² In late spring 1945, he arrived dramatically at the editorial offices of the *Tägliche Rundschau* “with an empty stomach [and appearing] ragged, but full of energy” to join in the spread of the “steadfast principles of the Marxist-Leninist Party.” He became invaluable to the paper’s coverage of cultural affairs, and the Soviets saw him as just another “nice, warm ... proletarian writer.” He left the *Tägliche Rundschau* in 1947 or 1948 to work for the SED’s *Neues Deutschland*.⁴¹³

⁴¹¹ Weiss, “Damals in Berlin,” 20-21, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1838.

⁴¹² Karl Grünberg, *Brennende Ruhr. Ein Roman aus dem Kapp-Putsch* (Rudolstadt: Greifenverlag, 1929); Hans-Erich Korbsschmitt (Dir.), *Brennende Ruhr* (Berlin: DEFA, 1967); Volker Weidermann, *Das Buch der verbrannten Bücher* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2008), 123-125; and “Erinnerungen: Karl Grünberg,” in Bestand: Erinnerungen, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1116. For an excellent analysis of *Brennende Ruhr*, see George L. Mosse, *The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 129-132.

⁴¹³ Tjulpanow, *Deutschland nach dem Kriege*, 77; Weiss, “Damals in Berlin,” 19, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1838; and Grünberg, “Entschiessungen der SED-Schriftstellertagung vom 8. und 9. April 1948. Der Kulturabteilung zur Bearbeitung überwiesen,” April 1948, 68, folder No. 2 (Bl. 46-74) in Fond: Lex Ende. Arbeitsmaterialien und Materialsammlung aus seiner Tätigkeit als Chefredakteur beim “ND,” Juli 1946 – Juli 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4070/5. Grünberg remained active in East German literary circles, and wrote a celebrated play, *Golden fließt der Stahl* (“Golden Flows the Steel”) in 1949. His early postwar works exerted a powerful influence on GDR literature and was a model for many authors, including Erich Neutsch. See Günther Erken, Rolf Rohmer, Werner Gommlich, Gunter Kaiser, Joachim Näther, Horst Seeger, Käthe Seelig, Peter Ullrich, and Wolfgang Wöhlert, “German Democratic Republic,” in Don Rubin, Péter Nagy, and Philippe Rouyer (Eds.) *The World Encyclopedia of Contemporary Theatre* (London: Routledge, 1994, 2001), 361 and Joshua Feinstein, *The Triumph of the Ordinary: Depictions of Daily Life in East German Cinema, 1949-1989* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 186.

The *Tägliche Rundschau* also employed non-political Germans, many of whom joined out of liberal democratic convictions, a desire to participate in reconstruction and to cooperate with the Soviets, or a desire for a position in the emerging postwar press. The latter was certainly the case with Desider Kisch, a former Berlin correspondent for the liberal Hungarian newspaper, *Pester Lloyd*.⁴¹⁴ Kisch was a “journalist of great skill” who demonstrated his ability to “edit [and] invent witty, humorous headlines,” but he fought with his editors on a regular basis. According to Weißpapier, Kisch wanted the Soviet occupation newspaper to become a sensationalist scandal rag (*Skandal Chronik*) that focused less on political affairs, significant events or “accuracy” in order to leave room for “juicy stories.” Kisch apparently believed that the majority of readers lived by their passions, whereas Weißpapier’s Marxist-Leninist perspective dictated against using newspapers as “a leash.” There were several more minor disputes, which culminated in a piece on the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. In his column, Kisch expressed admiration for Manhattan Project scientists, evoked no sympathy for the victims, and declared, “wars on earth are at an end.” The *Tägliche Rundschau* ran a “dry” TASS story in the corner of the second column, and Kisch’s contribution never saw the light of day. He left the newspaper the next day and found work for a US news agency in Berlin.⁴¹⁵

Tägliche Rundschau personnel also varied in style. There were those similar to the German reporter Fritz Siegel, who could “harm a person’s soul with a harsh word.” Despite his character flaws and the annoying fact that his editors never saw him “consumed by creative agonies,” his writing commanded the attention of a broad readership and he always exhibited a

⁴¹⁴ Not to be confused with Egon Erwin Kisch, who also wrote for *Pester Lloyd*. Humorously, Desider Kisch introduced himself to Weißpapier with the words “I am Kisch ... but unfortunately not Egon Erwin Kisch.” Weiss, “Damals in Berlin,” 24, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1838

⁴¹⁵ Weiss, “Damals in Berlin,” 25-29, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1838.

sharp wit.⁴¹⁶ There were also those like the young, “round-cheeked and good-natured” former NKFD member, Werner Mußler. A regular “*Hans Dampf in allen Gassen*” (roughly, “jack of all trades”), Mußler grew up “in the bosom of the educated German intelligentsia” but came to his own at the *Tägliche Rundschau*.⁴¹⁷ He began as an editorial assistant and was soon publishing his own editorials. Tellingly, one of his better pieces claimed that the introduction of Soviet newspaper norms had successfully taught Germans to accept the universality and correctness of the Soviet worldview.⁴¹⁸

By 1947, the ratio of German employees to Soviet employees had increased from 1:10 to more than 3.5: 1.⁴¹⁹ The paper’s staff and contributors included future cultural luminaries of the GDR, such as Johannes Becher, and well-known writers of the age, including Hans Fallada. The newspaper even managed to attract writers and editors from the West, most notably Karl Adalbert, an editor of the US-licensed *Tagesspiegel*, who moved to the Soviet Zone in fall 1945 (before fleeing back to the west in 1953), and later Stefan Heym and Emil Carlebach, of *Die Neue Zeitung* and the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, respectively. Most of the staff was neither outstanding nor completely incompetent. Instead, they were a “fairly colorful conglomerate ... complicated, difficult, [and] all the more interesting because of it.”⁴²⁰

⁴¹⁶ Weiss, “Damals in Berlin,” 10-11, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1838.

⁴¹⁷ Weiss, “Damals in Berlin,” 6, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1838.

⁴¹⁸ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 58 and n140. After leaving the *Tägliche Rundschau*, Mußler received his doctorate in History and became the head of the *Akademie Verlag der DDR*. Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 49, n83 and Weiss, “Damals in Berlin,” 9, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1838.

⁴¹⁹ In 1947, there were only 70 Soviets on staff and about 250 Germans, whereas in mid-1945 there were only 18 Germans to more than 180 Soviets. Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 51.

⁴²⁰ Weiss, “Damals in Berlin,” 5, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1838.

“Letutschka” and the Reception
of Soviet “Friendship”

By most accounts, the German staff found their experiences at the *Tägliche Rundschau* challenging but convivial. Fear of arrest at the hands of the NKVD was certainly a factor, but the Soviet editors also tried create close working relationships between the Soviet and German staffs.⁴²¹ Their principal means of creating bonds between politically different employees and indoctrinating occasionally skeptical German workers into the Soviet fold was to employ the wartime concept of the *Letutschka* to the postwar newsroom.⁴²²

Literally a flyer, a briefing, or a “flying editorial meeting,” the term *Letutschka* originally appeared in Vladimir Mayakovsky’s poem *150,000, -000* (1919-1920). It refers to a timely flyer with little but relevant information or a “flying” meeting on an important topic.⁴²³ In Soviet press culture, the term becomes even more confusing. Weißpapier, who apparently utilized this word more than most, even gave up trying to define it in one of his postwar memoirs by stating that *Letutschka* was “well known to our German colleagues, the journalists in the GDR.”⁴²⁴ Practically speaker, *letutschka* required regular *letutschki*, meetings at which all journalists and editors undertook “*post mortem*” discussions and planned future issues.⁴²⁵ These meetings

⁴²¹ There were a significant number of arrests in 1949 and a few later in the post-occupation era, such as the arrest and sudden disappearance of the then-chief of the cultural affairs department, Gustav Leuteritz, in 1952. Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 49.

⁴²² In its Latinate form, the word also appears as *letuchka*. As this study focuses upon the German application of the term, I will use the Germanic-Latinate spelling.

⁴²³ My thanks to Jeffrey Brooks for his explanation of this term. Robert Williams e-mail correspondence with Jeffrey Brooks, 16 September 2007.

⁴²⁴ Weiss, “Damals in Berlin,” 75, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1838.

⁴²⁵ Rudolf Schlesinger, “Problems of the Soviet Press as Illustrated by the Soviet Journalists’ Monthly Sovetskaya Pechat,” *Soviet Studies* 9:2 (1957), 228 and Weiss, “Damals in Berlin,” 72, 75-77, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1838.

occurred every other day at a large table draped in a green cloth. There were no assigned seats and latecomers stood along the walls. Poorly run, they took considerable time, were occasionally stormy, but were “always instructive.”⁴²⁶ A *letutschka* was not just a top-down gathering, with editors informing journalists of the propaganda message of the day; it was also a forum for the general staff to express their opinions on which stories deserved coverage, to find flaws in editorial plans, and to air grievances.⁴²⁷ Instruction underlay each meeting, insofar as the practice allowed the Soviets the opportunity to understand perceived German needs and for the German staff learn the demands and needs of their Soviet occupiers. To achieve the latter, the *letutschka* acted as a “school of life,” one that tested the temperament and character of the German staff and allowed the Soviets to determine the actors who would play a role in the reformation of the German character.⁴²⁸

Letutschki certainly allowed the Soviets to consolidate the talents of their staff and pare away malcontents, but they did not make the halls of the *Tägliche Rundschau* an Avalon bereft of conflict. Even in Weißpapier’s romanticized memories of “the atmosphere that prevailed in the newspaper [and] the relations between German and Soviet counterparts” he admitted that there were tensions at the newspaper.⁴²⁹ On occasion, the source of this tension was Weißpapier’s short temper and “distinct sense of justice.” Accounts of Weißpapier’s personality

⁴²⁶ Weiss, “Damals in Berlin,” 76, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1838.

⁴²⁷ Weiss, “Damals in Berlin,” 76-77, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1838. In the Soviet Union, it appears that *letutschki* were different from the occupied-German variety. At these meetings, Soviet editors informed the staff of what they needed to cover and how to cover it, with very little room for discussion. See Schlesinger, “Problems of the Soviet Press,” 228-229.

⁴²⁸ Weiss, “Damals in Berlin,” 79, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1838 and Alexander Abusch, *Einer neuen Zeit Beginn. Erinnerungen an die Anfänge unserer Kulturrevolution 1945-1949* (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1980), 563.

⁴²⁹ Weiss, “Damals in Berlin,” 4, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1838.

vacillate between those who saw him as a collegial soul and those who saw him as a duplicitous, “foaming at the mouth” communist who attacked anyone with the audacity to disagree with him.⁴³⁰ At other times, unease arose out of patron-client relationships. Finally, a less obvious source of conflict and strife stemmed from the staff’s mission to provide the “truth” to the German people as a means of reeducation.

Einsiedel’s memoir suggests that these three forces often coincided. In contrast to the rosy portraits that appear in the writings of Tiulpanov, Kirsanov, Weißpapier, and lesser-known *Tägliche Rundschau* correspondents, Einsiedel remembered an editorial office rife with tension, with each journalist and editor afraid to speak up, lest he or she become the next victim of the seemingly omnipresent NKVD.⁴³¹ In one case, Einsiedel refused to write a report about the arrival of “the alleged 500,000th German” returning from a Soviet POW camp. He remarked to a Soviet colleague, “the Russians should take the consequences for their treatment of the prisoner-of-war issue.” His colleague advised caution and suggested that many Soviet staff members

⁴³⁰ Einsiedel, *I Joined the Russians*, 260; Weiss, “Damals in Berlin,” SAPMO-BArch, ZPA SgY 30/1838 or Weiss, *Am Morgen nach dem Kriege*, op cit. Support for his claims, however, appears from time to time. See, for example, the direct assertions of Theek, “Vorwort,” 6-14 or more oblique references such as Stefan Doernberg, “Die Tätigkeit der Sowjetischen Militärverwaltung – deutsch-sowjetische Freundschaft in Aktion,” in Alfred Anderle (ed.), *Zwei Jahrzehnte deutsch-sowjetische Beziehungen 1945-1946. Beiträge von einem Kollektiv beim Institut für Geschichte der Völker der UdSSR an der Martin-Luther Universität Halle* (Berlin: Staatsverlag der DDR, 1965), esp. 37.

⁴³¹ Cf. Abusch, *Einer neuen Zeit Beginn*, op cit.; Weiss, “Damals in Berlin,” SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1838; Weiss, *Am Morgen nach dem Kriege*, op cit.; Kirsanow, “Rede. Veranstaltung am 15.5.1975 an des Karl-Marx-Universität, Leipzig,” 15 May 1975, 1-9, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 63/1197; W. Broder, “Überskr: Anatoli Viktoowitsch Schnittke,” 14 March 1972, 68-74, as in Bestand: Erinnerungen: Anatol Schnittke, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 19/51; Druckerei Tägliche Rundschau, *20 Jahre Druckerei Tägliche Rundschau. 20 Jahre Arbeit für die sozialistische Presse* (Berlin: Druckerei Tägliche Rundschau, no date [after 1970]), 2, as in Bestand: Zentrag, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 63/2318; or B. Schliebe, “Geschichten zur Geschichte: Für das neue Leben neue Zeitungen,” *Zentrag-Information* 4:84 (23 February 1984),” Folder: Betriebsgeschichte: Tägliche Rundschau Verlag, Druckerei, in Bestand: Zentrag, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA DY 63/1197.

thought Einsiedel was “an agent provocateur of the NKVD” out to bait them into criticizing the Soviet Union. Einsiedel also remembered a particularly illuminating *letutschka*. The topic of the day concerned a SMAD directive that SOVZON residents could not send packages to the western zones of occupation. Einsiedel claimed that no one on staff wanted to write a commentary in support of this measure, likely because they knew it would prove unpopular with the civilian population. Facing largely silent deliberations over how best to handle this directive, Weißpapier “jumped up from his seat” and declared, “This is a blow to the saboteurs of the new order who want to plunder the Eastern zone ... [and will] unite Germany, because now people will see how poor the Western zone is and how rich the Eastern.” In response, the “Russian department heads shook their heads or looked down in embarrassment,” while the reporter charged with writing the story received mocking smiles from his colleagues.⁴³² To Einsiedel, this was proof that the paper was a world where “friend and foe become indistinguishable.”⁴³³

Whether the newspaper staff felt a unified purpose is relatively immaterial when one considers the reach of the *Tägliche Rundschau*. SMAD’s decision to transform the *Tägliche Rundschau* from a Berlin newspaper to a zonal press throughout the SBZ afforded the Soviets the opportunity to centralize control over their own media while simultaneously expanding their audience and reach. The newspaper increased its circulation to 600,000 copies per issue by November 1945 and then to 800,000 by March 1946.⁴³⁴ Approximately 40 percent of copies remained in Greater Berlin and the rest went to the provinces.⁴³⁵ Distribution of the paper

⁴³² Einsiedel, *I Joined the Russians*, 256

⁴³³ Einsiedel, *I Joined the Russians*, 261.

⁴³⁴ Peter J. Fliess, “Berlin Newspaper Circulation,” November 17, 1945, NACP RG 466/176/6 and Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 57-58.

⁴³⁵ Fliess, “Berlin Newspaper Circulation,” November 17, 1945, NACP RG 466/176/6.

peaked at around 950,000 copies per issue in 1947. By early 1949, however, the editors reduced the number of weekday issues by 50,000 copies.⁴³⁶

Many Berliners gravitated to the “clean and proper” *Tägliche Rundschau* in mid-1945 over the poorly printed publications of the Magistrat, the KPD, or the SPD.⁴³⁷ Things began to change after the appearance of the American’s *Allgemeine Zeitung*, the licensed *Der Tagesspiegel*, and the British-run *Der Berliner*. Though these papers only appeared thrice weekly, on alternating days, Berliners flocked to the western press. Public opinion polls undertaken by the U.S. Military in October 1945 suggest that, with even more choices available to them, 26% of Berliners chose to read the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, followed by *Der Berliner* (18%) and then the *Berliner Zeitung* (10%). These results appeared despite the fact that 11% of respondents self-identified with the KPD and another 36% with the SPD. Of those claiming KPD-affiliation, a full 50% claimed they read the KPD’s *Deutsche Volkszeitung* more than any other paper. SPD men and women read the *Allgemeine Zeitung* 25% of the time, while “unpolitical” respondents chose *Der Berliner* over other papers. The *Tägliche Rundschau* failed to receive mention other than in response to the question “Which paper don’t you ever buy?” Here, 22% claimed they did not read the *Deutsche Volkszeitung*, while another 19% of respondents claimed their disinterest or revulsion for the SMAD organ.⁴³⁸ When asked again in February 1946, a similar sample claimed they read *Der Tagesspiegel* more than any other “Berlin paper” (29%), while only 9% claimed they read the *Tägliche Rundschau*; a figure all the

⁴³⁶ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 58, 60-61.

⁴³⁷ Verlagsleitung der *Berliner Zeitung* und *Deutsche Volkszeitung* to Firma H. Müller & Sohn, z.Hd. Herrn Steves, 24 Juni 1945, Fiche No. 1, in Bestand: Sozialistisches Einheitspartei Deutschlands, Zentralkomitee, ZPKK, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA DY 30/IV 2/4/388.

⁴³⁸ “Newspaper Questionnaire of 30 October 1945,” in *General Summary of Public Opinion Surveys* [Berlin], NACP RG 260/1172/85.

more troubling for SMAD considering that 32% claimed they read the US Military's *Die Neue Zeitung*.⁴³⁹

By this point, however, the *Tägliche Rundschau* had already established itself as one of the dominant models for the emerging eastern zone press. While its influence eventually paled in comparison to that of *Neues Deutschland*, it nevertheless acted as a site for the training of future GDR media luminaries and set the tone for discussions on the Soviet contribution to postwar peace. The paper's control of its content, its development of the themes of a communist struggle that shared a common goal with the wants of the German people, and its ability to mold the thinking of journalists who sought to promote the "truth" received later refinement in the developing KPD/SED press. At the same time, however, the degree to which the *Tägliche Rundschau* remained the most visible newspaper in the Soviet Zone made it a target for the observations of US information control and intelligence authorities. As discussed later, it also remained largely non-confrontational in its first year of publication. This fact and an excessive American focus on the Soviet newspaper led OMGUS underestimate the antagonistic rhetoric that emanated from German communist circles in the SBZ.

⁴³⁹ "Survey of Political Trends, 21 February 1946," in *General Summary of Public Opinion Surveys* [Berlin], NACP RG 260/1172/85.

CHAPTER 5

THE “NEW NEWSPAPER” AND THE AMERICAN ZONAL PRESS

In late-June 1945, Hans Habe reacted to the decline of military government newspapers by campaigning for the maintenance of an overt U.S. Military press. He premised this campaign on the assertion that licensed publications would not create the conditions necessary to “lead Germany into the family of free people.”⁴⁴⁰ He called for the development of an overt U.S. occupation newspaper for zonal distribution that required an all-German staff under the direction of American émigré German-speaking editors. This arrangement, so Habe argued, would lead to a newspaper that was both familiar to German readers and acceptable to U.S. press norms.⁴⁴¹

Many within PWD-ICD viewed this proposal with some skepticism. As they saw it, the goals of reeducation and reconstruction required steps that would convince the occupied public that the press was a legitimate and native medium. Ostensibly destined for failure, Habe’s proposal received little mention until plans for a quadripartite newspaper in Berlin broke down in the face of French reluctance to centralize media control and Soviet refusal to phase out the *Tägliche Rundschau*.⁴⁴² After they reviewed a revised version of Habe’s proposal, PWD agreed to the publication of an official zonal newspaper on the assumption that it would serve as a reminder that the occupying authorities could replace the licensed press, be a model of a free and

⁴⁴⁰ Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 24-25, n32.

⁴⁴¹ Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 25.

⁴⁴² Lt. Col. F.N. Leonard, Information Services Control Section, US HQ Berlin District to Chief of Staff, US Hq. Berlin District, “A Combined Overt Newspaper,” August 7, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/201; Hartenian, *Controlling Information*, 79; USGCC, “§12.c. Press: Forecast of conditions” in “Special Report,” July 16, 1945, 3-4, NACP RG 260/247/75; and ICD USFET thru G-4 Installations Branch, “Use of Volkischer [sic] Beobachter Plant in Munich,” August 8, 1945, 1-2, NACP RG 260/253/197.

democratic press, support reeducation programs, and act as a site for the training of future press professionals.⁴⁴³

Luther Conant, the chief of ICD Press Licensing and Control, considered the zonal newspaper to be a mere supplement, “in case we have something to say.”⁴⁴⁴ James Chesnutt, then the chief of the Press Section, felt the paper’s zone-wide distribution and relatively rich resources far exceeded those of the licensed press and disadvantaged German newspapers. Chesnutt also lambasted the notion that Habe’s newspaper would “provide the means for the full dissemination of all official notices.” By law, the licensed press had to print such announcements, as was the premise the newspaper would project US authority. After all, “the Germans will realize that the occupying authority remains on German soil with or without such a newspaper.”⁴⁴⁵ These concerns had merit. Before the first printing, the 6871st DISCC reduced *Die Neue Zeitung*’s distribution in Frankfurt out of concern that the paper’s “great advantages” were counterproductive to the fortunes of the licensed press, and issued a separate protest over Habe’s promise to pay Frankfurt’s *DNZ* distributor an income of RM 6,000. Such a salary was more than six times that of the licensed editors of the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, and more than enough to make the distributor an “important power in the newspaper world.”⁴⁴⁶ Similar

⁴⁴³ Lt. Col. William H. Kinard, Chief, Plans and Directives Section, USFET, ICD to Colonel C.H. Powell, “Zonal US Newspaper,” September 21, 1945, 1, NACP RG 260/253/197. See also Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 26; Hurwitz, *Stunde Null*, 112-113; and Lt. Col. James G. Chesnutt, Chief, Press Section, 6871st DISCC to Commanding Officer, 6871 DISCC, “United States Zonal Newspaper,” October 13, 1945, 1-2, NACP RG 260/253/197.

⁴⁴⁴ Hurwitz, “Interview with Hans Habe,” January 23, 1950, 2, NACP RG 260/118/459.

⁴⁴⁵ Chesnutt, “United States Zonal Newspaper,” October 13, 1945, 2, NACP RG 260/253/197.

⁴⁴⁶ Cedric Belfrage to Commanding Officer ICD, USFET (Attn. Chief of Press Section) and Commanding Officer 6871st DISCC (Attn. Lt. Col. Chesnutt and Major Smith), “Distribution of overt paper,” October 1, 1945, NACP 260/1495/1214.

anxieties beset the mayor's office in Munich, which objected to the newspaper's use of only one distribution house in a city that had three at its disposal.⁴⁴⁷

Despite such detractors, Habe built a newspaper in his own image. With the exception of William Konecky, the captain in charge of technical concerns, every leading staff member was a US soldier born in Germany, Austria, or Hungary. This group of émigré editors shaped the whole enterprise. Hans Wallenberg, the chief editor of the paper after November 1945, came from Berlin, as did the chief of the Berlin bureau, Peter Weidenreich. Stefan Heym, who had risen to the rank of lieutenant, was in charge of the paper's literary section. Born in Chemnitz, he was a best-selling U.S. author with a home in Manhattan. Two Westphalians, Erich Winters and Karl Löwenstein, headed the Monitoring section and the World News section, respectively. Habe even brought aboard two colleagues from his days in Vienna, Jules Bond and Arthur Steiner. There was a bit of a generational divide separating the thirty-odd-year-old staff members like Habe, Heym, and Wallenberg, who viewed their task with a missionary zeal, and younger staff members who viewed their time at the newspaper as just another job.⁴⁴⁸

Habe was considerably less cautious when it came to choosing above-the-board non-military personnel. The head of the cultural section was Erich Kästner. He had been a celebrated author of the Weimar period, and the Nazis had burned some of his works in the bonfires of the early 1930s. Despite Nazi bans on his works, Kästner wrote under a pseudonym and received compensation for his screenplay of *Münchhausen*, which the Propaganda Ministry

⁴⁴⁷ US Civil Censorship Report, From: Direktor Dr. Ackermann, Informations-Dienst, Rathaus, Munich to Herr Stolper (?), Neue Zeitung-Vertriebsstelle, Det. ICD, "Munich Director of Information at Townhall Condemns Neue Zeitung Distribution as Directed by Americans and Insists on Decentralization," 3 December 1945, NACP 260/894/139.

⁴⁴⁸ Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 31-37. See also idem, "Art is Democracy," 24-28.

and UFA produced in 1942.⁴⁴⁹ Another editor, Wilhelm Rehm, had attempted to join the NSDAP in the 1930s and contributed economic news to the *Völkischer Beobachter* during the Nazi era. Although a March 1946 intelligence report noted that Rehm's history precluded him from working in the occupation-era press, Habe retained him in direct violation of occupational government directives.⁴⁵⁰ An even more egregious example of *Die Neue Zeitung* personnel with experience in the Nazi press was Hans Lehmann, who became acting chief of the foreign policy section. Lehmann had been the political editor of the *Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten* and failed to pass a Counter Intelligence Corps review. Nevertheless, in a decision that had considerable consequences for the successes of the newspaper in the late occupation, Habe kept him on staff.⁴⁵¹

Growth and Goals

When *Die Neue Zeitung* published its first issue on October 18, 1945, it greeted readers with a front-page article in which General Eisenhower outlined the goals for the paper:

- As distinguished from those German newspapers which are now published by German publishers and which represent the beginning of a free press in Germany, *Die Neue Zeitung* will be an official organ of the American authorities. Its

⁴⁴⁹ Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 37; Klaus Kordon, *Die Zeit ist kaput: Die Lebensgeschichte des Erich Kästner* (Weinheim: Belz & Gelberg, 1995), 159-174; Opritsa D. Popa, *Bibliophiles and Bibliothieves: The Search for the Hildebrandslied and the Willehalm Codex. De Gruyter Cultural Property Studies* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2003), 18, n43; and Josef von Báky (Dir.), *Münchhausen* (Germany: Universum Film Aktuelles (UFA), 1943), 134 min. Kästner's pseudonym, Berthold Bürger, did not appear in the film's credits.

⁴⁵⁰ Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 38.

⁴⁵¹ Other *DNZ* staffers with compromised pasts included Elisabeth Noelle (later Noelle-Neumann) wrote for the *Frankfurter Zeitung* then for Goebbels's weekly *Das Reich* until 1942. Walter Kiaulehn worked for the Nazi-controlled *Deutscher Verlag* and wrote for the international propaganda magazine *Signal*. For *Die Neue Zeitung*, he wrote anti-Nazi articles for the cultural section. See Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 39-40 as well as Norbert Frei and Johannes Schmitz, *Journalismus im Dritten Reich* (Munich: Beck, 1989), 110-115.

circulation will not be restricted to any given area; rather, it will be circulated throughout the US occupied zone, thus linking all sections.

- *Die Neue Zeitung*, as an American newspaper published in the German language, will set an example for the new German press through the objectivity of its reporting, through unconditional devotion to truth in its articles, and through high journalistic standards.
- Through its emphasis on the affairs of the world, *Die Neue Zeitung* will widen the view of the German reader by giving him facts which were suppressed in Germany during the twelve years of National Socialist rule.
- *Die Neue Zeitung* will be a factor in demonstrating to the German people the necessity of the tasks which lie ahead of them. These tasks include self-help, the elimination of Nazism and militarism from the German mind, and the active de-Nazification of German government and business.⁴⁵²

These words did not constitute an official mandate for the newspaper. In fact, ICD did not realize that there had been no “overall directive extant to govern the operations – and especially the content – of the *Neue Zeitung*” until November 1945, when General McClure’s team forwarded a six-point directive for it.⁴⁵³ In addition to its mission to disseminate occupation laws, printing international news, and reeducating Germans through factual presentations, *Die Neue Zeitung* had to avoid competing “economically or otherwise” with the licensed press and “project America to the German people” by devoting half of its coverage to the United States.⁴⁵⁴

ICD policymakers had hoped for an Anglo-Saxon newspaper modeled on the *New York Herald Tribune*. What they received was something akin to a stylized version of elite Weimar newspapers with highly subjective, culturally chauvinistic editorials that failed to live up to the expectations of the paper’s tagline as “An American Newspaper for the German People.”⁴⁵⁵

⁴⁵² OMGUS, ICD, “History,” 30, NACP RG 260/118/454

⁴⁵³ Lt. Col. Charles A.H. Thomson, Office of the Chief of ICD, Plans and Directives, to Arthur Eggleston, Policy Advisor, Memorandum of November 28, 1945, NACP RG 260/247/71.

⁴⁵⁴ Charles A.H. Thomson to Arthur Eggleston, November 28, 1945, NACP RG 260/247/71.

⁴⁵⁵ Luther Conant to Hans Habe (Draft) May 14, 1945, 2, NACP RG 260/253/215;

Rather than balance between the poles of Military Government demands and the wishes of its émigré staff, the editors exercised what they believed to be their prerogative to publish the paper as they saw fit. For example, on the front page of the first issue, one sees a cartoon depicting an Americanized yet still stereotypical “Aryan” couple preparing to clear rubble left over from the war, with a subtitle declaring that “Everybody’s work matters!” (*Auf die Arbeit jedes einzelnen kommt es an!*). Below this, one sees a smallish picture of General Eisenhower and a medium-length article detailing his four points for the newspaper. At first glance, this might seem to be a trifling detail. Days earlier, however, Habe had received Eisenhower’s dictation for the introductory article. During this discussion, the Supreme Commander stated directly that he cared little about differences between “good and bad” Germans and wanted only to dictate US policy to the supposedly passive German people. Eisenhower declared that popular appeal “is not the chief test [of] whether *Die Neue Zeitung* is carrying out its mission” and “it may be desirable and necessary at times to risk unpopularity.”⁴⁵⁶ In light of this encounter, the layout of this front page, with “Ike” below the earnest German couple, seems very much the product of Habe’s intent to forward his vision for the newspaper and not that of the US Military.

Die Neue Zeitung became quite successful in a very short time. Although Habe had to accept a relatively meager press run of 391,000 copies for the first issue, by January 1946 the paper distributed 1.5 million copies. In contrast, the total distribution of licensed AMZON newspapers was 4.5 million copies per issue.⁴⁵⁷ To place this in even greater perspective, the

Humphreys, *Media and Media Policy*, 27-28 and Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 78.

⁴⁵⁶ Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 28-29; Habe, *Im Jahre Null*, 85-86; and OMGUS, “Weekly Information Bulletin No. 66,” November 4, 1946 as in OMGUS, ICD, “History,” 31, NACP RG 260/118/454.

⁴⁵⁷ The circulation figure of 391,000 represents the total estimates for priority groups 1, 2, and 3, as in Headquarters, USFET, ICD, “Circulation Figures for Zonal Newspaper, *Die Neue*

total circulation of the Weimar era's largest publication, Ullstein's *Berliner Morgenpost*, peaked at 600,000 copies, that of the *Völkischer Beobachter* at 1.7 million, and the *Tägliche Rundschau* at below a million copies.⁴⁵⁸ ICD came to believe that they could sell three million copies with little trouble, but supply restrictions forced the paper to maintain a maximum circulation of 1.5 million copies per issue.⁴⁵⁹ At any rate, readers claimed that they shared the publication with their friends, and it was reasonably inexpensive at 20 pfennig per copy.

The newspaper's successes did not occur in a vacuum. *Die Neue Zeitung* was the juggernaut of the American Zone press and its broad distribution gave it a reach greater than that of the emerging German-run press.⁴⁶⁰ While some licensed newspapers, e.g., the *Frankfurter Rundschau* or *Der Tagesspiegel*, enjoyed reasonably large press runs, they had to work with

Zeitung, Munich," October 11, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/197. The total of 500,000 is from Chesnutt, "United States Zonal Newspaper," 13 October 1945, 1, NACP RG 260/253/197 and OMGUS, ICD, "History: 8 May 1945-30 June 1946," 30-31, NACP RG 260/247/69. See also Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 26, for an estimate of 363,000 copies, which is the total of priority groups 1 and 2 in the above referenced "Circulation Figures" document. For later circulation numbers, please see Pilgert, *Press, Radio, and Film*, 16 and OMGUS, ICD, "History," 31, NACP RG 260/118/454.

⁴⁵⁸ For a time, as Habe claimed correctly, the paper's readership was second largest in the world, behind London's *Daily Mirror*. Habe, *Im Jahre Null*, 95. See also Hermann Ullstein, "We Blundered Hitler into Power," *Saturday Evening Post* 213:2 (1940), 13; USFET, ICD, "Control of the German Press: A Study of Nazi Methods in Relation to Democratic Objectives," September 22, 1945, 2, NACP RG 260/253/200; Peter de Mendelssohn, "Notes on the Development and Present Situation of the Berlin Press," September 14, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/201; or B. Schliebe, "Geschichten zur Geschichte: Für das neue Leben neue Zeitungen," *Zentrag-Information* 4/84, February 23, 1984 in Bestand: Zentrag, Folder: Betriebsgeschichte: Tägliche Rundschau Verlag, Druckerei, SAPMO-BArch, DY 63/1197.

⁴⁵⁹ OMGUS, ICD, "History," 31, NACP RG 260/118/454.

⁴⁶⁰ This was a source of frustration for domestic U.S. publications, some of which complained openly about their inability to spread "Americana" to the German people. Dana Adams Schmidt, "US Publications Rate in Germany: Trading with the Enemy Act Makes Circulation Difficult," *New York Times*, 15 April 1946, 3.

insufficient equipment and a scant paper supply.⁴⁶¹ *Die Neue Zeitung* may have benefited from the paper shortages that affected German consumers, many of whom were desperate for materials with which to write or wrap packages any paper, even that with printing on it.⁴⁶²

The German Response

In its early months, *Die Neue Zeitung* managed to avoid serious reprimand from higher authorities. This is unremarkable when one considers the public reaction. Many readers expressed satisfaction with the newspaper because it seemed both familiar in form and reasonably objective, that is, non-propagandistic, in presentation. A January 1946 ICD survey of 1,000 randomly selected American zone Germans determined that almost half the population had read the *Neue Zeitung*, with 25 percent reading it regularly.⁴⁶³ Up to five people often shared a single copy of the newspaper, which, if true, meant that the paper's total audience was potentially as large as 7.5 million persons.⁴⁶⁴ Surprisingly, two-thirds of respondents preferred *Die Neue Zeitung* to their local licensed newspaper.⁴⁶⁵ Readership was highest in Berlin, while

⁴⁶¹ In 1945, three newspapers had significantly large circulations. The *Frankfurter Rundschau*, licensed on July 31, 1945, received an initial distribution of 400,000 copies (later reduced to 250,000); *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, licensed October 6, 1945 and published in Munich, had a circulation of 410,000; and Berlin's *Der Tagesspiegel*, licensed on September 27, 1945, reported a circulation of 450,000 copies. OMGUS, ICD, "History," 23-24, NACP RG 260/118/454.

⁴⁶² Pilgert, *Press, Radio and Film*, 18

⁴⁶³ OMGUS, ICD, "Reactions to the *Neue Zeitung*," *ICIS No. 31*, 12, February 16, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157. These results confirmed the results of an earlier December 1945 survey. See OMGUS, ICD, "Public Opinion: *Die Neue Zeitung*," *ICIS No. 25*, 5 January 1946, 9-10, NACP RG 260/250/157.

⁴⁶⁴ OMGUS, ICD, "History: 8 May 1945-30 June 1946," 32, NACP RG 260/247/69.

⁴⁶⁵ "Reactions to the *Neue Zeitung*," *ICIS No. 31*, 12, February 16, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157. In the December 1945 survey, 34 percent of all newspaper readers claimed they preferred it to German-run newspapers. See "Public Opinion: *Die Neue Zeitung*," *ICIS No. 25*, January 5, 1946, 10, NACP RG 260/250/157.

in the *Länder* Bavarians read the paper more than did residents of Greater Hesse or Württemberg-Baden.⁴⁶⁶ Most readers were Catholic, upper class, or well educated. The paper also had a significant audience of ex-Nazi Party members and former prisoners of war.⁴⁶⁷

In a January 1946 study on reader satisfaction in Heidelberg, more than a few respondents felt *Die Neue Zeitung* was the best newspaper in the American Zone, followed closely by the *Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung* and then the *Frankfurter Rundschau*. Those of this opinion included the leader of the Heidelberg SPD, a CSU Bürgermeister, a university professor, an independent Oberbürgermeister, and a Heidelberg philosophy professor dismissed from his duties because of his Nazi past. Those dissenting included a former journalist, a former Nazi publisher, and the local KPD secretary.⁴⁶⁸ When asked why they preferred *Die Neue Zeitung*, most respondents cited the paper's wide variety of topics, better German grammar, unbiased presentation, and the "cultural tone and intellectual level of the paper."⁴⁶⁹ Only one out of 300 noted the paper's "more complete explanation of America" and US occupation policy.⁴⁷⁰ Criticisms were few, but 20 percent of readers disliked certain article types, including pieces on the IMT, criticisms of Nazism, and the "imputation of war guilt" on Germans. Others objected

⁴⁶⁶ Jessica Christiane Elisabeth Gienow, "Cultural Transmission and the US Occupation in Germany: The *Neue Zeitung*, 1945-1955," doctoral dissertation, University of Virginia (1995), 157-158 and OMGUS, ICD, "Reactions to the *Neue Zeitung*," *ICIS No. 31*, 12, February 16, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157

⁴⁶⁷ "Reactions to the *Neue Zeitung*," *ICIS No. 31*, 12, February 16, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157.

⁴⁶⁸ OMGUS, ICD "Reactions to the *Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung*," *Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS) No. 29*, February 2, 1946, 3-6, NACP RG 260/250/157.

⁴⁶⁹ "Reactions to the *Neue Zeitung*," *ICIS No. 31*, 12, February 16, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157.

⁴⁷⁰ Most of the respondents failed to note either a surfeit or a surplus of "American" material. "Reactions to the *Neue Zeitung*," *ICIS No. 31*, 13, February 16, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157.

to contributions by supposed “non-Germans,” including Thomas Mann (!), Franz Werfel, or the Danish-born Sigrid Undset. Two disliked Habe’s editorials, and a few objected to the newspaper’s “distasteful” cartoons. Tellingly, 40 percent of readers “made the mistake” of believing that the paper was published by Germans and not by the Americans. This group was unable to decide whether the newspaper presented an American or German perspective on news, culture, or the occupation.⁴⁷¹

The most important indicators of success and public opinion are oral or written testimonies. Between March and June 1946, the Intelligence Branch of ICD analyzed 2,500 letters to the editors of *Die Neue Zeitung* and Munich’s *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. ICD determined that submitters wrote according to the following patterns:

Table 1. Reactions to the Neue Zeitung, March-June 1946.

Topic	<i>Neue Zeitung</i>	<i>Süddeutsche Zeitung</i>
Denazification	60%	40%
Political parties	45%	55%
Discussion of other zones	50%	50%
The Nuremberg Trials (IMT and USMT)	80%	20%
German administration	30%	70%
Problems implanting democracy in Germany	30%	70%
Refugees	90%	10%

These results suggest that German readers of *Die Neue Zeitung* remained conscious of the paper’s status as an American publication, and therefore chose to address domestic concerns with

⁴⁷¹ “Reactions to the *Neue Zeitung*,” *ICIS No. 31*, 12-13, February 16, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157

the licensed German-run *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and issues of occupation policy with the editors of the *Neue Zeitung*.⁴⁷² Seen another way, those who wrote to *Die Neue Zeitung* hoped that American officials at the paper would address their concerns with the occupational authorities because, after all, they were of the same group. This, in turn, refines the results of the January survey and suggests that, despite outward similarities to urban, middle- and upper-class newspapers of the Weimar period, readers believed that the paper was neither wholly American nor completely familiar.

Readers sent letters to the offices of *Die Neue Zeitung* in surprisingly significant numbers. Habe, for one, estimated that the newspaper received an average of 2,000 letters per day, with a peak of 8,000 letters following the publication of his editorial on the “mutual disappointment” felt by occupiers and occupied alike.⁴⁷³ In all likelihood, these figures were exaggerations of a more mundane reality. Based on a sample of 5,305 letters received by the newspaper between February 3 and 18, 1946, that is, during the publication of and response to Habe’s “Mutual Disappointment,” it averaged roughly 350 letters per day. Approximately one-third included submissions and reactions to the paper’s letters to the editor column, “Das Freie Wort,” or attempts to debate Habe’s editorials as published in his “Tagebuch” column. A further 42 percent referenced insufficient numbers of copies for readers or were requests for distribution rights to the newspaper. Finally, only slightly more than five percent of these letters contained article submissions.⁴⁷⁴

⁴⁷² OMGB, ICD, Intelligence Branch, Political Affairs Section, “Daily Brief of Political Affairs,” June 19, 1946, NACP RG 260/893/111/24.

⁴⁷³ Hurwitz, “Interview with Hans Habe,” January 23, 1950, 3, NACP RG 260/118/459.

⁴⁷⁴ Figures based on memos entitled “Bericht über Posteingang” or “Posteingang vom [specific date of receipt]” as in New York Public Library (NYPL), Miscellaneous Collections: Germany, Box 4. “Letters to the Editor of Neue Zeitung, 1945-46.”

The participation of those who actively read, responded to, and called for more issues suggests public participation even at this early stage. The only reasonably sized collection of letters to the editor to survive the six decades since the paper's founding consists of a mere 107 random letters, article submissions, and correspondence written between December 1945 and May 1946. While many of these letters address the concerns noted in the spring 1946 analysis of letters to *Die Neue Zeitung* and the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, considerably more focus on German-American relations (16 percent) and denazification (12 percent).⁴⁷⁵ As Gienow-Hecht has noted, "few of these letters were outright hostile," yet one can read in these letters personal frustrations over occupation policies and willed attempts to enter into dialogue with other readers of the paper, its staff, and the occupational authorities.⁴⁷⁶ Of the more orthodox letters to the editor, the most positive consider ways to reconcile with American authorities as well to reverse the disenchantment of German youth.⁴⁷⁷ Several noted Habe's "Tagebuch," agreed with the claim there is a "German problem," and expressed their belief that Austria was just as complicit as Germany in criminality of the Second World War.⁴⁷⁸ Another recounted a positive encounter with an US Army sergeant, an event that forced reflection on the war, the occupation, and the

⁴⁷⁵ NYPL, Miscellaneous Collections: Germany, Box 4. "Letters to the Editor of Neue Zeitung, 1945-46." Cf. OMGB, ICD, Intelligence Branch, Political Affairs Section, "Daily Brief of Political Affairs," June 19, 1946, NACP RG 260/893/111/24 and Gienow, "Cultural Transmission," 163-164, f23.

⁴⁷⁶ Gienow, "Cultural Transmission," 164.

⁴⁷⁷ See for example, Dr. Gerhard Scholz, "USA-Army in Deutschland, 1945/1946" or Angelika Maier, "Unter dem Titel: Das Freie Wort" in NYPL, "Misc.: Germany," Box 4, Folder "Letters to the Editor of Neue Zeitung, 1945-46."

⁴⁷⁸ Géza von Horeczy on the editorial "Das Recht auf Glück," February 21, 1946 and Dr. E. Biesel, regarding Habe's "Tagebuch," February 22, 1946 in NYPL, "Misc.: Germany," Box 4, Folder "Letters to the Editor of Neue Zeitung, 1945-46."

German-American divide.⁴⁷⁹ In an amusing attempt to contribute a political cartoon, “M” submitted “*Das nannte sich Hitler*,” a cartoon of a Beelzebub-character removing a Hitler-mask from his face.⁴⁸⁰ Finally, in an extremely long and detailed critique, Christel Jacobsen argued for German participation in projects that sought to locate plundered art owing to its importance and in spite of her belief that “the Americans think too internationally.”⁴⁸¹

Negative and quasi-negative letters outnumbered positives by a ratio of almost three to one. Because they variously criticized occupation policies or extolled the virtues of Nazism, these letters never made it to print. Even so, they certainly reflect the thoughts of at least a sizable portion of the readership. Of the extremely negative, pro-Nazi variety, Franz Zilly argued that Hitler was merely a twentieth-century Napoleon and would never have achieved power but for the deprivations caused by the Treaty of Versailles.⁴⁸² Reflecting another irrational, but nevertheless common, postwar claim, two separate writers expressed their disbelief over military government reports on concentration camp crimes.⁴⁸³ The first argued that estimates of eleven million persons murdered in the concentration camps was entirely too

⁴⁷⁹ “...once a Sergeant with a smile and a handshake said to me, ‘If you and I are of different opinions, why should we not inform ourselves about each other?’ It was a word of confidence and I hope we will.” Dr. Gerhard Scholz, “USA-Army in Deutschland 1945/1946,” NYPL, “Misc.: Germany,” Box 4, Folder “Letters to the Editor of Neue Zeitung, 1945-46.”

⁴⁸⁰ “M” to Verlag “Die Neue Zeitung,” München in NYPL, “Misc.: Germany,” Box 4, Folder “Letters to the Editor of Neue Zeitung, 1945-46.”

⁴⁸¹ Christel Jacobsen to Hans Habe, 10 February 1946 in NYPL, “Misc.: Germany,” Box 4, Folder “Letters to the Editor of Neue Zeitung, 1945-46.”

⁴⁸² Franz Zilly to the Editorial Staff of “Die Neue Zeitung,” February 20, 1946 in NYPL, “Misc.: Germany,” Box 4, Folder “Letters to the Editor of Neue Zeitung, 1945-46.”

⁴⁸³ Müller, “An den Verlag der Neuen Zeitung,” February 2, 1946 and P. Martin Eberl “für ‘Die freie Meinung,’” no date, in NYPL, “Misc.: Germany,” Box 4, Folder “Letters to the Editor of Neue Zeitung, 1945-46.”

high and “so exaggerated that no one will believe it.”⁴⁸⁴ The second echoed the common claims of ignorance of the Holocaust and the concentration camp system, but for Dachau.⁴⁸⁵

Other common criticisms centered on denazification and the prosecution of war criminals. In a severe indictment of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg, “A Reader” excused disinterest in the IMT because nothing could shock the Germans after “your atrocious bombings and phosphorous war” and a U.S. policy that chose to “pursue the Gestapo but shake hands with the GPU.”⁴⁸⁶ In a similar attempt at relativism, an anonymous author argued that the Italians should bear the same guilt as Germans since, after all, “did not Hitler copy a large part of his doctrine from Mussolini [including] the ‘German’ greeting, which was a Roman greeting anyway?”⁴⁸⁷ Other extreme complaints echoed the earlier claims of those Aacheners who felt that U.S. policy targeted minor Nazi party members and *Parteigenossen* (PGs).⁴⁸⁸

Indictments of occupation policies also appeared in a tempered and proactive fashion. Writing in broken English, “One who had never been some Nazi” sent a letter to the editors in the hope that they would pass it along to the Deputy Governor of OMGUS, General Lucius Clay. “One” railed against American policies that enforced the winter deportations of *Volksgenossen*

⁴⁸⁴ Müller, “An den Verlag der Neuen Zeitung,” February 2, 1946 in NYPL, “Misc.: Germany,” Box 4, Folder “Letters to the Editor of Neue Zeitung, 1945-46.”

⁴⁸⁵ P. Martin Eberl “für ‘Die freie Meinung’ (for the free argument), no date in NYPL, “Misc.: Germany,” Box 4, Folder “Letters to the Editor of Neue Zeitung, 1945-46.”

⁴⁸⁶ “Ein Leser,” “Antwort an den Nürnberger Korrespondenten der New-York-Times in Pressespiegel der ‘Neuen Zeitung,’” no date, in NYPL, “Misc.: Germany,” Box 4, Folder “Letters to the Editor of Neue Zeitung, 1945-46.”

⁴⁸⁷ Anonymous, re. article “Zankapel Südtirol,” February 13, 1946, in NYPL, “Misc.: Germany,” Box 4, Folder “Letters to the Editor of Neue Zeitung, 1945-46.”

⁴⁸⁸ Lore Fuchs, “An den Redaktion der ‘Neuen Zeitung,’” February 20, 1946 in NYPL, “Misc.: Germany,” Box 4, Folder “Letters to the Editor of Neue Zeitung, 1945-46.”

back to Eastern Europe and argued that Nazi sins called for “better rulers” and better treatment of one’s fellow human being.⁴⁸⁹ Another letter writer, Karl Hager, recognized that many former SA members still circulated in society while many Germans remained Allied prisoners of war, and so suggested that the Americans trade these men for regular military POWs.⁴⁹⁰ Finally, in a letter criticizing the Swiss press, an anonymous author suggested that American press policy was still too rigid and asked if open political criticism was just “a privilege of the U.S.A. press.”⁴⁹¹

Some criticisms and suggestions never made it to the offices of *Die Neue Zeitung*.

Between 1946 and 1947, U.S. censors captured at least ninety-seven telephone conversations and letters that focused on the press in Bavaria.⁴⁹² A brief consideration of some of these conversations suggests highly critical views of the press. For example, in a July 21, 1946 letter to his wife in New York, Baron B.V. Recum of Donau stated that “the so-called German newspapers don’t represent the real Germany” because they are staffed by émigrés intent on building the postwar press upon the atavistic and partisan Weimar model.⁴⁹³ In contrast, a contributor to the licensed publication *Simpl* praised the Americans for their “earnest [pursuit of]

⁴⁸⁹ “One, Who had never been some Nazi” to Lucius Clay re. *Neue Zeitung* 11 January 1946, p. 3 in NYPL, “Misc.: Germany,” Box 4, Folder “Letters to the Editor of Neue Zeitung, 1945-46.”

⁴⁹⁰ Karl Hager, “Nochmals Pg. und Kriegsgefangene!,” no date, in NYPL, “Misc.: Germany,” Box 4, Folder “Letters to the Editor of Neue Zeitung, 1945-46.”

⁴⁹¹ Anonymous, “Die Schweizer Press - ... ist sie objectiv?” no date, in NYPL, “Misc.: Germany,” Box 4, Folder “Letters to the Editor of Neue Zeitung, 1945-46.”

⁴⁹² All examples represent a larger series of records from Bavaria. The ninety-seven records synthesized here are available in NACP RG 260/893/111/24; 260/893/112/41-41; 260/893/113/34-34b and 37; 260/893/119/96; 260/893/129/1; 260/893/136/1; and 260/893/138/2.

⁴⁹³ Censorship Submission, Civil Censorship Division (CCD), US Forces European Theater (USFET), Baron B.V. Recum to Baroness Recum, Item No. II, “[Aristocrat] states German newspapers misrepresent the real Germany,” July 21, 1946, condemned letter. NACP RG 260, Box 111, Folder 24.

freedom of the press.”⁴⁹⁴ Finally, in a letter to Hilde Ophuls in Hollywood, Elsa Schleiermacher expressed her opinion that *Die Neue Zeitung*’s blunt messages on the merits of democracy were too American and unsuitable to German culture and history.⁴⁹⁵ Even if these and other intercepted letters and telephone calls indicate that OMGUS conclusions were mostly correct, they also suggest a certain degree of German misunderstanding of the complex relationship between freedom of the press, American messages on democratic society, and the prospects for Germany’s future.

The American Response

German reactions to the newspaper were of course important, but *Die Neue Zeitung* also had to satisfy the demands of American occupational authorities. More often than not, the newspaper was a thorn in the side of ICD. Its tendency to overstep bounds and ignore proper bureaucratic channels became clear in its first months of operation and remained persistent throughout Habe’s tenure. U.S. information control officers found myriad problems with the “American Newspaper for the German People,” including its tendency to take credit for news created by other agencies, its belief that it was the preceptor of the licensed press, and its apparent inability to publish meaningful content or stories that ICD designated as crucial to the success of the occupation.

⁴⁹⁴ Censorship Submission, Civil Censorship Division, USFET, letter from M. Schrimpf to Dr. Erna Gast, “Contributor to ‘Simpl’ Praises Military Government for Furthering Freedom of Press,” December 12, 1946, letter released, NACP RG 260, Box 113, Folder 34A (1 of 2).

⁴⁹⁵ Censorship Submission, Civil Censorship Division, USFET, letter from Elsa Schleiermacher to Hilde Ophuls [presumably the former Hilde Wall, the mother of director Marcel Ophuls], “Americans Seen as Unfit to Teach Democracy to Germans,” December 10, 1946, released, NACP RG 260, Box 113, Folder 34AA (1 of 2).

On November 19, 1945, W.P. Davison of the Office of Plans and Directives wrote the first detailed criticism of *Die Neue Zeitung* in a memorandum to Policy Advisor Arthur Eggleston. Davison charged that the newspaper paid relatively little attention to news, as indicated by the fact that an average 34-column issue utilized only 12 to 14 columns for “straight reporting” while the rest of the paper devoted space to “commentaries, cultural articles, and pictures.”⁴⁹⁶ When the paper did print news items, it often concealed its sources, printing only the initials “NZ” regardless of where the story originated. In a related issue, Davison complained that the lack of attributed sources discredited the work of DANA and might lead German readers to assume that the news agency “is so poor” that even the Americans refused to use it. Then, in a slightly baffling criticism, he argued *Die Neue Zeitung* was not “a high-class type of publication, along the lines of the *New York Times* or the *London Times*.” Rather, it was too popular and occasionally “undignified.” As evidence, he referenced a contest promising monetary prizes to the best reader-submitted letters for the column “Who knows the truth” (*Wer weiß die Wahrheit*), an idea Davison believed was akin to “bribing the Germans to see facts our way.” Finally, he noted that the newspaper had failed to live up to its purpose as an educator of all things Americana to the German people, as shown by the dearth of “American feature material,” U.S. news, “American views,” or photographs of “American life.” Absent features on American “culture,” he felt that the *Feuilletons* supported “the old Nazi slogan that America is a land of barbarians, looking only to Europe – and principally to Germany – for culture and art.”⁴⁹⁷

⁴⁹⁶ W.P. Davison to Arthur Eggleston, Inter-Office Memorandum, November 19, 1945, 1, NACP RG 260/1140/20.

⁴⁹⁷ W.P. Davison to Arthur Eggleston, November 19, 1945, 1-3, NACP RG 260/1140/20 and Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 84-85.

In his conclusion, Davison gave *Die Neue Zeitung* a backhanded compliment: “If it were a licensed paper, one could be very proud of it.” He proposed five immediate changes:

1. Increase by at least 50 percent the amount of news material carried. The bulk of this news material should show DANA as its source. In addition an exclusive file of American news might be supplied.
2. Attempt to secure adequate American feature material. This might take the form of selected reprints from US publications, as well as exclusive material.
3. Attempt to secure the services of a ‘name’ American columnist or news analyst to write a regular column. Or, better still, get two columnists of varying views and alternate them.
4. Make the bulk of the strictly German feature material and original picture now carried available to the licensed press, either through DANA or direct.
5. Attempt in general to influence opinion leaders and more educated groups rather than the broad masses.⁴⁹⁸

Elements of these points made their way into McClure’s November 28 directive, which boosted ICD’s confidence that *Die Neue Zeitung* could move past its early problems and become the newspaper they had envisioned. They were wrong. Habe continued to ignore advice, criticism, and the specifics of General McClure’s directive.⁴⁹⁹

One of the first post-November 1945 controversies centered on *Die Neue Zeitung*’s encroachment upon the limited resources of DANA. By design, *Die Neue Zeitung* could access every news agency in the Allied world and commanded a considerable staff of reporters. Notwithstanding these advantages, the editors often demanded the first pick of DANA news stories. Complicating matters further, the editors often failed to credit DANA. For example, on December 6, 1945, the *Neue Zeitung* and Munich’s *Süddeutsche Zeitung* printed stories on the attempted suicide of Sophie Funk, the wife of the Nazi Economics Minister and Nuremberg defendant Walter Funk. With the exception of their titles, both stories were identical to one

⁴⁹⁸ W.P. Davison to Arthur Eggleston, November 19, 1945, 3, NACP RG 260/1140/20.

⁴⁹⁹ Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 85.

another. The *Süddeutsche Zeitung* credited DANA, whereas the *Neue Zeitung* left the story unaccredited, thereby suggesting that one of their journalists wrote the piece.⁵⁰⁰ Practices such as these led DANA and the Press Control Section of the 6870th DISCC to issue a formal protest to ICD in December 1945. ICD found itself, once again, clarifying the role of *Die Neue Zeitung* in the occupation press. While the U.S. zonal paper could access DANA resources in order to supplement material not covered by the Associated Press or the Reuters News Agency, its right to such stories was no greater than that of the licensed newspapers. As ICD reaffirmed, DANA's primary responsibility was to the licensed press.⁵⁰¹ In an ironic twist, in 1947 ICD reprimanded *Die Neue Zeitung* for not using the resources of DANA's successor organization, DENA.⁵⁰² In the meantime, *Die Neue Zeitung* largely heeded this warning while simultaneously using its considerable weight to advantage itself in the newspaper market in other ways.

In postwar interviews, Habe claimed that the majority of licensed press editors believed the *Neue Zeitung* was a positive role model and a source of "valuable material."⁵⁰³ He was incorrect. As troubled as the relationship between *Die Neue Zeitung* and DANA, the newspaper engendered even greater tensions with the licensed press. In January 1946, ICD interviewed a

⁵⁰⁰ "Selbstmordversuch Frau Funks," *Die Neue Zeitung* (hereafter, *DNZ*), December 6, 1945; "Frau Funk unternimmt Selbstmordversuch," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, December 6, 1945; and Walter H. Brockmann, Scrutiny Officer, 6870 DISCC to Mr. Arthur Gerecke, Press Control Section, 6870 DISCC, "Scrutiny Report for Week ending 8 December 1945," December 8, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/212.

⁵⁰¹ Colonel J.H. Hills to Commanding Officer, 6840th Theater Information Services Control Command, USFET, "Relationship of DANA to the licensed Newspaper and to the Zonal Newspaper," December 19, 1945, NACP RG 260/1488/1141.

⁵⁰² Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 92.

⁵⁰³ The licensees of *Der Tagesspiegel* took issue with this claim. Hurwitz, "Interview with Hans Habe," January 23, 1950, 2, NACP RG 260/118/459.

series of newspaper editors and publishers to ascertain their opinions of the newspaper.⁵⁰⁴ When asked if *Die Neue Zeitung* was a model for the future German press, very few editors answered in the affirmative. Most believed that space limitations and the need to print local news and advertisements made it impossible to model their papers on the *Neue Zeitung*. Not that had inclinations to do so in the first place. Several felt *Die Neue Zeitung* was “more of a magazine than a newspaper,” and suggested that the newspaper shift wholly over to this format. The most vocal criticisms came from the editors of *Der Tagesspiegel*, who declared pointedly “the *Neue Zeitung* might learn something about journalistic practice from them – like following the American policy of all editorial material on one page.” When asked what they liked, a few editors referenced the newspaper’s foreign affairs coverage and an editor of the *Frankfurter Rundschau* noted that its cultural discussions were “the envy of all the licensed press.”⁵⁰⁵

Die Neue Zeitung’s archetypal quality (or lack thereof) was not the only question at stake in this discussion. When asked if the newspaper was a competitive threat to the licensed press, answers varied from editor to editor. Many claimed that *Die Neue Zeitung* would not harm the fortunes of the popular press because it was so similar to the *Neue Zeitung* of old, that is, atavistic and too intellectual. Some respondents complained of the newspaper’s “undue advantages,” including its first pick of DANA news reports, its use of foreign press services, and its wonderful facilities and ample paper supply. The editors of the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* claimed

⁵⁰⁴ The editors and publishers were from the following newspapers: *Hochland Bote* (Garmisch-Partenkirchen), *Frankfurter Rundschau*, *Nürnberger Nachrichten*, *Schwäbische Landeszeitung* (Augsburg), *Wetzlarer Neue Zeitung*, *Main Post* (Würzburg), *Hessische Nachrichten*, *Darmstädter Echo*, *Marburger Presse*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *Isar Post* (Landshut), *Gießener Freie Presse* (Kassel), and *Der Tagesspiegel*. “Reactions to the *Neue Zeitung*,” *ICIS No. 31*, February 16, 1946, 10, NACP RG 260/250/157.

⁵⁰⁵ “Reactions to the *Neue Zeitung*,” *ICIS No. 31*, February 16, 1946, 11, NACP RG 260/250/157

with some indignation that *Die Neue Zeitung* had tried to woo some of the Munich paper's best correspondents, and the editor of a rural newspaper claimed that the *Neue Zeitung* had used "high pressure salesmanship" to increase its subscription base among poor farmers. The vast majority of the licensed press representatives also felt it focused too much on Bavarian life and politics at the sake of stories in the other zones of occupation. Tellingly, they felt that the paper's appeals to the soul of German romanticism belied the editors' ignorance of German psychology, which might have a deleterious effect on overall reeducation efforts. Finally, most agreed that *Die Neue Zeitung* failed to present US policy or the American perspective in a satisfactory manner. This dissatisfaction applied also to the paper's coverage of "American life," which conspicuous ignored "the lives of ordinary people, something in which the Germans are very much interested." Overall, this group seemed uncertain of the paper's purpose, audience, or perspective, as shown by the comments of one editor who, in a possible compliment, declared that the content of the paper was such that the reader would have no idea it was an American newspaper if he or she ignored the masthead.⁵⁰⁶

Many of *Die Neue Zeitung*'s flaws were relatively minor and similar to those of some licensed newspapers. For example, a January 7, 1946 story on the declaration of a General Strike in the United States cited as its source the *Daily Worker*, a British communist newspaper and, on January 21, the paper used Gothic script in its headlines.⁵⁰⁷ Finally, as noted by the *Tagesspiegel* editors and like many licensed newspapers in the first year of occupation, the *Neue Zeitung* frequently failed to distinguish which sections of the newspaper were editorials and

⁵⁰⁶ "Reactions to the *Neue Zeitung*," *ICIS No. 31*, February 16, 1946, 10-12, NACP RG 260/250/157.

⁵⁰⁷ "Consolidated Scrutiny Report on *Die Neue Zeitung*," February 25, 1946, 2-3, NACP RG 260/253/197.

which were news stories. Habe exacerbated this problem by giving his editorials front-page prominence. ICD was tolerant of such practices under “extraordinary circumstances” but had no desire to allow the official newspaper to become Habe’s personal *Sprachrohr*, and so ordered him to stop in March 1946.⁵⁰⁸

Other violations were considerably more serious and indicative of the self-assuredness felt by *Die Neue Zeitung*’s operational staff vis-à-vis the licensed press and ICD command. In January, the newspaper assumed the unofficial role of press monitor for the American Military Government. In three separate issues, it engaged in “oblique attacks” on the *Nürnberger Nachrichten* and the *Frankenpost*.⁵⁰⁹ First, on January 12, 1946, *Die Neue Zeitung* reprinted a *New York Times* column on the *Nürnberger Nachrichten*’s insufficient coverage of the IMT on November 24, 1945. As the Nuremberg newspaper had already remedied this problem, ICD believed it was inappropriate for *Die Neue Zeitung* to address this matter one and a half months after the fact. Second, regarding the *Frankenpost*, the editors of *Die Neue Zeitung* lambasted the publication for printing an interview with Rudolf Hess’s mother, writing, “On no account must the German public think that the Military Government approves of even a single article which applies Goebbels’s or Hugenberg’s journalistic techniques.”⁵¹⁰ ICD Press Control objected and informed Habe that they had already scrutinized the article in question and decided that it was in bad taste. Finally, *Die Neue Zeitung* revived the issue of the *Nürnberger Nachrichten*’s IMT

⁵⁰⁸ Arthur Eggleston, Acting Chief, Press Control Branch, OMGUS, ICD to General McClure, “Die Neue Zeitung,” March 9, 1946 and 1st Lieutenant Leon Edel, OMGUS, Chief of Staff to Arthur Eggleston, “Die Neue Zeitung,” March 6, 1946, 1-2, in NACP RG 260/253/197.

⁵⁰⁹ It attacked the *Nürnberger Nachrichten* twice, once on January 14 and again on January 21, 1946. “Consolidated Scrutiny Report on *Die Neue Zeitung*,” February 25, 1946, 1-2, NACP RG 260/253/197.

⁵¹⁰ 1st Lt. J.L. Edel, Deputy Chief, Press Control Branch to Colonel Kinard, “Inter-office Memorandum: Attached NZ Memorandum,” February 13, 1946, 1, NACP RG 260/253/197.

coverage on January 21, when it published a letter to the editor that expressed dismay over Nuremberg newspaper's inadequate trial coverage. As before, ICD wondered why Habe's team chose to print this letter and why it engaged in bad journalistic ethics.

On February 4, 1946, Habe wrote an informal "and vituperative" response to ICD criticism, which he addressed to Colonel Clifford A. Powell, the Deputy Director of ICD. To this letter, he appended the translation of a January 7, 1946 editorial in praise of the licensed press. This failed to assuage ICD criticism, which noted that the paper "distributed a bouquet one week" only to "throw brickbats" in three successive issues. ICD chastised the newspaper for overstepping its directive and violating good journalistic practices. They ordered the newspaper to "refrain from indiscriminate criticism of the licensed press" because doing so was an inappropriate task for the official organ of the Military Government.⁵¹¹ That said, ICD noted no objections to *Die Neue Zeitung* discussing the licensed press, provided the newspaper worked with Press Control to verify information and if it adhered to the same procedures as "other Branches of [the] Information Control Division." Finally, ICD warned Habe to refrain from delusive, "out-of-channel tantrums" that were "foreign to the spirit of ICD."⁵¹²

This series of relatively minor events begs a question ICD failed to ask: Why did the *Neue Zeitung* assume the role of fusspot and adviser to the licensed press? Criticism of rival media outlets was nothing new in the mid-1940s. More to the point, *Die Neue Zeitung* was supposed to be the model for the licensed press. Did the editors believe it was their duty to coach the nascent licensed press? This is an unlikely explanation. At the same time that the

⁵¹¹ 1st Lt. J.L. Edel, Deputy Chief, Press Control Branch to Colonel Kinard, "Inter-office Memorandum: Attached NZ Memorandum," February 13, 1946, 1, NACP RG 260/253/197.

⁵¹² Edel to Colonel Kinard, "Attached NZ Memorandum," February 13, 1946, 1, NACP RG 260/253/197.

eighteen newspapers licensed by the end of December 1945 devoted approximately 20 percent of their total coverage to the IMT, *Die Neue Zeitung* gave a meager 6.3 percent of its space to discussions of the trial.⁵¹³ Its coverage improved slightly in January 1946, when the paper granted the IMT an average of 7.8 percent of its printed space.⁵¹⁴ In terms of the degrees of prominence given to the trial, *Die Neue Zeitung* granted the IMT front-page coverage throughout November, but its trial coverage moved to the back of the paper in December and, in January, articles on the IMT appeared only four times on the front page.⁵¹⁵ The January 1946 focus on the *Nürnberger Nachrichten*, then, is even more curious considering that the Nuremberg newspaper devoted 26.2 percent of its space to the IMT throughout December 1945.⁵¹⁶ In short, *Die Neue Zeitung*'s focus on the *Nürnberger Nachrichten*'s IMT coverage in November while ignoring its reportage the following month, suggests that the zonal newspaper was more than willing to deflect attention away from itself by highlighting the faults of other newspapers. Rather tellingly, of the few *New York Times* pieces that discussed the German press and the IMT at this time, Habe's group neglected the only article that noted *Die Neue Zeitung*, no doubt

⁵¹³ "Nuremberg Coverage in December 1945," no author, January 7, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/198.

⁵¹⁴ OEC-ICD 000.76 (Pr3), "Consolidated Scrutiny Report on *Die Neue Zeitung*," February 25, 1946, 1, NACP RG 260/253/197.

⁵¹⁵ The editors granted front-page coverage to the IMT in the January 7, 14, 18, and 28, 1946 issues. File OEC-ICD 000.76 (Pr3), "Consolidated Scrutiny Report," February 25, 1946, 1, NACP RG 260/253/197.

⁵¹⁶ There percentage would have been higher, yet they scaled back their coverage from 28 percent on 19 December to 15 percent on December 22, 1945 following the start of the two-week recess of the IMT. Nuremberg Coverage in December 1945," no author, January 7, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/198.

because the article referenced the U.S. paper's relatively weak coverage of the IMT in comparison to the licensed press.⁵¹⁷

The greatest source of controversy in early 1946, however, was the newspaper's skimpy coverage of the United States, its policies, and its "culture." *Die Neue Zeitung* editors sought to reestablish widespread acceptance of historical German *Kultur* alongside international high-cultural forms in order to engender appreciation for foreign cultures. They believed such an approach might elicit a well-functioning, internationalist democracy.⁵¹⁸ Alongside articles on German experimental art, interwar architecture, or Nazi-led purges of museum collections, there were pieces on international fine art, literature, and theater. It is perhaps no great surprise, therefore, that the editors saw little room for or had acceptance of the works of the New York School or jazz, much less the Andrews Sisters, Humphrey Bogart, or Mickey Mouse.

ICD might have tolerated the dearth of coverage on American cultural forms had *Die Neue Zeitung* followed the spirit of McClure's directive to "project America" by writing articles on U.S. foreign and domestic policies, U.S. domestic news events, and stories of American "everyday life." The paper fell short on this front throughout Habe's tenure. For example, the six-page January 28, 1946 issue devoted 12 percent of its space to the IMT, 23 percent to German news, 36 percent to features and sports, 6 percent to economic news, and 23 percent to world news.⁵¹⁹ Within its 34 columns, only one and a half counted as "Americana" – a one-

⁵¹⁷ "Press in Germany Covers War Trial," *New York Times*, December 13, 1945, 13. Other *NYT* articles which mention press coverage of the IMT during the period under consideration included Anne O'Hare McCormick, "Germany Little Interested in Trial of War Criminals," *New York Times*, December 1, 1945, 22; Raymond Daniel, "'So What?' Say the Germans of Nuremberg," *New York Times*, December 2, 1945, SM3 and 53; or "War-Crimes Trial Dull to Germans," *New York Times*, January 2, 1946, 6.

⁵¹⁸ Gienow-Hecht, "Art is Democracy," 29-31.

⁵¹⁹ Unknown to Mr. Arthur Eggleston, "Die Neue Zeitung (Munich) of Jan. 28, 1946, 6

column story on the U.S. general strike and a dateline story on “Radar Contact with the moon.” The rest of the issue focused on elections in the American zone, the United Nations Organization conference, a half-page *Feuilleton* on modern art and Picasso, the last days of Oscar Wilde, and a larger-than-average “world survey” on the “Polish Zone Question.”⁵²⁰ In February, ICD saw slight improvements. The February 11 issue, for example, devoted only 10 percent of its space to German news, and its front-page headline announced “Truman Plans Help for Europe.”⁵²¹ It also included a story on improved labor negotiations in the United States and a photo of Sinclair Lewis. Inside the newspaper, Habe opined on the “Right to Happiness,” beginning with the well-known quote from the Declaration of Independence. Even here, however, Habe gave little attention to the Declaration itself, and instead called for Germans to focus on solving present-day problems in order to achieve individual, rather than collective happiness.⁵²²

Perhaps nothing highlights the inadequacies of *Die Neue Zeitung*’s American material better than a comparison with the *Tägliche Rundschau*. While some of the *Tägliche Rundschau*’s leading Russian editors, e.g., Dymshitz and Weißpapier, shared Habe’s sense of style and belief in the primacy of German *Kultur*, their Germanophilism never prevented them from paying often and obsequious homage to the Soviet Union, its peoples, and the ideals of Marxism-Leninism. In the aforementioned November 7, 1945 issue of the *Tägliche Rundschau*, the editors gave the plurality of the paper’s space over to discussions of the triumphs of Russian

pages,” February 1, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/197.

⁵²⁰ “Die Neue Zeitung (Munich) of Jan. 28, 1946, 6 pages,” February 1, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/197.

⁵²¹ Unknown to Mr. Arthur Eggleston, “Die Neue Zeitung (Munich) of Feb. 11, 6 pages,” February 20, 1946, 1, NACP RG 260/253/197.

⁵²² “Die Neue Zeitung (Munich) of Feb. 11, 6 pages,” February 20, 1946, 1, NACP RG 260/253/197.

life and culture as well as commemorations of the Bolshevik Revolution and the feats of Lenin and Stalin.⁵²³ Similar issues granted equal attention to other important events in Soviet history, as well as to anniversaries of the births and deaths of the principals in the hagiography of Soviet life. In contrast, in the February 11, 1946 issue, *Die Neue Zeitung* made no mention of Abraham Lincoln, even though it was the day before anniversary of his birth.⁵²⁴

On February 18, 1946, Alfred Toombs, the chief of the Intelligence Branch of ICD noted that *Die Neue Zeitung*'s coverage of American news features varied from issue to issue, resulting in a situation whereby German readers and even a few licensed newspaper editors were uncertain of the newspaper's allegiances. Toombs referenced earlier public opinion surveys and concluded that the *Die Neue Zeitung*'s popularity in well-educated circles suggested a lack of appeal to the younger and lower-educated population, that is, the demographic that ICD believed might have the greatest chance of becoming interested in American items since their elders had already fixed opinions of the United States and its social-cultural life. Toombs felt this audience had been underserved by *Die Neue Zeitung*, as shown by its weak attempts to impart "forceful

⁵²³ "Es lebe der 28. Jahrestag der Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution!" "Einige geschichtliche Lehren," "Die Rote Armee – das A Werk der Oktoberrevolution," "Die Große Sozialistische Oktoberrevolution," "Die Oktoberrevolution und die Akademie der Wissenschaften der UdSSR," "Der untrennbare Bund freier Republiken," "Eine große Familie gleichberechtigter Völker," "Im Geiste der wahren Demokratie," "Das Sowjetsystem – die Frucht der Oktoberrevolution," "Was man als vergessen darf," "Ihre Errungenschaften zum Großen Jahrestag," "Der Kindergarten einer Fabrik," "Ein sowjetischer Betrieb, wie er wirklich ist," "Das Volk im Schaffen," "Männer und Frauen der Sowjetindustrie," "Die Oktoberrevolution und die Elektrifizierung der UdSSR," "Die freie Kunst der freien Völker," "Sowjetische Kindertheater," "Musikschulen für Kinder," "Der Leidensweg," "Lenin," "Wie der Stahl gehärtet wurde," "Lenin: 'Lernen, lernen und nochmals lernen!'" "Das Reisezeugnis im Werk erworben," "Mit dem Manne gleichberechtigt," "Agronom und Gelehrter," "So ist Sibirien geowrden," "Die Kollektivwirtschaften haben alle Prüfungen des Krieges überstanden," and "Die Welt feiert den Jahrestag der Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution," *TR*, November 7, 1946 and Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 88-89.

⁵²⁴ Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 87 and "Die Neue Zeitung (Munich) of Feb. 11, 6 pages," February 20, 1946, 1, NACP RG 260/253/197.

explanations of German war guilt,” infrequent discussions on denazification and reparations, and widespread ignorance of U.S. policy among the German population. In his eyes, *Die Neue Zeitung* had failed to live up to its mission, and had contributed to the spread of baseless rumors and the reinforcement of beliefs that the Americans had a “soft” occupation policy.⁵²⁵

A few days later, on February 21, Leon Edel, the Deputy Chief of the Press Control Branch, proposed that *Die Neue Zeitung* hire a “special Americana editor.” He suggested that this position go to Eugene Jolas, the editor-in-chief of DANA and a man reputed to be “one of the most wrathful and anti-German US press directors.”⁵²⁶ Edel assumed that Jolas would need the job because ICD planned to pass DANA over to German control in the very near future. In March, Arthur Eggleston again suggested Jolas as an ideal candidate to “uncover sources for American news and see that it gets in the paper.”⁵²⁷ DANA’s transition away from direct US operational control took longer than expected, however, and Jolas remained at DANA for some time before moving to the *Neue Zeitung* editorial staff in 1948.⁵²⁸

On the heels of these suggestions came a scathing report by the U.S. civilian Bernard Lewis. Lewis began his assessment by declaring the paper’s designation as “An American Newspaper for the German People” a lie because the “intended tone has, unfortunately, never

⁵²⁵ Alfred Toombs, Chief of Intelligence Branch, to Col. C.R. Powell, Deputy Director of Division, “Inter-Office Memorandum: Scrutiny of *Neue Zeitung*,” February 18, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/197; OMGUS, ICD, “Reactions to the *Neue Zeitung*,” *ICIS No. 31*, February 16, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157; and Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 85-86.

⁵²⁶ First Lieutenant Leon Edel, Deputy Chief, Press Control Branch to Colonel Kinard through Mr. Eggleston, “Americana in *Neue Zeitung*,” February 21, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/197 and Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 85-86.

⁵²⁷ Arthur Eggleston, Acting Chief, Press Control Branch to General McClure, “*Die Neue Zeitung*,” March 9, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/197.

⁵²⁸ Hartenian, *Controlling Information*, 239-241 and John Stuart, Jr., Chief, Press Liaison Section, DENA and Alfred Jacobson, Press Liaison Officer, DENA, “DENA History,” November 5, 1948, esp. 1-5, NACP RG 260/255/224.

extended below the slug line.” He objected to its use of a “traditional German make-up despite the fact that American make-up has been scientifically demonstrated to be the best in the world,” and echoed Davison’s claim that an exaggerated focus on German culture “involuntarily played the Goebbels propaganda tune.”⁵²⁹

Lewis gave two reasons for the immediate conversion of *Die Neue Zeitung* into an “American paper,” preferably based out of New York. First, he believed that Germans yearned for information about the United States because “who and what Americans are is a life-and-death matter to Germans because it determines how much they eat, how much freedom they have, [and] possibly how much they suffer.” Second, as a citizen of a victor country that enjoyed “a rich 170-year-old history and development and culture” Lewis saw no reason to “be afraid to tread on Germany’s ideological toes.” In his conclusion, he suggested ICD abandon the “boring-from-within, slow-change method” by announcing the closure of *Die Neue Zeitung* and the transfer of sole responsibility for imparting “German” news to the licensed press.⁵³⁰

Lewis’s comments were at the extreme end of criticisms that reached Habe’s offices on an almost daily basis in early 1946. Oftentimes, Habe responded to negative feedback by ignoring it or by displacing blame. By March, however, he began to seek a way out of his current situation. After a failed attempt to establish the production of *Time* magazine out of the *Völkischer Beobachter* plant, Habe became even more frustrated with his work.⁵³¹ Following yet another argument with ICD over the need to publish Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech, he

⁵²⁹ Bernard Lewis, US Civ., to Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, “Suggested Changes in *Die Neue Zeitung*,” April 26, 1945, 1, NACP RG 260/253/197. Cf. W.P. Davison to Arthur Eggleston, November 19, 1945, 1, NACP RG 260/1140/20.

⁵³⁰ Bernard Lewis, “Suggested Changes in *Die Neue Zeitung*,” April 26, 1945, 4, NACP RG 260/253/197.

⁵³¹ See Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 90-91.

decided to resign from the US Military and the *Neue Zeitung*.⁵³² While Habe went on to write for other newspapers, including the *Los Angeles Daily News* in the early 1950s, his replacement, Hans Wallenberg, faced the difficult task of restructuring the newspaper to better suit the visions of the ICD command.

⁵³² Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 91; Habe, *Im Jahre Null*, 106; Habe, *Ich stelle mich*, 499; and Hurwitz, "Interview with Hans Habe," January 23, 1950, 2, NACP RG 260/118/459.

CHAPTER 6

THE LICENSED PRESS IN FRANKFURT

When it went to press in the late evening of July 31, 1945, the *Frankfurter Rundschau* became the first licensed German newspaper in the American zone of occupation. By circumstance and by choice, it differed from traditional German newspapers. Its use of four to six pages per issue and small font size, for example, were as much a product of the material deprivations of the early postwar era as they were a rejection of the German press during and before the Nazi era.⁵³³

The importance of the early *Frankfurter Rundschau* lies not in its physical appearance, however. This newspaper's origins, its attempts to generate public discourse on the Holocaust, and its strongly leftist political stance incited controversy in Frankfurt and in the U.S. Military Government. These features reflected the many changes brought by American oversight of the German press, the myriad impulses that shaped non-Nazi German press professionals' visions for postwar newspaper culture, and the roles played by the public and their reaction to their media. This chapter will outline the development of the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, and in doing so force consideration of the importance of the survivors of Nazi terror in the reconstruction of public political life in postwar Germany. In addition, it will point to the intrinsic relationship between growing concerns over communist influence in AMZON and the ways by which anti-communism might have contributed to the arrested development of Holocaust discourse during the early years of the occupation.

⁵³³ A limited pulp supply confined the *Rundschau* to a twice-weekly press run of four- to six-page issues.

Origins

When the Americans captured Frankfurt on March 28, 1945, U.S. information control personnel were rather confident that they would have little trouble establishing German-run press operations. They miscalculated. Despite the availability of ready-made “White, Black, and Grey” lists of German media personnel and the rapid acquisition of the city’s remaining newspaper offices and plants, launching a postwar newspaper in Frankfurt made the Aachen experience seem as if it had been “a village maypole dance.”⁵³⁴ Allied bombing campaigns had devastated the city such that only fifteen percent of its residential buildings remained intact and its population decreased from 550,000 citizens to approximately 269,000; a number that included the devastating loss of Frankfurt’s Jewish community, which fell from 31,000 persons to 140.⁵³⁵ Beyond physical barriers, many prominent Frankfurters reified their city’s premier pre-Nazi newspaper, the *Frankfurter Zeitung*. Fond memories of this publication and the efforts of its former staff cast an effective shadow over all press operations in the city through much of the American military occupation.

Frankfurt’s first occupation-era newspaper was the 12th Army Group’s *Frankfurter Presse*, a U.S. Military offering that printed out of the facilities of the former *Frankfurter Anzeiger* and the former Nazi organ, the *Rhein-Mainische Zeitung*.⁵³⁶ Like other 12th Army

⁵³⁴ Welsch, “Die hessischen Lizenzträger,” 74; SHAEF, PWD, Intelligence Section, Memo on “principal targets of interest for Information Control Purposes in the SHAEF area of Germany (excluding Berlin),” no date (late-March 1945), NACP RG 226/16/1421/12422; SHAEF, PWD, “PWD ‘White Lists’ of Persons in Germany Believed to be Anti-Nazi or Non-Nazi,” December 5, 1944, NACP, RG 226/19/292/XL 20084; and Schwabe, “American Occupation Experiences in Aachen,” op cit. Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 181.

⁵³⁵ Rebecca Boehling, *A Question of Priorities: Democratic Reforms and Economic Recovery in Postwar Germany* (New York: Berghahn Books, 1998), 80-81.

⁵³⁶ Habe, *Im Jahre Null*, 52. Technically, it was the former home of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, though both the *Anzeiger* and *Rhein-Mainische Zeitung* used the multi-building site in

Group newspapers, the *Frankfurter Presse* “sold out in a jiffy” but its sales were deceiving since the civilian population was well aware that the American-run newspaper served a propaganda function.⁵³⁷ U.S. military officials were aware of this. By the time amicable relations began to develop between U.S. troops and the civilian population in late-spring 1945, PWD willingly oversaw the softening of U.S. information control policies and developed strategies that sought to encourage a press that would address the general “lack of feeling of war guilt” and the seemingly pervasive problem of rumormongering.⁵³⁸ Central to their plans was a scheme that would grant a single publication’s licenses to groups of individuals, with each person ideally representative of acceptable non-Nazi political and ideological perspectives. Each licensee should have avoided working for newspapers since 1933, have demonstrated opposition to Nazism, and be willing to work with persons with differing political perspectives. This, so PWD believed, would obviate against the emergence of a dominant political narrative, thus engendering an “above party” press.⁵³⁹

the last days of the war.

⁵³⁷ Habe, *Im Jahre Null*, 53 and SHAEF, PWD, “Weekly Intelligence Summary for Psychological Warfare #37,” June 11, 1945, 3, NACP RG 260/1140/14.

⁵³⁸ Headquarters, Detachment E1G2, Land Hessen-Nassau, “Weekly Military Government Summary Report No. 2 for Week ending 282400B July 1945,” 6, NACP RG 226/16/1641/XL 14173. Frankfurt’s public discourse consisted of many myths, including claims that there were to be penalties assessed to German women with multiple children and that U.S. Army officers were Soviet agents who distributed meager food rations in order to drive Germany towards communism. In some cases, rumors were part of a larger plan to spread distrust between the occupied population and the occupiers; other times, they owed themselves to ignorance and the persistence of Nazi wartime propaganda. Military Government Detachment E1D2, Company D, 2nd ECA Regiment, Frankfurt a/Main, Germany, “Daily consolidated MG Report of Military Government Detachments in area Frankfurt on Main,” July 5, 1945, NACP RG 260/1400/99 and Strategic Services Unit, War Department, “Intelligence Dissemination: Public Opinion in Northern Rhine Province,” October 5, 1945, NACP RG 226/19/340/XL 25727.

⁵³⁹ Luther Conant, Chief, Press Section, “Grant of license to Wilhelm Knothe, Wilhelm Gerst, Arno Rudert, Paul Rodemann, Hans Etzkorn, and Otto Grossman as publishers of

PWD had an initial list of 100 candidates, which they quickly narrowed to 38. The first among these was Wilhelm Hollbach, the first postwar mayor of Frankfurt.⁵⁴⁰ Until 1933, Hollbach had been the chief of the news bureau at the *Frankfurter Zeitung*. After the Nazis came to power, he held editorial positions at other Societäts-Verlag properties, notably the *Neueste Nachrichten*, the *Illustrierte Blatt*, and finally at the *Frankfurter Anzeiger*, which continued publishing until two days before Frankfurt's fall.⁵⁴¹ Hollbach also surrounded himself with a group of former *Frankfurter Zeitung* journalists and editors who were confident in their belief that they had resisted the Goebbels line more than did other Nazi-era newspaper professionals.⁵⁴²

PWD found no evidence that Hollbach had been a Nazi Party member, but interviews with many of his former colleagues, other newspaper professionals, and a host of former Nazi propaganda officials such as Max Amann, yielded a wealth of information, including the fact that the *Frankfurter Zeitung* had received considerable leniency from the Propaganda Ministry. The only black mark in his early application for licensure came from a discussion he held in late April 1945 with OSS operatives. To his credit, he was frank: "We have all prostituted ourselves. ... We have not only written stuff for which we assumed no responsibility, but which we despised to the bottom of our hearts." He continued by noting that stories in the *Frankfurter*

Frankfurter Neueste Nachrichten," July 6, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/195 and Cedric Belfrage, 6871st DISCC, 12th Army Group to Major Chesnutt, Commanding Officer, 6871st DISCC, "Frankfurt German Newspaper," July 1945, 6, NACP RG 260/253/195.

⁵⁴⁰ On Hollbach's rise and fall as mayor of Frankfurt, see Boehling, *A Question of Priorities*, 81-83, 127.

⁵⁴¹ Hollbach's role at the *Frankfurter Zeitung* is the source of some confusion. Belfrage, for example, claimed that Hollbach had nothing to do with the publication of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*. However, an OSS report verified that he had worked at the paper through 1933. OSS, Research & Analysis Branch, "Interview by Hans Meyerhoff with Dr. Hollbach, Acting Mayor of Frankfurt a/M," April 23, 1945, 1, NACP RG 226/19/128/XL 9520. See also Gillesen, *Auf verlorenem Posten*, 504.

⁵⁴² Belfrage, "Frankfurt German Newspaper," July 1945, 2, NACP RG 260/253/195.

Zeitung and *Frankfurter Anzeiger* “were really much more dangerous than the outright Nazi press,” because they came from a source that seemed independent of the Nazis.⁵⁴³

While this admission did not endear Hollbach to PWD press control officers, subsequent investigations into his past yielded much more damaging information and proved that he had falsified his *Fragebogen*. First, he made no mention of his editorship of the *Illustrierte Blatt*. This detail escaped the attention of the U.S. Military Government, which only learned of the publication after a local Communist brought them copies of issues in June 1945, each bearing Hollbach’s name.⁵⁴⁴ Occupation officials generously concluded that he had neglected to include this information because it was “incidental to his main employment at the *Frankfurter Zeitung*.”⁵⁴⁵ In a second lie, Hollbach claimed that there were no Nazis at the *Frankfurter Zeitung*. A quick check confirmed that there were at least eight former Party members in managerial and editorial positions at the newspaper between 1933 and 1943.⁵⁴⁶ Third, and finally, Hollbach proclaimed over and over again that he had “not written a single word under the Nazis.” This was true but it was not an act of conscientious abstention. Hollbach was an editor, not a journalist, and had indeed approved and revised articles that were compliant with Propaganda Ministry guidelines.⁵⁴⁷

⁵⁴³ OSS, Research & Analysis Branch, “Interview by Hans Meyerhoff with Dr. Hollbach, Acting Mayor of Frankfurt a/M,” April 23, 1945, 4, NACP RG 226/19/128/XL 9520 and Gillessen, *Auf verlorenem Posten*, 511.

⁵⁴⁴ Belfrage, “Frankfurt German Newspaper,” July 1945, 4, NACP RG 260/253/195 and idem., *Seeds of Destruction*, 139.

⁵⁴⁵ Boehling, *A Question of Priorities*, 128.

⁵⁴⁶ Belfrage, “Frankfurt German Newspaper,” July 1945, 4, NACP RG 260/253/195.

⁵⁴⁷ Belfrage, “Frankfurt German Newspaper,” July 1945, 3-4, NACP RG 260/253/195.

As he came to doubt the likelihood of a press license, Hollbach tried to force his way back into the newspaper business. In mid-June, he informed press control officers that he was going to launch the first of edition of a local government newsletter, and demanded the facilities of the *Frankfurter Presse* for this purpose.⁵⁴⁸ The Habe group immediately protested that it was against official policy to sell such a publication. PWD had no objection to the concept, but realized that Hollbach was merely trying to reinsert himself “back in the door of newspaper activity” in an oblique manner, and therefore denied his request.⁵⁴⁹ Soon thereafter, Hollbach informed the candidates for the proposed German-run newspaper that they could not use the materials or buildings of the former *Frankfurter Zeitung* because it was the property of Kurt Simon and that he, Hollbach, was Simon’s sole legal representative in Germany.⁵⁵⁰ PWD concluded that there were no grounds for Hollbach’s claim.⁵⁵¹ This final gambit ended Hollbach’s press ambitions and his term as mayor of Frankfurt. On July 4, the Military

⁵⁴⁸ 6871st DISCC, 12th Army Group, Frankfurt a/M Press Detachment, “Frankfurt Official Mitteilungsblatt: Hollbach Claims to FZ Property,” June 22, 1945. NACP, RG 260/1490/1175.

⁵⁴⁹ Belfrage, 6871st DISCC, 12th Army Group, Frankfurt a/M Press Detachment to Commanding Officer, 6871 DISCC, att: Lt. Col. Chesnutt, “Frankfurt Official Mitteilungsblatt; Hollbach Claims to FZ Property,” June 22, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175 and Belfrage, “Frankfurt Official Mitteilungsblatt,” June 22, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

⁵⁵⁰ Simon, by this point, resided in the United States. Belfrage, “Frankfurt Official Mitteilungsblatt,” June 22, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175. Please note that Carlebach mistakenly identified Hecht as the instigator of this plot. See Carlebach, *Zensur ohne Schere. Die Gründerjahre der “Frankfurter Rundschau” 1945/1947* (Frankfurt, a.M.: Röderberg-Verlag, 1985), 21.

⁵⁵¹ Cedric Belfrage, 6871st DISCC to Commanding Officer, 6871 DISCC, Att. Col. Chesnutt, “Subject: Kurt Simon,” August 11, 1945, 1-2, NACP RG 260/1490/1175 and Cedric Belfrage, 6871st DISCC, 12th Army Group, Frankfurt a/M Press Detachment, “Frankfurt Official Mitteilungsblatt: Hollbach Claims to FZ Property,” June 22, 1945. NACP, RG 260/1490/1175. Hollbach claimed he received a note from a former colleague, a “Mr. Nachmann” stating that a “plenipotentiary of the heirs of Heinrich Simon” planned to come to Frankfurt in order to relinquish legal control of the former Societäts-Verlag to Hollbach. W. Hollbach to Frau Dr. Margret Boveri, August 31, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

Government forced him from office and banned him from working in any capacity with the press or local government.⁵⁵²

The next principal candidate was a former editor of the *General Anzeiger*, Erich Dombrowski. With several years experience as a journalist and editor, Dombrowski began working at the *Anzeiger* in 1926, and remained there until a subsidiary of *Eher Verlag* purchased thirty percent of the newspaper in 1936. Almost immediately after the purchase, he received his dismissal because his wife was Jewish. Dombrowski continued to work as a freelance journalist until the *Reichsverband der deutschen Presse* revoked his membership in January 1938.⁵⁵³ PWD objected to the fact that he continued receiving a pension from the *General Anzeiger* and thereby failed “to influence the population most strongly against the rise of Nazism.” Regardless, he was still eligible due to his obvious anti-Nazi politics.⁵⁵⁴ Like Hollbach, Dombrowski proved to be his own worst enemy. When offered the chance for a license, Dombrowski declared that he would not cooperate with members of left-leaning political parties. He also stated, “Journalism ... is an art and not a tool to fight with,” and declared that anti-Nazism would soon lose its appeal with Germans.⁵⁵⁵

⁵⁵² Boehling, *A Question of Priorities*, 128-129 and Belfrage, “Kurt Simon,” August 11, 1945, 2, NACP RG 260/1490/1175. As for the title “Frankfurter Zeitung,” Hollbach’s escapades led PWD to conclude that the *Frankfurter Zeitung* model, with its “highly-specialized” content would appeal only to “intellectuals and businessmen.” They therefore deemed it appropriate to the goals of the occupation and forbade use of the title throughout the period of the military occupation. See “Kurt Simon,” August 11, 1945, 2, NACP RG 260/1490/1175

⁵⁵³ Belfrage, “Frankfurt German Newspaper,” no date [July 1945], 4, NACP RG 260/253/195.

⁵⁵⁴ Belfrage, “Frankfurt German Newspaper,” no date [July 1945], 4, NACP RG 260/253/195.

⁵⁵⁵ Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 146-147. In 1945 and 1946, Dombrowski received the French Military Government’s permission to publish two newspapers in Mainz, the *Neuen Mainzer Anzeiger* and the *Allgemeine Zeitung*. In 1949, he and four colleagues – Hans

With Hollbach and Dombrowski no longer under consideration, PWD chose Wilhelm Knothe as the first licensee for what they had planned to call the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*.⁵⁵⁶ Between 1920 and 1933, Knothe had been Party Secretary for the Wetzlar Gebiet and Party Leader in the Frankfurt Kreistag, a manager at Frankfurt's *Volksstimme*, and a contributor to *Vorwärts*, the *Kasseler Volksblatt*, the *Offenbacher Abendblatt*, the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, and the *Frankfurter Nachrichten*. After several arrests between 1934 and 1937, he worked at a Frankfurt merchant firm until the Gestapo arrested him in August 1944. Personable and spry, he possessed "sound international and anti-militarist views," which he often professed to those around him in the form of long soliloquies.⁵⁵⁷

With the need to sift through approximately one hundred additional candidates, PWD hired Knothe to aid in the screening process. Each potential licensee began his or her interview in a room with Knothe. PWD operatives sat outside and "waited for the shots to ring out." If the candidate "survived the conversation without getting into a brawl about politics or religion," he or she moved to the next round of screening.⁵⁵⁸ This narrowed the field down to six men – two additional members of the SPD, three from the KPD, and a left-leaning former Center Party member. While the seven licensees of the *Frankfurter Rundschau* did not represent "all shades of anti-Nazi political thought," each had strong anti-Nazi credentials, most had suffered arrest

Baumgarten, Karl Korn, Paul Sethe, and Erich Welter – co-founded the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*.

⁵⁵⁶ PWD abandoned the name "*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*" in July 1949 for the "*Frankfurter Neueste Nachrichten*." Later, they settled on the "*Frankfurter Rundschau*."

⁵⁵⁷ Belfrage, "Frankfurt German Newspaper," no date [July 1945], 5, NACP RG 260/253/195 and idem, *Seeds of Destruction*, 157-158.

⁵⁵⁸ Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 155 and Belfrage, "Frankfurt German Newspaper," no date [July 1945], 5, NACP RG 260/253/195. Note: there is no record of a female candidate for licensure, which suggests that the Aachen experience effectively closed the door for women to enter the postwar press at a senior level.

and detention between 1933 and 1945, and none, as Belfrage wrote proudly, had cause to place “Doctor” in front of his name.⁵⁵⁹

Paul Rodemann was the second SPD licensee. After a decade-long career at Hamburg’s *Volksblatt*, he became editor in chief of the suburban Frankfurt SPD’s *Offenbacher Abendsblatt* in the mid-1920s. After Hitler’s rise to power, Rodemann engaged in the illegal distribution of SPD literature in Germany and assisted SPD cells in Holland, Belgium, and France. But for short-term work at the Frankfurt *Landrat* in 1940, he spent much of the Nazi era under arrest.⁵⁶⁰ According to his colleagues, he was a “quiet and collegial worker who distinguished himself” despite a “slight, but probably chronic, case of inferiority complex and intellectual snobbery.”⁵⁶¹

The last SPD licensee was Hans Etzkorn, a former editor for the *Vorwärts* Sunday magazine, *Volk und Zeit*. Etzkorn was not a hard-nosed newspaper professional or a dogmatic Party man. He specialized in illustrated features, and had some experience in providing coverage of socialist cultural programs during the 1920s. He avoided arrest and worked as an advertising canvasser for much of the Nazi era. Owing to this, and because he was the least politicized of the licensees, his colleagues seemed to wonder why he received a license in the first place.⁵⁶²

Arno Rudert was the first of the communist licensees. A former editor-in-chief for the Frankfurt KPD’s *Arbeiterzeitung*, Rudert received his first arrest at the hands of the Nazis in February 1933. Released two weeks later, the SA arrested Rudert again and almost beat him to

⁵⁵⁹ Headquarters, United States Forces, European Theater, G-5 Public Relations Branch, [Press Release] “Following story from Gee Five for immediate release,” July 31, 1945, NACP RG 260/247/72 and Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 155.

⁵⁶⁰ Belfrage, “Frankfurt German Newspaper,” no date [July 1945], 5, NACP RG 260/253/195.

⁵⁶¹ Carlebach, *Zensur ohne Schere*, 16 and Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 158-159.

⁵⁶² Carlebach, *Zensur ohne Schere*, 16.

death in the process. Because he was a communist with a Jewish wife, he received another Nazi-led beating during the pogrom of November 1938. Finally, in January 1945, the Gestapo sent him to Clausthal labor camp, where he remained until the camp's liberation in April. His experiences under the Nazis led to a "bad nervous condition," which manifested itself by involuntary fasciculation of his head and neck, "as though he were recoiling before a blow."⁵⁶³ Quiet and unassuming, his colleagues liked Rudert, even if a few pitied the "broken man."⁵⁶⁴ His wife, who survived the Holocaust, played a supportive role in his life and encouraged him to apply for a press license. His experiences certainly influenced his work, which reflected his interest in "the fate of persecuted Jews and his rescue by the Americans."⁵⁶⁵

The second KPD licensee was Otto Grossmann, who had contributed the occasional article on KPD sport and youth activities for the *Arbeiterzeitung* before 1933.⁵⁶⁶ In his youth, he joined the Workers' Youth Movement at the age of 14, and then the USPD (Independent Social Democratic Party). He left the KPD in 1926 because he opposed the party's opposition to the other workers' parties.⁵⁶⁷ Arrested twice for the distribution of illegal literature in the mid

⁵⁶³ Belfrage, "Frankfurt German Newspaper," no date [July 1945], 6, NACP RG 260/253/195 and idem., *Seeds of Destruction*, 159.

⁵⁶⁴ Carlebach, *Zensur ohne Schere*, 17.

⁵⁶⁵ Carlebach, *Zensur ohne Schere*, 17; Belfrage, "Frankfurt German Newspaper," no date [July 1945], 6, NACP RG 260/253/195.

⁵⁶⁶ Belfrage, "Frankfurt German Newspaper," no date [July 1945], 7, NACP RG 260/253/195.

⁵⁶⁷ Belfrage, "Frankfurt German Newspaper," no date [July 1945], 8, NACP RG 260/253/195. He was also a member of the *Naturfreunde* organization, which promoted internationalism and communion with nature. Carlebach, *Zensur ohne Schere*, 17.

1930s, he eventually found work as a printer and engraver, and remained in this role through 1945. Both his colleagues and PWD were fond of the “nice and sympathetic” Grossmann.⁵⁶⁸

PWD believed that the former Center Party member Wilhelm Karl Gerst, although not a communist by party affiliation, was motivated “to spread his doctrine of religious, classless socialism.”⁵⁶⁹ A member of the Center Party through the Weimar Republic, Gerst aligned himself with National Socialism after the signing of the Concordat with Rome on July 20, 1933.⁵⁷⁰ After the Nazis rejected him, his worldview adjusted such that he began to self-identify as religiously Roman Catholic, politically Democratic, and economically communistic.⁵⁷¹ For obvious reasons, he was a challenging case for U.S. licensing authorities.

Gerst’s press and publishing experience was quite extensive. He had been editor in chief of the Center Party’s *Hildesheimische Zeitung* before the First World War and involved himself variously in newspaper work, book writing, and theatrical and film production during the Weimar Republic.⁵⁷² In 1932, he established the *Volksschaftsverlag für Buch, Bühne und Film*,

⁵⁶⁸ Carlebach, *Zensur ohne Schere*, 17 and Belfrage, “Frankfurt German Newspaper,” no date [July 1945], 7, NACP RG 260/253/195.

⁵⁶⁹ Information Control Division, ICD Screening Center, “Subject: Gerst, Karl Wilhelm, screened as chief editor, Frankfurter Rundschau,” April 17, 1946, 3, NACP RG 260/253/194.

⁵⁷⁰ ICD Screening Center, “Subject: Gerst, Karl Wilhelm,” April 17, 1946, 3, NACP RG 260/253/194.

⁵⁷¹ ICD Screening Center, “Subject: Gerst, Karl Wilhelm,” April 17, 1946, 3, NACP RG 260/253/194.

⁵⁷² He was General director and business manager (*Geschäftsführer*) for the *Bühnenvolksbund* (Volk League of Stages), the *Preußischen Landestheater-Organisation* the publishing house for the *Bühnenvolksbund*, and the *Reichsbund für deutsche Freilicht- und Volksschauspiele* – one of the central organizations in the *Thingspiel* movement. Personalfragebogen Wilhelm Karl Gerst, Anlage 2: Berufstätigkeit, NACP RG 260/253/195 and Belfrage, “Frankfurt German Newspaper,” no date [July 1945], 6, NACP RG 260/253/195.

which published plays for Catholic audiences.⁵⁷³ That same year, he offered publishing contracts to Walther Blachetta and Kurt Eggers, eventually publishing Blachetta's *Hitler-Jugend marschiert* and Eggers's infamous *Das Spiel von Job dem Deutschen* the following year.⁵⁷⁴ Soon thereafter, he sold the *Volksschaftsverlag* and launched a publishing house in Frankfurt, the *St. Georg Verlag*. Gerst claimed that he did so because he did not want to publish "purely Nazi literature."⁵⁷⁵ *St. Georg* published Catholic publications until Gerst's arrest for penning anti-Nazi articles in October 1944.⁵⁷⁶ He was sentenced to one and a half years in a Darmstadt prison. The U.S. Army freed him in May 1945.

As proof of his anti-Nazi *bona fides*, Gerst requested and received a reference from Konrad Adenauer, who confirmed that Gerst was a "staunch opponent of National Socialism," but he made no mention of Gerst's desire to leave Nazi cultural organizations.⁵⁷⁷ PWD was

⁵⁷³ Personalfragebogen Wilhelm Karl Gerst, Anlage 2: Berufstätigkeit, NACP RG 260/253/195; Frankfurt Detachment, 6871st DISCC to Commanding Officer, 6871st DISCC, Att. Chief of Intelligence, "Subject: Karl Wilhelm [sic] Gerst," July 29, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175; and ICD Screening Center, "Subject: Gerst, Karl Wilhelm," April 17, 1946, 2, NACP RG 260/253/194.

⁵⁷⁴ Eggers was a protestant priest, a moderately important Nazi figure, and a member of the SS. Frankfurt Detachment, 6871st DISCC, "Subject: Karl Wilhelm [sic] Gerst," July 29, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175; Walther Blachetta, *Hitler-Jugend marschiert* (Berlin: Volksschaft-Verlag, 1933); and Kurt Eggers, "Das Spiel von Job dem Deutschen. Ein Mysterium," in *Aufbruch zur Volksgemeinschaft* (Berlin-Südende: Volksschaft-Verlag, 1933), 8-72.

⁵⁷⁵ ICD Screening Center, "Subject: Gerst, Karl Wilhelm, screened as chief editor, Frankfurter Rundschau," April 17, 1946, 2, NACP RG 260/253/194.

⁵⁷⁶ Frankfurt Detachment, 6871st DISCC, "Subject: Karl Wilhelm [sic] Gerst," July 29, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175 and Belfrage, "Frankfurt German Newspaper," no date [July 1945], 6, NACP RG 260/253/195.

⁵⁷⁷ T/Sgt. George K. Schueller, Frankfurt Intelligence Detachment, 6871st DISCC, "Testimony of Dr. Adenauer about Karl Wilhelm [sic] Gerst," August 2, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175 and Dr. Adenauer, Oberbürgermeister, Cologne City Administration, [to 6871st DISCC], July 31, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175. For PWD's initial assessments of Gerst, see Belfrage, "Frankfurt German Newspaper," no date [July 1945], 6, NACP RG 260/253/195 and

remained ignorant of the extent of Gerst's ties to the Nazi state until it was too late to revoke his license. On July 28, 1945, that is, three days before the *Frankfurter Rundschau* went to print, that PWD learned that Gerst had published Blachetta's and Egger's works in 1933. As this revelation came to the fore, so too did many others, including Gerst's delivery of several pro-Nazi speeches in 1933 and 1934 as a guest of Otto Laubinger, an official with the Propaganda Ministry. In one of these speeches, Gerst praised "the spirit of the National Socialist State" for eliciting "the direct and lively participation of the whole in cultural matters." He declared his pride in having been witness to the end of the Weimar Republic and the birth of "an organic democracy based on Germanic psychology, a socialistic economy, and an organic secular culture embracing all the people of our nation."⁵⁷⁸ PWD took no action, and a few days after the *Rundschau* went to print they learned that Gerst had written an antisemitic article in the *Mitteilungen für die Presse* in 1924 and had been a major figure in the *Bühnenvolksbund*, which promoted itself as an antisemitic, anti-Democratic organization.⁵⁷⁹

According to information control guidelines, Gerst "voluntarily gave substantial moral and material support to the Nazi Party" and was therefore ineligible for a press license.⁵⁸⁰ In the

Frankfurt Detachment, 6871st DISCC July 29, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

⁵⁷⁸ Phill Davison to Colonel Kinard, "Subject: Gerst," July 22, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/194; Lt. Col. J.B. Stanley, Commander, Headquarters, 6871st DISCC to Chief, Information Control Division [ICD] United States Forces, European Theater [USFET], "New Evidence Concerning Wilhelm H. Gerst, Frankfurter Rundschau Licensee," August 29, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/194; and T/Sgt. Schueller and T/3 Arnhold, Frankfurt Detachment 671st DISCC to Commanding Officer, 6871st DISCC, "Speech delivered by Wilhelm Karl Gerst, 7 August 1933," August 25, 1945, 2-3, NACP RG 260/1490/1174.

⁵⁷⁹ Wilhelm Karl Gerst, "Der Kulturkampf auf dem Theater," *Mitteilungen für die Presse*, November 1924. He reiterated this view in a June 18, 1926 story in the *Berliner Tageblatt*. See Major Shepard Stone, Headquarters, 6871st DISCC, Intelligence Section, "Subject: Wilhelm Karl Gerst," August 29, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/194.

⁵⁸⁰ Stone, "Subject: Wilhelm Karl Gerst," August 29, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/194.

wake of the Hollbach affair, however, U.S. authorities were particularly cautious to maintain an air of authority. Because they had learned of Gerst's problematic past as the *Frankfurter Rundschau* began publishing, they concluded that Gerst, "through no fault of his own," had become unwillingly embroiled in various Nazi ventures.⁵⁸¹ The Americans were also suspicious of the fact that the sources of the Gerst revelations included former Nazis, Catholic publishers, and "conservative elements."⁵⁸²

The final licensee was Emil Carlebach. Carlebach was the *Kollegium*'s only Jewish licensee, its youngest, and later its most famous owing to a public debate with Maragerete Buber-Neumann in the early 1950s.⁵⁸³ Born in 1914, Carlebach grew up in a wealthy and well-known German-Jewish family where the *Frankfurter Zeitung* "was like the Bible." His extended family included a number of prominent German rabbis, but Carlebach's upbringing was largely

⁵⁸¹ Frankfurt Detachment, 6871st DISCC, "Subject: Karl Wilhelm [sic] Gerst," July 29, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175 and Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, Chief, Information Control Division to U.S. Political Advisor, "Subject: Wilhelm Karl Gerst, Co-Licensee of the Frankfurter Rundschau," September 5, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/194.

⁵⁸² Lt. Col. William H. Kinard, Deputy Director, Political Affairs, "ODIC," October 2, 1946," NACP RG 260/253/194; McClure, "Subject: Wilhelm Karl Gerst," September 5, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/194; and Stone, "Subject: Wilhelm Karl Gerst," 29 August 1945, NACP RG 260/253/194; Stone, "Subject: Wilhelm Karl Gerst," August 29, 1945, 5, NACP RG 260/253/194; and McClure, "Subject: Wilhelm Karl Gerst," September 5, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/194. One of Dombrowski's associates, Alois Bilz, sent the *Frankfurter Presse* staff a copy of the Eggers or Blachetta play. Copies of the August 7, 1933 speech came from Georg Schmidt, whom Gerst had identified earlier as a Nazi informer and responsible for his 1944 arrest. Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 182 and Schueller and Arnhold, "Speech delivered by Wilhelm Karl Gerst, 7 August 1933," August 25, 1945, 1, NACP RG 260/1490/1174.

⁵⁸³ In 1951, Carlebach engaged in a well-publicized debate with Buber-Neumann over brutalities visited upon German Communists in the Soviet Union. Carlebach maintained Stalin's innocence for crimes against members of the KPD and slandered Buber-Neumann in an article written for the *Frankfurter Rundschau*. This led to a one-month prison term. See Klaus Neumann, *Shifting Memories: The Nazi Past in the New Germany* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 168 and Andrea Reiter, *Narrating the Holocaust*, trans. Patrick Camiller (London: Continuum, 2000), 247.

secular. In the late 1920s, he rejected the tenets of Orthodox Judaism, along with a number of other members of Frankfurt's Orthodox Jewish community.⁵⁸⁴ The U.S. trial and executions of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti in 1927 shaped his political perspective. Three years later, he joined two Marxist-socialist youth organizations before becoming a KPD member in 1932.⁵⁸⁵ It was around this time that he began writing and distributing freelance articles and KPD leaflets, and he continued doing so until the Nazis arrested him in May 1933. Released six weeks later, he went to France but returned to Germany at the end of 1933.⁵⁸⁶ He fell under arrest again soon thereafter, and received a three-year sentence. After his release in January 1937, the Gestapo arrested him again in April and sent him to Dachau, where he remained until the SS transferred him to Buchenwald in 1938.

At Buchenwald, Carlebach became leader of an *Arbeitskolonne* (labor gang) and then *Blockältester* (block elder) of Block 22 in 1940.⁵⁸⁷ He used this position to organize the "Buchenwald International Underground" and to wrest control from the "Greens," that is, the

⁵⁸⁴ Welsch, "Die hessischen Lizenzträger," 82, n211 and Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 161. Jonathan C. Friedman, *The Lion and the Star: Gentile-Jewish Relations in Three Hessian Communities, 1919-1945* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1998), 57-58. Carlebach's extended family also included Azriel Carlebach, who in the 1940s wrote for *Yedioth Ahronoth* and, in 1948, helped found the popular Israeli newspaper *Maariv*. Emil later joked that the Americans "had no idea they had caught a communist when they thought they had a Zionist." See *Werkreis Literatur der Arbeitswelt. Band 11: Die Kinder des rotten Großvaters erzählen* (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1976), 132 as in Welsch, "Die hessischen Lizenzträger," 82-83.

⁵⁸⁵ DKP [Deutsche Kommunistische Partei]-Hessen, "Interview zur Biographie: Emil Carlebach – Wider das Vergessen," no date, at <http://www.dkp-hessen.de/galerie/personen/carlebach-interview.htm>, last accessed January 31, 2008 and Welsch, "Die hessischen Lizenzträger," 82. See also Carlebach, *Zensur ohne Schere*, 19.

⁵⁸⁶ Welsch, "Die hessischen Lizenzträger," 82.

⁵⁸⁷ See, for example, Max Kimenthal, Ernest S. Elberfeld, George K. Schueller, Frankfurt Mission, 6871st DISCC, "Report on Emil Carlebach, former political inmate of concentration camps," June 11, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175; Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 162; or Neumann, *Shifting Memories*, 168.

criminal prisoners. Carlebach's group often identified brutal *kapos* and warned them "in the strongest possible way" to cease their mistreatment of other prisoners before taking retributive action.⁵⁸⁸ They also secured food for prisoners, tried to place the infirmed into less taxing work details, and trained for an uprising by becoming part of the *Lagerschutz* (Camp Police).⁵⁸⁹ An uprising finally occurred on April 11, 1945. Upon liberation, Buchenwald survivors from Frankfurt elected Carlebach as their representative to liaise with the Americans.⁵⁹⁰

On the surface, Carlebach was an almost obvious candidate for a license but his experiences at Buchenwald almost prevented this from occurring. PWD received several reports in early June 1945 that claimed Carlebach had engaged in "ruthless and brutal" behavior against prisoners in Buchenwald.⁵⁹¹ Based on this evidence, the Intelligence Section of PWD concluded that Carlebach was an unsuitable candidate. Upon becoming aware of this development, Press Control officers in Frankfurt undertook their own investigation and reassessed the Intelligence Section testimonies against Carlebach. They began their inquiry by interviewing the already

⁵⁸⁸ Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 113 and Werber, *Diary*, 73-74, 77, 79.

⁵⁸⁹ Werber, *Diary*, 74-80. See also, for example, Samuel P. Oliner, *Do Unto Others: Extraordinary Acts of Ordinary People* (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 2003), 72-73; Elmer Luchterhand, *The Nazi Concentration Camps: A Study in Survival and Rebellion* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1949), 198; or Emil Carlebach, Paul Grunewald, Helmut Roder, Willy Schmidt, and Walter Vielhauer, *Buchenwald, ein Konzentrationslager. Bericht der ehemaligen KZ-Häftlinge* (Frankfurt, a.M.: Roderberg, 1984).

⁵⁹⁰ International Camp Committee, Buchenwald, Weimar, Untitled Document: "Certification: The former political prisoner in the concentration-camp of Buchenwald, Carlebach, Emil, Frankfurt/M., is elected as representative for his fellow-prisoners to communicate in behalf of their interests with all civil and military authorities," signed [Walter] Bartel, no date, NACP RG 260/1490/1175; Kimenthal, et al., "Report on Emil Carlebach," June 11, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175; and Carlebach, *Zensur ohne Schere*, 11.

⁵⁹¹ Press Detachment, 12th Army Group "Emil Carlebach," June 14, 1945, 3, NACP RG 260/1490/1175 and Kimenthal, et al., "Report on Emil Carlebach," June 11, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

well-known Buchenwald survivor Eugen Kogon.⁵⁹² When asked, Kogon merely stated that Carlebach was over-aggressive, but that he was “keenly intelligent, had leadership ability” and could prove useful to in the reconstruction of the press if he were “balanced off [by] less aggressive men.”⁵⁹³

Other interviewees made disturbing accusations. Valentin Gelber, a Viennese lawyer and former inmate of Block 22, claimed Carlebach used his position as Block Leader to dispense arbitrary justice. He recounted the case of Benzion Moskowitz, the High Cantor of a prominent Amsterdam synagogue, whom Carlebach had allegedly placed in a harsh and fatal work detail as punishment for the alleged theft of a razor. Gelber also claimed that Carlebach attempted to do the same to Jakob Ihr, a member of the “Austrian opposition.” When this alleged attempt failed, Gelber asserted that Carlebach tried to kill Ihr by giving him a lethal injection in the camp hospital.⁵⁹⁴ Potentially more damaging, Moritz Zauderer, who had known of Carlebach since coming to Buchenwald in 1939, claimed that Carlebach purposefully assigned “middle-class”

⁵⁹² Press Detachment, 12th Army Group “Emil Carlebach,” June 14, 1945, 1, NACP RG 260/1490/1175. The Austrian-born Kogon was indeed an ideal source of information. At that time, he worked with PWD in constructing the “Bucehnwald Report,” which later became the source of inspiration for his seminal study, *The Theory and Practice of Hell*. See David A. Hackett, *The Buchenwald Report* (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1997), 2-4 and Eugen Kogon, *The Theory and Practice of Hell: The German Concentration Camps and the System Behind Them*, trans. Heinz Norden (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1946, 1950, 2006).

⁵⁹³ Press Detachment, 12th Army Group “Emil Carlebach,” June 14, 1945, 1-2, NACP RG 260/1490/1175. Cf. Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 163, which includes the claim that Kogon was the source of a plot against Carlebach.

⁵⁹⁴ This general story also appears in the testimony of Moritz Zauderer, though Zauderer claimed that Carlebach attempted to place Ihr on an *Invalidentransport* for extermination. See Testimony of Moritz Zauderer, Weimar, June 10, 1945, 2, NACP RG 260/1490/1175. In addition to these claims, Gelber alleged that Carlebach tried to execute another prisoner, a man by the name of Manheim, by sending him to the prison hospital and attempted to beat to death and lynch a Hungarian physician. Testimony of Dr. Valentin Gelber, Buchenwald, 9 June 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

men to *Himmelfahrtskommando* (suicide mission) tasks such as quarry work and beat prisoners “for the merest trifles,” including maintaining a less-than-tidy mess kit.⁵⁹⁵ Per Zauderer, Carlebach also stated in spring 1943, “I am only interested in saving 30 to 40 Jews ... the others can go to hell, they are after all only capitalists, stinkers, and asocial elements.”⁵⁹⁶

A slightly more judicious testimony came from Ferdinand Römhild, a political prisoner from Frankfurt whom Kogon had recommended to the Americans.⁵⁹⁷ Römhild believed that Carlebach’s youth and relative inexperience had made him incapable of compassion for the plight of older prisoners. He made vague references to Carlebach’s role in the arbitrary beatings of certain prisoners, but noted that such actions were “in accord with the general tendencies of the camp, which in turn were dictated by the force of circumstances and by the SS.”⁵⁹⁸ In a subsequent interview, Römhild declared that he could not judge Carlebach since “he had absolutely no first hand information” on any of the particular cases from their time in Buchenwald.⁵⁹⁹

Upon becoming aware of the charges against him, Carlebach marched into Cedric Belfrage’s office and shouted, “You can lock me up now ..., but you cannot impress a man who spent 11 years chased by the SS and Gestapo.”⁶⁰⁰ Belfrage calmed Carlebach and requested that

⁵⁹⁵ Testimony of Moritz Zauderer, Weimar, June 10, 1945, 1, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

⁵⁹⁶ Testimony of Moritz Zauderer, Weimar, June 10, 1945, 2, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

⁵⁹⁷ Press Detachment, 12th Army Group “Emil Carlebach,” June 14, 1945, 2, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

⁵⁹⁸ Testimony of Ferdinand Roemhild, Frankfurt a.M., June 8, 1945, 1, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

⁵⁹⁹ Press Detachment, “Emil Carlebach,” June 14, 1945, 2, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

⁶⁰⁰ Carlebach, *Zensur ohne Schere*, 19. Cf. Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 165, wherein Belfrage remembers Carlebach’s reaction as “calm but ironical.”

he provide evidence in his favor.⁶⁰¹ Such evidence was rather scant. He did produce a copy of a certificate that granted him authority to liaise between liberated prisoners at Buchenwald and the Military Government. Carlebach also wrote a short testimony, in which he claimed that Gelber suffered from a mental condition and resented him for failing to spark an uprising in 1943.⁶⁰² Carlebach also claimed that he disrupted the planned murder of 3,000 Jews in the first week of April 1945 and denied torturing fellow prisoners, punishing others without due cause, or representing camp authorities. He stated that he remained conscious of the need to avoid giving “even the impression that I should wish to lift my reputation in the eyes of these murderers!”⁶⁰³

Several ex-Buchenwalders defended Carlebach. Freddy Roth, who by summer 1945 worked for the Press and Publications Section, claimed that Carlebach routinely hid him during camp roundups.⁶⁰⁴ Siegfried Schwarz admitted that Carlebach was perhaps harsher on older inmates, but claimed that he did so in order to protect those younger prisoners who were the most likely to rise up against their Nazi guards.⁶⁰⁵ Schwarz suffered from partial paralysis due to childhood meningitis, and referenced his own experience as proof of Carlebach’s better intentions. He testified that Carlebach had secured him a position in Buchenwald’s sock darning and mending department, but had placed his elderly uncle on a list of those set for transport to

⁶⁰¹ Press Detachment, 12th Army Group “Emil Carlebach,” June 14, 1945, 1, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

⁶⁰² Emil Carlebach, Elected representative of the political prisoners of the Camp Buchenwald to [PWD], no date, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

⁶⁰³ Emil Carlebach, Elected representative of the political prisoners of the Camp Buchenwald to [PWD], no date, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

⁶⁰⁴ Press Detachment, “Emil Carlebach,” June 14, 1945, 1, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

⁶⁰⁵ Press Detachment, “Emil Carlebach,” June 14, 1945, 1, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

Auschwitz. Schwarz stated that he “hated him [Carlebach] for what he did to my uncle,” while at the same time acknowledged that Carlebach protected him and had saved his life.⁶⁰⁶

Cedric Belfrage accepted that Carlebach had become “accustomed to seeing and taking part in frightful atrocities” but doubted the testimonies against him because they came from “older men who may have had a natural resentment against being bossed by a youth.” Belfrage believed Carlebach used his position to resist as much as possible given the conditions, and that his very survival testified to an ability to adapt to “the temporarily inevitable” for the attainment of a higher goal, that is, freedom from Nazism. Of greater importance, as Belfrage argued, there were very few qualified young people with the experience and resolve to build a democratic German press. At the time, younger émigré journalists could not return and the mass of those German press professionals under thirty-five years of age either possessed little journalistic experience or had wasted their ability in service to the Nazi state. Consequently, recently liberated camp populations were ideal groups from which to draw young, democratically minded newspaper professionals, for it was only in the camps that “a German could daily hear and join in discussions of democratic issues.”⁶⁰⁷

PWD concluded, “all evidences [sic], pro and con, concerning Carlebach’s character are true as we know from other sources that such a position as Carlebach held in the Buchenwald Concentration Camp demanded characteristics which are above the average.”⁶⁰⁸ Given the

⁶⁰⁶ Testimony of Ferdinand Roemhild, Frankfurt a.M., June 8, 1945, 2, NACP RG 260/1490/1175; Press Detachment, “Emil Carlebach,” June 14, 1945, 2, NACP RG 260/1490/1175; and Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 164.

⁶⁰⁷ Press Detachment, 12th Army Group, “Personal Notes on the Carlebach Case” in “Emil Carlebach,” June 14, 1945, 7, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

⁶⁰⁸ Lt. Col. James G. Chesnutt, Chief, Press Section, 6871st DISCC to Commanding Officer, 6871st DISCC, “Emil Carlebach,” July 9, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175 and Captain Jacob I. Tenenbaum, Deputy Chief, Intelligence Section, Headquarters 6871st DISCC to

horrors of the concentration camp system, they determined that his actions were necessary to his survival, and thus they could neither “praise [nor] condemn.” They rested their decision on the evidence of his activities as an anti-Nazi before and during the war.⁶⁰⁹ Clearly uncomfortable, as shown by a prominent note that the American Military Government retained the right to rescind his license at any time without notice, PWD granted Carlebach a license.⁶¹⁰

With the Carlebach affair behind them, PWD and the *Kollegium* of the *Frankfurter Rundschau* spent the remainder of July 1945 planning and preparing for their first issue. Following the closure of the *Frankfurter Presse*, the licensees assumed occupancy of its offices and began to oversee many of the 12th Army Group’s 220 German employees.⁶¹¹ At the organizational level, Gerst became business manager and chief of operations, and each licensee took responsibility for the five news divisions. Rudert, Knothe, and Rodemann agreed to edit the political section and oversee the gathering of international news from DANA. Elsewhere, Gerst oversaw culture and contributed the main editorials for the paper, Eitzkorn was responsible for the *Feuilleton*, and Grossmann oversaw sports coverage. Local news became Carlebach’s

Commanding Officer, 6871st DISCC, “Emil Carlebach’s position on the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,” July 9, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

⁶⁰⁹ Tenenbaum, “Emil Carlebach’s position,” 9 July 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175 and Chesnutt, “Emil Carlebach,” July 9, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

⁶¹⁰ Press Detachment, 12th Army Group, “Personal Notes on the Carlebach Case” in “Emil Carlebach,” June 14, 1945, 8, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

⁶¹¹ Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 180; Carlebach, *Zensur ohne Schere*, 21; and Stanley, “Occupancy of Premises of *Frankfurter Zeitung*,” August 6, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175. They also inherited the dilapidated conditions of the plant and had to reestablish telegraph and telephone lines to their offices, as well as figure out a way to secure automobiles and bicycles to deliver the newspaper. See “Sonderbeilage der *Frankfurter Rundschau* zum 25jährigen Bestehen vom 1.8.1970,” *Frankfurter Rundschau* (hereafter *FR*), August 1, 1970, 2; Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 180-181; and Welsch, “Die hessischen Lizenzträger,” 87.

responsibility.⁶¹² During the organizational process, Knothe was the group's political conscience, and his office became a beehive wherein one could find licensees "flinging political orations at each other's heads [while] the oft-repeated word 'Demokratie' rang down the corridor."⁶¹³

The newspaper secured a twice-weekly press run of 400,000 copies per issue, with 100,000 copies for Frankfurt and 300,000 for other areas in the American zone, at a sales price of 20 pfennig per copy.⁶¹⁴ On Wednesdays, it would print four pages, while the Saturday edition would have six. There were to be subscriptions at a cost of RM 1.85 per customer and a wide distribution network would ensure the paper's availability throughout Greater Hesse.⁶¹⁵ Finally, with everything set, the *Frankfurter Rundschau* printed a test run of its first issue on July 24.⁶¹⁶

⁶¹² Carlebach, *Zensur ohne Schere*, 22; Welsch, "Die hessischen Lizenzträger," 87-88 and Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 180-181.

⁶¹³ Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 180. See also, Welsch, "Die hessischen Lizenzträger," 87.

⁶¹⁴ Public Relations Division, USFET (Main) from Lovejoy from Jordan to Publication Relations Division, USFET (Rear) for Information Room for Patrick, "For Immediate Release," July 31, 1945, NACP RG 260/247/72. Through subscriptions and "special price" offers, the cost of an issue varied from prices as low as 14 pfennig to as high as 20 pfennig. See Lt. Col. C.M. Whitney, Deputy Chief, Fiscal and Business Management Section, USFET, "Report of Audit of Frankfurter Rundschau for Month of August 1945," September 21, 1945, 2, NACP RG 260/252/177/1.

⁶¹⁵ Whitney, "Report of Audit of Frankfurter Rundschau for Month of August 1945," September 21, 1945, 2, NACP RG 260/252/177/1.

⁶¹⁶ A Sergeant Martyn also participated in PWD's oversight of the initial run of the paper, though there is insufficient data on his duties with the newspaper. Lt. Col. James G. Chesnutt, Chief, Press Section, Headquarters, 6871st DISCC to Press Control Officers – Heidelberg, Stuttgart, Kassel and Bremen Detachment, "Test Run of *Frankfurter Rundschau*," July 25, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

“Democratic Cooperation” and the

Frankfurter Rundschau

Lieutenant Colonel James Chesnutt felt the test issue lacked “punch and drive.” He decided not to mention this to the licensees, because he did not feel it was the mission of PWD to tell men of such “bitter experience” that it was their duty to print “something crisp and sparkling and distinctive.”⁶¹⁷ And so, he congratulated the licensees of the *Frankfurter Rundschau* for a “well-written, attractive” newspaper that was sure to “be the forerunner of a new and democratic tradition in German journalism.”⁶¹⁸ Others were less sparing of their criticism. The soon-to-be licensees of Heidelberg’s *Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung*, AMZON’s second licensed newspaper, disapproved of the paper’s use of a subdued, conservative format and a masthead too small and messy to capture the attention of readers passing a newsstand.⁶¹⁹ They also felt that Gerst’s *feuilleton* on Law No. 191 was interesting but insufficiently “educational” and that the paper’s “Nazi items” were “too petty to illustrate the weight of fascist policy.”⁶²⁰ To remedy the latter, they suggested the inclusion of articles on large-scale Nazi policies, such as colonial practices in the Balkans.

⁶¹⁷ Col. Chesnutt, “Comments on FR test run,” no date, handwritten document, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

⁶¹⁸ Lt. Col. James Chesnutt, Chief, Press Section, 6781st DISCC to Collegium [sic], *Frankfurter Rundschau*, July 25, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175/Correspondence (b).

⁶¹⁹ First Lieutenant John Boxer, 6871st DISCC, Heidelberg Detachment to Commanding Officer, 6871st DISCC, attention: Chief Press Section, “Criticism of Test Run of Frankfurter Rundschau,” July 30, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175. A number of influential figures of the postwar era were part of this group, including Rudolf Agricola, who later became a respected East German political economist, and Theodor Heuss, the future first president of West Germany. See Robert Wolfe, “Revival of Democratic Culture during the American Occupation of Heidelberg, 1945-1949” in *Heidelberg 1945*, eds. Jürgen C. Heß, Hartmut Lehmann and Volker Sellin (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1996), 13-27.

⁶²⁰ Boxer, 6871st DISCC, Heidelberg Detachment, “Criticism of Test Run of Frankfurter Rundschau,” July 30, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

When the *Frankfurter Rundschau* went to press, it incorporated some of the cosmetic changes suggested by the *Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung* publishers. The subheadings appeared in a very recognizable form and the paper's masthead was bold and legible.⁶²¹ With the exception of late-breaking news items, it retained much of its original content. On July 31, 1945, with everything in place, General McClure presented the *Kollegium* and each member thereof copies of Information Control License No. 2 for the *Frankfurter Rundschau* in a formal ceremony held on the platform of a Rotation Machine. The terms of each license noted that the license was not a form of personal property and that Military Government reserved the right to revoke it at any time without notice. In addition, each licensee was obliged to follow a series of conditions, the most important of which was compliance with "all laws, ordinances, regulations, and instructions of Military Government."⁶²² Following the presentation of the licenses, McClure reminded the *Kollegium* that the licensing of their newspaper was a "certain experiment" on the ability of "men of different backgrounds and different personalities [to] work together for a common cause and a common good."⁶²³ With these words, McClure pushed a button on the rotation machine and the first issue began rolling off the press.

While the licensees celebrated their achievement by autographing each other's first editions and dining with the press control team, the people of Frankfurt purchased the inaugural

⁶²¹ The font of the masthead in the first issue of the *Frankfurter Rundschau* is similar, though slightly thinner, that used today. Moreover (and obviously) the words *Veröffentlicht unter Lizenz Nr. 2 der Nachrichtenkontrolle der Militärregierung* no longer appear under the masthead, and were replaced by the subheading "Independent Daily Newspaper" (*Unabhängige Tageszeitung*) in 1949.

⁶²² The original draft of the license held the bearer only to "Press Policy Instruction" number 1 and "Press Operating Instruction" number 1, though the final version chose to use the broader concept of general "policy and operating instructions." Compare License Nr. 2 [Draft] in NACP RG 260/1490/1175 with that in Carlebach, *Zensur ohne Schere*, 10.

⁶²³ Carlebach, *Zensur ohne Schere*, 31.

August 1, 1945 issue.⁶²⁴ Within its pages, they found articles on the liberation of Dachau, Military Government updates, the state of the war in Japan, and a much-anticipated advertising section. The front page foreshadowed the tone that the paper would assume in the coming months and years. On the left-hand side was a picture of a rather content-looking Clement Attlee and an accompanying story on the recent British Parliamentary election.⁶²⁵ To the immediate right, a column titled *Unsterbliche Opfer* (Immortal Victims), which noted an upcoming radio commemoration of the victims of fascism and listed the names of 24 of the thousands of victims from Frankfurt.⁶²⁶ The licensees also included an article on the mission of the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, in which they promised to escort Frankfurters on a path away from the lies of “Goebbels and his creatures” and toward widespread democratic cooperation.⁶²⁷ These themes would appear on a consistent basis in the newspaper throughout the occupation.

Popular reaction was swift and reasonably positive. Of 187 random Frankfurters surveyed in the first week of August 1945, 81 percent had read the first issue of the *Frankfurter Rundschau*.⁶²⁸ The majority were over 41 years of age with less than eight years of education,

⁶²⁴ Note, though dated August 1, 1945, the *Frankfurter Rundschau* reached the streets of Frankfurt on July 31. For details on the champagne dinner offered to the licensees, see Belfrage, *Seeds of Destruction*, 183. In addition, one can find a copy of an autographed first issue in Carlebach, *Zensur ohne Schere*, 30.

⁶²⁵ “Absolute Mehrheit der Arbeiterpartei. Attlee – der neue Premierminister,” *FR*, August 1, 1945.

⁶²⁶ “Unsterbliche Opfer ...,” *FR*, August 1, 1945.

⁶²⁷ Die Herausgeber [Carlebach, Eitzkorn, Gerst, Grossmann, Knothe, Rodemann and Rudert] “Der neuen Zeitung zum Geleit!” *FR*, August 1, 1945.

⁶²⁸ The remaining 19% declared their desire to read the paper. Headquarters, USFET, ICD, Intelligence Section, Opinion Surveys Unit, “Reactions of the Frankfurt Population to the Frankfurter Rundschau,” August 16, 1945, 1, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

while another 28 percent were of a similar age but with a reasonably better education.⁶²⁹ Most claimed “non-political” status, followed by affiliation with the SPD, the DNVP, and then the Center Party. Only one reader self identified as a member of the KPD and four admitted they were former members of the NSDAP.⁶³⁰ A number of readers (26.3%) had greater confidence in the *Frankfurter Rundschau* than in the *Frankfurter Presse*; one must note that this figure was not significantly greater than those who did not notice any difference between the two papers (25.7%) or those who answered that they “did not know” (21.7%).⁶³¹ Most felt that the *Frankfurter Rundschau* provided “more complete news” in a clear and intelligible manner. Despite the fact that the licensees stated that they were independent publishers in the inaugural issue, only 52.6 percent of respondents understood that the *FR* was a German-run newspaper, while another 20.4 percent answered that its staff was “German but under Allied control.”⁶³²

⁶²⁹ 71 out of 82 men and 81 of 105 women read the newspaper. “Appendix B, Table II: Relationship between Sex and Reading of Rundschau,” in Opinion Surveys Unit, “Reactions of the Frankfurt Population to the Frankfurter Rundschau,” August 16, 1945, 4, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

⁶³⁰ Party affiliations for those who read the paper were as follows: 4 NSDAP, 16 DNVP, 10 DVP, 14 Center, 8 Democratic Party (LDP?), 26 SPD, 1 KPD, 2 “Other”, 6 “Too young to judge,” 45 “Non-Political,” and 20 declined to answer. “Appendix B, Table IV: Relationship between pre-1933 Political Sympathies and Reading of Rundschau,” in Opinion Surveys Unit, “Reactions of the Frankfurt Population to the Frankfurter Rundschau,” August 16, 1945, 5, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

⁶³¹ Forty people preferred the *Rundschau*, while 15 expressed their confidence in the *Presse* because, amongst other reasons, “We are used to it.” Thirty-nine noticed “no difference,” 9 declared that it was “too early to judge,” thirty-3 “don’t know,” and 16 refused to answer. Opinion Surveys Unit, “Reactions of the Frankfurt Population to the Frankfurter Rundschau,” August 16, 1945, 2, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

⁶³² The answers were as follows: 80 answered “Germans,” 31 “Germans under American Control,” 15 “Military Government,” 4 “Other” including two who thought the *FR* publishers were of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* group, 15 did not know, and 7 declined to answer. “Appendix B, Table V: Distribution of Answers to Question 3: Who Publishes the Frankfurter Rundschau?” in Opinion Surveys Unit, “Reactions of the Frankfurt Population to the Frankfurter Rundschau,” August 16, 1945, 4, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

When asked what they liked most, the majority referenced the advertising section, followed by local news, and then the basic notion of “free speech in their press.”⁶³³

There were very few specific objections. Several readers disliked stories on the German military, the SS, and crimes in the concentration camps. When pressed, 19 respondents (12.5%) claimed these stories were Allied lies or exaggerations. This low figure had little to do with the readers’ faith in the new newspaper, however. Fourteen percent of those who did not read the *Frankfurter Rundschau* made similar claims.⁶³⁴ When asked what features would improve the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, five requested more editorials of the “*FZ*” variety; others hoped to see serialized fiction as well as more entertainment and economic news.⁶³⁵ One critic, Heinrich Cobert, wrote a four-page review in which he urged the licensees to remain mindful that they were “trustees for every Frankfurter desirous to know our true situation” and work to spur reconstruction efforts. He advised that they forgo the temptation to model the newspaper on the *Frankfurter Zeitung* because, while “the *FZ* was very well informed about the capital market,” the readers of the *Frankfurter Rundschau* “own nothing but their hands and minds” to serve the community.⁶³⁶

⁶³³ Opinion Surveys Unit, “Reactions of the Frankfurt Population to the Frankfurter Rundschau,” 16 August 1945, 3, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

⁶³⁴ Of those that read the first issue of the newspaper, 19 (12.5%) stated that stories on concentration camps were Allied exaggerations, while 112 (73.7%) felt they were not. Three respondents doubted the claims in the stories and 18 refused to answer. Of those who did not read the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 5 (14.3%) made similar claims, 23 (65.7%) did not, 6 (17.1%) expressed doubts, and 1 (2.8%) refused to answer. “Appendix B, Table IX: Distribution of Answers to Question 10: Do you think Allied reports of concentration camps [are] exaggerated?” in Opinion Surveys Unit, “Reactions of the Frankfurt Population to the Frankfurter Rundschau,” August 16, 1945, 5, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

⁶³⁵ Opinion Surveys Unit, “Reactions of the Frankfurt Population to the Frankfurter Rundschau,” August 16, 1945, 3, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

⁶³⁶ Heinrich Cobert, “Stimmen zur Frankfurter Rundschau,” August 7, 1945, 2-3, NACP

Surprisingly positive reviews came from two of Hollbach's colleagues. The first, Gertrud Becker, had been the head of the mayoral Press Department during Hollbach's term, a *feuilleton* writer for the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, and a journalist at the *Frankfurter Anzeiger*. She praised the *Frankfurter Rundschau* for revitalizing the Frankfurt press, particularly since she felt the "tabloid style" of the *Frankfurter Presse* had become "a little tired," but noted that the front-page stories were unfinished and not quite up to the standards of pre-Nazi journalism.⁶³⁷ The second Hollbach colleague, Eberhard Beckmann, had been a reporter for the *General Anzeiger* and *Frankfurter Anzeiger* and had served as the Blaum administration's division chief in charge of returning former concentration camp inmates in August 1945. He understood that the newspaper was not completely free and that its printed material reflected a limited source base, and so suggested that the *FR* focus on "salient political events" in order to gain the trust of the readership.⁶³⁸ Both Becker and Beckmann considered the paper's coverage of local news too formulaic and noticeably different from the relatively dynamic coverage of world events. Others felt the same. Gerhard Siegel, a licensee candidate in Marburg, felt the *Frankfurter Rundschau*'s stunted style and emphasis on local news was superfluous and potentially harmful because it might fail to teach postwar Germans of their "relative unimportance in the family of nations."⁶³⁹

RG 260/1490/1175.

⁶³⁷ Gertrud Becker, "Erste Nummer der 'Frankfurter Rundschau,' in Frankfurt Detachment, 6871st DISCC, "Criticism of the first issue of the 'Frankfurter Rundschau' by Miss Gertrud Becker," August 6, 1945, 1, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

⁶³⁸ Eberhard Beckmann, no title in Frankfurt Detachment, 6871st DISCC, "Criticism of the first issue of the 'Frankfurter Rundschau' by Eberhard Beckmann," August 6, 1945, 1, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

⁶³⁹ 6871st DISCC, Marburg Detachment, "Short Criticism of 'Frankfurter Rundschau' by Gerhard Siegel, applicant for license as editor," September 8, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

Sales of and subscriptions for the newspaper were brisk in its first month. By September 1, 1945, PWD increased the circulation of the *Frankfurter Rundschau* to 476,500 copies. Within a month, it rose to 502,500. Of the 4.46 million copies distributed in September, 62 percent sold through a mail-based subscription service, while retailers accounted for an additional 23.5 percent of sales.⁶⁴⁰ Remarkably, the *Frankfurter Rundschau* increased sales at the same time that its area of distribution shrank due to the launch of German-run newspapers in Heidelberg, Marburg, Stuttgart, Bremen, and Kassel.⁶⁴¹ In certain areas, such as Darmstadt, it competed with other licensed newspapers.⁶⁴² Circulating 500,000 copies per issue, it was second only to *Die Neue Zeitung*, and accounted for up to 32.8 percent of the total distribution for all licensed newspapers in the Western Military District in 1945.⁶⁴³

⁶⁴⁰ Circulation figures for the month of September 1945 were as follows: Issue No. 10 (1.9.45), 476,500; No. 11 (5.9.45), 489,150; No. 12 (8.9.45), 493,550; No. 13 (12.9.45), 496,550; No. 14 (15.9.45), 499,250; No. 15 (19.9.45), 500,800; No. 16 (22.9.45), 500,650; No. 17 (26.9.45), 500,334; and No. 18 (29.9.45), 502,500 copies per issue. They sold 641,998 through courier delivery, 2,745,000 through mail subscription, 1,048,702 at newsstands and other retail locations, and gave away 24,500 copies. See M/Sgt. Leo Schwilling and S/Sgt. W.A. Acton, Fiscal & Business Management Section, "Circulation figures for September 45" in "Report on the Second Audit of the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, relating to the month of September 1945, 6 Sept. [sic – October] 1945," 3, NACP RG 260/252/177/1.

⁶⁴¹ ICD gave licenses as follows: *Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung* (Heidelberg), September 5, 1945; *Marburger Presse*, September 15; *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, September 17; *Weser Kurier* (Bremen Enclave), September 19; and *Hessische Nachrichten*, September 26, 1945.

⁶⁴² The *FR* competed with the *Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung* in Darmstadt until November 21, 1945, when the *Darmstädter Echo* received its license. Chesnutt, Chief, Press Section, Headquarters, 6871st DISCC to Commanding Officer, 6871st DISCC, "Immediate Plans for Press Section Operations," November 13, 1945, 2, NACP RG 260/1488/1142.

⁶⁴³ By September 1945, the total distribution of all licensed newspapers in the Western District was 1.53 million copies per issue, of which the *Frankfurter Rundschau* accounted for 500,000 copies (32.8%). By mid-November, all Western District newspapers increased to 1.96 million, and the *FR* sold 505,100 copies per issue, or 25.8% of the overall total. See Chesnutt, Chief, Press Section, Headquarters, 6871st DISCC to Commanding Officer, 6871st DISCC, "Immediate Plans for Press Section Operations," September 27, 1945, 1-2, NACP RG 260/1488/1142 and Chesnutt, "Immediate Plans for Press Section Operations," November 13,

The paper also enjoyed some considerable popularity, at least for a time. When 200 random Frankfurters filled out anonymous questionnaires in November 1945, 65 percent held a favorable judgment of the newspaper, while 26 percent thought it was a “fair” newspaper and only 3 percent “did not like it at all.”⁶⁴⁴ When one compares this to similar studies in Kassel, Stuttgart, and Nuremberg, where 40 percent of readers thought their newspaper was “good,” it appears that Frankfurters held the *Frankfurter Rundschau* in at least some esteem.⁶⁴⁵ Finally, when asked if it exhibited a political bias, only 7 percent responded in the affirmative and 49 percent declared that it was impartial.⁶⁴⁶

Political Enemies

After his failure to receive a license, Hollbach held a grudge against the Military Government and the editors of the *Frankfurter Rundschau*. He made no great secret of his belief that the newspaper was “fabulously incompetent.” Soon after the first issue, he began to complain publicly that the Americans had organized the *Kollegium* to forward socialist propaganda.⁶⁴⁷ By September 1945, Dombrowski joined the public critics who argued that the *FR* was “too communistic.”⁶⁴⁸ There seems to be little doubt that Hollbach’s reaction owed itself

1945, 2, NACP RG 260/1488/1142.

⁶⁴⁴ Eighteen percent thought the paper was “very good,” 47% “good,” 26% “fair,” and 3% “did not like it at all. Headquarters, USFET, ICD, File: BIC 319.1 (InT), “Surveys of German Reactions to Newspapers,” November 20, 1945, NACP RG 260/247/72.

⁶⁴⁵ ICD, “Surveys of German Reactions to Newspapers,” November 20, 1945, NACP RG 260/247/72.

⁶⁴⁶ ICD considered the large number of non-responses to this question the direct product of “the considerable political apathy of the population.” ICD, “Surveys of German Reactions to Newspapers,” November 20, 1945, NACP RG 260/247/72.

⁶⁴⁷ Wilhelm Hollbach to Margret Boveri, August 31, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

⁶⁴⁸ Cedric Belfrage to Lt. Col. Chesnutt, 6871st DISCC, “Frankfurter Rundschau –

to his quixotic attempt to reestablish the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and that Dombrowski hoped to undermine the newspaper in an attempt to secure an individual license. However, the general opinion that the *Frankfurter Rundschau* had become too extreme in its leftist politics became prevalent in some circles of the Military Government and Frankfurt political circles by the end of September 1945.

The licensees chose to make the *Frankfurter Rundschau* an aggressively critical medium for German democratic development. At times, it did so in subtle ways. For example, the editors would place news and editorials in more prominent positions than cultural pieces on the belief that doing so could stimulate critical dialogue on politics and society.⁶⁴⁹ Other times, they chose to attack particular policies and political figures in order to rectify what they saw as a wrong. These approaches won the licensees occasional praise for having created the “most forceful and outspoken paper in the American zone,” while simultaneously encouraging anger and resentment.⁶⁵⁰ In the fourth issue, the licensees introduced a new column titled *Unser Wille zur Zusammenarbeit*, in which each licensee would express his political views and hopes for the postwar world. Gerst wrote the first editorial, titled “I speak as a Catholic.” He argued that the German people must come together in the spirit of political and ideological cooperation if they

Conversation with Lt. Col. Sheehan,” October 15, 1945,” NACP RG 260/253/216.

⁶⁴⁹ About 50% of the material in the *Frankfurter Rundschau* focused on “German coverage,” including local news, historical discussions, and editorials. They devoted another 20-25% to world news, and left an additional 20% for the *Feuilleton* or cultural matters. In comparison, the *Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung* devoted 45% of its space to cultural matters, and only 8-10% to world news. Aronson, “Licensed Press Scrutiny Report,” November 15, 1945, 4-5, NACP RG 260/1488/1157.

⁶⁵⁰ A.J. Aronson, Deputy Chief for Policy, Press Section to Luther Conant, Chief, Press Control Section, Headquarters, USFET, ICD, “Licensed Press Scrutiny Report,” November 15, 1945, 4, NACP RG 260/1488/1157.

wanted to move forward to a better, democratic future.⁶⁵¹ He argued that the small-scale outreach that existed among some Communist and Social Democratic factions could serve as a model for future cooperation and lamented the lack of determination to engage in similar efforts by members of the former Center Party. Therefore, he urged Catholics to reject Pope Pius XI's *Divini Redemptoris* and come to a "common ground" with Communists based on their shared antifascism and antimilitarism, common commitment to democracy, and mutual belief in the need to care for others.⁶⁵²

Gerst's editorial did engender "healthy" discussion on the need to cooperate with persons who held differing political views, but it angered Catholic clergy and politicians.⁶⁵³ Bishop Johann Baptist Dietz of Fulda declared that Gerst was not a true Catholic and at the 1945 Bishops Conference at Fulda a priest remarked, "Now that I have seen and read the *Rundschau*, I would rather go back to reading the *Hessische Post* again!" The ecclesiastical consensus held that Gerst's editorial was "not only out and out communist, but was also directed against the Catholic Church."⁶⁵⁴ In time, Gerst's unorthodox views of the Catholic-Communist dynamic developed further and opened the newspaper to considerably more rancorous criticism from ecclesiastical circles, as well as from staunch lay Catholics like Konrad Adenauer.

⁶⁵¹ Gerst, "Ich spreche als Katholik," *FR*, August 11, 1945; Welsch, "Die hessischen Lizenzträger," 92; Carlebach, *Zensur ohne Schere*, 40-42; and Lt. Otto Schoeppler, 6871 DISCC, Marburg Detachment to Commanding Officer, 6871 DISCC for Chief of Intelligence, "Catholic Church vs. Dr. Gerst," September 13, 1945, 1-2, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

⁶⁵² Gerst, "Ich spreche als Katholik," *FR*, August 11, 1945; Welsch, "Die hessischen Lizenzträger," 92 and Carlebach, *Zensur ohne Schere*, 41.

⁶⁵³ T/3 Charles Haimoff, 6871th [sic] DISCC, Marburg Detachment to Commanding Officer, 6871st DISCC, Attn. Chief of Intelligence Section, "Reactions to the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 25 August 1945, NACP RG 260/1488/1157 and Chesnutt, "Press Section Weekly Memorandum No. 16 to Outposts" September 8, 1945, NACP RG 260/1488/1151.

⁶⁵⁴ Schoeppler, "Catholic Church vs. Dr. Gerst," September 13, 1945, 1-2, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

The specter of communism that some found in Gerst's brief editorial appeared in other issues of the early *Frankfurter Rundschau*, often alongside direct attacks on prominent postwar politicians. The four-page September 8, 1945 edition included a picture of Tito, a large picture of Stalin, "Stalin's Order of the Day," an article entitled "Russia is China's Friend," stories of agrarian reform in the Russian zone, and Stalin's address to the Soviet Union on the surrender of Imperial Japan. It also had a front-page story on the first session of the Frankfurt *Bürgerrat*.⁶⁵⁵ With the publication of this last piece, the *Frankfurter Rundschau* cultivated a significant political enemy: Frankfurt's second postwar mayor, Kurt Blaum.

In retrospect, the paper's highly controversial coverage of the Blaum administration was appropriate. The September 8 story quoted Blaum's address to the city council, and highlighted his declaration that the "ills of the present situation in Frankfurt are due to the lack of fascists in the administration."⁶⁵⁶ When confronted by a Reuters correspondent, Blaum dismissed the story as an exaggeration concocted by the "communist element on the editorial board of the [*Frankfurter Rundschau*]."⁶⁵⁷ Undaunted, the licensees then charged Blaum with running Frankfurt according to the *Führerprinzip*. Between November 1945 and March 1946, they built

⁶⁵⁵ *Frankfurter Rundschau*, September 8, 1945. See also Carlebach, *Zensur ohne Schere*, 49-50 and "Subject One," September 21, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175. The 28-person Bürgerrat was a city council body, which MG established in place of Hollbach's council of May 1945. It was considerably more representative of Frankfurt's diverse population than Hollbach's group of conservative and industrialist councilors. Boehling, *A Question of Priorities*, 85.

⁶⁵⁶ According to the FR story, Blaum claimed that some of the "present ills of the present situation in Frankfurt are due to the lack of fascists in the administration" "Die erste Bürgerratssitzung in Frankfurt," *FR*, September 8, 1945. See also Carlebach, 49-50.

⁶⁵⁷ "Subject One," September 21, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175. There is sufficient evidence that Blaum lamented the removal of Nazi Party members and sympathizers in Frankfurt City Government, and did everything in his power to circumvent denazification within his administration, including trying to avoid granting privileges to established victims of Nazism. Boehling, *A Question of Priorities*, 136-137.

upon this claim by repeatedly referencing a 1940 article in which Blaum defended autocratic rule and arianization policies in Alsace-Lorraine.⁶⁵⁸

Blaum's hint at a communist conspiracy fit with conservative discussions in Frankfurt and in the Military Government. The public was not so certain. Some readers expressed their dissatisfaction with exposés on organizational faults in the Lord Mayor's office because they undermined the ability of the civic government to improve conditions and the strength of governmental leaders. Other readers saw the articles as part of a planned attack on Blaum, which was "not in keeping with democratic principles" owing to Blaum's perceived inability to "retaliate through the media." The largest group, however, saw the article as a "healthy sign showing [a] return of free speech."⁶⁵⁹

As the Blaum controversy developed, the editors published an open letter from the SPD and KPD to Karl Geiler, the *Ministerpräsident* of Greater Hesse on October 26. This document accused the government of a one-sided political approach because it excluded leftists from the political process. Four days later, Geiler demanded that his response appear on the front page and that it appear in the most prominent position available. The editorial board refused and placed his response at the bottom of page one, in the selfsame position as the original open letter

⁶⁵⁸ "Führerprinzip oder Demokratie," *FR*, November 13, 1945; OMGUS Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS) No. 19," November 17, 1945, NACP RG 260/250/157; Emil Carlebach, "Renazifizierung?" *FR*, 5 March 1946; "Eine Antwort von Dr. Blaum," *FR*, March 12, 1946; Julius Hollos (Scrutiny Desk) to Arthur Eggleston, "*FR* 26th March," March 28, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/216.

⁶⁵⁹ 6871st DISCC, "Reactions to the article entitled 'Die erste Buergerratsitzung [sic]," 11 September 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175 and Frankfurt Detachment – Intelligence Section, "Addition to Conclusion of report entitled 'Die erste Buergerratsitzung [sic]," article published in 'Frankfurter Rundschau' of 8 September 1945," September 12, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

that prompted this series of events.⁶⁶⁰ This elicited additional accusations of a leftist political bias and led some in Military Government to believe that these articles were subtle attacks on the occupation and evidence that the *Frankfurter Rundschau* was “turning somewhat conspicuously toward left.”⁶⁶¹

On October 1, 1945, Lt. Col. Francis Sheehan, the deputy Military Government Officer for Frankfurt, spoke with Belfrage about the *Frankfurter Rundschau*. Sheehan explained that he had grown concerned over rumors that the newspaper had become communist. After reading several translations of important articles, he saw no evidence of such a shift. Nevertheless, to assuage the critics, he and Belfrage developed a plan to remove one of the SPD licensees and one of the Communists. Because Rodemann had already planned to resign in order to establish the *Darmstädter Echo*, they considered granting Grossmann “an important job in the city administration” to thin the field of left-leaning licensees.⁶⁶²

Less even-handed responses came from within ICD. In late 1945, Colonel Clifford Powell, the Assistant Chief for Operations of ICD, wrote a brief memorandum to the Deputy Director of ICD, Colonel William Kinard. In this letter, Powell accused the 6871st DISCC of having granted newspaper licenses to communists “in accordance with the political philosophy of certain press control officers” and without consideration of the political constituency of the local population. This threatened the occupation, so Powell argued, because “a member of the Communisty [sic] Party cannot be objective” and, if communists were in the majority of a

⁶⁶⁰ *Frankfurter Rundschau* 30 October 1945 and 6871 DISCC, Frankfurt to Chief of Press Section, 6871st DISCC (attn. Lt. Col. Chesnutt), “Weekly Scrutiny Reports,” November 1, 1945.

⁶⁶¹ “Subject One,” September 21, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175.

⁶⁶² Belfrage, “Conversation with Lt. Col. Sheehan,” October 15, 1945, 2, NACP RG 260/253/216. Grossmann later left the *FR* after receiving a magazine publisher’s license for *Neuer Sport*.

newspaper's *Kollegium*, they would then express their political viewpoints above all others.⁶⁶³ Powell's accusations mirrored those of Captain Richard Scudder, who had earlier declared his intention to "make trouble" because he believed that the whole of the licensing program was a dramatic failure.⁶⁶⁴ In a complaint to the Press Section in Bad Homburg, Scudder declared that Cedric Belfrage, Colonel Chesnutt, and "a first lieutenant with an Italian name" were all communists. Luther Conant, the Chief of the Press Control Branch, responded to Powell and explained that he had no knowledge or indication that Belfrage was a communist, that Chesnutt was a registered Republican, and that the "first lieutenant with the Italian name," Deputy Chief of Operations for 6871 DISCC Allan J. Aronson, enjoyed the PWD's complete confidence.⁶⁶⁵ Conant concluded that both Scudder and Powell seemed unaware that it was impossible to determine the political makeup of a given German community in the summer and fall of 1945 due to the nature of the defeat and the ban on political parties. Moreover, the most important quality of the early licensees was not their political orientation, but the degree to which each was sufficiently anti-fascist, and that the purpose of the multi-person licensing scheme was to prevent

⁶⁶³ Col. C.R. Powell, Asst. Ch. for Operations, ICD, SHAEF, to Col. Kinnard [sic], "Memo on Communists in Military Government," undated (late 1945), sub: Licensed Press, NACP RG 260/118/459 and Powell to Kinard, "Licensed Press," December 13, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/198.

⁶⁶⁴ Luther Conant, Chief, Press Control Branch to General McClure, "Memorandum of Colonel Powell regarding the licensed press," February 3, 1945 [sic – 1946], 1, NACP RG 260/253/198. Powell admitted that he received most of his information from Scudder. See Powell to Kinard, "Licensed Press," January 9, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/198.

⁶⁶⁵ Conant to McClure, "Memorandum of Colonel Powell regarding the licensed press," 3 February 1945 [sic – 1946], 1, NACP RG 260/253/198. In fact, Belfrage became a member of the Communist Party of the United States in 1937, though he left the CPUSA. In 1948, he and Aronson co-founded the *National Guardian* in New York. An FBI investigation in 1947 showed that he passed an OSS report to the KGB. After fighting deportation for a number of years, he finally returned to England in 1955. See John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, *Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 109-111.

the emergence of one particular, yet acceptable, political ideology over another. In the end, he agreed that the *Frankfurter Rundschau* tilted to the left but was unconcerned because ICD had plans to establish a right-of-center newspaper as a counterbalance.⁶⁶⁶

Powell replied to Conant by stating that the nature of U.S.-Soviet cooperation was such that it did not require the Americans to assist “Russian Communist efforts to project their tentacles into the American zone,” and punctuated his argument with sarcastic statements on future German elections, when the Germans would decide “how far off center they want to go.” He suggested that ICD reassess local political conditions to determine if newspaper licensees represented the interests of the community and advocated increased and detailed political analysis of editorials to ascertain the degree to which a given newspaper shifted from the “center” or whether certain editors possessed the ability to be “objective in all matters.”⁶⁶⁷

As tensions increased between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, concern over communist infiltration and influence in the American Zone became all the more prevalent. But for a November 27 editorial by Gerst on the “positive developments” of political cooperation in Hesse, which effectively apologized for the paper’s heightened political and social criticism, the licensees largely stayed outside of the debate.⁶⁶⁸ While the *Frankfurter Rundschau* often focused its discussion on uncomfortable subject matter, including the related issues of antisemitism, responsibility for Nazism, and the failures of the past, the very existence of the controversies surrounding the paper played a significant role in its inability to elicit meaningful discussion on

⁶⁶⁶ Conant to McClure, “Memorandum of Colonel Powell regarding the licensed press,” 3 February 1945 [sic – 1946], 3-4, NACP RG 260/253/198.

⁶⁶⁷ Powell to Kinard, “Licensed Press,” January 9, 1946, 2-3, NACP RG 260/253/198.

⁶⁶⁸ Karl Wilhelm Gerst, “Positive Developments,” November 27, 1945 (35) and RG 260/1495/1214, Ernest W. Adler to Chief of Press Section, 6871st DISCC, attn. Major Smith, “Scrutiny Report,” November 27, 1945, 2.

the legacies of the Nazi era and the political issues of the day. There is no better proof of this than the development of a Frankfurt council resolution against the paper's "communist tendencies" in March 1946, a resolution brought to the floor by the SPD under the leadership of the *Rundschau*'s original licensee, Wilhelm Knothe.

CHAPTER 7

FROM PEOPLE'S NEWSPAPERS TO A NEW GERMANY

Neues Deutschland, the flagship newspaper of the SED, often projected itself as a collaborative venture that reflected proud German communist and social democratic traditions. Launched in April 1946 after the closure of the KPD *Deutsche Volkszeitung* and the Soviet zone SPD newspaper *Das Volk*, *Neues Deutschland* included personnel from both publications and presented themes common to the Unity campaign that led to the establishment of the SED. Despite this pedigree, it was nevertheless very much like other SED entities in that it reflected and projected the interests of the former KPD elite and a small contingent of likeminded SPD men. Control of the publication fell to a group of “veteran communists” who published content that remained bound to a narrow Marxist-Leninist worldview, betrayed an insufficient understanding of the needs of the postwar German population, and defied both common sense and Stalin’s advice by attacking the west and praising the Soviets at a very early stage.⁶⁶⁹ These tendencies reduced the chance that the KPD/SED might popularize communist policies after twelve years of Nazi propaganda. The realities of Soviet occupation further limited its appeal. Strikingly, the KPD/SED flagship newspapers increased their coverage of the Soviet Union over the course of the years after 1945 and demonstrated an eagerness to denigrate the western powers at a time well before the appearance of sharp east-west antagonisms in the Soviet press.

⁶⁶⁹ Catherine Epstein, *The Last Revolutionaries: German Communists and their Century* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), 3.

Shaping the Postwar Communist Press

Many of the KPD members who had accompanied the Red Army into Germany initially served as *de facto* political advisors at the local level, as liaisons between the general population and the military commands, and as propaganda support staff. Some may have experienced frustration with their minor roles and the occasional need to stifle the ambitions of those *Genossen* who had remained in Germany during the war, but this period of relative political impotence proved brief.⁶⁷⁰ On May 26, the Kremlin ordered Ulbricht to come to Moscow in order to prepare for the rebirth of political life in Germany.⁶⁷¹ Nine days later, he, Ackermann, and Sobottka rendezvoused with Wilhelm Pieck and others for a series of meetings with Stalin, Molotov, Zhdanov, and Dimitrov.⁶⁷² At one of these meetings, Stalin expressed his now-famous concern about the emergence of two Germanies despite “unity between the Allies.”⁶⁷³ He advised the German communist leadership to secure a “unified KPD, a unified ZK [Central Committee], a unified workers party, [and] a unified party at the center” and, after discussing a draft of the KPD *Aufruf* (“appeal”) to the German people, noted that circumstances were inopportune for the establishment of a Soviet-style system in Germany. Instead, he ordered the

⁶⁷⁰ On the issue of problems with the KPD who remained in Germany, see the case of early postwar Pirna in Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 255-256.

⁶⁷¹ Spilker, *East German Leadership*, 29.

⁶⁷² Pike, *Politics of Culture*, 3-8. Pieck was still in Moscow, apparently enthralled with the “trappings of Soviet hospitality.” For this, see Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 298.

⁶⁷³ See Spilker, *East German Leadership*, 2-5 and 31-32; Pike, *Politics of Culture*, 3-6; Benning, *Geschichte des SED-Zentralorgans*, 37-38; Helmut Altrichter, “Ein- oder mehrdeutig? Ziele und Konzeptionen sowjetischer Deutschlandpolitik 1945/46,” *Erobert oder befreit? Deutschland im internationalen Kräftefeld und die Sowjetische Besatzungszone (1945/46)*, Eds. Harmut Mehringer, Michael Schwartz, Hermann Wenkler (Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 1999), 48-50; Gunther Mai, *Der Alliierte Kontrollrat in Deutschland 1945-1948. Alliierte Einheit – deutsche Teilung?* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995), 80-81; and Wilfried Loth, *Stalin’s Unwanted Child*, 7-14.

creation of an “antifascist democratic parliamentary regime” bound to a “common platform.” To drive home his point, Stalin warned the KPD to avoid rhetoric that spoke “glowingly of the Sov[iet] Union, and so on.”⁶⁷⁴

Ulbricht, Ackermann, Sobottka, and others returned to Berlin on June 10, the same day that Zhukov issued an order that permitted the reestablishment of approved German political parties.⁶⁷⁵ Within a day, they oversaw the dissemination of thousands of copies of their Stalin-approved *Aufruf*, which at its core proposed a ten-point program for postwar development:

- The complete destruction of “remnants of the Hitler regime” through the arrest and punishment of Nazi Party members;
- Broad programs that would “fight against hunger, unemployment, and homelessness”;
- The restoration of trade unions;
- Democratically based self governance at the local level;
- Protections for workers;
- The “expropriation of all assets of Nazi leaders and war criminals”;
- Redistribution of large estates;
- Local control of utilities;
- A “peaceful and neighborly” foreign policy; and
- Acceptance that Germans must make reparations for the war.

It attempted to appeal to the desires of “industrious German people” (*schaffendes deutsches Volk*) in the hopes that they would participate in the taking of a “new way” from the militaristic and capitalistic political cultures that underlay Nazism. Finally, the *Aufruf* affirmed that German communists were “of the opinion that the imposition of the Soviet system on Germany would be

⁶⁷⁴ Dimitrov had revised the *Aufruf* in a meeting with Sobottka, Pieck, Ackermann, and Ulbricht 6 June 1945. Georgi Dimitrov, *The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933-1949*, edited by Ivo Banac, translated by Jane T. Hedges, Timothy D. Sergay, and Irina Faion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 371-372; Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 258; and Wettig, *Stalin and the Cold War*, 99.

⁶⁷⁵ Order No. 2 gave the Soviets the right to “monitor, check, and control” all political activity within and outside of a given party, including the KPD. Oversight typically occurred through an intermediary, that is, through a Soviet liaison officer. Naimark, “The Soviets, the German Left, and the Problem of ‘Sectarianism’ in the Eastern Zone,” 430.

... inappropriate to the present circumstances” and that the postwar era should witness the birth of a “parliamentary democratic republic with all democratic rights and freedoms for the [German] people.”⁶⁷⁶

Calls for political cooperation with “bourgeois” political parties and the resurrection of Germans’ better social and cultural history could only convince so many people. Despite forward-thinking notions couched in language that promised to lead Germany toward a democratic end and avoid the “mistakes of 1918,” certain aspects of the *Aufruf*, particularly its call for the elimination of “old reactionary Prussian militarism with all of its political and economic ramifications,” echoed Weimar-era KPD polemics. The *Aufruf* also set forth the foundations for the SED’s understanding of victimization and notions of collective guilt for the sins of Nazism. Although it argued for widespread atonement, the *Aufruf* laid principal blame on the “unscrupulous criminals” who had started the war. This group included men like Jodl and Keitel and the “imperialist supporters [*Auftraggeber*] of the Nazi party,” as well as traditional “class enemies” such as the Krupp Concern and Siemens.⁶⁷⁷ The KPD focused opprobrium, after the elites, on those who voted for the Nazis or sat idle while Hitler “smashed all democratic

⁶⁷⁶ “Aufruf der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands,” *Deutsche Volkszeitung* (hereafter, *DVZ*), 13 June 1945. See also “Proclamation of the Communist Party of Germany, June 11, 1945,” in J.K.A. Thomanek and James Mellis, *Politics, Society and Government in the German Democratic Republic: Basic Documents* (Oxford: Berg, 1989), 13; Herf, *Divided Memory*, 27-32; Spilker, *East German Leadership*, 36-40; Pike, *Politics of Culture*, 13-15; Benning, *Geschichte des SED-Zentralorgans*, 38; Betriebsparteiorganisation der SED in der Druckerei Neues Deutschland, *Druckerei Neues Deutschland. Betriebsgeschichte 1945-1965. Teil I* (Berlin: Druckerei Neues Deutschland, 1988), 18; Klaus Hesse, Draft: “Unsere Druckerei – Ergebnis der sozialistischen Entwicklung der Arbeiter- und Bauernmacht in der DDR [for] Betriebsgeschichte der Druckerei Neues Deutschland,” 10-11, as in Bestand: Zentr., SAPMO-BArch, DY 63/1200; and Max Nierich, Draft: “Der Prozeß der Vereinigung von KPD und SPD zur Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands,” no date (likely 1965-1966), 7, in Bestand: Erinnerungen: Nierich, Max. SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1332.

⁶⁷⁷ “Aufruf der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands,” *DVZ*, June 13, 1945.

organizations, *particularly worker's organizations*, and locked up the best Germans, tortured them, and beheaded them.”⁶⁷⁸ Few escaped responsibility for the Nazi state, but the *Aufruf* also urged Germans to seek hope in and give thanks to the Soviets for having brought forth the end of National Socialism and for having eschewed the temptation to visit upon them the same brutalities that the Nazis had visited upon others.⁶⁷⁹

Establishing and Staffing a

“People’s Newspaper”

The *Aufruf* made its second appearance on June 13, in the inaugural issue of the KPD’s *Deutsche Volkszeitung* – not the first KPD “People’s Newspaper,” but the most influential one.⁶⁸⁰ It emerged out of the same June 1945 Kremlin meetings that established the early KPD platform in Soviet-occupied Germany, and Georgii Dimitrov suggested its self-consciously nationalistic title. Theoretically, the *Volkszeitung* aspired to merge the political and the popular, give voice to the “industrious,” and engender a “truly national culture.”⁶⁸¹ It continued to

⁶⁷⁸ Added emphasis. “Aufruf,” *DVZ*, June 13, 1945.

⁶⁷⁹ Herf, *Divided Memory*, 29.

⁶⁸⁰ An underground KPD organization in Prague used the same title for its journal, copies of which made their way to Paris during the war. One of the editors of this publication, Lex Ende, later rose to the position of editor in chief of *Neues Deutschland*. Jean-Michel Palmier, *Weimar in Exile: The Antifascist Emigration in Europe and America*, trans. David Fernbach (London: Verso, 1987, 2006) 138-139, 204, and 302, n18.

⁶⁸¹ Die Schriftleitung, “An unserer Leser!” *DVZ*, June 13, 1945. The exact date of when Dimitrov suggested the title remains vague. Several sources state that the meeting occurred on June 4, 1945. However, Dimitrov’s diary for that date indicates that Ulbricht et al. had only just arrived in Moscow. As Dimitrov met with the KPD group between June 6 and 9, 1945, it is likely that the decision to name the newspaper the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* occurred at one of the later meetings. As for when Dimitrov met with the KPD leadership, see Georgii Dimitrov, *The Diary of Georgii Dimitrov, 1933-1949*, edited by Ivo Banac, translated by Jane T. Hedges, Timothy D. Sergay, and Irina Faion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 371-373 and Robert Williams, “Correspondence with Ivo Banac,” June 9, 2008. See also Benning, *Geschichte des SED-Zentralorgans*, 38, n94 and “4.6.1945 in Moskau beschlossen bei einer

popularize these themes over the course of its eleven-month lifespan, yet it ultimately catered only to those sympathetic to the communist party.

Like so many newspapers in the early period of the Soviet occupation, the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* was born in haste. Anton Ackerman was responsible for its launch, which occurred three days after his return to Berlin.⁶⁸² The KPD's pre-Nazi era publishing site at the Karl-Liebknecht-Haus on Alexanderplatz was inaccessible, and so his group made use of the shared Soviet facilities located at the site of the former *Völkischer Beobachter* plant.⁶⁸³ Because Soviet supplies and space were insufficient to meet their needs and ambitions, the party leadership dispatched various printing specialists (*Jünger der schwarzen Kunst* or "disciples of the black arts") to scour damaged printing houses and supply depots for press equipment. After locating a small flatbed press and two Heidelberg printing press machines, the KPD appealed to SMAD for additional supplies and better working spaces.⁶⁸⁴ Within a few months, the KPD had a printing

Sitzung: Pieck, Ulbricht, Ackermann, Dimitroff: Zentralorgan soll heißen "Deutsche Volkszeitung," 1, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/670; David Pike, *The Politics of Culture in Soviet-Occupied Germany, 1945-1949* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 332; and Peter Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren. Medienkontrolle und Propagandapolitik unter sowjetischer Besatzungsherrschaft in Deutschland* (Berlin: AkademieVerlag, 1996), 67.

⁶⁸² Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 67.

⁶⁸³ The Karl-Liebknecht-Haus had been KPD headquarters until the Nazis raided the building in February 1933. Renamed the "Horst-Wessel-Haus" during the Third Reich, wartime bombing campaigns had destroyed the structure by spring 1945. The SED rebuilt the building in 1948, before giving it to the Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus in the 1950s. Today, it operates as the headquarters for *Die Linke*. The KPD/SED later acquired editorial offices on Zimmerstraße but continued to share printing facilities with the *Tägliche Rundschau* and *Berliner Zeitung* for a time, much to the consternation of the *Volkszeitung's* distributors. Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 68; Benning, *Geschichte des SED-Zentralorgans*, XXX; and Druckerei Neues Deutschland, *Betriebsgeschichte*, 20.

⁶⁸⁴ "Druckerei Neues Deutschland, *Betriebsgeschichte*, 24 and Pieck an die Sowjetische Militär-Administration, z. Hd. Herrn Major Davidenko," September 14, 1946, as in Bestand: Wilhelm Pieck. Entwicklung der SED zur Partei neuen Typus. Agitation und Propaganda. Parteipresse/DVZ dann DN Juni 1945-Febr. 1946, April 1946-Juni 1951, Juni 1951, SAPMO-

site next door to the paper's editorial offices on Zimmerstraße.⁶⁸⁵ Soon after that, in December 1945, SMAD granted the KPD rights to develop a publishing site on Schönhauser Allee.⁶⁸⁶

Most *Volkszeitung* personnel began their careers at Weimar-era KPD newspapers and had remained active during their years of exile, internment, or hiding between 1933 and 1945. The new newspaper's offices were akin to a training ground that tested party functionaries before they moved on to higher positions or political exile at an institution lower in the SED hierarchy. The first editor in chief, Paul Wandel, was something of a last minute appointee. Many in the KPD leadership had assumed that Pieck would be the editor in chief, while Wandel would remain in Moscow as an official representative of the KPD.⁶⁸⁷ Ulbricht, it seems, had other plans in mind. At the June meetings in Moscow, he suggested that Pieck remain behind so Wandel could assume control of the party newspaper, a development that rankled Pieck, as shown by his redaction of the word "*Chef*" next to Wandel's title as *Chefredakteur* with the word *verantwortlich* ("responsible") on a KPD organizational chart.⁶⁸⁸ Although Wandel claimed that he worked tirelessly at the newspaper and approved every printed word, the U.S. Army's Peter

BArch ZPA NY 4036/670, bl. 42-43.

⁶⁸⁵ Benning, *Geschichte des SED-Zentralorgans*, 38.

⁶⁸⁶ "Die Entstehung und Entwicklung der Druckerei Neues Deutschland in der Zeit von 1946 bis 1966," in Bestand: Zentrage, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA DY 63/1200, 12.

⁶⁸⁷ Wandel had control of the Russian language and had served as a lecturer at the Comintern school at Kushnarenkovo. Branko Lazitch and Milorad M. Drachkovitch (eds.), *Biographical Dictionary of the Komintern: New, Revised, and Expanded Edition* (Stanford: Hoover Press, 1986), 504 and Pike, *Politics of Culture*, 72-73, n2.

⁶⁸⁸ This document used Wandel's pseudonym, Paul Klabner. Pike, *Politics of Culture*, 72-73, n2.

de Mendelssohn was unimpressed by Wandel's "quiet soft-spoken" demeanor and assumed the cultural affairs editor, Fritz Erpenbeck, was in charge of day-to-day operations.⁶⁸⁹

Neither assessment is wholly accurate. Much of the actual correspondence from the newspaper to SMAD and the Central Committee of the KPD came from the collective editorial board or from Pieck, who had returned to Berlin at the beginning of July. In late-August 1945, Wandel left the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* to assume control of the German Central Education Administration.⁶⁹⁰ His successor, Hans Teubner, had considerable experience as a newspaper professional but assumed a hands-off management style at the *Volkszeitung*.⁶⁹¹ The true day-to-

⁶⁸⁹ Pike, *Politics of Culture*, 41, n61 and Information Services Control Section, USHQ Berlin District, Press Sub-Section, "Semi-Weekly Report No. 2," 14 July 1945, 2, NACP RG 260/253/206.

⁶⁹⁰ Technically, Wandel remained the editor in chief through September 12, 1945. That is, until the Soviets allowed for the creation of the Central Education Administration. Mendelssohn, "Notes on the Development and Present Situation of the Berlin Press," September 14, 1945, 3, NACP RG 260/253/201. See also Benning, *Geschichte des SED-Zentralorgans "Neues Deutschland"*, 39. For Wandel's work at the DVV, see John Connelly, *Captive University: The Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish Higher Education, 1945-1956* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 35-46.

⁶⁹¹ Teubner had been the editor for the Weimar-era *Roten-Gewerkschaft-Internationale* and spent much of the Nazi era in Swiss exile. There is little in the way of archival evidence on Teubner, no doubt due to his fall from grace after the Hungarian trial of Laszlo Rajk. Teubner was stripped of his position as the editor in chief of the *Sächsische Zeitung* in August 1950 following an SED report claimed that he and ten other SED functionaries collaborated with or insufficiently vigilant against the espionage activities of Noel Field. References to Teubner appear in "Angestellte der *Deutschen Volkszeitung*," December 1945, SED ZK, Finanzverwaltung und Parteibetriebe, Monatsbericht der DVZ für 12.45, fiche 1/3, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA DY 30/IV 2/22/104; Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 67; Paul Scholz, *Persönliche und politische Entwicklung*, 10, Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, Zentrales Parteiarchiv, Bestand: Erinnerungen, Paul Scholz. SAPMO-BArch, SgY 30/2165; Klaus Hasse, *Mitarbeiter der Geschichtskommission, Druckerei Neues Deutschland*, "Daten- und Faktensammlung zur Betriebsgeschichte der Druckerei Neues Deutschland, aus sammen gestellt aus "ND-Echo" und anderen betrieblichen Unterlagen," October 1982, 2; and George H. Hodos, *Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-1954* (New York: Praeger, 1987), 118. For the so-called "Field Affair" and the Rajk trial, see Hermann and Kate Field, *Trapped in the Cold War: The Ordeal of an American Family* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); Pike, *Politics of Culture*, 571, n113; and Hodos, 33-72.

day powers at the newspaper were the various sections chiefs, particularly Fritz Erpenbeck and Paul Scholz. Erpenbeck had joined the KPD in 1927 and spent most of the Nazi era in Soviet exile. He returned to Germany at the end of April 1945 as part of the *Gruppe Ulbricht*, and had assisted the Soviets as a staffer at the *Tägliche Rundschau* and *Berliner Zeitung* for the first months of the occupation.⁶⁹² When he came to the *Deutsche Volkszeitung*, he became the paper's cultural affairs editor and theater critic, and he remained in this post until the paper closed in April 1946.⁶⁹³ Scholz began his journalistic training as a "worker correspondent" for the Weimar-era *Rote Fahne*, and became an organizer for the KPD's *Unterbezirk* in Steglitz after 1933. Arrested in October 1936, he spent the rest of the Nazi era in prison. Scholz thrived at the KPD newspaper and remained on the editorial staff through the transition to *Neues Deutschland*.⁶⁹⁴

⁶⁹² Manfred Malzahn, *Germany, 1945-1949: A Sourcebook* (London: Routledge, 1991), 200; Smith, *War for the German Mind*, 120, n48; Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 17; and Pike, *Politics of Culture*, 73, n2.

⁶⁹³ Erpenbeck later joined the Berlin SED's *Vorwärts* as editor in chief. During his term as director of the Central Program Committee of the Ministry for National Culture, he achieved some renown for his attempts to reform East German theater through the imposition of "socialist-realist" tropes. Manfred Wilke, *Anatomie der Parteizentrale. Die KPD/SED auf dem Weg zur Macht* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1998), 38; PR/ISCB, Berlin, "Background Notes," July 15, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/198/"Newspapers, 16; Pike, *Politics of Culture*, 334; Mark W. Clark, *Beyond Catastrophe: German Intellectuals and Cultural Renewal after World War II* (Oxford: Lexington, 2006), 142; and Peter Hutchinson, *Stefan Heym: The Perpetual Dissident* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 78.

⁶⁹⁴ He ultimately left in 1948 in order to accept an appointment at the Party school in Liebenwalde. Per Scholz's state-mandated memoir, he sought out Franz Dahlem after the release of the first issue of the *Volkszeitung*. Scholz claims that Dahlem secured for him the position of editor for "party affairs." There is a degree of inconsistency with this claim, however, since Dahlem had left Mauthausen for Moscow in May and then returned to Berlin on July 1 – more than half a month since the paper's launch. Scholz, "Persönliche und politische Entwicklung," 11, Bestand: Erinnerungen, Paul Scholz. SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/2165. In January 1948, Scholz became deputy editor of *Der Freie Bauer*, the weekly journal of the *Vereinigung der gegenseitigen Bauernhilfe* (Organization for Mutual Farmers Aid). For Dahlem's path, see Epstein, *Last Revolutionaries*, 101.

In the institutional memory of the KPD/SED press, editors were of less importance than were the workers at the printing plant. With the creation of the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* came the birth of the *Verlag Deutsche Volkszeitung*, which was under the control of Fritz Kroh, Fritz Granzow, and Alfred Oelßner.⁶⁹⁵ Kroh's memoir tells a tale that was typical of many "veteran communists." He joined the SPD in 1912, the USPD in 1917, and then the KPD in 1920. He was also a cofounder at *Rote Hilfe*, a member of the "League of Friends of the Soviet Union," and part of the *Rotfrontkämpferbund* in Halle until he fled to France in 1933, where he published anti-Nazi literature. Arrested in 1940, he spent the rest of the war in confinement at several camps, including Sachsenhausen. There, he became one of the 33,000 prisoners ordered to march in an evacuation to the northeast on April 20, 1945. He survived the march and received his liberation at Mecklenburg.⁶⁹⁶

⁶⁹⁵ Not to be confused with Fred Oelßner, of the Red Army's Dresden *Tageszeitung* and later leader of the KPD's Agitation and Propaganda Administration. In addition to Kroh and Oelßner, Franz Dahlem and Richard Gyptner were the principle shareholders of the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* publishing house. Klaus Hasse, "Daten- und Faktensammlung zur Betriebsgeschichte der Druckerei Neues Deutschland, ausammengestellt aus 'ND-Echo' und anderen betrieblichen Unterlagen," October 1982, 2, Bestand: Zentrag, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA DY 63/1200.

⁶⁹⁶ Kroh's memories of the march are a bit imprecise. He claimed that 45,000 persons marched from the camp. "Politische Kurzbiographie des Gen. Fritz Kroh" and Fritz Kroh, "Nach sieben Jahren in KZ: Verlagsleiter der 'Berliner Zeitung'," as in Kroh, Fritz, für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED. Zentrales Parteiarchiv. Bestand: Erinnerungen, SAPMO-BArch, SgY 30/0514. Internment at Sachsenhausen served as a form of political currency among the old fighters of the KPD/SED. Kroh's colleague, Alexander Tschermack, was the marketing director for the *Volkszeitung* and for *Neues Deutschland*. In his memoir, he references a stay of undetermined length at Sachsenhausen, when in fact his sentence lasted but a few weeks. See Alexander Tschermack, "Tatsachenbericht über den Aufbau des Vertriebs-Apparat der Zeitung des ZK der KPD *Deutsche Volkszeitung* und der Zeitung des ZK der SED *Neues Deutschland* von Anfang an (1945-1952)," January 29, 1979, in Bestand: Erinnerungen, Alexander Tschermack, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA SgY 30/1903 and "Politische Abteilung an die Lagerleitung [Sachsenhausen,]," October 20, 1937, in List Material Sachsenhausen, Veränderungsmeldungen des KL Sachsenhausen, 10.02.37-07.12.37, International Tracing Service Archive, USHMM 1.1.38.1, folder 189, doc. ID 4113522.

Rapid Growth and Insecurity in Berlin

Many early staffers at the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* viewed the Soviets as allies in a common struggle, and there is little to suggest strife with occupation authorities.⁶⁹⁷ Good relations certainly did not harm the paper's fortunes. By November 1945, SMAD had increased the KPD press allotment from 100,000 to approximately 400,000 copies per issue, establishing the paper as the second most distributed in the Soviet Zone.⁶⁹⁸ At an initial cost of 20 pfennig per copy, the *Volkszeitung* was profitable enough to have brought 2.1 million Marks to the party's coffers by January 1946.⁶⁹⁹

Most copies of the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* sold in Berlin, where press competition was considerably greater than that in the rest of Germany for much of the occupation. By the end of 1945, Berlin was home to more than a dozen newspapers under the control of each of the four

⁶⁹⁷ Information Services Control Section, USHQ Berlin District, Press Sub-Section, "Conversation with the editor of 'Das Volk' in "Semi-Weekly Report # 1," July 11, 1945, 3, NACP RG 260/253/206; Pike, *Politics of Culture*, 41; and Paul Scholz, *Persönliche und politische Entwicklung*, 10, Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, Zentrales Parteiarchiv, Bestand: Erinnerungen, Paul Scholz. SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/2165.

⁶⁹⁸ The *Tägliche Rundschau* distributed approximately one million copies per issue. Benning, *Geschichte des SED-Zentralorgans*, 39 and Verlagsleitung, "Deutsche Volkszeitung an das ZK der KPD, z. Hd. Genossen Ackermann," November 15, 1945, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/22/104, fiche 1/3; Verlagsleitung, *Deutsche Volkszeitung an das ZK der KPD, z. Hd. Genossen Ackermann*, November 15, 1945, as in SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/22/104, fiche 1/3; and "Schriftwechsel auf der Redaktion *Neues Deutschland*. "Vorläufiges Monatsbudget der *Deutschen Volkszeitung* bei einer Auflage von 200,000 Exemplaren pro Nr." NY 4182/919, fiche No. 1/5. This growth came rather quickly, for in September 1945, the *Tägliche Rundschau* distributed 600,000 copies, while the *Volkszeitung* had a press run of 350,000 copies per issue. "Memorandum No. 10: Statistics on Berlin Newspaper Circulation," September 7, 1945, NACP RG 466/176/6.

⁶⁹⁹ "Verlagsleitung Deutsche Volkszeitung an das ZK der KPD, z. Hd. Genossen Ackermann," November 15, 1945, SAPMO-BArch ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/22/104, fiche 1/3. In September 1945, the paper's total assets were 1.2 million RM. In October 1945, the party reduced the *DVZ* sales price to 15 pfennig, which had a minimal effect on profits. "Monatsberichte der Deutschen Volkszeitung" as in SAPMO-BArch ZPA, NY 4036/670.

occupying powers. Much of the credit for the *Volkszeitung*'s growth goes to the network of distributors and agents who operated from rail stations and street-corner kiosks. This early distribution network included a great many bicycle couriers who earned considerable praise (if little compensation) from the Party and the newspaper's staff.⁷⁰⁰ Through their efforts, the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* cultivated its distribution network such that by early 1946 it controlled 126 distribution sites in Berlin and a further 192 outside of the city.

Competition bred a deep sense of insecurity in the minds of the paper's leadership.⁷⁰¹ At first, the KPD had to contend with the *Tägliche Rundschau* and the *Berliner Zeitung*. One month later, SPD, CSU, and Liberal Democratic Party newspapers emerged on the scene, and a host of licensed and military-controlled competitors in the western zones followed soon thereafter. The *Deutsche Volkszeitung* published more copies per issue than other political party organs, but its staff evinced some concern over the popularity of the Social Democratic Party's *Das Volk*.⁷⁰² As for the *Berliner Zeitung*, which was a *de facto* communist publication, the KPD felt considerable unease due to the relative costs of each newspaper. After all, why would a reader buy the 20-pfennig *Deutsche Volkszeitung* if the 10-pfennig *Berliner Zeitung* cost half the price?⁷⁰³ For this

⁷⁰⁰ In 1946, an unknown author (F.B.) wrote a poem for the "brave *Pedalritter*" while another unknown author composed a "Hymn to the Cyclists" (*Hymnus auf die Radfahrer*). Druckerei Neues Deutschland, *Betriebsgeschichte*, 22.

⁷⁰¹ For example, sales of the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* in the SBZ provinces accounted for approximately 11.5% of sales (or 93,896.41 RM) for the month of September 1945. See Monatsbericht der "Deutschen Volkszeitung" September 1945 as in SAPMO-BArch, ZPA NY 4036/670, 8. The party tried to increase its sales in the provinces through a subscription-based service and the creation of a separate "zonal edition" of the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* in January 1946. Benning, *Geschichte des SED-Zentralorgans*, 42.

⁷⁰² In contrast, the distribution of the SPD's *Das Volk* peaked at 150,000 copies per issue. Fliess, "Berlin Newspaper Circulation," November 17, 1945, NACP RG 466/176/6.

⁷⁰³ Raub, "Deutsche Volkszeitung Verlagsleitung an das ZK der KPD, Betrifft: Verkaufs- und Abonnementspreis der DVZ," August 24, 1945, SAPMO-BArch NY 5182/919, Fiche No.

reason, the publishers requested that the Central Committee of the KPD convince the *Berliner Zeitung* to lower its price.⁷⁰⁴ Finally, the KPD newspaper shared a somewhat symbiotic relationship with the *Tägliche Rundschau*, as shown by the number of mutually reinforcing articles in each publication and KPD/SED correspondence that indicated the party's regular monitoring of the content, distribution, and sales of the *Tägliche Rundschau*.⁷⁰⁵

Perhaps because the KPD recognized that Western Allied publications would prove popular, the early leaders of the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* indicated a willingness to work with the American military. In his July 1945 meeting with Mendelssohn, Wandel expressed his desire to cooperate in the development of shared news services and distribution networks, as well as his hope to publish more pieces that emphasized "solidarity and unity of purpose between the three major allies." He apologized to Mendelssohn for failing to "give the US and Britain the big headlines they deserved," and excused this shortcoming by claiming that the KPD was in a "delicate position" and could not support one occupying power over the others. Mendelssohn recognized that the KPD's supposed neutrality did not prevent the publication of generous articles on the Soviet Union and the Red Army, but he did believe Wandel's espoused desire for good relations with the British and Americans.⁷⁰⁶

1/5.

⁷⁰⁴ Raub, "Betrifft: Verkaufs- und Abonnementspreis der DVZ," August 24, 1945, SAPMO-BArch NY 5182/919, Fiche No. 1/5. Please note that Raub made a direct comparison to the *Berliner Zeitung*, but did not mention the *Tägliche Rundschau*.

⁷⁰⁵ Verlagsleitung Deutsche Volkszeitung an das ZK der KPD, Z. Hd. Genossen Ackermann, 15 November 1945 as in SAPMO-BArch, ZPA DY 30/IV 2/22/104, fiche 1/3; This practice of observing the *Tägliche Rundschau* also continued after the creation of the SED and *Neues Deutschland*. See, for example, W. Pieck [to] Redaktion "Neues Deutschland," May 23, 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA NY 4036/670, bl. 32.

⁷⁰⁶ Information Services Control Section, US HQ Berlin District, Press Sub-Section, "Semi-Weekly Report No. 2," July 14, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/206.

While the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* proved to be well circulated the Soviet sector, many outside observers and a few within the KPD felt that it failed to live up to its potential.⁷⁰⁷ The paper's overt ideological orientation failed to meet even the loosest standards of "objective" journalism, but this orientation sheds considerable light on the intentions of the German Communist Party and the degrees to which KPD propaganda often contradicted Ulbricht's well worn, if possibly unspoken, political maxim: "It must look democratic."⁷⁰⁸ More important, a review of the paper shows that although the KPD may have discussed ways to separate popular views of the party from its relationship with the Soviets, they certainly failed to do so in the pages of their party press.

The paper's pro-Soviet orientation made itself clear in the first issue. While the first page gave prominence to the *Aufruf*, which made only the briefest mention of a need for vigilance in the face of "incitement and hostility against the Soviet Union," the next few pages were dedicated to articles on Soviet-American cooperation, the ratification of a peace treaty with Tito's Yugoslavia, a speech by Édouard Herriot on Russo-Franco cooperation and a quote by General Eisenhower on the Soviet desire for peace.⁷⁰⁹ Page 3 also contained a curious choice for an inaugural piece of serialized fiction: Theodor Plievier's *Stalingrad*. Plievier's treatise on the

⁷⁰⁷ A U.S.-led November 1945 poll of 586 newspaper readers in all four occupied districts of Berlin concluded that the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* shared the position of being the most popular newspaper in the Russian sector with the U.S.-published *Allgemeine Zeitung*. OMGUS, "Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS) No. 19," November 17, 1945, NACP RG 260/250/157, 6.

⁷⁰⁸ Leonhard, *Die Revolution*, 365.

⁷⁰⁹ "Aufruf der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands"; Marschall Shukow, General Eisenhower und Feldmarschall Montgomery in Frankfurt am Main," "Stettinius über die russisch-amerikanische Freundschaft," "Marschall Tito über den sowjetischen-jugoslawischen Freundschaftspakt," "Herriot über russisch-französische Zusammenarbeit," and "Eisenhower über die UdSSR," *DVZ*, June 13, 1945.

moral decline brought forth by Nazism and popular complicity in its actions certainly fit with the overall position of the principal Allies.⁷¹⁰ Resurrecting popular memory of the battle of Stalingrad – perhaps the most important and symbolic battle of the mid-Second World War – risked broad reflection on the ways by which the turnabout of 1942/43 might be seen as the end of the “good times.” This line of thinking was certainly incompatible with KPD goals. However, the temptation to lionize the Soviet victory apparently blinded the editors to the potential drawbacks of printing this piece, suggesting that the KPD was incapable of considering the perspectives of the largely anti-communist German public, some of whose relatives had died in the battle or in Soviet POW camps afterwards.

KPD emphasis on Soviet victimhood accompanied themes of Soviet good intentions, the benefits of a communistic society, and the peaceful desires of the Soviet people. Perhaps no early article conveyed these messages better than a June 22, 1945 reflection on the outbreak of hostilities between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. In this article, in which the editors designated the launch of Operation Barbarossa as “the blackest day in German history,” the unidentified author judged the “guilt of the Nazi rulers” attacking the Soviet Union despite the Soviets desire to build amicable economic and cultural relations with Germany over the decades since the end of the First World War. The article made no mention of the mobile killing squads that decimated the Soviet-Jewish populations of Ukraine or Belorussia, much less the practice of genocide in the East.⁷¹¹

⁷¹⁰ See Theodor Plievier, *Stalingrad* (Berlin: Globus-Verlag, 1947); “Interview mit Theodor Plievier,” *DVZ*, June 21, 1945; and Jennifer E. Michaels, “The War in the East: Theodor Plievier’s Novels *Moscow*, *Stalingrad* and *Berlin*” in M. Paul Holsinger and Mary Anne Schofield (eds.) *Visions of War: World War II in Popular Literature and Culture* (Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State University Press and Popular Press, 1992): 36-46, esp. 36-42.

⁷¹¹“Heute vor vier Jahren: Der schwärzeste Tag deutscher Geschichte,” *DVZ*, June 22, 1945.

The paper often took its coverage of Soviet “friends” to extremes, such as when it followed the Soviet line that the Japanese surrender was due only to the entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific theater of war.⁷¹² Content of this sort contributed to the corruption of historical memory in what became the GDR by stifling critical interrogation of the treatment of Germans by some segments of the Red Army.⁷¹³ Following the June 16, 1945 death of the Red Army commander of Berlin, Nikolai Bersarin, for example, the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* devoted almost half an issue to praiseworthy articles on Berlin’s short-lived Red Army commander. “General-Comrade Bersarin” received repeated references as a “hero” devoted to bringing the German people a return to “normal life.”⁷¹⁴ The paper also included a letter from the Central Committee of the KPD to Zhukov, in which the party declared that Bersarin was a “great son of the Soviet Union” and that his death had elicited sadness in the hearts of “German antifascists

⁷¹² “Eine Woche nach Kriegseintritt der Sowjetunion im Fernen Osten. Am Ende des zweiten Weltkriegs,” *DVZ*, August 16, 1945.

⁷¹³ For other articles, see for example, “Russisch-polnisches Handels abkommen in Moskau unterzeichnet,” *DVZ*, July 10, 1945; “Die Sowjetunion im Friedensaufbau,” *DVZ*, July 26, 1945; “Die Moskauer Zeitung ‘Prawda’ zu den Beschlüssen der Berliner Konferenz,” *DVZ*, July 8, 1945; or “Eisenhower vor der Presse in Moskau,” *DVZ*, August 16, 1945.

⁷¹⁴ Bersarin died in a motorcycle accident in June 1945. See “Zum Tode eines edlen Menschen,” “Berlins Stadtkommandant Generaloberst Bersarin tot,” “Beileidsschreiben des ZK der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands,” “Otto Braß: ‘Wir gedenken Bersarins,’” “Sowjetgeneral und Gewerkschaftler: Ein Empfang bei Generaloberst Bersarin wenige Tage vor seinem Tode,” *DVZ*, June 17, 1945. One can speculate that the enormity of coverage devoted to Bersarin contributed to the myth of his generosity and heroism in East Berlin. In 1946, the Magistrat changed the name of Baltenplatz to “Bersarinplatz.” This testimonial to Bersarin was unique, insofar as Bersarinplatz was the only street named for a Red Army officer in the whole of East Berlin. In 1995, Herwig Haase, the CDU senator in charge of transportation in Berlin, attempted to change the name of the street as part of a larger program calling for the revocation of GDR street names. Popular protests forced the mayor of Berlin, Eberhard Diepgen, to overrule Haase and maintain the name, Bersarinplatz. See Brian Ladd, *The Ghosts of Berlin: Confronting German History in the Urban Landscape* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 208-215, esp. 213.

and the Berlin population.”⁷¹⁵ Many Berliners would have recognized that Bersarin had presided over some of the worst brutalities and rapes perpetrated by the Red Army in the German capital – crimes that Bersarin had excused as “nothing like the bestial way German officers and soldiers pursued the peaceful [Soviets]” in the pages of the *Tägliche Rundschau*.⁷¹⁶ In the rare instances when the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* addressed topics that touched on the behavior of the Red Army, it argued either that the Germans should be thankful for deliverance from Nazi oppression, or it would displace blame for brutalities. In the case of the latter, the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* of January 1946 gave considerable coverage to the arrest of four Eberswalde youths who had donned Red Army uniforms and undertaken a crime spree throughout Brandenburg.⁷¹⁷ This allowed both the Soviets and the KPD an opportunity to claim that Red Army crimes were attributable to disaffected German youth.⁷¹⁸

Celebration of the Soviet cause was nowhere more obvious than in the paper’s treatment of the October Revolution. The *Volkszeitung* began its celebration of the revolutionary event with an article by Fred Oelßner on the lessons of the “Great Socialist October Revolution.”⁷¹⁹ On the date of the actual anniversary, November 7, the paper doubled in length to a full eight pages devoted to the promotion of Bolshevik heroism and arguments for the establishment of a

⁷¹⁵ “Beileidsschreiben,” *DVZ*, June 17, 1945.

⁷¹⁶ Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 108 and “Feierliche Gründungsversammlung des neuen Berliner Magistrats. Generaloberst Bersarin spricht,” *TR*, May 22, 1945.

⁷¹⁷ “Der Prozeß in Eberswalde: Deutsche Banditen in Russen-Uniformen. Die gerechte Sühne: Zwei Todesurteile und hohe Zuchthausstrafen,” *DVZ*, January 8, 1946.

⁷¹⁸ Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 104-105.

⁷¹⁹ Fred Oelssner, “Zum 28. Jahrestag der Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution. Zum politischen Schulungstag,” *DVZ*, November 4, 1945.

“close friendship with the Soviet Union.”⁷²⁰ This issue also included an article on the “unbreakable [Soviet] family” in Azerbaijan, which emphasized the state of “happiness and prosperity” enjoyed by the “eighty [sic] peoples” of the USSR. This piece was a clear attempt to convince readers that the Soviet model at once offered a means to overcome the problems of nationalism, while simultaneously letting Germans enjoy the benefits of rapid civic and cultural reconstruction.⁷²¹

Presentations of life in Western Europe and the United States contrasted drastically with stories on progress in the Soviet Union. There were a few articles on the unified purpose of the occupation powers or successful cases of denazification in the American and British zones in July and August 1945, but these stories nevertheless projected the Anglo-Americans as secondary partners to the Soviets.⁷²² After August, most of the *Volkszeitung*’s coverage of the

⁷²⁰ Wilhelm Pieck, “Ein nationals Gebot für Deutschland: Enge Freundschaft mit Sowjetunion,” *DVZ*, November 7, 1945. Representative articles from this issue include, but are not limited to, “Die ganze Welt feiert die Oktober-Revolution,” “Am Vorabend der Revolutionsfeiern,” “Nie wieder Heße und Feindschaft gegen die SU,” “Der Beginn der neuen Aera. Tage, die die Welt erschütterten,” A. Mikojan, “Lenin-Stalin,” “Aus der Losungen des ZK der UdSSR zum Jahrestag der Großen Oktoberrevolution,” “28 Jahre Sowjetunion/Chronik der Ereignisse,” Fred Oelssner, “7. November 1945 – der 28. Jahrestag,” Max Keilsson, “Die Lösung des Nationalitätenproblems in der Sowjetunion,” “Die Wurzeln der Kraft und des Sieges der Sowjetunion,” “Die Sowjetdemokratie – die vollendetste Demokratie der Welt,” “Lenin im Oktober,” “Bildung und Kultur in der Sowjetunion,” and Fritz Erpenbeck, “Schrifttum in der Sowjetunion,” *DVZ*, November 7, 1945.

⁷²¹ “Eine unzerstörbare Familie – die Völker der Sowjetunion,” *DVZ*, November 2, 1945. See also Max Keilsson, “Die Lösung des Nationalitäten problems in der Sowjetunion,” *DVZ*, November 7, 1945.

⁷²² “Einheit der Sowjetunion und der Alliierten, ein Lebensinteresse des deutschen Volkes. Kommentar des Moskauer Rundfunks zur Besetzung Deutschlands,” *DVZ* July 13, 1945; Wilhelm Pieck, “Ein Lichtblick für das deutsche Volk. Zu den Ergebnissen der Berliner Konferenz,” *DVZ*, August 5, 1945; “Geheimsitzung bei Göring leitet die Kriegsvorbereitungen ein: Hitler erhielt Millionenbeiträge von deutschen Rüstungsindustriellen. Die Amerikaner verhafteten in Bayern hundert Kriegsverbrecheraus der Industrie, dem Handel und der Finanz,” *DVZ*, July 12, 1945; and “50000 aktive Nazis bisher in der amerikanischen Zone verhaftet,” *DVZ*, July 17, 1945. Examples of stories that painted the Americans and British

west either offered praise to leftist and socialist movements or mischaracterized the economic stresses of postwar British and American society.⁷²³

On November 4, 1945, two days after having praised U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes for speaking out against the “politics of isolation” and anti-Soviet sentiment, the KPD newspaper began reprinting TASS articles on U.S. industrial decline.⁷²⁴ By December, its attention turned to Detroit automobile strikes, the growing strength of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and meditations on possible OMGUS seizures of German companies and the diminution of Germany’s military and industrial potential.⁷²⁵ These stories were not violations of four-power rules, *per se*, but they did reinforce notions that became central to cold-war-era propaganda in the eastern bloc: western societies suffered from corrupt leadership and had home societies that enjoyed little happiness owing to all manner of economic and social ills. In

as powers in the shadow of the Soviets include “Generallissimus Stalin und Außenkommissar Molotow in Berlin: Die Eröffnung der Berliner Konferenz der drei Mächte,” *DVZ*, July 18, 1945; “Für Frieden, Sicherheit und Freiheit! Moskauer Pressestimmen zur Berliner Konferenz,” *DVZ*, July 19, 1945; “Das Dokument der Berliner Konferenz. Die Periode des Krieges in Europa ist zu Ende. Die Periode des friedlichen Aufbaus hat begonnen. Das deutsche Volk muß sich im freilichen demokratischen Aufbau bewähren!” *DVZ*, August 4, 1945; and Pieck, “Lichtblick,” *DVZ*, August 5, 1945.

⁷²³ For example, “Labour regiert in England,” *DVZ*, July 26, 1945.

⁷²⁴ “Keine Intrigen – Keine Isolation. Politik des Vertrauens. Staatssekretär Byrnes über das Verhältnis zur Sowjetunion,” *DVZ*, November 2, 1945 and “Amerikanische Produktionsinstab,” *DVZ*, November 4, 1945. On Byrnes’s speech, see Gaddis, *United States and the Cold War*, 275-276.

⁷²⁵ For example, “Von amerikanischen Automobilarbeiterkonflikt. Einigung bei General Motors,” *DVZ*, December 11, 1945; “Massenstreiks in Amerika: Generalstreik drohung in Connecticut” and “Amerikanischer Gewerkschaftler über die Sowjetgewerkschaften,” *DVZ*, January 3, 1946; “Vor neuen Streiks in den USA” and “3 ½ Millionen Arbeitslose in den USA,” *DVZ*, January 15, 1946; “Amerikanische Streikbewegung dehnt sich aus,” *DVZ*, January 15, 1946; “Eine halbe Million Streikende in den USA,” *DVZ*, 16 January 1946; “Amerikanische Plan für deutsche Abrüstung,” *DVZ*, 22 December 1945; “Beibehaltung der Rationierung in USA,” *DVZ*, December 24, 1945; “Ansteigen der Kriminalität in Amerika,” *DVZ*, December 26, 1945; and “In Amerika Streiks auch im neuen Jahr,” *DVZ*, December 31, 1945.

comparison to stories on the same subjects in the pages of the *Tägliche Rundschau*, the prominence of anti-western coverage becomes all the more apparent.⁷²⁶ More important, the appearance of such news stories that were by implication critical of the west came well before the development of anti-Soviet propaganda in the western zones or anti-American propaganda in the SMAD-run press; they indicate the KPD's desire to engage in a struggle for control of Germany well before the occupiers became hardened in their resolve to obstruct and defame one another.

The *Deutsche Volkszeitung* did print a great many pieces that suggested unity among German political parties in the Soviet Zone. These appeals began in the first issue of the *Deutsche Volkszeitung*. In addition to the *Aufruf*, a front-page editorial by Wilhelm Pieck urged all non-Nazi parties to build a new political future in cooperation with one another. Pieck was careful to note that unity between the SPD and KPD was but part of a larger program that called for the development of the "bloc of antifascist democratic parties" that would ensure Germany's return to a "community of free and peace-loving peoples."⁷²⁷ Subsequent issues promoted the interrelated themes of political unity, the postwar quest for peace and peaceable foreign relations, and rejection of the politics of the past. The bulk of coverage nevertheless emphasized the KPD and SPD.⁷²⁸ In time, the need for such discourse began to fade, and discussions of non-worker

⁷²⁶ "Arbeitsprobleme in den USA," *TR*, September 16, 1945; "Truman über die Demobilisierung der USA-Streitkräfte," *TR*, September 22, 1945; "Streiks in den USA und Kanada," *TR*, October 5, 1945; or "Die Streikbewegung in den USA," *TR*, October 30, 1945.

⁷²⁷ Wilhelm Pieck, "Feste Einheit der demokratischen Kräfte," *DVZ*, June 13, 1945.

⁷²⁸ There were occasional mid-summer stories on the full "United Front" of the SPD, KPD, CDU, and LDPD "Die antifaschistische demokratische Einheit ist da! Einheitsfront der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands, der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, der Christlich-Demokratischen Union Deutschlands und der Liberal-Demokratischen Partei Deutschlands," *DVZ*, July 15, 1945. More often than not, though, coverage of antifascist political development was similar to that in "Kommunisten, Sozialdemokraten, Demokraten, und

parties became restricted to occasional articles on relatively benign programs or necessary mentions of changes to the leadership of the CDU in late 1945.⁷²⁹

With the decline of discussion on broad bloc politics, the *Volkszeitung* began promoting unity among the various trade unions and social unity among Germans.⁷³⁰ In the case of the latter, it attempted to convince Germans that KPD policies offered a way out of present miseries. At times, it presented German communists as remarkably tolerant of dissenting perspectives, such as when the *Volkszeitung* published side-by-side articles by Heinrich and Thomas Mann on the necessary “struggle for freedom and peace” and the potential development of a unified state.⁷³¹ There were also articles for specific subgroups. German men were one of the targeted groups, but the KPD was incredibly ambitious in its attempts to appeal to female readers, as

Zentrum in einheitlicher Front!,” *DVZ*, June 14, 1945.

⁷²⁹ For example, “Zum ersten Friedensweihnachten. An alle Berliner!” *DVZ*, December 9, 1945 or “Neue Leitung der CDU: Hermes und Schreiber scheiden aus,” *DVZ*, December 21, 1945. As one might expect, these pieces made no mention of Hermes’s opposition to land reform in the SBZ, nor did it dare discuss the reasons behind Hermes’s resignation. On Hermes and Soviet interference with the CDU leadership, see Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 152, 183-184, and 323-324; Noel D. Cary, *The Path to Christian Democracy: German Catholics and the Party System from Windthorst to Adenauer* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 147-158; Hans-Peter Schwartz, *Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic. Volume I: German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution, and Reconstruction* trans. Louise Wilmot (Providence: Berghahn, 1996), 362-364; and Gary Bruce, *Resistance with the People: Repression and Resistance in Eastern Germany, 1945-1955* (Lanham: Rowman& Littlefield, 2003), 29-32.

⁷³⁰ “Gewerkschaftseinheit!” *DVZ* June 19, 1945; “Ein Willebeherrscht – der Wille zur Einheit: Rede des Genossen Chwalek auf der Kundgebung des Vorbereitenden Gewerkschaftsausschusses für Groß-Berlin,” *DVZ*, June 20, 1945; and “Von der Einheit der Parteien zur Einheit des Volkes,” *DVZ*, June 20, 1945.

⁷³¹ “Ruf er zum Kampf für Freiheit und Frieden,” Thomas Mann, “Deutschland kann leben und glücklich sein,” and Heinrich Mann, “Über das deutsche Volk und seine Zukunft,” *DVZ*, June 14, [sic, the paper misprinted the date] 1945.

shown by the great number of articles devoted to discussion on the reconstruction of the educational system and the ways by which children represented “hope and joy” for the future.⁷³²

The KPD leadership hoped that the *Volkszeitung* would support Party claims of broad acceptance by the German public, but the paper’s content was hopelessly self-congratulatory and incapable of overcoming the ideological barriers imposed upon it by the need to serve political ends. There is perhaps no better example of this than Franz Dahlem’s late-July article on “Who can become a member of the KPD.” Dahlem began with the expected argument that any German who “loves his people” and believes that the KPD is “the only guarantee” for the rebirth of a respectable German state can join. He then limited the number of prospective party members by asserting that working class men and women, at the exclusion of others, remained “steadfast, unimpeachable antifascists” and would be the wellspring for Germany’s future “strength and hope.”⁷³³

Scholars largely agree on what the KPD meant by the term “steadfast, unimpeachable antifascist,” yet the communists left the term unclear throughout much of 1945. Some clearly did not fit in the postwar world, for example, militarists or “fascist-capitalists.” Were there other outsiders? On the one hand, other Nazi victims and resisters did not merit a status equal to communist “anti-fascists.” Members of non-KPD resistance movements, such as the Kreisau

⁷³² “Alles für unsere Kinder! Gemeinsamer Beschluß des Einheitsfront-Ausschusses,” *DVZ*, November 25, 1945; Friedel Malter, “Zur Eröffnung des internationalen Frauenkongresses,” *DVZ*, November 25, 1945; “Ein Wort für die Frauen,” *DVZ*, 26 November 1945; “Meinungen aus dem Leserkreis: Wosteht die deutsche Frau?” *DVZ*, November 26, 1945; “Ins neue Jahr – ins bessere Leben,” *DVZ*, December 31, 1945; “Frauenleben – Frauenschaffen,” *DVZ*, 13 January 1946; “Neues Leben in der Schule. Das dringlichste Problem – der Mangel an guten, jungen Lehrern,” *DVZ*, July 11, 1945; or “Der neuen Schule entgegen,” *DVZ*, December 31, 1945. Articles designed for German men followed the paper’s appeals to women. See, for example, “‘Vati ist verunglückt’: Einzuverlässiger Arbeitsschutz gehört zum Wiederaufbau,” *DVZ*, January 18, 1946.

⁷³³ Franz Dahlem, “Wer kann Mitglied der KPD werden?” *DVZ* July 26, 1945.

circle or the conspirators behind the 20 July 1944 plot, were too capitalistic or tied to the Prussian elite, and so they were out.⁷³⁴ So too were Holocaust survivors given a lesser status, as shown by the KPD's reluctance to address the issues of the Nazi murder of German Jews or to grant survivors the same benefits as members of the KPD. On the other hand, KPD writers spilled a great deal of ink inveighing against "passive" masses and their failure to prevent and then overthrow the Nazi state, while simultaneously appealing to "productive people" and those who were willing to demonstrate a desire to work with the party. Between the lines, it was clear that only the party faithful would benefit.

The SPD's *Volk*

In newsworthiness and overall appearance, the SPD's *Das Volk* was far superior to its KPD competition in the Soviet district of Berlin. Quality did not ensure the paper's success, however, and it overcame many obstacles before it made its first appearance on the streets of Berlin. When various members of the SPD met in Berlin on June 7, 1945 to begin planning for the reconstruction of their political party, they also set an agenda for a party newspaper.⁷³⁵ They had hoped to publish under the same title as their pre-Nazi party organ, that is, *Vorwärts*, but the Soviets rejected this title, claiming that it was too atavistic and out of place in the postwar era.⁷³⁶ This was but the first of several acts of direct and indirect obfuscation by SMAD. While the KPD could distribute the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* throughout the occupation zone, SMAD restricted the SPD newspaper to Berlin. Although the SPD received permission to reconstitute its party press on June 17, 1945, SMAD claims of inadequate paper supplies led to a three-week

⁷³⁴ Indeed, the *DVZ* made no mention of the July plot or Helmuth von Moltke's group. For the KPD's views on the July 20 plot, see Herf, *Divided Memory*, 22.

⁷³⁵ The Zentrallausschuss included Max Fechner, Eric W. Gniffke, and Otto Grotewohl.

⁷³⁶ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 70.

delayed publication. After the editors had secured use of the former Ullstein printing plant on Kochstraße, SMAD informed the SPD on the eve of the first issue that the plant was unacceptable because it was in the soon-to-be U.S. sector. Within hours, the paper's staff had to move printing operations to the shared facilities on Schützenstraße, although they did not mention this fact in their advertising of the paper's publication and editorial facilities.⁷³⁷

Das Volk appeared in a four-page, *Berliner* format on Saturday, July 7, 1945. Its sale price was 15 pfennig and it printed 100,000 copies per issue.⁷³⁸ The inaugural issue shared certain superficial similarities with the *Deutsche Volkszeitung*, insofar as it gave prominent coverage to a party *Aufruf* that agreed with KPD calls for “organizational unity” between the German working classes and their political parties and the need to establish an antifascist-democratic regime “with all democratic rights and freedoms.”⁷³⁹ The SPD conveyed a proactive

⁷³⁷ The SPD obtained editorial offices at the same site as the new party headquarters, the former Dresdner Bank building at Behrenstraße 35-39, and secured distribution through a contract with Rudolf Ullstein, the remaining trustee of *Deutscher Verlag*, which based itself in Tempelhof. Mendelssohn, “Notes on the Development and Present Situation of the Berlin Press,” 3, 14 December 1945, NACP RG 260/253/201; “SPD-Verwaltung und Presse,” *DV*, July 7, 1945. Max Nierich, “Der Prozeß der Vereinigung von KPD und SPD zur Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands. Journalisten und Redakteure gingen daran, ein neues Zeitungen-Wesen aufzubauen,” no dated (circa 1965) in Bestand: Erinnerungen. Nierich, Max. SAPMO-BArch, ZPA SgY 30/1332; Nierich, “Journalisten und Redakteure gingen den Aufbau eines neuen Zeitungswesens,” in Fanny Rosner, Ilse Schiel and Heinz Vosske (eds.), *Vereint sind wir alles: Erinnerungen an die Gründung der SED*, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Dietz, 1966, 1971), 249-266; Susanne Grebner, *Der Telegraf: Entstehung einer SPD-nahen Lizenzzeitung in Berlin 1946 bis 1950* (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2002), 58; Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 70; and Altendorfer, *Mediensystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 287, §67b. SMAD also made claims of insufficient supplies to SPD outside of Berlin. See Gareth Pritchard, *The Making of the GDR, 1945-53: From Antifascism to Stalinism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 97.

⁷³⁸ Mendelssohn, “Notes on the Development and Present Situation of the Berlin Press, 3, 14 September 1945, RG 260/253/201.

⁷³⁹ See “Vom Chaos zur Ordnung. Aufruf der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands,” *Das Volk*, July 7, 1945 or “Proclamation of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), June 15, 1945” as in J.K.A. Thomanek and James Mellis (eds.), *Politics, Society and Government in the German Democratic Republic: Basic Documents* (Oxford: Berg,

message different from that of the communist party. In the case of the Soviet question, SPD leader Otto Grotewohl limited the party's words to a message of gratitude to the Red Army for having created the conditions necessary to give "the gift of freedom of association" (*das Geschenk der Vereinigungsfreiheit*).⁷⁴⁰ The SPD appeal also offered the public a multi-point platform for political and social renewal that sought

- The destruction of "all traces of the Hitler regime" and the pursuit of justice against members of the NSDAP;
- the creation of consumer cooperatives and regulated trade in order to ensure "food security";
- local political cooperation to ensure adequate housing, clothing, and utilities for the general population;
- cooperation with trade unions to engender economic reconstruction;
- a vigorous education program for youth, which would promote arts and sciences in order to elicit a "democratic, socialistic spirit";
- a "liberal and democratic organization of labor laws"
- the development of social welfare protections;
- nationalization of financial and mineral industries; and
- a German state based not just on "antifascist-democratic" principles, but also on protections for individuals, freedoms of expression, religious freedom, and "criminal legal protections against racial incitement (*Rassenverhetzung*)."⁷⁴¹

Many of these points show a degree of separation between the SPD and the KPD, and the last is the most striking example. Both parties acknowledged Nazi racial crimes to one degree or another, but the SPD did so in explicit terms and without equivocation, stating that the "German people must pay the costs for the frauds of fascism" owing to the "thousands of [Nazi] victims from all parties, religions, and social strata of the German people." Moreover, they declared that the fact of the defeat of the Nazi state had little bearing on Nazism's persistent influence in German society. In doing so, the SPD sought to prepare Germans for the legacy of "Hitler's

1989), 12-13.

⁷⁴⁰ Otto Grotewohl, "Wille und Weg," *Das Volk*, July 7, 1945.

⁷⁴¹ "Aufruf der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands," *DV*, July 7, 1945.

guilt, unspeakable misery, and a deep valley of suffering.”⁷⁴² What followed, however, was rather weak by comparison but very much in keeping with the KPD’s establishment of a common myth of suffering and the glorification of the antifascist resistance.

The other three pages were relatively neutral and worldly for a political party organ. Page two, for example, included a TASS article on the arrival of American troops in Berlin, a Reuters story on the war in the Pacific, an article from *Pravda* on the signing of the United Nations Charter in San Francisco, a BBC story on the rebirth of political life in Poland, a blurb from Radio France on Franco’s rule in Spain, and an un-credited piece on the arrest of several higher Nazi Party functionaries.⁷⁴³ The editors also published their contact information on this page, something their KPD competition chose not to do for quite some time after their first issue.⁷⁴⁴ “Frankness and liveliness” declined within a few short months, though, and the paper soon began to “recede to the background” of political debates in Berlin.⁷⁴⁵

SMAD licensed *Das Volk* to the three principle members of the SPD Central Committee, that is, to Max Fechner, Otto Grotewohl, and Erich W. Gniffke.⁷⁴⁶ Fechner rarely contributed material, while both Grotewohl and Gniffke provided regular content for publication. The editor in chief was Otto Meier, a former parliamentarian and member of the Weimar-era SPD’s press

⁷⁴² “Aufruf der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands,” *DV*, July 7, 1945.

⁷⁴³ “Englische und amerikanische Truppe in Berlin,” “Der Krieg im Pazifik. 72 Stunden ununterbrochener Bombenhagel auf Japans Mutterinsel,” “Die Weltsicherheits-Charta,” “Anerkennung der polnischen Regierung,” “Franco am Ende?” and “Das Ende der ‘Größen,’” *Das Volk*, July 7, 1945.

⁷⁴⁴ The entry noting contact information gave the address and directions on how to reach the paper’s offices by foot or train. “SPD-Verwaltung und Presse,” *Das Volk*, July 7, 1945.

⁷⁴⁵ “Memorandum No. 9: Berlin Newspaper Circulation,” November 17, 1945, NACP RG 466/176/6, 5.

⁷⁴⁶ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 70.

commission that had supervised the publication of the original *Vorwärts*. SMAD rejected the nomination of the original candidate for deputy editor, Georg Engelbert Graf, and so the position went to Max Nierich, a journalist and writer who had been editor in chief of the Frankfurt SPD's *Volksstimme* before 1933.⁷⁴⁷ After the Nazi rise to power, the police arrested Nierich for "suspicious trafficking" of illegal pamphlets, a practice he resumed in Frankfurt and Berlin in 1944. By the February 1945, he fled to Mecklenburg, and returned to Berlin at the end of May to begin working with the SPD. He became an outspoken supporter of the unity campaign.⁷⁴⁸

Neues Deutschland

The forced union of the KPD and the eastern SPD in April 1946 brought with it two new newspapers for Berliners and a host of new SED party organs throughout Soviet-occupied Germany.⁷⁴⁹ In Berlin, the first of these new newspapers was *Vorwärts*, the would-be replacement to *Das Volk* that proved to be a short-lived local daily. It met its public thirteen days before the famous handshake of Otto Grotewohl and Wilhelm Pieck. The second was the SED's flagship newspaper, *Neues Deutschland*, which claimed to be the inheritor of the legacy

⁷⁴⁷ Donna Harsch, *German Social Democracy and the Rise of Nazism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 71-72 and Gary Bruce, *Resistance with the People: Repression and Resistance in Eastern Germany* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 24, n23.

⁷⁴⁸ Gestapo Frankfurt, "Kartei Gestapo Frankfurt: Nierich, Max," Behälter: GFFM20E. Last update: July 22, 1933, in International Tracing Service Archive, USHMM 1.2.3.1, "Gestapo Frankfurt Card File," folder Ney-Nikolaj, doc. ID 12243015_1 and 12243015_2.; Bundesstiftung, "Nierich, Max," *Wer war wer* at http://www.stiftung-aufarbeitung.de/service_wegweiser/personen_detail.php?ID=1762; and Nierich, "Der Prozeß," SAPMO-BArch, ZPA SgY 30/1332.

⁷⁴⁹ In 1946, the SED newspapers included Erfurt's *Thüringer Volk*, Schwerin's *Landeszeitung*, Dresden's *Sächsische Zeitung*, Halle's *Freiheit*, Potsdam's *Märkische Volksstimme*, Leipzig's *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, Bautzen's *Lausitzer Rundschau*, Zwickau's *Freie Presse*, Magdeburg's *Volksstimme* and the *Volksstimme* of Chemnitz. Altendorf, *Mediensystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 287, §67c and OMGUS, "Information Control Intelligence Summary No. 41," May 11, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 6.

of the *Volkszeitung*. In principle, each publication enjoyed some degree of autonomy from the control of the newly established Central Committee of the SED, but each ultimately relied on Berlin for news and modeled themselves upon the *Neues Deutschland* and the cheap, short-lived evening tabloid *Vorwärts*. In the capital, the closure of *Das Volk* and the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* accompanied the end of the SPD and KPD in the Soviet zone of occupation. Rather than transfer the entirety of the staff of the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* into that for *Neues Deutschland*, the SED party leadership decided to intermingle personnel from *Das Volk* and the *Volkszeitung* into the newly created personnel of their two premier party organs in Berlin.

Although the final issue of *Das Volk* included front-page editorial titled “*Vom Volk zum Vorwärts*,” the Soviet-licensed *Vorwärts* was an inheritor of Wilhelm Liebknecht’s famous newspaper only in name.⁷⁵⁰ Tiulpanov presented the license for *Vorwärts* to the eastern SPD and the paper’s editor-in-chief, Klaus Zweiling, approximately two weeks before the SED merger, and it printed its first issue as a “*Berliner Volksblatt*” on April 9, 1946.⁷⁵¹ It remained under the

⁷⁵⁰ Otto Meier (O.M.), “*Vom Volk zum Vorwärts*,” *Das Volk*, April 21, 1946. Liebknecht was editor-in-chief of the original *Vorwärts* from its founding in 1890 through his death in 1900. He occasionally used this organ to reinterpret Marxist doctrine to his own purposes. The best example of this occurred when Liebknecht “revised” Engels’s yet-to-be-published introduction to Marx’s *Class Struggles in France* to such an extent that Engels protested that Liebknecht twisted his words in such a way that it appeared he was “a peaceful advocate of legality *under any circumstances*.” Manfred B. Steger, “Friedrich Engels and the Origins of German Revisionism: Another Look,” in Manfred B. Steger and Terrell Carver (eds.), *Engels after Marx* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 191; On Liebknecht’s term with *Vorwärts*, see Henry and Mary Garland, “Liebknecht, Wilhelm,” in *Oxford Companion to German Literature*, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976, 1997), 529; and Public Relations/Infm [Information] Services Control Branch [henceforth, PR/ISCB], H.Q. Control Commission for Germany (British Element), Berlin, “Background Notes on the Berlin Press and Periodicals,” July 15, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/198, 15.

⁷⁵¹ Zweiling was a philosophy professor and chief editor for the SED’s preeminent journal, *Einheit*. The paper later changed its subtitle to “Evening Paper of the Reich Capital,” until the French objected to the phrasing. By 24 April, it was the “Evening Paper of Germany’s Capital,” until the paper closed in 1947. PR/ISCB, Berlin, “Background Notes,” 15 July 1946, NACP RG 260/253/198, 15.

ostensible control of the SPD until late-April 1946 when it became the property of the Berlin *Land* leadership of the SED.⁷⁵² For one week, it was a thrice-weekly morning newspaper, during which time it devoted itself almost exclusively to the Unity campaign. On April 16, it shifted its coverage to world and general interest news. Indeed, although sources for the newspaper's contents came largely from TASS and the *Sowjetische Nachrichtenbüro* (SNB), it occasionally attributed stories to the Associated Press and Reuters. Such diversity also appeared in the general content sections of the newspaper, despite the fact that some of the staff came directly from other newspapers in the Soviet zone. In addition to having somewhat diverse coverage, *Vorwärts* was a reasonably priced four-page offering, at 10 pfennig per copy. By July 1946, it sold at a rate of 300,000 copies per issue, but sales decreased to about 250,000 copies by November and fell further to between 140,000 and 160,000 copies by 1947.⁷⁵³ By this point, *Vorwärts* had become a Monday-morning supplement to *Neues Deutschland*, one that provided the SED a party newspaper on the traditional day off. This lasted for a year when, at the end of 1948, it became a monthly publication.⁷⁵⁴ Little more than supplement to *Neues Deutschland*, it lived in the shadow of that publication for the duration of its publication run.

Neues Deutschland was the preeminent newspaper in the Soviet zone and the GDR. Its purpose between 1946 and 1989 was to affirm the decisions of the state and to bring the German people into the SED fold.⁷⁵⁵ The editors of *Neues Deutschland* and the SED Central Committee

⁷⁵² Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 72.

⁷⁵³ PR/ISCB, Berlin, "Background Notes," July 15, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/198/, 15-16; Benning, *Geschichte des SED-Zentralorgans*, 85, n244; and Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 72 and 72, n62

⁷⁵⁴ Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 72. Not to be confused with the SPD's *Vorwärts* in the Federal Republic of Germany.

⁷⁵⁵ Between 1813 and 1814, a Berlin magazine appeared under this name and dedicated

operated under the belief that the press should be the *schärfste Waffe* of the party in its struggle toward socialistic political development. In terms of coverage, the early *Neues Deutschland* mirrored the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* that served as a constant and important indicator of the whims of the SED Central Committee.

The SED leadership, particularly Grotewohl and Pieck, played an active role in the early life of the newspaper. Pieck was a constant advocate for the interests of the publication, often writing to and persuading the Soviets to give up greater amounts of paper and supplies to ensure the success of *Neues Deutschland*. Pieck also enjoyed arriving at the paper's offices in the early morning to advise on content, layout, or simply to hold discussions with the editors. Moreover, it appears that Grotewohl often consulted with Pieck before submitting articles and opinion pieces to the editors.⁷⁵⁶ Day-to-day operations fell to the editors in chief. The first of these were Sepp Schwab (KPD) and Max Nierich (SPD), with the latter enjoying considerably greater influence than the former due to the strength of his conversion to "unity" and force of will.⁷⁵⁷

At its founding, *Neues Deutschland* published a manifesto that declared the "old dream" to be a reality, that is, the unity of the workers' parties. The following day, the leaders of the SED, Otto Grotewohl and Wilhelm Pieck, noted that the newspaper would serve as a "vital link" between the party, its membership, and the whole of the German people as they "fought" to make a new life and society out of the "debris and chaos" of the Second World War. It would be

itself to writing stories on oppression at the hands of the landed classes, but this *Neues Deutschland* seems to have taken as its muse the last issue of the Alexander Abusch edited *Freies Deutschland/Alemanía Libre*, which published in Mexico City between 1941 and 1946. Benning, *Geschichte des SED-Zentralorgans*, 51-52 and Herf, *Divided Memory*, esp. 42-68.

⁷⁵⁶ Benning, *Geschichte des SED-Zentralorgans*, 57-58.

⁷⁵⁷ Indeed, Nierich went on to enjoy a long career in the SED press. Nierich, "Journalisten und Redakteure," in *Vereint sind wir alles*, 249-266 and idem., Draft: "Der Prozeß der Vereinigung," no date, in SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SgY 30/1332.

the “mouthpiece for all productive people in Germany: the workers, general employees, farmers, women and mothers, the youth, and the German intelligentsia.”⁷⁵⁸ Additional stories in support of these claims came in the form of articles that noted, among other things, the approval of some KPD members in the western zones, the official status of the new party in the eyes of the occupation, and the party’s pledge to carry forth the antifascist resistance. This self-congratulatory tone would only increase in strength and frequency over the years. There was also a degree of fear mongering, although it was not until the third day that the paper took up the banner of its predecessor and began to print front-page stories on those “dark corners of the Fatherland” that sought to bring down the SED and the Soviet occupation.⁷⁵⁹ Nevertheless, the party newspaper warned readers that the “reaction is not dead” and promised that the Unity party organ would be a “merciless critic.”⁷⁶⁰

The paper began life by minimizing its advocacy of the Soviet Union and by devoting more space to negative stories on life in the western zones.⁷⁶¹ In its first three weeks, it commented extensively on the failures of denazification in AMZON, yet conspicuously avoided

⁷⁵⁸ Pieck and Grotewohl, “Dem Zentralorgan ‘Neues Deutschland’ zum Geleit,” *ND*, April 24, 1946.

⁷⁵⁹ “Der neue Tag,” *ND*, April 25, 1946. Earlier stories included the page 2 item, “Die Reaktion ist nicht tot,” *ND*, April 23, 1946.

⁷⁶⁰ “Die Reaktion ist nicht tot,” *ND*, April 23, 1946 and “Das Zentralorgan ‘Neues Deutschland’ zum Geleit,” *ND*, April 24, 1946.

⁷⁶¹ A notable exception was *Neues Deutschland*’s three-day treatment of Stalin’s interview to the *Sunday Times*. See “Interview Stalins mit dem Korrespondenten der ‘Sunday Times.’ Stalin gegen das Gerede von einem ‘neuem Krieg.’ Freundschaftliche und dauerhafte Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Sowjetunion und den westlichen Demokratien – Demokratisierung Deutschlands,” *ND*, September 25, 1946; “Die Welt unter dem Eindruck des Stalin-Interviews,” *ND* September 27, 1946; or “Das Weltecho des Stalin-Interviews,” *ND*, September 29, 1946.

mention of denazification in the SBZ.⁷⁶² Perhaps this development explains, at least in part, the decision to force Schwab to step down in summer 1946. By the beginning of July, it had become clear that the Central Secretariat of the SED needed a new editor in chief for the newspaper. They replaced Schwab at the end of July 1946 with Adolph (Lex) Ende.⁷⁶³

Born in Bad Kissingen in 1899, Ende began his work with the USPD in Hannover in 1919. He moved from paper to paper throughout the Weimar era, working at well-known KPD organs, including Berlin's *Rote Fahne* and Cologne's *Ruhr-Echo*. During the Nazi era, he resided in France and Switzerland, where he edited and published anti-Nazi newspapers, including the first *Deutsche Volkszeitung*.⁷⁶⁴ Upon his arrival at *Neues Deutschland*, he immediately reorganized operations and changed the presentation of content in an attempt to appeal to a wider audience. He did so by returning to the antagonistic themes that had characterized operations hitherto, and then he amplified the paper's rhetoric

As was common with the *Volkszeitung*, the SED press intensified its condemnations of "bourgeois," née fascist elements in the U.S. and British zones of occupation through attacks on the licensed press in the western districts, especially *Der Tagesspiegel*. Indeed, by August 9, 1946, the western Berlin press was an almost daily subject of discussion. That day, *Neues Deutschland* published an unattributed editorial that raised the specter of Goebbels and warned

⁷⁶² Information Control Division, "Information Control Intelligence Summary 43," May 25, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157.

⁷⁶³ The Secretariats set arrangements at the end of June 1946 and decided on July 25. Schwab remained at the paper until August 9, 1946, and Ende reported the next day. "Protokoll Nr. 19, Sitzung am 24.06.1946," SAPMO-BArch, ZPA DY 30/IV 2/2.1/16; "Protokoll Nr. 24 der Sitzung des Zentralsekretariats vom 25. Juli 1946," SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/2.1/20; "Dienstzeiten der Chefredakteure" in *Betriebsgeschichte: Verlag Neues Deutschland*, SAPMO-BArch, DY 63/2316; and Benning, *Geschichte des SED-Zentralorgans*, 68-69.

⁷⁶⁴ Benning, *Geschichte des SED-Zentralorgans*, 70-72.

the public of fascist propagandists eager to thwart German democratic renewal.⁷⁶⁵ Four days later, it included a special exposé on three “unified detractors”: the SPD’s *Sozialdemokrat*, the British-licensed *Telegraf*, and the *Tagesspiegel*. The article claimed that each paper had employed fascist propaganda tactics when they dared to discuss the disappearance of children in the SBZ.⁷⁶⁶ Subsequent issues published daily invectives, including cartoons depicting the *Telegraf* as *Mein Kampf* and claims that the *Tagesspiegel* represented an odd conglomerate of mendacious SPD and Nazi apologists.⁷⁶⁷

As the October elections neared, *Neues Deutschland* began linking the “reactionary press” to U.S. and British policy. For example, the *Telegraf*’s disapproval of Soviet-style land reform was not simply proof of an active “Junker reaction,” but a suggestion that the “reaction” ran the American and British zones.⁷⁶⁸ The SED was not yet bold enough to paint western powers as mere dollar-imperialists eager to thwart “true” democracy, and so *Neues Deutschland* suggested that the U.S. was too distracted to commit to Germany.⁷⁶⁹ Articles of this type often balanced praise of U.S. intentions with direct critiques of conditions in AMZON.⁷⁷⁰ The most notable case was Walter Ulbricht’s printed response to U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes’s

⁷⁶⁵ “Goebbels geht um,” *ND*, August 9, 1946.

⁷⁶⁶ “Naziterroristen als ‘verschleppte Kinder.’ Entlarvte Pogromhetze: Die ‘Einheit’ der Verleumder, ‘Telegraf,’ ‘Tagesspiegel,’ ‘Sozialdemokrat’ übertrumpfen selbst Goebbels,” *ND* August 13, 1946.

⁷⁶⁷ Arno Schölz, “Telegraf: Mein Kampf,” *ND*, August 22, 1946; “Verstoß der Kriegsverbrecher in Berlin. Die Berliner fordern Uebereignung der Kriegsverbrecherbetriebe: Die SPD-Führer dagegen – Alarmierender Artikel im ‘Tagesspiegel,’” *ND*, September 19, 1946; and “Zweimal ‘Telegraf,’ Damit sich niemand täusche,” *ND*, September 29, 1946.

⁷⁶⁸ “Zweimal ‘Telegraf,’ Damit sich niemand täusche,” *ND*, September 29, 1946.

⁷⁶⁹ “Die Streik Auswirkungen in Amerika,” *ND*, September 12, 1946.

⁷⁷⁰ “Der amerikanische Plan für die Entwaffnung Deutschlands,” *ND*, May 4, 1946.

September 1946 Stuttgart speech. Ulbricht began by welcoming Byrnes's calls for continued denazification and demilitarization, but then lamented his observation that denazification in AMZON remained incomplete; this situation allowed "reactionary forces" the opportunity to preserve "positions of power in industry, agriculture, and in the administration."⁷⁷¹

Did the SED press charm Berlin readers in 1946? Reports show that the *DVZ* and *Neues Deutschland* lost 30 percent of their cumulative audience between March and October.⁷⁷² At the same time, the *Tagesspiegel* and *Telegraf* increased their reach.⁷⁷³ Awareness of these problems led Pieck to request additional paper stocks from SMAD throughout the summer.⁷⁷⁴ In time, the paper's distribution increased from 320,000 copies per issue in June to 495,000 by September.⁷⁷⁵ Although total distribution fell slightly in October, the SED managed to print and ship about 180,000 copies per day throughout Berlin in the weeks before the 20 October election.⁷⁷⁶

⁷⁷¹ Walter Ulbricht, "Um die Zukunft Deutschlands. Zu den Erklärung der süddeutschen Ministerpräsidenten zur Rede von Außenminister Byrnes," *ND*, September 12, 1946.

⁷⁷² Betriebsgruppe B 18, "Neues Deutschland" an das Zentralsekretariat der SED, z.Hd.d. Genossen Pieck, November 2, 1946, SAPMO-BArch ZPA, NY 4036/670.

⁷⁷³ Pieck, "Neues Deutschland an Genossen Generalleutnant Bockow bei der Sowjetischen Militäradministration," June 20, 1946, SAPMO-BArch ZPA, NY 4036/670.

⁷⁷⁴ Wilhelm Pieck, "Neues Deutschland an Genossen Generalleutnant Bockow bei der Sowjetischen Militäradministration," June 20, 1946, SAPMO-BArch ZPA, NY 4036/670.

⁷⁷⁵ "Die Entstehung und Entwicklung der Druckerei Neues Deutschland in der Zeit von 1946 bis 1966," 12, SAPMO-BArch ZPA, DY 63/1200 and Pieck, "an die Sowjetische Militär-Administration – Propagandaabteilung, z. Hd. Herrn Major Davidenko," September 14, 1946," SAPMO-BArch ZPA, NY 4036/670.

⁷⁷⁶ "Die Entstehung und Entwicklung der Druckerei Neues Deutschland," 12, SAPMO-BArch ZPA, DY 63/1200; Pieck, "an die Sowjetische Militär-Administration – Propagandaabteilung, z. Hd. Herrn Major Davidenko," September 14, 1946," SAPMO-BArch ZPA, NY 4036/670; and Betriebsgruppe B 18, "Neues Deutschland" an das Zentralsekretariat der SED, z.Hd.d. Genossen Pieck, November 2, 1946, SAPMO-BArch ZPA, NY 4036/670.

Even so, copies went unsold. Despite the SED's understanding that "the first impression was the most sustainable," readers rarely received the paper on time. More often than not, the *Tägliche Rundschau* reached Berlin's newsstands at 5:00, the *Tagesspiegel* at 6:30, and *Neues Deutschland* not until the late morning or early afternoon. Circumstances and poor planning were the causes of these delays. Work conditions were chaotic, particularly in the cramped and disorganized editorial offices on Schönhauser Allee. Moreover, the staff consistently complained that censorship requirements and operational mismanagement forced the publishing house to hold off printing the paper until the early morning hours.⁷⁷⁷

Institutional shortcomings do not explain the SED's surprisingly lackluster attempts to sway Berlin voters before the October 1946 election. With the exception of occasional appeals to broad groups, such as women, *Neues Deutschland* published few strong, "positive" articles on "democratic renewal."⁷⁷⁸ Instead, the paper continued to devote considerable space to negative coverage of the west. This trend continued through the October 20 "day of political parole."⁷⁷⁹ While purely political appeals received greater attention in that issue, the editors nevertheless buttressed their front-page overtures with a rebuke of the *Telegraf* and a story on domestic US

⁷⁷⁷ Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands Betriebsgruppe B 18, "Neues Deutschland" an das Zentralsekretariat der SED, September 30, 1946, SAPMO-BArch ZPA, NY 4036/670; Neues Deutschland an das Zentralsekretariat der SED, October 10, 1946, SAPMO-BArch ZPA, NY 4036/670; Capt. Bert S. Fiedler, Chie, Press Section, "Weekly Report No. 64/67," July 31, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/206; Pieck an die Chefredaktion "Neues Deutschland," September 6, 1946; *Neues Deutschland* an das Zentralsekretariat der SED, October 2, 1946 (read by Pieck and Grotewohl on October 5, 1946); and Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands Betriebsgruppe B 18, "Neues Deutschland" an das Zentralsekretariat der SED, September 30, 1946, as in SAPMO-BArch ZPA, NY 4036/670.

⁷⁷⁸ See, for example, "Den Frauen ihr Recht," *ND*, August 6, 1946; "Otto Grotewohls Antwort an eine Frau: 'Wirt un alles, um zu helfen,'" *ND*, October 4, 1946; or "Ein Wort an die Frauen ... Für eine bessere Zukunft, Wählt SED Liste 2," *ND*, October 18, 1946.

⁷⁷⁹ Wilhelm Pieck, "Mahnendes Wort in letzter Stunde!," *ND*, October 20, 1946.

criticism of the Truman administration.⁷⁸⁰ This approach won them few friends, and an insufficient number of votes in Berlin.

The Foundations of 1946

The KPD/SED operated under the ideological guidelines established by Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, which dictated that the press should be the main instrument to reach and change the thinking of the masses.⁷⁸¹ Yet messages of antifascism and coded references to “democracy” failed to convince the German public and led to a deep ideological dilemma within the KPD/SED itself. To paraphrase Pike, they had to decide whether it was now democratic and no longer communist or whether it was still communist and thus undemocratic.⁷⁸² In the end, they chose to redefine the notion of democracy to fit a particular Marxist-Leninist vision for social-political development, while maintaining hope that the emerging body politic would align with a communistic worldview. More than this, they chose to rely upon rhetoric and themes of struggle and conflict, which ultimately yielded little interest from the readership or the electorate.

The fact that the KPD/SED tested and set the general tone of what became cold war-era rhetoric at a time when four-power agreements forbade such material raises a number of important issues, including that of the U.S. and Soviet response. By late-spring 1946, the Soviets’ *Tägliche Rundschau* began printing material similar to, but less blatant than that found in the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* and *Neues Deutschland*. Moreover, there is ample evidence that the Soviet Military Government effectively supported the activities of the KPD press earlier that

⁷⁸⁰ Pieck, “Mahnendes Wort in letzter Stunde!,” Max Fechner, “Berliner, was mußt du heute tun?,” “Berlin wählt heute SED, Liste 2,” “Der ‘Telegraf’ zum zweitenmal gestäupt,” and “Kritik an Trumans Fleischgesetz,” *ND*, 20 October 1946.

⁷⁸¹ Benning, *Geschichte des SED-Zentralorgans*, 7 and ZK der SED, *Unsere Presse – die schärfste Waffe der Partei*, op cit., SAPMO-BArch-Biblio. No. 3/669.

⁷⁸² Pike, *Politics of Culture*, 158-159.

year. For their part, the SED's anti-western focus apparently peaked in 1951, when *Neues Deutschland* devoted an average of 65 percent of each issue to denunciations of NATO member states and West Germany.⁷⁸³

The rise of antagonistic press material was one of several reasons the U.S. decided to allow and sponsor the publication of articles critical of the Soviet Union and the SED.

Regardless, the KPD/SED's role in initiating postwar press and propaganda wars should force greater consideration of the ways by which the GDR's nascent elite (if not the readership at large) participated in the development of postwar political culture and the rise of East-West tensions in the years between 1945 and 1949.

⁷⁸³ At the same time, the *Tägliche Rundschau* focused about 50% of its coverage to critiques of the west. In contrast, the US-controlled *Die Neue Zeitung* dedicated 15% of its pages to discussions of the east, saving a full 80% for articles on western concerns. Richard Conrad, "Social Images in East and West Germany: A Comparative Study of Matched Newspapers in Two Social Systems," *Social Forces* 33:3 (1955), 283.

CHAPTER 8

ENCOUNTERING AND AVOIDING THE NAZI PAST IN THE PRESS

The military occupation of Germany might have brought about a political and press culture that encouraged significant reflection on the crimes of the Nazi past. Allied encounters with Holocaust sites and the utter defeat of the Nazi war machine provided sufficient cause to push for public engagement with Nazism and its crimes through the short-lived enforcement of collective guilt messages that were common to both the Soviet and American occupations in 1945. In time, the German people witnessed a number of public postwar trials of the Nazis and their collaborators and engaged to one degree or another with the diverse groups of Displaced Persons who had survived the Holocaust and related Nazi atrocities. And once political life began anew in postwar Germany, party platforms on both sides of the zonal divide often contrasted the Nazi past with promises for a new German politics, inspired variously by the antifascist resistance or a new society built on the foundations of western democratic traditions. If the conditions for an honest confrontation with the past seemed to have been ideal, why then did Germans avoid doing so in the immediate postwar years?

Some scholars have attributed the slow development of Holocaust memory to a collective German “inability to mourn,” to a desire by some Germans to claim the status of victims of Nazism, and to a willful ignorance of Nazi crimes, or to the nuanced political decisions of the leadership of the early GDR and FRG.⁷⁸⁴ The relative apathy to the plight of Nazi victims

⁷⁸⁴ Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, *The Inability to Mourn: Principles of Collective Behavior* (New York: Grove Press, 1975); Theodor Adorno, “Guilt and Defense,” in Adorno, *Guilt and Defense: On the Legacies of National Socialism in Postwar Germany*, trans. and ed. Jeffrey K. Olick and Andrew J. Perrin (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,

exhibited by both the Soviets and Americans in the pages of their occupation newspapers certainly played a role, as did the fact that many of the institutions established by the occupations avoided recognition of Jews as the primary victims of the Nazi state. The unique position of those few postwar German Jews who played an active role in the early occupation also contributed to this development. Many sought to work for the creation of a new German society but then found themselves forced to confront the realities of the postwar era, the reintegration of former Nazis into political and social life, and a world unsympathetic to their stories, their needs, and justice for the crimes perpetrated against them.

This situation was perhaps most acute in the eastern state. In the minds of many Soviets and German communists, the victory over Nazism at once shattered the myth of German racial superiority and verified their belief in the values and worldview espoused by Marxism-Leninism. Consequently, East German life developed in such a way that development of general acceptance of Jews as “victims of fascism” was often at odds with state-sponsored denigration of the state of Israel, the purging of “Zionists” and “Cosmopolitans” from political life, and active attempts to avoid restitution programs.⁷⁸⁵ The contours of steady exclusion from postwar narratives of the past became familiar in the west, as well. The realities of the coming cold war and the ideological positions that informed its development proved to be of considerable importance. In the American zone, the late but vigorous reaction to the antagonistic anti-Americanism of the

2010), 45-188; Adorno, “What does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean?” in Geoffrey H. Hartman (ed.), *Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 114-129; and Herf, *Divided Memory*, op. cit. For an overview of some of these positions, see Robert G. Moeller, “Germans as Victims?: Thoughts on a Post-Cold War History of World War II’s Legacies,” in *History & Memory* 17:1/2 (2005), 147-194, esp. 151-152.

⁷⁸⁵ On East German restitution policy, see Michael Meng, “East Germany’s Jewish Question: The Return and Preservation of Jewish Sites in East Berlin and Potsdam, 1945-1989,” in *Central European History* 38:4 (2005), 606-636.

SBZ met with the need to assuage German economic and political concerns at the expense of a critical interrogation of the past. These developments had significant consequences for the only newspaper in this study that engaged regularly with the topic of the Nazi genocide of the Jews of Europe: the *Frankfurter Rundschau*. Given the backgrounds of its founding licensees, it is perhaps unsurprising that the newspaper often focused discussions on uncomfortable subject matter that included the related issues of antisemitism, responsibility for Nazism, and the failures of the past. Throughout its first four years of publication and beyond, the *Frankfurter Rundschau* fell short in its attempts to elicit discourse and dialogue on the Holocaust and the murders of related victim groups owing to the controversies, myths, and specter of communism surrounding the paper.⁷⁸⁶

German newspapers engaged with the past to varying degrees in order to convey messages to the public that were in keeping with the ethos of the emergent West and East German states. These stories often reflected vigorous political debates that, at their core, wrestled with ways to control the presentation of the past as a means to shape future political development. In the end, two victorious visions, one communistic and the other politically conservative, won out. Both avoided widespread discussion on the specificity of Nazi crimes, a development that would not emerge for another three decades.

Collective Guilt

During the first six months after May 1945, the notion of “collective guilt,” that is, the claim that the German people were responsible for the rise of the Nazi state and its actions was common to both the American and Soviet occupations. It nevertheless failed to persuade the

⁷⁸⁶ See, for example, Arno Rudert, “Wiederweihe des ersten jüdischen Gotteshauses in Frankfurt a.M.,” *FR*, 12 September 1945; “KZ-Häftlinge daran weiter,” *FR*, 29 August 1945 or “Erstes Todesurteil im KZ-Prozeß Bergen-Belsen,” *FR*, 15 September 1945.

majority of the population on both sides of the zonal divide. Lackadaisical enforcement of collective guilt messaging in the American zone and awareness of public discomfort with the concept led some Americans to conclude that campaigns that emphasized these themes were counterproductive to democratization efforts. In the SBZ, the press emphasis on collective guilt began in response to general Soviet and KPD disappointment in the German people's failure to rise up against Nazism, it but soon became a rhetorical device that distinguished between those who could participate in the development of the SED state and those who could not.

The Soviets' position throughout 1945 seemed to favor collective guilt owing to disappointment and frustration with the Germans acceptance of National Socialism. Because the German masses had created the conditions that made possible the rise of Nazism and profited from the actions of the state, it was therefore their responsibility to participate in projects that would "cleanse Germany of the 'Brown plague' and create the conditions necessary for rebuilding political life on a free and democratic basis."⁷⁸⁷ Articles in the pages of the *Tägliche Rundschau* pushed this message in a variety of ways. At first, the paper's coverage of Nazi crimes focused on the attack against the Soviet Union and the deprivations suffered by its peoples. The most forceful report came in mid-May 1945, when the *Tägliche Rundschau* printed a lengthy, one-and-a-half-page article on the conditions encountered by the Red Army when it liberated Auschwitz. With considerable detail on the fates that awaited the victims of this camp, this story noted the loss of "4 million citizens of the Soviet Union, Poland, France, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Holland, Belgium, and other countries," but made

⁷⁸⁷ United States Group Control Council, Information Control Service, "Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS) # 7," August 24, 1945, NACP RG 260/250/157, 19, and "Der Nazismus wird ausgerottet werden," *TR*, May 17, 1945.

no mention of any Jewish identity.⁷⁸⁸ In June, the publication of stories that might have inspired guilt and reflection increased in number, but appeared often on the inside pages of the newspaper. Even so, this campaign began to fade after the reestablishment of the KPD, which demanded the promotional power of the Soviet zone media. In addition to articles that concentrated on the scale and depravity of Nazi crimes and utter defeat at the hands of the Red Army, many other pieces characterized the Nazi state as a “war profiteer’s paradise” for established plutocrats. Others focused on the disenfranchisement of the working class or the people’s acceptance of the state’s war policies.⁷⁸⁹ Between the lines of what appeared in the paper, this campaign sought to energize the masses to participate in cooperative efforts in the SBZ. At the same time, it provided the Red Army an opportunity to deny and obscure Soviet criminality during the late war. This was particularly so in the case of the Soviet massacre at Katyn, which the *Tägliche Rundschau* dismissed as propaganda and attributed to the Nazis.⁷⁹⁰

The limited effort put forth in the official Soviet-run press allowed the KPD to lead the charge for coming to terms with the past in the SBZ. Most German communists who had returned from exile were largely unwilling to confront the legacies and significance of Nazi racial policies and worldviews owing to their perspective on Nazism as a capitalist phenomenon

⁷⁸⁸ “Ungeheuerliche Verbrechen der Nazis im Todeslager Auschwitz,” *TR*, May 17, 1945. The failure to mention Jews in the context of Auschwitz was common in the pages of the *Tägliche Rundschau*, including in reports submitted by the camp’s survivors. See, for example, Hildegard Kloß, “Erlebnisbericht aus Auschwitz. Die drei Stratgrade,” *TR*, July 12, 1945.

⁷⁸⁹ “Der Nazismus wird ausgerottet werden,” *TR*, May 17, 1945; “Wovon die Gestapo – Dokumente sprechen,” *TR*, June 2, 1945; “Die letzten Tage der Hitlerclique,” *TR*, June 6, 1945 and June 8, 1945; “Nazideutschland – Kriegsgewinnler-Paradies,” *TR*, June 1, 1945; “Politische Versklavung,” *TR*, June 1, 1945; “Das haben die Hitlerbanditen getan. Die Schuhe von Maidanek,” and “Konzentrationslager Hamburg-Neuengamme,” *TR* June 13, 1945; “Die Schlacht von Stalingrad,” *TR*, June 19, 1945; “Massengrab ermordeter politischer Häftlinge geöffnet,” July 4, 1945; among others.

⁷⁹⁰ “Neue Einzelheiten zu Katyn,” *TR*, July 4, 1945.

and because acknowledgment of Jewish victims was counterproductive to the elevation of communists in the emerging hagiography of the anti-fascist resistance. Nevertheless, the party's *Aufruf* required that "the German people carry a significant part of the shared guilt and shared responsibility for the war and its consequences." It also emphasized that the burden of blame rested in the hands of those who controlled the economic machinery of the state and those who took advantage of the imperialist and nationalist impulses of the people.⁷⁹¹ The juxtaposition of leading Nazi functionaries with the "everyday" German suggested that the best way to avoid consequences for the actions of the past was through cooperation in "democratic" redevelopment and the establishment of peaceable relations with the Soviet Union and its peoples.

The use of comparison was common throughout the Soviet zone press, and there were several powerful attempts to explain German complicity in the actions of the Nazi state. In a July 10, 1945 reprint of a Berliner Rundfunk program led by Paul Schüler, for example, the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* sought to respond to the common defense that there were those who held no responsibility for National Socialism despite not participating actively in the resistance. Schüler argued that the German people had been exposed to innumerable speeches by Nazi leaders that betrayed the true intentions of the state, and therefore should have risen up to overthrow the government before it could effect plans that would lead to the murder of millions. This lent support to the common SBZ line that absence of the means to resist was no excuse for the failure to try, and argued persuasively that the policies of Hitler's government had received widespread support throughout much of the war. The only hope for moving forward, so Schüler argued, was to recognize the shame of the immediate past and to build the future in a direction. Even so, the article leading into Schüler's speech began with a reflection on the fact that the

⁷⁹¹ "Aufruf der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands," *DVZ*, June 13, 1945.

decisions made on the behalf of the German people came from the minds of “Hitler, Göring, Himmler, and Goebbels,” as well as other individuals and corporations noted in the *Aufruf*.⁷⁹² Then, on June 25, 1945, Walter Ulbricht spoke on the failures of the working class to prevent the rise of Nazism.⁷⁹³ The text of this speech appeared two days later on the front page of the *Deutsche Volkszeitung*, and showed that Ulbricht tempered his disappointment by noting the public’s belief in German technical and racial superiority as a contributing factor.⁷⁹⁴

By qualifying collective guilt and allowing for a rhetorical distinction between “typical” Germans and Nazis, the KPD was able to inform and develop one of the overriding myths of the GDR, namely, that the SED state was at once anti-fascist and democratic. The months of summer and fall 1945 witnessed significant efforts by the KPD to remain true to the *Aufruf*’s pledge to destroy “all remnants of the Hitler regime.” The pages of the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* proved crucial to this effort. In August 1945, the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* published an article that indicted the Siemens Corporation for building and installing the crematoria and gas chambers used at Auschwitz. The British occupation government took this claim seriously, and arrested the firm’s director, Wolf-Dietrich von Witzleben.⁷⁹⁵ Similar articles focused on the actions of IG

⁷⁹² “Zum Thema: Die Mitschuld des deutschen Volkes. Eine für viele unangenehme, aber lebensnotwendige Feststellung ...” *DVZ*, July 10, 1945.

⁷⁹³ Peter Monteath, “Review Article: The German Democratic Republic and the Jews,” in *German History* 22:3 (2004), 448-468 452.

⁷⁹⁴ “Erste Funktionärkonferenz der KPD Groß-Berlins. Programmatistische Rede des Genossen Walter Ulbricht,” *DVZ*, June 27, 1945.

⁷⁹⁵ S. Jonathan Wiesen, *West German Industry and the Challenge of the Nazi Past, 1945-1955* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 45-46 and “Krupp an KZ Auschwitz beteiligt. Siemens lieferte die Vergassungsanlage,” *DVZ*, August 5, 1945.

Farben during the war, including an exposé on the company's use of slave labor at Auschwitz-Monowitz (Auschwitz III).⁷⁹⁶

At the same time, dedication to purging Nazi elements from Germany became a useful weapon against the western occupiers. One finds the first hints of this in a July 1945 article that criticized a letter sent by Bavarian bishops to the cardinal of Munich. Noting the bishops' claim that "the German people are not responsible for the crimes of a few rogues," the KPD argued that such lines of thought turned Germany back by "a quarter century" and failed to address the critical needs of the present.⁷⁹⁷ Within months, the focus on events in Bavaria turned from religious leaders to political leaders, many of whom the KPD/SED would claim had once again worked in for the same conservative capitalistic interests that had made possible the rise of the Nazi state. So too did discussion shift from the companies that had participated in the Nazi war effort and the Holocaust to the U.S. seizure of Germany's means of production and the economic woes of the American industrial landscape. After a month of stories on decreased industrial potential and worker unrest in the United States ended the year, the KPD began contrasting stories on the U.S. and British seizure of German companies with pieces that suggested nefarious motivations for doing so.⁷⁹⁸ Subsequent editions continued to highlight U.S. worker unrest, material deprivations, and the rise of crime, as well as increased discussion of the American

⁷⁹⁶ Anklagende Tatsachen gegen Hauptschuldige. Moloch IG-Farben-Konzern. Menschenverschleiß für die Chemie-Aktionäre im Konzentrationslager Monowitz," *DVZ*, August 2, 1945.

⁷⁹⁷ "Bayerische Bischöfe auf falschem Wege. Keine Wiederholung von 1918! Ohne Anerkennung der Mitschuld am Kriege kein gesicherter Frieden," *DVZ*, July 27, 1945.

⁷⁹⁸ "Deutsche Rüstungswerke werden verschrottet" and "USA-Militärbehörde beschlagnahmte 1909 deutsche Unternehmen," *DVZ* December 1, 1945.

atomic bomb program – all with the implication that the United States and its leaders were desperate and might compensate for their losses by taking from the German people.⁷⁹⁹

Manipulation of collective guilt for political ends followed a different path in the American zone. U.S. policies led to a gradual decline in the importance of collective guilt propaganda in the months immediately following May 1945, but it was not until January of 1946 that General McClure issued guidance against Manichean presentations in favor of nuanced discussions that taught the cause and effect of supporting the Nazi dictatorship. In part, the decline of collective guilt was a product of the limits of understanding within U.S. information control programs. As Larry Hartenian has shown, the decision to stress collective guilt emerged over the course of winter 1944/1945 and was to serve as an adjunct to themes of “unconditional surrender” in U.S. propaganda campaigns. Rather than attempt to convince Germans of their complicity in the Nazi state, PWD/ICD programs consisted of factual presentation of Nazi crimes in an attempt to elicit popular reflection.⁸⁰⁰ PWD experiences in Aachen and with 12th Army Group publications demonstrated that coordination of media often led to repetitive presentations of the same story across multiple publications and a public that had an incomplete understanding of the social, cultural, and political forces that led to the rise of Nazism. More to the point, licensed newspapers in the American zone were under no obligation to use articles that

⁷⁹⁹ Example articles include “Streikverbot in USA? Botschaft des Präsidenten an den Kongreß,” *DVZ* December 7, 1945; “Die Zerstörung von Nagasaki,” *DVZ* December 8, 1945; “Vom amerikanischen Automobilarbeiterkonflikt. Einigung bei General Motors,” *DVZ*, December 11, 1945; “Demokrat Delaseys Forderungen in Philadelphia: Amerikanische Außenpolitik im Geiste Roosevelts. Atombomben-Kontrolle,” *DVZ*, December 12, 1945; “Amerikanischer Plan für deutsche Abrüstung,” *DVZ*, December 22, 1945; “Beibehaltung der Rationierung in USA,” *DVZ*, December 25, 1945; and “Ansteigen der Kriminalität in Amerika,” *DVZ*, December 26, 1945.

⁸⁰⁰ Larry Hartenian, “The Role of Media in Democratizing Germany: United States Occupation Policy, 1945-1949,” *Central European History* 20:2 (1987), 149-150.

might lead to a reckoning with the past, unless such pieces were official proclamations. This oversight did not become apparent until the end of November 1946, when DENA sent a request to all newspapers to print the story “How Germany Fell into Debt: An Insightful Investigation.” Not a single publication in the whole of Greater Hesse published this piece, much to the consternation of the press branch of ICD.⁸⁰¹

The editors and staff at *Die Neue Zeitung* were never comfortable with presenting highly critical assessments of Nazi crimes because its leadership self identified with the classical traditions of Central Europe and believed too great an emphasis on Nazi crimes was counterproductive to democratic development.⁸⁰² But for several articles on the upcoming IMT, the first month of the paper’s existence contained very few stories that spoke to the notion of collective guilt and the sins of the past.⁸⁰³ Of those that did, most were high-cultural discussions. To note just one example, in mid-fall 1945 a debate arose between the Norwegian novelist and Nobel Laureate Sigrid Undset and the University of Heidelberg philosopher Karl Jaspers in the *feuilleton* of *Die Neue Zeitung*. This well-informed and thoughtful discussion certainly forwarded compelling notions. Undset argued that German literary and philosophical traditions were the greatest hindrance to democratic renewal, while Jaspers replied that the destruction of

⁸⁰¹ Raymond J. Stover, OMGH, ICD to all licensees of the Greater Hessian Newspapers, “Publications of Articles,” January 16, 1947, NACP RG 260/253/211.

⁸⁰² Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 29.

⁸⁰³ “Prozeßbeginn: 20. November. Wie die Beschuldigten von Nürnberg die Anklageschrift aufnehmen,” “Erstveröffentlichung der Prozeßordnung,” “Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit,” and Hans Habe, “Tagebuch: Der verzögerte Prozeß,” *DNZ*, October 21, 1945; “Wessen sie beschuldigt sind. Zusammenstellung der vier Anklagepunkte des Nürnberger Prozesses,” *DNZ*, October 25, 1945; and “Selbstmord Dr. Leys in Nürnberg,” *DNZ*, October 28, 1945.

the German people provided the basis for its renewal under the guidance of the occupiers.⁸⁰⁴

Jaspers's thesis fit with the overall perspective of *Die Neue Zeitung* on the question of guilt and renewal, as shown by the number of articles that reflected on the better past of German cultural life and the several wartime and postwar political cartoons that appeared through October and November.⁸⁰⁵ Even these submissions mitigated notions collective responsibility to a degree, as well as verified ICD assessments that *Die Neue Zeitung* catered only to the intellectual elite.⁸⁰⁶

In the end, the *Neue Zeitung* stance on collective guilt reflected Hans Habe's personal belief that it was foolish to impart this to the German public. Habe and his paper attempted to "sabotage" collective guilt by printing material that focused on the positive history of German culture and by drawing distinctions between the acts of the Nazi leadership and the German people.⁸⁰⁷ Still, Habe's November 30, 1945 editorial on "misunderstood solidarity" rebuked some Germans for identifying with former party members in direct and indirect ways. He decried this development as a legacy of Goebbels's propaganda, which could manifest in overt ways or through belief in an impending war between the Soviet Union and the United States. To

⁸⁰⁴ Sigrid Undset, "Die Umerziehung der Deutschen," *DNZ*, October 25, 1945 and Karl Jaspers, "Antwort an Sigrid Undset," *DNZ*, November 4, 1945.

⁸⁰⁵ Günther Strupp, "[sketch from] 'Aus dem Dritten Reich,'" *DNZ*, October 18, 1945 and Daniel Bishop, "Der lange schwere Weg zurück in die Familie der Nationen," *DNZ*, October 25, 1945.

⁸⁰⁶ See, for example, "Die Blinden," which appeared as an example of material banned in Germany. The 1942 cartoon from the Swiss magazine *Die Nebelspalter* shows a Nazi figure, head held high while holding a flag that bears the word "Sieg," marching a group of sightless persons over a cliff. "Die Blinden," *DNZ*, November 21, 1945.

⁸⁰⁷ Harold J. Hurwitz, "Interview with Hans Habe, former chief editor of the 12th Army Group newspaper and later editor of the *Neue Zeitung*, presently editor of the *Muenchener Illustrierte*," January 23, 1950, NACP RG 260/118/459, 3.

solve this problem, he urged non-Nazi Germans to redeem themselves by coming to understand the falsities of their earlier beliefs.⁸⁰⁸

The *Frankfurter Rundschau* was the most consistent advocate for a critical interrogation of the past in early-occupied Germany. It emphasized discussion of Nazi crimes and utilized this material to teach a series of lessons on democratic renewal, as shown by the fact that the amount of space the paper devoted to discussions of Nazi criminality and the murder of European Jews was demonstrably greater than that of many of its competitors and cousins in the American and other Allied zones. The first year of publication brought daily pieces on a range of relevant topics, including war crimes trials and concentration camp atrocities.⁸⁰⁹ No early issue addressed the issue of collective German guilt in as forceful a manner as that from 9 November 1945. Whereas *Die Neue Zeitung*, the *Deutsche Volkszeitung*, and the *Tägliche Rundschau* ignored the anniversary of the pogrom of 1938 entirely, the *Frankfurter Rundschau* devoted about 20% of its four-page issue to the subject.⁸¹⁰ Ewald Allschoff, the future leader of the Frankfurt Jewish Community, contributed a detailed description of his experiences and survival at Auschwitz. Below a large picture of the burning synagogue at Börneplatz, an article by Rabbi Leopold Neuhaus outlined the physical and material destruction of the pogrom, the political machinations that fed it, the relationship between the pogrom and what became the Holocaust, and the

⁸⁰⁸ Hans Habe, "Missverständene Solidarität," *DNZ*, November 30, 1945.

⁸⁰⁹ For example, Arno Rudert, "Wiederweihe des ersten jüdischen Gotteshauses in Frankfurt a.M.," *FR*, 12 September 1945; "KZ-Häftlinge daran weiter," *FR*, 29 August 1945; "Erstes Todesurteil im KZ-Prozeß Bergen-Belsen," *FR*, 15 September 1945.

⁸¹⁰ Indeed, the KPD/SED press failed to mention the pogrom until 1948. Even then, they only printed announcements for three memorial services in Berlin. It was not until the late 1970s that mention of Kristallnacht appeared with any regularity. Coverage peaked in 1988 with the fiftieth anniversary of the pogrom and increased interest in the Holocaust throughout the GDR. Mark A. Wolfgram, *"Getting History Right": East and West German Collective Memories of the Holocaust and War* (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2011), 40-47.

dishonorable actions undertaken by both the SA and “everyday Germans” alike. His article posed a direct and haunting question, and one that was clearly on the minds of survivors and many if not all of the licensees at the *Frankfurter Rundschau*: “Who will answer?”⁸¹¹ Similar stories became increasingly common during the course of the Nuremberg Trial, so much so that the *Frankfurter Rundschau* was often the standard by which the Americans compared other AMZON newspapers.⁸¹²

This drive to reflect on the past and move political and social life away from the National Socialist past occasionally informed political coverage in the *Frankfurter Rundschau*. The paper’s response to the Blaum administration in Frankfurt was a case in point.⁸¹³ The motivation for discussing both the historical and the contemporary relevance of Nazi crimes came from Emil Carlebach and Arno Rudert. Rudert, who had survived a series of imprisonments and beatings at the hands of the Nazis, produced articles that were broadly reflective and in keeping with his

⁸¹¹ Ewald Allschoff, “Ich war in Auschwitz!” and Rabbi Leopold Neuhaus, “In Memoriam ...,” *FR*, November 9, 1945.

⁸¹² For the paper’s handling of the IMT and the US Military Government’s comments, see, for example, “Message for Stricker DANA Nuremberg from Hollos from Eggleston,” July 1946, NACP RG 260/253/212; Joseph Dunner to Luther Conant, “Scrutiny Report on FR,” 28 December 1945, NACP RG 260/253/216; Ernest Adler to Chief of Press Section, 6871st DISCC, “Scrutiny Report,” 27 November 1945, NACP RG 260/253/216; W. Pfefferkorn to Eugene Jolas, “Press Survey,” covering the period October 13th – 20th 1945, 21 October 1945, NACP RG 260/253/212.

⁸¹³ “Die erste Bürgerratssitzung in Frankfurt,” *FR*, September 8, 1945; “Führerprinzip oder Demokratie,” *FR*, November 13, 1945; Emil Carlebach, “Renazifizierung?” *FR*, 5 March 1946; “Eine Antwort von Dr. Blaum,” *FR*, March 12, 1946; 6871st DISCC, “Reactions to the article entitled ‘Die erste Buergerratsitzung [sic],’” 11 September 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175; Frankfurt Detachment – Intelligence Section, “Addition to Conclusion of report entitled ‘Die erste Buergerratsitzung [sic],’” article published in ‘Frankfurter Rundschau’ of 8 September 1945,” September 12, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175; “Subject One,” September 21, 1945, NACP RG 260/1490/1175; OMGUS Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS) No. 19,” November 17, 1945, NACP RG 260/250/157; Julius Hollos (Scrutiny Desk) to Arthur Eggleston, “*Frankfurter Rundschau*, 26th March,” March 28, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/216; Carlebach, *Zensur ohne Schere*, 49-50; and Boehling, *A Question of Priorities*, 136-137.

commitment to discuss and expose the crimes of Nazism through the press, a tendency that lasted until his death in 1954. Carlebach, however, used his personal experiences in German concentration camps to impart lessons on the need to bring about an accord and acceptance with communism. In Carlebach's first article on his years as a prisoner in Buchenwald, he gave short shrift to the plight of the camp's Jewish population and instead wrote at greater lengths about the unified purpose of Catholics, Jews, Protestants, and those without religious convictions in the struggle against the actions of the Nazi guards. He claimed this experience was proof that Germans need not fear an unknown "Bolshevik danger," because the depravities we now associate with the Holocaust came about not through a Bolshevik dictatorship, but through Hitler's "bloodless revolution."⁸¹⁴ Carlebach's politicization of the Holocaust was indicative of his broader worldview, and ultimately contributed to the end of his licensure as a newspaperman in the American zone.

Denazification

In both zones, policies that favored the promotion of collective guilt built upon the active processes of denazification underway in all four zones of occupation. Section II-A, point 6 of the Potsdam Conference proceedings required the removal of "all members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities" from political life and other "positions of responsibility."⁸¹⁵ Such measures, so the Allies hoped, would allow for the eradication of National Socialist impulses from public life, and engender a democratic transition

⁸¹⁴ Emil Carlebach, "Unser Wille zur Zusammenarbeit. Der Weg zur nationalen Freiheit," *FR*, 25 August 1945.

⁸¹⁵ §II.A.6 of "Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, August 1, 1945," as in United States Department of State, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 57.

during the occupation. Each occupier experienced degrees of success in removing former Nazis from the public sphere. Yet, at the same time, Germans across the occupied territories felt aggrieved by policies that, in their minds, were at once too severe and variously incomplete or too lax. Some SBZ Germans felt that SMAD's denazification measures were more just than those in the American zone were. In a captured letter from December 26, 1945, a Berlin resident declared, "the Russians are not carrying out denazification as blindly as the Americans." A former Nazi in Saale shared this view, and was pleased that he engaged in only 533 hours of "reparation work" before becoming "a decent person again in the new Germany."⁸¹⁶ Others concluded that U.S. measures at once failed to distinguish between high party functionaries, low-ranking members of the NSDAP, and so-called "fellow travelers," while at once restricting the possibility of public involvement in these measures in the early stages of the occupation.⁸¹⁷ In both the American and Soviet cases, denazification remained incomplete and transitioned away from a purge of all Nazi Party functionaries in 1945 to broad acceptance of former Nazis in public life by 1948 and 1949.

Press coverage of denazification began in 1945 as a means to expose former Nazis and their crimes to the public. In doing so, SBZ and AMZON media hoped to force some degree of critical assessment of the past. Biographies, general summaries, and opinion pieces on those who had Allied themselves with the Nazi state were common.⁸¹⁸ Gerst, of the *Frankfurter*

⁸¹⁶ OMGUS, "Information Control Intelligence Summary No. 32," February 23, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 3.

⁸¹⁷ Cornelia Rauh-Kühne, "Life Rewarded the Latecomers: Denazification during the Cold War," translated by Edward G. Fichtner and Sally Robertson, as in Junker, *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945-1990*, 65-72.

⁸¹⁸ See, for example, "Nazis im Internierungslager," *FZ*, August 22, 1945; "Nazi-Entlassungen überall," *FZ*, August 25, 1945; "Ein Kommandant von Auschwitz verhaftet," *FZ*, August 25, 1945; "Säuberung in Hessen," *FZ*, October 2, 1945; "Nazi-Parteisten gefunden,"

Rundschau, wrote one of the earliest of the broad reflections on the nazification and denazification of German society despite his own compromised past.⁸¹⁹ Other newspapers highlighted in numerical terms the numbers of persons purged from German life across both the SBZ and AMZON.⁸²⁰ The *Tägliche Rundschau* was the exception. After May 1945, it rarely discussed issues relevant to the purging of Nazi officials from positions of influence. In terms of total coverage, the *Frankfurter Rundschau* outpaced the U.S. zonal newspaper, insofar as the latter rarely granted attention to matters relevant to denazification or guilt, while the German-run publication made it an almost constant subject of discussion in each issue it published through early 1946.

While interest in denazification began to decline after the start of the IMT in November 1945, it remained a highly charged (if inconsistently reported) matter of public concern well through the occupations. Following the dismissal of 13 additional bureaucrats from the Bavarian economic ministry in late-December 1946, for example, *Die Neue Zeitung* declared that German officials had failed to live up to the complete meaning of denazification. At the same time, General Clay gave a speech in Munich in which he expressed his satisfaction with denazification

FZ, October 13, 1945; “Kein Wahlrecht für die Nazis,” *FZ*, November 13, 1945; “Parteiakten in einer Papiermühle. Wie das vollständige Parteiverzeichnis aufgefunden wurde,” and “Die ‘Weiße Liste’ deutsche Kultur,” *DNZ*, October 25, 1945; “Die Säuberungsaktion von deutscher Seite,” *DNZ*, November 12, 1945; “Den Nazismus ausrotten – aber wie?” *DVZ*, June 13, 1945; “Zwei weitere Naziführer gefasst,” *DVZ*, June 14, 1945; “Berliner Magistrat beschließt: Nazivermögen werden beschlagnahmt,” *DVZ*, July 12, 1945; “Frieden und Demokratie auf den Trümmern des deutschen Imperialismus. Neue Wege der deutschen Wirtschaft,” *DVZ*, July 22, 1945; “Säuberung von faschistischen Unrat,” *DVZ*, August 10, 1945; Entfernung der Nazis aus den Aemtern,” *DVZ*, January 13, 1945; “Der Nazismus wird ausgerottet werden,” *TR*, May 18, 1945; and “Auf dem Wege zur Ausrottung des Nazismus,” *TR*, May 30, 1945.

⁸¹⁹ Wilhelm Karl Gerst, “Wer kennt diesen Jungen?” *FR*, August 4, 1945.

⁸²⁰ “15 000 Prozesse durchgeführt,” *FR*, August 18, 1945; “Frontbericht der Säuberung,” *DNZ*, November 8, 1945; and “50 000 aktive Nazis bisher in der amerikanischen Zone verhaftet,” *DVZ*, July 16, 1945.

measures and his expectation that the administration of purging former Nazis from responsible positions would remain in German hands.⁸²¹ This was less of a concern in the Soviet zone. Although denazification courts continued to function through 1948, that is, until the SED began to reintegrate former Nazis into the political life of the Soviet zone, the issue of denazification effectively disappeared in the pages of the press after May 1946.⁸²² At the same time, Soviet zone media began to build upon earlier critiques of incomplete denazification in AMZON. In response, U.S.-zone newspapers began to publish articles critical of the purges underway in the SBZ. The first U.S. salvo in this campaign began in January 1947, when *Die Neue Zeitung* noted that Soviet authorities had just begun “to make up for the dereliction in denazification [in their zone].” The paper noted that the SBZ press largely ignored the issue of denazification in its pages, but based on the small number of press reports available, Soviet and SED authorities had begun to effect denazification procedures in parts of Saxony in order to place SED Party members in lower-level governmental positions.⁸²³

Military Tribunals in the Press

Trials of war criminals in the zones and on the international scale provided unique opportunities to not only affect the norms of justice after war and to convey the lessons of the past on the German public, but also to promote the better intentions of the occupiers. In a sense,

⁸²¹ OMGB, ICD, Intelligence Branch, Political Affairs Section, “Special Brief of Political Affairs,” January 7, 1947, NACP RG 260/894/144, 2.

⁸²² OMGUS, “Information Control Intelligence Summary No. 43,” May 25, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 9; OMGUS, “Information Control Intelligence Summary No. 46,” June 15, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 7; and Timothy Vogt, *Denazification in Soviet-Occupied Germany: Brandenburg, 1945-1948* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), 112-113 and 235.

⁸²³ ICD, Translation “‘Denazification Problems in the East Zone: Denazification in the Russian Zone lags far behind other Occupation Zones,’ NZ Berlin, 26 Jan.,” January 29, 1947, NACP RG 260/253/197 and “Das Säuberungschaos in der Ostzone,” *DNZ*, January 31, 1947.

each of the Allies had an opportunity to prepare for coverage of the International Military Tribunal during the course of the two-month trial of 45 Bergen-Belsen and Auschwitz personnel during the Belsen trial of September 17 through November 17, 1945.⁸²⁴ Coverage of this, the first major postwar trial relevant to the Holocaust in Germany, was rather weak, although the *Weser Kurier* and *Frankfurter Rundschau* performed well enough to meet U.S. expectations.⁸²⁵ In the Soviet zone, the *Tägliche Rundschau* provided regular coverage for about a month after the start of the trial.⁸²⁶ By mid-October, however, it shifted its focus to reconstruction efforts, the benefits of life in the Soviet Union, and the coming trial at Nuremberg.

The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg served as a means to impart the truth about the Nazi state and its crimes in the immediate postwar. As Herf rightly notes, it brought about an interregnum that proved to be a “golden age of judicial confrontation with the Nazi

⁸²⁴ The formal title of the trial was “The Trial of Josef Kramer and 44 others.” See United Nations War Crimes Commission, *Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals. Volume II: The Belsen Trial* (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1947).

⁸²⁵ Pfefferkorn, “Press Survey covering the FR, Hessische Nachrichten, Marburger Presse, Rhein Neckar Zeitung, Stuttgarter Zeitung, Sueddeutsche Zeitung, Tagesspiegel, Weser Kurier, [and] Wiesbadener Zeitung] Analysing how the Various Papers Handled the ‘Belsen Trial,’” late 1945, NACP RG 260/253/212.

⁸²⁶ “Die Massenmörder von Belsen vor Gericht,” *TR*, September 19, 1945; “Aus der Gerichtsverhandlung in Lüneburg. Grausame Wahrheit über Belsen und Auschwitz,” *TR*, September 20, 1945; “Belsen ein zweites Auschwitz. Zeugen im Lüneburger Prozeß entlarven die Henker,” and “Die Sowjetpresse zum Lüneburger Prozeß,” *TR*, September 23, 1945; “Weitere Zeugenaussagen in dem Belsen-Prozeß,” *TR*, September 26, 1945; “Erneute Beweise für die Schandfalten in Belsen und Auschwitz,” *TR*, September 27, 1945; “‘Selektionen’ – Auswahl der Todesopfer,” *TR*, September 29, 1945; “Weitere Zeugenaussagen im Lüneburger Prozeß,” October 2, 1945; “Neue Eingeständnisse im Lüneburger Prozeß,” *TR*, October 9, 1945; “Verteidigungsreden im Lüneburger Prozeß,” *TR*, October 10, 1946; “Vom Lüneburger Prozeß, Kramers Eingeständnisse und klägliche Ausreden,” *TR*, October 11, 1945; and “Der Lüneburger Prozeß. Faschistische Aerztemoral – Wagen mit dem Zeichen des Roten Kreuzes wurde für Massenmorde benutzt,” *TR*, October 13, 1945.

past.”⁸²⁷ Both the Americans and the Soviets saw within the trials an important propaganda tool that could at once ensure the pacification of the German people while also compelling cooperative development of political-cultural shifts away from Nazism. Ultimately, it served as a testing ground for the political-ideological fight for the meaning of Nazi crimes in the postwar era, as an opportunity to develop a rhetorical association between Nazi crimes and the suffering of the German people as well as a rejection of collective guilt theses.⁸²⁸

Ensuring that the lessons and information that resulted from the trials would reach the German audience required careful coordination of resources and the developing press culture in the zones of occupation. Both the Americans and the Soviets arranged press coverage of the trials in a manner conducive to providing thorough coverage to domestic and foreign audiences. Licensed publications were to have “every opportunity possible to report the trials and provide for their newspapers” in the hope that it would elicit public identification with the prosecution. The AMZON press had broad license to report on all testimony, including that which could otherwise violate policy instruction 2, as long as the reporting was accurate and objective.⁸²⁹ This conflicted with a later policy, namely, that the U.S. and the other Western Allies would accept Soviet evidence, including testimonies relevant to the massacre in the Katyn Forest. In an

⁸²⁷ Herf, *Divided Memory*, 204.

⁸²⁸ Francine Hirsch, “The Soviets at Nuremberg: International Law, Propaganda, and the Making of the Postwar Order,” *The American Historical Review* 113:3 (2008), 703; Hartenian, “The Role of Media,” 160-161; Herf, *Divided Memory*, 207-208; and USFET, ICD, “Guidance – Nuremberg Trials,” November 5, 1945, NACP RG 260/247/69.

⁸²⁹ USFET, ICD, “Guidance – Nuremberg Trials,” November 5, 1945, NACP RG 260/247/69.

attempt to avoid any complications, ICD advised DANA not to send this material to licensed publishers or to suggest that Soviet evidence required deferential treatment.⁸³⁰

German reporters who attended the IMT did not have an easy time. Limited seats in the gallery required reporters to rotate the days at which they would be in the courthouse. The DANA Hellschreiber in the town frequently broke down and, if it failed to work, there was only a spotty telephone line available for those reporters who had to submit a story before a deadline. The city of Nuremberg also proved too expensive for some reporters, while inaccessible for others owing to the tendency there to accept only Marks issued by the OMGUS.⁸³¹ In light of these conditions, many AMZON and SBZ journalists relied on occupation news agencies for much of the trial.

The press spent the weeks leading up to the November 20, 1945 start of the IMT preparing the population. The first in-depth articles appeared in October as detailed discussions of the charges as set at the London Conference, reports on the principal members of the prosecution and the Tribunal, and biographies of the accused.⁸³² This early campaign gained momentum in mid-November, when newspapers in both zones printed considerably detailed front-page pieces and special inserts that outlined the future course of the trials and the

⁸³⁰ Arthur Eggleston to Colonel Powell, "Subject: Nuremberg," January 29, 1945 [sic – 1946], NACP RG 260/253/198.

⁸³¹ Ernest W. Adler to Chief of Press Section, Attn. Major Smith, "Nürnberg Bitch Sheet," December 4, 1945, NACP RG 260/1495/1214.

⁸³² "Prozeßbeginn: 20. November. Wie die Beschuldigten von Nürnberg die Anklageschift aufnahmen," "Erstveröffentlichung der Prozeßordnung," and "Vebrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit," *DNZ*, October 21, 1945; "Oberrichter Jackson über Nürnberg," *FR*, October 3, 1945; "Die erste Sitzung des Internationalen Kriegsgerichtshofs" and "Die Internationale Militärgerichtshof," *TR*, October 10, 1945; and "Der Nürnberger Prozeß beginnt am 20. November," *TR*, October 20, 1945.

significance of the proceedings.⁸³³ The *Deutsche Volkszeitung* published fewer front-page pieces during October and November than did the other three publications considered in this study. Even so, it printed a daily “Nuremberg Rogues’ Gallery” feature on the second page of each issue through much of November 1945 and speculated on the ultimate fates of those who stood in the dock.⁸³⁴

After the initial rush of press coverage that accompanied the start of the trials, each publication proceeded to treat the IMT in a variety of different, often inconsistent ways. In the SBZ, the *Tägliche Rundschau* often gave the trial more prominence than the political press. Its content consisted of SNB dispatches, special reports by Wladimir Pomeranzew, and TASS articles that pulled quotes from newspapers in the Soviet Union, including articles written by Konstantin Fedin for *Izvestiia*.⁸³⁵ Through early spring, most IMT articles appeared on the front page of the *Tägliche Rundschau*. There were occasional exceptions, of course, such as when the paper celebrated the founding of the Soviet Union on December 5, 1945.⁸³⁶ The paper granted the trials approximately 15 percent of its space, but it used bold headlines and placed the articles in prominent positions on the page to attract the attention of the reader.

⁸³³ “Sonderbeilage der ‘Neuen Zeitung’: Die Nürnberger Prozeß. Die Dokumente, Prinzipien und Personen der Kriegsverbrecher-Prozesse,” *DNZ*, November 12, 1945; “Vorarbeiten für Nürnberg,” *FR*, November 9, 1945; “Am Vorbend der Nürnberger Prozesse” and “Vorbericht zum Kriegsverbrecher-Prozeß,” *FR*, November 13, 1945; “Nürnberger Prozeß am 3. Dezember,” *FR*, November 16, 1945; and “Vor dem großen Kriegsverbrecher-Prozeß in Nürnberg,” *TR*, November 10, 1945.

⁸³⁴ See, for example, “Aus dem Nürnberger Verbrecheralbum,” *DVZ*, November 2, 8, 13, 20, 21, and 23, 1945 and “Welche Strafe für die Nürnberger Angeklagten? Eine Antwort auf viele Zuschriften,” *DVZ*, November 20, 1945.

⁸³⁵ OMGUS, “Information Control Intelligence Summary No. 29,” February 2, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 15-16.

⁸³⁶ “Es lebe die Verfassung der UdSSR – die Verfassung der sozialistischen Gesellschaft! Es lebe die sowjetische Demokratie!” *TR*, December 5, 1945.

Front-page stories remained prominent through January 1946, at which point the *Tägliche Rundschau* began to transition away from prominent coverage of the IMT to other concerns. One of these was the Eberswalde trial of the “German bandits in Russian uniforms,” as well as the developing Unity campaign in the Soviet zone.⁸³⁷ The KPD newspaper made such a significant shift away from the IMT that the proceedings at Nuremberg comprised less than ten percent of total space used during the month of January.⁸³⁸ This drift away from significant coverage of the IMT was less obvious in the case of the German communist newspaper owing to its relatively meager coverage of the trials after November 24, 1945. Indeed, the November 25 issue contained no stories on the IMT, and subsequent issues alternated between front-page coverage, inside page stories, and outright neglect of the proceedings in Nuremberg. The most glaring omission came in the December 31, 1945 New Year edition, which published pieces that reflected on the past and looked to the future, but made no mention of the IMT, denazification, or other programs relevant to the Potsdam Declaration. In short, shoring up a political base attracted to the promises of the communist party became a more immediate concern to the KPD, and increasingly so to SMAD.

By the late spring and early summer of 1946, the IMT had become a secondary issue in the Soviet zone. In May and June, the only newspapers to publish in-house editorials on the trials were CDU party organs, while the rest of the press relied on SNB and TASS articles, most

⁸³⁷ OMGUS, “Information Control Intelligence Summary No. 29,” February 2, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 15-16; “Der Prozeß in Eberswalde: Deutsche Banditen in Russen-Uniformen. Die gerechte Sühne: Zwei Todesurteile und hohe Zuchthausstrafen,” *DVZ*, January 8, 1946; and “Banditen werden bestraft” and “Der Prozeß gegen die Banditen von Eberswalde,” *TR*, January 8, 1946.

⁸³⁸ OMGUS, “Information Control Intelligence Summary No. 29,” February 2, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 16.

of which appeared on the second and third pages.⁸³⁹ *Neues Deutschland* ignored the trials for its first two issues, and allocated front-page space to the IMT on an inconsistent basis through early October 1945. So too did the *Tägliche Rundschau* follow a similar course. Many of its front-page items focused on the birth and successes of the Unity Party through September 1946, when it began to discuss strikes and worker unrest in the United States. Both newspapers restarted their focus on the IMT in October with the publication of the verdicts. Of the two, the *Tägliche Rundschau* assumed a more sedate approach. Its headline read “Death Penalty for 12 of the Major War Criminals.”⁸⁴⁰ Two pages of supporting articles included praise for the fairness of the proceedings and the perspective on the trials in the Soviet Union.⁸⁴¹ In contrast, the headline in *Neues Deutschland* listed the names of those who received the sentence of death by hanging and included a sub-headline that lamented the acquittal of Schacht, Fritzsche, and Papen.⁸⁴² Article after article for the next ten days lamented the Tribunal’s decision to acquit the three men. The paper’s emphasis of this issue also provided the SED an opportunity to suggest that it was at the forefront of a popular movement that sought to ensure justice for all war criminals, thereby deepening the divide between antifascists of different stripes and those responsible for Nazi crimes.⁸⁴³ In fact, this campaign had some effect. On October 2, the SED led a mass

⁸³⁹ OMGUS, “Information Control Intelligence Summary No. 46,” June 15, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 7.

⁸⁴⁰ “Urteile im Nürnberger Proceß. Todesstrafe für 12 Hauptkriegsverbrecher,” *TR*, October 2, 1946.

⁸⁴¹ “Richlinie über die Urteile des Internationalen Militärgerichtshofes,” “Sowjetischer Vorbehalt zum Urteil,” “Die Szene im Gerichtssaal,” and “Das Urteil,” *TR*, October 2, 1946

⁸⁴² “Tod durch den Strang für Göring, Ribbentrop, Keitel, Kaltenbrunner, Rosenberg, Frank, Frick, Streicher, Sauckel, Jodl, Seyß-Inquart und Bormann ebenfalls zum Tode verurteilt. Freispruch von Schacht, Fritzsche und Papen,” *ND*, October 2, 1946.

⁸⁴³ Relevant articles include “Die Meinung des Volkes über das Urteil,” *ND*, October 2,

protest at Bebelplatz against the verdicts. Max Fechner declared before the crowd that the German people had found all of the defendants guilty. There was also an SPD meeting in Moabit that same day. There, SPD speakers assumed a line similar to that of the SED.⁸⁴⁴

Developments in AMZON shared few similarities with those in the Soviet Zone. *Die Neue Zeitung* often handled the trial in an insufficient manner. The weaknesses of the American newspaper captured the attention of the *New York Times*, a development that may have forced Habe and his team to assume an aggressive stance vis-à-vis the rest of the press in AMZON.⁸⁴⁵ In January 1946, it allocated between five and seven percent of its space to discuss the trials. Although many of these articles were on the front page, the low percentage of space put it on a par with the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* and well behind the licensed press in terms of total coverage.⁸⁴⁶ Nevertheless, *Die Neue Zeitung* articles were remarkably diverse and engaged with uncomfortable subject matter, including the Nazis' drive to eradicate European Jewry. In addition to articles on the German genocide of the Jews, the paper published a remarkable graphic titled "How many Jews have survived Hitler?" Provided by the American Jewish Joint

1946; "Die Forderung der Volksmassen. Alle Kriegsverbrecher vor ein Volksgericht," "Das Ausland zum Nürnberger Urteil," Volksstimmen zum Nürnberger Urteil" and "Professor Dr. Geiler über Nürnberg," *ND*, October 3, 1946; "10 Minuten Arbeitsruhe wegen der Freisprüche. Berlin streikte zum Protest," *ND*, October 4, 1946; Schacht, Papen und Fritzsche noch in Nürnberg," *ND*, October 5, 1946; "Ein Brief an Papen," *ND*, October 6, 1946; and "Schacht und sein Komplize Reusch" and "Die Freigesprochenen schuldig!" *ND*, October 10, 1946.

⁸⁴⁴ OMGUS, "Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS) No. 62," October 5, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 1-2.

⁸⁴⁵ "Press in Germany Covers War Trial," *New York Times*, December 13, 1945.

⁸⁴⁶ OMGUS, "Information Control Intelligence Summary No. 29," February 2, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 15.

Distribution Committee, it utilized human figures to demonstrate the scale of the destruction and the deaths of the then understood figure of 4,800,000 European Jews.⁸⁴⁷

Diversity of coverage was a rarity in AMZON. An ICD review of U.S. zone newspaper coverage of the IMT in the first two weeks of January 1946 yielded some surprising results. Ninety percent of all stories were DANA releases, and so the same articles often appeared throughout the zone. Smaller publications were more likely to change the material, often cutting and summarizing to save space. Many papers utilized special correspondents, and so published occasional articles of their own creation. On average, the majority of the newspapers devoted up to a fifth of each issue to the IMT, and most treated the trials as front-page material. When the subject was pushed to the back page, these papers did so to provide enhanced promotion of stories such as the UNO conference in London and food rations for the occupied public. Most story titles were stark, although a few adopted sensationalist headlines, such as the *Frankenpost*'s "The Bloodhounds of the Gestapo under Cross Examination: A Witness who Murdered 90,000 Persons."⁸⁴⁸

Of all of the newspapers in AMZON, the *Frankfurter Rundschau* and *Main Post* published the most material that dealt with the brutality of Nazi crimes. The underlying message behind many of *Frankfurter Rundschau* articles on the trials and the Nazi past was simple: "Let

⁸⁴⁷ Graphic, "Wieviele Juden haben Hitler überlebt?" *DNZ*, February 1, 1946. Other *DNZ* articles on the IMT that are relevant to the Holocaust and antisemitism include Kurt Wittler, "Heß gesteht Täuschung des Gerichts. Sein 'Gedächtnisschwund' war simuliert – KZ-Film übt schockierende Wirkung," *DNZ*, December 3, 1945; "Der Nürnberger Prozeß. Gaskammern und Operettenmusik – Die Auschwitzer Falle," *DNZ*, February 1, 1946; "Aus Menschen wurde Seife," *DNZ*, February 22, 1946; "Rosenberg und die Philosophie," *DNZ*, March 8, 1946; and "Hoess, ein Zeuge des Entsetzens, sagt aus," *DNZ*, April 19, 1946.

⁸⁴⁸ OMGUS, "Information Control Intelligence Summary No. 29," February 2, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 14-15.

us never forget the oppression we imposed on other people.”⁸⁴⁹ A review of issues published between fall 1945 and late-October 1946 shows that this licensed German newspaper consistently published stories on the trials on the front page of the majority of its issues, but for a decline in coverage in late summer and early fall 1946. At the same time, it also gave considerable attention to trials that took place outside of Germany. In early February, it was one of a few AMZON newspapers to print articles on the trials underway in Kiev, Minsk, Riga, and other cities in the Soviet Union. One such article, “Generals on the Gallows,” advised German readers “to hear the moaning caused by pains and the fury of the Russian people and not be surprised when the bill will be presented to us. We are, after all, not all of us so free of guilt as we would like to appear today.”⁸⁵⁰ A variety of contributors provided special reports on topics that ranged from the testimony of General Paulus, Nazi race theory, the historical significance of the trial, and the reactions of those sentenced to death.⁸⁵¹

In AMZON, surveys of the adult population in January 1946 indicate that about half of all adults maintained their interest in the proceedings by reading newspaper accounts with some regularity. This group felt that the IMT was a fair and informative trial. Moreover, they had increased their acquired knowledge of Nazi crimes over the course of the trial in December. Approximately 30 percent of respondents were able to relay in full what they had learned from

⁸⁴⁹ OMGUS, “Information Control Intelligence Summary No. 29,” February 2, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 14-15.

⁸⁵⁰ OMGUS, “Information Control Intelligence Summary No. 32,” February 23, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 15.

⁸⁵¹ F.W. Kasten, “General Paulus als Zeuge in Nürnberg,” *FR*, February 15, 1946; “Deutsche Herrenrasse – Mörder und Räuberbande,” *FR*, February 15, 1946; Karl Gerold, “Die letzten Tage in Nürnberg,” *FR*, October 1, 1946; Susanne Czapski, “Geschichtliche Stunde,” *FR*, October 2, 1946; and Karl Gerold, “Die letzten Stunden in Nürnberg,” *FR*, October 3, 1946.

the trial.⁸⁵² A fall 1946 survey indicated that 79 percent of adults in AMZON followed media reports of the trials, while 90 percent of residents in the U.S. district of Berlin did the same. When asked “Have you learned anything through the Nuremberg trials you did not know before, 71 percent of those from AMZON answered in the affirmative, compared to 65 percent of Berliners who had access to multiple media outlets from across the quadripartite controlled city. The most common “revelation” learned during the trial was information concerning concentration camps (71% AMZON and 58% Berlin), followed by “extermination of the Jews, [and] mass murders” (12% AMZON, 20% Berlin). As for lessons of the IMT, most respondents answered, “Never elect a dictator as a leader” and “ensure a lasting peace.”⁸⁵³

The Americans were aware that interest in the trial waxed and waned. When questioned in February 1946, German community leaders admitted flagging interest owing to local elections and the length of the proceedings.⁸⁵⁴ ICD attributed this phenomenon to a German supposition that the trials would automatically lead to the convictions of the defendants and to the immediacy of everyday problems.⁸⁵⁵ A March poll determined that public expected heavy punishments for

⁸⁵² In early December 1945, about 65 percent of respondents indicated that they were learning more. By late January 1946, the percentage of those who answered in the affirmative was 85 percent. OMGUS, “Information Control Intelligence Summary No. 30,” February 9, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 11-12.

⁸⁵³ The sample size for these questions included 1,509 residents of AMZON and 206 residents of the American district in Berlin. A separate question on the verdicts had different sample sizes. Information Control Division, Opinion Surveys Branch, “Survey No. 31,” no date (likely late-October 1946), RG 260/250/149. The sample size included 1,509 residents of AMZON and 206 residents of the American district in Berlin. Information Control Division, Opinion Surveys Branch, “Survey No. 31,” no date (likely late-October 1946), RG 260/250/149.

⁸⁵⁴ OMGUS, “Information Control Intelligence Summary No. 30,” February 9, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 10.

⁸⁵⁵ OMGUS, Office of Director of Information Control, Surveys Branch, “The Trend of Reactions to the Nuernberg Trials, Report Number 33,” December 18, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/161, 1.

Göring, Streicher, Ribbentrop, Kaltenbrunner, Sauckel, Rosenberg, and Frank, but lighter punishments for Papen, Schacht, Fritzsche, and Hess.⁸⁵⁶ ICD's conclusion coincided with the formal end of collective guilt as a press line. Media reports coming from DANA and *Die Neue Zeitung* reflected a new policy that encouraged stories on German resistance and emphasized Justice Jackson's statements that the IMT did not accuse the whole of the German people for the crimes of Nazism.⁸⁵⁷ At the same time, public opinion surveys suggested that the reading public began to doubt the veracity of news. This decline continued through late spring and summer 1946, but interest increased in August when news that the trial would end began to appear in the press.⁸⁵⁸

The end of the IMT generated considerable public interest. Crowds gathered before the *Neue Zeitung* posting on the *Litfassäule* at Schnelllingstrasse in Munich to read the verdicts. Most seemed surprised by the acquittals of Fritzsche, Papen, and Schacht, and a few speculated that the Catholic Church had intervened to save the life of the former German Chancellor. A few objected to the sentencing of Dönitz and Raeder because they believed these men "were only carrying out military orders."⁸⁵⁹ In Frankfurt, a few people expressed disagreement with the acquittal of Papen, and others felt that hanging was a dishonorable fate for the military men, Jodl

⁸⁵⁶ OMGUS, "Information Control Intelligence Summary No. 36," March 23, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 4.

⁸⁵⁷ Director, ICD, OMGUS, USFET, "Policy: German Guilt," January 17, 1946, NACP RG 260/247/69 and Director, ICD, OMGUS, USFET, "Policy: The American Soldier in Germany," January 16, 1946, NACP RG 260/247/69.

⁸⁵⁸ OMGUS, Office of Director of Information Control, Surveys Branch, "The Trend of Reactions to the Nuernberg Trials, Report Number 33," December 18, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/161, 1.

⁸⁵⁹ OMGB, ICD, Intelligence Branch, Political Affairs Section, "Special Brief on Political Affairs: Bavarian Reactions to Nurnberg Verdicts," October 3, 1946, NACP RG 260/894/145, 1.

and Keitel.⁸⁶⁰ Immediately before the release of the verdicts, some Frankfurters also noted that the “new German press” suffered from “inadequate freedoms,” which limited true reflection and understanding of war crimes, including those of the occupying powers.⁸⁶¹

As soon as the IMT issued its verdicts, ICD investigators began assessing opinions of the results. In the U.S. and British districts of Berlin, more than half (as opposed to 20%) of persons polled felt the verdicts had been too easy, although the majority (88%) believed the trials had been fair. Perhaps the reason for such drastic difference lay in Berliners’ “greater leftism and political sophistication about Nazism,” as ICD concluded.⁸⁶² Public opinion in the American zone was remarkably similar. A survey of 498 persons in the three Länder found that the majority felt the trial had been just, while 20 percent felt the punishments were “too mild.” Eleven percent concluded that the sentences were “too harsh,” and referenced the sentences handed to Keitel and Jodl as proof of their claims.⁸⁶³

The IMT ultimately served political purposes, some of which the Soviets and Americans could not have expected. As early February 1946, Walter Ulbricht and Lex Ende held discussions on how take advantage of public interest in the Nuremberg trial in order to stem the reification of elite German *Kultur* and to change the tone of the German communist press such

⁸⁶⁰ Karl F. Brauckmann, Chief Surveys Officer, ICD, OMG for Greater Hesse to Mr. Praeger, Deputy Chief of Intelligence, ICD, OMG for Greater Hesse, “Reaction to Nuernberg Trials,” October 22, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/153.

⁸⁶¹ Interviewer: Askanasy, “Bemerkungen zum Nuernberger Prozess,” October 1, 1946, 2, as within report Karl F. Brauckmann, Chief Surveys Officer, ICD, OMG for Greater Hesse to Mr. Praeger, Deputy Chief of Intelligence, ICD, OMG for Greater Hesse, “Reaction to Nuernberg Trials,” October 22, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/153.

⁸⁶² OMGUS, “Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS) No. 63,” October 12, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 15.

⁸⁶³ OMGUS, “Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS) No. 62,” October 5, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 3.

that it would seem inclusive of all Germans, irrespective of past affiliations.⁸⁶⁴ A similar shift occurred in AMZON, where distinctions between the German people and the Nazi leadership fed the public's desire to find a means to move away from discussion of the past. By late December 1946, 60 percent of Germans in AMZON felt they held "limited responsibility" for Nazi crimes, while at the same time 83 percent believed the occupiers had committed an equal proportion of "crimes against humanity and peace" during the war. The disparity between these responses suggest that the causal chain that led from the rise of Nazism to the decision to launch the Second World War and the Holocaust became lost to the German people at the sake of an overemphasis of U.S. zone coverage that suggested that "without Hitler [there would be] no atrocities."⁸⁶⁵

Antisemitism and Jewish-German relations in AMZON

In late 1945, ICD investigated whether a "*Jewish problem* still exists in Germany."⁸⁶⁶ A number of Jewish and non-Jewish community leaders, as well as Military Government officials, provided the sample for a survey that determined there were simply too few German Jews remaining to suggest an immediate risk of a resurgence of popular antisemitism sufficient to constitute a threat to public safety. Nevertheless, the Americans remained concerned that such an event might be around the corner owing to the financial and physical barriers that obstructed

⁸⁶⁴ Lex Ende to Walter Ulbricht, February 17, 1946, SAPMO-BArch, NY 4070/3.

⁸⁶⁵ OMGUS, "Information Control Weekly Review: Political Analysis and Public Opinion, No. 21," April 26, 1947, NACP RG 260/250/158, 3-4 and ODIC, Opinion Surveys Hq., OMGUS, "Attitudes toward Collective Guilt in the American Zone of Germany, Report Number 51," April 2, 1947, NACP RG 260/250/161.

⁸⁶⁶ Emphasis in original. OMGUS, "Information Control Intelligence Summary No. 32," February 23, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 5.

reintegration of Jews and the negative reactions of non-Jews to the presence of those few who had returned or remained outside of communities in Displaced Person (DP) camps.⁸⁶⁷

Occupation-era media failed to ameliorate antisemitism. By December 1946, at the same time that the AMZON public began to see the atrocities of the Second World War in a relative light, there was a rise in antisemitism throughout the zone. Reports from Hesse indicated broad dissatisfaction with restitution policies premised on the notion that “the Jews robbed the Germans in the first place and that there is thus no reason for returning their properties to them.” In the town of Bensheim, numerous Germans claimed that the Holocaust survivors who resided in the local DP camp were responsible for burglaries, assaults, and rapes. A police investigation found only one incident of violence. This case involved a Jewish woman from Poland who encountered the man responsible for her family’s murder. Local officials also claimed that Jewish DPs overran movie theaters and dance halls and intimidated the local German population. Investigations into these claims found no evidence of such problems at movie theaters, and determined that dance halls often drew crowds that were approximately 85 percent German, 10 percent Jewish, and 5 percent Polish, and that individuals at these gatherings were “polite and always correct.”⁸⁶⁸

Surveys of the public at this time determined a concomitant rise in nationalism and antisemitism throughout AMZON. Whereas in October 1945, 20 percent of Germans believed that the Nazis were right to do “something ... to keep them [Jews] within bounds,” by December 1946 ICD had determined that 40 percent of all AMZON Germans were “very seriously disposed

⁸⁶⁷ OMGUS, “Information Control Intelligence Summary No. 32,” February 23, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 5-7.

⁸⁶⁸ OMGUS, “Information Control Weekly Review: Political Analysis and Public Opinion, No. 4,” December 21, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/158, 13.

to racial prejudice.” Another 20 percent of the population could not “be expected to counter any expressions of anti-Semitism” because they possessed an outlook that tended to conformity. Only two percent of those interviewed indicated that they did share biased or racialized worldviews. Age, experiences with Nazism, Wehrmacht service, and Nazi Party membership did not correlate strongly with anti-Semitic worldviews, thereby suggesting a systemic problem and the failures of U.S. reeducation policy.⁸⁶⁹ An incomplete understanding of German antisemitism also provided the Americans an opportunity to excuse the unjust behavior of some local officials. In the case of Bensheim, for example, ICD saw reports of Jewish criminality not as indicative of antisemitism *per se*, but rather as a mechanism of “administrative obstructionism” and a rational response to the pressures of the occupation and the presence of displaced persons. In other words, some within the occupation government believed that antisemitic expressions emerged out of the “infiltration of DPs and the resultant increased difficulties for the average citizen,” misgivings over the better treatment of Jewish survivors, a German tendency to succumb to “scape-goatism,” and the simple need to vent frustrations.⁸⁷⁰

The fact that the principal leaders at *Die Neue Zeitung* were Jewish by heritage played no role in their editorial decisions. As Gienow-Hecht has noted, their “Jewishness was a very peripheral feature of their identity” as members of the educated elite.⁸⁷¹ Even the phrase “never forget,” which has become so associated with Holocaust memory in contemporary society, applied not to the victims of Nazism but to Germany’s cultural and social decline in the pages of

⁸⁶⁹ OMGUS, “Information Control Weekly Review: Political Analysis and Public Opinion, No. 16,” March 22, 1947, NACP RG 260/250/158, 9-13.

⁸⁷⁰ OMGUS, “Information Control Weekly Review: Political Analysis and Public Opinion, No. 16,” March 22, 1947, NACP RG 260/250/158, 9.

⁸⁷¹ Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 36-37.

Die Neue Zeitung.⁸⁷² Early editions of the paper made next to no mention of European Jews as Nazi victims, and Nuremberg coverage often focused on the atrocities that took place between 1941 and 1945 at the sake of presentations on popular antisemitism in German society. Some of the IMT articles that leant themselves to such discussions, such as the March 8, 1946 piece on the prosecution of Alfred Rosenberg, largely neglected the issue of antisemitism.⁸⁷³ After the IMT, as coverage of other trials appeared with considerably less frequency and on the inside pages of the newspaper, articles on German-Jewish relations, antisemitism, and indeed even the immediate history of National Socialism began to disappear altogether.

This was not the case at the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, although its coverage of such matters fell into decline owing to interference by the U.S. occupation government and the removal of licensees from the board. This left-leaning, German-run newspaper continued to give attention to matters relevant to German antisemitism after the IMT. It printed a number of articles on other postwar trials, issues relevant to the restitution of Jewish property and the care of DPs, and exposés on new evidence of Nazi criminality.⁸⁷⁴ Through 1948, it published almost daily pieces on the successor U.S. Military Tribunals. Tellingly, the *Frankfurter Rundschau* was also the only newspaper in AMZON to reprint the speech of the German pacifist Fritz von Unruh at the centennial anniversary of the 1848 National Assembly.⁸⁷⁵ Even during the Berlin Blockade, it printed a number of articles that focused on Holocaust survivors who were leaving

⁸⁷² Stefan Heym, “Vorwärts und nicht vergessen!” *DNZ*, November 4, 1945.

⁸⁷³ “Rosenberg und die Philosophie,” *DNZ*, March 8, 1946. This article made one mention of Jews, and that appeared in the context of Baldur von Schirach’s claim that he opposed “the persecution of Jews and churches in the Third Reich.”

⁸⁷⁴ Hans Deichmann, “Kirche und Entnazifizierung,” *FR*, February 7, 1948

⁸⁷⁵ OMGH, ICD, “Monthly summary for period 1-31 May 1948,” 1 June 1948, NACP RG 260/258/250, 2.

Europe to emigrate the newly established state of Israel, as well as political and military developments in that region of the world.⁸⁷⁶

Continuity of coverage gave the *Frankfurter Rundschau* the occasional opportunity to serve as a voice to the small community of Holocaust survivors living in Frankfurt. In early 1947, for example, local survivors petitioned the newspaper to advocate for robust and fair policies in Hesse following a radio address by the Lord Mayor, Walter Kolb. On New Year's Day, Kolb spoke on the need for Jews to return to Frankfurt to contribute the rebuilding and future prosperity of the city "despite the misery which befell them, and despite the distrust they still feel towards Germany." Kolb's appeal, built as it was on the belief that Jewish business owners would revitalize the struggling economy, prompted an immediate response from the survivor community. They noted that there were still former Nazi party members living in better conditions than much of the population, that some survivors had received little by way of aid from the local administration, and that the return of looted property had yet to take place in any meaningful way. Arno Rudert followed up on this protest by writing an editorial that demanded the return of all stolen property as a precondition not just for the return of German Jews, but to end the "conspiracy of silence" that fell on Germany in the wake of the Holocaust.⁸⁷⁷

By maintaining its original stance on the need to remind Germans of their past, the *Frankfurter Rundschau* lost much of its public and potential influence. This was not just a

⁸⁷⁶ See, for example, "Waffenstillstand in Palästina?" *FR*, April 1, 1948; "Auschwitz Nr. 247359 will nach Israel," *FR*, June 3, 1948; "Lösung der Palästinafrage?" *FR*, June 22, 1948; Jack Winocour, "Juden im Krieg," *FR*, July 6, 1948; and "Flüchtlingsproblem Palästina," *FR*, August 10, 1948. Ultimately, the paper's discussions of Israel became a secondary concern owing to the start of the Berlin Blockade.

⁸⁷⁷ Office of Military Government for Greater Hesse, Information Control Division, Intelligence Branch, "Political Analysis and Public Opinion Weekly Review No. 4," January 29, 1947, NACP RG 260/250/155, 13; "Oberbürgermeister Kolb zum Neuen Jahr," *FR*, January 2, 1947; and Arno Rudert, "Juden wieder erwünscht," *FR*, January 4, 1947.

product of persistent antisemitism in early postwar Germany. Politics played a role as well. The leftist stance adopted by the *Frankfurter Rundschau* at its founding affected its reputation and led to a decline in its distribution, the emergence of a direct competitor in the form of the conservative-leaning *Frankfurter Neue Presse*, and the purge of many of its leading licensees. Many potential readers of the newspaper had long abandoned the newspaper owing to its reputation and their dislike of rhetoric that, in the words of one 18-year-old male in 1947, “criticizes Nazism and patriotic Germans ... those good nationalists who have the interests of Germany at heart.”⁸⁷⁸

The Holocaust and the Nazi

past in the SBZ

Soviet zone developments differed considerably from those in AMZON. The belief that Marxism-Leninism had won out over capitalistic fascism in the Second World War contributed to the creation of two mutually reinforcing myths, namely, the myth of a general category of “victims of fascism” and that the future East German state emerged out of the “anti-fascist resistance.” In the case of both, the KPD/SED set the tone, while SMAD supported its development. At its core, the East German concept of victims of fascism included a great many categories of victims, including Jews, but gave greatest prominence to those communists who, like Ernst Thälmann, died at the hands of the Nazis.⁸⁷⁹ These communists, in turn, received the

⁸⁷⁸ David Rodnick, *Postwar Germans: An Anthropologist's Account* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), 88

⁸⁷⁹ Herf, *Divided Memory*, 164; Alan L. Nothnagle, *Building the East German Myth: Historical Mythology and Youth Propaganda in the German Democratic Republic, 1945-1989* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 93-142; and Russel Lemmons, “‘Germany’s Eternal Son’: The Genesis of the Ernst Thälmann Myth, 1930-1950,” *German Studies Review* 32:2 (2009), 343-356.

praise of the state as the foremost martyrs of the antifascist resistance. The practical applications of these myths on life in the SBZ were such that many Jews who had survived in the Soviet zone or who had gone there seeking refuge and hope for “new Germany” soon became disenchanted with the occupation’s, and then the state’s, minimization of their suffering and the whitewashing of history promoted by antifascism.

In one of his first postwar speeches, Walter Ulbricht declared that the KPD rejected the “medieval race theory” of National Socialism.⁸⁸⁰ The KPD/SED did not necessarily classify individuals by race, but rather by creed. A religious- and affiliation-based definition determined who was and was not Jewish in the GDR, and thereby provided opportunities for secular Jews to remain active in the state.⁸⁸¹ Many of the leading figures in the occupation-era press were Jewish by birth, as were a number of early leading SED functionaries, including Alexander Abusch, Rudolf Herrnstadt, and Leo Zuckermann. Many Jewish communists enjoyed considerable influence in GDR and SBZ propaganda and cultural organizations, although there were few opportunities available to them in the security services.⁸⁸² Those Holocaust survivors who stayed in the GDR and came to terms with official policies benefited from state-run programs and often believed that conditions were optimal for the development of a new state free of the burdens of the past.⁸⁸³ Indeed, in the words of a child survivor of Sachsenhausen, life in

⁸⁸⁰ “Einheit, Aufbau und demokratische Erneuerung: Erste Funktionärkonferenz der KPD Groß-Berlins. Programmmatische Rede des Genossen Walter Ulbricht,” DVZ, June 27, 1945 and “Einheit, Aufbau und demokratische Erneuerung,” SAPMO-BArch DC 20/4084, film 437.

⁸⁸¹ Monteath, “The German Democratic Republic and the Jews,” 465.

⁸⁸² Karin Hartewig, *Zurückgekehrt. Die Geschichte der jüdischen Kommunisten in der DDR* (Köln: Böhlau, 2000).

⁸⁸³ Frank Stern, “The Return to the Disowned Home – German Jews and the Other Germany,” *New German Critique* 67 (Winter 1996): 57-72.

the SBZ and GDR was reasonably peaceful because “the anti-Semites there were so splendidly obliged to deny their anti-Semitism that one could really get along with them quite well.”⁸⁸⁴

During the first years of the occupation, the KPD/SED gave scant attention to the needs of Holocaust survivors or the importance of antisemitism in Nazi ideology. Few articles focused on the racist worldview of National Socialism appeared in the pages of the *Tägliche Rundschau*, *Deutsche Volkszeitung*, and *Neues Deutschland* between 1945 and 1946. In two instances during the IMT, once for the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* and another for the *Tägliche Rundschau*, entire articles focused on Nazi racial theory. In the case of the KPD newspaper, it consisted of a report the prosecution of Alfred Rosenberg and Hans Frank, noting only that they sought the extermination of the Jewish people.⁸⁸⁵ At approximately the same time, the *Tägliche Rundschau* published a lengthy, second-page report on Nazi plans to enslave Slavic peoples and bring about the destruction of European Jewry. This article, however, focused almost exclusively on slave labor battalions in the East and the myth of Slavic inferiority.⁸⁸⁶

Although discussions of Nazi crimes were common in the KPD/SED press, the most significant article on the relationship between antisemitism and Nazism did not appear in the pages of *Neues Deutschland* until 1948. On November 10, the day after the tenth anniversary of Kristallnacht, the paper published material from Paul Merker’s *Dritte Reich und sein Ende*, the second volume of his larger work, *Deutschland – Sein oder Nicht Sein?* Known best for having taken a principled stand on issues relevant to restitution and the care for Holocaust survivors,

⁸⁸⁴ Stern, “Returned to the Disowned Home,” 61.

⁸⁸⁵ Exceptions included “Was Frank und Rosenberg nebenbei erledigten: Die Ausrottung der jüdischen Rasse,” *DVZ* December 13, 1945.

⁸⁸⁶ “Die Rassentheorie als geistige Grundlage einer modernen Sklaverei,” *TR*, December 16, 1945.

Merker placed antisemitism at the center of the National Socialist project. He argued that it was as a means to distract the masses from attacking the corruption of capitalism, and was therefore a false ideological construct that was anathema to socialism.⁸⁸⁷ While laudable, the significance of this article in the pages of *Neues Deutschland* is due less to the fact of its appearance and more to the fact that it was so uncommon. More important, if one were to look forward in the history of the GDR, it was perhaps one of Merker's final broadly disseminated addresses on issues of antisemitism before he and many other higher SED functionaries became subject to an anti-Zionist/anti-Cosmopolitan purge in the early GDR.⁸⁸⁸

At the same time, the KPD/SED began to establish categories of victimhood that placed the "Old Fighters" in prominent positions. Here, the press played an extremely role beginning on July 3, 1945, when it published an article on a meeting held at the Berlin office of the Victims of Fascism committee. It was at this meeting that the KPD-led group declared, "You have all suffered ... but you did not fight!"⁸⁸⁹ In its first major piece on the death camp at Auschwitz, the front-page article did not note Jewish victims among the 800,000 to one million deaths referenced in the story.⁸⁹⁰ Such neglect became all too common in the press, such as in November 1945 when the paper printed a numerical list of the cost of the Nazi war on the Eastern front. This list included 23 million people, tens of thousands of hospitals and buildings,

⁸⁸⁷ Wolfgram, "*Getting History Right*," 38-39 and Paul Merker, "Die Hintergründe der Kristallnacht," *ND*, November 10, 1948. A fuller analysis of *Dritte Reich und Sein Ende* is in Herf, *Divided Memory*, 44-45 and 59-60.

⁸⁸⁸ Herf, *Divided Memory*, 106-161 and Herf, "East German Communists and the Jewish Question," *op. cit.*

⁸⁸⁹ Monteath, "The German Democratic Republic and the Jews," 453.

⁸⁹⁰ "Der Massenmörder von Auschwitz gesteht Beteiligung an einer Million Morde. Strenges Gericht über die Hauptschuldigen und ihre Kreaturen," *DVZ*, August 15, 1945.

seven million horses, but not a single mention of the victims of the ghettos, camps, and mobile killing squads that decimated the Jewish communities of Eastern Europe.⁸⁹¹

The politicization of Nazi crimes gave the SED a mechanism by which they could attack the western Allies. Because development along the antifascist lines prescribed by the SED was the only path to a better, peaceful society, there was no room for alternate worldviews – a Manichean understanding of political-cultural development that made possible the simple step from criticisms to outright claims that the same “bandits” who supported Nazism continued to prosper in the west. Within two years of the occupation, it even made possible the corruption of the language of tolerance to fit early cold war aims.⁸⁹² So too did western zone presentations on the criminality of the Nazi regime and the ways by which it led the German people down a path to perdition lend themselves to transferring the critical language that the press had used to assess the past to critiques of contemporary political developments in the “totalitarian” east. Thus, the struggle for control of Germany’s past in both zones of occupation was but a piece in a larger ideological development that accompanied the end of the Second World War and the start of the cold war. The dynamics of political developments on both sides of the *Zonengrenze* fed the ways by which Germans came to understand their history and place in the world, and then informed how they would operate within emerging postwar society. The confluence of the two, the struggle for the past and that for the future, forced several shifts in German political and press culture. As the next chapters will illustrate, these forces had irrevocable influence on the newspapers in the mid-occupation era, leading to the removal of many of the founders of the postwar press, the establishment of rules that structured media operations in both German states,

⁸⁹¹ “Vergiß das nie: es geschah im Namen Deutschlands,” *DVZ*, November 7, 1945.

⁸⁹² See, for example, Lex Ende, “Toleranz!” *ND*, June 20, 1947.

and the crystallization of German relationships with newspapers that would become standard for decades to come.

CHAPTER 9
COLD WAR DEVELOPMENTS AND SHAPING
GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Seen over time, shifts in the press of the Soviet Occupied Zone reflected the intensification of the Cold War. In June 1945, the *Tägliche Rundschau* published a lengthy, third-page article titled “Destruction of a Myth” that praised the Anglo-Americans for the invasion of Normandy. It included a quote from Stalin, who declared that the operation was a remarkable achievement of military skill and might. The following year’s article on D-Day, while still positive in tone, juxtaposed Soviet efforts to maintain the Eastern Front with implicit criticism of the length of time it took for the British and the Americans to enter the European theater. By June 1947, the *Tägliche Rundschau* resurrected the past’s years criticism in a five column, front-page article that declared pointedly that the British and Americans acted when they did in order to take some of the glory away from the Red Army, which “was just about to liberate all of Europe when the Allies struck.”⁸⁹³

Coverage and discussions of international politics and relations between the Soviet Union and the United States often provided the lenses through which the occupied Germans viewed their place in an increasingly alliance-driven world. In more ways than one, the international sphere shaped German perspectives on the occupiers, particularly the United States. The image of “America” as variously a paternalistic shepherd of German democratic development and an obstacle to communist control was one of the dominant themes found between the lines in much

⁸⁹³ “Die Zerstörung eines Mythos,” *TR*, June 6, 1945 and OMGUS, “Information Control Weekly Review: Political Analysis and Public Opinion, No. 27,” June 14, 1947, NACP RG 260/250/158, 1.

of the German press in the U.S. and Soviet zones of occupation. This chapter assesses much of the response, coverage, and development of German views of the United States through the start of 1948, that is, through the period immediately before the Berlin Blockade. It notes the ways that the occupied publics received information on international developments that concerned them, as well as their responses to the changing state of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Stages of Discord and the Difficulties of Reunification

Incomplete compromises on the issue of reparations at the Potsdam Conference and the concerns elucidated by U.S. Ambassador George F. Kennan in his “Long Telegram” of February 1946 were just a few of the sign posts that the occupation of Germany turned from being a potentially cooperative enterprise to one characterized by outright competition for German “hearts and minds.”⁸⁹⁴ Among the occupied populations, there were innumerable rumors and sincere expectations that the Americans and the Soviets would have a falling out. But there were few public signs of serious discord between the erstwhile Allies before March 6, 1946, when former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill delivered his “Iron Curtain” speech to a crowd at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri. With his warning that the peoples of Eastern

⁸⁹⁴ “Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, August 1, 1945,” in United States Department of State, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, 59-60; John Gimble, *The Origins of the Marshall Plan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 57-61; Naimark, *The Russians in Germany*, esp. 167-168; Jörg Fisch, “From Weakening an Enemy to Strengthening an Ally: The United States and German Reparations,” translated by Sally E. Robertson, in Junker (Ed.), *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945-1968*, vol. I, 271-272; Ruud van Dijk, “Winning the Peace: The United States, Western Germany, and the Ambiguities of ‘Dual Containment,’ 1945-1950,” in idem., 79; George F. Kennan and John Lukacs, *George F. Kennan and the Origins of Containment, 1944-1946: The Kennan-Lukacs Correspondence* (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1997); and Fijk, “Winning the Peace,” 78-84

Europe were susceptible “not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow,” Churchill became an almost immediate topic of discussion.⁸⁹⁵ The immediate response in the American zone was somewhat balanced. The *Frankfurter Rundschau* carried a three-paragraph DANA story on the second page of its March 8 issue, and placed this piece next to an even shorter article that outlined the British Liberal Party leader Archibald Sinclair’s statements of friendship with the Soviet Union.⁸⁹⁶ Four days later, it carried another DANA story on the response to the Fulton speech as printed in *Pravda*. This article noted the great sacrifice of the Soviet Union during the war, Churchill’s status as a private citizen, and his long history of international agitation against communism since the end of the First World War.⁸⁹⁷ *Die Neue Zeitung* took a different approach. It emphasized Churchill’s call for continued close relations between the United States and Great Britain and played down his concerns over the obstacles to democratic development in Eastern Europe. Of the two quotes in the article, one included Churchill’s hopes for the United Nations. The other was his statement, “I do not believe Russia desires war.”⁸⁹⁸

⁸⁹⁵ John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972, 2000), 306-309.

⁸⁹⁶ “Churchills Rede in Westminster College” and “Anglo-sowjetische Freundschaft,” *FR*, March 8, 1946.

⁸⁹⁷ “‘Prawda’ gegen Churchill,” *FR*, March 12, 1946.

⁸⁹⁸ “Freundschaft England-Amerika. Churchill über weltpolitische Fragen,” *DNZ*, March 8, 1946. The proper quote is “I do not believe Soviet Russia desires war.” Winston S. Churchill, “The Sinews of Peace,” in James W. Muller (Ed.), *Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” Speech Fifty Years Later* (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1999), 11. The qualified coverage of *Die Neue Zeitung* was a product of the inconsistencies born of the Habe-era newspaper. Months earlier, ICD had chastised Habe for publishing an editorial that suggested Soviet use of former Nazis in the occupation. This matter, when combined with a series of criticisms of the newspaper from within ICD and the possibility of a major deal with *Time/Life*, had rendered Habe unwilling or uncertain of the need to publish a fuller review of the speech. Eventually, the frustrations of the first few months of 1946 and his handling of the Churchill speech proved too

In the Soviet zone, the press response was similarly calm, at least at first. The March 7 *Tägliche Rundschau* ran a two-column, second-page story that characterized Churchill's speech in a broadly negative manner, and buttressed this article with select western news reports that suggested widespread condemnation of his message.⁸⁹⁹ In the *Deutsche Volkszeitung*, the KPD focused exclusively on the negative international response.⁹⁰⁰ The SBZ press seemed, at least in part, to be waiting for direction from Moscow. One week later, both newspapers printed large, front-page stories on Stalin's March 14 interview with *Pravda*. In this interview, the Soviet leader noted that the sacrifice of the Red Army during the war outpaced that of the British and American armies and that Churchill was no longer Prime Minister because the British electorate had "isolated reactionaries in Europe [and] collaborators with fascism by giving their preference to left democratic parties."⁹⁰¹ Coverage of Stalin's response and that of the international community created such knowledge of Churchill's distaste for communism in the Soviet zone that his words and his person became a touchstone for future anti-western rhetoric. Indeed, as late as 1949, the SED used "Churchill" as a reference to the machinations of the imperialistic Anglo-American bloc.⁹⁰²

much for Habe, and he left the newspaper. Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 86-91.

⁸⁹⁹ "Churchills Rede in Fulton," *TR*, March 7, 1946.

⁹⁰⁰ "Churchill unterschätzt die Kräfte des Friedens," *DNZ*, March 12, 1946 and "Wir wollen Frieden – Churchill will Krieg," *DVZ*, March 17, 1946.

⁹⁰¹ "Ein Interview J.W. Stalins durch den Korrespondenten der 'Prawda' anlässlich der Rede Churchills," *TR*, March 14, 1946 and "Stalin über die Churchill-Rede," *DVZ*, March 14, 1946.

⁹⁰² See, for example, "Hitler sollte Europe-Rat beitreten – Churchill wollte 'vereinigtes Europa' schon 1942 gründen," *ND*, September 13, 1949 or "Von Churchill zu Tito – Die Entwicklung der imperialistischen Interventionspolitik auf dem Balkan. Werdegang des Spions Laszlo Rajk," *ND*, September 22, 1949

Signs of discord from the west might have worked to the advantage of the KPD. The KPD in its path to party unity promised rapid reunification. The first major editorial on this issue appeared in the January 18, 1946 issue of the *Deutsche Volkszeitung*. Titled “Seventy Five Years of the German Reich,” the editorial’s author, Hans Teubner, played to nationalistic sentiment by arguing “the unified nation is the foundation of Germany and the condition of existence of every German.” Teubner noted that the Junker class had united Germany under the threat of force in 1871, and therefore urged the working class to distinguish itself by uniting Germany under the banner of democracy and peace.⁹⁰³ Many more articles drew a link between the need for unity of the working class as a precondition for the future unity of Germany.⁹⁰⁴

Themes of a reunified Germany appeared only in the SED press for several months after the formation of the Socialist Unity Party. It was not until after Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov’s July 10, 1946 speech at second session of the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) in Paris that the *Tägliche Rundschau* began to discuss, albeit infrequently, the issue of zonal merger. On that day, Molotov declared that the Soviet Union would “transform Germany into a democratic and peace-loving state” characterized by peaceful economic relations and an all-German government.⁹⁰⁵ Yet, he failed to present a workable solution by which a

⁹⁰³ Hans Teubner, “75 Jahre Deutsches Reich,” *DVZ*, January 18, 1946

⁹⁰⁴ See, for example, “Einheit der Arbeiter – Einheit der nation!” and “Probleme der Vereinigung von KPD und SPD. Wilhelm Piecks große Rede auf der Parteikonferenz am 2. März 1946,” *DVZ*, March 3, 1946; “Einheit sichert den Aufstieg unseres Volkes. Wortlaut der Rede des Genossen Wilhelm Pieck in der Berliner Staatsoper (Admiralpalast),” *DVZ*, March 10, 1946; and “Die hessischen antifaschistischen Parteien für die Einheit Deutschlands,” *DVZ*, March 12, 1946; “Die Empirekonferenz über die Zukunft Deutschlands,” *ND*, May 4, 1946; “Für die Wirtschaftseinheit Deutschlands,” *ND*, May 12, 1946; of “Für sie gibt es keine Zonengrenze,” *ND*, May 16, 1946.

⁹⁰⁵ “Statement by Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov at the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris, July 10, 1946,” in U.S. Department of State, *Occupation of Germany: Policies and Progress* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), 233-236

German-run government might ensure the continuation of denazification and reparations programs.⁹⁰⁶ This was not his goal, however. Instead, his words suggested that the Soviets wanted to maintain significant influence in Germany and were willing to do so by appealing to German popular sentiment. This rhetoric combined with Soviet determination to change reparations policies to their favor, and ultimately drove the British and Americans to work closer on merging their zones of occupation.⁹⁰⁷

After the Paris CFM, the State Department ordered OMGUS to forward an in-progress proposal to the Allied Control Council for the fusion of the British and American zones of occupation, a subject that had been under discussion for months.⁹⁰⁸ At the Control Council meeting on July 30, the Deputy Military Governor of the British zone, General Brian Robertson, announced his government's intentions to begin working with the United States on zonal merger. He urged the French and Soviets to join the discussions, but the French remained reticent and Marshall Sokolovskii rejected the idea out of hand.⁹⁰⁹ AMZON and British zone newspapers treated the subject quite positively, as shown by editorials that saw in it a sign for economic prosperity. The French zonal press was cautious, noting that the possibility of Soviet intransigence would force the French to choose to side with the Anglo-American bloc. In the

⁹⁰⁶ Eric J.C. Hahn, "The Occupying Powers and the Constitutional Reconstruction of West Germany, 1945-1949," in German Historical Institute, *Cornerstone of Democracy: The West German Grundgesetz, 1949-1989* (Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute Occasional Paper No. 13, 1995), 13.

⁹⁰⁷ Edmund Spevack, "The Allied Council of Foreign Ministers Conferences and the German Question, 1945-1947," in Detlef Junker (ed.), *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945-1990. A Handbook. Volume I: 1945-1968* (Washington, D.C. and Cambridge: German Historical Institute and Cambridge University Press, 2004), 46.

⁹⁰⁸ Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line*, 233-240.

⁹⁰⁹ Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line*, 241.

Soviet zone, TASS and SNB provided stories characterized the agreement as a means of splitting Germany and violating the tenets of the Potsdam Declaration.⁹¹⁰

Bizonal fusion did not disappear as a topic of press discussion at the end of summer 1946. Indeed, it gained momentum on September 6 when, in possible response to Molotov's populist appeal of July, U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes delivered a speech in Stuttgart that outlined U.S. intentions in Germany and the need for a British and American zonal merger.⁹¹¹ In his speech, Byrnes emphasized that the U.S. saw reparations as a means to ensure the end of an industry geared for war, but noted that the United States did not seek to impoverish the German people permanently. Rather, he hoped Germans could enjoy "average European living standards without assistance from other countries." He reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the development of Germany as an economic unit and the end of the zonal divides, but chastised the Allied Control Council for failing to work together to establish "the necessary steps" to achieve this goal. Without mentioning the Soviets by name, he dismissed the idea of payments from postwar industrial production – a desire of the Soviet Union – as "wholly incompatible with the levels of industry now established under the Potsdam Agreement." At the end of his speech, Byrnes assured the audience that the Americans hoped to leave Germany after a reasonable time and had no desire to "deny the German people an opportunity to work their way out of those hardships so long as they respect human freedom and follow the path of peace."⁹¹²

⁹¹⁰ OMGUS, "Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS) No. 55," August 17, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 9-11.

⁹¹¹ Spevack, "Allied Council of Foreign Ministers Conferences," 46.

⁹¹² "Address by Secretary of State Byrnes on United States Policy Regarding Germany, Stuttgart, September 6, 1946," in United States Department of State, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State Publication 9446, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 91-99.

Byrnes's qualified promise that the German people might soon control their fate certainly encouraged some measure of hope for the future. Immediately after Byrnes's speech, ICD interviewed AMZON political leaders to gauge their reactions. Most found much to like, particularly in Byrnes's messages against isolationism and in the promise of a continued U.S. presence in Germany. Those Germans critical of the speech had hoped for more information on economic development, more discussion of the food situation, and a solution the problems associated with displaced persons.⁹¹³ The press response in western districts of Berlin was more revealing. Whereas the *Tagesspiegel*'s Erik Reger declared that Byrnes had forwarded "a thorough solution to the German problems" and the British-licensed *Telegraf* called for the Soviets to follow the American line, the French-licensed *Der Kurier* compared Byrnes's speech with that made by Molotov in July. *Der Kurier* noted that the two officials offered somewhat similar plans, differing only on the issues concerning the development of a federal constitution for a future German state.⁹¹⁴

Soviet-licensed and run publications did not print the speech, but rather carried an abridged, 140-line SNB story and made use of neutral headlines, such as "The Byrnes Speech" (*Tägliche Rundschau*) or "The Byrnes Speech in Stuttgart" (*Neues Deutschland*). This uniformity of coverage suggests direct interference by Soviet censors, as did the complete absence of discussion on Byrnes's statements concerning a federal government.⁹¹⁵ The tone

⁹¹³ OMGUS, "Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS) No. 59," September 14, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 1.

⁹¹⁴ OMGUS, "Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS) No. 60," September 21, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 12.

⁹¹⁵ OMGUS, "Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS) No. 59," September 14, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 3-4 and OMGUS, "Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS) No. 60," September 21, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 12.

grew more critical a few days later, when the SED press began reprinting negative press reactions from Britain and France under the headline “London and Paris Reservations.”⁹¹⁶ *Neues Deutschland* also reprinted a radio address by Walter Ulbricht, in which he first praised Byrnes for promising to continue denazification in AMZON and then declared that the Secretary of State’s acknowledgment of this need proved that the Americans had failed to remove Nazis from positions of power. Ulbricht then referenced Molotov’s July address to claim that a federal system would promote authoritarianism and reinforce “the reactionary movement.” Finally, he declared that a merger of the British and the U.S. zones would “ultimately serve only the purpose and the goal of preventing German unity and promoting the dismemberment of Germany.”⁹¹⁷ *Der Tagesspiegel* responded to Ulbricht’s speech on September 15 with a pointed attack, writing, “antipathy toward ‘authoritarian organs’ sounds peculiar if coming from circles which ... have never stated that it lacks the confidence of the people only because it was appointed by an occupying power.” The paper then asked, “Is [Ulbricht] aware of the fact that he condemns the policy of his party?”⁹¹⁸

Within weeks of Byrnes’s Stuttgart speech, the SBZ press began to align in an appreciable and non-coincidental manner. In early October 1946, for example, each newspaper in the Soviet zone published a translation of an interview that Stalin gave to a correspondent of

⁹¹⁶ OMGUS, “Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS) No. 59,” September 14, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 4.

⁹¹⁷ Walter Ulbricht, “Um die Zukunft Deutschlands. Zu den Erklärungen der süddeutschen Ministerpräsidenten zur Rede von Außenminister Byrnes,” *ND*, September 12, 1946 and OMGUS, “Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS) No. 59,” September 14, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 4 and OMGUS, “Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS) No. 60,” September 21, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 13.

⁹¹⁸ OMGUS, “Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS) No. 60,” September 21, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 13.

the *London Times*. Stalin's interview was not a direct response to Byrnes's address. This did not stop the Soviet zone press from treating it as such. Considerable focus rested on Stalin's declaration that the Soviets did not see Germany as a pawn in a great game between East and West, as well as on his hopes for "friendly and lasting cooperation" between the Soviets and their wartime Allies.⁹¹⁹ In a complementary editorial, *Neues Deutschland* praised Stalin for striking "a major blow" against those who sought to cleave Germany and Europe into separate blocs, and then condemned Byrnes's speech for having "caused a certain uneasiness" by suggesting discord between the Allies. The editorial expressed hope that the reassurances of the Soviet leader would "find their way into the hearts of all peace-loving peoples, especially women."⁹²⁰ Another two issues published international praise of the *London Times* interview, as well as "man-in-the-street" responses. One of these was a conversation "overheard in the subway," in which an elderly man assured a friend that he believed Stalin was honest in his claim that "there will be no war."⁹²¹ The *Tägliche Rundschau* buttressed coverage in *Neues Deutschland*. Otto Grotewohl even published a response to Stalin's interview, in which the SED leader declared that all German communists agreed with and supported Stalin's declarations for world peace and assurances against the use of Germany as a means of forcing their positions on Western Europe. In a swipe at the United States, Grotewohl praised the Soviet Union for being "free from atom bomb psychosis and speculation for foreign bases." Although he was

⁹¹⁹ "Interview Stalins mit dem Korrespondenten der 'Sunday Times': Stalin gegen das Gerede von einem 'neuen Krieg,'" *ND*, September 25, 1946.

⁹²⁰ Im Geiste des Friedens," *ND*, September 25, 1946 and OMGUS, "Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS) No. 62," October 5, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 12.

⁹²¹ "Das Weltecho des Stalin-Interviews," *ND*, September 26, 1946; "Die Welt unter dem Eindruck des Stalin-Interviews," *ND*, September 27, 1946; and OMGUS, "Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS) No. 62," October 5, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 13.

publishing these words in an official Soviet newspaper, he concluded with an assertion that the SED was independent of Soviet influence and then thanked Stalin for his efforts “to destroy completely ridiculous political calumnies about the SED in Germany and the world.”⁹²²

At the end of October, Stalin and the SBZ press overplayed their hand by republishing a question-and-answer interview with the Soviet leader, as written by the president of the United Press, Hugh Baillie. Most newspapers across the Soviet zone reprinted the thirty-one answers in full. Supporting editorials focused on particular answers and highlighted Stalin’s characterization of Winston Churchill as one of many “incendiaries for a new war.” None hinted at affairs in Yugoslavia, Soviet interest in the atomic bomb, reconstruction in the Soviet Union, or Soviet troop strength in occupied countries.⁹²³ In the American zone, many Germans believed that publishing the interview was “the ultimate in journalistic naïveté” and expressed their concern that westerners might believe the Soviet leader.⁹²⁴

By this point, ICD had already become aware of increased opprobrium in the Soviet zone press. In July 1946, ICD forwarded a report to Arthur Eggleston, the chief of press operations in Berlin. While there had been no “really violent direct attacks on the U.S,” the report concluded, the SBZ press tactics could discredit the western powers by “playing up [the] USSR and policy [in] the Soviet Zone, and by playing [up] the weaknesses of the West and shortcomings in the

⁹²² “Das Weltecho des Stalin-Interviews,” TR September 24, 1946 and OMGUS, “Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS) No. 62,” October 5, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 12.

⁹²³ Hugh Baillie, *High Tension: The Recollections of Hugh Baillie* (New York: Harper & Row, 1959, 1973), 235; OMGUS, “Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS) No. 68,” November 16, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 10; and “Stalin zur Weltlage,” *TR Sonderausgabe*, October 28, 1946.

⁹²⁴ OMGUS, “Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS) No. 69,” November 23, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 16.

Western occupation Zone.” This simple statement was one of the first U.S. diagnoses of press trends in the SBZ. It focused on the *Tägliche Rundschau* and included only a few references to *Vorwärts* and *Neues Deutschland*.⁹²⁵ As fate would have it, July 1946 was also significant for it brought a marked decrease in anti-American rhetoric in the pages of the SBZ press. In part, this seems to have been the product of a formal protest by General McClure to Colonel Tiulpanov as well as press focus on the plebiscite in Saxony.⁹²⁶ Regardless of the cause for the temporary dip, ICD had begun to overcome its myopic perspective on heated SBZ press rhetoric.

On September 19, OMGUS issued a formal protest to the Allied Control Council over the publication of a *Neues Deutschland* article that mischaracterized British and American reparations programs in their zones of occupation. Specifically, the article claimed that the U.S. and British governments had forced the payment of reparations using goods derived from current production and that a joint Anglo-American operation (Operation “Sparkle”) had effectively stolen more than 15 million tons of gold and jewels.⁹²⁷ ICD worked with the Economics Branch of OMGUS to investigate the charges made in the piece, and concluded, “the entire article, from beginning to end, is considered to be completely untrue.”⁹²⁸ General Clay raised this matter at

⁹²⁵ “Analysis of Newspapers in the Russian Sector of Berlin, mostly 20-26 July 1946,” 27 July 1946, NACP 260/253/212, 1.

⁹²⁶ OMGUS, “Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS) No. 51,” July 21, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 12 and OMGUS, “Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS) No. 49,” July 6, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 9.

⁹²⁷ “Anglo-amerikanische Reparationen aus Deutschland,” *ND*, September 18, 1946.

⁹²⁸ Michael Josselson, Chief of Intelligence, “Article on Anglo-American Reparations from Germany in ‘Neues Deutschland’ of 18 September,” September 18, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/213.

the next meeting of the Coordinating Committee of the Control Council, and received a promise to investigate the matter from the deputy commander of SMAD, General Pavel Kurochkin.⁹²⁹

Despite these developments, the United States approved the passage of Allied Control Council Directive No. 40, which allowed the press to comment in a limited and proactive manner on the policies of the occupation powers. One month later, in November 1946, SMAD abandoned pre-publication censorship of the press. Within two months, ICD monitors identified at least twenty violations of Directive No. 40 and grew concerned that the “consistent tendentiousness of the Soviet-licensed German press” might engender German hostility against the American occupation. ICD took small comfort in the fact that the distribution of the two prime offenders – the *Tägliche Rundschau* and *Neues Deutschland* – was limited largely to Berlin since, after all, both papers went to the entire Soviet zone.⁹³⁰

The Bizonal Shift and the

Decline of the CFM

Although there was little progress on addressing the pressing problems of the occupation of Germany, the closure of the late 1946 CFM in New York brought with it the final plans of the

⁹²⁹ “Extract from agreed minutes of the Coordinating Committee Meeting held on 23 September 1946,” NACP RG 260/253/213.

⁹³⁰ Milton S. Pratt, Chief, Press Scrutiny Board to Office of the Director, Information Control, “Anti-American Propaganda in the Soviet-licensed German-language Press,” 25 February 1947, NACP RG 260/118/455, 1-2; Hartenian, 150-152; R.W. van Wagenen, “Cooperation and Controversy among the Occupying Powers in Berlin,” *The Journal of Politics* 10:1 (1948), 78; and Control Council, “Directive No. 40: Policy to be Followed by German Politicians and the German Press,” 12 October 1946 as in *Enactments and Approved Papers of the Control Council and Coordinating Committee* vol. V/IX ((Berlin: Legal Division of the Office of Military Government for Germany, 1945-1948), 49. Please note that Directive No. 40 is not Law No. 40, the “Repeal of the Law of 20 January 1934 on ‘The Organization of National Labor,’ which the Control Council signed on 30 November 1946. See Allied Control Council, “Repeal of the Law of 20 January 1934 on ‘The Organization of National Labor,’ 30 November 1946 as in *Enactments and Approved Papers* vol. V/IX, 169.

British and the Americans to effect the unification of the economies of their zones of occupation. Bizone, which came into being on January 1, 1947, promised institutions that would lead to economic self-sufficiency by 1949 and an immediate increase in standards of living. These topics became dominant subjects of western press discourse in late 1946. In the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, for example, an article titled “A Christmas Present” expressed considerable enthusiasm about the prospects for economic growth, although the next page’s editorial warned against too much optimism. The *Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung* and the *Darmstädter Echo* picked up this theme, but qualified their coverage by noting the absence of agreements with the French and Soviet zones and the fact that the Bizone restricted direct German trade with the world market owing to a complex import-export program. British Zone media largely mirrored that which appeared in the American zone, although there were some negative reactions from the political party press. Two KPD newspapers echoed arguments common to the SED press, namely that the merger would benefit American businesses and that it was “contrary to the spirit of the Potsdam agreement.”⁹³¹ An SPD newspaper, the *Lübecker Freie Presse*, expressed particularly anxiety over the possibility that the merger would force the Soviets and the French to make decisions that might lead to the permanent division of Germany into two or three separate states.⁹³²

Aside from the conspicuous absence of coverage in a few CDU and LDP-controlled newspapers, the whole of the SBZ press opposed the Bizone. *Neues Deutschland* attempted to argue that provisions requiring the use of export sales to make reparations payments would render Germany a client state of Anglo-American industry and strengthen the zonal divide. It

⁹³¹ OMGUS, “Information Control Weekly Review: Political Analysis and Public Opinion, No. 4,” December 21, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/158, 8.

⁹³² OMGUS, “Information Control Weekly Review: Political Analysis and Public Opinion, No. 4,” December 21, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/158, 8-10.

also pointed to a reduced minimum caloric intake for residents in both zones as a sign that the British and Americans had already failed to improve living conditions before the merger had even happened.⁹³³ Then, in its New Year edition of January 1, 1947, the SED paper printed a simple map of the zonal borders of 1946, under which appeared the following line: “The old year was marked by federalization. Our wish for the New Year: May it bring about the unity of Germany.” Subsequent pages included a series of New Year wishes and quotes from several persons across the occupied zones on their desire to see a resolution to border disagreements.⁹³⁴ Three days later, it claimed that the creation of Bizone made possible further exploitation by “foreign capitalistic groups” who would work with “the political reaction” to undermine the development of a peaceful Germany.⁹³⁵ These variations in tone fit with the approach adopted by the *Tägliche Rundschau* in early 1947.⁹³⁶ By assuming an approach that on the one hand portrayed economic fusion in the west as a barrier to German reunification, while on the other defaming it as a threat to peace and reparations policies, SMAD and SED newspapers sought to generate broad disapproval and confusion over this issue. In the end, however, their discussions never met the levels of condemnation seen in the pages of *Pravda*.⁹³⁷ Within a month, the immediacy of the Bizone had passed, and the subject became merely another touchstone in SED

⁹³³ OMGUS, “Information Control Weekly Review: Political Analysis and Public Opinion, No. 4,” December 21, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/158, 10.

⁹³⁴ “Deutschland 1946” and Einmütigkeit über Zonenegrenzen,” *ND*, January 1, 1947.

⁹³⁵ OMGUS, ICD, “Neues Deutschland attacks two-zone merger,” January 7, 1947, NACP RG 260/253/213 and “Was bedeutet das Inkrafttreten des ‘Zweizonenplans’?” *ND*, January 4, 1947.

⁹³⁶ Alfred Meusel, “Kampf um die nationale Einheit in Deutschland,” *TR* January 3, 1947 and “Demontagen endgültig eingestellt. Reparationen erheblich herabgesetzt,” *TR*, January 14, 1947.

⁹³⁷ Department of State, “Message received from Moscow – for your interest,” January 31, 1947, NACP RG 260/253/213.

and SMAD rhetoric against U.S. and British policies and in allegations of western collusion with war criminals.⁹³⁸

ICD instituted a short-term covert information program to counter possible misperceptions of the merger by western Germans who had access to SBZ media. The peak of the response came days after the merger when *Die Neue Zeitung* declared the development of Bizone a “Hope for Economic Recovery.” This article recapitulated the main points of Byrnes’s Stuttgart speech, and claimed the development of a shared economic life would benefit the greater European economy, as well as that of a post-occupation Germany.⁹³⁹ With this article, the debate over the Bizone began to subside in line with diminished public interest and new objects of intrigue on the stage of foreign policy. The strategy behind the article, however, fit well with ICD’s new “covert” propaganda policy, which sought to assume a proactive approach to negative Soviet propaganda by providing a factual presentation of the benefits afforded by the U.S. occupation.

It would be some time before ICD could assess the efficacy of this program, but early experiments included balanced attempts to present a wide range of political views on a future

⁹³⁸ OMGUS, ICD, “Taegliche Rundschau condemns American ‘monopolists,’” February 11, 1947; OMGUS, ICD, “Neues Deutschland attacks Allied employment of Germans,” January 6, 1947; OMGUS, ICD, “Russian over paper attacks war criminal DP’s [sic] in AMZON,” January 8, 1947; OMGUS, ICD, “‘Anti-Fascist Democratic’ parties condemn Nuremberg bombing,” January 11, 1947; OMGUS, ICD, “Taegliche Rundschau attacks denazification in AMZON,” January 11, 1947; OMGUS, ICD, “Russian overt newspaper on currency reform,” January 13, 1947; OMGUS, ICD, “Neues Deutschland attacks Schumacher’s Munich Speech,” January 15, 1947; OMGUS, ICD, “Neues Deutschland Demands ‘Freedom from Fear,’” January 22, 1947; W.S. Pratt, Chief Security Office, ICD, “Denazification,” January 19, 1947; OMGUS, ICD, “SED paper attacks US economic policy in Germany,” January 23, 1947; and OMGUS, ICD, “Russian press comment on arrests of Nazis in BRIZON,” February 25, 1947 in NACP RG 260/253/213.

⁹³⁹ OMGUS, Office of the Director of Information Control, “Die Neue Zeitung Answers Critics of Bizonal Merger Plan,” January 10, 1947, NACP RG 260/253/197.

role for Germans on the international stage. On January 31, 1947, *Die Neue Zeitung* published the results of a series of discussions with some of the leaders of the four major parties across occupied Germany. These leaders were Wilhelm Külz (LDP, SBZ), Jakob Kaiser (CDU, SBZ), Kurt Schumacher (SPD), and Otto Grotewohl (SED). Each answered ten questions to indicate their perspectives and hopes for the Moscow CFM. When asked if a peace treaty was preferable to a peace decree, Külz, Kaiser, and Grotewohl preferred a treaty, while Schumacher argued that the “German problem” required resolution at the United Nations. All four politicians agreed that Germany needed a voice at the CFM, but they disagreed over the role, scope of authority, and appropriate representation for such a delegation. On the issue of reparations, Külz was the only one willing to accept “a balanced system of reparations” based on Germany’s economic potential. Kaiser rejected reparations out of hand, arguing that they further weakened an already devastated economy. Schumacher used this question as an opportunity to urge for greater production, and Grotewohl declared that current production was a sufficient gauge to assess reparation potential. All four wanted to keep the Ruhr part of Germany, but the CDU and LDP rejected the loss of Eastern Prussia. Schumacher and Grotewohl, however, seemed to be equally comfortable with the boundaries set by the Potsdam declaration. In terms of governmental structure, all four agreed to various forms of a unified state with different responsibilities for the central government and local administrations. Finally, on the question of restricting the powers of the occupying authorities after the conclusion of a peace treaty, Schumacher urged for German control of domestic policy and Control Council control of foreign policy decisions. Grotewohl chose to cede all governmental responsibilities to the German people.⁹⁴⁰

⁹⁴⁰ “Friedenswünsche deutscher Politiker. Parteigührer beantworten Fragen der ‘Neuen Zeitung’,” *DNZ*, January 31, 1947 and OMGUS, “Information Control Weekly Review: Political Analysis and Public Opinion, No. 11,” February 15, 1947, NACP RG 260/250/158, 10-12.

Despite U.S. propaganda attempts to mitigate the spread of communism and promote the bizonal merger, Anglo-American zonal fusion remained largely outside the sphere of interest for much of the occupied public. As late as October 1947, many Germans in AMZON and the three western districts of Berlin had heard of the Bizone, but less than a third knew of the existence of the British, American, and German Bizonal Economic Council in Frankfurt, a.M. Despite this, upon hearing this news, 73 percent expressed their belief that economic conditions would improve in short order. By early 1948, however, such confidence began to ebb, owing to continued material and food restrictions and a belief that “nothing is getting done.” Of broader concern, many Germans seemed uncertain if the bizonal merger would help or prevent the merger of the four zones of occupation. This was particularly true of residents in Berlin, where 37 percent of those polled felt the Bizone would impede German reunification.⁹⁴¹

Managing Declining International

Relations in Germany

Before the four powers met at the Moscow CFM on March 10, 1947, their ministries met in London to hammer out a plan for the upcoming discussions. The western zone press, in a sign of increased latitude on the part of ICD, expressed concern over the fact that the German people and its nascent leaders could not play an integral role in the discussions. This was not a problem in the Soviet zone, where the press advocated for Soviet positions and promoted the benefits of political life in the SBZ. The SED leadership managed the latter through a series of public relations trips to the Western zones. When Pieck and Grotewohl visited Munich in March 1947, *Die Neue Zeitung* editorialized that the two SED leaders “seemed compelled to allay fears that

⁹⁴¹ ICD Opinion Surveys, OMGUS, “Report No. 107: Public Reception of the Bizonal Administration,” March 29, 1948, 1-4, NACP RG 260/1400/77.

the democratic silver lining in the eastern zone was threatened by heavy shadow.” They also proclaimed that the SBZ was on a democratic path, while those in the west were under the sway of the “capitalistic power, the United States.” Their solution was “clarity and an open attitude” to develop the understanding necessary to come to some manner of a political accord and to reunite Germany through “synthesis between the east and west.”⁹⁴²

The *Tägliche Rundschau* used the build-up to the Moscow CFM to promote the populist position espoused Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Fedor Gusev. Gusev had been a thorn in the side of the Americans throughout the discussions owing to his insistence that non-occupying powers and German political leaders play a role in the upcoming meeting.⁹⁴³ This stance received a strong endorsement in the pages of the *Tägliche Rundschau*, which called it a “logical link in the chain of development of Soviet policy” and necessary for the development of a “centrally governed Germany.” The Soviet position on Germany at the CFM, so the *Tägliche Rundschau* argued, stood in stark contrast to the “plans of certain postwar politicians who drape themselves in the mantle of unctuous phrases and assertions of friendship in order to exploit the defeated opponent as much and as long as possible.”⁹⁴⁴ There were few attempts to respond to this claim in the Berlin press, but for two editorials in *Der Tagesspiegel*.⁹⁴⁵

⁹⁴² OMGB, ICD, Intelligence Branch, “Special Brief of Political Affairs,” March 27, 1947, NACP RG 260/894/144, 1-2 and “SED-Führer antworten der Presse,” *TR*, March 14, 1947.

⁹⁴³ “The United States Deputy for Germany at the Council of Foreign Ministers (Murphy) to the Director, Office of European Affairs (Matthews),” February 4, 1947, as in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947. Volume II: Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), 21-24.

⁹⁴⁴ OMGUS, “Information Control Weekly Review: Political Analysis and Public Opinion, No. 10,” February 8, 1947, NACP RG 260/250/158, 10.

⁹⁴⁵ OMGUS, “Information Control Weekly Review: Political Analysis and Public Opinion, No. 10,” February 8, 1947, NACP RG 260/250/158, 9.

When the United States delegation arrived at the Moscow CFM, Secretary of State George C. Marshall believed Stalin might accept plans for the development of a unified state led by a popular government. Indeed, Molotov made such a proposal at the CFM. Reparations continued to be a sticking point. The Soviets pursued reparations from current production in all of the zones, which would place a considerable burden on the western zones given the weak state of industrial production in east.⁹⁴⁶ Then, two days after the start of the CFM, U.S. President Truman addressed a joint session of Congress to outline his so-called Truman Doctrine. In this speech, he contrasted the liberation that had occurred with the Allied victory in the Second World War with the fact that “the peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will,” making direct reference to Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. Truman obligated the United States to work in the spirit of the U.N. charter to ensure that U.S. democratic values succeed over those of states that base their existence on the use of “terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.”⁹⁴⁷

The next day’s *Frankfurter Rundschau* and *Die Neue Zeitung* focused on the president’s call for financial and professional aid to Turkey and Greece, as did *Neues Deutschland*.⁹⁴⁸ Over the course of the next several days, however, the SED newspaper began to follow a familiar pattern by publishing a series of international reactions to the U.S. president and articles that

⁹⁴⁶ Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 56-61.

⁹⁴⁷ “President Harry S. Truman’s Address before a Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947,” as at *Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History, and Diplomacy*, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp, last accessed August 30, 2012.

⁹⁴⁸ “Truman sagt Hilfe zu 400 Millionen Dollar für Griechenland und die Türkei gefordert,” *DNZ*, March 14, 1947 and “Truman fordert 400-Millionen-Dollar für Griechenland und Türkei,” *FR*, March 13, 1947.

praised the Soviet position at the CFM.⁹⁴⁹ It then commented that Truman had the endorsement of Churchill, which suggested an American plan to continue its “bankrupt policy.” The *Tägliche Rundschau* was even more hostile, printing select American reactions to Truman’s speech in order to paint his policies as “aggressive imperialism.”⁹⁵⁰ Buttressing these pieces, *Neues Deutschland* published an article that declared the existence of a new National Socialist organization in AMZON.⁹⁵¹ At the same time the SBZ press degenerated into outright condemnation of the western powers, it also remained optimistic. In its review of the first week of the Moscow Conference, *Neues Deutschland* praised the Soviets for their “will to cooperate” and highlighted Molotov’s speech on demilitarization and the need to continue the expropriation of land, the shattering of trusts and the nationalization of major industry in order to prevent a militaristic resurgence.⁹⁵²

Discussions in Moscow ultimately went nowhere. After meeting with Stalin to discuss ways to improve U.S.-Soviet relations, Marshall concluded that cooperation with the Soviet Union was no longer possible. In his summary report, Marshall noted that all Soviet proposals would lead to a German government that “would be mortgaged to turn over a large part of its

⁹⁴⁹ “Das Echo der Truman-Botschaft,” “Drei Vorschläge Molotows,” “Molotows Vorschläge zur Demokratisierung,” and “Debatte der Moskauer Sonderbeauftragten für Deutschland,” *ND*, March 14, 1947; “‘Iswestija’ zur Truman-Rede,” H.L., “Trumans Rede,” “Die drei Vorschläge Molotows,” and “Entnazifizierung Deutschlands. Sowjetunion forert deutsche Regierung ohne Verzögerung,” *ND*, March 15, 1947; and “Ablehnung der USA-Einmischung,” “Prawda zur Botschaft Trumans,” and “Wyschinski zur künftigen Gestaltung Deutschlands. Keine Föderalisierung!” *ND*, March 16, 1947.

⁹⁵⁰ “Kritik an Trumans Politik,” *ND*, March 23, 1947 and OMGUS, “Information Control Weekly Review: Political Analysis and Public Opinion, No. 16,” March 22, 1947, NACP RG 260/250/158, 8.

⁹⁵¹ “Neue Nazi-Organisation in der US-Zone,” *ND*, March 27, 1947.

⁹⁵² OMGUS, “Information Control Weekly Review: Political Analysis and Public Opinion, No. 16,” March 22, 1947, NACP RG 260/250/158, 7 and H.L., “Schluß damit!” *ND*, March 13, 1947.

production as reparations, principally to the Soviet Union.” He concluded that time was beginning to pass for European recovery; or, as he wrote in a now famous statement, “the patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate.”⁹⁵³ This assessment came as no great surprise to many Germans, who had expected the failure of the Moscow conference but had hoped for some improvement to the postwar situation.⁹⁵⁴

The Soviet zone press attempted to paint the failures of the Moscow CFM in the best possible light, in part because the SED expected the conference would provide an opportunity for the party to exercise considerably more power at its conclusion.⁹⁵⁵ A few days after the conference, *Neues Deutschland* focused attention on General Robertson, who claimed that the CFM had been but the first round in future negotiations toward German unity.⁹⁵⁶ It also published an editorial titled “What Moscow Taught.” This editorial recalled Molotov’s speech at the United Nations in October 1946, in which the Soviet foreign minister noted that international relations depended on cooperation for peace and security lest it become the purview of “reactionary imperialist groups and enemies of cooperation,” as evidence of a longstanding Soviet resolve to ensure German unity. The *Tägliche Rundschau* forwarded a similar message, stating that unification would have happened but for “the one-sided procedure of the British-

⁹⁵³ “Report by Secretary of State Marshall on the Fourth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Moscow Session, April 28, 1947,” in United States Department of State, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, 117-123, esp. 122-123.

⁹⁵⁴ Richard G. Akselrad, Fulda Detachment, “Public Opinion, Rumors, Letters to the Fuldaer Volkszeitung,” April 25, 1947, 2, NACP RG 260/1493/1184.

⁹⁵⁵ Address by Otto Meier as in “Stenographische Niederschrift über die Redakteur-Konferenz am Sonnabend, dem 22. März 1947,” March 22, 1947, 2, SAPMO-NArch DY 30/IV 2/1.01/39.

⁹⁵⁶ “General Robertson erklärt: Moskau war ein Fortschritt,” *ND*, April 30, 1947.

American zonal merger!”⁹⁵⁷ It would take another month before the *Tägliche Rundschau* acknowledged that the CFM had failed to resolve “The German Question.” The Soviet newspaper did not suggest a future course, but it did warn that the Americans and British were untrustworthy and that “the German people, could ill afford further distortions of the situation before them.”⁹⁵⁸

European Recovery and Its Discontents

The failures and frustrations of the Moscow CFM influenced Marshall’s thinking on the need for a significant financial stimulus to spur economic recovery in Europe in order to mitigate financial collapse, political upheaval, and another war on the Continent. Announced first on June 5, 1947, Marshall’s European Recovery Program (ERP) had three essential aims: to promote production in countries that were a party to the ERP, to further “the restoration or maintenance” of European economies, and to facilitate international trade by reducing tariffs and other barriers.⁹⁵⁹ Participant countries had to make certain structural changes, such as the liberalization of trade, to receive funding from the plan. These features and mutual distrust led to further discord between the United States and Soviet Union in Germany.

⁹⁵⁷ OMGUS, “Information Control Weekly Review: Political Analysis and Public Opinion, No. 22,” May 3, 1947, NACP RG 260/250/158, 10.

⁹⁵⁸ “Zur deutschen Frage,” *TR*, June 1, 1947.

⁹⁵⁹ “Foreign Assistance Act of 1948/Economic Cooperation Act of 1948,” 80th U.S. Congress, 2D Session, Chapter 169, April 3, 1948 as at http://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/documents/Marshall_Plan/Reports/Foreign_Assistance_Act_of_1948.pdf, last accessed May 2, 2012. Foreign Relations scholars continue to debate the intent and significance of the ERP. The most recent discussions have centered on the claim that the ERP was a means to ensure the division of the Continent between East and West. As this analysis of Soviet and American press trends shows, the drive toward the lines of the Cold War preceded the establishment of ERP in Europe. See Michael Cox and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, “The Tragedy of American Diplomacy? Rethinking the Marshall Plan,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 7:1 (2005), 97-134 and Günter Bischof, “The Advent of Neo-Revisionism,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 7:1 (2005), 141-151.

Soviet participation in the ERP remained a theoretical possibility in the summer 1947. In the SBZ press, however, the Marshall Plan became an almost instant subject of criticism.⁹⁶⁰ In August 1947, the *Tägliche Rundschau* printed 31 editorials alone on the matter as well as a host of supporting articles, while *Neues Deutschland* carried 28 editorials.⁹⁶¹ These pieces coincided with the distribution of a Verlag Tägliche Rundschau pamphlet, *What is Behind the Marshall Plan?* Headlines were consistently negative and denounced the ERP as little more than a thinly veiled attempt by American capitalists to gain control of Europe. *Tägliche Rundschau* articles were often little more than translations from *Pravda* or *Izvestia*, but *Neues Deutschland* published many original pieces.⁹⁶² Beyond sensational articles, both newspapers printed political cartoons that ridiculed the intentions or potential successes of U.S. financial welfare policies in Germany.⁹⁶³ The establishment of the Bizone also reappeared as a subject of discussion. SMAD and the SED would argue that Bizone's existence was proof that western powers had betrayed the Potsdam Declaration.⁹⁶⁴ There were also to patterns to the papers' coverage. The *Tägliche Rundschau* printed broad content that opposed the Marshall Plan on the premise that it would

⁹⁶⁰ On Soviet diplomatic reactions to the ERP, see Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line*, 323-324 and Cox and Kennedy-Pipe, "The Tragedy of American Diplomacy?" 117-119.

⁹⁶¹ OMGUS, "Soviet Propaganda Practices in Germany," November 1947, NACP RG 260/118/459, 5-6.

⁹⁶² OMGUS, "Information Control Review: Political Analysis and Public Opinion, No. 34," September 13, 1947, 6

⁹⁶³ OMGUS, "Soviet Propaganda Practices in Germany," November 1947, NACP RG 260/118/459, 6; Boris Jefimow, "Zu den Ergebnissen der 'Pariser Konferenz'," *TR*, July 30, 1947; K. Jellisejew, "Die Kehrseite der Medalle," *TR*, August 10, 1947; "Der 'mitleidige' Herr," *ND*, July 23, 1947; "Wenn von dem Dollarprofit etwas für den deutschen Monopol-Kapitalisten abfallen soll, dann muss der Arbeiter sich dem Riemen noch enger schnellen," *ND*, June 20, 1947.

⁹⁶⁴ OMGUS, "Soviet Propaganda Practices in Germany," November 1947, NACP RG 260/118/459, 7.

lead to the creation of a Western European economic system that would “divert the economic crisis in the United States” by forcing the Germans to assume American debt. These negative stories often appeared in parallel to pieces that highlighted the benefits of trade relations with the Soviet Union.⁹⁶⁵ In contrast, *Neues Deutschland* often claimed that the ERP would destroy any hope of German unity.⁹⁶⁶ For months, the SED scrutinized western and eastern zone media for seemingly every mention of the Marshall Plan in an attempt to shape messages that would agitate against support for this program.⁹⁶⁷

Discussions of ERP in the western zones built awareness and support for the program in a relatively short period of time. Coverage of ERP was not universally positive. One of the few significantly negative assessments came in the pages of the *Frankfurter Rundschau* in an editorial written by Emil Carlebach, who claimed that Soviet distrust of ERP was a product of a

⁹⁶⁵ For example, “Bedenken gegen Marshall-Plan,” N. Orlow, “Unerfreuliche Ergebnisse,” and “Neue Deutschland Politik der USA,” *TR*, July 17, 1947; “Der Schleier um die USA-Hilfe,” “Fruchtbare Zusammenarbeit. ‘Prawda’ über die sowjetisch-tschechoslowakischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen,” and “Dr. Külz über den Marshall-Plan,” *TR*, July 18, 1947; “Marshall-Plan keine Entspannung,” “Handelsvertrag UdSSR-Ungarn,” “Der Außenhandel der Ostzone,” *TR*, July 19, 1947; “Differenzen zwischen den Westmächten” and “Uneigennützig Hilfe,” *TR*, July 22, 1947; “Anstatt Hilfe – Sparmaßnahmen. Amerikanische Warnung an die europäischen Länder,” “Der Garant der Unabhängigkeit,” and “Englands Abhängigkeit von den USA,” *TR*, August 26, 1947.

⁹⁶⁶ OMGUS, “Information Control Review: Political Analysis and Public Opinion, No. 34,” September 13, 1947, 6. Examples include “‘Hilfsplan’ gegen Deutschland? Molotow für Unabhängigkeit und Selbständigkeit aller Länder Europas,” *ND*, July 4, 1947; “Kohlenplan für die Ostzone,” “Einseitige Berichte über Paris,” and “Pressestimmen zur Pariser Konferenz,” *ND*, July 6, 1947; “Westdeutscher Dollarbund? Feinde der deutschen Einheit lassen ihre Maske fallen – Dreister Vorstoß der Föderalisten,” *ND*, July 8, 1947; “Zur Politik der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands,” *ND*, July 12, 1947; “Der Marshall-Plan und Deutschland. Stellungnahme der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands,” *ND*, July 25, 1947; Wilhelm Pieck, “Um Deutschlands Einheit,” *ND*, July 29, 1947; “Ruhrgebiet und Marshall-Plan,” *ND*, August 7, 1947; and “Gegen die ‘guten Dienste’ der USA,” *ND*, August 20, 1947.

⁹⁶⁷ “SED-Informationen,” August 27, 1947, 1, SAPMO-BArch ZPA DY 30/IV 2/9.03/8.

general understanding that Marshall designed the program to save the U.S. economy. Carlebach continued by suggesting that ERP sought to rebuild goodwill in the wake of the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, which he posited had caused a sense of disenchantment with the United States throughout AMZON.⁹⁶⁸ Even so, Carlebach qualified his criticism by acknowledging that Soviet maneuvers that sought to put an end to ERP would be disastrous for the German people and Europe at large.⁹⁶⁹ Days later, in a likely attempt to maintain an even political balance, the *Frankfurter Rundschau* headlined a Reuters story on Marshall's radio address against anti-American propaganda.⁹⁷⁰

The doubts raised by Carlebach were uncommon in the western zones. Awareness of the ERP spread over the course of the year after its first public announcement. While only 47 percent of AMZON residents and 60 percent of West Berliners had heard of the plan in August 1947, within a year knowledge of ERP increased to an average of 90 percent throughout the western sections of Germany. While awareness increased, approval remained at a rate of approximately 75 percent in both West Berlin and AMZON.⁹⁷¹ To assess opinions of U.S. motivations for the Marshall Plan, ICD/ISD administered a survey to close to 4,000 Germans

⁹⁶⁸ JGC, "Analysis of the Editorial 'The Marshall Plan' by Emil Carlebach, July 1, 1947, NACP RG 260/1400/79.

⁹⁶⁹ ICD translation, "Comments on the Marshall Plan," June 28, 1947, NACP RG 260/1400/79.

⁹⁷⁰ "Rede des USA-Außenministers Marshall gegen antiamerikanische Propaganda," *FR*, July 2, 1947.

⁹⁷¹ Residents in Bremen gave higher-than-average rates of approval, largely due to the urban nature of the occupied Bremen enclave. Opinion Surveys Branch, ISD, OMGUS, "Report No. 149: Trends and Present Attitudes on the Marshall Plan," December 10, 1948, 1-3, NACP RG 260/253/206.

under western occupation. Participants indicated their agreement with two of six possible motivations, and their responses over the first three quarters of 1948 were as follows:⁹⁷²

Table 2. Perceived American Motivations for the Marshall Plan, February-September 1948.

Question	Feb. 22, 1948		June 8, 1948		Aug. 2, 1948		Sep. 17, 1948	
	AMZON	W. Berlin	AMZON	W. Berlin	AMZON	W. Berlin	AMZON	W. Berlin
Anxious to help Europe	44%	54%	45%	50%	50%	55%	51%	65%
Prevent communism	80%	82%	75%	79%	78%	82%	74%	81%
Wants allies in Europe	29%	28%	28%	20%	20%	23%	28%	25%
Get rid of goods	25%	25%	27%	34%	23%	25%	18%	16%
Force way into markets	9%	6%	6%	5%	7%	4%	8%	4%
Impose capitalism	3%	3%	3%	2%	2%	2%	3%	2%
No opinion	6%	2%	7%	5%	5%	4%	8%	3%

These relatively static rates of response are remarkable, particularly when one considers that many of these dates coincided with the early stages of the Berlin Blockade. Moreover, the

⁹⁷² Please note that these figures do not include responses from Bremen's residents. The total number of those surveyed was approximately 3,800, with 3,000 from AMZON, 300 from Bremen and Bremerhaven, and 500 in the three western districts of Berlin. The full statements listed in the survey were 1) "America is sincerely anxious to help Europe get on its feet again so that it can be self supporting;" 2) "America is anxious to prevent Western Europe from becoming communistic;" 3) "America wants to make friends in Western Europe so as to have allies in case of a war with Russia;" 4) "America is using the Marshall Plan as a way of getting rid of surplus products that result from overproduction at home;" 5) "America is using the Marshall Plan as a means of forcing its way into European markets;" and 6) "America is using the Marshall Plan to try to impose its kind of capitalistic system on Europe." Opinion Surveys Branch, ISD, OMGUS, "Report No. 149: Trends and Present Attitudes on the Marshall Plan," December 10, 1948, 6, NACP RG 260/253/206.

consistency by which respondents believed that the ERP emerged out of American benevolence and a desire to stem the tide of communism and not the need to engage in economic imperialism spoke to the degrees by which U.S. propaganda and information programs had begun to establish ideological links to “America” in the imaginations of much of the occupied public. Securing and maintaining these linkages, however, continued to be a considerable concern to OMGUS.

Threats to the Appeal of “America”

In September 1947, Colonel Gordon Textor, the head of ICD, addressed the German press at a convention in Coburg and declared that the work of his division in “changing the basic attitudes and mental characteristics of the German people will undoubtedly take many years” and would require the collective effort of all forms of information media. He lamented that Information Control had not been able to influence the democratization of the German population with as much speed as had been anticipated in 1945. Textor blamed this laggardly pace on the antagonistic practices of the Soviet zone, where “newspapers and the radio not only misrepresent US policy and programs, but systematically and maliciously attack America and all it is trying to do in Germany.” In contrast to the Soviet model, Textor asserted that “U.S. Military Government policy is that we do not, under any circumstances, engage in propaganda as such” out of respect for the German people and their experiences under years of Nazi propaganda. Instead, he characterized the U.S. response as one that promoted the full and truthful provision of information on U.S. policies.⁹⁷³

⁹⁷³ Col. Textor, “Coburg Press Convention,” September 1947, NACP RG 260/247/72, 4. Note: the language of this document is significantly different than the transcript of Textor’s speech to the Coburg Press convention. Cf. OMGUS, Public Information Office, “Address of Colonel Gordon E. Textor, Director, Information Control Division, Office of Military Government for Germany,” September 1947, NACP RG 260/247/72.

Textor's speech was appropriate to the time, if but a bit misleading in its assertion of the veracity of U.S. information media. Soviet zone newspapers took advantage of every opportunity to suggest that the Americans and British hoped to establish the permanent division of Germany to suit all manner of capitalistic and imperialistic ends. How susceptible were Germans to anti-American rhetoric? To answer this question, ICD undertook a detailed experiment in mid-summer 1947. Two-thirds of the 300 participants in this study received a list of positive or negative statements on "America." They received instructions to indicate her or his agreement with each statement on the list. The final 100 participants received "choice" statements that had yes or no questions, such as "Are the Americans a highly cultured people, or do most Americans, for example, value a work of art only according to its price?" Sixty-two percent of those who received the choice survey yielded pro-American responses. Those who received lists that contained overwhelming negative statements agreed at a rate of 57 percent, while those who received the pro-American survey expressed agreement at a rate of 70 percent. From these results, ICD determined that anti-American propaganda would lead to diminished support for the United States and its policies in Germany.⁹⁷⁴

A separate assessment of 3,400 residents of the Bizone and the Anglo-American sectors of Berlin determined that more Berliners (85%) trusted their news than did residents of Bavaria (77%), Hesse (70%), or Württemberg-Baden (73%). Faith in the news fell by May 1947, after winter had passed and knowledge of food shortages had become a thing of experience rather than theory, such that only 73 percent of Berliners came to trust information media.⁹⁷⁵ In some

⁹⁷⁴ OMGUS, ICD, Research Branch, "Propaganda and the German Public: A Study of German Susceptibility to Anti-American Propaganda, Special Report No. 2," August 18, 1947, NACP RG 260/250/165, 1-3.

⁹⁷⁵ OMGUS, ICD, Research Branch, "Propaganda and the German Public: A Study of German Susceptibility to Anti-American Propaganda, Special Report No. 2," August 18, 1947,

Länder, especially in Greater Hesse, German opinions of “America” shifted in response to a wide range of factors, such as availability of food or perceived tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. By early 1947, those who preferred the American occupation did so because of U.S. material assistance in the zone, recognition of higher degrees of personal liberty, relatively little inference by the Military Government in day-to-day life, and a higher standard of living. These individuals also felt the United States had insufficiently steered the other occupiers to improve quality of life in the zones and deplored what they saw as excessive appropriations of property, patents, and other forms of material wealth.⁹⁷⁶

At approximately the same time, ICD assessed German-held stereotypes of the Allies. When asked to choose from a list of 12 adjectives to describe each of the occupiers, a sample of 3,500 Germans from U.S.-occupied *Länder* and the British and American sectors of Berlin chose the word “decent” more often than not for the British and Americans, while the French were “harsh” and the Soviets “uneducated.” Other popular adjectives for the Americans included “friendly,” “good-hearted,” and “generous,” whereas the British were “cultured and “intelligent.” In contrast, the second, third, and fourth most common adjectives for the Soviets were “undisciplined,” “harsh,” and “good-hearted.” While there had been considerable U.S. concern about the state of American culture as seen from the German perspective in the early occupation, these results indicated that the occupation public saw the Americans as better than the Soviets, but less cultured than the French or British.⁹⁷⁷ This study also confirmed earlier assessments of

NACP RG 260/250/165, 4.

⁹⁷⁶ Office of Military Government for Greater Hesse, Information Control, “Political Analysis and Public Opinion Weekly Review: Review No. 8,” February 27, 1947, NACP RG 260/250/155, 13.

⁹⁷⁷ OMGUS, “Information Control Weekly Review: Political Analysis and Public Opinion, No. 28,” June 21, 1947, NACP RG 260/250/158, 1.

popular perceptions of the Soviets as uncouth and brutal.⁹⁷⁸ Nevertheless, there were hints that maintaining such positive goodwill would require careful management, particularly in light of changes in Eastern Europe and the SBZ.

Coinciding with these assessments, the Soviets established the Communist Information Bureau, also known as the Cominform. This would-be successor to the Communist International in many ways emerged as a means to maintain a consistent political line across the many nations that would become satellite states of the Soviet Union. In his opening remarks to the Cominform, senior Politburo member Andrei Zhdanov declared the cleavage of Europe a reality, and indeed this Soviet institution helped strengthen the divide between East and West.⁹⁷⁹ In the same address, Zhdanov explained that the United States had gained from the Second World War, emerging “considerably stronger in both economic and military respects,” thereby providing conditions for American capitalists to direct policies that sought to reduce “capitalist partners [in Germany, Japan, and Great Britain] to [positions of] subordination and dependence on the USA.” The only power able to stand up against these plans was the Soviet Union, so he argued, because it was “a bastion of anti-imperialist and anti-fascist policy, together with the new democracies, which have escaped from control by Anglo-American imperialism.”⁹⁸⁰

⁹⁷⁸ An earlier poll in October 1946 asked a similar question to assess German views of the Soviets. At that time, fewer respondents linked “good-hearted,” “wasteful,” or “undisciplined” when asked to describe the “Russians,” which may have resulted from a SMAD decision to increase discipline among occupation troops. OMGUS, “Information Control Weekly Review: Political Analysis and Public Opinion, No. 28,” June 21, 1947, NACP RG 260/250/158, 2.

⁹⁷⁹ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 64 and Cox and Kennedy-Pipe, “The Tragedy of American Diplomacy,” 124-125.

⁹⁸⁰ “Comrade Zhdanov’s Report: On the International Situation,” in Giuliano Procacci, *The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences, 1947/1948/1949* (Milan: Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, 1994), 221-223.

Zhdanov was merely repeating tested lines of Soviet anti-American propaganda.

Although SBZ German political leaders were not part of the Cominform, their propaganda fit the patterns outlined by Zhdanov. Indeed, by fall 1947, the whole of the communist SBZ press routinely presented the U.S. as

- A capitalistic and imperialistic power that exploited everyday people;
- A society divided by racial and class conflict;
- On the brink of an economic downfall;
- Manipulative in its relations with smaller states;
- Exploiters of the German people;
- Collaborators with unrepentant Nazis and German nobles; and
- Eager to divide Germany so as to create an anti-Soviet bloc in the west.⁹⁸¹

Several of these themes emerged in SBZ press coverage of Andrei Vyshinsky's September 18, 1947 speech before the United Nations. The Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister launched a scathing attack on the United States, in which he declared that the Truman Doctrine and ERP violated the spirit of the U.N. and would ensure the division of Europe. The United States, Vyshinsky continued, would bring conflict and, in turn, "war brings monopoly capital immense earnings, like a bloodthirsty alchemist it melts the blood of millions of its victims into clinking coins for the plutocrats and imperialists." He then juxtaposed the United States with the Soviet Union, which engaged in an "untiring struggle for peace and disarmament [that] expresses the will and the longing of countless millions of working people throughout the world, who demand peace and freedom."⁹⁸²

⁹⁸¹ Colonel Gordon E. Textor, "The Mission and Status of the Information Control Division Program," no date (second half of 1947), NACP RG 260/118/459, 10-11 and OMGUS, "Soviet Propaganda Practices in Germany," November 1947, NACP RG 260/118/459, 1.

⁹⁸² OMGUS, ICD, "Taegliche Rundschau: 'The Mask is Off'," October 3, 1947, NACP RG 260/246/62.

Vyshinsky's speech received considerable coverage in the Berlin press, albeit with the lion's share of press reports coming out of the Soviet district. In contrast, Marshall's speech at the UN received little coverage throughout the quadripartite-controlled city.

Table 3. Berlin Press on Vyshinsky and Marshall Speeches to the UN, September 1947.

	Marshall (530 lines)	Vyshinsky (1,450 lines)
<i>Tägliche Rundschau</i> (SMAD)	16 lines	Full report
<i>Vorwärts</i> (SMAD-licensed)	26 lines	Full report
<i>Berliner Zeitung</i> (SMAD-licensed)	33 lines	Full report
<i>Neues Deutschland</i> (SMAD-licensed)	49 lines	Full report
<i>Neue Zeit</i> (SMAD-licensed)	50 lines	Full report
<i>Kurier</i> (French-licensed)	80 lines	82 lines
<i>Telegraf</i> (British-licensed)	70 lines	88 lines
<i>Der Sozialdemokrat</i> (British-licensed)	80 lines	89 lines
<i>Der Tagesspiegel</i> (U.S.-licensed)	61 lines	60 lines

Vyshinsky-related pieces appeared as front-page stories in Soviet and Soviet-licensed newspapers, buttressed by praiseworthy editorial comments, such as *Neues Deutschland's* statement that it made little difference whether if country fell subject to the whims of an outside entity "by armed force or by means of the infiltration of foreign currency."⁹⁸³ Two days later, the *Tägliche Rundschau* asked, "What is going on in the U.S. Military Government?" It answered this question by focusing on OMGUS decartelization efforts, and suggested that the reigning director of the OMGUS decartelization division, James Marten had resigned from his

⁹⁸³ OMGUS, "Information Control Weekly Review: Political Analysis and Public Opinion, No. 35," October 11, 1947, NACP RG 260/250/158, 10.

post in the Military Government because he objected to policies that would make Germany “an unlimited field of operations for the monopolies.”⁹⁸⁴

Vyshinsky’s speech and the pending establishment of the Cominform allowed Soviet officials in Germany to criticize the west. One of the first major attacks came from Tiulpanov, who had often shied away from making his presence known in the press. While addressing the Plenary of the SED Party Congress on September 20, 1947, he railed against “American monopoly capitalism.”⁹⁸⁵ The tenor of Tiulpanov’s speech demonstrated to OMGUS that the Soviets had settled on a permanent position that was overtly hostile to the United States and the western zones of occupation. This, in turn, made OMGUS question Soviet willingness to engage honestly in four-power decisions. Textor advised General McClure to file a formal protest with Marshal Sokolovskii to determine if this was the official Soviet view. If it was, McClure wanted to make it clear to SMAD that there was “little hope” of controlling the western zones’ press response to this rhetoric.⁹⁸⁶

A few days after Tiulpanov spoke, Alexander Dymschitz, who had since become the chief cultural officer in SMAD, wrote a pointed attack on U.S. information control policies in an editorial titled “Totalitarian Culture-Politics in the West.” This piece was a response to a September 19 *Neue Zeitung* article titled “Seventeen Months of a Totalitarian Episode.” Dymschitz asserted that every issue of *Die Neue Zeitung* included anti-Soviet material, and that the entire apparatus of ICD attacked the Soviets and the SED to ensure the continuation of

⁹⁸⁴ OMGUS, ICD, “Taegliche Rundschau: ‘What is Going on in the U.S. Military Government?’,” October 5, 1947, NACP RG 260/246/62.

⁹⁸⁵ “Oberst Tulpanows Begrüßungsrede,” *ND*, September 21, 1947

⁹⁸⁶ Gordon Textor, “Memorandum to Military Governor. Subject: Speech by Colonel Tulpanov before SED Convention,” September 29, 1947, NACPR G 260/246/62.

monopolistic, fascistic capitalism in the west. He claimed that Soviet methods of media control sought only to ensure that they filtered out Nazi ideology, whereas the U.S. method “is a feature of totalitarian reaction (well-known in Germany; who would not remember Goebbels and Hinkel in this connection!).” Oddly enough, this editorial pointed to the lack of available socialist literature in the American zone as proof of the moral bankruptcy of the United States, and claimed that it was part of a larger plan to obfuscate the reality of American life and culture. He also decried *Die Neue Zeitung*’s “slandorous article” on Ilya Ehrenburg, claiming that its content reminded readers of Goebbels’s wartime rants against the Soviet writer. Finally, he concluded by impugning all of the western zones for exercising control in favor of capitalism, stating “it is no longer a ‘totalitarian episode,’ it is totalitarian policy.”⁹⁸⁷

These events forced the Military Governor of Germany, General Lucius Clay, to launch Operation Talkback on October 25, 1947. This program called for the insertion of overt anti-communist and anti-Soviet material into the pages of the AMZON licensed press. Clay was remarkably open about this shift in policy. Three days after his decision to launch Talkback, Clay held a press conference at which he referenced JCS 1067 as a precedent to enact policies that would ensure that the U.S. must do everything in its power to “protect democracy and to resist communism” in its zone of occupation.⁹⁸⁸ By publicizing the new aggressive stance of U.S. information media, Clay and ICD sought to ensure that the plurality of Germans under U.S. occupation would support this strategy, particularly in Berlin’s political circles. The response pleased ICD. When asked, Erich Brost, Schumacher’s representative in Berlin, declared, “At last

⁹⁸⁷ Alexander Dymshitz, “Totalitäre Kulturpolitik im Westen,” TR, September 28, 1947 and OMGUS, “Information Control Weekly Review: Political Analysis and Public Opinion, No. 37,” November 29, 1947, NACP RG 260/250/158, 3.

⁹⁸⁸ Patrick Major, *The Death of the KPD: Communism and Anti-Communism in West Germany, 1945-1956* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 246.

... the Americans have made up their mind to see the thing through,” and declared the support of the SPD. A more sober assessment came from the Erik Reger at the *Tagesspiegel*. Reger was nonplussed by the announcement since anti-communism had already been his paper’s policy and that of *Die Neue Zeitung* for several months, but he was concerned that the campaign might bring neo-Nazis into the fold.⁹⁸⁹

Within weeks of Clay’s press conference, ICD increased the distribution of *Die Neue Zeitung* by 525,000 copies per issue. One hundred thousand copies went to Berlin in the hope that they might filter across into the Soviet zone, while an additional 50,000 copies went straight to the Soviet district. Another 250,000 copies went to regions along the SBZ border, while the rest went to the Ruhr and the French zone, with an emphasis on the Saar.⁹⁹⁰ The Soviets felt this pressure almost immediately, and Marshal Sokolovskii soon spoke out against so-called war propaganda coming from the Bizone. ICD responded that its practices required that newspapers print material from reputable news agencies, and that such content did not warrant the charge of war propaganda. Moreover, “contrary to the Soviet charge, systematic propaganda is not being carried on in U.S.-licensed press but in the German papers under Soviet control.” ICD was astonished that the Soviets seemed to believe that printing claims such as “Anglo-American monopoly capitalism is organizing Western Germany for [a] bloody assault on Soviet-Russia” was permissible under Directive No. 40, while the printing of news unfavorable to the Soviet Union in AMZON constituted a violation of the directive.⁹⁹¹ At the end of this series of events,

⁹⁸⁹ OMGUS, “Information Control Weekly Review: Political Analysis and Public Opinion, No. 36,” November 8, 1947, NACP RG 260/250/158, 1-3.

⁹⁹⁰ OMGB, ICD, Research and Analysis Branch, “Confidential Supplement to TREND No. 48,” November 18, 1947, NACP GR 260/894/144, 1.

⁹⁹¹ Alfred V. Beorner to Mr. Sundquist, “Comment on Marshal Sokolovsky’s Recent Statement,” November 24, 1947, NACP RG 260/246/62, 1-3.

ICD advised the press to remain cautious, lest counter-propaganda “overshadow and eclipse everything we are trying to do in the field of positive reorientation and reeducation of the Germans toward democracy.”⁹⁹²

Toward Division

The failures of the four powers to come to an accord bred a sense of gloom in the minds of the German public. Four separate surveys, the first of which began in July 1946, asked AMZON Germans to answer the question, “Do you think the Allies will work together for the purpose of leaving behind a united Germany at the end of the occupation.” Over the course of eleven months, public opinion shifted from a solid majority who answered “yes” to an overwhelmingly negative response. Residents in Greater Hesse were the most pessimistic, whereas Bavarians and Berliners still had some hope for U.S.-Soviet cooperation. Correlations with rates of newspaper readership showed that those who stayed abreast of current affairs were more likely to hold pessimistic views.⁹⁹³

Pessimism among Berliners, as well as all Germans, increased in the coming months. Following the collapse of the fall 1947 CFM in London, the British, French, and Americans held an informal conference with the Benelux nations in London between February 23 and June 2, 1948. These discussions led to several plans for the development of a western bloc dedicated to economic renewal and security from Soviet incursion. On March 6, the “Six-Power Conference” forwarded its first recommendation, which called for the development of a West German state in

⁹⁹² Colonel Gordon E. Textor, Briefing, “The Mission and Status of the Information Control Division Program,” no date, Second half of 1947, NACP RG 260/118/459, 12.

⁹⁹³ OMGUS, ICD Opinion Surveys, “The Trend of German Attitudes toward Allied Cooperation, Report No. 87,” January 9, 1948, NACP RG 260/250/162, 1.

the regions occupied by the British, French, and Americans.⁹⁹⁴ Soviet consternation was both expected and palpable. On March 20, Sokolovskii demanded a report on the proceedings to the Allied Control Council. The U.S. and Britain replied that the meetings were informal, and therefore a report was not necessary. Sokolovskii walked out of the Control Council, never to return. In his statement on the withdrawal of the Soviet government from the ACC, Sokolovskii pointed to the meetings in London as a sign that the British and American governments “are destroying the Control Council” and consequently, “actions taken now or which will be taken in the future in the Western zones of occupation ... cannot be recognized as lawful.”⁹⁹⁵

After the dissolution of the Allied Control Council, the *Tägliche Rundschau* published an interview with the SMAD chief of staff, Lieutenant General Grigori Lukaschenko, who explained that Sokolovskii had marched out because the Americans had violated the Potsdam Agreement, thereby nullifying the basis upon which the ACC had existed. These violations included the creation of the Bizone and vague but willful attempts by the Anglo-American occupiers to suspend the legislative power of the ACC. In light of these violations, Sokolovskii had little choice but to walk out of the meetings, since the separation of Germany had become an established fact and the Soviet Union could not participate in a body that existed only to cover British and American machinations.⁹⁹⁶ There were no hints suggesting that the Soviets would pursue an aggressive policy, although one certainly emerged in short order.

⁹⁹⁴ “Communiqué on Informal Discussions of the German Problem Issued by France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Benelux Countries, London, March 6, 1948,” in United States Department of State, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, 140-141.

⁹⁹⁵ “Statement by Marshal Sokolovsky Marking the Soviet Withdrawal from the Allied Control Council for Germany, March 20, 1948,” in United States Department of State, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, 142.

⁹⁹⁶ ICD, “Translation: Taegliche Rundschau, 26 March 1948. The Situation in the Control Council,” NACP RG 260/246/68 and “Die Lage im Kontrollrat,” *TR*, March 26, 1946.

Clay believed that the Soviets had planned the walkout or something equally dramatic well in advance of the ACC meeting.⁹⁹⁷ The SBZ anti-American campaign of March 1948 supports Clay's conclusion. In a March 3, 1948 piece titled "A New Anti-Comintern?" *Neues Deutschland* pointed to the reappearance of policies similar to the heavy-handed (*ohne glatte Handschuhe*) measures undertaken by the early Nazi regime. It supplemented this claim with a Reuters report on the U.S. Congressional decision to consider a "five-point pact against communism," and concluded that this motion was indicative of "what the Marshall Plan really means." On that same day, the *Berliner Zeitung* published an editorial that was almost identical to that in *Neues Deutschland*. Four days later, the *Tägliche Rundschau* reported on the start of discussions between the western powers in London, which the SMAD newspaper (accurately) claimed would ensure the permanent division of Germany. *Neues Deutschland*, the *Berliner Zeitung*, and *Vorwärts* published complementary articles on the nefarious machinations of the west at the London Conference. By the middle of the month, both the *Tägliche Rundschau* and *Neues Deutschland* strengthened their rhetoric against the London Conference, much of which sought to induce panic by speculating about the development of a military force in Bizone. This army, so the stories suggested, was the brainchild of General Clay and one that developed with the advice of members of the CDU, LPD, and SPD.⁹⁹⁸ Articles of this variety were to become a mainstay throughout the spring and early summer of 1948, as did articles on the systemic criminality of the "Anglo-American imperialists" and all that they touched.⁹⁹⁹

⁹⁹⁷ Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line*, 391.

⁹⁹⁸ Memorandum to A.V. Boerner, "Russian-Licensed Press Campaign," March 18, 1948, NACP RG 260/246/68, 1-3.

⁹⁹⁹ See, for example, the following from the *Tägliche Rundschau* in the month of March: "Kernpunkt – der Militärblock," *TR*, March 17, 1948; "Antisowjetische Propaganda muß unterbunden werden," "Die wirklichen Pläne der Anglo-Amerikaner," "Westzonenzuzug

By the end of March, SMAD moved beyond press invectives by establishing policies and enacting measures that worked against the western occupiers. The most dramatic of these consisted of new regulations concerning western travel to the east, which became effective on April 1. When the Americans and British refused to comply with the new regulation, SMAD cut off all transportation and communication lines to Berlin. Thus began the short-lived, ten-day “baby blockade.” After the Soviets resumed access to Berlin in mid-April 1948, there were an additional series of temporary transportation stoppages in early June, which certainly hinted what was to come later that month.¹⁰⁰⁰

As outlined in the next chapter, the developments of the months that followed April 1948 proved significant to the course of the occupation and postwar German political development and relations with the occupying powers. In many ways, however, the symbol of America as variously supportive and threatening had been set. The hopes of the occupied populations in the West remained based in the promises of U.S. occupation and international policy programs, despite relatively little improvement in day-to-day existence over the first years after 1945. Such hopes depended on a variety of environmental and economic factors, yet would likely have faded over time if not for perceptions of, and occasional direct knowledge of the state of life in the Soviet zone and the increasing threat of communism in the early cold war. Despite its initial sluggish response to Soviet zone anti-American rhetoric, the U.S. occupation government took seriously the possibility that the goodwill that had developed between AMZON Germans and the

gefährdet Ernährung,” “USA-Plan zur Zerstörung der UN,” and “Amerikanischer Sektor als Verbrechenssammelbecken,” *TR*, March 24, 1948; “Kriegshetze bringt Profit,” *TR*, March 25, 1948; and “Hungerflüchtlinge und Terrorbanden aus dem Westen” and “Kriegsgefahr nur von den USA,” *TR*, March 31, 1948.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Daniel F. Harrington, “The Berlin Blockade Revisited,” *The International History Review* 6:1 (1984), 93-94 and Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line*, 394.

occupiers could fade at any instant. Therefore, ICD developed programs that at once degraded confidence in the Soviet Union and supported the creation of acceptance for recognizable democratic development in AMZON under the tutelage of the western powers.

Across the zonal divide, the repetition of negative tropes had become so common in the SBZ press that it contributed to a developing sense of normalcy in crisis, a feeling that became an almost permanent feature of life in the GDR. Popular and political press treatments of the western occupiers and their societies became appropriated in time by less ephemeral media and by the East German intellectual class, particularly the historical profession which often shaped history to fit contemporary expectations.¹⁰⁰¹ At a simpler level, the United States was the enemy *par excellence* for the occupation-era because the projected image and relative successes of America on the international stage provided an excuse for the lack of noticeable improvements to life in the Soviet zone. The imperfections of life in the United States and in its zone of occupation also provided a convenient foil by which the SED could forward its platforms for democratic development.

The symbolic and actual power of the United States informed Germans' sense of collective self in the postwar world. The spread of communism also proved crucial to the emerging consciousness of both the East and West German states, for good or for ill. The response to communism differed from that to American influence, however. As the next chapter will suggest, AMZON reactions to and the SBZ promotion of the spread of communism became more than just a simple trope in public discourse – it informed the establishment of a press suited to meet the realities of German political and press cultures after the military occupation.

¹⁰⁰¹ Martin Sabrow, "Dictatorship as Discourse: Cultural Perspectives on SED Legitimacy," in Jarausch (ed.), *Dictatorship as Experience*, 200-201.

CHAPTER 10
COMMUNIST ENCROACHMENT AND THE REORGANIZATION
OF THE GERMAN PRESS THROUGH 1949

After the foundational year of 1945, the press played an ever-greater role in the war of words that accompanied Soviet-American discord and the development of the anti-western and anti-communist political cultures of the East and West German states. This eventuality owed as much to international political developments as it did to the constant reorganization and redeployment of the occupied press to fit domestic and interzonal realities, particularly those that followed the establishment of the Socialist Unity Party in 1946. The creation of the SED brought with it a rise in the influence of German communism in the Soviet zone, an increase in acrimonious rhetoric in the forms of anti-Americanism and anti-Communism, and the gradual strengthening of domestic political culture throughout all of the zones of occupation. During and after the Unity Campaign, the press in both zones began to harden its rhetoric in opposition to developments in the other zone, leading to the formation of the anti-communist and anti-American lines of discourse that became common to popular German political culture for the next four decades.

The Birth of the SED and the Fight
against Western “Press Reptiles”

Months before Stalin outlined for the KPD the steps necessary to establish a “Unity” party, SMAD propaganda chief Sergei Tiulpanov had begun to opine on the ways by which the popularity of the SPD threatened the political ascendancy of the German communists.¹⁰⁰² Soon

¹⁰⁰² Wettig, *Stalin and the Cold War*, 99-100.

thereafter, on November 2, 1945, the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* printed the first hint of a new stance on party unity as shown in an article by the Central Committee's cadres specialist Franz Dahlem. Through Dahlem, the KPD argued that "the tasks before the German people" required that the working class assume a vanguard role and force the workers' parties, that is, the SPD and KPD, to march "side by side" in order to "eliminate the vestiges of fascism and [bring about] the rapid democratic development of a united [Germany]." ¹⁰⁰³

Conversations on unifying the two parties began in earnest in late fall 1945. By mid-December, however, the leadership of the Berlin SPD seemed wary and in search of ways to delay the issue until unity became possible in all four zones of occupation. Nevertheless, the SPD in the east adopted a resolution to develop a program for unity during the first of the so-called Conferences of Sixty on December 20, 1945. ¹⁰⁰⁴ The *Deutsche Volkszeitung* devoted almost a full page to the decisions and speeches of the first day of the conference. Tellingly, the article downplayed SPD leader Otto Grotewohl's earlier reticence to move forward on unity of the workers' parties. ¹⁰⁰⁵ In the pages of *Das Volk*, the SPD claimed the resolution was but a step on the path to political unity, thus acknowledging publicly that many in the SPD desired political

¹⁰⁰³ Franz Dahlem, "Deutschland braucht eine starke Kommunistische Partei," *DVZ*, November 2, 1945.

¹⁰⁰⁴ At this conference, the SPD's Gustav Klingelhöfer accused the KPD of kidnapping, stabbing, and leaving for dead a member of the SPD. In response, Pieck heckled Klingelhöfer. Noel Anna, *Changing Enemies: The Defeat and Regeneration of Germany* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995, 1997), 190. For speculation on why Grotewohl and other members of the Berlin SPD changed their minds, see Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 278-281.

¹⁰⁰⁵ "Für die einheitliche Arbeiterpartei: Beschlüsse gemeinsamer Mitgliederversammlungen für des Zusammenausschuß von SPD und KPD," *DVZ*, December 21, 1945.

unity but not on the terms demanded by the communists. In consequence, SMAD censors forbade further publication of the decisions of the conference.¹⁰⁰⁶

Throughout the zone, KPD and SMAD officials browbeat and in some cases arrested dissenting Social Democrats over the course of the first three months of 1946. Even Pieck went so far as to express regret over the behavior of some KPD functionaries at the second Conference of Sixty in February 1946, while Grotewohl complained to the British occupation commander that the Soviets and KPD had so “completely undermined” the SPD throughout the Soviet zone that there was no possibility of resisting party unity.¹⁰⁰⁷ Such matters did not receive discussion in the SBZ press. Instead, both SPD and KPD newspapers displaced suspicion of any possible problems by engaging in a proxy war against the western district press.

The primary object of attack by the SBZ press was the American-licensed *Der Tagesspiegel*, which was in many ways the most vocal western media outlet opposed to the Unity Party and the communist takeover of the Soviet zone. *Der Tagesspiegel* had already become fodder for the *Berliner Zeitung* and *Tägliche Rundschau* by late 1945 after it criticized the Berlin Magistrat and printed articles in favor of a federal state. The Soviet occupation newspaper also reacted strongly to the *Tagesspiegel*’s printing of the constitutions of the United States and Soviet Union in the same issue as an unrelated piece on Friedrich Engels. The *Tagesspiegel* had noted that the power of the Communist party in Russia was such that it was unlikely that other Soviet republics could secede, while the Engels article noted the philosopher’s

¹⁰⁰⁶ Anna, *Changing Enemies*, 190.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Grieder, *East German Leadership*, 17; Murphy *et al.*, *Battleground Berlin*, 399-402; and Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 277-282.

reliance on Hegel. The *Tägliche Rundschau* referenced both articles in a prominent second-page story titled “The Reactionaries of *Der Tagesspiegel* Get Out of Hand.”¹⁰⁰⁸

SBZ press opposition to the *Tagesspiegel* increased in intensity in January 1946 following the publication of an article that suggested forced merger in the SBZ would prevent party unity throughout occupied Germany. A few days later, the *Tagesspiegel* reprinted a DANA dispatch of a speech by SPD leader Kurt Schumacher, in which he declared, “the SPD stands for the independence of the party in the forthcoming elections” and that the party was not bound by decisions made in Berlin. The response by the SPD and KPD press in the Soviet zone was instantaneous and strong. Otto Meier, in a reflection of the changing times, wrote an editorial in *Das Volk* that accused the *Tagesspiegel* of undermining the interests of the working class and of being a puppet of the American occupation. He followed up on this theme in a January 15 editorial that argued that the SPD would work with the KPD to achieve unity despite the exhortations of “the excited article writer of the *Tagesspiegel*.” The *Deutsche Volkszeitung* printed a similar piece, and decried the western district newspaper’s assumption of a democratic guise while working to ensure the success of the “reaction’s business.”¹⁰⁰⁹ By February, the KPD and SPD began to reference the *Tagesspiegel* as a “handyman of reactionary and fascist forces” and used quotes from the newspaper to raise indignation at public meetings during elections to the SED trade union, the *Freie Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund*.¹⁰¹⁰

¹⁰⁰⁸ Information Services Control Section, US HQ Berlin District, “Weekly Report No. 33,” December 7, 1945, NACP RG 260/253/206.

¹⁰⁰⁹ OMGUS, “Information Control Intelligence Summary No. 27,” January 19, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 18-19.

¹⁰¹⁰ OMGUS, “Information Control Intelligence Summary No. 32,” February 23, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 17.

KPD and SMAD terror influenced the still reticent leadership of the Soviet zone SPD to accept a formal path to unity in February 1946, with the provision that party members across the SBZ have an opportunity to vote on the matter. SMAD and the KPD overcame this obstacle in the provinces, but doing the same in quadripartite Berlin proved difficult. The KPD agreed to a citywide referendum for SPD members for the month of March. The *Deutsche Volkszeitung* spent almost a full month running stories that promised unity of the “workers’ parties” would guarantee the reunification of the German state.¹⁰¹¹ This effort proved unnecessary because SMAD effectively cancelled the vote in East Berlin. When SPD members in the western districts took to the polls, they demonstrated their wide disapproval for party unity and struck down the measure by a vote of 19,526 to 2,937.¹⁰¹²

This response made possible the continuation of SPD activities in western Berlin, but the path to party fusion continued in the eastern district. By mid-April, the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* proclaimed, “Berlin decided on Unity.”¹⁰¹³ Soon thereafter, the KPD newspaper began to wind down its operations and focused almost exclusively on the upcoming unity conference, the structure of the new party, and the missives of KPD and Berlin SPD party leaders. Finally, on April 21 and 22, the Socialist Unity Party held its unification conference at the Admiralpalast in

¹⁰¹¹ Early examples include “Einheit im Werden, auch in West und Süd,” *DVZ*, March 1, 1946; “Gruß den Delegierten und Gästen in Deutschlands Hauptstadt!” and “Einheitspartie von lebenswichtiger Bedeutung,” *DVZ*, March 2, 1946; “Einheit der Arbeiter – Einheit der Nation!,” “Probleme der Vereinigung von KPD und SPD,” Anton Ackermann, “Überwindung des Opportunismus und Dogmatismus,” and “Ost und West – ein Deutschland,” *DVZ*, March 3, 1946; and “So wächst die Einheitspartei in Berlin,” *DVZ*, March 14, 1946.

¹⁰¹² Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 282 and Murphy *et al.*, *Battleground Berlin*, 400.

¹⁰¹³ “Berlin beschloß die Einheit. Bezirksparteitage der SPD und KPD haben gesprochen,” *DVZ*, April 14, 1946.

Berlin, which made official the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the development of a whole host of new party institutions.

The next day, with the printing of the first issue of *Neues Deutschland*, Berliners and much of the rest of the world received their first copy of the SED's new manifesto for the German people. This document resurrected elements of the KPD *Aufruf* of June 1945, but there were differences. Although the Manifesto claimed that German communists were committed to being "the party for the construction of an antifascist, democratic, [and] parliamentary republic" necessary to secure all manner of human rights, including those of free expression, it also declared that the party's ultimate goal was "the socialist ordering of society."¹⁰¹⁴ This slight shift in position received its first expression months earlier when, in February, Anton Ackermann published an article on the "special German road to socialism" in the pages of the KPD intellectual journal *Einheit*. In his article, Ackermann did not abandon orthodox Marxist belief in the need for a parliamentary system as a precondition for proletarian unity on the path to pure socialism, but he warned that a democracy "in the hands of reactionary forces" would fail to protect workers' rights and those of the general population. Therefore, the only solution was democratic development "under the leadership of the working class."¹⁰¹⁵ This nationalistic approach was in line with similar political movements in Eastern Europe, and it was not an outright call for a dictatorship of the proletariat.¹⁰¹⁶ Within a few short years, however, the

¹⁰¹⁴ "Manifest an das deutsche Volk," *ND*, April 23, 1946.

¹⁰¹⁵ Anton Ackermann, "Gibt es einen besonderen deutschen Weg zum Sozialismus?" *Einheit* 1 (1946): 22-32; Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 303; Peter Grieder, "The Leadership of the Socialist Unity Party under Ulbricht," in Major and Osmond (eds.), *The Workers' and Peasants' State*, 22-23; and Melvin Croan, "Soviet Uses of the Doctrine of the 'Parliamentary Road' to Socialism: East Germany 1945-1946," *American Slavic and East European Review* 17:3 (1958), 303-304.

¹⁰¹⁶ Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 303.

“special path” disappeared and gave way to outright sovietization masked under the rubric of the SED as a “party of the new type.”

A Failed Election and the Reorganization of SED Media

The months leading up to the October 20 local election in Greater Berlin brought significant structural changes to the German press under Soviet occupation as well as the intensification of criticism of the West. Beginning in August, the *Tägliche Rundschau* began to cast suspicion on the motivations and policies of the British and American governments. In an article on “the sources of anti-Soviet propaganda,” the SMAD publication engaged in what would become a well-worn argument that tied Nazi methods with those of British and American “monopolists” and their proxies, the western SPD. Many such articles also forwarded rhetoric that inspired panic by juxtaposing peaceful pro-Soviet and pro-SED messages with suggestions that western “enemies of peace” would bring about a new war.¹⁰¹⁷ *Neues Deutschland* followed a familiar course through much of September and October 1946. The SPD was still a target, as

¹⁰¹⁷ L.L., “Die Quellen der antisowjetischen Propaganda,” *TR*, August 18, 1946; “Das Wollen der antifascistischen Einheitsfront,” *TR*, August 14, 1946; “Land- und Kreistagswahlen am 20. Oktober,” *TR*, September 12, 1946; “Um die Einheit Deutschlands,” “Wahlordnung bestätigt,” and “USA-Streiklage unverändert,” *TR*, September 13, 1946; “Berlins Frauen fordern ihr Recht” and “Die demokratische Gemeindeverfassung für die sowjetische Besatzungszone Deutschlands,” *TR*, September 14, 1946; “Niederlage der SPD im Westen,” *TR*, September 17, 1946; Otto Grotewohl, “Grundlagen deutscher Erneuerung,” “Wahl auf Probe,” and “Franz Neumann kneift. Der ‘Telegraf’ überführt ihn unfreiwillig der Lüge Arbeiter stellen ernste Anschuldigungen auf,” *TR*, October 1, 1946; “Stalin über die brennenden Fragen der Politik. ‘Ich glaube nicht an eine tatsächliche Gefahr eines neuen Krieges’,” “Allgemeine Erleichterung und Freude. Der Wiederhall des Stalin-Interviews in der Welt,” “USA-Volk stimmt Wallaces Kampf zu,” and “Scharfe Kritik an Trumans Politik,” *TR*, September 23, 1946; “Das Weltecho des Stalin-Interviews,” *TR*, September 24, 1946; “Stalin zeigt den Weg zum Frieden” and “Molotow-Vorschlag gutgeheißen,” *TR*, September 27, 1946; “Deutschland zum Stalin-Interview. Stalin kündigt den Frieden der ganzen Welt an,” “Deutschland zum Stalin-Interview. Bullwerk gegen den Krieg,” and “Die Sowjetunion im Kampf für den Frieden,” *TR*, September 28, 1946.

were a few newspapers in the western districts.¹⁰¹⁸ Unsurprisingly, SED-centric articles used proactive and all-inclusive language.¹⁰¹⁹ The party newspaper made a significant push to attract women voters, and included a number of articles that focused on the concerns of mothers and children in the Soviet zone.¹⁰²⁰ Other pieces addressed the prospective totalitarianism of the SED, the compatibility of Christianity and communism, and the ways the Party protected the needs of the working class.¹⁰²¹

These appeals did not garner much interest, as shown by decreased sales of *Neues Deutschland* in the months after the founding of the SED. Rather than question the quality and efficacy of their propaganda, the party leadership and the newspaper's editors attributed this decline to the physical and bureaucratic barriers that hampered press operations. There was

¹⁰¹⁸ "USA-Streikwelle wächst," *TR*, September 12, 1946; "Die Streik Auswirkungen in Amerika," *ND*, September 12, 1946; "USA-Streiklage unverändert," *TR*, September 13, 1946; "Vor einem Generalstreik in den USA?" *ND*, September 13, 1946; "Wendung im Seemannsstreik," *TR*, September 14, 1946; and "200 000 amerikanische Seeleute treten in Streik," *ND*, September 14, 1946.

¹⁰¹⁹ "Ueber die Aufgaben der demokratischen Presse. SPD-Betriebsräte stellen sich schützend vor Nazi-Direktoren," *ND*, September 5, 1946; "Die Streik Auswirkungen in Amerika," Walter Ulbricht, "Um die Zukunft Deutschlands. Zu den Erklärungen der süddeutschen Ministerpräsidenten zur Rede von Außenminister Byrnes," and "Wer war Gestapoagent S9? Eine Antwort an Gustav Dahrendorf," *ND*, September 12, 1946; "Vor einem Generalstreik in den USA?" *ND*, September 13, 1946; "200 000 amerikanische Seeleute treten in Streik," *ND*, September 14, 1946; "Gestapo-Agent S9 gesteht" and "SPD gegen Arbeitermehrheit," *ND*, September 15, 1946; "Anglo-amerikanische Reparationen aus Deutschland," *ND*, September 18, 1946; "Die fröhliche Verantwortungslosigkeit der Berliner SPD-Führer," *ND*, October 15, 1946; "Piecks treffende Antwort an Dr. Schumacher," "Hinter den Kulissen der SPD-Politik," and "Porträt Schumachers," *ND*, October 18, 1946; and "Der 'Telegraf' zum zweitenmal gestäupt," *ND*, October 20, 1946.

¹⁰²⁰ "Otto Grotewohls Antwort an eine Frau: 'Wir tun alles, um zu helfen,'" "Ein Wort an die Jugend," *ND*, October 6, 1946; Käthe Kern, "Wir wollen Frieden," *ND*, October 15, 1946; "Ein Wort an die Frauen," *ND*, October 18, 1946; and "Herr Muckermann ist wieder da!" *ND*, October 20, 1946.

¹⁰²¹ "Totalitäre Partei?" and "Muß der Arbeiter Marxist sein?" *ND*, October 10, 1946; and "Christentum und Sozialismus sind keine Gegensätze," *ND*, October 17, 1946.

some cause for doing so. At the paper's headquarters on Schönhauser Allee, for example, there were no meeting rooms and insufficient office space.¹⁰²² Approved copy often reached the printer too late in the morning, where *Neues Deutschland* had limited access to rotation machines. A weakened delivery capacity inside and outside of Berlin was another difficulty. More often than not, the paper arrived on the streets of Berlin by mid to late morning, and the edition that went to the provinces often failed to make it to newsstands by the late afternoon. This situation led to innumerable complaints and the cancelling of subscriptions, especially among female readers.¹⁰²³ Total readership fell dramatically. In March 1946, 60,000 news dealers and paper carriers distributed and sold a total 245,325 copies per issue of the *Deutsche Volkszeitung*. By October, the number of dealers and carriers fell to 29,000 with total sales of 171,734 copies.¹⁰²⁴ At the same time, other newspapers continued to sell quite well in Berlin.¹⁰²⁵

¹⁰²² Neues Deutschland an das Zentralsekretariat Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland, October 10, 1946, 73, SAPMO-BArch ZPA NY 4036/670 and Wilhelm Pieck an die Sowjetische Militär-Administration – Propagandaleitung, z.Hd. Major Davidenko, September 14, 1946, 42, SAPMO-BArch ZPA NY 4036/670.

¹⁰²³ Pieck an die Chefredaktion "Neues Deutschland," September 6, 1946, 63, SAPMO-BArch ZPA NY 4036/670; Neues Deutschland an das Zentralsekretariat der SED, October 2, 1946, 64-66, SAPMO-BArch ZPA NY 4036/670; and Betriebsgruppe B 18, "Neues Deutschland" an das Zentralsekretariat der SED, September 30, 1946, 68-69, SAPMO-BArch ZPA NY 4036/670.

¹⁰²⁴ Betriebsgruppe B 18, "Neues Deutschland" an das Zentralsekretariat der SED, z.Hd. d. Genossen Pieck, November 2, 1946, 92-93, SAPMO-BArch ZPA NY 4036/670.

¹⁰²⁵ Betriebsgruppe B 18, "Neues Deutschland" an das Zentralsekretariat der SED, October 23, 1946, 78, SAPMO-BArch ZPA NY 4036/670.

Table 4. Newspaper Sales in Greater Berlin, October 1946.

Non-SED Newspaper	Copies per issue	SED Newspaper	Copies per issue
<i>Tagesspiegel</i>	450,000	<i>Neues Deutschland</i>	180,000
<i>Telegraf</i>	500,000	<i>Vorwärts</i>	250,000
<i>Sozialdemokrat</i>	50,000	<i>Berliner Zeitung</i>	370,000
<i>Spandauer Volksblatt</i>	100,000	<i>Nacht Express</i>	250,000
<i>Kurier</i>	400,000		
<i>Neue Zeit</i>	250,000		
<i>Der Morgen</i>	250,000		

Irrespective of organizational troubles and the SED's poor performance as a third-place finisher behind the SPD and CDU, *Neues Deutschland* assumed a victorious demeanor after the Berlin election.¹⁰²⁶ The October 22 banner headline read, "Great Victory of the SED in the Zone." Below this was the slightly smaller subhead, "In Berlin, the SPD Accounted for the Greatest Number of Votes."¹⁰²⁷ The front-page carefully listed each party according to its ballot list number, with the SPD first, the SED second, and the CDU third. It also published an anonymous editorial that claimed an overall SED victory in the *Kreis-* and *Landtag* elections but overlooked the party's failure to carry an absolute majority. Of greater significance, the author of the editorial declared that Berlin failed to meet the SED's "legitimate expectations." Instead, the Berlin electorate had given the "reactionary press" a victory. The "reaction," so the article

¹⁰²⁶ The SPD won 48.7 percent of the vote and the CDU 22.2 percent. Dirk Spilker, *The East German Leadership and the Division of Germany: Patriotism and Propaganda, 1945-1953* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 101.

¹⁰²⁷ "Großer Wahlsieg der SED in der Zone: Auf die Berliner SPD entfiel die größte Zahl der Stimmen," *ND*, 22 October 1946.

continued, had learned that it could lead the masses to the “wrong decision,” just as it had in 1933. Therefore, the SED pledged to continue its work with all anti-fascists and “any *honest* democratic party” in the reconstruction of Berlin and the building of a new Germany.¹⁰²⁸

Behind the scenes, *Neues Deutschland* bore considerable blame for the party’s losses. Hermann Matern, the head of the Berlin SED, led the charge.¹⁰²⁹ Over the course of a series of post-mortem critiques, *Neues Deutschland*’s staff engaged in the well-worn practice of self-criticism. They noted several personal and organizational failures, and assigned considerable blame to the “enemy press reptiles” in the west.¹⁰³⁰ They also held discussions with Matern and editors of likeminded Berlin newspapers, including those from *Vorwärts*, *Tägliche Rundschau*, *Tribün*, and the *Berliner Zeitung*. During these sessions, they agonized and assessed their failure to win the vote. In the end, the editors came to the self-fulfilling conclusion that the SPD and its British and American masters engaged in the same tactics that brought the Nazis to power, and did so in order to destabilize political development in the Soviet zone and in Berlin.¹⁰³¹

These discussions compelled Ende to reorganize all operating procedures at *Neues Deutschland*. His plan granted him greater day-to-day authority by ensuring that he was present for the majority of the evening editorial sessions after co-editor in chief Max Nierich went

¹⁰²⁸ “Unsere Pflicht,” *ND*, 22 October 1946.

¹⁰²⁹ Anjana Buckow, *Zwischen Propaganda und Realpolitik. Die USA und der sowjetisch besetzte Teil Deutschlands 1945-1955* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2003), 237.

¹⁰³⁰ Betriebsgruppe B 18, “Neues Deutschland” an das Zentralsekretariat der SED, October 23, 1946, SAPMO-BArch ZPA, NY 4036/670; Lex Ende, “Vorschläge zur Reorganisation der Redaktionsarbeit des ‘Neuen Deutschland,’” October 26, 1946; and Betriebsgruppe B 18, ‘Neues Deutschland’ an das Zentralsekretariat der SED, z.Hd.d. Genossen Pieck, November 2, 1946, all in SAPMO-BArch ZPA, NY 4036/670.

¹⁰³¹ Bericht von der Information des Genossen Matern an die Redaktionen am 21.3.1947, March 21, 1947, 121-123, SAPMO-BArch ZPA, NY 4036/670.

home.¹⁰³² The staff began to meet with Nierich and Ende each Monday at 10 in the morning to set a schedule of topics and themes for the week's issues. The operations group (Betriebsgruppe B 18) also restructured itself to ensure a cleaner product and timely, early-morning deliveries.¹⁰³³ Finally, everyone from the operations group to the party's Central Committee resolved to refine and increase *Neues Deutschland's* attacks on the western zone press and their sponsors. Within months, distribution and sales increased throughout the provinces, although sales in Berlin continued to decline.¹⁰³⁴

As Ende reorganized operations at *Neues Deutschland*, he also advised the SED leadership on the development of a party school for journalists. In a December 1946, he proposed a two-day conference to instruct the school's first class and faculty on the SED's expectations of the press. This gathering would not only ensure that students had immediate exposure to the party line; it would also allow for a "final break with bourgeois 'role models'" and allow for the "creation of a new type of socialist press."¹⁰³⁵ As he explained in an earlier proposal, Ende did not envision the strict sovietization of the press. Rather, he hoped to generate a press culture that met the needs of German communists, just as that in the Soviet Union met the needs of Bolsheviks.¹⁰³⁶ Although tinged by the quasi-nationalistic vision outlined by

¹⁰³² Lex Ende, "Vorschläge zur Reorganisation der Redaktionsarbeit des 'Neuen Deutschland,'" October 26, 1946, SAPMO-BArch ZPA, NY 4036/670.

¹⁰³³ Betriebsgruppe B 18, Neues Deutschland an das Zentralsekretariat der SED, z.Hd.d. Genossen Pieck, November 2, 1946, SAPMO-BArch ZPA, NY 4036/670. See also Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands Bezirk Prenzlauer Berg an das Zentral-Sekretariat der SED, November 8, 1946, SAPMO-BArch ZPA, NY 4036/670.

¹⁰³⁴ "Situationsbericht, 1946," January 4, 1947, 113-114, in SAPMO-BArch NY 4036/670.

¹⁰³⁵ Lex Ende an die Parteivorsitzenden, December 16, 1946, SAPMO-BArch NY 4070/3.

¹⁰³⁶ Lex Ende, "Betreffend Journalistenschule," November 1, 1946, SAPMO-BArch NY

Ackermann at the beginning of 1946, Ende's call for a "new" SED press modeled on the standards set by *Pravda* and other Bolshevik party organs foreshadowed the redirection of SED policies that took place in the latter half of the Soviet occupation.

The Consequences of Fusion in the AMZON Press

Some prominent U.S. zone officials, such as Hans Habe, would claim that they saw the coming cold war as early as 1945, and therefore worked to undermine the Soviet state through the press. But a concerted American effort against communist propaganda and its influence on postwar German political culture came later in the occupation and was largely defensive.¹⁰³⁷ The needs and wants of German political parties also played a considerable role in informing the U.S. response to the left-leaning press in AMZON. By 1947, the situation changed owing to Soviet-U.S. tensions on the international stage and increased concern within ICD and ISD over communist intentions in the American and the other western zones. These concerns prompted the development of formal propaganda programs that sought to undercut communist criticism, and encouraged U.S. authorities to interfere in German press life.

This development began in part with the reaction to the formation of the SED, the increasing stridency of its anti-western democratic rhetoric, and the strengthening of an anti-communist perspective in the western zones. Under the leadership of Party Spokesman Kurt Schumacher, anti-communism became a dominant position in the SPD, winning the party and

4070/3.

¹⁰³⁷ In a later interview, Habe claimed that he knew the Americans would have trouble with the Soviets and so he published anti-communist materials rather early in the life of *Die Neue Zeitung*. Harold J. Hurwitz, "Interview with Hans Habe, former chief editor of the 12th Army Group newspaper and later editor of the *Neue Zeitung*, presently editor of the *Muenchener Illustrierte*," January 23, 1950, NACP RG 260/118/459, 3.

Schumacher some measure of trust in the increasingly conservative environment of the American occupation. While Schumacher's most famous statement on German communists asserted that they were no more than "red-painted Nazis," his stance based itself in appropriate skepticism about KPD/SED claims of adherence to democratic principals.¹⁰³⁸ As early as late-fall 1945, he began to work with local SPD leaders in the various British and American *Länder* to agitate against and discourage cooperation with members of the KPD. One of the party functionaries he brought into the fold was the first licensee of the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, Wilhelm Knothe, who had since risen in the hierarchy of the SPD to become the leading Party member in Frankfurt and Greater Hesse. After several meetings with Schumacher in Hannover, Knothe began to pressure local SPD journalists to avoid cooperating with newspapers that had KPD licensees upon penalty of expulsion from the party.¹⁰³⁹

Circumstances beyond the SPD also influenced Knothe's decision. Shifts in the structure of the U.S. occupation had led to the assignment of a new press control team in Frankfurt by January 1946. This team revoked Knothe's license because his political responsibilities had clearly begun to affect his work at the newspaper. His SPD colleague, Hans Etzkorn, also lost his license for failing to secure the confidence of his co-licensees and for "professional incompetence."¹⁰⁴⁰ Knothe did not respond well to this turn of events. On an official level, he agitated against the *Frankfurter Rundschau* in his capacity as a senior member of the SPD and the Party's main representative in the Frankfurt city council. In March 1946, for example, he

¹⁰³⁸ Major, *Death of the KPD*, 43-44 and Herf, *Divided Memory*, 32.

¹⁰³⁹ Boehling, *A Question of Priorities*, 198-201.

¹⁰⁴⁰ OMG Greater Hesse, ICD, *Historical Report: Press Branch* (summer 1946), 19, NACP RG 260/1491/1180 and Anthony F. Kleitz to All Licensees of the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, "Replacement of Licensees on the *Frankfurter Rundschau*," 11 February 1946, in OMG Greater Hesse, ICD, *Historical Report*, NACP RG 260/1491/1180.

pushed forward a city council resolution in opposition to the paper's "communist tendencies."¹⁰⁴¹

Unofficially, he sought to ruin the newspaper by exposing Gerst's past sins out of a belief that the former Center Party member was too tolerant of communism at a time when an SPD-KPD merger was a real concern.¹⁰⁴² More important, perhaps, he harbored a not-too-secret hope to create conditions for the publication of an SPD organ in Hesse. Etzkorn had already hinted at Knothe's plans, weeks before their dismissal, to split the *Rundschau* into separate SPD and KPD newspapers. Then, in a February 1, 1946 meeting of the Greater Hessen SPD executive committee, Knothe noted that the Gerst campaign was necessary because Gerst "leans strongly to the left side" and that Frankfurt needed a "purely SPD party paper."¹⁰⁴³

Gerst would have likely brought about his own demise without Knothe's interference. In spring 1946, the Frankfurt police received an anonymously delivered copy of a US intelligence summary that contained a transcript of a speech delivered by Gerst to a Nazi Propaganda Ministry function in August 1933. This revelation led Frankfurt authorities to revoke his right to vote. Strangely, no one informed Gerst or OMGUS of this before the May elections, and it

¹⁰⁴¹ Ernest Blumenfeld to Captain Peter J. Lert, Chief of Intelligence, Information Control Branch, OMG Greater Hesse, March 18, 1946, NACP RG 260/1491/1180.

¹⁰⁴² Max Kimenthal to Capt. Peter J. Lert, Chief of Intelligence, Information Control Branch, OMG Greater Hesse, "Ref. Reshuffle of *Frankfurter Rundschau* licensee," 1 February 1946, NACP RG 260/1491/1180.

¹⁰⁴³ Max M. Kimenthal to Chief of Intelligence, Information Control Branch, Military Government Detachment E-5, 2nd Military Govt Ba (Sep) Wiesbaden, "Theater critique of the *Frankfurter Rundschau* and Licensee Hans Etzkorn," 12 January 1946, NACP RG 260/1491/1180; Max Kimenthal to Chief of Intelligence, Information Control Branch, OMG Greater Hesse, "Wilhelm Knothe and the *Frankfurter Rundschau* reshuffle," 2 February 1946, NACP RG 260/1491/1180; Max Kimenthal to Chief of Intelligence, Information Control Branch, OMG Greater Hesse, "Theater Critique of the *Frankfurter Rundschau* and Licensee Hans Etzkorn," 12 January 1946, NACP RG 260/1491/1180; and Vincent O. Anderson, Chief Press Branch, to Chief, ICD, OMG Greater Hesse, "Frankfurt Report," 20 September 1946, 4, NACP RG 260/1495/1214.

seems that he cast his vote.¹⁰⁴⁴ Regardless, after not receiving a notice to vote in another election, Gerst complained to Frankfurt's Statistical Bureau on 28 June 1946.¹⁰⁴⁵ This led to public discussion of his past and an eventual summons before a local denazification board (*Spruchkammer*).¹⁰⁴⁶ Curiously, ICD was unsure of how to proceed after learning of these affairs. Some in the division were reluctant to remove Gerst because they believed conservative political circles had engendered the controversy in order to curtail the paper's aggressive criticism of local government and to purge Gerst and then Carlebach from the *Rundschau*. Another motivation for keeping Gerst was the simple fact that removing him for having a Nazi past would embarrass the American occupation.¹⁰⁴⁷ Others, however, had tried to revoke Gerst's license since at least April 1946, after another intelligence review determined that he was an unacceptable licensee.¹⁰⁴⁸

¹⁰⁴⁴ Max Kimenthal to Commanding Officer, ICD, OMG Greater Hesse, "Subject: German National Karl Wilhelm Gerst [sic], licensee of the Frankfurter Rundschau, loses right to vote," July 9, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/194.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Kimenthal to Commanding Officer, ICD, OMG Greater Hesse, "Gerst ... loses right to vote," 9 July 1946, NACP RG 260/253/194. Gerst took his case to the election board, and ultimately failed to receive permission to vote.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Lt. Col. William H. Kinard to Tom Wenner, Political Affairs, "Wilhelm Karl Gerst," October 2, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/194; Max Kimenthal to Chief of Intelligence, ICD, OMG Greater Hesse: German National Karl Wilhelm Gerst [sic], licensee of the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, loses right to vote," July 9, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/194; Kimenthal to Chief of Intelligence, ICD, OMG Greater Hesse: German National Karl Wilhelm Gerst [sic], licensee of the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, loses right to vote (Second Report)," July 12, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/194; Kreiswahlleiter des Wahlkreises V, Frankfurt am Main to Mr. Kimenthal Intelligence Section des amerikanischen Militär-Regierung in Frankfurt am Main, July 12, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/194; and Gerst to Kreiswahlleiter des Wahlkreises 5 Frankfurt/M., July 1, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/194.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Kimenthal to Commanding Officer, ICD, OMG Greater Hesse, "Gerst ... loses right to vote," July 9, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/194 and Phill Davison to Colonel Kinard, "Subject: Gerst," July 22, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/194.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Alfred Toombs, Chief, Intelligence Branch, ICD to Mr. James Clark, "Subject: Gerst," April 25, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/194.

As it turned out, Gerst made their decision easy. In the months since the paper's founding, his mistreatment of subordinates had led to severe inefficiencies throughout the paper's operations and a demoralized workforce. Even Carlebach deplored Gerst's behavior, but he tolerated it because Gerst did not interfere with his work.¹⁰⁴⁹ On top of this, Gerst tried to extort would-be publishers in Frankfurt to join the common welfare organization of the *Frankfurter Rundschau* and failed to satisfy ICD demands for financial records.¹⁰⁵⁰

Sensing he was in trouble, Gerst belatedly attempted to supply ICD with copies of correspondence that attested to his value to the American mission.¹⁰⁵¹ When ICD learned that he

¹⁰⁴⁹ Lt. Col. Anthony F. Kleitz, Director, ICD, to Office of Director of Information Control and OMGUS, "Revocation of License of Wilhelm Karl Gerst, Licensee of *Frankfurter Rundschau*," October 8, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/194; "Report by Gerold: Political and Personal Situation," (Translation), September 27, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/194; Kimenthal, "Wilhelm Karl Gerst, licensee of the *Frankfurter Rundschau*," (Conversation with Alfons Montag), 7 October 1946, NACP RG 260/253/194; Kimenthal, "Wilhelm Karl Gerst, licensee of the *Frankfurter Rundschau*," (Conversation with Otto Piz), 7 October 1946, NACP RG 260/253/194; Raymond J. Stover to Lt. Col. A.F. Kleitz, 7 October 1946, NACP RG 260/253/194; Kimenthal, "Wilhelm Karl Gerst, licensee of the *Frankfurter Rundschau*," (Conversation with Max Racky), October 7, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/194; Kimenthal, "Wilhelm Karl Gerst, licensee of the *Frankfurter Rundschau*," (Conversation with Emil Carlebach), October 8, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/194; or Kimenthal, "Wilhelm Karl Gerst, licensee of the *Frankfurter Rundschau*," (Conversation with Arno Rudert), October 9, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/194.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Alfred G.T. Wilhelm to George L. Frenkel, Frankfurt Detachment, Publications Section, Information Control Branch, Frankfurt, June 19, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/194; Stover to Kleitz, October 7, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/194; and Kimenthal, "Wilhelm Karl Gerst," (Conversation with Paul Schoenfeld), October 7, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/194.

¹⁰⁵¹ Vincent O. Anderson, Deputy Chief, Press Branch, to Major D. Schroeder, Deputy Chief, Information Control Division, Office of Military Government for Greater Hesse, "Knothe Complaint against the Rundschau," May 28, 1946, NACP RG 260/1495/1214; Vincent O. Anderson, Deputy Chief, Press Branch, to Major D. Schroeder, Deputy Chief, Information Control Division, Office of Military Government for Greater Hesse, "Transmittal of Letters from Mr. Gerst of the Rundschau," May 28, 1946, NACP RG 260/1495/1214; Copy of letter from Gerst to Newspapers in Hesse, June 29, 1946, NACP RG 260/1495/1214; and Gerst to Mitgliedsverlage des Verbandes Grosshessischer Zeitungsverlage, June 22, 1946, NACP RG 260/1495/1214.

was to appear before a *Spruchkammer* on October 7, they suspended his license pending the results of the trial. The same day he appeared before the trial board, ICD officially revoked Gerst's license for "tyrannical actions with reference to personnel."¹⁰⁵² In response, the remaining licensees and the works council of the *Frankfurter Rundschau* lodged a protest over the fact that ICD had not consulted them.¹⁰⁵³ Carlebach went so far as to submit a critical editorial to the British-licensed *Die Welt*. This piece acknowledged that Gerst possessed a "despotic attitude," but noted that the employees of the *Frankfurter Rundschau* disagreed with the claim that Gerst had been a bad business manager. Eugene Jolas, the editor in chief of DANA, which received the first copy of the editorial letter, urged ICD officials to review it with an eye to violations of the terms of Directive No. 3.¹⁰⁵⁴ ICD decided to redact those lines that focused on the reaction of the *Rundschau* employees and forwarded the piece to the British zone. In their final review, ICD determined that the newspaper's staff had no legal reason to demand advanced notice of the revocation of a license.¹⁰⁵⁵

Although ICD claimed that neither Gerst's politics nor those of the *Rundschau* influenced their decision, reports concerning his dismissal suggest the degrees to which ICD was susceptible to influence by German political sentiment. This is not to say that ICD or OMGUS exceeded their mandate. The terms of licensure stipulated that OMGUS could revoke a license at any time

¹⁰⁵² OMGGH, ICD, "Information Control Weekly Summer #38, 28 Sep – 5 Oct 46," October 5, 1946, NACP RG 260/255/247, 1-2 and Kleitz, "Revocation of License of Wilhelm Karl Gerst," October 8, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/194.

¹⁰⁵³ "Rundschau Workers Deny Staff Instigated Protest against Gerst," 31 October 1946, NACP RG 260/253/194.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Eugene Jolas, Press Control Officer, DANA Bad Nauheim to Lt. Col. Kleitz, Information Control Division, October 23, 1946, NACP RG 260/255/231.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Lt. Col. Anthony F. Kleitz, Chief, Information Control Division, "Frankfurt Letter," November 1, 1946, NACP RG 260/255/231.

without notice. Moreover, ICD had never been reluctant to interfere in affairs at the *Frankfurter Rundschau*. Almost immediately after the first issue, some officials began calling for the reorganization of the licensee board to satisfy Frankfurt's conservative leaders.¹⁰⁵⁶ In late 1945, at least two U.S. officers accused the first Frankfurt press control team of creating a newspaper "in accordance with the[ir] political philosophy" rather than that of the public.¹⁰⁵⁷ By February 1946, that is, after the removal of Knothe and Etzkorn but before the Gerst affair, concern over communist influence at the *Rundschau* was appropriate because the licensee board consisted of three communists and Gerst (the other SPD licensee, Paul Rodemann, left in November 1945 to run the *Darmstädter Echo*). Consequently, ICD removed Grossman and installed Karl Gerold, a moderate SPD journalist who had the approval of Knothe and who had worked with the British Secret Service while in Swiss exile.¹⁰⁵⁸ Finally, the timing of Gerst's dismissal occurred

¹⁰⁵⁶ Initial plans called for the removal of the SPD licensee Paul Rodemann and the KPD licensee Otto Grossmann. As Rodemann was leaving the *Rundschau* to start the *Darmstädter Echo*, they planned but ultimately failed to give one a KPD licensee, Otto Grossman, "an important job in the city administration" in an attempt to decrease the number of left-leaning license holders. Belfrage, "Conversation with Lt. Col. Sheehan," 15 October 1945, 1, NACP RG 260/253/216.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Col. C.R. Powell, Asst. Ch. for Operations, ICD, SHAEF, to Col. Kinnard [sic], "Memo on Communists in Military Government," undated (late 1945), sub: Licensed Press, NACP RG 260/118/459 and Powell to Kinard, "Licensed Press," 13 December 1945, NACP RG 260/253/198. They had an argument with the first point, though they could not have known it at the time. Two members of the first Frankfurt Press team, Cedric Belfrage and James Aronson, had leftist political sympathies and later established the *National Guardian*. On the latter claim, however, their superiors were quick to point out that there was no political life to speak of in early postwar Frankfurt and that all of the licensees were acceptable by dint of their anti-fascism. Luther Conant, Chief, Press Control Branch to General McClure, "Memorandum of Colonel Powell regarding the licensed press," 3 February 1945 [sic – 1946], 1, NACP RG 260/253/198.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Knothe had submitted Gerold's along with five others to ICD in March 1946. Ernest W. Adler, Deputy Chief, Press Section to Lt. Col. Kleitz, ICD, OMG Greater Hesse, "Submitted names for *Frankfurter Rundschau*," 29 March 1946, NACP RG 260/1495/1214. Gerold was an impeccable candidate and had returned to Frankfurt by March 1946. See Ernest Biberfeld to Commanding Officer, Information Control Branch, OMG Greater Hesse, "Karl Gerold-Lang, prospective licensee of the *Frankfurter Rundschau*," 12 April 1946, NACP RG 260/1491/1180;

alongside rising American interest in SBZ highlighting of news hostile to Britain and the United States. The U.S. assessment found that news on Anglo-American developments in the Soviet zone indicated that “reactionary forces” dominated western and southern Germany, that U.S. policies of denazification failed due to a lack of earnestness on the part of the occupiers, and that all of the ills in the Anglo-American zones owed themselves to the British and American “capitalist tradition.”¹⁰⁵⁹

After the Gerst affair, the controversies surrounding the *Frankfurter Rundschau* seemed to recede to the background. Gerold’s arrival certainly helped, as did the paper’s diminished advocacy of the “experiment” in the Soviet Zone.¹⁰⁶⁰ The *Rundschau* also faced a direct competitor in the form of the right-of-center *Frankfurter Neue Presse*, which launched in late-spring 1946.¹⁰⁶¹ Competition came with a price. Once the *Neue Presse* began printing, ICD reduced the *Frankfurter Rundschau*’s circulation to roughly 150,000 copies per issue in an attempt to create parity between the two publications.¹⁰⁶² U.S. officials took comfort in their belief that the *Neue Presse*’s rightist stance counterbalanced the *Rundschau*’s leftism.¹⁰⁶³

OMG Greater Hesse, ICD, *Historical Report: Press Branch* (summer 1946), 20, NACP RG 260/1491/1180; and Max Kimenthal to Commanding Officer, Information Control Branch, OMG Greater Hesse, “Karl Gerold-Lang, Prospective Licensee for the *Frankfurter Rundschau*,” 12 April 1946, NACP RG 260/1491/1180.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Per the U.S. report, SBZ news on the French zone of occupation was “conspicuous by its absence. OMGUS, “Information Control Intelligence Summary No. 46,” June 15, 1946, NACP RG 260/250/157, 7.

¹⁰⁶⁰ See, for example, “Klarer SPD-Sieg bei den Berliner Wahlen,” *FR*, 24 October 1946; Emil Carlebach, “Berlin,” *FR*, 24 October 1946; and Frankfurt Scrutiny, “Berlin Elections,” 25 October 1946, NACP RG 260/253/216.

¹⁰⁶¹ Office of Military Government for Greater Hesse, Information Control Division, “Historical Report: Press Branch,” no date [1947], 4, RG 260/1491/1180.

¹⁰⁶² By summer 1946, both publications distributed an average of 153,353 copies per issue. “Appendix No. 1: Circulation Graph – ‘Frankfurter Rundschau,’” and “Appendix No. 4: Distribution and Circulation 1 July 1946 of Licensed German Press of Land Greater Hesse,”

The News from the Other Zones

As ICD policy hardened against the perceived spread of communism from the east, concern within the division began to center on the growing availability of media from the SBZ. Rules to govern the interzonal exchange of printed material did not exist in the first year of the occupation. The Allied Control Council only began to discuss the issue following the seizure and ban of copies of *Die Neue Zeitung*, *Der Tagesspiegel*, and other western-licensed newspapers in Soviet-occupied Berlin in early 1946. In these initial discussions, OMGUS pressed SMAD to open distribution networks for all approved media. Soviet intransigence and the inability of the Allied Control Council to settle the matter delayed a formal policy for another year and a half.¹⁰⁶⁴ In the interim, *ad hoc* measures permitted limited distribution of newspapers across zones and districts. For example, in late 1946, British and French policies allowed SBZ publications as long as the residents of their zones subscribed to a newspaper and received it via the Reichspost.¹⁰⁶⁵ The SED took advantage of this and increased its distribution of *Neues Deutschland* in both Berlin and in the French and British zones immediately after the October election.¹⁰⁶⁶ The situation was more complex in AMZON. OMGUS assumed a “sight unseen”

OMG Greater Hesse, ICD, *Historical Report: Press Branch* (summer 1946), NACP RG 260/1491/1180.

¹⁰⁶³ This expectation preceded the release of the *Neue Presse*. See OMG Greater Hesse, ICD, *Historical Report: Press Branch* (summer 1946), NACP RG 260/1491/1180 and Conant to McClure, “Memorandum of Colonel Powell regarding the licensed press,” 3 February 1945 [sic – 1946], 1, NACP RG 260/253/198.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 103 and “Notes on Berlin Information Control Meeting, 12-14 August 1946,” August 16, 1946, 1, NACP RG 260/894/145.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Vertriebsabteilung “Neues Deutschland,” “Bericht über den Zeitungsvertrieb in der russischen Zone aussch. Gr.-Berlin sowie in den westlichen Besatzungszonen für die Zeit vom 1.9.46 – 30.11.1946,” November 30, 1946, 101, SAPMO-BArch ZPA NY 4036/670.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Vertriebsabteilung “Neues Deutschland,” “Bericht über den Zeitungsvertrieb in der russischen Zone aussch. Gr.-Berlin sowie in den westlichen Besatzungszonen für die Zeit vom

stance. As long as a newspaper escaped intercept by the Civil Censorship Division and arrived in a first class mail pouch, ICD was willing to allow Soviet zone newspapers in AMZON. The SED was unaware of this fact, which made them eager to find a solution that would allow them to sell copies across the zonal divide.¹⁰⁶⁷

Media exchange policies remained arbitrary and subject to the inclinations of local administrators and higher occupation officials until the Control Council passed Directive No. 55 in June 1947. This directive authorized the free exchange of newspapers, magazine, and other print material across the zones as long as such media did not threaten the security of the occupation or have the potential to contribute to “a resurgence of national socialism and militarism.”¹⁰⁶⁸ Directive No. 55 had the potential to work to the advantages of both the Soviets and the Americans. The self-assuredness of the SED and SMAD fed their hopes for the successful cultivation of a sympathetic audience in the western zones. The U.S. perspective also contained elements of an unwavering belief in the inherent appeal of western messages and media practices, which informed their position on the value of open borders in the increasingly high-stakes propaganda war. The development of the covert propaganda policy of ICD in January 1947, which had hoped to counter Soviet messages through subtle refutations of the negative stereotypes of Americans and U.S. policy, certainly suggests this was the case. With free exchange, *Die Neue Zeitung* would assume a vanguard role in U.S. information control

1.9.46 – 30.11.1946,” November 30, 1946, 99-101, SAPMO-BArch ZPA NY 4036/670.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Robert Schmid, Acting Chief, Intelligence Branch, ICD, “Banning of Russian Publications,” October 5, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/213 and Vertriebsabteilung “Neues Deutschland,” “Bericht über den Zeitungsvertrieb in der russischen Zone aussch. Gr.-Berlin sowie in den westlichen Besatzungszonen für die Zeit vom 1.9.46 – 30.11.1946,” November 30, 1946, 101, SAPMO-BArch ZPA NY 4036/670.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Allied Control Authority Control Council, “Directive No. 55: Interzonal Exchange of Printed Matter and Films,” June 25, 1947, NACP RG 260/246/64.

programs across the zonal divide. Consequently, the occupation newspaper expanded its operations to the former German capital by launching a Berlin edition.¹⁰⁶⁹

These new policies led to an unforeseen side effect within the American zone. The U.S. focus on subtle propaganda and the recriminations of the press across the zonal divide provided an opportunity for German political leaders to encroach upon the conduct of the press. Common tactics included the passage of local laws that opposed the tone of a particular newspaper, attempts to persuade businesses not to purchase advertising space, and orders to minor public officials to avoid discussions with reporters. Some resorted to restricting gas, coal, and electricity to newspapers and newspaper plants in an attempt to shut out the press. Fortunately, few were as extreme as the mayor of Schwäbisch-Hall, who called for the hanging of local newspaper licensees before the town council in spring 1947.¹⁰⁷⁰ A desire to maintain the prestige of political power was a major motivation for several of these measures.

This issue was even more acute in Frankfurt, where the largely CDU-dominated *Frankfurter Neue Presse* and the would-be KPD-sympathetic *Frankfurter Rundschau* faced a hostile SPD government that was all too keen to restrict gasoline allotments, vehicle registration certificates, and housing facilities in order to make life uncomfortable for the press. These experiences led the *Frankfurter Rundschau* to assume a particularly vocal role in supporting ICD decisions against the emergence of a political party press. Doing so led to increased opprobrium

¹⁰⁶⁹ Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 106-108 and Hartenian, "Role of Media in Democratizing Germany," 163-166.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Vincent O. Anderson, Deputy Chief, Press Branch, to Chief, Information Control Division, Office of Military Government for Hesse, Attn: Chief, Press Branch, "Interference with the Press," February 25, 1948, NACP RG 260/1495/1214; OMGB, ICD, "TREND: A Report of Political Analysis and Public Opinion. Report no. 48," November 17, 1947, 26-28, NACP RG 466/894/144; and Office of Military Government Land Württemberg-Baden, ICD, Research Branch, "Intelligence Report No. 17, Period Ending 13 May 1947," 12, NACP RG 260/885/62.

by local politicians. Beyond public recriminations against political interference, however, many licensed newspaper editors were uncertain how to respond to future attacks. When politicians in Hesse began drafting a constitution, newspaper publishers' anxieties only increased because the draft placed the *Land* in charge of the allocation and delivery of newspaper supplies.¹⁰⁷¹

Political maneuvering to secure moral authority over the press was at odds with U.S. policy. In the words of General Clay, the goal of U.S. information control was to allow the German press complete access to "official sources of information" to ensure that media "assume strong leadership in all questions affecting the community good and ... be in a position to examine critically the acts of German government officials." *Die Neue Zeitung* took this position as an opportunity to castigate German governmental attempts to curtail press freedoms.¹⁰⁷² In early 1947, it cited an ordinance passed by the denazification minister of Greater Hesse, who prohibited the passing of information to the media on major public officials who appeared before the dock. They quoted from an earlier *Leipziger Volkszeitung* article, and reminded readers to "recall from time to time that it was the absence of free public criticism which ... caused the misfortune from which Germany has to suffer today."¹⁰⁷³

Although OMGUS was aware of the pitfalls inherent to local political interference in press operations, it remained focused on the potential threat posed by Soviet propaganda. There were valid reasons for concern. The penetration of SBZ newspapers in the western zones began

¹⁰⁷¹ Office of Military government for Hesse, Information Control Division, Research Branch, "Public Opinion Review No. 3," June 10, 1947, NACP RG 260/250/155, 7-12.

¹⁰⁷² See "Freedom for the German Press, 1 October – trans.," October 3, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/193 and "DNZ 'Freedom of the Press, 9 Sep. 46 – trans.," September 10, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/193.

¹⁰⁷³ ICD, Translation "Die Neue Zeitung, 17 Feb. 'The Wicked Press'," February 20, 1947, NACP RG 260/253/193.

to have an effect by the middle of fall 1947. A resident in Fulda, for example, had declared, “The Americans should have learned better from Goebbels how to make propaganda.”¹⁰⁷⁴ When asked why they purchased SMAD newspapers, common answers included “to familiarize themselves with the Russian viewpoint” and because U.S.-licensed papers publish “only what the Americans want.”¹⁰⁷⁵ Sales of SBZ newspapers in Fulda were relatively limited, but this was not the case in major cities. In Frankfurt, 5,000 copies of the *Tägliche Rundschau* were available for sale each day, and the local KPD distributed an additional 300 copies of *Neues Deutschland* throughout the city.¹⁰⁷⁶ ICD expressed even more concern about the situation in Bavaria, given its proximity to the SBZ border. In contrast to the meager number of copies of *Neues Deutschland* in Frankfurt, news dealers in Munich reported that they received roughly 5,000 daily copies of *Neues Deutschland* in October 1947.¹⁰⁷⁷ By December, 487,319 copies of SBZ publications came into Bavaria, as compared to 173,119 from the British zone of occupation and 478,841 from the French zone.¹⁰⁷⁸ KPD operatives in AMZON played a role in distribution, and often promoted SBZ publications at news stands.¹⁰⁷⁹ Their efforts had an effect, as there were

¹⁰⁷⁴ Fulda Outpost, “Public Opinion Review,” 25 November 1947, NACP RG 260/1493/1184, 10.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Richard G. Akselrad, Fulda Detachment, “Interzonal Exchange of Printed Matter,” 25 October 1947, NACP RG 260/1493/1184, 1-2.

¹⁰⁷⁶ OMGUS, ICD, Research Branch, “Interim Report on effects of ACA Directive #55,” October 2, 1947.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Interview 0867, “Reaktion auf interzonalen Handel von Zeitschriften und Zeitungen,” October 22, 1947, NACP RG 260/891/94.

¹⁰⁷⁸ OMGB, ICD, Research and Analysis Branch, “Import of Newspapers from other than the US Occupation Zone of Germany,” December 18, 1947, NACP RG 260/891/94.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Interview with Hugo Ehrlich, Press Officer of the Communist Party, Munich, Bavaria, October 22, 1947, NACP RG 260/891/94.

indications that sales of the *Tägliche Rundschau* were quite vigorous because readers “want to know exactly what the Russians say about the Americans.”¹⁰⁸⁰

Of the newspapers that arrived in Bavaria in December, copies of the SED flagship organ constituted 7,500 copies.¹⁰⁸¹ With a moderate western distribution system in place, the SED decided to start a training program that would bring two or three representatives from the socialist parties in the western zones to Berlin to work on staff at the SED newspaper. Following a period of training, these individuals would return to their homes and serve as correspondents from the West.¹⁰⁸² A limited version of this plan had already taken shape at the end of 1946. In December 1946, OMGUS received a request to travel to Fulda, Berlin, and other cities in the Soviet from a writer in Wiesbaden. This person, Paul Kohlhoeffter, claimed that he was a correspondent for *Neues Deutschland*. Given that there was no agreement concerning the exchange of correspondents between the zones, General McClure reached out to Colonel Tiulpanov. Tiulpanov acknowledged that Kohlhoeffter was an unofficial correspondent for *Neues Deutschland*, but claimed that he had made the request to travel on his own initiative.¹⁰⁸³

¹⁰⁸⁰ Interview 0867, “Reaktion auf interzonalen Handel von Zeitschriften und Zeitungen,” October 22, 1947, NACP RG 260/891/94.

¹⁰⁸¹ The lion’s share of SBZ publications included the *Berliner Zeitung* (116,952 copies), *Tägliche Rundschau* (23,462), and the *Berliner Mittag* (22,000). OMGB, ICD, Research and Analysis Branch, “Import of Newspapers from other than the US Occupation Zone of Germany,” December 18, 1947, NACP RG 260/891/94.

¹⁰⁸² Neues Deutschland Editors in Chief to Pieck, August 20, 1947, SAPMO-BArch DY 63/2316, b. 153.

¹⁰⁸³ Paul Kohlhoeffter, Application for a temporary travel permit, September 5, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/213; J.C. Butler, Press Control Branch to Intelligence Branch, December 7, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/213; Brigadier General Robert A. McClure to Colonel S.I. Tulpanov, December 16, 1946, NACP RG 260/253/213; Chukayeff, OMGUS, to Press Section, Att. Mr. Butler, January 9, 1947, NACP RG 260/253/213; and Colonel S. Tulpanov to Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, January 21, 1947, NACP RG 260/253/213.

While on-the-ground reporting from the western zones might have done little to improve the successes of SED information programs, the leadership at *Neues Deutschland* nevertheless became encouraged each time they received news from someone across the zonal divide. Almost immediately after the passage of Directive No. 55, the offices at *Neues Deutschland* began to receive letters from the west. In one of these, an SPD party member from Hamburg claimed he preferred the content of *Neues Deutschland* to local offerings due to its cleaner appearance and appropriate political orientation. The newspaper had a clear influence on this individual, as shown by his reference to *Der Tagesspiegel* as a “Wall Street sheet.”¹⁰⁸⁴

Interference with the press from other zones became a common occurrence after the passage of Directive No. 55. One of the first cases came in August 1947, when *Neues Deutschland* wrote that postal authorities throughout Bavaria and Württemberg-Baden had refused to deliver parcels of the SED newspaper to subscribers.¹⁰⁸⁵ This obstruction was in part a reaction to regular interference by Soviet zone authorities in the distribution of western zone material, but it was ultimately a result of a decision by the Quadripartite Postal Committee to delay implementation of interzonal exchange policies.¹⁰⁸⁶ In the SBZ, confiscations of AMZON newspapers became a normal practice. Between October and December 1947, ICD chronicled tens of cases of interference with the distribution of the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *Der Tagesspiegel*, and *Die Neue Zeitung*. In fall 1947, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* sent 15,000 copies of its issues to

¹⁰⁸⁴ Chefredaktion Neues Deutschland an den Zentralsekretariat, July 3, 1947, SAPMO-BArch DY 63/2316, b. 130.

¹⁰⁸⁵ OMGUS, ICD, “Memorandum for the Director, Information Control Division: Article from Neues Deutschland,” August 25, 1947, NACP RG 260/253/199 and “Nachrichtenfreiheit unterdrückt: Willkürliche Massnahmen gegen das ‘Neue Deutschland’ in München, Würzburg und Heidelberg,” *ND*, August 23, 1947.

¹⁰⁸⁶ OMGUS, ICD, “Memorandum for the Director, Information Control Division: Article from Neues Deutschland,” August 25, 1947, NACP RG 260/253/199.

the SBZ, of which a third made it to their destinations. The rest had been confiscated or returned to the paper's offices by post.¹⁰⁸⁷ The number of such cases only increased in 1948, with eleven incidents in January and February of that year.¹⁰⁸⁸ Within months, the Berlin blockade put an effective end to the policies outlined in Directive No. 55 throughout occupied Germany, but for Berlin.

The Effects of Anti-communism in the AMZON Press

Directive No. 55 heightened American concerns that Germans would become susceptible to communist propaganda.¹⁰⁸⁹ Although there were only a few KPD licensees left in AMZON media, ICD increasingly saw them as a political liability, but remained somewhat reluctant to interfere in the constitution of licensing boards.¹⁰⁹⁰ Local AMZON politicians, conditioned by at least two years of hostility to the press, were not so reticent. In June 1947, the Frankfurt City Council began to threaten prosecution for rumormongers in the city. The Lord Mayor of Frankfurt, Walter Kolb, was clear on this matter: all citizens should report on rumormongers and

¹⁰⁸⁷ R.C. Martindale, OMG, ICD, Research and Analysis Branch, "Confidential Supplement to TREND No. 48," November 18, 1947, NACP RG 466/894/144.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Colonel Gordon Textor, Director, ICD, to Colonel S.I. Tulpanov, Chief, Information Division, March 24, 1948, NACP RG 260/253/210.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Richard G. Akselrad, Fulda Detachment, to Chief, Research Branch, OMG Greater Hesse, ICD, "Interzonal Exchange of Printed Matter," 25 October 1947, NACP RG 260/1493/1184; Fulda Outpost, "Public Opinion Review," 25 November 1947, 10-12, NACP RG 260/1493/1184; OMGUS, ICD, "Soviet Propaganda Practices in Germany," November 1947, NACP RG 260/118/455; and especially Research Branch, Information Control Division, OMGUS, "Special Report No. 2. Propaganda and the German Public: A Study of German Susceptibility to Anti-American Propaganda" 18 August 1947, NACP RG 260/118/459.

¹⁰⁹⁰ In addition to Carlebach, Rudolf Agricola of the *Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung* was one of the last remaining KPD licensees with any influence in the AMZON press. Major, *The Death of the KPD*, 252.

“enemies of the new democratic Germany,” that is, Nazis and Communists who engaged in “campaigns of lies and slander” against the government.¹⁰⁹¹ Events such as this encouraged some in ICD. With domestic political leadership increasingly antagonistic to far-left politics and with the perceived threat of SED and Soviet propaganda, ICD decided to purge their zone’s newspapers of their communist licensees.

Carlebach was one of the last communist licensees of the American occupation. Already an object for criticism at the time of his licensure, his submissions to the *Frankfurter Rundschau* had become relatively tame by the middle of 1947.¹⁰⁹² Since the Gerst affair, the newspaper had begun to present a wide range of political views in a reasonably balanced manner. This did not stop SPD complaints of ill treatment by the *Frankfurter Rundschau*. However, a two-week study of the *Frankfurter Rundschau* and the *Frankfurter Neue Presse* in late 1946 determined that the *Frankfurter Rundschau* routinely offered to print articles from the SPD in an attempt to “give equal space and prominence to each [acceptable German political] party.” Since the SPD had declined this invitation, ICD had decided that they had no room to complain.¹⁰⁹³ Moreover, the *Frankfurter Rundschau* remained the most popular newspaper in Frankfurt, with a readership that was overwhelmingly lower middle and working class, highly political, and statistically less

¹⁰⁹¹ Richard O’Regan, Associated Press, “Kampf den Gerüchtermachern,” June 16, 1947, NACP RG 260/1495/1214; Howard W. Calkins, Press Control Officer to Chief, Information Control Division, Office of Military Government for Hesse, Attn: Chief, Press Branch, “AP Handling of Frankfurt City Council rumour [sic] monger resolution,” June 26, 1947; NACP RG 260/1495/1214.

¹⁰⁹² Emil Carlebach, “Der Sieg des Dr. Adenauer,” *FR*, July 26, 1947.

¹⁰⁹³ OMGGH, ICD, “Information Control Weekly Summary #4, 18-25 January 1947,” January 25, 1947, NACP RG 260/255/227, 1.

aligned with the Nazi Party or its ideals. In other words, the paper continued to demonstrate its “ability to attract and hold [a] ‘better’ audience.”¹⁰⁹⁴

ICD nevertheless continued to cast a suspicious eye on the *Frankfurter Rundschau* for its “left wing tendencies.” A detailed review in March 1947 suggested considerable bias in those issues under Carlebach’s editorial control. ICD addressed this matter with the other licensees, and they promised to take steps to correct this tendency.¹⁰⁹⁵ One month later, ICD concluded that the newspaper’s bias had become apparent in its choice of western news services. The *Rundschau* utilized Associated Press stories, while the *Neue Presse* printed United Press material. When President Truman spoke at the commencement for Baylor University in March 1947, both newspapers carried the story. The UP story noted the president’s comment on the need for “free competitive trade” on an international scale, while the AP story omitted this point. If Frankfurters read both newspapers, ICD concluded they might suspect the *Rundschau* of politicization through omission.¹⁰⁹⁶ The papers also differed in what they covered. While the *Neue Presse* tended to focus on local concerns in response to a lack of middle-class German interest in world news, the *Rundschau* continued to highlight international developments.¹⁰⁹⁷

While these tendencies did not suggest an overtly communist perspective, ICD revoked Carlebach’s license without cause or warning on August 21, 1947, noting only that his political

¹⁰⁹⁴ OMGUS, “Information Control Weekly Review: Political Analysis and Public Opinion, No. 25,” May 31, 1947, NACP RG 260/250/158, 8.

¹⁰⁹⁵ OMGGH, ICD, “Information Control Weekly Summary #9, 22 Feb – 1 Mar 47,” March 1, 1947, NACP RG 260/255/247, 1.

¹⁰⁹⁶ OMGGH, ICD, “Information Control Weekly Summary #12, 15-22 March 1947,” March 22, 1947, NACP RG 260/255/227, 2.

¹⁰⁹⁷ OMGGH, ICD, “Information Control Weekly Summary #15, 5-12 April 1947,” April 12, 1947, NACP RG 260/255/227, 1-2.

beliefs and character were inappropriate for a newspaper publisher of the postwar era.¹⁰⁹⁸

Immediately after losing his license, Carlebach held a press conference for approximately 40 journalists. He attributed his dismissal to a cabal of OMGUS officials and “various Germans” who had long hoped to stop him from working as a journalist and publisher. When asked if his dismissal would affect freedom of the press, Carlebach responded, “Yes, certainly,” and declared that he knew of no instance of his having violated ICD directives. At the same time, he submitted a letter of protest to the director of the Military Government of Hesse, James Newman. Newman replied that Carlebach had lost his license owing to his “apparent inability to understand the fundamental principles of democracy.” Carlebach wrote to General Lucius Clay, accusing OMGUS of removing him not just for his political perspectives, but also because he was Jewish.¹⁰⁹⁹

Carlebach’s dismissal caused a minor uproar in AMZON newspaper circles, which saw in his case the degree to which the occupation-era press remained dependent on the goodwill of the Americans.¹¹⁰⁰ Many journalists in Greater Hesse expressed their displeasure with the way by which ICD removed Carlebach. Even staunch anti-communist publishers, such as the licensee for the *Hessische Nachrichten*, lamented Carlebach’s situation and saw ICD’s approach as a sign of the inherent limitations imposed on democratic development in AMZON. *Neues Deutschland* also made its opinion known, arguing that Carlebach’s experiences as an active

¹⁰⁹⁸ Colonel Gordon Textor, Director, Information Control Division to Director, OMG Hesse, “Withdrawal of Publishing License of Emil Carlebach,” 19 August 1947, NACP RG 260/253/196; Carlebach, *Zensur ohne Schere*, 132-181.

¹⁰⁹⁹ OMGH, ICD, Research Branch, Public Opinion Review No. 9,” September 9, 1947, NACP RG 260/1488/1134 and Carlebach, *Zensur ohne Schere*, 165.

¹¹⁰⁰ OMG Hesse, ICD, Research Branch, “Public Opinion Review No. 9,” 8/9 September 1947, 17-20, NACP RG 260/1488/1134

antifascist were argument enough to keep him in the press, especially at a time when former Nazis continued to enjoy careers under the U.S. occupation. In Frankfurt, however, there was a generally positive reaction, with some in the city claiming that his removal was a sign that “the Americans had finally awakened and were willing, at last, to remove from office these people who use their influence to undermine democracy.”¹¹⁰¹

After his dismissal, Carlebach’s reputation continued to vex OMGUS. In mid-January 1948, ICD believed he influenced the publication of an article in the Swiss newspaper *Der Tat* on the “Crisis of the German Licensed Press.” This article accused U.S. military press operations of patent theft and contained elements that appeared in Carlebach’s letter of protest to General Clay.¹¹⁰² Carlebach had little to do with its publication. A month earlier, Gerst had published a similar piece in the pages of the *Berliner Zeitung*, in which he railed against U.S. policies that allowed for the revocation of publishing licenses, and argued that the press cannot be free until publishers could operate in a manner that was independent from the whims of the occupying state. Gerst made no mention of similar practices in the Soviet zone, of course, but instead argued forcefully that the development of newspapers under the Americans would lead to a restricted media that was anathema to democratic political development.¹¹⁰³

¹¹⁰¹ OMGH, ICD, Research Branch, Public Opinion Review No. 9,” September 9, 1947, NACP RG 260/1488/1134. By October 1947, only three KPD licensees remained at newspapers in the whole of the American zone. The *Frankfurter Rundschau* licensee Arno Rudert was one of them. He managed to stay on because the KPD had kicked him of the party in summer 1947 for being insufficiently communist. ICD “Political Affiliations and Tendencies of 97 Newspaper Licensees U.S. Zone as of 15 October 1947,” October 15, 1947, NACP RG 260/253/194.

¹¹⁰² Vincent O. Anderson, Deputy Chief, Press Branch to Chief, Information Control Division, Office of Military Government for Hesse, Attn: Chief, Press Branch, “The Crisis of the German Licensed Press,” January 26, 1948 and Transcription of *Der Tat*, “Die Krise der deutschen [sic] Lizenspresse,” [January 17, 1948], in NACP RG 260/1495/1214.

¹¹⁰³ Wilhelm Karl Gerst, “Von dieser Stelle aus,” *Berliner Zeitung*, December 12, 1947 and Vincent O. Anderson, Deputy Chief, Press Branch to Chief, Information Control Division,

After Carlebach left, the *Frankfurter Rundschau* became even more accommodating to various political viewpoints in the zone. It published every bit of official information that came across its wire, even though such action was not required of the German press. This shift caused concern among some in ICD who felt that over-promotion of official news releases might diminish the paper's ability to reeducate the populace.¹¹⁰⁴ In April 1948, though, it received a special commendation for printing a balanced issue on various political parties and party platforms immediately before the April 25 Land Hesse elections.¹¹⁰⁵ Even so, the newspaper's early postwar reputation as a troublemaker continued to color U.S. perspectives. The following month, it received unjust criticism for its coverage of one of General Clay's press conferences in Frankfurt. In this case, ICD contrasted the *Frankfurter Rundschau*'s handling of the matter with that of the *Frankfurter Neue Presse*. They determined that the *Rundschau*'s comprehensive and solid approach to the discussion was better than that of the *Neue Presse*, which suggested that the licensees did not believe in the goals of democratization and had engaged in a disingenuous attempt to curry favor with American authorities.¹¹⁰⁶ In other words, ICD had lost faith in the *Frankfurter Rundschau* and saw it as permanently tainted to the occupation. This situation would change again in a matter of months, but it required the Berlin Blockade to make possible a shift in the fortunes of Frankfurt's first postwar newspaper.

Office of Military Government for Hesse, Attn: Chief, Press Branch, "W.K. Gerst: The American Licensed Press," January 8, 1947, NACP RG 260/1495/1214.

¹¹⁰⁴ Vincent O. Anderson, Deputy Chief, Press Branch, Office of Military Government for Hesse, "Clay and the Frankfurt Papers," 3 May 1948, NACP RG 260/1495/1214.

¹¹⁰⁵ The local KPD in Fulda made this election particularly difficult, since they distributed many copies of a special edition of *Neues Deutschland*, which contained an article by Otto Grotewohl, "A Word to the Hessian Voter." OMGH, ICD, "Semi-monthly summary for period 16-30 April 1948," 1 May 1948, NACP RG 260/258/250, 1.

¹¹⁰⁶ Vincent O. Anderson, Deputy Chief, Press Branch, to Chief, Press Branch, ICD, OMG Hesse, "Clay and the Frankfurt Papers," 3 May 1948, NACP RG 260/1495/1214

Press Radicalization during the Berlin Blockade

The developing proclivities of the shifting press cultures of the SBZ and AMZON radicalized during the era of the Berlin Blockade. As with so many phenomena in the late-occupation, these developments reflected the interaction of international decision-making, domestic political initiatives, improvised and strategic reactions by the occupiers, and the actions of individuals engaged in the press. They did not necessarily occur in reaction to the crisis in Berlin, but they grew out of the tensions that characterized the early cold war era and informed collective German senses of self and nation in an increasingly polarized world. Moreover, these final occupation-era struggles for political cultural dominance and the resultant reorganization of press that followed them established the bases upon which German press culture began to develop largely independent of direct interference by the Americans and the Soviets after the foundation of the FRG and the GDR.

While in many ways the origins of the Berlin Blockade rest in earlier antagonisms between the Soviets and the Americans, the issuance of final recommendations by the Six-Power Conference on June 7, 1948 provided an excuse for a final break between the eastern zone and those zones in the west. These “London Recommendations” urged the western occupiers to grant “the German people the opportunity to achieve on the basis of a free and democratic form of government the eventual re-establishment of German unity,” opening the path for West German statehood. Given the lack of agreement reached at the level of the various CFM meeting, the London Recommendations urged a joint meeting between the military governors of the British, French, and American zones with the elected Minister-Presidents of each Land to develop procedures for the convocation of a “Constituent Assembly in order to prepare a

constitution for the approval of the participating states.¹¹⁰⁷ Within a month, the meeting between the military governors and minister-presidents had taken place at OMGUS headquarters in Frankfurt, leading to the establishment of the “Frankfurt Documents” and a call to form a constituent assembly on September 1.¹¹⁰⁸

Shortly after the announcement of the London Recommendations, the now trizonal authorities finalized preparations to introduce a new currency to the western zones to stem black market profiteering and to spur growth in the production of goods for domestic consumption. Between October 1947, when OMGUS first developed this plan, and April 1948, the U.S. Military Government and the Bizone Economic Council, which was under the directorship of the future West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, began printing the new Deutsche Mark.¹¹⁰⁹ With sufficient quantities in hand, Britain, France, and the United States issued an order for currency conversion on June 18, 1948. Under the terms of the law, individuals could trade their Reichsmark for an equal value of Deutsche Mark. Conversion would become effective on June 20, 1948, and apply only to residents in the zones – Berliners were exempt from this law. The old currency lost its value the following day, although individuals could register or turn in the devalued money through June 26.¹¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰⁷ “Communiqué Issued at the Conclusion of Informal Talks on Germany Among Representatives of France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Benelux Countries, London, June 7, 1948,” in United States Department of State, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, 143-146.

¹¹⁰⁸ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 78 and Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, *A History of West Germany. Volume I: From Shadow to Substance, 1945-1963* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 217-219.

¹¹⁰⁹ Bark and Gress, *From Shadow to Substance*, 198-199.

¹¹¹⁰ “Summary of the First Law of Currency Reform Promulgated by the Three Western Military Governors, Effective June 20, 1948,” in United States Department of State, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, 147-149.

In full realization that the introduction of a new currency in the west could threaten the economy of the SBZ by turning the zone into a home to the worthless Reichsmark, SMAD introduced its own currency, the Ostmark, on June 22. Unbeknownst to the West and even to some within the SED, the Soviet response was planned and part of a larger propaganda offensive. Months earlier, in December 1947, SMAD had begun planning for the introduction of a new currency in the SBZ. To this end, it printed hundreds of thousands of coupons, which users would paste to Reichsmark once reform became practical. These plans remained secret for a reason. When the western occupiers announced the Deutsche Mark, SMAD was able to make a show of being unprepared for such a change, and could then make it seem as if they and the SED were but reacting to further encroachment by western capitalistic powers.¹¹¹¹ However, SMAD overreached when it announced that West Berlin would be a site for dispersal of the Ostmark. This decision forced a western response on June 23 and the introduction of the Berlin-Mark (B-Mark) into the western sectors of the city. Within hours, the Soviets suspended all land communication in West Berlin, cutting it off from the western zones and the SBZ.¹¹¹²

The struggle for Berlin served an important propaganda function for both the United States and the Soviet Union. From the U.S. perspective, it provided an opportunity to convey political and military strength, to suggest that western Germans would be allies in the cold war, and it proved conducive to the strengthening of anti-communist sentiment in the west. Within Berlin, ICD and its successor, the Information Services Division (ISD), worked with the U.S.

¹¹¹¹ Jochen Laufer, "From Dismantling to Currency Reform: External Origins of the Dictatorship, 1943-1948," in Jarausch (ed.), *Dictatorship as Experience*, 82-84.

¹¹¹² Harrington, "The Berlin Blockade Revisited," 96-97; Bark and Gress, *From Shadow to Substance*, 214; and "Tripartite Statement Announcing Extension of the Western 'Deutsche Mark' as Currency in the Western Sectors of Berlin, Effective June 24, 1948," in United States Department of State, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, 149-150.

military to increase its allotment of paper for West Berlin newspapers. An average of 210 tons of newsprint landed in Tempelhof each week, and these shipments remained constant in between August 1948 and June 1949, with only one major interruption in November 1948 owing to fog and limited paper supplies.¹¹¹³ Information Control also encouraged *Die Neue Zeitung* to give the Berlin Blockade prominent coverage. Fortunately, *Die Neue Zeitung* had already established a base of operations in Berlin.¹¹¹⁴ For the first six months of the blockade, *Die Neue Zeitung* published almost daily reports about the situation in Berlin, totaling 46 articles and editorials. On the one-hundredth day, it published a four-page supplement with a full page of pictures.¹¹¹⁵

Although the U.S. and British worked to ensure somewhat regular shipments of newsprint, paper, and other supplies, the blockade reduced the daily circulation of newspapers in Berlin from 1.3 million copies to slightly more than 1 million. Currency conversion also led to a temporary situation whereby western Allied newspapers sold at an increased rate in the Soviet sector. The June 26, 1948 Berlin edition of *Die Neue Zeitung* sold out in what seems to have been a very short period of time. So too did late-June issues of *Der Tagesspiegel* and *Der Abend*.¹¹¹⁶ This was the result of a decision to allow western sector newspapers to sell their editions for Ostmark at a guaranteed one-to-one conversion ratio for up to 25% of total sales.¹¹¹⁷

¹¹¹³ “Berlin Sector: A Report by the Office of Military Government, Berlin Sector, from July 1, 1945 to Sept. 1, 1949,” NACP RG 466/17/1, 73-74.

¹¹¹⁴ Report of the Working Party of the Preservation of Allied Information Media,” February 15, 1951, NACP RG 466/176/6, 7.

¹¹¹⁵ OMGUS, ICD, “Berlin-Luftbrücke. Artikel in der Neuen Zeitung com [sic] 28.6.48 bis heute,” December 31, 1948, NACP RG 260/247/77 and Clinton C. Gardner, Assistant Chief, “Die Neue Zeitung,” Berlin Edition” to Rogers, ISD, OMGUS, “Coverage of the air bridge by the Neue Zeitung,” April 23, 1949, NACP RG 260/247/77.

¹¹¹⁶ Fred B. Bleistein, Chief, Production Section, “Sale of Newspapers in Berlin and US Zone,” June 28, 1948, NACP RG 260/246/65.

¹¹¹⁷ OMG, Berlin Sector, ISB, “Report on the Publishing Industry in Western Berlin,”

Sales of Soviet districts newspapers fell in West Berlin over the course of 1948, but winter sales them to reapproach their pre-blockade sales figures by February 1949.¹¹¹⁸ On March 20, the western powers announced that the Deutsche Mark would be the sole currency for the western sectors, which caused the circulation of western newspapers to drop to a mere 610,834 copies per day owing to almost-depleted newsprint supplies, weak financial reserves, and a one-to-five exchange rate with the Ostmark.¹¹¹⁹

The whole of the press in the Soviet district of Berlin spent the blockade waging a war of words. Articles from the *Tägliche Rundschau* and *Neues Deutschland* defended the maintenance of travel and communication restrictions, while conspicuously avoiding mention of the word “blockade.” At the same time, they promoted the benefits of life in the Soviet district, claimed that the lot of West Berliners experienced degrees of suffering well beyond that which was actually occurring at the time, and decried the “provocative airlift policies” of the British and American militaries.¹¹²⁰ The SED was also conscious of the need to maintain morale. The

October 1949, NACP RG 260/253/202, 4-6.

¹¹¹⁸ OMG Berlin Sector, Information Control Branch, Interrogation of ten newspaper dealers in the U.S. Sector of Berlin, September 3, 1948, NACP RG 260/1172/93.

¹¹¹⁹ OMG, Berlin Sector, ISB, “Report on the Publishing Industry in Western Berlin,” October 1949, NACP RG 260/253/202, 4-6.

¹¹²⁰ There were myriad articles of these types. Better examples include “Die Werktätigen, voll Zorn auf die Spalter Berlins, fordern stürmisch: Nur die Ostwährung gültig für Groß-Berlin,” “Das Urteil der werktätigen Bevölkerung,” “Was jeder Berliner wissen muß,” and “Westmark Ruin Berlins,” *ND*, June 24, 1948; “Berliner Arbeiterschaft erhebt ihre Stimme,” “Der Werktätige lebt besser,” M. Sabinow, “Wenn der Kopf ab ist, weint man nicht über die Haare,” *TR*, June 24, 1948; “Für Deutschland – Gegen Londoner Diktat,” *ND*, June 26, 1948; “Sichert die Einheit Berlins!” *TR*, June 26, 1948; “Normal Geschäftsverkehr in der Zone,” *ND*, June 27, 1948; Freundschaft mit der Sowjetunion ist die beste Garantie der Unabhängigkeit,” *TR*, June 27, 1948; Hermann Matern, “Berlin keine amerikanische Kolonie,” *ND*, July 4, 1948; “Die Kontrolle des Flugverkehrs,” *ND*, July 7, 1948; “Faschismus unter amerikanischem Schutz” and “Flugsicherheit durch britische Flugzeuge gefährdet,” *TR*, July 11, 1948; “Luftbrücke gegenstandslos,” *ND*, July 20, 1948; “Lebensmittel treffen laufend ein um alle Berliner mit

possibility that the crisis might affect the 927 employees who published *Neues Deutschland* led to the launch of an internal publication, the *ND-Echo* in September 1948.¹¹²¹ Then, in December 1948, Verlag Neues Deutschland began printing materials for select audiences across the zone. These publications included the magazine *Der junge Pionier* and the complementary party functionary organ, *Der Pionierleiter*.¹¹²² At the same time, the newly-established *Deutscher Volksrat*, which served as the body that drew up the constitution for the GDR in coordination with the “People’s Congress Movement” (*Volkskongressbewegung*), established a detailed press unit that issued daily reports to SBZ media outlets in an attempt to convince residents in the zone that democratic progress was proceeding at a fast pace.¹¹²³ Finally, the Central Committee oversaw the production and distribution of weekly “*SED-Informationen*” reports, which guided publications throughout the zone on those news items that were appropriate for print.¹¹²⁴

erhöhten Rationen zu versorgen,” *ND*, July 29, 1948; “40 Tage Lebensmittel für ganz Berlin im Sowjetsektor vorrätig,” *ND*, August 11, 1948; “Berlin muß das Chaos überwinden,” *TR*, August 12, 1948; “Beliner! Alle um 12Uhr in den Lustgarten,” *ND*, September 12, 1948; “Kriegshetzerpresse” and “Ostpresse in USA-Zone verboten,” *ND*, September 25, 1948; “Westmächte verhindern Berliner Lösung,” *TR*, October 26, 1948; “Schutz vor den B-Mark-Spekulanten,” *ND*, October 16, 1948; “Das Geheimnis der West-Berliner ‘Wahlen.’ USA-Generale wollen Berliner Konflikt erneut verschärfen,” *ND*, November 12, 1948; and “Die Werktätigen Berlins haben gehandelt,” *ND*, December 1, 1948.

¹¹²¹ Klaus Hasse, Geschichtskommission Druckerei ND, “Daten- und Faktensammlung zur Betriebsgeschichte der Druckerei Neues Deutschland, aus zusammengestellt aus ‘ND-Echo’ und anderen betrieblichen Unterlagen,” October 1982, SAPMO-BArch DY 63/1200. For employment figures, see Neues Deutschland untitled Berlin report, April 12, 1948, SAPMO-BArch NY 4070/5

¹¹²² “Verlag ‘Neues Deutschland’ und Druckerei Neues Deutschland,” August 1977, SAPMO-BArch DY 63/2316.

¹¹²³ See press reports in “Deutscher Volksrat: Sekretariat, Abteilung III, V – Fachausschüsse. Auschuß für Sozialpolitik. Presseübersichten auf dem Gebiete der Sozialpolitik, 1948-1949,” June 1948-September 1949, SAPMO-BArch DA 1/147/51.

¹¹²⁴ See “*SED-Informationen*,” May 20, 1948 – May 2, 1949 in Zentralkomitee: Propaganda, SAPMO-BArch ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/9.03/8.

Coinciding with events in Berlin, the SED and SMAD began to undertake a significantly new course in the political development of the SBZ. As international tensions increased over the course of 1947 and 1948, the Soviet Union became impatient with the relative lack of popular support for the SED and the relatively slow pace taken on the “German road to socialism.”¹¹²⁵ Soon after the start of the Berlin blockade, Tiulpanov began to pressure the SED leadership to adopt an orthodox Stalinist line. While Pieck and Grotewohl went along with this recommendation, Ulbricht followed suit more than most. Over the course of the summer of 1948, he made several declarations on the need for a “party of a new type.”¹¹²⁶ By autumn, the SED began to dismiss and arrest party members. The victims of this purge included those suspected of appreciation for Titoist Yugoslavia, those with ties to the west, and many Jewish SED members whom the party accused of having pro-Zionist sympathies.¹¹²⁷ The ideological and structural move to a Stalinist SED also led to the resignation of many members who were not under a cloud of suspicion. Erich Gniffke, a former member of the Central Committee for the SPD, was among those who fled to the west in fall 1948. In a farewell letter, Gniffke declared that he was not leaving the SED, but rather “the Ulbricht KPD of 1932.”¹¹²⁸

Months before the First Party Conference of January 1949, which made the “party of the new type” an official policy, *Neues Deutschland* became the site in which the SED rejected the hitherto established notion of a particular German road to socialism, and called instead for the

¹¹²⁵ Tiulpanov first expressed his rejection of the nationalistically tinged notion of a “German road to socialism” in July 1947, but it would be another year before he began to insist that the SED abandon this concept in its public propaganda. Dietrich Orlow, “The GDR’s Failed Search for a National Identity, 1945-1989,” *German Studies Review* 29:3 (2006), 540.

¹¹²⁶ Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 308-316.

¹¹²⁷ Herf, *Divided Memory*, esp. 106-161; Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 310-311; and Pritchard, *Making of the GDR*, 166-169.

¹¹²⁸ Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 313.

communistic development of the SBZ along the lines established by the Bolshevik Revolution. For those readers who had remembered Ackermann's 1946 article in *Einheit*, this shift became apparent on December 21, 1948, when he wrote in *Neues Deutschland* that there was no need to account for the particularities of nationalism in a Marxist-Leninist democratic order. This article prompted a debate between Ackermann and Rudolf Herrnstadt, with Herrnstadt affirming that there were distinct historical, cultural, and economic differences between the Soviet Union and Germany, and therefore the path in the SBZ as well as in a reunified German state must necessarily account for degrees of difference. The two went back and forth in the pages of *Neues Deutschland*, prompting Pieck to intervene by shutting down the discussion lest it confuse the party rank-and-file.¹¹²⁹ As David Pike has suggested, the Ackermann-Herrnstadt debate indicated the degrees to which the SED had yet to eschew the nationalistic undertones of its earlier positions and the party's relative programmatic incoherence on the eve of the birth of the German Democratic Republic. Publically, however, Pieck and Grotewohl spoke of the need to learn from the Bolshevik model in order to lead to the democratic development of all of Germany as it moved to "its period of rule of the working class." This phrase became common

¹¹²⁹ Anton Ackermann, "Stalin, Führer des Weltproletariats," *ND* December 21, 1948; Rudolf Herrnstadt, "Auf dem Wege zur Partei neuen Typus," *ND* January 9, 1949; Ackermann, "Eine notwendige Antwort," *ND* January 16, 1949; Ackermann, "Lenin und die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung," *ND* January 21, 1949; Herrnstadt, "Antwort auf eine Polemik," *ND*, January 23, 1949; and Pike, *Politics of Culture in Soviet-Occupied Germany*, 546-551. Ackermann's position within the party during this discussion proved to be tenuous. Given Herrnstadt's popularity with the party leadership and Ackermann's declining reputation as the ideological voice of the SED, this challenge became influential in the SED leadership's decision not to appoint Ackermann to the Politburo in July 1950 and likely contributed to the circulation of rumors that Ackermann had been associated with Noel Field, the American who had been tortured and tried as a spy in Hungary in 1949. HICOG, "Biographic Data: Eugen Anton Ackermann," December 14, 1951, NACP RG 466/176/1, 5.

in the pages of *Neues Deutschland* and other newspapers in the SBZ because it was an acceptable substitute for the most appropriate term, that is, dictatorship.¹¹³⁰

Neues Deutschland was in a relatively weak position as it set to embark on the path set in summer 1948. As Ende acknowledged, “our press is bad and *Neues Deutschland* is in no way prepared to face the situation.”¹¹³¹ In his view, this was not a product of the unpopularity of party policies but of insufficient ideological discourse. Therefore, the SED set in motion several steps to enhance its engagement with the population. First, they worked with SMAD to provide *Neues Deutschland* additional printing supplies in order to boost production of the newspaper and widen its audience.¹¹³² Second, the SED press as a whole resolved to enhance the “ideological work” of party newspapers in order to instruct and mobilize mass support for the drive to sovietization. They recognized that *Neues Deutschland* and local SED newspapers were generally unpopular. Their solution was a “popularization offensive” that at once promoted the Soviet Union and other “people’s democracies,” while simultaneously increasing focus on the actions of the western powers.¹¹³³ In addition to regular discussions on the “great experiences of the CPSU(b) and the international labor movement,” the press would encourage popular

¹¹³⁰ Pike, *Politics of Culture in Soviet-Occupied Germany*, 546-555.

¹¹³¹ Benning, *Die Geschichte des SED Zentralorgans*, 116.

¹¹³² Brigitte Böttger, Hiltrud Hötzel, Rudolf Schulze, and Martin Pamp, “Belagarbeit Marxismus-Leninismus: Das Zentralorgan der SED ‘Neues Deutschland’ – der Kollektive Agitator, Organisator und Propagandist bei der Umgestaltung der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse auf dem Gebiet der heutigen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik,” 1976, 11-12, SAPMO-BArch DY 63/2316.

¹¹³³ “Resolution der Zentralen Konferenz der Parteipresse (Die Entwicklung der Presse der SED zu einer Presse von neuem Typus),” February 1950, 72, SAPMO-BArch ZPA NY 4090/313; Draft “Betriebsgeschichte. Druckerei Neues Deutschland – 1 – 1945-90 A,” 28-30; “Richtlinien für den Aufbau und die Arbeit der Abteilung Werbung,” no date (approx. summer 1948), 69, SAPMO-BArch NY 4070/5; and “Resolution der Zentralen Konferenz der Parteipresse (Die Entwicklung der Presse der SED zu einer Presse von neuem Typus),” February 1950, 72-73, SAPMO-BArch ZPA, NY 4090/313.

“criticism” of those who failed to live up to or enunciate the ideals of Marxism-Leninism. The third step occurred behind the doors of *Neues Deutschland* and other newspapers, where the SED press establishment set procedures that ensured the closer coordination of press activities between reporters and higher party functionaries.¹¹³⁴ Fourth and finally, *Neues Deutschland* established a “People’s Correspondents Movement” (*Volkskorrespondentenbewegung*), which the SED believed would create a significant relationship with the general population by providing them the opportunity to participate in public discourse, while at the same time training them to write in accordance with the party line.¹¹³⁵ On February 26, 1949, the SED held its first “Congress of People’s Correspondents” in Leipzig. More than 500 Party members and representatives of SED mass organizations participated. They took part in training on the practices undertaken by “workers-correspondents” for *Pravda*, attended lectures from the “short course of the CPSU(b),” and learned of the SED’s two-year plan and the need for widespread acceptance of a “socialist ideology in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism.”¹¹³⁶

Lofty plans and the occasional ideological debate aside, on a practical level the content of *Neues Deutschland* increased in tenor and frequency but central messages remained largely static. Strong statements of support for the Soviet Union had long been the norm in the pages of the KPD/SED press, as had criticisms of the western powers. The latter proved to be of particular concern to Ende. He had long advised the SED to balance its discourse on so-called

¹¹³⁴ “Resolution der Zentralen Konferenz der Parteipresse (Die Entwicklung der Presse der SED zu einer Presse von neuem Typus),” February 1950, 72-73, SAPMO-BArch NY 4090/313.

¹¹³⁵ Ellen Bos, “Das Prinzip ‘Massenverbundenheit’ der Presse in der DDR,” 156-159 and Boyer, *Spirit and System*, 123-127.

¹¹³⁶ Telegram: Hans Schieschke and Paul Lange to Zentralsekretariat der SED, February 28, 1949, SAPMO-BArch ZPA NY 4036/750.

“enemies of unity” with proactive discussions on reunification. For a brief period after the January 1949 Party Conference, *Neues Deutschland* published several pieces that revived the German unity rhetoric that had originally accompanied the foundation of the SED.¹¹³⁷ Yet these contributions paled in comparison to the increased number of front-page stories on Stalin, the Soviet desire for peace, and the ill intentions of the western powers.¹¹³⁸

Ende’s inability to transition *Neues Deutschland* into a proactive newspaper that encouraged popular support for the SED failed because of the wishes of those like Hermann Matern, who believed that proactive presentations of unity would fail to persuade the public. The SED forced presentations that consisted of denunciations of “enemies,” rather than positive developments underway in the Soviet zone.¹¹³⁹ In May 1949, Ende resigned to start a new SED magazine, the *Frischen Wind*.¹¹⁴⁰ With Ende’s departure, the SED decided to exercise its January 1949 abandonment of the need for equal representation by former members of the SPD

¹¹³⁷ Indeed, the notion of German unity was an important element of the SED Manifesto that followed the First Party Conference in late-January 1949. “Manifest der ersten Parteikonferenz der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands. Es lebe der Kampf für Einheit und gerechten Frieden,” *ND*, January 29, 1949. Example articles and editorials include Franz Dahlem, “Internationale Solidarität im Kampf um Einheit und Frieden für Deutschland,” *ND*, January 30, 1949; “Nationale Selbsthilfe erkämpft Frieden und Einheit Deutschlands,” *ND* February 8, 1949; Banner headline: “Für Einheit, Frieden und Völkerverständigung,” *ND*, May 1, 1949.

¹¹³⁸ “Erklärung des Außenministeriums der UdSSR zum Atlantikpakt. Gegen die Politik der Aggression und der Entfesselung eines neuen Krieges,” “Jeder Gewerkschafter gegen das Ruhrdiktat!” and “Die Wallstreet greift nach Indonesien,” *ND* January 30, 1949; “Stalin stellt die Westmächte vor die Notwendigkeit, eine klare Antwort zu geben,” “W. Pieck zum Stalin-Interview,” and “ERP-Gelder für reaktionäre Propaganda,” *ND* February 1, 1949; “12000 t Fett aus der Sowjetunion,” *ND*, February 2, 1949; “Stalin ist bereit zu einem Treffen mit Truman,” *ND* February 3, 1949; “Truman will keinen Frieden,” *ND* February 5, 1949; and “Nichtangriffspakt-Angebot der UdSSR,” *ND* February 8, 1949.

¹¹³⁹ See for example “Bericht von der Information des Genossen Matern an die Redaktionen am 21.3.1947,” March 21, 1947, 121-123, SAPMO-BArch ZPA NY 4036/670.

¹¹⁴⁰ “Dienstzeiten der Chefredakteure” in Draft “Betriebsgeschichte: Verlag Neues Deutschland,” no date, DY 63/2316 and Benning, *Die Geschichte des SED-Zentralorgans*, 8.

and the KPD, and so removed his co-editor-in-chief, Max Nierich.¹¹⁴¹ Herrnsstadt replaced both, and held his tenure as editor in chief of *Neues Deutschland* until July 1953, when the Politburo forced him out of the party for criticizing Ulbricht for pursuing rapid industrialization and socialization after the June 1953 uprising.¹¹⁴² Like Herrnsstadt, Ende became a victim of the Stalinization of the SED. In August 1950, his name surfaced with others suspected of contact with the would-be American spy, Noel Field. The Central Committee fired him from his position and banned him from the party.¹¹⁴³

As the SED press intensified its far-left rhetoric, *Die Neue Zeitung* underwent a distinct, if short-lived, shift to the conservative right. The origins of this transition also preceded the start of hostilities in spring 1948. Over the course of the months between Habe's resignation and the intensification of anti-communist propaganda in AMZON, Hans Wallenberg had left the newspaper. While the circumstances of Wallenberg's fall 1947 resignation are curious, the fact that he left *Die Neue Zeitung* caused some considerable speculation.¹¹⁴⁴ In Fulda alone, several residents decried his departure and noted their observations that the newspaper's quality had

¹¹⁴¹ On "the principle of parity" and the SED decision to end this policy, see Pritchard, *Making of the GDR*, 128 and 164.

¹¹⁴² Major, *Death of the KPD*, 122. During his purge from the SED, Herrnsstadt's early 1949 debate with Anton Ackermann became one of several pieces of evidence used against him. "Rudolf Herrnsstadt an die Mitglieder und Kandidaten des Politbüros zur Information," August 31, 1953, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J 2/2J/3.

¹¹⁴³ Herf, *Divided Memory*, 114 and Engbergs, Wielgoßs, and Hoffmann, *Wer war wer in der DDR?* as at <http://www.stiftung-aufarbeitung.de/wer-war-wer-in-der-ddr-%2363%3B-1424.html?ID=717>, last accessed March 4, 2008.

¹¹⁴⁴ As Gienow-Hecht discussed, Wallenberg would often feel overwhelmed and then submit a letter of resignation to General McClure. Each time, McClure would calm Wallenberg, who then returned to his job. Then, in summer 1947, McClure returned to the Pentagon. His replacement, Colonel Gordon Textor, had less patience. When Wallenberg submitted another letter of resignation in August 1947, Textor accepted it. Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 109 and 113-114.

begun to decline almost immediately after he left. A Protestant dean in the city believed that Wallenberg had become a victim of certain conservatives because he was a secret advocate for “Catholic circles.” He tried to substantiate his claim by pointing to recent articles on existentialism, which this individual had decided “corresponded entirely to the Catholic line of reasoning.” Expressing a different conspiracy, an LDP party secretary in Fulda suggested that political conservatives had pushed Wallenberg out, as evidenced by recent content that seemed to be “more and more floating in the wake of socialism.”¹¹⁴⁵

Wallenberg’s replacement was the Wisconsin-born Jack Fleischer, a former UP correspondent who had worked for *Time* and *Life* magazines. Fleischer’s micro-managed operations at the newspaper out of a desire to shift the paper’s tone to force an emphasis on anti-communism and to increase the amount of pro-American material published in its pages. Fleischer’s policies led to increased public criticism of *Die Neue Zeitung* as a propaganda organ with a sterile tone and little news value.¹¹⁴⁶ He also caused a split in the newspaper’s ranks. A number of younger and established German journalists became even more eager to publish more anti-Communist material, but written from a nationalistic perspective. Enno Hobbing, the editor of the *Berliner Blatt* of *Die Neue Zeitung*, was one of the principal members of this group, but its *de facto* leader was the paper’s foreign affairs editor and Habe-era appointee Hans Lehmann.¹¹⁴⁷

At the end of August 1948, Fleischer contracted pneumonia and went on sick leave for seven weeks. During this time, Hobbing assumed control of *Die Neue Zeitung*, and used this

¹¹⁴⁵ Richard G. Akselrad, Fulda Detachment [ICD], “Public Opinion Review,” 8 September 1947, NACP RG 260/1493/1184, 4.

¹¹⁴⁶ Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 121-140 and Hartenian, *Controlling Information in U.S. Occupied Germany*, 333.

¹¹⁴⁷ Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 142-144.

opportunity to promote Lehmann and dismiss those who had been close to Fleischer. ICD approved these changes. Within three days of Fleischer's return to the paper's Munich offices, Textor informed him that his services were no longer required. Fleischer's replacement, Kendall Foss, began work a month later and set the paper on a course that fit the vision of Lehmann and those who supported him.¹¹⁴⁸ A staunch anti-communist, Foss gave Lehmann and Hobbing freedom to print as they saw fit, and criticism of the strong, nationalistic tone of *Die Neue Zeitung* emerged within weeks of this change in internal policy.¹¹⁴⁹

On January 25, 1949, the *Frankfurter Rundschau* published a scathing review titled "The 'New Newspaper' is no longer new." This article suggested coyly that "some people in Germany smile knowingly when they read *Die Neue Zeitung*" for in its pages they can always find "peppered criticism of the U.S. occupation or Anglo-American occupation policy" clothed in the form of objective editorial columns and reader letters. It also reported that readers noticed that *Die Neue Zeitung* "apparently entertains no dislike of journalists from the Third Reich" when she or he reads bylines.¹¹⁵⁰ Two days later, the *New York Herald Tribune* ran a story, "*Neue Zeitung* Turns Nationalist," which focused on Lehmann and accused the paper of resurrecting nationalistic themes.¹¹⁵¹ The *Frankfurter Rundschau* followed this with a UP story that claimed *Die Neue Zeitung* had employed former Nazis. This piece prompted Colonel Textor

¹¹⁴⁸ Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 145-146.

¹¹⁴⁹ Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 150-151 and Hartenian, *Controlling Information in U.S. Occupied Germany*, 334.

¹¹⁵⁰ "Die 'Neue Zeitung' nicht mehr neu," *FR*, January 25, 1949.

¹¹⁵¹ Edwin Hartrich, "Neue Zeitung Turns Nationalist," *New York Herald Tribune*, January 27, 1949; Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 158; and Hartenian, *Controlling Information in U.S. Occupied Germany*, 334.

to make a public promise to investigate these claims.¹¹⁵² Soon thereafter, another short United Press piece announced the dismissal of Hans Lehmann.¹¹⁵³ Within days, the story became a controversy throughout the zones.¹¹⁵⁴

At the offices of *Die Neue Zeitung*, the staff loyal to Lehmann reacted not to coverage from within the zone, but rather to the *Herald Tribune* article. Lehmann declared that the article contained several lies, and that its author, Edwin Hartrich, had failed to exercise proper journalistic ethics. Some of his points had merit. Hartrich had incorrectly ennobled Lehmann by adding a “von” to his name and claimed mistakenly that Lehmann had been an editor at *Die Allgemeine Zeitung*. Lehmann also pointed out that he always published material that affirmed a thoroughly pro-American perspective.¹¹⁵⁵ He tried to explain his time at the *Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten*, the Nazi-era paper that had been the source of his rejection by the CIC in 1945, by claiming the Nazi Party had suspended him from the paper in October 1933 and that he remained in the paper’s employment thanks to the protection of his editor in chief. Indeed, he assured ICD that his anti-Nazism was so well known that “the only Nazi editor [sic] employed with the paper once said that he hoped that ‘in this war there will be a bullet also for me.’” In the end, he attributed his downfall to Fleischer’s tenure, which brought a decline in standards and various

¹¹⁵² “Textor und ‘Die Neue Zeitung’,” *FR*, January 31, 1949.

¹¹⁵³ “Redakteur Dr. Lehmann mußte ‘Die Neue Zeitung’ verlassen,” *FR*, February 2, 1949.

¹¹⁵⁴ “Textor über ‘Die Neue Zeitung’,” *FR*, February 9, 1949; *Frankfurter Neue Presse*, “Die Krise in der NZ,” February 9, 1949; and *Abendpost*, “Palastrevolution bei der Neuen Zeitung,” February 8, 1949; and “‘Neue Zeitung’ nicht für die Deutschen,” *TR*, February 8, 1949.

¹¹⁵⁵ “Statement by Dr. Hans Lehmann, ‘Neue Zeitung’ editor on foreign affairs,” no date [late-winter 1949], NACP RG 260/246/65.

whisper campaigns among that staff that he, Lehmann, was variously “[a] militarist, [a] reactionary, or even [a] communist.”¹¹⁵⁶

Carl Ebbinghaus, another member of the Lehmann clique, also denied statements attributed to him in the Hartrich article.¹¹⁵⁷ As for his “nationalist tendencies,” he pointed to his 1942 imprisonment for “anti-national-socialist activities.”¹¹⁵⁸ Following ICD’s decision to remove Lehmann from the paper and Foss’s announcement of a new course, Ebbinghaus and his colleague Peter Bönisch left the newspaper. The day after, they wrote and distributed a statement that *Die Neue Zeitung* would no longer be a newspaper, but a mouthpiece for U.S. policies. This statement appeared in several newspapers across the occupation zones.¹¹⁵⁹

The Lehman affair ended with the dismissal of three German staff and the resignations of ten additional personnel.¹¹⁶⁰ The ISD placed a tripartite board in charge of the newspaper. Policies at *Die Neue Zeitung* remained the same, but the board became responsible for control of the newspaper’s editorial content and the dictation of policy to the editor in chief. ISD also ordered the board to “study the present organization of *Die Neue Zeitung*, as to both German and American staffs, and make any necessary changes.”¹¹⁶¹ Foss remained the nominal editor in

¹¹⁵⁶ “Statement by Dr. Hans Lehmann, ‘Neue Zeitung’ editor on foreign affairs,” no date [late-winter 1949], NACP RG 260/246/65.

¹¹⁵⁷ “Statement by Carl Hermann Ebbinghaus, ‘Neue Zeitung’ editor on Domestic Affairs,” no date [late-winter 1949], NACP RG 260/246/65.

¹¹⁵⁸ “Statement by Carl Hermann Ebbinghaus, ‘Neue Zeitung’ editor on Domestic Affairs,” no date [late-winter 1949], NACP RG 260/246/65.

¹¹⁵⁹ Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 158-160.

¹¹⁶⁰ “Weekly Report – Die Neue Zeitung Editorial Board,” February 18, 1949, NACP RG 260/246/65.

¹¹⁶¹ Gordon E. Textor, Director, Information Services Division, “Divisional Memorandum No. [no number given],” February 9, 1949, NACP RG 260/246/65.

chief, but had an awkward relationship with the board. One month after the Lehmann debacle, the journalist Curt Heymann reported to ISD that the split between the tripartite control board and Foss led to practices that were “frequently contrary to standard rules of American journalism and quite often contrary to good judgment.” The board seemed to agree with his assessment and outlined plans to develop new procedures. In a subsequent meeting with Heymann, Foss expressed his doubts about the future benefit of publishing *Die Neue Zeitung* because he believed any solution to its problems would be doomed owing to a basic obstacle: “MG policy and directives.”¹¹⁶²

The End of the Blockade and the Creation of Two German Republics

The peak month of the Berlin Airlift was also one of the last of the blockade. In April 1949, the British and American air forces delivered more than 200,000 tons of material to the city. To promote this achievement and boost support for the airlift, the U.S. Air Forces in Europe worked with the Public Information Office at OMGUS to write a story for release in the Berlin press. It noted many of the finer details of the airlift, including the numbers of U.S. servicemen who had died during the operation, the supplies delivered, and a complete timeline. While it appears that the twelve-page story never appeared in full, it became a press primer on the U.S. effort and the pride felt by the western powers in successfully maintaining a presence in the former German capital.¹¹⁶³

¹¹⁶² Curt L. Heymann to Thomas P. Headen, Deputy Director, Information Services Division, OMGUS, Berlin, February 18, 1949, NACP RG 260/246/65.

¹¹⁶³ OMGUS, Public Information Office, “For Information of Correspondents,” May 10, 1949, NACP RG 260/247/77.

The fact of the blockade and the western airlift did much to raise the importance of Berlin in the minds of many western zone Germans, many of whom had begun to think increasingly less of the importance of Germany's capital city in the early years of the occupation. An early fall 1947 survey of 3,400 Germans across the American Zone and in the British and American sectors of Berlin exhibited a great diversity of responses to the question, "Do you think that Berlin should be the capital of Germany?" While more than 90 percent of Berliners answered in the affirmative, there were considerably different responses in the zone. Residents of Greater Hesse were more likely to answer "yes" than were their co-nationals in Bavaria and Württemberg-Baden, while citizens in small towns with populations less than 10,000 persons were more likely to answer yes than were urbanites. Those who answered "no" suggested Frankfurt, a.M. (47%) as the future capital, followed by Munich (32%), Stuttgart (4%) or other cities.¹¹⁶⁴ Bonn was not an option in the minds of these respondents.

With the airlift, the importance of Germany's former capital became a preeminent issue in the press and in the minds of the leadership of the nascent East and West German states. In the West, the standoff in Berlin engendered widespread approval for the establishment of a West German government.¹¹⁶⁵ In the East, it became a symbol of the imperialistic intentions of the western powers and proof of the need for a German government that enjoyed friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Throughout the blockade, German media across the *Zonengrenzen* reported on the development of constitutions and institutions for the future German states. Such

¹¹⁶⁴ ICD Opinion Surveys, "Berlin – Symbol of a National State, Report No. 71," October 17, 1947, NACP RG 260/250/162.

¹¹⁶⁵ OMGUS, ISD, Opinion Surveys Branch, "Hessians Consider the Effect of Lifting the Blockade on the West German Government, Report No. 174," May 27, 1949, NACP RG 260/150/163.

reporting often came across as highly optimistic, exhibiting considerable hope for the future while maintaining an eye for future unification under better circumstances.

Given the context of the crisis in Berlin and the uncertainties of Soviet-American tensions what did newspaper readers make of the radicalization of media in Berlin?

Unsurprisingly, the Berlin blockade had a negative influence on the morale of the city's population. By October 1948, most Berliners had little hope for a peaceful settlement or for the Americans to break the blockade by force.¹¹⁶⁶ At the same time, appreciation for western democratic freedoms developed over the course of the blockade. Seven times between 1947 and 1948, ICD asked western Berliners what was more important, "a government which provides the people with economic security and good employment opportunities" or "a government which assures free elections, free speech, a free press, and freedom of religion." Over these two years, answers to these questions trended toward greater appreciation for the freedoms guaranteed by democratic states, although interest in economic security remained a popular response.¹¹⁶⁷

Table 5. West Berliners on Economic Security vs. Democratic Freedoms, 1947-1948.

	2/1947	5/1947	7/1947	1/1948	4/1948	6/1948	11/1948
Economic security (%)	66	66	64	64	58	61	40
Freedoms (%)	26	30	24	29	38	34	54
No Answer (%)	8	4	12	7	4	5	6

¹¹⁶⁶ OMGUS, ICD, Opinion Surveys Branch, "How Berliners Expect and Want the Crisis Settled – With their Recommendations, Report No. 147, November 17, 1948, NACP RG 260/250/162, 1-2.

¹¹⁶⁷ OMGUS, ISD, Opinion Surveys Branch, "Report No. 151: Security Versus Freedom in Blockaded Berlin," December 18, 1948, NACP RG 260/253/206.

At the same time, West Berliners began to reject *Die Neue Zeitung* in favor of German-run newspapers. By the mid-1949, the American occupation organ distributed only 43,000 copies per issue in the city, while *Der Abend* sold about 88,000 copies per day and *Der Tagesspiegel* enjoyed a daily circulation of between 155,000 and 187,000.¹¹⁶⁸ Because these newspapers printed material that favored a western orientation, American occupation authorities could take heart in declining interest in *Die Neue Zeitung* and the ascendancy of the German-run press. However, the American response to communist encroachment in media operations led to the tempering of left-wing voices and the development of conditions conducive to the revivification of a right-wing, nationalist press that could hamper democratic development as much as its communistic variant. Moreover, the inherent restrictions placed upon the press and the high degrees of interference by both the U.S. occupation and local political figures may have contributed negatively to the fact that only 40% of western Germans expressed indifference to the terms outlined in what became the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany.¹¹⁶⁹

Apathy to politics remained considerably greater in the east. Absent public opinion polling in that zone, one must take into account several factors, all of which suggest that SBZ residents believed they had three options. They could accept the SED line, flee to the west, or learn to live with the new reality. While many hundreds of thousands of SBZ/GDR residents chose the second, many millions resigned themselves to the third option. The cultivation of this “passive majority” developed over time, however, and is not attributable solely to the Stalinist

¹¹⁶⁸ OMG Berlin Sector, Information Services Branch, “Monthly Summary for Period 1 through 30 April 1949,” May 1, 1949, NACP RG 260/258/251, 3 and “Attestation by notary public on the circulation of *Der Tagesspiegel*,” May 7, 1949, NACP RG 260/1172/93.

¹¹⁶⁹ “The Constitution” in Elisabeth Noelle Neumann and Erich Peter Neumann, *The Germans: Public Opinion Polls, 1947-1966* (Bonn: Verlag für Demoskopie, 1967), 227.

stance adopted by the SED in 1948 and 1949.¹¹⁷⁰ Rather, it came about through the constant repetition of rhetoric that at once promised a bright future for the German people under communist tutelage and the reality that these promises brought little material, physical, or psychological benefit to the vast majority of the population. These residents simply tried to live as best they could under the new circumstances, and often chose to ignore the appeals of the SED and SMAD. Even during the Blockade and the material privations it imposed, lack of trust in communist intentions was so great that only 19,000 Berliners from all four districts accepted food when the Soviets offered it in summer 1948. This came as a shock to Ministry of State Security officials, since the Soviet Union had sent enough food for two million persons.¹¹⁷¹

The resolution to the Berlin Blockade accompanied the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany. On May 8, 1949, the Parliamentary Council in Bonn approved the *Grundgesetz* of the Federal Republic of Germany. The British, French, and U.S. military governors gave their approval on May 12, the same day that SMAD Order No. 56, which ended the Berlin Blockade, came into effect.¹¹⁷² Eleven days later, the Federal Republic came into being. It would take several more months of discussions within the *Volksrat* and People's Congress of the SBZ before the codification of the Constitution of the German Democratic

¹¹⁷⁰ Pritchard, *Making of the GDR*, 228.

¹¹⁷¹ Murphy et al., *Battleground Berlin*, 63

¹¹⁷² Sokolovskii's replacement, General Vasily Chuikov, issued Order No. 56 on May 9, and it went into effect at 12:01 am on May 12. Basic Law (Constitution) of the Federal Republic of Germany, Approved by the Parliamentary Council in Bonn, May 8, 1949," in United States Department of State, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, 221-258; "Order No. 56 of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany Lifting the Berlin Blockade Effective May 12, Issued May 9, 1949," in United States Department of State, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, 258-260; and "Letter from the Military Governors of the Three Western Zones of Occupation to the President of the West German Parliamentary Council Approving, With Reservations, the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, May 12, 1949," in United States Department of State, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, 260-262.

Republic on October 7, the same day that the GDR became a state.¹¹⁷³ Within days, the Office of the High Commissioner for Germany, the successor organization to OMGUS, issued a statement denying the legality of the East German state.¹¹⁷⁴ As discussed in the concluding chapter, the foundations to the unique press cultures of 1945 to 1949 continued to play formative roles in the shaping of collective identities after the foundation of the two Germanies. So too did German and foreign political reactions to the press continue to reshape and redirect newspaper culture to fit the cold war and the development of domestic political life.

¹¹⁷³ “Constitution of the German Democratic Republic, Promulgated October 7, 1949,” in United States Department of State, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, 278-306.

¹¹⁷⁴ The Soviets issued a similar reply to the foundation of the Federal Republic on October 1, 1949. “Note from the Soviet Union to the United States Protesting the ‘Formation of a Separate Government for the Western Zones of Germany,’ October 1, 1949,” in United States Department of State, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, 274-278 and “Statement by the Allied High Commission on the Establishment of the German Democratic Republic, October 10, 1949,” in United States Department of State, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, 308-309.

CHAPTER 11

CONCLUSION: THE OCCUPATION PRESS AND THE TWO GERMAN REPUBLICS

In late December 1948, Arno Rudert published an editorial in the *Frankfurter Rundschau* titled “Without Tutelage.” This piece ostensibly focused on freedom of trade in the U.S. Zone. He referenced the Nazi past, and proposed that the German people learn to work within the rules of a capitalistic and truly democratic society, and free political and economic life from the “tendency of submission” that had led to “tutoring” of the people by German officials. Rudert hoped readers would come to realize that the use of nationalistic rhetoric from some corners of the western zones could “silence the pleasure over the large hunk of freedom which the Americans have given us,” and that they should instruct German politicians to understand that “liberty means the same for all of us.”¹¹⁷⁵

There was good reason for Rudert to raise the specter of right-wing nationalism. For months, some of the political leadership in the nascent Federal Republic had attempted to establish measures that would restrict the rights of would-be entrepreneurs, suspected political enemies, and the press. The relationship between the AMZON press and politicians in the zone had always been fractious, perhaps nowhere more so than in Frankfurt. Ultimately, the protections promised by the *Grundgesetz* and the interventions of the United States secured the

¹¹⁷⁵ ISD, “Translation (from ‘Frankfurter Rundschau’ of December 22, 1948: Without Tutelage by Arno Rudert,” no date, RG 466/27/11; OMGUS, ISD, “Translation (from ‘Frankfurter Rundschau,’ Dec. 4, 1948): Compulsory Licenses Will Cease,” no date, RG 466/27/11; OMGUS, ISD, “Translation: Newspaper article from ‘Frankfurter Rundschau’ of December 17, 1948: Freedom of Trade and Public Opinion,” no date, RG 466/27/11; and OMGUS, ISD, “Translation (from ‘Frankfurter Rundschau’ of December 27, 1948): No Prejudice,” no date, NACP RG 466/27/11.

independence of newspapers in West Germans. The opposite phenomenon occurred in the German Democratic Republic, where pledges to develop a democratic state and the freedoms it could afford never materialized.

The trends that shaped press culture in AMZON and the SBZ continued beyond 1949. When compared side by side, 1950 and 1951 issues of *Die Neue Zeitung*, *Neues Deutschland*, the *Tägliche Rundschau*, and seven other publications from East Germany, West Germany, and Switzerland display several familiar patterns. The overwhelming majority of articles published in the GDR focused on developments in the west, and always painted such stories in an unfavorable light. In those cases when *Neues Deutschland* or the *Tägliche Rundschau* did present domestic news or covered events in the eastern bloc, their treatments were positive. In the FRG, newspapers focused on domestic developments much more so than did their eastern counterparts. Political life within the FRG received considerable and often critical coverage. West German newspapers were also remarkably diverse in relation to East German offerings and treated a range of topics that included the legacies of the past, the reconstruction of the present, and hopes for the future.¹¹⁷⁶

Although German press culture after 1949 exhibited many features established under the military occupations of Germany, there were also differences. In West Germany, the creation of a massive media landscape after 1949 placed the AMZON licensed press in an odd position. No longer did individual newspapers benefit from being the only (or one of the only) press offerings in a region. In addition to the risks of the marketplace, they often depended upon the whims of

¹¹⁷⁶ The other publications included *Der Tag* (FRG), *Neue Zeit* (GDR), *Der Telegraf* (FRG), *Die Kirche* (FRG), *Glaube und Heimat* (GDR), *Der Bund* (Switzerland), and *Berner Tagwacht* (Switzerland). Richard Conrad, "Social Images in East and West Germany: A Comparative Study of Matched Newspapers in Two Social Systems," *Social Forces* 33:3 (1955): 281-285.

the readership and politicians at both the local and national levels. In the East, the SED moved to centralize all means of communication within the state in an attempt to stifle open discussion on the affairs of the state or broader society. Once the Kremlin was satisfied with the relative stability of SED control, the influence of the Soviet press in the GDR began to fade. Indeed, the press of both German states continued to change due to the confluence of social, political, and economic forces that followed the direct military administrations of occupied Germany.

The schärfste Waffe of the SED

One of the many seemingly inconsistent declarations of the first East German constitution appears in Article 9, which guaranteed that freedom of expression “shall not be restricted,” and which forbade censorship of the press.¹¹⁷⁷ Free speech never emerged in the GDR, although censorship proved largely unnecessary due to the development of a party-state press culture that made deviations from the norm all but impossible. The repressive mechanisms of the state, including the Ministry for State Security (the *Stasi*), proved crucial to maintaining control. They had already begun operations in the middle of the occupation era under SMAD guidance, and so entered the 1950s with sufficient structure to ensure that they could accomplish the goals of the party-state.¹¹⁷⁸ The complicity and passivity of journalists also played important roles in ensuring conformity with the SED party line. Yet, so-called *Schere im Kopf* (“scissors in the head,” or self-censorship) was not an exclusive motivation. As Dominic Boyer has noted, East German journalists operated “between censorship and circumvention, duty and fear, willing participation and half-hearted resignation, belief in the potential of the party-state to strengthen

¹¹⁷⁷ “Constitution of the German Democratic Republic, Promulgated October 7, 1949,” in United States Department of State, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, 278-306, esp. 280.

¹¹⁷⁸ Naimark, *The Russians in Germany*, 353-464.

the nation and depression at the reality of the violence and intolerance ... that accompanied the actualization of party dogma.”¹¹⁷⁹

There were only two newspaper types in the whole of the GDR, namely, the political party press and that of mass organizations.¹¹⁸⁰ Both relied on direction from Berlin. Press control often began in the offices of the *Allgemeine Deutsche Nachrichtendienst* (ADN), which was the state’s exclusive news service and only legal provider of information to the press. Beyond ADN, each of the 14 SED offices at the *Bezirk* level received daily media guidance from the capital. These offices, in turn, relayed orders to press operations in the *Landkreise* (administrative districts). The Agitation Division of the Central Committee (ZK) of the SED also held weekly “*Argu*,” or argumentation sessions.¹¹⁸¹ These meetings followed a format similar to the Red Army’s *letutshki*, and thereby allowed for the coordination of themes and forbidden topics, as well as a mechanism to gain a sense of which organizations and individuals had failed to maintain the approval of the Politburo. There were also regular meetings in Berlin between the Agitation Division, the GDR Press Office, and editors of publications at the *Bezirke* and *Landkreise* levels. These gatherings ensured regular communication of the needs of the press and the party-state to the provinces, as did the seemingly unending delivery of documents and press advisories from Berlin. The General Secretary of the GDR was behind all of these measures and controls. Both Ulbricht and his successor, Erich Honecker, often proofread and

¹¹⁷⁹ Boyer, *Spirit and System*, 116

¹¹⁸⁰ Zentralkomitee der Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, Abteilung Agitation, “Unsere Presse – die schärfste Waffe der Partei. Rede disposition für die erste Mitgliederversammlung der Grundorganisationen der SED,” February 1952, 6, SAPMO Bibliothek 3/669.

¹¹⁸¹ An excellent overview of all of these features is in Boyer, *Spirit and System*, 128-135.

edited daily issues of *Neues Deutschland*. Their comments went to the Politburo's Secretary for Agitation, who would turn these into orders for editors and publishers across East Germany.¹¹⁸²

In line with the principles established by the launch of the "party of the new type," the SED justified its micromanagement of the press by making media integral to the development of the state. The Central Committee announced this policy in early 1952, declaring that the press was the "sharpest weapon" of the Party and the voice of the masses. This vision saw *Neues Deutschland* and all newspapers in the GDR as the inheritors of the traditions established not just by Marx in his *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, but also by the Bolsheviks in the pages of *Pravda*. By freeing itself from "profit-driven entrepreneurs and monopolists," the GDR press sought to engage in the construction of the "anti-fascist democratic order" by attracting and exciting the population while at the same time explicating their perceived needs and grievances. It also had to serve as a constant critic of party members, policies, and the public to ensure efficiency in the "struggle for peace, unity, and development."¹¹⁸³ In sum, the imagined press culture of the GDR sought to be the lattice around which the state would construct itself.

Neues Deutschland was the most important newspaper in this system. In the minds of the Central Committee, it would guide functionaries as they carried out the decisions of the party and serve as a daily site for communication with the people.¹¹⁸⁴ In reality, it was a mechanism for the promotion of party propaganda and a medium for SED leaders and functionaries to exercise political grievances and test the party's receptivity to visions for the future. As for the people of

¹¹⁸² An excellent overview of all of these features is in Boyer, *Spirit and System*, 128-135.

¹¹⁸³ ZK der SED, Abteilung Agitation, "Unsere Presse – die schärfste Waffe der Partei," February 1952, 1-10, SAPMO Bibliothek 3/669.

¹¹⁸⁴ ZK der SED, Abteilung Agitation, "Unsere Presse – die schärfste Waffe der Partei," February 1952, 12, SAPMO Bibliothek 3/669.

East Germany, they had few opportunities to engage with the state to express their needs. But for occasional strikes, acts of sabotage, or the decision to vote with one's feet by fleeing to the west, communication between the citizenry and the state was a top-down process wherein the vast majority of the public remained silent.¹¹⁸⁵

The rise of the SED press lessened the need for the *Tägliche Rundschau* in East Germany. Through the early 1950s, it continued to publish as many as 700,000 copies per issue. Its staff was mostly German by birth, and it was an open secret that several of its personnel had been members of the Nazi Party.¹¹⁸⁶ No longer a "Front Newspaper for the German People," the *Tägliche Rundschau* had become a "Newspaper for Politics, the Economy, and Culture."¹¹⁸⁷ By mid-1951, it began to focus its political, social, and cultural coverage on the Eastern Bloc and increased the number and scope of critical assessments of the West. Even so, approximately 40 percent of its material focused on topics relevant to the Soviet Union and Soviet-German friendship.¹¹⁸⁸ By the middle of 1955, with the Warsaw Pact a reality and the closure of the U.S. Office of the High Commissioner, the Soviet Union became confident that East German press culture had developed sufficiently along the lines prescribed by Marxism-Leninism. The final issue of the *Tägliche Rundschau* appeared on June 30, 1955. In a farewell article, the editorial board thanked the Soviet and East German governments, the paper's correspondents, staff, and readers, and wished its audience continued success in building toward world peace. The next

¹¹⁸⁵ Mary Fulbrook, "Popular Discontent and Political Activism in the GDR," *Contemporary European History* 2:3 (1993): 265-282.

¹¹⁸⁶ HICOG, Report on the SOVZON Press, no date, likely late 1949 or early 1950, NACP RG 466/176/8, 1-3.

¹¹⁸⁷ Several scholars have noted this shift in tag lines. See Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren*, 41 and Kuby, *Russians and Berlin*, 321.

¹¹⁸⁸ Conrad, "Social Images in East and West Germany," 283.

day, the SED Central Committee's *Zentrag* assumed ownership of all remaining Soviet press facilities in the GDR. In both name and practice, the *Verlag Tägliche Rundschau* made possible decades of additional opportunities for the GDR press, as *Zentrag* used its machines to publish an additional six newspapers and innumerable magazines and books.¹¹⁸⁹

The Diversity and Difficulties

of the West German Press

Although the press culture of the Federal Republic of Germany seemingly mirrors that of the United States and Great Britain, this was not quite the case in the early years after 1949. Many of the newspapers that emerged during the occupation era had features that were distinct for being at once German and Anglo-American in form and practice. Several Imperial- and Weimar-era practices continued, such as allowing editors to write articles, commentaries, and features. Overlapping tasks of this sort were uncommon to U.S. newspapers at the time. In fact, it was not until the launch of Axel Springer's *Bild* in 1952 that a mass press newspaper mirrored Anglo-American practices in the range of activities between writing and editing a story through its publication.¹¹⁹⁰

The conditions of the first years of the new state brought with them the rise of nationalistic newspapers, the resurrection of Nazi- and Weimar-era biases, and the desire of the FRG political elite to muzzle freedom of the press. The nature of governance and the juridical structure of the state contributed to the last of these major obstacles. Three of the 141 articles of the *Grundgesetz* protected freedom of the press, but legislation that governs media practice was

¹¹⁸⁹ Druckerei Tägliche Rundschau, 20 Jahre Druckerei Tägliche Rundschau: 20 Jahre Arbeit für die sozialistische Presse, no date (after 1970), 1-6, SAPMO-BArch DY 63/2318.

¹¹⁹⁰ Jürgen Wilke, "The History and Culture of the Newsroom in Germany," *Journalism Studies* 4:4 (2003), 472

(and remains) the responsibility of *Land* governments.¹¹⁹¹ This development was the result of OMGUS interventions during the late occupation. As the Parliamentary Council met in Bonn to decide upon the Basic Law, OMGUS ordered the governments of Bremen and each of the three AMZON *Länder* to draw up legislation that would ensure the inviolability of the press in a West German state. By 1949, there were four separate press laws for Hesse, Bavaria, Württemberg-Baden, and Bremen, each of which met the approval of the U.S. Military Government.¹¹⁹² The remaining *Länder*, that is, those that had been under British or French occupation, did not follow suit. Through the early 1950s, their press laws were effectively amended versions of the *Reichsgesetz für die Presse* of May 7, 1934.¹¹⁹³

The inconsistency of press laws across the FRG provided an opportunity for those politicians who did not look fondly upon independent newspapers to introduce legislation and measures to curb press freedoms. Several argued that *Grundgesetz* protections for the democratic process allowed the state to ban newspapers that were too critical of or seemed to undermine the government. A few federal institutions agreed with this line of thought, as shown by the Ministry of the Interior's attempts to pass a national press law in 1952, which would allow

¹¹⁹¹ Article 5 codified "Freedom of the Press and freedom of radio and motion-pictures reporting are guaranteed," while Article 18 noted that any individual who "abuses the freedom of expression, in particular the freedom of the press" will forfeit the basic rights guaranteed to them through the Basic Law. Article 75 allowed the federal government the right to pass press laws in cases where a *Land* failed to do so. Basic Law (Constitution) of the Federal Republic of Germany, Approved by the Parliamentary Council in Bonn, May 8, 1949," in United States Department of State, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, 221-258, esp. 222, 225, and

¹¹⁹² "Hessian Law on Freedom and Rights of the Press," May 4, 1949, NACP RG 260/1488/1136; Bavaria, "Law Concerning the Press," July 5, 1949, NACP RG 260/118/459; Württemberg-Baden Law No. 1032, "Concerning Freedom of the Press," March 24, 1949, NACP RG 260/118/459; Der freien Hansestadt Bremen, "Law for the Protection of the Freedom of the Press," December 20, 1948, NACP RG 260/118/459; and Pilgert, *Press, Radio and Film in West Germany*, 23-26.

¹¹⁹³ Claus Jacobi, "The New German Press," *Foreign Affairs* 32:2 (1954), 329-330.

for the forcible closure of newspapers that were “hostile” to the state.¹¹⁹⁴ There were also subtle attempts to silence the press. Although he did not attempt to legislate against press freedoms, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer ordered his cabinet not to speak to media without his permission. In turn, many of ministers ordered their ministries to centralize the process by which officials could speak to newspapers.¹¹⁹⁵ These features, when combined with the government’s plans to restore a traditional civil service and the relatively weak opposition of the SPD, caused considerable concern in some U.S. circles.¹¹⁹⁶ When reporters asked U.S. High Commissioner John J. McCloy to give a statement on the tense relationship between the press and FRG politicians, he merely noted that it was “a German matter” and advised that a free press was necessary for a truly democratic society.¹¹⁹⁷ Away from the public eye, HICOG remained very active in its attempts to secure a future for freedom of the press and for the newspapers that emerged during the occupation.

The scale of press growth in the early FRG was perhaps the greatest threat to the future of the OMGUS-licensed press. The end of licensing restrictions in summer and early fall 1949 brought forth a flood of new newspapers onto the streets of the Federal Republic. Many of these

¹¹⁹⁴ HICOG, Office of Political Affairs, Division of Internal Political and Governmental Affairs, “Special Political Report No. 2: Prospects for Democratic Development of the Federal German Government,” December 9, 1949, NACP RG 466/16a/57/957, 10 and Jacobi, “The New German Press,” 330.

¹¹⁹⁵ HICOG, Office of Political Affairs, Division of Internal Political and Governmental Affairs, “Special Political Report No. 2: Prospects for Democratic Development of the Federal German Government,” December 9, 1949, NACP RG 466/16a/57/957, 10-11.

¹¹⁹⁶ HICOG, Office of Political Affairs, Division of Internal Political and Governmental Affairs, “Special Political Report No. 2: Prospects for Democratic Development of the Federal German Government,” December 9, 1949, NACP RG 466/16a/57/957, 22-23.

¹¹⁹⁷ HICOG Frankfurt to SEC State Washington, “Serial No. 4535,” December 3, 1949, NACP RG 466/1/4/D(49) 409a and “Mr. McCloy’s Reply to Question on Freedom of the Press,” November 30, 1949, NACP RG 466/1/4/D(49)409b.

were under the control of former Nazis, such as the former owner of the publishing plant for *Der Stürmer*, or persons who had failed to obtain a license during the occupation era.¹¹⁹⁸ West Germany had more than 1,230 newspapers by the early 1950s. Their total circulation was 13 million copies per issue, or one newspaper for every four inhabitants.¹¹⁹⁹ High rates of growth can deceive, however. Although there were 287 new newspapers in Bavaria within a month of the cessation of licensing restrictions, only 150 remained by February 1950. In addition, the decline in sales of the licensed press was relatively mild. Established Bavarian newspapers had anticipated losses of between 30 and 50 percent before the end of licensing on September 1, 1949. In October, circulation did fall by 25 percent, but it rose within a few months to an average loss of only 16 percent. Total circulation exceeded 1.6 million copies per issue for 25 newspapers.¹²⁰⁰ At the same time, the circulation of all new newspapers was 450,000.¹²⁰¹

Several factors account for these developments. ISD, for its part, believed the occupation-era selection of licensees “on the basis of their anti-Nazi and anti-communist background” staved off significant losses.¹²⁰² There is some merit to this claim. Many early post-occupation newspapers utilized the atavistic formats and styles common to the Weimar and

¹¹⁹⁸ “Naziredakteure werden aktiv,” *DNZ*, August 26, 1949.

¹¹⁹⁹ “Hesse erhält 78 Tageszeitungen,” *DNZ*, August 31, 1949; “Triumph of Democracy in the German Press,” no date (likely 1950), NACP RG 260/118/459, 1; Jacobi, “The New German Press,” 323.

¹²⁰⁰ Of the 27 licensed Bavarian newspapers only two closed in the first six months after the founding of the Federal Republic. Both were small with limited circulation. A third, the *Augsburger Tagespost*, changed its name to the *Donaupost*. HICOG, Office of Land Commissioner for Bavaria, Information Services Branch, “Monthly Report Covering Period from 1 to 28 February 1950,” NACP RG 260/118/459, 1-2.

¹²⁰¹ HICOG, Office of Land Commissioner for Bavaria, Information Services Branch, “Monthly Report Covering Period from 1 to 28 February 1950,” NACP RG 260/118/459, 1-2.

¹²⁰² “Triumph of Democracy in the German Press,” no date (likely 1950), NACP RG 260/118/459, 3.

Nazi eras. The readership largely rejected such newspapers, much to the astonishment of ISD and the licensed publishers who had assumed there would be considerable nostalgia for the past.¹²⁰³ Of course, some new publishers adopted the layouts established during the occupation, as shown by the separation of news from editorials and “human interest” stories. Many of these were not perfect newspapers. Irrespective of layouts, a considerable number of post-1949 newspapers distinguished themselves by playing up nationalistic themes or exhibiting reticence to criticize the actions of local governmental administrations or officials.¹²⁰⁴

Die Neue Zeitung became a troublesome critic of the press that followed the birth of the Federal Republic. The U.S. newspaper was not shy about naming former Nazis who had reentered the press in Bavaria or predicting the financial ruin of newspapers in Hesse.¹²⁰⁵ When smaller town newspapers began to pool their resources through the institution of procedures that allowed for the group editing of local press offerings and the consolidating of nationalistic messages across a wider area, *Die Neue Zeitung* went on the attack. Working with ISD radio services, it published a commentary that the institution of *Gemeinschaftsredaktion* processes, while potentially helpful to small newspapers with few resources, also allowed for greater coordination of propaganda and could lead to the restriction of free expression. At the end of its editorial, the paper demanded that the West German people learn to recognize and respond to these problems before media became akin to “the prison air blowing upon us from the East.”¹²⁰⁶

¹²⁰³ “Triumph of Democracy in the German Press,” no date (likely 1950), NACP RG 260/118/459, 3.

¹²⁰⁴ HICOG, Office of Land Commissioner for Bavaria, Information Services Branch, “Monthly Report Covering Period from 1 to 28 February 1950,” NACP RG 260/118/459, 4.

¹²⁰⁵ “Naziredakteure werden aktiv,” *DNZ*, August 26, 1949 and “Hesse erhält 78 Tageszeitungen,” *DNZ*, August 31, 1949.

¹²⁰⁶ “Amerikanische Warnung vor Sensations-Artikeln,” *DNZ*, September 17, 1949.

Despite the attempts of newspapers like *Die Neue Zeitung* and several other occupation-era publications, much of the press in the early Federal Republic resurrected the nationalistic and antisemitic demons of the past in ways that were decidedly dangerous. Surprisingly, one of the first newspapers that became a touchstone in public discussions about antisemitism was Munich's *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, which was one of the most liberal occupation-era publications after the *Frankfurter Rundschau*. The origins of the debate about antisemitism at the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* began on August 1, 1949, when McCloy delivered a speech to a conference of Jewish leaders in Heidelberg. In his remarks, McCloy stated that the Federal Republic's treatment of Jews and other minority populations would be one of the most important tests for the new state. If they failed, McCloy believed there was no "possibility of developing democracy within the country."¹²⁰⁷ The following day, the political editor of the *Süddeutsche*, Wilhelm Süskind, published an editorial in which he wrote, "Mr. McCloy's statement means that democracy is not simply a matter of administration but it is first and foremost a question of a fair public attitude toward our fellow citizens." He continued

From the moral point of view we will have to give special consideration to the Jews and treat them with indulgence even if the individual Jew does not always encourage such an attitude. Intellectually, our opinions should not be influenced either by mistakes made by individual Jews or general characteristics of this highly-bred race. And from a solely practical viewpoint we should never cede the enormous advantages which the presence of a Jewish minority within a state has always proved to contribute to the material and cultural life of any people intelligent enough to avoid the mass hysteria of anti-Semitism.¹²⁰⁸

¹²⁰⁷ Ernest Langendorf, OMGUS, ISD, Press and Publications Branch, Munich, "Background Information on the Jewish Riots against the Sueddeutsche Zeitung, Munich," August 11, 1949, NACP RG 260/1140/28.

¹²⁰⁸ Ernest Langendorf, OMGUS, ISD, Press and Publications Branch, Munich, "Background Information on the Jewish Riots against the Sueddeutsche Zeitung, Munich," August 11, 1949, Appendix 1: "Translation from the 'Sueddeutsche Zeitung' #90, 2 August 1949, (W.E. Sueskind): 'The Jewish Question a Test'," NACP RG 260/1140/28.

It seems that Süskind had hoped to generate dialogue on Jewish-German relations in order to ameliorate the persistence of antisemitism in German society and encourage many survivors of the Holocaust to return. His words, which betray a combination of philosemitism and antisemitism, provoked an immediate response. Numerous letters to the editor flooded into the offices of the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. Some supported Süskind's position and expressed their desire to discuss antisemitism and work toward a society built on mutual respect. Others condemned the editorial and engaged in a wide array of antisemitic attacks against the paper and Süskind. Four of these letters appeared in the August 9 issue of the newspaper. An Adolf Bleibtreu wrote one published response, in which he called Süskind a "blood sucker" and declared that the Americans were only disappointed by one thing: "that we have not gassed all of the Jews."¹²⁰⁹ When this issue appeared, the small local Jewish community took to the streets to protest this letter. There was a response by some local citizens, and a riot ensued. Several people were injured, and it provided a brief opportunity for the GDR press to declare that the U.S. Army sat idly by while *Süddeutsche Zeitung* engaged in the incitement of genocide and Bavarian police fired openly into a crowd of 1,000 persons.¹²¹⁰ When the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* responded to the rioters in its August 11 issue, its editors justified their decision to print the letter

¹²⁰⁹ Ernest Langendorf, OMGUS, ISD, Press and Publications Branch, Munich, "Background Information on the Jewish Riots against the Sueddeutsche Zeitung, Munich," August 11, 1949, Appendix 2, "Translation from the 'Sueddeutsche Zeitung' Letters to the Editor," NACP RG 260/1140/28.

¹²¹⁰ "Presse-Übersicht vom 8.-14.August 1949: Bayerische Polizei schützt Rassenhetze. Schwere Unruhen in München – 'Süddeutsche Zeitung' fördert offen Rassenmord," in Deutscher Volksrat: Sekretariat, Abteilung III, V – Fachausschüsse. Auschuß für Sozialpolitik. Presseübersichten auf dem Gebiete der Sozialpolitik, 1948-1949, SAPMO-BArch DA 1/147/51.

by affirming their hope to expose the pervasive and vile nature of antisemitism in German society while promoting freedom of expression of all types, no matter how objectionable.¹²¹¹

The persistence of antisemitism in post-occupation West Germany was a problem, as was the rise of conservative political movements and an insufficient willingness to confront the past. One the first major controversies of the HICOG era came on January 31, 1951 when Commissioner McCloy issued his “Landsberg decision,” which commuted the death sentences of 33 war criminals. In their review of the decision and in subtle sign of the changes that had occurred at the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, Karl Gerold wrote that the five who were to go before the gallows were the last victims of the Nazi regime. He continued by suggesting that the execution of these men would save the German people from having to confront their complicity in the actions of the Nazi state: “Since nobody can be stupid enough to ignore the fact that somebody must have been responsible for Auschwitz and Buchenwald, the only alternative would be that the German people must be collectively held responsible for these crimes if the living war criminals were to be declared innocent.”¹²¹² Alfred Krupp was among those amnestied, which prompted a reaction in East Germany. The *Tägliche Rundschau* declared, “in the eyes of American imperialists these West German business magnates (Krupp) are as innocent as the American ‘death manufacturers,’ Dupont and Kaiser.”¹²¹³

¹²¹¹ Ernest Langendorf, OMGUS, ISD, Press and Publications Branch, Munich, “Background Information on the Jewish Riots against the Sueddeutsche Zeitung, Munich,” August 11, 1949, Appendix 3, “(Sueddeutsche Zeitung, Thursday 11 August),” NACP RG 260/1140/28.

¹²¹² HICOG, Public Relations Division, “Review of German and Foreign Press Reaction to the Clemency Decisions on Landsberg War Crimes Cases,” 10 February 1951, NACP RG 466/1/24/D(51)126, 3. On the political repercussions of McCloy’s decision in Germany, see Herf, *Divided Memory*, 294-300.

¹²¹³ HICOG, Public Relations Division, “Review of German and Foreign Press Reaction to the Clemency Decisions on Landsberg War Crimes Cases,” 10 February 1951, NACP RG

While there was little outcry against the Landsberg decision in West Germany, the public responded quite differently later that year when HICOG pardoned Hans Kemritz, a German attorney who had been accused of delivering Nazi spies to the Soviets during the early occupation.¹²¹⁴ But for *Die Neue Zeitung*, almost every West Berlin newspaper decried the decision to pardon Kemritz. The *Tagesspiegel* declared the decision an “affront to [the] German sense of justice,” while the *Telegraf* stated that the Americans must cease in their protection of Kemritz or the “Germans will lose confidence in [the] U.S.”¹²¹⁵ This response concerned HICOG, because at the same time there were signs that the West German population had begun to respond to communist messages that the United States had few concerns for the well being of individual Germans if it ran counter to the “imperialist policies” of capitalism. HICOG realized that broad terms such as “democracy” and “the free world” had little meaning to audiences in the west if they did not appear in concrete and definable ways. Finally, old-standing stereotypes of America and its culture made it difficult for U.S. propaganda authorities to convey the “spiritual, moral, and religious fiber of American society” to the German population.¹²¹⁶

U.S. information and propaganda operations in post-occupation Germany had to operate in an increasingly complex world. Authority overlapped between the Department of State, the Economic Cooperation Administration, HICOG, the various U.S. intelligence services, and the

466/1/24/D(51)126, 12.

¹²¹⁴ HICOG Berlin to HICOG Frankfurt 1726, “Restricted Incoming Message,” June 21, 1951, NACP RG 466/1/28; HICOG, Public Affairs Guidance No. 91, June 21, 1951, NACP RG 466/1/28; HICOG Frankfurt to Secretary of State, “Subject: Kemritz Case,” June 16, 1951, NACP RG 466/1/28; and David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev, George Bailey, *Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 408-409.

¹²¹⁵ HICOG Berlin to HICOG Frankfurt 1726, “Restricted Incoming Message,” June 21, 1951, NACP RG 466/1/28, 2.

¹²¹⁶ Alfred Puhan and Robert Bauer to Foy D. Kohler, “Report on Trip to Europe and the Near East,” July 30, 1952, NACP RG 466/176/6, 2-37.

Propaganda Sub-Committee of the Allied Kommandatura for Berlin.¹²¹⁷ The end of military administration also required a shift from on-the-ground innovation to strict adherence to orders from Washington.¹²¹⁸ Complicating matters further, West Berlin remained the only site in Germany with an active information services branch under the control of the U.S. Military owing to its location as “the only place behind the Iron Curtain where the printed and spoken word is effectively free.”¹²¹⁹ Fortunately, West Berlin was “a propagandist’s dream” and had many newspapers eager to engage in efforts against the GDR.¹²²⁰ Most propaganda operations in the city were the responsibility of Public Affairs Division of HICOG’s Berlin element. After its first year of operation, HICOG realized that this office did not have the capacity to implement wide-ranging and effective programs. After consultations with Shepard Stone, who was on leave from the *New York Times*, and Director of the Office of Public Affairs Ralph Nicholson, the High Commissioner refined the scope of this office’s activities.¹²²¹ Its primary purpose required it to

¹²¹⁷ Department of State, “Foreign Service Information and Educational Exchange Circular No. 4: USIE and Indigenous Operations,” November 1, 1951, NACP RG 466/176/6 and Major General Maxwell D. Taylor, “Subject: Propaganda Organization in the Kommandatura,” 1 May 1950, NACP RG 466/176/3.

¹²¹⁸ Department of State, “Foreign Service Information and Educational Exchange Circular No. 4: USIE and Indigenous Operations,” November 1, 1951, NACP RG 466/176/6, 3-4.

¹²¹⁹ “Berlin Sector: A Report by the Office of Military Government, Berlin Sector, from July 1, 1945 to Sept. 1, 1949,” NACP RG 466/17/1, 71.

¹²²⁰ Berlin Element, Public Affairs Division, “Interim Report on Plans for Unified Propaganda Effort,” 2 December 1949, NACP RG 466/176/3, 1. For an overview of Stone’s work at this point in the postwar era, see Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe*, 44-68.

¹²²¹ Major General Maxwell D. Taylor to John J. McCloy, May 3, 1950, RG 466/176/3.

engage in activities that allowed for the provision of information to West Germans so they could become aware of “Soviet moves, intentions and bad faith.”¹²²²

The anxieties of the U.S. government and its allies over the situation in Berlin were considerable, particularly after they realized that sales of U.S.-licensed newspapers had begun to fall in Berlin. By early 1950, *Der Tagesspiegel* sold only 101,000 copies, while the Berlin edition of *Die Neue Zeitung* fell to a mere 35,000.¹²²³ This prompted the western powers to move forward on earlier discussions to provide financial subsidies to those newspapers that served broader propaganda goals. In February 1950, Britain, France, and the United States agreed that the West Berlin press was woefully short on funds and was at risk of collapsing to economic pressures.¹²²⁴ The Kommandatura allocated 1.6 million DM for a fund available for the newspapers to spend between February and July of that year. Out of this fund, they immediately sent 326,000 DM in payments to seven newspapers, with the majority going to *Der Telegraf*, *Der Tagesspiegel*, and *Der Kurier*.¹²²⁵ The grantees of these loans could not use the funds for operational costs or investments. Their sole purpose was to provide funding necessary to overcome any end-of-quarter losses.

¹²²² Major General George P. Hays, HICOG Responsibilities in Implementation of HICOG-EUCOM-USCOB paper entitled “A Review of the Berlin Association,” August 29, 1950, NACP RG 466/177/1, 13-14.

¹²²³ HICOG, Report on the SOVZON Press, no date, likely late 1949 or early 1950, NACP RG 466/176/8, 1-3.

¹²²⁴ Allied Kommandatura Berlin, “Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the Commandants held at the Allied Kommandatura Building, Berlin-Dahlem, on Thursday, 23 February 1950, at 1530 hours,” 6 March 1950, NACP RG 466/176/3.

¹²²⁵ Allied Kommandatura Berlin, “Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the Commandants held at the Allied Kommandatura Building, Berlin-Dahlem, on Thursday, 23 February 1950, at 1530 hours,” 6 March 1950, NACP RG 466/176/3. Total loans to *Der Tagesspiegel* were at least 350,000 DM between December 20, 1949, and June 30, 1950. “Loans to Newspapers in the U.S. Sector of Berlin,” RG 466/176/4. In contrast, *Der Telegraf* received 462,000 DM through Allied loan programs. “Newspaper Loans,” December 8, 1953, NACP RG 466/176/4, 3.

German tax law was a considerable obstacle. By definition, these loans were a capital influx and thereby taxable at a very high rate.¹²²⁶ Overcoming the potential legal issues associated with these loans was not an easy task. It was not until late 1953 that HICOG decided that it must retroactively convert these loans into “grants-in-aid.” HICOG ordered Berliner Bank, the original guarantor of the loans, to cancel them from their books.¹²²⁷ In the interim, the Americans worked with *Der Tagesspiegel* to restructure the organization and efficiency of the newspaper in an attempt to increase profits. There were some modest gains, but it was clear that there remained a consistent need for financial assistance to the West Berlin press. And so, the Kommandatura finally opened the door to grants for many West Berlin newspapers.¹²²⁸

Several months later, the British objected to plans to continue subsidizing West Berlin newspapers. They argued that the press in the Federal Republic was no longer “American,” “British” or “French” and expressed concern that a long-term grant program would fail to provide a fiscal lesson for independent newspaper operations. In other words, the British wanted that the press to learn to run itself. The French agreed with this argument, and the U.S. gave in. The Kommandatura decided to suspend new subsidies to newspapers in the former capital city. If the newspapers proved viable, there was no need to return to the issue.¹²²⁹

¹²²⁶ Franz Karl Meier [*Der Tagesspiegel*] to Mr. Eb. Maguire, Economic Affairs Division, HICOG Berlin Element, February 14, 1953, NACP RG 466/176/4, 2-3.

¹²²⁷ “Cancellation of Newspaper Loans,” December 17, 1953, NACP RG 466/176/4; Allied High Commission in Germany, Allied General Secretariat, “Abolition of the Debts of Berlin Newspapers,” 11 December 1953, NACP RG 466/176/4; and “Newspaper Loans,” December 8, 1953, NACP RG 466/176/4.

¹²²⁸ “Brief [for Council of Allied High Commission Meeting No. 20], tab 2: Financial Assistance to the Berlin Press,” 16 March 1950, NACP RG 466/1/11.

¹²²⁹ Office of the U.S. Chief of Staff, Allied Kommandatura, Berlin, Minutes of Meeting Held on September 7, 1950, NACP RG 466/176/3.

Alternative grant programs under the terms of the Marshall Plan provided the United States another means to subsidize the press. In fall 1950, the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), which administered the Marshall Plan, and the West German Minister for Marshall Plan Franz Blücher established a fund of 15 million DM for the purposes of aiding the democratic press. Repayment of these grants became the responsibility of the West German government, which restricted allocation. Within a year, it became clear that the limitations imposed by the German government benefitted favored newspapers, thereby placing in jeopardy many of the publications of the American military occupation. In response, HICOG released the FRG from its obligation to repay the funds and forced the ECA to restrict grants to newspapers that did not employ communists, ex-Nazis, or neo-Nazis.¹²³⁰

A separate process underway in the larger Federal Republic emerged out of concern that the licensed press remained at great financial risk because there was increased competition for resources and because many of these newspapers found themselves in an uncertain position in 1949, without ownership of their plants or offices or the business acumen to make successes their enterprises. Consequently, HICOG, the U.S. State Department, and some intelligence agencies developed discrete grant-giving programs for newspapers that demonstrated their value to the process of democratization but faced considerable hurdles. There was a particular need for such funds in Frankfurt. On November 1, 1949, one of the biggest competitors of the *Frankfurter Rundschau* began operations. The launch of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* also began with rhetoric hostile to the United States. In its inaugural issue, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* assured readers that it had no intention to claim a lineage that began with the *Frankfurter Zeitung*. These were largely empty words given the similar appearance of the post-1949 newspaper to the pre-

¹²³⁰ Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, “Background Information: Background No. 64,” September 11, 1951, NACP RG 466/176/1, 1-2.

Nazi *FZ*. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine* also criticized the U.S. occupation for disallowing the reestablishment of the *FZ*, which betrayed American “ignorance of German conditions.”¹²³¹

From the first issue, its publishers sought to make the newspaper a profitable enterprise. To that end, the paper's founders spent approximately 1.5 million DM within the first few years.¹²³²

Against such strong resources, the *Frankfurter Rundschau* had few hopes to maintain a dominant presence in one of the most important cities in West Germany. This was a particular concern of Shepard Stone, who had since become director of the HICOG Office of Public Affairs. Stone believed that it was imperative for the United States to support and maintain the model press that began during the U.S. occupation in the Federal Republic. Failing to do so, he believed, would lead to the decline of democratic politics in the West Germany. In cooperation with the Ford Foundation and Central Intelligence Agency, Stone managed to secure 1.6 million DM to subsidize operations at the *Frankfurter Rundschau*. These funds came through a grant delivered by the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and were premised on the need to maintain the newspaper due to its aversion to the highly nationalistic line of much of the press in the FRG and the stridency of its publishers in their quest to achieve a democratic society.¹²³³

A different fate befell *Die Neue Zeitung*. In mid-summer 1949, many factions within HICOG urged for the continuation of U.S. media programs. One of the most active was the Working Party of the Preservation of Allied Information Media, which saw as its mission the continuation of U.S. press operations because “No German organization and no German

¹²³¹ HICOG, Office of the Land Commissioner for Hesse, “Monthly Report for November 1949,” November 30, 1949, NACP RG 260/253/202, 3.

¹²³² Jacobi, “The New German Press,” 327.

¹²³³ Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Germany*, 67-72 and Jacobi, “The New German Press,” 327.

individuals can or should be counted on to speak clearly, frankly and unequivocally for the United States.” The Working Party sought to create and disseminate media without restrictions, and did so through *Die Neue Zeitung*, the *Amerika Dienst*, and the magazines *Ost Probleme* and *Der Monat*. There was no expectation that these operations would continue forever, of course. Rather, they hoped to maintain certain media outlets, such as *Die Neue Zeitung*, “until such time as the U.S. decides to eliminate one or all editions or to confine one or all editions.”¹²³⁴

By 1951, *Die Neue Zeitung* appeared six days a week, and had American editors in Munich, Berlin, and Frankfurt. ISD saw the newspaper as a “second paper” that should not compete with German-run publications.¹²³⁵ Its advertising rates were among the highest in the Federal Republic, and it rented publishing and office space in Frankfurt and Berlin. Making it attractive for many Germans was no longer a goal. Policies restricted content such that it only published material from an American perspective. At the same time, it enjoyed somewhat greater freedom of movement in its operations insofar as it was able to contract with a variety of freelance journalists and media outlets.¹²³⁶ With these restrictions and a larger media landscape, its circulation fell into rapid decline.¹²³⁷ By 1952, diminished sales of *Die Neue Zeitung* and its increasing irrelevance to West German press culture forced the closure of Munich operations and a decrease in distribution to a mere 150,000 copies per issue. Its audience shrank as well, and

¹²³⁴ Theodore Kagan, Joseph E. Bare, and Henry C. Ramsey, “Report of the Working Party of the Preservation of Allied Information Media,” February 15, 1951, NACP RG 466/176/6.

¹²³⁵ “Report of the Working Party of the Preservation of Allied Information Media,” February 15, 1951, NACP RG 466/176/6, 1

¹²³⁶ “Report of the Working Party of the Preservation of Allied Information Media,” February 15, 1951, NACP RG 466/176/6, 1-2.

¹²³⁷ Glenn R. Parson, Chief, Press & Publications, OMG Berlin Sector to Director, Information Services Division, OMGUS, August 5, 1949, NACP RG 260/246/65.

reports indicate that the newspaper primary readership included German government officials, students, prisoners, and visitors to *Amerika Häuser*. It sent an abridged edition to the GDR, which proved to be popular among political dissidents and East German journalists who scrutinized and commented on the U.S. newspaper in their stories.¹²³⁸ There were attempts to utilize *Die Neue Zeitung* in major U.S. propaganda initiatives, but these ultimately failed owing to the limited reach of its distribution and competency of its staff. After 1953, only the Berlin office remained active. Further declines in popularity led to its closure on January 31, 1955.¹²³⁹

Press Culture and Identity in the Two German States

The diversity and number of newspapers in West Germany stood in stark contrast to the relatively few and tightly controlled offerings in the East. This trend continued through 1989. In that year, the Federal Republic of Germany had roughly 300 daily newspapers and several hundreds of smaller weekly and bi-weekly publications for approximately 77.4 million citizens (or one daily newspaper for every 258,000 citizens). In the German Democratic Republic, there were approximately 40 dailies for roughly 16.7 million citizens (or one daily newspaper for every 417,500 citizens).¹²⁴⁰ Controls on the number of publications and the content printed in them ensured that the whole of the GDR citizenry had no choice but to interact with the wishes and whims of the SED, even if what they read failed to align with their needs. It is no great

¹²³⁸ “Semi-Annual Evaluation Report on the Public Affairs Program in Germany (Covering the Period December 1, 1951-May 31, 1952),” October 1952, NACP RG 466/16a/974, 167-169

¹²³⁹ Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible*, 167

¹²⁴⁰ Seventeen of the 40 GDR newspapers closed within three years of reunification. Winand Gellner and Gerd Strohmeier, “The ‘Double’ Public: Germany after Reunification,” in Winand Gellner and John D. Robertson (Eds.), *The Berlin Republic: German Unification and a Decade of Changes* (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 2003), 64.

wonder then that many readers felt alienated by the press and attempted to surreptitiously access western media after the foundation of the East German state. By contrast, the citizens of the FRG could access a wide range of views and perspectives. This, in turn, helped fulfill some of the conditions necessary for the development and maintenance of the participatory associational life necessary in healthy liberal democratic societies.

If the German press changed during and after the military occupation, did its readers? The clear answer is yes, and it is important to note that the readership of SBZ/GDR newspapers developed along lines considerably different from their counterparts in the western zones. In AMZON, the press focused on recovery from the physical and economic devastation of the Second World War and the need to establish a politics that revived and improved upon western democratic traditions and those established during the Weimar Republic. At the same time, there were publications like the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, which sought to engender discussion of the sins of the past and the need to consider the benefits of left-leaning politics on the road to postwar recovery. The reactions to the messages forwarded by the *Frankfurter Rundschau* and real concerns over the spread of communism encouraged the development of a relatively conservative political identity by the late occupation. Embedded in this identity were strong anti-communist currents and an unwillingness to engage critically with German complicity in the crimes of National Socialism. Within ten years of 1949, the conditions engendered by the anti-communism and anti-leftist political ethos of West Germany led to the criminalization of the KPD and the abandonment of Marxism as a foundational ideology in left-wing politics.¹²⁴¹

¹²⁴¹ The FRG outlawed the KPD in 1956. Three years later, the SPD abandoned Marxism in its party program. See Orlow, "The GDR's Failed Search for a National Identity," 546 and Boehling, *A Question of Priorities*, 277.

Although one can ascribe a certain political identity to the West German population in the early Federal Republic, it is important to note that some citizens remained relatively apathetic to political life and identity. While 80 percent of the electorate voted in the 1949 Bundestag elections, for example, the majority of those who did not claimed they had no interest in politics.¹²⁴² Widespread concern with improving individual standards of living remained a priority. Nevertheless, politics affected everyday life, particularly when one read the newspaper. Although the U.S. perspective on a political party press influenced the failure of this medium in the FRG, independent newspapers assumed politicized stances on contemporary developments. There were those who identified with the political left, such as the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, and those who assumed the mantle of the conservative right, such as the newspapers controlled by the Springer Verlag in the 1950s and 1960s. This range of perspectives proved to be a healthy indicator of democratic development, but it would take another generation before the mass of the population began to engage regularly with the political life of the state and their identity as the inheritors of German culture, for good and ill.

In East Germany, notions of collective identity are at once easy to identify and difficult to resolve owing to insufficient information on individual reactions to media during the formative years of the GDR state. The press of the Soviet zone and GDR forwarded three essential messages over the course of the first decade after 1945. First, the SBZ/GDR press focused heavily on the need to identify enemies to socialistic-democratic development. The constant repetition of indignant press claims of the criminality and ill intentions of the western powers and those sympathetic to them continued through 1989. This remarkably consistent theme argued that a vast conspiracy sought to undermine and enslave the German people so that the

¹²⁴² “The First Election” in Neumann and Neumann, *The Germans*, 227.

west could engage in all manner of capitalistic and imperialistic campaigns. These presentations provided convenient explanations at those times when the state failed to meet the needs of the people and justified restrictions on personal liberties and the repressive measures undertaken by the GDR's security apparatuses.

The second theme had a shorter life than the first; the SED was the only party committed to reunifying the German people under a single state. Despite the shift to a "party of the new type" in 1948 and 1949, appeals to atavistic nationalist sentiment continued after the foundation of the East German state. In part, this theme mutually reinforced press messages that reified German communists and their sacrifices as members of the "antifascist resistance" during the Nazi era. It also received expression through rhetoric and actions that hoped to integrate conservatives and former National Socialists during the late occupation. Such actions included the SED-sponsored and Soviet-inspired formation of the National Democratic Party of Germany in 1948, which catered to so-called "little Nazis," and the development of the SED's 1952 program for national reunification, which the party-state justified as necessary because "American imperialism is systematically fighting German national culture."¹²⁴³ Unity of the German people remained a dominant message in the GDR press and a core policy of the SED until the late 1960s, that is, until Ulbricht attempted to act on Unity rhetoric through the development of better relations with the FRG. This led to his ouster as General Secretary and the abandonment of the principle of reunification by his successor, Erich Honecker, in 1971.¹²⁴⁴

The third and last theme promoted the Soviet model as the only guarantor for postwar peace. Beginning in 1945, discussions of the benefits of a Soviet existence and Soviet goodwill

¹²⁴³ Orlow, "The GDR's Failed Search for a National Identity," 542-543.

¹²⁴⁴ Orlow, "The GDR's Failed Search for a National Identity," 546-547.

only increased in number, scope, and intensity. They encouraged considerable participation by the masses in organizations that included the 5.5 million-member strong Society for German-Soviet Friendship and justified the state's reliance on the Soviet Union throughout its existence.¹²⁴⁵ However, reliance on and promotion of the Soviets came with a considerable downside: any victory for the East German state would automatically pale beside those already won by the Soviets.¹²⁴⁶

At an essential level, thematic presentations of enemy rhetoric and alignment with a principal postwar occupying power were not unique to the GDR. Analogous phenomena became characteristic in the FRG, where a less coercive focus on the possible threat of communist domination encouraged a shift away from leftist politics in the 1950s and the development of a sense of identification with the Atlantic World. Similarly, each German polity distinguished itself from the Nazi past, be it as the inheritor of a democratic tradition established during the Weimar Republic and in the practices set by western forms of governance, or as the product of a mythic antifascist resistance to Nazism and the dreams of Marxist revolutionaries. Finally, the press of both Germanies benefit from varying degrees of popular support in the public political life of the state. Even in the GDR, members of the "passive majority" participated in the state's controlled public life by joining any number of mass organizations, by engaging in cultural pursuits, or by interacting with the state's press culture.

Collective identity formation nevertheless remained incomplete. If one takes as a given that the imagined nation requires not just the boundaries imposed by borders, a shared cultural tradition, or a common language, but also a belief in the inherent sovereignty of a "people," then

¹²⁴⁵ Fulbrook, *The People's State*, 83; Nothnagle, *Building the East German Myth*, 150-151 and Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 416-419.

¹²⁴⁶ Orlow, "The GDR's Failed Search for a National Identity," 538.

it becomes impossible to discuss a crystallized and shared belief in the German nation during the occupation era and in the decades of semi-sovereignty that followed.¹²⁴⁷ Alliances with the dominant powers of the cold war and the pressures of ensuring domestic political and material stability through engagement with economies in the east and west led Germans and their press to look outward for support and for encouragement after 1949. Consequently, German identities were at once transnational, complex, and in a constant state of redefinition. Just as had happened during the occupation, so too did the German press of the cold war continue to present and react to domestic and international shifts, thereby influencing the worldviews of its readers. In doing so, the press contributed to the cultivation of collective German identities capable of coping with the realities of life at the heart of a divided Europe.

¹²⁴⁷ This follows the lines established by Benedict Anderson, who argues that the nation is an “imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.” Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, revised edition (London: Verso, 1983, 1991), 6-7.

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