
DEVELOPMENT PARADIGMS AND PEACEBUILDING THEORIES OF CHANGE: ANALYSING EMBEDDED ASSUMPTIONS IN DEVELOPMENT AND PEACEBUILDING

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Abstract

Peacebuilding and development professionals typically draw on different theoretical frameworks for developing their programmes. Development professionals reference the paradigms of development whereas peacebuilding professionals reference theories of change. These two different frameworks make it difficult for these professionals to communicate across their disciplines, even though they are increasingly engaging in very similar forms of intervention. This article develops a framework for correlating the respective development paradigms with peacebuilding theories of change. It concludes by examining the implications for three practitioner-level issues: assimilative versus transformative models, the conundrum of practitioner imperialism, and the normative question of which model is correct.

Introduction: Developing a Common Paradigm Landscape

The fields of development and peacebuilding have become increasingly intertwined in the past decade. NGOs and bilateral and multilateral entities are increasingly reframing development thought and practice as peacebuilding (Schirch 2004). However, inter-disciplinary conversations have not always been easy because the theoretical frameworks and specialist terminologies have evolved along different paths. Development emerged as a recognised practice discipline at the end of World War 2 with the implementation of the Marshall Plan to help rebuild Europe, and became professionalised in post-colonial nations. Peacebuilding with its emphasis on constructing sustainable systems for peace emerged from the fields of conflict resolution and peace studies and became a recognised professional discipline after the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. University programmes exist in both peacebuilding and development to train practitioners in techniques and paradigms and bestow credentials on their graduates. International organisations such as USAID, the World Bank and CARE advertise to employ peacebuilding professionals as they used to advertise for development professionals. Each discipline has societies for members to join and an annual conference. Historically, however, the professions have relatively little understanding of each other.

If pressed, development professionals would likely have described peacebuilding as focusing on preventing violence and conflict. Likewise, peacebuilding professionals would likely have described development as focusing on poverty alleviation. Both characterisations lacked the full nuance of the respective disciplines and created an artificial dichotomy. The perceived divisions soon became blurred. Practitioners in both disciplines became increasingly aware

of the intertwined nature of poverty and conflict, their shared root causes and the increasing complexity involved in addressing them. Consequently, both fields began to expand their scope. For example, during the mid-1990s, development work began to include elements such as democracy building, rule of law and human rights (Yoder *et al* 2004), while in the new millennium, peacebuilding began to include economic development strategies (Schirch 2004). This blurring of the lines has led to some uneasy tensions. Development professionals chafe when peacebuilding is placed at a holistic, integrated centre with development relegated to a poverty alleviation module on the periphery. In turn, peacebuilding professionals chafe when development is placed at a holistic, integrated centre with peacebuilding relegated to a conflict-resolution module on the periphery.

This turf discussion becomes more complicated by the different terminology of paradigms that apply in each field. Our empirical experience as practitioners and scholars in development and peacebuilding suggest that communication between practitioners in these two professions has not always been smooth. Development professionals tend to be unfamiliar with peacebuilding theories of change and peacebuilding professionals tend to be unfamiliar with the development paradigms. Not all professionals are aware of the breadth of the theories of change that inform their own fields; some end up talking past each other. One way to overcome these barriers to communication is to map the paradigms of development and peacebuilding theories of change against a larger intellectual theoretical

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landscape. By locating themselves within a larger theoretical landscape, peacebuilding and development professionals might better understand their relative affinities, drawing on a common framework to communicate more effectively. Both development and peacebuilding practitioners invite reflective practice. However, in both cases, this usually involves having practitioners analyse their

actions against an idealised template, such as the extensive 'best practices' literature in development. In peacebuilding, reflective practitioner texts such as *Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners* (Anderson & Olson 2003) or *Reflective Peacebuilding: A Planning, Monitoring, and Learning Toolkit* (Lederach *et al* 2007) also provide a set of idealised templates that practitioners can use to evaluate their work. However, these reflection techniques do not examine the embedded assumptions within the idealised templates.

This essay is an attempt to match peacebuilding theories of change with their representative counterparts in the development field. Paradigms and theories of change and a sample of representative scholars of development and peacebuilding are examined within a larger landscape of social theory from Western European sociology. While it is recognised that both development and peacebuilding have been influenced by intellectual disciplines besides sociology, the purpose of this exercise is to allow practitioners to locate themselves and each other within the spectrum of intellectual traditions of social theory, to identify the conceptual models that undergird their practices, and to communicate across disciplines with those who share affinities while understanding those who do not. Correlating these respective paradigms and theories of change enables us to identify the sources of disagreement on three debates at the level of the practitioner: assimilative versus transformative interventions, implicit imperialism in practice, and the normative nature of the paradigms.

This analysis draws largely on the intellectual history of European sociology not because of any inherent superiority but rather because of its enormous historical influence on the development, and later peacebuilding, industry in the global North. Any professional

development worker, regardless of origin, operates in a milieu shaped by Western European thought buttressed historically by Western economic power. Consequently, many practitioners' embedded assumptions reference Western European intellectual traditions, often unwittingly (e.g., Illich 1995, Gunder-Frank & Frank 1992).

This essay outlines three major development frameworks and their location within the larger intellectual traditions and presents an overview of the peacebuilding theories of change, which are catalogued according to their congruence with each development paradigm. Table 1 summarises these development and peacebuilding paradigms. The final section discusses the implications of this exercise for three debates in the field.

Peacebuilding Theories of Change

An interesting exercise in articulating the embedded assumptions within the peacebuilding field has been some of the work initiated by Peter Woodrow at CDR Associates and modified by Cheyenne Church at Tufts University. The latest iteration highlights 10 categories, or models, of theories of change found within peacebuilding practice (Church & Rogers 2006:14):

- *Individual*: peace depends on the transformative change of a critical mass of individuals;
- *Healthy relationships and connections*: peace results from a process of breaking down divisions and prejudices between groups;
- *Withdrawal of the resources for war*: interrupting the supply of people and goods to the war-making system will cause it to collapse;
- *Reduction of violence*: reducing the levels of violence perpetrated by combatants or their representatives will allow peace to develop;
- *Root causes/justice*: peace results from addressing underlying issues of justice, exploitation, threats to identity and security and people's sense of victimisation;
- *Institutional development*: peace is ensured through stable/reliable social institutions that guarantee democracy and human rights;
- *Changes in political elites*: peace depends on political (and other) leaders considering it in their interests to take the necessary steps;
- *Grassroots mobilisation*: 'When the people lead, the leaders will follow.'
- *Economics*: as a politician once said, 'It's the economy, stupid!' People make decisions based on rewards and disincentives. If the economies associated with war are unattractive, peace occurs.
- *Public attitudes*: peace can be promoted by using mass media to change public attitudes and build greater tolerance in society.

Taxonomy of Theories of Development

Three overarching frameworks have principally shaped development discourse since the early 1950s: modernisation, growth with equity, and liberation from dependency (Yoder *et al* 2004). These frameworks synthesise the ideas of social theorists and philosophers of intellectual traditions ranging from Durkheim and Spenser to Foucault, Habermas and Marx. The paradigms serve as lenses for interpreting the nature of society, the causes of poverty and the implied solutions for development practitioners. The era of globalisation

since the early 1990s has modified the focus of these paradigms somewhat in that it moves the primary unit of analysis from the nation state to global regions, but the primary paradigms are still relevant for interpreting practice.

The three development paradigms gained ascendancy at different periods. Modernisation theory was the predominant development perspective during the years after World War 2 and is ubiquitous even today. However, in the 1970s and 1980s, modernisation-oriented development came under increasing criticism. At the same time that macro-level growth was occurring, the number of people living in poverty also increased. Modernisation practitioners had to explain how increased development and increased poverty could occur at the same time. Among development workers, there were essentially two kinds of responses: to hold on to modernisation assumptions but to modify them slightly, or to shift to alternative development models based on different intellectual traditions. These intellectual traditions had always been on the scene, but it wasn't until the early 1970s that development practitioners and agencies began to explore these models in earnest.

In the first category, those who maintained the modernisation assumptions defended the basic tenets of modernisation, but noted that a degree of upheaval was inevitable as societies moved from traditional to modern structures. A variation contended that traditional groups had refused to adopt the values, structures or technology of modernity. The factors accounting for these 'anti-modern' tendencies ranged from biological – that certain groups were not capable of modernity (Spenser 1857); cultural – having the wrong values instilled (Lewis 1966); and to social barriers such as the lack of education (Coleman 1988). These responses led to modifications of modernisation-oriented programmes by incorporating an element of 'transition mitigation', such as relief or welfare, or by implementing public awareness campaigns to cajole stubbornly conservative groups into adopting modern institutions and practices.

In the second category of responses, practitioners began to question the underlying assumptions of modernisation theory and to implement alternative development models based on two other intellectual streams. One stream drew on the social conflict intellectual tradition and gave rise to development models commonly referred to as 'liberation from dependency'. Another stream evolved from adding the rational-utilitarian tradition to structural-functionalism, and its micro-level focus gave rise to what came to be known as the 'growth with equity' development approach.

The following section briefly summarises three major paradigms in the development landscape and discusses how the authors see these aligned with corollary frameworks within the peacebuilding field.

Modernisation

Modernisation theory is the oldest and predominant paradigm among development practitioners. Theorists from this framework drew heavily on structural-functionalists such as Durkheim, who posited that societies evolve through a series of phases from primitive/traditional to more complex and modern. Although different theorists hypothesised different mechanisms for this evolution, the implication for development was that impoverished societies or individuals came to be defined as those who had not evolved the appropriate modern structures (Rostow 1960), systems (Rogers 1969) and values to run these systems efficiently (Inkeles & Smith 1974). The post-colonial emerging nations were seen to be divided between modern sectors and the traditional or village sectors (Rostow 1960). Modernisation prescribed that for each social institution, the appropriate

modern system was: economic > capitalism; political > liberal democracy; governmental > (efficient) bureaucracy; social > rational individualism; religious > secular humanism.

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was to instil modern values and attitudes in the impoverished sectors of a nation through education and assimilation and to bring people out of the 'idiocy of village life' (Agawahl 1998:3). The success of the Marshall Plan with its emphasis on the importation of technology,

infrastructure, training and credit suggested a model that development practitioners could apply in other parts of the world, transferring material goods, systems or values from 'advanced' to 'less advanced' nations. Thus modernisation had both a theoretical grounding and a practical blueprint of 'best practices'.

Contemporary modernisation orientations are reflected in items such as the Millennium Development Goals (Sachs 2005). The term 'capacity building' draws on modernisation assumptions – implying that the impoverished group lacks the capacity to fully manage modern systems or integrate into modern systems in some way. 'Failed states' is another popular framework with roots in modernisation theory: poverty exists since certain states lack the capacity to manage modern systems because of corruption, incompatible cultural or social values, or a lack of expertise.

Modernisation and peacebuilding

Modernisation-related peacebuilding approaches assume that as complex societies evolve, certain structures and values become necessary to support them. They assume that individuals, groups or nations are in conflict because they are not integrated into modern society due to social, cultural or physical factors. The theories of change assume a relatively benign relationship between peaceful and conflictive nations and that peacebuilding occurs through the assimilation of conflictive groups into a modern and complex system with the values of rational individualism and secular humanism. A few modernisation peacebuilding theorists might also contend that increased conflict is a temporary condition caused by the transition of a group into a modern society. Peacebuilding solutions involve the transfer of processes, systems, and values to societies in conflict.

Some peacebuilding scholars who might share the same intellectual landscape with modernisation development thinkers are Mitchell (1996) of George Mason University, Boulding (1989) formerly of Michigan State University, Docherty (2001) at Eastern Mennonite University, or Schirch at 3-D Security (www.3dsecurity.org). Six peacebuilding theories of change fall within the same intellectual tradition as modernisation: individual change, withdrawal of resources for war, reduction of violence, institutional development, public attitudes, and political elites. These authors and theories of change share some of the embedded assumptions of the Durkheimian intellectual tradition. These assumptions include an implied emphasis on social evolution (Mitchell 1996, Boulding 1989), the need to develop appropriate values for a system to function sustainably (Docherty 2001), and espousing a transference model for achieving peacebuilding (Docherty 2001; Boulding 1989) or a policy (Schirch 2004). These six theories of change would align with the modernisation development paradigm because the paradigm and the theories of change all share an assumption that the root of the problem (poverty or conflict) lies with the impoverished or conflicting parties: they lack the right systems, technology, values, or processes (Jantzi 1991).

Growth with equity

The paradigm often termed 'growth with equity' contended that the principal tenets of modernisation were still valid, but shifted the focus slightly from macro-level and societal to micro-level and individual. Drawing on the micro-oriented rational-utilitarian tradition, the paradigm offered a modification to the prevailing modernisation view by claiming that the poor were not poor because of internal or intrinsic factors. Rather, they lacked access to modernising forces because of physical, social or political factors outside of their control. This contention in development mirrored some of the rational-utilitarian

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frameworks of protected and unprotected markets creating barriers to access. Schumacher's famous *Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered* (1973) is a typical work based on growth-with-equity assumptions. Development solutions based on growth with equity emphasised providing opportunity through decentralisation, regional development and small-scale, locally based

programmes targeting those left behind in the modernisation enterprise. In development practice, this included a variety of strategies from micro-credit and appropriate technology to Fair Trade strategies or farming co-operatives. David Werner's classic medical text, *Where There Is No Doctor* (1977), draws heavily on a growth-with-equity set of assumptions. Habitat for Humanity International uses a growth-with-equity framework for its programming. The website describes its mission as providing access to low-cost housing to the poor and working through a model of community-level cooperation to build subsidised houses that are affordable and provide dignity. The terminology of providing access and the community-based approach are typical of programmes oriented to growth with equity.

Growth with equity was not opposed to the transfer-oriented assumptions of modernisation, but it did place some limits on what could be transferred from one context to another. Solutions in this framework emphasised small-scale, locally based initiatives that often draw on resources within a context (so as to create a more 'appropriate' technology). The goal was to provide access: instead of constructing a large modern hospital in the capital city, the state might build many small clinics in the countryside to reach those isolated from modern health care.

A critique of this orientation focused on small-scale programmes while essentially ignoring the larger market forces surrounding the impoverished sectors. For example, Fair Trade coffee benefits those farmers who can participate in the programme. Whether a farmer can participate depends on whether a Fair Trade buyer happens to come to the village. The larger global economic free market is still the dominant force. Some development theorists criticised growth-with-equity efforts as being niche development that emphasised 'boutique' programmes (Taylor & Taylor 2002:42). Proponents of growth-with-equity assumptions have wrestled with how to scale up to create more national and international impact.

Growth with equity and peacebuilding

Peacebuilding frameworks that overlap with growth with equity keep many of the same assumptions of peacebuilding modernisation, but they frame conflict as being the result of structural barriers impeding access rather than an innate refusal of a group to integrate. This perspective might define groups as 'falling through the cracks', which then leads to conflict. Growth-with-equity peacebuilding focuses on the cultural and contextual appropriateness

of processes and is sceptical of a wholesale transference of models and processes. While this critique is also found in the neoliberal critiques of the development process, growth with equity still contains many of the embedded assumptions of modernisation and therefore is free from the neoliberal criticisms: it does not assume that one needs to change the global, macro-context (such as international social, political and economic relations).

Peacebuilding programmes that operate in a similar fashion to the growth-with-equity development paradigm would be those that emphasise small-scale, locally based peacebuilding initiatives, often drawing on resources and strategies already found within a context. Peacebuilding practice correlated with growth with equity would emphasise the need to design culturally appropriate, locally oriented strategies. Instead of referring to 'appropriate technology' (a development term), peacebuilders in this framework would refer to 'appropriate processes'. As with the development paradigm, this peacebuilding framework still assumes that the cause of conflict is the lack of social integration of marginalised groups and it further assumes that this integration can be achieved through decentralised, local-level processes.

The elicitive peacebuilding approach that emerged in the mid-1990s as a peacebuilding intervention could be interpreted as a growth-with-equity reaction to prescriptive peacebuilding approaches usually rooted in the assumptions associated with modernisation. The elicitive approach sought to identify 'culturally and contextually appropriate peacebuilding' practices (Lederach 1995:14). The critique facing peacebuilding growth-with-equity programmes would be the perceived over-emphasis on local grassroots initiatives and the challenge of how small-scale 'boutique' peacebuilding initiatives might create macro-level impacts. Among the peacebuilding authors who would share some of these growth-with-equity assumptions would be Lederach (1995) of Notre Dame and Mary

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Anderson (1992) of Collaborative for Development Action. Both of these writers focus on community-level, context-appropriate interventions that seek to break down barriers from the bottom up. Peacebuilding theories of change that overlap

with growth-with-equity assumptions are the 'healthy relationships' model and the 'economics' model. Both of these models assume barriers exist to integration and emphasise micro-level engagement for practitioners. In addition, neither theory of change questions the beneficence of integration and does not specifically address macro-level international relationships in programmes.

Liberation from dependency

A more drastic theoretical response to modernisation theory questioned the principal assumptions embedded in structural-functionalism. This intellectual stream gave rise to a range of frameworks loosely grouped under 'liberation development' and drew on conflict theorists such as Marx and Habermas rather than Durkheim and Spenser. While there had been at least a few development theorists writing from this perspective since the beginning of the professionalisation of the industry in the 1950s and '60s, it wasn't until the 1980s that enough practitioners began to develop programmes based on these writings to become visible in the development landscape. Jantzi (1991) describes how community development practitioners would have drawn on these writings to develop programmes emphasising community organising for empowerment, often utilising Paulo Freire's 'action-reflection-action' cycle (1970) or Saul Alinsky's 'rules for radicals' (1971) written a decade earlier. Ann Rice and Sally Timmel's manual on 'training for transformation' (1984) provided a

framework for how a community development worker with a liberation paradigm could work in the community. At other levels, national and international development programmes oriented to land reform or debt forgiveness also drew on this social conflict paradigm (Yoder *et al* 2004). In contrast to the Durkheimian ideal of societal evolution, social conflict theorists focused on the use of power to benefit some groups at the expense of others. Terms such as ‘oppressor’ and ‘oppressed’ were commonly used in discussing social interest groups. If society did evolve, it was through convulsive phase transitions that redistributed power rather than the smooth evolution pictured by Durkheim’s transitions in social morphology. Development theorists drawing on this intellectual tradition contended that both modernisation and growth-with-equity theories primarily held *assimilative* assumptions – that poor nations or individuals were so because they were isolated from the mechanisms of modern society. The liberation framework posited that they were already assimilated into modern systems, but in an exploitative relationship that caused their impoverishment. The path to development therefore lay in ‘transforming’ these exploitive relationships at all levels. In contrast to modernisation, which defined the causes of poverty as characteristics *within* the individual, group or nation (as assumed by structural-functionalists), liberation theorists perceived the causes of poverty as embedded in the relationships *between* individuals, groups or nations (Held & Ayse 2007).

Wallerstein’s ‘world systems’ theory, developed in a series of articles beginning in 1960, was one of the first efforts to explore systematically how the relationships between nations were a fundamental factor in underdevelopment (Wallerstein 1974, 1984). Liberation theorists such as Gunder-Frank (1966) added the contention that poverty was due to a core of elites who

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benefited from the existing structures, but at the expense of the poor. Liberation theory led development workers to examine *power* in relationships and the role of exploitation in maintaining persistent poverty (Wilber 1979). The implied solutions for development in this

framework were about altering the exploitive nature of relationships either through top-down reforms – political, land or international market – or through grassroots mobilisation of oppressed interest groups to gain power by their strength in numbers. Where modernisation theory would push for reforms to make social structures more modern, liberation development would push for reforms to make them less exploitative.

Development workers developed a range of strategies aimed at reducing power differences across the gamut of individual and social relationships – self-perception (helping people see their exploitation); community organising; redefining national and international relations; and levelling the playing fields through nationalising businesses or rejecting international debt obligations. NGO practitioners working at the community level in this paradigm drew on resources such as the three-volume *Training for Transformation* (Hope & Timmel 1984). In Latin America, the term ‘popular education’ came to denote a range of NGO community organising and community empowerment strategies that grew out of Paulo Freire’s writings on consciousness raising and organising (1970).

Liberation theory and peacebuilding

Liberation-theory-and-peacebuilding frameworks focus on issues of power and of transforming relationships between the powerful and the powerless. The practitioners in this perspective are likely to be critical of conflict resolution initiatives or traditional peacebuilding initiatives; they would see them as efforts to maintain existing power distribution. They would also tend to be suspicious of the role of the state in peacebuilding. Peacebuilding strategies

that focus on structural violence or grassroots 'empowerment' share the intellectual landscape of liberation development. Theorists such as Galtung (1996), Curle (1990), and Fisher and Zimina (2009) are representative of liberation-style peacebuilders whose frameworks fit the patterns described above. In the theories-of-change models, the two that would align most closely with liberation frameworks would be the 'root causes/justice' model and the 'grassroots mobilisation' model. While technically the 'grassroots mobilisation' theory of change could result in interventions oriented to a modernisation outcome – e.g., mobilising grassroots community to develop more 'modern' values, this theory of change is placed here because both of these models assume a level of exploitation as a root cause of conflict and require restructuring power differentials to address this exploitation. The emphasis on restructuring power differentials is an important component of the liberation paradigm. In contrast to the modernisation paradigm which assumes that the root of the problem is due to inherent characteristics of the target population, the liberation model assumes that the root of the problem is located in the relationships between the target population and the privileged and further contends that the only way to address these root causes is to radically restructure the power differences in the relationships.

Implications for Three Debates

Table 1 below provides a summary of the key assumptions found among practitioners in peacebuilding and development when viewed through the lens of the traditional development paradigms. While no particular theory has complete explanatory power for describing conflict or development, practitioners are likely to hold to assumptions embedded in one framework or another. The attempt to develop a common framework around the perceived causes of conflict or poverty is intended to help development and peacebuilding practitioners to locate themselves within the same paradigmatic landscape. When practitioners can articulate their embedded assumptions, they can enhance the quality of dialogue with other practitioners and begin meaningful discussions concerning the implications of their assumptions in teaching, research and practice. The development field has a much longer history of theory, research and practice than peacebuilding; by correlating peacebuilding models and theorists with development models, we may be able to highlight issues for conversation in the peacebuilding field based on actual cases in development. In this next section, we discuss some of these possible issues.

Inter-practitioner conflict: assimilative versus transformative perspectives

Within the fields of development sociology, it is widely recognised that there is a paradigm shift between the modernisation and growth-with-equity models and the liberation-from-dependency model (e.g., Bradshaw & Wallace 1999, Jantzi 1991, Webster 1984). The former draw on the Durkheimian intellectual tradition and are essentially *assimilative* in nature. Development or peacebuilding is implicitly assumed to be a process of assimilating marginalised groups into existing societal structures. In contrast, the latter draws on the social conflict intellectual tradition and is primarily *transformative*. Development or peacebuilding is implicitly seen as liberating those already assimilated and exploited, by transforming societal systems to achieve justice. This might be done through seeking autonomy and self-sufficiency or through equalising power relationships in the global community (Jantzi 2000:134).

This division has important implications for practitioner conversations. Over the years in the development field, liberation-oriented practitioners have emerged who, in assuming

Table 1: Correlating Development and Peacebuilding Paradigms

European Intellectual Tradition	Durkheimian/ Structural Functional	Structural Functional + Rational-Utilitarian	Social Conflict
Development Paradigm	Modernisation	Growth with Equity	Liberation
Key Assumptions	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Society evolves to modernity• Social problems related to intrinsic and internal factors• Goal: to transfer values, institutions and technology necessary for functioning modern society	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Groups have experienced barriers to integration• Social problems related to extrinsic factors that impede access• Goal is to provide opportunity and access• Tends to have micro-level focus	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Society undergoes convulsive transformations• Social problems related to the quality of relationships between interest groups - exploitation• Goal: to transform society by balancing power
Basic Orientation	Assimilative	Assimilative	Transformative
Peacebuilding Theories of Change Models	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Individual Change• Withdrawal of Resources for War• Reduction of Violence• Institutional Development• Public Attitudes• Political Elites	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Healthy Relationships• Economics	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Grassroots Mobilisation• Roots Causes/Justice
Profiled Development Scholars	Rostow Inkeles Sachs	Schumacher Werner Chambers	Freire Hope & Timmel Easterly
Profiled Peacebuilding Scholars	Boulding Mitchell Docherty	Anderson Lederach	Galtung Curle Fischer & Zimina

that the solution to the problem requires transforming power in relationships, are critical of ‘assimilationists’, whom they would view as reinforcing an unjust social structure or at best failing to address the root problems. This may not be an accurate assessment of assimilative-oriented practitioners, but is a common example of the ‘othering’ of a different paradigm. Likewise, there are assimilative-oriented practitioners who characterise the ‘transformationists’ as extremists wanting to ‘throw the baby out with the bathwater’. The conceptual divide can create conflict among development practitioners (Jantzi 2000:157).

The similarity in patterns with development suggests that the same conceptual divide exists within the peacebuilding field, reflected in some of the earliest writings about peacebuilding. Lederach (1989:15) and Chupp (1991:3) were among the first of many thinkers who highlighted the common tension in peacebuilding between ‘revolutionaries versus resolutionaries’. A more recent critique of the same dynamic comes from Fisher and Zimina (2009:21), who differentiate between ‘technical’ and ‘transformative’ peacebuilding. They contend that most peacebuilding is technical (assimilative) and does not question basic assumptions about society. They argue that these approaches often inadvertently reinforce the status quo. Transformative approaches to peacebuilding question the underlying assumptions about the nature of society and the role of social change. This suggests that practitioners who use a theory-of-change model correlated with

the Durkheim intellectual tradition and its assimilative tendencies will find themselves at odds with those who reference a theory of change model reminiscent of the social conflict intellectual tradition and its transformative tendencies. For example, peacebuilders who draw on the 'root causes/justice' model for informing their practice are likely to be impatient with a 'withdrawal of resources for war' model because they would see it as an approach that masks a latent conflict rather than one that truly builds peace (Curle 1990:14). The tensions between elicitive and prescriptive peacebuilding can also be correlated with the different intellectual traditions. The elicitive approach is likely to be uncomfortable with the prescriptive approaches associated with modernisation and which resemble its transfer-of-technology assumptions (Lederach 1995:3).

The role that advocacy is seen to be playing in development provides another arena for examining how the paradigmatic discontinuities create tensions among peacebuilding practitioners. 'Advocacy' is a term that is thought to be commonly understood, but it can hold different meanings, processes, or embedded assumptions. The advocacy associated with modernisation would emphasise policies that encourage greater assimilation of marginalised groups. A growth-with-equity approach would also use advocacy to alter policies to make it easier (and more worthwhile) for groups to assimilate. Liberation theorists, on the other hand, would criticise advocacy as a strategy because they would perceive it as petitioning the powerful to exercise their power. Freire (1970) among others contends that the powerful cannot truly liberate the oppressed. Liberation-inclined thinkers and practitioners would be sceptical of the entire advocacy process.

In peacebuilding, the political elites theory of change would be associated with a modernisation approach to advocacy. This theory of change assumes that the elites need to see their interests as being rooted in peace, but it does not question the existence of elites in the structure. A modernisation approach to advocacy would involve petitioning the powerful to enact policies on behalf of the powerless. In contrast, the 'grassroots mobilisation' model would be more closely related to the liberation camp. Power needs to be redistributed and the powerless have to gain power in order to demand a shift in relative exploitation. Therefore, it would not be surprising to find that practitioners using a political elite model encountering criticism and tensions from those using a 'grassroots mobilisation' model.

The Conundrum of Practitioner Imperialism

Among the many theoretical criticisms of the development industry, one of the most persistent has been the contention that development is a form of neo-imperialism from the North. A host of theorists have questioned whether the dominant modernisation model is simply the North imposing its agenda on the South (Nyerere 1974; Korten 1990). This criticism may be directed to peacebuilding, especially those approaches that draw on

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assumptions correlated with modernisation.

When practitioners hold that conflict occurs because a group lacks the proper values, processes or systems, it becomes tempting to conclude that successful peacebuilding will eventually mimic the values and institutions of peaceful nations: secular humanism,

individualism, liberal democracy, capitalism, and clean and efficient bureaucracy. Peacebuilding theories-of-change models, such as 'individual change' or the 'institutional development', are particularly vulnerable to being categorised as imperialist because their best practices and idealised templates closely reference Western structures and values.

John Paul Lederach (1995:3) describes a conflict mediation simulation in Guatemala that exemplifies this potential criticism of imperialism. The simulation was in Spanish. The situation was culturally specific to Guatemala. With the exception of Lederach, all the workshop designers and participants were Guatemalan. However, during the debriefing, one of the Guatemalan observers commented that ‘you looked like a bunch of gringos up there’. Given the lengths to which Lederach and the facilitators had gone to make the workshop culturally appropriate, it caused him to ask himself, ‘is there something about the process *itself* that is essentially North American?’ This reflection raised the question of whether modernisation peacebuilders are simply exporting their own processes with the implication that their beneficiaries in conflict situations come to resemble them. Such peacebuilders would argue that some processes are universal. Practitioners who favour growth with equity would be reluctant to make such claims of universalism. Development or peacebuilding practitioners who would operate from a set of assumptions correlated with the liberation-from-dependency paradigm or the social conflict intellectual tradition would consider the propagation of universal processes as being part of the larger hegemony and a subtle form of exploitation. Gunder-Frank and Frank’s critique of development practices (1992) is an example of this orientation.

Normative Questions: So Which Paradigm is the Right One?

Each development paradigm or peacebuilding theory of change makes sense given its own premises; however, in spite of practitioner bias, two general trends can be noted.

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Regardless of the variation in the literature, when it comes to development practice, the overwhelming majority of development programmes are modernisation-based followed by a significant minority drawing on growth with equity.

Only the smallest fraction of development programmes falls into the liberation paradigm. This does not mean that few development practitioners are sympathetic to the liberation orientation. In interviews with the authors, a surprisingly large number of practitioners made observations about root causes of social problems that were consistent with the social conflict sociological paradigm, the intellectual

basis for the liberation-from-dependency framework in development. However, the embedded assumptions of the programmes themselves within which the practitioners work almost always turn out to be those of modernisation or growth with equity. It is not unusual for practitioners’ own internal orientations to differ from the embedded programme assumptions.

This disjuncture is due to funding streams rather than practitioner deceptiveness. Since the World Bank and USAID – the biggest multilateral and bilateral aid agencies – favour modernisation or growth-with-equity programming, most NGOs in search of funding develop programmes along these lines. Even though the Norwegian and Swedish bilateral equivalents are known for funding projects with a liberation approach, they represent a small fraction of the total development funding in play.

A question that must be asked is: how are the funding streams in peacebuilding affecting the percentage of peacebuilding projects located within each theory of change? For example, we have not seen any literature on the percentage of peacebuilding work based on the ‘healthy relationships’ theory of change or the percentage of projects rooted in the ‘public attitudes’ model. However, by locating peacebuilding theories-of-change models alongside

the development paradigms, it seems to show that the majority (six) of the peacebuilding theories of change correlate with modernisation assumptions. Only two models are consistent with the liberation perspective. Obviously the number of models does not necessarily indicate the number of projects within each cluster or the dollar amounts invested in each cluster. Nevertheless, it seems the peacebuilding profession, like the development field before it, is becoming disproportionately oriented to modernisation-style projects regardless of the orientations of the practitioners.

Literature versus practice: While modernisation theory is the most commonly followed in the development field, it is also the most criticised in the theoretical literature. Academics in the discipline are generally more hostile towards modernisation than practitioners are in the field. For every Sachs or Friedman who defends modernisation, there exist three or four critics like Easterly, Uvin or Agawahl. This was not always so. In the 1960s and early 1970s, Rostow, Inkeles and other pro-modernisation theorists outnumbered the Freires, Gunder-Franks and other pro-liberation writers. Not until the crisis of faith that modernisation encountered in the 1970s (described earlier in this essay) did the academic literature and research began to swing away from a pro-modernisation stance. The peacebuilding field seems to be in a phase when most of the theorists are located in modernisation-style frameworks. If peacebuilding follows a similar trajectory as development did, this suggests that peacebuilding will shortly see more liberation-oriented criticisms of its practices. This would be consistent with the neo-liberal critiques of peacebuilding that have already emerged from theorists such as Pugh *et al* (2008), Paris and Sisk (2009) and Goodhand (2006).

There are some interesting implications for the correlation between theory and practice. Although the development literature has grown increasingly critical of modernisation models as noted, modernisation projects still command the bulk of development funding. There is a major disjuncture today between development theory and practice as development funding streams drive programming in certain directions even in the face of the highly critical literature.

This disjuncture has affected the credibility of the development enterprise, leading some theorists to use the term 'post-development' to highlight how much the development industry has come under fire in the literature, if not the practice. While the peacebuilding theory and practice have until now been more closely aligned, if the same patterns hold in peacebuilding, there will be a growing critique

There is a major disjuncture today between development theory and practice as development funding streams drive programming in certain directions even in the face of the highly critical literature.

of certain peacebuilding theories of change in the literature even while they continue to dominate the practice. Will this then lead to theorists beginning to discuss a 'post-peacebuilding' framework some day when peacebuilding has developed a credibility gap?

Conclusion

This exercise to locate the respective peacebuilding and development paradigms inside a common larger intellectual framework can be a first step towards understanding inter-disciplinary and intra-disciplinary practitioner conflicts. In the case of the former, this exercise suggests that professional development workers or peacebuilders will be able to work better together if they are operating from certain specific paradigms or theories of change that overlap on shared assumptions. On the other hand, if development and peacebuilding professionals are operating from frameworks with very different embedded assumptions, conflict is more likely to occur between the practitioners. For example, a liberation-from-dependency development worker is more likely to be able to work with a 'root causes/justice' peacebuilder than with a 'public attitudes' peacebuilder or an

‘individual change’ peacebuilder. Moreover, intra-disciplinary conflicts among practitioners can also be understood by analysing the respective theories of change or paradigms. For example, peacebuilders doing advocacy informed by a ‘political elites’ theory of change will likely find themselves in conflict with those doing advocacy from a ‘grassroots mobilisation’ theory of change. Based on the history of conflicts among development

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practitioners, it is also likely that unless the respective peacebuilders can articulate their own theories of change and embedded assumptions, they may not be able to articulate *why* they are having conflicts with each other. In development, a modernisation-oriented development worker is commonly in conflict with a worker oriented to growth with equity,

but neither may be able to articulate why they are in conflict (Jantzi 2000). As peacebuilding continues to become more professionalised, it is likely that intra-practitioner conflicts will grow as different projects are embedded in different theories of change.

Development has a slightly longer history than peacebuilding as a recognised professional discipline; besides providing a framework for an inter-disciplinary conversation between professionals, the exercise can illuminate issues that may emerge within peacebuilding by showcasing some of the conundrums and theoretical criticisms that have emerged in the development field. This might help initiate discussions about how the peacebuilding profession can respond to some of the criticisms and issues that have beset the development profession. From our analysis, it appears that many of the peacebuilding theorists and practice models could be correlated with the modernisation frameworks in development. In development, the modernisation framework comprises the bulk of contemporary development projects, but is also the most criticised in the literature. The criticisms highlight the assimilative assumptions embedded in modernisation as well as the potential for subtle forms of imperialism to encroach on practice. The disjuncture between the literature (mostly anti-modernisation) and the practice (mostly pro-modernisation) has led to a growing credibility in the literature about development and has initiated discussions about a ‘post-development’ world. If the parallels hold true for the peacebuilding profession, it suggests that peacebuilders will see an increasing criticism of their projects as being assimilative in nature, harbouring a subtle form of Northern imperialism and the growing contradiction between the literature and the practice in peacebuilding could affect the profession’s credibility and give rise to conversations on a ‘post-peacebuilding’ world. We are not suggesting that these dynamics are occurring in peacebuilding, but merely trying to tap into the history of development to provide a framework for possible parallels that may emerge as the peacebuilding profession continues to grow.

This article is not intended to be the final word on this analysis and there are many nuances that we have overlooked in this short essay. Nevertheless, we hope that this can be a beginning of a cross-discipline dialogue concerning embedded paradigms and their relationships to the larger intellectual landscape that can be used to understand future relationships and issues.

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