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# COMMITTING TO PEACE: SOFT GUARANTEES AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO POWER SHARING IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE

STEPHEN BROWN AND MARIE-JOËLLE ZAHAR

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## Abstract

*This article analyses how alternative power-sharing mechanisms can be used to secure peace in countries where warring parties fail to reach a traditional power-sharing agreement, the most common method of solving the 'credible commitment' problem. By examining the cases of Angola and Mozambique, it demonstrates how 'soft' guarantees — in these cases, on the integration of armed forces and access to financial and material resources for rebel leaders — can help end civil wars. The non-binding nature of these pledges, however, also facilitated the ruling parties' progressive withdrawal from them, which has set back the democratisation process in both countries. This in turn may put at risk future peace and development.*

## Introduction

The settlement of civil wars and the transition to a sustainable peace pose formidable challenges. Former antagonists are expected to disarm and demobilise, even in the absence of trust. This 'commitment problem' is often blamed for the breakdown of peace and a return to fighting. Concerned outsiders often recommend the inclusion in peace agreements of formal political power-sharing institutions in order to enhance the opposing actors' sense of security and the stability of the transition. By giving all parties a stake in post-war institutions, for instance by sharing cabinet positions among parties or forming a government of national unity, outsiders hope to elicit a credible commitment to peace (Lijphart 2004). In recent years, however, several critics have questioned the ability of formal power sharing to solve the commitment problem. They highlight fundamental tensions between the short-term success of power sharing and its longer-term costs. They contend that such institutions lead to an inflexible division of spoils, provide political leaders with the means to reinforce societal divisions, and stand in the way of real and meaningful democratisation (Roeder & Rothchild 2005). Some even argue that the stability of power-sharing frameworks is contingent on the continued involvement of outside actors (Zahar 2005). Supporters of power sharing contend that, though flawed, these agreements do end wars. They question whether other methods exist to solve the credible commitment problem that stands in the way of sustainable peace (Noel 2005).

This article challenges the widely held belief that only formal power sharing with hard guarantees — explicit, binding obligations with an enforcement mechanism — can secure credible commitment.<sup>1</sup> Alternative forms of power sharing can also play an important role in the cessation of hostilities. In addition to guaranteed participation in formal political

institutions, agreements may include other enticements to secure peace – sometimes in the form of ‘soft’ guarantees, which are not nearly as explicit or binding as ‘hard’ ones. Below we examine alternative power sharing through a focus on two cases of transition from war to peace, Angola and Mozambique. The cases provide an interesting comparison.

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Despite their similar backgrounds, Mozambique is often labelled a success, and Angola a failure, of conflict resolution. The 1992 General Peace Accords, signed in Rome, ended the fighting in Mozambique, while Angola went through a succession of peace agreements before fighting ended definitively following the death of Jonas Savimbi in 2002.<sup>2</sup> It would therefore be tempting to call the process in Mozambique

a negotiated peace agreement and in Angola a military surrender. In both cases, however, two key alternative power-sharing arrangements played an important role in convincing rebels to put their weapons down: the distribution of positions in the reconstituted armed forces, and material and financial resources.

The paper explores how these arrangements helped overcome the ‘credible commitment’ problem and examines their implications, short-term benefits and longer-term costs. Assisted by the fact that alternative power-sharing mechanisms were in the form of soft guarantees and of unspecified duration, the governments of both Angola and Mozambique have introduced significant constraints on opposition participation and influence. The international community has tacitly accepted this, thus exhibiting a pro-government bias.

The article develops the following argument: The use of alternative ways to share power has facilitated the transition to peace, but the ‘softness’ of the guarantees has damaged the democratisation process in both countries and may have harmful implications for lasting peace and development. A better understanding of this novel means of resolving conflict and its short- and long-term implications could assist in the design of future peace agreements, potentially making not only a cessation of hostilities more likely, but also improving the odds that the peace will be lasting.

To make this argument, we begin with an analysis of power sharing and the issue of ‘credible commitment’. We subsequently analyse the negotiated accords that ended hostilities in Angola and Mozambique, focusing on alternative power-sharing mechanisms. Finally, we consider the longer-term impact of the soft guarantees on democracy and development in these countries, including the question of the durability of peace. The first section engages the theoretical literature on civil war and power sharing. In the latter two sections, we conduct a structured-focused comparison of Angola and Mozambique (George & Bennett 2005), drawing on a variety of sources, including the secondary and ‘grey’ literature and some 40 interviews we conducted in Angola, Mozambique and South Africa in 2006 with a variety of participants in and observers of the peace process.

## Power Sharing and the Commitment Problem

When they sign peace agreements, warring parties express the willingness to cooperate and end violence. However, the ultimate outcome depends as much on one’s strategy to position oneself in the new political environment as on the other party’s decision to abide by the terms of the agreement. Protagonists can manipulate peace to their own advantage or use it as an opportunity to rearm and regroup. Spoilers can sabotage the process.

Fearful of such scenarios, protagonists find it difficult to trust one another and disarm as a first step towards conflict resolution. However, demobilisation and disarmament are essential if the state is to regain its monopoly over the legitimate use of force and if combatant factions are to be reassured of each other's intentions. This engenders the 'credible commitment' problem: while each party might want to disarm, it is also acutely aware of the fact that its weapons provide the only means of protection against the unilateral defection of others (Stedman 1997; Walter 1997, 2002). These circumstances create a security dilemma, whereby the move of one faction to increase its own security by holding back on demobilisation and disarmament is perceived as threatening to the other, thus endangering the sustainability of peace agreements (Posen 1993; Snyder & Jervis 1999). This dilemma can be avoided only if parties provide mutual assurances to pre-empt marginalisation, most commonly through power sharing.

Most instances of post-conflict power sharing include hard rather than soft guarantees. hard guarantees are mandates which specify that groups must occupy specific posts in government. Soft guarantees are formal or informal institutions that 'provide selection

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procedures that increase the probability that all major ... groups will in fact be represented' (Roeder & Rothchild 2005:32). Mediators have devised complex institutional structures to allay the fears of protagonists in several peace settlements, including in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burundi, Lebanon and Northern Ireland. Constrained by the

survival imperative, acutely aware of the fact that their political, economic, and sometimes physical survival depends on their being in government, intransigent leaders seldom accept soft guarantees. They seek certainty, not probabilistic outcomes.

The 'harder' the guarantees, the greater the risk that institutions will be 'sticky' and inefficient and that elites will exercise brinkmanship. Hard guarantees are empirically linked with a number of outcomes harmful to both democracy and peace, including an inflexible division of spoils, the reinforcement of societal divisions and an emphasis on issues that divide rather than those that unite (Roeder & Rothchild 2005:36-41). In contrast, soft guarantees are said to be more malleable and adaptable to context. However, there is a dearth of theoretical and empirical work focusing on instances of post-conflict power sharing involving soft rather than hard guarantees. We also know little about the conditions conducive to the adoption of soft rather than hard guarantees.

When will elites seek soft as opposed to hard guarantees? Guarantees depend, in part, on the military balance of power. According to Zartman (1995), conflicts are settled through negotiations only when one or both parties agree there is no military solution to the conflict and that the status quo is untenable. Parties would rather secure limited gains than face the prospect of defeat. If one group is weak while the other is strong, the weak may settle for relatively little in return for the prospect of survival. Where equally strong groups locked in a stalemate might not consider giving up weapons without hard mandates, equally weak groups might settle on softer guarantees.<sup>3</sup>

We now turn to an analysis of two cases where peace accords constituted an alternative form of power sharing. In Angola and Mozambique, peace agreements granted relatively soft guarantees to the main non-state armed actor. What role did these soft guarantees and alternative forms of power sharing play in ending the two civil wars? The analysis of

experiences in Mozambique and Angola challenges existing assumptions about the need for formal power sharing and hard guarantees in order to achieve peace. It also provides insight into the achievements of alternative forms of power sharing and soft guarantees, as well the longer-term effects of this form of conflict resolution.

## Ending War and Committing to Peace

Neither Mozambique's 1992 General Peace Agreement nor Angola's 2002 Luena Memorandum of Understanding, which both ushered in the peace, contains hard guarantees of power sharing. Alternative ways of securing the commitment of the opposition forces were devised in both countries. Soft guarantees for alternative power-sharing mechanisms, made important contributions to the settlement of the conflicts. Despite the absence of traditional power-sharing mechanisms thought to be so necessary to secure the 'credible commitment' of protagonists in situations of protracted internal violence, Angola and Mozambique are not expected to relapse into violence. In both cases, the armed opposition obtained government promises to include demobilised rebel combatants in all levels of the national armed forces. Soft financial guarantees also played an important role. In Angola, the government promised UNITA direct access to revenue from the sale of natural resources to fund its activities as a newly civilianised party. In Mozambique, the international community played a key role in allaying RENAMO's fears for its survival in peacetime.

### *Mozambique*

Despite of the absence of formal power-sharing provisions and a deep mutual distrust, the governing *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO) and the rebel *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO) succeeded in overcoming the 'credible commitment'

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problem and ending the Mozambican civil war, which lasted from 1975 to 1992 and resulted in a stalemate. Two soft guarantees facilitated the achievement of Mozambique's peace agreement: power sharing in the military, and the international support given RENAMO in its effort to transform into a political party. The Rome Accords provided for complete demobilisation of both FRELIMO and RENAMO under UN

supervision and for the inclusion of only a small number of soldiers in the new 30,000-strong national army. This alone would have been insufficient to keep the peace. Demobilisation ran into problems from the beginning. At the end of 1994, there were still military skirmishes and profound mutual distrust. RENAMO advocated holding elections before the completion of the demobilisation process. Illustrating the 'credible commitment' problem, the opposition movement feared that demobilisation would leave it vulnerable. Indeed, the behaviour of the Mozambican government was not particularly reassuring: FRELIMO continued to carry out military operations, though on a smaller scale (Rupya 1998; Domingos 2006).

Since no real ideological differences remained between RENAMO and FRELIMO,<sup>4</sup> the main outstanding issue was demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of the warring combatants (Pereira 2006). DDR is the process most likely to trigger a 'credible commitment' problem, since protagonists see it as a threat to their survival (Walter 1997).



This problem was averted in Mozambique by addressing RENAMO's concerns through alternative means. Key among these, the Rome Accords included a soft guarantee of power sharing in the military. According to Protocol IV of the Rome Accords, each branch of the new Mozambican defence force would have an equal number of government's armed forces and RENAMO cadres. Though not specified in the protocol, it was understood that this would also apply to top levels and that members of both parties would head up two of the four branches of the armed forces.<sup>5</sup>

More telling, however, was FRELIMO's intransigence over RENAMO's demands for *hard* guarantees for power sharing. The accords had established principles and a timetable for multiparty elections, which were held after some delays in 1994. When RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama sought a pre-electoral agreement on a government of national unity (classic power sharing), President Joaquim Chissano unequivocally refused to consider his request.

Unlike FRELIMO, RENAMO needed to transform itself from a rebel force into a political party and required external resources to mount an electoral campaign. It demanded that the government finance its conversion into a political party (Rupiya 1998:16), but FRELIMO would not provide it with campaign funds nor take steps to reassure its leaders that they would remain politically relevant if they lost the elections. The issue of party financing was left out of accords, and RENAMO eventually obtained some \$14 million from donors after threatening to return to the bush. The UN Secretary-General's Special Representative, Aldo Ajello personally ensured that RENAMO remained committed to the peace process while moderating FRELIMO's tendency to dictate its terms and timetable (Synge 1997). International assistance served an essential purpose in providing RENAMO with guarantees of political survival. Combined with soft guarantees concerning DDR, it was key to clinching the deal and ushering in the transition from war to peace.

### Angola

If Mozambican negotiators on both sides had little interest in formal power sharing, there was even less interest in Angola for such a solution. Indeed, formal power-sharing provisions were not included in either the 1991 Bicesse Accords or in the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, except for the principle of parity in the reintegration of government and rebel combatants in the Angolan armed forces.<sup>6</sup> In 2002, the governing *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*

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(MPLA) negotiated what amounted to the surrender of the *União para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA). Two months after rebel leader Jonas Savimbi was killed in battle, the two sides signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in Luena in April 2002, ending the final phase of the civil war which

had begun in 1975. Though the MoU was an addendum to the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, the MPLA took no steps to apply some of its principles, notably the provisions for the integration of UNITA personnel in the civilian and military infrastructure of the state.

Although UNITA members of Parliament elected in 1992 were allowed to take their seats and while a government of national unity was formed in 1996 and reconstituted in 2002 according to the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, the functioning of the government reflects the asymmetry in the balance of forces (Samakuva 2006; Santos 2006; Leão 2006). The protocol also contained provisions for the second round of the 1992 presidential elections to be held with UN assistance, but the government ignored them. In fact, there have been no elections, presidential or parliamentary, since 1992. The government has repeatedly postponed them,

most recently until September 2008, and refused to commit to a firm timetable. It claims that a new constitution is needed first, while the opposition argues that elections must be held before a new constitution can be debated (Ntoni-Nzinga 2006).

At Luena, all UNITA could obtain were promises that existing integration provisions would be implemented. Anything more was precluded by the military situation as UNITA had been effectively defeated. The issue of combatants' integration into a neutral force remains pending. Although each successive peace agreement included provisions for integrating the parties' armed wings, until Luena neither side had fully supported integration because each desired to retain a partisan fighting force.<sup>7</sup>

Soft guarantees for post-conflict wealth sharing, a variant of alternative power sharing, is also important in accounting for the negotiated end to the Angolan civil war. Though the Lusaka Protocol did not formally provide for the sharing of export revenue, the MPLA accepted

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the principle that UNITA should, as a political party, receive an income from natural resources. UNITA obtained some diamond concessions (Ngolo 2006), though these were only a fraction of the diamond-production capacity it had controlled at its apogee during the civil war.<sup>8</sup> Provisions on wealth sharing

promised that UNITA would have the financial means to complete its transformation and compete electorally as a political party. UNITA also receives around \$14 million per year in allocations to its elected representatives (Vines & Oruitemeka 2008:258). Like the soft guarantees for military power sharing, this provided UNITA with assurances that it would remain a relevant political actor after relinquishing its military capacity.

## The Price of Peace

As argued above, soft guarantees for alternative forms of power sharing were important for overcoming the commitment problem and reaching peace agreements in Mozambique and Angola. In this section, we explore the consequences of these new approaches for the democratisation process, as well as on development and the durability of peace. While alternative power sharing defused the conflict, the 'softness' of the guarantees allowed the ruling party to renege on its commitments, which has been detrimental to democratisation. It may also hinder longer-term peace and development in both countries.

### *Mozambique*

Analysts increasingly question Mozambique's status as a 'success story' and a model of conflict resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding (Lundin 2000; Weinstein 2002). The transition to democracy has stalled and possibly even reversed course under a hegemonic party system. The softness of its guarantees allowed the FRELIMO government to chip away at the assurances it had granted to bring RENAMO into the peace process. As FRELIMO strengthens its hold on power, it increases its ability to undermine the principles that underpinned the peace accords. Having relinquished its role as the guarantor of the peace accords, the international community fails to recognise the capture of that state by the governing party, and aid donors actually provide FRELIMO with resources to strengthen its hold on the system. The erosion of democratic principles and of the prospect that RENAMO will ever win an election, coupled with the increased alienation of RENAMO supporters, make a reversion to civil conflict more probable. Though a

resumption of the civil war is not imaginable, a return to many of the conditions that led to and sustained the conflict in the 1970s and 1980s could jeopardise the peace and the sustainability of development efforts.

In Mozambique, the separation between state and party is often unclear. In some rural areas, the same person represents both. There are reports of systematic discrimination against RENAMO supporters in most parts of the country: access to employment in the civil service, for instance, can require a FRELIMO party card. FRELIMO's liberation fighters, though not necessarily its next generation of leaders, think they won the country and have a 'dangerous sense of entitlement'; there is neither trust nor a culture of dialogue and cooperation between the parties (Pereira 2006). Furthermore, FRELIMO is hardly prepared to lose power in free-and-fair elections and sit in opposition. If it were, observers argue, there is a risk the highly politicised army, police and security forces would not accept a RENAMO commander-in-chief (Zunguza 2006). Parliament has little role in agenda setting and has been described as 'a farce' (de Lima 2006), leaving little space, if any, for policy input from RENAMO. Moreover, some perceive FRELIMO's ever-increasing parliamentary majority as a potential danger to democracy, since it could eventually amend the constitution single-handedly. Already, debate within FRELIMO is more important than debate between FRELIMO and other parties (Bogaards 2005). The Mozambican police are generally deemed unaccountable, inaccessible, partial, and lacking in representativeness and transparency (Baker 2003). The judiciary lacks independence and several presumed assassinations have not been satisfactorily investigated.<sup>9</sup>

The softness of many of the guarantees that persuaded RENAMO to lay down its weapons has made it possible for FRELIMO to increase its hold on the state and renege repeatedly on power-sharing principles. It complied sufficiently with the protocols to satisfy the international community, but never shared military power with RENAMO. According to incumbent and former senior RENAMO officials, RENAMO's influence in the security sector is being eroded in two ways. First, ex-RENAMO soldiers are being systematically sidelined. Of the country's 23 battalions, only two are led by former RENAMO fighters and they are based in the country's most remote areas. Top RENAMO officers are being

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retired and many ex-RENAMO soldiers receive no posting, thus increasing FRELIMO's relative proportion of active soldiers (Domingos 2006). Second, the government is sifting effective power from the armed forces to the Ministry of the Interior and the police. At FRELIMO's insistence, the role and composition of the

police and security forces were excluded in the Rome Accords, effectively leaving the police and state security forces in FRELIMO's hands (Domingos 2006; Simango 2006). Many capable FRELIMO officers are being transferred to the police (de Lima 2006), reducing the army to 'a symbolic force' (Moyana 2006). There are also reports of differential treatment of demobilised fighters: FRELIMO's demobbed soldiers were civil servants and therefore entitled to salaries and social security, whereas RENAMO fighters were promised retirement packages, but often did not receive them (Carlos 2006).

FRELIMO as a party also profits materially from its hold on power. The blurring of lines between party and state is consequential because the international community channels substantial development assistance through the state. FRELIMO elites are buying privatised companies, becoming business elites and transferring funds back to FRELIMO as party resources (Domingos 2006; Zunguza 2006). FRELIMO is thus benefiting from the new

market economy, while RENAMO has no independent access to funds other than for parliamentary representation (de Lima 2006).

The close international involvement widely believed to have been crucial for a lasting peace in Mozambique (Walter 1997) is contributing to the institutional decay of RENAMO. Though Mozambique's high level of aid dependency potentially gives donors tremendous

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leverage, they do not raise governance problems forcefully even if they are aware of them, including in the application of the peace accords (Taillon 2006). They prioritise economic reform over political reform and want to maintain Mozambique's image as a poster child for successful post-conflict economic recovery (Moran & Pitcher 2004).

As is common practice in post-conflict situations across the world, international donors concentrate their resources on the strengthening of the state and its institutions without sufficiently empowering opposition parties or civil society. Given the ruling party's capture of the state, such decisions contribute indirectly to the strengthening of FRELIMO.

Having lost three general elections, RENAMO has not gained much from the peace. The party has few resources, it has no part in formal power sharing and has little say in managing state-owned enterprises (Gaspar 2006). It does nonetheless run some town councils, for instance in Beira, the second largest city. Its only formal channels to influence governance are the unicameral parliament and elected municipal governments. However, in this first-past-the post system, 'the winner appoints members of his own party to administer every locality' (Weinstein 2002:152). Even RENAMO strongholds are thus controlled by FRELIMO. Some donors had probably hoped that strong RENAMO electoral results would prompt the government to enter into a formal power-sharing arrangement (de Lima 2006), but no such mechanisms were ever put in place.

The alternative forms of power sharing did not last in Mozambique. Though specific guarantees contributed to RENAMO's willingness to lay down arms, their lack of hardness has allowed FRELIMO to concentrate progressively more power in its own hands, circumventing both the letter and the spirit of the Rome accords. These actions undermine the democratic principles that formed the basis of the peace agreements. Other actors are unable or unwilling to hold the government to account: RENAMO is a weak political force and the international community prefers to avoid overtly political issues. The erosion of the soft guarantees of alternative power sharing could exact a higher cost in the medium and longer term. If many of the grievances that led to war three decades ago resurface, conflict could erupt again. This would, as it did in the past, have disastrous effects on development.

## *Angola*

The conflict in Angola did not end in a stalemate, as was the case in Mozambique, but rather with a virtual rendition agreement. Give the asymmetry of power, the MPLA was even less bound by soft guarantees than was FRELIMO. Natural resource wealth, mainly oil and diamonds, has further strengthened the ruling party's hand. As a result, the MPLA has eroded with greater ease the soft guarantees it gave UNITA, and it has significantly dragged its feet in the democratisation process. Though many have criticised the freeness and fairness of Mozambique's three successive elections, Angola has not held any since 1992 (though polls are currently scheduled for September 2008).



In Angola, the MPLA dominates political life and ignores the provisions for a 'government of national unity': policy is not made jointly with other parties and the MPLA controls the agenda (Capapelo 2006; Samakuva 2006; Santos 2006; UNITA MP 2006). UNITA remains internally divided, holds limited political sway and desperately lacks adequate economic resources to compete with the MPLA. This situation is not only a function of UNITA's internal squabbles and of its defeat on the battlefield; it is also the result of MPLA policies intended to secure its control over political life in the country. With the opposition divided and in disarray, the MPLA's commitment to democracy, both within the party and on the political scene, is questionable. By determining access to resource wealth, it can cut off critics and weaken the opposition. After UNITA had been defeated, the government no longer saw a need to pursue democratisation (Pestana 2006). From a position of strength, it unilaterally changed the law on diamond concessions and reduced UNITA's share, thereby aggravating the party's financial crisis (Ngolo 2006) and backtracking on the soft guarantees it had given. And although UNITA generally receives its yearly financial allocations, the MPLA has on occasion delayed or withheld funds (Vines & Oruitemeka 2008:258). FRELIMO has also barred the opposition party from branching into business while it continues to benefit from large oil bonus payments from foreign companies (McMillan 2005; Vines & Oruitemeka 2008).

By controlling the military, the MPLA can also quell dissent. The Luena MoU enshrined integration of UNITA forces into the army and police, but the unity and neutrality of the armed forces remain in question. Some officials assert that the military, especially the upper echelons, generally profess greater allegiance to their parties than to the country (Ngolo 2006; Nunda 2006). Many believe that most members of the armed forces identify with the MPLA (Capapelo 2006). There is little that UNITA can do in response.

As for other forms of alternative power sharing, the president of UNITA complained, for instance, that the National Electoral Commission was composed of eight MPLA members and only three UNITA representatives (Samakuva 2006). Moreover, the Lusaka Protocol stipulated that UNITA's partisan radio station would be regularised and licensed, but 'many restrictions' on its operation remain, including customs clearance of equipment (UNITA Senior Official 2006).

The MPLA has agreed to formal and alternative mechanisms of power sharing when politically convenient, but then only partially implemented them, undermined their principles or sometimes reneged on them outright. The international community, meant to be the guarantor

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of the agreements, has generally responded with silence and even cast UNITA as the spoiler, taking the government's side on UNITA's complaints at the lack of commitment to power-sharing principles. Its role has also been weakened by its perceived inability to broker a sustainable peace deal, given that the war effectively ended with a military defeat.

The international community's lack of support for the power-sharing agreements it helped negotiate has undermined the integrity of those provisions, fostered the implementation of soft guarantees, and further concentrated power in the hands of the MPLA.

The ruling party's lack of commitment to its obligations in the successive peace agreements has been compounded by its growing autonomy and imperviousness to international pressure. Efforts to increase transparency began in the early 2000s under the joint impulse

of an international ‘publish what you pay’ campaign and the locally based Campaign for a Democratic Angola, launched in 2004. Oil giant BP announced in 2001, for instance, that it would disclose the signing bonuses that it pays, but there is much more to be done. In Angola, Africa’s second-largest oil producer and the fourth-largest diamond producer in the world, about 70% of the people live on less than a dollar a day (McMillan 2005:158). Meanwhile, the seven richest Angolans are all high-ranking government officials and MPLA party members.<sup>10</sup> Although economic growth is strong, continued exclusion of the kind that contributed to the conflict is not being sufficiently addressed. A renewal of conflict, though not currently foreseeable, could also prove highly destructive for longer-term development in Angola.

## Conclusion

Angola and Mozambique provide interesting examples of how alternative power-sharing arrangements can help avoid paralysis and overcome the commitment problem in war-to-peace transitions. In both cases, the alternative mechanisms are a key part to understanding how peace was achieved, despite the absence of formal power-sharing institutions usually associated with negotiated transitions. These soft guarantee mechanisms, notably the integration of armed forces and the allocation of material and financial resources to rebel elites, contributed to persuade rebel forces to demobilise and disarm, thus helping the former belligerents overcome the commitment problem in spite of deep-rooted mutual distrust. In the case of Mozambique, the international community played a key role in providing the necessary financial resources, notably in helping RENAMO reconstitute itself as a political party and mount an electoral campaign, not to mention benefits for RENAMO elites settling in Maputo. In Angola, the sharing of income from diamonds supplemented other soft guarantees to UNITA’s viability as an opposition party. Though outright military victory was not a prospect for either side in Mozambique or for UNITA in Angola, alternative power-sharing provisions made peace agreements more palatable and therefore accelerated the advent of a negotiated settlement.

In both countries, the government progressively undermined these alternative power-sharing provisions, once the rebel forces had renounced the armed struggle. Both ruling parties selectively ignored or reneged on the letter of the various accords and the spirit of their implementation in order to concentrate power in their own hands.<sup>11</sup> Though the

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agreements brought an end to armed conflicts, they have been much less successful at ensuring democratisation. Neither the MPLA in Angola nor FRELIMO in Mozambique seems prepared to lose elections and hand over power. The soft guarantees in

alternative power-sharing arrangements provide few checks and balances. The domestic actors have limited resources and little internal capacity: UNITA is internally divided and RENAMO is extremely top-down in its leadership. The ruling parties control access to resources and dominate security forces that can repress any threats to their hegemony.

The sidelining of democracy, good governance, transparency and accountability, however, carries a risk. If many of the popular grievances that fuelled both civil wars — including those related to socio-economic inequality and political exclusion — are not resolved and the former rebel movements forfeit their stake in the peace, conflict could break out again. Though currently not foreseeable, renewed civil war would claim a huge cost in lives and

once again create immiseration of tremendous proportions. Even a small-scale conflict could undo most of the developmental benefits of recent years of peace. Moreover, if the conclusion is reached that soft guarantees are not guarantees at all, alternative power sharing will not secure future peace agreements elsewhere and will make conflict resolution more difficult. If rebel groups like UNITA and RENAMO insist on harder guarantees, ruling parties might agree to sign the peace agreements or uphold them only after extended negotiations, if at all. As a result, the conflicts could last longer and exact a greater toll. Nonetheless, harder guarantees would be more likely to produce agreements that are respected, making them more propitious for democratisation. Peace might then last longer or indefinitely, creating longer-term developmental benefits.

International actors have been largely silent about the Angolan and Mozambican governments' unilateral abrogation of the soft agreements and the fate of former rebels. In

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Short-term stability has been privileged at the expense of democracy and conditions that would favour a deeper, more durable peace ...

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their enthusiasm for supporting economic liberalisation (especially in Mozambique) and obtaining access to natural resource exploitation (notably Angolan oil), international actors consider the benefits of the shallow peace to outweigh the need for

good governance and further democratisation. Short-term stability has been privileged at the expense of democracy and conditions that would favour a deeper, more durable peace and, arguably, a sounder basis for longer-term development.

How generalisable are these findings? Angola and Mozambique are atypical post-conflict societies. For one, their peace has endured. Even the weakened former rebels admit that a return to the bush is currently unthinkable. Moreover, in both cases, socio-political segmentation is markedly more fluid and less sharply defined than in places that have experimented in formal power sharing, such as Bosnia, Burundi, Kosovo, Lebanon, Macedonia and Northern Ireland, where the divisions along ethnic and/or religious lines are much clearer. Moreover, many Mozambican and Angolan civilians were brutalised by both sides during the civil war and therefore are less likely to have a lasting identification with one former belligerent or the other.

Despite these differences with typical cases examined in the literature on power sharing, this article points to a new area of analysis that would benefit from additional comparative study. Possible cases to explore would include Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia, perhaps to be followed soon by Côte d'Ivoire. The growing literature on power sharing would benefit from additional empirical and theoretical research into the alternative power-sharing arrangements that complement and sometimes replace formal mechanisms, particularly in three areas: their contributions to ending civil wars, their subsequent impact on democratisation, and the potential longer-term threats to lasting peace and development.

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**STEPHEN BROWN** is Associate Professor, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa. His main research interests include democratisation, foreign aid, political violence and peacebuilding, mainly in relation to Sub-Saharan Africa.

**MARIE-JOËLLE ZAHAR** is Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Université de Montréal. Her main research interests include the politics of non-state armed actors, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction in comparative perspective.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> The authors thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for funding their broader project on transition violence in Angola, Kenya, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, from which this study is drawn.

<sup>2</sup> The 1991 Bicesse Accords, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol and the 2002 Luena Memorandum of Understanding.

<sup>3</sup> While there is little hard evidence to link the international community to a specific kind of guarantee, where outsiders have forcefully militated in favour of power sharing, they have tended to privilege harder guarantees, typically the proportional representation of the main warring groups at all levels of government. Heavy international involvement in peace processes might therefore lead to harder guarantees, though there is no obvious logical argument why limited international involvement would be necessarily associated with soft guarantees.

<sup>4</sup> Many of RENAMO's political grievances had been redressed before the peace agreement was negotiated. For instance, FRELIMO had enacted a new constitution that included a bill of rights and abandoned Marxism-Leninism and the centralised economy.

<sup>5</sup> The agreement on informal power sharing within the military even led Mozambican observers to mistakenly assume that the Rome Accord 'explicitly called for equal representation of the government and rebel forces in the FADM [Mozambican armed forces] from the leadership down to the rank-and-file' (Coelho 1998), though a close reading of Protocol IV does not substantiate this assumption.

<sup>6</sup> Bicesse included extensive ceasefire and DDR provisions, as well as mechanisms for the verification and monitoring of their implementation. It also provided for the holding of national elections. Lusaka reaffirmed many of its principles, including parity in the reintegration of UNITA members within the army (but not the navy or air force) and for integration of a 'significant' number of UNITA members into the Angolan national police. In the spirit of 'national reconciliation', UNITA members would be included in the public service according to technical and professional skills. UNITA members of parliament elected in 1992 would take their seats; the party and its representatives were to be granted 'adequate facilities and appropriate residences' within existing means and availabilities, as well as security details. Finally, the UNITA party leader was granted special status. For the texts of the agreements, see [www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/angola](http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/angola)

<sup>7</sup> In spite of the provisions agreed on at Bicesse and Lusaka, UNITA retained *matériel* and soldiers (Solomon 2002:54). The MPLA also partially reneged on its DDR commitments. After signing the Bicesse Accords, the MPLA transferred thousands of its soldiers to a newly created Rapid Intervention Police, seen by some as the president's private army, and armed many of the party's supporters (Gato 2006). In 2002, the Angolan government launched an ambitious Programme for Demobilisation and Reintegration with the support of several donors including the World Bank. At the end of the process, in 2003, the World Bank estimated the number of demobilised UNITA ex-combatants at 105,000 with 18 generals integrated into the Armed Forces of Angola (FAA) and a further 40 in the national police force (Vines & Oruitemeka 2008:252).

<sup>8</sup> The export of natural resources long financed both sides of the Angolan conflict (mainly offshore oil for the MPLA and diamonds for UNITA), especially after they lost international backing in the dying days of the Cold War (see Le Billon 2001).

<sup>9</sup> Including the murders of investigative journalist Carlos Cardoso, banker António Siba-Siba Macuacua and possibly RENAMO MP José Mascarenhas.

<sup>10</sup> *Angolense*, Luanda, 13 January 2003, cited in McMillan (2005:155).

<sup>11</sup> To be fair, one must recognise that it is not clear how long alternative arrangements should last. No sunset clauses have been discussed. Should any major new Angolan parties also have access to natural resource concessions? How long would it be possible to aim for parity in the composition of the armed forces? Future agreements would benefit from greater reflection and precision on such matters.



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