

SOCIAL CAPITAL IN POST-DISPLACEMENT RECONSTRUCTION
IN OUAGADOUGOU, BURKINA FASO

By

Michel Tinguiri

Submitted to the

Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences

of American University

in Partial Fulfillment of


the Requirements for the Degree


of the Doctor of Philosophy


In


Anthropology


Chair:


Rachel Watkins, Ph.D.


Susan Shepler, Ph.D.


Christopher Wise, Ph.D.


David Vine, Ph.D.


Dean of College

August 7, 2013
Date

2013
American University
Washington, D.C. 20016

© COPYRIGHT

by

Michel Tinguiri

2013

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

DEDICATION

For my wife Assétou Barry, my daughter Binta Tinguiri, my parents

And my sister Mariam Tinguiri who just passed away

SOCIAL CAPITAL IN POST-DISPLACEMENT RECONSTRUCTION
IN OUAGADOUGOU, BURKINA FASO

BY

Michel Tinguiri

ENGLISH ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores the relevance of social capital in post-displacement livelihood reconstruction under Project ZACA, an urban renewal project in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Based on ethnographic research, it examines how displacees mobilized and used socioeconomic resources to restore and attempt to improve their livelihoods after displacement. Providing a historical background of Project ZACA and urban transformation in Ouagadougou more broadly, the study details a repeated history of dispossession leading to impoverishment, school dropouts, trauma, deaths, and the loss of valuable social networks and infrastructure. The study shows that while social capital is significant, the availability of infrastructure, diverse livelihood strategies, diverse institutional resources, and cross-sectorial synergy remain central components to post-displacement livelihood reconstruction. These factors interact with individual agency to determine displaced people's access to and use of resources for the improvement of their livelihoods. Building on collective and individual awareness and solidarity, displacees challenged the Burkina repressive state apparatus, its strategies of exclusive production of city space and its representation of good citizenship. The dissertation underscores that displacees adopted open and hidden resistance to the state's actions, including the use of financial structures and the creation of associations to rebuild their livelihoods. Post-

displacement livelihood reconstruction requires a continuous struggle against socio-economic and political constraints. In the light of competing scholarly explanations of post-displacement livelihood reconstruction, these findings allow us to understand Project ZACA as a symbol of the state's strategies for the production of physical, political, and socio-economic space, sometimes at the expense of citizens. Post-displacement livelihood reconstruction is indeed a struggle against destruction for an inclusive, productive, sustainable and liberating form of development.

The study also shows how embodied gender expectations played a major role in accessing *tontines* (rotating credit systems) as part of livelihood diversification and improvement. Such practices highlight gendered spaces, gender roles and a shift in intra-household relationships and negotiation in post-displacement reconstruction. This dissertation contributes to the body of literature on the role of social capital in livelihood reconstruction after forced displacement, as well as to literature on migration, involuntary displacement, urban development and gender studies.

SOCIAL CAPITAL IN POST-DISPLACEMENT RECONSTRUCTION
IN OUAGADOUGOU, BURKINA FASO

BY

Michel Tinguiri

FRENCH ABSTRACT

Cette recherche ethnographique examine la pertinence du capital social et les stratégies de mobilisation et d'utilisation de ressources socio-économiques dans la reconstruction post-déplacement suite au Project ZACA à Ouagadougou.

L'étude retrace d'abord les processus socio-historiques et acteurs ayant participé activement à la transformation du paysage urbanistique Ouagalais. Ces processus ont souvent dépossédé et marginalisé les citoyens, provoqué l'abandon scolaire, des traumatismes, des décès, et la perte de ressources sociales et d'infrastructure valables, ce qui confirme les résultats de recherches sur les risques associés à la délocalisation des populations. L'étude démontre que le capital social, la disponibilité d'infrastructures, la diversité des stratégies de subsistance, et la synergie intersectorielle s'avèrent complémentaires dans la reconstruction post-déplacement. Toutes ces composantes interagissent pour faciliter pour les recasés l'utilisation des ressources dans la diversification et l'amélioration de leurs modes de subsistance.

Par ailleurs, se fondant sur la conscience collective et individuelle ainsi que la solidarité, les participants à cette recherche ont défié l'appareil répressif de l'état, ses stratégies d'exclusion dans la production de l'espace urbain, et sa définition du bon citoyen. L'étude révèle que la stratégie de résistance passive et active contre les appareils

d'état, l'utilisation des structures financières, ainsi que la création d'espaces associatifs étaient autant d'armes utilisées par les déplacés dans la reconstruction de leur vie. La reconstruction de la vie post-déplacement est une lutte perpétuelle contre les contraintes socio-économiques et politiques. A la lumière de théories et explications concurrentes, les résultats de cette étude nous amènent à considérer le Projet ZACA comme symbole des stratégies de l'état burkinabè dans sa production d'espaces physiques, politiques et socio-économiques, et parfois, aux dépens des citoyens. C'est en effet une lutte contre la destruction et la déconstruction en faveur d'un développement inclusif, productif, durable et libérateur.

L'étude souligne que les attentes et dispositions liés au genre ont joué un rôle majeur dans l'adhésion aux *tontines* dans le cadre de la diversification et de l'amélioration de la vie des recasés. Ces pratiques mettent en exergue le renversement du rôle de genre et le changement de la dynamique relationnelle et de négociation dans le ménage. L'étude indique par ailleurs que la reconstruction comprend le bien-être communautaire, notamment la participation des recasés aux activités associatives et événements socio-religieux. L'étude fait des recommandations aux décideurs et acteurs politiques et rebondit sur les grands débats sur la délocalisation, l'accès aux ressources, le renforcement des capacités, le genre et l'amélioration des conditions de vie.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to take this opportunity to thank Assétou Barry (my wife), Binta Tinguiri (my daughter), my friends, and parents for their unconditional love and support during the writing and completion of this dissertation. To Professor David Vine, thank you so much for your great support, care and understanding. Words cannot really capture what you have done for me. You symbolize for me the future of anthropology. Had it not been your total support and constant encouragement, this dissertation would not exist. My deep thanks go to Professor Rachel Watkins who accepted to co-chair this dissertation. Thank you so much for your support and understanding. My profound gratitude to Professor Wise who instilled in me the confidence and desire to enroll in a PhD program ever since 1996, and my heartfelt gratitude to Professor Susan Shepler who graciously accepted to join the committee despite her overwhelming calendar and workload. Thank you so much for your support and guidance. Without your support and insights, this dissertation will not exist.

My heartfelt thanks to Professor Sabiyha Prince for her support, understanding and advice. I would like to express all my gratitude to Elizabeth Lang for her assistance with proofreading the drafts of the dissertation, and her constant words of encouragement. Similarly, my gratitude goes to Professor Geoffrey Burkhart for his excellent comments and advice, not just for this dissertation, but also for his guidance in my early days in the department of anthropology.

I am grateful to Professor Dolores Koenig for her support and guidance in the early stage of this research, and thanks to all those who helped shape this dissertation in one

way or another. Special thanks to Yaro Zakarya, a friend, and my Research Assistant whose constant efforts and availability allowed for maintaining contact with the field. A friend in need is a friend indeed!

My deepest gratitude goes to Professor Ouédraogo Amadou, who has been a model, guide and teacher, and helped me develop critical thinking ever since 1993. Thank you for your feedback and words of support. Thank you for being there when I needed help and guidance.

I would also like to thank the administrative and faculty members of the anthropology department at American University and the Robert Mathias Grant. Special thanks to the College of Arts and Sciences for funding my studies at American University. Special thanks to Dr. Fanta Aw and the supportive team at the International Students Service Center. Your advice and constant availability have provided me comfort as an international student.

Thanks to all my research participants, and local experts namely: Guigma Léandre, Ouédraogo Haoua, Professor Gomgnimbou Moustapha, Niamba Adama, to EZACA headmistress, and to the nurses of the CSPS of Ouaga 2000-C.

Thanks to Professors Bissiri Amadou and my professors from the University of Ouagadougou who helped pave the way towards the achievement of my intellectual goals. Thank you for your unfaltering support.

My gratitude to the administrative and faculty members of the anthropology department at Montgomery College who gave me the chance to teach anthropology while completing this dissertation. Thank you for being there when I needed help and support. I

would also like to thank all my students who even enabled me to better learn anthropology while teaching it. Also, thanks to Dr. Gail Riley of the French Department at American University for allowing me to teach in the French department while completing my dissertation. Similarly, I would like to thank Dr. Marshall Bradford at George Washington University for his encouraging words and support.

Last but not least, my heartfelt thanks to Mysara Abu-Hashem, Adelaide M. Lusambili, Maria Amelia Viteri, Kalfani Ture, Batamaka Somé, Dianda Issa, Gama Lamoussa, Professor Jean-Bernard Ouédraogo, Dr. Victor Doulou, Flavien Owolabi, Moussa Sangaré, Johnny Sozi, Siaka Tinguiri, Lacina Tinguiri, and Yacouba Tinguiri for their support and advice. Thanks to all my cohorts who contributed in one way or another in shaping and engaging my intellectual curiosity in anthropology.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ENGLISH ABSTRACT.....	ii
FRENCH ABSTRACT.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	vi
LIST OF TABLES	xii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.....	xiii
LIST OF MAPS	xiv
LIST OF ACRONYMS	xv
Chapter	
1. INTRODUCTION: FIELDWORK EXPERIENCE AND METHODOLOGY	1
Geographic Setting and Administrative Organization of Research Site	7
Interview Methods and Types of Data Collected	19
Assistance in Fieldwork and Ethnographic Collaboration	24
Preparedness and Research Timeline	25
Difficulties and Research Limitations	27
Positionality: Returning Home to Do Fieldwork.....	29
Organization of the Dissertation.....	37
2. HISTORICAL PROCESSES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBANIZATION IN OUAGADOUGOU	40
Land Management in Pre-colonial Ouagadougou	40
The Scramble for Ouagadougou.....	47
Colonial Ouagadougou: Managing City Space and Citizens	49
French Colonial Urban Land Management and Urban Policies.....	50

	The Colonial Transformation of Ouagadougou	52
	Post-colonial Ouagadougou: From 1960 to 1983.....	58
	Land Management and Urban Policies from 1983 to the 1990s	60
	Understanding Urban Policies from the 1990s to the Present	63
	Conclusion.....	68
3.	PROJECT ZACA: SOCIO-HISTORICAL PROCESSES AND OBJECTIVES	71
	Building Modern Cities and Urban Renewal	71
	The Revolution and the Creation of Project ZACA	74
	Legal and Institutional Framework of Project ZACA-I	78
	Legal and Institutional Framework of Project ZACA-II.....	79
	ZACA's Internal Difficulties: Financial and Coordination Hurdles	81
	Overview of Neighborhoods' Characteristics Prior to Displacement	85
	Compensation Arrangements and Related Problems	89
	Conclusion.....	94
4.	SOCIAL CAPITAL AND COLLECTIVE RESISTANCE TO STATE-LED FORCED EVICTION	96
	Main Debates on Social Capital	96
	Bonding, Bridging and Linking Relations for Collective Resistance	98
	Social Justice and the Protection of Social Capital and Cultural Heritage..	108
	Conclusion.....	117
5.	BREAKING BONDS, WEAKENING LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES AND FIGHTING BACK.....	119
	Displacement and the Dislocation of Social Capital	119

Still Up and Fighting	130
Social Capital without a Market is Less Useful	133
Conclusion.....	143
6. ANALYZING GENDER, SOCIAL CAPITAL IN POST-DISPLACEMENT LIVELIHOOD RECONSTRUCTION.....	145
Livelihood and Post-displacement Reconstruction	146
From Friendship to Business Partnership: The Story of Estelle and Rakia	149
The <i>Tontine</i> : Social Economy in Livelihood Reconstruction	159
No <i>Tontine</i> in my House: Saving the Family or Male's Power?.....	162
Honor, Shame and the Obligation to Return	167
The Catholic Women's Struggle for Space for their Community	172
Conclusion.....	176
7. GENERAL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	179
APPENDIX A : INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND QUESTIONNAIRES	192
APPENDIX B : GUIDE FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED AND INFORMAL INTERVIEWS.....	201
REFERENCES	203

LIST OF TABLES

Table

1. Main Languages Spoken in Ouagadougou	9
2. Distribution of the Residents of Ouagadougou Metropolitan Area	10
3. Demographic Evolution of Ouagadougou from 1904 to 1962	56

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure

1. Muslims Praying for Binger (Binger 1892: 457)..... 46
2. Ruins of Bilibambili's Mosque next to Ouagadougou's Railway Station..... 55
3. Traditional Beer Preparation Hearth (Photo by Author)..... 136

LIST OF MAPS

Map

1. Map of Ouagadougou Adapted from Wikimapia	8
2. Google Earth View of Ouaga 2000-C.....	12
3. Location of Ouaga 2000-C Neighborhood	13
4. Author's Map of Ouaga 2000-C Neighborhood	16
5. Map of Ouagadougou Drawn by Binger in 1892.....	44
6. Project ZACA Area (Adapted from Google Earth)	89

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ABRETAO-2000: Association pour le bien-être des résidents de la trame d'accueil de Ouaga 2000 [Association for the Well-being of Residents of Ouaga 2000-C]

CEGECE : Centre de gestion des cités [Center for Housing Management]

CFA : Communauté financière africaine [African Financial Community]

CFIAM: Centre féminin d'initiation et d'apprentissage aux métiers [Women's Training & Apprenticeship Center in the Trades]

CSPS: Centres de santé et de promotion sociale [Center for Health and Social Promotion]

COGES: Comité de gestion [Management Committee]

DGUT : Direction générale de l'urbanisme et de la topographie [The General Directorate for Urban Planning, Topography and Land Registry]

EZACA: Ecole ZACA [ZACA school]

FAARF: Fonds d'appui aux activités rémunératrices des femmes [Support Funds for Women's Income-Generating Activities]

FASI : Fonds d'appui au secteur informel [Support Funds for the Informal Sector]

FIDES: Fonds d'investissements pour le développement social et économique [Investment Funds for Socioeconomic Development]

GAD : Gender and Development

GO : Grand Ouaga [Greater Ouaga]

INSS : Institut National des Sciences de la Société (National Institut of Social Sciences)

IRD : Institut de recherche pour le développement (Research & Development Institute)

INSD : Institut National de la statistique et de la démographie (National Institute of Statistics and Demography)

ISSP : Institut supérieur des sciences de la population (Higher Institut of Population Studies)

MAT : Ministère de l'administration territoriale [Ministry of Territorial Administration]

MATS : Ministère de l'administration territoriale et de la sécurité [Ministry of Territorial Administration and Security]

ONATEL : Office national des télécommunications [National Office of Telecommunications]

ONEA : Office national de l'eau et d'assainissement [Public Water and Sanitation Utility]

PAD : Postmodernism and Development

PUH : Permis urbain d'habiter [Urban Residence Licence]

RAF : Réorganisation agraire et foncière [Land and Agrarian Reform]

SAP : Structural Adjustment Program

SDAGO Schéma-directeur d'aménagement du grand Ouaga [Urban Master Plan of Greater Ouaga]

SDAU : Schéma-directeur d'aménagement et d'urbanisme [Urban Management and Master Plan]

SMI: Santé maternelle et infantile [Maternal and Infant Health Center]

SONABEL: Société Nationale d'Electricité du Burkina [National Electricity Company of Burkina]

SONATUR : Société nationale d'aménagement des terrains urbains [The National Land Management Authority]

SOTRACO: Société de transport en commun de Ouagadougou [Transportation Company of the Commune of Ouagadougou]

WAD : Women and Development

WID : Women in Development

ZACA: Zone d'activités commerciales et administratives [Administrative and Commercial Activity Zone]

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: FIELDWORK EXPERIENCE AND METHODOLOGY

“The bulldozers started to tear down houses...The rumors began to materialize before my own eyes...People were compelled to move by force...And we left helter-skelter...Before Project ZACA, I used to be a trader. Today, I have to rely on occasional construction contracts...My wife sells clothes and perfumes to help, but that is not enough...We are surviving. Life here is monotonous...Most people go to the city center to fend for themselves.” (Field interview, August 2009)

One hot afternoon in July 2009, I drove slowly past Karamogo’s fenceless house. I did not then know his name. He was tilling his small garden of peanuts with two of his little children behind him. I continued my exploration of the outskirts and then, the center of Ouaga 2000-C. I quickly noticed the contrast between finished and unfinished houses, fenced and fenceless houses, high rises and low houses, empty streets inside the neighborhood and the busy Pô road. Echoing Henri Lefebvre, Ijla writes, “the street is where movement takes place, the interaction without which urban life would not exist... The street is a place to play and learn...” (Ijla 2012: 53). Yet, the streets of Ouaga 2000-C were mostly empty. I wondered where the people went. Thus began my early steps in my research amidst contrasts and apparent silence.

When I asked Karamogo, a married male research participant with six children, about Project ZACA¹ (Zone d’activités commerciales et administratives), he had this to say, “When my mother heard that the bulldozers were tearing down houses, she began to cry like a child. The news totally broke down her spirit as she witnessed her village torn

¹ For clarification, throughout this dissertation, when participants talk about Project ZACA (or ZACA for short), they are referring to Project ZACA-II. ZACA means Administrative and Commercial Activity Zone.

down. When we relocated here, she fell very sick and she nearly died...” (Interview, August 2009).

Karamogo’s story helps capture the nightmare associated with bulldozing neighborhoods and subsequent livelihood reconstruction. Many research participants still remembered vividly when the bulldozers began to destroy their houses. They also remembered painfully their early struggles to make a living when Project ZACA relocated them to Ouaga 2000-C. For some, Project ZACA has marked them since their childhood and teenage years. In fact, the story of Project ZACA goes back to 1983, when a coup brought to power a Marxist military group. The revolutionary rulers engaged in an authoritarian transformation of Ouagadougou and other medium and small cities across Burkina Faso. In 1985, to beautify the city and pursue their vision of socioeconomic development, the revolutionary leaders created Project ZACA-I, which began with rebuilding the central market of Ouagadougou (also known as Rood Woko) and its immediate neighborhoods (Koulouba and portions of Zangouenttin). This led to the forced eviction of thousands of families without any compensation. It dislocated families, traumatized and impoverished many of them and left them with bitter memories. Some of the participants in this research still remembered the impacts of this first phase of Project ZACA on their relatives and neighbors. After a bloody military coup, the revolutionary regime ended in 1987. The incoming government abandoned Project ZACA-I. It was only in the 1990s that the post-revolutionary regime revisited Project ZACA by defining its surface area and overall objectives; however, it did not implement the project. After another period of silence on Project ZACA, in 2000, the government revived the project and decided to implement it. This revival of Project ZACA-II led to more tensions with

residents and the subsequent eviction of thousands of people. The difference this time was that heads of households received financial compensation. Chapter 3 discusses the detailed history of Project ZACA and its compensation mechanism.

The implementation of Project ZACA created many problems, including family dislocation, school-dropouts, loss of valuable social relations, impoverishment, marginalization, loss of self-esteem, deaths resulting from sorrows, poor compensation, the lack of appropriate follow-up measures and mechanisms for post-displacement livelihood restoration and improvement (Audet-Gosselin 2008). At the time of this research, many research participants were still struggling to rebuild their livelihoods. For example, through their children, Rakia and Estelle² met and spent most of their time listening to the radio, watching television or by-passers, or sharing their family hardships. But then, when they got a loan from CFIAM (Centre féminin d'initiation et d'apprentissage aux métiers³), their lives took a different turn. They decided to come together to set up a small snack bar. They moved from friendship to partners in business. While Rakia and Estelle managed to rebuild their lives slowly, post-displacement reconstruction was even harsher for many other participants as exemplified below:

“What we need is help, money, my friend, what we need is money! I have skills; I used to work at SONABEL [National Electricity Company of Burkina] as an intern before ZACA relocated us here. Since I relocated here [Ouaga 2000-C], I stopped the internship because I could not afford transportation costs...But I don't have any good connections; I mean connections that can help me get a good job

² Rakia and Estelle are female participants in this research. Estelle was 37, and was married with four children. Rakia was 38-year old, a widow with three children. I discuss their story in details chapter 6.

³Women's Training & Apprenticeship Center in the Trades.

or a loan... If I can get a little bit of help, that will make a big difference.”
(Interview of Seydou Ouéder also called the philosopher, September 2009)

Seydou Ouéder’s statements help capture most research participants’ perceptions on the significance of skills, connections, and access to material and financial resources in livelihood restoration and improvement.

Against this background of displacement caused by Project ZACA, this study explores social capital in livelihood reconstruction in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. While social capital is a much-debated concept, according to Bourdieu (1986), social capital is a set of social relations owned by individuals. Social capital is durable and fungible, that is convertible into cultural (educational qualifications) or economic resources (financial and material resources). It is used to achieve individual or collective goals in society, and the ways in which women and men create and use it vary by gender (Bourdieu 1986; Erickson 2004a; O’Neill 2004). It builds on trust, reciprocity, and cooperation (Putnam 2000). Individuals involved in networks may rely on existing forms of cooperation, assistance or institutions. They may also create new forms of generating resources or accessing available resources by developing alternative ways of collaboration and cooperation.

The primary goal of this research is to look specifically at how individuals in resettlement situations create and use social capital to generate resources or access available resources through formal or informal networks. It examines how gender influences access to and use of resources for livelihood restoration and improvement. In finding answers to these questions, the study charts the history of urban development and redevelopment in Burkina Faso in general, and in Ouagadougou in particular. It examines how various historical processes led to the implementation of Project ZACA and its socio-

economic impacts on the relocated populations in terms of access to, production, and actual use of resources for livelihood reconstruction in a post-displacement situation. Development experts have often assumed that keeping family structures or communities together could foster and leverage post-displacement livelihood reconstruction. Although, the literature on migration abounds with studies underscoring the significance of social capital in livelihood strategies, there are limited studies that highlight this situation in infrastructure-induced displacement and resettlement.

The anthropological literature on migration (a form of displacement whether for socio-political or economic reasons) has successfully illustrated the significance of social capital in community building or rebuilding (Ley 2006; Lessinger 1995; Mahler 1995). Mahler (1995) argued that while ethnic enclaves can serve as a hub to facilitate access to the labor market, marginalization within such enclaves has also fostered intra-ethnic conflicts contrary to a widely praised concept of ethnic solidarity by scholars of immigration. The literature suggests that in certain contexts, strong social capital can be problematic as well as useful. However, such a perspective is not significantly discussed in the resettlement literature. Therefore, this research will discuss the possible advantages and disadvantages of social capital in post-displacement livelihood reconstruction. It will examine how individuals develop different strategies within or outside their communities to resist forced eviction and how they access and use social capital to restore and improve their livelihoods after resettlement.

Studies on urban renewal programs in Ouagadougou show that since 1983, the state has engaged in aggressive urban development at the expense of the poor (Jaglin 1995; Otayek 1996). It often targeted old neighborhoods and dismantled them. Alain

Marie (1989: 34) notes that urban renewal under the revolution resulted in social dislocation, loss of friends and customers, impoverishment and the marginalization of the urban poor. Discussing the impacts of Project ZACA-I, Jaglin (1995) argues that it affected traditional lifestyle and social interaction by dismantling extended family members and entire communities. Also, in examining the socio-economic impacts of Project ZACA-I in Ouagadougou, scholars highlighted how it fragmented and segregated urban space by pushing the poor to the periphery and slums while housing the bourgeois class in high standing houses (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1985; Jaglin 1995; Fourchard 1999). Echoing these scholars, Bonkougou (1990) and Nebié (1991) examined the impacts of displacement and resettlement on the affected populations as they lost their income sources, jobs and social networks under ZACA-I. However, all these studies failed short to probe the significance of social capital in accessing or generating resources for livelihood reconstruction.

Further, with respect to Project ZACA-II, research findings had insisted on the protest against the implementation of the project and subsequent eviction and resettlement difficulties in general (Ouédraogo N. Clémence 2004; Ouédraogo E.B. 2005; Audet-Gosselin 2008). Biehler (2006) contends that Project ZACA led to socio-spatial marginalization and the development of a segregated city and the emergence of new urban norms: a more rigid and regimented construction code and use of urban space. Audet-Gosselin (2008) has highlighted how Islam played a major role in mobilizing people against Project ZACA. His approach highlighted the role of religion as both a mobilizing and divisive force. Similar to previous findings, his research also portrayed early


resettlement hardships without examining the significance of social capital in post-displacement livelihood reconstruction.

However, most of these scholars agree that renewing the city by removing the poor and relocating them on the periphery does not solve the issue of urban slums as the same residents may reproduce the same behaviors leading again to the re-emergence of slums. In short, most studies highlighted complaints about unfair compensation, joblessness, dislocation of family and friend networks, insecurity, loss of income generating activities due to their displacement and resettlement (Audet-Gosselin 2008; Biehler 2006; Ouédraogo E.B. 2005), but they all failed short to explore the relevance of social capital in post-displacement livelihood reconstruction. Therefore, this study closely examines the relevance of social capital in post-displacement livelihood reconstruction, with special attention to potential gender difference in post-displacement experience.

Geographic Setting and Administrative Organization of Research Site

This research site is located in Ouagadougou, the capital city of Burkina Faso, with a surface area of 518 Km², Ouagadougou's population was estimated at 1.5 million inhabitants in 2006 (INSD 2008).

Map 1: Map of Ouagadougou Adapted from Wikimapia



Source: Adapted from Wikimapia on 1/01/2012

Ouagadougou (Ouaga for short) is the inherited colonial capital city of former Upper Volta, now Burkina Faso.⁴ Initially called Wogé, Wogdogo or Wodgo, the town was subsequently baptized as Ouagadougou by Malinké traders who added the morpheme “dougou” meaning “country or village” in Jula/Bamanakan. Wogdogo means, “come and honor me” in Mooré, a local dialect spoken by about 78% of residents of Ouagadougou (INSD 2009: 33).

⁴ During the Revolution, Upper Volta became Burkina Faso on August 4, 1984 resulting in the change of the national flag indicating a break with imperialism and colonialism.

Table 1. Main Languages Spoken in Ouagadougou

	Percentage
Mooré	77.5 %
French	8.7
Jula	4.6%
Other languages (about 30 languages)	2.1%

Source: Adapted from INSD (2009: 33)

According to the Ouagadougou mayor's office (Mairie de Ouagadougou 2005), the metropolitan area of Ouagadougou is made up of 30 districts and 5 *arrondissements* (boroughs) and 17 villages: Baskuy (Districts 1-12), Bogodogo (Districts 14, 15, 28, 29, 30 and the villages of Balkuy and Yamtenga), Boulmiougou (Districts 16 - 19 and the villages of Boassa, Sandogo, Zagtouli, and Zongo), Nongre-Massom (Districts 23-27 and the villages of Nioko II, Roumtenga, Sakoula, and Sogodin), and Sig-Noghin (20-22 and the villages of Bassenko, Darsalam, Kamboincé, Silmiougou, and Yagma). With 426,185 inhabitants, Bogodogo hosted part of the displaced of Project ZACA and it remains the second most populated *arrondissement* after Boulmiougou (449,519 inhabitants) (Compaoré and Nebié 2003). Ouagadougou has expanded in recent decades, with its surface area increasing from 8,600 ha in 1970 to almost 19,000 ha in 2000 (Compaoré 2003:34). According to INSD (2008: 20), the population of the Ouagadougou metropolitan area was estimated at 1.5 million inhabitants in 2006 that is, 85.5% of the national urban population. Ouagadougou hosts 12.3% of the entire population of the country. Approximately 22.7% of the national population lives in cities, with 23.5% of men and 22% of women (INSD 2008:18-20).

Table 2. Distribution of the Residents of Ouagadougou Metropolitan Area

Commune	Households	Resident Population			
		Total	Male	Female	Number of Males for 100 Females
Komki-Ipala	3,281	20,562	9,582	10,980	87
Komsilga	11,360	53,108	26,573	26,535	100
Koubri	7,380	43,928	21,645	22, 83	97
Pabré	4,355	27,896	13,168	14,728	89
Saaba	10,493	50,885	25,224	25,661	98
Tanghin-Dassouri	8,692	55,172	25,202	29,970	84
Baskuy (Arrondissement)	41,525	195,793	96,491	99,302	97
Bogodogo (Arrondissement)	93,753	426,185	215,061	211,124	102
Boulmiougou (Arrondissement)	88,445	449,519	228,159	221,360	103
Nongremassom (Arrondissement)	46,071	220,891	112,904	107,987	105
Sig-Noghin (Arrondissement)	38,436	182,835	92, 674	90,161	103

Source: INSD (2008: 32)

Even though there was no official census data on the actual total size of all the people displaced⁵ by Project ZACA, different sources estimated their number between

⁵ The term “displaced people” here refers to the people that Project ZACA removed from the center of the city of Ouagadougou and relocated some of them in Ouaga 2000-C and Nioko-I. When I use the terms “displaced residents, displaced people, placees or relocatees” to refer to people who were displaced by infrastructure development projects across the world, I specify the context to differentiate this usage from the one referring to the people displaced by Project ZACA. Further, by using the modifier “displaced” with “residents or people”, I do not intend to homogenize the diverse experiences of the people affected.

Similarly, by using the term “collective” as in “collective resistance”, I emphasize here the togetherness rather than the homogeneity of the people involved in the resistance against forced eviction. Different people coalesce to cooperate, and to defend their interests, which may intersect at some point. Moreover, I use the term “network” here to mean the set of social relations inherited or acquired by individuals in their life. For instance, individuals inherit kin relations or develop friendship or work-based

10,000 and 50,000 people (Ouédraogo E.B 2005). Some sources estimated the total number of displaceds at about 20,000 people.⁶ Exchanges with local experts and Project ZACA leaders revealed that more than two-thirds of the displaceds resettled in Ouaga 2000-C, with only 27 in Nioko I, and the rest in other parts of Ouagadougou (Field notes July 2009). Thus, based on such figures, I estimated the displaceds of Ouaga 2000-C to number roughly between 6,700 and 33,400 people.⁷

Ouaga 2000-C⁸ shares borders with the rest of Ouaga 2000, an upscale neighborhood hosting the new presidential palace, the U.S. Embassy, numerous ministerial departments, luxurious hotels, and headquarters of international NGOs. Ouaga 2000 covers a surface area of 730 hectares divided in three main areas based on the types of services developed: A (highly equipped with all paved streets), B (well equipped with paved streets), and C (basic equipment with no paved streets inside the neighborhoods). Interviews conducted in September 2009 also indicated that plot costs vary depending on the areas: 8000 CFAF/m² for area C, area B about 15,000 CFAF/m², and up to 25000 CFAF/m² for area A.⁹

relations, which could facilitate access to different forms of resources. Such forms of relations constitute their network.

⁶ Informal interviews

⁷ This is a personal estimate based on field notes. I multiplied 10,000 by 2/3, and 50,000 by 2/3 to get the rough estimate of the people displaced by Project ZACA.

⁸ In this study, research participants often refer to Ouaga 2000-C as the *trame d'accueil*.

⁹ Communauté Financière Africaine France (African Financial Community France)

Map 2: Google Earth View of Ouaga 2000-C



Source: Adopted from Google Earth showing Ouaga 2000-C

On its eastern border, along Pô road, lies an irregular settlement known as Lanoayiri, which was partly destroyed by the flood of September 1, 2009. Pô road became the bridge that linked residents of Ouaga 2000-C and Lanoayiri as people gathered to sell or buy goods of all kinds (food, condiments, bed sheets, mattresses, shoes, drinks, dresses, and many others), and to converse with friends and colleagues.

Map 3 : Location of Ouaga 2000-C Neighborhood



Source: Adapted from Wikimapia, September 5, 2011

In Ouaga 2000-C, one could identify the following types of activities including spare parts shops, mechanic and workshops, tailor workshops, and shirt-ironing workshops, and many street vendors. There were also two training centers: Padre Celestin's Training Center and CFIAM's center (Women's Training & Apprenticeship Center in the Trades). In both centers, women could have access to training in sewing and auto-repair. With respect to health and educational resources in Ouaga 2000-C, participants complained about poor health structures, and very limited school infrastructures. For instance, the health clinic in Ouaga 2000-C did not have a good quality birthing-table, sterilization materials, and incinerators to destroy trash. Nurses were using a trash dump to burn trash. Since the opening of the health clinic, it has rather

been operating as an SMI (Santé Maternelle & Infantile = Maternal and Infant Health Center) with limited human and material capacities. The center was not a full birth clinic yet because it did not have enough equipment and complete staff members. The entire neighborhood did not have its own ambulance. They had to resort to the ambulance of the CMA (Basic Surgical Medical Center) of District 30.

In addition, there was only one public primary school, called EZACA (Ecole ZACA = ZACA school), located next to the maternal and infant health center and the dispensary (CSPS = Center for Health and Social Promotion). The school had six classes with a total of 465 pupils for the school year 2008-9. According to the schoolmistress, there were too many schoolchildren, insufficient teachers, a lack of substitute teachers, and a lack of parental involvement in school management. It was against this background of post-displacement livelihood reconstruction that this research took place.

To identify participants to this research, I used area sampling as a strategy in Ouaga 2000-C and snowball sampling for other participants scattered throughout the city of Ouagadougou. Area sampling, it is “a method in which the area to be sampled is subdivided into smaller blocks which are selected at random and then sub-sampled or fully surveyed; method is used when a complete frame of reference is not available.” (FAO 1997) As for the snowball sampling strategy, it consists on relying on referrals, that is, research subjects helping to identify other research subjects that could help with information (Bernard 2006; Barbie 1973).

Failing to have the list of all the displaced people under Project ZACA for creating a sampling frame, I found it convenient to focus on Ouaga 2000-C where two thirds of the displacees relocated. However, to triangulate information gathered in Ouaga 2000-C, I


also included in my sample other displacees dispersed throughout the city by using the snowball method while acknowledging the limits of the latter (Bernard 2006; Babbie 1973).

The sampling strategy in Ouaga 2000-C involved three stages: (1) area-cluster; (2) convenience selection of households in the cluster areas; and (3) individual interview at the household level (Babbie 1973). The purpose of this multi-stage sampling approach was to ensure the inclusion of an array of relocatees¹⁰ of all socio-professional, religious and ethnic categories residing in Ouaga 2000-C (Babbie 1973). To create area-based clusters in Ouaga 2000-C, I first mapped the neighborhood by riding on my scooter, conversing with people to better identify different important locations or reference points in the neighborhood. These reference points are places familiar to residents, which they locally use to provide directions to visitors or strangers, or places that they frequent for social, religious, educational, commercial, or administrative purposes. Based on such information, I identified the following sites in Ouaga 2000-C: (1) Ecole Ezaca [Ezaca], (2) CSPA (Center for Health and Social Promotion), (3) CFIAM (Centre Féminin d'Initiation et d'Apprentissage aux Métiers = Women's Training & Apprenticeship in the Trades), (4) the Mosque next to the Dankambary community [DM], (5) the mosque built by Kuwaiti's support and Associations des Musulmans d'Afrique [KM], (6) the Catholic chapel [CC], (7) Grace Academy Center [GAC], (8) Road N°5 / Pô road [RP], (9) the market space [MS], (10) Lido Bar [LB], and (11) Centre Féminin Padre Ceslestino (Padre Ceslestino's

¹⁰ For the record: the term “displacees or relocatees” refer here to the people that project ZACA displaced and relocated in Ouaga 2000-C.

Women's Training Center) [PC]. The following is a map of Ouaga 2000-C locating the aforementioned reference points.

Map 4: Author's Map of Ouaga 2000-C Neighborhood



Socio-Demographic Characteristics of the Sample

I subdivided the overall sampled population in the following three major categories: (1) displaced residents of Ouaga 2000-C; (2) displaced residents in other neighborhoods of Ouagadougou, and (3) key informants. To balance gender participation in the interview, I included one male and one female from each selected household.

I selected 33 households in Ouaga 2000-C, but I was able to interview 58 people out of an expected number of 66 interviewees, with eight (8) who declined an interview. I also interviewed twelve (12) people through the snowball method in other parts of Ouagadougou, and twenty-five (25) resource persons including association leaders, schoolteachers, nurses, sociologists, urban experts, ABRETAO¹¹ leaders, COGES¹² leaders, architects, Imams, and the Zangouen-Naaba (the chief of the Hausa ethnic group who relocated in Ouaga 2000-C).

As part of the preparation for the fieldwork, I was able to contact some of these resource people before actually being in the field. I knew some of these resource persons as a resident and former staff member of the University of Ouagadougou. I also learned about some of them through the press, and sometimes through conversations with participants in Ouaga 2000-C or friends who happened to know them.

Including resource people in the sample facilitated the gathering of additional information on urban policies in Burkina Faso in general and in Ouagadougou in particular. This breakdown of my research participants is no claim to representativeness or an attempt to capture the totality of the experiences of all the people displaced by Project ZACA into statistics. While bearing in mind the multi-faceted experiences of participants, this breakdown seeks to provide the reader with a view of who the research subjects are in terms of gender, ethnicity, religion, age, marital status and education. The

¹¹ Association for the Well-Being of Residents of Ouaga 2000-C

¹² Management Committee

sample includes 32 females and 38 males distributed across eleven ethnic groups. In terms of occupations, participants' jobs included the followings: restaurant and bar managers, tailors, hairdressers, mechanics, drivers, jobless, students, civil servants, retired civil servants, international civil servants, Imams, catechists, NGO leaders, and pastors. The Mossi ethnic group alone stands for 36 participants, followed by the Hausa (18), Samo (4), Fulani (3), Gurunci (2), Somono (2), and the Bissa (1), Gulmace (1), Silmi-moaga (1), Somono (1), and Wolof (1).

In addition, two religious groups dominated the sampled population: Catholics and Muslims. Muslims constituted 53 (75.79%) people out of the 70 sampled research participants, and 17 (24.31%) for Catholics. Muslim women and men respectively stand for 34.32% and 41.47% of the sample whereas Catholic women and men stand respectively for 11.44% and 12.87% of the sample.

With respect to age distribution of participants to this research, 35.75% of the sampled participants are between 30-39 age groups, followed by the age groups: 18-19 (2.86%), 20-29 (20.02%), 40-49 (18.59%), 50-59 (5.72%), 60-69 (12.87%), and 70-79 (4.29%).

Out the 70 respondents, 61.49% of them are married, 28.6% are single, 5.72% are widows, 2.86% are unmarried couples living together, and 1.43%. With respect to education, participants are distributed as follows: Koranic School (7.15%), Franco-Arabic primary school (2.86%), illiterate (20.02%), primary school (38.61%), secondary school (27.17%), and University education (4.29%).

Interview Methods and Types of Data Collected

I administered questionnaires¹³ to gather socio-demographic data on all 70 research participants. Rather than having participants fill out the questionnaire, which would require more time from the interviewees and discomfort for those who were illiterate, I asked questions orally and tape-recorded them, and took additional contextual notes.

I requested participants to describe their lives before and after resettlement, their personal assessment of priority needs before and after displacement (health, education, clothing, food), their relations with colleagues, friends, relatives and neighbors, other ethnic and religious groups before and after displacement, the resources accessed and shared prior to displacement and after resettlement, the advantages and disadvantages of relations with friends, relatives, colleagues, and neighbors, and other ethnic and religious groups. I also asked participants to share their stories and to talk about the people who supported them prior to displacement and after resettlement, people they helped before and after displacement, and the types of resources shared, their membership in associations (including *tontines* or *susu*) and the roles they played before displacement and after resettlement, and prospects for their new neighborhoods.

¹³ A model of the questionnaire is appended at the end of this dissertation.

Interviews¹⁴ were mostly carried out in French, and sometimes in Jula or Mooré (Mooré is a local language spoken by more than half of the populations of Burkina Faso, and Jula is a lingua franca widely spoken in Burkina and Francophone West Africa).

I also used the semi-structured interviews to collect data. The semi-structured interviews covered key topics and questions on livelihood strategies before and after resettlement, the role of social relations in generating or accessing resources (financial, material, information resources), support networks, and participants' involvement in associations before and after resettlement. Some of those questions overlapped with those already asked in the questionnaire, which allowed for recapturing any information that I may have missed in the administration of the questionnaire. Informal interviews turned out to be casual conversations as follow-ups to earlier interviews. Such conversations facilitated the development of trust and rapport. In such instances, I avoided taking notes on the spot, but immediately after leaving the interview site, I took copious notes on our discussions, and saved them on my computer.

In my interview with resource persons, I also used the semi-structured interview format. Such interviews focused on different topics depending on their area of expertise. Discussions with experts (sociologists, historians, geographers, and architects) covered urban history, the impacts of rapid urban expansion on citizens' lives, their perspectives on Project ZACA and other past and ongoing urban projects, the types of structures and

¹⁴ I speak both Mooré and Jula. In transcribing and translating the interviews, when I recall for instance that the interviewee made some gestures or smiled, I put it in brackets right after the utterance concerned.

resources available within the displaced community for livelihood reconstruction, urban policies, city planning, and land reform issues.

Regarding the main health center, EZACA (the only public primary school at Ouaga 2000-C), and CFIAM (Women's Training & Apprenticeship Center in the Trades), the semi-structured interviews focused on the availability and actual access to resources. The objective was to triangulate information gathered from community members on resource availability and actual use for their livelihood reconstruction.

Further, I conducted participant observation in restaurants, snack bars, and having casual conversations with customers, follow-up visits of some interviewees, attended chess games next to Maquis la Vie (a small bar in Ouaga 2000-C), and tea-groups (also known as *le grin*) on Padre Celestino's street. Similarly, I also conducted observation on different locations, namely, Pô road, Avenue Sembène Ousmane (separating Ouaga 2000-C from the rest of Ouaga 2000), the street facing the Dankambary community, the street facing Padre Celestino's Center, the street next to Doctor Dakyo's pharmacy, CFIAM's street, EZACA's street, CSPA's street, the street from the market space to the Catholic Chapel.

On Pô road, I sometimes carried out observation early around 7:00 am, 12:00 pm and 6:00 pm in a single day. I sometimes stayed at Restaurant Tara as an observation point. Around 7:00 am, I often found people busy taking out their merchandise on both side of the road, some shops already opened, some being opened, women making cakes, some heading to the center city with their merchandises on their bicycles or scooters, some people sweeping the front side of their shops. At noon and in the evening, I could see trucks, cars, and buses passing on Pô road at high speed. In the evening, I was able to

observe residents returning from the center city whether on scooters or getting off SOTRACO bus. Cabs were very scarce in Ouaga 2000-C! I also observed residents from Lanoayiri busy selling their goods, crossing back and forth across Pô Road to Ouaga 2000-C.

In the morning, at noon and in the evening, along both sides of the road, one could see people mingling, discussing, bargaining, buying, selling, conversing, working or listening to music or to the radio news. Sometimes, a group of children and some adults flocked around a television set to watch a Brazilian soap opera. Life along Pô road was livelier compared to life inside the Ouaga 2000-C. That road is the “natural boundary” between Lanoayiri and Ouaga 2000-C. Nevertheless, it is also the bridge between the two neighborhoods. It became a “spontaneous market,” especially on the eastern side of the resettlement area.

Further, during such observation, I was able to see whether some of the rare businesses in Ouaga 2000-C attracted customers or not. I also visited Lanoayiri’s market to see the kinds of goods and services available on the market: traditional beer, sauce leaves/condiments, boutiques (millet, rice, soaps, candies, crackers, batteries, potassium, and imported cooking oil), shirts, cooking wares, spare parts, tires, and mattresses. These various activities allow gaining access to the livelihood strategies and resources in and around Ouaga 2000-C.

On Friday, for *djuma* prayers (Friday prayers), residents of Lanoayiri flocked to the two Friday mosques in Ouaga 2000-C: the mosque in front of the Dankambary community and the one built by the Kuwaiti’s support and *Association des Musulmans d’Afrique* (Association of African Muslims). Old and young, women, and children wore

their best Friday white robes or dresses, holding their prayer mats and rosaries (locally known as *tatabia*).

Besides, I took pictures and videotaped places in the neighborhoods, including Ouaga 2000 A and B, other districts of Ouagadougou, and Lanoayiri. Whenever I did not go to Ouaga 2000-C for interviews, I would ride around in Ouagadougou, videotaping traffic, and street life in Ouagadougou, buildings and monuments. All these kinds of data are meant to help describe life in the city of Ouagadougou compared to Ouaga 2000-C.

Information collected about research participants represent a snapshot of opinions and views expressed during the research. As qualitative research, this study does not claim to portray the totality of displaced populations' experiences. It rather provides a window towards understanding post-displacement livelihood reconstruction. Individuals' experiences and reactions to specific events are indeed specific, situational, dynamic and evolving. Stories told about events are the re-presentations of various socio-historical and political perspectives that informed the story and the storyteller's perspectives. They are already interpretations, and I re-present these stories in this analysis (Berkhofer 1995; Dudukovic et al 2004). I am therefore relativizing the concept of representativeness. Claiming so may be totalizing and homogenizing the diverse and rich stories of participants in this research.

The next section below discusses field collaboration, my research assistant's roles and responsibilities, including how this collaboration allowed me to continue research after returning to the United States.

Assistance in Fieldwork and Ethnographic
Collaboration

Yaro Zakarya, a friend and social worker assisted me in carrying out my interviews in Ouaga 2000-C during fieldwork, and we continued to collaborate after I left the field in October 2009. Yaro Zakarya earned a post-graduate degree in social work, and a Bachelor of Arts in English. Yaro, as I always call him, is a childhood friend. After his studies at the University of Ouagadougou, Yaro left for a vocational training school in social studies in 1995, and worked in Diébougou (a small town in Burkina Faso) before returning to Ouagadougou in 1999 to finish his postgraduate studies in social work. He currently works at the Ministry of Social Affairs while teaching English in a local high school. Yaro took courses in research methodology, anthropology of development, social policy analysis, sociology of development, general psychology, linguistics, to quote but a few. Yaro speaks and writes excellent French and English. He is also fluent in San, Mooré, and Jula. His thesis for his postgraduate study is titled: “Observance of antiretroviral treatment by people living with HIV under the supervision of the African Solidarity Association in Ouagadougou.” He carried out multiple interviews for his own research, and he was highly aware of research ethical standards as he worked on a sensitive issue like HIV/AIDS.

I explained to Yaro the objectives of my research and its ethical requirements and the scope of his responsibilities. Given his own experience in fieldwork, there was no need for additional training, except for the provision of information about his role in this research.

Yaro helped discuss the sampling strategy and to administer interviews and we continued to collaborate even after I was not present in the field. He also helped identify different types of activities carried out along the streets crossing Ouaga 2000-C resettlement area (from the eastern side), starting from Pô road, until the end of Ouaga 2000-C (western side). Business activities included the following: cafés, restaurants, shops, hairdressing salons, pharmacies, health centers, schools, bars, etc. The main objective was to be able to compare the variety of economic activities on the *trame d'accueil* with those carried out prior to displacement based on previous research findings in Ouagadougou.

This research privileged continuous exchanges with research participants. The next section discusses research preparedness, preparatory activities to fieldwork, and research timeline.

Preparedness and Research Timeline

As a citizen of Burkina Faso, and having lived in Ouagadougou from 1993 to 2004, I became acquainted with Project ZACA-II in early 2000 during debates and subsequent violent demonstrations of residents against the implementation of the Project. I also witnessed the bulldozing of some houses. However, little did I know then, that I would be interested in studying this issue several years later.

Having lived in Ouagadougou for eleven years also enabled me to have a personal understanding of social and cultural urban dynamics in Ouagadougou. This experience could be a double-edged sword as I may be “too close to see,” but it also allowed me to better interact with research participants during fieldwork. Further discussions will be devoted to this issue later in the chapter when I discuss “being a native anthropologist.”

My academic interest in studying the effects of Project ZACA and its socio-economic implications for the displacees began in 2006. This scholarly interest led me to read more on existing academic literature, and hundreds of pages of newspapers' articles and interviews on Project ZACA, urban renewal in Burkina, and Ouagadougou in particular. Thus, in 2008, as part of my research method class, I initiated preliminary research on gender and forced eviction under Project ZACA through email and phone based interviews of eight participants. I also conducted two face-to-face interviews: one consultant economist to Project ZACA, and the other with one well-informed journalist on Project ZACA (both were students living in Maryland, USA); and email and phone exchanges with one urban expert in Burkina, phone exchanges with five relocatees (two males and three females) identified through a close friend. Questions focused on the following: participants' views on life before and after Project ZACA, the management of financial compensation by families, the inclusion of men and women, socio-economic difficulties encountered by men and women, strategies for social cohesion and livelihood reconstruction, lessons learned from the implementation of the Project. Since that time, I kept contact with these participants preparing the ground for a potential fieldwork.¹⁵

This resulted in fieldwork from July to October 2009, and continuous contacts and discussions (post-October 2009 to March 2011) with some research participants and my

¹⁵ As a lead up to fieldwork, in June 2009, I compiled a list of 30 people working in research, educational, public, and private institutions and initiated email exchanges with ten social scientists working on urban issues in Burkina.

research assistant to compensate for the lack of a longer stay within the research community. I examine the benefits and limits of this approach further in this chapter.

Difficulties and Research Limitations

As already noted, my presence in Ouagadougou lasted from July to October 2009, which did not allow for using certain techniques to collect data. For instance, this did not allow for the follow-up on the economic activities of the relocatees over a much longer period. Nor was I able to stay longer within the community for participant observation of residents' lifestyles. However, I believe that my knowledge of Ouagadougou during the eleven years (1993-2004) spent there as both a student and professional translator, and as a resident, could partly compensate for that need for a longer stay to immerse in the local language and culture.

Another difficulty encountered was having access to the list of all the relocatees with Project ZACA leaders. Getting the list could have enabled me to avoid focusing primarily on Ouaga 2000-C, but rather to track down randomly selected participants throughout the city of Ouagadougou. This lack of access to the list raises issues of confidentiality, ethics, and fieldwork as often discussed in the ethnographic literature (Bernard 2006: 74-75; Sanjek 1990). It also highlights fieldwork uncertainties and power dynamics that anthropologists (whether native or not) encounter during fieldwork (Fedorak 2008). This led to the following reflection: confidentiality is not just binding for the fieldworker, it is also binding for our interlocutors who must navigate ethics, and local confidentiality rules to share information with the anthropologists. As an anthropologist, I believe that under no circumstances, should we violate such local confidentiality rules to get access to confidential documents.

Furthermore, in some households, when the male head of the household accepted to be interviewed, his wife/wives automatically declined to be interviewed, arguing her/their husband had already said everything. Other participants simply declined my request, arguing that they had had enough with interviews that do not help change their socio-economic conditions. In the face of the refusals of some women to assume a “speaking subject position,” I often wondered if their refusal to speak on their own behalf was not reflective of the gendered expectations of who should speak and when within the household.

Some individual interviews often turned into group interviews as family members and friends would flock around to share their opinions, even when I did not ask them or invited them to share their views. As a result, I would often go back to such research participants, and have some informal conversations for any additional information that they might have refrained from sharing because of the presence of others.

In addition, research of secondary data revealed the poor organization of urban resources in Ouagadougou. Urban resources were scattered through the city in different libraries, and the Ministry of Habitat and Urbanism does not even have a library. Further, the library of the Directorate of Urbanization also had very limited resources. A centralized library or documentation center dealing with urban resources¹⁶ would facilitate researcher’s tasks and minimize researchers’ efforts to access secondary data. All these

¹⁶ The field observation urged me to take immediate action by creating a website where I have been compiling urban resources and called for a greater scholarly collaboration: <www.burkinaurbanresourcecenter.net>.

hurdles led to the following reflection on my position as an anthropologist doing research “at home”.

Positionality: Returning Home to
Do Fieldwork

Although from Burkina Faso, I am not a native of Ouagadougou. I was born and raised in Kiembara, a Samo village located in the Northwest of Burkina Faso, about 180 km from Ouagadougou. Even though, I see Ouagadougou as home because I lived there from 1993 to 2004, I am still not from Ouagadougou. Moreover, I spent five years in the USA studying, and I was eager to return home to do research among my people. However, I neglected one thing: I was away for five solid years during which period the city of Ouagadougou and its citizens experienced various socio-economic changes. I needed to reposition myself in my struggle to understand these physical and socio-economic changes to navigate field power dynamics. My social capital was partially eroded by my long absence, and I had a hard time re-adjusting to some discursive practices such as “Do you have money?” or “Are you financially OK”? Such questions really irritated me at the beginning. However, in the end, I finally viewed them as simple curiosity about my financial capacity or indirect ways of asking for money.

During fieldwork, one participant said to me the following: “Today, in Ouagadougou, if you don’t know how to speak you cannot earn your living.” I asked him, what he meant by “knowing how to speak.” He replied that sometimes, young people have to engage in lies to earn something to eat. However, as I was recording the interview with him, I was wondering whether he was fabricating all this discourse because he expected me to give him something in return. I was disappointed that research participants

developed a strategy of accumulation by learning to tell their story in a way that would provide them with some income. Indeed, anthropologists and other social scientists have engaged in accumulating knowledge, publishing their research findings, and becoming famous, sometimes, at the expense of research participants. This is probably one of the reasons why some of my research participants reacted by stating that they were fed up with those students coming to interview them to collect their intimate stories, and then at the end of such research interviews, their socio-economic situation does not change. Telling the story of displacement has become a way of seeking hope and voicing their concerns to the public and authorities in the following terms: “tell them that we need their help; tell them that they should not forget us.” I have come to understand some of my research participants’ statements as an invitation for the researcher to be an active agent of change, not simply as an observer and reporter. They were inviting me as a researcher to reciprocate by ensuring that my findings could benefit them. As a matter of fact, in an interview with the Zangouen-Naaba (the Chief of the Hausa ethnic group), he told me that once I stepped in their community, I have become part of their family and community, and that it was my duty to remember them. Remembering my research participants has become mandatory. Unless, I am ungrateful, I have the moral obligation to remember my research participants, and to help them change their situation. I replied that I have always remembered people I met. Then, he quickly added, “Ah no! You should not just remember us, you should maintain that relationship.” After all, my research is about social capital, and the first lesson I learned was to maintain relationships.

All this led me to reflect on what it means to be a “native anthropologist”¹⁷, compared to a non-native anthropologist in terms of fieldwork expectations, hardships, power dynamics, and the various strategies deployed by ethnographers to navigate the field.

Today, “native anthropologists” or “insider anthropologists” are engaged in the study of their own cultures and people. This situation has some advantages and disadvantages. Native anthropologists may have some linguistic and cultural advantages by studying their own peoples and cultures because they can easily negotiate meaning and perceive some socio-cultural and linguistic nuances that outsider anthropologists may not necessarily perceive (Jacobs-Huey 2002; Narayan 1993; Owusu 1978). Native anthropologists, namely Owusu (1978), Narayan (1993), Mascarenhas-Keyes (1988), Kuwayama (2004), Jacobs-Huey (2002), to cite but a few, all agree that as native anthropologists, their linguistic fluency facilitated their interaction with their research subjects.

By contrast, the outsider or traditional anthropologists may take some time to learn the local language. Linguistic or cultural accents may constitute serious obstacles in communication with interlocutors who may be distracted and rather pay attention to the

¹⁷ I am problematizing here the notion of native anthropologist/ethnographer as often discussed in anthropology. Some anthropologists have often viewed the term “native ethnographer/anthropologist” as incompatible because they assumed that “natives” could not be objective in the study of their own people. In this respect, in “The Virtual Anthropologist”, Kath Weston (1997: 166) argues, “If one is not born an anthropologist, neither is one born a native.” Rather than “going native”, the native anthropologist is supposed to be “going ethnographer” to achieve objectivity, if ever there is any such objectivity at all.

awkward speech or cultural behaviors of the researcher. They may also mistranslate some messages due to linguistic competence Owusu (1978).

However, not all native anthropologists have this linguistic advantage, especially in a multilingual and multicultural context. Such was my case in Ouagadougou. Even though I speak Mooré, native speakers quickly realized that I am not a Moaga (singular form for Mossi [plural form]) due to my accent and last name (Tinguiri), which is a local ethnic boundary marker. In Burkina Faso, an individual's patronym indicates his/her ethnicity and place of origin. As noted earlier, I am originally from Kiembara, a Samo village in the Northwest of Burkina Faso, about 180 km from Ouagadougou. When some research participants asked about my origin, I answered that I was from Kiembara. This highlights how identity shifts depending on situations and the people asking to know who we are. It also questions the rigidity of ethnicity as often advocated by the primordialists.

As shown by Undie (2007) and Jacobs-Huey (2002) though native anthropologists, they still had hard time negotiating their initial steps within their research communities. Undie (2007) had to learn when to stand up and what kinds of questions to ask or not. As for Jacobs-Huey (2002: 203-4), she made some communicative missteps by stating, "How nice it is to be back here?" Her research subject replies, "what do you mean by "back here?" Such questions are clear indications that one may be a native anthropologist, and still stumble in communicating with the respondents. In my case, in attempting to establish rapport and to have access to a prominent local political leader for an interview, I used the joking relationship (locally called in Mooré *rakiéré*) between the Mossi and the Samo as an entry point. Unfortunately, it did not work as the subject (also the personal secretary and nephew of the political leader in question) I referred to as a Moaga bluntly replied he

was not a Moaga, but rather a Yarsé. Even though the Yarsé speak Mooré, most of them still do not consider themselves as Mossi. Though I insisted that as a Samo, I did not see any difference between a Yarsé and a Moaga, the subject's refusal to be identified as a Moaga did not facilitate my negotiation strategy. This partly shows that participants can challenge even locally "established norms" of ethnic identity.¹⁸ So, one may be a native anthropologist, and still fail to establish successful rapport with research subjects (Visweswaran 1996). It is just not enough to speak a language fluently, what is mostly important is to be able to establish rapport with respondents. As already noted, on several occasions, some men and women categorically refused to participate in my research. Some women rather replied to my interview request by stating that their husbands have already said everything. I have come to interpret this as a sign of power dynamic and intra-household negotiation. Those women who refused to speak referred to the authority and all-encompassing aspect of their husband's speech as representing their views. I viewed this attitude as a sign of subordination and an expression of patriarchal power relations. However, when some men refused to assume a speaking subject position, they just did it on their own or simply found excuses such as "I have already said the same thing to other researchers." They refused to speak not because other people spoke for them, but rather because they were not willing to do so.

Further, as argued by Kuwayama (2004: 7), if native anthropologists may have linguistic advantages in their interactions with their research communities, they may be

¹⁸ Even though this research is not about ethnicity, it is worth noting here that the research subject's attitude reveals that ethnic boundaries are not rigid. They are fluid and circumstantial.

“too close to see”, and this is likely to affect the quality of data collected, objectivity and the outcome of their analysis. Also, by distancing themselves, the outsider anthropologists are likely to be free from any commitment to members of their research communities.

However, the native anthropologists may not always be in a position to distance themselves from their respondents since the local people perceive them as part of the community. Refusing to assist one’s community could lead members to interpret such an attitude as selfishness. In this respect, research participants asked me to inform the local authorities about the need for support in starting their market, creating job opportunities for the youth, and helping to improve the health clinics (CSPS) and the school facilities. Participants often openly asked me to be their voice, and I often tried to answer through a smile or simply assuring them that one of the objectives of my research was to help find solutions to some of their difficulties and needs for better socio-economic conditions. I also often added that my research findings might also help guide future urban policies for the benefit of the coming generations.

Being a native or being perceived as a native anthropologist may not always be advantageous. Whether a native anthropologist or not, the field is already full of tensions and struggles for power, rules and regulations governing confidentiality and access to information. Native anthropologists are also responsible for respecting confidentiality, and avoiding ethical pitfalls (Mascarenhas-Keyes 1988:190-1). As already noted, I already faced confidentiality issues with respect to accessing the list of displacees of Project ZACA, as well as the refusal of some participants to share their intimate stories and feelings about the Project and its impact on their livelihood strategies.

Both native and non-native anthropologists face these ethical issues in the exercise of their profession. No matter their origin, they all face the same professional ethics: protecting the subjects of their studies. Whether a native or not, their writing should be scrutinized to make sure that they meet high professional ethical standards. In the meantime, this ethical question is also strongly tied to the issue of power that both native and non-native anthropologists face in the field and after the field.

In the face of power dynamics in and after the field, the research subjects sometimes challenge non-native anthropologists' authority. As shown by Scheper-Hughes (a non-native anthropologist) who was blamed by one of her research subjects as follows: "Who made you such an authority? You weren't a grand person when you and your family came to live in our bungalow. You could hardly control your own children. Why don't you go home and write about your own troubles?" (2007: 202-203). This reveals that the research subjects perceive themselves as an authority when it comes to self-representation. In addition, they are ready to challenge the authorities of the outsider anthropologist when their views diverge. This type of challenge is also valid for native anthropologist. An examination of Undie's (2007) account of her field experience reveals that in the village council meeting, she is instructed by her key informant not to ask questions about Ikwong, Ubang's frightening secret society, because this could create hostility and result in the sabotage of her research. She obeys these instructions, which reveals that the native anthropologists' research questions can be influenced by local discursive practices. Failing to obey could inhibit data collection and therefore her capacity to achieve her goals. This also partly reveals how the local communities are directing the research and influencing the selection of what should be included in the ethnographic writing. Keshodkar sums this

power dynamic in the field as follows: “The positions we acquire in the field will directly reflect the power relations in the community and the degree of power we possess in this process.” (2004: 9).

Before concluding this reflection, it is worth noting that the division between native versus non-native anthropologist may be futile today because all anthropologists could be considered natives of some place (Weston 1997). I have therefore argued here that being a native anthropologist can be an advantage, especially from a linguistic and cultural perspective. The language and cultural advantage may facilitate the native anthropologist’s data collection, communication with research subjects, and he/she may easily avoid some ethical and translation pitfalls, which may not be the case for an outsider anthropologist.

All anthropologists will face power dynamics and emotional challenges in the field and care is required if they do not want to compromise their research. The field can dictate changes in the ways the research method may unfold or the topics to discuss. Such was sometimes the case when some of my research participants endlessly emphasized the lack of market place as the major obstacles to earning their livelihood when I was asking them question about how they manage to generate or have access to resources through their social relations. In short, the researcher’s gender, ethnicity, status, class, and age do matter in the appreciation of respondents’ experience and vice-versa. These categories are fundamental to the ways the respondents perceive and classify the researcher according to their own classificatory schemes. Local power dynamics shape the researcher and the research subject.

Organization of the Dissertation

Including this introduction, the dissertation is organized in seven chapters. Chapter 2 discusses the historical processes and dynamics that shaped and transformed the city of Ouagadougou from the pre-colonial period to the present. This historical approach allows for grasping how past events and actors contributed to the socio-cultural, political and economic configurations and transformations of the city of Ouagadougou, as well as the creation and implementation of Project ZACA. This historical approach allows us to understand the state's strategies in the production and control of urban spaces, how they affect socio-economic and political spaces of urban dwellers.

Along this line, chapter 3 discusses the socio-historical and political context that led to the emergence of Project ZACA. Going back to the early 1980s, the chapter charts how the revolution of 1983 and its populist discourse on citizenship and city building, led to the emergence of major urban projects such as Project ZACA. The chapter also builds on various sources, including ethnographies, research reports, case studies, and fieldwork interviews and observation. It then highlights Project ZACA, its policy objectives, financial hurdles encountered by the project, as well as the compensation mechanisms put in place to support residents. It shows that Project ZACA is symbolic of the battle among competing ideologies and forces of socio-economic development, which deconstructs and reconstructs citizens' way of life.

Chapter 4 builds on social capital and collective resistance frameworks while examining the stories of residents of the neighborhood affected by Project ZACA, and how they organized to struggle against their eviction by relying on bonding, bridging and linking relations. It highlights how the struggle for social justice for the protection of

social capital and cultural capital, and social economic well-being were the main driving force against forced eviction. The chapter attempts to show that the anti-ZACA movement coordinated by young leaders, traditional and religious leaders, as well as elders in the neighborhoods concerned about the project built on long-standing friendship, kinship and neighborhood relations.

Chapter 5 discusses the impacts of the project on displacees in terms of dislocation of their social networks and their ways of making a living. In this respect, the chapter highlights that the market is not simply a place where only economic transaction occurs, but also a locus where social relations are generated, reinforced, and maintained along gender lines, which allows access to resources for livelihood reconstruction. Against that background, the chapter argues that the ban on market start-up and street vending affects ways of socializing, and accessing resources readily available or generated through such venues. The chapter shows that the state-led production and control of urban spaces affects socio-economic spaces across gender lines.

Chapter 6 examines the gender dynamics of livelihood reconstruction after resettlement building on the stories of research participants and field observations. It discusses how men and women engaged in different modes of networking and accessing resources in rebuilding their lives. Drawing on the literature on social capital, local financial support mechanisms also known as the *tontine* or *susu*, this chapter demonstrates how such long-nurtured traditional modes of pooling and redistributing resources proved helpful in livelihood reconstruction after displacement, especially for women who were the most involved in this form of networking and resource mobilization. Examining individual narratives, the chapter also argues how gender and power dynamics are

fundamental in different ways of negotiating within and outside the household spaces. Further, exploring the struggle of Catholic women and the apparent silence of their male counterparts, the chapter argues that when women have the opportunity, they can be a powerful force in rebuilding community life, accessing resources, and fighting to defend and to preserve their families and communities' interests and needs. Along the same lines, the chapter explores the various coping strategies by both men and women in their struggle for re-starting the market despite the opposition of local authorities.

Chapter 7, which is the conclusion to this dissertation, summarizes the main findings of the study, identifies the practical and theoretical implications and provides some recommendations based on the analysis of the research findings.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL PROCESSES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBANIZATION IN OUAGADOUGOU

This chapter discusses the historical processes and dynamics that shaped the city of Ouagadougou from the pre-colonial period to the present. This historical approach allows for grasping how past events and factors contributed to the physical and socio-cultural, political and economic configurations of the city of Ouagadougou, as well as the creation and implementation of Project ZACA.

The history of Ouagadougou could be subdivided as follows: the pre-colonial period (15th century to 1896); the colonial period (1896 to 1960); independence (1960 to 1983); from the revolution in 1983 to 1990, and 1990 to the present. These various periods illustrate different socio-historical, political, and economic processes and dynamics that shaped and continue to shape urban planning and redevelopment in Burkina Faso in general, and in Ouagadougou in particular. Examining all these various periods will help the reader understand the gradual transformation of Ouagadougou as shaped by these policies, the roots and subsequent creation of Project ZACA.

Land Management in Pre-colonial Ouagadougou

To understand city building and the occupation of urban land for settlement or any other purposes, it is significant to grasp land management and allocation in the first place, following the prevailing laws and customs, and how access to land contributed to city development and redevelopment.

In pre-colonial Ouagadougou, the *teng-soaba*, that is, the owner of the land or chief of land controlled land management as in most of West Africa (Izard 1985). The *teng-soaba* (always the male elder of the lineage in the Mossi society) oversees the distribution, uses, and exploitation of the land (Kevane and Gray 1999). Even today, the *teng-soaba* plays a socio-religious, political, and economic role in customary land management (Izard 1985; Compaoré 2003). The *teng-saobdamba* are the natives, and in pre-colonial Ouagadougou, they lived in Wogdogo and Mankudgu located in the Western part of current Ouagadougou (Fourchard 2001: 42-43).

The *teng-soabdamba* (plural for *teng-soaba*) intercede with the gods to request health, rain, good crops, and children. Thus, not only do they oversee land distribution and management, they also participate in the socio-political well-being of the populations (Izard 2003; Skinner 1974). However, they remain the subordinates of the Mogho-Naaba (the Mossi king) who owns *naam*, that is, power, which is reinforced by sacrifices performed by *teng-soabdamba*. All the *tengbiisi* (children of the land or natives) and other subjects owe allegiance to the Mogho-Naaba as discussed later in the section on the socio-political organization of Ouagadougou (Izard 1985).

It is important to note here that the power of the Mogho-Naaba covered the territories controlled and managed by the *teng-soabdamba* under his control (Izard 2003; Jaglin 1995). This highlights the connection between territory and power in the Mossi society, but also between power and the subjects living on such territories. In Mooré, there is a popular saying that “*nèb-la naam*,” meaning, “people are power,” a king without subjects is a powerless king. Aware of the connection between power and land, as noted by Fourchard (2001), in the 17th century, under Mogho-Naaba Yandfo’s reign (1620-

1661), the Mogho-Naaba got actively involved in allocating lands to people settling in Ouagadougou. Thus, in pre-colonial Ouagadougou, whenever new subjects requested to settle in Ouagadougou, their request was addressed to the Mogho-Naaba who referred them to the *teng-soaba* to provide them the portion of land they could use for settlement and for agricultural purposes. For instance, when the Hausa arrived in Ouagadougou in the late 18th and early 19th centuries to settle down, the Mogho-Naaba asked the *teng-soaba* to show the land where they could settle (Izard 1985).

Today, whether in urban or rural areas, the *teng-soaba* remains the traditional managers of the land as in most of West African countries (Akuffo 2009). The co-existence of customary land management with the current land reform law creates a competition and tension between the State and *teng-soabdamba* over land ownership (Izard 2003). This competition is still prevalent today in urban land management as discussed later in this chapter. Having discussed land control and management in pre-colonial Ouagadougou, the next section examines the socio-spatial and political organization of the city and its functions.

Socio-political Organization of Ouagadougou

Socio-political organization played a major role in carving the urban landscape in pre-colonial Ouagadougou. Examining this aspect will help understand the various functions of neighborhoods and their demographics prior to the French invasion.

In depicting the physical appearance of Ouagadougou in the 19th century, the French explorer, Dr. Crozat noted the following:

A large denuded plateau that one perceives from a vast distance, four to five kilometers as one comes from the north; a wide expanse of land with immense


lougans; a line of ponds; small portions of waste land where one suspects ferruginous rocks underlie the rank weeds; some clusters of large trees; and here and there groups of Bambara-type huts hidden by millet stalks—such is Ouagadougou. The capital, like the smallest Mossi hamlet, is only an agricultural village, and, were it not for the deforestation of the area, nothing would reveal to the traveler that here is the great center and the residence of a sovereign. But the inhabited area here is truly considerable; and the groups of houses, if not denser, are incomparably more numerous. As far as the eye can see, other comparable groups of agricultural hamlets—really dispersed small farms—are in view, or are suspected to be all over the plateau and are like suburbs of this rustic town *ville campagnarde*. Also, one should say right away that each one of these groups of small huts has a particular name, even that of the group of the royal huts which is called Kounkounbissi (Crozat 1890, cited in Skinner 1974: 20).

This description of Ouagadougou emphasizes the rustic aspect of the city. From Dr Crozat's perspective, Ouagadougou could not even be considered a city. Similarly, Binger (1892: 459-460) viewed the palace as a group of squalid houses surrounded by rubbish, and thatched huts. For him, Ouagadougou, which he spelt "Waghadougou" was made up of the following: the palace or Mogho-Naaba's residence, the Muslims' village (originally from the Mandé ethnic group), the Zang-ana neighborhood inhabited by the Marenga from Songhay, the Zang-ouér'o or Zangouéto (Hausa), the Fulani neighborhood, and other neighborhoods inhabited by non-Muslims. He estimated the population of Ouagadougou at about 5,000 people. "Early travelers reported that pre-colonial Ouagadougou was a whole complex of villages scattered over 12 square kilometers and linked by footpaths to Na'Tenga and to the market place....Each homestead within the villages and hamlets, whether the king's palace, or the houses of nobles, commoners, serfs, or slaves, was surrounded by its own garden or 'village' farm" (Skinner 1974: 25).

In the 15th century, the Mossi came from Dagomba in current Ghana and conquered Ouagadougou, which was then called Wogdogo. They found the Ninisi who used to persecute the Nyonyosé people. At that time, Naaba Oubri, the son of Zoungrana

conquered the Ninisi and ousted them from the area. According to oral history, the Ninisi (also known as the San or Samo people) migrated to Tougan and other San regions.

Map 5: Map of Ouagadougou Drawn by Binger in 1892



Source: Binger (1892: 397), Vol. 2: Map of Ouagadougou (Electronic document)

Pre-colonial Ouagadougou was made-up of different neighborhoods and surrounding villages playing specific roles in the kingdom (Fourchard 2001: 42). Subjects could come and visit the king, offer gifts and take part in various ceremonies and festivities. Life in Ouagadougou was more about farming and market activities, drinking traditional beer, socializing, visiting, and gifts giving to the King, and often by organizing raids against neighboring tribes, including the Gurunci and the Samo (Binger 1892). The citizens were engaged in trade, agriculture and the Mogho-Naaba levied taxes on traders. Such forms of production and consumption made up the economy of the kingdom.

The old neighborhoods around the Na'Tenga (the King's village or the capital) dating back to the pre-colonial period include: Ouidi, Gounghin and Kamsonghin, Larhlé or Larghlé, the latter extended north-west to constitute a small village called Ouagadougou.

The Mogho-Naaba resided in Na'Tenga while his provincial governors, also referred to as his notables/ministers, lived in the surrounding neighborhoods with his other subjects. Each neighborhood had its socio-political and economic functions.

For instance, Ouidi (horse in Mooré) was the neighborhood where the Head Knight resided (Dao 1972; Skinner 1974). The Ouidi-Naaba took care of the Mogho-Naaba's horses, which were used for war to defend the interests of the Kingdom, and to raid neighboring chiefdoms. This neighborhood was the strategic military camp of the Mogho-Naaba as it was located in North-west away from the Naaba's residence (Balima 1996). The Larhlé Naaba was the Minister of Defense. He was responsible for calling troops together in times of war. Further, Ouagadougou used to be the neighborhood of the Ninisi whose chief was Wogdogo Naaba. Each newly crowned Mogho-Naaba had to visit the Wogdogo Naaba who blessed him by offering him a magic and empowering potion to drink. When the Mossi conquered the city, the Wogdogo Naaba lost most of his powers. He only had to perform symbolic and religious rituals meant to empower the Mogho-Naaba.

With respect to social events, Binger had the opportunity to witness the Friday visits of Mogho-Naaba Sanom by his provincial chiefs as well as his Monday's parade followed by his subjects and griots beating tom-toms. The Naaba combined traditional religion and Islam by participating in Muslims' feasts and prayers as shown in the

following picture by Binger (1892) where he was given blessings by Issaka, a Muslim scholar, and returnee from Mecca.



Figure 1: Muslims Praying for Binger (Binger 1892: 457)

However, Binger also observed that the “so-praised” Mossi Kingdom with a powerful military organization could no longer carry out such military expeditions against Timbuktu and surrounding chiefdoms, let alone against the French military machinery (Binger 1892: 465). Indeed, the subsequent conquest of Ouagadougou by the French colonial army would change the physical and socio-demographic dynamics and configurations of Ouagadougou.

The Scramble for Ouagadougou

Ouagadougou was famous for its powerful warriors and its centrality in trade in the region. As a trading center, Ouagadougou was connected to other regional cities such as Timbuktu, Mopti, Djenné, Say, Salaga, and Gao (Fourchard 2001: 42-47). However, as rightly described by Binger (1892), even though the Kingdom seemed vibrant, it was already weakened by internal disputes for power. Such conflicts opposed Naaba Sanom to Boukary (who became later Naaba Wobgo). The chief of Lallé and Gurunci ethnic groups also contested even Naaba Wobgo's power (Balima 1996). It was against such a backdrop that the German explorer, Krausse visited the Mogho between 1886-1887, followed by Captain Binger in 1888, and then Officer Monteil in 1891. These various visits were situated in the larger context Europe's exploration of the African continent in the 19th century, which was followed by military conquest, and political, economic and cultural domination often well-summed in the three Cs: Civilization, Commerce and Christianity (Surun 2006: 23).

It was against this background that the Mogho-Naaba became suspicious and got irritated by the increasing visits of European explorers, and finally ordered the expulsion of Monteil. All the explorers tried to gain his favors, but in vain. Then, in 1894, an Afro-British traveler by the name of George Ekem Ferguson, representative of the British Empire, visited the Naaba to negotiate a trade and protectorate agreement signed on July 2, 1894 (Balima 1996: 124). The competition for Ouagadougou gained momentum in 1895 with a succession of German, British, and French emissaries, but to no avail. Finally, when the French last envoy Ibrahim Guira failed to persuade Naaba Wobgo to sign a protectorate agreement, the French decided to use military force to conquer Ouagadougou

(Balima 1996). Interestingly, while the Naaba was aware of the power of relationships, he also knew that signing protectorate agreements with the European explorers would mean losing his power and kingdom contrary to all the promises made by his European visitors.

Subsequent events proved him right. Indeed, led by Voulet and Chanoine, the French colonial army attacked Ouagadougou on September 6, 1896, burned houses, and massacred residents. This bloody conquest of Ouagadougou, led Pacéré Titenga (a poet, essayist, and cultural scholar) to publish in 1979 a controversial book titled “*Ainsi on a assassiné tous les Mossi: essai-témoignage.*” [Thus were all the Mossi Assassinated]. Pacéré (1979) denounces the socio-cultural and ethical destabilization, collective and individual humiliation of the Mossi. After that humiliation, Naaba Wobgo fled, roamed the countryside, sought unsuccessfully the support of the British,¹⁹ and finally died in 1904 (Skinner 1974; Balima 1996). With the death of Naaba Wobgo, and the “pacification” of the Mossi Kingdom, the French secured their presence in Ouagadougou. The French colonial military destroyed the Mossi King’s palace and transformed it into a military base (Balima 1996; Skinner 1974).

This downfall of the Mogho-Naaba and settlement of the French military in the former palace was meant to signal the shift in power dynamics that was to change the geo-political, economic, and urban landscape of Ouagadougou, among other things, through the influence of European mode of government, city planning and architectural design.

¹⁹ Naaba Wobgo tried to use the protectorate signed in 1894 to request the British support, but the British rather preferred to avoid confrontation with the French given the terms of the Berlin Conference of 1885 specifying that once one European country conquered a territory, others should not seek to conquer the same territory.

Colonial Ouagadougou: Managing City
Space and Citizens

Arguably, for Jaglin (1995), the first colonial “urban planning project” was marked by the destruction of the Mossi king’s palace, and its replacement with a military camp. Such argument is indeed questionable because it is grounded in a Eurocentric definition of city. Ouagadougou was already the capital of the Mossi Kingdom, and it was growing and expanding at its own pace. Once the French conquered Ouagadougou, the capital of the most powerful Mossi Kingdom, it was much easier to conquer the rest of the Mossi territory, and expand the grip of the French colonial presence in the country. The Mogho-Naaba was compelled to sign a protectorate, and Ouagadougou then became a basis for the conquest of the rest of the country (Balima 1996). From 1896 to the creation of the Upper Volta colony in 1919, the colonial administration did not initiate major urban projects in Ouagadougou. However, being the colonial administrative center, Ouagadougou continued to attract more traders and some rural migrants and subsequently became a significant economic center. This also led to the increased population and diversification. Discussing its economic function, Skinner (1974: 25) writes:

The economic activities of the early French administrators in the Upper Volta did much to change the traditional economic life of Ouagadougou.... Many rural Mossi organized caravans to Ouagadougou where they sold their goods to get the necessary species from the administration and merchants with which to pay the taxes. Inevitably, some of the caravaneers stayed on and augmented the town’s population.

It is important to bear in mind that the French aimed at using Ouagadougou as mainly an administrative and military city from which they could pacify the most turbulent western parts of the country. It was therefore imperative to create laws and regulations to achieve those objectives (Fourchard 2001). With the occupation of

Ouagadougou, the main colonial administration was still headquartered in Bamako and it was from there that Ouagadougou, Bobo-Dioulasso (the current second major city of Burkina Faso), and their dependents were governed until 1919 (the year of creation of the Upper Volta colony). According to Maharaux (1995), the creation of the Upper Volta (current Burkina Faso) was meant to reduce indigenous revolt against the colonial administration, and to curb population migration towards the Gold Coast (current Ghana), and divert such a migration to Cote d'Ivoire to supply its agriculture-based economy with manpower.

French Colonial Urban Land Management and Urban Policies

With the military conquest, the French colonial administration was engaged in demographic identification and territorial demarcation of its colonies for a better political and economic administration of its Volta colony (Maharaux 1995). Parallel to the traditional customary law, the colonial administration also introduced its land reform law on July 1904 in French West Africa governing land registration; which created a new form of land management. That law also included provisions dealing with wastewater management, and banning stray animals in the city. It was also during the same year that the French colonial administration officially dissolved the sovereignty of traditional chiefs, which aimed at re-affirming its role as the sole central authority. Furthermore, the colonial health and hygiene administration was the sole authority to approve any construction plans, and it required the use of durable materials, and the enforcement of strict building code regulations (Fourchard 2001).

As noted by Benga (2003), finally on December 4, 1926, the French colonial administration declared Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso as *commune mixte*, which is the grouping of municipal commune and the bourgeoisie's commune. This implied more investment in infrastructure and planning in the commune. In 1927, the residential zone of Ouagadougou experienced its first urban planning followed by that of the commercial area in 1932. On July 26, 1932, it passed another land reform and landownership law, which opened the way for private landownership in French West Africa. That law thus subdivided land ownership as follows: land governed by customary laws, land belonging to the public domain and the private domain. Public domain lands belonged to the state, and as such, they could not be condemned under any circumstances unless they lost their status of public domain. Private domain lands belonged to private and secondary public institutions (Dialla 2003:7-8). Unfortunately, that land reform did not operate as expected due to local populations' resistance to land management through a regulatory framework. The French philosophy of land management held that a vacant land, that is, a land without master or owner, belonged to the State. Yet, in most African societies, and for the Mossi in particular, whether used or not, the land always has an owner or owners (community). As a result, when the French dissolved the Upper Volta colony in 1932, as will be discussed later, the urban lands under no-construction law, local residents occupied such lands and built houses (Fourchard 2001). With land laws and regulations in place, the French colonial administration was ready to actively transform the urban landscape of Ouagadougou.

The Colonial Transformation of Ouagadougou

It was under Governor Edouard Hesling that the colonial administration began to take urban planning more seriously, partly motivated by fiscal and health reasons (Fourchard 2003). Thus in 1919, the colonial administration zoned 67 hectares of lands, and built wide boulevards²⁰ of 60 meters, and emphasized the geometric planning of the city as opposed to the natives' settlement pattern. The main goal of city planning was to put in place an operational administrative center symbolized by the governor's residence, the caserns, the tribunals, the prison and the guards' camps (Fourchard 2001). The reconfiguration of urban space in the early 20th century, led to the first eviction of the Hausa neighborhood in 1921, and their relocation next to the Mogho-Naaba's new palace.

As in other French West African colonies, urban development emphasized the separation of indigenous neighborhoods from that of the colonial administration and the so-called "evolués" or "civilized" by a wide boulevard of 50 meters width and a buffer zone or *cordons sanitaires* (health buffer zone) designed to prevent diseases from spreading and contaminating the European neighborhoods. Governor Hesling decided to zone and to regulate the neighborhoods for the "semi- evolués" (traders and wage-earners) to monitor and collect taxes from traders. A three-tiered city planning strategy was enforced. Thus Bobo-Dioulasso and Ouagadougou were divided in three main neighborhoods: European neighborhoods, which welcomed the "evolués," a neighborhood

²⁰ The wide boulevards remind us of the haussmanization of Paris in the 19th century. As noted by Winters (1982: 143): "The model was usually Haussmann's Paris. The grid was the basic form of the design, often with squares and diagonals intersecting at elaborate traffic circles."

for “semi-evolués” (traders and wage-earners), and finally neighborhoods called “arriérés” (primitive neighborhoods) hosting indigenous people (Fourchard 2001: 440). Any request to settle in the “evolués” and “semi- évolués” neighborhoods had to be approved by the Governor. This planning strategy also reveals the French colonial administration’s concern for trade (economy) and administration (politics).

Indeed, as noted by Winters (1982), the French colonial administrators were highly concerned with health in urban design in their colonies:

Healthiness was another turn-of-the-century concern expressed in urban design. Life in the tropics was risky for individuals coming from temperate climates. Thus enormous effort was made to design a built environment that would be as healthy as possible by contemporary standards. Designs included water and sewerage systems. Houses in some parts of the rain forest were built on stilts to keep out insects. The structures were raised only after the prevailing wind direction was thoroughly studied to assure proper ventilation and were adorned with well-screened verandas... (1982: 144)

Further, as highlighted by Njoh (2008), the French colonial administration endeavored to avoid using “openly racist language” in planning African cities. It rather emphasized rigid construction codes requiring durable materials imported from Europe, knowing that such building materials were out of the financial reach of natives who could not therefore build in Europeans’ neighborhoods. Further, the enforcement of French land tenure system in the colonies, led to the commoditization of lands. This commoditization of land “effectively changed the prerequisite for access to land from membership in a family- as was the case under traditional African system-to financial ability. This reduced or eliminated the chances of Africans accessing land in the more desirable areas, hence transforming such areas into ‘white only enclaves’” (Njoh 2008: 91). Also, in Conakry, as in other colonies, proficiency in the French language was required for any natives

planning to reside in Europeans' neighborhoods, and since very few locals had such linguistic capital, they were excluded (Njoh 2008: 92). This also highlights why the "evolués" who acquired educational, financial and linguistic capital were the ones to reside next to European neighborhoods (Fourchard 2001).

The construction of urban space in terms of "civilized," "semi-civilized" and "uncivilized/primitive" echoes early evolutionists' perception of human beings' evolution: savagery, barbarism, and civilization. It also reflects the French colonial administration's concept of assimilation and association. While association emphasizes the involvement of natives in colonial activities, and advocates fraternity, assimilation presupposes inequality (Betts 2005: 120). Once an "indigenous" person acquires all the cultural demands of "Frenchness," s/he was considered "civilized" and could therefore integrate/assimilate to the French, and associate with the French people. Urbanization was used as a weapon of domination, dispossession, "detribalization," and assimilation into the French culture.

All this planning was done without the involvement of local people as noted by Fourchard: "Contrary to France where city planning was a matter of compromise and consultation between the State, the municipalities, real-estate agents and property owners, such was not the case in the colony. In the colony, without any consultations, a small group of field officials (administrators, technicians, and planners) designed a city plan that could be quickly implemented."²¹ (2001: 64) Often, when African neighborhoods (viewed as irregular settlements) expanded towards European neighborhoods, the inhabitants of

²¹ The translation is mine.

such spontaneous settlements were evicted as it was the case for Medina in Dakar in 1915, Poto-Poto in Brazzaville in 1920, and Treichville in Abidjan in the 1930s (Winters 1982). In Ouagadougou, Governor Hesling's planning also led to the eviction of residents of Dapoya who relocated in Nindaogo Kango (a former execution ground). The Hausa and other immigrants who were living in ancient Zangouenttin or Zangana were forced to relocate to Pallentenga and Tiedpaogho to make way for a hospital. They renamed their neighborhoods Zangouenttin II. Similarly, the building of the railway station led to the eviction of the Muslims to Bilibambili (Skinner 1974: 30). However, their mosque was left untouched to avoid controversy. Its ruins still exist next to the railway station of Ouagadougou as shown by the following pictures.



Figure 2: Ruins of Bilibambili's Mosque next to Ouagadougou's Railway Station

As noted earlier, residents were evicted and resettled whenever the French colonial administration found it necessary (Fourchard 2001). As noted by Skinner (1974), there was no open resistance on the part of natives. However, "of course, people grumbled, but judging from conversations with some of those who remember this reorganization of Ouagadougou, there was surprisingly little overt opposition to this project because they all feared and respected the power of the Europeans" (Skinner 1974: 30).

The planning of Ouagadougou would be interrupted by the decreased economic interest of the French in the colony, which was then worsened by the global economic crisis of 1929. As a result, the French dismantled the Upper Volta colony from 1932 to 1947, leading to the reduction of economic activities, out-migration, and loss of the status of administrative and political city. According to Skinner (1974: 33), the population of Ouagadougou was estimated at 32,077 in 1953 and 59,126 in 1962, i.e., two years after independence.

Table 3. Demographic Evolution of Ouagadougou from 1904 to 1962

Year	African populations	European populations	Total
1904	-	-	8000
1914	19332	12	19344
1919	19000	75	19075
1926	12015	223	12238
1931	10500	268	10768
1936	14050	150	14200
1945	17639	161	17800
1948	19360	340	19700
1953	-	-	32077
1962	56605	1347	57952

Source: Sylvie Jaglin (1995: 36)

The dismantling of Ouagadougou led to the migration of part of its active populations to the plantations of Côte d'Ivoire and to the Office du Niger, which severely affected the centrality of Ouagadougou as a colonial administrative city and a growing commercial urban center (Skinner 1974; Fourchard 2003; Jaglin 1995). Further, during World War II, some residents left Ouagadougou to avoid being drafted by force by the French colonial army (Skinner 1974). Thus, labor, the global financial crisis of the 1930s, and World War II combined to push part of residents of Ouagadougou towards different destinations including Ghana, the Côte d'Ivoire, and Mali. As Skinner observed,

“Ouagadougou even lost its position as the largest urban agglomeration in the former colony, dropping to third behind Bobo-Dioulasso and Koudougou, two towns located in the agriculturally richer western part of the territory” (1974: 33). But given the strong determination of the Mogho-Naaba to see Ouagadougou become a major player in the making of the Volta colony, the French decided to reconstitute the territory on September 4th, 1947 as part of their larger economic scheme of considering Upper Volta as a labor pool for the agriculturally productive colonies, namely Cote d’Ivoire (Jaglin 1995; Balima 1996). Indeed, the French also realized that Ouagadougou could be the link between traders from other parts of the Sahel and the rest of the Volta colony, and a point of cotton collection and export to France (Skinner 1974). The struggle of the Mogho-Naaba for the reconstitution of the colony could find some explanations in the preservation of the center of his power. More investment began to flow in for the transformation of the “bancoville” into a more equipped city with infrastructures (Jaglin 1995). Through the FIDES (Fonds d’Investissements pour le développement social et économique or Investment Funds for Socioeconomic Development), the French colonial administration developed basic infrastructure including water and electricity supply, paving roads, a hospital and high school, and the first multi-story buildings (Jaglin 1995: 36).

After World War II, the French colonial administration was more interested in urban development in Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso). Thus, the colonial administration zoned and assigned 9,500 plots throughout Ouagadougou as follows: airport area for civil servants in 1950, central neighborhoods next to the main market in 1951 and 1952, Ouidi in 1955, and Gounghin in 1958 (Conseil Economique & Social 2010:13-14).

The French colonial urban planning approach was modified, which allowed the colonial administration to initiate the following actions: the European district of 1928 was baptized as “commercial, administrative, military and residential neighborhoods”, and African neighborhoods became “native neighborhoods” in 1954 and “traditional neighborhoods” when the country became independent on August 5, 1960 (Fourchard 2001). Consequently, as noted by Alain Marie, from 1960 to 1980, the government zoned and regulated only 1,040 hectares of land, that is, 52 hectares per year, while at the same time, spontaneous settlement areas increased up to 210 ha per year, that is, four times more rapidly. Such urban development projects aimed at curbing urban sprawl, controlling and managing urban land management.

Post-colonial Ouagadougou: From 1960 to 1983

As noted earlier, after independence, colonial urban and land management policies continued and the government did not initiate any major urban projects. The European neighborhoods gradually became residential neighborhoods for the African upper-class, and the African neighborhoods became increasingly older and poorer in terms of infrastructure (Winters 1982). Some residential neighborhoods became overcrowded as the result of the arrival of migrants from the rural areas in search of jobs. This contributed to the expansion of slums. The increased demand for housing led some property owners to build rental houses within their compounds, which resulted in different family members and renters living together in the same compounds (Fourchard 2003b). Spontaneous settlement continued to expand.

In the 1970s, the World Bank initiated an urban project, which met the opposition of traditional chiefs in land management. They opposed the Bank’s project in Cissin by

presenting an impressive list of dependents that should be given a plot. Reporting on such land management, the World Bank's (1978) wrote the following:

Squatter households depend on traditional chiefs for permission to occupy a designated plot of land. Households pay the chiefs a fee, either in money or in kind, for traditional occupancy rights.... In contrast to the lack of municipal jurisdiction, traditional chiefs continue to wield substantial authority over the squatter areas, determining the physical layouts, type of construction, and most importantly, influencing the popular will, such as community reactions to improvements which are proposed by Government and private agencies (World Bank 1978: 3)

However, the traditional Mossi power structures did not adhere to the World Bank urban project. This reluctance of the traditional chiefs aimed, among others, to curb the settlement of new dwellers among them, and to guarantee an old social order that enabled them to exercise their power and authority over their local community network that they knew better (Jaglin 1995:49).

Urban planning and urban governance remained in line with the colonial urban policy of segregation after independence. As noted by the World Bank (2002:6), "the basic difference between these two areas was the level of infrastructure, which was limited to the layout of roads for the traditional areas but included paved roads with drainage and electricity for the other residential areas." For UN-Habitat (2007), urban development was poorly coordinated, and the city was not then built for socio-economic development, but rather for the pursuit of the colonial administration's policy objectives.

In 1978, noting that "infrastructure investments of the colonial period and of the period immediately following independence in 1960 [were] no longer sufficient to meet the needs of a growing urban population", the World Bank decided to provide financial support to the cities of Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso, and to other medium-size cities

(World Bank 1978:5). In terms of infrastructure development and modernization, most of Ouagadougou still remained a “bancoville,” a mud-built city until the early 1980s (Jaglin 1995).

In 1980, a Dutch-funded project, named Wagadogo-Nonsin project aimed at restructuring spontaneous settlement in Ouagadougou. The project zoned and managed lands in the city, including the building of gutters, water taps, wells, schools, and health clinics. The government was able to zone and regulate only 3,300 hectares out of 8,000 hectares with 3207 plots zoned and regulated in spontaneous settlements. Unfortunately, when the project phased out, the local authorities were not able to continue with infrastructure development (World Bank 2002; Jaglin 1995). However, urban sprawl continued to grow, almost out of control. Then followed the period from 1983 to 1990: a new era with different urban laws and land management practices.

Land Management and Urban Policies from 1983 to the 1990s

Prevailing land law in Burkina Faso does not recognize customary land rights: all land is considered state property, and anyone seeking access to land must apply for use rights. On the other hand, local communities do not recognize this monopoly ownership and regard themselves as the true owners of their land by virtue of their ancestral rights. While the state’s monopoly of landownership is theoretical, it has resulted in great insecurity with regard to land tenure for the 90 percent of the population whose rights to land are customary. It is also at the root of the enduring conflict between the legality of state monopoly of land and the legitimacy of communities’ land claims. (Hubert Ouédraogo 2006: 36)

In 1983, with the advent of the revolution led by Thomas Sankara, urban development took a different dynamic with a more authoritarian intervention of the state in urban planning and land management. The state nationalized and centralized land management and adopted a Land Tenure Reform Act in 1984, which then gave the state the authority to use eminent domain power to seize land for public purposes. The revolutionary state also broke from the traditional land management system, which led to tensions between the government and local religious and traditional leaders who used to manage the land to exercise power and control over their community members. The state engaged in the destruction of old central neighborhoods and the reconstruction of new neighborhoods (Vennetier 2003).

However, the peri-urban lands continued to be managed by traditional landowners and chiefs (village chief, head of the land, or the lineage chief). Thus, prior to the land reform of 1984, the State did not have any real control over peri-urban land management, and it had to negotiate with traditional chiefs or lineage chiefs to regulate a given area (Dialla 2003). The land reform law of 1984 aimed at controlling urban land production and consumption with the overarching goal of solving urban housing problems worsened by an uncontrolled urban sprawl and increased rural-urban migration. It also aimed, among others, at promoting food self-sufficiency in rural areas. The land reform was based on *Zatu* and *Kiti* (Ordinance n°84-050/CNR/PRES of August 4, 1984 and Decree n°85-404/CNR/PRES of August 4, 1985). Both laws abrogated private landownership based on the French legal system as well as customary law governing community and individual landownership (Dialla 2003:10). Under the revolution, urban management was highly politicized with the involvement of the Committee for the Defense of the

Revolution (CDR), which literally replaced traditional leaders and checked any counter-power to the revolutionary ideology (Marie 1989). The 66 old districts of Ouagadougou were thus dislocated, merged, and re-divided into 30 districts controlled by the CDRs at the expense of traditional leadership. Also in 1985, rent became free to satisfy the supporters of the regime and to stop rent speculation. Spontaneous settlements were systematically zoned and regulated to fight increasing land speculation, which was then framed as a struggle against a greedy bourgeoisie (Marie 1989; Jaglin 1995). To further reduce the authority of traditional landowners, the CDRs were charged with settling land related conflicts. With the state's intervention, from 1985 to 1987, about 60,000 plots were zoned and regulated in the spontaneous settlements areas (Marie 1989:29).

Unfortunately, urban sprawl continued unabated due to the lack of appropriate policy measures to support new owners of urban plots who could not build because they lacked the financial resources to finalize the process of ownership. Such owners often ended up selling their newly acquired plots and resettled at the periphery of the city (Marie 1989). This situation was worsened with the influx of rural migrants lured by the promises of the city as a job machine. Such migrants settled in the periphery of the city (Hubert Ouédraogo 2001). Thus, providing a regulatory framework as a panacea to urban sprawl and housing problems were far from sufficient in-and-of itself. Yet decent housing policies, land occupation and distribution policies, and legal frameworks were strongly linked.

In the 1990s, the rise of democracy combined with the implementation of neoliberal developmental agenda in the forms of privatization and decentralization increasingly led to the withdrawal of the state from trade, health, and educational sectors.

As a result, Christian and other religious institutions often filled this vacuum by engaging in community building activities and serving as a relay between the state and the local populations (Diawara 1999; Otayek 1996). They have been active in peri-urban Ouagadougou, poor neighborhoods and communities affected by urban displacement and resettlement providing moral, material and health and educational support (Diawara 1999; Rouamba 1999; Otayek 1996).

Further, the 1990s marked the beginning of another era of urban development in Burkina Faso heavily dominated by neoliberal policies of privatization and Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP). That era was characterized by a slight improvement of urban development and housing management, and the decentralization of urban functions (World Bank 2002). However, the continued perception of the city as a growth machine contributed to rural-exodus, which even sapped the urban plans put in place. Since then, major urban development projects have been implemented across the country and in Ouagadougou in particular (Jaglin 1995), sometimes at the expense of city dwellers.

Understanding Urban Policies from the 1990s to the Present

As already observed, in Burkina Faso, the current land system has its roots in customary and the colonial land management systems, which are sometimes conflictual (Dialla 2003, Hubert Ouédraogo 2001). Indigenous residents in old inner-city neighborhoods viewed the land as sacred and inalienable, which conflicted with the state's land management systems (Dialla 2003:7).

Against that background, the persistent expansion of spontaneous settlements led to the adoption of a more radical land reform approach. This viewed residents of

spontaneous settlements as violators of settlement laws and therefore they should expect to be ousted at any time at their own risks and perils (Hubert Ouédraogo 2001; Guillaume Josse et Pacaud 2009). Thus, paragraph 2 of article 39 of the land reform law of 1996 stipulates, “urban lands yet to be developed or suburban lands can only be occupied under exceptional circumstances and with the authorization of the State. Any settlement without legal deed is prohibited. As a result, any forced displacement of such residents shall not be compensated.”

Thus, the land reform law of May 23, 1996 (Loi n°014/96/ADP du 23 mai 1996) under article 2 does not define what “exceptional circumstances” actually mean. It gives the state the full power to declare any land a public domain and thus condemn it for public purpose (Burkina Faso 2008). This was aimed at solving urban sprawl and controlling urban space production and consumption in Ouagadougou and its outskirts.

In 1999, the government designed a new urban plan called “Grand Ouaga” or *Greater Ouaga* to solve the issue of urban sprawl, and to enhance the Urban Master Plan of Ouagadougou and its suburbs. This strategy includes planning, zoning and regulating the neighboring villages of Ouagadougou (also known as central villages) while encouraging citizens to settle in those villages (Georges Compaoré 2003). Article 28, under its second paragraph, authorizes city officials and urban planners to include in the city master plan, neighboring villages.²² This section does not however provide measures

²² Article 28, paragraph 2 specifies that communities on the outskirts of the city may be included in the urban master plan (Burkina Faso 2008).

for curbing the encroachment of village lands by city expansion. Such a policy could endanger rural farms bordering the city. Urban development ends up displacing farmers, creating, and even worsening rural poverty due to the loss of farms taken away by urban development and growth. Thus, the Greater Ouaga project encompasses the province of Kadiogo whose capital is Ouagadougou as well as Loubila commune.

According to Dieudonné Tapsoba,²³ Greater Ouaga is an inclusive urban development project, as everyone seeking for a roof will find his /her share. It aims at better organizing urban space management and creating wealth and decent housing for the residents of Ouagadougou and its neighboring villages by 2025. Despite all these reforms, urban land continued to be a major issue due to rural-urban migration, and natural urban population, and the strong desire to own a house.

Indeed, the RAF²⁴ (Land Reform Law) faces some challenges in its actual implementation due to conflict with traditional land management system as noted by Roger Nama in 2004 at a joint conference UN-Habitat and the Ministry of Infrastructure and Urbanism of Burkina. The underlying problem stalling the successful implementation of urban land reform is pervasive rural and urban poverty worsened by the current global

²³ “Le project Grand Ouaga n’est pas une utopie...” Sidwaya du jeudi 12 février 2009 Interview réalisée par Sié Simplicie HIEN. Dieudonné Tapsoba was the director of urban planning, a dismemberment of the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism at the time of the interview by Sidwaya newspaper.

²⁴ La Loi N° 014/96/ADP du 23 mai 1996, portant Réorganisation Agraire et Foncière au Burkina Faso (RAF). This law applies to rural and urban land management, land, forestry and mineral resources and real estate management. The law makes the state the owner of the land. Article 5 of the law stipulates that legal entities, corporation can become landowners; and once they become landowners, the state cannot strip them from that ownership (See Sawadogo Yacouba 2003, La Legislation au Secours des Pedoconflits au Burkina Faso).

crisis.²⁵ As noted by Fanta Cheru (2002: 2): “the urban crisis cannot be resolved independent of the land issue. It is people’s lack of access to land for dwelling and a means of livelihood that is at the root of poverty as well as homelessness.”

Today, as specified under article 4 of the code of urbanism and construction, urban development (infrastructural development, rehabilitation, restoration, redevelopment, renewal, etc.) is under the strict supervision of the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism that coordinates, organizes, manages, and controls urban development, construction, and urban planning nationwide.²⁶ Three bodies assist the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism: the National Council for Urbanism and Construction, the Regional Commission for Urbanism and Construction and finally the Communal Commission for Urbanism and Construction. No amendment of the urban development laws, regulations, and urban plans can be carried out without the approval of the national council of urbanism and construction. Similarly, the regional commission assists the regional council for urbanism and construction and its approval and perspectives are required for the implementation or amendment of any urban development projects or law within their regional jurisdictions. Such is the case for the communal commission whose approval and perspectives are also required for the municipal council to initiate any urban development project or law.

²⁵ Roger Nama was a speaker at that conference and was the Director of territory management, and local and regional land development.

²⁶ Article 4 : Le ministère en charge de l’urbanisme et de la construction assure la coordination, l’organisation, la gestion et le contrôle du secteur de l’urbanisme et de la construction sur l’ensemble du territoire national (Assemblée Nationale 2006 :4).

Further, according to the current government, any urban development project has to be modeled on national urban land development master plan. More importantly, article 61 of the code of urbanism and construction indicates that the elaboration of the urban development master plan falls under the jurisdiction of the state.²⁷ As such, the urban development master plan can only be amended under a decree adopted in a council of ministers specifying the conditions for the approval of its elaboration, revision, or amendments²⁸ (Assemblée Nationale 2006).

At the international colloquium on social housing held in Ouagadougou on June 24-26, 2010, Georges Compaoré (2010) noted that from 1991 to 2008, together with its local partners, the government promoted private land ownership under the national urban land (Domaine Foncier National). Later, in 1999, it developed the first urban master plan, the Urban Master Plan of Greater Ouaga (SDAGO), which saw the implementation of major urban projects such as “Ouaga 2000”, Project ZACA-II. In 2006, the National Assembly passed the Code of Construction and Urbanism known as law N° 17-2006/AN. During that same period, the state developed the Land Occupation Plan, drafted and defined urban land management tools in the Urban Management and Master Plan (SDAU).

²⁷ Article 61 : L’initiative de l’élaboration du Schéma directeur d’aménagement et d’urbanisme est de la compétence de l’Etat (Assemblée Nationale 2006).

²⁸ Article 68 : Un décret pris en Conseil des ministres sur proposition du ministre en charge de l’urbanisme et de la construction précise les procédures d’élaboration, d’approbation et de révision du Schéma directeur d’aménagement et d’urbanisme.

In 2008, the state adopted the National Urban Policy and Urban development Plan and set up a National Council of Urbanism and Construction, and recently implemented a social housing plan for 10,000 houses for the middle-incomers (Conseil Economique et Social 2010).

Conclusion

This chapter discussed the socio-political, economic, and human factors that contributed to the transformation of Ouagadougou from the 15th century to the present. It has shown that while Ouagadougou was depicted in the early 19th century as a group of squalid houses, it was indeed a city with its own socio-political and spatial organization, growing at its own pace and rhythm. Prior to the French colonial period land allocation was already organized, managed, and controlled by the *teng-soaba* under the supervision of the Mogho-Naaba. Each neighborhood played a specific role in the development of the city. Ouagadougou was already a segregated and hierarchical city based on ethnicity, socio-political and economic functions of city dwellers.

However, the invasion of the French colonial machinery in 1896 accelerated city space transformation, urban land management, and the political economy of city building. The French colonial administration, guided by its assimilation and association policies, forced on the locals the French philosophy of urban land management, the Haussmanian, and Euclidean approach to city planning, combined with an acute concern for health. With the creation of the Volta colony in 1919, the French colonial administration got more active in transforming the city of Ouagadougou. It adopted a more segregated approach to city planning under Governor Hesling: the European neighborhoods, the neighborhood of the évolués [civilized], the neighborhood of the “semi- évolués [the semi-civilized] and

the neighborhood of the *arriérés* [the primitive]. Combining land law and urban policies, the French were seeking to control the built environment for administrative, military, and economic purposes. But the economic crisis of 1929 led to the subsequent split up of the Upper Volta colony from 1932 to 1947, which resulted in the abandonment and economic decline of Ouagadougou. With the reconstitution of the colony in 1947, the French colonial administration engaged in more planning activities including the zoning, regulation, eviction, and resettlement of residents. However, given the low quality of materials used for construction, and the little investment in transforming the city, Ouagadougou became a “*bancoville*”. That label stuck with the city image until the independence of Upper Volta in 1960.

Though independent, the new political leaders and elite continued to enforce the inherited colonial urban policies. They initiated few efforts to transform and develop the city. It was only in the early 1970s and 1980s that Cissin and other neighborhoods were restructured with the financial support of the World Bank and Holland. Urban land management and urban planning became inefficient as the city’s population kept growing partly due to rural exodus, leading to increased urban sprawl and the irregular occupation of urban lands.

It was only in 1983, with the advent of the revolution under a Marxist regime that the city of Ouagadougou underwent major urban transformation with the building of social houses²⁹ named “*Cités an II, an III, an IV.*” Such major urban projects continued to

²⁹ These social houses included either townhouses or apartments.

be implemented even after the revolution in 1987. Thus, Project ZACA-I emerged in 1985 and had its root in the revolutionary planning. It led to the eviction of residents of old neighborhoods in the center of the city with little to no compensation. From the 1990s to the present, with democratization and the implementation of neoliberal economic policies (Structural Adjustment Programs), policy-makers and urban planners emphasized the beautification and “modernization” of Ouagadougou to match its regional and global image of capital of African cinema. This led to the creation of new neighborhoods including Ouaga 2000, and the extension of Project ZACA into its second phase: ZACA II in 2000. The following chapter will be devoted to discussing Project ZACA, its policy objectives, and socio-economic and political implications for city-dwellers and the populations affected by such projects.

CHAPTER 3

PROJECT ZACA: SOCIO-HISTORICAL PROCESSES AND OBJECTIVES

Chapter 3 examines the socio-historical and political context that led to the emergence of Project ZACA. It therefore provides an overview of discussions on urban redevelopment as it intersects with modernization to account for urbanization in Africa in general, and in Burkina Faso in particular.

Against that backdrop, the chapter charts how the revolution of 1983 and its conception of citizenship and modernizing cities led to the emergence of major urban projects such as Project ZACA.

To better frame the socio-historical processes that led to Project ZACA, the chapter also builds on various sources, including ethnographies, research reports, case studies, and fieldwork interviews and observation. It then highlights Project ZACA, its policy objectives, financial hurdles encountered by the project, as well as the compensation mechanisms put in place to support residents. First, I will discuss the influence of modernization on urban development policies in general and Project ZACA in particular.

Building Modern Cities and Urban Renewal

Project ZACA occurred within the context of city development to attract local, regional and international investors. For the record, ZACA means Commercial and Administrative Zone, which is indicative as the project aimed at achieving infrastructure development (various forms of material and financial resources as shown in the word “commercial”) and structure (governmental institutions and departments), with the ideal (ideology) of building a modern city. Indeed, urban development and renewal have often occurred against the backdrop of modernization, which has guided most development

policies implemented in Third World countries. First, as noted by Kim (2005), the term modern is a Western concept invented towards the end of the 16th century. It is the rupture with medieval and ancient periods, and an expansion of European trade and Judeo-Christian values beyond Europe. Scholars refer to this cultural and economic expansion to other parts of the world as modernization (Kim 2005).

In Europe, the 18th century saw the industrial revolution, which led to rural exodus. This often led to the emergence or expansion of cities into industrial centers offering job opportunities to the new urban dwellers. This human movement led to the increase of urban populations and to the emergence of new urban centers in France, England, Germany, and Scotland (Malanima 2010). For instance, in the 19th century, Baron Haussmann transformed the city of Paris with the goals of fostering economic development, fluidizing traffic, and improving infrastructure for a better urban management (Davis 2006). When examining Africa, as Matunhu (2011) indicated, modernization came to mean following the footsteps of Europe. In this respect, colonial urban development led to the uneven development of African cities: dual cities including the neighborhood of the ruling elite and the neighborhood of indigenous people (King 2009). Such an approach laid the ground for urban inequalities that the new ruling elites reinforced in independent African countries (Kamulu 2007; Matunhu 2011). Thus, from the colonial period to the 1960s (years of independence for most African countries), some development scholars and experts assumed that African countries in particular would only become modern if they adhered to “Western values and resources in the form of investments, loans and aid” (Ajei 2007: 27). Development experts tended to view development as transferring the technology, knowledge, and human resources from

developed countries to developing ones. They continued to believe that by so doing, there would be a trickle-down effect and the poor and vulnerable groups in both urban and rural areas would benefit from the outcomes of policy implementation (Peet and Alaine 1999). Such perception of development led to heavy investment in infrastructure development projects such as the construction of dams, roads, and redevelopment of slums, resulting instead to the removal of communities, their dislocation and impoverishment (Lebrun 2002; London and Bruce 1984). Urban renewal became synonyms with forced eviction or urban removal. It often led to the dispossession of the poor, the expansion of city slums and their subsequent destruction, the dislocation of communities, starvation, increased mortality, and impoverishment (Cernea 1999; Fullilove 2004). Unfortunately, this ended up marginalizing the rural and urban poor in decision-making and policy implementation. Social relationships, community values, and neighborhood needs are therefore under-emphasized in favor of increasing the value of commercial property (Walton 1993). Thus, urban modernization sometimes occurs at the expense of the poor whether in developing or developed countries across the globe.

Further, today, with globalization and the growth of neoliberalism, governments began to rely on decentralization and privatization. In developing countries, namely in Burkina Faso, in the early 1990s, the neoliberal Structural Adjustment Program advocated the gradual withdrawal of the state and the devolution of some of its responsibilities to the private sector, local governments, civil society, NGOs, and religious organizations (Davis 2006). Thus, in Burkina Faso as in many African countries, governments began to adhere to IMF/World's policies of privatization, which often led to the marginalization of local communities, and subsequent social upheavals. Such social protests often transformed the

urban landscape into contested terrains. To transform cities into growth centers, government often engaged in bulldozing old neighborhoods to make way for high rises and modern buildings as exemplified by the implementation of Project ZACA in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.

The Revolution and the Creation of Project ZACA

On August 4, 1983, after a military coup led by Captain Thomas Sankara, Blaise Compaoré (the current President), Henri Zongo and Boukary Lingani, the group proclaimed a revolutionary government, and Thomas Sankara became President. This marked a turning point in the history of Burkina Faso. Even though the revolutionary regime lasted only four years, from 1983 to 1987, most urban experts and historians agree that it laid the foundation for ambitious urban projects, and redefined urban policies and planning in Burkina Faso in general and in Ouagadougou in particular.³⁰ How did the revolution rulers actually achieve such urban policies and redevelopment schemes, leading to Project ZACA?

First, it is important to note here that the French colonial administration restructured the commercial activity zone of the main market of Ouagadougou in 1920. The same area and its neighboring districts were also targeted by Project ZACA decades later. In other words, the creation of a commercial and administrative activity area was laid down during the colonial period. However, Project ZACA (Administrative and

³⁰ Field notes from the Interview with Professor Gomgnimbou Moustapha in September 2009.

Commercial Activity Zone) started under the revolutionary regime when it rebuilt the commercial zone in 1985. All this happened against the backdrop of a populist and developmentalist ideology in the 1980s, which advocated the state's involvement in urban development. Thus, a strong political will combined with an economic vision of the city led to the design and implementation of housing programs. Such policies led to the eviction of residents in old neighborhoods, the restructuring of the main market of Ouagadougou, including parts of the immediate neighborhoods, and the building of new houses called "social housing". The state often packaged such development schemes as the people's project.

As noted by Harvey (2007), to legitimate their projects, governments often proclaim themselves to be high moral authorities concerned with social justice, equality, prosperity, and the defender and protector of the people and the nation. Similarly, the revolutionary regime adopted a rhetorical strategy to legitimate its housing programs presented social oriented and pro-poor. In addition, it used oppressive measures to suppress and deter any dissent (Marie 1989; Jaglin 1995). Anybody refusing to adhere to this rhetoric was labeled a reactionary stooge of imperialism and the bourgeoisie. Appealing to citizens' pride and sense of the longstanding tradition of solidarity and self-reliance, the revolutionary regime began to mobilize citizens across the country to implement social housing programs (Marie 1989).

Grass-root mobilization was especially spearheaded by the strong involvement of the CDRs (Committee for the Defense of the Revolution) in community development (Bonkougou 1990; Jaglin 1995). The rhetoric for urban redevelopment was symbolized in slogans such as "cleanup operation" or "patriotic labor" or "clean city operation", and

“building together”, “One CDR equals One Household”, to quote but a few. Multiple urban projects were initiated across the country, including the city of Ouagadougou, notably the zoning and regulation of irregular settlements embodied in slogans such as “commando operations” (Jaglin 1995). The regime carried out such building projects in very short periods, hence the name “commando”.

The revolutionary regime ensured that the completion of the housing programs coincided with the celebration of the anniversary of the revolution as indicated by the names of such housing units (*Cité* in French). Such houses included, Cité An II (built in ten months and totaling 188 four- bedroom houses), Cité An III (totaling 376 apartments and houses), Cité an IV A (52 more elaborate houses), and Cité An IV B (200 houses for the supporters of the revolution – comrades) (Jaglin 1995: 422-423).³¹

Involvement in community labor was synonymous with being patriotic, pro-revolution, devoted to justice, socio-economic progress, and self-sufficiency. When the rhetorical strategy embedded in patriotic and social justice themes failed to work, then intimidation, fines, repression and incarceration followed. The policy of carrots and sticks shaped such urban schemes under the revolution (Marie 1989; Bonkougou 1990; Jaglin 1995). This rhetoric on good citizenship, which then implied the unquestionable compliance with the state developmentalist agenda, notably urban redevelopment, was heavily present in public space through public radio and television, billboards and monuments. It was against the backdrop of such a populist discourse and actions that the

³¹ Only Cité An IV A was implemented as part of project ZACA-I.

state created Project ZACA in 1985. The overthrow of Thomas Sankara's regime on October 15, 1987 did not put an end to Project ZACA-I nor to the other revolutionary urban projects, which continued to be implemented under the new regime called "Popular Front". For instance, the completion of the *1200 logements* (1,200 houses), which started in 1987 were pursued through 1989. It was against this background that Project ZACA-II would be revived in 1990 (Jaglin 1995).

In 1991, Burkina Faso adhered to the Structural Adjustment Program under the supervision of the World Bank/IMF. This neoliberal program sought to redress the economy of developing nations by emphasizing the privatization of state-owned companies, liberalization, and the promotion of the private sector. At that period, development discourse emphasized less state intervention (Hagberg 2001). However, it is against that background that the Burkinabè government revived Project ZACA-II. Under the neoliberal agenda and global discourse on liberalization, the current regime used the free market as an excuse to implement Project ZACA, and other development projects. Rather than deregulating or withdrawing from the free market as often praised by neoliberalism, the state engaged in planning, regulating, and reconstructing urban space for economic accumulation. As will be discussed later, the project laid emphasis on beautifying the city, increasing the tax-base, improving the local economy, and allowing the city of Ouagadougou to better position itself as the global capital of African cinema and a national growth pole.³² Competing ideologies and actors led to the implementation

³² Field interviews, October 2009.

of urban renewal projects that destroyed socio-economic spaces to produce new narratives and norms on what a modern city should be.

Having highlighted the various discourses and actions that contributed to the emergence of projects ZACA, among many others, the next section will focus on the institutional and legal framework of Project ZACA-I.

Legal and Institutional Framework of Project ZACA-I

Prior to the creation of Project ZACA-I, Sankara's regime reformed land management and ownership law³³ in 1984 specifying that all lands belonged to the state, whether private or public (Jaglin 1995). Then, the regime adopted the land reform application decree on August 4, 1985. However, by July 1985, it had already entrusted the DGUTC (The General Directorate for Urban Planning, Topography and Land Registry) to lay down the specifications for restructuring the main market and its outskirts.³⁴ On August 26, 1985, the government officially adopted the plan and its specifications leading to the emergence of Project ZACA-I, which included the restructuring of Rood Woko area, as well as the building of Cité AN IV-A covering altogether about 115 hectares.³⁵ Project ZACA-I was therefore the merging of two projects: the first component that targeted the main market was called PARZCO (Planning and Restructuring Project of the

³³ Decree 84-050 of August 4, 1984 followed by an application decree of that land reform known as decree 404 on of August 4, 1985.

³⁴ Information accessed on July 25, 2010 at <http://www.projectzaca.bf/>

³⁵ Information accessed on July 25, 2010 at <http://www.projectzaca.bf/rubriques/historique.htm>

Commercial Zone of Ouagadougou (Bonkougou 2008). The second component was the building of Cité AN IV-A, which targeted old neighborhoods in the center city, namely Koulouba, with the goal of modernizing the city (Bonkougou 2008).

The government gave residents two months to produce building plans in agreement with the project's expectations, including high rises, and the use of durable materials in building houses and structures. Failure to do so resulted in forced eviction. Residents were forced to relocate in other parts of the city with little or no compensation under late President Sankara's regime (Bonkougou 1990).

According to historian Gomgnimbou Moustapha, the destruction of part of Koulouba and its "balkanization" was meant to reorganize the city of Ouagadougou, but also to weaken existing traditional power structures, which relied on the resident populations. The regime therefore proceeded to the redistricting of the city of Ouagadougou from 66 districts to 30 because it perceived those old neighborhoods as a threat to the exercise of its power as the local leaders could still use their base to resist. This forced eviction under ZACA-I dispersed not just community members, but especially the Naaba's subjects who were the source of his power (Gomgnimbou 1999: 30).

The implementation of Project ZACA-I thus laid down the groundwork for a potential extension of the project to neighboring residential areas.

Legal and Institutional Framework of Project ZACA-II

Following a Council of Ministers, a law entitled Kiti AN III 0060/FP/EUIP/SEHU of September 5, 1990, the State defined the surface covered by Project ZACA as well as its general objectives, including creating a modern and operational urban center;

transforming the urban center into a commerce-oriented center as originally intended while safeguarding goods and people; changing citizens' vision to accept urban management.³⁶

In addition, the legal and institutional framework that facilitated the implementation of ZACA-II is found in law 014/96/ADP of May 23, 1996 and its enforcement decree n°97-054/PRES/PM/MEF of February 6, 1997 on Land Reform. Article 226 of law 014/96/ADP gave the state the power to condemn any land for public purpose. The government thus adopted various laws in order to put in place the legal and institutional framework that led to the implementation of Project ZACA-II.

On November 2, 2000, Blaise Compaoré's government adopted a decree 2000-522/PRES/PM/MIHU to extend ZACA, covering 85 hectares, and thus extending the entire ZACA to 200 hectares.

Next, on December 29, 2000, a joint decree n°2000 71/MIHU/MEF/MATD/MCPEA/MEE/MMCE/MIR/MTP,³⁷ allowed the government to set up an Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee (CIP) to assist in defining the main objectives and orientations, and to support the project office with needed technical expertise. All members were under the general supervision of the Ministry of Housing and Planning.³⁸ The project also sought for other financial sources.

³⁷ Published in the Official Journal n°06, 2001

³⁸ The CIP included twelve members distributed as follows: the Ministry of Infrastructures, Housing and Planning (2 representatives); the Ministry of Economy and Finances (1 representative); the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (1 representative); the Ministry of Environment and

With respect to funding, Project ZACA benefited from local financial and institutional support. The Commercial Bank of Burkina (BCB), and Ecobank-Burkina (a Pan-African Bank) brought their financial contributions to the project. They committed to financially support the project by respectively providing 2 billion and 500 million CFA francs. In addition, CNSS (National Retirement and Social Security Bank) committed to grant 5 billion CFA francs to the project at an interest rate of 5%; and SONATUR (National Land Management Authority) committed to provide two billion CFA francs in support of the project's activities. Despite all this support, the project faced financial difficulties.³⁹

ZACA's Internal Difficulties: Financial and Coordination Hurdles

In an interview with a local expert involved in the project, an evaluation carried out in 2006 revealed some internal difficulties encountered by Project ZACA. Such difficulties included the lack of coordination and formalized collaboration with ONEA (Office national de l'eau et d'assainissement =Public Water and Sanitation Utility), SONABEL (SONABEL: Société Nationale d'Electricité du Burkina = National Electricity Company of Burkina), and ONATEL (ONATEL : Office national des télécommunications = National Office of Telecommunications); the lack of operation of the Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee; the lack of information and marketing department; limited human

Water Resources (1 representative); the Ministry of Trade, Enterprise and Handicraft Promotion (1 representative); the Ministry of post and Telecommunications (1 representative); the Ministry of Mining and Energy (1 representative); the Ministry of Regional Integration (1 representative), the Mayor's Office of Ouagadougou (1 representative); property owners (2 representatives).

³⁹ Field interviews and notes, September 2009.

resources and the lack of capacity development programs for the project's staff; the lack of reliable and transparent accounting and financial structures. The project office was under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Urban Planning and Housing, which created administrative bottlenecks in terms of decision-making (also see Ministère de l'Habitat et de l'Urbanisme 2006: 22)

Further, the local authorities thought that Project ZACA would be able to self-finance based on the money that it would earn from reselling the plots to new subscribers. They simply assumed that since private business people had already been buying land and building high rises in the areas concerned, prior to ZACA-II, the government could step in to accompany that process. Based on such assumptions, it decided to extend Project ZACA in 1990, hoping that the same business people would come to buy the land from the government and then build according to the new building codes and regulations.⁴⁰

Further, the government anticipated that the compensation money given out to the relocatees would round up to 15 billion CFA francs, but it ended up paying 18 billion CFA francs for compensation, which led to a financial gap of 3 billion CFA francs. As a result, in 2004, the project already began to have trouble getting funds released by the Treasury Department because its account was already in the red.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Interview field notes, September 2009

⁴¹ Interview field notes, September 2009

In an interview with Moussa Sankara, the current Director of Project ZACA,⁴² he noted that initially, the project expected subscribers to pay up to 30% of their dues. However, that could not happen as some paid 10% or 15% whereas others paid 100%. That discrepancy in the payment amount and pace did not facilitate the continuation of the project activities as initially planned. More importantly, some subscribers were reluctant to pay their dues because they were not satisfied with the development works implemented on the project sites. Furthermore, the sewers were narrow, and they quickly clogged with sand and dirt, leading rainwater to flood streets.

Moreover, the project identified 107 proprietors who decided to remain on the project site, because their buildings already met the requirements of Project ZACA's specifications. However, none of them paid fully their subscription dues. Some abandoned altogether the idea of building in the ZACA area, as they could no longer afford it due to personal financial difficulties. In an exchange with Project ZACA's internal monitoring and evaluation officer, the project engaged in discussions with such people to find ways to accommodate them by either buying their properties or finding new buyers among potential subscribers. I had the opportunity to witness one woman who came to the project's office to discuss this issue with the monitoring and evaluation officer who asked her to return for additional paperwork.⁴³ When the woman left, he briefly commented that initially, her family members thought they would be able to build a house

⁴² Field notes, July 2009.

⁴³ Field observation, September 2009.

meeting the new building code requirements in the project area. However, the family had gone through financial difficulties, and could not afford to do any more.

Another difficulty that slowed down the start-up of actual building on the project site was the persistent fear of an existing water table in the eastern site.⁴⁴ A local urban expert and architect even went as far as to note that she would never support the construction of a multi-story building in that area because of the existence of a hole whose depth could not be accurately determined.

To cope with these various financial and institutional difficulties, Project ZACA explored different paths, including resorting to local and international funding agencies. It contacted potential funders, such as the Romanian Smith General Cargo Ltd, Filden Group and ASCO Finance; Malaysia (no response from the partner); Saudi Arabia (not favorable due to the partner's requirement that 50% of equipment should come from Saudi Arabia); the French Development Agency (interested in funding market related activities); World Bank and the West African Development Bank (the project was not part of their intervention area)⁴⁵. So far, despite multiple statements by high-ranking authorities,

⁴⁴ Jolivet Emmaüs (2009). Moussa Sankara, DG de project ZACA : “La zone sera un véritable chantier d’immeubles en 2010” In Sidwaya mercredi 1er avril 2009. Accessed at < <http://ebomaf.com/spip.php?article15>>, June 2010.

⁴⁵ Conversation with a local financial consultant on project ZACA's funding strategies (March 2011).

including Sankara Moussa (the current director of Project ZACA),⁴⁶ no major works have been initiated on the project site.

The previous discussion highlighted the history of Project ZACA from phase 1 to phase 2, the institutional and financial hurdles it met as well as the tentative financial solutions. The next section will present the characteristics of the neighborhoods affected by Project ZACA II.

Overview of Neighborhoods' Characteristics Prior to Displacement

As noted by several ethnographies and case studies (Ouédraogo N. Clémence 2004; Ouédraogo E.B. 2005; Audet-Gosselin 2008), various ethnic groups, predominantly foreign nationals from neighboring countries used to live in Zangouettin, Kamsaonghin, Kiedpaloghin, Peuloghin, Koulouba and Camp Fonctionnaire. Those were the neighborhoods affected by the project. The demographic distribution included the followings: 41.4% of traders, 39.4% wage earners and 12.8% of informal actors. Trade remained the dominant activity in the neighborhoods. Most of them were Muslims, but others included smaller religious communities such as Christians and the practitioners of traditional religions.

They shared the daily routine of city life and its socio-economic realities. Different ethnic groups and religious denominations peacefully cohabited (Ouédraogo E.B. 2005:

⁴⁶ Victorien A. SAWADO (2010). Moussa Sankara, directeur général du Project ZACA : La ZACA est un pôle d'investissement de près de 500 milliards sur les cinq ans à venir". In Sidwaya, Tuesday, January 12, 2010. < <http://www.lefaso.net/spip.php?article34850>>

29). Being next to the central market, Rood Woko,⁴⁷ the residents developed income-generating activities by repairing scooters or motorbikes, selling goods by the roadsides, managing restaurants and small snack bars.

However, land tenure was a serious problem in the area because some residents sold their properties in violation of national land regulations. There were also inheritance issues, multiple ownerships, and lack of deeds indicating the actual owner of a property. As the area attracted more business people because of its proximity to the central market, land speculation began to be a major concern for the local government (MITH 2003: 23).

According to Ouédraogo E. B (2005: 29) and MITH (2003:20) and many research participants, the city center was characterized by narrow streets, bad smells emanating from waste water and garbage carelessly thrown on the streets. There was a general lack of sanitation. Houses were mostly mud-built and very old, hosting extended family members, or were rented by sex-workers or local small shopkeepers. Further, the jobless youth were engaged in drug sales and other illegal activities. Roadside trade was common and they sometimes disturbed traffic.⁴⁸ These poor housing conditions sharply contrasted with the neighboring modern buildings hosting hotels, consulting firms, international

⁴⁷ The municipal authorities closed the central market in 2003 following a fire incident due to electric short circuit issues. It was re-opened in 2006 by Simon Compaoré, the then Mayor of Ouagadougou. He announced the re-opening in an interview in 2006 on Africa# 1.

⁴⁸ Justin Daboné (2007). Project Zaca : Le serpent de mer sort enfin de terre. Observateur, 6825 du mardi 13 février 2007 http://www.observateur.bf/spip.php?page=article_archive&id_article=5889&vo=11

organizations and NGOs, modern restaurants, administrative centers and banks such as Ecobank and Bank of Africa (BOA), the FESPACO's headquarters, among others.

There were in the neighborhoods concerned by the Project ZACA about 1,600 plots mostly used for residential or commercial purposes combined. Hotels represented 33% of existing structures; pharmacies stood for 21% of facilities, followed by schools (16%) and gas stations (16%). Other structures such as town halls, markets, and green spaces and sport grounds stood for 3 to 4% of facilities. There were informal activities such as street vending, and mechanic workshops, sex-workers, and illegal trade practices such as drug selling and banditry. Administrative structures and activities accounted for 20% and they included banks, state-owned institutions (entities partly owned by the State and carrying out some commercial activities), ministries, and ministerial departments. Commercial activities roughly represented 80% of businesses in the neighborhoods affected by Project ZACA (Ouédraogo N. Clémence 2004, Project ZACA 2004).

According to Project ZACA's Environmental Impact Study, 85.34 % of the heads of households of the neighborhoods were owners of their plots (with 84% with a legal deed and 1.43% with no legal deed). The majority of heads of household inherited their plots (68.5% of them), 15% officially owned their plots which were assigned to them by the state, and 14.17% purchased their plots. Most of the roofs were covered with corrugated iron (99.32% of them), 80% of the floors were cemented and most residents were living in two-three bedrooms (Project ZACA 2004: 42).

The project area was 75% electrified, more than 50% of the inhabitants used to get their water supply from public pumps and 40% were supplied by the government

owned water Distribution Company. Most households owned traditional latrines (MITH 2003: 20).

Such were the neighborhoods (Zangouettin, Kamsaonghin, Kiedpaloghin, Peuloghin, Koulouba and Camp Fonctionnaire) prior to the actual implementation of Project ZACA-II, and their demolition as shown by Map 6. *Avenue de la Nation* (the Avenue of the Nation) and *Avenue de l'Indépendance* (the Avenue of Independence) border the project area on its northern side, on its eastern side, there are *Avenue de la Résistance* (Avenue of Resistance) and a portion of *Avenue de l'Aéroport* (the Airport Avenue). In the southern border of the project area, there are portions of *Avenue de l'Aéroport* (the Airport Avenue) and *Avenue Houari Boumedienne* (Avenue Houari Boumedienne). The western side of the project area is bordered by portion of *Avenue Bassawarga* (Avenue Bassawarga) and *Avenue de la Grande Mosquée* (Avenue of the Great Mos).⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Information accessed on July 25, 2010 at <http://www.projectzaca.bf/>

Map 6 : Project ZACA Area (Adapted from Google Earth)



Source: Map adopted from Google Earth showing Project ZACA

Compensation Arrangements and Related Problems

Before proceeding to the demolition and removal of residents in early 2004, Project ZACA authorities requested heads of households of the neighborhoods to submit their application backed with proper legal documents attesting ownership to the property.⁵⁰ Then, the project sent its own real estate assessors to assess the value of properties prior to any disbursement of the financial compensation, which mostly started in early 2003 according to some participants.⁵¹

⁵⁰ Fieldnotes, August 2009.

⁵¹ Sigué, Cheick Beldh'or (2003). « *Burkina Faso: Project Zaca - Le blues des déguerpis.* » In *Le Pays*. Available at <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200311060308.html>

As noted earlier, some of the properties were built in the early 1960s and 1970s, well before the devaluation of the CFA francs⁵² in 1994 and the cost of life was then less expensive compared to 2000. Further, as noted by most interviewees, not everyone was compensated at the same moment, and yet a deadline of three months was given to all residents, regardless of their compensation date, to leave the neighborhoods by the end of 2003.⁵³ This resulted into a precipitous departure of some residents, and others were evicted by the police force (Ouédraogo E.B. 2005: 43). Also, as noted by the local newspaper,⁵⁴ depending on the location of the property, i.e. near a paved road or farther down in the neighborhood, the local authorities determined what amount to pay to the owners of the property:

An amount of CFAF 50,000/m² is paid to the resident whose property is located next to two asphalted roads. If the property is facing a single asphalted road, the owner is paid CFAF 40,000/m², and CFAF 25,000/m², if it's located near a non-asphalted road, and finally CFAF 22,500/m², if it's not next to any road at all. Also, if the road is asphalted and wider, the more expensive is the house (Le Pays 2002: n° 2686)⁵⁵.

Most participants believed the compensation was unfair, but very few were able to demand an increase of the amount proposed by the project authorities. However, some participants decided to fight for an increase of their compensation amount. Such was the

⁵² CFA means Communauté Financière Africaine (African Financial Community). The currency was devalued in 1994.

⁵³ Field notes, September 2009

⁵⁴ <http://www.lepays.bf/quotidien/confidences2.php?codeart=1443&numj=2686>

⁵⁵ This is my translation of the original French text.

case of the Ouéder family,⁵⁶ an upper class family made of a prominent architect and urban expert, one sociologist, one former Manager of the computer and information department of a regional bank, with a strong family and friends' support network. In my interview with Mary⁵⁷ (pseudonym of a member of the Ouéder family), she noted that Project ZACA authorities notified their family that it had to move despite its capacity to build according to the architectural norms of the project. While the Ouéder agreed to move, they had issues with the compensation amount that the project proposed, which was 12 million CFAF. The family therefore activated their expertise and network to demonstrate that the project's estimate of their property was not only wrong, but also unfair. Indeed, Mary estimated the price of their property at about 40 million CFAF. Therefore, the family hired a prominent local lawyer, also a family friend, and took Project ZACA to court and won the trial. Project ZACA had to pay them about 28 million CFAF instead of 12 million as it initially proposed. Despite this legal victory over the project, up to August 2009, Project ZACA did not finish paying their compensation money in full. While such stories of people taking Project ZACA to court were rare, they lead us to raise questions about the fairness in the compensation arrangements and procedures as echoed by many participants.

Further, the compensation method did not favor properties built with very expensive durable materials, and yet located far from main paved roads. Neither did the

⁵⁶ Ouéder is a pseudonym as the interviewee requested anonymity.

⁵⁷ From field notes, August 2009

project authorities put in place safety measures to mitigate potential family feud, nor gender related issues that might arise from the monetary compensation.⁵⁸

A case in point was Mrs Salzoung (a pseudonym), an administrative assistant in a Ministerial department in Ouagadougou. She was 48 at the time of the interview (September 2009), single with two grown-up children. She was very reluctant to talk to me, but when she finally agreed to share her experience, she preferred to remain anonymous. Here is a snippet of our conversation, and her recollection of the hardships and suffering she went through as a woman, a physically challenged person, a single mother, and as someone who lost her family's support and trust, and underwent the humiliation of incarceration due to the use of the compensation money:

Salzoung: So, when I was summoned to the gendarmerie, the issue got tougher. I said that I did not embezzle any money. I took the money and built a house thinking that I was doing something good for the family. Rather than sharing the small compensation money, I thought it was a good thing to build a house for the family...I just don't understand why a family problem should be solved at the gendarmerie. The money belonged to my deceased father. To get the compensation money, I took the lead to solve all the paperwork. Now that the money is here, they've become hysterical...Thanks God, my boss, not the current Minister, but the former one, did not remain indifferent to my lot. She took the matter in her hands when she learned that I was going through hardships. When I was struggling to get the compensation, my relatives, my brothers and sisters, were not there to help me get the paperwork done. But, they did everything to take the rest of the money that I should have used to bring water and electricity to the new house that I built. They took the money and shared it, even with their friends from the neighborhood. Is that justice, is that fair? (Interviews, September 2009)

As shown by Salzoung's interview, the project did not put in place any mechanism to ensure that families did not break apart due to the management of the compensation

⁵⁸ Field notes, August 2009

money. Project ZACA did not take into account those family members who could not speak for themselves and defend their interests, including women and mentally challenged people. The compensation mechanism at times led to intra-family feuds, which weakened family relations, sometimes at the expense of women. Single mothers and widows were compelled to share the compensation money with the rest of their family members.

While Salzoung was freed from jail thanks to the support of her acquaintances and colleagues, she has since suffered from the psychological impact of the family division and animosity triggered by the use of the compensation money. When interviewed by L'Observateur Paalga⁵⁹ on some of the problems engendered by Project ZACA, notably at the compensation level, Alain Bagré, the former ZACA project Director, had this to say:

One day, some old women came to see us regarding the payment of their compensation. After everything was done by the notary in agreement with the law, when they returned home, they were required to put the law and legal document aside because the money was to be shared according to the Quran. The old women came to us in tears and when we told them not to accept that method, they replied that they would be kicked out of the house if they refused to share the money following the Quran or customs⁶⁰ (L'Observateur Paalga 2003; n°2371).

This passage clearly illustrates how some local residents interpreted the law, especially their perception of the woman's role and place in society when it comes to decision-making and financial management within the household. This kind of problem existed before, but under Project ZACA such problems re-surfaced and undermined

⁵⁹ L'Observateur Paalga is a daily local newspaper. This passage is retrieved from its online version at the following link: http://www.lobservateur.bf/Oarticlearchive.php3?id_article=2371 (Accessed on September 29, 2006).

⁶⁰ The translation is mine.

family relations and women's exclusion. A casual conversation with a government official revealed that the authorities were aware of such issues, but they preferred to let families handle the compensation money the way they wanted to avoid being criticized for meddling in the families' affairs.

However, this did not prevent research participants such as L.G. (a local urban expert) to note the following about women's place in the compensation mechanism: "Very bad, they were excluded as usual...The situation of women is always a big issue in these kinds of situations. Money belongs to men in our society. And they have to decide for the better or worse." Thus, urban renewal under Project ZACA reveals, to some extent, the perpetuation of the cycle of marginalization: the marginalized groups were continuously marginalized by not having a say in urban planning. The government defined the compensation criteria, and cared little about the people's input. Moreover, Project ZACA did not include renters in the compensation mechanism, let alone other adult members of households. Conversations with most research participants revealed the project authorities focused only on compensating property owners. No matter how much renters invested in the properties, they did not receive any compensation either from the project authorities or the property owners.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the socio-historical processes that led to the emergence of Project ZACA. The chapter highlighted the legal and institutional frameworks that governed the project as well as the compensatory arrangements and related issues under Project ZACA-II.

Though Project ZACA emerged from the revolutionary regime's policies of urban transformation and development agenda, there are still traces of the revolutionary urban planning legacy even today under Blaise Compaoré's regime, since 1987 to the present. Given its design and implementation, the project failed to develop coherent financial resource mobilization strategies and to draft an inclusive compensation mechanism sensitive to gender, developmentally disabled people, and renters as well.

The announcement of the Project ZACA led to a collective resistance movement by residents affected by the project. Building on the literature on social capital, the next chapter will examine how local residents mobilized social relations to fight against the forces of urban transformation, and how that struggle consolidated or in some cases, weakened the community both during their opposition to the project and their resettlement.

CHAPTER 4

SOCIAL CAPITAL AND COLLECTIVE RESISTANCE TO STATE-LED FORCED EVICTIION

On March 28, 2002, the intellectual wing of the anti-ZACA movement published in a local newspaper (Le Pays, N°2598) a letter arguing for the defense and protection of the community, the collective memory and cultural heritage of the neighborhoods affected by the project. “[...].We are against a baseless eviction of thousands of families,” the intellectuals emphasized. Their struggle was not against beautifying the city, but it was rather against the dislocation and marginalization of families and communities. “All the evictions that occurred ... only inflicted considerable pain, suffering, and countless deaths...If this logic of destroying to construct continues... in the end, no neighborhood will survive” the letter underscored (Le Pays, N°2598).

Against this background, this chapter draws on social capital and collective resistance to examine how residents of the neighborhood affected by Project ZACA organized to fight against their eviction.

Main Debates on Social Capital

Social capital has generally come to mean a set of resources that actors mobilize through networks and their membership in socio-cultural, political, religious, economic or ethnic structures to achieve personal or collective goals. These networks may be formal (associations institutions or work-based relations) or informal (friends, kin, neighbors) (Stone 2001). Social capital can be productive by allowing its holders to access social resources including, “advice, love, practical assistance, attention, influence, physical strength, knowledge, expertise, status, money, food, health care, etc.” (Van Der Gaag and

Snijders 2004: 5). Bourdieu (1986: 248) contends that social capital is “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition.” It implies the amount of time invested in relationships, which facilitates access to available resources for the benefit of actors. The diversity of positions accessed and the resources provided by such people may enhance social capital (Lin 2005; Erickson 2004a; Van Der Gaag and Snijders 2004). These various aspects of social capital highlight the instrumental and functional dimension of social capital at individual and collective levels. Despite agreement on the general concept of social capital, scholars disagree about the most important characteristics of it and propose a variety of instruments to measure it.

For example, Putman (2000) addressed social capital from a community perspective by underscoring that the quality of social capital within a specific neighborhood can influence the socio-economic and collective achievements and well-being of the community. Putman (2000:18-19) viewed social capital as a set of connections among individuals built on reciprocity and trust, which can facilitate collaboration and cooperation among group members for the improvement of collective conditions (Norris and Inglehart 2004:1-2; Fukuyama 2000;). Along this line, Grootaert (1999) focused on local associations, namely the density of associations, internal heterogeneity, and frequency of meeting attendance, members’ effective participation in decision-making, payment of dues, and the community orientation of associations.

Putman (2000: 22-23) also distinguished bonding social capital from bridging social capital. Bonding social capital undergirds reciprocity and in-group solidarity based on shared identities and trust. It provides moral, psychological, and material support to its

members. Bonding and bridging social capital are not mutually exclusive because the same individual can possess and use both of them for personal or collective purposes. In contrast, Burt (2005) argues that it is the relative absence of ties (structural holes) that facilitates individual mobility within a given group and creates what others refer to as bridging social capital. Weaker ties can be sources of new knowledge and access to social resources that can be used for social mobility (Burt 2005: 18-19; Portes 1998: 6). While bonding capital can create in-group loyalty, its closure may also lead to out-group antagonism. Closure forbids in-group members to display behavior or express new ideas not approved by their groups. Acting against groups' expectations can lead to excommunication (Burt 2005). In this research, I will look at both bonding and bridging social capital to highlight how individuals access and use social resources within their community or outside for the reconstruction of their personal lives in a post-displacement situation.

Bonding, Bridging and Linking Relations for Collective Resistance

In discussing Project ZACA and its aftermath, Audet-Gosselin (2008) has shown that religion, notably Islam, has been the main driving force guiding opposition to Project ZACA. His approach highlighted the role of religion as both a mobilizing and divisive force. In this chapter however, I emphasize the role of social capital grounded in a long-nurtured tradition of solidarity, a quest for social justice, and an acute awareness of the significance of kinship, friendship and neighborhood relations in the face of power and perceived injustice. The anti-ZACA movement was led by the Coordination, a

spontaneous movement set up and mostly led by elders, local chiefs, heads of households, and religious leaders of the neighborhoods affected by ZACA.

In the heat of the controversy about their forced eviction, former residents of Tiendpalogo, Kamsonghin, Koulouba, Camp Fonctionnaire, and Zangouenttin⁶¹ came together to set up a movement whose main goal was to fight against eviction.

The government's public announcement of the ZACA plans in November 2000 therefore came as a shock. Repeated appeals to reconsider were brushed aside. Residents reacted by forming a crisis committee and staging seven major protests. These anti-ZACA actions grew in size between March and July 2002 and took a more violent turn, with road blockades, damage to public buildings, and some skirmishing with riot police. The authorities ultimately managed to contain the unrest with a combination of police repression and promises of more compensation and other assistance for those relocated (Harsch 2009: 281).

The Coordination's fight was not really about religion even though the media rhetoric often gave that impression.⁶² It was about a people fighting for social justice, and mobilizing to defend their families and neighborhoods from being bulldozed by the forces of "modernity." This echoes what Mario Diani noted when discussing the role of social capital in collective action: "...the rise of collective action and its subsequent developments are affected by the distribution of social capital within potential movement constituencies. Mobilization processes rely heavily upon previous networks of exchange and solidarity" (1997: 134). As observed by a prominent member of the anti-ZACA movement, Zangouenttin was the center, the heart of the city of Ouagadougou. Aware of

⁶¹ The term Zangouenttin has come to represent all the neighborhoods affected by Project ZACA in public discourse, including the displacees.

⁶² Interview notes with Niamba Adama on September 2009.

the centrality of their neighborhood in “popular culture” such as the dodo⁶³ carnival, and in the local economy given the existence of multiple resources such as markets, administrative structures, NGO headquarters, public and private banks, schools, and a long-nurtured community support, residents created this resistance movement to defend their interests and rights. They felt the government was seeking to marginalize them by pushing them to the edge of the city. As noted by Oliver-Smith (2002: 6), “the perception that many of the most vulnerable are forced to share an unfair burden of the costs of development as constituting violations of basic human and environmental rights is the core substance of resistance.”

Conversations with most research participants revealed that residents strongly felt that their world was falling apart. My conversation with Niamba highlighted such feelings. Niamba was one of the prominent leaders of the anti-ZACA movement, a trade unionist and senior executive officer at the WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union). He noted the following:

Interviewer: Yes, eh...can you talk more about your experience of Project ZACA, how things happened, how things started, and about your involvement in the struggle against your eviction?

Niamba: Oh well ...at the beginning, well, we were lucky to be living in the central neighborhoods of Ouagadougou, namely Zangouenttin, Tiendpalogo,

⁶³ According to Dankambary Aboubacar, the term dodo is a Hausa word meaning “monster.” It is a dance performed by a group of young children wearing masks and singing songs during the Ramadan period. It has its root in Hausa legend. One day, during the holy month of Ramadan, one of their ancestors went hunting, and yet it was forbidden to do so. His face was transformed into an animal face, and the villagers had to walk him around while singing and praying God to forgive him. Since then, the dodo has become a tradition performed during the Ramadan period. It was introduced in Burkina in the early 18th century with the arrival of the Hausa in Ouagadougou. The dodo carnival has become part of a national culture, regulated and celebrated every year in Ouagadougou. For him, the Hausa contributed to urban culture in Burkina in general and in Ouagadougou in particular (Field notes, September 2009)

Peuloguin, and Koulouba. Eh..., unfortunately, things quickly accelerated, eh... things happened brutally, let's put it like that. There was no communication, no dialogue with the populations affected by the project, a dialogue to clearly present the project in all its aspects to the populations. But we rather learned about it through rumors... Oh yeah! Yeah! We learned about this project through rumors. So, we learned just like everybody else that the government was planning to implement a project in our neighborhoods... The rumors amplified and so was the fear among residents. So, we've decided to organize ourselves because we said that well, if our departure is inevitable, then we've got to do something. We've got to organize to avoid the project from being implemented or if it were to be implemented by force, at least we should get some compensation. We got to organize to benefit from appropriate support measures. So, just when people started to organize, the government also set up a parallel structure to counter our movement... We got organized and we had a structure that we called "the Coordination." But.., the government also put in place another structure, you know, and they controlled its members who were residents among us. So, you see, they were two structures in place! The first structure, which is ours, was called "Al-Qaida", we were pretty radical in our views of the project. We said, "Nous pas bouger! [We are not budging!]" That was our motto. But the actual name of our structure was *la Coordination* [The Coordination]. This Coordination represented the people who did not want to budge from the neighborhoods. (Interview, September 2009)

Local residents mobilized various forms of resources, including friendship, kinship, cultural capital (experience in trade unions and deep knowledge of residents of the neighborhoods), the use of the press, and the quest for developing linking relations with the ruling elite (vertical social capital). Indeed, social capital builds on strong leadership and existing structures and institutions (Bourdieu 1986), which was why the anti-ZACA movement sought to connect with the political leadership and the Mossi traditional power structures. Strong leadership grounded in strong social relations reinforced by kinship, religion, and age factors, was significant in mobilizing against ZACA.

The Coordination leaders needed the support of residents by persuading them that long standing leadership roles in their community could be assets for voicing their

concerns and requesting that government meet their demands. What united them was the concern for preventing the destruction of their neighborhoods, which they viewed as a family. As noted by O.B. (a schoolteacher, intellectual, and young member of the anti-ZACA movement⁶⁴), “everybody was welcomed in our struggle. We were like a family. It wasn’t about Islam even though the pro-government press painted us like radicals motivated by religious ideology. They [some local newspapers] even called us Al-Qaida, and all that. It was about defending our neighborhoods and the future of our children, and our community. That’s it! Enough is enough!” Members of the anti-ZACA movement included intellectuals, experienced trade union members, men and women, the youth and elders of the neighborhoods, and members of the Burkinabè Human Rights Movement.⁶⁵ Also, according to *L’Hebdomadaire* (2002 n° 153), on February 3, 2002 about 400 women went into the streets to demonstrate, some holding signs proclaiming “No to development that excludes the people.” They requested the Prime Minister put a definite end to the project implementation, which had devastating consequences on their family structures, and socioeconomic life.

O.B.: The movement included everybody: men, women, children, elders, the youth, everybody took active part because we couldn’t accept being treated like trash. Enough is enough. When we heard the news from the television, we decided to mobilize spontaneously. And we all agreed that this time we had to fight tooth and nail for the government to treat us with dignity. In Mooré, there’s a proverb that when you raise a bastard, he destroys your family.

Interviewer: What do you mean? Who is the bastard here?

⁶⁴ Interview in August 2009

⁶⁵ Interview notes from Niamba Adama in September 2009.

O.B.: Ha ha [laughter]. The authorities of course! Some of these people who were planning to destroy our neighborhoods were raised by our parents when they were at school. They came from the village, and stayed with our parents for their education. Today, they became somebody, and they turned against us. They say that our neighborhoods are dirty, and smelly. But they were raised in those very neighborhoods they wanted to destroy today! You see how ungrateful they are! (Interview, August 2009)

Six years after relocation, the angst, and deep disappointment could still be perceived in the eyes and gestures of O.B. as he talked about the project and its aftermaths. By qualifying the authorities as “bastards” and “ungrateful,” O.B. was expressing his deep disappointment regarding the project and its initiators. In the face of such a threat, residents decided to unite to fight back. This was also echoed by Dankambary Aboubacar (a local religious leader and member of the Coordination) in the following terms: “unity being force, we decided to come together to defend our neighborhoods. The youth wanted to use violent demonstrations, but we tried to calm them.” The movement built on the strong belief that the project was meant to destroy their families and unity, which were the foundation of their community.

Some members of the movement who were from Zangouenttin, mostly inhabited by Hausa, Yoruba and foreigners were also aware of the need to demonstrate in their rhetoric that they were not foreigners, and that they even had blood relationships with the Mogho Naaba. It was this quest for and affirmation of existing strong bonds with the dominant ethnic power structures (the Mogho-Naaba) that led Dankambary Aboubacar to say:

When our ancestors came here, they were the ones that expanded Islam in Ouagadougou; they married with the Mossi princes and princesses. They even took sides against the colonizers by siding with the Mogho-Naaba, you see. But to break our movement, people started circulating rumors that the violent demonstrations were led by the Hausa and Yoruba, who did not care anyways

because they did not belong here. That is not true! That's absolutely not true! We have become part of the Mogho's family. The Zangouen-Naaba takes part in the Mogho-Naaba's Friday appearances. The Zangouen-Naaba himself was enthroned by the Mogho-Naaba. We are not foreigners, and Zangouenttin is our home. You cannot kick us out of our homes like that! [...] We said that we wanted them to beautify the city too, but they had to go through dialogue and negotiation. (Interview, September 2009)

This narrative reveals the theme of “foreignization” in the local rumors,⁶⁶ which was a rhetorical strategy used by the government to portray its opponents as outsiders seeking to undermine the interests of locals and good citizens. Similarly, some local press and Project ZACA's supporters portrayed leaders of the movement as “Others”, and blamed them for being gerontocratic. However, the elders, local chiefs and religious leaders in the community were based on their long-standing experience, and roles in their neighborhoods, as well as their capacity to pull into their group emerging and vocal leaders such as Niamba Adama. Commenting on life in the neighborhood, Dankambary Aboubacar had this to say:

People have been living in the neighborhoods for decades. It was like a family. We knew each other very well. Our children played together, went to school together, and, we did everything together. People couldn't accept such long-standing bonds to be broken like that! No responsible family head could accept that. (Interview, September 2009)

It was indeed that sense of place and belongingness among the anti-ZACA movement members, and the long-standing image of leadership position that propelled them to the front stage in the struggle against ZACA. Leaders of the movement viewed their fight as a defense of their families, and their responsibility.

⁶⁶ Local rumors also known as *radio kankan*.

These leaders also built on the historical involvement of Zangouenttin in mass mobilization. By framing their struggle in terms of historical reputation of resisting against government, the anti-ZACA leaders also tried to package their fight as the defense of that historical legacy as embodied in such expressions by participants: “Zangouenttin was the heart of Ouagadougou or Zangouenttin is well known for being tough or Zangouenttin is modernity.” This echoes what Bourdieu labeled as symbolic capital, that is, the prestige, attention, pride, and all the honors associated with the name Zangouenttin (Bourdieu 1986). This symbolic capital was often conveyed in expressions as “Zangouenttin is the heart of Ouagadougou” and in the ways that participants narrated the history of the transformation of Ouagadougou in terms of the significance of their neighborhoods (Biehler 2006)

A quick historical glance at the role of Zangouenttin in political movement revealed that the neighborhood was at the heart of other socio-political movements. Most importantly, it was at Zangouenttin that the first Friday Mosque of Ouagadougou was built, which puts the neighborhood at the heart of the expansion of Islam in Ouagadougou. For instance, in the 1950s, the Haussa of Zangouenttin contested the legitimacy of the Yarsé Imam, El Hadji Mahama Bagyan by refusing to attend Friday prayers led by the latter (Fourchard 2003). As noted by Dankambary Aboubacar, Zangouenttin has always been at the heart of major political events in Ouagadougou. He noted that the late President Sangoulè Lamizana was supported by residents of Zangouenttin, as he would attend child-naming ceremonies and funerals. Because he was a Muslim, residents of Zangouenttin decided to fully support him during the presidential campaign leading to his victory in 1978. Even late President Thomas Sankara was familiar with residents of

Zangouenttin, and he used to have close friends there too as noted by Dankambary Aboubacar.

As a result of the growing anti-ZACA feeling, the government also put in place a parallel structure known as *Comité Interministériel de Pilotage* (the Inter-ministerial Steering Committee) to counter the Coordination, which it portrayed as a radical movement. The Inter-ministerial Steering Committee was meant to frame the project in such a way as to “pacify” the anti-ZACA residents by giving the impression that the state was ready for an inclusive negotiation that would take into account their interests and expectations. Indeed, the creation of the Inter-ministerial Steering Committee began to crack the anti-ZACA movement. As a result, the anti-ZACA movement was often referred to as the group of radicals. It was labeled as *Nous Pas Bouger* or *Al-Qaida* in the local press (Le Journal du Jeudi N°565 of July 18-24, 2002). Commenting on the mobilization of the state press against the anti-ZACA movement, O.B., a fierce opponent to ZACA had this to say:

The state mobilized its press to disparage our movement. But, we were highly aware of their tactics. We used “le grin” [tea group] to discuss how to go about our mobilization strategies. Sometimes, we used our mobile phones to call each other for meetings or we just use word-of-mouth strategy to disseminate information. That was how we shared information among ourselves, and to make people understand the ills of the project. Listen, if we are in a real democracy, our voice should be heard. We refuse to be treated like trash. They can’t fool us all the time. (Interview, August 2009)

Gatherings around tea are the most common ways of bringing the youth together, and it was at such places that people exchanged useful information about local and even international issues. This resonates with what Harsch pointed out: “By protesting, . . . Burkina’s citizens are showing that they will not remain silent in the face of the

difficulties confronting them – and that they expect the authorities to hear and act on their complaints.” (2009: 266)

This movement was deeply rooted in a sense of place and community as indicated by interviewees. In Zangouenttin for instance, “we used to live together like a family,” said some participants. The metaphor “like a family” reflects their sense of community and long nurtured bonds that spread over decades. The concept of family is extended to friends and neighbors, which goes beyond the biological connections between individuals. Participants tended to use the family-metaphor to convey the strength of relations within their neighborhoods. As O.B. observed about their communication and mobilization strategy for demonstrations:

We grew up together here in Zangouenttin. We have known each other since childhood. We went to school together; we spent time together around tea. So, before going to the gathering at the *Maison du Peuple*, we spread the news by word-of-mouth or cellphone calls. We told everyone to be well prepared. We know each other, so we spread the word in our neighborhoods. The day of the meeting, all the young people were there. We avoided going there in group. Everyone just knew that we had to go there separately to avoid any suspicion. It was a huge mobilization! (Interview, August 2009)

Such words from O.B. are quite telling regarding the mobilization strategies of the anti-ZACA members. This pressure led the government to take into account their request for financial compensation⁶⁷ as discussed in chapter 3. While some members of the anti-ZACA movement resorted to violent demonstrations, elders and leaders held multiple meetings with high-ranking government officials, and local traditional and religious leaders across the city to push their agenda. Some demonstrators were arrested and jailed.

⁶⁷ See the section on compensation arrangements in chapter 4.

Similar to any social resistance movement, their claims were often met with repression: by the police and the prison system. Aware of the need to expand their grip, the intellectual wing and the leaders of the Coordination attempted to link with the political power structures. This linking strategy resonates with Harsch's (2009: 286) statement: "Much depends on the strength of local social networks, the degree and caliber of civil organizations, and the ability of activists to link up with social movements beyond their own localities."

Social Justice and the Protection of Social Capital and Cultural Heritage

As already discussed, the anti-ZACA movement was highly aware of creating relationships with people in power, especially the local political leaders who might need their votes for legislative or municipal elections. Commenting on the need to have connections with the power structures, Dankambary Aboubacar said:

Unfortunately, we did not have powerful political leaders who could defend our cause. We knew that if we were to succeed in our struggle, we had to do everything to talk to the Prime Minister, the minister of urban development or to the President himself. We had to find somebody in the government to help us. We met one of the Ministers, but he told us that the matter was beyond his capacity. He told us that the decision to implement the project came from above; from the President himself. The young people wanted to use violence, but we the elders wanted to be more tactful. You see, you can't fight with your bare hands somebody who has a gun. (Interview, September 2009)

Leaders of the neighborhoods even attempted, but failed to meet with President Blaise Compaoré. That strategy of linking with people in power is indicative of their awareness of the significance of having connections with decision-makers as often observed in everyday discourse in Ouagadougou, "*ce sont les relations qui comptent* [Connections are what matter]. Their goal was to negotiate directly with the President

himself. As noted by Fayong (2010: 18), “ordinary social movements involve many cross-class participants including some social elites who may have connections with high-ranking authorities; their organizers thus have more channels to construct and employ vertical links.” While leaders of the Coordination were struggling to meet with high government officials, including the President, a group of intellectuals from the neighborhoods affected by Project ZACA addressed a letter to the National Assembly requesting its involvement in the struggle against their eviction. The letter published in newspaper *Le Pays* (March 28, 2002), appealed to the Parliament’s sense of social justice, nationalism, democracy, and inclusive socio-economic development. I have chosen to cite passages from the letter in the following section to allow the reader to capture the rhetorical strategies deployed by the group of intellectuals to persuade Members of Parliament. Rather than resorting to violent street demonstrations, the intellectuals tried to situate themselves in line with “official realities” and the power structures while giving the impression that they were not actually against the good intentions of the project. Their rhetorical strategy is what James C. Scott (1990:57) called “the public transcript of apparent compliance” which is also expressed in the form of “unanimity.” An excerpt of the letter says:

Towards the end of your respective terms, the populations of Kadiogo Province in general and residents of Project ZACA area in particular are pleased to acknowledge and thank you for your great contribution to the promotion of social justice and democracy in Burkina Faso. The laws that you passed have, on the whole, allowed the Burkinabè people to have materials ready for their multiple development projects. Historical records will note that during the crisis following the events of Sapouy, you went beyond partisan politics, and you continued to assume your responsibilities as representatives of the people without any weakness or demagogy. You fulfilled your responsibility as representatives of the people, of all the people without exclusion.

The Burkinabè people will also long remember the courage that you displayed by deciding to review article 37 of our constitution. You showed to the most skeptical groups that you would not give up social peace, which is dear to the Burkinabè people. Moreover, during the university crisis, your honest position simply magnified your role as representatives of the people in this country. In short, like thousands of Burkinabè, we honestly think that the second legislature of the fourth Republic was made up of patriotic men and women. That sense of responsibility that you showed during your entire term makes us believe that you couldn't remain indifferent to the suffering that the Government has been inflicting on the people through Project ZACA68 (Le Pays, N°2598, March 28, 2002).

To prevent that from happening, they appeal to the goodness and sense of concern of the legislative branch while underscoring its unswerving support of the people. The intellectuals praise legislators for their courage, patriotism, responsibility, and great achievements in solving major socio-political crises, including the assassination of Norbert Zongo (the investigative journalist), the University crisis (which led to a blank academic year⁶⁹), the controversy around the revision of article 37 of the Constitution (which seeks to remove the limit on the presidential mandate), the national reconciliation day, and the compensation of residents of Bilibambili (victims of forced eviction during the revolution) (Jaglin 1995: 415). All these achievements were attained following major upheavals involving students' associations, political parties' demonstrations, strikes, and street violence. These events threatened the regime and socio-political stability. However, the letter holds that the legislative branch's sense of responsibility and patriotism allowed

⁶⁸ The translation is mine. Letter from Le Pays (2002). "Des intellectuels de la zone contre le déguerpissement". Le Pays, N°2598 du 28/03/2002. Accessed at <http://www.lepays.bf/quotidien/nation2.php?codeart=700&numj=2598>,

⁶⁹ Young people in the central neighborhoods were influenced by the students' movement which led to invalidation of the academic year 1999-2000 at the University [of Ouagadougou] (Audet Gosselin 2008 : 134).

for overcoming these crises. Their rhetorical strategies highlight what Scott (1990) termed as the “hidden transcripts,” which was used as strategy to link with the legislative branch of power. Examining this letter, one can detect the recurrent themes that constitute the building blocks of the intellectuals’ rhetorical strategy. The ultimate goal of the letter is to have the support of the legislative branch (vertical social capital) against the executive branch’s decision. First, to create a sense of concord with Parliament, the letter praises the legislative branch by appealing to its sense of social justice, peace, the respect of human life and dignity, and democracy. This rhetorical strategy consists in situating themselves in the same register as the legislative branch while reminding members of the latter that they owed their power to the votes of the Burkinabè people in general and residents of the neighborhoods to be bulldozed by Project ZACA. In other words, the dismantling of these neighborhoods constitutes a threat to their power base. This rhetorical strategy, which consisted in requesting the support of the legislative branch, aims at reinforcing the intellectuals’ network, and therefore their social capital in achieving their objectives.

The tone shifts to that of a struggle opposing the new rich (implying those who got rich through embezzlement of public goods) versus the poor who are often referred to as the “real country” who only ask to live on their land and enjoy their freedom and legitimate property inherited from their fathers and grandfathers. The letter then portrays Project ZACA as the dispossession of the urban poor for the benefit of the “new rich”; yet the executive branch headed by the Prime Minister and the Head of State seemed to be indifferent to the lot of the poor despite their neoliberal discourse on poverty reduction. Clearly, such a rhetorical strategy would resonate more with the opposition party in Parliament. However, it also aims at creating some discomfort among Members of

Parliament of the ruling party whose voters were in those neighborhoods concerned by the project. By so doing, the intellectuals were building and framing their struggle as a nationalist and patriotic struggle for true social justice and democracy, peace and prosperity, but also as a class struggle: the proletariat versus the new bourgeoisie. Thus, this allows us to better situate the movement led by the Coordination of residents of ZACA area not simply as a spontaneous struggle against forced eviction, but also as the struggle of the urban poor to protect their interests:

Indeed, claiming to beautify the center of the city of Ouagadougou, the Burkinabè government, which has engaged on several occasions in preaching on poverty reduction, is now committed to dispossess without any prerequisites the poor Burkinabè for the benefit of the new rich. Most of the people that are threatened with eviction from their lands earn their livelihood exclusively based on the location of their houses. It is this location that has prevented them thus far from suffering and emigrating to countries in the sub-region, for instance in Côte d'Ivoire. It is as if the poor have no right to the city of Ouagadougou and to live decently based on the only goods that they inherited from their fathers, and grandfathers (Excerpt from *Le Pays*, N°2598, March 28, 2002).

The intellectuals also chose to speak from the archives, that is, by referring to major recent historical events, contextualizing their struggle while inviting the Members of Parliament to draw their own conclusions (Jan Blommaert 2005). In contextualizing their struggle and framing it as the struggle of the poor for justice, the intellectuals emphasize the pain and suffering inflicted on residents. Through its intellectual wing, the movement also tried to extend its base and therefore its power by attempting to develop bridging social capital with the rest of the populations. It appealed to other Burkinabè to join them in their struggle against forced eviction:

This is indeed a clear case of political violence similar to the deportations perpetuated against our fellow citizens in Tabou by the Ivorian government. The proof is that the compensation request introduced by former Bilibabili residents was approved by the national reconciliation commission. An admitted fault is half

forgiven if and only if the perpetrator commits not to repeat the same mistake again. If the national day of forgiveness is not a mockery, why then is the government trying to perpetuate violence once again? Isn't this government concerned with the promise made by the Head of State, which is banning once and for all political violence in our country? (Le Pays, N°2598, March 28, 2002)

They compare this forced eviction to the brutal murder of Burkinabè in Tabou (Côte d'Ivoire) and their subsequent massive return (war refugees) to Burkina Faso. There is juxtaposition between the two situations: a forced eviction due to xenophobia in Côte d'Ivoire (a foreign government) and forced eviction at home of Burkinabè by their own government. Thus, the intellectuals are putting the Burkinabè government on the horn of a dilemma. It could not condemn the brutal murder, expropriation, and expulsion of its nationals in other countries if it failed to protect its own citizens on its own territory. By calling on Members of Parliament as the representatives of the people who voted them in power, the intellectuals were thus reminding these elites of the risks of being voted out if they did not take any actions to counter the destructive actions of the executive branch, which did not care about the people since it did not derive its existence from their votes. In other words, the intellectuals were highlighting the fact that together as a community, they had social capital, which the politicians used to earn political power. Dismantling that community was tantamount to cutting the branch on which one was sitting, that is, undermining that social capital which earned their political capital. At least, in this letter, the intellectuals were able to package an ordinary movement of resistance into a major national class struggle. And, more importantly, through extrapolation, they situated their narrative into a regional and global condemnation of the killing and expulsion of Burkinabè in Côte d'Ivoire by comparing it to the dispossession and forced eviction of residents of Project ZACA area. They emphatically observed that this was nothing other

than treating these Burkinabè as if they were second-rate citizens or “sub-humans.” The letter holds:

If culture is really the foundation of all kinds of economic development as stated by some of our leaders, be aware that the designer of this project are uprooting a great pillar of that culture. [We]...reject any form of forced eviction of the Burkinabè is that the sub-regional context does not favor it. Quite recently, the international community condemned the forced displacement of Burkinabè living in Tabou (Ivory Coast). Today, it is the Burkinabè government that wants to forcefully evict Burkinabè living in Ouagadougou. Honorable Members of Parliament, if you accept without a word this policy, you will undoubtedly give reason to the extremists of Tabou who even came to think that a Burkinabe is a kind of sub-human that one can “kill” without any problem... (Exerpt from *Le Pays*, N°2598, March 28, 2002).

If the legislative branch did not act now, the government juggernaut machine would be inflicting violence and suffering amidst innocent citizens who only asked for the right to live as a community with a long nurtured tradition and culture.

Another important aspect in the intellectuals’ letter was presenting Project ZACA not simply as a danger to families, the communities concerned, but also as a threat to their cultural capital. By cultural capital, I mean the embodied experiences of the community members, their values, symbols, and cultural assets (Bourdieu 1986).

Their struggle was also about preserving cultural capital materialized through the mosques, shrines, group performances such as the dodo dance. Indeed, according to key informants, the Hausa people (residents of Zangouenttin) brought the dodo dance to Ouagadougou. The intellectuals insisted that their call for cultural heritage preservation was well situated in the context of the National Week of Culture (SNC) celebrated in the country. Thus, they highlighted the contradiction between cultural preservation and celebration on the one hand, and the destruction of other Burkinabè’s culture on the other.

However, despite this call, the government often countered residents' demonstrations with repression, which was followed by internal divisions and the creation of a parallel structure among residents more amenable to negotiations. This internal division led to increased animosity and death threats between proponents and opponents of the project. Highly aware of the efficacy of such a weapon, the government was able to develop a parallel movement within those communities headed by high profile individuals such as Mahamadi Kouanda who once admitted in a local newspaper that he was "manufactured" by President Blaise Compaoré as follows:

Thanks for acknowledging that I am a well-known political leader. The first time I was elected as the youth leader in my neighborhood, Tiendpalgo, more precisely as a sport leader, was in 1969. But Project ZACA wiped away my neighborhood, but I am still a notable and central figure in that neighborhood. I have come to politics thanks to Blaise Compaoré. If you believe that Blaise has local straight men, I think that, somehow I owe him that. I am a product of President Compaoré. I was a central leader before encountering the head of state, but I started real politics with Blaise Compaoré⁷⁰. (L'Observateur N° 6304, 2005).

During fieldwork, on several occasions, I tried in vain to have an interview with Mahamadi Kouanda to hear his version of events.

Radical members of the movements were opposed to the purchase of plots in the already zoned neighborhoods as noted by Niamba. While publicly preaching resistance against eviction, some members and residents sent people to subscribe them on the list of people willing to move out of the neighborhood. Niamba noted that was detrimental to the movement. Saidou Bangré who was initially against their forced eviction began to water down his position, which led some supporting members of the Coordination to view

⁷⁰ The English translation is mine.

him with suspicion. The anti-ZACA's members' determination finally paid off because the government decided not only to compensate them financially, but also to designate two resettlement areas: Ouaga 2000-C and Nioko-I. This movement partly succeeded thanks to the organizational skills of its leaders and strong motivation of members who viewed the struggle as the protection of their families, communities and interests. As noted by Oliver-Smith (2002: 10): "... the responses and motivations for acceptance or resistance are complex and diverse, ranging from purely material considerations to the most deeply felt ideological beliefs and concerns." Niamba believed his trade unionist knowledge and skills enabled him to better participate in coordinating the movement and mobilizing the youth to achieve their objectives.

As an interviewee by L'Observateur Paalga (2003: n°2371) notes: "we [residents of the neighborhoods affected by ZACA] were expelled from the center of the city under the pretext that our life styles did not comply with health and hygiene standards. However, they put us in the same conditions here in Ouaga 2000! So, we fear that in the future our children still suffer from the same situation." With the direct or indirect support of the state, urban planners and capitalists organize, coordinate and execute urban redevelopment projects for the accumulation of more capital, often at the expense of the poor (Greenhut 2004; Harvey 2007). This leads to the exclusion of the poor and minority groups and the violation of basic human rights (Feeney 1998; Greenhut 2007; Satter 2009; Williams 1994).

Indeed, governments often legitimate their development policies by arguing for the improvement of lives and socio-economic conditions across the board. However, women, minorities, and other marginalized groups bear the brunt of these decisions forced down

on them. They often reject such practices through demonstrations, rebellions, and alternative ways of consolidating social relations (Harvey 2007). The struggle against forced eviction revived existing social relations and created movement-based social capital for the protection and defense of the right to the city.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the significance of social capital in collective resistance against forced eviction under Project ZACA. It has shown that the anti-ZACA movement coordinated by young leaders, traditional and religious leaders, as well as elders in the neighborhoods affected by the project built on long-standing friendship, kinship and neighborhood relations. The movement was mostly grounded in a localized social capital, which they attempted to transform into a nation-wide struggle against forced eviction. The movement also sought to develop bonding social capital by regrouping people from all socio-economic and religious background as well as linking social capital by attempting to connect with people in power within the government and in civil society organizations such as the Burkinabè Human Rights Movement. The collective resistance movement also revealed that residents used different rhetorical strategies to mobilize members such as word-of-mouth and cellphone calls, sending a letter to the Members of Parliament, attempting to link their movement to other struggles in the country. Such strategic expansion of their base revealed that the anti-ZACA movement was aware of the significance not just of bonding social capital, but also bridging social and linking social capital. To paraphrase James Scott, social capital is the weapon of the weak. As the saying goes, “a lonely tree cannot stand the wind.” United, they fought for their right to the city and for an inclusive development, which takes account of the people’s needs and

aspirations. The struggle against forced eviction has shown that even though the government prevailed by relocating the people, they viewed their unity and determination as victory. Their struggle created a movement-based social capital.

The next chapter examines how this forced eviction resulted into social dislocation and the various ways in which the displaced people were impoverished.

CHAPTER 5

BREAKING BONDS, WEAKENING LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES AND FIGHTING BACK

Displacement and the Dislocation of Social Capital

Whether for infrastructure development such as road, dam, transmission line or military base construction, forced eviction has always inflicted tremendous grieves among the affected populations (Cernea 1999; Fullilove 2004; Vine 2009). In discussing the risks associated with displacement and resettlement, Cernea (1999) argues that forced eviction dismantles family, friendship, tribal, ethnic and associational networks. Forced displacement leads to the dislocation of both formal and informal networks, leading in turn to insecurity, powerlessness, increased morbidity and mortality, impoverishment, and marginalization. Financial compensation often results in family conflict and dispersal of its members. Against this background, social scientists and policy-makers have recommended resettling displaced communities together based on formal and informal networks to “maintain the power of their community life, social network, social capital, and social insurance” (Cernea 1999: 211). Many scholars have supported this proposition about how to avoid social disarticulation and marginalization (Briggs 1997; Koenig and Diarra 1998; Mahapatra 1999; Downing 2002; Fadda and Jirón 1999; Fullilove 2004; Wilson and Taub 2007; Satter 2009).

Rapid urban transformations coupled with infrastructure development are more likely to increase the number of programs causing involuntary population displacement over the next 10 years (Robinson 2003:10). Urban development and infrastructure projects

already account respectively for 33% and 57% of all projects involving forced displacement and resettlement in Africa alone during the periods of 1980-1986 and 1987-1995 (Robison 2003: 18-19). Historically, as noted by Broudehoux (2008; also see Fullilove 2004:51-54), Haussmann's modernization project of Paris was the first large-scale urban renewal project implemented. However, the United States was among the first countries to develop specific national programs of urban renewal with a comprehensive federal government involvement through the Housing Act of 1949 (Anderson 1964). The objectives were among others to redevelop blighted neighborhoods, rejuvenate cities, and provide an increased tax-base to local communities (also known as the tax increment financing) as well as decent housing to its citizens (Levy 1988: 185).

Governments sometimes promise better re-housing conditions to evicted people, and yet as noted by Muñiz (1998: 65), in reality, displaced residents are generally abandoned to their fate. They are sometimes relocated in public housing followed with simultaneous evictions. Similarly, Fullilove (2004) depicts how urban renewal, often dubbed as state-led gentrification resulted in the destruction of African-American neighborhoods, dispersed its members, created more pains and post-displacement trauma, poverty and socio-economic inequalities. In the name of modernization, power structures selectively include or exclude participants, which may result in the unequal redistribution of the fruit of development (Fullilove 2004).

As already noted, the literature is fraught with risks associated with forced displacement (Colson 1999; Fullilove 2004; Satter 2009), but it also highlights policies addressing its setbacks. Cernea's model has been tested by many scholars including Lakshman Mahapatra who applied the model to India, where he discovered that among

displaced families, only 21% were rehabilitated with a job or self-employment, land loss for cash compensation leading to increased landlessness, prevalence of acute illness and chronic diseases among resettlement groups, and school dropouts among displacees' children (Robison 2003:13). Similarly, building on Cernea's Impoverishment Risk and Livelihood Reconstruction Model (IRLR) models, Roncallo (2007) argues that the mining project run by the American transnational mining corporation not only displaced the Quechua community of San Cristóbal (Bolivia) but it mainly impoverished them by alienating them from their environment and weakening their socio-cultural networks.

However, scholars like Mehta (2002:11) have criticized Cernea's IRR model by indicating that it tends to focus largely on economic systems that are productive in monetary values. Yet, women's roles in attending the ill and the elderly, childrearing, the well-being and happiness of the household are often left out and cannot be given an income value. Indeed, such forms of social support mechanisms are essential in community development. Further, Hammar (2008) acknowledges that such generalizing models reproduce homogenizing labels and fail to capture gender roles and needs that are part of the complex personal and social histories and heterogeneity of those displaced by infrastructure projects.

Inspired by the World Bank's policy guidelines on forced displacement and resettlement, different national and international organizations have put in place various mechanisms to address development-related risks (Asian Development Bank 2003; OECD 1992). Unfortunately, the World Bank's operational policy lacks a gender section dealing with how the needs of both men and women will be addressed in forced displacement. Further, the dominant language of financial and material compensation and restoration of

the displacees' life back to pre-displacement have been heavily criticized for not paying enough attention to psychological and moral impacts. Worse the restoration language may mean that displacees cannot be beneficiaries of the projects (Robinson 2003: 30).

Also, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development adopted in December 1991, a series of guidelines, which took into account women's experiences of forced displacement by indicating that relocations should consider their preferences while addressing their specific needs and constraints (Robinson 2003: 35). These recommendations focus on including women in development policies rather than emphasizing inter-gender and intra-gender relationships in production and reproduction along class, racial, ethnic, age, cultural, and religious lines.

To borrow from Cernea,⁷¹ "compulsory displacements [...] raise major ethical questions because they reflect an inequitable distribution of development's benefits and losses." Indeed, Project ZACA created frustrations among the displaced people, traumatized some displacees and even broke families apart, and dispersed communities (Ouédraogo 2005; Le Pays 2002: n° 2686; L'Indépendent 2006: n° 682).

Indeed, residents of the affected neighborhoods had an emotional attachment to their neighborhood and developed strong friendship, and kin-based relationships that Project ZACA destroyed. As Ouédraogo E.B. (2005) notes, the neighborhood was their village and witnessing the destruction of one's village was a traumatizing experience for most residents. They used to visit each other, and shared meals and supported each other.

⁷¹ http://www.his.com/~mesas/irr_model/irr_page_1%20social%20justice.htm (accessed September 6, 2006)

Their past and long nurtured relations were eroded by the displacement. According to a local newspaper, “In Zangouenttin, there were more interaction and group spirit. Everyone could eat or sleep in their neighbor’s house. Now, except in case of death, everyone goes their separate ways... We prefer solidarity in poverty to individualism in comfort.”

(L’Observateur Paalga 2003: n°2371):

In the early days of resettlement, some relocatees lost their jobs because of the high costs of transportation that compelled them to give up. Others who used to manage cafés, small restaurants, and small garages lost their customers because of the resettlement. Property owners who used to rent their houses also lost their income generating sources and had a hard time fending for their large families (also see Ouédraogo E.B. 2005; Le Pays 2002: n°2686; L’Indépendent 2003: n°682).

Further, schoolchildren also suffered from the relocation, which sometimes resulted in dropouts, if they could not endure transportation difficulties since they had to ride their motorbikes or bikes fifteen kilometers to go to school.⁷² The relocated felt so disappointed that no compensation could repair the “moral damage⁷³” the project inflicted upon them as well as the loss of their social relations, a social capital that they built over many years. They feared yet another relocation given their proximity to the new Presidential Palace, and the up-scale neighborhood.

Indeed, social scientists and policy-makers have recommended resettling displaced communities together based on formal and informal networks to “maintain the power of

⁷² Field notes, October 2009

⁷³ Moral damage is a term used by some participants in this research.

their community life, social network, social capital, and social insurance” (Cernea 1999: 211). Prior to their relocation to Ouaga 2000-C and Nioko I, the inhabitants concerned by Project ZACA were living in extended families. The implementation of Project ZACA triggered family feuds because some family members refused to resettle in their new location and required that the money be split up. They were not happy with those new settlement areas because they considered them as the “bush,” which means they required relocation out of the city (Ouédraogo 2005; Le Pays 2002: n°2686). This overall situation resulted in family break-ups in some cases (L’Indépendent (2006: n° 682)).⁷⁴

In terms of social structure, families and community life were disrupted, which was accelerated by financial difficulties or family feuds about sharing the financial compensation. Zangouenttin was a real home for them as everyone relied on relatives, friends, and neighbors for moral, psychological, and material needs and support. As noted emphatically by Ambo, a research participant, “Before, doors were wide open. But today, people have gated their homes. This means that they don’t want to be disturbed and you dare not go knock at their door. You see, things have changed! Ha ha ha,” he laughed sarcastically. Ambo viewed Ouaga 2000-C as a form of gated community as people symbolically gated themselves in their compound. He viewed those gates as signs that social interactions and unannounced visits to neighbors’ compounds could not continue as in the pre-displacement days. For participants, in Zangouenttin, their children could enter

⁷⁴ http://www.independant.bf/article.php3?id_article=70?&sq=arti (accessed on September 29, 2006). L’Indépendent is a local newspaper that always scathingly criticizes the government. This led to the assassination of its founder, Norbert Zongo on December 13, 1997.

their neighbors' compound, play with other children, eat there, and even sleep over without fear. Even though the situation seemed to have slightly improved compared to the early days of resettlement, most participants noted that social interaction in Ouaga 2000-C often boiled down to "hi and bye". Symbols such as the doorbell and locked gates represented closure, and deterred residents from having recourse to unannounced visits as it used to be in their former neighborhoods.

Further, some residents had to walk to the center city or rely on friends or acquaintance to get there. Most residents lost contacts with their friends and relatives who moved to other districts of Ouagadougou. They could see such people only during weddings, funerals, child-naming ceremonies, or while visiting ill relatives or friends.

Interviews with those who did not resettle in Ouaga 2000 also revealed complaints about loss of contacts with friends, relatives, former neighbors, and customers. Losing customers was also losing their markets, because for them, having a market meant having customers who could actually buy goods. Without customers, there was no market. Even though some of them were in the vicinities of Project ZACA, and not far from the central markets and Boulevard Kwamé N'kroumah, their businesses still did not operate successfully because some of their customers were among those displaced and relocated to different neighborhoods. For some of the relocatees living in other neighborhoods in Ouagadougou, their resettlement turned them into "strangers" in their new neighborhoods. They saw themselves as trapped in new spaces they were struggling to understand. Some were living in the house owned by the extended family. However, the relocation dispersed

family members who ended up in rented houses. Elders had hard time developing new relationships while children could hardly find new playmates.⁷⁵

Most participants residing in Ouaga 2000-C viewed their neighbors from Lanoayiri with suspicion. Some even went as far as to add that most of the thieves robbing them are from Lanoayiri, the irregular settlement. Others added that when they resettled in Ouaga 2000-C at the very beginning, their corrugated iron sheets used for roofing, and other construction materials were stolen by thieves from Lanoayiri. One participant named Ambo (pseudonym) said the following: “Even though we see each other, we greet each other during the day, at night; nobody knows who is who and who does what. I am sure that if you continue with your investigation, and you ask people, I am sure you will find that more than 90% of people don’t trust the guys from Lanoayiri.” I viewed such a statement as a quick classist overgeneralization of residents’ of Ouaga 2000-C’s perception of Lanoayiri residents. Yet, they had a very different view of the rest of Ouaga 2000-C, which symbolizes for many yet another resettlement by expropriation given that some of their rich neighbors often proposed to buy the relocatees properties. The relocatees were thus sandwiched between the two margins: the neighborhood of the richest people in Ouagadougou (Ouaga 2000) and Lanoayiri (regrouping the poor and not-so-poor). However, they rather chose to collaborate with the poor in their daily interactions even though with suspicion.

⁷⁵ Field interviews, September 2009

Such suspicious views were prevalent among participants. However, they also recognized their dependency on Lanoayiri for buying condiments and other basic goods and merchandises since they still did not have their own market. One resident noted that the lesson that he learned from interacting with people from Lanoayiri is that not all residents of irregular settlement are poor and “ignorant.” Some people were living in such neighborhoods as a way of strategizing to get their own “home.” Indeed, while residents of irregular settlements always settled in the city margins, they tended to be marginalized in many ways and portrayed as not part of the city. They were often treated as “ignorant villagers.” The “peripherilization” of those who used to be at the center of the city of Ouagadougou often led them to view irregular settlements’ residents of Lanoayiri with suspicion. At the same time, it allowed some research participants to discover the usefulness of the margins through their local market and the strategies they developed to be part of the city and city life. They attended prayers together, and when the flood of September 1, 2009 affected Lanoayiri, residents of Ouaga 2000-C were the first rescuers. Thus, the margins and the “marginalized center” have learned to collaborate, not just in times of crisis, but also in times of prayer, child-naming ceremonies, and funerals. Indeed, children from Lanoayiri attended EZACA School (the only public primary school at Ouaga 2000-C).

In terms of infrastructural and resource difficulties, all of the 70 participants reported to be experiencing the following constraints: market, health, transportation, education, and financially related hardships. Only 17 participants responded that they had no transportation problem as they had either a scooter or car for transportation. However, when asked about gas prices, they would usually add that skyrocketing gas prices were

their main constraints, which falls under financial constraints. Those experiencing transportation constraints had to rely mostly on public transportation (SOTRACO's buses = Transportation Company of the Commune of Ouagadougou) or cabs (privately owned). Yet, all 70 participants also noted that prior-displacement; they did not even need any transportation means as they were very close to schools, health clinics, and several markets (Zabr-daaga, Zangouenttin Yaar, Rood-Woko (the Central Market of Ouagadougou), and Kwame N'Kroumah's Boulevard) around their neighborhoods. All these structures were within walking distance, which was not the case at the time of the interview in September 2009.

Yet, to mitigate the effects of the displacement and resettlement, Project ZACA's Environmental Impact Assessment study had made some recommendations, which the project authorities did not actually implement after resettlement. These recommendations underscored that during the displacement phase, residents involved in the informal sector (small restaurants, bars, tailor and carpentry workshops, small boutiques, etc.) were negatively affected after relocation. The government did not initiate any actions to mitigate the effects of such predictions. Indeed, the relocation caused the loss of their jobs and customers. The Environmental Impact Assessment also recommended the building of stores, which could be rented to those who resettled in specific resettlement areas such as Ouaga 2000-C and Nioko-I, to help them rebuild their livelihood. However, six years later, this recommendation was still not implemented and residents of Ouaga 2000-C were still forbidden to start-up their market which was now covered with weeds and small trees. Residents continued to violate the banning of opening businesses on streets as a resistance and coping strategies. Most participants viewed the lack of market as the main obstacle to

their livelihood rebuilding. Chapter 6 discusses the gendered effects of the lack of market in Ouaga 2000-C. Most women indicated that they were facing increasing financial difficulties because of the lack of public market.

Yet, Project ZACA's Environmental Impact Assessment indicated that women and other vulnerable groups should be supported to reduce an increase in poverty among the displaced populations. The government was supposed to provide financial support to such groups to facilitate livelihood reconstruction. The study actually devoted a section to financial support to women, which amounted to 150 million CFA francs. It also recommended that NGOs and projects such as FAARF should be supporting these measures to mitigate the impacts of the project and to rebuild livelihoods. Projects initiated by the PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper) and programs under the Ministry for Social Affairs and National Solidarity could target such vulnerable groups to support them in the implementation of their businesses. The study also indicated that together with its partners, the government should put in place projects or programs to reduce poverty. It went on to recommend the construction of 20 small shops at 2.5 million CFA francs each (on the whole 100 million CFA francs) to support those who lost their jobs as a result of their displacement. However, such financial support was non-existent as residents continued to struggle to rebuild their livelihoods in Ouaga 2000-C.

Despite this situation, they have been trying to rebuild community life, to claim and to assert their rights to the city by setting up associations.

Aware of the significance of connections with power structures, residents of Ouaga 2000-C set up a commission made up of twelve members who were in charge of negotiating with the mayor and local political actors and decision makers to meet their

market request. Initially, residents used force to start-up the market, but after being ousted by the police force, they returned to the negotiation table, which seems to be rewarding as some of them already had a spot at the *Yaar* (the small market) in Ouaga 2000-C.

Those living in Ouaga 2000-C learned to develop reciprocal relationships with Lanoayiri's residents by purchasing goods, and buying food from roadside sellers, and even by developing friendly relations with residents and taking tea together. While recognizing the benefits that women had in purchasing some condiments at Lanoayiri's market, most interviewees acknowledged that the market was already an occupied space, and it was difficult for them to get any spot there for commercial purposes. Most of them rather turned to the market of Patte d'Oie, Karpala, or the vicinities of Rood Woko. Moreover, some residents complained that the goods and services offered on Lanoayiri's market did not meet their needs. They rather viewed Lanoayiri's market as "a traditional beer market" with limited goods.

Still Up and Fighting

After resettlement, the Coordination movement morphed into an association set up in 2004: ABRETAO (Association for the Well-being of Residents of Ouaga 2000-C) whose leading members were also some activists of the Coordination of residents of the Project ZACA area. This transformation echoes what Mario Diani (1997: 135) observed when he said that "social movements do not merely rely upon existing social capital: they also reproduce it, and sometimes create new forms of it." The resistance against forced eviction created or revived a sense of awareness, and led some former members of the Coordination to set up an organization with different goals.

ABRETAO was set up to keep the community fighting, but this time with different objectives.⁷⁶ The overall objective of the association is to engage community members in developing projects aimed at improving their living condition. Such objectives include informing, sensitizing, training and regrouping residents of Ouaga 2000-C to defend their moral and material interests. It also seeks to find appropriate solutions to health, education, water, transportation, and electricity and communication issues for the benefit of residents. Further, the association advocates gender sensitive activities, and ensures the protection of vulnerable groups including women, children, and physically challenged people and the poor. The creation of ABRETAO led to some internal division as some young people did not want the same elders to take the lead in the creation of an association in their new neighborhood.⁷⁷ According to Niamba, some members of the Coordination resettled in different neighborhoods. It was therefore logical to change the leaders of this association to meet the needs and goals of residents of Ouaga 2000-C. ABRETAO was able to carry out some activities for the benefit of the residents of Ouaga 2000-C as noted in the following passage:

Niamba: Let me say that the association has not been futile, because when it was created, we hit the ground running by solving pressing issues such as requesting a bus line for the neighborhood. We met the manager (a female manager) of SOTRACO (Transportation Company of the Commune of Ouagadougou) and submitted to her attention our concerns and she was very receptive to our request for a bus line. A week later, we got a bus in our neighborhood. This was a great relief and we used our contacts among high-ranking officials to have the National Electricity Company (SONABEL) to install lamps on public spaces because, truly

⁷⁶ <http://www.legiburkina.bf/> “Récépissé de déclaration d’association n° 2004-0057 /MATD/ PKAD/HC du 26 juillet 2004 »

⁷⁷ Interview with Niamba Adama, September 2009.

when the night fell, we were literally assaulted by thieves. It wasn't just any small thefts. It was real organized banditry. You were attacked because there was no light and it was total darkness. So, we fought to have public spaces electrified. There was only EZACA here, the only public primary school. We fought to have a health clinic even though it is still not operational (Interview with Niamba Adama, September 2009).

While ABRETAO was able to achieve tree planting activities, requested a bus line and a health clinic, including the setting up of COGES, a management committee that collects contributions from residents for the management of the health center and the primary school; some participants still viewed the association with suspicion. The association has also been unsuccessful in pressing the authorities to allow residents to start up their market, which was also their top priority. As noted by Niamba, when asked about the state of collaboration with existing structures and associations:

Interviewer: Was the association [ABRETAO] able to collaborate with other associations to help residents of Ouaga 2000-C?

Niamba: "At the beginning, we contacted other associations. We contacted an association called SOS to collect garbage in our neighborhood because we want to make sure the neighborhood is clean. We used our connections in the Ministries of basic education, health, territorial administration, the commune of Bogodogo. We were really active. But you know, after a certain time, when you are not taking the lead to find partners to involve them in things that interest them, it is difficult. So, the association is not able to meet as it used to do initially. Problems remained unsolved if there are no actions undertaken to solve them." (Interview with Niamba Adama, September 2009).

In fact, some of its leaders were civil servants who were transferred to different cities or abroad. For instance, Niamba was transferred in 2011 to Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire) as a senior professional within WAEMU (the West African Economic and Monetary Union). The subsequent dispersal of ABRETAO's key leaders also contributed to weaken the association. Most participants viewed it as an association that existed in name only

because it was unable to hold meetings or to undertake concrete actions as specified in its initial objectives.

Indeed, by examining how residents of Ouaga 2000-C viewed ABRETAO across gender, ethnicity, religious, economic sector and level of education, it appears that 15/58 (26%) participants did not trust the association, 31 (54%) of them declared that they had doubts about the association and 12/58 (20%) said it can be trusted. Further, while the lack of market made them dependent on Lanoayiri, residents of Ouaga 2000-C still engaged in a struggle to have their own market because most of them used to earn their livelihood through the multiple markets in their former neighborhoods.

Social Capital without a Market
is Less Useful

The market is our life. We spent all our life in the market, selling goods to feed our family. That's the only thing I know; it's the place where I spend all my day from sun-up to sun-down. During Ramadan for instance, we break our fast in the market with friends; we buy food together and sit around to eat. The market means everything to us. (Interview of Zakari, September 2009)

These words from 36-year old Zakari are illustrative of the significance of the market for the relocatees. Indeed, both men and women often were very concerned with the lack of market in Ouaga 2000-C across age, gender, ethnicity, and religious lines.

The market has both a social and economic function. Discussing market practices among the Mossi in Burkina, Elliott Skinner observed, "a market is a place where people meet to buy and sell.... In the market one often meets and drinks with one's friends" (1962: 255). The market is a locus for the production and reproduction of social relations. Similarly, Swedberg (1994: 255) holds that the market is a kind of social structure because

there are recurrent and patterned interactions between agents. Such interactions could lead to formal and informal relations.

Some residents thus viewed Pô road as an unofficial commercial zone: restaurants, bars, shops, cabarets, mechanics, public water tap, traditional pharmacy, welding shops, hairdressing shops, music shops, cake and peanut sellers, phone card sellers, business centers, raft sellers, including the clandestine markets: tailor, cabarets, and other undeclared businesses. If the government can manage the physicality of the market, it remains to be seen if the government can also regulate, control, and police the embodied experience of market actors, that is, how people practice market in their daily interactions with customers.

Ironically, as discussed earlier, when “the market” (neoliberalism) evicted former residents of Zangouenttin, Tiendpalgo, Camp Fonctionnaire, Kamsonghin, and Koulouba, the lack of a physical market in Ouaga 2000-C inhibited their livelihood reconstruction. In casual conversation with residents of Ouaga 2000-C, some articulated their views of the market as a public space where people from all backgrounds buy and sell various kinds of items. Others viewed the market as a personal space where they sold their products and interacted with other traders and customers. In this respect, one could talk about one’s market as a success or a failure in terms of customers’ purchases or lack thereof. The lack of a public market also meant for them, the lack of jobs, money, access to merchandise and services, and the distribution of goods to reinforce social relations, and to provide for their families.

A conversation with other relocatees revealed similar views as illustrated below by sixty-two years old Sidoni, a traditional beer tavern owner. Sidoni was soft-spoken,

married with seven children. Her husband was a retired municipal councilor. She had some scarification, a mark of her Mossi ethnic group. When asked about life before displacement and after resettlement, she said:

Sidoni: Hmm, life was good. We couldn't complain.

Interviewer: What do you mean, you couldn't complain?

Sidoni: Before coming here, we were living in a community. We had everything. The markets were near us. And I could go visit friends and talk. If something happened to your neighbor, it's as if it happened to you. ZACA dispersed people. Some went to Kaarpala, and other neighbors. Now is not like before. Han! Han! [No! No!]. It can't be like before. You see, we don't even have a market. A village without a market is like the bush.

Interviewer: But you have Lanoayiri's market, no?

Sidoni: Hmm, that's just a condiment market. When I got here, I used to go there to sell my beer. But it wasn't working. So, I decided to stay home and sell it here. Now, things are getting better. It's better than nothing.

Interviewer: Have you got the permission from the authorities to do that, I mean to sell your beer at home?

Sidoni: No, well, you know, we have to survive. You cannot tell people to sit down idle. I don't have the permission, but what else can I do? Tell me what else can I do? (Interview, September 2009)

For Sidoni just like many other female residents in Ouaga 2000-C, life has become monotonous and the lack of market worsened that monotony and made it difficult for them to rebuild their livelihood, forcing them to rely on resources from friends, relatives, and neighbors. However, Sidoni was able to start her small beer tavern thanks to a loan that she got from FAARF (Support Funds for Women's Income-Generating Activities), based on the support of friends. This was not the case for most residents, especially for women who used to sell food and condiments on roadsides and in the markets prior to their displacement. As noted by a key informant:

It's the market that makes life in a neighborhood. Can you imagine a neighborhood without a market? Almost everyone was a trader before. You can't bring us near a rich neighborhood and then try to force on us their lifestyle. What will our mothers and sisters do? Where will they sell their benga, fura, gonrè, and

peanuts? Where? Where? The youth can walk to the center of the city to do odd jobs. How about our elderly mothers? (Interview, September 2009)

Such questions were directed to me as if I were to provide an immediate answer.

And they reminded me of some participants blaming researchers who always came to ask questions about their hardships and in the end their socio-economic conditions never changed. Such interrogations also highlighted the significance of “where”, in other words, a space where people can rebuild their livelihoods. The participant views the market as the heart of a neighborhood. It is a socio-economic space where people sell and buy goods, but also a social space where they produce, reproduce and maintain relationships. The lack of market also raises the issue of space and mobility. While the youth can move to other spaces (the center of the city) to search for jobs, elderly people are trapped into the new space (Ouaga 2000-C). This trap prevented them somehow from engaging in productive economic activities. Thus, space or territory becomes significant in economic mobility.



Figure 3: Traditional Beer Preparation Hearth (Photo by Author)

Given the lack of market and the persistent embargo of the local authorities banning any market activity in the place reserved for the market, residents (both men and

women) came together to meet the Mayor of Bogodogo to startup the market. As discussed earlier, the government rejected their collective action arguing that it was still trying to figure out the best way to start up the market. Once their action was rejected, residents tried to resort to existing structures like ABRETAO and other leadership structures (Zangoeun-Naaba) to request their municipal authorities to authorize the market start. The only satisfaction they got so far was the random selection of residents and assignment of spots in the small market space next to the Dankambary community. However, residents continued to violate the ban of opening businesses on streets as a resistance and coping strategies. As noted by one interviewee:

Interviewer: How is the construction of street shops regulated?

Fanta: The authorities said no to street shops. They forbade us to do so. They even came here once with the CRS police [National Guard] to demolish shops and stalls and forced people to stop selling on streets. People removed their stalls and began to respect the banning. But, it did not take long for people to come back and restart their street vending activities, and some people started to build small shops again.

Interviewer: Since that first time that the police came to demolish shops, have they come back to verify whether their ban for no street shops and no street vending is being enforced on the *trame d'accueil* here?

Fanta: No, it was in 2007. After that, they did not come any more to demolish stalls and shops. People are not authorized to build street shops, but they still continue to do it any ways. We have to be realistic! You cannot continue to prevent people from building shops here on the *trame d'accueil*. We were all traders in Zangouenttin and Koulouba before being relocated here by force. It's the same people that came here after the displacement. Initially people wanted to demonstrate against SONATUR, the agency in charge of plot assignment on the *trame*, because of the ban to build shops. Could you imagine, you don't own a means of transportation, and then you see yourself compelled to travel far away in the city center to look for a job or earn some income. That's really tough! I think that the authorities finally understood. They haven't done anything else since they first came to demolish shops and forced people to remove their stalls.

Interviewer: How about the building of the market here on the *trame d'accueil*, what are the prospects, any news?

Fanta: No, there's no news about that. They don't even talk about it anymore. (Interview, August 2009)

In the name of discipline and order, the government has strictly forbidden residents of the Ouaga 2000-C to construct or start-up the market the way they wanted. When residents of the *trame d'accueil* tried to create the market by occupying the empty space without the consent of the local authorities, their actions were brutally repressed by the police force. Power structures embodied by the City Hall dictate what can and cannot be done on the space recognized by all as the official market space and place. One of the major consequences of the lack of a public market was the inability to build regular customers-vendor relationships. For instance, in a study of market women's interactions in Ghana, Chamlee (1993) found that market women tended to develop clusters or small groups among themselves, which served a basis for mutual social and economic support. They set up a micro-credit system known as *susu*, which enabled them to lend each other in turn financial support to boost their economic activities.

As reported by 41 year-old Cissé Hassia, prior Project ZACA she was selling locally made orange juice, *bissap* (locally made drink), and cooked rice in Zangouenttin-yaar [Zangouenttin market] and together with friends who were also petty traders, they engaged in a *tontine* (a rotating credit system discussed in details in chapter 6). With the money earned, she could supplement her income and did not have to worry about financial issues. But most of her former *tontine* members relocated to other neighborhoods of Ouagadougou. Since her resettlement in Ouaga 2000-C, she had stopped selling juice and *bissap*, only to focus on selling cooked rice, which was not working well for her. She could not afford to be involved in a *tontine* for fear of not being able to pay her dues on time: "I want to be involved in a *tontine*, but I don't have enough money to do so. My

business is not prospering like before. My husband is also jobless, and we're struggling to eat. With that, you can't venture into a *tontine*."

Former residents of Zangouenttin, Koulouba, Tiendpalgo, Kamsonghin, and Camp Fonctionnaire used to make their own markets by selling on the streets, in front of their compounds, and in the nearby markets. The resources thus accumulated were often shared with friends, neighbors, and relatives when needed. Some traders would allow a friend or neighbor to sit in front of their shop in the market. As pointed out by Mr. Karamogo while referring to the fire incident of Rood Woko⁷⁸ [the central market of Ouagadougou], "the central market was overcrowded because people would let their relatives or friends sit by the corner of their shops to sell small items. Many women used to do that. I also allowed my brother's wife to sit next to my shop to sell condiments, traditional soap, and children's clothes. With the money she can help in lessening my brother's burden a bit."

Such forms of collaboration reinforced or generated social relations, which enabled both the shop-owner and the user of the shop corner to generate resources. The user of the shop corner agreed to reimburse the owner a certain amount of money to sell his/her products. By so doing, s/he was creating a social relation with the owner, which allowed both of them to generate financial resources. As reported by the jobless 34 year-old Ibrahim in the following words:

When I was in Zangouenttin, I did not really own a shop. I was a go-between. I found customers for other traders, and when they bought their products, they would give me a commission. But today, there is no market. We don't have that

⁷⁸ See discussions in earlier chapters about the fire incident of Rood Woko which led to its closure. Traders used such forms of collaboration by allowing a friend, a relative to sit next to their shop corner to sell small items that do not pose any competition with the owner of the shop.

opportunity any more. In Zangouenttin, sometimes, when a trader wanted to go to pray or if he had some errands to do, he would ask me to look after his goods for him. Many young people did that kind of job, and at the end of the day, you could easily pocket up to 20,000 CFA francs if the market sold well. (Interview, November 2009)

Thus, the market is a place for networking, not simply between sellers and buyers, men and women, but also between big sellers and petty traders who can rent the external corner of their shops to friends, relatives, or neighbors. In conversing with residents of the *trame d'accueil*, by allowing somebody to settle in the shop corner or allowing someone to play the intermediary with actual and potential customers, one was creating an income generation opportunity for oneself and for that person. Some participants noted that they used to have good connections with wholesalers, and because of such relations they were able to get goods on credit, and then pay back the owner once they finished selling the products. With their relocation, they went out of business and did not own a shop any more, let alone get such products on credit.

People used such relations and resources to fend for their families and even to support a friend in need of help. Without the market, such forms of social interactions were negatively affected, leaving some elders, old women, and young people without jobs. In talking with Kamba Moise (Secretary in charge of information of ABRETAO, and former resident of Zangouenttin), he said, “One cannot live on fresh water and love alone.” There is a need to have bread to support love in a family and community. His view was also echoed by Boureima Ouéder⁷⁹ (an interviewee): “you can’t even find a good

⁷⁹ Interview on October 2009.

place to buy bread! It's forbidden to sell on the streets as we used to do it in Zangouenttin, Koulouba, and Tiendpalgo. We don't have a market. That's our main preoccupation now. Our moms and sisters can't sell anything. They are forced to stay home. *Raaga yel ya toogo [the lack of market is a serious problem]*".

The lack of market not only affected some elderly women's involvement in income generation activities within families; it also reduced some male power as Boureima Ouéder noted:

If you say you are a man, and you can't even buy bread for your family, that's a big shame in our society. As a Moaga, a real man is supposed to take care of his family. But if you can't do that, if you can't take care of your children, and you depend on the small cash earned by your wife to survive; that's a shame. Friends avoid you and when they see your calls, they say, 'Ah! It's this cocksucker again!' And they don't take it, and when they take your call by mistake, they say, 'I'll call you back' And they never call you back. You see, ZACA really ruined me. I lost everything. (Interview, October 2009)

Indeed, in the Mossi society (the largest ethnic group in Burkina Faso, and in Ouagadougou), males are considered as the owner of the household or *zak-soba*. Boureima translates the inability to provide for the family as a failure to meet "a real man's" roles and expectations. His feelings are to be situated within the larger gender roles and expectations in the Mossi society. Similar to Boureima, other males felt disempowered because the forced eviction led them out of business, and they blamed it on the lack of market, and their subsequent economic marginalization. This echoes what El Jack noted in her research on the gendered implications of forced eviction, and role reversal within the Dinka and Nuer refugee families in Kakukan camp in Kenya. "It's a matter of prestige to be able to support one's family...Moreover, when a role reversal

takes place -- for example when a wife supports an unemployed husband-- his position within the nuclear and extended family is threatened” (El Jack 2008: 252).

Yet, as discussed in details in chapter 6 later, other males like Souley and Mr. Karamogo did not frame their hardships in terms of losing their manhood. They seemed to accept such shifting expectations, while still blaming Project ZACA and the lack of market as part of their uphill battle to rebuild their livelihoods. At least, such awareness of the contribution of women highlights women’s value and role within the family, especially in a post-displacement livelihood reconstruction. While some males interpret this economic and social status in terms of disempowerment, others rather accept it in the negotiation and navigation of family relationships. Sen (1999: 192) rightly put it that decision-making within the family goes through a process of negotiation and implicit agreement. This also echoes what Moore (1992: 132) noted about intra-household dynamics: “The household is a site of competing interests, rights, obligations and resources, which often involves members in bargaining, negotiation, and conflicts.” While such stories are local, they speak to larger discourses on displacement and resettlement already explored by scholars elsewhere (Koenig 1995; Colson 1999).

Thus, almost seven years later, there was still no market for the relocatees. Some interviewees said that their savings had dwindled, and they were now struggling to make ends meet. At the end, while their resettlement on the *trame d’accueil* took most of their savings, they could hardly carry out incoming generating activities on the *trame d’accueil* since there was no market, and they also lost most of their customers. They used to share in their former neighborhoods because they could easily earn resources. In times of abundance, sharing material resources was not an issue. But, in the post-displacement

context, everybody was trying to fend for themselves and their immediate family. As an interviewee pointed out, “Everybody is going through hard times. And you can’t blame people if they cannot help you. Times are hard for everyone.”

In Zangouenttin, Koulouba, Tiendpalgo, Camp Fonctionnaire, and Kamsonghin, the markets were near, and people could manage to earn resources that they could share without any fear for tomorrow. But, today income generation has become very difficult since there was no market to facilitate the flow and exchange of goods and services. Residents of the Ouaga 2000-C have to travel to the center city to sell their goods and services. The various markets were places where they could make money, which they used to lubricate social relations. Social capital without a market is less useful. According to Seydou Ouéder,⁸⁰ also known as the philosopher, “now, the government is regretting its offer and the only way to keep people out of the *trame d’accueil* is to take away from them their blood-line: the market.” Social capital becomes rigid, fragile, and vulnerable under sustained economic pressure.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that forced eviction led to family break-ups, loss of friends and customers, loss of business, and loss of access to resources and infrastructure such as the market. In this context, livelihood reconstruction was a major challenge for many participants in this research. While agency was a determining factor in how various participants handled the resettlement, infrastructure (material and financial resources),

⁸⁰ Field notes, September 2009.

structures (government support institutions, micro-credit institutions, NGOs, Associations, faith organizations) and supra-structure (local perception of government roles and responsibilities, government's perception of modern city, and embodied gender expectations) were fundamental to the diversification, restoration or improvement of livelihood strategies.

Finally, while the anti-ZACA movement could not stop the project, it morphed into ABRETAO, an association with a different objective and leadership. That association initially attempted to keep the resistance movement going, but it gradually dwindled as its leaders and some of its active members relocated in different places. Many participants in this research rather saw ABRETAO as a puppet association working for the ruling party, which led to distrust and increasing disinterest in the association. This also shows the complexity of displacement as it affects people from many perspectives.

Further, this section argued that the market is not simply perceived as a mere economic place where financial transactions occur. It is also a place that facilitates the generation of social relations (renting shop corners or joining *tontines*), maintaining, and reinforcing such relations. Its existence creates job opportunities, customer-relations, access to financial and material resources that could be used for smoothing social relations in a post-displacement reconstruction. It is therefore important for policy-makers to allow and facilitate displaced people's livelihood diversification strategies across gender lines. Policy and decision-makers could initiate both prior and post-displacement studies to identify together with the local communities priority needs rather than imposing on them a model of development that will only lead to increased poverty and inequality.

CHAPTER 6

ANALYZING GENDER, SOCIAL CAPITAL IN POST-DISPLACEMENT

LIVELIHOOD RECONSTRUCTION

“...When people fall on hard times, they know it is their friends and family who constitute the final safety net.[...] Some of our happiest and most rewarding hours are spent talking with neighbors, sharing meals with friends, participating in religious gatherings, and volunteering for community projects.” (Woolcock and Narayan 2000: 225-6)

This chapter specifically examines the gender dynamics of livelihood reconstruction after resettlement due to Project ZACA by building on the stories of research participants, and field observations. It examines how men and women engaged in different modes of networking and accessing resources in rebuilding their lives. It therefore underscores how participants creatively activated neighborhood, friendship, and kin-based relations and transformed them into driving forces for meeting their socio-economic needs. Drawing on the literature on livelihood strategies and social capital, and local financial support mechanisms also known as social and solidarity economy (the *tontine/susu*), this chapter demonstrates how such long-nurtured traditional modes of pooling and redistributing resources was significant in livelihood reconstruction after displacement. By examining individual narratives, the chapter also argues how power dynamics are fundamental in different ways of negotiating within and outside the household in terms of accessing credits or loans, engaging in associations in a heavily patriarchal society. It also delves into narratives regarding family stability and veiled attempts to preserve male power within the broader context of the struggle for post-displacement livelihood reconstruction.

Moreover, examining the struggle of Catholic women and the silence of their male counterparts on reclaiming the plot for their church, the chapter argues that when women have the opportunity, they can be a powerful force in rebuilding community life, accessing resources, and fighting to defend and to preserve their families and communities' interests and needs.

Livelihood and Post-displacement Reconstruction

As noted by Farrington et al. (2002: 24), "...while social capital is an important asset for the poor, processes of urbanization and migration may weaken social networks for some groups." So, of course, can forced eviction. Farrington (2002) defines livelihood as a means of support of one's life, which translates in the capacity to fend for oneself and for the household: food, clothing, education, and health. For Walker et al (2001:297), livelihood is an organized "set of lifestyle choices, goals and values, and activities influenced by biophysical, political/legal, economic, social, cultural, and psychological components." Similarly, Ellis and Allison (2004:3) have identified five categories of resources that are "owned or accessed by family members: human capital (skills, education, health), physical capital (produced investment goods), financial capital (money, savings, loan access), natural capital (land, water, trees, etc.), and social capital (networks and associations)."

Depending on opportunities, people develop different strategies based on their relationships to have access to and control of resources for maintaining or improving their lives. Such actions are partly shaped by socio-cultural, political, and economic structures and processes. Further, the livelihood literature often emphasizes the roles of governments

and development agencies in ensuring basic human needs in terms of food security. Key features characterizing the sustainable livelihood approach include capabilities and assets to support, to maintain or improve living conditions, even in the face of shocks and stress (Department for International Development 1999; Eldis 2009). This assumes that the livelihood of the poor is dependent on their ability to access resources that could be financial, material, natural, human resources (Victor et al. 2008). Displaced communities may need more than social capital to reconstruct their livelihood. They may also need operational institutions: health centers, schools, markets, cult space, job opportunities, etc. Livelihood strategies allow us to highlight the agency of the displaced people. In the face of socio-economic constraints such as those created by Project ZACA, livelihood strategies could allow to examine how the displacees were able to activate existing relations either to fight against their relocation, or to create relations or build on existing ones to improve their lives.

In discussing multiple livelihood strategies in African cities, Owusu (2007) holds that livelihood strategies involve participation in multiple economic activities, usually in both the formal and informal sectors (Owusu 2007: 450). In short, people diversify their livelihood strategies by practicing multiple activities: combining for instance agriculture with trade, and civil servant duties, getting involved in *tontines* or *susu*, etc. People often diversify livelihood strategies to reduce vulnerability in terms of shock, stress, risks, or crisis. This allows them to widen their options in terms of access and use of resources (Ellis and Allison 2004).

In this respect, Victor et al (2008) highlight how the lack of adequate basic infrastructure such as water supply, sanitation, and waste disposal negatively affects

livelihood reconstruction. The authors therefore recommend a further examination of how men and women respond to stress and shock in a degraded environment. Similarly, by studying how Kabul's urban poor manage to combine resources as coping strategies, Hunte (2004) highlights that some women are hardly able to undertake income-generating activities due to very limited opportunities. Refugee returnees are particularly disappointed by the lack of employment, poor infrastructure, and basic services in Kabul. Poor households are increasingly dependent on children's active participation in the urban cash economy (petty trades, street vending, etc.). Resources pooled from these various coping strategies are invested in food and houses. The lack of cash constitutes an extreme insecurity for most households. As a result, social relations appeared fragmented as people's poor economic situation precluded exchange (exchange visiting, gifts, provision of financial support, etc.). Hunte (2004) recommends the consideration of social network in studying urban livelihood strategies, as financial income and shelter supply alone are not sufficient to grasp the complexity of livelihood strategies. Understanding urban livelihood can help strengthen development interventions by building on existing assets and skills and support poor community organizations (McDowell 2002).

Along the same lines, in examining the displacees of Project ZACA, I seek to underscore that resettlement based on proximity such as family, relatives, friends, and community members could be a great step towards facilitating livelihood reconstruction, but this may prove insufficient if displacees' livelihood strategies are not included in the project design and implementation.

From Friendship to Business Partnership:
The Story of Estelle and Rakia

Stories connect to stories. They take us to people, places, through time, and institutions. Like other testimonies discussed in this study, those examined in this section are specific to the socially situated individuals⁸¹ (Berkhofer 1995). As such, their stories are similar to a thread in a “web of relations” embedded in the story of displacement, which in its turn is embedded in larger discourses of economic development advocated by the state. Their stories are about being neighbors, friends, business partners, raising children together, sharing space, husbands and wives losing jobs, facing individually or collectively financial hardships, connecting to institutions such as CFIAM,⁸² creating associations, and meeting other displacees and citizens in the process of livelihood reconstruction. Their stories are about the production of social spaces (friendship and neighborhood relations) in a space where they had to rebuild their lives. However, their story is not the story of all displaced women and men, but it highlights how some displaced women showed signs of resilience, creativity and determination to rebuild their lives after displacement hardships. Their testimonies do not represent the totality and

⁸¹ Berkhofer (1995), individuals live in context shaped by socio-historical processes. Such individuals have their interpretation or interpretations of their own context and the anthropologists also have their analysis of context, which includes the two contexts (socio-historical context, and the people’s interpretation of their context).

⁸² For the record, CFIAM (Women’s Training & Apprenticeship Center in the Trades) is created in 2003 by a national NGO called ATTOUS (Association tous pour tous-Yennenga = All for All-Yennenga Association). In 1994, a group of educators created ATOUS. CFIAM’s goals include promoting gender equality on the job market, in vocational occupations, by training young girls in occupations initially perceived as males’ turf: painting, auto- mechanic, roofing, electricity, broidery, tailoring and design (cutting and sewing). Field notes, September 2009. For further details about CFIAM also visit the website at < <http://jcfressaix.free.fr/monvoyage-au-burkinafaso/MonProjectcfiam/indexcfiam.htm>>

complexity of all the displaced men and women, but they connect to and echo other stories.

Their narratives reflect Bourdieu's (1986) instrumental approach to social capital, as they activate relations to access or generate resources. This also resonates with Lin's interpretation of social capital which, simply put, implies the existence or creation of relationships between and among egos, which consequently facilitates access to ego's resources (Lin 2001: 135). Such relations may take an economic turn as it is the case with Estelle and Rakia, but they first emerged in the form of social exchange, that is, from neighborhood and friendship relationships to the creation of a new business.

On September 11, 2009, I slowly drove my scooter and stopped in front of the snack bar where I had my interview appointment with Estelle. She was sitting on a chair and her friend, Rakia was busy washing dishes. I parked my scooter and greeted them as required by local custom. Estelle turned around and said, "Oh it's you? Have a seat." After brief ritual greetings, I ordered a cup of coffee. While Rakia was preparing the coffee, I pulled myself together and reminded Estelle that I was there for the appointment for my research on Project ZACA, to which she replied: "Eh, Project ZACA!" I took my cup of coffee and sat on a bench next to Estelle while Rakia went back to finish washing the dishes.

After briefing her about the objectives of the research, Estelle told me I could go ahead with the interview at the snack bar because she felt comfortable talking about the project in front of Rakia, who was her close friend and also a relocatee of Project ZACA.

Estelle and Rakia did not know each other prior to their relocation on the *trame d'accueil of Ouaga 2000-C*. Estelle, 37 at the time of the interview, was married and had

four children. Her husband used to work for the U.S. Embassy, but he had lost his job and had not found another since. Estelle used to work for Petrogaz as a retailer of gas-bottle, a business she discontinued due to financial difficulties. In the past, the family had had no financial difficulties, as noted by Estelle. There were other relatives and students living in their household, which brought the total number of people to eleven. However, at the time of the interview, she was just living with her husband and their three children. The other members relocated to different places given that they could no longer afford to provide for them. As for 38-year old Rakia, she was a widow and had three children. Her husband died before Project ZACA. She said her father used to have ten different houses, which was formally the main source of income for the extended family. She was living in Zangouenttin in one of her father's house and was working as a hairdresser. With the money she earned and with her brothers' and sisters' support, she was able to meet the basic needs of her children in terms of food, clothing, health, and education. With the compensation money from Project ZACA, she got 4.5 million CFA francs, and she was able to buy a plot at Ouaga 2000-C and build a house.

Both women happened to be neighbors, whom had developed into a friendship that led to a business partnership: the snack bar. When asked how their friendship developed and led to this business, Estelle recounted the following:

Estelle: At the beginning, there was nobody around here! We were among the first to have finished building our houses. Rakia and I would meet and talk, and that's how we became friends, just like sisters. Well, sometimes, she will borrow my scooter to go to the center city for errands or we'd go together. We became friends and we spent time together... One day I said to her, look we cannot stay like that doing nothing. I told her that I learned from my cousin that there was a center giving financial assistance to women... I said we should go there to see. You never know! So we went there... Yeah, we each got 50,000 CFA francs and put it together, so with the CFA francs 100,000, we rented this space to start the

snack bar...We manage it together. I brought my gas-bottle, and some chairs, and she brought her radio, some plates and dishes, benches, you know, we manage it together. You see as the saying goes, "*one finger cannot gather powder.*"... When we make profits, we reinvest to keep the business going. We don't really make a lot of profits; but it's better than nothing...We hope things will get better. (Interview, September 2009)

When I met Rakia and Estelle, I was impressed by their initiative of coming together to start a business. Indeed, as Estelle said, "one finger cannot gather powder," a proverb that rightly applies to their case as they both decided to work together to rebuild their livelihood. They were able to have access to information on CFIAM from Estelle's cousin who mentioned CFIAM as a center that provided financial assistance in the form of loans. This is illustrative of social capital and the circulation of information. However, that would not have been enough if they were not able to have access to actual financial support from CFIAM. Estelle and Rakia's case helps understand how social capital based on neighborhood and friendship can be activated as a coping strategy for livelihood reconstruction. While their case cannot be generalized to the diverse strategies deployed by men and women in terms of access to or generation of resources for livelihood reconstruction, one cannot but recognize how it helped these women find an income generation source, and how this struggle for livelihood reconstruction connect to many other stories. By following the thread of their stories as they connect to other stories, one can access part of the world of the displacees of Project ZACA to grasp how some of them manage to overcome post-displacement hardships. Against this background, one can argue that infrastructure (for instance access and availability of the market or material resources) and structures (financial institutions or associations, government support structures,

NGOs, etc.) played certain roles in post-displacement livelihood restoration and improvement as exemplified by Estelle's and Rakia's case.

To variant degrees, other female participants in this research were engaged in different modes of livelihood strategies. While some participants used their past material resources and connections to restore their livelihoods, others had to rely on their skills and knowledge (either by working for themselves or for somebody else) to regenerate resources and connections to fend for themselves and their families. Other participants, notably elderly participants complained about their inability to travel long distances on foot to search for customers, but in contrast, young ambulant traders could push their carts or carry their merchandises on their head in search for customers across the city.

Yet elderly women could not sell even in the local market at Ouaga 2000-C, because it was not operational. These various possibilities and constraints highlight that post-displacement livelihood reconstruction is multifaceted. It requires individuals' agency and inter-sectorial synergy.

Some participants used their pre-displacement skills, including, restaurant management, bar management, mechanic, hairdressing, traditional beer preparation, petty trades or other small business management, to generate resources for livelihood reconstruction. Unfortunately, those who could not use such skills or keep up with past relationships, and those who failed to create new networks were the ones that experienced hardships in livelihood reconstruction. Further, not all participants with practical skills were able to self-employ or earn a living based on such skills. Such was the case of Souley, a driver who did not have any job at the time of this research, and he had to be dependent on his wife and relatives. While other participants were able to engage in petty

trades, they still complained about la *vie chère*, which was the high cost of life resulting from the global economic crisis locally felt in the forms of skyrocketing food and gas prices. This highlights another level of complexity of post-displacement livelihood reconstruction. Local policies and global economic forces also partly influenced the process towards livelihood reconstruction after relocation under Project ZACA.

Further, individuals' agency, complementarity, creativity, and accumulated past resources were significant in post-displacement livelihood restoration and improvement (De Haan 2002). Indeed, social capital is durable (deeply embedded in past networks and experiences) and convertible (Bourdieu 1986; Lin 2001). For instance, Mrs. Thiam (a restaurant owner, married with eight children at the time of the interview in October 2009) has been in the restaurant business for about fifteen years and started with only three employees. Over time, her staff increased to twenty-one employees. However, when Project ZACA evicted her, she only kept ten of them to run her business. She did not get any compensation money from Project ZACA because she was a renter. In her former restaurant location, she renovated the space by installing water, electricity, painting, and other arrangements to make the place much more attractive and valuable for her business. However, when the displacement occurred, the owner of the house categorically refused to share any portion of the compensation money with her because she was not the owner of the premises, but a simple renter. From a legal point of view as laid out by Project ZACA, she had no recourse because renters were not included in the compensation entitlement. Because of the eviction, she was compelled to reduce her staff members. Further, her relocation also led to the loss of some of her customers. She was able to revive her business based on her personal resources, and by keeping her skilled workers, and

continuing to operate in her specialty. Mrs. Thiam was satisfied with the income generated by her post-displacement restaurant activities. This echoes what Koenig and Diarra (1998: 37) noticed that in Manantali (Mali), women participated in specialized trades, by setting up their own small stores in their villages. Similarly, Cernea (1997: 30-31) observed that in the context of Burkina Faso's Water Supply Project, support was given in fishing sector to the people, and women benefited from the promotion of productive cooperatives, charcoal and fuel wood production activities. This echoes what proponents of gender and development advocate about empowering women to enable them to take ownership of the development of their communities (Indra 1999; Rathgeber 1989; Sweet 2003).

Similar to Mrs. Thiam, Mr. Koupouli (the owner of Lido Bar) started his business in Zangouenttin in the 1970s. With the relocation under Project ZACA, he suffered from high blood pressure because of the financial and psychological hardships resulting from the loss of customers and slack business. However, through perseverance and the support of his two grown-up children (both graduates in economics), he was able to revive his business. Building on his personal resources, family, former worker force, and experience, Mr. Koupouli was able to revive his business. Lido Bar has become one of the most frequented places by both residents of Ouaga 2000-C and people from other parts of Ouaga 2000.

However, it is also important to note here that while some business owners across gender lines, such as Mrs. Thiam and Mr. Koupouli were able to rely on their past material and financial resources and workforce as well, to revive their businesses, other people such as Fanta went out of business after relocation. Instead, she was depressed and her grandmother strongly encouraged her to open a restaurant. Prior to her relocation, she was

running a hair-salon, video shops, and managing an association involved in providing health-related support to the poor and vulnerable in Zangouenttin. She had to challenge the authorities' ban on selling in streets. Her customers were mostly residents from Lanoayiri and Ouaga 2000-C. By shifting jobs, building on her experience, family support and personal savings, Fanta was able to rebuild her livelihood and subsequently became involved in *tontine*, COGES and in community activities.

Other participants resorted to NGOs providing loans to rebuild their livelihood. For instance, to have access to CFIAM's loans, one of the conditions established by the organization for any person interested in its loans was to require the parties concerned to form a group of at least five women. The group loans range from 50,000 up to 950,000 CFA francs as noted by Mr. Zongo, CFIAM's Director. This lending strategy allows CFIAM to guarantee that group members could put pressure on other members who failed to pay their dues on time. As noted by Mrs. Georgette Ouéder, the CFIAM's financial advisor:

We give loans to women in groups because this allows them to put pressure on each other to pay back. If you don't pay back, others may be prevented from benefiting in the future. And you are destroying the image of the group. It is also meant to help women come together to develop a project that takes into account their interests. Even though CFIAM is not a lending institution, we're trying to include that financial support system as part of our goal of empowering women, to help them be financially independent. When women get the loan, it benefits the whole family, their children, and themselves. As I already said, we try to help women by giving them some advice about managing their business, and we teach them all that. We also visit them in their homes to see how they are doing, and how their business is going. We did all that because we want to be close to women by giving them financial advice and psychological support as well. We want to make sure they know how to manage the loan we give them. (Interview, September 2009)

As illustrated in this passage, group lending is also a way for women to learn and empower themselves in terms of financial management. It is also a place for psychological support. This echoes what McKernan (2002: 109) noted about the significance of group lending in terms of “cohesion, joint liability, incentives to share information, and social development programs.” By asking women to set up a group sharing interests as a prerequisite for accessing their loans, CFIAM is also laying the basis for indirectly “formalizing” their relations. Such self-formed groups minimize risks as members are compelled to monitor each other, and they would even select people they trust before engaging in any such venture (Stiglitz 1990).

Thus, as a group, their relation with CFIAM allows them to have access to the financial resources of the NGO. I refer to such a form of relationship as a vertical/linking social capital (that is, a form of social capital that connects to higher structures), which participants instrumentalized for livelihood reconstruction (Bourdieu 1986). These women activated their bonding social capital (a form of social capital used to link peers or people with similar interests) to connect with a resource providing center (financial capital and knowledge). While some participants received financial assistance from CFIAM, Abwed aged 31, married with one daughter at the time of the interview, was able to secure a job as an auto-mechanic at CFIAM, thanks to his close friend (a private auto-repair shop owner and also his former boss). The latter highly recommended him for the position. This partly shows how a work relationship reinforced by friendship could open doors to opportunities, as it was the case with Abwed.

Thus, after resettlement, some relocatees differently activated various forms of connections based on the aforementioned cases, such as relying on existing lending

agencies or kin or friend-based social capital. For instance, Georgette Ouéder, a financial adviser at CFIAM, was able to rely on her husband's friend, who allowed her to use his facilities to open a snack bar without charging her any rental fees. When asked why her husband's friend provided such a support, she replied as follows:

We've known each other for a long time. The two families have become as one. When we relocated here, I wasn't doing anything. When he [her husband's friend] opened his bar; there was a space available, and nobody was using it. So, when I asked if I could rent it as a snack bar [locally known as kiosque], he said I could have it for free, that I did not have to pay him. We've become the same family. He gave me this space to use for free. He did not want any money from me. That's how I got this space. (Interview, September 2009)

By privileging friendship over immediate financial gains, such an attitude from Georgette's husband's friend could imply the quest for the consolidation of his relationship with the family to a much stronger level, that is, kin-relations as expressed in the metaphor "we've become the same family." Similar to Mrs. Georgette Ouéder, Mbapé Junior (a male seller of roasted chicken at Kamsonghin), also benefited from a relative's support who gave him a space to start up his business. However, Mbapé Junior had to rely on his experience, his own financial resources and the support of his relatives and friends to launch his business. With respect to Georgette Ouéder, she rather received some financial support from CFIAM and from her husband's friend, which allowed her to start-up her business. She also worked at CFIAM as a financial adviser to the women benefiting from the organization's assistance. Her position within the CFIAM, the support from her husband's friend and her own family were significant in her post-displacement livelihood restoration and improvement. When asked how she managed to meet the women who benefited from CFIAM's loan system, she answered:

Interviewer: After lending the money to the women, do you have a follow-up system to ensure that they will pay you back? How do you make sure they are actually using the money for the business they said they would invest in?

Georgette Ouédér: It's true, we don't have a strong monitoring system, but as the financial adviser, I visit the women on a monthly basis to see how their business is going. I also hold meetings with them regarding financial management here at the center. If they are going through difficulties, I advise them to talk to us so that we can find a solution together. For instance, if they cannot pay their dues on time, we can still find some arrangement. I advise them to open a saving account at the *Caisse Populaire* (Popular Savings Bank), and little by little, they can even have loans to enhance their business in the future. (Interview, September 2009)

Thus, as a training center, CFIAM is not simply an organization providing financial assistance to the women requesting it, but it also put in place a financial advising mechanism through which they could improve their knowledge of business and financial management. By requiring members to set up a group, the center was contributing to the emergence of a network, which could lead to new forms of financial collaboration that go beyond friendship. It was thanks to the loan from CFIAM that Mrs Karamogo was both able to initiate a small business, and to expand her profit-making network by getting involved in the *tontine* held by her friend Fanta. In the next section, I discuss in details, the role of the *tontine* in post-displacement livelihood restoration and improvement.

The *Tontine*: Social Economy in Livelihood Reconstruction

The ethnography of work cooperative or local financial support network in Sub-Saharan Africa is common (Dialla 2005; Mahir 1983; Seibel 2001). As noted by Seibel (2011: 2), “a work cooperative comprises a group of farmers who work in turn on each member's farm. Distribution of labor services rendered and received is based on strict reciprocity.” The *tontine*, which is, a cash-based form of cooperative, does not involve cooking or providing drink to other members, except when they are invited to attend a

member's wedding or child-naming ceremony. However, this cash-based cooperative or *tontine* requires the payment of one's due in time (Ardener 1995; Bortei-Doku 1995).

Whether for farm works such as sowing, tilling or harvesting, work cooperative, or work party is a strategic form of saving time, money and enhancing social cohesion and collaboration (Geertz 1962; Mahir 1983; Banque Mondiale 2010). While farm work cooperative are prevalent in rural areas, in urban areas, the *tontine* or *susu* seems to take over as there are often no farms in cities. In Burkina Faso, in rural areas, it is common practice for people to mobilize farm-labor as a form of bride price as well. Although such practices are rare in urban settings, some urban farmers who have residences in the rural and urban areas, still resort to this practice. They may own a farm on the periphery of the city or in their native villages.

Indeed, social scientists have observed such mutual aid practices in Sub-Saharan African countries, which provide the poor and not so-poor access to financial resources without the kind of paperwork required by banks (Aryeetey 1996; Hans Dieter 2001). A *tontine* is generally made up of a group of people who may be practicing the same trade or not (Purkayastha 2004). Members contribute a fixed amount of money collected on a biweekly or monthly basis by the treasurer of the group and given to one member of the group at a time. The *tontine* builds on proximity relations: kin, friends, colleagues, and neighbors. Arguably, such forms of social relations are meant to reduce risks and any malfeasance as noted by Granovetter (1985) in discussing the significance of morality and reputation in socioeconomic transactions. Indeed, the *tontine* is meant to be a financial support network, and some relocatees of Project ZACA built on this local lending and mutual aid practice to rebuild their livelihood.

The *tontine* is so popular in Burkina Faso that one may think that it originated in the country. However, as noted by Seibel Hans Dieter when describing similar forms of *tontines* in other parts of Africa:

The institution of rotating savings is ancient, dating back at least to the 16th century, when Yoruba slaves carried it to the Caribbean, as part of their institutional luggage— or social capital. Both the term ‘esusu’ and the practice have persisted to this day, as esu in the Bahamas, susu in Tobago or sou in Trinidad. Among the Yoruba in Nigeria today, there is hardly a single adult who is not a member in one or even several esusu, numbering anything between two and several dozen or even hundreds of members. The institution exists all over West Africa as well as in many other parts of the world, where it is an integral part of the local micro-economy and referred to with its own vernacular term (arisan in Indonesia, paluwagan in the Philippines, gameya in Egypt, ekub in Ethiopia, and cuchubal in Guatemala. (Hans Dieter 2001: 3)

Furthermore, a close examination of the history of the word *tontine* reveals that it originated in Italy. According to Alain Henry, “the origins of the word are attributed to Italian banker, Tonti, who inspired Mazarin to create a financing organization supported by the State in which each member saves an amount of money regularly and when one of the members dies, the other members divide his share between them.” (2003: 2, also see Mckeever 2011: 492).

Today, in many Sub-Saharan African countries, the *tontine* appears as an alternative to state-support, a group-based way of creating opportunities for livelihood reconstruction in a post-displacement context (Alabi et al 2007). The sociological and economic literature often termed such financial practices as social and solidarity economy, which is deeply rooted in long-nurtured traditions of solidarity. In short, social and solidarity economy is nothing other than the people taking measures and steps to meet their needs when they have limited access to credit in the banking system (Ardener 1995).

Such forms of financial support are common not simply among the marginalized but also among some African immigrants from different ethnic and nationalities (for instance: displaced for economic reasons), and they create a setting for socialization as well as channels to financial resources, which could otherwise be difficult to obtain (Jeanne Semin 2007). In describing West Indian immigrants, and the use of *susu*, Henke notes that the *susu* is a form of investment, community building through trust where members could share their personal stories. The *susu* could be a hub to entering the mainstream market as members could provide guidance to other members seeking jobs. It also allows for building bridges between immigrants from different backgrounds, and the diversification of one's relations (Henke 2001: 39-40).

In this research, while most participants relied on friends and relatives to have access to resources (material or financial resources), women participants were the most involved in associations such as the *tontine* as a financial network for rebuilding their livelihoods.

No *Tontine* in my House: Saving the Family or Male's Power?

Studies have shown that men and women participate in different networks for livelihood restoration or improvement (Erickson 2004a; O'Neill 2004; Alidou 2005; Pelemen 2002). Erickson (2004b) maintained that men and women participate in different associations, have different patterns of leisure activities, and tend to befriend people of the same gender. As for Putman (2000), he argued that women's participation in religious organizations could facilitate access to the labor market while connecting them with external socio-political movements and institutions fighting for women's empowerment.

In this research, many other participants reported that they were not involved in a *tontine* because of the problems often associated with this practice, notably failure to pay and subsequent dishonor and animosity among members. Such was the case of Daki Awa as described in the following passage:

Daki Awa: I had a bad experience with the *tontine*, and I don't want to hear about it anymore. In Zangouenttin, I was selling cooked rice when I decided to be involved in a *tontine*; but there was my brother's wife who refused to pay the money when it was my turn. She said she had other priorities, and she couldn't afford to pay the money. But I knew she did not want to pay because it was my turn to collect the money. I was the last person to collect it when all this happened. I told my brother to pay the money because I needed it for my business. But, he was also mad at me and said he had nothing to do with our *tontine*, and that I had to settle the matter with his wife. It was very bad, and our treasurer couldn't do anything about it. Since then, I don't want to hear about *tontines* anymore.

Interviewer: How did you solve the problem?

Daki Awa: She did not pay, and we stopped the *tontine*. I wanted to take her to the police, but my mother said not to do it because that will be shaming my brother and the family. I left the matter with God. God will provide, I said. It wasn't good at all. So, *tontine* means problems for me. (Interview, September 2009)

Similarly, some research participants said they were not involved in *tontines* because of the associated socioeconomic risks. This also suggests that the *tontine* may not always be the safest way to save and earn money, as it can create conflict between members who are often friends, relatives, or colleagues. More importantly, while some men refused to get involved in the *tontine* for the above reasons, they often actually extended such decisions by telling their wives not to engage in *tontines*. Souley is an example of such men among others as illustrated in the following passage:

Souley: The *tontine* is for women. When my wife asked me if she could join a *tontine*, my answer was no! No *tontine* in my house.

Interviewer: How? I think men can also join a *tontine*.

Souley: Yeah, but it's for women. Women do it everywhere. Where women come together, there are problems, and I don't want problems. *Tontines* always create

problems. A *tontine* can kill family relations. I saw many bad cases where families and friends became enemies because of the *tontine*. So, no, I'm not in that business. I told my wife to stay away from it. She earns a little bit by selling cooked beans, porridge, and rice. We thank God for that. My father used to say that where there is money, there is Satan. When people gather around money, Satan is there among them. (Interview, September 2009)

This passage highlights gender and power dynamics behind the *tontine* and the perceived contribution it makes to family stability and prosperity. Indeed, for some reasons, the *tontine* is often perceived as women's banking system.⁸³ Souley's point of view about the *tontine* being for women is prominent in Burkina Faso, but his refusal to let his wife join such an association is indicative of the power struggle within the household regarding who decides what is in the best interest of the family. Souley views the *tontine* as a threat to family stability and probably to his status as the head of the household. His reference to his father as an authority figure and the source of wisdom regarding money and family well-being is quite telling. However, he had no objection to his wife undertaking petty trades such as cooking and selling food because that did not constitute a threat to family stability and therefore to his position as *zak-soba*, a Mooré word for head of household literally translated as the "owner of the house." Indeed, when I talked to his wife, Mrs Kadidja, she had this to say about the *tontine*: "*tond-zak-soba ka sak'd yenda yé* [the owner of the house does not accept that]". Such an attitude may be viewed as a sign

⁸³ According to Bortei-Doku and Aryeetey (1995), in Ghana, market women jealously exclude men from being involved in their susu to defend solidarity among women and to ensure that men do not come to take control of their susu business.

of submission, and the lack of bargaining power on her part.⁸⁴ However, since she was allowed to sell food as a source of income, that too may be viewed as a compromise in decision-making (Sen 1990).

In discussing with Fanta about gender relations within and outside the *tontine*, she recounted the following:

Interviewer: Tell me, is your *tontine* only for women or do you often have men in your *tontine*?

Fanta: Ah! Do you mean for this *tontine*?

Interviewer: Yes, I mean even before coming here, before ZACA.

Fanta: Yeah, for this *tontine*, the only man is my cousin Sarambé. It's not just limited to women; we just want people who are honest and willing to pay their dues. When I was in Koulouba, we used to have more men involved in it. About four men, I think. But there too, I was the treasurer.

Interviewer: Do you think that it's easier to deal with women compared to men members of the *tontine* in terms of relationship?

Fanta: Not that I know.

Interviewer: What does your husband say about the *tontine*, the restaurant management? Does he approve all that?

Fanta: Ha ha [sarcastic laughter]. There's no problem with my husband. He's a lawyer. Today is not like in the past. Women have to contribute to family life. My husband has no problem with that! He's an intellectual, and he understands things. Ha ha! Times have changed, so we help each other. That's it. (Interview , August 2009)

Fanta's perspective of gender relations reflects her educational background, her involvement in multiple associations, and her travel across the world, which allowed her to be exposed to different understanding of gender relations. She acknowledged that women have their role to play in family life, including providing financial resources by undertaking small businesses. Even though her husband financially supported her in her

⁸⁴ In other instances, especially in a study by Chamblee-Wright (1993: 85), in Ghana, some women traders who were financially backed up by their husbands avoided being involved in a *susu* because they rather viewed such associations as a locus for gossip and for "illiterate" women. But such pejorative views were not encountered in this research.

restaurant business, she remained the owner of the restaurant and the income. She would use such income to support the family whenever necessary. Her husband did not seek to control her business. With respect to Souley, his opposition to his wife's involvement in a *tontine* had nothing to do with him financing that participation since he was jobless and had to rely on the small income generated by his wife's petty trade. He argued that the *tontine* was a threat to family life and stability. As for Mr. Karamogo, he did not oppose his wife's decision to join the *tontine*. He rather welcomed her decision to share the family's burden since he went out of business because of the relocation. As already noted, Mr. Karamogo was a trader prior resettlement, but with their relocation, he had to rely on temporary manual labor with construction companies. The money earned in such labor being insufficient, he welcomed his wife's decision to seek a loan and to engage in a *tontine* as shown in the following conversation:

Mr. Karamogo: When my wife decided to seek a loan, I was happy and I prayed a lot for that. I'm the only provider, and things are really difficult for me. With six children, my mother, and my wife, I can't do it alone. A lonely tree cannot stand the wind. At least, when she got her loan money; she started to sell clothes and local perfumes. Even if the profit is not big, she can buy small things like soap and condiments and I don't have to worry about that. And when, later, she asked me if she could join a *tontine* with friends; I said she could do whatever she wanted. I told her that I had no problem with her joining the *tontine*. I was also involved in a *tontine* when I was in Zangouenttin. But now, given that I don't have money on a regular basis, I don't want to be involved in it. A *tontine* is good when you are sure you can spare money to pay your dues. So, I told her she can do it if she wants. Who doesn't need help? I need help, especially in these difficult times. I don't have a farm; I don't have cows, no shop anymore. It's hard. Anybody that can help is welcome.

Interviewer: But are you not concerned about the problems often associated with the *tontine*?

Mr. Karamogo: Like I said, I don't see any problems with the *tontine*. Even if you are not in a *tontine*, you can still have problems. You know, being a man is having problems. With the *tontine* money, she can help a bit with the children's school needs, because I can't always get small contracts for the type of jobs I do. It's not

a lot of money, but at least it helps cover our shame so that we won't be going out begging for food. (Interview, August 2009)

These varied ways of assessing the *tontine* indicate how participants had different understandings of the *tontine* based on their life experiences. Souley did not see it as necessary in their livelihood strategy in the post-displacement context. But Mr. Karamogo was inclined to yielding part of his patriarchal power for the stability and well-being of his family by approving his wife's decision to take a loan and to engage in a *tontine*. Such an attitude allows us to grasp intra-household negotiations with respect to decision-making regarding livelihood options (Sen 1990; Koenig 1995; Anderson and Baland 2002; Meharie 2009). As noted by Fanta, the owner of restaurant Tara, in the following snippet of our conversation:

Interviewer: Can you tell me what you do with the money collected, I mean you specifically?

Fanta: Ah! Well, I use it to buy soap, groceries for my restaurant, and sometimes gas for my car or the scooter. I don't know about others, but everybody uses it the way they want. (Interview, August 2009)

Indeed, some women participants in this research were involved in a *tontine*, which allowed them to save money but also to earn it by reinvesting the amount collected in their small businesses or by buying basic household needs such as groceries, dishes, soaps for family members or items given out during child-naming or wedding ceremonies.

Honor, Shame and the Obligation to Return

In a post-displacement context, the *tontine* can be a reliable way of community rebuilding by bringing people closer together, and providing space for financial and social support. Social pressure compels members to honor their contributions otherwise; they may lose their social status and respectability in the eyes of community members. As

noted by Lin (2001: 137), differential obligations imply that the existence of the group or collectivity requires the maintenance, reproduction and sharing of resources that bring them together. This also implies the recognition and reputation associated with such binding rules, strong sentiments, obligations, and engagements. In this respect, the story of Marie-Jeanne (pseudonym for a former leader of a *tontine* who passed away shortly after Project ZACA) as recounted by Fanta (a research participant, and current leader of a *tontine*):

No *tontine* member believed that Marie-Jeanne (pseudonym) would do this to us. May her soul rest in peace; she passed away. Bad companies ruined Marie – Jeanne by giving her bad advice. She took our money, and invested in her business. When it was Salimata’s turn to collect the money, there was no money to collect. No Marie-Jeanne; Marie-Jeanne disappeared. She avoided every meeting, and every *tontine* member. We put pressure on her and her family. In the end, she confessed that she gave the money to a trader who was supposed to bring her merchandises from Togo. Unfortunately, the custom officers confiscated that trader’s merchandises, including Marie-Jeanne’s. She lost everything, including her dignity, and the pain eroded her soul. I can’t say that she died of shame. But, it was a real dishonor for her and her family. It was painful. When you lose your honor, you lose your soul. You lose everything. (Interview, August 2009)

In this narrative, expressions such as, “pressure on family, shame, dignity, pain, erosion of the soul, loss of everything, dishonor, and death” are illustrative of the negative impacts of any failure to meet the expectations of the *tontine*. The consequences do not affect just the individual, but her family as well. The last sentence, “when you lose your honor, you lose your soul. You lose everything” exemplifies the underlying ethical conducts expected from members. On a different note, when asked about collaboration among members of a group benefiting from CFIAM’s loan in terms of reimbursement of the loan, Mrs Karamogo (a loan recipient), replied:

We are friends, and we trust each other. We don't have any problem paying back. We call it "maliya-wari" [Shame-money in Jula]. It's like a rope [juru]⁸⁵ around your neck. Nobody wants to be shamed for failing to pay. How can you stand up and look at your friends in the face, if you failed to pay your turn? How? Death is better than shame, you know. I make sure that I have the money ready every time. (Interview, August 2009)

Indeed the term "*juru*" in Jula literally means rope, but it also means credit, debt, or loan. The implication is that entering such a contract is binding, and one cannot help but associate this image with "hanging one-self," which may ensue if one cannot pay one's debt. By "shame-money," Mrs Karamogo implies the dishonor associated with a failure to reimburse the debt. Paying one's turn is therefore about face saving and protecting one's honor and social standing. Honor and shame are thus associated. To pay one's dues is therefore to avoid shame in the eyes of the public; it is to save one's social standing. As the saying goes, "give honor to whom, honor is due." This echoes what Fanta said when she emphatically noted that she was not going to run away with the *tontine* money because of self-respect and honor.

Interviewer: Why were you chosen as the treasurer of the tontine?

Fanta: Everybody knows me, and they trust me. It's trust. I have the habit of working with people, in associations. I am involved in my mother's Association, which trains orphans in dance, song and performance, and my own association "Future Mère et Enfants [Future Mothers and Children]". With my mother's association, I traveled to Europe: France, Switzerland where I made friends. It's not to brag, people knew me very well in Zangouenttin. I'm not a stranger. And they know they can trust me with their money, I'm not going to run away with it. It is a matter of honor, and self-respect, you know! (Interview , August 2009)

⁸⁵ Juru also means credit, debt, or loan in Jula. If a person enters a debt or loan, this is literally translated in Jula by having a rope around one's neck. Such a metaphor also implies both the binding nature of the debt as well as the likelihood of death by suicide, should the creditor failed to pay his/her debt. This metaphor better translates indeed the notion of honor and face saving as reflected in such a trope.

The combination of shame with honor is meant to regulate membership behavior in a *tontine* as a social control mechanism. Along the same lines, Bortei-Dokhu and Aryeetey (1995) noted that in Ghana, women would rather borrow to pay their *tontine* money than default as this could affect their reputation, a symbolic capital that they strive to preserve by honoring their dues. This social and moral obligation to return reminds us of Bourdieu's (1979) concept of the obligation to return. For instance, among the Kabyles, there is no disinterested gift as Bourdieu observed. Any gift implies an honor-related stake and therefore one's social status or honorability. Indeed, this is also what Bourdieu calls symbolic capital, which translates into prestige and honor. A gift is like a transaction (Bourdieu 1977:49), the ultimate goal of which is to maintain social order through the obligation to riposte to save one's honor. In Kabyle society, as Bourdieu (1979: 28) underscores, "conforming to the social order is primarily a matter of respecting rhythms, keeping pace, not getting out of step." Similarly, in participating in a *tontine*, one has to keep pace by paying one's dues as required and participating in other social events involving members of the *tontine*. Failing to do so could be interpreted as threatening group order and cohesion. This brings in the notion of ethics and the obligation to adhere to membership rules. As noted by Fanta, except when a member was overtaken by circumstances beyond his/her control, s/he must honor his/her dues.

Further, *tontine* members could pay each other visits or have the moral obligation to participate if another member has wedding, child-naming or funeral ceremonies. As noted in a conversation with Fanta, she often visits the *tontine* members, and some of them

stop at her restaurant to chat.⁸⁶ Such forms of social relations contribute to reinforcing social cohesion.

Indeed, as Mrs Karamogo pointed out, when her family relocated to Ouaga 2000-C, it was difficult to get a job; but when she received CFIAM loan, she also decided to be involved in a *tontine* as savings and investment strategy. This allowed her to meet her basic needs in terms of providing for food, education, and health of her children:

Mrs Karamogo: My husband used to be a trader in Zangouenttin. At that time life was really good for us. I was selling zoom-kom [local drink made of millet powder, sugar and ginger] and bissap [local drink from Guinea sorrel leaf also known as *Hibiscus sabdariffa*], helping him in the boutique. But ZACA ruined our life. Now he is jobless, and he has to rely on temporary labor with construction companies. I had to stand up, really stand up. When I heard of CFIAM giving loans, I went there with some friends to enquire about how to get the loans. We were told by the director Mr. Zongo that we have to set up a group of five people. We talked to other friends around who joined us, we got the required number, and we went ahead and submitted our application.

Interviewer: How much did you get?

Mrs Karamogo: I got 50,000 CFA francs. With that money, I started selling clothes and some local perfumes. I walked around in the neighborhood to sell my things. The profit is not big but it's better than sitting idle. With the money, I can buy some condiments, small things like soap. Life is hard here. Look our tap water was cut off because we couldn't pay the bill. We're getting some water from our neighbor's house.

Interviewer: Who is he? Was he your neighbor in Zangouenttin too?

Mrs Karamogo: No, it's here that we met him. He's really nice. He allows us to get some water from his well. My husband always goes there in the evenings to take tea and chit-chat there with other neighbors and friends. Many young people gather in front of his house to take tea. He's really a good person.

Interviewer: Do you have friends here?

Mrs Karamogo: Yes, I have some friends. That's what I told you for the loan.

Interviewer: Ah yes, sorry! But do you, I mean, are you involved in any association?

Mrs Karamogo: Association?

⁸⁶ As noted earlier, the *tontine* builds on existing relations such as kinship or friendship. While members may already be visiting each other regardless of the *tontine*, it could also bring new members who were not friends or relatives, thus creating new relations.

Interviewer: Yes, do you have a group, beside the group you set up to get the loan; do you have a group like a *tontine* or something like that?

Mrs Karamogo: Oh, yes, when we got the loan from CFIAM, I decided to join a *tontine* run by a friend, Fanta that I met here in Ouaga 2000-C. She is the owner of Tara restaurant on Po's road.

Interviewer: Ah, yes, I think I know her. I've already met her.

Mrs Karamogo: Yes, the *tontine* helped me a lot. With the money, I was able to buy soaps, condiments, and notebooks for my children; and with the rest of the money I use it for investing in my small business. This is how we manage, because when ZACA brought us here, it was very difficult at the beginning. Even to buy a bar of soap was a problem. Our main preoccupation was to eat. If you have food to eat, that's when you think about washing your clothes. At the beginning, all this area was like the bush. There was nobody around, except residents of Lanoayiri. But, now we are trying to stand up, but life cannot be like in Zangouenttin. (Interview, August 2009)

While some women joined associations like *tontines*, others were also fighting for space in their quest for rebuilding their communities. The next section examines the case of the Catholic women who played a major role in acquiring the space for their Church.

The Catholic Women's Struggle for Space for their Community

"Making the invisible visible, bringing the margin to the center, rendering the trivial important, putting the spotlight on women as competent actors, understanding women as subjects in their own right rather than objects for men..." (Reinharz 1992:248)

Too often, women have been portrayed in displacement literature as passive victims of oppressive and repressive forces of development. Their experience has often been perceived as part of daily routines, and men head of households tended to speak for their wives (El Jack 2008). To challenge such preconceived ideas, I examine in this section, the gendered experiences of the Catholic women as they engaged in the struggle to secure a religious space for their community. Their struggle is symbolic of the battle not just for owning a piece of land (physical space), but it is also a challenge of

ideological spaces (gender roles within and outside the household, and religious spaces as well).

Seventy-two year-old Marie Rose, a devout Catholic, is a widow with seven children. Her husband was a nurse specialist in anesthesia. She grew up in Zangouenttin, and attended the Catholic school with the intention of becoming a nun. However, failing to become a nun, she spent most her life working as a cook at the Church while teaching Catechism to young children. At the time of the interview, she was actively involved in teaching young children basic precepts of Catholicism. Her story illustrates how women, notably Catholic women, banded together to resist the “stealing of their land.”

The day of the interview, she was sitting on the porch listening to Christian songs in Mooré. Marie Rose speaks French and Mooré, but she chose to speak Mooré. From time to time, she would use some French words to make a point.⁸⁷

The Catholic women’s struggle emerged from a dispute over ownership of a plot that opposed resident Muslims to the Catholic community in Ouaga 2000-C. In the dispute, male Muslims took the lead to reclaim the ownership of the plot and they were rather confronted by the Catholic women. Catholic males kept a low profile because they wanted to avoid violent confrontations with the Muslims. It was against that background that Catholic women became central to the struggle to regain ownership of the plot, and

⁸⁷ Such linguistic behavior also known as code switching caught my attention because it partly reflected the pride that she had for speaking her language. I tried to tease her into speaking French because of the joking relationship between her ethnic group (Mossi, plural; and singular is Moaga) and the Samo (my ethnic group), but she replied that she was not going to abide by her slave’s rules. Indeed, “slave” is how a Moaga often addresses a Samo in jokes. This instance revealed code-switching and power dynamics in the field, a subject that will be discussed in the methodology about “being a native anthropologist”.

subsequent building of their Church. Talking about the hardships in the early days of their relocation in Ouaga 2000-C, Marie Rose highlighted in our conversation the contours of their struggle, the commitment of the Catholic women, and support of church members and leaders:

Marie Rose: Now everything is fine. I have friends around who sometimes come to visit. But, some of my children are in the provinces, but those in Ouagadougou also come to visit. I'm staying with my grand-children, and everything is fine. Thank the Lord, things have improved a lot. And I like this place.

Interviewer: Can you talk about your role in the church, what kinds of things do you do together with church members?

Marie Rose: We pray together, when there is a child-naming ceremony we celebrate all these events together. When there are meetings for our community, I mobilize women together with Mrs Koné. She is one of the women leaders in our community. But she travelled to Bobo. So, when a church member is sick, we visit the person and lend him our support and pray for that person.

Interviewer: Yes, that's great. But I also learned that getting a plot for the church was very hard for you because of the land dispute between your community and the Muslim community; can you talk a bit about what you went through to get the space for your Church?

Marie Rose: Ah! You are asking too many questions [Laughter]. Well, at the beginning we did not even have any place to pray. We used to go to Patte d'Oie for our Sunday prayers. But now every two weeks, the priest from Patte d'Oie comes to officiate here on the *trame d'accueil*. At the beginning, when we got the plot and we wanted to build our church, the Muslims came and said the place belonged to them. They wanted to steal our land by force. Mr Koné built a stall where we used to gather for prayers. We did not fully build the church. That was when the Muslims threatened to take it away. We had to pray and fast, pray and fast. I was the prayer leader, and I stood up and mobilized all the Catholic women here in Ouaga 2000-C, and we spent nights praying at the current church location. We prayed and prayed. It wasn't easy at all. The Muslims said we had no right to build our Church there because that place was assigned to them by SONATUR [The National Land Management Authority]. We therefore asked the priest of Patte d'Oie, and religious leaders, to help us write a letter to SONATUR. They helped us. We then went to SONATUR and requested to meet the Director. We had to press hard while praying and fasting, praying and fasting. We had to be really enduring. The women did not sleep, and finally the Lord heard our prayers. SONATUR gave us the plot and we were able to build our chapel. We the women took our mats and slept on the plot and prayed there. Yes, it is true, men couldn't take the lead in this struggle because, they were afraid that this might lead to confrontation with the Muslims. But with women, who would have the courage to be aggressive with women? The Muslims did not do anything to us. When

SONATUR said the plot was ours, the matter was closed and we were able to build our chapel. So, yes, we the women really stood up in prayers and fasting, sleeping under the stall, which was then our church, and finally, the Lord heard our cry for help. We got our chapel. That's how things happened.

Interviewer: Since then, what role have women played in the church?

Marie Rose: Well, we continue to pray, and visit each other when someone is sick or when there are child-naming ceremonies. I personally teach young children catechism in Mooré. That's what I do. That's what I've always done for the community. (Interview, September 2009)

As illustrated in the above passage, the struggle for securing a plot for the Catholic Church went through the persistence and determination of women: from prayers to group's determination and support from the church leadership structure. Indeed, other Catholic male and female participants in this research also confirmed Marie Rose's statements. This story highlights that when women have the opportunity, even in a highly patriarchal society, they can play a significant role in decision-making and in defending the interests of their community members. Sen (1999: 199-200) rightly underscores, "there is plenty of evidence that when women get the opportunities that are typically the preserve of men, they are no less successful in making use of these facilities that men have claimed to be their own over the centuries." The Catholic women's struggle is the expression of the resistance against marginalization, a struggle for place, and the preservation of community's interests and needs. It is about self-empowerment and the empowerment of their community. This struggle for space is for freedom, visibility, and rebirth in a space dominated by patriarchal power and repressive state apparatus. It is also about complementarity in the struggle for socio-economic prosperity, as Sen (1999) would put it. Acquiring a cult place was symbolic of women's victory. It put them right at the center of community rebuilding, cohesion and the preservation of their religious identity. It is a struggle to preserve a space where they build, maintain and reproduce relations. It is also

a way to counter the dominant state's strategy of producing urban space by moving and removing people while breaking relations, and reconstructing new social spaces (Elden 2004). Their struggle echoes the situations of many other displaced people across the world (Cernea 1999; Colson 1999; Vine 2009). Similar to the Puerto-Rican women's struggle against forced eviction in the Barrio neighborhood in New City as discussed by Muñiz (1998), the Catholic women asserted their negotiation and mobilization power, which allowed them to be part and at the center of their community rebuilding (Oliver-Smith 2002). This also resonates with Mehta's argument when she notes that one should not "portray displaced women merely as passive agents or victims of development-induced-displacement, state policies and patriarchal structures in their communities" (2002:5). In the same vein, Muñiz highlights how Puerto Rican struggle against displacement as "a conscious and collective way of expressing and acting on their interests as women, as wives and mothers, as members of neighborhoods and communities, and as members of a particular race, ethnic and class group" (Morgen 1988: 111).

This also shows that displaced women (whether due to dam construction or urban redevelopment projects), can resist the power structures behind displacement and resettlement to defend their interests and those of their communities. The balance of power shifted in favor of the Catholic women who clearly asserted their determination, and sense of organization for social justice in the face of state power.

Conclusion

I have argued in this chapter that gender matters in how Project ZACA's displacees accessed or generated resources in livelihood reconstruction. Indeed some participants were able to move from simple neighborhood relations to friendship, and then

to creating partnerships for livelihood reconstruction. This implies that social capital whether it builds on neighborhood relations or friendship can lead to business partnership. However, some participants were able to access resources thanks to a credit system established by CFIAM. Such a group lending system is especially accessible to the poor and not so-poor given that banks have more binding rules, such as credit-worthiness and the requirement of collaterals. But in such a group lending system, peer monitoring, self-motivation and already existing trust are significant in minimizing risks. Such strategies of facilitating access to loans could be reinforced by policy-makers by allowing loan implementation agencies such as CFIAM to manage and regulate access to loans for the displaced in livelihood reconstruction. It facilitates access not only to financial resources but also to information, knowledge and empowers women as they participate in catering for their families' basic needs: food, clothing, health, and children's education.

Highly aware of the power of women in society, the Catholic relocatees of Ouaga 2000-C relied on their women to take the lead in the struggle to regain their plot and to resist the threat of losing their property to the Muslim community. Such resistance movement is reminiscent of the Puerto Rican women's struggle against forced eviction in Barrio of New York City to preserve and defend their interests and needs as a community (Muñiz 1998). This also highlights another level of resistance in a post-displacement context, one group against the other as their interests diverge (Oliver-Smith 2002).

In Ouaga 2000-C, the low profile of Catholic males in that struggle is illustrative of the basic fact that if women are offered the opportunity to lead, they could succeed in safeguarding community's interests. The struggle to acquire a cult space is also a way to

secure a place for social gathering, socialization, preserving and reinforcing their religious identity.

In other words, policy-makers, and authorities should anticipate such forms of access to resources to empower displaced people in their struggle for livelihood reconstruction. Regarding the socioeconomic context of Burkina Faso, future development policies, including urban redevelopment should seek for ways of promoting such mechanisms of pooling resources for livelihood reconstruction. *Tontines* are therefore ways of developing more personalized social relations and financial transactions and they could be transformed into ways of teaching saving and financial accountability not just for the individual but for the entire communities involved. Such forms of pooling resources may facilitate “the learning of new skills, patterns of behavior, and value orientations, and makes possible some changes in the structural principles in the general direction of modernization, without undermining the basic cohesion and solidarity of the group” (Eisenstadt quoted by Geertz 1962: 260).

CHAPTER 7

GENERAL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This dissertation investigates the relevance of social capital in post-displacement livelihood reconstruction under Project ZACA in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. It examines how individuals accessed, used or generated resources through their networks to restore and improve their lives.

First, the study highlights that across time; a variety of actors interrupted and even disrupted city life, and the socio-political, economic and spatial development of Ouagadougou. The Mossi's invasion of Ouagadougou in the 15th century interrupted the city, produced and controlled urban space to fit the Mossi ruling elite's vision of Ouagadougou. Ethnicity and status played a major role in the settlement patterns of Ouagadougou, with various neighborhoods playing socio-economic, religious and political functions. The production of city space created hierarchies and inequalities. When the French conquered Ouagadougou in 1896, they also disrupted the earlier narratives of the city by dictating their conception of the city. They introduced a European approach to city planning leading to a more differentiated city echoing social Darwinism: the European neighborhoods, the neighborhood of the "évolués" (civilized), the neighborhood of the "semi-évolués" (the semi-civilized) and the neighborhood of the "arriérés" (the primitive) in the early 20th century. Under the colonial rule, Ouagadougou became an important political and economic city space labeled as "bancoville" (mud-built city) given the cheap construction materials used in housing.

That image stuck with the city even after the independence of Burkina Faso (then Upper Volta) in 1960 up to the 1980s. Thus, the implementation of new urban policies

interrupted city life in the early 1980s under the revolutionary regime, which led to the emergence of new actors and imaginaries of the city causing dispossession and marginalization. It was against this background that Project ZACA-I (an authoritarian state production and control of urban space) emerged and caused trauma, death, impoverishment, loss of property and valuable social relations. Beginning in the 1990s, with the dominant narratives of neoliberal economic policies (Structural Adjustment Programs), policy-makers and urban planners emphasized the transformation of cities as growth centers, leading to the implementation of major urban projects to modernize Ouagadougou to match its regional and global capital image as the capital of African cinema. Their actions led to the creation of new neighborhoods including Ouaga 2000, and the extension of Project ZACA into its second phase: ZACA II in 2000. Thus, socio-historical processes and different actors interrupted and disrupted city life in Ouagadougou, each echoing the dominant local and global narratives of development. Such competing forces often led to the production of inequalities and disparities at the expense of the urban poor.

This study shows that forced eviction under Project ZACA led to the impoverishment and marginalization of some displaced people causing the loss of jobs, access to resources, school dropouts, deaths, and the loss of valuable social networks and infrastructure. The study points out that development that breaks relations through the dismantling and removal of poor communities is bound to failure. Project ZACA turned out to be a symbol that highlights the intersection between social capital, socio-economic and spatial factors of development. Developing a city by removing and relocating people is part of the state's strategies of producing and controlling urban space, but also a way of

deconstructing and reconstructing relationships, which affect livelihood strategies.

Therefore, this study shows that understanding the complexity of locality and community development can help avoid the destruction of people's socio-economic spaces. Echoing Cernea (1999:17-18) and scholars of displacement and resettlement, I argue that planners and policy-makers should seek to avoid displacement when possible, and if not, they should thoroughly examine those risks in the resettlement action plan.

To counter the Burkinabè state's strategies of city space production through the exclusion of the urban poor, residents of the neighborhoods concerned by Project ZACA mobilized their long-nurtured social capital to fight back against their eviction and dispossession, and what they perceived as a denial of their right to the city. The anti-ZACA movement coordinated by young leaders, traditional and religious leaders, as well as elders built on long-standing friendship, kinship and neighborhood relations. The movement also sought to develop bonding social capital by regrouping people from all socio-economic and religious background as well as linking social capital by attempting to connect with people in power within the government and in civil society organizations. Collective resistance movement demonstrates that social capital matters, and that "unity makes force". While building on kinship, friendship and neighborhood relations to claim their rights to the city, the collective movement also revealed a rhetorical strategy used as a weapon of the weak in the face of overwhelming state power. The research therefore shows the significance of social capital in collective resistance to forced eviction and exclusive state-led production of urban space.

The study also highlights that bureaucratic delays, authoritarian and rigid regulations of market management and use of public space proved to be major challenges

that hindered post-displacement livelihood reconstruction. Participants viewed the market as a locus for job opportunities, developing customer-relations, socializing, accessing financial and material resources and creating social spaces in post-displacement reconstruction. Consequently, the lack of market had gendered effects including joblessness for elderly women, and some male participants interpreted this lack as disempowering them and preventing them from playing their traditional gender role as the main family provider. Even when social relations are preserved, preventing relocatees from exercising their main income generating activities (for instance not having a market) is asphyxiating them economically and potentially laying the ground for relocation, thus creating a cycle of dispossession.

Post-displacement livelihood reconstruction is multifaceted. It requires infrastructure and various resources, but also individuals' agency and will to engage in a continuous battle against socio-economic and political constraints. As Sen (1999: xii) puts it, "there is a strong complementarity between individual agency and social arrangements." Further, this study also reveals that livelihood reconstruction often includes community well-being in terms of participants' involvement in local associations, and socio-religious activities and events.

In addition, the study demonstrates that despite the hardships and trauma caused by Project ZACA, other displaced people were able to rely on their skills, networks, material and financial resources, and determination to restore and improve their livelihood. As Sen (1999) argues, development is more than material resources. It is also about individual

agency, diversity of actors and contributors, the diversification of modes of livelihood and complementarity. Thus, pre-and post-displacement infrastructure⁸⁸ and post-displacement institutions (Banks, micro-credit institutions, associations, NGOs and market), as well as participants' worldviews (their perception of city and citizenship, gender roles and expectations) were central to the ways they negotiated their livelihood strategies. The study echoes what Woolcock and Narayan (1999:12) noted while underscoring the need for cross-sectorial synergy: "States, firms, and communities alone do not possess the resources needed to promote broad-based, sustainable development; complementarities and partnerships forged both within and across these different sectors are required." Development is multifaceted and requires multiple actors and forms of resources. Development should seek to free people from poverty, political and cultural tyranny. Individual agency can help achieve that goal (Sen 1999).

In this respect, some participants were able to access resources thanks to a loan system established by CFIAM. Such a group lending system is especially accessible to the poor and not so poor given that banks have more binding rules, including credit-worthiness and the requirement of collaterals.

Besides, gender spaces play a significant role in post-displacement reconstruction. Caught in the local representation of gender roles and expectations (ideological spaces), some male and female participants could not break away with such patriarchal worldviews to diversify, restore and improve their livelihoods whereas others learned to be flexible

⁸⁸ Infrastructure refers here to material and financial resources too.

and to adapt to the resettlement new realities. The study therefore shows that “social structures not only act on people; people act on social structures” (Risman 2004: 432). When such spaces become a trap, social capital becomes useless. When husbands oppose their wives’ participation in *tontines* (associations or rotating credit system) on the ground that *tontines* threaten family stability, this highlights “embodied cultural expectations” of gender roles within the households (Risman 2004). Some males viewed their failure to get a job and to provide for their families as a challenge to their “manhood”, disempowerment and loss of self-esteem. Yet, getting rid of the yoke of local gender constraints and creating flexible gender relations and spaces within the household is fundamental in post-displacement reconstruction. On the other hand, when husbands and wives negotiate their livelihood restoration and improvement beyond constraints created by the lack of infrastructure and embodied gender expectations, they overcome socio-economic constraints, which also show the significance of intra-household negotiation.

The findings also show that women are more engaged in *tontines*, which allows them to have access to resources and to contribute to their families’ basic needs such as food, health, clothing and children’s education. Involvement in *tontines* underscores the significance of kinship and friendship in accessing resources, as well as the strong sense of honor and face saving associated with this rotating credit system. This support network provides financial, moral and psychological support to members. *Tontines* contribute to the reinforcement of solidarity, social cohesion as they build on local understanding of respect, reciprocity, honor, responsibility, transparency, and accountability. Indeed as Geertz (1962: 241) noted quoting Gunnar Myrdal, “the building up of a variety of institutions, serving the purpose of promoting individual savings, and organizing them and

making them fruitful to the saver and to the community, should be given a high priority in every development plan.”

Further, the study shows that women showed more resilience as they could easily shift jobs moving from selling food, groceries, local beer, perfumes, to selling local fabrics. The ability to move from one socio-economic space to another one helps in post-displacement livelihood reconstruction.

In addition, participants’ involvement in the local health committee (COGES) and Catholic women’s struggle to reconquer the church plot for their community, demonstrate that when women have the opportunity, they become active agents in defending the interests of their communities. The Catholic relocatees of Ouaga 2000-C relied on their women to take the lead in the struggle to regain their plot and to resist the threat of losing their property to the Muslim community. Such resistance movement is reminiscent of the Puerto Rican women’s struggle against forced eviction in Barrio of New York City to preserve and defend their interests and needs as a community (Muñiz 1998). Their struggle allowed their community to secure a place for gathering, socialization, the preservation and reinforcement of their religious identity. The Catholic women’s struggle is not merely the conquest of the physical space, it is also an ideological battle challenging gendered spaces (gender roles within and outside the household, and religious spaces as well). The study underscores that women are not always passive victims of forced evictions, but also victors.

Moreover, some participants were able to move from simple neighborhood relations to friendship, and then to creating partnerships for livelihood reconstruction. Estelle and Rakia’s story helps us understand that the creation of social spaces (friendship

and neighborhood relations) can lead to productive business opportunity in a post-displacement reconstruction. The study suggests that social spaces could be breeding grounds for the development of gender-based relations, leading to gradual economic empowerment.

In this work, I have adopted multiple and flexible levels of analysis throughout the chapters. At the methodological level, I discussed the research objectives, field experience, and reflected on the significance of being a native anthropologist. Today, research subjects challenge both native and non-native anthropologists, which highlight power and shifting subjectivities and local perception of the role of researchers. More than ever before, the research subjects expect the researcher's work to benefit directly their community. Further, the "binarism of ethnographic power relations," often dubbed as "studying-down" or "studying-up", "native versus non-native anthropologist" is no longer valid. The ethnographers are increasingly engaged in the study of people like them or their equals in many ways. As such, research participants take active part in the production of knowledge, as often directly requested by my research participants. The study also highlighted that understanding the history of Ouagadougou is key towards understanding the urban development policies and narratives that interrupted city life, and produced differences and inequalities across city space.

The dissertation underscores that Project ZACA failed to (1) carry out an environment assessment study of the neighborhoods directly concerned by the project; (2) design a gender sensitive resettlement action plan; (3) meet its own promises of providing financial support to the displacees (women and vulnerable groups) in accessing credits and loans ; (4) allow residents of Ouaga 2000-C to start their market, which had negative

impacts on their livelihood strategies; and (5) to design a well-thought out funding mechanism, and identification of partners to redevelop the bulldozed neighborhood. Finally, (6) for most participants in this research, Project ZACA failed to keep them informed and was unfair in compensation arrangements. It handed over compensation money only to the heads of households and excluded renters and other adult household members.

These findings are important as they help us gain access to the worldviews of displaced people and the multiple and diverse livelihood strategies they deployed to restore and improve their livelihoods. Moreover, the diverse views of participants are inter-connected, and they relate to larger discourses on displacement and resettlement. As a result, this study does not seek to homogenize or essentialize such diverse experiences, but it rather opens venues towards understanding the displaced people's worldviews, and the various socio-historical narratives that interrupted citizens' lives.

Recommendations

Given the complexity of urban renewal and the need to consider diversity, agency, and complementarity in post-displacement reconstruction, my recommendations are not totalizing remedies to the issues of displacement and resettlement in general because their impacts vary across countries, societies, cultures, communities, gender, and actors concerned. Post-displacement livelihood reconstruction is multidimensional. Local decision-making mechanisms and processes, the implementation and follow-up of development projects, other factors such as unexpected consequences, and the intersection of the global and local neoliberal forces are significant factors to consider in any recommendations. In this respect, multiple livelihood strategies combined with other

factors, both material and immaterial play significant roles in post-displacement livelihood reconstruction.

These findings suggest that future urban renewal projects should learn from success stories such as the Arenal Hydroelectric Project in Costa Rica, which allowed relocatees to improve their livelihoods and to take control of their lives.⁸⁹ Future urban planning should : (a) collect meaningful data on the populations concerned by the displacement and resettlement for the elaboration of a realistic and practical resettlement plan; (b) consult and engage them into a collaborative development of a meaningful participation in the preparation process; (c) and allow the relocatees to continue with livelihood strategies known to them for a gradual re-adjustment and introduction of new livelihood strategies that are sensitive to their needs and priorities (Partridge 1993). Urban planners and city authorities should put in place conflict resolution mechanisms, which could help mitigate or settle potential pre-and post-displacement tensions or conflicts.

With respect to capacity building and access to resources, my analysis finds that skills, access to and use of resources or micro-credit institutions are important in post-displacement livelihood reconstruction. I therefore suggest that government and development agencies engage in employment generating programs by training relocatees in new skills. They should also collaborate with existing structures such as CFIAM and FAARF to provide financial and material support to relocatees in restoring and improving their livelihoods across gender and age.

⁸⁹ Instructor Notes for Session No. 8, Accessed at < <http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/edu/crr.asp>>, January 17, 2012

In addition, I find that *tontines* were important in livelihood restoration and improvement for women participants in this research. Given that *tontines* are methods of developing more personalized social relations and financial transactions, they could be transformed into ways of teaching saving and financial accountability not just for the individual but for the entire communities involved. Policy-makers could reinforce loan-implementation agencies such as CFIAM to manage and regulate access to loans for the displaced in livelihood reconstruction, especially women who were more involved in this specific form of lending system. This may facilitate access not only to financial resources but also to information, knowledge, and the empowerment of women.

My other suggestion relates to the significance of the market in livelihood diversification. This research has also highlighted to some degree, the importance of the market in residents' livelihood strategies and its gendered effects. It is important that policy-makers not just relocate people based on proximity relations such as kin and families, but it is also fundamental to allow them to diversify their livelihood strategies across gender lines, notably by having a market where they can sell and buy goods, socialize and generate new relations. Policy and decision-makers could initiate both pre- and post-displacement studies to identify together with local communities, priority needs rather than imposing on them a model of development that will only lead to increased poverty and inequality followed by forced eviction and relocation. Discarding such dialogue only contributes to the production of differences and inequalities exacerbated by local and global neoliberal forces.

In the light of the Catholic women's struggle to defend and protect their socio-religious space, the findings suggest that future studies could specifically examine in-depth the topic of gender and religion in post-displacement livelihood reconstruction.

Moreover, this study is both significant for urban research in Burkina Faso and beyond. It can therefore serve as a springboard to examine further issues such as political participation and representation across gender line in a post-displacement context. Last but not least, as participants kept mentioning the impact of *la vie chère* (the impact of global economic crisis which led to increased prices of local and imported consumables), future studies could also investigate the impact of the global economic crisis as it intersects with displaced people's livelihood reconstruction.

From a theoretical perspective, this study contributes to the body of literature on social capital in livelihood reconstruction in forced displacement, migration, refugees, and gender studies. It allows for understanding how people displaced by infrastructure projects managed to access, use, or create social capital for the reconstruction of their lives. It highlights the role of the state in the production and control of urban spaces where socio-economic relations are constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed. It contributes to the debate about the production of relations of production, which citizens continuously contested.

This research could serve as a case study in doctoral training in forced displacement and resettlement. Researchers who plan to investigate gender and social capital in urban anthropology may use these findings in their courses. The findings of this research may guide policy-makers, development agencies with respect to the role of social capital in local development policies. It can also help better anticipate and minimize

displacement risks in the future and initiate development projects that foster the engagement of local communities in defining their priorities for the improvement of their livelihoods in Ouagadougou.

APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND QUESTIONNAIRES

I. INFORMATIONS SUR LE/LA PARTICIPANT(E) A LA RECHERCHE

Le chercheur collectera les données suivantes sur la personne à interviewer au début de tout entretien ou administration du questionnaire:

Lieu de l'entretien

Nom réel de la personne à interviewer : **Pseudonyme:**.....

Données démographiques	
<p>A1. Quel est votre âge?</p> <p>A2. Sexe: 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Homme 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Femme</p> <p>A3. Quel est votre lieu de naissance? Lieu : Province :</p> <p>A4. Lesquelles des langues ci-dessous parlez-vous? 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Français 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Mooré 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Dioula 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Foulani 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Autre:</p> <p>A5. Quelle est votre langue maternelle? <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>A6. Quel est votre groupe ethnique? <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>A7. Quelle est votre religion? 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Catholique 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Musulman 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Protestant: 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Religion traditionnelle 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Aucune 6 <input type="checkbox"/> Autre religion:</p> <p>A8. Quel est votre niveau d'éducation? Niveau:</p>	<p>A9. Quelle est votre situation matrimoniale? 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Célibataire 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Marié (e) 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Concubinage 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Divorcé(e) 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Séparé(e) 6 <input type="checkbox"/> Veuf/Veuve</p> <p>A10. Combien d'enfants avez-vous?</p> <p>A11. Combien d'époux/ses avez-vous? N/A</p> <p>A12. Dans quel quartier viviez-vous avant votre déplacement?</p> <p>A13. Quand avez-vous été déplacé(e) ?</p> <p>A14. Depuis quand vivez-vous ici?</p> <p>A15. Quelle(s) activité(s) constitue(nt) votre principale source de revenu?</p> <p>A16. Quel est votre emploi et comment l'avez-vous obtenu ? 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Par concours 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Par les relations 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Autre :</p>

EQUIPEMENTS POSSEDES AVANT ET APRES DEPLACEMENT

NB: Il sera demandé aux participant (e)s à cette recherche s'ils possédaient l'un des articles suivants avant leur déplacement et ensuite, il leur sera demandé s'ils possèdent maintenant les mêmes articles. Les réponses seront notées comme suit: **Oui=1** et **Non=0**

Articles		Maintenant Oui=1 Non=0	Passé Oui=1 Non=0
	Pieds		
	Voiture		
	Moto		
	Vélo		
	Transport public		
	Autres :		
	Eau de puits		
	Eau de fontaine publique		
	Eau de fontaine à domicile		
	SONABEL		
	Générateur		
	Panneau solaire		
	Lampe à pétrole		
	Lampe à pile		
Energie utilisée pour la cuisine	Gaz		
	Charbon		
	Bois		
	Autres:		
Information et communication	Télé en couleur		
	Télé noir/blanc		
	Radio		
	Téléphone fixe		
	Téléphone cellulaire		
	Journal		
	Internet		
	Bouche à oreilles		

II. VOTRE APPRECIATION DU PROJECT ZACA

✓ Que pensez-vous du Project ZACA ?

Avantages	Inconvénients

✓ Qu'est-ce que le Project ZACA aurait dû faire pour vous ?

I. Description de la vie avant le déguerpissement par Le Project Zaca

II. Description de la vie après le déguerpissement par Le Project Zaca

III. Continuez-vous à fréquenter la même église ou la même mosquée après votre déplacement ? Si oui pourquoi ?

IV. CAPITAL SOCIAL ET ENJEUX DE LA RECONSTRUCTION POST-DEPLACEMENT

IDENTIFICATION DES PERSONNES SUR QUI VOUS POUVEZ COMPTER

NB : Veuillez indiquer le type de relations (parent, ami/e, collègue, connaissance, voisin/e, religion).

NB: La force de la relation signifie ici l'importance ou la valeur accordée à la relation. Elle est mesurée en terme de : mauvaise, passable, assez bonne, bonne, très bonne, excellente

Quelles sont les personnes sur qui vous pouvez compter en cas de problèmes ?						
Personnes sur qui vous pouvez compter NB : Indiquer leurs occupations/professions	Sexe H=Homme F=Femme	Age	Types de relations	Nature du problème	Force de la relation	Durée de la relation?

V. QUESTIONS SUR LES RELATIONS HORS DE VOTRE QUARTIER

(En provinces, dans d'autres villes ou dans un pays étranger)

- ✓ **Avez-vous des parents OU autres relations ailleurs ou à l'étranger qui vous aident avec une certaine forme de ressources? Si oui, quel genre de ressources vous ont-ils donné après votre déménagement?**

- ✓ **Avez-vous des parents OU autres relations ailleurs ou à l'étranger que vous avez aidés ou que vous aidez présentement? Si oui, quels genres de ressources avez-vous partagé avec ces parents?**

AVANTAGES ET INCONVENIENTS DES RELATIONS

Quels sont les avantages et inconvénients que vous tirez des relations avec vos parents, amis, connaissances, collègues, membres d'association ou vos voisins (es) ?

Type de relations	Avantages	Inconvénients
Ami(e)		
Parent		
Voisin(e)		
Connaissance		
Collègue		
Membre d'une même association		

COHABITATION OU DE-COHABITATION AVEC LES PARENTS

Habitez-vous chez vos parents ? Si oui, quels sont les avantages et inconvénients de la cohabitation avec vos parents ?

COHABITATION AVEC LES PARENTS= VIVRE AVEC LES PARENTS	
AVANTAGES	INCONVENIENTS
DE-COHABITATION = NE PAS VIVRE AVEC LES PARENTS	
AVANTAGES	INCONVENIENTS

ECHANGE DE RESSOURCES

Avec le Project ZACA, avez-vous déjà apporté de l'aide à des parents, amis, connaissances, collègues, membres d'association ou vos voisins (es) et sous quelles formes ?

Type de relations	Types de ressources partagées
Ami(e)	
Parent	
Voisin(e)	
Connaissance	
Collègue	

Êtes-vous membre d'une ou des association (s) ? Lesquelles, et quels rôles y jouez-vous ?

Nom de l'association	Rôles	Avantages	Inconvénients

VI. QUESTIONS SUR LES ENJEUX DE LA RECONSTRUCTION DE LA VIE

✓ Observations sur l'apparence actuelle de la maison

NB: Le chercheur prêtera attention aux détails suivants sur les caractéristiques physiques suivantes de la maison de la personne participant à la recherche:

Caractéristiques physiques de la maison	Réponses
Cour avec portail Oui=1 Non=0	
Type de maison : Banco=2 ; Brique rouge=3 ; Ciment=4 ; Marbrée=5	
Clôturée Oui=1 Non=0	
Fleurs : Oui=1 Non=0	
Climatisé : Oui=1 Non=0	
Ventilateur : Oui=1 Non=0	

✓ **STATUT DE RESIDENCE**

Statut de propriétaire de maison avant votre déplacement	Réponses Oui = 1 Non= 0
Etiez propriétaire de la maison ou vous viviez ?	
Si oui, aviez-vous les titres? (titre foncier)	
Etiez-vous locataire ?	
Viviez-vous chez les parents?	
Statut de propriétaire de maison après votre déplacement	Réponses Oui = 1 Non= 0
Etes-vous propriétaire de la maison	
Si oui, avez-vous les titres ?	
Je suis locataire	
Je vis chez les parents	

VII. IDENTIFICATION DES BESOINS PRIORITAIRES

✓ **Lesquelles des choses suivantes étiez-vous capable de faire et lesquelles êtes-vous capable de faire maintenant ?**

NB : Degré de satisfaction : mauvaise ; passable ; assez bien ; très bien ; excellent

Besoins de la famille/ménage	Degré de satisfaction	
	Maintenant	Avant votre déplacement
Besoins alimentaires		
Besoins vestimentaires		
Besoins sanitaires		
Besoins éducatifs		
Autres		

Commentaires de l'interviewé/e : -----

VIII. QUESTIONS SUR VOS PROPRES BESOINS PRIORITAIRES

✓ Veuillez indiquer vos **PROPRES** besoins prioritaires avant et après déplacement?

NB : Degré de satisfaction : mauvaise ; passable ; assez bien ; très bien ; excellent

Besoins de la famille ou du ménage	Degré de satisfaction	
	Maintenant	Avant votre déplacement
Alimentaire		
vestimentaire		
sanitaire		
éducatifs		
Autres		

IX. QUESTION SUR L'ESTIME SOCIALE

✓ Pensez-vous que le déplacement a affecté votre estime sociale, si oui comment?

NB: Dans ce contexte précis, l'estime sociale se définit comme la manière dont l'individu se perçoit en termes de respect et de considération sociale par les autres membres de sa communauté ou de sa famille.

X. PERSPECTIVE D'AVENIR

✓ Quelle perspective avez-vous de la vie communautaire dans ce quartier ?

✓ Quels sont vos Projets et comment comptez-vous les réaliser?

XI. QUESTION SUR LA CONFIANCE GENERALE ET INTERPERSONNELLE ET LA COLLABORATION

✓ En général, diriez-vous qu'à part votre famille et vos amis, on puisse faire confiance à la plupart des gens, ou qu'il faille être très prudent dans les relations

avec autrui ? En d'autres termes, comment décrieriez-vous relations avec les amis, parents, voisins, membres d'association, etc. en termes de collaboration et de confiance ?

Réponses possibles :

- a) on peut avoir confiance au gens (oui = 1)*
- b) Non, la prudence est de mise (non=0)*
- c) Je ne sais pas (=2)*

✓ **Quelles sont vos relations avec les autres groupes ethniques et religieux (musulmans ou chrétiens, et autres), et aussi avec les habitants de Lanoayiri (quartier non-lotie voisin de la trame d'accueil) ? Quelle est votre appréciation de l'état de ces relations ou de votre collaboration ?**

APPENDIX B

GUIDE FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED AND INFORMAL INTERVIEWS

A. Topics to address in informal interviews with research participants

1. Description of life before and after displacement
2. The compensation money and arrangements
3. Perception of Project ZACA
4. Perception of one's own situation (self-esteem) and future prospects
5. Resources, opportunities and infrastructure in past and current neighborhoods
6. Description of relationships, their advantages and disadvantages
7. Main difficulties related to resource availability
8. Information and communication sources
9. Water and electricity utilities
10. House ownership status and house physical characteristics
11. Participants' socio-demographic characteristics
12. Participants' evaluation of their income evolution
13. Participants' evaluation of their priority needs (food, education, health, clothing, and others)
14. Financial and material support network
15. Participants' involvement in associations or any group activities
16. Social support network (wedding, funerals, child-naming events, and others) and job channel support network
17. Trust relationships with friends, neighbors, colleagues, and relatives

B. Topics to address in interview with resources persons (University professors, chiefs, local leaders, experts in urban development)

1. Urban history and policies in Burkina Faso

2. The roles of the state in urban planning
3. Forced eviction and urban renewal in Burkina Faso
4. Urban land management and urban planning
5. Urban issues and gender
6. Urbanization and irregular settlements
7. About participation and consultation of project-affected people
8. Monitoring & Evaluation of urban development projects
9. Suggestions for policy-decisions regarding Project ZACA and future urban renewal projects

C. Topics to address in interviews with NGOs, Associations, or Institutions

1. Description of the NGO, Association or Institution: history, objectives, achievements, and partners
2. Identification of areas of interventions and partners
3. Identification of any partnerships with the state
4. Projects implemented within the community or elsewhere
5. Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms
6. Capacity development mechanisms
7. Involvement in the community, and forms of support to community members
8. Involvement in any health-related projects
9. Gender policies and actions initiated that are gender sensitive
10. Specific support to women or men
11. Request documents: reports, books, or websites

REFERENCES

- Akuffo, Kwame
2009 Conception of Land Ownership in African Customary Law and Its Implications for Development. *African Journal of International and Comparative Law*, 17 (1): 57-78.
- Alabi, Joshua et al.
2007 Effects of “susu” - a traditional micro-finance mechanism on organized and unorganized micro and small enterprises (MSEs) in Ghana. Institute of Professional Studies, Legon, Accra, Ghana. Accepted 24 October 2007.
- Alidou, Ousseina
2005 *Engaging Modernity: Muslim Women and the Politics of Agency in Postcolonial Niger*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Anderson, Martin
1964 *The Federal Bulldozer: A Critical Analysis of Urban Renewal, 1949–1962*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Anderson, Siwan and Baland, Jean-Marie
2002 The Economics of Roscas and Intra-Household Resource Allocation. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, August 2002, pp. 963-995
- Ardener, Shirley, and Sandra Burman, eds.
1995 *Money-Go-Rounds: The Importance of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations for Women*, Berg Publishers, Oxford and Washington DC.
- Arun, Shoba et al.
2004 Researching Ict-Based Enterprise for Women in Developing Countries: *A Livelihoods Perspective*. IDPM, University of Manchester, UK. Accessed at <<http://www.womenictenterprise.org>> on June, 2011
- Aryeetey, Ernest
1996 The Complementary Role of Informal Financial Institutions in the Retailing of Credit: Evaluation of Innovative Approaches, Tech. Publ. no. 58, ISSER (Institute for Statistical, Social and Economic Research), Univ. of Ghana, Lagon.
- Assemblée Nationale
2006 Loi N° 017-2006/AN Portant Code de l’urbanisme et de la Construction au Burkina Faso. Troisième Législature, Burkina Faso.
- Audet-Gosselin, Louis
2008 Le Project ZACA et ses Suites (Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 2001 à nos Jours): Marginalisation, Résistances et Reconfigurations de l'Islam Ouagalais. Mémoire de Maîtrise de Sociologie, Université de Laval.
- Babbie, Earl R.
1973 *Survey research methods*. Belmont, Calif: Wadsworth Pub.

Banque Mondiale

- 2010 Développement Local, Institutions et Changement Climatique au Burkina Faso : Analyse de la situation et Recommandations opérationnelles. Accessed at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org>

Bascom, William R.

- 1952 The Esusu: A Credit Institution of the Yoruba." *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 82: 63-69.

Benga, Ndiouga Adrien

- 2003 Citoyenneté française, citoyenneté locale: la municipalité en Haute Volta (1926-1960). In Burkina Faso: Cent ans d'Histoire (1895-1995). Yenouyaba Georges Madiéga et Oumarou Nao (eds). Paris: Karthala, Pp. 973-987.

Berkhofer, Robert F.

- 1995 *Beyond the great story: history as text and discourse*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Bernard, H. Russell

- 2005 *Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press.

Berrou, Jean-Philippe and Gondard-Delcroix, Claire

- 2011 Dynamique des réseaux sociaux et trajectoire d'entreprises informelles à Bobo-Dioulasso (Burkina Faso). *Bulletin de Méthodologie Sociologique* 110 : 26-44.

Biehler, Alexandra

- 2006 Renouveau Urbain et Marginalisation: Le Cas d'habitants du Centre-Ville de Ouagadougou-Burkina Faso. *Revue Tiers Monde* 185, pp. 57-78.

Bolton, Roger

- 2005 Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action and the Theory of Social Capital. Department of Economics and Center for Environmental Studies. Paper read at meeting of Association of American Geographers, Denver, Colorado, April 2005

Bondi, Liz

- 1999 Gender, Class, and Gentrification: Enriching the Debate. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 17: 261-282.

Bortei-Doku, Ellen, and Ernest Aryeetey

- 1995 Mobilizing Cash for Business: Women in Rotating Susu Clubs in Ghana. In Ardener, Shirley and Sandra Burman, eds, 1995. *Money-go-Rounds: The Importance of rotating savings and credit associations for women*. Washington, D.C. BERG.

Bourdieu, Pierre

1979 *Algeria 1960: The Disenchantment of the World: the Sense of Honor: the Kabyle House or the World Reversed: Essays*. Cambridge [Eng.: Cambridge University Press.

1986 The Forms of Capital. In *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*. John Richardson et al., (eds.). New York: Greenwood Press. Pp. 241 – 258.

Briggs, Xavier de Souza

1997 Social Capital and the Cities: Advice to Change Agents. *National Civic Review* 86 (2): 111-118.

Broudehoux, Anne-Marie

1994 Urban Renewal. In *Neighborhood Regeneration in Beijing: An Overview of Projects Implemented in the Inner City Since 1990. Housing A Billion: Volume III*.
<http://www.mcgill.ca/mchg/student/neighborhood/chapter1/>, Accessed on April 27, 2008

Buch-Jepsen, Niels

2003 Fespaco and the Transformations of Pan-African Film Promotion. Electronic document, accessed at <http://archive.sensesofcinema.com/contents/festivals/03/26/fespaco.html>, July 2, 2009.

Burt, Ronald S.

2005 *Brokerage and Closure: An Introduction to Social Capital*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cahill, Caitlin

2007 Negotiating Grit and Glamour: Young Women of Color and the Gentrification of the Lower East Side. *City & Society* 19 (2): 202–231.

Canclini, Nestor Garcia

2001 Hybrid Cultures. In *Media and cultural studies: Keywords*. Pp.488-510. Edited by Durham, Meenakshi Gigi, and Douglas Kellner. Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishers.

Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE)

2007 Fair Play for Housing Rights: Mega-Events, Olympic Games and Housing Rights. Geneva, Switzerland. Electronic document, accessed at www.cohre.org/mega-events.

Cernea, Michael (Ed.)

1999 Mutual Reinforcement: Linking Social and Economic Knowledge about Resettlement. In *The Economics of Involuntary Resettlement: Questions and Challenges*. World Bank: Washington DC. Pp.1-4.

Chamlee-Wright, Emily

1993 Indigenous African Institutions and Economic Development, *CATO Journal* Vol. 13 (1): 1: 79-99.

2002 Savings and Accumulation Strategies of Urban Market Women in Harare, Zimbabwe. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*.

Coleman, James S.

1988 Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. *The American Journal of Sociology* 94: 95-120.

Colson, Elisabeth

1999 Gendering Those Uprooting by 'Development'. In *Engendering Forced Migration: The Theory and Practice*. Doreen Indra, ed. New York: Berghahn Books. Pp. 23-39.

Commune de Ouagadougou

2005 La Vie Municipale. Electronic document, accessed at <http://www.mairie-ouaga.bf/Vie%20Municipale/frame5.htm> on September 5, 2006.

Compaoré, Georges

2003 L'évolution des espaces périurbains à Ouagadougou. Pp.29-58.

Compaoré, Georges and Nebié, Ousmane

2003 Croissance démographique et espaces urbains à Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso). Pp. 9-28.

Cussac, Maud

2004 Des Quartiers à Ouagadougou ? Développement Péripherique et Tissu Social à Kouritenga. Mémoire de Maîtrise en géographie/UFR Sciences Sociales et Administrative, Université de Nanterre.

Daboné, Justin

2007 Project ZACA : Le serpent de mer sort enfin de terre. *Observateur*, 6825 du mardi 13 février 2007.
http://www.lobservateur.bf/spip.php?page=article_archive&id_article=5889&vo=11

Debord, Guy

1994 [1967] *Society of the Spectacle*. Pp.11-29. Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith. New York: Zone Books.

De Haan, Leo J.

2002. The Livelihood Approach and African Livelihoods. African Studies Center. Leider.

Dialla, Basga Emile

2003 La question foncière sur les périmètres hydro-agricoles du Burkina Faso.

2005 Pratiques et savoirs paysans au Burkina Faso : Une présentation de quelques études de cas. Série Documents de Travail. DT-CAPES N° 2005-20 : 1-25.

Diamitani, Boureima

1988 Politiques de rénovation et d'aménagement urbains à Ouagadougou: capitale du Burkina Faso de 1966 à nos jours, étude de cas: la Cité AN II. Mémoire de Diplôme d'Etude Approfondie (DEA), Urbanisme, Gestion de l'Espace et Décentralisation. Université de Droit, d'Economie des Sciences d'Ex-Marseille.

Diani, Mario

1997 Social Movements and Social Capital: A Network Perspective on Movement Outcomes. Mobilization: An International Journal, 2(2): 129-147.

Downing, Theodore E.

2002 Avoiding New Poverty: Mining-Induced Displacement and Resettlement. Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development (MMSD) and the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED). Electronic document, accessed at www.iied.org/mmsd/mmsd_pdfs/058_downing.pdf, March 25, 2009.

Dudukovic, Nicole M. et al

2004 Telling a Story or Telling it Straight: The Effects of Entertaining Versus Accurate Retellings on Memory. Applied Cognitive Psychology 18: 125-143 (2004).

Dye, Michael

1998 Characteristics of Technique in Zan Boko. Accessed at http://ccms.ukzn.ac.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=195&Itemid=43, July 3, 2009.

El Jack, Amani

2008 "In the Name of Development: Conflict, Displacement and Gender Transformation in Sudan." York University (Canada), Canada (<http://search.proquest.com/docview/304396032?accountid=8285>).

Emmaüs, Jolivet

2009 Moussa Sankara, DG de Project ZACA : "La zone sera un véritable chantier d'immeubles en 2010" In Sidwaya mercredi 1er avril 2009. Accessed at < <http://ebomaf.com/spip.php?article15>>, June 2010.

Erickson, Bonnie H.

2004a The Distribution of Gendered Social Capital in Canada. In *Creation and Returns of Social Capital: A New Research Program*. Edited by Henk Flap and Beate Volker. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 27-50.

2004b A Report on Measuring the Social Capital in Weak Ties. A Report Prepared for the Policy Research Initiative, Ottawa, Canada.

Fadda, Giulietta and Jirón, Paola

1999 Quality of life and gender: a methodology for urban research. *Environment and Urbanization*, 11 (2): 261-270.

FAO

1997 "Sampling in Marketing Research". In *Marketing Research and Information Systems*. Marketing and Agribusiness Texts - 4. Rome: FAO Regional Office for Africa.

Fedorak, Shirley

2008 *Anthropology Matters!* [Toronto], Ont: UTP.

Fespaco

2007 *African Cinema and Cultural Diversity*. 20th edition, February 24-March 3, 2007. Accessed at www.fespaco.bf/fespaco2007/Catalogue2007.pdf, on April 26, 2008.

Fourchard, Laurent

1999 Naissance du baroque colonial: les cérémonies catholiques à Ouagadougou, 1900-1945. In *Fêtes urbaines en Afrique: espaces, identités et pouvoirs*. Pp. 149-166. Odile Goerg (ed). Paris: Karthala.

2003a Propriétaires et commerçants africains à Ouagadougou et à Bobo-Dioulasso (Haute-Volta), fin 19^{ème} siècle-1960. *The Journal of African History*, 44 (3): 433-461.

2003b De la résidence lignagère à la rente immobilière: cours et compounds en Afrique occidentale française et au Nigeria, fin XIX^e siècle-1960. *Le Mouvement social*, No. 204, Sociétés et Espaces Urbains en Afrique : pp. 47-64.

Fukuyama, Francis

2000 Social Capital and Civil Society. IMF Working Paper WP/00/74, Washington DC: IMF.

Fullilove, Mindy T.

2004 *Root Shock: How Tearing Up City Neighborhoods Hurts America, And What We Can Do About It*. New York: One World/Ballantine Books.

Gardner, Nathaniel E.

2006 "The Extraordinary Subaltern: Testimonio Latinoamericano and Representation." University of Canterbury. Hipertexto 4: 36-49.

Gasse-Hellio, M. Matthieu

2010 Les *tontines* dans les pays en développement. Accessed at <http://www.gdrc.org/icm/french/matthieu/section-2.html>

Gaye, Malick

1996 Villes entrepreneures : de l'action participative à la gouvernance urbaine Dakar : ENDA-Editions.

Geertz, Clifford

1962 The Rotating Credit Association: A Middle Rung in Development. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 10 (3): 241-263.

Gotham, Kevin Fox

2005 Theorizing Urban Spectacles Festivals, Tourism and the Transformation of Urban Space. *City*, 9 (2): 225-246.

Granovetter, Mark

1983 The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited. *Sociological Theory* 1: 201-233.

1985 "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness." *American Journal of Sociology* 91: 481-501

Greenhut, Steven

2004 *Abuse of power: how the government misuses eminent domain*. Capitals? Santa Ana, Calif: Seven Locks Press.

Grootaert, Christiaan

1999 Social Capital, Household Welfare, and Poverty in Indonesia. Policy Research Working Paper no. 2148. Washington DC: World Bank.

Handelman, Howard

2003 Women and Development. In *The Challenge of Third World Development*. 3rd edition. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall. Pp.115-145.

Hamel, Pierre and Poitras, Claire

2008 [1998] Modernité et Post-Modernité: La Contribution des Études Urbaines. Electronic document, accessed at classiques.uqac.ca/contemporains/hamel_pierre/modernite_et_posmodernite/modernite_et_posmodernite.doc, October 12, 2008.

Hans Dieter, Seibel

2001 Mainstreaming Informal Financial Institutions *Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship* 6 (1): 83-95. <<http://www.microfinancegateway.org/gm/document-1.9.25525/250.pdf>>

Harrison, Philip

2006 On the Edge of Reason: Planning and Urban Futures in Africa. *Urban Studies*, Vol. 43 (2): 319–335.

Harsch, Ernest

2009 Urban Protest in Burkina Faso. *African Affairs*, 108/431, 263–288.

Harvey, David

1992 Social Justice, Postmodernism and the City. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 16 (4): 588-601.

Hebdomadaire

2002 La Marche des Femmes sur le Premier Ministère. L'Hebdomadaire N°153 du 22 au 28 Février 2002, accessed at http://www.hebdo.bf/actualite2/hebdo153/societe_zaca153.htm, November 15, 2007.

Henke, Holger

2001 The West Indian Americans. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press.

Ijla, Akram M.

2012 Does public space create social capital? *International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology*, Vol. 4(2): 48–53.

INSD

2008 Recensement Général de la Population et de l'habitation de 2006. Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances/Institut National de la statistique et de la démographie (INSD) : Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.

Jacobs-Huey, Lanita

2002 Exchange across Difference: The Production of Ethnographic Knowledge. The Natives Are Gazing and Talking Back: Reviewing the Problematics of Positionality, Voice, and Accountability among "Native" Anthropologists. *American Anthropologist* 104 (3):791-804.

Jassen, Jacques, and Verheggen, Theo

1997 The Double Center of Gravity in Durkheim's Symbol Theory: Bringing the Symbolism of the Body Back In. *Sociological Theory* 15(3), November 1997.

Jaglin, Sylvie

1995 *Gestion Urbaine Partagée à Ouagadougou : Pouvoirs et Périphéries (1983-1991)*. Paris: Editions Karthala.

Jones, Delmos J.

1995 Anthropology and the Oppressed: A Reflection on "Native" Anthropology. *NAPA Bulletin*, 16 (1): 58-70.

Josse, Guillaume et Pacaud, Pierre-Alain

- 2009 Améliorer les quartiers précaires : Approches suivies au Burkina, Djibouti et Haïti. Agence française pour le développement, accessed at <http://www.afdturkiye.org.tr/jahia/webdav/site/afd/users/administrateur/public/Portail%20Dvpt%20Urbain/doc/Ameliorer%20les%20quartiers%20precaires.pdf>

Kearns, Ade

- 2004 Social Capital, Regeneration & Urban Policy. *CNR Paper 15*, 1-39. Electronic document, accessed at <http://www.bristol.ac.uk/sps/cnrpaperspdf/cnr15pap.pdf>, January 5, 2009.

Kennedy, Maureen and Leonard, Paul

- 2001 Dealing with Neighborhood Change: A Primer On Gentrification And Policy Choices, Washington: The Brookings Institution.
- 1995 *From the Ganges to the Hudson: Indian Immigrants in New York City*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Keshodkar, Akbar

- 2004 The politics of Localization: Controlling Movement in the Field. *Anthropology*, 6 (2): 1-9.

Ki-Zerbo, Françoise; Konaté Georgette and Ouattara, Souley

- 2006 Sécurisation des droits fonciers des femmes rurales au Burkina Faso. GRAFT-OXFAM-Solidarité : Burkina Faso.

Khuda, Barkat E.

- 2011 Social Safety Net Programmes in Bangladesh: A Review. *Bangladesh Development Studies Vol 34(2): 87-108*.

Koenig, Dolores

- 1995 "Women and Resettlement." *The Women and International Development Annual*, Volume 4. R. Gallin and A. Ferguson, eds. Boulder, CO: Westview. Pp. 21-49.

-
- 1997 "Competition among Malian Elites in the Manantali Resettlement Project: The Impacts on Local Development." *Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development* 26 (3/4): 369-411.

Koenig, Dolores and Diarra, Tiéman

- 1998 Environmental Effects of Policy Change in the West African Savanna: Resettlement, Structural Adjustment and Conservation in Western Mali. *Journal of Political Ecology* 5: 23-52.

Kuwayama, Takami

- 2004 Natives as Dialogic Partner: Some Thoughts on Native Anthropology. In *Native Anthropology: The Japanese Challenge to Western Academic Hegemony*. Pp.1-14. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press.
- Lafontaine, Sandrine
1990 *La Destruction d'un Quartier Populaire Ouagalais: Etude du Parcours des Familles Déguerpies*. Mémoire de Maîtrise de Géographie, Université de Paris XII Val de Marne.
- Lammers, Ellen
2003 Young, Urban Refugees in Kampala, Uganda: Some Thoughts on the Ethics of Fieldwork and Issues of Representation.
- Lassiter, Luke Eric
2005 *The Chicago Guide to Collaborative Ethnography*. Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press.
- Launay, Robert and Miran, Marie
2000 Beyond Mande Mory: Islam and Ethnicity in Côte d'Ivoire. *Paideuma* 46: 63-84.
- Lessinger, Johanna
- Lee, Hiram
2009 Home of *Slumdog Millionaire* Child Actor Destroyed by Mumbai Authorities. May 15, 2009. <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/may2009/slum-m15.shtml>, accessed on June 27, 2009.
- Lefebvre, Henri
1976 *The Survival of Capitalism: Reproduction of the Relations of Production* (London: Allison & Busby).
- Lejeal, Frédéric
2002 *Le Burkina Faso*. Paris: Karthala.
- Ley, David
2006 The Immigrant Church as an Urban Service Hub. *Urban Studies* 45 (10): 2057–2074.
- Lin, Nan.
2001 *Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- 2005 A Network Theory of Social Capital. Electronic document accessed at <http://sociology.nccu.edu.tw/Chinese/speech/paper-final-041605.pdf>, March 15, 2009.
- Mahapatra, Lakshman K.

- 1999 Testing the Risks and Reconstruction Model on India's Resettlement Experiences. In *The Economics of Involuntary Resettlement: Questions and Challenges*. Michael Cernea, ed. World Bank: Washington DC. Pp.189-230.

Maharoux, Alain

- 1995 La Haute-Volta devient Burkina Faso : un territoire qui se crée, se défait et s'affirme au rythme des enjeux. Centre d'Appui à la Formation et à l'Évaluation, N'Djamena, Tchad, pp.1-19.

Mahler, Sarah J.

- 1995 *American Dreaming: Immigrant Life on the Margins*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Manheimer, Dean and Hyman, Herbert

- 1949 *Interviewer Performance in Area Sampling*. The Public Opinion Quarterly, 13 (1): 83-92.

Mairie de Ouagadougou

- 2006 Vie municipale. Electronic document, accessed at <<http://www.mairie-ouaga.bf/Vie%20Municipale/frame5.htm>>, September 5, 2006.

Mascarenhas-Keyes, Stella

- 1986 The Native Anthropologist: Constraints and Strategies in Research. In *Anthropology at Home*. Pp. 181-195, edited by Anthony Jackson. New York: Tavistock Publications.

Marie, Alain

- 1989 Politique urbaine : une révolution au service de l'état. *Revue Politique Africaine*, N°3 : 27-38.

McDowell, Christopher

- 2002 Involuntary Resettlement, Impoverishment Risks, and Sustainable Livelihoods, *The Australasian Journal of Disaster and Trauma Studies*, 2002-2. Accessed at <<http://www.massey.ac.nz/~trauma/issues/2002-2/mcdowell.htm>>

McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.

- 2003 "Area Sampling". In McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific & Technical Terms, 6th edition. Accessed at <http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/area+sampling>

McKernan, Signe-Mary McKernan

- 2002 The Impact of Microcredit Programs on Self-Employment Profits: Do Noncredit Program Aspects Matter? *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 84 (1): 93-115.

McIlwaine, Cathy

- 2008 "Challenging Displacement: Livelihood Practices among Colombian Migrants in London." *Department of Geography, Queen Mary, University of London*. Pp.1-37.

Meharie, Anduamlak

- 2009 "Urban Development and Displacement in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Impacts on Livelihoods and Social Relations in Yeka Tefo with a Focus on Youth." University of Kentucky, United States -- Kentucky
(<http://search.proquest.com/docview/859487364?accountid=8285>).

Mehta, Lyla

- 2002 "The Double Bind: A Gender Analysis of Forced Displacement and Resettlement". University of Sussex: Institute of Development Studies. Paper prepared for workshop 'Engendering Resettlement Policies and Programs in India'. New Delhi, September 12 and 13, 2002. Electronic document, accessed at
<http://www.ids.ac.uk/IDS/KNOTS/PDFs/DoubleBind.pdf>, April 21, 2009.

Miran, Marie

- 2006 The Political Economy of Civil Islam in Côte d'Ivoire. SOAS, pp.1-30.

Monbiot, George

- 2007 Everywhere they Go, the Olympic Games become an excuse for eviction and displacement. ZNet - Olympic Games Displacement. Accessed at
<http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/15054>, March 21, 2009.

Muñiz, Vicky

- 1998 *Resisting Gentrification and Displacement: Voices of Puerto Rican Women of the Barrio*. New York: Garland Publishing.

Muzvidziwa, Victor Ngonidzashe

- 2004 Reflections on Ethical Issues: A Study of How Urban Women Dealt with Impoverishment. Nordic Journal of African Studies 13(3): 302–318.

Narayan, Kirin

- 1993 How Native Is a "Native" Anthropologist? *American Anthropologist*, New Series, 95 (3): 671-686.

Nebié, Mahamadi

- 1991 *Dégueupissement et Effets sur les Activités des Populations : Cas des Populations du Secteur 14 Transférées au Secteur 22 de Ouaga*. Mémoire de Maîtrise de sociologie, Université de Ouagadougou.

Nielsen, Greg Marc

- 2002 The Norms of Answerability: Social Theory between Bakhtin and Habermas. State University of New York Press: Albany.

Observateur Paalga

- 2004 Ce n'est pas l'état qui expulse, c'est le marché. *L'Observateur Paalga*, n°6325 du 04 au 06 février 2005. Accessed at http://www.lobservateur.bf/Oarticlearchive.php3?id_article=2371 , September 29, 2006.

Oliver-Smith, Anthony

- 2002 "Displacement, Resistance and the Critique of Development: From the Grass Roots to the Global". RSC Working Paper No. 9: 1-66.

O'Neill, Brenda

- 2004 Gender, Religion, Social Capital and Political Participation. *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. Electronic document, accessed at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60628_index.html* , March 25, 2009.

Opel, Aftab

- 2005 Bound for the City: A Study of Rural to Urban Labor Migration in Afghanistan. *Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit*, pp.1-42.

Otayek, René

- 1996 L'islam et la révolution au Burkina Faso: mobilisation politique et reconstruction identitaire. *Social Compass* 43 (2): 233-247.
 _____ *Dieu dans la Cité : Dynamiques Religieuses en Milieu Urbain Ouagalais*. Paris: Karthala.

Ouédraogo, Estelle Bréatrice

- 2005 *De la Délocalisation à la Trame d'accueil: les Péripéties d'une Lutte Urbaine: le Cas de la ZACA à Ouagadougou*. Mémoire de Maîtrise en sociologie, Université de Ouagadougou.

Ouédraogo, Hubert M.G.

- 2001 Politiques urbaines étatiques et stratégies populaires d'accès au foncier : le problème de l'habitat spontané à Ouagadougou. Groupe de Recherche et d'Action sur le Foncier.

 2006 The Land Policy Process in Burkina Faso: Building a National Consensus. In *Land Rights for African Development from Knowledge to Action*. Edited by Esther Mwangi. International Food Policy Research Institute: Washington, DC., pp.36-38.

Ouédraogo, Oumarou

- 1988 *La politique de rénovation urbaine au Burkina Faso: Cas de Bilbambili et de Tiedpalgo*. Mémoire de Maîtrise en Droit, Université de Ouagadougou.

Owusu, Maxwell

- 1978 Ethnography of Africa: The Usefulness of the Useless. *American Anthropologist*, New Series, 80 (2): 310-334.

Partridge, William

- 1993 "Successful Involuntary Resettlement: Lessons from the Costa Rican Arenal Hydroelectric Project," in Cernea, M.M. and S.E. Guggenheim (eds.) *Anthropology and Involuntary Resettlement: Policy, Practice and Theory*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Pays (Le)
- 2002 "Des intellectuels de la zone contre le déguerpissement". Le Pays, N°2598 du 28/03/2002. Accessed at <<http://www.lepays.bf/quotidien/nation2.php?codeart=700&numj=2598>>
- Peet, Richard, and Elaine R. Hartwick
- 1999 Feminist Theories of Development. *Theories of Development*. Pp. 163-194. New York: Guilford Press.
- Péhaut, Yves et al. eds
- 2003 Préface à études urbaines à Ouagadougou: Burkina Faso.pp.1-8. Bordeaux: Presses Universitaire de Bordeaux.
- Peleman, Katleen
- 2002 The Impact of Residential Segregation on Participation in Associations: The Case of Moroccan Women in Belgium. *Urban Studies* 39 (4): 727–774.
- Perks, Thomas
- 2007 Does Sport Foster Social Capital? The Contribution of Sport to a Lifestyle of Community Participation. *Sociology of Sport Journal*, 24: 378-401
- Portes, Alejandro
- 1998 Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology. *Annual Review of Sociology* 24:1-24.
- Putnam, Robert
- 2000 Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Purkayastha, Bandana, and Subramaniam, Mangala
- 2004 The power of women's informal networks: lessons in social change from South Asia to West Africa. Lanham, Md: Lexington Books.
- Ramirez-Sanchez, Saudiel and Pinkerton, Evelyn
- 2009 The impact of resource scarcity on bonding and bridging social capital: the case of fishers' information-sharing networks in Loreto, BCS, Mexico. *Ecology and Society* 14(1): 1-22.
- Reinharz, Shulamit
- 1992 *Feminist Methods in Social Research*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Risman, Barbara J.

- 2004 Gender as a Social Structure: Theory Wrestling with Activism. *Gender & Society*, Vol. 18 (4): 429-450

Robinson, W. Courtland

- 2003 Risks and Rights: The Causes, Consequences, and Challenges of Development-Induced Displacement. The Brookings Institution – SAIS Project on Internal Displacement: Washington DC. Electronic document, accessed at [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/LGEL-5NEKS5/\\$file/brookings-dev-may03.pdf?openelement](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/LGEL-5NEKS5/$file/brookings-dev-may03.pdf?openelement), June 6, 2008.

Roncallo, Alejandra.

- 2007 Multilateralism, Population Displacement & Resettlement in San Cristóbal Silver Mines, Bolivia. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago.

Rouamba, Pascal

- 1999 Religion et identité: la “première église baptiste” de Ouagadougou. In *Dieu dans la cité: dynamiques religieuses en milieu urbain ouagalais*. Edited by René Otayek. Paris: Karthala, pp.129-141.

Sanjek, Roger

- 1990 *Fieldnotes: the Makings of Anthropology*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Saul, Paul

- 1983 Work Parties, Wage, and Accumulation in a Voltaic Village. *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 10 (1): 77-96.

Sawadogo, Victorien A.

- 2010 Moussa Sankara, directeur général du Project ZACA : La ZACA est un pôle d’investissement de près de 500 milliards sur les cinq ans à venir”. In Sidwaya mardi 12 janvier 2010. < <http://www.lefaso.net/spip.php?article34850>>

Sawadogo, Yacouba

- 2003 La Législation au secours des pédoconflits au Burkina Faso.

Scott, James C.

- 1990 *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Semaine Nationale de la Culture

- 2008 Semaine nationale de la culture. Accessed at <http://www.snc.gov.bf/textes/historique.htm>, April 27, 2008.

Sen, Amartya Kumar

1990 "Gender and Cooperative Conflicts," in *Persistent Inequalities: Women and World Development*, Irene Tinker, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 123-149.

1999 *Development As Freedom*. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.

Shostak, Marjorie

1981 *Nisa, the life and words of a!Kung woman*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Siegmann, Karin A. and Susan, Thieme

2007 Coping on Women's Back: Social Capital-Vulnerability Links Through A Gender Lens. Panel 3, Migration Management, Multi-local Livelihoods and Vulnerability: Resources, Institutions and Social Relations of Transmission. Electronic document, accessed at http://www.iss.nl/content/download/8387/81639/file/Panel%203_Siegmann,%20Thieme.pdf, September 11, 2008.

Siisiäinen, Martti

2000 Two Concepts of Social Capital: Bourdieu vs. Putnam. Paper presented at ISTR Fourth International Conference, July 5-8, 2000 "The Third Sector: For what and for whom?" Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland.

Sigué, Cheick Beldh'or

2003 « Burkina Faso: Project ZACA - Le blues des déguerpis. » In *Le Pays*. accessed at <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200311060308.html>

Skinner, Elliott P.

1974 *The Transformation of Ouagadougou*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Spaas, Lieve

2000 *The Francophone Film: A Struggle for Identity*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Ståhle, Alexander and Marcus, Lars

2009 Compact Sprawl Experiments four strategic densification scenarios for two modernist suburbs in Stockholm. Accessed at http://www.sss7.org/Proceedings/05%20Spatial%20Morphology%20and%20Urban%20Growth/109_Stahle_Marcus.pdf, June 10, 2009.

Steiner, Philippe

2009 La domination moderne passe par le marché qui devient l'instance de vérité, économique, mais aussi politique, de l'individu et des groupes sociaux. » In *Le marché, forme de la vie sociale*. lavedesidees.fr, le 17 juin 2009.

Stiglitz, Joseph E.

1990 Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets. *The World Bank Economic Review*, Vol. 4 (3): 351-366.

Stone, Wendy

- 2001 Measuring Social Capital: Towards a Theoretically Informed Measurement Framework for Researching Social Capital in Family and Community Life. Research Paper No. 24, Australian Institute for Family Studies. Electronic document, accessed at <http://www.aifs.gov.au/institute/pubs/stone.html>, March 25, 2009.
- Taylor, Nigel
 1999 Anglo-American Town Planning Theory since 1945: Three Significant Developments but No Paradigm Shifts. *Planning Perspectives*, 14: 327–345.
- Thijssen, Alite
 2001 Reflections on FESPACO 2001. Electronic document, accessed at <http://www.africanfilmny.org/network/news/Wthijssen.html>, July 2, 2009.
- Uitermark, J., J.W. Duyvendak & R. Kleinhans
 2007 Gentrification as a governmental strategy. Social control and social cohesion in Hoogvliet, Rotterdam, *Environment and Planning A* 39: 1-19.
- Undie, Chi-Chi
 2007 My Father's Daughter: Becoming a 'Real' Anthropologist among the Ubang of Southeast Nigeria. *Anthropology Matters Journal*, 9 (1): 1-9.
- UN-Habitat
 2007 Profil Urbain National du Burkina Faso 2004-2005. *Programme des Nations Unies pour les Établissements Humains Bureau Régional pour l'Afrique et les Pays Arabes (BRAPA)*
- United Nations Organization
 1948 [2009] Article 25. In The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Electronic document, accessed at <http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html#a25>, April 21, 2009
- Université de Ouagadougou
 2006 Séminaire régional sur les dynamiques d'économie sociale et solidaire en Afrique de l'Ouest et du Nord : Economie sociale, développement local, cohésion sociale (Ouagadougou – 2 au 4 mai 2006). Accessed at < www.univ-ouaga.bf/autres_fichiers/.../DynEcoSociale_TermesRef.doc >.
- Van Der Gaag, Martin P.J.
 2005 *Measurement of Individual Social Capital*. Amsterdam: F&N Boekservices.
- Van Der Gaag, Martin and Snijders, Tom A.B.
 2003 A Comparison of Measures for Individual Social Capital. ICS, University of Groningen Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. 27th November 2003. Electronic document accessed at http://www.xs4all.nl/~gaag/work/comparison_paper.pdf on March 15, 2009.
- Van der Gaag, Martin.P.J.; Snijders, Tom A.B. and Flap, Henk D.

- 2004 Position Generator Measures and their Relationship to Other Social Capital Measures. Paper presented at the XXIII Sunbelt International Social Networks Conference; February 12-16, Cancún, Mexico. Electronic document, accessed http://www.xs4all.nl/~gaag/work/PG_comparison.pdf, March 15, 2009.

Vine, David

- 2011 *Island of Shame: The Secret History of the U.s. Military Base on Diego Garcia*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Visweswaran, Kamala

- 1996 "Refusing the Subject" in *Fictions of Feminist Ethnography*, pp. 60-72. New Delhi: OUP.

Weickmann, Felix

- 2006 Riverfront Planning: Case Study of the 'Chicago River Corridor Development Plan'. NEURUS Program 2005/2006, Humboldt University Berlin & University of Illinois Urbana Champaign: 1-42.

Weston, Kath

- 1997 "The Virtual Anthropologist". *Anthropological locations: boundaries and grounds of a field science*. Eds. Gupta, Akhil, and James Ferguson. Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press. Pp.163-184.

Wilson, William J., and Richard P. Taub

- 2007 *There Goes the Neighborhood: Racial, Ethnic, and Class Tensions in Four Chicago Neighborhoods and Their Meaning for America*. New York: Vintage Books.

Woolcock, Michael

- 1998 Social Capital and Economic Development: Toward A Theoretical Synthesis and Policy Framework. *Theory and Society* 27: 51-208.

Woolcock, Michael and Narayan, Deepa

- 2000 Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, Research, and Policy. *The World Bank Research Observer*, vol. 15(2): 225-249.

World Bank

- 2002 *Upgrading of Low Income Settlements Country Assessment Report: Burkina Faso*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

-
- 1978 *Appraisal of Upper Volta Urban Development Project*. World Bank, Washington, DC.