

SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN COLOMBIA:
CASE STUDY OF THE PASTRANA AND URIBE ADMINISTRATIONS

By

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

This study seeks to investigate the why the government of Colombia has failed to successfully negotiate an end to the civil war with the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC). Violence continues to affect all levels of society with a particularly strong impact on communities in rural areas. The study will examine the negotiations taken place during the Pastrana and Uribe administrations with the FARC. Through an analysis of negotiation theory and strategies for conflict resolution, my findings demonstrate the importance of civil society inclusion. Colombian communities continue to be deeply affected by the internal conflict, have limited access to their political system, lack economic mobility and are affected by regional policy initiatives.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This investigation begins by discovering how the FARC armed conflict against the Colombian government has evolved throughout the past ten years, and specifically how negotiations have led to this evolution in Chapter 1. Negotiations alone are not the only factor contributing to the amelioration or diminishment of the conflict; however, they are an important contribution to the peace building process. The various efforts made by the Colombian government, and the two administrations studied in this investigation, demonstrate the changing mandate by the Colombian voters in the face of violence.

Colombia has been known to tout itself as being one of the longest standing democracies in Latin America. Governments in democracies are elected by their populations to represent, protect, defend, and support their citizens. During conflict, the citizens look to their government to uphold their obligations as elected officials. The government's responsibility involves the "institutions of government, recognizing the links to international recognition and resources but stressing the relationship between the institutions of governance and the territory's citizens or population, also known as 'empirical sovereignty'" (Call 2008:7). It is crucial to consider this definition of government's responsibilities as we analyze the ability of the government of Colombia (GOC) to provide for the needs of their citizens through its institutions, its ability to

attract and expand relationships with the international community and its ability to “exercise power, not a neutral, benign collection of executive agencies” (Call 2008: 7).

Thus, the GOC struggles to maintain a balance between these actors – internal and external – and its commitment to resolving the civil war. Chapter 1 will explore the historical background of the conflict, which is important to understanding the last decade of strife and the current situation in Colombia. As the conflict evolves, so have the objectives of the State. I examine the efforts of the Pastrana administration, 1998 – 2002, and Uribe administration, 2002 – 2010, in terms of their negotiations with the FARC in an attempt to find why the strategies have failed.

The analysis of the GOC begins as the United States commits to a multi-billion dollar project in the region, the National Consolidation Plan (*Plan Nacional de Consolidación*, PNC) and the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI). The initiative first developed by the Pastrana administration as Plan Colombia, began its implementation in 2000 and ended in 2009 (Ferchette interview 2011). The aid changed its role from the primary assistance for support against the guerrillas, to strengthening the government’s presence in rural areas. Currently the CSDI also seeks to provide more socio-economic and humanitarian assistance to the region. The involvement of the U.S. in Colombia has played an enormous role on the GOC’s ability to conduct negotiations, while pursuing a strong anti-narcotics strategy. The “War on Drugs” led by the United States quickly became the global “War on Terror” after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks. According to the U.S. Department of State’s website there are currently three groups from Colombia on their terrorist threat lists - the FARC, the ELN and the AUC.

Curbing the drug trade and fighting against terrorism in Colombia would, in effect, reduce the ability for these groups to launch attacks and reduce their ability to trade and manufacturing illicit drugs. Ultimately, these organizations still exist, and they continue to launch attacks and are still holding peace hostage in the mountains of Colombia.

Efforts made by the GOC through negotiation strategies to bring sustainable peace have not been successful. The country continues to endure violent attacks from the FARC, ELN, paramilitary groups, drug cartels and the GOC military. This paper will demonstrate the complex issues at hand and focus on the negotiation strategies used the by the GOC with the FARC. I argue that although the negotiations initiated by the GOC are influenced by U. S. policy, ultimately these negotiations must incorporate the internal civil organizations that represent the Colombian citizens.

Purpose Of Thesis

The overall aim of this thesis is to examine why the GOC-led negotiations have not successfully ended the violent internal conflict with the FARC.

In order to better understand the current civil war in Colombia, it is necessary to discuss the main issues affecting the country. The current conflict in Colombia is a reflection of three principal issues: political exclusion, economic instability and geopolitics. Each of these issues have been exacerbated for more than four decades by violence and protracted conflict.

Political Exclusion

Colombian government officials have historically made it difficult for new political parties to emerge while allowing two to hold an almost political monopoly in power. Since the *Violencia* era in the 1940s, factions of Colombian society who saw the assassination of Liberal leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitan as political exclusion, formed parts of what are now the most notorious guerrilla groups in Colombia: *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC) and *Ejercito de Liberación Nacional* (ELN). The political exclusion evidenced by the persecution of progressive and leftist political parties, gave rise to the current guerrilla groups.

Economic Instability

The lack of economic stability over the past decades in Colombia has also contributed to the ease of drug traffickers, guerrillas, and paramilitary groups' ability to infiltrate communities, take over legal crop production and replace it with lucrative coca cultivation. Also, the number of people who have been displaced by the conflict has left grave social and defense costs for the government – as such, hardly any capital remains for investment in development.

Geopolitics

The balloon effect has often been utilized to describe the current situation in the Colombian region. Peru and Bolivia have taken action to curb illicit drug manufacturing in their countries, which has consequently increased the cultivation of illegal crop growth in Colombia. Notwithstanding, disputes with neighboring countries such as Venezuela

and Ecuador have compromised some negotiations with the FARC and potential bargaining power. Colombia has had reason to believe that Venezuela harbors FARC leaders, which has led to increasing tensions between the two countries.

GOC-led Negotiations

As a result of GOC negotiations, as well as interventions by public figures, agreements have been signed, cease fires implemented, kidnapped persons have returned to their families and prisoners have been released. Nevertheless, the violence continues.

The assumption is that civil war continues to produce violence around the country based on the consistent attacks on Colombian forces by the FARC. Second, the influence from the international community has contributed to the rise and fall of civil war. Third, I argue that the GOC and FARC negotiation tactics have excluded civil society thus making it difficult for either side to gain enough support to end the war. Fourth, the FARC have few incentives to integrate into the civilian population. The security dilemma remains a critical issue as previous experience shows that an armed GOC will continue to persecute civilian FARC and an armed FARC will continue to attack GOC military and police. Chapter 1 briefly considers the FARC's attempt to enter the political scene through the *Union Patriota* (UP) political party.

International Negotiation Theory

The theoretical framework for this study will focus on the negotiation theory, conflict escalation and civil society. The different challenges to opening and conducting negotiations for insurgent groups and governments during civil wars have been explored

by Zartman (1995) in depth. Hopmann (1996) explains international negotiations processes and strategies. Fisher and Ury (1992) present negotiations as a means for all parties to reach mutual gains. Raiffa et al. (2002) propose various tools to increase dialogue between parties such as the Full, Open, Truthful Exchange (FOTE) model. Such dialogue is crucial for relationship building and is necessary considering that the government administration, and thus players, objectives, and current political and economic conditions constantly change in Colombia.

Lax and Sebenius (2006) offer insight into perceptions and realities of the environment for negotiations and the importance of the social contract. When negotiating, the authors insist that successful negotiations must include relationship development. Relationship development commits parties to a social contract in any agreement.

Mediation, the conduct of negotiations through a third, external party, has been considered by numerous authors, including Ury (2000). He argues that the ‘third side’ can expand the possibilities, understanding underlying interests, heal damaged relationships, foster genuine dialogue, and support non-violent action.

In addition to negotiation theory, the role of the government and its institutions play an important part in the peace process. Throughout the ongoing conflict in Colombia, the legislative, judicial, and executive institutions have been repeatedly called into question as to their effectiveness, their ability to confront the violence and the ways and means they prosecute the perpetrators. Call’s (2008) work in increasing the effectiveness of the governments to bring peace will be further discussed. Many have

denounced the impunity of paramilitary groups' horrendous actions and also actions committed by the Colombian military themselves such as the case involving *falsos positivos*. The Colombian government had implemented a standard of quotas for all military members to capture and kill guerrilla members. This policy has contributed to atrocities, such as GOC military members massacring civilians and dressing them as guerrilla members to prove they met their quotas (El Espectador). The GOC's inability to bring perpetrators to justice or to give victims of the armed conflict a sense of peace and security have left many disappointed in the GOC and its branches, including the judicial system.

Victims in Colombia have faced one of the longest protracted conflicts in modern history. Kim and Pruitt (2004) explain the dynamics of escalation that drive intergroup and international conflicts concepts, which help us, understand the intractable nature of the conflict in Colombia. The authors argue that the longer a conflict continues, the more difficult it is for the conflict to reach long-lasting sustainable peace, due to new grievances, problems of psychological entrapment and commitment among others.

Escalation is also critical to understand protracted conflicts. Constant war changes the attitudes towards peace making violence "socially accepted, legitimized or even heralded as heroic" (Pruitt and Kim 2004: 12). Thus adding to the difficulty in reaching the ripe moment to conduct lasting negotiated agreements. De-escalation and stalemate are methods that will eventually transform the conflict to reach the ripe moment. These terms are further discussed in Chapter 3.

Throughout the civil war, the role of civil society has shaped either sympathy or revulsion for the FARC and legitimacy of the role of the GOC. Much of the citizen support of the GOC is based on the proximity of departments to the capital city since the GOC has less structural influence in rural areas. Rural areas are susceptible to control by the FARC, who have provided services that have historically been provided by government such as: education, food supply, the building of roads and healthcare (FARC website). During the last ten years, civil society has been kept out of talks, has not had an active role at the negotiating table, and has been unable to contribute to a national peacebuilding process. Negotiation is a peace building method that ultimately appeals to all aspects of society. “Within this approach, the parties to a conflict are encouraged to not view each other as adversaries negotiating against one another, but rather to interpret the situation as one in which they have a common problem that needs to be overcome by taking joint decisions” (Fisher et al. 1992: 27).

History Of The Conflict



La Violencia

For decades Colombia has faced one of the longest protracted conflicts in the Western Hemisphere. Long before the current drug wars, Colombia experienced political unrest during *The War of a Thousand Days* (1899 – 1903) and *La Violencia* (1946 – 1957), which generated thousands of deaths and thousands, more displaced persons. These civil wars stem from socio-economic hardships and political exclusion. Currently, while the country expands its industry and attracts foreign direct investment, the population is unable to compete with cheap imports from abroad, which have inversely affected multiple parts of civil society. In addition to liberal trade policies and economic inequality, the civil and drug war has left thousands homeless, making Colombia one of the top countries with internally displaced people. Most companies are only willing to pay the bare minimum wage, forcing a struggling population to work for less than what is

equitable. Consequently these impoverished conditions gave rise to popular movements that challenged and demanded that the government improve the livelihood and living standards. *La Violencia* occurred after a charismatic presidential candidate was assassinated sparking distrust, illegitimizing the government and causing repression.

Leftist Revolutions

Inspired by the Cuban revolution of the early 1960s, groups formed in the hemisphere fueled by the notion of social equality and inclusion. Long neglected by their governments, the population sought to find ways in which they could form a voice. Although many around the world recognize the FARC, there are many other groups that formed during the 1960s as a force to raise awareness in impoverished communities. Social movements such as the M-19 named after the fraudulent presidential elections of April 19, 1970, were created from outrage amongst student activists. The movement turned to the countryside to pursue their ideas and gain support. The M-19 eventually disbanded in the early 1990s and formed a political party, *Alianza Democratica Movimiento 19 de Abril* (ADM19) after negotiating with the government of the time. The group had gained some attention from the media “in 1974 with the daring theft from a museum of a saber that belonged to Bolivar, the 19th-century liberator of what is now Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Peru and Bolivia” (Brook 1990). Much to the dismay of his supporters, one of the most charismatic leaders of this newly formed political party, Carlos Pizarro, was assassinated when running for president. Still, the integration of the M-19 demonstrated a possibility of space for political inclusion. ADM19 members

currently serve as public officials in Colombia and continue to be attacked and labeled as terrorists or worse.

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the FARC had attempted to incorporate into civil society – following the steps of the *Movimiento 19 de Abril* (M-19). The FARC formed the *Union Patriota* (UP) and led successful campaigns in local elections. Nevertheless, many of the UP members were succinctly targeted and assassinated. More than 3,000 members of the UP were killed. Such a violent repression of political freedom created the distrust in the GOC. FARC members were wary to conduct any serious negotiations because of this experience. Fearing their security, the FARC found it difficult to reintegrate into civil society. Opting instead for continuing their armed struggle and impacting the security of the GOC. The security dilemma in Colombia is one of the principal reasons for the protracted nature of the conflict. Thus the GOC and FARC remain in a constant armed struggle,

“How a statesman interprets the other’s past behavior and how he projects it into the futures is influenced by his understanding of the security dilemma and his ability to place himself in the other’s shoes. The dilemma will operate much more strongly if statesmen do not understand it, and do not see that their arms – sought only to secure the status quo – may alarm others and others may arm, not because they are contemplating aggression, but because they fear attack from the first state. These two failures of empathy are linked. A state which thinks that the other knows that if wants only to preserve the status quo and that its arms are meant only for self-preservation will conclude that the other side will react to its arms by increasing its own capability only if it is aggressive itself. Since the other side is not menaced, there is no legitimate reason for it to object to the first state’s arms; therefore, objection proves that the other is aggressive” (Jervis 1979: 181).

Chapter 5 will provide recommendations to move past the security dilemma along with other recommendations to continue the peace building process.

Another group named the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (ELN) or the National Liberation Army formed around Marxist and liberation theology and utilized guerrilla strategies to retaliate against political oppression. As these ideological groups were forced to flee into the jungles and mountains of Colombia or be killed, they began to use force against the repressive oligarchies that controlled the government. Privately run paramilitary groups, such as the *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (AUC) or the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia fully developed in the 1990s to combat the guerrilla groups and all those who were deemed associated with them. The AUC demobilized in 2006 but there are many who refused to disarm and created new-armed groups such as the *Águilas Negras* (Black Eagles) who according to the 2010 U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report continued to “commit numerous unlawful acts and related abuses.” A cycle of violence persists as all these groups use the drug industry, solicit local farmers to work for them and fuel more violence.

Illicit Drug Trade

Trafficking of illicit drugs in Colombia sprang across the region and especially towards its southern borders. The governments in Peru and Bolivia had initial success when they began the eradication of its coca exports. This left a void for supplying the narcotics demand, which thus shifted the production to Colombia (Wren 1999). Currently, the large drug trade comprises a third of the country’s total exports. Although many of the drug cartels were eliminated during the mid 1990s, the guerrilla and paramilitary groups took this opportunity to continue their violent campaigns. As the

drug trade took hold of the country, lack of confidence in public institutions eroded, as did the social contract between the people and its government. The apparent powerlessness of the government to stop the drug trade and large criminal activity added to the desperate situation that most Colombian citizens faced in the 1980s and 1990s. Although the guerrilla groups and paramilitary criminals had an active role in the drug trade, the Cartel de Cali, and Cartel de Medellin made terrorist campaigns against politicians, police and the government to ensure that the drug trade was allowed to continue.

In 1999, the elected President Andres Pastrana set out to combat the violence and sought an alliance with the United States. This alliance would see one of the most extensive policy initiatives in the Americas. Three U. S. Presidents have now helped shape *Plan Colombia*, from President Bill Clinton to George H. Bush to the current President Barack Obama. Each has contributed to the continued assistance of U.S. military in combating narco-terrorism in Colombia.

Present Day Conflict

Over the last decade, the U. S. has contributed more than \$7 billion dollars to Colombia (Beittel 2011: 24). As a dominant geopolitical force in the Western Hemisphere, the U.S. has had a major impact on the future of its neighbor's economic development, democratic institutions, and viability. From supporting authoritarian regimes, to inciting coup d'états, to donating billions of dollars to combat leftist guerrilla warfare, the United States is a driving force in all-major activities to the Southern Cone.

The drug wars have taken hold of Colombia and traveled north through Central America and Mexico. Yet, Colombia still produces 60% of the world's cocaine and is the source of almost 90% of the cocaine consumed in the United States (Beittel 2011: 20). The detrimental consequences of the drug industry are at our doorsteps. Congress has acted in its best interest to secure the region. Although Congress never enacted Plan Colombia as proposed by President Pastrana, Congress has appropriated a large number of funds every year since 2000. Over the course of a decade more than \$8 billion will be delivered to Colombia. See Figure 1.

(in millions \$)

	ACI/ACP	ESF	FMF	IMET	INCLE	NADR	Air Wing	DOD	Total
FY2000	60.1	—	—	—	—	—	38.0	128.5	226.6
P.L. 106-246	832.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	100.7	932.7
FY2001	48.0	—	—	—	—	—	38.0	190.2	276.2
FY2002	379.9 ^a	—	—	—	—	25.0	38.2	117.3	560.4
FY2003	580.2 ^b	—	17.1	1.2	—	3.3	41.5	164.8	808.1
FY2004	473.9	—	98.5	1.7	—	.2	45.0	178.2	797.5
FY2005	462.8	—	99.2	1.7	—	5.1	45.0	155.3	769.1
FY2006	464.8	—	89.1	1.7	—	—	45.0	140.5	741.1
FY2007	465.0	—	85.5	1.6	—	4.1	37.0	129.4	722.6
FY2008	244.6	194.4	55.1	1.4	41.9	3.7	39.0	119.9	700.0
FY2009	230.1	196.5	53.0	1.4	45.0	3.2	12.4	127.9	669.5
FY2010 (est)	^c	201.8	55.0	1.7	243.9	4.8	—	122.8	630.0
FY2011 (req)	—	202.9	51.5	1.7	204.0	4.8	—	n.a.	464.9
FY2012 (req)	—	189.1	44.0	1.8	160.6	4.8	—	n.a.	400.3
Total	4,241.4	984.7	648.0	15.9	695.0	59.0	379.1	1,675.5	8,699.0

Sources: Figures are drawn from the annual State Department Foreign Operations Congressional Budget Justifications for fiscal years 2002 through 2012 and the State Department's Washington File, "U.S. Support for Plan Colombia, FY2000 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations," July 5, 2000. DOD data for FY2002-FY2010 provided by DOD in response to CRS request, received April 22, 2010.

Figure 1. US Assistance for Plan Colombia, FY 2000 – FY 2012

In 2002, the U. S. Congress granted the Colombian administration the flexibility to use the funds for counterinsurgency and narcotics suppression. After 9/11 the U.S. began to not only fight a war against drugs but also a war against terror. All of the

Colombian guerrilla organizations and some of the paramilitary organizations were listed as terrorists. Counterinsurgency became a main issue because “narcotics trafficking and the guerrilla insurgency had become intertwined problems,” (Beittel 2011: 25). The administration began to fight wars of counterinsurgency and drug wars around the world.

To adequately curb production of cocaine in Colombia, the U. S. gave support for Colombian forces as well as contractors like Northrop Grumman, among many others, to use aerial fumigations. There is much controversy over the effectiveness of these tactics and its chemical effects. The Congressional Research Service reports,

In the years 2000-2006 coca cultivation and production of cocaine had actually increased by about 15% and 4%, respectively. The report concluded that while the Colombian government achieved significant security gains with U. S. assistance, coca farmers had taken effective countermeasures against eradications, and alternative development programs had not been implemented where the majority of coca is grown. Moreover, the report criticized the “nationalization” of Plan Colombia programs—the transfer of U.S. administered programs to the Colombians—as too slow and lacking coordination (Beittel 2011: 30).

Even as the U.S. attempted to use manual eradication in 2010, there were many “budgetary disbursement delays, security concerns, and the dispersion of coca to smaller fields. ” Furthermore, the report notes “that 32 manual eradicators (including Colombian police, military and civilian contractors) were killed in manual eradication operations in 2010 down from 40 deaths in 2009” (Beittel 2011: 25). Since December 2000 eradication began in Putumayo, a southwestern department of Colombia bordering Ecuador. There are also reports of birth defects, killing of non-narcotic crops, and ruining of local economies due to the fumigations – the environmental impact and effects on humans will last for decades in the fumigated regions.

As Plan Colombia rages on, changing its name to the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI), keeping the majority of the funds to the GOC military, the communities have created innovative ways to continue their own livelihood. The Putumayo department is rich in natural resources; fertile land and oil reserves are its main sources of wealth. In 2000, Putumayo had far more coca plants than any of Colombia's 32 departments with guerrilla presence and paramilitary activities (Isacson 2006). Putumayo has seen the first hand effects of the balloon affect. Wren explains that, "while coca cultivation plunged in Bolivia and Peru, it increased next door in Colombia, the primary source of cocaine. Mr. Arlacchi, who last visited Colombia in March, said eradicating its coca crops depended on whether the Government could achieve peace with leftist guerrillas who control much of countryside." This province of perhaps 350,000 people is where the major escalation of U. S. military assistance of Plan Colombia occurred and continues to this day (Isacson 2006). Fumigation uses the herbicide glyphosate but also other chemicals, which cause destructive effects on any type of crop that, could come in contact with the material, according to the Report on Health Effects from Glyphosate. Aerial sprays would spread everywhere and many times fell on the unsuspecting population. Crops that were used for subsistence were fumigated, skin problems developed on citizens, drinking wells were contaminated, and deadly chemicals ran into water supplies of the Amazon River and trickled down to Ecuador. Such accusations have created tensions to the relationship between Ecuador and Colombia. A report found from "credible, reliable testimony showing that glyphosate fumigation along the border between the two countries can cause damages to the physical and mental

health of people in Ecuador” (Vieira 2007). Yet, the position of the United States remains that the fumigations are safe, and that the health consequences are not caused by the fumigation.

The efforts to eradicate coca production only served to fuel more distrust in the GOC and the United States to actively combat the drug traffickers. The GOC committed to augment counter-narcotics police to vastly increase their campaign of fumigating the coca fields with herbicides sprayed from aircraft to then implement new economic initiatives. Isacson explains, “in their wake would come alternative-development programs to help Putumayo’s farmers participate in the legal economy” (Isacson 2006). Yet these initiatives came too slow, too late without community support and resources to make an impact. Tired of the GOC’s inability to keep commitments, stop the drug traffickers, and reduce violence, the community would have to turn to other resources. Over 90% of the population is Catholic and the Church has played a major role in assisting thousands of displaced, mistreated and forgotten people. Both the Putumayo and the Caquetá departments are home to many attacks by the FARC forces. This gives the impression that FARC is largely able to survive with the support of the citizens in the area.

It is within this context of conflict and tension that the current attempts at peace negotiations has to be understood. In the next chapter I will elaborate the research methodology of this study.

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study focuses on an analysis of the last decade, from the beginning of the Pastrana administration to the beginning of the Santos administration. The timeframe concentrates on the most recent events, giving enough time to analyze the existing civil war in Colombia. For my qualitative analysis I used the case study method that incorporates the study of the Pastrana and Uribe administration negotiations held with the FARC. To validate my study, I incorporated discursive analyses, interviews with NGO representatives, government officials, students, and other citizens.

Case Study

The purpose of the case study is to allow a more in depth analysis into the conflict occurring in Colombia. I utilized a content analysis of the current studies, articles, publications and other literary material.

The research methodology draws from a multi-track negotiation analysis focusing on track one and track four negotiations in resolving conflicts. Multi-track negotiations involve government, professional mediators, and civil society. I argue that sustainable peace in the communities most affected by drug trafficking is dependent upon the use of multi-track negotiations. The government of Colombia, the United States, and civil society all play an important role in combating narco-terror and government sponsored violence.

Security is a major issue for internal and external actors during a conflict. There are not enough resources to effectively support a multi-level approach to increase security. In order to address the security dilemma, all parties involved must commit to a strategic plan of action beyond rhetoric with set goals and funding. Such a strategic plan must also involve a consideration towards solving the root causes of the conflict. Ultimately the funding from Plan Colombia, and the CSDI are an important contribution to combating drug trafficking in the region.

By establishing connections with organizations that have direct ties to civil society, such as the United States Institute of Peace and the Washington Office of Latin American Affairs, I inquired about their interactions in Colombia. In addition, I used my own personal connections and networks through my travel to the region in December 2010. Over time, I hope that these connections can continue to link me to various community members who are organizing to create new initiatives in Colombia. I conducted structured and semi-structured interviews, participant observation and surveys. The semi-standardized interview “involves the implementation of a number of predetermined questions and special topics. These questions are typically asked of each interview in a systematic and consistent order, but the interviewers are allowed freedom to digress; that is, the interviewers are permitted (in fact, expected) to probe far beyond the answers to their prepared standardized questions” (Berg 2009: 152).

To conduct my research I sought approval from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of American University. My research design included ethical considerations as suggested by the IRB and through the design process. The use of the archival analysis

method and content discourse analysis validated my work both prior and post the ethnographic research. Screening content through scholarly databases, newspapers, magazines, blogs and online communities provided a wide range of perceptions and the direction of the conflict. The data provided a way in which to find trends and patterns over time, which have occurred during government negotiations with the FARC.

Data Collection

The importance of the various means of gathering data is to obtain triangulation. Triangulation as described by Berg is the use of “several lines of sight to obtain a better, more substantive picture of reality; a richer, more complete array of symbols and theoretical concepts; and a means of verifying many of these elements”(Berg 2009: 5). It typically involves the use of three different data gathering techniques to investigate the same phenomena. Using various kinds of data techniques is to “counteract the threats of validity identical in each method” (Berg 2009: 6). To fully address the issues of validity one must use multiple lines of sight to produce a greater understanding of the subject in question. The process starts at the design and creation of the research, analyzing the data and preparing the conclusion.

As noted by Amy Ross, “beyond the physicality of violence, security and the lack thereof influence every aspect of our work – the project we design, the people we interview the data we collect and the meaning of the project” (Ross 2009: 186) will change. Some challenges include personal security, establishing relationships, gaining trust, obtaining access, possible fatigue from explaining the conflict and the community members affected by trauma. Prior to my trip, risk assessments and vulnerability

assessments were conducted as delineated by Julie Mertus (2009: 171-173). Preparations were made to ensure I had a contact in the country and out of the country that I could rely upon in a precarious situation. I also thought about my own level of acceptable risk and communicated these assessments with my points of contact (Mertus 2009: 173). These security measures are some among many that were taken into consideration based on the current context in Colombia.

To address issues of establishing relationships, trust and access, I utilized my identity as a student, a woman, my Latin American heritage, my culturally Catholic upbringing, and my native fluency in Spanish to connect with the population on a variety of levels and dissuade suspicions that I am a government official or illegal group collaborator. I started at the university level and sought like-minded professors and students willing to talk about their views through the use of my own personal connections (Norman 2009: 76). Also, modeling Norman's efforts, I attended various events held by organizations that work with the community to introduce myself to those members (Norman 2009: 78). Norman identifies snowball sampling as a practical way in which to pursue more interviews through already-made connections. In effect, she defines the snowball sample as to start with an "initial core group of individuals willing to be interviewed (often identified by a local contact or organization), and then ask subjects to identify others willing to participate" (Norman 2009: 79). However, she warns against becoming dependent on one subgroup and encourages expanding the network to make the research more valid.

When initiating interviews it is important to draw lessons from the dramaturgical framework as explained by King and Berg. King describes the dramaturgical metaphor as an “analytical framework from which to compare tactics and strategies devised by authors in the field” (9). Such strategies would allow for the anticipation of the unexpected and to quickly change plans in the face of new dilemmas. A tactic described in King’s *Demystifying field research* is the use of code names for otherwise contested concepts. Another tactic is to constantly prepare for the unanticipated events that will shift the work or design. Furthermore, “luck cannot be predicted, but good strategy can make it easier to seize opportunities when they arise” (Martin-Ortega and Herman 2009: 233). They also explain that over a period of time, your purpose in the community may be skewed. It is important to seek out rumors to make sure your interviewees trust you. Throughout the interviews I conducted, I would “try to hear and react to rumors and ideally refute them” and “assign some time where your interviewee is able to ask questions, both at the beginning when you introduce yourself and the research project and at the end when they have seen the questions you have posed and may be concerned about the purpose and use of their answers” (Martin-Ortega and Herman 2009: 234). Allowing for the subjects to take a more active role helped to refute any doubts and helps stop the spreading of rumors.

In addition, I ensured that the meetings would take place in a relatively safe location, as many meetings could be the sight of repressive tactics by the conflicting parties. Throughout the meetings, it was important to remember the “balance between developing relational, emotional trust, which contributes to access, with cognitive and

behavioral trust, to avoid creating unrealistic expectations” (Norman 2009: 82). To avoid unrealistic expectations, I reminded the community of my research purpose and made sure that I was not providing any false assumptions of my purpose. I demonstrated my interest in meetings and asked to continually participate as an observer if granted permission. In this manner, I contributed to the sustainability of my participation. Notwithstanding, I continued to monitor the security situation, the context, any new developments and quickly adapted to the situation.

The interviews focused on academic scholars, members of non-governmental organizations, and government actors. The purpose was to gauge interviewees’ view on the current situation in Colombia, efforts to curb violence, perceptions of the conflict and actions taken to obtain peace. In doing so, I utilized ethnographic methods as suggested by Alma Gottlieb in *A Handbook for Social Science Field Research: Essays and Bibliographic Sources on Research Design and Methods*.

According to Gottlieb, ethnographic research “offers an unparalleled set of methods for exploring and gaining insight into people’s values, beliefs, and behaviors.” (Gottlieb 2006: 48). Such an analysis is necessary to obtain a deeper understanding of the conflict and its transitions. At the initial stages, it is paramount to gain rapport with those interviewed of which Gottlieb describes as a process that, “can take far more time, attention and imagination than one might anticipate” (Gottlieb 2006: 49). Furthermore the notion of valuing depth over breadth must be taken into consideration. Much of the discussion in academic circles is the validity of qualitative methods over quantitative methods. The dilemma is as follows, “quantitative methods produce breadth but sacrifice

depth: qualitative methods produces depth, revealing a complexity that quantitative methods might miss, but they sacrifice breadth” (Gottlieb 2006: 51). While this maybe an oversimplification of the issue, the notion that there is a tradeoff between qualitative and quantitative methods of research exists. Therefore in my case study I seek to incorporate various research methods to provide both breadth and depth in my analysis.

In addition to the case study and ethnographic research, I utilized discursive analysis of literature and secondary sources. I relied on the work of scholars in the conflict resolution field, focusing on government-led negotiations and on those who have conducted studies of the conflict in Colombia. Likewise, I found articles written by Colombian scholars and non-profit leaders who have deep connections to the conflict. The literature and secondary sources also come from a large amount of current articles reflected in major newspapers, journals, and scholarly databases with a collection of various news sources. My effort to combine various sources of information is to validate and triangulate my data.

CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework provides an analysis of the peace building process. Chapter 4 will give an analysis of the Colombian context and the applicability of the theory. Three main theories are discussed in this chapter: negotiation, conflict escalation and theories on civil society inclusion. However, I argue that the greatest tool for peace building is negotiations, which incorporate the government and all other aspects of civil society. To better understand the negotiation process, it is necessary to discuss basic negotiation principles and a definition of the term. Negotiation is a process of decision-making that allows groups or individuals to arrive to interests, needs, concerns and aspirations of all parties involved. Most think of negotiation as a win-lose situation, where compromises and sacrifices are made. However, negotiations allow for all parties to arrive to agreements that satisfy their underlying interests.

Negotiation

Negotiations between governments and insurgents are typically characterized by power asymmetry. “The most striking characteristic of internal conflict is asymmetry: one party (government) is strong and the other (insurgents) is weak” (Zartman 1995: 5). The FARC in this case are the weaker power and seek to address grievances; their exclusion from normal party politics from the 1960s onward. The only place the FARC and the GOC can find the equilibrium in negotiation is when both have exhausted all

other options. The precise ripe moment is constantly changing given the demands of the current political climate. It is important to understand that “as long as redress of grievances and commitment to the cause are in balance or the first exceeds the second as a motivator, negotiations are possible. But when commitment to continuing the rebellion exceeds as a motivation, it becomes an end in itself” (Zartman 1995: 9). Therefore, even when the ripe moment presents itself the insurgency can determine whether or not to pursue a negotiated agreement. A negotiated agreement is dependent upon the perception of whether the commitment to the struggle is the motivation itself, as a means to obtain its goals or the possibility to address their grievances can actually be accomplished.

Perceptions of power play a major role in the possibility of a negotiated agreement. Power itself is defined as the “the perceived capacity of one side to produce an intended effect on another through a move that may involve the use of resources” (Zartman and Rubin 2000: 14). In the Colombian context, the FARC at some points in history are perceived as a strong force that needs to be addressed by the GOC via negotiations. At other times, the FARC are perceived as a weaker entity, which can be forcefully controlled by the GOC via the military. Even as the weaker party, the FARC have options during negotiations and can seek ways to increase their ability to meet their interests. Some of those efforts include “borrowing sources of power, enabling actions intended to move the stronger party in a desired direction and countering the actions of the stronger party, is a collection of action on possible actions” (Zartman and Rubin 2000: 277). Although negotiations may be asymmetrical in the Colombian context, both the FARC and the GOC can maximize their mutual gains during negotiations by using their resources to their benefit. For the GOC, there are many distractions during

negotiations that occur as it balances their vast interests. Often these contending interests will have an affect on the ability of the stronger party to focus on the negotiations.

Stronger parties are restrained by a number of factors.

“One is the clever tactics of weak parties who know how to handle their bigger partner, like mice and elephants, children and their parents, and workers and their employers. The second factor is that many other issues distract the powerful, while the weak are able to face the issue with concentration and commitment. A third factor is the constraining effects of the relationship itself, which limits the crushing effects of high-sided dominance and gives the low side a threat, an appeal and a chance” (Zartman and Rubin 2000: 284).

While asymmetrical negotiations have their advantages and disadvantages, the GOC and the FARC continue to struggle to reach their underlying interest in a manner that also satisfies all sectors of civil society.

During the negotiation process there are issues relating to fair, equal and distributive gains. The zone of possible agreements (ZOPA) is found by analyzing the existence of any overlap between the reservation values of each party. If there is no overlap, there is no ZOPA. Over the years, the FARC have made few changes in their underlying interests. In an analysis of the negotiations between FARC and the GOC, it is extremely difficult to discern any ZOPA at all. The minimum acceptable demands of each side tend to remain very far apart. Mark Chernick argues

“the FARC has consistently articulated a set of proposals for political change at the negotiation table. The failures of past negotiations are not due to the inherent existential, that is criminal nature of the FARC – or, as former president César Gaviria once put it, because the guerrillas are onetime Marxist revolutionaries who have become drug traffickers and organized criminals. The failures have to do with the inability to bridge the political gaps as the root of the conflict” (Bouvier ed 2009: 71)

Interest identification is a key component during negotiations as it allows the process to build “creative problem solving, in which the parties individually, or together, try to

invent options that will produce mutual benefits” (Hopman 1996: 88). I argue the failures in the negotiations between the GOC and FARC are due to the inability to take advantages of the ripe moment, the little effort to create mutual gains around common interests, and a lack of citizenship participation. Further, political exclusion, economic instability and geopolitics have prolonged the internal conflict. For the most part, Colombia is governed by the ruling elite who have little knowledge of the conflict outside their urban districts (Gonzalez interview 2012). With the elites unwilling to cede power and include the larger civil society, options for mutual gains will remain small. Notwithstanding, the wide range of interests make it difficult to find a common ground. Conferences held with civil society have difficulty addressing all the issues within the conflict and generate communication overload. There are too many participants that work within a limited timeframe, such that “a few people typically dominate the discussion – those who are most comfortable shouting over others. Each additional person brings new issues to discuss. The conversation is easily sidetracked, and time is wasted on irrelevancies. The same arguments are rehearsed again and again, without persuading anyone” (Raiffa et al. 2007: 392). While some representatives focus on human rights issues, others may focus on the illicit drug trade, while others focus on political inclusion. The wide range of interests raised at such conferences renders it almost impossible to come to an agreement on the agenda let alone finding concrete steps to peace. Possible agreements are dependent on the range of interests of the parties and their ability to arrive at an overlap on those interests.

Escalation

The violence produced by the drug trade has given rise to the intractability of the conflict. According to the definition given by Pruitt and Kim, escalation “occurs when one or both parties adopt contentious tactics that are harsher than those previously used” (Pruitt and Kim 2004: 8). Escalation includes the increased intensity of a conflict as a whole or one party using heavier tactics than before hand, and thus pressuring the other to increase their use of heavier tactics. In general, light tactics are those that involve some sort of violence not directed at the parties involved, perhaps just a demonstration of power. These light tactics may include ingratiation overtures or persuasive arguments (Pruitt and Kim 2004: 89). In heavy tactics, violence is used directly against each other and increases since the problem does not resolve the differences. The authors explain that most conflicts begin as a light strategy but are “supplanted by their heavier counterparts: threats, coercive commitments and so on” (Pruitt and Kim 2004: 89). Egregious effects occur from using heavy tactics, creating losses on all sides of the parties involved. While escalation increases during the conflict, the initial motivation for the conflict changes. At first, the parties involved may be reacting to a single event, but as tactics change from light to heavier, competition rises to out-do the other. The motivation is no longer a reaction but how to hurt the other the most.

Escalation, as seen through the conflict spiral model, emphasizes the vicious cycle of violence. The reasoning behind this ongoing cycle is based on the perception of both sides. A need for retaliation arises because not doing so would be a sign of weakness. Furthermore, the parties’ reputation for self-defense is on the line (Pruitt and Kim 2004: 97). These concepts can be applied to the GOC and the FARC as they rely on violence to

resolve the conflict. The authors explain that while both sides may be responding to each other's actions, if "unsuccessful, they adopt heavier tactics in what they view as a rational effort to find a level of pressure that will persuade the Other to desist. The irony of this is that the Other is reacting in the same way to *their* level of escalation. Hence, they would be better off de-escalating rather than escalating" (Pruitt and Kim 2004:97). In our case, both actors have yet to de-escalate their tactics and in fact continue looking for funding for increased heavy tactics from internal and external sources. The tactics used depend on the current leadership of both the GOC and the FARC.

The changing nature of conflicts is also described in Kim and Pruitt's structural change model. There are psychological or emotional changes, group changes and community changes. These changes can occur and recur many times during the conflict and at many levels, affecting the ability to find durable solutions. Accordingly, "emotional changes are products of the moments and tend to disappear quickly once a conflict episode is over" (Pruitt and Kim 2004:120). In addition, psychological changes such as blame, anger, fear, perceived threats and dehumanization also affect the group and larger community. These psychological changes add to the difficulty in de-escalating conflicts during a conflict spiral. Often times, the power of numbers can polarize their members to move from "moderation to militancy as can the communities surrounding the conflicting parties. All of these changes result from prior escalation and contribute to further escalation" (Pruitt and Kim 2004:120). Thus, the protractibility of conflicts involving the structural change and conflict spiral model will see increased escalation without the intervention of communities outside of the immediate realm of conflict.

Understanding the conflict spiral and structural change model gives advantages to learning how to de-escalate the violence. Pruitt and Kim suggest for communities to create ways in which to increase stability by: empathy, dependence and enforcement of conflict-limiting norms, the presence of peace-loving third parties, pressure from allies who are negatively affected by the conflict and loyalty to the broader community (Pruitt and Kim 2004: 149). The community at large has the responsibility to see the end of conflicts. As everyone in the surrounding area is impacted, it must fall upon those with the most vested interest to make significant changes to help de-escalate conflicts. Pruitt and Kim also argue that the most effective way to end conflict during a stalemate is negotiation. Once the parties involved realize the costs are greater than the benefits, the parties are then forced into some type of negotiation. Pruitt and Kim describe this process as “a mild form of overt conflict, in which the same strategic choices are found as in any other conflict. The difference between negotiation and most other forms of conflict behavior is that negotiation makes it possible to settle or even resolve the conflict that gives rise to it” (Pruitt and Kim 2004: 178). It is up to the parties involved to make a unilateral conciliatory initiative to begin communication, restore relationships and move to a problem-solving stage. The unilateral conciliatory initiative consists of one of the major actors involved to “simply reach out and make cooperative moves on its own that require no acquiescence from Other” (Pruitt and Kim 2004: 184). This move can only be effective at the point in which the players cannot move beyond the stalemate and are ready for communication and cooperative action to begin. The actor making the first move would do best by following the “graduated and reciprocated initiatives in tension reduction (GRIT)” which requires a “series of striking actions aimed at eroding the

distrust and other structural changes on the other side and starting de-escalatory spiral and positive action and reaction” (Pruitt and Kim 2004: 184). These initiatives must be taken at a moment where each party is ready to begin to understand such conciliatory measures and have a clear distinction of the direction toward which the conflict is shifting. Otherwise, the moves for de-escalation will be viewed as suspicious, disingenuous and weak. Pruitt and Kim explain the process of a positive entrapment “when the conflicting parties become committed to a pattern of de-escalation they cannot escape. Momentum has been established in prior phases and the parties have come to feel that they have too much invested in the de-escalation sequence to give it up” (Pruitt and Kim 2004: 188). Positive entrapment gives ways for the parties involved to forge a path toward solving their underlying interests, formalizing negotiated agreements and maintaining stability in their communities.

Civil Society

Communities play a large part in resolving conflicts. Without community or civil society, negotiated agreements and positive actions from the GOC have a slim chance of survival. Such that when civil society is excluded from negotiations, there is an increased possibility in the recurrence of violence. In an article presented by authors Anthony Wanis-St. John and Darren Kew called *Civil Society and Peace Negotiations: Confronting Exclusion*, the authors argue that the exclusion of civil society can negatively impact negotiations. Furthermore, the authors contend “the reason for secrecy and exclusion in negotiation have feedback effects and as the stakes of the negotiation get higher, the effects of exclusion seem to be more damaging to long term projects such as

peace” (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008: 13). Long term and sustainable peace has not been achieved in Colombia, regardless of the military and security structure currently in place. In Chapter 5, I will describe my findings of participation from civil society in the last ten years in Colombia.

The reality is that civil society cannot be categorized as one single group. Wanis-St. John and Kew explain that “civil society is not uniform; it comes in many organizational forms, it can have varying degrees of autonomy from the state and sometimes it can even serve as a substitute for the state when governments fail to serve their population’s needs” (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008: 13). Therein lies the complexity of civil society. Too many fractions, groups and interests can complicate negotiations. To address this point, the authors suggest, “civil society groups must also be civic-minded, in that their purpose is to promote the interests and perspectives of a particular sector of society, but not all issues for all sectors, generally within a lawful framework” (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008: 15). Common goals among civil society actors can be formed and strengthened in order to reach a more overarching good. With this in mind the actors formulating these common goals can be reminded, “by some estimates, up to 90 percent of war casualties are among civilians as wars become more about attacking populations than armies fighting each other” (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008: 18). This staggering fact alone is cause for all civil society impacted by violence and civil society to seek peaceful solutions to the conflict. Starting with communities in small groups, civil society has the power to “usefully serve as components of a wider intercommunal process of ‘constituency building’ since they ‘can open up new avenues for dialogue where none existed before and generate new ideas that feed into the broader

political debate” (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008: 19). Grassroots efforts can lead to innovative ideas generated by the community’s needs and a desire to move past the violence. Such an indirect role in formal negotiations is commonplace for civil society. The authors state “this indirect mode, with all its variations [is] currently the most prevalent way by which civil society gets a role in peace processes” (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008: 20). Still, the role played by civil society is a large one as it encompasses the ability to hold government accountable by seeking just and fair conclusion of the war.

With access to information from all over the world it is no wonder that “transitional civil society groups can provide important lifelines for civil societies at risk. Not only can they provide material and financial assistance, but they can also be important political allies that open channels to foreign governments and the global media” (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008: 17). These elites have the power to maneuver and change public opinion but also “Cooperation by predatory elites is an omnipresent problem and as physical insecurity grows, civil society groups can find themselves increasingly and literally in the line of fire, as the ‘moderate middle’ becomes increasingly untenable” (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008: 16). Civil war is just that, war involving all of civil society as growing discontent continues across various level of society.

Even as war continues, these political elites “need civil society groups to gain public support for their policies, check political rivals, provide expert advice and get elected in democratic political systems” (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008: 15). The democratic system greatly varies from country to country. In this thesis we will assume that generally populations have some ability to affect their government via the voting

booth despite corruption in most of Latin America. Corruption is a separate subject for debate, with all its facets: cultural issues, acceptance and legitimacy. The link between the elite and their ability to work towards their own desires is intricately balanced with civil society. Such that, “civil society groups can also provide temporary havens for future political elites or their advisors who can rebuild the political structures or provide expert advice needed to restore a state” (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008: 16). The state, in many instances, is built by the elites but needs the legitimacy of the civil society to implement its policies. Each group ultimately relies on each other to arrive to their goals. However, in negotiations, much of the focus is given to the formal, top-level officials. The concentration of top-level negotiation, “often leaves the populace at large without perceived stakes in the agreed peacebuilding frameworks, weakening the ability of governments and transitional authorities to reach sustainable peace” (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008: 13). Stability allows for governments to grow economically, bring more prosperity to its people and strengthen its institutions to combat violence. As civil society and its well being impacts the effectiveness of its government or elite to accomplish its duties, those groups would do well by ensuring civil society is allowed a seat at the negotiation table. The authors explain that even though civil society is given access to the negotiations, it is “invariably controlled by the more powerful parties who dominate the state, society and the instruments of violence at odds in the conflict” (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008: 20).

Just as each powerful party will have its own agenda, each civil society actor also has its own agenda. Including a large number of parties on all sides increases the complexity and the interests. Wanis-St. John and Kew add “this leads to disagreements

about the purpose of negotiation, divergent approaches to process, different levels of commitment to the negotiation at hand and inconsistent ways of sharing information or arriving at a decision – all of which impede agreement” (2008: 22). In addition, the authors highlight that “with the addition of more parties, the possibility that a spoiler – a party with a vested interest in preventing agreement – may have been introduced into the group also increases” (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008: 22).

Successful negotiations must consider these obstacles carefully and realize that excluding civil society may lead to more conflict in the future. With the inclusion of civil society, the elite and government officials can learn from civil society actors who “may also bring greater democratic experience from their own internal workings if they themselves are democratically structured and/or have expertise on critical issues that can help craft a better agreement” (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008: 31). In the ever-changing conflict environment, it is important for governments to take the lead in incorporating all actors. Only then will sustainable peace be achieved, as all parties come to the realization that although not all positions can be met, through negotiation, increasing options and creative solutions, all interests can be obtained.

The internal armed conflict in Colombia must apply different techniques to resolve the ongoing struggle. This investigation argues that negotiations, institution building, understanding escalation and incorporating civil society can bring an end to the civil war.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

During the past ten years, the Pastrana and Uribe administration have differed greatly in their approach to bringing an end to the internal conflict. The Pastrana administration focused on a negotiated settlement with the FARC while the Uribe administration attempted to use the military to strategically terminate the FARC. Pastrana lacked enough buy-in from all levels of society, particularly the military and the elite. Uribe did not take advantage of the few opportunities available for negotiation and instead opted for a more violent approach. I will discuss their approaches relating them to the theoretical framework described in Chapter 3. Both presidents campaigned on their promise to bring peace to Colombia. Both administrations demonstrate the need to incorporate different and sometimes contrary strategies simultaneously to obtain sustainable peace. This chapter explores the negotiations in the early 1990s, details the negotiations during the Pastrana and Uribe administrations and analyzes the theory presented in Chapter 3.

Negotiations Prior to Case Study

Colombia continues to add, change, remove, and accept new burgeoning political parties such as the *Partido Social de Unidad Nacional*, the party of current President Santos and ex-President Uribe. However, both the liberal and conservative parties have dominated Colombia's political realm since its independence from Spain. During the

1990s the Cali and Medellin Cartels caused much destruction in Colombia amongst the guerrilla warfare. In addition, the FARC, ELN and other guerrilla groups to combine forces to combat the GOC politically. These groups created the *Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar* (CGSB) or the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board. Much of the dialogue between the CGSB and the GOC took place outside of the country. Although some strides were made in meetings to discuss an end to the civil war, concrete solutions such as a cease fire agreement were never made. The tensions further mounted with the death of Colombian Minister Argelino Duran Quintero and the death of Daniel García, the diplomatic emissary of the FARC. Since the death of aforementioned representatives, the relationship between the government and the FARC remained strained.

One of the greatest successes of the negotiated agreements with the GOC was when the M-19 and the *Ejército Popular de Liberación* (EPL) or the Popular Liberation Army officially joined the political scene after 20 years of guerrilla mobilization. M-19 aggressively negotiated for political inclusions and changes to the constitution; many of which were never implemented. Even so, the tensions between the GOC, the military and the growing frustration of the powerful landowners were the primary causes for the formation of paramilitary groups. The *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (AUC) or the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia saw a growth of 31,000 members towards the end of the 1990s. Paramilitary groups grew in numbers, they were able to launch campaigns against the FARC, the ELN and M-19 who had incorporated into political groups such as the *Union Patriota* or the Patriotic Union (UP) and the *Alianza Democrática* M-19 or the Democratic Alliance of the April 19th Movement (ADM19).

Targeted assassinations took place against leaders of all the guerrilla groups who had incorporated into civil society. Reports show that up to 3,000 UP and ADM19 members were also killed in the late 1980s and early 1990s (NY Times). Guerrilla members became extremely cautious of any attempt to join the political scene based on these events.

Pastrana Administration Approach

Pastrana context

Towards the end of President Samper's administration, Pastrana's predecessor, Samper was embroiled in a scandal linking his campaign finances to the narcotraffickers. During this time, Colombia was trying to rid itself of major cartels that had caused great violence and destruction. "By pushing Samper's administration to dismantle the Cali cartel, the United States once again increased the FARC's ability to extract resources from the cocaine industry" (Peceny 2006: 104). At this turning point in 1998, Colombian citizens elected the Liberal Andrés Pastrana Arango with one of the highest margins a presidential elect in Colombia's history. He campaigned on a promise to bring peace, job employment and tax reform. The Pastrana presidency sought dialogue with the FARC and brought optimism by promising to finally bring an end their decades-long armed conflict to an end. The Colombian citizens had confidence in Pastrana, as he intimately knew the effects of the guerrilla tactics having been kidnapped himself only seven years prior to his election. He also had strong ties to the United States and there was much confidence in his ability to bring foreign investment to Colombia.

In addition, Pastrana had the legacy of being the son of President Misael Pastrana Borrero who had brought economic strength to the country. Some would also remember

that the election of President Pastrana Borrero was the reason for the formation of the M-19 guerrilla group. This optimism gradually decreased throughout Pastrana's four-year term as the kidnappings, extortion and illegal drug trafficking continued. A great contribution to the decline in his popularity was attributed to Pastrana's demilitarized zone given to the FARC. Critics argued that the zone was used as a launching pad for the guerrilla organization, while the group only stalled negotiations and did not produce any tangible results during the four years of the Pastrana's term.

With a dwindling economy, weak military, continued violence by the cartels, guerrilla insurgencies and paramilitary violence the internal conflict seemed to have no end in sight. Yet Pastrana remained optimistic as he received the political mandate from 10 million Colombian citizens who voted to bring the insurgent struggle to an end. A demilitarized zone containing more than five municipalities was conceded to the 15,000-strong FARC in 1998.

Pastrana Negotiations

January 7, 1999 marked the official start of the negotiations and the beginning of a long and drawn out process of dialogue between the FARC and the GOC. At this meeting, Manuel "Tirofijo" Marulanda Vélez one of the founders of the FARC decided not to attend. The highly broadcasted event would be remembered as the *silla vacia* or empty chair. The FARC demanded the GOC troops leave parts of the demilitarized zone and thus decided to not attend the inaugural dialogue until this demand was met. The January 7th meeting was indicative of future peace talks - a process with constant setbacks. Even so, small progress was made during Pastrana's negotiation efforts.

Within the guerrilla safe haven, agendas were agreed upon at the negotiation's beginnings. The "*Agenda comun por el cambio hacia una nueva Colombia*" was signed on March 6, 1999. This agenda set common goals towards the resolution of the ongoing conflict (see Annex 1). The GOC made a leap of faith in giving the FARC an enormous demilitarized zone to enable dialogue and welcome more cease fire agreements. However, not all entities of the GOC were content with the progress. In May 1999, a large staff of military leaders and officials resigned as a response to the concessions made by Pastrana. Regardless of the resignations and the fractioning of the GOC, Pastrana continued with the peace process.

Part of the difficulty in maintaining the negotiations were military officials who were unhappy with the approach and who were unable to take a greater part in the official negotiations. Later that same year, the GOC and the FARC agreed on a short cease-fire during the holiday season in 1999/2000. Apparently, over 100,000 holiday cards were sent to the guerrillas by the GOC military which may have had an impact on the cease-fire agreement. The temporary cease-fire agreement demonstrated a small progress towards peace. The FARC had previously demanded an end to U.S. military involvement and the extradition of Colombians as a prelude to any cease-fire agreement. The Christmas cease-fire of 1999 had confirmed Pastrana's commitment to peace.

Pastrana Third Party Involvement

Pastrana called upon the diplomatic community and sought support from President Fidel Castro and President Hugo Chavez. Pastrana had taken steps to include these leaders in the peace process. Castro had decided to take a back-stage approach but

offered to support the peace talks. Chavez also stated his willingness to support the peace process when called upon. Nonetheless, the FARC demanded all negotiations and mediations take place within Colombia and without international presence. The FARC had consistently demanded the demilitarized zone be expanded in order for any cease-fires to be considered. Throughout Pastrana's term, the FARC used this area to launch attacks, continue their illegal drug trafficking and expand their ranks. The Colombian government was unable to utilize international diplomatic support, as the FARC continued to demand negotiations take place within their demilitarized territory.

In addition to political acknowledgement, the FARC also demanded more credible penal action taken against the paramilitary groups. On April 29, 2000 the FARC created the *Movimiento Bolivariano por la Nueva Colombia* (MBNC) or the Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia in an attempt to become a more civically engaged organization. Yet, throughout the negotiation process, kidnappings and assassinations of Colombian officials and FARC members continued. Also, the "necklace bomb" event on May 16, 2000 led media attention to the paramilitary's violent attempt to sabotage the peace talks by blaming the occurrence on the FARC. Explosives were placed on the neck of a woman and the bomb was set off as experts tried to remove the device. Many claimed that the paramilitaries were the only counterbalance against the guerrillas, since the Colombian military, at the time, did not have the resources and strength to combat either group. Paramilitaries were also competitors of the illegal drug trafficking industry. Without them, it would have been effortless for the FARC to take over the industry. Notwithstanding, the FARC also took actions to dissuade the GOC from continuing the peace talks. On September 18, 2000, the FARC hijacked a plane carrying a FARC

prisoner and landed it in the demilitarized zone. Pastrana immediately called off the peace talks opting instead to finding resources outside of Colombia and a new approach to end the conflict. President Pastrana traveled during his administration four times according to news sources to the FARC safehaven. He was able to meet with FARC leadership three times during those visits. With each talk came the disappointing actions by the FARC, the paramilitaries and the GOC as their actions continued to contradict the resolution of the internal conflict.

Pastrana looked to the United States to provide military support and he armed Colombia in anticipation of a possible collapse of the peace talks. During Pastrana's administration he solidified what is known as Plan Colombia, a drug eradication plan that had initially incorporated social and economic development. Pastrana envisioned Plan Colombia as an opportunity for the country to dissuade rural peasants from cultivating coca plants and put its labor force back to work. However, the funding for the program was almost exclusively used for the eradication of coca production and the fight against illegal drug trafficking. With Plan Colombia, the failing economy was able to borrow the aid needed to build its arms and prepare to combat the guerrillas-turned-drug traffickers. By October 7, 2001, almost immediately following the fall of the twin towers at the World Trade Center; the GOC had ended the peace talks and prepared to join the fight against the War on Terror. The FARC were included on the U.S. Department of State's list of terrorists and remain on that list to this day. Once the peace talks came to an end, the Colombian army moved in to close the demilitarized zone – which was at this point the size of Switzerland.

Escalations

The conflict escalated quickly as the international community began to pay closer attention to the escalating conflict. In order to de-escalate these actions, the FARC gave parts of the demilitarized zone back to the GOC in the presence of national and international media. The GOC attempted, as a last ditch effort, to restart the dialogue before the holiday season on December 24, 2001. However, in the beginning of 2002 the GOC was unable to make any concessions, even through U.N. participation and a new 14-point agenda created by the FARC. By February 21, 2002 President Pastrana made the final announcement of ending the peace talks with the FARC. Leading up to the presidential campaign was the citizens' desire to end the talks as no concrete solutions were made and the killings continued. The Colombian citizenry demanded a quick end to the FARC conflict – since peace talks seemed futile and the only other option, as the future President of Colombia campaigned, was the use of brute force to stamp out the FARC.

End of Negotiations

Throughout the last four decades of violence, the rural communities have been caught in the middle of the violence from all sides and lack access to resources. During the GOC take over of FARC territory, rural communities were often marked as FARC collaborators. With limited options, there was an exodus of displaced persons to the urban cities, something which still plagues Colombia today. Unable to join one or the other group out of fear that the GOC, the FARC or paramilitaries will attack them, their only choice was to flee. Tired of fleeing, the citizens began to rally behind a presidential candidate who would take a hard stance against both the FARC and the paramilitaries. By

2002, Plan Colombia allowed for the next President to take advantage of intelligence, training and equipment provided by the U.S. to rid the country of terrorist organizations by force.

President Pastrana dedicated his whole administration to the possibility of a cease-fire agreement. Throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s much changed in the world; including the attack on the U.S. on September 11, 2001. Strategies to combat the “War on Drugs” during President Clinton’s administration changed into strategies to combat the global “War on Terror” for President Bush. With good intentions, Pastrana sought outside sources to grow the economy but the funding, as demonstrated above, focused primarily on expanding the GOC military.

Uribe Administration

Uribe Context

The Uribe administration policies towards the FARC were in stark contrast to the Pastrana administration. In 2002, Uribe campaigned on a firm hand or *mano dura* stance with the FARC. Civil society had tired of the Pastrana’s administration, which had shown little results after four years of attempted negotiations. President Alvaro Uribe was personally affected by the FARC when they killed his father in a 1983 kidnapping attempt. President Uribe’s father was a wealthy landowner who had ties to the cattle industry and the Medellin Cartel. In his obituary in *El Mundo*, a popular newspaper in Medellin, the article sites President Uribe, then mayor of Medellin, as utilizing Pablo Escobar’s helicopter to reach his father at the hospital. Many critics point to his father’s death as Uribe’s point of contention and desire to forcefully put an end to FARC activities.

President Alvaro Uribe's political involvement started at a young age with his five-month term as the mayor of Medellin. Prior to becoming elected to the presidency, Uribe was the governor of Antioquia from 1995 – 1997. During his time as governor, Uribe presided over the controversial security program called CONVIVIR. The basis of this program was to rid Antioquia of the FARC and its sympathizers. Defenders of human rights such as Human Rights Watch criticized the program and quickly pointed to its involvement with paramilitary violence. The group CONVIVIR was linked by federal government authorities to a series of killings in 1996 and 1997, while Uribe was governor. The program was later demobilized but it is thought that members may have joined paramilitary groups. During his presidential campaign in 2002, Uribe kept General Rito Alejo del Río, as a close adviser, who was fired in 1999 by President Andrés Pastrana for his alleged support of paramilitary groups while in command of the Seventeenth Brigade in Antioquia between 1995 and 1997. In 2002, the United States canceled Del Río's visa to the United States because of his alleged involvement in acts of terrorism and drug trafficking. Throughout Uribe's leadership, he allied himself with those who could forcefully rid Colombia of the FARC and their ideals.

Uribe's administration is marked by a rapid succession of events that completely changed Colombian security strategies. Uribe was not open or accessible for dialogue with the FARC and set preconditions for any negotiations to take place. President Uribe won the support of more than 53% of those who voted, most of which came from the upper and middle class of Colombia. With this new mandate and U.S. backing, the Uribe administration set forth on a military confrontation against the FARC. The election itself had an increase of 200,000 police and guards all over the country. Days after his

inauguration, Uribe implemented an emergency tax to increase military spending in a short time. The insistence on the use of force to end the internal war brought about much destruction throughout the country during Uribe's two terms in office. Both the GOC and the FARC were determined at that time to make sure each side would show its viability. Even when pressured from the U.S. and U.N. to pursue negotiations in May 2002, President Uribe insisted he would only initiate talks if "the rebels laid down their weapons and put an end to kidnappings" (BBC News). Such a hard stance on the FARC peace process could only bring more killings. Thus, "high security requirements make it very difficult to capitalize on a common interest and run the danger of setting off spirals of arms races and hostility" (Jervis 1979: 175). The incentives for peace by negotiation were greatly reduced with Uribe's policies.

Throughout his campaign, there were three known assassination attempts made to President Uribe by the FARC. After the election, the BBC reported news of attacks on mayors who supported Uribe but also of the possibility that the paramilitaries may have been involved in the attacks. Clearly, the feud between the paramilitary groups and FARC were only just beginning. Given President Uribe's intimate ties with paramilitary violence since he was governor, the paramilitary groups had much immunity in persecuting FARC and those labeled as FARC sympathizers. Such immunity led to atrocities, massacres and left civil society caught in the middle of ruthless killings. Negotiations were never recovered as the GOC concentrated on eliminating the FARC.

Uribe Negotiations

Without the initiative to reach a negotiated agreement the country seemed doomed to perpetual violence, strained relationships and an ongoing conflict for years to come. The war in 2002 recorded a staggering 1.2 million internally displaced Colombians. Attempts from the U.N. to mediate the conflict turned useless as each side made demands before any talks could take place. The FARC continued to demand a demilitarized territory while the GOC demanded the FARC release the kidnapped and demobilize. By 2003, the FARC and ELN joined forces to combat the GOC military offenses. For the guerrillas, this collaboration was their only chance for survival. In their opinion, “so long as the illegitimate government of Alvaro Uribe Velez persists in its fascist and militaristic policies, we will not move forward on any process of political rapprochement or national dialogue” (BBC News). Dialogues and pathways to peace proved elusive as the country used its resources to stamp out the FARC by force. Human rights activists and other NGOs recognized that the conflict in Colombia was turning into a blood match between the government and armed forces. In a book published in 2003, “The Authoritarian Curse,” over 80 organizations criticized President Uribe’s militarization of the conflict. That same year, Human Rights Watch (HRW) “assisted several threatened human rights prosecutors in Colombia, one of whom became the first Colombian prosecutor involved with human rights cases to receive direct assistance from the United States to gain political asylum and resettle in the country. [HRW] brought these cases to the direct attention of Colombia's president and the U.S. ambassador, urging their personal intervention to protect the lives of public officials who had investigated key cases implicating the military in collaboration with paramilitary groups.”

Across the board, human rights violations to the citizens, internal displacement and attacks on trade unionists, were the principal reasons behind the delayed free trade agreement with the United States.

Regardless, Colombian military, paramilitary and the FARC continued to combat thus increasing the risks for innocent bystanders. The violence, however, attributed to the release of captured FARC hostages since the kidnapped were released by the FARC to ease the attacks. Many of these releases were televised increasing the popularity of the Uribe administration. Even so, the FARC made pleas to the military to resume talks for a negotiated agreement. Two letters were sent in 2003 to persuade military leaders to consider peace talks, which were largely ignored by the GOC. There seemed to be no available avenue for a negotiated end to the internal conflict. The only possibilities for dialogue were the exchanges of kidnapped for political prisoners. As such dialogues occurred, the GOC continued to target and assassinate FARC leaders.

In November 2003, the second in command of the FARC eastern bloc, Marco Aurelio Buendia was killed in a targeted attack. It was to be the first in a series of targeted attacks on the FARC. Two months later another FARC leader, Simon Trinidad was captured in Ecuador by the Colombia military. By May 2004, Simon Trinidad was sentenced to 35 years in prison. These targeted assassinations and captures left little room for peace talks. But at the same time gave leverage from which the GOC could bargain for more hostage releases. In August 2004, the GOC announced the possibility of exchanging 50 FARC prisoners for the kidnapped kept by the FARC via talks with the FARC by Luis Restrepo, the government negotiator at the time. At the time of this paper's writing, Mr. Restrepo is currently under investigation for the false demobilization

of a FARC brigade. The GOC had further made several conditions to the exchange, which the FARC rejected. According to the BBC the FARC had “59 people hostage, including 22 politicians, 34 military personnel and police officers and three U.S. nationals.” Shortly, another proposal was sent to the FARC to pardon 23 guerrillas and encourage a similar exchange of kidnapped politicians.

Yet that same month, the GOC captured another senior leader of the FARC, Rodrigo Granda. The GOC threatened the FARC with the possibility of extraditing Simon Trinidad unless the FARC released the kidnapped. The tactics used by the GOC seemed to stem more violence, less cooperation and fewer opportunities for a peaceful solution. At the beginning of 2005, another FARC leader was extradited to the U.S. for handling the finances of the drug trafficking accounts of the FARC. In August 2005 the GOC again attempted to negotiate with the FARC on an exchange of the kidnapped for guerrilla prisoners after a series of attacks made by the FARC. The proposal was rejected by the FARC and reinforced their plans to dismantle Uribe’s security initiative. Another offer was made by the GOC enticing the FARC to join peace talks for a hostage exchange while the GOC would halt military operations for a period of 90 days in the Pradera municipality. Again, the FARC rejected this proposal, as it did not satisfy their demands for a large demilitarized zone. In the meantime, Uribe won the right to run for re-election in the upcoming year.

The media then shifted its attention to Uribe’s campaign strategy and the “progress” made by his security front. By the time of his reelection, the FARC publicly announced through Venezuelan media their intentions of returning to peace talks if a demilitarized zone was created to enable any type of negotiation. The GOC rejected

demands on FARC terms and said it would continue its security policy. In October 2006 after Uribe won the reelection, he announced that the only method for releasing hostages would be through a military rescue operation. After months of increased attacks from the FARC, the GOC announced its willingness to reopen pathways for a negotiated humanitarian trade. Uribe agreed to the possibility of having direct negotiations with the FARC. Further, at the request of the French government, the GOC released guerrilla prisoner, Rodrigo Granda into a government rehabilitation center in the hopes of reciprocity by the FARC in June 2007. The FARC viewed this as a farce and refused any type of reciprocity until a demilitarized zone was established. After protests by thousands of Colombian citizens to release hostages, the GOC announced the possibility of creating a demilitarized zone for peace talks if the FARC released its hostages.

Uribe Third Party Involvement

Towards the end of 2007, the GOC supported mediated talks through Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. Although, no hostages were released that year, a video capturing Ingrid Betancourt, the presidential candidate who was captured in 1998 and French citizen, showing she was alive helped put an end to rumors that she had been killed. Through President Chavez' efforts Ms. Clara Rojas, the woman who had campaigned with Ingrid Betancourt was released in January 2008. The FARC also released four Congressmen the next month through the efforts made by President Chavez. Briefly after these releases, the GOC killed Raul Reyes in Ecuador, one of the top leaders of the FARC command in March 2008 along with Ivan Rios, head of the central bloc of the FARC forces.

The killing of Raul Reyes in Ecuador brought much tension into the Andean region as Ecuadoran troops moved to the border, against what they called Colombian aggression. Chavez recalled his involvement in the mediation process and also moved troops to the border. The tensions were finally dismantled at the Summit of the Americas in 2008. The Uribe administration highly publicized the surrender of a FARC member that was under Rios' command. In addition, the death of Manuel Marulanda by natural causes in May 2008 greatly weakened the FARC membership and was considered a great blow to the FARC morale. Marulanda was one of the founding members of the FARC and had led the organization since 1964.

Another blow to the FARC membership came with the GOC military rescue of Ingrid Betancourt in July 2008. Later that year, a FARC guerrilla fighter and a captured Congressman escaped contributing to the FARC's perception of deterioration. Military checkpoints were established throughout the country and the FARC were forced to flee deep within Colombia's mountains. Through mediation, with then Colombian Senator Piedad Cordoba, the FARC released another hostage in February 2009. Cordoba was later accused of collaborating with the FARC and was removed from office. The GOC later banned her from running in a public office for 18 years. She continued her work towards a political solution and is actively involved with organizations that promote peace.

Escalations

In March 2009, the FARC launched Plan Rebirth to contradict the perception that the movement was dying. By 2009, the numbers of internally displaced increased by 25% under Uribe's security mandate. With the increased violence from the security initiative,

the civilians had no choice but to flee in desperation. According to U.N. estimates, there are a total of 3.6 million internally displaced people in Colombia. Many of these people fled to the cities, creating drastic changes to the urban landscape. Yet, the security mandate still seems to dominate the political agenda.

A year later, in March 2010, the FARC released a captured soldier with meditation efforts from ex-Senator Cordoba. The GOC also recovered four more kidnapped officials through a rescue operation in June 2010. By this time Colombia had elected Juan Manuel Santos to continue Colombia's path for legitimate force. Even so, the FARC called for a political resolution for the conflict and was quoted saying "Between all of us, we have to find common ground and, with the input of a majority of Colombians, we have to identify the difficulties, the problems and contradictions and create perspectives and a way out of the armed conflict" (BBC News). Santos was the Defense Minister under President Uribe and is slated to continue the security initiatives. In the first two years of his presidency Santos has implemented the same strategies as his predecessor. New laws have also passed in recognition of the millions of civilian victims from the armed conflict. It is yet to be seen if the GOC can create the infrastructure needed to address those who have lost their territory via displacements. Nevertheless, while negotiations are underway to halt FARC kidnapping, the GOC continues its offensive in the killing more guerrilla fighters.

Pastrana Theoretical Analysis

Clearly Pastrana's administration took risks in attempting to solve the conflict with the FARC through peace talks. Although the GOC and the civilian population were

ready for a negotiated agreement the FARC had become a powerful force. Therefore, without the commitment by the GOC to make concessions there existed little incentives for the FARC to settle on GOC terms. The opportunity for successful negotiations can only occur when “each party feels better off with the agreement than without one” (Zartman and Rubin 2000: 286). As witnessed during his four years in office, the FARC and GOC continued their offenses against each other. Both groups utilized political and military tactics to condemn the peace talks. The integrity of the talks was constantly tested by the actions taken by both parties.

Initially, the GOC may have utilized the demilitarized zone to lure the FARC to begin the dialogue but as the demands became larger and more controversial, the GOC backed away from any real commitments or actions towards long-lasting solutions. The result of the four-year process was a lofty agenda, several meetings that did not amount to more progress and little buy-in from other sectors of the government and society.

In the initial stages of the negotiation, a key component to bringing each side to the table is relationship building. Between the GOC and the FARC there is a perpetual distrust that stems from a long history of violence. With each step forward during Pastrana’s administration, there was a step backward. The late 1990s brought a great promise towards a negotiated settlement but as time progressed, each side was unwilling to take the peace process a step further. Trust plays an important role in keeping and adopting new agreements. As GOC administrations change so does the ability for each administration to capture trust. Ultimately, a change in leadership has an affect on the strategies to either terminate or prolong the peace process.

The idea that one can simply wipe out another has long lost its effectiveness in a world where knowledge and the spread of ideas is at one's fingertips. These ideas continue to inspire new guerrilla leadership and social movements. For example, students from Mexico who were researching the FARC had been tragically killed when GOC forces targeted the FARC leader Raul Reyes in Ecuador. These students may have been inspired by FARC ideals and sought to study them. It is therefore imperative that the GOC realize the importance of gaining the trust of the FARC leaders, guerrilla fighters but also civil society. Neither side can reach its optimum outcomes without the participation of the community. The grass-roots approach to conflict resolution is often thought to belong solely to the citizens from the bottom. Yet, a community includes all citizens from the poor to the wealthy, from the farmer to the businessman, the FARC to the GOC. Ury explains that communities can become "self-organizing, with its own natural laws. As each person contributes his or her bit, a powerful phenomenon materializes" (Ury 2000: 14). Further, he argues that the community that works collaboratively on their interests can take action to influence others to do the same. Only in collaboration can the community affect change in their current situation. When acting "individually, people may not prove very influential. But collectively, they are potentially more powerful than any two conflicting parties. Organizing themselves into a coalition, they can balance the power between the parties and protect the weaker one" (Ury 2000: 15). Perhaps the most visible of communities acting in unison are the mass demonstrations in 2011 that occurred throughout the Middle East, such as: Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. These communities were able in some instances to rid themselves of decades-old regimes. The struggle continues in many of these communities but has demonstrated

that a collaborated, organized community can take power of their current situation and improve their conditions. In Colombia today, the citizens are slowly rebuilding their trust in the GOC to end the conflict and rid society of the FARC.

Out of the eleven Colombian citizens who were surveyed and living in Bogota ranging from students to non-profit professionals, five opted for a military solution to the conflict. Many explained that after the failed negotiations and continued violence of the early 2000s, they did not expect the FARC to comply with any agreements if they were ever made. However, extinguishing the FARC may not bring an end to the conflict either, since the “revolutionary and leftist” ideas that formed part of their armed struggle will continue to spread if not addressed. Ury acknowledges that “unresolved conflict escalates because no one is paying attention to the conflict, or even if someone is, because no one sets limits on the fighting or lastly because no one intervenes to provide protection. ” (Urey 2000: 170). Protection is not just the responsibility of the GOC but also of the Colombian citizens. Each community and each neighborhood can provide protection from the abuses by one side or another. Yet, it is their inaction that will prolong the conflict. As an outsider, it is easy to call the citizens to action, yet the reality is always different. Fear continues to thrive as the media, government and even the FARC spread fear through the use of violence. Ury notes, “once people feel safer through strengthened defenses, they become more willing to discard their offensive weapons” (Ury 2000:182).

For Colombians, the use of legitimate force by their government seems closer as the Uribe and now Santos administration continue to build the country militarily. Ury continues, “the aim is simultaneously to reduce the power of offensive weapons and strengthen defenses to the point where the advantage in any fight goes to the defender.

Any would-be aggressor would then think hard before attacking” (Ury 2000:182). The Pastrana administration, in giving the demilitarized zone for peace talks initiated an atmosphere of trust and relationship building. In good faith, they also retracted the label of criminal organization and terrorist labels and instead referred to the FARC as a political organization. These acts gave way for a cease-fire agreement in 1999 and 2000. Without such drastic measures, it is difficult to see any progress for peace in the country.

However, with the passing of time and the agenda set, the goals and the furthering of peace seem to have become limited. While both the GOC and the FARC spoke of working towards a solution, they acted on tit-for-tat murders, killings and attacks. In 2000, the FARC were blamed for the killing of a TV director, which spread widely across the media. By May of the same year, the infamous “necklace bomb” topped headlines. Bomb experts tried to remove the bomb from a woman but were unsuccessful and all were killed. Colombian citizens were shocked and terrified at such an event, denouncing all those who were involved. The media initially blamed the FARC for the bomb but later pointed the finger to paramilitary groups. The media has played a large part in changing public opinion and shaping perspectives on the progress of the armed conflict. Further exacerbating the talks was the forced landing of a FARC prisoner in the demilitarized zone after hijacking the plane. The talks were formally suspended until February 2001. During this time Pastrana met with Marulanda in an attempt to reinstate the negotiations. This proved unsuccessful as the GOC prepared to retake the demilitarized zone. Throughout this process, the community could only speculate about the progress of the talks reported through the media. Such limited access to the peace process made the talks elusive from their onset. Without active participation, the talks were reduced to top-level

discussions of which only the interests of the government and the FARC could be discussed. However, the lives of millions of Colombians are affected by these decisions. Therefore, in order for the talks to be successful, there needed to be more involvement, more education and more ideas from the citizens to keep a sustainable peace process. The government of Colombia spurred the citizens to stay involved through the lens of the media that could only produce more fatigue as reports of continued violence and kidnappings kept the peace process from attaining any semblance of meaningful progress.

The '*Agenda Común Para el Cambio*' set lofty goals, which did not produce any effect on the general population. If avenues had been created for community involvement such as an institutionalized structure to report kidnapping, grievances, social reforms and the strengthening of the judicial system, then perhaps the government could have had the public support needed to continue the peace process. Yet, the offenses continued from both sides. Ignoring public sentiment and pulled the public away from any type of a negotiated settlement, the GOC made it difficult for the public and other sectors of the government to buy in to the idea of reaching the agenda items.

With few tangible results from the peace process, Colombians elected an ultra-right ideologist with the mandate to forcefully put an end to the FARC insurgency. Sustainable peace can only be attained with the acknowledgement and greater participation of the citizens. Wanis-St. John and Kew describe civil society with the potential to deliver support for viable agreements but also "they are seen as potentially spoilers – that is, they are believed to be in a position to undermine significantly any agreement that might be reached" (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008: 20). The power to influence the government's ability to continue the peace process is enormous and was

seen in the election of President Alvaro Uribe to put an abrupt halt to these efforts. For Wanis-St. John and Kew, the power of local communities could have a greater effect on the peace process than the national and international actors.

Local leaders are the most likely to know the conflict intimately, as their populations face the FARC along with other armed groups. Such arguments were made by scholars like Angélica Rettberg in her in depth analysis of civil society grassroots movements towards peace. Rettberg demonstrates the capacity for community mobilization and desire to move towards peace through activism. The difficulty stems from the multitude of initiatives from poverty, to education to violence and displacement. Rettberg suggests that these movements take a more united approach in finding common agendas and whose approach has an emphasis to put on an end to the guerilla movement. She recommends the community focus on “a) a political solution to the armed conflict b) address the direct impacts (destruction, loss of life, displacements) and indirect impacts from the armed conflict (reparations, reincorporation of justice and security). ” (Rettberg 2004: 56). Further, she calls all active members of society to remember the importance of social development as a topic that should be worked on concurrently with all the initiatives mentioned.

Colombian citizens have taken it upon themselves to work towards peace with and without the help of the government. However, to create long lasting sustainable peace with all parties involved in the conflict the citizens must all work together to create a united effort in ending the armed conflict. Ury explains that not all conflict is bad; in fact, conflict is necessary for progress. It is the constant use of brutal force that takes deteriorates a society’s ability to resolve the underlying issues.

For years, the FARC have battled under leftist ideologies. Attempts have been made to incorporate these ideologies into the political sphere. Through these attempts, the FARC have learned that once they turn in their weapons, they face assassination when running for political office. The lack of security and space for their ideas has kept the ongoing-armed conflict. According to news sources, three thousand FARC members who were a part of the Patriot Union party were killed during the 1980s. Even amongst the mass killings of the disarmed FARC members, the leadership continued to profess its desire to have political space in the creation of the *Movimiento Bolivariano por la Nueva Colombia* (MBNC). The MBNC was launched in April 2000 as a new avenue to spread the FARC's leftist ideals. It has since continued to exist under the auspices of the FARC but has not launched any formal political campaigns. (See Annex 2 for the MBNC platform). With good reason, the MBNC has stayed behind the scenes while the FARC continues its armed offense. Nevertheless, the interests of both the GOC and FARC have not reached a crossing point. Negotiation theory tells us the importance of finding the crossing point to reach sustainable agreements.

With Pastrana's mandate to end the armed conflict, he set the tone by conceding to FARC demands on a demilitarized zone and also recognizing the group as a political organization. Even with the initial backing of Colombian citizens to end the violence, the government missed the opportunity to bring lasting peace to the country, progress made was slow and did not allow for greater participation. The high level talks did not pull from local resources and community engagement. Wanis-St. John and Kew explain "peace negotiations, even when they result in agreement, may not definitely resolve the underlying conflict issues and worse still they may not mark an end to the violence"

(Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008: 1). In the case of Colombia, the small steps made by the GOC to induce the FARC to a peace agreement did not halt the violence, kidnappings, and extortion. Many of the kidnapped were political officials, police and soldiers of which the government had a great interest in their release. The GOC was successful in a prisoner exchange where the FARC released 250 police and soldiers in the exchange of 14 FARC members in jail in June 2001. The action showed signs of positive steps taken towards peace. However, in August 2001, the GOC military attacked the FARC and killed almost 50 rebels. The Colombian military seemed all too ready to reclaim the demilitarized territory, even after the release of kidnapped soldiers. By September 2001, shortly after 9/11 the peace talks with the FARC were cancelled, almost in anticipation of the pending actions to be taken by the U.S. The talks never resumed as the presidential campaigns took hold of the media attention.

Candidates were now campaigning for a hard-handed approach to ending the FARC insurgency. Non-violent approaches disappeared as the candidates called for a toughening on the FARC. William Ury provides an analysis of underlying interest and the approaches to obtaining needs or desires “Just because there is a conflict of interests, however, does not necessarily imply a conflict of positions. Where the norm was to share food and access to territory, many potential conflict of interests would not have become overt conflicts of position. Nor do conflicts of position necessarily produce power struggles. The habit of cooperation would have helped people find ways to avert escalation by, for instance negotiating fair division. Humans, in short, have a choice – they can handle their conflicts cooperatively or coercively. Far from being the opposite of conflict, then cooperation becomes a prime way to deal with conflict” (Ury 2000: 41).

The conflict gradually shifted from a focus on a negotiated settlement to the use of brute force. However, underlying interests remain unresolved causing for a perpetual existence of the conflict and a limited space to address these issues. Wanis-St. John and Kew would argue that the lack of citizen participation directly resulted in unsustainable peace efforts.

News reports demonstrated the harsh tactics and continued violence under a supposed negotiated effort to bring peace. The citizens rallied behind those who could bring an end to the violence. For these authors, civil society “give[s] voice to broader segments of the population whose interests are not well represented by the Track 1 negotiators, but civil society’s presence also pressures Track I actors to function in a more democratic fashion and perhaps to take actions to address the public interests they purport to represent” (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008: 30). With pressure from Colombian citizens, the past 10 years under President Uribe and President Santos have seen a recurrence in violence and an exponential increase in the percentage of GDP spent on the military and security forces. All in the name of rendering the FARC obsolete.

Uribe Theoretical Analysis

The regime under President Uribe made a complete turn around in the negotiated settlement approach of President Pastrana. Although Pastrana made great strides in obtaining funding for Uribe’s military campaign, Pastrana was always under the impression that Plan Colombia would also serve to help Colombia invest in its people. Social reforms were left on the wayside while Uribe pushed for the militarization of the conflict. President Uribe succeeded in stamping out large sectors of the FARC membership. Reducing their numbers greatly but at a high cost of civilian casualties.

Scandals and human rights abuses by the military and paramilitary forces were rampant. The *falsos positivos*, where soldiers would massacre villages to increase their count of FARC deaths, were abhorred by the population and human rights organizations around the world. Many of Uribe's cabinet members would later resign as investigations implicated them with involvement in paramilitary activities and drug trafficking.

Negotiations during Uribe's presidency focused solely on the idea of trading prisoners. The Peace Commissioner from 2002 - 2010, Luis Carlos Restrepo largely focused on dismantling the AUC (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia) paramilitary group. Restrepo and Uribe ignored the possibility of any talks with the FARC unless the group met their pre-conditions. Most of Restrepo's interaction with the FARC was in reaction to hostage releases the FARC made in order to entice the GOC to release imprisoned FARC members. Recent news reports Restrepo's involvement in the false demobilization of a small FARC bloc in 2006. To date, he has fled the country to avoid arrest; implicating him further in these allegations.

President Alvaro Uribe's desire to rid Colombia of the FARC has grown from his personal connections with the FARC, the drug cartels and paramilitaries. Roger Fisher and William Ury explain that in each negotiation "the human aspect of negotiation can be helpful or disastrous. The process of working out an agreement may produce a psychological commitment to a mutually satisfactory outcome" (Fisher and Ury 1991: 19). The platform under Uribe made it clear to the FARC that there would be little room for an all encompassing negotiated settlement. The assassination attempts by the FARC committed during Uribe's campaign trail also meant that any future dialogue would be strained. Thus any negotiated proposals that were generated during Uribe's eight years in

office were often dismissed by the FARC. After all “every negotiator wants to reach an agreement that satisfies his substantive interests” (Fisher and Ury 1991: 19). For Uribe’s administration the goal was to militarily limit the FARC’s ability to carry out attacks and successfully release the kidnapped. For the FARC, they continued their armed struggle to bring awareness to their cause. Many citizens could no longer see the FARC’s cause as their attacks against government forces brought an equal amount of losses. It is important to recognize that with any negotiation the relationship between the parties is as important as the outcome produced by the negotiation (Fisher and Ury 1991: 20). Sustainable peace is the ability to create a long-lasting relationship that allows the exchange of information and ideas.

Since 1998 the FARC have maintained a large number of political prisoners: presidential candidates, GOC soldiers and police officers. During Uribe’s presidency the rescue of the kidnapped and the capture and killing of the FARC were made public via the media – increasing Uribe’s popularity. With support from the U.S. who was fighting “Wars on Terror” and “Wars on Drugs,” Colombia was the example of how this policy could be executed. Yet, demonstrations of military strength that sought to exterminate the enemy in the 21st century have been disasters: Iraq, Afghanistan and the al-Qaida group – with no end in sight. Meanwhile, civilians continue to be the most impacted. The internal war that the GOC has continued with guerilla fighters, paramilitary groups (which at times were supported by the GOC) and drug cartels also seem to have no end in sight.

President Uribe was able to attract the world’s attention to the violence in Colombia through military offenses taken against the FARC. “People think of negotiating power as being determined by resources like wealth, political connections, physical

strength, friends and military might. In fact, the relative negotiating power of two parties depends particularly on how attractive to each is the option of not reaching agreement” (Fisher and Ury 1991: 102). The Uribe administration also captured three high-ranking officials of the FARC and extradited them to the U.S. on drug trafficking allegations. These continued attacks from the GOC signaled its strategy to maintain the legitimacy of the use of force and the perception of its increased power. With this, the GOC expected to gain more leverage in bargaining for the release of those still captive by the FARC. However, neither the FARC nor the GOC would negotiate unless their terms were met.

In Colombia, from 2002 – 2010, the ability for the two parties to negotiate on equal terms, address underlying issues and the needs of their support were limited. After an unsuccessful negotiations in his first term, Uribe enlisted President Hugo Chavez and Senator Piedad Cordoba in 2007 to mediate a humanitarian exchange with the FARC. Successful bids for the hostage release of Clara Rojas and Consuelo Gonzalez were made in 2008 but not without much controversy. President Chavez was removed from the mediation efforts when he had direct communication with the military – a condition that was placed during the negotiations. Chavez responded by removing his ambassador to Colombia. Relations between Venezuela and Colombia would resume after talks and an apology by Chavez. After the attack on the camp of Raul Reyes in March 2008, a high-ranking FARC leader, a laptop was confiscated containing files implicating Senator Cordoba with close ties to FARC long-term strategies. The end of a thorough investigation in 2010 prohibited Senator Cordoba from running for public office for eighteen years. She is appealing and has denounced these claims. Interestingly, in 2009 she was nominated for the Nobel Prize for her efforts to release hostages. These releases

and the death of Raul Reyes attributed to the perception of the FARC's demise. Yet, small attacks by the FARC in rural areas against paramilitaries and GOC military continued, top FARC leaders were jailed, assassinated or died.

Thus, the FARC's tactics remained the same, the kidnapped were still held and sustainable peace efforts remained on the sidelines. The achievements made by President Chavez and Senator Cordoba demonstrated the importance of relationships to achieve stated interests – the release of the political prisoners. Both were able to implement FOTE (Full, Open, Truthful Exchange) (Raiffa et al. 2002: 85 – 87). Such efforts were an important step to realizing the end goals for both the FARC and the GOC. Conflict would not simply subside with the end of violence. Conflict allows for debate, progress and the empowerment of people to meet their needs. Many Colombians have lost their land during the war, the abuses to human rights are rampant and the ability to freely join the political space without repercussion is still elusive. Wanis-St. John and Kew state that “sustained peace does not mean that serious problems have ended. Numerous concerns plague post-conflict countries including much of which is exacerbated by the challenges of demobilizing, disarming and reintegrating former fighters” (2008: 28). The FARC are a weakened force by the number of deaths and captured leaders. Yet, they continue to launch attacks when possible, making it known to the Colombian citizens that the internal conflict has not ended.

Escalation Analysis

The tit-for-tat strategies used during the Uribe campaign resonate with the conflict spiral model of Kim and Pruitt. “In a conflict spiral, the motivation for both sides is partly

a matter of revenge – to punish Other for the suffering it has produced” (Pruitt and Kim 2004: 96). Once begun, the conflict spirals can take years to overcome. In Colombia, it is only recently under increased scrutiny by the public to renounce kidnapping that the FARC has announced it will cease this policy. “Each side feels that its reputation for resolute self-defense is on the line. In addition, neither side is willing to make conciliatory moves that might break the cycle” (Pruitt and Kim 2004: 97). Even when small conciliatory moves were made by the FARC in releasing hostages, such as the release of Clara Rojas, the GOC would counter it by an offensive, the military rescue of Ingrid Betancourt. For more than 10 years during the Uribe administration and currently under Santos, the FARC and the GOC have been at odds in the public. The GOC remains that the best way to combat the FARC is an outright military offensive

“The belief that an increase in military strength always leads to an increase in sensitivity is often linked to the belief that the only route to security is through military strength. As a consequence, a whole range of ameliorative policies will be downgraded. Decision makers who do not believe that adopting a more conciliatory posture, meeting the other’s legitimate grievances, or developing mutual gains from cooperation can increase their state’s security, will not devote much attention or effort to these possibilities” (Jervis 1979: 183).

The focus on security to build peace has greatly changed the FARC’s ability to come at a peaceful end to their armed struggle. Perhaps there are other routes to explore a negotiated settlement for both parties to lay down their arms. The authors describe that the transformation of the conflict during a spiral “escalation is commonly accompanied by several other transformations: issues proliferate, parties become increasingly committed to the struggle, specific issues give way to general ones, the desire to succeed turns into a desire to win, which turns into a desire to hurt Other, positive feelings give way to negative feelings and both sides grow by recruiting formerly neutral individuals

and groups” (Pruitt and Kim 2004:100). Colombia has witnessed an exponential increase in military spending that seems to have helped to decrease FARC capabilities.

However, in concentrating in arming the military the GOC created much destruction throughout the country and the decreased potential funding for social reforms and political inclusion – the basis for the existence of the FARC. Increasing security and ensuring safety is a crucial aspect to any government’s social policy. In Colombia, increased security translated into safety for the urban centers but dismal environments in rural areas. It is in these rural areas that the FARC have continued to thrive. The absence of the GOC creates a space for the FARC to continue its activities. The negative feelings that are generated from years of ongoing attacks have left little chance for a negotiated settlement. Pruitt and Kim explain, “hostile attitudes and perceptions tend to endure once established because they support each other. Negative beliefs validate negative feelings and negative feelings make negative beliefs seem right” (Pruitt and Kim 2004: 153). These attitudes and beliefs only lead to more hostile actions by both sides. Sustainable peace and long-term peace seeks to transform these hostilities.

Other authors such Lax and Sebenius offered various approaches to increase opportunities for negotiated agreements. The authors argued that the ‘norm of reciprocity’ could increase avenues for trust, encourage sharing and when executed properly, increase the ability to request more reciprocity (Lax and Sebenius 2006: 209). These tactics were used numerous times by both parties. In June 2007, the GOC released FARC prisoners in the hopes the FARC would do the same. In February 2009, the FARC released several political prisoners held since 2001. Both of these instances were marked by several others but did not produce the reciprocity intended. According to Lax and

Sebenius in negotiations there can be a sequence in negotiated agreements. Typically the sequence begins with the easiest issues first. These procedures would help “build trust, rapport, as sense that progress is possible and momentum as you tackle harder issues. Getting to easy issues out of the way can simplify the remaining negotiation” (Lax and Sebenius 2006: 210). In the Colombian context with Uribe and Santos in the leadership, the issues are not easy or simple.

The exchange of highly publicized hostages and prisoners would seem as a weakness of any side if there were no reciprocity. As long as the GOC continues to publicly announce their military campaigns against the FARC it is difficult to see any transformation to the conflict. It is imperative for the GOC if they want to see an end to the internal conflict to first build the relationship with the FARC. For the authors “building a positive relationship during and after the negotiation process and expanding that working relationship into a constructive social contract over the life of the deal” is part of what makes lasting, sustainable agreements (Lax and Sebenius 2006: 149). Utilizing mediators such as President Chavez and Senator Cordoba was one step towards improving the relationship between the FARC and the GOC. Since those mediations have ended, the ability for the FARC and the GOC to come together on any issue has faded.

Civil Society Analysis

The top-level approach has not worked to end the Colombian conflict. The lack of opportunities to negotiate proves the distrust, lack of understanding and miscommunication between these two groups. The Uribe and Santos leadership were elected in a democratic process and were given a mandate by the citizens to control the

FARC attacks just as Pastrana was elected to attempt open dialogue. The citizens play an important role in the possibility to end the internal conflict by negotiated settlement or by a military solution.

In surveys I collected of more than ten Colombians living in major cities of Colombia in January 2012, half agreed with a military solution to the conflict. Most agreed that Colombia still faced a threat by the FARC who they categorized as a narco-terrorist organization. In describing the FARC, one Colombian citizen wrote the following: “They are the cancer of Colombia, that excuse themselves before the world with ‘principles’ of liberation, but in reality they are a people with weapons who massacre the innocent, kidnap for ransom, plant bombs, destroy nature with illicit plantations, traffic drugs and weapons, the FARC are nothing of what they say to the world, they are one of the coldest terrorist groups, most aggressive and most corrupt currently active in world” (Jan. 2012 Survey). The utter disgust is palpable in these phrases as are other descriptions captured in the survey. To them, the FARC remain a pest to the economic development of the country, an antiquated group that has lost all resemblance of its ideological past. All but one who participated agreed with the current policies in place: a military solution to the conflict. These answers demonstrate the belief that the country is going in the right direction by imposing a GOC military domination over all the armed groups in Colombia. The FARC, for these citizens, no longer has credence, “Because the FARC way of thinking is completely narrow-minded, they only think of themselves and not in the interest of Colombian society” (Jan 2012 Survey).

After failed attempts by President Pastrana, Colombian society grew tired of the

negotiations, which only brought more kidnappings, further armament of the FARC and deeper involvement in illicit drug trafficking.

When asked about how ordinary citizens could help bring an end to the conflict, many indicated the need to become more involved in collective action,

“Peace processes do not just lie in the field of politics and debates for negotiations. Colombia needs a society that is culturally conceived as a constructive society for peace and not war. My actions are intended to participate in alternative elections that choose regional development and finding solutions to the conflict, generate educational processes that affect the culture of war that has been learned by many years in all stages of the life, social, cultural and politics in Colombia. Lead or participate in demonstrations aimed at building a culture of nonviolence in all stages of life and build a relationship with oneself, with nature and society based on the recognition, respect and promotion of development” (Jan. 2012 Survey).

The Colombians surveyed all demonstrated the willingness to become actively involved in the peace process through elections, campaigns, demonstrations, paying taxes and not losing faith in their politicians. The survey thus provides useful insight to those who have grown knowing no other side of Colombia than the conflict at hand. Nonetheless, they demonstrate courage and faith that the current government can achieve their goals in ending FARC violence.

In the study by Rettberg, the author documents thousands of political, social and economic movements conducted by the citizens in pursuit of peace over the course of 14 years, from 1990 to 2004. She carefully describes the plethora of organizations reaching a variety of interests in maintaining sustainable peace in the country. She argues that although the GOC’s direct negotiations with the FARC have ended, the citizenry has demanded through its initiatives a more constructive path towards peace. “This results in organizations that focus their work on issues of forced displacement, reconciliation and

redress, address the specific needs of victims of the conflict and which focus on the challenges that emerge from the needs of demobilized combatants” (Rettberg 2004: 36). These activities take place parallel to the GOC military strategies; perhaps to fill the void left behind by the government. It is precisely the multitudes of various interests and avenues to achieve peace and lack of unified structure that have made the citizen organizations unable to produce long-lasting impacts within their communities. Society reflects the contradictions and conflicts inherent in a nation divided by years of war and political violence.

While civil society shows an enormous capacity for recovery, a great ability to mobilize the power from below and a capacity to generate new leaders, this reflects the many threads in the social fabric of the nation” (Rettberg 2004: 44). In the analysis, the author reinforces the credibility of citizens taking action to build peace in Colombia but highlights the importance of a unified approach backed by political support. A country that can jointly organize to bring sustainable peace in Colombia through grassroots efforts but also through political will can certainly put an end to the five-decade internal armed conflict.

The Pastrana and Uribe administrations have demonstrated the great variety of tactics used to bring an end to the internal conflict with the FARC. Through negotiations, understanding conflict escalation, and the participation of civil society, the GOC will have a greater ability to bring sustainable peace to Colombia. Security and the GOC’s institutions remain a major component of maintaining the capability to bring the FARC to the table. I argue that neither the GOC nor the FARC met each others’ underlying interests to bring a long-term sustainable peace in the country. Further, the

lack of participation from civil society during the dialogue contributes to the limited buy-in for the continuation of the peace talks. Instead the peace talks during the Pastrana administration aggravated society as they saw repeated offenses from FARC kidnappings and terrorist activities, as well as the government's support of paramilitary violence. For the GOC the priority was and continues to be to secure the country by building its military and police force. Only through a combined use of institution building, negotiations and a thorough understanding of citizenry, can the FARC and the GOC generate actions to produce sustainable peace.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Reach out to those you fear.
Touch the heart of complexity.
Imagine beyond what is seen.
Risk vulnerability one step at a time.
—John Lederach *The Moral Imagination*

In this thesis, I analyzed and contrasted the Pastrana and Uribe administrations' attempts to negotiate with the FARC to end the civil war. The research presented demonstrated that negotiations alone could not bring sustainable peace to Colombia. To date, the violence continues as both the GOC and the FARC launch attacks against each other. All things considering, what strategies can bring sustainable peace to Colombia?

Negotiation Findings

There are a number of factors contributing to the unsuccessful negotiations between the GOC and the FARC. Trust or the relationship between the GOC and the FARC, the conditions for the ripe moment, weak GOC institutions and the existence of illegal drug trafficking have contributed to the difficulty in reaching an end to the internal armed conflict. Further, political exclusion, economic instability and geopolitics have all contributed to the protracted nature of the conflict.

The asymmetrical negotiations have also led to the intractability of the conflict. From the onset, the GOC set the rules, had the legitimacy, and resources all of which the

FARC lacked and aimed to capture. Thus, negotiations under these conditions cannot produce lasting solutions; “one of the basic findings about the negotiation process is that it functions best under conditions of equality and indeed only takes place when the parties have some form of a mutual veto over outcomes” (Zartman 1995: 8). The FARC has not perceived any urgency in seeking settlement, as it can continue to finance its existence through the drug trafficking. All of the aforementioned factors contribute to an absence of ripeness in the negotiation process.

GOC relationship with the FARC

Prior to the negotiations attempted during the Pastrana and Uribe administrations, the GOC had a legacy of incorporating guerrilla insurgents into the political system and then delegitimizing their parties, committing targeted assassinations and not enforcing their agreements. Such was the case with the UP members who attempted to participate in Colombian politics and were assassinated by paramilitary groups under President Bentacur in the early 1990s. Further, M-19 leaders were killed during presidential campaigns and current ADM19 members are constantly under attack in media owned by political elites. The ADM19 was also slated to make changes to the constitution, which would allow for greater political access to civil society. These changes were largely ignored by the GOC.

During the Pastrana administration, the conflict between the FARC and the GOC had reached an important turning point. Civil society was ready for negotiations, pressuring the government to end the conflict with the FARC through negotiations. The

negotiations that occurred during the Pastrana administration demonstrated however, that they had not obtained the trust needed for any type of open exchange. The first official negotiation was marked by the absence of FARC leadership (*la silla vacia* incident). From then on, the GOC attempted to include the FARC in the negotiating table by inviting trusted third parties, Cuba, Venezuela, and the U.N. Further, the GOC also attempted to deliver a large demilitarized zone to the guerrilla forces in contemplation of negotiation. Despite these actions, the FARC at that time was supported by a large following, had hundreds of kidnapped, and access to continued financial support via illegal drug trafficking. The commitment to the cause exceeded the need to address grievances thus throwing away any possibility for a negotiated agreement (Zartman 1995: 9). With the media attention, and legitimacy of its insurgency, the FARC were emboldened to continue their fight until all of their demands were met. On the other hand, the GOC was unwilling to concede to their demands and negotiations slowly started to crumble. Other critical events changed the possibility for dialogue such as the necklace bomb incident. The FARC also hijacked a plane carrying a FARC prisoner and forced it to land in their demilitarized zone. From that moment, the talks with the GOC were suspended. The lack of trust was apparent throughout the GOC attempts to dialogue with the FARC. Both sides continued to sabotage the efforts by launching attacks on each other while appearing to negotiate.

Over the last decade the GOC has implemented a strong stance against the FARC and made attempts to eliminate their existence. Such a hard stance has made negotiations all but impossible. With the start of the Uribe administration all of the

demilitarized zones were secured and retaken by the government. The GOC criminalized the FARC labeling them as terrorists. Subsequently, the GOC would have difficulty in finding opportunities to negotiate with the FARC labeled as criminals or terrorists. During the Uribe administration little was accomplished through any type of high-level dialogue. The only issues leading to talks was the negotiation for exchange of kidnapped for FARC prisoners. Even so, the GOC lacked any trust in the FARC's ability to carry out peaceful exchanges and instead opted for heavily armed military operations to rescue the kidnapped. The fighting increased as each side launched attacks to counter the other. Thus, the GOC enlisted Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez to mediate between the two parties and help the GOC release some of the FARC's kidnapped.

The relationship between President Chavez and the Uribe administration lacked the trust needed to allow open dialogues. Uribe had placed conditions on Chavez not to speak to military officials directly; Chavez was to use the appropriate bureaucratic channels. Despite the condition, Chavez contacted military officials, which led to a breakdown in the GOC's communication with Venezuela. As a result, GOC further implicated Venezuela with collaborating with the FARC and harboring FARC leaders in their country. The only positive contribution, which came from Venezuelan dialogue with the FARC, was the release of videos proving the FARC kidnapped were alive as well as the release of some key hostages. Yet, the lack of trust between the GOC, Venezuela and the FARC prohibited any real exchanges and dialogue to take place.

The Ripe Moment

During civil war, the ripe moment for dialogue comes when both parties are at a stalemate and continued fighting outweighs the cost.

Three elements in the conflict affect its dynamic and govern the possibilities of successful negotiation: the insurgents' needs and the phases of rebellion, the government's agendas and structural relations between the two sides. The dynamics of each element are independent of each other; each has to be in the right phase to be supportive of negotiations. Such a multivariate determination of appropriate conditions further underlines the difficulty of resolving internal conflict (Zartman 1995: 13)

Perhaps the closest the country has been to the ripe moment was the election of Pastrana and his mandate to end the war through negotiations. Regardless of the opportunity, the GOC and the FARC threatened the peace mandate with escalated attacks. "Once the escalation has taken place, negotiation becomes much more difficult until both sides have adjusted to the new situation and found a new stalemate" (Zartman 1995: 19). The ripe moment can quickly come and go as each party rearms, finds new resources to continue fighting, and legitimizes its use of force. Only when the parties have reached a mutually hurting stalemate can they begin to have full, open and truthful exchanges. In Colombia, the mutual stalemate is now approaching as FARC release the last of their political hostages, demonstrating a turning point in the tactics used by the group. Yet, the GOC continues to launch attacks, targeting specific FARC encampments, and killing leaders. In the case of Colombia it is clear that the long protracted civil war has had an affect on taking advantage of the ripe moment.

After a long period marked by violence there is a suspicion of newly promised effectiveness of those politics. There is a danger that reconciliation may be a trap; either the government or the rebellion might take advantage of the opportunity to

rebuild its forces and to lure the other out into the open in ambush. Furthermore, violence is the only means the insurgents have to counter the power of government: without violence the asymmetry is overwhelming, because government by definition retains the legitimate use of force (Zartman 1995: 336).

The GOC has yet to reach its mutually hurting stalemate as resources continue to expand allowing the GOC to pursue its military objectives. Neither the GOC nor the FARC have been able to obtain the full support of all sectors of civil society. As certain sectors continue to be marginalized, they will continue to support FARC activities. While other sectors of society are affected by their inability to carry out their business activities, they will continue to persecute the FARC via their votes or by supporting paramilitary violence. In addition, the GOC has an obligation to use force and protect its citizens from both outside and inside threats.

Political Exclusion

Another reason why the Pastrana and Uribe administrations lacked success are the weak Colombian institutions. If unable to fully participate in the government, civil society will turn to methods that will allow them to contribute into normal politics. At times, Colombia was labeled as a failed state, incapable of maintaining security and attending to the basic social needs of its population. In recent years, Colombia has had an influx in funding to bolster the military and police forces. The funding provided the necessary tools to defend Colombia's citizens but is still in need of reform. The military largely ignores issues relating to human rights abuses committed by their members drawing outcries from affected citizens and NGOs. Even with surges in military might, a recent study shows that the GOC military is decreasing its efforts because of the low

morale. Military members are increasingly being brought to trial at Colombian civil courts even though most high-level senior officials are not prosecuted (Adam Isacson, Just the Facts, entry posted February 7, 2012).




Table 1. GOC Military (FFMM) and FARC Forces

The “Table 1” above is from a study by the Sergio Arboleda University, which graphically demonstrates the leveling of attacks from both the FARC and the GOC, and predicts the possibility of decreasing attacks from the GOC (Adam Isacson, Just the Facts, entry posted February 7, 2012). Security overall in the country has improved but still insufficient to further develop the economy; many still fear extortion especially in the rural areas. Without the appropriate and legitimate use of force, the GOC and the FARC will continue to fight each other until a mutual stalemate is reached. Until that time, victims of the violence have nowhere to turn in terms of justice.

Besides the GOC military, Colombia lacks a strong judicial system to properly prosecute violent crimes against its population. Progress towards peace and reconciliation cannot take place unless the judicial system can process grievances from victims. The country currently uses three different types of judicial processes for public, private and constitutional law. Further, Colombian military courts are set to prosecute defense personnel. Such a complicated system inhibits efficiency, prolonging already complicated cases and leading to frustrations on all sides. Access to this basic right to justice is denied to many Colombians. According to Amnesty International impunity is a long-standing issue in Colombia

A U.N. report on Colombia published earlier this year found that at least 300 people working as part of judicial investigations had been killed in the past 15 years. Colombia is the world's most dangerous country for trade unionists, and a staggering 95% of the roughly 3,000 cases of assassination of union members committed over the last 30 years remain unprosecuted.

The lack of justice will continue to impede the GOC's ability to end the civil war with the FARC and the public will begin to delegitimize the GOC unless the government does more to address judicial concerns. GOC negotiations with the FARC cannot progress unless more attention is paid to the security and justice of Colombian citizens. These critical institutions provide the greatest legitimacy to the government. Further, the GOC must provide basic needs to its citizens by providing access to housing, healthcare, education and employment.

The reality is that out of the 45.7 million Colombian citizens almost 3-5 million are internally displaced people (IDPs). According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, the rates of the IDPs in Colombia are only comparable to Sudan (3-5

million) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (2 million). The GOC must continue to strengthen its capacity to address the growing population of IDPs and provide basic social welfare to its ostracized population to also help delegitimize the FARC's cause. In Colombia the infant mortality rate remains at 17%, while maternal mortality rate is a staggering 76% according to UNICEF figures. These rates demonstrate that access to healthcare is largely unattainable for the most vulnerable sectors of society. Although, the literacy rate remains high there are little employment opportunities to apply this knowledge. The unemployment rate lies at 11% according to figures from the World Bank. The high rate of unemployment gives rise to clandestine operations that feed into illegal drug trafficking. Outside the capital, there is a great disparity between the urban and rural areas in terms of access to healthcare, education and employment. These disparities contribute to the growth of FARC members, paramilitary members and illegal drug trafficking.

Economic Instability

Another factor that contributed to the unsuccessful negotiations between the FARC and the GOC is the problem of increasing drug trafficking in Colombia. As economic development is left on the wayside while the government is purportedly increasing its arms, the civilian population is left with few opportunities to make an honest livelihood. In addition, all levels of society are receiving funding from this highly lucrative commodity. Further, the GOC is constantly linked to cartels, and other drug trafficking negotiations in political finances. The FARC are also linked to the drug

trafficking trade through production, transportation and extortion. The FARC gain access to arms and money, through the drug trade and are able to continue launching attacks against GOC forces from illegal drug trafficking sources. The GOC and the FARC cannot gain the legitimacy needed from all sectors of society when they are linked to criminal organizations. Therefore, the GOC must gain control over this commodity, by supporting growth in other agricultural areas, providing viable opportunities for its population and making drug trafficking a costly choice through a strong judicial, legislative and executive processes. The GOC cannot continue to label the FARC as a criminal organization if it wants to make serious attempts to create a negotiated agreement. The Uribe administration demonstrated that the public would not tolerate negotiations with criminals; therefore the GOC must control the output of illegal drug market and find ways of stopping the FARC from entering the industry. Real dialogue and open exchange can commence only when the GOC decides to stop labeling the FARC as criminals.

Geopolitics

Continued involvement by the region and the U.S. adds complexity and can help end the conflict. Ury argues that the third side has an important role to play as the mediator with another perspective. Yet, at times involvement from Venezuela has created more tension and distraction from the internal conflict. Other times, the involvement of Venezuela added to the possibility of an end to the conflict by negotiating the release of FARC hostages. When Uribe's military crossed the Ecuadoran border in pursuit of FARC leaders, Ecuador reacted by sending its troops to the border. These actions create

unnecessary diplomatic disputes combating a common problem – groups that use illegal drug trafficking to supply resources for their causes.

Recommendations

Generating and stabilizing security in Colombia is important during negotiations. Security is paramount and necessary for all levels of civil society inclusive of the FARC and GOC members. With the increase of international support, the government of Colombia has proven its ability to improve its national security but still has much more to accomplish. Thus far, the FARC has become less able to launch the attacks and kidnap the political prisoners as it had in the past. The death and capture of its leaders has also had a growing perception that the FARC is weakening. These events help further support Colombian security initiatives and provide the faith needed from both the citizens and the international community. It is only with increased institutions and security measures that Colombia can encourage its citizens to engage entrepreneurial activities free from persecution of clandestine groups and also attract foreign direct investment. Both of these factors bring much needed economic development to improve the lives of the Colombians.

These security initiatives however, are not without criticism. Thousands of peasants and rural inhabitants have been driven off their lands. The displaced persons flee from military forces that deem them as collaborators with guerrilla or paramilitary organizations as they attempt to expand their activities; which made the GOC unpopular. Meanwhile, neighboring countries notice the increase of these refugees across their

borders. In these security initiatives, there will always be those who are more directly affected by the violence. Even when the displaced persons travel to urban centers, the lack of jobs, educational opportunities and community centers increase the dichotomy between the rich and the poor. With the increase of security however, the nation is slowly attracting internal and external investment. It is the hope of all stakeholders in the Colombia economy that the military put an end to guerrilla groups, paramilitary groups and drug cartel activity or otherwise that the government ensures that the activities of the illegal groups do not affect the economic interest of investors in Colombia. This case study finds it difficult to see any other avenues for negotiated settlements that incorporate the guerrilla movements such as the M-19 unless there is more political pressure from the citizenry.

Civil Society

Unfortunately, mass media and regular sources of information have convinced the population that force is the only option, and that anyone that questions the security policies is a terrorist supporter. According to the BBC, “Colombia is one of the most dangerous places in the world for journalists. Media workers face intimidation by drug traffickers, guerrillas and paramilitaries. More than 120 journalists were killed in the 1990s, many for reporting on drug trafficking and corruption.” Therefore, fairness in reporting is often unattainable by reporters unless they risk their lives.

Active participation of civil society to support government efforts in the negotiation process will determine the success of the negotiations. During the Pastrana

administration, Colombians stood by their president in his efforts to meet the demands of the FARC. Even with the support of the Pastrana regime, the administration largely ignored and did not involve civil society in any of the peace talks. They waited patiently for concrete results, which never materialized. The agenda items created for the meetings Pastrana held with the FARC were only partially explored, leaving desires for peace unfulfilled. During his time in office Pastrana was heading a massive initiative with the U.S. to first increase security and secondly increase economic development.

The military efforts made by the Uribe were funded by Pastrana's efforts to woe monetary support and technological expertise from the U.S. Although Pastrana was able to meet with FARC leaders and publicly speak of his desires to bring a negotiated settlement, both the FARC and the GOC continued to their armed offenses to bring them closer to their demands. At the end of Pastrana's term, many Colombian citizens were disillusioned of the possibility of a negotiated settlement. Even while electing Uribe, who ran under a security enforcement policy, the citizens had begun to organize.

Hundreds of non-governmental organizations started to emerge, as government initiatives were slow to reach the population. The GOC continued its military offensive while citizens came together to form ways to make sure the resources became available to those in need. These organizations formed around a range of issues: women's rights, children's rights, displacement, kidnappings, human rights abuses, labor organizing and protection services. Each organization acted in reaction to the lack of government support in their communities. They enabled civil society to function while the government concentrated on the militarization of the country. At times Colombians were able to

gather in numbers to protest against the FARC. The Colombians, in thousands of numbers, demanded an end to kidnappings, extortion and illegal drug trafficking.

These movements and organizations have been stratified across the nation and across the various interests. In order to implement the greatest impact on these issues, Colombia needs a unified approach to combat the guerrilla activity, paramilitary violence and drug cartels in a way that at least negative peace can allow for the return of security and stability. No nation is free from criminal organizations; however it is important for the citizens to rely on their government to see that these organizations have to answer to the laws and regulations set in place by an active and democratic civil society. As one Colombian describes, the citizens should:

“Live with seriousness and ethics with responsibility. Expand, in however possible, the vision of my actions to a collective impact, that is to say, being conscious that the actions I take in my proximity can also affect the collective dynamic of life. I must take advantage of the electoral space to make conscious votes.” (Jan. Survey 2012)

Thus with the realization of a collective and collaborative initiative, civil society can take the reigns of implementing sustainable peace throughout the nation.

The literature outlines the complexity of the issues at stake in the Colombian conflict. Although the FARC have continued its activities since 1964, the dynamics of the conflict are constantly changing. In the case studies presented, the last ten years of the conflict have seen an increasing view that the real solution is via the military. It is yet to be seen if this was in fact the correct solution but many Colombians see no other way of addressing the violent activities taken by FARC rebels. The literature provides a background to the various issues. Pruitt and Kim provide an understanding of escalation

principals and models that detail why conflict continues. They propose problem solving and joint-making decisions to bring an end to the cycle of violence. The theory presented above allows for an in-depth analysis of the avenues available for peace.

The functions of government in a Western society include, “security, public finance, the administration of justice – as well as the basic services such as public health, public education and public transportation” (Call 2008: 375). The international community has a role to play in helping secure that a government functions properly. Not only do stable governments increase security around the world but also can become partners in expanding globalized trades, markets and the possibility of more interdependence. These interactions and interdependence decreases the possibility of unnecessary wars for resources. Therefore, wars on ideas, based on ethnic lines are on the rise and can only be addressed by properly functioning governments – supported by the democratic processes of their populations.

Colombian citizens can develop a web of networks that find and open paths to engage in the peacebuilding process. Lederach describes the process, “networking is not just about instrumental connections among organizations that help us to achieve our goals or that minimize friction and competition. That is a narrow view of networking. Web watching as a discipline requires us to locate change processes in the web of how organic relationships occupy social space, how the connecting points create the flow and function of constructive, life-giving energy and how pieces and strands of change are located within a larger system” (Lederach 2005: 111). Within this framework, the author gives the opportunity for grassroots networks to connect with the larger networks that are

composed of the national government and international actors that are ready and willing to implement sustainable peace. He underlines the importance of mobilization not in terms of mass numbers but in terms of quality of actions: “Constructive social change requires different image of strategy. We need to generate a greater quality of process with the available, often few, resources. In peacebuilding, when we think strategy, we should think about what gives life and what keeps things alive. In the simplest terms, to be strategic requires that we create something beyond what exists from what is available but has exponential potential” (Ledearch 2005: 100). The potential lies in the willingness of the community and other actors to begin something novel and constructive in a way that helps progress the path towards peace. The realization is sustainable peace, which may not occur from one day to another but that the persistence and insistence towards new methods of obtaining peace become an integral part of the process.

The need to incorporate civil society in the negotiation process to solidify long-lasting peace is demonstrated through the continuation of the conflict. Colombia has faced internal war for the past five decades. The conflict has many sides, changing issues and has evolved over time as the leadership, methods and tactics become entrenched with the trafficking of illegal drugs. It is therefore imperative that all those involved in the conflict take a more united and unified approach to end the violence. Successful negotiations occur at the ripe moment, when the parties have reached a mutual stalemate and are ready to discuss mutually beneficial options. The country will only be set free of the civil war with the strong participation of civil society, government and political will

and the external actors who play an integral part in ensuring the conflict continue or abate.

Further research is needed to understand the complications that arise when dealing with illicit drug trafficking. These commodities slip into all aspects of society, taking hold of political officials, drug cartels, guerrilla groups, military personnel, farmers, peasants and the average citizen. To stop a conflict spiral, there needs to be a space for negotiation, where the violence is no longer sustainable as the costs of continuing the strife outweigh the benefits. For those involved in narcotrafficking, the costs must outweigh the benefits. Researching into these topics can find ways of ensuring these commodities reach their destination at a lower cost to the security, development and stability in the region.

APPENDIX A

Agenda comun por el cambio hacia una nueva Colombia

1. Solución Política Negociada Se buscará una solución política al grave conflicto social y armado que conduzca hacia una nueva Colombia, por medio de las transformaciones políticas, económicas y sociales que permitan consensos para la construcción de un nuevo Estado fundamentado en la justicia social, conservando la unidad nacional.

En la medida en que se avance en La negociación, se producirán hechos de paz. De ahí, el compromiso que debemos asumir todos los colombianos con la construcción de la paz, sin distinción de partidos, intereses económicos, sociales o religiosos

2. Protección de los Derechos Humanos como responsabilidad del Estado

2. 1 Derechos fundamentales

2. 2 Derechos económicos, sociales, culturales y del ambiente

2. 3 Tratados internacionales sobre derechos humanos

3. Política Agraria Integral

3. 1 Democratización del crédito, asistencia técnica, mercadeo

3. 2 Redistribución de la tierra improductiva

3. 3 Recuperación y distribución de la tierra adquirida a través del narcotráfico o enriquecimiento ilícito

3. 4 Estímulos a la producción

3. 5 Ordenamiento territorial integral

3. 6 Sustitución de cultivos ilícitos y desarrollo alternativo

4. Explotación y Conservación de los Recursos naturales

4. 1 Recursos naturales y su distribución

4. 2 Tratados internacionales

4. 3 Protección del ambiente sobre la base del desarrollo sostenible

5. Estructura Económica y Social

5. 1 Revisión del modelo de desarrollo económico

5. 2 Políticas de redistribución del ingreso

- 5. 3 Ampliación de mercados internos y externos
- 5. 4 Estímulos a la producción a través de la pequeña, mediana y gran empresa privada
- 5. 5 Apoyo a la economía solidaria y cooperativa
- 5. 6 Estimulo a la inversión extranjera que beneficie a la Nación
- 5. 7 Participación social en la planeación
- 5. 8 Inversiones en bienestar social, educación e investigación científica

6. Reformas a la Justicia, lucha contra la Corrupción y el Narcotráfico

- 6. 1 Sistema judicial
- 6. 2 Organos de control
- 6. 3 Instrumentos de lucia contra la corrupción
- 6. 4 Narcotráfico

7. Reforma Política para la ampliación de la democracia

- 7. 1 Reformas a los partidos y movimientos políticos
- 7. 2 Reformas electorales
- 7. 3 Garantías a la oposición
- 7. 4 Garantías para las minorías
- 7. 5 Mecanismos de participación ciudadana

8. Reformas del Estado

- 8. 1 Reformas al Congreso
- 8. 2 Reforma administrativa para lograr una mayor eficiencia de la administración pública
- 8. 3 Descentralización y fortalecimiento del poder local
- 8. 4 Servicios públicos
- 8. 5 Sectores estratégicos

9. Acuerdos sobre Derecho Internacional Humanitario

- 9. 1 Desvinculación de los niños al conflicto armado
- 9. 2 Minas antipersonales
- 9. 3 Respeto de la población civil
- 9. 4 Vigencia de las normas internacionales

10. Fuerzas Militares

- 10. 1 Defensa de la soberanía
- 10. 2 Protección de los derechos humanos
- 10. 3 Combate a los grupos de autodefensa

10. 4 Tratados Internacionales

11. Relaciones Internacionales

11. 1 Respeto a la libre autodeterminación y a la no intervención

11. 2 Integración regional latinoamericana

11. 3 Deuda externa

11. 4 Tratados y convenios internacionales del Estado

12. Formalización de los acuerdos

12. 1 Instrumentos democráticos para legitimar los acuerdos

(Firmado)

Por el Gobierno Nacional:

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Raúl Reyes

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APPENDIX B

Plataforma Bolivariana por la Nueva Colombia

1. Solución política al grave conflicto social que vive el país.
2. La doctrina militar y de Defensa Nacional, será BOLIVARIANA. En cumplimiento del mandato del libertador, los militares emplearán su espada en defensa de las garantías sociales. Las nuevas Fuerzas Armadas se distinguirán por su amor al pueblo y el odio a la tiranía. Serán garantes de la soberanía nacional, respetuosas de los derechos humanos, y tendrán un tamaño y un presupuesto acorde a un país que no está en guerra con sus vecinos.
La Policía Nacional dependerá del Ministerio del interior y justicia, reestructurada para que cumpla su función preventiva; moralizada y educada en el respeto de los derechos humanos.
3. Participación democrática nacional, regional y municipal en las decisiones que comprometen el futuro de la sociedad. El pueblo se erige en soberano y como tal elige directamente al Presidente, a los miembros del legislativo unicameral, a los titulares del poder moral (Procuraduría, Defensoría y Contraloría) y al titular del poder electoral. Se instituirán los poderes moral y electoral. Todas las instancias de elección popular podrán ser objeto de revocatoria del mandato. La Corte Suprema de Justicia, la Corte Constitucional, el Consejo de Estado y el Consejo Nacional de la Judicatura serán elegidos por voto directo de todos los jueces y Magistrados del país, previa democratización del sistema judicial. Se suprimirá el sistema penal acusatorio.
4. Se pondrá fin a la corrupción y a la impunidad. Los incursos en estas conductas recibirán castigo ejemplar. El nuevo gobierno resarcirá la dignidad de los millones de desplazados, desaparecidos, asesinados, y de todas las víctimas del terrorismo de Estado.
5. Habrá libertad de prensa y democratización de los medios masivos de comunicación. En todo caso primará el interés social.
6. Rechazo a la política neoliberal. Desarrollo y modernización económica con justicia social. El Estado debe ser el principal propietario y administrador de los sectores estratégicos: el energético, las comunicaciones, los servicios públicos, vías, puertos y recursos naturales en beneficio del desarrollo económico-social equilibrado del país y las regiones.

Se procurará la ampliación del mercado interno, la autosuficiencia alimenticia y el estímulo permanente a la PRODUCCION, a la pequeña, mediana y gran industria, a la autogestión, la microempresa y a la economía solidaria.

La gestión económica oficial se debe caracterizar por su eficiencia, su ética, su productividad y su alta calidad. Habrá participación de los gremios, las organizaciones sindicales, populares, entes académicos y científicos en la elaboración de las decisiones sobre la política económica, social, energética y de inversiones estratégicas.

7. Explotación de los Recursos Naturales como el petróleo, el gas, el carbón, el oro, el níquel, las esmeraldas, el agua y la biodiversidad etc. , en beneficio del país y de sus regiones, garantizando la preservación del medio ambiente. Renegociación de los contratos con Compañías Multinacionales que sean lesivos para Colombia. La Comisión Nacional de Energía, con participación del Estado, los trabajadores del sector y las regiones, planificará la política energética.

Se construirán más refinerías y se desarrollará la industria petroquímica. El gobierno le informará a la comunidad con transparencia, los términos de los contratos existentes.

8. El 50% del Presupuesto Nacional será invertido en el bienestar social, teniendo en cuenta al ciudadano, su empleo, su salario, salud, vivienda, educación y recreación como centro de las políticas del Estado, apoyados en nuestras tradiciones culturales y buscando el equilibrio de la sociedad y la naturaleza. Los derechos de la niñez, la juventud, las mujeres y los ancianos, de los pueblos indígenas y afro-descendiente, serán especialmente reivindicados por el nuevo gobierno.

El 10% del Presupuesto Nacional, será invertido en la investigación científica.

9. Quienes mayores riquezas posean, más altos impuestos aportarán para hacer efectiva la redistribución del ingreso. El impuesto del IVA, sólo afectará bienes y servicios suntuarios.

10. Política Agraria que democratice el crédito, la asistencia técnica y el mercadeo. Estímulo total a la industria y a la producción agropecuaria. Proteccionismo estatal frente a la desigual competencia internacional.

Cada región tendrá su propio plan de desarrollo elaborado en conjunto con las organizaciones de la comunidad, liquidando el latifundio allí donde subsista, redistribuyendo la tierra, definiendo una frontera agrícola que racionalice la colonización y proteja del arrasamiento nuestras reservas. Ayuda permanente para el mercadeo nacional e internacional.

11. Relaciones internacionales con todos los países del mundo bajo el principio del respeto a la libre autodeterminación de los pueblos y del mutuo beneficio. Priorizar tareas por la integración de Nuestra América. Todos los latinocaribeños serán considerados ciudadanos de Nuestra América. Patria Grande y socialismo será nuestra divisa. Respeto a los compromisos políticos con otros Estados sin menoscabo de la soberanía. Revisión

total de los pactos militares, tratados comerciales y convenios lesivos para la nación. Se pondrá fin a la extradición de nacionales. Objeción al pago de la Deuda Externa en aquellos préstamos viciados de dolo en cualquiera de sus fases. Para los otros casos se planteará una moratoria en el servicio para facilitar la cancelación de la deuda social.

12. Solución del fenómeno de producción, comercialización y consumo de narcóticos y alucinógenos, entendido ante todo como un grave problema social que no puede tratarse por la vía militar, que requiere acuerdos con la participación de la comunidad nacional e internacional y el compromiso de las grandes potencias como principales fuentes de la demanda mundial de los estupefacientes. Materialización de la propuesta de sustitución de cultivos emanada de la audiencia pública internacional sobre cultivos ilícitos y medio ambiente.

Novena Conferencia de las FARC-EP
Por la Nueva Colombia, la Patria Grande y el Socialismo

APPENDIX C

Survey Questions

1. How do you define conflict?
2. Does conflict exist in Colombia?
 - If so what do you regard as the main conflicting issues?
 - If not do you think there was a period in time that conflict existed in Colombia?
 - What period of time would you consider that Colombia was under conflict?
3. How is/did Colombia resolve these issues?
4. Do/Did you consider the process as a success?
5. What concrete results have been achieved?
6. What do you think about the FARC?
7. How do you think Colombia can resolve issues concerning the FARC?
8. Have there been successes in Colombian government dialogue with this group?
 - If so what are those successes?
 - If not, why do you think there has been a lack of success
9. Do you participate in local or presidential elections?
10. What can you do as a member of society to help the government of Colombia in the peace efforts?

Spanish Translations:

1. ¿Cómo define conflicto?
2. ¿Existe conflicto en Colombia?
 - ¿Si cree que existe conflicto cuales son los temas principales del conflicto?
 - ¿Si no cree que existe conflicto en Colombia, cree que en algún tiempo hubo conflicto?
 - ¿En qué tiempo cree que existía conflicto en Colombia?
3. ¿Cómo puede o como resolvió el conflicto en Colombia?
4. ¿Cree o creía que el proceso de resolver el conflicto fue un éxito?
5. ¿Cuales han sido los resultados concretos que han surgido del proceso de la resolución del conflicto?
6. ¿Qué opina de las FARC?
7. ¿Cómo cree que el gobierno de Colombia pueda resolver los asuntos con las FARC?
8. ¿Ha habido éxito con el dialogo con el gobierno Colombiano y las FARC?
 - ¿Si cree que ha habido éxito cuáles son?
 - ¿Si no ha habido éxito, porque cree que no ha habido?
9. ¿Participa en elecciones locales o presidenciales?
10. ¿Que puede hacer como miembro de la sociedad para ayudar al gobierno de Colombia en el proceso de paz?

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