

DRUGS, BORDERS, AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY:

A CASE STUDY OF EKATERINBURG

By

Maureen Carothers

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

Of American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

In

International Affairs

Chair:

Linda Lucia Lubrano, Ph.D.
Linda Lucia Lubrano, Ph.D.

Eric Lohr, Ph.D.
Eric Lohr, Ph.D.

Jane M. Holger
Dean of the School of International Service

August 2
Date

2013

American University

Washington, D.C. 20016

© COPYRIGHT

by

Maureen Carothers

2013

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

DEDICATION

To my wonderful parents, John and Frances, whose support helped me overcome numerous obstacles to finish graduate school.

DRUGS, BORDERS, AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY: A CASE STUDY OF EKATERINBURG

Maureen Carothers

ABSTRACT

This thesis will examine the interdependent relationship of drugs, border security, and sovereignty following the 1991 collapse of communism in Russia and the 2001 US-led overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Regime changes, particularly in Russia, led to a sharp decline in state revenues and subsequent loss of capacity to adequately fund border control institutions. The decline of border control mechanisms resulted in porous borders and fewer barriers for narcotics traffickers. In turn, drug traffickers weakened border security institutions through the corruption and co-optation of border guards. The thesis will use a historical case study analysis of Ekaterinburg and draw on data from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, World Bank, and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The study will conclude with a discussion of the concept of the sovereignty, and how trans-border phenomena, such as the drug trade, pose a challenge for territorial-based definitions of sovereignty.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Completion of this thesis would not have been possible without the contributions of friends, colleagues, mentors and professors.

To Kristin Lagerquist, Ann Edmonds, and Borislav Chernev, whose razor-sharp minds and critiques propelled me forward during periods of immense frustration and self-doubt.

To Gerry Vans and Megan Oliver, who gave me time off from work to pursue this endeavor, and helped me remain solvent during graduate school.

To my thesis committee, Professors Linda Lucia Lubrano and Eric Lohr, whose encouragement, suggestions, and edits fostered the completion of a thesis I'm proud to put my name on.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	iii
LIST OF TABLES.....	vi
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.....	vii
CHAPTER 1	
INTRODUCTION.....	1
Historical Background.....	2
Research Methodology.....	6
Chapter Outline.....	14
CHAPTER 2	
LITERATURE REVIEW.....	16
Drug Trade.....	17
Border Security.....	23
Sovereignty.....	28
Eurasia Area Studies.....	32
CHAPTER 3	
REGIME CHANGES.....	36
Soviet Union.....	36
Afghanistan.....	45

CHAPTER 4

RUSSIAN / KAZAKH BORDER.....	53
Inability to Secure the Border.....	53
Vulnerabilities Exposed by Drug Traffickers.....	60

CHAPTER 5

CASE STUDY OF EKATERINBURG.....	64
Center-Periphery Politics in the Soviet Union.....	64
Regime Change in the Soviet Union.....	66
Regime Change in Afghanistan.....	68
Russia's Drug Trade.....	70
Ural Heavy Machine Building Plant (Uralmash).....	75
Drug Trade in Ekaterinburg after Overthrow of the Taliban.....	77

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION.....	81
Shortcomings in the Literature.....	87
Policy Implications for Russia's Drug Trade and Border Security.....	89
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	93

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Russian Defense Expenditures.....59

Table 2 Control of Corruption, Comparison Across Selected Countries.....74

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1 Border Crossing between the Soviet Union and Estonia c. 1920s.....	37
Figure 2 Modern-Day Border Crossing between Russia and Estonia.....	41
Figure 3 Afghani Opium Production.....	48
Figure 4 Afghan Heroin Hits Russia.....	73

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Russia's role in the international drug trade has changed drastically following the collapse of the Soviet Union and, once again, as a result of the fallout from the 2001 U.S.-led overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The flow of drugs, particularly heroin, had increased exponentially over the past decade. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), heroin seizures have increased from 984 kg in 2000 (just before the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan) to 1,431 kg in 2003, and more than doubling to 2,445 kg in 2006.¹ This upsurge had profound effects in the public health and national security spheres. The number of Russians with HIV had exploded because of the abundant supply of heroin and the common practice of sharing needles. The Kremlin was equally, if not more, concerned with the impact of the drug trade on its national security, which affects customs/border security, foreign policy, and military posture.² This chapter will review the historical and methodological underpinnings of the thesis.

¹ United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime Regional Office for Central Asia, *Illicit Drug Trends in the Russian Federation* (Moscow: United Nations, 2008): 9.

² Erica Alini, "The First Step is Denial," *Maclean's* 124, no. 6 (February 21, 2011): 35.

Historical Background

Russia's role in the international drug trade was a fairly recent phenomenon. Russia had a narcotics trade under Communism, for which drugs were produced and consumed domestically. However, the Soviet regime managed to maintain restrictions on drug trafficking, which while not always effective, at least modified the degree to which it could take place. Regime changes throughout the USSR in 1989-1991 opened up new opportunities for increased drug trafficking across the former internal and external borders of the Soviet Union. This was especially true for Russia's borders with Kazakhstan and the drug trade from Afghanistan to Russia through Central Asia.

The Russian/Kazakh border devolved from tightly controlled to highly porous in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation from 1991 to 1999, cut defense spending by 20 percent out of necessity and simultaneously pursued a policy of stronger integration with Central Asia.³ The present border crisis was further complicated by the fact that Kazakhstan had a large Russian population, and many Russians viewed the southern border of Central Asia as their own. Kazakhstan was an important trading partner of Russia, and the Kremlin was reluctant to stifle commerce along the 7,500-kilometer shared border.⁴ Two factors that complicated Kazakhstan's ability to cooperate with Russia more fully

³ Leszek Buszynski, "Russia and the Asia-Pacific Region," *Pacific Affairs* 65, no. 4 (Winter, 1992-1993): 506.

⁴ Leszek Buszynski, "Russia's New Role in Central Asia," *Asian Survey* 45, no. 4 (July/August 2005): 549-551.

on border security were its close ties with the U.S. and the nationalist orientation of its regime.⁵

The rapid departure of the Soviet army from Afghanistan (mid-May 1988 to mid-February 1989) resulted in a power vacuum and a decade of civil war. After several unsuccessful attempts, the Taliban took control of Kabul on September 27, 1996. However, there was no cessation to the violence as they continued to battle opposition forces for control of the country. The closest the Taliban came to total control was in 1997-1999, when it had captured 90 percent of the country. Futile attempts were made both internally and externally to settle the conflict. The government signed a power-sharing agreement, but quickly reneged in April 1999. The Six Plus Two Group (comprised of diplomats from Pakistan, Tajikistan, Iran, China, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan along with Russia and the United States) met with both sides in the hope of reaching a ceasefire. The Tashkent Declaration was signed on July 19, 1999, and called for the opening of roads, prisoner exchanges, and the distribution of humanitarian aid. The agreement proved to be a paper tiger since the two sides resumed the conflict as soon as they returned home.⁶

The Taliban fostered the heroin trade and directly profited from it. Opium cultivation became the backbone of the economy after the infrastructure was decimated during the Soviet regime's occupancy and exit and the civil war that followed; Afghanis

⁵ Annette Bohr, "Regionalism in Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Regional Order," *International Affairs (Royal Institute Of International Affairs 1944-)* 80, no. 3 (May 2004): 485-91.

⁶ Farhang Jahanpour, "The Rise of the Taliban and its Regional Repercussions," *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 8, no. 15 (September 1999): 99-101.

who sought to earn an above-subsistence wage had few alternatives to poppy farming. The one exception to Taliban's otherwise unequivocal support of poppy farming came in 2000. The Taliban banned poppy farming on July 27th, which may have been in response to pressure from the international community to fight the drug trade. The ban was limited to cultivation, and farmers were allowed to sell poppies domestically at bazaars as well as on the international market. Officials in the counter-narcotics community viewed this as a ploy to drive up prices, which indeed occurred. The price of heroin rose tenfold to \$400 a kilogram. Under pressure from farmers and in need of cash, the Taliban lifted restrictions on poppy cultivation in 2001.⁷

The region was further destabilized by a second regime change—the U.S. overthrow of the Taliban in 2001.⁸ The U.S. destroyed Afghanistan's economic infrastructure during the invasion and war, which left its people little choice, but to return to the highly profitable cultivation of opium poppies.⁹ The overthrow of the old regime forced Afghans to resume growing opium poppy as a means of subsistence. In turn, Afghanistan supplanted its neighbors to the east—Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia—to become the world's largest producer of opium, from which heroin was made. While a small portion of the heroin was consumed domestically, most of it was exported. A modern Silk Road took shape—a route for the transport of heroin from

⁷ U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Taliban and the Drug Trade*, by Raphael Perl (Washington, DC, 2001): 8.

⁸ Graham Farrell and John Thorne, "Where Have All the Flowers Gone?: Evaluation of the Taliban Crackdown Against Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan," *International Journal of Drug Policy* 16, no. 2 (March 2005): 83-86.

⁹ "Afghanistan's Opium Fiends," *The Economist* 358 (February 24, 2001): 43.

Afghanistan to Europe via Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Russia.¹⁰ Yet there was reason for optimism that Russia and Kazakhstan would work together to stem the flow of narcotics: They started holding bilateral forums in 2003 to discuss areas ripe for collaboration. Though their efforts bore little fruit, they began to strategize ways to fortify their borders and fight the drug trade.¹¹

Russia, Europe, and the United States were equally concerned over the drastic increase in the flow of heroin out of Afghanistan. The Kremlin had cooperated with the international community on stemming the influx of Afghani drugs. Russia's defense minister, Sergei Ivanov, articulated this in no uncertain terms during a 2005 meeting with NATO. Mr. Ivanov cited an internal figure that 90 percent of heroin trafficked in Europe was of Afghani origin. Afghani production passed the 500-ton mark and continued to climb. Skyrocketing production coincided with the withdrawal of Russian border patrol agents from the Pyandzh River, which forms a natural boundary between Afghanistan and Tajikistan.¹²

The breakdown in security along the Pyandzh River represented only a small fraction of Central Asia's border security crisis. It also underscored the complex, non-

¹⁰ International Criminal Police Organization, "Heroin," <http://www.interpol.int/public/drugs/heroin/default.asp> (accessed August 7, 2011).

¹¹ Sergei Nikolaev, "Russia-Kazakhstan: Cross-Border and Interregional Cooperation," *International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy & International Relations* 57, no. 1 (2011): 152.

¹² Lgor Vitalyevich Plugataryov, "A Heroin Sluice Has Been Opened on the Pyandzh River," *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 57, no. 37 (October 12, 2005): 12.

linear relationship between border security and the Eurasian drug trade. Border security throughout the former USSR was undermined by a dearth of economic capacity, particularly in Central Asia. The newly created states were hesitant to secure their borders because it hindered the free movement of people. The security of Central Asia's internal boundaries was loosely enforced during the Soviet period, and the overnight creation of sovereign states disrupted decades of social and economic integration. The fall of Communism therefore saw the creation of roughly 48,000 kilometers of new borders and an immediate identity crisis as well. The dichotomy of borders recognized by sovereign governments versus those recognized only by sub-national groups catalyzed ethnic conflicts that persist to this day.¹³

Research Methodology

The crux of my research will be to explore how regime changes in Russia and Central Eurasia have facilitated an expansion of drug trafficking in the region, and how this, in turn, has led to further deterioration of Russia's border security and sovereignty. My research questions are: What were the effects of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the U.S.-led overthrow of the Taliban on the Eurasian drug trade? How has Russia's border security been affected by these changes in the drug trade? How have changes in the Eurasian drug trade affected Russian sovereignty? In answering these questions, it will become evident that there is a complex interdependence of porous borders, drug trafficking, and the inability of governments to protect their sovereignty. Regime

¹³ Vladimir Kolossov, "Post-Soviet Boundaries: Territoriality, Identity, Security, Circulation," in *The Ashgate Research Companion To Border Studies*, ed. Doris Wastl-Walter (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011), 177-9.

changes and the breakdown in border security provide opportunities for drugs to move more easily throughout the region, while the drug trade itself erodes border controls through corruption and challenges to state authority. This will be evident through qualitative assessments of these conditions in a contextualized case study of Ekaterinburg.

Data will be collected on *regime change* in Russia by searching databases (including Academic Search Premier and JSTOR) for articles in peer-reviewed journals. The following search terms will be used: Soviet Union, 1991, *glasnost*, *perestroika*, Gorbachev, and Yeltsin. Articles on regime change in Afghanistan will be identified using these search terms: Afghanistan, 2001, United States, and invasion. Articles will be scrutinized for information on political, economic, and social conditions before and after the Taliban overthrow.

Data on the *drug trade* will be obtained from the *World Drug Report*, a publication compiled annually by UNODC. The UNODC estimates the number of tons of opium cultivated per year, broken down by country. A caveat was that Afghanistan has been known to stockpile a percentage of its annual yield in order to maintain a high market price.¹⁴ The main drawback to using UNODC figures is that they are estimates and not raw data. Data on opium seizures will be procured from Interpol. This data will be used to show the relative effectiveness of counter-narcotics efforts.

¹⁴ Hubert E. Bagley Jr., *Afghanistan: Opium Cultivation And Its Impact On Reconstruction* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2004), 4-5.

Data on *border security* will be obtained from the World Bank and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. These organizations were chosen because both of them collect data on Russian military expenditures. The decision was made to use military spending as a proxy indicator for border security because I was unable to find sufficient, publicly available data on the Russian Interior Ministry budget. I believe that the benefits outweigh the drawbacks because Russia's military is involved in border protection. Moreover, this is a qualitative study about the influence of regime change on the drug trade, border security, and sovereignty as well as the circular relationship among the latter three. These figures will be contextualized by the literature on corruption among border guards. Russia has been cooperating with the international community on the drug trade because it threatens the country's public health and national security. However, cooperation should not be confused with transparency. The circumspect Kremlin was trying to strike a delicate balance between enlisting assistance and projecting power.

The relationship between the drug trade and border security in Eurasia is best described as circular. The heroin trade has increased due to a breakdown in border security following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, drug traffickers compromised Russia's borders. They have relied on bribes and coercion to move their product past border checkpoints. It will be shown that regime changes in Russia and Afghanistan precipitated an increase in the heroin trade through Central Asia and a decrease in border security. Following these regime changes, the drug trade and a breakdown in border security have proved mutually sustaining.

Russia's porous borders will be examined within the larger context of the sovereignty literature. Traditional notions of sovereignty are wrapped up in the Westphalian doctrine that a well functioning state is directly related to the ability of its government to secure its borders. However, transnational phenomena, including narcotics trafficking, are forcing a rethinking of the concept. Transnational phenomena that require international cooperation pose a serious challenge to definitions of sovereignty that hinge on territoriality. In order to collectively fight the drug trade, nations must cede a modicum of autonomy to an international organization or regulatory body. But does this make them less sovereign?¹⁵

Data collection on *sovereignty* will involve searching peer-reviewed journals for historical definitions of the concept. The concept of sovereignty has proved fluid and evolved over time. The primary goal of data collection will be to analyze definitions of sovereignty against changes precipitated by globalization and trans-border phenomena including the drug trade. Analysis of sovereignty will conclude with a discussion of how territory-based definition of sovereignty can be adapted to reflect changes brought on by globalization.

The case study method was chosen for this thesis because I wanted to look at a cross-section of the Russian/Kazakh border to determine what influence regime changes—the fall of the Soviet Union and the U.S.-led topple of the Taliban—have had on the drug trade and border security at the local level. The existing literature on the

¹⁵ Peter Andreas, "Illicit Globalization: Myths, Misconceptions, and Historical Lessons," *Political Science Quarterly* 126, no. 3 (Fall 2011): 404-5.

Eurasian drug trade and border security tends to take a deductive approach and infer local dynamics based on macro trends. I believe that a more accurate understanding of the drug trade can be gleaned by taking a microcosmic example, i.e. a case study of Ekaterinburg, to make an inductive argument about the intersection of drugs and border security in Russia.

Moreover, considering the continuing uncertainties surrounding the issues involved, it would be difficult if not impossible to develop a parsimonious theory about the impact of the drug trade on Russia's border security. The case study method does not require a unified theory, but it does necessitate the creation of an in-depth snapshot of a person, place, institution etc. that is accessible to expert and layman alike. It is particularly advantageous when studying the changing relationship between two or more persons, places, groups, and/or events over time, which would be harder to capture with qualitative analysis focusing on specific points in time. Case studies are most effective when the author presents the facts sans editorializing and allows readers to arrive at their own conclusions. Francis Bacon said it best:

There are and can only be two ways of searching and discovering the truth. The one flies from the senses and particular to the most general axioms . . . this is now the fashion. The other derives senses and particulars, rising by a gradual and unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the most general axioms last of all.¹⁶

¹⁶ Robert E. Stake, "The Case Study Method in Social Inquiry," in *Case Study Method: Key Issues, Key Texts*, ed. Roger Gomm, Martyn Hammersley, and Peter Foster (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Ltd., 2000), 22.

To paraphrase Bacon, the case study method allows the researcher to start with the, “senses and particular” and arrive at “general axioms” about the intersection of drugs, border security, and sovereignty in Eurasia.¹⁷

Marc Trachtenberg’s work on historiography will be used to frame the case study. Trachtenberg advocates formulating open-ended questions so that the evidence will drive the analysis and not vice versa. He stresses doing historical analysis in carefully ordered stages to avoid the trap of zeroing in on evidence that fits preconceived notions. This approach is reflected in the research objectives (see page 6) that establishes the parameters for investigating the relationship between drugs, border security, and sovereignty in Russia. The evidence will be used to build an understanding of these three phenomena in Russia. Lastly, Trachtenberg’s advice to resist forcing conclusions to fit an elegant theory will be heeded.¹⁸

Ekaterinburg was selected because of its substantial role in the heroin trade as a major Russian transport hub as well as its proximity to the Kazakh border. Throughout its history, Ekaterinburg’s political system had been something of a thorn in the Kremlin’s side. This Urals city had exhibited a high level of autonomy, which was crystallized when Ekaterinburg became the first non-republic to sign a power-sharing agreement with the Kremlin. The region functioned as a de facto republic by 2001, with Gov. Rossel arguing that regions should be allowed to enact laws as they saw fit, even if

¹⁷ Ibid., 20-3.

¹⁸ Marc Trachtenberg, *The Craft of International History: A Guide To Method* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 24-28.

they directly contradicted federal laws. Understandably concerned, the Kremlin dispatched an envoy that quickly surmised that 20 percent of Ekaterinburg's laws were noncompliant. From that point on, the Kremlin made it a point to closely monitor political developments in Ekaterinburg. Although his powers were constrained, the governor leveraged the dependence of federal government agencies on regional governments for tax collection. The independence of the local government impeded the Kremlin's ability to coordinate drug control policy, e.g. enforcing long jail sentences for drug traffickers, at the federal level.¹⁹

The main advantage of selecting Ekaterinburg was that it is a large transport hub for narcotics trafficked from Afghanistan to Europe via Russia. The city is located approximately 200 miles from the Kazakh border, and is a stop on the Trans-Siberian Railroad, which was critical for moving narcotics quickly through Russia's vast terrain.²⁰ Another factor in its selection was that the drug trade was long established before the collapse of the Soviet Union. This made it possible to trace its development before and after tent-pole moments; namely the fall of the Soviet Union in 2001 and the U.S.-led overthrow of the Taliban a decade later. The main drawback of this choice was that the city is not located right at the border.²¹ Ekaterinburg was chosen, nonetheless,

¹⁹ Lynne D. Nelson and Irina Y. Kuzes, "Implications of the Federal Reform in Three Regions: Sverdlovsk, Smolensk and Voronezh," in *Dynamics of Russian Politics: Putin's Reform of Federal-Regional Relations*, ed. Peter Reddaway and Robert W. Orttung (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 427-33.

²⁰ Dominique Moran, "Drug Use and Hiv/Aids: Risk Environments in Post-Soviet Russia Geography and Drug Addiction," in *Geography and Drug Addiction* ed. Yonette F. Thomas, Douglas Richardson and Ivan Cheung (New York: Springer, 2008), 288-9.

²¹ Howard Campbell, "No End in Sight: Violence in Ciudad Juárez," *NACLA Report on the Americas* 44, no. 3 (May 2011): 19-20.

because of the large body of primary and secondary sources regarding a possible relationship between drug trafficking and weakening border control institutions. That makes it possible to test the argument that the drug trade from Central Asia into Russia was both a consequence of, and a contributor to, a breakdown in border security.

Newspaper and journal articles were surveyed to determine if the experience of Ekaterinburg, particularly its connection to Kazakh drug traffickers, was in fact unique. Chelyabinsk, Omsk, and Volgograd were considered because of similar populations and proximity to the Kazakh border. Chelyabinsk, known for its nuclear accidents, was omitted because of its looser, less clear ties to Kazakh traffickers.²² Omsk was disregarded because the known drug traffickers in this city appear to be low-level drug runners without significant connections to organized crime.²³ Lastly, Volgograd was not selected because of insufficient evidence supporting a connection to Kazakh traffickers at the border.²⁴ In short, Ekaterinburg was selected because of the large volume of heroin trafficked from Central Asia, the presence of organized crime with ties to the drug trade, and the connection between the drug trade and weak border control institutions.

²² Andrew Osborn, "How Chelyanbinsk Became Synonymous with Pollution," *The Daily Telegraph* July 27, 2011.

²³ Interfax, "Over Six Kilograms of Heroin Seized from Kazakh Woman in Omsk," *Military News Agency* January 31, 2012.

²⁴ U.S. Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, *Involvement of Russian Organized Crime Syndicates, Criminal Elements in the Russian Military, and Regional Terrorist Groups in Narcotics Trafficking in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Chechnya*, by Glenn E. Curtis (Washington, DC, 2002), 24.

Chapter Outline

The chapters that follow will examine the impact of regime change on the international drug trade along Russia's borders. Through a review of the literature and a case study of Ekaterinburg, these chapters will demonstrate the close interdependence of porous borders, security, and state sovereignty in this region.

- Chapter Two will review the existing literature on border security, the drug trade, and sovereignty and elucidate its shortcomings. My research will highlight the effects of regime changes on the drug trade and border security as well as the implications for the concept of sovereignty.

- Chapter Three will delineate the impact of regime changes in Afghanistan and Russia on border security in the region and will be grounded by two tent-pole regime changes: the collapse of Communism in 1991 and the U.S. overthrow of the Taliban a decade later. A discussion of regime changes will be used to show why drug trafficking has thrived in a region with ineffectual governments and porous borders.

- Chapter Four will focus on the history of the Russian/Kazakh border from the late Soviet period to the present. It will detail cross-border flows, specifically narcotics, and the institutions that each country had created to regulate them. It will find that drug traffickers were exploiting breakdowns in border control institutions that date back to the late Soviet period.

- Chapter Five is a case study of Ekaterinburg, a microcosm of how the changing nature of border security, the heroin trade and sovereignty has played out on the local level. The chapter will also attempt to answer questions such as: Can a state be considered sovereign if sub-national agents control a significant portion of its territory?²⁵

The concluding chapter will review the impact of regime change on the drug trade, border security, and sovereignty. It will highlight what we have learned from the case study of Ekaterinburg and the critical role the city has played in the growth of the Russian drug trade as well as in the weakening of border security. The Conclusion shows how a criminal syndicate based in Ekaterinburg has usurped powers previously held by the local government and has effectively countermanded Moscow's counter-narcotics policies. Finally, the thesis argues that the inability of central and local governments to execute counter-narcotics policies has ramifications for the exercise of Russia's sovereignty and for territorial-based notions of the concept in the academic literature.

²⁵ Brian L. Job, "Confronting Terrorism: Dilemmas of Principle and Practice Regarding Sovereignty," in *Re-Envisioning Sovereignty: The End of Westphalia?*, ed. Charles Sampford, Ramesh Thakur, and Trudy Jacobsen (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2008), 119-20.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter examines the current body of literature on the drug trade, border security, and sovereignty. The analysis highlights shortcomings in the literature and details reasons why further research is needed. Researchers are taking a macro approach to their study of the narcotics trade, while emphasizing the criminalization of the state and a dearth of effective substance abuse treatment programs in Russia. My research corrects for this by examining cross-border drug trade dynamics at the local level and using inductive reasoning to extrapolate macro trends. The border security literature underscores the push-pull relationship of Russia's imperial past and present-day need for Central Asian nations to secure their borders. The literature traces the decay of borders from being highly fortified to porous and examines the ramifications of this for the drug trade and Russian sovereignty. The sovereignty section explores how different scholars have conceptualized sovereignty and considers whether territory-based definitions remain relevant in a globalized world. My research highlights the usefulness of current conceptions of sovereignty, but stresses the need to expand definitions beyond territory-based iterations. In particular, I emphasize the shift from governments with a monopoly on power to a situation in which power is shared between state and sub-state actors. The chapter concludes with a section on Eurasian area studies to show how my research complements and expands on the existing literature. Area studies has focused mainly on the role of external actors in the region, especially the United States,

whereas my research underscores the power of drug traffickers and organized criminal syndicates in this area.

Drug Trade

The existing literature on the Russian drug trade is mainly concerned with the Kremlin's inability to control the flow of drugs into the country. Moscow's failings in fighting the trade can be broken down into two main schools of thought: the first is devoted to the criminalization of the state, and the second laments the lack of adequate treatment programs. On the one hand, Handelman, Shelley, Paoli, and Cornell focus on Russia's failed transition to democracy and the opportunities it creates for organized crime to gain control of state and regional governments. They use a supply-side argument that the government could stem the flow of narcotics, particularly heroin, if it has secured the borders and prosecutes more traffickers.²⁶ Makarenko and Renz follow in a similar vein and hone in on the threat the drug trade poses to Russia's national security.²⁷ On the other hand, Van Solinge, Boev, and Orlova employs a demand side argument and posits that Russia is losing the 'war on drugs' for the same reasons as their Western counterparts: overemphasis on criminalization of drug addiction and

²⁶ Stephen Handelman, "The Russian Mafiya," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 2 (March 1994): 85; Louise I. Shelley, "Post-Soviet Organized Crime: Problem and Response," *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research* 3, no. 4 (1995): 341-3; Letizia Paoli, "The Price of Freedom: Illegal Drug Markets and Policies in Post-Soviet Russia," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 582 (July 1, 2002): 168-70; Svante E. Cornell and Niklas L.P. Swanström, "The Eurasian Drug Trade: A Challenge to Regional Security," *Problems of Post-Communism* 53, no. 4 (July 2006): 15.

²⁷ Tamara Makarenko, "Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay Between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism," *Global Crime* 6, no. 1 (February 2004): 132; Bettina Renz, "Traffickers, Terrorists, and a 'New Security Challenge': Russian Counternarcotics Strategy and the Federal Service For the Control of the Drugs Trade," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 22, no. 1 (March 2011): 55-6.

inadequate funding of treatment programs.²⁸ The writers/researchers in both schools agree that Afghani heroin is supplying the Russian drug market and is being trafficked through Central Asia. At the same time, there is a noticeable gap in understanding of how heroin is trafficked across the border from Kazakhstan into Russia.

The Soviet legacy—specifically, law enforcement institutions and the drawing of borders—plays a prominent role in attempts to understand the modern drug trade. Handelman and Shelley views the ability of organized crime to infiltrate the state as a casualty of its failure to make a clean break with the past and create entirely new institutions. For example, the government's reliance on the mafia dates back to the earliest days of the Soviet Union, when the Bolsheviks rely on criminal gangs to bankroll operations.²⁹ Shelley views law enforcement's gross violations of civil rights and use of draconian tactics as business as usual. The very same terror squads responsible for domestic order under Communism also provides enforcement for the mafia during the transition, and continues to work for the government, holding different versions of their former jobs.³⁰ Orlova concurs with Shelley that Soviet practices strongly influences Russia's handling of the drug trade, and she is particularly critical of its handling of rampant drug addiction. The Kremlin punishes drug addicts for possessing minuscule amounts of narcotics and only paid lip service to adequately funds

²⁸ Tim Boekhout van Solinge, "Drug Use and Drug Trafficking in Europe," *Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie (Journal of Economic & Social Geography)* 89, no. 1 (February 1998): 100-2; B. Boev, "Narcotics Abuse in Russia," *Russian Education and Society* 45, no. 3 (March 2003): 47; Alexandra V. Orlova, "The Russian 'War On Drugs': A Kinder, Gentler Approach?," *Problems of Post-Communism* 56, no. 1 (January 2009): 24-5.

²⁹ Handelman, "The Russia Mafiya," 86.

³⁰ Shelley, "Post Soviet Organized Crime," 341-3.

treatment programs. Furthermore, Moscow uses drug trafficking as a vehicle for oppressing ethnic minorities, among them Georgians, Kazakhs, and Azeris.³¹ The case study of Ekaterinburg in chapter five will illustrate how Soviet holdovers have captured the regional government and uses it for drug trafficking and other criminal activities.

In light of the level of state capture and the nefarious activities funded by narcotics trafficking; drug use and abuse in Russian has moved from public health and criminality into the national security sphere. Shelley highlights how organized crime left the state vulnerable to dependence on illicit economic activities for funding. During a regime change, the greatest danger is that the social contract between the government and people will break down if the former no longer depends on the latter for revenues.³² This occurs because it becomes very difficult for citizens to place a check on the government's powers if the latter does not need the former for revenues. A lack of citizen oversight opens the doors for the government to openly participate in illicit activities. Cornell backs up Shelley's argument by adding that narcotics profits have been used to fund terrorism and insurgencies.³³

The Soviet legacy and criminalization of the state threatens its future as a viable functioning government. Shelley, Makarenko, Cornell, and Paoli agree that the impact of the drug trade presents a threat to Russia's sovereignty, given the level of state institutions already in the crime syndicates' grasp. Shelley calls Russia's loss of

³¹ Orlova, "The Russian 'War On Drugs,'" 24-5.

³² Shelley, "Post-Soviet Organized Crime," 343-5.

³³ Cornell, "The Eurasian Drug Trade," 11.

influence in Central Asia a direct result of its economic collapse. Central Asian nations, particularly Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, have become increasingly reliant on drug trafficking for income once Soviet subsidies dry up.³⁴ Echoing Shelley, Makarenko points to how the vacuum of power after the collapse of Communism creates opportunities for sub-national powers, notably drug cartels, to assume powers typically held by the state. Narcotic syndicates won the loyalty of the public by providing law and order along with other basic social services during the anarchic early 1990s.³⁵ Cornell is also concerned with drug traffickers from a security standpoint, and held that globalization is shifting the conflict nexus from bilateral to sub-national actors.³⁶ Paoli concurs with Cornell that the drug trade represents a major security threat. Further, the inability of the government to secure the borders and reduce drug abuse is indicative of state failure.³⁷ My research will show how criminal organizations are capturing the government on the local level and why it is difficult for the legitimate authorities to regain power once it has been lost.

The most current research is largely focuses on the dichotomy between Eurasia's development of a narcotics legal framework and the inability to enforce it. According to Orlova, Russia made strides—at least on paper—toward shifting its focus from addicts to dealers and traffickers. Under an amendment to the 2003 Russian Criminal Code, a person is guilty of possessing a "large" amount of heroin if found with

³⁴ Shelley, "Post-Soviet Organized Crime," 354.

³⁵ Makarenko, "Crime Terror Continuum," 141.

³⁶ Cornell, "The Eurasian Drug Trade," 11.

³⁷ Paoli, "The Price of Freedom," 168-70.

1 gram, and is subject to a 5- to 7- year prison sentence. This actually is considered an improvement, since the threshold was previously much lower. In 2006, even such a mediocre rate of progress could not be sustained as Viktor Cherkosov, head of Russia's Drug Control Agency, bowed to internal and external pressure and lowered the threshold to .5 grams.³⁸ Ineffective creation and execution of policy is very much a regional problem. Utyahseva agrees that Russian drug policies has been ineffective, and went further by showing how Russia is negatively influencing the creation of counter-narcotics strategies in Central Asia. Central Asian nations are adopting similar supply-side legislation with one crucial exception: They allow addiction substitution therapy for an addict, which is strictly prohibited in Russia.³⁹

The existing literature contains critical methodological flaws. Van Solinge notes that drug trafficking data, including that employed by Interpol, is largely extrapolated from drug seizure data. For decades, international organizations assumed that 10 percent of all trafficked narcotics are seized. He raises the important question of whether the data on which researchers rely is more a reflection of the actual volume of trafficking or fluctuations in the efficacy of law enforcement.⁴⁰ Boev goes to the opposite extreme, and argues that Russia's domestic narcotics demand could be contained if it is accurately captured with statistical modeling. Unfortunately, Boev fails

³⁸ Orlova, "The Russian 'War On Drugs,'" 27.

³⁹ Leah Utyasheva and Richard Elliott, "Effects of UN and Russian Influence on Drug Policy in Central Asia," in *At What Cost? HIV and Human Rights Consequences of the Global "War on Drugs,"* ed. Fabio Mesquita (New York: Open Society Institute, 2009), 92.

⁴⁰ Boekhout van Solinge, "Drug Use," 102.

to move beyond epidemiological metaphors and explain in empirical terms how such a model would be used to curb drug use in a real world scenario.⁴¹ However, given Russia's steady progression to a closed society, it is implausible that the Kremlin would start releasing reliable data.⁴² Lastly, Cornell is overly reliant on Non-Eurasian cases (e.g., Colombia and Peru) as models for understanding the flow of heroin through Central Asia.⁴³ The gaps and flaws in the current literature have left plenty of room for improved and expanded research.

Given the ineffectiveness of the macro approach to drug trafficking, research should focus on a greater understanding of the intricacies of the problem on the local level. A greater understanding of cross-border dynamics can be used to elucidate policy prescriptions for both Moscow and Ekaterinburg. The gravest needs are a demand-side counter-narcotics strategy and a unified regional policy on border security. Eurasia must buck international trends and invest heavily in treatment programs. Equally important, and perhaps more realistic, is the need to secure the borders. Securing the Russian/Kazakh border is more realistic in that it plays into each country's suspicious and protectionist nature. A crucial first step to understanding cross-border narcotics flows as a whole would be to analyze a small cross-section of the Russian/Kazakh border, which is what my research aims to do.

⁴¹ Boev, "Narcotics Abuse," 51-2.

⁴² Anders Aslund, "Putin's Lurch Toward Tsarism and Neoimperialism: Why the United States Should Care," *Demokratizatsiya* 16, no. 1 (Winter 2008): 18-9.

⁴³ Cornell, "The Eurasian Drug Trade," 13.

Border Security

The border security literature shows the tension between memories of Russia's imperial past and a present day need for the Kremlin's southern neighbors to fulfill the responsibilities of statehood. Russian border security is contingent on that of its southern neighbors. However, Central Asian nations have played a passive role in their transition to statehood. Stalin drew the borders without consulting local populations. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, republic governments similarly had little input in the transition process.⁴⁴ Russia is still the regional hegemon, which made Central Asian nations—who had no prior history of independent statehood—reluctant to make demands in the early post-independence period. Olcott agrees with Allison, for example, that the newly created states are largely bystanders with regard to important decisions regarding borders and security—matters largely dictated by regional hegemons—first Russia, and then the United States and China over the past decade.⁴⁵ Bohr shares Olcott and Allison's pessimism about the likelihood of the region asserting its autonomy and breaking the vicious circle of looking to Russia and the U.S. for leadership in the face of a security crisis.⁴⁶ Gleason sees tension in Central Asian

⁴⁴ Roy Allison, "Regionalism, Regional Structures and Security Management In Central Asia," *International Affairs* 80, no. 3 (May 2004): 464.

⁴⁵ Martha Brill Olcott, "Taking Stock of Central Asia," *Journal of International Affairs* 56, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 5-6.

⁴⁶ Annette Bohr, "Regionalism in Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Regional Order," *International Affairs* 80, no. 3 (May 2004): 486.

nations trying to reinforce their national sovereignty while cooperating on issues that affect them all, such as transnational crime.⁴⁷

The complicated history of border security is particularly evident in the works of Allison, Menon, Gleason, Bohr, and Swanstrom. Roy Allison traces the posture of Central Asian nations from *passive* following the collapse of USSR to *active* after the September 11th attacks.⁴⁸ Menon agrees with Allison that Central Asian nations have been very passive, and pointed to neo-imperialist Russian policies as more barriers to regional autonomy. Evgenii Ambartsumov (then chair of the Duma's Committee on International Affairs) notes that, "Russia is something larger than the Russian Federation in its present borders," which crystallized this sentiment.⁴⁹ Gleason advocates for a "functional" approach to cooperation, whereby states take small, incremental steps towards working together; it is said this would build trust among nations, and pave the way for more sophisticated integration.⁵⁰ Bohr breaks with Gleason and argues that a functionalist approach in Central Asia would never work, given how opposed its leaders are to the prerequisites of liberal social, economic and political institutions.⁵¹ Swanstrom takes Bohr's argument even further, and posited that cooperation is nearly impossible in a region where leaders are too insecure to cede

⁴⁷ Gleason, "Inter-State Cooperation in Central Asia from the CIS to the Shanghai Forum," *Europe-Asia Studies* 53, no. 7 (November 2001): 1078.

⁴⁸ Allison, "Regionalism, Regional Structures," 464.

⁴⁹ Rajan Menon, "In the Shadow of the Bear," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 158-9.

⁵⁰ Gleason, "Inter-State Cooperation," 1079.

⁵¹ Bohr, "Regionalism In Central Asia," 499.

power to their own citizens, let alone another nation.⁵² There is clearly a need for more scholarship on how Russia and Central Asian nations can maintain their sovereignty while cooperating on border security and the scourge of transnational crime.

Gleason asserts that greater integration actually enhances each nation's autonomy, and cited liberal trade policies and joint military exercises as examples. Conversely, open borders are conducive to transnational crime.⁵³ As Swanstrom points out, criminal syndicates preferred to operate in countries with weak governments.⁵⁴ Allison and Olcott argue in favor of regionalization, but the looming presence of regional hegemons makes them skeptical.⁵⁵ The region has failed to unite in large part because of the amount of influence Russia has exerted since the earliest days of independence and the U.S. post-Afghani invasion. Bohr reiterates the dangers of over-reliance on regional hegemons, but placed the blame squarely on Central Asia. The twin threats of drug trafficking and terrorism would persist and grow so long as leaders settle for short-term gains.⁵⁶

There was some hope of a shift in the geopolitical landscape after the U.S.-led rout of the Taliban. Allison blames Russian hegemony, mutual distrust, and Western

⁵² Swanstrom, "The Prospects For Multilateral Conflict Prevention and Regional Cooperation In Central Asia," *Central Asian Survey* 23, no. 1 (March 2004): 51.

⁵³ Gleason, "Inter-State Cooperation," 1085.

⁵⁴ Swanstrom, "The Prospects For Multilateral," 42.

⁵⁵ Allison, "'Regionalism,'" 465; Martha Brill Olcott, "Taking Stock," 4.

⁵⁶ Bohr, "Regionalism in Central Asia," 501.

intervention for Central Asia's failure to form a credible regional security apparatus.⁵⁷ Olcott and Bohr were initially optimistic about a post-9/11 restructuring of the balance of power in Central Asia, but it did not happen. If anything, regional cooperation on trans-border issues has been diminished by competition for favored nation status with the United States, Russia, and China.⁵⁸ Cooperation on border security is complicated by ongoing border disputes rooted in the way the Kremlin drew them in 1924. It is especially problematic that the borders follow neither natural boundaries nor ethnic diversity.

There is very little testing of hypotheses in the literature. Scholars, most notably Bohr, tend to work backwards and begin with their conclusions. She asserts that the United States—and to a lesser extent, China—has replaced Russia as the regional hegemon, then backfills her argument with an examples of Central Asian nations being willingly bullied. Gleason makes an argument for functional cooperation enhancing national autonomy, but provides no specific details on how this could be achieved.⁵⁹ Allison is considerably more pessimistic and highlights economic woes and corrupt governments to illustrate why regionalization has yet to take hold. Menon contradicts himself by saying that in Central Asia, autonomy can be bolstered if nations seek out a hegemon benefactor like the U.S. or China, a point reiterated by Olcott.

⁵⁷ Allison, "Regionalism," 465.

⁵⁸ Olcott, "Taking Stock," 4; Allison Bohr, "Regionalism," 486.

⁵⁹ Gleason, "Inter-State Cooperation," 1091-3.

Current research approaches border security as ancillary to the immediate crises of drug trafficking, terrorism and fundamentalism. A viable Central Asian regional security organization is a prerequisite for a unified border security policy.⁶⁰ Experiments in trust building are essential so that the region can reap the benefits of economic integration and collectively confront security challenges, including terrorism and the drug trade.⁶¹ Olcott, who concurs that trust is paramount, emphasized that personal relationships among leaders and unity in fighting the drug trade are key to improving border security.⁶²

There is a need for more research on creating border control mechanisms that foster regional trade while preserving sovereignty and national security interests. Bohr suggests that nations take an all or nothing approach, whereby border security mechanisms are either nonexistent or place onerous limitations on regional trade.⁶³ Kolossov has taken an important first step toward this goal by looking at the intersection of border security, globalization, and sovereignty. Nations tend to look inward for fear a neighbor's problems would become their own--one reason globalization poses a challenge to integration and cooperation.⁶⁴ The next section will

⁶⁰ Allison, "Regionalism," 465.

⁶¹ Gleason, "Interstate Cooperation," 1092.

⁶² Olcott, "Taking Stock," 13.

⁶³ Bohr, "Regionalism," 498.

⁶⁴ Kolossov, "Border Studies: Changing Perspectives and Theoretical Approaches," *Geopolitics* 10, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 619-20.

explore in more detail the challenges of preserving national sovereignty in an increasingly globalized world.

Sovereignty

Globalization has long undermined territorial notions of sovereignty. Jackson defines sovereignty as the ability of the state to exercise control within the borders of its territory.⁶⁵ Rose and Miller conceptualize it as the ability of the state to gain the allegiance of its people and to have shared goals. In this respect, the state gains its power by working with its subjects outside the official apparatus and respecting individual autonomy. This iteration of sovereignty is problematic with respect to my research, mainly because of the large number of Russians living in Kazakhstan, and vice versa—each state a melting pot that lent itself to nebulous loyalties.⁶⁶ Agnew asserts that globalization seriously challenges traditional territory-based definitions of sovereignty, especially when issues such as global warming, the drug trade and health crises transcend national borders.⁶⁷ Analysis of a cross-section of the Russian/Kazakh borderlands would have broad implications for Russia's sovereignty for the broader concept itself.

⁶⁵ Robert Jackson, "Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape," *Political Studies* 47, no. 3 (Special Issue 1999): 433.

⁶⁶ Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller, "Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of Government," *British Journal of Sociology* 43, no. 2 (1992): 174-9.

⁶⁷ John Agnew, "Mapping Political Power Beyond State Boundaries: Territory, Identity, and Movement In World Politics," *Millennium* 28, no. 3 (1999): 437-8.

Sovereignty can also be conceptualized in fluid terms. At a specific point in time, a sovereign is exercising power over the individuals who live in its territory, which is the way security is maintained. In other words, security can only be upheld if the entire territory is subject to the laws of the ruler. If the jurisdiction of the ruler does not extend to the entire geographic territory, then sovereignty has been compromised. In this respect, it is the responsibility of rulers to continually reinforce their ties to their subjects in order to maintain discipline.⁶⁸ Michel Foucault refers to the triangular relationship between sovereignty, discipline, and government as *governmentality*. Accordingly, rulers must use government institutions to stabilize the economy and security of a territory to maintain discipline over their subjects, which is the source of a ruler's legitimacy.⁶⁹ This begs an obvious question: What are the ramifications if a sub-national or transnational group underpins the economy or security of a given territory?

The sovereignty literature is slowly moving beyond its fixation on territoriality. The European Union poses a major challenge to traditional notions of governance and definitions of political space. The blurring of borders brought about by shared political functions and economies that are more integrated has given rise to the term "fuzzy borders." Under this theoretical umbrella a state's sovereignty is not diminished if it is ceding some of its traditional functions to another nation or an international organization. On the contrary, globalization is altering the ways in which states interact

⁶⁸ Michel Foucault, "Spaces of Security: The Example of the Town, Lecture of 11th January 1978," *Political Geography* 26, no. 1 (2007): 48-52.

⁶⁹ Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977-1978*, trans. by Graham Burchell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 241-4.

with one another, which is edging territorial notions of sovereignty toward obsolescence. These post-modern definitions of sovereignty borrow heavily from Foucault's idea that a geographic territory is the space in which power is aggregated and negotiated. In this sense, territorial boundaries are akin to a guard at a gated community maintaining control over the comings and goings of people and goods. However, a community is in no way a fortress; therefore, there is a double movement of people and goods that escapes the power of the sovereign.

Krasner argues that the concept of sovereignty has been misunderstood from the beginning and has always existed more in theory than in practice. The birth of the nation-state has been tied to the Peace of Westphalia, which affirmed the right of principalities to enter into treaties while maintaining their subordination to the Holy Roman Empire. Furthermore, states have never had absolute control over the movement of peoples and goods in and out of their territories. While it can be argued that some states are more sovereign than others—the United States vs. Eritrea, for example—it has always existed more as an idea and status symbol than a concrete reality.⁷⁰

The sovereignty of the state can and probably should be viewed in very fluid terms. The state is not a static entity; it is an organism that is constantly evolving. The assertion that the state achieves part of its sovereignty from having a monopoly over violence is relative. Factions are continually jostling for a monopoly over violence. The legitimacy of the person or group who claims to be the supreme ruler is very specific to

⁷⁰ Stephen D. Krasner, "Sovereignty," *Foreign Policy* no. 122 (January 2001): 20-2.

time and space.⁷¹ In our increasingly globalized world, the state no longer has a monopoly over rule within its borders. The reality is that rule is shared by state and non-state actors alike, most notably criminal syndicates. Redefining sovereignty in this way presents major challenges for statehood, considering that sub-national, supranational, and international organizations now carry out many traditional functions of the state. It is possible to reconcile sovereignty with globalization if traditional notions of unification are replaced with pluralism.⁷²

The need to understand the intersection of pluralism and sovereignty is thrown into relief by the September 11th attacks in the United States. The attacks brought up many questions about whether the attacks are criminal acts or acts of war. In the process, the underlying assumptions of state systems since World War II are turned on their head. The rationale for the politics of exception is that actions between states take place in an inherently nebulous space. While inside territorial boundaries, sovereignty and constitutionality usually prevail, state interactions always take place in an arbitrary space where, it is argued, there are few rules or bodies to enforce them. The bodies that do exist, such as the United Nations and International Criminal Court, are not included, given the frequency with which they are circumvented and their legitimacy questioned. Therefore, domestic exceptions to sovereignty become the rule in the international community. Order can be achieved only by reconciling domestic notions of sovereignty

⁷¹ Jens Bartelson, "Second Natures: Is the State Identical With Itself," *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 3 (1998): 320-2.

⁷² Jens Bartelson, "The Concept of Sovereignty Revisited," *The European Journal of International Law* 17, no. 2 (2006): 465-470.

with transnational manifestations in a way that is specific to time and place. For example, domestic notions of sovereignty in Russia and Kazakhstan need to be reconciled with the transnational drug trafficking groups operating in their respective spaces.⁷³

Eurasia Area Studies

There is an extensive body of literature on Eurasian geopolitics, but very little that looks specifically at the intersection of drugs, border security, and sovereignty from 1991 to the present. Sternik, Wilhelmsen, and MacHaffie are preoccupied with the power vacuum left by the sudden breakup of the Soviet Union and the ensuing power struggle over which country would be the new regional hegemon.⁷⁴ Russia, China, and, following the September 11th attacks, the U.S., have all been competing for influence in Central Asia because of its economic and geostrategic significance. Sternik and MacHaffie stress the importance of trust between leaders in the region, particularly Russia and China, in order to thwart the growing influence of the US. MacHaffie is particularly suspect of the likelihood of Russia and China forming a lasting alliance

⁷³ Jef Huysmans, "International Politics of Exception: Competing Visions of International Political Order Between Law and Politics," *Alternatives* 31, no. 2 (April 2006): 135-140.

⁷⁴ James MacHaffie, "China's Role in Central Asia: Security Implications for Russia and the United States," *Comparative Strategy* 29, no. 4 (September 2010): 369; A. Sternik "Central Asia and Russia: Mutual Attraction," *International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy & International Relations* 58, no. 5 (September 2012): 61; Julie Wilhelmsen and Geir Flikke, "Chinese–Russian Convergence and Central Asia," *Geopolitics* 16, no. 4 (December 2011): 881.

given their complicated history of territorial disputes and broken promises to share nuclear technology, to name a couple examples.⁷⁵

The drug trade is critical to any discussion of regional power struggles. Drug trafficking has created public health, and national security challenges for Russia that has forced her to seek external assistance, most notably from the U.S. and Kazakhstan. Blank sees this as proof that Russia's influence has sharply declined while Sternik comes to the opposite conclusion.⁷⁶ A more likely approximation of Russia's power is that it retains some, but must compete with the U.S., Russia, and China for influence. Central Asian nations have become more emboldened over the last decade and are leveraging the need for assistance on combating the drug trade and the war on terror to extract rents from their more powerful Russian and Chinese neighbors.⁷⁷

The war on terror has pushed Central Asia to the forefront of international politics and has proved a catalyst for regional area studies. Collins focuses on the divergent trajectories that Central Asian nations followed in the 1990s. The author uses the outlier case of Kyrgyzstan, which has made progress toward democratization, to challenge post-independence transition theory.⁷⁸ Kuru agrees with Collins that the theories currently being used to describe regional political life are outdated, and he

⁷⁵ Sternik, "Central Asia," 61; MacHaffie, "China's Role," 369.

⁷⁶ Stephen J. Blank, "Challenges to Russia in Central Asia," *American Foreign Policy Interests* 33, no. 5 (September 1, 2011): 215; Sternik, 61.

⁷⁷ Wilhelmsen, "Chinese Russian Convergence," 881.

⁷⁸ Kathleen Collins, "Clans, Pacts, and Politics in Central Asia," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 3 (2002): 139-41.

selects the 'rentier state' model to frame his analysis.⁷⁹ This model is appropriate given the vast reserves of natural resources found in the region. Central Asian governments have increasingly relied on foreign governments to develop their natural resources at the expense of developing their domestic human capital.⁸⁰

The most significant gap in the current Eurasian studies literature, therefore, is that the authors—particularly Sternik, Wilhelmsen, and MacHaffie—are overly focused on external regional influences, while neglecting internal factors, including the drug trade, border security and sovereignty.⁸¹ The region has changed dramatically over the past two decades, largely owing to two regime changes—the collapse of the Soviet Union and the U.S.-led overthrow of the Taliban. These regime changes precipitated the creation of new states, while upsetting the balance of power in the region. Yet, the current scholarship fails to consider the significance of these changes in relation to drugs, borders, and sovereignty.

This chapter has shown that the current body of literature looks at Eurasian regime changes, the drug trade, border security, and sovereignty in isolation. A shortcoming in the drug trade literature is its preoccupation with supply side dynamics. The border security literature emphasizes the role of external actors, particularly the US, following the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. A flaw in the sovereignty literature is that

⁷⁹ A rentier state is one in which the government relies on a source other than its domestic population's economic production for revenues.

⁸⁰ Ahmet Kuru, "The Rentier State Model and Central Asian Studies: The Turkmen Case," *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* 1, no. 1 (2002): 52-4.

⁸¹ MacHaffie, 371; Sternik, 61; Wilhelmsen, 881.

territory-based definitions do not account for changes brought on by globalization. The next chapter on regime changes focuses on the influence of the 1991 collapse of Communism and 2001 US-led overthrow of the Taliban on the drug trade, border security, and sovereignty in Russia.

CHAPTER 3

REGIME CHANGES


Power shifts in the nations of Eurasia have had far-reaching implications. The largest and mightiest was regime change in Russia, which fell under Communist rule early in the 20th century and soon transfigured itself as the linchpin of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). After the USSR collapsed in 1991, Russia and most of its formerly Communist republics changed from closed societies to relatively open ones. At the same time, economic hardship left them without the funds to control their borders and fight drug runners. Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, the United States made a *quid pro quo* deal with the Taliban: Hamid Karzi's newly elected regime would focus on achieving and maintaining political stability in exchange for the American tabling of their concerns about Afghanistan's booming production of drugs, namely, opium from poppies.

Soviet Union

The Soviet Union's preoccupation with border controls was rooted in its desire to keep outsiders out and insiders in. The border guards primarily had a twofold mission: They were charged with controlling the flow of goods and people and with spying on citizens. Given the vast size of the empire, the Kremlin relied on individuals posted in the borderlands to immediately report back on suspicious activity. The role of border officers evolved once again following the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop

annexations. The Soviet Union received parts of Poland, and Finland as well the Baltic States in return for agreeing to remain neutral in the event that Germany was attacked. The new territories pushed the frontier westward, and the Kremlin relied heavily on its border patrol to acculturate new residents to Soviet norms. As party functionaries, guards were charged with indoctrination through propaganda and also with making sure the locals participated in elections. The process of setting up a border zone proved to be an extremely violent one. Villagers were often displaced or deported. Jails were quickly set up to house dissidents and those trying to flee. A system of physical barriers, bureaucratic red tape, and psychological duress was employed to fortify USSR borders. Figure 1 shows how imposing the border crossings were in order to discourage illegal entry and exit. This system was nearly destroyed during World War Two, and the Kremlin replaced it with an even stronger one.⁸²

Figure 1 Border crossing between the Soviet Union and Estonia c. 1920's



Source: Sven Karjahärm's Collection.

http://www.estonica.org/en/Border_crossing_between_Estonia_and_the_Soviet_Union,_1920s/

⁸² Andrea Chandler, *Institutions of Isolation: Border Controls In the Soviet Union and Its Successor States, 1917-1993* (Montreal: McGill Queens University Printing, 1998), 78-9.

Border controls also played a role in the informal second economy. The Soviet Union endured chronic shortages caused by the failure of factories and farms to meet production targets and the central government's perpetual misallocation of resources. In a market economy, the state could easily use exports to make up for any shortfalls, whereas under the Soviet system only state-owned foreign trade organizations had access to international markets. Because foreign exchange was the preferred method for accessing the black market, Soviet citizens were highly motivated to circumvent the rules.⁸³ All strata of Soviet society relied on illegal contraband to make up for the failings of a planned economy. A partial list of items smuggled in from the West included jeans, stereos and calculators. Likewise, so-called Red Directors and the factories they ran suffered from the lack of direct access to world markets. Corruption of local officials and border guards allowed some goods and contraband to cross borders.⁸⁴ Nonetheless, it was commonplace for production facilities to use technology that was five to fifty years behind global markets, which made it that much harder to attain a competitive advantage. Following the relatively prosperous years presided over by Leonid Brezhnev from 1964 to 1982; living standards began to plateau as the shortcomings of a planned economy became magnified.⁸⁵

⁸³ Anna Meyendorff, "The Black Market for Foreign Exchange in the Former Soviet Union," *Comparative Economic Studies* 36, no. 4 (Winter 1994): 161-71.

⁸⁴ Steven L. Sampson, "The Second Economy of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 493, no. 1 (1987): 120-136.

⁸⁵ Charles Alexander, Gisela Bolte and Erik Amfitheatrof, "Sinking Deeper into a Quagmire," *Time* 120, no. 21 (November 22, 1982): 34.

Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to forestall the collapse of the Soviet economy through *perestroika* and *glasnost*, programs aimed at the reconstruction and liberalization of social, political, and economic institutions. As is well known, the reforms ultimately hastened the regime's loss of political authority. Those living in Russia and the republics became increasingly brazen as they realized the central government was acting from a position of weakness. A separatist movement that began in Poland quickly spread to most of the republics, and the Kremlin could do little more than watch. Separatist movements led to declarations of independence, and by December of 1991 the Soviet Union was no more.⁸⁶

The chaos that followed was largely a function of the fact that very few people predicted a collapse. The speed and accompanying shock of the Soviet Union's fall left hardly any preparation time for what was to come next.⁸⁷ One of the immediate effects of the transition was an economic meltdown, and the Yeltsin administration—the first of a non-Communist federation of Russia and fourteen other post-Soviet states—lacked the resources to shield citizens from its harsher effects. Food shortages became the norm as farmers were freed from their obligation to sell to the state at artificially low prices; instead, farmers could suddenly reap the gains of selling to competitive local markets. The federation saw a massive decline in food and fuel production following the abrupt halt of central planning. The new republics faced not only a real threat of starvation when the Kremlin longer diverted food from areas with surpluses, but also

⁸⁶ David Arbel and Ran Edelist, *Western Intelligence and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, 1980-1990: Ten Years That Did Not Shake the World* (London: Routledge, 2003), 174-83.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 169-70.

the daunting task of having to fend for themselves. One U.S. Treasury official noted that providing humanitarian aid would be an uphill battle, because Russia's transportation network was in an advanced state of decay, making it extremely difficult to get food and medical supplies to those most in need.⁸⁸

In the midst of trying to nurse an economy on the brink of disaster, and to secure its nuclear hardware, the new government embarked on a search for identity. The Russian Congress of People's Deputies (RCPD) spent a whole day debating what the name of their new country should be, and then ended up agreeing to have two names: Russian Federation and Russia. The RCPD also had to make some fundamental decisions about the shape that economic and political systems would take. It is not surprising that the transition to a democracy and a market economy stalled, given that the RCPD's members were mostly holdovers from the old regime that stood to benefit from the status quo. Hardliners such as Viktor Aksyuchits, a powerful Belorussian, went a step further and believed that the transition was more of an interregnum and that they need only bide their time until the end of 1992, "because by then the country, the government, Yeltsin, the whole thing would have collapsed anyway."⁸⁹

The elaborate Soviet system of borders collapsed along with the Union. The guards who remained were unclear of their mission once the political component of their duties was removed. The boundaries between countries were nebulous, at best, and

⁸⁸ Russell Watson and Fred Coleman, "And Now What?," *Newsweek* 118, no. 12 (September 16, 1991): 32.

⁸⁹ Elisabeth Rubinfiel, "Russia's Identity Crises," *National Review* 44, no. 9 (May 11, 1992): 19-20.

disputed more often than not. Figure 2 is an example of diminished post-Soviet border control capacity and shows how easier it became to smuggle illegal contraband, including heroin. It was very easy to smuggle goods and avoid taxes because the guards were underpaid and easily corruptible. Chaos along the border remained the norm for much of 1992-1993 until the Kremlin started cracking down on tax evasion and capital flight. The Russian Central Bank and the Russian Customs Service worked together to create a new system by which individuals, firms, and financial institutions would have to document all goods and capital entering and leaving the country. A vast bureaucracy was created to administer the system, which ultimately served only to multiply corruption in the financial industry and border patrol service.⁹⁰

Figure 2 Modern-day border crossing between Russia and Estonia



Source: "Day 1 - Estonia and its borders with Russia and Latvia."
<http://freepages.misc.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~hughwallis/Baltics/Estonia.htm>

⁹⁰ Vladimir Tikhomirov, "Capital Flight from Post-Soviet Russia," *Europe-Asia Studies*, 49 no. 4 (June 1997): 595-7.

The chaos and uncertainty that resulted from the legacy of Stalin's borders spread throughout Central Asia. The Communists had intentionally drawn the republics in such a way that would preclude any one ethnic group from becoming too powerful. This proved to be a perfect recipe for post-independence ethnic conflict. The Fergana Valley (a disputed area between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) and Nagorno-Karabakh (bordered by Azerbaijan and Armenia) were, and continue to be, notable tinderboxes. The new Russian government was equally concerned with fighting in Moldova and Ossetia and also the very real possibility of an armed conflict with Ukraine over Crimea.⁹¹

Early hopes that the newly independent Central Asian states would join together as a cohesive region quickly proved false. Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan formed the Central Asian Union (CAU) in 1994 and later admitted Tajikistan. (Turkmenistan had categorically refused to join any regional organizations). The CAU and its future iterations—Central Asia Economic Union (CAEU) and Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO)—were supposed to promote economic cooperation with agreements on taxes, monetary policies, and customs duties, but member countries have largely ignored their unity proclamations and adopted protectionist policies instead. CACO also attempted to cooperate on security matters through the creation of

⁹¹ Vladimir P. Lukin, "Our Security Predicament," *Foreign Policy*, no. 88 (Autumn, 1992), 57-75.

the Central Asian Battalion (Centrasbat), which has failed to mobilize during armed conflicts.⁹²

The Fergana Valley, an extremely fertile agricultural region, had been the scene of massive, unrelenting bloodshed for the past two decades. Like many in the region, the conflicts were rooted in Stalin's delineation of national boundaries almost a century ago. Stalin gave each republic a sizeable portion of the valley, but ignored the potentially explosive consequences of drawing lines around such a diverse mix of ethnicities. To a certain extent, he was counting on latent ethnic tensions to keep any one group from becoming too powerful. The ethnic strife that followed was partly caused by the attempts of states (none of which had a history of statehood) to form national identities. The second catalyst was the collapse of agriculture following the abrupt end of collective farming. Farming became progressively less profitable in the post-independence years, and the Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Kyrgyz had to fight for pieces of a rapidly shrinking pie. The chaos and lawlessness that followed had made the Fergana Valley very attractive for heroin traffickers, who were drawn by the heavy presence of organized crime.⁹³

The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic was another region that was a cause of great concern to Russia. As in the Fergana Valley, the chaos surrounding the violence makes the republic an ideal hub for drug smuggling. Rightful ownership of the land had been

⁹² Annette Bohr, "Regionalism," 485-7.

⁹³ Charles Recknagel, "Ferghana Valley: A Tinderbox for Violence" Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, January 17, 2010
http://www.rferl.org/content/why_is_the_ferghana_valley_a_tinderbox_violence/2074849.html (accessed November 18, 2012).

disputed since at least the 1st century BC. Armenians can trace their ties to the region back two millennia, when they built churches and monasteries that are still standing today. In neighboring Azerbaijan, the ethnically Turkish Azeris feel an equally strong connection to the land, because the Ottomans, and Turks had ruled the area on and off since the 11th century. The current conflict has its roots in the 1924 Soviet creation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region within Azerbaijan, then 94 percent Armenian and 6 percent Azeri. Relations between the two nationalities were further strained by the Ottoman and Turk acts of genocide against the Armenians in present-day Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. This conflict started in 1988, when the Nagorno-Karabakh National Council, catalyzed by *perestroika*, announced that the region should be transferred to Armenia. (The nationality split was 75 percent Armenian and 25 percent Azeri at this time.) The Azeris did not take the Council's proclamation sitting down, and the region was the scene of retaliatory pogroms until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. A ceasefire was declared three years later, at which point the Armenians had taken control of Nagorno-Karabakh and parts of western Azerbaijan. Despite the devastating social and economic toll, the Azeris and Armenians were highly ambivalent toward solving the conflict.⁹⁴

The Georgia breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia presented additional border security and drug smuggling challenges for Russia. Russia earned the ire of the international community when it immediately recognized the sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia once they declared independence. Russia took on the role

⁹⁴ Georgios Theophanous, "Blurred Borders," *Harvard International Review* 24, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 12-3.

of guarantor of their sovereignty and, in August 2008, fought a bloody war with Georgia over these territories. Russia's end game was hardly the sovereignty of these territories; it was to stoke tension with Georgia as a way of discouraging investment and weakening the central government.⁹⁵ Ethnic conflicts were an attractive operating environment for drug traffickers, because the absence of law and order made it easier to transport illegal products across borders.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan is the largest producer of heroin in this region, with much of it trafficked through Central Asia and Russia to reach European markets. Afghani opium producers took advantage of the Taliban ouster in 2001 to increase cultivation with the tacit approval of the U.S.-led coalition. Afghani citizens felt they had little choice but to rely on poppy farming after three decades of continuous conflict had decimated the country's economic infrastructure. After the fall of the Taliban, drug traffickers were able to leverage an increase in regional lawlessness to move their product with relative ease from Afghanistan to Russia and beyond. Regime change in Afghanistan was therefore important to this study, because it triggered an increase in Eurasian drug trafficking and continues to pose an ongoing threat to regional border security.

Afghani reliance on the opium trade can be traced back to the Soviet occupation. The Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989, and Mohammad Najibullah was president from 1986 until his regime was toppled in 1992. A civil war ensued as

⁹⁵ Philip P. Pan, "Georgia: Russia Is Stoking Tensions," *The Washington Post*, February 2, 2009.

various tribal leaders fought to form an Afghan government. The chaos that followed allowed Muhammed Omar, a leader of the Taliban, to come to power. Omar claimed to have had a vision in which Allah instructed him to bring peace to the country and rule it according to Islamic law. His early following was small, but grew significantly after he helped free a Pakistani convoy that had been taken hostage. Omar and his followers went on to disarm local towns and to establish law and order, which kept some 20,000 Afghans and Pakistanis feeling safe enough to leave their refugee camps and join him.⁹⁶

Ethnic conflict played a central role in Afghani drug trade. The Taliban are ethnically Pushtun, which accounts for 40 percent of Afghanistan's population and helps to explain their popularity in the south. When the Taliban came to power, they ruled with a combination of Islamic and Pushtunwali laws. They alarmed the international community with their Pushtunwali law of *badal*, by which a man was expected to seek vengeance when either his own or his family's honor had been violated; in doing so, the man was backed by his family and tribe. The Taliban were never able to take absolute control over the territory, because of regional, ethnic, and national cleavages. Nevertheless, they continued to fight their main opposition, the Northern Alliance, right up until the eve of the American invasion in 2001.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ Christopher Kondaki, "The Taliban: A Primer," *Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy* 29 no. 10 (Oct. 2001): 6-7.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 6-7.

Afghanistan was a failed state when the Taliban came to power in 1996, when all of the basic functions of government, including a monopoly of violence, collection of revenues and control over the territory, were in an advanced state of decay. In one instance, a man tried to get his passport stamped near the border, and found the duty office empty when he arrived; he ended up having to go to the border guard's apartment and ask him to stamp it in the middle of his breakfast.⁹⁸ This type of chaos was repeated all over Afghanistan as the jockeying for power started long before the Soviet troops exited the country in 1989, and it continued almost unabated after the Taliban came to power. Internal borders were constantly shifting and external ones were under the control of regional *shuras* (rulers), who maintained a monopoly on customs duties. The *shuras* collected customs duties at the border and failed to share any with the central government, which left the latter desperate for an alternative revenue source.⁹⁹

The Taliban turned to opium cultivation as a source of revenue for its fledgling government. They immediately set about bringing the country's number one cash crop under its jurisdiction, and it was estimated that they controlled 96 percent of cultivation after one year in power. Before 1996, most of the opium refinement process took place outside Afghan borders, but this changed when the Taliban became aware that refined heroin was considerably more lucrative than raw opium.¹⁰⁰ The Taliban profited in


⁹⁸ Michael A. Rubin, "Afghanistan: as Bad as its Reputation?" *Middle East Quarterly* 7, no. 3 (September 2000): 56.

⁹⁹ Barnett R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 271-2.

¹⁰⁰ Reid Smith, "A Detailed History of the Afghan Drug Trade," *Afghanistan Press*, December 24, 2008.

many ways by taxing farmers, refiners and exporters. They also modernized production. As Figure 3 shows, opium production increased dramatically under the Taliban. It exploded in the late 1990s, going from 2,200 metric tons in 1996 to 4,600 metric tons in 1999.¹⁰¹

Figure 3 Afghani Opium Production



Source: Gretchen Peters, *How Opium Profits The Taliban*, 12.

In spite of booming production, Mullah Mohammed Omar urged the Taliban issued a *fatwa*, or religious decree, banning opium cultivation, which took effect in July 2000. The ban was partly motivated by religious conviction, concerned as the Taliban were about a sharp increase in heroin addiction among young Afghani men. Another catalyst was a strong desire to appease the United Nations, which had imposed harsh economic sanctions.¹⁰² Omar used three principal methods to enforce the ban: harsh retributions against violators, systematic local monitoring and public shaming of the

¹⁰¹ Gretchen Peters, *How Opium Profits the Taliban* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 12.

¹⁰² "Afghanistan's Opium Fiends," *Economist* 358, no. 8210 (February 24, 2001): 43.

noncompliant. The often grotesque shaming of violators included public executions and dismemberment. In other cases, the Taliban would play the honor card and blacken the faces of the guilty party and announce their crime to the whole town. The ban resulted in a 99 percent reduction in opium cultivation. However, the estimates don't take into account the 5 percent of land controlled by the Northern Alliance.¹⁰³

The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent overthrow of the Taliban had the unintended consequence of reviving opium cultivation.¹⁰⁴ U.S.-backed—and democratically elected—President Hamid Karzai replaced Omar. Despite billions of dollars in international counter-narcotics aid, Karzai had been unable to stem the flow of opium pouring out of Afghanistan. The U.S. and the Afghans share the blame for enabling opium production, since both were far more concerned with the legitimacy of the new regime. Both governments were reluctant to take a hardliner stance against poppy farmers because they relied on them for assistance in overthrowing the Taliban.

The two parties resorted to finger pointing as they faced heat from the international community over the explosion in trafficking. The Bush Administration criticized Karzai for not prioritizing counter-narcotics efforts, which was crystallized in a U.S. Embassy memo leaked to the *New York Times* just before his 2005 visit to Washington. The Afghani president countered that eradicating crops would prove unsustainable if farmers lacked any alternative livelihood. Two other impediments to slowing production have been rampant corruption among police officers, who have

¹⁰³ Farrell and Thorne, "Where Have All," 81-5.

¹⁰⁴ James P. Rubin, "Stumbling Into War," *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 5 (September 2003): 46.

been known to charge farmers with a 10 percent tax, and the failure to build a counter-narcotics legal framework from scratch.¹⁰⁵

Porous borders, especially the one separating Pakistan and Afghanistan, complicated the fight against the narcotics trade. Border security was problematic under the Taliban and only worsened after their downfall. Once the leaders of the Taliban and al Qaeda were overthrown, they were forced across the border into Pakistan. A modern “great game” had ensued in which U.S.-led coalition forces, Afghani troops, Pakistani leaders, tribal factions, al Qaeda and the Taliban were fighting for control over the border region. Cooperation between the Pakistani and Afghani governments had been a challenge because there was so much mutual mistrust. The Pakistanis were frustrated because Afghanistan had a minimally functioning government, and thousands of refugees had crossed the border to escape the fighting. Conversely, the Afghanis accused the Pakistanis of sponsoring terrorism through Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). It is evident that counter-narcotics efforts should not be localized to Afghanistan, given the fact that regional instability facilitates trafficking.¹⁰⁶

Stemming the flow of drugs out of Afghanistan hinges on securing the border. This has proven an uphill battle so far, but there are reasons for optimism as of late. Pakistani and Afghani forces, aided by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have been holding regular meetings to discuss increased cooperation on border

¹⁰⁵ Joellen Perry. "Field of Dreams," *U.S. News & World Report* 138, no. 21 (June 6, 2005): 30-34.

¹⁰⁶ Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid, "From Great Game to Grand Bargain," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 6 (November 1, 2008): 30-3.

security. These meetings take place in sparsely populated areas and consist of men sitting on lawn chairs discussing family, religion, history, and shared security concerns. Collaboration has already paid dividends along the Nawa Pass, which separates Kunar Province in Afghanistan and Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The two regions have reaped economic benefits as a direct result of increased security. A road was recently constructed in Kunar near the border, which has enabled farmers and merchants to gain access to markets in other sections of the province. Both sides have concluded that the benefits of cooperation outweigh the risks associated with it.¹⁰⁷

The case of the Nawa Pass is both a cause for optimism and an example of how far Eurasia is from achieving political stability and economic integration. With respect to border integrity, Russia is still recovering from the collapse of its empire. The country is facing the daunting task of rehabilitating its border control mechanisms during a time of continued regional political and economic uncertainty.¹⁰⁸ The porousness of its borders—unthinkable during the Soviet era—enables heroin to flow freely in and creates an immense public health crisis. This has compromised already tenuous relations with the former republics and seriously disrupts other economic activities in the region.

¹⁰⁷ Matthew C. Moeller, "Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the United States Agree: Cooperation is the Key to Success Along Border Pass," *DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management* 31, no. 3 (November 2009): 139-140.

¹⁰⁸ Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes, "Russia after the Global Financial Crisis," *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 51, no. 3 (2010): 290.

Central Asian nations faced economic problems even greater than Russia's, in part because they had no history of statehood. Kazakhstan was not the only Central Asian nation that had to create government institutions from scratch, and like the others, had to build industry on the ruins of the Soviet planned economy. These nations faced the paradox of building self-sustaining economies while also being dependent on regional trade partnerships. Fortifying the borders was very low on the agenda because of the dearth of funds and political will. In another paradox, the increased flow of heroin through the post-Soviet republics, which corrupted local institutions, also proved to be the catalyst for greater political cooperation in the region. The security of the Russian/Kazakh border is therefore an instructive case in point. Its complicated history is traced in the next chapter from Stalin to the present.

CHAPTER 4

THE RUSSIAN/KAZAKH BORDER

The unfettered flow of heroin from Afghanistan into Russia was facilitated by the highly porous nature of the Russian/Kazakh border as well as by ethnically diverse populations. Present day border insecurity has its roots in the way that Stalin drew the borders of the republics in the 1920s. Stalin sought to create an "empire of nations" and used a combination of assimilation and coercion tactics to bring the future republics into the fold. This included education policies that were nationalist in form and socialist in content. He posited that once the Union became a fully consolidated socialist society, people would no longer yearn for national identities.¹⁰⁹ The Soviet government had paternalistic notions of the assimilation of tribes and clans into their respective republics and into the Soviet Union as a whole. This chapter will explain how drug traffickers flourished in Central Asia, aided by porous borders, ethnic conflict, and extensive tribal networks.

Inability to Secure the Border

Present-day ethnic conflicts and porous borders are byproducts of how borders were drawn in the 1920s. Party elites used demography and cartography to determine how to draw borders around diverse tribal lands. In the case of Kazakhstan, this

¹⁰⁹ Francine Hirsch, "Toward an Empire of Nations: Border-Making and the Formation of Soviet National Identities," *Russian Review* 59, no. 2 (April 2000): 225.

translated into a large Uzbek minority. Conversely, a sizeable number of Kazakhs found themselves living within Uzbekistan's borders. Joseph Stalin was aware that ethnic conflict might result from the creation of multi-ethnic nations from above, but at the same time counted on latent mistrust to prevent any particular nationality from becoming too powerful. Ethnic minorities who felt they were being discriminated against by the majority embarked on their own nationalization-from-below campaigns. They quickly became skilled lobbyists as they learned how the Soviet system worked and adopted the best practices for manipulating it. Lobbying efforts took the form of letter-writing campaigns and sending delegations to Moscow to plead their case. The republics were never completely subdued, and the push-pull dynamic continued until the collapse of the Soviet Union.¹¹⁰

Soviet leaders had a vested interest in the economic development of Kazakhstan because it was rich in oil, natural gas, and uranium and had vast expanses of arable land. Soviet modernization programs in Kazakhstan built on preceding Tsarist ones and included the construction of factories, expansion of irrigation systems, laying down roads and railroad tracks, expanding extractive industries, and sending ethnic Russians to colonize the Kazakh Steppe. The Kazakhs were a primarily nomadic people whose lives and livelihoods were turned upside down when two million Russian settlers arrived following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the ensuing civil war. Moscow initially paid lip service to not exploiting the republics as their Tsarist predecessors had,

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 202-9.

but early promises of respecting a modicum of local autonomy were subverted by the need to jumpstart an economy decimated by war.

Moscow's desire for border controls and a planned economy directly contravened the Kazakhs' preference for moving around and living off the land. The Kazakh preference for a nomadic lifestyle and desire to preserve virgin lands often conflicted with the government's desire to extract as much as possible in the name of economic expansion, which led to decades of conflict and mistrust. Kazakh resistance took a violent turn, particularly in the 1920s, at the advent of collectivization. Many Kazakhs slaughtered their livestock and starved to death rather than accept Soviet dictates. Emigration and starvation decreased the number of ethnic Kazakhs from roughly four to three million between 1926 and 1939. Soviet bureaucrats, who were members of the *nomenklatura*, were also known to force prisoners to work in the extractive industries and assign them the most dangerous jobs.¹¹¹ Despite heavy resistance, the central planners forged ahead because they were heavily dependent on the Kazakhs to provide wheat, cotton, industrial resources, and energy for the factories in the nearby Urals. In return, the Kazakh republic was the beneficiary of a comparative large amount of investment, allowing its citizens a higher standard of living than some of their Central Asian counterparts.¹¹²

¹¹¹ The *nomenklatura* system referred to a list of key posts requiring Communist Party approval and a list of people qualified to fill those posts.

¹¹² Francis Newton, "Soviet Central Asia: Economic Progress and Problems," *Middle Eastern Studies* 12, no. 3, Special Issue on the Middle Eastern Economy (October 1976): 87-93.

The relationship of Soviet leaders with Kazakhstan was very much a function of what they needed at a particular point in time. They made controlling the borders a priority because of security concerns and fear of the impact of ever-increasing capital, goods, and inhabitants on their communist society. On paper, at least, Moscow was extremely vigilant about keeping people in clearly demarcated spaces. At the same time, serious understaffing hampered Moscow's control over the borders. Border staffing was complicated by the fact that some people viewed inspecting documents and possible contraband as being beneath them. Another challenge was that the local soviets perceived the border patrol as a threat to their power. Ultimately the border patrol was subjugated to the needs of the Kremlin.¹¹³

Russia had a very tenuous relationship with the republics and was willing to offer freedoms to certain sub-national groups in the name of larger goals. In the case of Kazakhstan, building trust and goodwill with inhabitants of the borderlands often took precedence over having absolute control over the latter's mobility. The demography of Kazakhstan factored in as the percentage of ethnic Russians doubled from one-third to two-thirds during the decades of Soviet rule. Kazakhs living in Russia wanted to be able to visit their families back home, and the same was true of Russians in Kazakhstan. Therefore, the stated goals of the Unified State Political Directorate (OGPU), or

¹¹³ Chandler, *Institutions of Isolation*, 39-41.

Russian border guard service, were often subverted to political and economic realities, and exceptions were granted on an as-needed basis.¹¹⁴

The OGPU and border migrants had a push-pull relationship and it wasn't always entirely clear who was calling the shots. On the orders of the central government, inhabitants of Kazakhstan were regularly deported and re-deported according to the needs of the economy. Gossip about who was likely to be relocated next spread like wildfire, and inhabitants often took the initiative to move where they saw fit depending on grazing lands and access to food. One estimate in 1935 was that fifty-seven percent of all illegal crossings throughout the Union took place in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The OGPU and its successors were unaided by natural geographical boundaries, and let migrants return with surprisingly little retribution; the migrants were allowed back in on the condition of settling near the border. This appeased them, since the harshest effects of collectivization were felt in the interior. It also ensured that migrants would not foment resistance on the collectives with tales of better living conditions elsewhere. Border security improved as time went on, but the case of the republics had shown that the Soviet Union was not the airtight, top-down society of popular lore.¹¹⁵

Border security and drug trafficking have an inverse relationship. Control of the borders was starting to relax in the early 1980s and liberalized even further after

¹¹⁴ Charles Shaw, "Friendship under Lock and Key: the Soviet Central Asian Border, 1918–34," *Central Asian Survey* 30, no. 3/4 (September 2011): 331–4.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 340.

Mikhail Gorbachev took office as CPSU General Secretary in 1985. Moscow tried to appease Washington by allowing greater freedom of movement across borders in the hope that this would relax restrictions on Soviet imports, since U.S. legislation linked trade to emigration policies.¹¹⁶ This resulted in the CPSU's policy of reevaluating the applications of *refusniks* and an overall rapid increase in emigration. On the eve of the collapse of the USSR, Gorbachev continued to manipulate migration and immigration policies in the name of preserving the regime.¹¹⁷ By doing so, Gorbachev inadvertently made the Soviet Union more vulnerable to the international drug trade.¹¹⁸

Gorbachev attempted to increase political and economic ties with the United States and Israel, which is why the USSR consented to allowing such a large number of Jews to leave voluntarily. Kazakhstan experienced a significant amount of outward migration, and this was not limited to Jews fleeing to the U.S. and Israel. Almost a million ethnic Germans fled Kazakhstan in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Its German population dated back to the 1940s, when the Soviet Union was fearful that the 500,000 Germans living within its borders would side with Germany, and therefore deported most of them to Siberia and Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan subsequently suffered a severe brain drain as most of its teachers, engineers, scientists, and physicians went back to Germany as soon as the borders opened. This crippled any chance the republic had of lessening the effects of the disastrous collapse of its economy in the 1990s, which

¹¹⁶ Anne de Tinguy, "Fuel to the Fire," *European Journal of International Affairs* 2, no. 12 (1991): 107-10.


¹¹⁷ *Refusniks* were emigration applicants whose applications had previously been rejected.

¹¹⁸ Laurie P. Salitan, "Domestic Pressures and the Politics of Exit: Trends in Soviet Emigration Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* (1989): 683.

coincided with a sharp decline in Russian subsidies and this, in turn, led to critical underfunding of border patrols.¹¹⁹

The staff guarding the Russia/Kazakh border deteriorated from small and underfunded to virtually nonexistent after the collapse of both communism and the economy. Table 1 provides a snapshot of the economic freefall Russia experienced in the 1990s and its diminished capacity to fund strategic organizations, including its military. This decrease in state capacity troubled the international community because Russia was in possession of a vast nuclear arsenal. Further, Russia had the potential to be a destabilizing influence both geopolitically and economically. With Russia still in an economic tailspin, politicians such as Gennady Zyuganov and Vladimir Zhirinovskiy used nationalist, great-power rhetoric during the 1996 presidential election, which made Russia's neighbors apprehensive about possible future aggression.¹²⁰

Table 1 Russian Defense Expenditures



Source: Foreign Policy Index. SIPRI. http://web.mit.edu/cis/fpi_russia.html

¹¹⁹ David Mould, "Between Deutschland and Karaganda," *Transitions Online* (August 29, 2011): 1.

¹²⁰ Adrian Karatnycky, "Russia On the Brink," *National Review* 48 no. 5 (March 25, 1996) 50-64.

On the other side of the border, Kazakhstan was preoccupied with jumpstarting its battered economy and resolving border disputes with its neighbors. Border disputes proved very messy, since Russia was laid claim to some of its hydrocarbon deposits, particularly those in the Caspian Sea. Another conundrum was that extremists, separatists, and terrorists all sought refuge within its territory because of Kazakhstan's porous borders, weak rule of law, and geostrategic significance. Political leaders in Astana, the country's capital, earned the ire of Beijing, because approximately 250,000 migrant Uigurs (descendants of a tribe in northern China) lived within its territory, and the Chinese government believed they intended to perform terrorist acts and to launch a separatist movement. In addition to fending off criticism of the Uigurs, Kazakhstan also had homegrown separatist movements to contend with along its northern border with Russia.¹²¹

Vulnerabilities Exposed by Drug Traffickers

Porous borders, corrupt police, and a quasi-functioning judicial system made Kazakhstan a haven for transnational criminals, particularly smugglers and terrorists. It is a very large country with long borders to protect, and for most of the 1990s, it "solved" its border problems by granting visa-free passage. As a failing state, the country lacked the human and material capital to secure its boundaries. The government made some efforts to secure the periphery, but the borders were easily circumvented with the use of false documents and well-placed bribes. In addition, checkpoints were easily avoided, since the country lacks fences or geographical deterrents such as rivers.

¹²¹ Sergey V. Golunov and Roger N. Mcdermott, "Border Security in Kazakhstan: Threats, Policies and Future Challenges," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 18, no. 1 (March 2005): 34-41.

Many borders ran through villages, which made it easy for smugglers and illegal immigrants to walk into the country, and blend into the vast, uninhabited grasslands.¹²²

The breakdown of law and order on both sides of the border has forced a reconfiguration of what constitutes sovereignty in Russia, especially given the current status quo in the borderlands. Michel Foucault's concept of *governmentality* represents a shift from government as an institution to government as a process. This process entails efforts to control the behavior of people through rules and regulations. State and non-state actors engage in a power game by enacting rules that regulate the behavior of individuals and, by doing so, the population as a whole. There are at least two distinct levels where competition takes place between state entities or between state and non-state actors: center-periphery competition between the city government and the federal government and local competition between the city government and industrial managers. In this case, the local government of Ekaterinburg passed laws that directly contravened those of the central government in Moscow. In addition, Uralmash competed with the city government for the loyalty of the local population.¹²³ The overlapping spheres of influence between Moscow, on the one hand, and the city government and Uralmash, on the other, resemble what William Walters calls the "fuzzy borders" of sovereignty.¹²⁴

¹²² Ibid., 41-2.

¹²³ Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 241-4.

¹²⁴ William Walters, "Rethinking Borders Beyond," 50-6.

The growth of sub-national actors such as those described by John Sullivan and Robert Bunker adds another much-needed layer of analysis, which further modifies the concept of Russia's sovereignty. These authors use the cartel model to show how highly organized and well-funded criminal organizations have corrupted a wide array of social, political, and economic organizations, but fall short of completely capturing the state. As we shall see, this is particularly applicable to Ekaterinburg, given how the city is controlled less by the government than it is by a colossal factory: Ural Heavy Machine Building Plant, which the Soviet government built in 1933 as a step toward the industrialization of Russia.¹²⁵

This chapter built upon the previous one by showing the influence of regime change on the Russian/Kazakh border. Borders were relatively secure up until the 1980s, at which time they were relaxed as part of Gorbachev's larger program of reform through modernization. Border control mechanisms all but disappeared in the 1990s due to a sharp decline in state revenues and attempts to improve relations with the United States. Drug syndicates used bribes and co-optation to ensure that the borders remained barrier-free. An increase in the flow of drugs following the 2001 US-led overthrow of the Taliban placed additional pressures on border control institutions. State efforts to restore a degree of border security were frustrated by ethnic diversity and the outmigration of minority populations. The collapse of the Kazakh economy, which coincided with a steep reduction in Russian subsidies, further hindered efforts to secure the Russian/Kazakh border. The inadequacy and inefficacy of border control institutions

¹²⁵ John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker, "Drug Cartels, Street Gangs, and Warlords," 44-5.

has ramifications for sovereignty and governmentality in the region. Neither government has succeeded in controlling the cross-border movement of goods and people. Moreover, drug traffickers have usurped the authority of the state by dictating the agenda of border guards through corruption and co-optation. Chapter 5 will use a case study of Ekaterinburg to show how drug traffickers have been able to leverage corrupt bureaucrats and porous borders to run their operations with relative impunity.

CHAPTER 5

CASE STUDY – EKATERINBURG

This chapter uses a case study of Ekaterinburg to demonstrate the influence of regime change on the drug trade, border security, and sovereignty in Russia. The first section presents the history of mistrust between Moscow and Ekaterinburg that slowly intensified for most of the Soviet period. In particular, the Kremlin was wary of Ekaterinburg's autonomy and continual disregard of federal laws. Regime changes in the Soviet Union and Afghanistan will then be explored with respect to their influence on the drug trade. The narcotics trade was fostered by post-Soviet decay of border control institutions and it exacerbated these weaknesses through bribery and co-optation of border guards. In the concluding section, a focus on the Ural Heavy Machine Building gang (Uralmash) highlights the relationship between drug trafficking, border security, and sovereignty at the local level.

Center-Periphery Politics in Ekaterinburg

The inability of Moscow to coordinate effective drug control policy in Ekaterinburg has its roots in Soviet center-periphery politics. Ekaterinburg, formerly known as Sverdlovsk, had a tenuous relationship with the Central Committee of the Communist Party (CPSU) throughout the history of the Union. Sources of friction included distance, fluctuating loyalties of apparatchiki, the centrally planned economy, and *perestroika* reforms. Distance played a pivotal role as Ekaterinburg and Moscow

are separated by roughly 1,800 kilometers. Another source of friction was that the loyalties of the *apparatchiki* (party functionaries) dispatched by Moscow tended to fluctuate. *Apparatchiki* were initially motivated to join the communist party by a combination of adherence to party dogma, career ambition, and economic gain. Their loyalty to Moscow was often tested after being sent to factories and towns in the borderlands. A chasm developed as the needs of the centrally planned economy often contravened those of individual factories and towns.¹²⁶ Tensions between Moscow and Ekaterinburg started to come to a head in 1934. Moscow was very frustrated with the regions for failing to make their production targets, and the latter were frustrated by constant material and labor shortages. Both sides resorted to scapegoats and show trials as a means of deflecting blame for the shortcomings of a planned economy. The center and the regions, including cities such as Ekaterinburg, continued to battle over power and autonomy right up until the 1991 collapse of the Union.¹²⁷

Perestroika, a reform program undertaken to preserve the regime, had the unintended consequence of driving an additional wedge between the center and the periphery. The 1987 Law on State Enterprises was passed to improve efficiency by transferring decision-making from Gosplan, the central planning committee, to red directors. The law also contained a provision that allowed red directors to establish firms that, theoretically, would operate under the umbrella of state-owned enterprises and would help to close the gaps in the planned economy. Red directors seized on the

¹²⁶ James R. Harris, *The Great Urals: Regionalism and the Evolution of the Soviet System* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 55-60.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 146-9.

opportunity to form private firms and used them to acquire state assets long before privatization was officially announce in 1992. Private seizure of state assets between 1987 and 1992 started slowly and gained momentum as it became increasingly clear that Gosplan lacked the resources to challenge unsanctioned privatization. Gosplan was hampered in its ability to take action by a separate *perestroika* reform, which transferred some tax collection responsibilities from the center to the periphery. This placed the Kremlin at the mercy of the regions for revenues and only further reinforced how powerless Moscow had become.¹²⁸

Regime Change in the Soviet Union

Cracks in the legitimacy and institutional capacity of the regime, which appeared in the late 1980s, were blown wide open following the collapse of communism. Up until *perestroika*, law enforcement placed tight controls on narcotics trafficking. The collapse of the state and privatization of assets created a perfect storm of theft and corruption.¹²⁹ Members of the *nomenklatura* (CPSU elites) were in the best positions to reap the maximum benefits from *perestroika* and used these advantages to turn their jurisdictions into mini fiefdoms. For example, the Governor of Ekaterinburg, Eduard Rossel, paid lip service to democratization and capitalism. In reality, he perpetuated the Soviet system of patronage and clientelism at the local level. Rossel exercised an extraordinary amount of power in the 1990s, which included control over

¹²⁸ Steven L. Solnick, "The Breakdown of Hierarchies in the Soviet Union and China." *World Politics* 48, no. 2 (1996): 223-4.

¹²⁹ Louise I. Shelley, "Post-Soviet Organized Crime: Implications for Economic, Political and Social Development," *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research* 3, no. 2 (1994): 341-3.

the value of land, licenses, permits, tax rates, and the amount of tax revenues sent to Moscow. The Kremlin was extremely wary of men like Rossel, but lacked the resources to place any real checks on their power.¹³⁰

The collapse of Communism in 1991 was cause for both celebration and alarm among Western politicians and policy analysts. The swift opening of Russia's borders and economy made Ekaterinburg vulnerable to the increased drug trade through Central Asia. Narcotics were trafficked from Afghanistan to Europe via Pakistan and Iran before 1991. Trafficking through Iran was problematic due to the high rate of seizures. The fall of the Soviet Union and ensuing collapse of border control institutions opened up Central Asia to the drug trade. Tajikistan has experienced a sharp increase in narcotics trafficking, which was exacerbated by the 2005 departure of Russia guards along the Tajik/Afghan border. Similarly, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan have all had precipitous increases in drug trafficking during the post-independence period. All five nations shared neither a history of statehood nor experience in counter-narcotics, which has hindered efforts to challenge the flow of drugs through the region.¹³¹

¹³⁰ Vladimir Brovkin, "Fragmentation of Authority and Privatization of the State: From Gorbachev to Yeltsin," *Demokratizatsiya* 6, no. 3 (1998): 511-3.

¹³¹ Vladimir Fenopetov, "The Drug Crime Threat to Countries Located on the "Silk Road"," in *The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 4, no. 1 (2006): 6-7.

Regime Change in Afghanistan

The Ekaterinburg drug trade was also fostered by the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The departure of the last Soviet troops in 1989 after a decade of occupation and war left the Afghani economy decimated and infrastructure ravaged. The civil war that followed created an opening for the Taliban, which rose to prominence in 1994 by promising peace to a war weary nation. The Taliban was comprised of Pushtun (the ethnic majority in Afghanistan) refugees from *madrasas* (Islam schools) in Pakistan. The Taliban dogma was heavily influenced by their Saudi and Pakistani backers, including Osama bin Laden, which helps explain their about-face on the use of force. In 1996, the Taliban transferred control of Afghan training camps to Pakistani factions and took control of Kabul. The swift rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and beyond is central to understanding the coterminous rise in drug trafficking throughout Central Asia. The Taliban relied on the opium trade to fund the regime. Cultivation in Afghanistan, trafficking through Central Asia, and distribution in Russia/Europe are all intricately connected to the viability of the Taliban. Particularly, the Ekaterinburg drug trade is driven by ethnic and tribal networks with the capacity to move narcotics through hostile, war-torn terrain.¹³²

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were all vulnerable to the Taliban because of weak borders, tenuous security services, and fledgling economies. While the Taliban was rising to prominence in nearby Afghanistan, the newly created states had only begun the process of creating state

¹³² Ahmed Rashid, "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism," *Foreign Affairs* 78 (1999): 23-7.

institutions from scratch. All five former republics had backed the Northern Alliance during the Afghan civil war and the Taliban retaliated by providing refuge to Central Asian dissidents. The protracted and increasingly diffuse conflict waged by the Taliban created exactly the type of environment that narcotic traffickers thrived in.¹³³

US involvement in Afghanistan began long before the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. The skills used by the Taliban to wage an insurgency against coalition forces were learned from US and Pakistani intelligence services in the 1980s. The US had aligned itself with the Afghani rebels as they shared a common enemy, the Soviet Union. The repercussions of US intervention in Afghanistan were fully revealed in 1993, when Arab militants bombed the World Trade Center in New York. These militants were the product of Taliban training camps in Afghanistan. One of the principal recruiters of the 1993 bombing was Osama bin Laden, who linked the Taliban with Saudi financing and Pan-Islamism. The bombers believed that the techniques used to defeat one global hegemon, the Soviet Union, could be used to defeat another, the US. After a few years abroad, bin Laden returned to Afghanistan in 1996 and formed a strategic partnership with the leader of the Taliban, Mohammed Omar. Bin Laden and Omar bonded over a shared hatred of the US, the United Nations, Saudi Arabia, and pro-Western Muslim regimes. The 1998 Taliban bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania raised the stakes between the US and the Taliban. The US attempted to retaliate by firing missiles at Taliban training camps but failed to damage bin Laden's

¹³³ Ibid., 28-30.

network. This was foreshadowing for difficulties later faced by the US following the 2001 invasion.¹³⁴

Russia's Drug Trade

The 1990s was a period of uncertainty for Russia and the international community as it remained unclear whether Russia would become a fully consolidated democracy or a Latin American-style narco-state. Hope for democracy began to fade in the mid-1990s when reports surfaced that drug traffickers had been quick to capitalize on the opening of Russia's borders. Increased supply of hard drugs, including heroin and cocaine, coincided with a rapid upsurge in demand. The collapse of the economy, loss of national identity, and decay of social norms drove demand for narcotics by urban youth. Federal and local authorities lacked the material resources, experience, and political will to challenge the steadily increasing supply and demand for drugs in the decade following independence. As the case study of Uralmash will show, increased supply and porous borders were mutually-reinforcing phenomenon.¹³⁵

The Ural Machine Building Plant, known as Uralmash, was a plant constructed in the 1930s to meet the needs of the centrally planned economy. A gang of the same name was formed inside the plant in the 1980s. Uralmash and other gangs were omnipresent and provided services such as private security for businesses and tax bill mediation to make up for gaps left by the collapse of state institutions. The Central

¹³⁴ Ibid., 31-3.

¹³⁵ Rensselaer W. Lee and Scott B. MacDonald, "Drugs in the East," *Foreign Policy* 90 (1993): 90-3.

gang, also known as Centralnaya, is Uralmash's main and most violent competitor in the ongoing struggle for control of Ekaterinburg. Firms quickly discovered that it was more expedient to do business with the mafia than going through official channels. Seeking assistance from law enforcement was a nonstarter since so many cops were corrupt and it would entail paying onerous state taxes. Ekaterinburg was controlled by "white" (Uralmash and Centralnaya), "blue" (ex-prisoners) and Central Asian (Turkmen, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Kazakhs) gangs following the collapse of Communism. Execution style hits were commonplace as the various gangs ruthlessly battled for turf. The local police did appoint an officer to investigate economic crimes, but he lacked the resources and legal framework to make any arrests.¹³⁶

The Russian mafia was just as active as the *nomenklatura* in profiting from the failed transition and generalized lawlessness. International criminal syndicates, including drug traffickers, started setting up shop in Ekaterinburg during the waning years of the Soviet Union. One of the darker aspects of globalization is that sworn enemies, Russian and Sicilian mafia for example, started forging previously unheard of partnerships to reduce risk and achieve economies of scale.¹³⁷ These early partnerships were also driven by the potential for huge profits since Soviet scientists, among the best in the world, were unemployed and willing to work for the highest bidder. Chemists, including those on Uralmash's payroll, used their technical expertise to produce some

¹³⁶ Victoria Clark, "Russian Mafia Tightens Grip, The Break-Up of the Soviet Union Created a Void Which Ruthless Gangland Leaders Have Not Been Slow to Fill," *The Guardian* (May 22, 1994).

¹³⁷ U.S. Department of State, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (Washington, DC, 1994), 154.

of the most powerful synthetic drugs the world has ever seen. The Uralmash syndicate's ability to produce highly profitable drugs, and efficiency at laundering money attracted the attention of other crime groups and oligarchs. The oligarchs became increasingly dependent on Uralmash gang to help them launder money overseas. The oligarchs' anxiety grew even more following the election of Vladimir Putin because of fear that the state could confiscate their wealth at any time.¹³⁸

The lack of law and order combined with its proximity to the border made Ekaterinburg an ideal narcotics transport hub, as shown by Figure 2. Heroin was smuggled into Ekaterinburg via the Silk Road. It is advantageous to smuggle heroin via Central Asia and Russia because corruption was high, the rule of law weak and borders porous. Primarily due to weak border controls, cities near the border, such as Ekaterinburg, thrived as transit hubs. Though the Silk Road was longer than the Balkan route (its southern counterpart), it was more desirable because it does not pass through Iran, a world leader in opium seizures. The northern route was also preferable because smugglers had access to members of their own ethnic clans and little competition for Russia's considerable domestic market.¹³⁹

¹³⁸ Misha Glenny, *McMafia: A Journey Through the Global Criminal Underworld* (London: Random House, 2008), 69-70.

¹³⁹ Sergei Golunov, "Drug-trafficking through Russia's Post Soviet Borders: Problems, Misperceptions and Countermeasures," *Acta Slavica Iaponica* no. 24 (2007): 25-6.

Figure 4: Afghan Heroin Hits Russia



Source: Tom Lasseter. "Flood Of Afghan Heroin Fuels Drug Plague In Russia" *McClatchy*.

Ekaterinburg remains an ideal transport hub largely due to its proximity to the Kazakh border and infrastructure left over from its former life as a major center of the Soviet military-industrial complex. Local police continued the Soviet legacy of supplementing their earnings with kickbacks and bribes. Given the high rate of extortion and bribes, it is often hard to tell where a criminal group ends and law enforcement begins. As the new millennium dawned, drug dealers conducted their business with impunity and operated under an umbrella of police protection so long as they gave the latter their share.

Along with ample supply, highly corrupt border guards continue to drive the drug trade in and near Ekaterinburg today. Becoming a Russian border guard has become so lucrative that applicants are willing to pay thousands of dollars to secure an entry-level position knowing they will recoup their investment very quickly. Aside from shaking down large-scale traffickers, the border patrol has been known to threaten petty

mules with harsh penalties if they refuse to pay a bribe. Even honest, relatively well-paid guards have been coerced into taking bribes. One retired guard recalled being told by a smuggler that he would become a millionaire if he looked the other way for five minutes. The man was subsequently threatened with his corpse being sent to Moscow if he refused. Large bribes have fostered top-down corruption in the government and are in no way unique to the border patrol. Perhaps the most notorious case of top-down corruption is that of a Tajik ambassador in Kazakhstan, who was caught with a large quantity of heroin in his trunk. Based on the available evidence (see Table 1), the insecurity of the borders appears to be increasing in proportion with the volume of heroin. Afghani farmers earn subsistence off poppy cultivation but the significant profits go to drug smugglers, border guards, bureaucrats, and politicians.¹⁴⁰

Table 2 Control of corruption, comparison across selected countries

Country	Sources		Year	Percentile Rank	Governance Score	Standard Error
				(0-100)	(-2.5 to +2.5)	
KAZAKHSTAN	12		2010	15.8	-1	0.13
	12		2008	18.4	-0.9	0.13
	11		2006	18.5	-0.9	0.14
	8		2004	11.2	-1.1	0.16
	6		2002	10.2	-1.06	0.17
	7		2000	8.3	-1.06	0.2
	5		1998	17.1	-0.94	0.19
	2		1996	9.3	-1.11	0.31
RUSSIAN FEDERATION	13		2010	12.4	-1.09	0.13
	13		2008	12.1	-1.05	0.12
	13		2006	21	-0.85	0.13
	10		2004	25.4	-0.74	0.14
	8		2002	22.4	-0.92	0.15
	8		2000	16.6	-0.92	0.18
	7		1998	17.6	-0.94	0.17
	5		1996	15.6	-1.02	0.23

Note: 0 percentile is most corrupt and 100 percentile is least corrupt.

Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators

¹⁴⁰ Nancy Lubin, "Who's Watching the Watchdogs?" *Journal Of International Affairs* 56, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 47-9.

Ural Heavy Machine Building Plant (Uralmash)

Large, well-organized criminal gangs as well as many independent, low-level traffickers drive the Ekaterinburg drug market. For the purposes of this case study, the focus will remain on one large criminal gang, specifically Uralmash. Uralmash was singled out among the Ekaterinburg gangs because it has progressed beyond criminal activities into the political arena. It has usurped some of the traditional powers of the city government by collecting taxes as well as providing security and social services to citizens. During the Soviet era, red directors would usurp the state and sell factory goods on the black market in return for much needed supplies. *Perestroika* and the turmoil that followed the collapse of the Union emboldened gang leaders so much that they moved operations to the factory floor and made no real effort to disguise their activities.¹⁴¹ The Uralmash group grew so powerful that its income was believed to exceed Ekaterinburg's city government revenues in 1997.¹⁴²

As part of larger efforts to gain control over its future and achieve political and social legitimacy, the Uralmash crime group competed with the city government for the loyalties of the populace and infringed on its sovereignty in the process. One illustrative case is Uralmash's decision to intervene in a dispute between striking workers and the Sverdlovsk Subway Construction Company (SSCC), a public entity. In retaliation for

¹⁴¹ Annelise Anderson, "The Red Mafia: A Legacy of Communism," in *Economic Transition In Eastern Europe and Russia: Realities of Reform*, ed. Edward P. Lazear (Stanford, CA: The Hoover Institution Press, 1995), 351.

¹⁴² David Satter, *Darkness at Dawn: The Rise of the Russian Criminal State* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 240-6.

having not been paid in almost a year, forty-three employees excavating the future Bazhovskaya station went on strike July 1999 and refused to eat or leave the tunnel until their three million rubles in back wages were paid. A group led by the head of the Uralmash Economic Association, Alexander Khabarov, arrived on the ninth day with a bag containing one million rubles. Khabarov and his associates implored the workers to take the money, go home to their families, and repay Uralmash whenever they could. When one of the striking workers was asked about the Uralmash men, he nonchalantly remarked that, "They were perfectly normal, decent guys. People say they are mafia. Well, it's not our place to judge."¹⁴³ The workers may not have been alarmed, but the same could not be said for the local government. The city and provincial governments as well as the SSCC scurried to come up with the remaining two million rubles out of fear that the public would begin to see Uralmash as a surrogate for the city government. A footnote to this tale is that SSCC's remaining two thousand workers immediately went on strike to collect their unpaid wages and in the process showed that the loyalties of *all* SSCC workers were for sale to the highest bidder.¹⁴⁴ This example was included to show how Uralmash acted as a surrogate for the city government by paying wages and thereby widened their sphere of influence.

In 1999, the Uralmash syndicate institutionalized its political ambitions with the formation of its political party, the Social-Political Union Uralmash. The formation of a party was an important turning point, because it showed that Uralmash was no longer

¹⁴³ Sergei Avdeyev, "Bag of Money Thrown to Hunger-Striking Subway Construction Workers in Yekaterinburg," *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 51, no. 11 (April 14, 1999): 16.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 16.

content with using bribes and violence to manipulate the political process. Its leaders made a strategic decision to scale back on the use of execution style hits that were commonplace for most of the 1990s in order to gain credibility with the public.¹⁴⁵ The public's support was brought into relief during the 1997 Duma elections when Alexander Khabarov, a leader in the Uralmash crime syndicate, won forty-seven percent of the vote in a field of seventeen candidates. Moscow was alarmed and sent a federal prosecutor to investigate the election. What the representative found was that the press was freely publishing photos of Khabarov vacationing with some of Russia's most wanted criminals and editorials on the perils of electing a known criminal as their representative. Despite all the bad press, Khabarov fell just four percentage points shy of victory. Amidst the chaos that followed independence, popular support for a criminal with a record of coming to the aid of the people dovetails with the larger national trend of preferring order to democracy and transparency.¹⁴⁶

Drug Trade in Ekaterinburg after Overthrow of the Taliban

In addition to local politics, the Ekaterinburg drug trade has been negatively influenced by international events beyond its control. The US-led overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 contributed to an upsurge of heroin trafficked through Russia. The US-led coalition's decision to prioritize the stability of the new regime over challenging the heroin trade earned the ire of Moscow as twenty-percent of Afghani heroin is Russia-

¹⁴⁵ EastWest Institute, "Russian Regional Report," 5, no. 24 (June 21, 2000): 9-10.

¹⁴⁶ Grigory Kakovkin, "Once Again, Candidates with a Dubious Past," *The Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press* 49 no. 48 (1997): 9.

bound.¹⁴⁷ Opium poppy output in Afghanistan more than doubled from 3,400 tons in 2002 to 7,700 in 2008.¹⁴⁸ Weak border security institutions, corruption, and regional free trade agreements fostered the increased flow of heroin out of Afghanistan. Russia and Kazakhstan signed numerous free trade agreements dating back to the Central Asian Union in 1994. These trade agreements were meant to facilitate legitimate commerce between the two countries but also had the unintended consequence of removing barriers to transporting contraband, including narcotics.¹⁴⁹

In the absence of tangible assistance from federal and local authorities, a group of Ekaterinburg elites took it upon themselves to combat drug abuse. Eugene Roizman, for example, along with Andre Kabanov and Igor Carlsbad, created the City Without Drug fund in 1999. Roizman et al quickly surmised that the police were not doing much to fight the drug trade so they would have to go it alone. The initial purpose of the fund was to try to convince drug traffickers to find other ways to earn a living. In this respect, it succeeded only on a limited scale, because the major drug runners continued to do business as usual. The fund slowly evolved into a link between residents and law enforcement agents, specifically the honest minority, who started taking drug abuse more seriously. Roizman's efforts have been considered a success, as the International Monetary Fund noted a twelve-fold decrease in drug overdoses between 1999 and

¹⁴⁷ Raymond A. Millen, *Afghanistan: Reconstituting a Collapsed State* (U.S. Army War College: Carlisle, PA, 2005), 8-9.

¹⁴⁸ United Nations, *World Drug Report 2010*, Office on Drugs and Crime (New York, 2010): 10.

¹⁴⁹ Annette Bohr, "Regionalism in Central Asia," 487-9.

2001.¹⁵⁰ The City Without Drug fund shows that it is possible for concerned citizens to have an impact on a major social problem, but the fact remains that Russia may have won a small battle, but continues to lose the war on drugs.

The City Without Drugs fund is not without its critics. The fund operates a drug treatment center, which has been criticized by international human rights groups. Methadone substitution treatment, the best practice for heroin detoxification, is illegal in Russia. Addicts sent to the facility are caged in bunk beds for their initial withdrawal, which takes a month on average. After their initial period of withdrawal, addicts are released and spend a year performing menial labor before being returned to their families. City Without Drugs enjoys popular support in Russia despite its primitive methods. This is likely attributed to the epidemic of intravenous heroin users in Russia, estimated to be 1.8 million in 2009. The facility in Ekaterinburg offers an option for drug addicts and their families in a country where few exist.¹⁵¹

The dynamics underpinning the turf war between Uralmash and the Ekaterinburg city government have been reproduced throughout Russia. The struggle for power over the purse is very much a continuation of the Soviet practice of stealing from the state as a zero sum game. Citizens have been socialized to believe that corruption is a fact of life and are not necessarily concerned about it as long as the benefits trickle down to them. The tendency to overlook corruption is nowhere more

¹⁵⁰ Alexander Mikhailov, "Ekaterinburg Boretsia Za Zvanie "Goroda Bez Narkotikov"" *National Information Group*, May 5, 2005.

¹⁵¹ Seth Mydans, "In Russia, Harsh Remedy For Addiction Gains Favor," *The New York Times Online*. September 3, 2011.

apparent than in Alexander Khabarov narrowly losing a Duma election despite being a known mafia boss. Instead, the populace chose to focus on the times he came through for the people when the properly authorities fell short, for example, by paying back wages to striking subway workers.¹⁵²

This chapter has demonstrated how regime changes have influenced the drug trade and border security on the local level and the interconnectedness of narcotics trafficking and porous borders. The drug trade in Ekaterinburg is fostered by its proximity to the Kazakh border, the Soviet transportation infrastructure, and Uralmash, a criminal syndicate turned political party. The drug trade has been facilitated by the decay of border security institutions following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In turn, the drug trade has exerted pressures on border security institutions through Uralmash and other criminals groups highly motivated to keep the borders open and barrier-free. The mutually reinforcing relationship shared by the drug trade and border security institutions raises important questions about Russia's sovereignty as well as territory-based definitions of sovereignty in general. The concluding chapter will analyze the changing nature of Russia's sovereignty, and discuss policy implications for the drug trade and border security.

¹⁵² Susan Rose-Ackerman, *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 10-13.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The goal of this thesis was to study relationships among regime changes, the drug trade, border security, and sovereignty. The first step was to examine how regime changes in the U.S.S.R. and Afghanistan have influenced the Russian drug trade, border security, and sovereignty. The next step was to look at the mutually reinforcing relationships in this region among drug trade, border security, and sovereignty. My research shows that narcotics traffickers have been aided by the collapse of border security institutions in Russia and Central Asia, and conversely, the drug trade has compromised border checkpoints through the corruption and co-optation of guards. Concurrently, the thesis analyzed a steady increase in trafficking with respect to Russia's border security and the changing nature of sovereignty.

The principal drivers of the Russian drug trade are ample supply, porous borders, corrupt guards, and a large domestic market. The government is taking the problem more seriously following the 9/11 attacks since it is now directly linked to national security and terrorism. Moscow has taken some initiative to find solutions in the form of reaching out to the West and working more closely with its Central Asian neighbors, particularly Kazakhstan. However, there is still much work to be done as narcotics are flowing into these countries unceasingly and HIV infections have increased dramatically in the region over the past decade.

The Russian drug trade is fostered by an extensive, Soviet-built transportation network. Soviet citizens built an elaborate system of railroads to meet the demands of a planned economy. Eurasian drug traffickers have made full use of the existing infrastructure to move narcotics into and through Russia.¹⁵³ Ekaterinburg proved very attractive as a transport hub because it has a large regional train station close to the Kazakh border.¹⁵⁴ Uralmash and other crime syndicates have taken full advantage of its geographically advantageous position, which is one reason the volume of Afghani heroin has grown exponentially over the last two decades.¹⁵⁵

The drug trade through Russia also owes part of its growth to two significant regime changes: the fall of the Soviet Union and the US-led overthrow of the Taliban. The breakup of the Soviet Union opened its society up to the infiltration of external markets, including the international drug trade. Almost overnight, Afghani heroin started flooding the Russian market. The volume of heroin transported through Russia increased steadily during the 1990s while European and domestic demand grew steadily. Young Russians increasingly turned to heroin to escape the despair brought on by the collapse of the economy and a concurrent loss of national identity.

The quantity of heroin pouring into Russia increased even more following the US-led overthrow of the Taliban. The Taliban had experienced some success in

¹⁵³ Curtis, 13.

¹⁵⁴ Paul Josephson, "Industrial Deserts: Industry, Science and the Destruction of Nature in the Soviet Union," *Slavonic & East European Review* 85, no. 2 (April 2007): 297.

¹⁵⁵ Didkovsky, 13.

decreasing Afghani heroin exports, which was largely a result of sanctions from the international community and draconian measures by the regime. There is some doubt that suppression of poppy farming could be sustained given that the Afghani economy was largely destroyed during the Soviet occupation and its people had few alternatives for earning a subsistence wage. The US-led coalition made a *quid pro quo* deal that poppy farming would not be targeted, at least at first, in exchange for political stability. This deal weakened Russia's support for coalition forces, as heroin has proven catastrophic for its citizens, given the common practice of sharing dirty needles.¹⁵⁶

Chapter Three highlighted the relationships of these regime changes to the drug trade and border security in Russia and Afghanistan. In the case of Russia, border control mechanisms devolved from secure to highly porous following the collapse of Communism. The speed with which the USSR collapsed hastened the breakdown of border security. The failed transition to a market economy precipitated a complete collapse of the economy, which deprived the central government of the revenues needed to adequately fund border security institutions. The relationship between the drug trade and border security has proven to be mutually reinforcing. On the one hand, drug traffickers compromised border control institutions through the corruption and coercion of guards. On the other hand, the breakdown in border security precipitated an increase in trafficking once barriers to passage were removed.

¹⁵⁶ Brigg Reilley, et al., "Injecting Drug Use and HIV in Moscow: Results of a Survey." in *AIDS, Drugs And Society*, ed. Alex Alexandrova (New York: The International Debate Education Association, 2004): 227-232.

A similar dynamic unfolded in Afghanistan whereby the US-led overthrow of the Taliban exacerbated the dual challenges of securing the borders and stemming the flow of narcotics. The increased cultivation, refinement, and trafficking of heroin following the 2001 US-led invasion can be attributed to the lawlessness and chaos that followed. The US-led coalition disrupted what little order the Taliban had achieved and led to a steady increase in narcotics trafficking through Central Asia over the past decade. The overthrow of the Taliban and ouster of the *shuras*, therefore, decimated border control institutions that had already been challenged by the previous history of Afghani drug dealers.

Drug trafficking and compromised borders are mutually reinforcing. The rise in the volume and street price of heroin has increased the incentives for drug producers to challenge any attempts to fortify borders. Efforts to control borders are further complicated by political realities. The US military, along with the Karzai government, made a strategic decision to prioritize the stability of the new regime over efforts to combat the drug trade. Backs were collectively turned on the cultivation and sale of opium, which is the largest sector of the Afghani economy, in exchange for supporting the new government. Recent efforts to clamp down on poppy farming have been met with heavy resistance, as there are few credible alternatives to earning subsistence wages.

The purpose of Chapter Four was to show how Russian/Kazakh cleavages have influenced border security and the drug trade. The roots of present-day border security challenges can be found in how Stalin drew them in 1920s. Borders were demarcated as

a means to political and economic ends. On the political front, boundaries were demarcated in such a way that would discourage any one particular sub-national group from becoming a majority. Low levels of ethnic and national tensions were viewed favorably as a way to thwart threats to its power base. Secondly, the economic component of border demarcation was grounded in maximizing agricultural and extractive output. Soviet central planners were particularly dependent on Kazakhstan for grains, meat, and minerals. The Kazakh people were able to leverage their economic significance for concessions. Most notably, the CPSU was very liberal in its enforcement of border crossing restrictions.

A legacy of weak border security and post-independence ethnic conflict has combined to make Kazakhstan a very popular transport country for narcotics traffickers. Border control mechanisms degraded from weak to nonexistent following the collapse of the Russian economy and drastically reduced subsidies to the newly created states. Police and border guards were eager to supplement their low wages with bribes. Weak law enforcement was exacerbated by ethnic conflict, which created the chaotic environment that criminal syndicates thrive in. The drug trade and border security have an inversely proportional relationship whereby an increase in volume and profits decreased the incentives for stronger border control mechanisms.

Chapter Five used a case study of Ekaterinburg to show how regimes changes have influenced the drug trade, border security, and sovereignty at the local level as well as their interdependence. Ekaterinburg is approximately 1,800 kilometers from Moscow, and due to its geostrategic remoteness, has enjoyed a relatively high degree of

autonomy. The Kremlin relied on party functionaries to represent Moscow's interests in the periphery during the Soviet period. This dependence on party loyalty was challenged by the planned economy-driven competition that pitted factory against factory and town against town. This legacy paved the way for the intensity of competition for political control of local markets in recent decades.

Chapter Five utilized the Uralmash Heavy Machine Building Plant (Uralmash), which is at once a factory, criminal syndicate, and political party. Uralmash was emboldened by *perestroika* and acted with increasing impunity in the waning days of the Soviet Union. The central government objected, but lacked the resources to check its power. In the early years of independence, Uralmash acted as a surrogate for the central government by providing security services for individuals and businesses. It consolidated its power during the 1990s through a combination of violence and social services.

Ekaterinburg was strategically situated near the border with Kazakhstan and able to take advantage of the rapid upsurge of heroin trafficked from Afghanistan to Europe via Central Asia and Russia. The city is a major hub on the Trans-Siberian railroad and that, combined with a culture of lawlessness corruption, made it ideal for narcotics trafficking. The lawlessness and corruption of Ekaterinburg spilled over to the nearby Russian/Kazakh border. The border guard service was chronically underpaid and understaffed, which made them amenable to bribes. The few honest guards were coerced with threats to their friends and families. Porous borders and the drug trade are

mutually reinforcing and will not be seriously challenged without both being addressed at the same time.

Russian border security and Afghani heroin has therefore become a mutually-reinforcing national security crisis. The Russian government has been unable to fund its border control institutions following the failed transition to a market economy. Drug traffickers are drawn to Russia given its prime location linking Eurasian heroin with Western European demand. Even as the economy has started to improve, the Russian/Kazakh borders remains highly porous because of the low guard per kilometer ratio and high levels of corruption.

Shortcomings in the Literature

The current literature on the drug trade is largely preoccupied with the flaws of a supply-side counternarcotics strategy. Handelman, Shelley, Paoli, Cornell, and Swanstrom argue that a supply-side strategy would increase in effectiveness if greater resources are devoted to law enforcement and border security.¹⁵⁷ Van Solinge, Boev, and Orlova look at the heroin trade from the demand side and assert that the nexus of counternarcotics programs should be shifted to investments that increase the quantity and quality of treatment programs, thereby reducing internal markets for drugs.¹⁵⁸ In Chapter Two I posited the view that scholars have been arguing both sides of the same coin, largely due to their faulty premise of drugs and border security having a causal

¹⁵⁷ Handelman, 85; Shelley, 341-3; Paoli, 168-70; Cornell and Swanström, 15.

¹⁵⁸ Bookhoet van Solinge, 100-2; Boev, 47; Orlova, 24-5.

relationship. My research shows that the drug trade and border security are mutually reinforcing phenomena. Supply-side and demand side strategies cannot be used in isolation, as my case study of Ekaterinburg has shown.

Moreover, current scholarly research approaches border security as ancillary to the pronounced threats posed by drug trafficking, terrorism, and fundamentalism. It is thought that a viable Central Asian regional security organization is a prerequisite for a unified border security policy.¹⁵⁹ Experiments in trust-building are said to be essential so that the region can reap the benefits of economic integration and collectively confront security challenges, including terrorism and the drug trade.¹⁶⁰ Olcott concurs that trust is paramount. She emphasizes, further, that personal relationships among leaders and their unity in fighting the drug trade are key to improving border security.¹⁶¹

The sovereignty literature is slowly moving beyond its fixation on territoriality. The European Union, for example, has posed a major challenge to traditional notions of governance and definitions of political space. The blurring of borders brought about by shared political functions and increasingly integrated economies has given rise to the term "fuzzy borders"; under this theoretical umbrella a state's sovereignty is not diminished if it is ceding some of its traditional functions to another nation or an international organization.¹⁶² On the contrary, globalization has altered the ways in

¹⁵⁹ Allison, 465.

¹⁶⁰ Gleason, 1092.

¹⁶¹ Olcott, 13.

¹⁶² Walters, 142.

which states interact with one another, which is edging territorial notions of sovereignty toward obsolescence. My research on Ekaterinburg supports this view.

Policy Implications for Russia's Drug Trade and Border Security

As drug trafficking is a transnational problem, it will require greater regional cooperation to solve it. Russia and Kazakhstan have taken steps towards sharing intelligence and resources through the formation of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, but they have proven to be paper tigers. One possible way to break the impasse is for the Kremlin to follow the example of the Pakistanis and Afghanis vis-à-vis the Nawa Pass. Russia and Kazakhstan have a long history of mistrust, but it is imperative that they work together to arrive at mutually beneficial solutions.

The Kremlin is taking the drug trade very seriously as it represents a critical threat to both public health and national security. Russia's domestic drug market paled in comparison to the West until the loosening of trade and travel restrictions in the 1980s. The Kremlin faced the daunting task of having to tackle an explosion of use and abuse just as its economy was collapsing. The government confronted the unenviable task of having to create institutions to stem the flow of narcotics, principally opiates, at a time when state revenues were in a free-fall. Moscow consulted the US and Europe in an effort to find the right mixture of supply and demand reduction strategies. The institutional manifestation of these strategies was the Federal Drug Control Service (Federal'naia sluzhba Rossiiskoi Federatsii po kontroliu za oborotom Narkotikov,

FSKN), which has enjoyed about as much success as its US counterpart, the Drug Enforcement Administration, despite having quadrupled the staff.¹⁶³

As with most new government institutions, the FSKN has faced its share of hurdles in fulfilling its mission. The Russians have very little experience in counter-narcotics, because in the Soviet era its closed borders and an equally closed society kept enforcement from becoming a pressing issue. It also has a two-fold problem regarding the much-feared security services. The public has been slow to trust the FSKN because of how closely they work with the security services to fight the drug trade. There is a great deal of animosity between the FSKN and the security services, so much so that in 2007 Victor Cherkosov, published an open letter in *Kommersant* denouncing the arrest of two officers on corruption charges. Whether it is true in this case, there is no denying that corruption is endemic in all branches of the Russian government. All indicators are that the hardest affected cities, such as Ekaterinburg, are largely on their own in creating and executing policy.¹⁶⁴

The ability of the Kremlin to reign in corruption will be constrained by the fact that it goes all the way to the top. However, its leaders are aware that corruption is eroding its ability to carry out even the most basic functions of the state, including securing its borders. In fact, the number one problem facing its border guard service is corruption. Guards tend to view their salary as a base and bribes as bonuses they give themselves. It is imperative that the pay of border guards be increased and an internal

¹⁶³ Bettina Renz, 57-60.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 62-4.

affairs unit be established that has real teeth to investigate and/or prosecute theft. Lastly, the government needs to greatly increase the number of guards, who are tasked with protecting roughly 13,000 miles of frontier.¹⁶⁵

The government could also create a whistleblower policy to encourage the reporting of corrupt guards. This will require a great deal of finesse, since it is likely to stir up memories of the Soviet era when neighbors turned each other in. However, it is important that the government create an atmosphere in which their employees feel safe enough to speak up about corruption. In order for the policy to be successful, guards have to be able report corruption in such a way that they will not fear losing their job or face retribution from coworkers. While policies can be written in a day, it takes much longer for them to be effective, because a culture of trust and transparency takes years to create.¹⁶⁶

The inability of Russia to execute policy is indicative of its waning territorial sovereignty. Russia most resembles Sullivan and Bunker's second phase cartel typology in that criminal organizations, such as Uralmash, have not completely captured the state, but there are disturbingly high levels of corruption and co-optation. The central government may have a quasi-monopoly on violence, but in other respects it is a weak state. The government has demonstrated that it not only lacks control over its borders, but also is inept at executing policies within them.

¹⁶⁵ Yulia Salnikova, "Border: The Border Troops Get Their Independence, Russia Will Stay within its Old Boundaries," *Digest of the Russian Press, The (Formerly the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press)* 46 no. 2 (February 9, 1994): 19-20.

¹⁶⁶ Lisa Zipparo, "Encouraging Public Sector Employees to Report Workplace Corruption," *Australian Journal of Public Administration* 58 no. 2 (June 1999): 83-5.

Transnational problems such as the drug trade, pollution, and terrorism are forcing a reconfiguring of the concept of sovereignty. Does the inability of a government to maintain jurisdiction over its entire territory make it any less sovereign? Globalization has caused a paradigm shift in the ability of governments to manage the flow of people, goods, and information across and within its borders. Governments can not effectively challenge trans-border phenomena, for example, the drug trade and global warming, in isolation. Governments have chosen to cede some of their sovereign powers to supranational organizations in order to gain the benefits of pooled information and resources. A shift in thinking about what government is and how it interacts with citizens in their daily lives is more eloquently captured in the writings of Michel Foucault. He theorized that government is less a discreet institution than a process of influencing the behavior of citizens in their daily lives through rules and regulations. Foucault's work can be used to reframe the sovereignty discussion away from territoriality and toward influencing the behavior and choices of individual citizens. The challenge for future researchers will be to reconfigure the definition of sovereignty in such a way that makes allowances for globalization, supranational organizations, and the increasing prominence of sub-national actors.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Agnew, John. "Mapping Political Power Beyond State Boundaries: Territory, Identity, and Movement in World Politics." *Millennium* 28, no. 3 (1999): 499–521.
- Alini, Erica. "The First Step is Denial." *Maclean's* 124, no. 6 (February 21, 2011): 35.
- Alexander, Charles. Gisela Bolte and Erik Amfitheatrof. "Sinking Deeper into a Quagmire." *Time* 120, no. 21 (November 22, 1982): 26-28.
- Allison, Roy. "Regionalism, Regional Structures, and Security Management in Central Asia." *International Affairs* 80, no. 3 (2004): 463-483.
- . "Strategic Reassertion in Russia's Central Asia Policy." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 80, no. 2 (2004): 277-293.
- Anderson, Annelise. "The Red Mafia: A Legacy of Communism." in *Economic Transition In Eastern Europe and Russia: Realities of Reform*. edited by Edward P. Lazear. Stanford, CA: The Hoover Institution Press, 1995.
- Andreas, Peter. "Illicit Globalization: Myths, Misconceptions, and Historical Lessons." *Political Science Quarterly* 126, no. 3 (Fall 2011): 403-425.
- Arbel, David, and Ran Edelist. *Western Intelligence and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, 1980-1990: Ten Years That Did Not Shake the World*. London: Routledge, 2003.
- Aslund, Anders. "Putin's Lurch Toward Tsarism and Neoimperialism: Why The United States Should Care." *Demokratizatsiya* 16, no. 1 (2008): 17-26.
- Avdeyev, Sergei. "Bag of Money Thrown to Hunger-Striking Subway Construction Workers In Ekaterinburg." *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 51, no. 11 (April 14, 1999): 16.
- Bagley Jr., Hubert E. *Afghanistan: Opium Cultivation and Its Impact on Reconstruction*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2004.
- Bartelson, Jens. "The Concept of Sovereignty Revisited." *The European Journal of International Law*. 17, no. 2 (2006): 463-474.
- . "Second Natures: Is the State Identical With Itself." *European Journal of International Relations*. 4, no. 3 (1998): 295-326.

- Blank, Stephen J. "Challenges to Russia in Central Asia." *American Foreign Policy Interests* 33, no. 5 (September 1, 2011): 209-221.
- Boekhout van Solinge, Tim. "Drug Use and Drug Trafficking in Europe." *Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie* 89, no. 1 (1998): 100-105.
- Boev, B. "Narcotics Abuse in Russia." *Russian Education & Society* 45, no. 3 (2003): 43-58.
- Bohr, Annette. "Regionalism in Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Regional Order." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 80, no. 3 (2004.): 485-502.
- Brovkin, Vladimir. "Fragmentation of Authority and Privatization of the State: From Gorbachev to Yeltsin." *Demokratizatsiya* (1998): 504-17.
- Buszynski, Leszek. "Russia and the Asia-Pacific Region." *Pacific Affairs* 65, no. 4 (Winter, 1992-1993): 486-509.
- _____. "Russia's New Role in Central Asia." *Asian Survey* 45, no. 4 (2005): 546-565.
- Campbell, Howard. "No End in Sight: Violence in Ciudad Juarez." *NACLA Report On the Americas* 44, no. 3 (May 2011): 19-22.
- Chandler, Andrea. *Institutions of Isolation: Border Controls in the Soviet Union and its Successor States, 1917-1993*. Montreal: McGill Queens University Press, 1998.
- Clark, Victoria. "Russian Mafia Tightens Grip the Break-Up of the Soviet Union Created a Void Which Ruthless Gangland Leaders Have Not Been Slow to Fill. Victoria Clark Reports from Ekaterinburg on the Effective Takeover By the Racketeers." *The Guardian*. May 22, 1994.
- Collins, Kathleen. "Clans, Pacts, and Politics in Central Asia." *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 3 (2002): 137-152.
- Cornell, Svante E., and Niklas L. P. Swanström. "The Eurasian Drug Trade: A Challenge to Regional Security." *Problems of Post-Communism* 53, no. 4 (July 2006): 10-28.
- Curtis, Glenn E. "Involvement of Russian Organized Crime Syndicates, Criminal Elements In the Russian Military, and Regional Terrorist Groups In Narcotics Trafficking In Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Chechnya." U.S. Library of Congress. 2002.

- De Tinguy, Anne. "Fuel to the Fire." *European Journal of International Affairs* 2, no. 12 (1991): 107-35.
- Didkovsky, Sergei. "Uralmash Gunman Strikes." *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 52, no. 28 (August 9, 2000): 13.
- Eastwest Institute. "Russian Regional Report." 5 no. 24 (June 21, 2000).
- Farrell, Graham, and John Thorne. "Where Have All the Flowers Gone?: Evaluation of the Taliban Crackdown Against Opium Poppy Cultivation In Afghanistan." *International Journal of Drug Policy* 16, no. 2 (March 2005): 81-91.
- Fenopetov, Vladimir. "The Drug Crime Threat to Countries Located on the "Silk Road"." *The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 4, no. 1 (2008): 5-8.
- Foucault, Michel. *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977-1978*. Translated by Graham Burchell. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- _____. "Spaces of Security: The Example of the Town. Lecture of 11th January 1978." *Political Geography* 26, no. 1 (2007): 48-56.
- Gaddy, Clifford G., and Barry W. Ickes. "Russia after the Global Financial Crisis." *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 51, no. 3 (2010): 281-311.
- Gaekwad, Shobha. "Organized Crime in Russia." *Economic and Political Weekly* 34, no. 38 (September 1999) 2715-2716.
- Gleason, Gregory. "Inter-State Cooperation In Central Asia from the CIS to the Shanghai Forum." *Europe-Asia Studies* 53, no. 7 (2001): 1077-1095.
- Glenny, Misha. "McMafia: A Journey through the Global Criminal Underworld." London: Random House, 2008.
- Golunov, Sergei. "Drug-Trafficking through Russia's Post Soviet Borders: Problems, Misperceptions and Countermeasures." *Acta Slavica Iaponica*, no. 24 (2007): 24-46.
- Golunov, Sergey V. and Roger N. McDermott. "Border Security in Kazakhstan: Threats, Policies and Future Challenges." *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 18, no. 1 (March 2005): 31-58.
- Handelman, Stephen. "Russian Mafiya." *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 2 (March 1994): 83-96.
- Harris, James R. *The Great Urals: Regionalism and the Evolution of the Soviet System*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999.

- Hirsch, Francine. "Toward an Empire of Nations: Border-Making and the Formation of Soviet National Identities." *Russian Review* 59, no. 2 (April 2000): 201-226.
- Huysmans, Jef. "International Politics of Exception: Competing Visions of International Political Order Between Law and Politics." *Alternatives* 31, no. 2 (April 2006): 135-165.
- International Criminal Police Organization. "Heroin." <http://www.interpol.int/public/drugs/heroin/default.asp> (accessed August 7, 2011).
- Jackson, Robert. "Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape." *Political Studies* 47, no. 3 (Feb. 2002): 431-456.
- Jahanpour, Farhang. "The Rise of the Taliban and its Regional Repercussions." *Critique: Journal for Critical Studies of the Middle East* 8.15 (1999): 99-120.
- Job, Brian L. "Confronting Terrorism: Dilemmas of Principle and Practice Regarding Sovereignty." in Charles Sampford, Ramesh Thakur and Trudy Jacobsen, *Re-Envisioning Sovereignty: The End of Westphalia?* Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2008. 119-50.
- Josephson, Paul. "Industrial Deserts: Industry, Science and the Destruction of Nature in the Soviet Union." *Slavonic & East European Review* 85, no. 2 (April 2007): 294-321.
- Kakovkin, Grigory. "Once Again, Candidates with a Dubious Past." *Current Digest of the Russian Press, The (formerly The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press)* 49, no. 48 (1997): 9-10.
- Karatnycky, Adrian. "Russia on the Brink." *National Review* 48 no. 5 (March 25, 1996): 50-64.
- Kolossov, Vladimir. "Post-Soviet Boundaries: Territoriality, Identity, Security, Circulation." In *The Ashgate Research Companion To Border Studies*, edited by Doris Wastl-Walter. 171-194. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011.
- Kondaki, Christopher. "The Taliban: A Primer." *Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy* 29 no. 10 (Oct 2001): 6-10.
- Krasner, Stephen D. 2001. "Sovereignty." *Foreign Policy* no. 122 (2001): 20-6.

- Kuru, Ahmet. "The Rentier State Model and Central Asian Studies: The Turkmen Case." *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* 1, no. 1 (2002): 51-71.
- Lee, Rensselaer W., and Scott B. Macdonald. "Drugs in the East." *Foreign Policy* 90 (1993): 89-107.
- Lubin, Nancy. "Who's Watching the Watchdogs?." *Journal of International Affairs* 56, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 43-56.
- Lukin, Vladimir P. "Our Security Predicament." *Foreign Policy*, no. 88 (Autumn, 1992): 57-75.
- MacHaffie, James. "China's Role in Central Asia: Security Implications for Russia and the United States." *Comparative Strategy* 29, no. 4 (September 2010): 368-380.
- Makarenko, Tamara. "The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism." *Global Crime* 6, no. 1 (2004): 129-145.
- Menon, Rajan. "In the Shadow of the Bear: Security in Post-Soviet Central Asia." *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995): 149-181.
- Meyendorff, Anna. "The Black Market For Foreign Exchange In the Former Soviet Union." *Comparative Economic Studies* 36, no. 4 (Winter 1994): 161-71.
- Mikhailov, Alexander. "Ekaterinburg Boretsia Za Zvanie "Goroda bez Narkotikov."" *National Information Group*. May 5, 2005.
- Millen, Raymond A. *Afghanistan: Reconstituting a Collapsed State*. U.S. Army War College: Carlisle, PA, 2005.
- Moeller, Matthew C. "Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the United States Agree: Cooperation Is the Key To Success Along Border Pass." *Disarm Journal of International Security Assistance Management* 31, no. 3 (November 2009): 139-140.
- Moran, Dominique. "Drug Use and HIV/AIDS: Risk Environments In Post-Soviet Russia Geography and Drug Addiction." in *Geography and Drug Addiction*. edited by Yonette F. Thomas, Douglas Richardson, and Ivan Cheung. New York: Springer, 2008.
- Mould, David. "Between Deutschland and Karaganda." *Transitions Online* (August 29, 2011): 1.
- Nelson, Lynne D., and Irina Y. Kuzes. "Implications of the Federal Reform In Three

- Regions: Sverdlovsk, Smolensk and Voronezh” in *Dynamics of Russian Politics: Putin's Reform of Federal-Regional Relations*. Edited by Peter Reddaway and Robert W. Ortung. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005.
- Newton, Francis. “Soviet Central Asia: Economic Progress and Problems.” *Middle Eastern Studies* 12, no. 3 (Oct., 1, 1976): 87-104.
- Nikolaev, M. "The Asia-Pacific Region and Russia's National Security." *International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy & International Relations* 56, no. 3 (May 2010): 68-77.
- Nikolaev, Sergei. “Russia-Kazakhstan: Cross-Border and Interregional Cooperation.” *International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy & International Relations* 57, no. 1 (2011): 152-160.
- Olcott, Martha Brill. "Taking Stock Of Central Asia." *Journal Of International Affairs-Columbia University* 56, no. 2 (2003): 3-20.
- Orlova, Alexandra V. "The Russian "War On Drugs": A Kinder, Gentler Approach?." *Problems of Post-Communism* 56, no. 1 (January 2009): 23-34.
- Osborn, Andrew. "How Chelyanbinsk Became Synonymous With Pollution." *The Daily Telegraph*. July 27, 2011.
- Philip P., Pan. "Georgia: Russia Is Stoking Tensions." *The Washington Post*. February 22, 2009.
- Paoli, Letizia. The Price of Freedom: Illegal Drug Markets and Policies In Post-Soviet Russia. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 582 (2002): 167-180.
- Perry, Joellen. "Field of Dreams." *U.S. News & World Report* 138, no. 21 (June 6, 2005): 30-34.
- Peters, Gretchen. *How Opium Profits the Taliban*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009.
- Plugataryov, Lgor Vitalyevich. "A Heroin Sluice Has Been Opened on the Pyandzh River." *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 57, no. 37 (October 12, 2005): 12-20.
- Rashid, Ahmed. "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism." *Foreign Affairs* 78 (1999): 22.
- Recknagel, Charles. “Ferghana Valley: A Tinderbox For Violence” *Radio Free Europe*

- Radio Liberty*. January 17, 2010.
http://www.rferl.org/content/why_is_the_ferghana_valley_a_tinderboxviolence/2074849.html (accessed November 29, 2011).
- Reilley, Brigg, Dave Burrows, Vitalec Melnikov, Tatiana Andreeva, Murdo Bijl, and Hans Veecken. "Injecting Drug Use and HIV in Moscow: Results of a Survey." *AIDS, Drugs And Society*. New York: The International Debate Education Association, 2004.
- Renz, Bettina. "Traffickers, Terrorists, and A 'New Security Challenge': Russian Counternarcotics Strategy and The Federal Service For The Control of The Drugs Trade." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 22, no. 1 (March 2011): 55-77.
- Rodriguez, Nestor. "The Battle for the Border: Notes on Autonomous Migration, Transnational Communities, and the State." *Social Justice* 23, no. 3 (1996): 21-37.
- Rose, Nikolas and Peter Miller. Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of Government. *British Journal of Sociology* 43, no. 2 (1992): 172-205.
- Rose-Ackerman, Susan. *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Rubin, Barnett R., and Ahmed Rashid. "From Great Game To Grand Bargain." *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 6 (November 1, 2008): 30-44.
- Rubin, Barnett R. *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse In The International System*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002.
- Rubin, James P. "Stumbling Into War." *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 5 (September 2003): 46-66.
- Rubin, Michael A. "Afghanistan: As Bad As Its Reputation?." *Middle East Quarterly* 7, no. 3 (September 2000): 55.
- Rubinfiel, Elisabeth. "Russia's Identity Crises." *National Review* 44, no. 9 (May 11, 1992): 19-20.
- Salitan, Laurie P. "Domestic Pressures and the Politics of Exit: Trends in Soviet Emigration Policy." *Political Science Quarterly* 104, no. 4 (1989): 671-687.
- Salnikova, Yulia. "Border: The Border Troops Get Their Independence. Russia Will Stay Within Its Old Boundaries. *Digest of the Russian Press, The (Formerly the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press)* 46 no. 2 (February 9, 1994): 19-20.

- Sampson, Steven L. "The Second Economy of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 493, no. 1 (1987): 120-136.
- Satter, David. *Darkness At Dawn: The Rise of the Russian Criminal State*. New Haven, Ct: Yale University Press, 2004.
- Schwartz, Michael. "Russia Scorns Methadone For Heroin Addiction." *New York Times*, July 22, 2008.
- Shaw, Charles. "Friendship Under Lock and Key: The Soviet Central Asian Border, 1918–34." *Central Asian Survey* 30, no. 3-4 (2011): 331-348.
- Shelley, Louise I. "Post-Soviet Organized Crime: Implications for Economic, Political and Social Development." *European Journal On Criminal Policy and Research* 3, no. 2 (1994): 341-358.
- Smith, Reid. "A Detailed History of the Afghan Drug Trade." *Afghanistan Press*. <http://kabulpress.org/my/spip.php?article2728>
- Solnick, Steven L. "The Breakdown of Hierarchies in the Soviet Union and China." *World Politics* 48, no. 2 (1996): 209-238.
- Stake, Robert E. "The Case Study Method in Social Inquiry," in *Case Study Method: Key Issues, Key Texts*. edited by Roger Gomm, Roger, Martyn Hammersley, and Peter Foster. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Ltd, 2000. 19-26.
- Sternik, A. "Central Asia and Russia: Mutual Attraction." *International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy & International Relations* 58, no. 5 (September 2012): 60-65.
- Sullivan, John P., and Robert J. Bunker. "Drug Cartels, Street Gangs, and Warlords." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 13, no. 2 (2002): 40-53.
- Swanstrom, Niklas. "The Prospects for Multilateral Conflict Prevention and Regional Cooperation in Central Asia." *Central Asian Survey* 23, no. 1 (2004): 41-53.
- Theophanous, Georgios. "Blurred Borders." *Harvard International Review* 24, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 12.
- Tikhomirov, Vladimir. "Capital Flight From Post-Soviet Russia," *Europe-Asia Studies*, 49, no. 4 (June 1997): 591-615.
- Trachtenberg, Marc. *The Craft of International History: A Guide To Method*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006.

United Nations. Office on Drugs, and Crime. *World Drug Report*. New York: United Nations, 2010.

U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. *Taliban and the Drug Trade*. by Raphael Perl. Washington, DC, 2001.

Utyasheva, Leah and Richard Elliott. "Effects of UN and Russian Influence on Drug Policy in Central Asia." In *At What Cost? HIV and Human Rights Consequences of the Global "War on Drugs,"* edited by Fabio Mesquita, 78-110. New York: Open Society Institute, 2009.

United Nations. Office on Drugs and Crime Regional Office for Central Asia. *Illicit Drug Trends in the Russian Federation*. Moscow: United Nations, 2008.

U.S. Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotic Matters. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*. Washington, DC, 2008.

Walters, William. Rethinking Borders Beyond the State. *Comparative European Politics* 2, no. 3 (2006): 141–159.

Watson, Russell, and Fred Coleman. "And Now What?." *Newsweek* 118, no. 12 (September 16, 1991): 32.

Wilhelmsen, Julie, and Geir Flikke. "Chinese–Russian Convergence and Central Asia." *Geopolitics* 16, no. 4 (December 2011): 865-901.

Zipparo, Lisa. "Encouraging Public Sector Employees To Report Workplace Corruption." *Australian Journal of Public Administration* 58, no. 2 (June 1999): 83-94.