NEGOTIATING MULTILATERALISM

By

Jason P. Rancatore

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

In

International Relations

Chair: Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Ph.D.

Craig A. Hayden, Ph.D.

Iver B. Neumann, Ph.D.

Anthony Quainton

Dean of the School of International Service

December 6, 2012

Date

2012

American University

Washington, D.C. 20016

To my parents

NEGOTIATING MULTILATERALISM

BY

Jason P. Rancatore

ABSTRACT

Where does the term multilateralism, as it is used in world politics, come from? How does its history make its current use possible? This dissertation specifies the relations instantiated by its use in politics to a variety of entities, ideas, and actions, with a particular focus on the time period 1919-1960. By exploring its use in diplomatic documents (primarily via the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series) and in mass media (primarily via the *New York Times*), this study concludes that multilateralism is an evolving, negotiated concept. In analyzing its use with greater precision by identifying the discursive practical relations being made, this dissertation advances our understanding of multilateralism's history, limits, and possibilities. Greater knowledge of the histories and relations between political concepts should be able to contribute to our explanations of politics.

PREFACE

Too often, simple explanations dominate our scholarly conversations. When things get complex, as they often do when we are offering explanations of politics, we either launch all-out attacks or qualify and modify our original conclusions so severely, we end up with very little left. Being wrong is not an option, and this is a problem.

The approach I have utilized in this dissertation to study "multilateralism" has tried to make three basic arguments. First, our methodologies and avenues of inquiry limit the way in which we argue over and research multilateralism. Second, I try to advance one way forward to enrich our scholarly debate. Third, I attempt to substantiate knowledge claims that were hitherto imprecise or taken for granted assumptions.

In doing so, I have tried the best I can to not overlook evidence or make unsubstantiated claims, and I have tried to write in the clearest language that I can what I believe to be new and important knowledge about how politics works. In this way, I would be happy to be shown wrong or to have made unnecessary assumptions. If that can lead us to a better understanding of politics, I welcome the engagement, and push our thinking forward.

A final note. I should say that by "better understanding of politics," I mean to take a well-worn position. We often observe instances of people doing politics (or anything really) a particular way because "this is the way things are done" or because "we've never done things any other way before." If there is explanatory work to be carried out by social science in general, it is to more fully grasp why we persist on doing things "normally" rather than "better than before." I hope to contribute to this research conversation because always doing things "normally" is sometimes a frightening prospect.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I have accumulated many debts in the production of this dissertation and in my journey as a student of politics. At the risk of leaving someone out, I want to acknowledge some communities and people who have contributed to my development as a researcher and as a person.

To my peers in school in New Hampshire and Minnesota, you are always with me. To friends in Cincinnati, thank you for encouraging me to follow my gut and take the plunge. Various Brussels characters with whom I shared an argument, and likely a beer, you have given me unforgettable memories and a sharper mind. Colleagues at AU, my experiences with you were always a pleasure and inspirational. Friends in Washington, DC, thank you for accommodating me and my thoughts when you did not have to. To all of those I met in Bolgatanga (and elsewhere in Ghana) from 2009 to 2011, your stories and our shared time were thoroughly educational and a delight.

The dissertation committee has my gratitude, and my chair, Patrick Jackson, never failed to push and prod. I look forward to more of it.

My parents, Paul and Yiu-Shiang, deserve so much credit in fostering and supporting my interests, as a child and in my adult life. I continue to hope that I make them proud.

Barb and Vaughan have welcomed me as part of the family in Saskatchewan and have been tremendous in their support.

Lastly, Jillian has always supported me through it all, and her unfailing confidence in my ability has been something that has picked me up in various moments of difficulty.

In case we have shared some thoughts over a drink and/or a view of the scenery, and I have missed you, you have my apologies. Let us catch up again soon.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Origin of the Term

To recall the first use of the term "multilateralism" in the public sphere, late Pulitzer Prize-winning New York Times columnist, and Presidential speechwriter, William Safire (in Safire's Political Dictionary; see also McGuinness 2006; Miller 2000) turned to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED). There, the OED identified a passage in the *Glasgow Herald*. This well-known daily newspaper, which began publishing in 1783 (see Phillips 1982), was credited with the first use of the term multilateralism.

The OED specifies an article dated June 13, 1928 (page 10, column 6), in the *Glasgow Herald*, which supposedly states:

> M. Briand insisted specifically on the term 'war of aggression' after first talking generically of all war. The reason was the transformation of bilateralism into multilateralism.

Here we observe two points: (1) a distinction between multilateralism and bilateralism and (2) that the speaker was referencing a legal phrase with its own context, as it was used in the contemporaneously recent Treaty of Locarno and discussed in the debate over the Kellogg-Briand Pact. These relations are widely accepted as facts in the history of international relations, and part of any reasonable understanding of the term multilateralism. When we turn to the *Glasgow Herald* (again June 13, 1928, page 10, column 6) we do not see these two sentences or any reference to multilateralism.[1]

Beyond the inaccuracy of the OED, the immediate question for me was: does it matter that the cited origin of multilateralism is not really its origin? One on the one hand, the meaning

[1] I used the Google News Archive to investigate this matter. The direct link to the copy of the *Glasgow Herald* on the date in question can be accessed (functional as of December 2012) at: http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=GGgVawPscysC&dat=19280613&printsec=frontpage&hl=en.

of multilateralism has not collapsed. So, in this regard, we can pragmatically conclude with a firm no. However, what are the consequences of this conclusion?

Here, I wish to make three related points. The first is somewhat obvious; that the origin does not by itself determine paths of adaptation or evolution. Second, these paths are likely to be explained by examining the relations between the term and its context (entities, language, and action). Third, it remains perfectly plausible that the *Glasgow Herald* had indeed reported this quotation from Aristide Briand in 1928. That this quotation resonates with certain facts in international relations, that bilateralism is to be distinguished from multilateralism, and that multilateralism is linked to legal notions that pertain to major treaties of the 1920s, remains so. Thus, this brief investigation to confirm the origin of the term has disclosed the threads that were associated with it at the beginning, even if that beginning is now not so clearly demarcated.

To the recent present



Figure 1. Circulation of “multilateral” in the *New York Times* (cumulative hits, 2000-2008).

Consider three pieces of text from 2009-2010: a speech made by US President Barack Obama to the UN General Assembly on peace in the Middle East as reported in the *New York*

Times, an article by scholar Ngaire Woods writing in a public policy journal on the financial crisis and response by global governance institutions (Woods 2010), and a UN General Assembly resolution on disarmament. In that order:

> … we will also pursue peace between Israel and Lebanon, Israel and Syria, and a broader peace between Israel and its many neighbors. In pursuit of that goal, we will develop regional initiatives with multilateral participation, alongside bilateral negotiations.[2]
>
> ... On the face of it, it would seem that multilateralism is breaking out all over the place. Are we witnessing the tipping point of a new, more multilateral era of global governance?
>
> …. [the UNGA] 1. Reaffirms multilateralism as the core principle in negotiations in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation with a view to maintaining and strengthening universal norms and enlarging their scope; 2. Also reaffirms multilateralism as the core principle in resolving disarmament and non-proliferation concerns... [3]

These usages by different speakers in different contexts disclose the different relations of multilateralism and its grammatical variants. At the same time, the usage reflects a clear understanding of what "multilateral" means in each of these cases. The debates over peace in the Middle East, global governance responses to the financial crisis, and disarmament are understood not to be about what "multilateral" means. In these statements, it refers to: (a) multiple participants (Obama), (b) a general norm of politics among states that includes international institutions (Woods), and (c) a general principle of state inclusivity (UNGA). These seem compatible enough definitions to justify using the same word.

Still, how did the notion, which apparently began in 1928 as a legalistic term end up becoming so flexible as to be a part of describing seemingly appropriate ways to manage all kinds of political issues in our recent past?

---

[2] "Obama's Speech to the United Nations General Assembly." *New York Times*, 23 September 2009.
[3] UNGA Resolution A/RES/64/34, "Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non proliferation," 2 December 2009.

A snapshot of the uses of "multilateral," 2008-2009

A snapshot of the uses of "multilateral" among the heads of international organizations in the recent past of 2008-2009 discloses a number of key points.[4] In this section, 16 publicly available speeches over a 12 month period (October 2008 to September 2009) by the heads of what are considered the most critical international organizations (IOs) are considered. These people could be considered policy-makers in world politics: Robert Zoellick (World Bank President), Ban Ki-moon (United Nations Secretary General), Pascal Lamy (World Trade Organization Director General), and Dominique Strauss-Kahn (International Monetary Fund Managing Director).[5] These remarks were selected because each contains a use of the term "multilateral." They do not exhaust every instance where "multilateral" is used in world politics in the period specified, but this selection is helpful because it allows for some evidence of how multilateral fits in, and is associated with language and action. In this sense, it is an empirical snapshot.

Multilateralism is associated with three points. The first is that the notion itself can be applied to a wide variety of problems; perhaps every issue of importance in world politics.[6] These issues are consequential in that they are instantiated as obstacles to peace and prosperity: development, finance, trade, security, terrorism, etc. They confront discrete political units, i.e. international organizations, who then find themselves in positions of authority to address these problems. The UN's "good work" involves addressing poverty, disease, climate change, development, and hunger, as its Secretary-General flatly states in October 2008, "it is our job."

[4] Full details of these remarks are listed in Appendix A.
[5] Of course, heads of state and governments use the term as well, and a more in-depth exploration of these usages to see if there is similarity or difference in terms of linked language and action would be worth investigating.
[6] In particular, see Zoellick's remarks in September 2008 and September 2009, and Ban's remarks in April 2009.

The second point is that to solve these issues a particular understanding of multilateralism is necessary. This multilateralism is described as “new,” “modern,” “improved,” or “reformed,” versus “old” or “dated.” It entails international organizations, like the UN, WTO, World Bank, and IMF performing particular tasks for states in the world system. These IOs are characterized as “vehicles” in need of drivers. They struggle, yet cannot be abandoned. They must “evolve.”[7] Whatever other groups or entities exist might be helpful, whether private sector actors or other G-numbered groups. However, they should be linked to entities with a broad a membership as possible.[8]

This aspect is linked to the final point: that the imperative for multilateralism is for the realization of benefits for all.[9] Indeed, attached to this idea is that it would be unethical to not “share responsibility.” It would be unrealistic to not recognize “interconnectivity,” and “common threats and interests.” This is not the same as a naïve idealism or a utopianism. The evidence for these speakers is the ability to specify common interests for which multilateralism has a function in their realization.

Given these statements, were there other available options to address the problems that were the subject of these speeches? If so, how were they treated in comparison to multilateral options? If there were attempts to de-legitimize, how was this done, and with what logics?

At a minimum, we observe traces of other possible paths. One recurring pattern that emerges from these statements are the articulations of problems, fears, and dangers, which are ostensibly meant help the audience understand why the particular solution being offered is desirable and better than other options (e.g. see the 1999 edited volume *Cultures of Insecurity*).

[7] See Zoellick’s remarks in September 2009.
[8] A non-numerical 'Steering Group' is suggested by Zoellick in his remarks in October 2008.
[9] In particular, see Ban’s remarks in April and June 2009.

From this perspective, we can read two alternative paths to multilateralism in the texts here, and the problems that are related to them.

The first is uncoordinated action, linked to the problem of "isolationism" and "nationalism." "Economic isolationism" is what Zoellick in October 2008, and repeated in March 2009, states must be confronted, embodied in price controls and export restrictions. Lamy uses "economic nationalism" and its associated "protectionism" in his remarks of February 2009, and Zoellick notes "creeping protectionism" in March 2009,[10] as "national governments are drawn increasingly to provide aid with their flag, not through multilateralism that encourages coherence and building local ownership." In opposition to "isolationism" are notions of community or "solidarity."[11] This notion avoids "unilateral, beggar-thy-neighbour responses" as Zoellick states in March 2009. Strauss-Kahn notes in May 2009 that "national interests" may hurt everybody.

The rationale for critiquing this policy alternative is a lack of responsiveness and efficiency. For example, Zoellick in October 2008 declares: "Most oil production is now controlled by national oil companies. These suppliers do not respond to market signals in the same way as private producers." Zoellick calls this policy in need of "modernization" and a "global bargain."

Note though, that national action will remain. As Ban states in November 2008, greater "coordination" entails "national action." In April 2009, Lamy similarly links international trade with "better domestic policy." Indeed, the "national" has to remain because multilateral action *is defined as* coordinated national action. Ban in April 2009 flatly states, "the common interest is the national interest," and in May 2009 Strauss-Kahn agrees: "on the whole, countries did the

[10] Ban also uses "protectionism" in April 2009; see also Strauss-Kahn in September 2009.
[11] In particular, see Lamy's remarks in November 2008, and Ban's that same month.

right thing, and they did it together. World leaders embraced multilateralism, and are reaping the rewards."

Now, the second alternative to multilateralism entails somewhat coordinated action, but not widespread enough or fast enough. This path is linked to the pejoratives of "uncertainty," "fear," and "danger." Like the first alternative above, what underpins this problem is lack of a rational logic of collective action. Properly applied, this logic—central to the "multilateral path"—can mitigate both conceptual problems linked to non-multilateral paths.

In October 2008, Ban notes that "the danger is a succession of cascading financial crises." There is the mitigation of danger with immediate action. Ban goes on to state that "too often, in recent weeks, financial leaders have been criticized for being too slow to recognize problems, for doing too little too late." Not acting is not an option, but even action needs to be conducted at a certain pace. As Ban remarks in November 2008: "a lot has been announced but I sincerely believe that the follow up doesn't go fast enough." He reiterates in April 2009: "absent decisive action, we face a real prospect of our existing system unraveling."

We can conclude this snapshot with four points. First, there is some variance with the associated terms and actions given the particular context in which we see "multilateral" being used. This is most clearly demonstrated in its relationship with "national interest." In some instances, "multilateral" requires some kind of rejection of "national interest." Yet in other instances, it is asserted to *really be* the "national interest." Second, this demonstrates that no single notion stands on its own. It requires other notions and practices to make sense either as having an affinity to or being distinguished from. Note that precisely how multilateralism mitigates "uncertainty," "fear," and "danger" is not at all clear. Third, given the first and second points, this then should move researchers to examine these relations as they are used in politics.

This move challenges us to consider what role multilateralism plays in the operationalization of policy.

My last point here is to invite skeptics to read on by stating that these relations appear to raise a puzzle whose answer may only seem obvious: why, specifically, is “multilateral” used in these instances, i.e. what is its purpose and value and how is this realized?

There are two common general explanations for why “multilateral” is used in politics that cut across both what International Relations (IR) has called logics of appropriateness and consequences. The first rests on a critical notion of hegemony. Because the hegemon provides and maintains the structure of world politics, it sets up norms and incentives to be followed by international society, lest the other entities in the system wish to be punished or shamed. The second explanation relies on rational institutions to socialize agents via norms and make incentives perceptible. These incentives, as they are successfully processed cognitively, appear to propel agents to make decisions based on costs and benefits likely to be achieved.

Neither the hegemonic-structural nor rational institutional-agentic approaches can generate an adequate account for why the specific term “multilateral” is used. In both explanatory perspectives, either hegemony or rational institutions determine action regardless of the actual diplomacy taking place. From this perspective, neither are well-suited to explain with the precision that I am seeking. In short, this study takes the position that the diplomacy itself is an important part of the causal story.

The distinction between the scientific and political concepts

Part of the problem in our study of multilateralism was hinted at in a 1958 article entitled, “Multilateralism—Diplomatic And Otherwise” by Inis Claude. In this piece (1958, 43), he points out that “multilateral diplomacy” has come to suggest “propaganda and insult.” He laments that

it is less a “topic for careful study” and more of a “symbol, evoking generalized reactions of approval or disapproval, confidence or anxiety.” Claude here, hints at the distinction between concepts we as scholars of IR, employ, and those very same concepts we observe being used in politics. As scholars, we become dissatisfied with public understandings and endeavor to lock down meanings to keep the scholarly separate from the political sphere (see the similar argument in Kratochwil 2006).

Consider Pahre’s (1994) critique of research on multilateralism.[12] For him, the key is to combine research so that it can be cumulative in a uniform way. Unfortunately, critiques like his do not go far in opening avenues of research. They appear to have an internal inconsistency because of their conceptualization of ‘multilateralism’ in the theoretical apparatus.

Pahre (1994) divides studies on multilateralism into two categories, each with its own short-coming. First, there are studies that use the term purely as a descriptor, such that it "raises no questions different" from bilateralist politics. In a sense, the notion itself adds nothing to political analysis—is epiphenomenal—other than *describe* a different outcome. Pahre argues that this position stems from making assumptions about politics at the outset that are “not generally true.” The second category of research treats multilateralism as “qualitatively different” from bilateralism. This leads to studies that employ different explanatory variables, depending on whether multilateralism or bilateralism is the dependent variable. Pahre argues that it is “preferable” to bring both of these into a single framework. That is to say, that they are ends of a continuum of a single dependent variable (see Pahre 1994, 328-333).

To Pahre's critique of the first category, I agree that treating multilateralism (and bilateralism, for that matter) as epiphenomenal unnecessarily limits our accounts of politics.

[12] An expanded treatment on leadership and hegemony (which includes more on multilateral bargaining) is Pahre 1999.

However, I would argue that the reason for adopting a different perspective is not because these accounts are “not generally true.” Regarding multilateralism as epiphenomenal is an ontological choice to put workable, pragmatic limits on research. Adopting a perspective that multilateralism matters permits a different account, which we wager (since we do not presumptively know, and we should not assume to know) can tell us something new and useful about politics.

But then, what can we claim to be true or false? First, I would argue that we can make adjudications of evidence. That is, within a specified methodology, we can determine the presence or absence of anticipated evidence. Did politicians use the term “multilateral treaties,” to refer to indispensable components of a functioning world order before the 20th century? In my research, I saw no evidence of this and would stand by that claim unless evidence suggests otherwise. In my view, Pahre is correct to make this criticism, but I would characterize his basis for this as a different ontological position. His operationalization of multilateralism (which then determines how it functions in politics) is different from other studies, though the underlying cost-benefit logic may be similar.

Pahre's relation to the second category is an interesting one. On the one hand, he disagrees that bilateralism and multilateralism are qualitatively different political phenomena. This implicit ontological position permits the use of a single framework to study them (for if they were qualitatively different, I find the argument for different frameworks more convincing). In a sense, I agree with Pahre that they are not qualitatively different, though I would employ a different framework.

On the other hand, Pahre shares a similar methodological commitment to analysis premised on probabilistically stable correlations of particular variables. Therefore, the framework seeks to explain qualitatively different outcomes by operationalizing the dependent

variable as a single kind of phenomenon—cooperation—where bilateral and multilateral are on opposite ends of a continuum.

Taken together, the criticism Pahre makes of these two categories of research sit uneasily. If multilateralism and bilateralism are not epiphenomenal (critique #1), then they exert some influence on the politics being studied, and can be studied as such. However, it seems difficult to hold this point consistently if we employ a framework that uses a single set of variables of interest to determine what type of cooperation results (critique #2). What explains the mode of cooperation are the variables of interest, nothing about multilateralism or bilateralism themselves, as they are used in politics (contra critique #1).

For Pahre, the reason for undertaking this critique is to create research that can be cumulative with standardized methods and frameworks. This is the apparent motivation for scholars of multilateralism (e.g. Martin 1992a; Kreps 2008) who interpret Ruggie (1992) to say that multilateralism has three properties: (a) nondiscrimination (that general principles, by virtue of being principles, are applied to all), (b) indivisibility (that the objectives pursued require (a)), and (c) diffuse reciprocity (that relatively stable expectations of policy coordination arise out of successful practice). In Ruggie's piece, though, note that he begins with (a) in his "grounded analysis" of multilateralism. That is, he observes (a) in already successful multilateral politics, and introduces (b) and (c) as corollaries to (a). Thus, the three properties are inter-related and hang together as logical and practical. It is not at all clear that he has divided multilateralism into three discrete essential properties, nor it is at all clear that this is the only way forward to produce knowledge about the political value of the term.

To know more about the notion of multilateralism, I depart from almost all previous research, and follow Kratochwil (2006) to suggest we study it as it is used in politics. Rather than

keeping multilateralism, as it normally is employed, outside of the empirical frame, or determining successful multilateralism at the outset and noting its properties, this study, conceptualizes it as a negotiated idea in politics. Attached to this notion are discursive and practical associations that operationalize it within a culture.

I suspect that this genealogical study, which investigates how "multilateralism" was made to fit various political contexts, will contain some strange episodes, where the relations being made to multilateral will appear odd from a particular perspective. It is precisely these oddities that are important for our understanding of how politics works. It is these strange combinations, such as the aforementioned importance of "national action" yet the problem of "nationalism," that gives us a warrant to reject a transcendent logic of multilateralism. Indeed, at the very bottom of this inquiry is a fundamental philosophical question: do we care about how a concept evolves? Because the position adopted here answers this question in the affirmative, I lay out one way to research conceptual adaptation and evolution.

To undertake this study, I first review the literature on multilateralism in Chapter 2 and identify two gaps, one empirical and one explanatory. In short, IR does not study multilateralism as it is used in politics and cannot convincingly say with much precision why it is used in the variety of instances we observe. That chapter ends with an argument that most research employs a "definitional" approach, which renders addressing these gaps non-sensical, and suggests a "practical" approach derived primarily from Kratochwil (2006). Chapter 3 articulates and defends the theoretical apparatus of the study by undertaking an explication of five related components: mode of inquiry, empirics, research methods, analytical tools, and explanatory results. I propose to construct an analytical narrative that focuses on contingency, is genealogical (by definition, an eye toward relations as explanatory), understanding political interaction (data)

as constituted by discursive practices, with results articulated by the researcher that are open to correctives based on historical evidence or re-interpretation.

Chapter 4 examines the notion of “multilateral treaties” in the first political uses of “multilateral” in diplomatic practice. This begins with the Treaty of Versailles and ends with the Kellogg-Briand Pact. At this point, “multilateralism” had not been utilized in scholarly, policy, diplomatic or and mass media circles. Yet, the idea of “multilateral treaties” as an essential part of the new international relations after the First World War was instantiated. The reasons for this were normative, or related to “rights” and “justice” (as demonstrated in the diplomacy concerning the Treaty of Versailles), and rational-logical, such that benefits stemming from such a treaty to renounce war could only really be obtained from the broad participation of Great Powers (as demonstrated with the Kellogg-Briand Pact). These logics would be re-animated and re-interpreted in new contexts as world politics emerged.

Chapter 5 examines “multilateral trade.” Arising from the development of economic theory and policy formation in response to the Great Depression, “multilateral trade” and “multilateralism” emerged as novel notions related to the specific domain of international economic relations. Antecedents in Western hemispheric diplomacy in addition to theoretical work by economists combined to make possible principled economic arrangements among states through a logic of balancing accounts (requiring some kind of currency stability). The logic has a family relation to the one associated with “multilateral treaties,” where broad participation is required in order for benefits to be realized. This chapter consists of sections on the London World Economic Conference of 1933 and discussions of post-war economic order, the Bretton Woods Conference, and US-UK loan at the end of 1945.

Chapter 6 examines "multilateral aid" and a "multilateral approach" to development. Attached to the "multilateral clearing" logic of the IMF and IBRD is the link between employment and trade. Through the fleshing out of this relationship, a connection is made to development, and the most sought-after tool to promote development: finance. This chapter begins with the negotiation of the ITO Treaty (where a link is made between "multilateral trade" and "aid" and "development") and ends with ECOSOC approval of the US proposal for a "special fund" for development. Chapter 7 concludes with a summary, "multilateral" topics not discussed, and a reflection that posits avenues of research.

"New Multilateralism": Fragment on a concept in politics[13]

A UNDP representative followed the opening remarks with a discussion of the organization's publication called *Growing Inclusive Markets*. In outlining the genesis of the report, he mentions the lesson of a previous report called *Unleashing Entrepreneurship* (2004) and the interaction between two commission members of that report, Paul Martin (former Canadian Prime Minister) and Mark Malloch Brown (former UNDP Administrator). He recalled that their discussion about the utility of public-private partnerships was emblematic of the core of that report, and produced what he called the "new multilateralism." This philosophy was central to this most recent UNDP report as it drew on empirical work produced by public-private endeavors. Indeed, the question-and-answer session (involving representatives from CARE, DAI, USTR, WRI, and AED) that followed his remarks did not revolve around whether or not this "new multilateralism" was important or not... Instead, the focus was on how to keep the private sector engaged, how to keep governments engaged, how to ensure civil society organizations are kept involved, and how to measure outcomes...

[13] Drawn from author's field notes written in Washington, DC in 2009.

... the apparent consensus was that public and private sectors need each other in some way; that both serve some function to get objectives accomplished. The tension between these sectors appears to have been dissolved. No one questioned that both sectors could benefit from each other; it is ‘obvious’...

... NGOs were involved in the GIM UNDP report, but none were on the Advisory Committee (as pointed out by a CARE representative). The UNDP official noted that NGOs were involved, but not at that level—and he hoped to include them at that level in subsequent activities. The AdComm of the report (which I collected from the distribution table) did include universities, governmental agencies, non-state economic entities, international organizations, research institutes, and firms.

CHAPTER 2

TOWARD EXPLANATION BY EXAMINING USE: A REVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF MULTILATERALISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LITERATURE

Introduction

In this introduction to the literature on multilateralism and a critique of it, I want to make three points. First, that it is unsurprising to observe an association between instantiations of policy for global issues with the term "multilateral." Second, that although the rationale for this association is presumed to be clear by virtue of a related logic for collective action, the influence of these instantiations to determine the practical shape of politics seems quite variable. Third, as a result, I argue that the continuing association between policies for global issues and the notion of multilateralism is a puzzling one for IR. As a scholarly community, it has not yet adequately explored the logic of this relationship between multilateralism and claims to legitimate global solutions in world politics, and this research project attempts to fill this gap.

Perhaps the most useful example of the connection between multilateralism and global policy can be drawn from the Millennium Declaration in 2000. At the time, the Millennium Summit was the largest ever gathering of heads of states, and here the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed a wide-ranging resolution laying out problems in world politics and potential pathways for solutions. It listed several fundamental values the international community holds "essential to international relations," including "shared responsibility." Under this point, the following assertion was made: "responsibility for managing worldwide economic and social development, as well as threats to international peace and security, must be shared among the nations of the world and should be exercised multilaterally."[14] This claim to proper politics is being linked to action to be conducted "multilaterally." The statement instantiates

[14] UNGA Resolution A/RES/55/2, "United Nations Millennium Declaration," 18 September 2000.

multilateral action as a broadly applicable, and most appropriate, way to address a wide range of political issues. However, what it means to exercise this shared responsibility multilaterally on an operational level seems to vary tremendously.

A glance at the previous ten years after that Declaration (1990-2000) discloses a wide range of political activity that can be described as both embodying and defying multilateralism. Some examples include: the UN-sanctioned invasion of Iraq, the NATO-led intervention into the former Republic of Yugoslavia, the disaster of UN peacekeeping in Somalia, the inaction of the UN Security Council in the wake of the Rwandan genocide, the establishment of international tribunals (in the Hague and Arusha), the integration of former Soviet Republics and Eastern bloc countries into international organizations, the formation of the WTO and the subsequent Battle of Seattle, the promulgation of the European Union, economic crises on several continents blamed on the IMF and the Washington Consensus, and the lack of US signatures onto the Kyoto Protocol and the newly formed International Criminal Court. Indeed, since the Millennium Summit, the use of multilateralism in world politics persists. This remains the case in spite of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty, as NATO leads a rather ambitious operation in Afghanistan, the G20 commits to increased funding of the IMF and the multilateral development banks (MDBs) to manage the global economic crisis, and the UN Secretary General proclaims the need for a "new multilateralism" to address concerns ranging from climate change to weapons of mass destruction to sustainable development.[15]

If anything, the record suggests that exercising politics "multilaterally" is fraught with all sorts of obstacles and negotiations about what exercising "shared responsibility multilaterally" actually entails. However, in spite of obstacles and challenges, the persistent use of "multilateralism" to describe and justify political activity across a wide range of issues remains a

[15] See Ban Ki-moon's remarks at Princeton University, 17 April 2009.

striking feature of world politics. Even the Joint Statement of George W. Bush and Tony Blair in November 2003 asserted that: "effective multilateralism, and neither unilateralism nor international paralysis, will guide our approach."[16]

Why have we met "multilateralism" here with this UNGA resolution, at the end of a tumultuous decade, which saw a mixed record of multilateral performance, in the widest consensual political declaration in human history? What explains the persistent use of "multilateralism" in world politics? In particular, two aspects remain inadequately explored and explained. First, our explanations lack precision for the observed repeated calls for multilateral action, especially since these calls have seen great variation in terms of their capacity to influence politics. One might argue that there is a norm of multilateralism, but this leaves aside a focused exploration of how entities practice diplomacy multilaterally.[17] Second, commitments to multilateral policy narrow rather than increase policy options. It is not clear why governments and international organizations circulate such language when increasingly complex political and economic relations appear to require greater policy flexibility, especially if the commitments from other entities remain quite variable. One might argue that shared identities or constructed trust through repeated iterations of negotiation reduce these uncertainties, but this leaves aside how these identities or uncertainties are made so in the variety of contexts and processes. This is consequential if we seek greater precision to how causal processes produce political outcomes. Put another away, if how identity formation occurs matters to the resulting situation, then we should be directing our attention to this process.

Perhaps the most relevant research area in IR which might provide an answer has been the study of cooperation. Straight away, however, we come to a philosophical break. This study's

[16] See the U.S./U.K. Joint Statement on Multilateralism, 20 November 2003.
[17] The value and lacunae that occur when adopting a norms approach, such as one that posits a norm of multilateralism (e.g. Wiseman 2004), will be discussed later in this chapter.

focus is not "cooperation" as an IR-defined activity to explore.[18] Instead, this study's focus is on the use of "multilateral" in politics. The UNGA resolution does not say that responsibility is to be exercised *cooperatively*; it says it should be exercised *multilaterally*.

To be clear, this study's primary empirical focus is not that set of empirics that is generally associated with multilateralism in IR: not treaty-making (Denemark and Hoffman 2008), international regimes or institutions (Duffield 2007), or international organizations (Hafner-Burton, von Stein, and Gartzke 2008).[19] We have yet to analyze specific usage of the term "multilateral," and our understanding of why its use persists in world politics remains under-theorized.

The following sections review and reply to what has been done to study multilateralism in IR, and how it has been done, to identify, articulate, and defend this project's research plan. What have previous studies informed IR? What gaps can be identified, and how might they be usefully addressed? As I began to examine research that concerns multilateralism based on the traditional categories of IR theory, I noted two consistent gaps across these categories, one empirical, and the other explanatory. This identification provides the rationale for the utility of the approach offered here.

This chapter will be successful if the research question is clear, its theoretical significance demonstrated, and a coherent argument and plan for research that usefully explains the phenomenon in question has been articulated. In particular, I will show:

---

[18] Recall that there is no necessary link between "cooperation" and "multilateralism." IR generally conceives of multilateralism as a method to achieve policy coordination. However, this method need not be cooperative; it could be coercive (Martin 1992b). Therefore, we should, at least for the moment, not equate cooperation with multilateralism. This *skipping* of multilateralism to focus on cooperation, institutions, regimes, or organizations was also notably pointed out by Ruggie (1992) and Caporaso (1992). See the discussion below.

[19] Pahre (1999, 177, emphasis added) mentions the "postwar period [after 1945]," as "one *natural* referent for extensive multilateral cooperation."

(1) How none of the research on cooperation, international organizations, institutions, or regimes, multilateral agreements, norms, or activities, and entities that helped create, sustain, or undermine these, can adequately explain how 'multilateralism' is made legitimate (we assume its legitimacy as an essential characteristic—distinctive of what I call a “definitional” approach);

(2) That part of the reason for (1) is that no IR study has put multilateralism squarely in the empirical frame (this is the consequence of an ontological/methodological decision, and cuts across research approaches in IR);

(3) That an adequate approach already exists in IR that puts processes of legitimation at the core of a discursive-practical theoretical apparatus (what I call a “practical” approach in contrast to a “definitional” one); and

(4) How (3) is useful to explain how multilateralism is legitimated because of its precision; enabled by a focus on relations and variation.

Before moving on, three points should be addressed here to foreshadow the theoretical discussion: (a) the broader impact of the study—a situation of the research, (b) the kind of knowledge claims being made, and (c) evaluation or assessment of these claims.

First, this study is an attempt at explaining a puzzle: at first glance, a counter-intuitive occurrence, that can be made logical and sensible through research. Why has the notion “multilateral” persisted in international affairs? Why all the effort to introduce and resuscitate the notion when it seems bound to create difficulties for solutions to problems in world politics?

“Multilateralism” and its various grammatical variants had to enter into the lexicon of diplomacy and world politics in some particular way to address particular issues. We know that it was not in the language of treaties and diplomatic cables until after World War I. We know that it is commonly used as part of the language of diplomacy today. We do not know with any

degree of precision how and why this happened beyond vague references to a greater liberal, democratic project.

The kind of puzzle articulated here bears a resemblance to a number of puzzles concerning the effects of culture upon individual action. It almost goes without saying that "culture matters" in social science. What is needed is knowledge about why and how particular cultural resources (because the phrase is not "all culture matters") are selected and what the effects are. This informs us how politics is legitimated. This permits knowledge about why certain language and practices persist and why others fade. We can posit related tendencies given particular usage or the tendency toward moments of creativity given particular objectives. In this sense, intentional political action for public consumption and “non-thinking behavior” premised on already present cultural understandings are both important aspects in explaining politics.

Second, the kind of knowledge claims being made are fundamentally not about isolating the key variable in determining politics, but rather explicating what the factors are, when and how they were employed in the historical episode specified, to produce the political outcome. Because we can empirically substantiate the resources that were used in these episodes, this is a safer position from which to generate a causal account resting on the relations between entities and discursive practices that do not purely rely on counterfactual propositions or ultimately adjudicating the thoughts and motivations of an individual.

Third, the evaluation or assessment of the conclusions made here cannot be asked in terms of "how do you know if you are wrong?" or "how is your claim falsifiable?" An empirical explanation—a causal account that rests on data—in the manner constructed here is not right or wrong in terms of correspondence to *how things really happened*. Instead, the explanation attempts to disclose something new, something overlooked, something assumed before, but

through research we can now know more about its operation. We can increase the *precision* in terms of *specifying key moments* where relationships are built or questioned. This study, thus, has affinity with *meso-level* research and theory-building, rather than grand, or systemic theory (e.g. Jackson 2006a). It is almost certain that the lines of relations being drawn here are not exhaustive. Alternative mapping-outs of relations over time may disclose something different and new, and worthwhile.

The empirical and explanatory gaps in IR research concerning multilateralism

The purpose of this review is to identify gaps in IR research concerning multilateralism, both empirically and analytically. In identifying an empirical gap, I aim to specify potentially useful data that has been overlooked. In identifying an explanatory or analytical gap, I aim to specify how particular questions, data, and methodological approaches have been inadequately explored or utilized. What should result is a convincing case for a different approach, for which this chapter will provide a broad outline: what I call a practical approach versus a definitional one.

The vast majority of IR research that studies multilateralism employs the term as part of the theoretical apparatus to study politics. It is generally considered a useful concept because it organizes and links research across a range of empirics: such as the activities of international regimes, economies, governments, and militaries. Keohane's suggestive assertion is probably correct: "multilateralism serves as a label for a cluster of fascinating issues for research," (Keohane 1990, 733). Consequently, studies involving multilateralism cut across boundaries of so-called traditional IR theories (which may be commonly known by their labels, such as realism, liberalism, critical theory, constructivism, and so on). As such, it is a perfectly acceptable label in our research vocabulary.

However, typifying different studies concerned with multilateralism by the traditional IR theory categories does not clearly illuminate systematic gaps in our understanding of what multilateralism is, what it does in world politics, and how it accomplishes this—its use. Therefore, this literature review attempts to substantiate two claims. First, that none of the research considers uses of the term multilateralism as bits of data (an empirical gap). Second, that the process in which multilateralism is instantiated and constructed is generally bracketed; that is, its persistent use and connected legitimacy are not adequately explained (an explanatory gap). This second gap is probably a consequence of the methodological decision that results in the first gap (and I set this discussion aside for the moment). In short, this review will be successful if it can illustrate the persistence of these gaps across different IR theory approaches.[20]

After three broad clusters of research are specified, this section typifies them into two categories: the definitional and the practical. In doing so, the beginnings of the study's methodology can be articulated.[21]

Cluster 1: When does multilateralism happen (systematic factors)?

Keohane's (1990) programmatic article is the foundation of much IR research on multilateralism. Straight away, the piece begins with a suggested definition: "multilateralism can be defined as the practice of co-ordinating national policies in groups of three or more states," (Keohane 1990, 731). This assertion is followed with an argument that multilateralism is important, and this importance is demonstrated through the manifestation of increasing numbers

[20] The distinctions here build on arguments made in Jackson 2006, 54-56; see also the discussion of Western Civilization vs. 'Western Civilization', pp. 9-12.
[21] See Appendix B for a summary of the research clusters.

of “multinational conferences,” “multilateral intergovernmental organizations,” and “multilateral arrangements.” Keohane (1990, 731-732) goes on to state that, in IR:

> ... multilateralism has served as a label for a variety of activities more than as a concept defining a research programme. When a scholar refers to multilateralism, it is not immediately clear what phenomena are to be described and explained. Before we can understand multilateralism, we need to think about how we should conceive of it and account for variations in its extent or form. My purpose in this essay is to specify some dimensions of multilateralism and to make some suggestions about possible lines of explanation of variations.

What results are suggestions for empirics, which can be analyzed given the definition of multilateralism offered at the outset to test the hypotheses Keohane discusses. He asserts that “the number, budgets, memberships, and scope of activity of international organizations provide plausible measures of institutional multilateralism,” (1990, 741). The empirics are found in the output of international organizations, often in the form of annual reports.[22]

To meet the explanatory objectives (causal inference/law-like generalizations), Keohane recognizes the obstacle of pre-existing conditions, as there is no “hypothetical institutions-free baseline from which to measure the impact of actual institutions on state capabilities,” (1990, 738). In spite of this, testing what variables matter hinges on demonstrating how institutions affect state capabilities. Such an objective may bracket, or appear to bracket, the process through which institutions do this, leading to the implication that the presence of institutions causes states to believe they can enact a certain set of possible policies, and render others impossible. For Keohane, one of the key questions that the analysis should attempt to answer is “under what conditions do institutions matter?” (e.g. Keohane 1990, 736). Indeed, it is arguable that the three

[22] Among others, see Hoole and Tucker's early (1975) statement on data availability and needs for studying international organizations and Modelski's (1970) assertion of the “well-known” phenomenon of the “multilateralization of world politics.”

other key questions are rather dependent on this one.[23] This line of questioning implies, if not assumes, that the bargaining process, where institutions have effects on states, not only will inevitably occur, but also that the outcomes of this process are potentially predictable and stable enough to remove the process itself from the empirical or explanatory focus.

To foreshadow, this philosophical move is inherent in nearly all of the studies in this cluster of research (e.g. Stone, Slantchev, and London 2008),[24] which captures most of mainstream IR. Bargaining processes are generally conceptualized as outcome-oriented models with particular characteristics that "simplify" reality, which permit them to be "tested against" cases that fit, or do not fit, these attributes. Bargaining in practice is, more or less, the running along the tracks already established in the model. Well-thought through formal models and analyses based on them should be able to determine the maximum of potential gains on the table and disclose some relationship between that outcome and the model's characteristics. Variation in gains in particular cases can potentially be explained by factors such as distrust, information asymmetry, reputational effects, and so on.

This treatment is problematic because bargaining processes, as they unfold, are constituted not only by offer – counter-offer interactions, but by a whole swath of cultural resources.[25] Ignoring how bargaining processes actually happen by focusing on systemic conditions puts the model first for the purpose of progress toward covering-law explanations. Explanatory leverage is premised on the attributes of the system, which are often categorized by definition deductively, rather than analyzing the particular configuration of the system. This leaves us not only with the sidelining of a distinct explanatory strategy, but also with less

[23] The other three key questions being: what accounts for the rise of multilateral institutions, what explains variations in membership, strength, and scope, and what accounts for variations in property rights and rules. See Keohane 1990, 736.
[24] Note also that this study is about which "cooperation" to choose, not specifically studying "multilateralism".
[25] At a minimum, offer – counter-offer interactions is one way to conceptualize bargaining processes.

precision in terms of explaining the process as it occurred. The methodological move to make private (that is, diplomatic cables, documents, and interaction de-classified or reported ex post facto) and public diplomatic processes in which the usage of "multilateral" occurs, the focus of the study is meant to remedy this situation. However, recent calls to put dynamic processes at the center of research on multilateralism (e.g. Finnemore 2005) have not yet resulted in studies that that attempt to rigorously unpack them (see also Kratochwil 2006).

In Martin's (1992a) nuanced article, I observe identical methodological parameters concerning empirics and explanation. Multilateral norms are given emphasis and the purpose is to explore the "comparative utility of multilateralism and alternative organizational forms [ideally and in practice]," (Martin 1992a, 766-7). Her explanatory goal concerns multilateral economic sanctions. Multilateralism is part of a pre-defined conceptual apparatus that organizes the empirics and directs the analysis. The purpose of this use of multilateralism as a "metric" is to distinguish different patterns of international cooperation by comparing the "ideal type," constituted by a set of behavioral "norms," against variable state activity and variable forms of international organization. Thus, she is able to fix the meaning of multilateralism, using the three principles—which she sometimes calls norms—outlined by Ruggie (1992): indivisibility, nondiscrimination, and diffuse reciprocity. The empirics are drawn from statements of diplomatic actors and governmental policy-makers as well as secondary sources that collect first-hand accounts. The analysis first explores cooperation problems through an ideal-typical game theoretical typology and then adds two elements to flesh out the beginnings of an empirical, historical analysis. The game theoretical section sets up expectations of ideal multilateralism against which the empirics of state action and organizational architecture can be compared and

contrasted. As a result, multilateralism is thus treated instrumentally ("as a means rather than a goal") for self-regarding states.

Following Keohane (and Ruggie), explaining the variation of cooperation is her central concern; that is, in terms of the conditions which affect state decision-making. She states that the "the problem of cooperation motivates this book, which examines the conditions under which two or more states will jointly impose economic sanctions against a third," (Martin 1992b, 4). In each game in her typology, Martin teases out where multilateral norms would, in the abstract, have an impact on outcomes, in terms of influencing state interests, maximizing absolute gains, and in terms of what functions international organizations could provide. This explanatory objective creates a point of departure for more "agent-centered" research on multilateralism, which could be an exploration of the process in which states select institutional forms by evaluating perceivable costs and benefits.

Another perspective on what "agent-centered" research could look like exists. We may begin by considering the study of this process vitally important because states exercise agency by constituting—actively participating in the on-going stabilization of—the very concepts which they use to justify political activity (Jackson 2006b). Put another way, if multilateralism is *only* an ideal type, what explanation do we have for its continued *real* use in world politics, particularly during the time period that Martin is examining? By keeping the empirical focus off these legitimation processes, they are treated as epiphenomenal. Yet, without the various uses of "multilateralism," states simply cannot do what they wish or hope to achieve what they desire (see also Finnemore 2009). How precisely would entities achieve their objectives? In short, for Martin, unpacking how multilateralism is made a possibility is left unattended. This endeavor would be useful for explaining world politics because if entities did not produce legitimate action

and language that instantiates multilateralism, then that organizational form is *not* a possibility for policy.

Rather, the key question for Keohane, Martin, and their interlocutors is: when do states cooperate? (cf. O'Neill, Balsinger, and VanDeveer 2004) This line of research assumes that we know why: it is in their interest. We simply posit explanations based on when incentives override whatever costs are incurred in a given temporal frame. Multilateralism, it is presumed, is a key functional element in cooperation as the mechanism through which policy coordination occurs. In a sense, the variable-label "multilateralism" to refer to a pre-defined set of behaviors or a "mechanism" which are present is part of whatever explanation is offered such that we can reliably mark the outcome as "multilateral" or not. The empirics concern state actors, their beliefs, and their exogenously given interests—not an account of how these behaviors are conducted or how the mechanism works. The explanatory objective for this research cluster is primarily to investigate *where* we observe multilateralism happening, given the assumptions of self-regarding state behavior.

Keohane is right to argue that the key weakness of both neoliberal and institutionalist theory is accounting for the variation of institutional forms and state behavior; that the "sources of variation... need to be explained," (Keohane 1990, 736). In general, IR had turned to either systemic factors (structure) or individual units (agents) to address this, rather than processes (e.g. Jackson and Nexon 1999).

This first cluster of inquiry is in the pursuit of a particular set of factors that result in pre-defined multilateral forms.[26] Pahre (1999, 178, emphasis in original) states that his analysis "depends critically on the definitions of *multilateralism* and *bilateralism*." The variables of interest are proxies for measuring the relative strength of multilateralism, as the "practice of

[26] See the similar argument on the conditions in which "institutions matter" in Martin and Simmons 1998.

policy coordination among groups of three or more states." To use Weber's (1992) words, multilateralism is treated as a "dependent variable."[27] Though Corbetta and Dixon (2004, 5-6) continue the treatment of multilateral participation as the dependent variable and the analysis discloses *when multilateralism happens* rather than why or how, the authors do recognize the lack of a theoretical sophistication in the IR literature:

> ... the discipline of international relations lacks any "off-the-shelf" theory for explaining multilateralism (Caporaso 1992: 604). The absence of a theory of multilateralism is accompanied by relative scarcity of systematic evidence concerning the relative propensity of major power states to act in coordination with other states... There is no agreed-upon definition of what constitutes multilateral action in the international relations literature... Nonetheless... most scholars appear to concur on what the essential traits of a multilateral action are. At its minimum, multilateralism can be defined as "the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states," (Keohane 1990: 731).

For Corbetta and Dixon, when multilateralism occurs is an important step to understanding why and how, and categorizing events as bilateral or multilateral is essential to doing the statistical analysis. However, this is only one step.

Cluster 1.1: "Multilateralism" and its contenders--a matter of agentic choice?

Recent IR research in political economy and trade relations has generally focused on state choice or decision-making. The more systemic theorizing discussed above, which focuses on the conditions for determining when multilateralism happens, stands somewhat in contrast to research that focuses on the agents in the structure to explain why a particular institutional form is selected. While this departs from the emphasis above, it retains the practice of defining multilateralism following Keohane, sometimes without citation (see Mansfield and Milner 1999). The definition of multilateralism seems like a settled matter, and these studies move on from

[27] Moving multilateralism into the "independent variable" column led Weber (1992) to counterfactual theorizing—a kind of endeavor that remains a contentious subject of debate. It is not at all clear that this move is of any help to the line of inquiry suggested in this study.

such conceptual issues to problem-solve why multilateralism and not other possible choices, e.g. unilateralism, bilateralism, or regionalism.

For example, Mansfield and Milner (1999) focus on regionalism as a state choice in trade relations or economic diplomacy. The question: "will regionalism erode multilateralism?" has seen extensive study (e.g. Bhagwati 1992; see also Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003). Mansfield and Milner follow Keohane in developing a proxy for regionalism: preferential trade arrangements (PTAs). These agreements constitute the empirics, and secondary literature focuses on them. Mansfield and Milner develop factors from both the domestic and international *inputs* (societal factors, domestic institutions, international hierarchy, and multilateral institutions) that explain state choices or *outputs*.[28] Determining the influential factors in making states decide "to go regional or not" is their explanatory goal (cf. Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003).

Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom (1998) tackle what makes *multilateral* institutions more influential; that is, why states choose to join "multilaterals" (multilateral organizations) and what effect this has on state behavior. Through a formal model and data that "fits," the authors claim that "multilaterals that start small and then expand" have greater influence over state decision-making than multilaterals with large membership at the outset (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1998, 413-414). This is an important point, but it remains fixed on explaining a choice through a set of assumptions for decision-making, rather than the process through which that choice becomes self-evident, and others inconceivable. This is the difference between what may be called the "calculus" and "cultural" approaches (Hall and Taylor 1996), or the "economic" from the "sociological" (Jackson 2006a). Moreover, the empirics remain in the domain of historical

[28] Note that Lake (2010), in discussing a "research agenda for global governance," has recently called this approach, which distinguishes domestic politics from international politics, untenable.

agreements and economic data, which correlate to a pre-defined notion of what "multilateral" means.

Brooks and Wohlforth's (2005) recent discussion of "unilateralism" (and "multilateralism") treats the concept as a strategic approach for policy makers (less to do with the practice or process and more a result of concrete policy choices). It not only reviews why realists would potentially criticize unilateralism, but also argues why multilateralism may be preferable for balance-of-threat realists. Brooks and Wohlforth (2005, 510) point out that the gains of unilateralism (and multilateralism) are dependent on the issue:

> We conclude that the current theoretical arguments do not show that a shift toward unilateralism necessarily has high costs... The question is whether punishing general costs accrue to policies that are unilateral regardless of their substance. On that question, current scholarship has no persuasive answer, although scholars routinely write as if it does. The same goes for the related issue of the benefits of multilateralism.[29]

If the calculation of costs are perhaps only part of the answer, then: "the case for acting multilaterally rests on the substance of a given issue, not on the purported costs of not doing so," (Brooks and Wohlforth 2005, 510).[30] As they note, this stridently diverges from institutionalist logic, which has dominated the studies presented so far. However, in spite of this difference, "multilateralism" remains a pre-defined, essentialized notion. The explanation remains focused on why the selection of a multilateral form versus other choices. The empirics are state actions that constitute these categories or classes.

Others in this cluster abound. Pahre (1999) examines why states select multilateral bargains when bilateral bargains of equal value are tabled.[31] Milner (2006) discusses why foreign

[29] Weber (1992) makes a similar point in examining multilateralism and NATO, especially pp. 637-638. Stiles (1995) also questions the assumption that multilateralism necessarily entails the realization of benefits.
[30] I would argue that there is a related point to made: that there is nothing naturally appropriate (or inappropriate) about unilateralism or multilateralism.
[31] Pahre (1999, 186) writes that there is "no particular reason to privilege either bilateral or multilateral cooperation," in concluding his chapter on multilateralism. He also notes that his analysis brackets the normative

aid is distributed through multilateral organizations. This focuses on state choice with empirics drawn from economic, quantitative data. The analysis strictly confines itself to domestic costs and benefits and conditions of information availability under bilateral and multilateral conditions. The explanation tabled is one that parses out what affects state decision-making. A recent study (Verdier 2008) addresses the multilateralism versus bilateralism debate regarding the issue of non-proliferation. In this study, through constructing a rational choice model that is then tested, bilateral agreements are claimed to be an "efficient component" of multilateral regimes. While this point is an interesting one, and Verdier questions the utility of the debate of bilateralism versus multilateralism (analogously, multilateralism versus any of the contenders might not be useful either), the same gaps result. The empirics are international treaties, not uses of "multilateralism"—because multilateralism's definition is a settled matter—and the explanatory objective is to account for state decision-making of particular options through assumptions of defined costs and benefits.

The key question for this cluster of inquiry is: what accounts for state selection of already defined institutional forms? Like the previous research on the systemic conditions in which we observe multilateralism, the presence and size of incentives determines state choice. The focus on states as agents does not necessarily account for their agency (Jackson 2006a). The empirics concern concrete empirical agreements or quantitative data, none of which are observations of uses of multilateralism. The explanatory objective is primarily to investigate the linkage between the state and the international context through a mechanism of choice. While this is important, the process through which particular factors are made legitimate remains bracketed.

---

content of the terms, but it is precisely this content that we should examine if we want to create more precise explanations.

Often, and perhaps to gain audience with policy-makers or demonstrate policy-relevance, the task at hand for this research is to demonstrate "how to obtain to a particular outcome." Whether or not a multilateral outcome is produced is simply a matter of comparing the size of the aggregated contending interests (as in, which produces the greatest utility). To be clear, this study finds no reason to necessarily reject this proposition. However, my initial premise, that actors themselves *produce* multilateralism through its *use*, is not one that is seriously considered.

To reiterate, the uptick, or presence, of various metrics for multilateralism, or the conjunction of these with other factors, is not, by itself, an explanation. It is accompanied by a causal logic that flows from correlated factors. Not only does such a logic often lead to a conflation of causation and correlation, to presume the capacity to discern interests validly is a contentious claim.[32]

Cluster 2: Multilateralisms?

As Corbetta and Dixon (2004) imply, empirical research must "get on" with the business of social science and, at minimum, accept provisional definitions that have gained wide adherence. Should a different definition be tabled, a different set of empirics should result. However, social science tends to build linkages *on top of* rather than *between* research endeavors, so this does not always happen. It is here that critical IR theory tends to intervene, critique and suggest new conceptualizations.

Just as Martin (1992a) makes the point that "cooperation" has a variety of possible forms, it is no stretch to claim that multilateralism can come in a variety of forms as well. As economist Jagdish Bhagwati (1990, 1304) wrote in the opening of an article: "multilateralism can mean many things to many people." In IR, Robert Cox has sought to articulate an alternative: a "new

[32] I discuss an alternative later in this chapter.

multilateralism." He coordinated the MUNS group (Multilateralism and the UN System), a five-year project sponsored by the United Nations University.[33] Cox (1992; 1997a) is explicit about the MUNS approach to multilateralism—that is, MUNS presents a new formulation. It is both a condition and a force for both order and transformation. As such, the MUNS approach was to "identify and investigate the impersonal historical forces that frame action," to direct "attention to long-term structural changes in the global system," and raise "the question of how developments in multilateralism can influence global structural changes in a normatively desirable direction," (Cox 1997a, 104). As a result, Cox (1997a) offers an understanding of a new multilateralism that is explicitly driven by consideration of civil society in world politics, the emerging relations between civil society groups and instruments of world order, such as international organizations, and how this interaction can lead to a more equitable, just world.

The definition of multilateralism used in institutionalist research practice is critiqued by the MUNS group (see also e.g. Schechter's 1998 edited volume). Cox (1997b, xvi) notes that "multilateralism in form is non-hierarchical but in reality cloaks and obscures the making of dominant-subordinate relationships." A re-formulation or corrective is necessary. They suggest that multilateralism is both a stabilizer for world order and an instrument of its transformation, depending on how it is used to legitimate particular ways of doing politics (see also Cox 1992).

The MUNS group is clear about what they wanted multilateralism to promote: social equity, diffusion of power, non-violent conflict resolution, biosphere protection, and mutual recognition of the values of different civilizations (Cox 1997a). Thus, their research was defined

[33] In a footnote, Coate, Knight, and Maximenko (2001, 26) recall: "The term 'new multilateralism' emerged out of discussions at a symposium in Fiesole (Italy) in September 1992 (part of the MUNS project concept by Robert Cox), which considered the implication for multilateralism on world order changes, different philosophical approaches to the study of multilateralism, and the views of world order held by different civilizations. The new multilateralism envisaged would be one that is coherent with a future post-Westphalian, post-globalization and post-hegemonic world."

by their conception of multilateralism—a definition dictated by a normative position, not empirics. Indeed, Cox does not consider the variety of uses of multilateralism in politics as data. The very problem for Cox appears to be that the use of multilateralism is so often *political*: “the problem for multilateralism is to bridge distant entities and identities and to achieve a common perspective of reality that is not simply the imposition of a single hegemon or perspective,” (Cox 1997c, 253). To foreshadow, such a problem could instead be treated as an empirical starting point.

O'Brien et al. (2000) offer the concept *complex multilateralism*. This notion is related to Cox's new multilateralism as theoretical and empirical space is made for the involvement of civil society (see O'Brien et al. 2000, 4-6). These authors investigate the new relations among states, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. This produces an interesting vantage point, as the empirics are the activities of these non-state actors, but still not the uses of multilateralism. Explanation, if offered, remains in terms of costs and benefits. Cooper (2004) considers the Inter-American Democratic Charter a case of complex multilateralism, where the dynamic is not simply top-down (old state-centric multilateralism) or bottom-up (new civil society multilateralism), but a contentious meeting of political agendas. While also a useful piece, the empirics do not focus on the uses of multilateralism in the process. The analysis is specific to the interaction in the case itself, rather than the wider cultural conditioning of political entities to consider a mode of interaction appropriate or not through relations made in uses of particular terms. Explanation is concerned with when and how particular points were agreed upon in the negotiating process. While the political agendas of NGOs and states like the US and Canada were, at times, in conflict, the right of NGOs to be involved was apparently never contested. This is also an important finding. Is this result (and justification) accompanied by reference to

multilateralism? Is the use of multilateralism part of the causal account? These questions are left unattended.

Just as Cox does, each author's work in this cluster is an attempt to re-define multilateralism, or to substantiate a re-definition of multilateralism, rather than observing how this term is used by the practitioners it studies. Multilateralism itself remains outside the empirical focus because it has been attached to a particular condition ex ante. It remains an outcome descriptor, although a radically different one conceptualized by others in IR. This new conceptualization is treated as a settled matter. Explanation, if a goal at all, rests on interest-based accounts rather than the process through which multilateralism—the term itself—is made legitimate.

Cluster 3: Toward precision

In 1985, Susan Strange questioned how multilateral is multilateral economic diplomacy. This somewhat cynical push for precision as to what exactly multilateralism entails perhaps led to Keohane's article outlining a research agenda, and seems to be the inspiration for the two most theoretically interesting (and among the most cited) attempts in identifying the gaps in research on multilateralism: the contributions of Ruggie and Caporaso.

John Ruggie's (1992) response to Keohane begins with a more nuanced attempt at definition. For Ruggie, “multilateralism is an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of ‘generalized’ principles of conduct... without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist,” (Ruggie 1992, 571). Politics is not reducible to only self-regarding interests. He goes on state that this formulation entails a notion of “non-discrimination,” and corollaries of "indivisibility" and "diffuse reciprocity" (citing Keohane 1986 on the latter). These *qualitative* dimensions of the

institution “multilateralism” have identifiable effects. Data for Ruggie consists of primary and secondary accounts of diplomatic encounters in history (covering political and economic issues): “we can better understand the role of multilateral norms and institutions... by recovering the principled meanings of multilateralism from actual historical practice,” (Ruggie 1992, 567). The researcher “recovers” history with this definition of multilateralism in mind.

The explanatory goals are to show “how and why those principled meanings have come to be institutionalized... and... how and why they may perpetuate themselves today,” (Ruggie 1992, 567).[34] For Ruggie, the automaticity of efficiency gains by rational actors is challenged. Indeed, Ruggie argues that he knows, “no good explanation in the literature of why states should have wanted to complicate their lives,” (Ruggie 1992, 583) with the “move to institutions” in the early 20th century. Though the range of empirics is now exponentially broadened, how does the analytical recovery of multilateralism from historical practice help construct an explanation to the ambitious questions he poses?

Though it sounds intuitively different from the methodology described by Keohane, there are significant similarities. Ruggie has struck a distinction between multilateralism and other institutional forms, like imperialism or hegemony (Ruggie 1992, 571). Thus, a researcher still approaches multilateralism with particular characteristics, as outlined by Ruggie. She then looks for relatively similar instantiations as key trailheads for empirical research. What is explained is why states came to institutionalize a pre-defined form. Ruggie's emphasis on the *qualitative* dimensions of multilateralism suggests a variety of institutional types and sub-types, but that some forms are not *truly* multilateral. Though Ruggie is explicit that the process through which terms like multilateralism become understood is an important explanatory objective, his

[34] In a nutshell, my answer to Ruggie’s query would be: use + culture = institutionalization + perpetuation.

historical treatment overlays his conception of multilateral onto historical practice rather than digging through contemporaneous practices.

The clearest example in his 1992 piece is the arrangements for clearing and trade created by Germany in the 1930s. For Ruggie, these are "bilateralist" arrangements. They are nominally multilateral, but not qualitatively multilateral because they are discriminatory (Ruggie 1992, 568-569). These adjudications of what *really is* bilateral are of little help from the perspective of the research question this study is proposing. The fact that German officials like Walter Funk described the system as a "multilateral" one, employing a notion of "multilateral trade," makes it an instance that requires our attention to see what associations are used in order to make this argument possible.[35]

For Ruggie, the explanatory goal of accounting for a particular institutional form is pursued by examining the particular combination of the international systemic context and domestic political compatibility. This is the underpinning analytic when he suggests the post-war period as characterized by "*American* hegemony versus American *hegemony*," (see Ruggie 1992, 592-593, emphasis in original; Ruggie 1994 passim.). Yet, the process through which *American* hegemony is created is not explored.[36] While he employs normative elements (rules, norms, principles as in Finnemore 2005) that are critically important components to the explanatory story, evidence for why these particular instantiations are powerful in those contexts is not addressed (this stands somewhat in contrast to Ruggie 1982 on embedded liberalism).

Caporaso (1992, 601) makes his position clear on how IR has treated multilateralism as an object of study and as part of an analytical apparatus:

[35] For further details, see Chapter 4.
[36] Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002) do attempt to address issues of identity and multilateralism, but similarly do not consider the uses of "multilateral" as data.

> I am not arguing that multilateral activities and organizations have been ignored... My point is that multilateralism is not extensively employed as a theoretical category and that it is rarely used as an explanatory concept. Indeed, even in cases in which multilateralism provides the central conceptual focus, cooperation or institutions usually turn out to do the important theoretical work...

In his "search for foundations," Caporaso finds that IR has virtually ignored any rigorous examination of "multilateralism." While that is correct, Caporaso does not specify precisely how rigorous is understood. Does a rigorous examination of multilateralism conceive of its use as data? Indeed, Caporaso claims ignorance about the essence of multilateralism and then talks of interdependence, and the involvement of many countries. This relies on a background notion of multilateralism, which is something that can be empirically explored by investigating the use of the term itself. In this way, "multilateralism" as an empiric remains neglected.

At the same time, the explanatory goals that Caporaso (1992, 631-632) articulates suggest that such an empirical strategy might be helpful:

> ... [the] assumption that preferences are exogenously given reduces multilateralism to a question of strategic interaction, making it difficult to comprehend multilateralism propelled by collective beliefs, presumptive habits, and shared values. ... [Instead we] might understand the emergence of multilateralism as a product of the power, resources, beliefs of important actors and the reproduction of multilateral institutions in terms of organizational inertia, socialization to system norms, and adaptation to the "needs of the institution."

If we consider multilateralism to not be reduced to strategic interaction, and we shift our focus to its *emergence*, then we can pose research questions which explore how it is produced. Though Caporaso (1992, 602-603) suggests that multilateralism is a belief, or more interestingly, "ideology," he also recognizes that these conceptions have concrete practices attached to them (and vice versa):

> The institution of multilateralism may manifest itself in concrete organizations, but its significance cuts more deeply. The institution of multilateralism is grounded in and appeals to the less formal, less codified habits, practices, ideas, and norms of international society. Bilateralism, imperial hierarchy, and multilateralism are alternative conceptions of how the world might be organized; they are not just different types of

> concrete organization... [multilateralism] may be a belief both in the existential sense of a claim about how the world works and in the normative sense that things should be done in a particular way. As such, multilateralism is an ideology "designed" to promote multilateral activity.

Caporaso's turn at multilateralism is unique and provides an important pillar for this study's theoretical approach.

Ikenberry's (2001) more complex treatment of US-led order post 1945 blends institutionalism with constructivist notes. For example, Ikenberry (2001, 16-17) recognizes that institutions are "constructs," but their effective role is to provide states with information and realize mutual benefits. The institutional "stickiness" that is the interesting aspect of the work is dependent on bargaining situations, which focus on given interests. In this particular work, multilateralism remains a descriptor, rather than an empiric to be processually explained (e.g. Ikenberry 2001, 172-173). A later study on American multilateralism finds Ikenberry (2003) similarly disposed. However, in this piece he declares that we "are witnessing not an end to multilateralism but a struggle over its scope and character [in other words: what it means]," suggesting "varieties of multilateralism," (Ikenberry 2003, 534-536). Later, he again names "new multilateralism" in quotation marks, suggesting its rhetorical use, and questions its character (Ikenberry 2003, 544-545).

This is striking. Not since Caporaso, more than 10 years before, has it been suggested that multilateralism is not simply a description of conditions, but rather a locus of contestations. This conceptual move breaks away from the normal treatment of it as a static term for which IR should develop metrics and conduct correlational analysis. Such a locus of contestation can be examined, and this becomes a task for empirical research. The results can tell us something about the politics in a process of legitimation. Ikenberry's sentiment, I argue, compels scholars to unpack what this struggle—or politics—is about. It suggests that multilateralism does not have a

defined quality. Claims like these should put the empirical focus onto multilateralism as it is used in political life. If the kind of knowledge IR seeks is about the "struggle," it follows that we observe this phenomenon and see how it unfolds.

In a similar vein, I agree with Finnemore (2005) who writes that, "[c]urrent debates over use of force look less like a fight between unilateralism and multilateralism than a fight over what exactly multilateralism means and what the shared rules that govern use of force are (or should be)," (Finnemore 2005, 187). However, multilateralism is not her primary empirical target: it is treated as a "policy preference" explained by "fights over rules" (see also Wiseman 2005). "Features" are noted, qualitative dimensions identified, and claims are made for its legitimation, yet the empirics are captured by differing interpretations of rules, not multilateralism itself. Still, she (2005, 206) notes that:

> Treating multilateralism as some static set of behaviours and standing outside to judge what is, or is not, multilateral, risks missing these crucial political processes. The ability to redefine what is multilateral and the huge effort people spend in doing so is part of what makes the concept so powerful and interesting. Being better attuned to the dynamics of multilateralism can help us redirect our inquiries in more productive ways.

If all social constructs are dynamic, "products-in-process" (Wendt 1992), then one way to understand and explain how their power and attraction emerge is to analyze its circulation in a process of legitimation. This empirical task, Finnemore rightly notes, has not yet been carried out: "We need to understand what legitimacy claims are accepted, which ones fail, and why," (Finnemore 2005, 206).[37] This study addresses this explanatory gap through filling the empirical gap by studying actual, political uses of multilateralism. In this sense, there is a *variability* to

[37] The work of Alexander Wendt has made research about ideational factors acceptable in mainstream IR. Perhaps we are now ready to unpack these ideational factors (what I believe to be Finnemore's implication) to understand the politics involved in making particular ones viable and preferred over others.

available discursive practices because not all are available at each particular moment (Jackson 2006a). A particular web of them hang together to make a particular understanding "fit."[38]

Typifying the clusters into two categories: "definitional" (when) and "practical" (how)

The first three (1, 1.1, 2) clusters of research can be typified as employing a definitional approach to theory-building by seeking to determine when multilateralism happens through empirical testing. The key differences among these clusters are the definition of multilateralism employed and the selection of independent variables. Across these clusters, the explanatory approach is identical, as it relies on pre-defined sets of parameters for determining when multilateralism occurs. The fourth cluster (3) can be seen as a primarily theoretical move to open up the study of multilateralism to other approaches. In this sense, it may be aligned with IR constructivism in its broadest sense, paraphrasing philosopher Ian Hacking's well-cited book on social constructions (1999): "Multilateralism need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. Multilateralism, or as it is at present, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable."

Reflecting this broadly constructivist position, Newman, Thakur, and Tirman (2006, 1) state:

> The values and institutions of multilateralism are not ahistorical phenomena. They are created and maintained in the context of specific demands and challenges, and through specific forms of leadership, norms, and international power configurations. All of these factors evolve and change; there is little reason to believe that multilateral values or institutions could or should remain static in form and nature. ... Like any social construction, multilateralism is destined to evolve as a function of changing environmental [or structural] dynamics and [perhaps agentic] demands.

[38] The concept of variables might be useful to understand what were causally relevant in producing a particular history. That is, we can describe history possibly varying in particular moments (e.g. possible future A, B, C, etc.) because we can specify the alternatives posited in the data. See the discussion below.

These characterizations by Hacking and Newman, Thakur, and Tirman, question the absolute need for *definition* at the outset.

Some points should be made regarding the persistence of the definitional approach in IR and what it overlooks. First, most IR research appears to take *when X happens* as the essential question to answer for theory-building. “When” questions are deemed important and the use of temporal notions like onset, occurrence, timing, and duration to set up research designs is common. This appears to be true for studies that utilize either (and sometimes both) qualitative and quantitative data because focusing on when X happens (necessitating the use of particular temporal notions to actually answer that kind of question) seems to require a logic of causal inference reliant on constant conjunctions controlling for various factors. In short, these questions require two pre-defined conditions (say A and B) and then seek to account for the change from condition A to B at (temporal) points t1 and t2, by looking at other pre-defined factors (say C and D) which covary with A and B. The key goal is to identify and causally evaluate the *determinants* of X, accomplished by identifying when factors appear or disappear.

Even where the perspectives differ on even more fundamental concepts like time, a similar focus on when X happens still appears to motivate research. In his comparison of realism and constructivism, Copeland (2000, 205) astutely asserts that these two IR approaches conceive of time differently, though it is probably more precise to say that particular methodologies conceive of temporality in particular ways. Copeland discusses the distinction between Wendt's focus on structure as the coaction (interaction) of units, and a realist’s focus on structure as the potential for coaction. It reflects a fundamentally different conception of the role of time in international politics. For Wendt and other constructivists, it is the past that matters: how do interactions and gestures in historical processes socialize actors to accept certain conceptions of

self and other? Realists certainly do not dismiss the ways that past interaction shape current beliefs. However, realism is fundamentally a forward-looking theory: states are rational maximizers of their security over their foreseeable future (Copeland 2000).

However, contra Copeland, realism and constructivism may see temporality very similarly. There appears to remain a focus on when X happens, which results in answers based on one particular logic of inference. We know that in actual research defining variables and coding are never that simple in practice (an idea that goes as far back as, at least, Manley O. Hudson coding treaties in 1925). As some have pointed out, the end of civil war does not necessitate the onset of peace (e.g. Mac Ginty 2010). The researcher who is interested in producing an answer to a "when" question is forced to take positions regarding basic conceptual questions, such as: when does war "end" and when does peace "begin?" Often this is shaped by a move toward being pragmatic about research, but as a consequence, too little research explores the actual practice of the phenomena in question, how it happens, and how its effects are produced; even when the language of "causal mechanisms" is employed. Put simply, the methodological positions of realism and constructivism are identical if they conceive of temporal concepts to be used as dichotomous variables to correlate and answer the question concerning *when X happens*. Their difference would be in the selection of variables, not the theoretical apparatus.

This is not the only way to think about theory and research, and an over-emphasis of this approach creates and sustains gaps in our knowledge. Answers to *when multilateralism happens* are comprised of identifying factors as *determinants* in which we observe the presence of a pre-defined notion of multilateralism. Answers to this question start with definitions. This

definitional approach requires researchers to answer fundamental conceptual questions at the outset of the study rather than making conceptual inquiry the point of the exercise.[39]

In contrast, a practice-oriented approach would de-emphasize questions concerning when X happens and turn attention to *how X happens*. Put another way, rather than using cross-case covariation as the basis for explanation, one may develop and employ analytical concepts to examine and unpack political practices, and the relationships that these instantiate (e.g. Der Derian 1987; Jackson 2006a). For example, civil war, peacekeeping, and diplomacy are all conducted at a particular pace, and it is this understanding of pace, drawn from the culture and history of each of these political practices, which provides actors with resources to do politics and produce effects (Foucault 1977; see Rancatore 2009 for an application). From this perspective, we can posit propositions for research. An investigation into the practice of peacekeeping, the conduct of warfare, or the culture of politics that diplomacy constitutes, through the examination of particular cases using analytical concepts, may provide useful accounts of their effects.

Generating the "when" and "how" figures

Two articles published in the same year, both critiquing the English School, articulate the difference between the two research design approaches mentioned. Copeland (2003) asserts that there is a starting point; that, "almost all scholars in the 'big three' American paradigms – realism, liberalism, and constructivism – would agree upon: namely, that there are causal forces out there (power, domestic factors, shared ideas, and so on) that drive state behavior, and that our collective goal is to understand when and how these forces operate, and with what relative explanatory salience," (Copeland 2003, 428). His concern with the English School is that it is

[39] Obvious related argument in Koselleck (1985). See Chapter 3 for my discussion on this topic.

merely descriptive, contending that it is more concerned with conceptualizations (and other important “ground clearing” exercises) rather than falsifiable hypotheses. Regardless of “paradigm” (or substitute terms like school of thought or ontology), explaining politics necessitates an account for when X happens. For Copeland, such an account specifies variables of interest; “conditions” in which the theorist posits causal mechanisms that connect these factors, which lead to further testable hypotheses (Copeland 2003, 430, 440). This is illustrated in four steps (one “pre-theory” and the following three “methodology”) in the figure below.

researcher has interest in X	operationalizes X as a dependent variable	generates hypotheses (selects independent variables)	Conducts tests
pre-theory	*methodology*		

Figure 2. The definitional approach.

Neumann's critique of the English School is actually quite similar to Copeland's “descriptive” charge. In his article, Neumann argues that the English School has produced interesting assertions, but little substantiation of them (Neumann 2003, 357). Neumann does not discount the value of identifying when X happens (it forms the basis for any empirical observation; see also Cunningham and Tomes 2004), but in contrast to Copeland, his understanding of an account does not specify variables of interest. Instead, it attends to constitutive practices. Thus, when X happens is part of a different question: how X happens.

researcher has interest in X	generates proposition about the practice of X	writes observations for how X occurs when reviewing data	conducts prospective / retrospective practical analysis
pre-theory	*methodology*		

Figure 3. The practical approach. For an early statement on prospective-retrospective analysis, see Nexon 2001.

For each approach, the goal remains an explanatory account. Note that both begin with a research interest specified by the researcher, like civil war or diplomacy. The next three steps combine to form a methodological position, though the first has profound effects on the other steps because this task provides the basis for organizing the collection of data. For the next section, I will focus on this very step—defining variables and generating propositions—because this is where the paths diverge and where the defense of methodology generally occurs. I do this by way of examining two scholars who have emphasized definitions (in radically different ways) while studying multilateralism.

Sharpening the distinctions: Kreps and Kratochwil

The abstractions above permit a distinction between research designs. This distinction is not based on competition as competing paradigms, but rather on the kind of question that can be answered. To be clear, the claim here is not to say that with these I can now identify two clearly delineated sets of empirics that fit with the abstractions, like the common practice of fitting singular cases into categories or classes. Rather, the ideal-types above are used to help bring into relief the differences between research that adopts different methodological positions. In this case, the decision of which question to focus on has important consequences. If *when X happens* is the objective, then defining it with precision at the outset is essential.

Kreps' (2008) recent review of multilateral military interventions provides a useful illustration of the definitional approach. Kratochwil's (2006) chapter in an edited volume on multilateralism provides an illustration of the practical approach. In that piece, *how X happens* is the objective, and analysis is preceded by propositions that direct the organization and collection of data. In this section, I use the abstractions created above to review the logics working in these two pieces to illustrate differences in research design and products.

Kreps (2008) produces another useful review of the various ways in which multilateralism has been conceptualized in the IR literature. Like Ruggie (1992), she finds that the quantitative definition offered by Keohane (1990) leaves much to be desired (Kreps 2008, 577). Indeed, there appears to be consensus that this definition is not difficult to operationalize, but is limited in terms of what it can account for and explain (e.g. Corbetta and Dixon 2004). In her examination of Corbetta and Dixon (2004), she argues that a review of the cases in depth discloses inconsistencies in the coding of the data. For example, coding the Grenada invasion as "multilateral," "seems to miss the spirit of the term," (Kreps 2008, 577).

As coding is such an important part of the research design—improper coding skews results—Kreps turns to Ruggie's norms (1992) for guidance. However, the "indeterminate caveat" of Ruggie's approach, where he argues that the norms he identifies are formalized abstractions and may not fit empirical cases, however selected, is a serious problem for Kreps. It introduces "conceptual ambiguity," for empirical cases must conform to the defined variables in the same respects in order for proper coding and subsequent statistical work to be done. The researcher in the definitional approach must be precise and specific in developing coding criteria to minimize the possibility of alternate interpretations: "[by] leaving the door ajar for such interpretational latitude, almost any or no case could be considered multilateral," (Kreps 2008, 578).

A definitional approach must be free of such caveats, or the analysis will carry those flaws as well.[40] While Kreps (2008, 581) applauds Finnemore's (2003) attempt at greater precision, she criticizes this constructivist account for falling short because it does not seek to determine "ex ante what authorization or composition constitutes multilateralism." For Kreps, research is most useful and policy-relevant when they perform this task. I would add that this is

[40] As Singer (1965) argued, it is in the coding that the researcher must be "ingenious."

the point of being precise with definitions: to be able to achieve high levels of confidence through statistical analysis that the effects of particular factors on the dependent variable are not due to chance and can be relatively accounted for. Those statistical results are open to serious criticism if the coding is questioned, as Kreps (2008, 582-584) demonstrates in her comments on Corbetta and Dixon (2004). Indeed, her final point in critiquing Finnemore (2003) demonstrates how essential it is to eliminate variation of interpretation on coding: "[a] definition that rests on such subjective parameters of legitimacy is difficult to replicate and falsify, undermining its value in both theoretical and policy terms," (2008, 582). The implication is that multilateralism should be locked down to a set of characteristics that are essential to it.

This definitional approach has utility if the goal is to be able to say with some degree of statistical confidence *when X happens*. To reiterate, this is *not* the only point of departure for explanation and theory-building. Indeed, there is no logical incompatibility between the approaches in sharing those goals, though each approach understands itself as one way toward achieving them. If the goal is *how X happens*, the definitional approach, and its associated statistical analysis and essentialism, is not logically necessary. Recall, that much small-n comparative analysis that relies on qualitative data requires strict definitional work in order for its comparative logic of inference to remain coherent. We can even consider Kreps' intuition, or subjectivity, that led her to argue that coding the Grenada intervention as multilateral "misses the spirit of the term" as a starting point for an alternate avenue of inquiry.

How to understand the "spirit of a term" can be answered by an exploration of what it means. Instead of resorting to a definition, or constructing one's own operationalization at the outset of a study, another way to understand meaning is to examine how a term is used in practice. In this perspective, there is no logical need to take a position on what a term's essence is,

or is not. There is no need to specify a timeless definition. There is no need to quantify data for the purpose of using statistical analysis or use the same logic of causal inference for analyzing qualitative data.

In contrast, Kratochwil (2006) rigorously adheres to the proposition that multilateralism is a social construction. Rather than defining multilateralism at the outset of the study, as is the norm in what he calls "scientific" practice, he instead undertakes an interpretive exercise where the meaning of multilateralism is constructed through analyzing its historical usage and conditions where it was made to fit: "[t]he meaning of 'multilateralism' consists not so much in referring to objects existing in the outer world, as in its ability of linking to other practices that let us 'go on'," (Kratochwil 2006, 140-141). Kratochwil's urging of attending to the links multilateralism instantiates and to where "claims for a multilateralism are made" is instructive. He prefers use over definition; meaning over natural properties. This suggests that empirical focus shift to instantiations of "multilateralism." For Kratochwil, definitions do not fit uncontentiously: "nominal definitions relying on stipulations or on descriptive reference are problematic because they mistake the [rhetorical] term for a [analytical] concept," (Kratochwil 2006, 139). In his perspective, Kreps' treatment suffers from this criticism.

Instead of statistical analysis, one constructs explanations by "tracing and critically examining the extensions and analogies of this concept to a variety of practices throughout history," (Kratochwil 2006, 140). Instead of defining variables at the outset, one looks to claims to it and how those claims are settled and made. Where claims are made, propositions can be formed. If "multilateralism" is an ideal-typical analytical concept that is distinguished or recognizable by its relations to ideas and practices like "inclusivity" or "reciprocity," then it is these relations that form the resources that can be employed to legitimate it. "What is

multilateralism?" then becomes a guiding analytical question rather than a question for the research to definitively answer.

Kratochwil (2006) proposes that multilateralism was part of the politics of recognition. Therefore, the negotiation of "sovereignty" is a place to explore associations, arguments, and concepts that are made available later in uses of multilateralism. Another is the proposition that multilateralism is linked with the Concert system. Again, historical review should disclose how this link is made, what associations developed, and what logic makes them hang together in a seemingly natural way. He adds the Versailles treaty and the founding of the UN as instances where links to "multilateralism" are made, contested, and re-formed. Kratochwil's all too brief genealogy illustrates some ways in which a practical approach can manage thorny methodological issues that the definitional approach requires the researcher to awkwardly adjudicate.

Type	Methodological beginning	Value
Definitional	Define concepts / variables	Permits hypothesis-testing; allows an answer to *when multilateralism happens*
Practical	Generate propositions	Permits explanations of legitimacy; allows an answer to *how multilateralism happens*

Figure 4. Differing approaches to studying multilateralism.

The first difference between Kratochwil's approach and this study is to conceive of "multilateralism" as both a political term and an organizational-analytical one. This research design begins with the actual uses of the word itself in practice first. Then it identifies associations and disassociations through time, rather than ideal-typifying it first and looking for associations, variations, and discrepancies. In a sense, Kratochwil's approach is to dig for unseen

roots deep under the ground, while this approach pulls the plant up to inspect roots immediately near the surface.

Second, Kratochwil's treatment of state sovereignty as an ancestral relation to multilateralism makes sense ex post facto, but one wonders what entities did and said publicly in reflecting on this association in the historical process itself. Retaining the method of presenting examples and then naming them multilateral is not an example of contemporaneous use. While Kratochwil's sentiment is to give some weight to Ruggie's claim that multilateralism has always been with us (how sovereignty is part of the grammar of multilateralism), the apparent value of this strategy of argumentation is primarily to demonstrate its historicity. In those contexts, the empirics are not "claims to multilateralism" with usage of the term itself. They are references—lineages—for such claims. This study looks to these usages themselves, where we can observe historical traces in the associated arguments, to show the connections between these varied usages. The stretch of time for the study is then *in between* the expanse of genealogy and the micro-temporal analysis of a single case study.

One argument against the definitional approach

Different questions have different explanatory objectives. Determining these go hand-in-hand. Arising from these two decisions is research that necessarily provides particular kinds of answers. Der Derian (1987, 31) is useful to recall:

> ... while it is easy to understand the clamour for definitional rigor in the social sciences, there are good reasons for avoiding the intellectual rigor mortis which often accompanies it. Since our enquiry studies the transformations of diplomatic culture, I am not prepared to straitjacket the term with a narrow definition.

Because this study is interested in how multilateralism is used and the relations it creates, perpetuates, or dissolves, there is no reason to define it at the outset. Again to cite Der Derian (1987, 106, emphasis added), "[w]hat gives definition to a diplomatic system... is not the

structure itself, but the conflicting *relations* which maintain, reproduce, and sometimes transform it."

All theory remains partial, so we should not expect answers to when X happens to also answer how X happens. However, elevating one to be more important than the other does social science a disservice if the point of the enterprise is to produce knowledge about politics. In his classic statement of two-level games, Putnam notes that both "when" and "how" different analytical levels affect each other are both questions that should be of interest to research (1988, 427).

In taking the practical approach, we may adopt an agnostic position or attitude toward the ultimate adjudication of *multilateral-ness*. It follows that this approach sacrifices any claim to *really know* the multilateral-ness of particular activities and entities. Instead, it wagers a value in explaining what gets understood as "multilateral" through its use and relations, regardless of its particular characteristics or attributes. In this way, it side-steps the problem of conceptual stretching.[41] That is a significant part of the value-added for the line of inquiry suggested here.

But are there stronger reasons for moving focus away from when X happens besides simply for the sake of answering different questions and side-stepping conceptual stretching? Two concerns are worth mentioning. First, there should be a distinction between method and methodology so that the issue of *unit homogeneity* can be shown to be much more difficult to resolve. Statistical analysis is a method, whose coherence depends on an assumption of homogenous unit variance.[42] Kreps' critique of Corbetta and Dixon's coding sounds like a well-repeated call for unit homogeneity: "comparisons across tests of multilateralism are almost

[41] See Sartori 1970 for origins; Guzzini 2005 for perspective; and Kratochwil and Friedrich 2009 for why this might be acceptable for pragmatism.
[42] See Jackson 2008 for a related discussion; see Bennett and Elman 2006 for using typologies to sort which data can be used for particular analyses.

impossible because the arguments, results, or conclusions cannot be interpreted consistently across studies that use different and conflicting definitions of multilateralism," (Kreps 2008, 583; see also 601). This move provides Kreps the logic to call Ruggie's treatment one that "approaches the height of conceptual ambiguity," (Kreps 2008, 578). However, this is a position on methodology not method. Cross-case comparison, a methodology, does not require statistics, which is a method (and statistics—a method for analyzing data—does not require cross-case comparison as a methodology). Note that Kreps does not use statistical analysis, but the methodology employed, which Jackson (2011) has termed "neopositivism," posits the same requirements of units of analysis and comparative procedures.[43]

Moreover, those who are concerned with conceptual consistency and expend significant time and energy to repair concepts for cross-case comparison still have serious problems. Finnemore (2003, 9-10) gave up this task after her attempt to code wars and interventions across a long history of politics. She details the problem with applying a pre-defined notion of "intervention":

> One way an analyst might grapple with these ambiguities would be to come up with a reasonable definition, apply to the universe of potential interventions, and then ask questions about that class of events coded as "intervention"—with what do they correlate, and how do they vary in time, space, duration, and frequency? … Indeed, I began this project with precisely this aim… the definitions used [in the literature] are some variant on the following: military intervention is the deployment of military personnel across recognized boundaries for the purpose of determining the political authority structure in the target state… I quickly discovered, however, that the definition was much less helpful outside that historical period [Cold War-era]. It could not accommodate, for example, interventions aimed at debt collection… Conversely, when I tried to code intervention in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, I discovered that the participants recognized no such thing. There was plenty of military activity across borders to change rules in this period, but people called it war. Before the Napoleonic period, states were either at war or they were not; they had no notion of nor use for an intermediate concept like intervention, and distinguishing between war and intervention analytically in this period was impossible.

[43] Logically, one could define "multilateralism" five different ways and use statistical analysis. This may not utilize cross-case comparison, but could still be useful for explaining when multilateralism happens.

For reasons noted above, Kreps (2008) creates her own measure of multilateralism, which leads to a coding of the Haiti intervention of 5 on a 15-point scale, and places it in the category of "procedural multilateralism." At the same time, Kreps (2007) has previously called the operation "unilateral in multilateral clothing." Moreover, she states that sometimes countries carry out multilateral and unilateral policies simultaneously (Kreps 2008, 596). This is precisely her argument in her article on Haiti, that military and diplomatic channels operated unilaterally and multilaterally, respectively (Kreps 2007, 471). It is thus, not at all clear, which category the Haitian intervention belongs to. It is not hard to imagine that "procedurally multilateral" interventions could be coded as "operationally unilateral." For all of the criticism leveled at other scholars, it is not at all clear that Kreps has not violated her own call for conceptual clarity: to definitively sort cases neatly into analytical categories.[44] Note again, that even for scholars working with qualitative data and not applying statistical analysis, one must fit cases into classes via definitive characteristics so that cross-case comparison can occur.

This ambiguity and tension should not be shrugged off. Indeed, Kreps says as much stating that measuring multilateralism is challenging, and factors that render one intervention multilateral may not apply to another (Kreps 2008, 599-600). If this statement is taken seriously, what is the warrant for cross-case comparison with variables when they are admittedly not strictly uniform across cases? It is precisely this tension that provides a reason for researchers to move away from the practice of constructing definitions that are supposed to align with "reality" and then make "real cases" fit into our abstractions. In my view, the central methodological tool is not simply "I know it when I see it," as Kreps claims the alternative represents (see the

[44] See also Vucetic (2011) who, in his statistical study of the "Anglosphere," calls unit homogeneity and direct causation "heroic" assumptions of what I have termed the definitional approach.

discussion in Chapter 3). I do agree with Kreps that multilateralism is not undefinable, but, as she hints, its meaning is contextual, not essential.

The second concern that arises in using a definitional approach is consideration of the level of specificity for answering the question when X happens. As discussed above, the purpose of definition for many researchers is so that we can know ex ante when policies will be considered multilateral; in other words, prediction is the objective.[45] The level of specificity in predictive endeavors is a serious issue. Two points follow. First, the greater the specificity, the greater the strain on the research design to be coherent. As the first concern showed, coherence is an enormous challenge. Therefore the specificity of predictions should be, at minimum, severely qualified. Second, increasingly greater specificity in predictive endeavors using statistical analysis refers to a higher level of confidence in the correlation between variables. This specification might seem useful, however, it tells us very little about the process through which alternatives are discounted or why that predicted outcome was predictable in the first place.

The argument against definitions that I am making here recognizes that we actually have some established behavioral regularities in world politics. What we do not have are well-developed meso-level explanations of how these emerged. Again, note that this call against defining variables at the outset is not a call for "no definitions" or "no limits." Any research design has defined analytical tools to manage the tasks at hand (see the discussion in Chapter 3).

Discussion

While research continues to produce evidence that state cooperation is made by possible by multilateralism, and that multilateralism as a policy option is a legitimate form, this evidence is not an adequately sophisticated explanation for the emergence of multilateralism, how it was

[45] It seems to be the case that this cuts across traditional "IR approaches": liberals, critical theorists, realists, Marxists, etc.

made to fit various political contexts, or its continued circulation in contemporary politics. Moreover, if the emergence is reduced to the rationalist argument (the most developed tradition that investigates multilateralism), which is the realization of an aggregate of mutual interests, then multilateralism is simply a transmission belt and is epiphenomenal. Indeed, if the theoretical objective is to simply determine when outcomes are multilateral or not, there appears to be no logical need to study multilateralism itself as a political notion.

Unlike the definitional approach, I argue that we have reason to believe the political use of "multilateralism" is not epiphenomenal. This is the core wager of a practical approach, which directs our attention to the use of multilateral by a variety of actors during a variety of historical episodes. In this way, this study agrees with Keohane's recent (2006) work that the legitimacy of multilateralism was dependent on the less-than-appealing alternatives. This study seeks to explain why and how these alternatives were dismissed. The most direct way we can account for the dismissal of alternatives and privileging of a particular diplomatic path is to examine the discursive and practical elements of the diplomacy itself.

This review is important because how multilateralism is conceptualized in the research design (in terms of empirics or research ontology, analytical apparatus, and explanatory objectives) makes all difference. In the definitional approach, multilateralism is treated as a resulting condition. Consequently, the question of "what is multilateralism" can never be examined empirically; that is, examinations of its use in those episodes never occur. Instead, multilateralism is presumptively essentialized. The push for greater precision has led some in IR to unpack these kinds of presumptions concerning dominant concepts in the discipline.

In sum, this chapter has pointed out two gaps in our study of multilateralism; the first explanatory, the second empirical. First, if "norms and institutions" matter (as Ruggie 1992

asserts) and “multilateralism” is not reduced to a question of strategic interaction (as Caporaso 1992 asserts) the process through which multilateralism is legitimated becomes an important explanatory objective. The review has demonstrated that we are left with much unanswered as to precisely how multilateralism becomes so obviously appropriate in world politics, how this concept was developed and sustained. Multilateralism, describing institutions and action as such, fits because it was appropriate, but what is left unexplained is how this particular notion became so—versus other possibilities. What is missing is a study of the process through which multilateralism is made to fit. The use of aggregated interests to explain politics has no need to make processes objects of inquiry. This leaves us in the dark as to whether the way in which those processes happen actually makes a difference in the outcomes. This study wagers that it does. In doing so, we can avoid overestimating the causal power of aggregated interests.

Second, one way to address the theoretical gap I identify is to seriously conceive of multilateralism as a product-in-process. This practical approach then considers its use as untapped empirical terrain to explore. Through an examination of the actual, political uses of multilateralism and its grammatical variants, I construct an explanation of how this process occurs, which in turn makes multilateral types possible.

Put another way, in various instances, the term “multilateral” is used in reporting and arguing over policy. These “negotiations” occur privately, in diplomatic cables, and publicly in public diplomacy and mass media. These negotiations provide this study with a way to account for (1) the identification of “multilateral” being attached to a policy option, and (2) what relations are associated with it that produce its legitimacy at different moments in time. The research task is to understand how these logics resonated with the political problems they were meant to solve, and defeated other logics, across various historical cases. It is the legitimation of

multilateralism in these historical cases that make possible its political currency, and not anything to do with how essentially "democratic" it is (contra Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik 2008).

I conclude this chapter with two points to summarize. First, here are the questions that motivate this research:

Without resorting to general explanations such as structure, interests, norms, or culture, why is "multilateral" used in politics? How is it made to fit various political contexts?

Second, in my review of the literature, I found no answer with the precision I have sought. Nearly all relied on some essentialized, or pre-defined, notion of what multilateralism meant. Nor, did I find any research, with one exception (Kratochwil 2006), that seriously adopted an approach that sought to investigate how the term was used in politics. This study next articulates a detailed methodology to address these gaps in our knowledge.

CHAPTER 3

STUDYING "MULTILATERALISM"

Introducing the methodology and methods: a setup in five parts

In observing contemporary politics, one notices that "multilateralism" is used by many political entities to achieve their goals. As a result, scholars believe it to be a topic worthy of study for IR. Finnemore has asserted that intervention must be multilateral to be legitimate (see Finnemore 2003, 53, 73-75, 78). Denemark and Hoffman (2008, 194) broadly state that "[p]olitics as usual" is multilateral. However, it was not always this way (Ruggie 1992). Therefore, if the question "how is multilateralism used?" is deemed important, then we should study the processes through which this term and its related practices are rendered acceptable and logical. This results in knowledge about how authority and credibility are produced.

This section on methodology and methods[46] will attempt to make clear how knowledge will be produced from this study. It describes, justifies, and defends what will be used to examine empirical material. To be clear, this study has no intention of resolving or justifying any normative agenda or ethical dilemma. Rather the goal is analytical: this study investigates "how multilateralism is used" to construct an explanation for "how multilateralism is legitimated." So, if the gaps laid out in the previous section are accepted, what methodology would ground a study of multilateralism that addresses these?

Jackson's (2006a, 42fn50) notion of a pragmatic standard is a useful guide for what this study's objectives are. It situates the researcher both as cognizant and aware of previous research and knowledge, yet also differentiating a study within the established literature of the discipline:

> Does my account generate insights about the empirical situation... that solve the problems associated with other accounts... in such a way that it consistently fulfills its declared social-theoretical goals?

[46] See Rancatore 2010 for some preliminary thoughts on this distinction.

This pragmatic standard is adopted here. So far, this study has identified empirical and explanatory gaps in the literature (see Chapter 2). Now, it specifies how this study's theoretical approach permits those gaps to be addressed, before providing an analytical narrative for the purpose of explanation that remains coherent to the philosophical decisions made. Specifically, I offer the inter-related categories of mode of inquiry, empirics, research methods, analytical tools, and explanatory results. Within these categories are concepts, understood as tools that are used in the study to construct explanations. This section discusses these in that order.

Mode of inquiry: contingent use

Discussing the mode of inquiry provides an answer to the question: what is the research interested in analytically disclosing? This study is interested in investigating usage to locate contingency, in other words: to identify previous uses that make subsequent uses possible. Other modes of inquiry might include: correlative relationships between variables (descriptive inference) and necessary and sufficient causality (causal inference, as in King, Keohane, and Verba 1994) or understanding/explaining (Hollis and Smith 1996). More specifically, I want to articulate and defend (a) what kinds of relationships are identified (in doing so, discuss how they are conceptualized), and (b) why they are important.

Seeking to locate contingency in use is not the standard mode of inquiry in IR. Indeed, the main debate is over notions of causes—causation—causal inference—causal mechanisms—causal theorizing, is ‘constitution’ also ‘causal’, etc. (see e.g. Adler 1997; Wendt 1998; Jackson 2006a). To be clear, this study takes the position that debates over what is *really* causal are disciplinary maneuvers to discredit particular research as “un-scientific.” Wendt himself insinuates this much (1998, 116):

> Although the resurgence of these [disciplinary] wars in the 1980s and 90s is due in large part to the rise of post-positivism, its roots lie in the epistemological anxiety of positivists,

> who since the 1950s have been very concerned to establish the authority of their work as Science... [the] implementation has been marred by an overly narrow conception of science as being concerned only with causal questions that can be answered using the methods of natural science. The effect has been to marginalize historical and interpretive work that does not fit this mould...

Rather than recount this debate, a pragmatic position concerning *explanation* is offered to circumvent taking sides in the argument, and keep a focus on the task of knowledge production. What is important is that social science seeks to explain and this need not be a necessary and sufficient kind of explanation.[47]

In some sense, we know the causes of social phenomenon, what Pouliot (2007; relying on Searle 1995) calls "collective intentionality." When I purchase an espresso at the university coffee shop, I pay with some metal coins. Everyone involved in that exchange intersubjectively agrees that the coins have value equal to one espresso, as fixed by the price determined by the coffee shop. That such a phenomenon occurs with absolutely no contestation is attributed to our collective intentionality. Thus, one might answer "collective intentionality" to almost any question explaining social interaction, but it would not be useful in understanding how it became so: why did it happen that particular way, and not otherwise? In order to gain that precision, one then goes down the explanatory scale. Like a notion of interest in politics, collective intentionality is a very broad explanation. More specific explanations may be limited by their applicability, yet they are more precise for specific instances.

So, explanations cut in at different levels and from different conceptual perspectives. The key characteristics of explanations should be the explicit articulations of their limitations and scope within the context of research conducted by a community of scholars. In those dimensions, explanations can be compared in terms of their analytical payoffs. In this sense, as researchers,

[47] Among others, Hansen (2006) and Jackson (2006a) are more clear than Wendt on an important matter: IR researchers should not make causal claims of the necessary-and-sufficient kind.

we should provide a multitude of explanatory accounts, not once-and-for-all projects, to see what their use is in understanding how politics works (perhaps as “explanatory potentials” Wendt 1998, 117, or the aforementioned situated pragmatic standards in Jackson 2006a). To be clear, any useful social science explanation offers a notion of why X occurred. Moreover, we should be producing accounts of phenomena that are not reliant on a random configuration (even though chance plays some role in particular configurations).

I suspect then that political analysis requires digging into a complex mass of data, including but not limited to: people, ideas, words, action, and culture. The key notion I employ to cut into this mass is *contingent use*, by which I mean a focus on not only the use of particular language and activity for the purpose of legitimating a way of doing politics, but also how that use is related to previous historical instantiations. This notion takes seriously that a mass of factors produce politics: specific individuals, situated within a particular context, using words, and performing action. Thus, the kind of contingent relationships include: concept-concept, concept-action, and action-action. Taking the example of purchasing espresso at the university cafe above, I illustrate these relational types in the figure below.

Type of relation	Concept	Concept	Action	Action
Concept-concept	“Ordering”	“Money”		
Concept-action	“Ordering”		As I approach the counter, I say “single long, please.”	
Action-action			As I approach the counter, I say “single long, please.”	Cashier writes “1 x” on a post-it and sticks it to the cup.

Figure 5. Illustrations of types of relations sought concerning concepts and actions.

As the above figure illustrates, use is not random, use is circumstantial, relying on history and previous practice to make the present. These are important because it is these links in the present that make possible our making sense of them as they happen; our ability to process them as part of political life/history (Jackson 2006b). Finally, it is an advantage to focus on use because it is observable. One can make concrete observations, which can then be analyzed—and defended against allegations of bias and criticism of imaginary or contrived data.[48]

The consequence of adopting contingent use as a mode of inquiry is a rejection of an essence of multilateralism (a common move in constitutive theorizing, Wendt 1998, 112; see also Jackson 2006a; Bevir and Kedar 2008). Whatever multilateralism means hinges on its history of uses. This history is not necessarily teleological, nor must it be linear. From this methodological stance, the researcher must look and, in a sense, create contingency. Simply put, this is the work of empirical analysis. As Jackson puts it, in each instance, the researcher "delineates the [discursive-practical] resources available," (Jackson 2006a: 37). In this study, the mode of inquiry produces an analytical narrative, where the researcher has drawn in the lines of relation, and highlighted the contingency at a "low" level of specific language and action. These lines and highlights are assembled to demonstrate and explain how the conclusions of each episode are made possible. Thus, contingency permits a reading of the historical relations between different instantiations of political concepts and activities. This mapping of relations, a genealogy, gives form to an explanation of why the present is as it is and not otherwise. The challenge can then made to the community: how else is the present possible? The empirical

[48] Yes, concepts and actions (in particular) do not happen in a vacuum outside of space and time. For the diplomacy I am examining, particularly the time period 1919-1960, I would argue that the important relationships have more to do with the linking of concepts with each other and with actions, than variation in space and time. Certainly there are no concepts to use or political actions without space and time, and I am certainly open to studies that more explicitly focus on spatial-temporal aspects.

trailhead identified above concerns political entities engaging in discursive practices. We can and should ask: how else could the present be accounted for?

This discussion of the mode of inquiry is important because it links the research question with an analytical objective. Research is guided by the researcher's identification of contingency, of related language and practice through historical episodes. The following discussion on how empirics are understood as *discursive practices* further clarifies the theoretical approach grounding this study.

Empirics: discursive practices

Data collection is an important (and constitutive) part of social science. What constitutes data and, moreover, what constitutes good data, remains the subject of a still-simmering debate, still largely if uneasily, drawn as proponents of qualitative and quantitative data.

All researchers are confronted with this common problem: how do we organize data in a way that makes explanation possible, whether the empirics are discursive practices, norms, inter-state war, or missing women and children. Because we often also ask, “how does this fit with my research question?” this is a methodological-philosophical position. It is not simply borne out of empirics, as it grounds and defends what is to be observed (leading to data collection).

This is critical because once this decision is taken, we then consider data collection a fairly straightforward process, whether one is conducting surveys, fieldwork, or archival research. There are standard procedures for data collection in different research traditions, and so long as researchers adhere to them, we believe their data will be good enough to do analysis, whether statistical inference, constitutive theorizing, or deconstruction. Indeed, this is often what makes a finding distinctive. However, I should point out that this understanding of data collection is deceptive. It re-circulates the idea that the data is “out there” to be collected; rather than included

in the process, where the researcher interprets what might be called facts, and turns them into useful data for analysis. We should ask for the warrant for conceptualizing data one way versus another and what the payoffs might be.

Turning to multilateralism, how has data been conceptualized? Keohane (1990, 741), suggests that the "numbers, budgets, memberships, and scope of activity of international organizations provide plausible measures of institutional multilateralism." In that article, he implies that “data-making” is not the problem, that these measures for multilateralism are, at least, adequate for analysis. The data is out there, ready to be picked. We know what useful data is. This methodological position makes possible: "systematic comparative analysis... such analysis could benefit from using sophisticated quantitative methods more often than it does now," (Keohane 1990, 764).

Like research on institutions and in IR in general, current practice tends to gloss over how “data is made” and leap to the task of collection. In discussing the future of research on international institutions, Martin and Simmons (1998) claim that the question of whether or not institutions matter (theory) has obscured more “interesting and productive” research projects. These are to be tackled through “better questions” and “empirical testing” (Martin and Simmons 1998, 730). This subtle bracketing of how data is conceptualized, and made from facts, is also evident in Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner (1998):

> The specific approach that scholars choose to follow in their work will depend on whether they are principally committed to advancing a theoretical viewpoint or to solving specific empirical problems, their own analytical predispositions, their methodological tools, the data to which they have access, the resources at their disposal, and the values they hold.

Hafner-Burton, von Stein, and Gartzke (2008), writing on international organization (IO) research, state that empirical studies have not kept pace with the theoretical development. They advocate systematic large-N hypothesis testing. “Meager” data was a problem (Hafner-Burton,

von Stein, and Gartzke 2008, 177). Though they mention that early statistical research on IOs included “rudimentary” coding, no more is said about data-making. Instead, “data collection on IOs is hard.” Systematically unpacking these difficulties has, thus far, not been the subject of rigorous discussion. Instead, researchers continue to generate data, especially data that is considered original, and thus of great disciplinary value, see what results, and then evaluate.

It is worth recalling J. David Singer who states: “the discipline is confronted with some difficult choices on the data-making front. Each of us must decide--not once, but often--which research strategies to adopt as each new study is contemplated,” (Singer 1965, 79). It is the researcher who takes “facts” and then “makes data.” In IR, Singer argues that “we have gone along for decades, in both the empirical and the theoretical vineyards, under the illusion that our digging in the former was contributing to a fine vintage in the latter,” (Singer 1965, 69). Taking the data-making admonition seriously requires extensive methodological explication of the data-making process. To be sure, there is great variation to this practice. Perhaps most often, we observe appendixes on data-making, such as in Denemark and Hoffman's (2008) study on multilateral treaties. As noted in the literature review above, I have found very little data-making for the purpose of studying the uses of multilateralism.

Moreover, if the role of the researcher in the data-making process recognized, the methodological consequences are hardly ever a subject of reflection. Denemark and Hoffman discuss their work in making the dataset, referring to consensus-building, including the graduate student in charge of the dataset and undergraduate student coders. The consequence of such “distortion” (as Singer might say) is that the researcher is situated within the data, not in some detached or distant position to the data “out there,” but is intimately involved in the construction of data. Jackson (2008b) stresses this point his critique of Van Belle. In his view, the analogy of

IR to paleontology, that data is "found rather than made" (Jackson 2008b, 101) is rather tenuous. To illustrate this, he suggests, and I agree, that one can stumble onto fossils, but not democracy (Jackson 2008b, 101).

Since the conceptualization of empirics has consequences on research, and having said that contingent use is the mode of inquiry, how can one conceive of empirics that allows for the identification of contingency? What counts as data? This study employs the concept of *discursive practices* in examining political activity. In doing so, this study takes the position that language and action operate in tandem and are always subject to cultural-historical contexts (Neumann 2002). Often in IR complaints emerge about a particular logic or model not bearing out "in practice" (e.g. Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik 2008; and in development economics, Rodrik 1996). It appears entirely appropriate, then, to turn our empirical focus to discursive practices.

Toward Neumann's 2002 model: discursive practices in IR

Here, I want to accomplish two tasks. The first is to attend to how IR research has experimented with the concept of discursive practices in previous studies. The second is present and defend the adoption of Neumann's (2002) conceptualization.

In the literature on diplomacy, we hardly ever observe research that employs the concept of discursive practices for analysis. James Der Derian's *On Diplomacy* (1987, 4) is an exception, as he describes the study as "an interpretation of how the power of diplomacy... constituted and was sustained by discursive practice, the diplomatic culture." Inspired by Foucault, that genealogy focuses on the language and practices of diplomats to mediate their mutual estrangement in different diplomatic "paradigms." In commenting on this work, Neumann uses a long quotation to illustrate how: "diplomacy, seen as a social practice, must be studied alongside

other social practices of the everyday life of its bearers," (Neumann 2003, 359). Thus, a first key point when using discursive practices is attention to the context in which diplomacy occurs at the micro- (among diplomats) and macro- (society in which diplomats live) levels.

Another early attempt at specifying what a discursive practices approach looks like can be seen in Shapiro, Bonham, and Heradstveit (1988). Also drawing on Foucault, they assert that "what is concretely understood on a given occasion is the result of the historically specific dominance of certain discursive practices," (1988, 399). These practices are particular understandings in circulation (also called "idea chains" 400-401) among a particular community. Implied is that circulation requires some kind of activity or "practice." Later, Shapiro (1992b) goes on to concretize "discourse" as involving "language practices" (suggesting his preferred conceptual articulation) in his discussion of "places" in medieval history. Each place together constituted a hierarchy; each had a function in everyday life (such as the "sacred place"). This "concern for the real life of men"—or this everyday-ness'—links language and practice, along with a history of temporality, culture, and political relations. These elements make possible analysis of discursive practices that is not simply "observe everything."

Doty (1993) builds a "Discursive Practices Approach", arguing that discursive practices are not traceable to "a fixed and stable center." Instruments do not always do what they are intended to; or even with intention, the result is not always intended. Instead, they are productions of subjects and worlds (1993, 302; in-step with the social constructivist tenet that social facts are products-in-process). They require work.[49]

The warrant for why language and action should be analyzed together does not simply rest on the idea that they appear to be inextricably involved with one another or that something is

[49] This is the sentiment in Weldes 1996, Laffey and Weldes 1997, Pouliot (2008), and Adler and Pouliot's edited volume (2011).

lost if not analyzed together, but also because they make no sense at all apart from each other (Wittgenstein 1953). Too strict of an analytical separation limits the possible options created for future interaction. This hampers the capacity of IR to lay out the contending options and study how contenders were marginalized. Several scholars follow Wittgenstein's understanding of language-in-use for political analysis in IR: Fierke (2002), Neumann (2002), and Hansen (2006) among others. As much as one can, Wittgenstein's (1953, 65-66) imperative 'don't think, but look'[50] is taken to heart when examining discursive practices in this study:

> Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on... To repeat: don't think, but look! -- ... And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities... I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances"...

These *resemblances* (and the contrasts between notions) observed in the politics, read from diplomatic cables and mass media articles, are the notable relational aspects that tie discourse and practice together in this analysis. Moreover, these resemblances are familial such that they are derivations from previous use, if not exactly the same. To be certain, the notion of *speaking as doing* is appreciated,[51] and there is no quarrel with how discursive practices should more precisely be called “discursive-practices.” This study's methodological goal is to never lose sight of that coupling. Arguments operate, or circulate, in tandem with practice. They both (a) make it possible for entities to make sense of their context, and (b) potentially discipline those entities to see particular discursive practices as normal, in a self-reinforcing, cultural manner through repetition. Capturing all of this parsimoniously is precisely what makes Neumann's (2002) simple circuit is useful.

[50] Also see Hopf (2010), which highlights the research in cognitive neuroscience that suggests people actually often 'do' without 'thought'.

[51] This also suggests an explanation for why two different social theoretical concepts: Foucault-inspired 'discursive practices' and Habermas-inspired 'speech-acts' have been so widely employed and debated over.

In IR, Neumann's research has sought to re-iterate the importance of concrete (observable) practices in providing explanatory accounts of politics, in particular the organization and life of foreign ministries and diplomats (Neumann 2005; 2007). As he (2002, 627) states:

> Wittgenstein and Foucault, both went about this [discourse analysis] by focussing on language in use—on discursive practices. Their followers in IR, however, have not always been as diligent in foregrounding the aspect of practice.

To be clear, the use of "practice" by Neumann is never meant, and it is not meant here, to marginalize the role of language in social life. I agree with Neumann (2002, 628) that:

> ... what is at stake is not the question of whether anything exists 'outside of' language. Practices are discursive, both in the sense that some practices involve speech acts (acts which in themselves gesture outside of narrative), and in the sense that practice cannot be thought 'outside of' discourse.



Figure 6. Reproduction of Neumann's (2002, 632) circuit of discourse, practice, and culture.

In this figure, Neumann follows Bartleson (1995) in taking "discourse" to simply be "a system for the formation of statements," and follows Barnes (2001) in conceiving practices as "socially recognized forms of activity, done on the basis of what members learn from others, and capable of being done well or badly, correctly or incorrectly," (Neumann 2002, 630-631). With these simplified terms, he asserts that aggregation should permit a reading of "culture": "if discourse refers to preconditions for action and practice to socialised patterns of action, then both should add up to a concept of culture," (Neumann 2002, 631).

The circuit and methodological explication by Neumann is useful because it illustrates the relationships amongst the basic concepts. On the one hand, language and practice are connected (following Wittgenstein), yet analytically distinguishable for the purpose of data

collection. On the other hand, these form the resources from which culture is continuously under production. However, I prefer to de-emphasize the "adding up" of discourse and practice to culture, because it is probably useful enough to think of language and practices as cultural. The focus on culture is logical and useful, as it is through cultural products that propriety is understood. This reduces the temptation for conceptual hierarchy, and re-focuses our exploration to the pragmatic use of concepts for explanation. Just as language and practice are interwoven to create social fabric, their historicity makes their instantiations discursive cultural products. The capacity to catch up all these elements (language, practice, historicity, culture) with the term *discursive practice* is precisely why it makes for a useful way to organize the empirics.

To reiterate, "discursive" should not be simply thought of as an adjective to "practice," as if one has primacy over the other.[52] Conceptual hierarchy makes a difference because one would direct attention at the expense of the other. Instead, this study seeks to show how they work *in tandem* during processes of legitimation. Discursive practice refers to combinations and associations of conversation, convention, and language always operating in a particular context in tandem with particular actions. "Discursive" also refers to the contingency of the present, permitting the use of a similarly disposed genealogical method. This recovers how histories are connected, and this is part of any explanation of the present. It is not necessarily linear or teleological, but woven from varied, yet specific and particular, resources.

A genealogical method, which is elaborated below, permits an account of the past that retrospectively identifies closures *and* contemporaneous prospective paths. That is, it is not

[52] Interestingly, the same was said for "socially structured practices," see Wendt 1989, 109. He (Wendt 1992, 413) also refers to practice as the sufficient cause for concepts in IR, and even goes so far as to connect norms and practices as ontologically inseparable: "[s]overeignty norms are now so taken for granted, so natural, that it is easy to overlook the extent to which they are both presupposed by and an ongoing artifact of practice... The sovereign state is an ongoing accomplishment of practice, not a once-and-for-all creation of norms that somehow exist apart from practice."

simply the repetition of an action to lock-in future instantiations, but repetition conducted a particular way to legitimate one way and marginalize another in particular contexts. “Practice” then also refers to this historicity, as if a model can be set forth as a precedent to be re-shaped for the future. The term is also conventionally used in reference to an activity, whether with a piano or among diplomats. Shifting attention to practice means an attention to not only the speech and action of public debates, but their conduct and context. These aspects are important because they permit investigation of “language in use” to be carried out with greater specificity and makes the inherent complexity of social action more manageable.

Given the concept of discursive practice articulated here, there are anticipated challenges. Since language and practice are moment-to-moment instantiations of life, how does one cut into the enormous amount of potentially useful data? Where are boundaries for the empirics since it is intended to be able to soak up so many elements?

This investigation began by interrogating the present (see snapshot analysis in Chapter 1). The use of multilateralism and its related grammatical forms during the course of practicing world politics (taking on specific diplomatic tasks like holding conferences, treaty-making, cable-writing, negotiation, etc.), in particular the public and private remarks of heads of states, heads of international organizations, and other diplomats, are used as a starting point for gathering data. This suggests that sources of material to be read and interpreted include information departments of governments and international organizations as well as diplomatic memoirs. Once data collection begins, references to other discursive practices can be identified, and lines of relation drawn to 'flesh out' the bundle of discursive practices that makes a claim to legitimate politics. This is the value of using this concept to organize the empirics. It permits

creative, yet logical, linkages between various pieces of language, action, entities, cultures, and histories that were perhaps not identified before.

To give this study a starting point (one of many possibilities), I start with usage of the word. This is in contrast to more wide-ranging perspectives, like Ruggie (1992, 567, 576) who is clear in stating that multilateralism has always been a part of modern international life and illustrates this with the phenomenon of the powerful example of the residential embassy. In this study, though, Ruggie's example is excluded because these ambassadors *did not refer* to the practice or norm of permanent diplomatic representation abroad as a *multilateral* one. To be sure, if one were to build a far-reaching enough genealogy, I suspect that they would be distant relations. Perhaps, the same can be said of Folke Hilgerdt's suggestion that "multilateral transactions probably began as soon as trade developed beyond the stage of primitive barter," (Hilgerdt 1943, 397). My point is to look at how the term itself was used, and how it and the actions that became associated with it became imbued with recognizable legitimacy. This is why the usage of the term at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 is the starting point for this study.[53]

Analytical tools: legitimation processes, the researcher

How does one conduct analysis given this the mode of inquiry and empirics described? What abstractions or instruments will be used to analyze the data?

First, I utilize the concept of a process of legitimation. This captures conflicts over "what to do" that are embedded in diplomacy in the 20th century in a multi-episode perspective. What we observe then, I offer, are series of discursive practices whereby political entities use

[53] In international law, the term "multilateral" was used before 1919 to describe the character of a treaty. For example, see Briggs (1906) on copyright law and the 1886 Berne Convention, especially p. 232-233, as well as the discussion in Chapter 4.

“multilateralism” and its related lexicon to instantiate a particular vision of politics and particular political activity.

Processual theorization has long been a staple notion of IR social constructivism: to say that anything is socially constructed is to say that it is a product of social processes (Wendt 1992); what have been called social facts not reducible to individuals (e.g. Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; see also Adler 1997; Jackson and Nexon 1999). Processes, by definition, are about *how* things happen. Indeed, often these kinds of questions are answered by examining a process. From this approach, a variety of processes (which are useful because they are directed toward how politics occurs) can be employed, such as collective identity formation or norm dynamics. Processes permit the historical, cultural, linguistic, and practical (all elements of discursive practice) to all fit in the frame.

One process that has been highlighted in the literature is that of legitimation (see the discussion in Hurd 1999; Finnemore 2005; Goddard 2006; Thompson 2006; Jackson 2006a). This particular process serves as a tool to organize analysis. Any number of commonplaces can be studied using this analytical tool, such as globalization, security, human rights, or the West (Jackson 2006a), not to mention the focus of this study: multilateralism. Often IR assumes that legitimacy is an automatic property of an entity. Frequently, multilateral institutions, so long as they are transparent, accountable, representative and/or apolitical, are deemed to be self-evidently legitimate (e.g. Rodrik 1995; Finnemore 1996, 2003; Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik 2008; see the discussion in Hurd 1999; Jackson 2006a, 19-20; Goddard 2006). What distinguishes this study from the usual treatment of legitimacy is an investigation into how it is made; not what factors are also present.

Warrant for this treatment is defensible when considering the statements of Alexander Thompson and Stacie Goddard. In his research on IOs, Thompson (2006, 4) states that "while there is a virtual consensus that this legitimation effect [of IOs on states] matters, the term [legitimacy] is used loosely, and there is no clear theoretical understanding of how it occurs." Indeed, Goddard has to present a theory of legitimacy based on relationalism, or positionality, to explain how territory becomes indivisible for particular populations. This is necessary because, as Goddard mentions, "what makes any particular claim legitimate is difficult to conceptualize," 2006, 40). Both of these indicate a reason to shift focus on process and combinations of language and action. This moves away from adjudication debates and toward theoretical precision about how politics happens and its effects. Whether or not multilateralism attains any ultimate or transcendental legitimacy is not the goal. It is considered a foundational assumption that the use of multilateralism is part of struggles over authority and resources (i.e. politics) and that this is enough to treat it as (intentionally or not)[54] having value in that context (at least, for the speaker).

This focus on use entails an incompatibility with an essentialist theoretical approach (e.g. that a property of a state's collective identity is legitimate). It is philosophically incoherent (and quite possibly empirically problematic) if our basis for making this claim is simply the corresponding presence of both concepts (see also Vucetic 2011). If one posits that things like a community's collective identity may lose legitimacy, then it is not an essential property. Alternatively, we could suggest that legitimacy is socially constructed—actors build and maintain shared ideas; that is, they produce legitimacy (see Goddard 2006).

To investigate how legitimacy is produced processually, this approach entails either a study of actor motivation—a reading of *true intentions*—or actors *being* in the world (observing

[54] Certain entities may employ it as part of rule-based behavior, while others may employ it to create new pathways of action.

what entities are saying and doing in particular contexts). Jackson (2006a) follows Weber in side-stepping motivation and adopts the latter; at least, in understanding *motive* not as the propellant but rather as "a complex of meaning," (Jackson 2006a, 23). Hurd (1999) chooses an approach that relies on the former. Although he recognizes the problem of *knowing* motivations, calling none of the methods compelling because they are not “really falsifiable” (see Hurd 1999, 392), Hurd argues that the move to rhetoric is untenable as rhetoric contains "all the distortions we expect of public statements," (Hurd 1999, 382, 390-391).

If we think that rhetoric distorts reality, and some other language system can precisely capture it, then this argument holds. However, I have argued above that there are reasons for thinking that rhetoric, like discourse, are not just words, but are constitutive of social reality and ontologically inseparable from practice (e.g. Wittgenstein 1953). Moreover, we have reason for thinking that all description, all accounts, regardless of claims to be un-rhetorical, are necessarily interpretations of that reality. It is that person’s account; not a complete or entirely undistorted picture (if that is even fathomable; see also Geertz 1973). Therefore, I argue that claiming an undistorted picture of reality based on triangulating real intentions that remain the perspective of the researcher is still a shaky wager.[55] A pragmatic, perspectival approach that does not rely on unobservables recognizes that all views are indeed from somewhere (cf. Jervis 2005; Kratochwil 2000), and dissolves the need to distinguish between what is real and what is rhetorical. Jackson (2006a, 24) suggests that since we cannot adjudicate the ultimate intentions of others, it is methodologically safer to confine ourselves to empirics we can observe (something of a positivism at work because of the privileging of the empirical; see also Jackson 2011). What I

[55] A similar 'anxiety' about certainty and clarity is the compelling reason why the security dilemma is a dilemma at all (see Herz 1950).

suggest is that others should offer their empirics using different theoretical tools so that the practice of IR theory (and social science, in general) can go on.

The key phenomenon to explain and analyze is this series of uses, or as this study conceptualizes them, discursive practices, that instantiate a particular political notion and associated action. This is an enduring question in contemporary political science, as Finnemore (2005) points out that we "want to know" why particular claims to legitimacy succeed, while others fails. Why is politics acceptable one way, but not the other, even when the "outcomes" appear to be the same? The point of departure for social constructivist thinking is not "the strong do what they wish, the weak do what they can," for even the strong have to figure out what they want and how to get it (e.g. Finnemore 2009). In order to "get things done," entities must figure out what is acceptable and conduct themselves appropriately.

Even though acceptable politics is a moving target, apparent stability can be observed in contemporaneous use, as it was formerly acceptable to establish colonies and build an empire, but not anymore. Because a "multilateral" orientation toward global political issues is a product of particular human action, there is contingency. It is not inevitable that such a political approach will result in addressing particular issues, but that its emergence as a legitimate option, if not the legitimate option for some issues, can be explained through discursive practices. These can be analyzed by identifying and analyzing the variety of plausible options both prospectively and retrospectively in a process of legitimation, where particular options are favored, and others marginalized.

This means that observations will be concrete and reliant on the relations being instantiated in these discursive practices. Jackson attends to the debates about "the West" because these debates specify (what he calls a causal mechanism) its meaning (see Jackson

2006a, 40, and its primary inspiration, Laffey and Weldes 1997). As policies are publicly and privately argued and discussed, their articulation and relations are important to note. Multilateralism is not different. Jackson's study accounts for ways in which certain policies were pursued and made acceptable (Jackson 2006a, 16, 24-25), while others marginalized in public rhetoric. He searches for rhetorical commonplaces deployed for these purposes.

This study similarly seeks *instantiations* and then *circulations* of related discourses and practices. These terms are chosen because they de-emphasize the origin of their deployment, instead seeking to identify their movement across and into different policy areas. These circulations are rhetorical in that their usage is for the purpose of privileging a particular articulation, potentially over several competitors. Thus, marginalization is possible. However, to understand discursive practices as primarily linguistic-rhetorical would deny practice aspects that I endeavor to demonstrate are also not only significant, but wrapped up with rhetoric. To put it bluntly again, language makes no sense without accompanying practice.[56]

Having articulated that a series of uses provides focus for our analysis, how do we know such a series has been successful to relatively stabilize a concept like multilateralism? I assume that relatively stable practices are not contested, they circulate and repeat. We can imagine the repetition of particular vocabularies or practices, or a general reference to reason, nature, or common sense. As Jackson (2006a) notes, the key is to grasp the *topography* (or cultural space) of the possibility for political action and trace through what discursive practices were operationalized or activated. What is it that circulates and what do these notions hang together with?

[56] A construction worker who says, “slab!” (and not “multilateralism!”) is interpreted in a particular way by another construction worker (Wittgenstein 1953). Observation and context provide pieces to understand how discursive practices fit.

The result is an account of the process of pulling together various threads whose purpose is to instantiate, circulate, and legitimate a particular policy. Out of a messy web of possibilities, entities grasp and tie certain strands to form a "bundle of practices" (Weldes 1996) from which a political claim is made. Over time, these understandings and relations require maintenance. As a result, "multilateralism" is constantly in need of being stabilized, re-affirmed, re-articulated (Jackson 2006a, 252-253). By this, I mean that every usage is a reproduction of meaning and a re-instantiation of its relationships and associations. The deployment (action) of "multilateral" makes no sense without the word, and the word does nothing without its contextualized deployment. This perspective makes a second foundational assumption in order for explanation to occur: entities do not make politics from nothing. Thus, I attend to the relationships between concepts and/or actions.

Let me summarize. Most of the time, we think that the presence or absence of X makes possible and plays some causal role in legitimating Y condition/outcome. This is often presented as how ideas matter. As Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002) argue: no collective identity in Asia, no collective security organization (or NATO-like organization). The relationships that I am interested in do not hinge on the presence or absence of factors conceived as independent variables because I *start with* actual uses of "multilateral." I know retrospectively what diplomatic products were realized (e.g. Bretton Woods agreement) or not (e.g. ITO)[57] and the prospective research undertaken here specifies the association between actual uses and those diplomatic products. My explanatory goal is to search for what relations were instantiated between "multilateral" and particular policy paths so that I can explain the term's persistence in world politics. It is these historical relations that give it any political utility in the present. But, in

[57] Note that whether these individual instances are "successes" or "failures" is not my goal since I am not explaining agreement/non-agreement as a dichotomous dependent variable.

order for these relations to be created, some particular reason or logic, entity, or practice has to be involved to provide some adhesion between "multilateral" and a particular policy path. In this sense, multilateral does not stand alone to automatically legitimate policy. Relations between "multilateral" and particular logics, entities, and practices combine to make it associated with and descriptive of a policy path *as* a legitimate option. In this sense, the traditional Y (diplomatic agreement, treaty, establishment of an international organization) is useful to analysis as a policy juncture for which relations between "multilateral" and other discursive practices can be specified. Through use that articulates these relations as normal, "multilateral" is made to fit—legitimated—in particular policy contexts centered around junctures like the Kellogg-Briand Pact or the Bretton Woods agreement.

Such individualized illustrations of the relationships instantiated provide a way to understand how legitimation occurs. As such, these illustrations can be seen as "structural" or "organizational" types of models (Clark and Primo 2007). This is different from "statistical models," which are almost invariably designed and evaluated on how well they fit the data, where prediction is the objective and metric for assessing their utility (e.g. Pelc 2010).[58] Should the empirical sections here result in a systematic, reasoned analytical narrative and not an incomprehensible "word salad" then it will have done its job (Clark and Primo 2007; Singer 1961). This perspective requires us to leave behind a particular kind of counterfactual reasoning (e.g. whether or not multilateralism makes a difference against other factors, which is a different theoretical perspective altogether) because the purpose of the research is not to predict, but to

[58] We should keep in mind, as Rodrik (2010) does, that all models are necessarily false.

interrogate how this process, which has identifiable consequences, unfolds. It is a move to adopt prospective and retrospective positions by using a genealogical method.[59]

A word on the researcher

No analytical tool is useful without an analyst; no lens does anything on its own without a set of eyes. Someone is doing analysis. As a result, the researcher is considered a part of the analytical toolkit. This perspectival or "monistic" (Jackson 2008a; Jackson 2011) understanding of the researcher in relation to the world has roots in the IR critical theory and "post-modern IR" literature (Cox 1987; Enloe 1989; Alker 1990). It follows that the researcher is in a potentially unique interpretive position, making available a reading of events (Neumann 2002, 628) and managing and evaluating contending explanations. Thus, when examining the data and observing instantiations of multilateralism, the researcher then draws up the relations that are taken to be the crucial ones in producing politics.

This position roughly bases, at least part, of its epistemology onto the researcher. This is a consequence of understanding that the researcher operates (lives) in the world in which she is observing. What obtains from this is an honesty (Jackson 2008a) about the explanatory results. Shapiro's (1992b, 788, emphasis added) advice and position is well-worth mentioning here:

> ... try to exercise "patience" (as Foucault put it) and consistently disclose what is lost by fixing interpretations that permit the legitimation of action. This is not a rejection of legitimation; it is an enactment, rather, of the recognition that legitimation involves a never-ending negotiation that requires the dissolution of certainties. It is thus *negotiation all the way down*.

The position argued here is that the researcher must make decisions before and during the course of a study that affect the explanatory results. Indeed, if the research question is drawn by staking out a gap in the literature, how could she (along with other scholars working on the same

[59] Recall that prediction need not be the one and only metric for social science (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Clark and Primo 2007).

topic) not? To be clear, though, the most direct way in which the researcher does this is in the data collection and analysis. During these moments, the researcher's capacity and skill to note, highlight, link, and demonstrate consequences is the critical task.

Research methods: genealogical[60]

Because this study looks for (a) historical, contingent use understood as (b) discursive practice in (c) processes of legitimation where (d) the researcher draws and highlights relations and associations and demonstrate consequences, what methods can operationalize this approach? To further organize the research and analysis, a genealogical method is adopted. In this section, I defend this choice by (1) reviewing its use in IR (previous payoffs), (2) what is called for in utilizing a genealogical method, and, most importantly (3) specify what the payoffs are for employing this method in this particular study.

Genealogy in IR: what the use is, what to do, and how to evaluate

Vucetic (2011b: 1295-1296) is right to argue that IR is "familiar" with genealogy, and also right to state that, "yet, IR is still largely undecided on what genealogy is, what it does, and how it differs from other research tools for qualitative-interpretative inquiry." While the obvious questions about "who is IR?" and "what is meant by qualitative-interpretative inquiry" immediately arise, the difficulty in pinning down answers to these questions is perhaps the thread from which I perceive something intuitively correct about Vucetic's statement. While I agree with Vucetic that genealogy can be a method of "first resort" for IR scholars, there is a lack of specificity for precisely how it would be useful for some and not others. Why would process-tracers not engage in genealogy—and vice versa? Why not simply an historical explanation or a

[60] By methods, I follow Yanow and Schwartz-Shea (2002, 460) to mean that both data access and data analysis are implied--and that this is an analytical-only distinction.

historically sensitive approach? Put another way, we are familiar with genealogy's *posture* rather than its operationalization as an analytical *method*.

Again, following Vucetic and others, we turn to *On Diplomacy*. Early on, Der Derian (1987, 3) makes two key points that give form to how to do genealogical analysis. First, it is to "act on a suspicion, supported by historical research." Paraphrasing this, I propose that the given rationale for multilateralism is constituted by the demands of its contemporaneous political context and, rather than *solely*, by its past principles and practices. Second, Der Derian recognizes a variety of techniques through which the past is used to exert power, to instantiate knowledge (Foucault 1980). Genealogy is cognizant of this aspect of history in determining the shape and direction of relations and lineages. To again paraphrase Der Derian, this study uses a genealogical method because it is concerned with the way in which political entities drew on discursive practices of diplomacy—the diplomatic culture—to produce a "regime of truth"; an only *seemingly* unassailable logic that grounds political action (paraphrasing Der Derian 1987, 69-70). This is the temporarily stable product of a process of legitimation.

Consider passages from *On Diplomacy* itself. Der Derian (1987, 83) explores the "prototypes" of diplomacy through examining the cleric, the warrior, and the trader, and he explains his rationale and objective:

> By scrutinizing how proto-diplomacy [an implied ideal-typical abstraction] was exercised at multiple sites, we can better understand how diplomacy emerged [as we know the term and its related practices] from unfamiliar relationships of force and truth at the infra- and supra-state levels.

He begins by noting what the warrior, the merchant, and the cleric share. The actual space of the marketplace and the church marked boundaries which had effects on the conduct of the warrior, "[h]ence, by the time of Charlemagne, breaches of market-place and church peace were considered more serious than breaches of common law," (Der Derian 1987, 84). He goes on

to clarify the relationship between these roles and diplomacy through three examples which "engendered proto-diplomatic [that is, what 'diplomacy' would later draw upon] rules," (Der Derian 1987, 87). The first was the droit d'aubaine, which specified the considerably restricted legal status of an "alien trader" crossing territorial boundaries (see Der Derian 1987, 87-88). An obstacle to diplomacy, Der Derian argues that the variety of strategies that resulted to deal with this obstacle, rather than a straight-forward, efficient path, demonstrates that the development of "common sense" in political life cannot adequately explain the eventual demise of the droit d'aubaine. As Der Derian (1987, 88-89, emphasis added) states, "[r]ather, it was frequently the clash *between* the common sense, say, of Thomas Paine or the French authors of the Rights of Man, and Edmund Burke or other late feudal apologists, which yielded new rules of diplomacy and new opportunities to impose them."

The second example is that of courtoisie, which provided a way to communicate propriety short of physical force. Traded goods brought into a country by envoys or warriors, might lead to the example Der Derian gives of a Greek princess, married to a Venetian doge, who uses a golden fork (see Der Derian 1987, 90). After a subsequent scandal, St. Bonaventure declares her death a punishment of God. These provide a stock of practices drawn on by early diplomatic writers such as William Caxton, Erasmus, and author of perhaps the first classic on diplomacy: Francois de Callieres.[61]

The final example is that of the church's role in regulating warfare in the Middle Ages. The papacy "confronted the qualitative advances in military technology," calling these new weapons (such as those that utilized gunpowder) the devil's invention (Der Derian 1987, 94-95). Though this failed to stem the increasing growth of the use of weapons and weapons technology,

[61] See the informative edited volume by Berridge, Keens-Soper, and Otte: *Diplomatic Theory From Machiavelli to Kissinger*.

this idea and practice of regulating weapons was utilized later in diplomatic culture and as an objective of international law.

Lastly, note his chapter on "diplomacy," where he details the passage from suzerain to sovereign states. Because "genealogy shuns the tendentious practice of attributing an immaculate beginning to the states or diplomatic system," (Der Derian 1987, 106), a rationale for his analysis is created. At the Congress of Regensburg (in 1454), Pope Nicholas V expected to organize another, final, crusade against the Turks. As per appropriate diplomatic practice, Emperor Frederick III had made the preparations for the Congress, inviting other heads of state. Pope Nicholas recently had a diplomatic success in mediating the War of the Milanese Succession. However, at Regensburg, only Philip of Burgundy arrived in person to greet the Pope. This marks one of a series of episodes where new forms of political identity and power are circulated.

Despite of this seeming failure, "nonetheless, a plan for united action was drawn up and another meeting was arranged for September," (Der Derian 1987, 108). Frederick III had to give a reason for not attending. This demonstrates that while a shift in understanding and practicing politics in the 15th century was transpiring, vestiges (particular vocabularies, discourses, and practices) of "old diplomacy" are re-shaped and re-formed rather than simply forgotten.

So, Der Derian's examples, disclosed as a result of his research, highlight the relationships between concepts and/or actions at particular moments in history and attempt to show how they were then consequential for future interactions. Now, other works that use genealogical method or self-identify as genealogy (Bartleson 1995; Underhill 2000; Overbeek 2004) hardly touch on methodology, and instead presume the reader knows that the point of the research is to unsettle or disturb our common notions of politics. This is also Der Derian's objective, and indeed most genealogical research in IR has not maintained theory-building as its

primary goal. However, recently, Der Derian (2008, 71) re-affirmed his position on genealogy as useful not only for interruption, but also theory:

> As I have argued in previous cases, a genealogy is the most appropriate way to disturb the naturalised order of IR. It calls into question the immaculate origins, essential identities and deep structures of IR … Some have faulted the genealogical approach for offering only interpretation and criticism, rather than remedies. Foucault has always offered more than negative critique: it clears but does not destroy or deny the existence of a ground for constructive theory.

What should then genealogy do if it is to be useful in theory-building? Molloy (2006, 9-15) offers a partial answer: "[i]t has to be demonstrated that a genealogy of Realism is capable of offering an alternative to the dominant knowledge/discourse." Klotz and Lynch (2007) add that genealogy "maps out conjectures" in this same sense: to disclose alternatives not taken, but were contemporaneous present. Like Der Derian, they stress attention to power relations within discourses. For Klotz and Lynch (2007), it is designed for "structural-side" analysis in mutual co-constitution, unlike "process-tracing" which normally focuses on agents and their socialization which leads to the internalization of particular ideas which *causes* outcomes. Thus, genealogy can clarify how power is exercised through structure by virtue of its prospective and retrospective modes of examination.

To fully satisfy the discussion here, I turn to Shapiro's theoretical writings in *Reading the Postmodern Polity* where he discusses genealogy in great detail (and perhaps is often overlooked in the methodological discussions about genealogy, at least in Vucetic 2011b). Aligning with Der Derian, Shapiro is clear that "unsettling" and "disrupting" need not be mutually exclusive with theory, nor must it be wedded to a "critical" ontology. It could be a more open pragmatic one.

The genealogical mode is one that produces critical interpretations (or anti-interpretations) (Shapiro 1992a, 1). To do so, it focuses on process (Shapiro 1992a, 1; 15; 24), is documentary (2; 16), and interrogates relatively stabilized concepts in order to disrupt or defamiliarize. In

focusing on language and practice in processes, it allows the researcher to interpret how stability is produced (Shapiro 1992a, 1-2). The production of stability is thought to entail processes in which power is exercised over time to render "intelligible" particular ideas and actions (Shapiro 1992a, 1-4). In this sense, he proposes "patience," to examine history very deliberately and thoroughly in empirical inquiry to see how either (a) old practices are interpreted to produce new power/knowledge, or (b) old practices are repeated to re-produce already legitimated ways of mediating political life. In this sense, process is able to highlight instances of condonement or contestation.

"Patience" entails removing the assumption of structural stability to see how that stability is produced; to view the present as "peculiar" (Shapiro 1992a, 4)--perhaps rational or irrational (see discussion Shapiro 1992a, 24). In a sense, this is an analytical move to distinguish between subject and object for the purpose of political inquiry (following Foucault), for explaining how the past occurred as it did and not otherwise (Shapiro 1992a, 49):

> In disclosing the present as remarkable, as a peculiar set of practices for problematizing some things and naturalizing others, for allowing some things into discourse and silencing others, Foucault provides a critical distance from it. He turns current "truths" into power-related practices by situating them in relation to alternative past practices and tracing the correlated economies of their emergence… In short, Foucault's analyses politicizes what passes for the uncontentious...

Whatever the particular discursive practices are, the genealogical method permits the researcher to explain how politics is conducted processually. The method brings no judgment on whether the discursive practices are just or unjust. It takes contemporary common sense as such and then digs for how common sense was made. Note that this is a somewhat different approach than the one adopted by much of the IR norms literature. This approach often selects preferable

norms that are held to be self-evident and then explains why they are powerful in demonstrating how they constrain entities often evidenced by variation in behavior.[62]

Genealogical method understands that discursive practices do not constrain in the sense that agentic decisions only *really* consider certain pathways. An approach that conceives of data as discursive practices seeks to understand how words and actions are rendered sensible in particular contexts (and traverse contexts) through their relations with other words and actions. Because genealogy is dependent on the researcher to notice these associations and relations, like an evolutionary biologist who notices similarities and differences in looking forward and backward to investigate current understandings of lineages. Genealogists look both ways to examine consequences of the past, instantiations of the present, and tracks for the future. The language of constraint overstates the prospects in terms of incentives in particular contexts to show how a norm makes particular choices impossible to consider. As Jackson (2006a) notes, humans possess agency, therefore the argument that certain "choices" are impossible is perhaps too bold and too imprecise. Better is to precisely demonstrate how certain choices or pathways cannot be made to fit or are rendered non-sensical through particular historical logics. By shedding constraints, one can attend to how paths are made to fit through their relations with other discourses and practices situated within culture, and move away from agent-centered "decision" analysis. Similarly, process tracing in IR usually entails either how norms are internalized by agents, or how agents spread norms without regard to what makes those norms attractive or what precisely makes practices of "internalization" so powerful.[63]

[62] 'Norms' often appear almost self-evidently are part of a project's methodological orientation. The defense often is reduced to 'ideas matter' therefore 'norms matter'.
[63] It should be noted that it seems difficult to separate the conduct of action as not having 'feedback effects' on the conductor in the approach presented here.

There are perhaps three perspectives then that can be seen for the use of genealogy in IR. While the overall objective of something general like knowledge production, or even theory, is implied by nearly all who discuss genealogy in IR, perspectives on how genealogy contributes to knowledge production or theory are very different. For some, the key element of genealogy is its capacity to interrupt or unsettle (e.g. Der Derian 1987; Shapiro 1992a), for others its ability to capture the dynamics of structural side constructivist approaches to theory (e.g. Klotz and Lynch 2007), and even others claim that genealogy can adjudicate particular truth-claims that other methods simply cannot (e.g. Vucetic 2011b). This study adopts the first and third perspective in its endeavor to answer the avenue of inquiry it has identified (see Chapter 2).

For the first perspective, genealogy is useful because of its capacity for disruption, de-naturalization, or arrestation that its historical method provides. What results is that such interventions provide space for critical interpretations (e.g. Shapiro 1992a; Der Derian 1987; my view is that de-naturalization allows for explanation). The key evaluative question is this: is there space to conceptually re-think the problems in and practices of international relations and IR theory? For the second perspective, it is a mode for deepening the structural side of constructivist theorizing. This kind of process tracing permits a better understanding of structure-side effects in processes of co-constitution (e.g. Klotz and Lynch 2007). For these scholars: does the genealogy capture the contribution of structural effects in producing a dominant discourse? For the third perspective, genealogy is able to adjudicate certain types of truth claims, especially those that rely on combining power and knowledge, which other research methods, especially those that analytically separate knowledge and power, simply cannot. Can this genealogy provide (perhaps unique) justifiable and valid evidence needed to substantiate causal claim X situated by the researcher's specification of scope conditions?

In spite of these different uses of and objectives for genealogy, there remain at least four common components, all of which are important aspects for the analysis here. First, genealogy is interested in historical (even if "very recent" history) research. Genealogies are "documentary" (see Shapiro 1992a; Klotz and Lynch 2007), and the idea of history includes a variety of possible pathways. Second, genealogy is processual and, perhaps too often by implication, relational (see Jackson and Nexon 1999). It is not single cataclysmic events that define history or ideas, it is the linking of entities, ideas, documents, words, and actions that produce social and political pathways. In that sense, a variety of "descendants" should be recognized. Third, that politics, questions about how authority is practiced and managed, is the central focus. Often, genealogy is used to specify the political. Lastly, the research products are almost always narratives (though perhaps more 'maps' should be created as guides to these narratives).

From these four commonalities, we could argue that evaluating genealogy may be possible in three dimensions. First, precision. Because genealogy is documentary, micro-level analysis is important. A certain amount of "digging" is required to recover concrete data on the level of individuals, particularly those whose words and action provide the basis for more widely circulated instantiations. To be precise requires the researcher to be able to order the events and highlight the crucial relations so that the narrative is rendered sensible and logical. Second, and related, is accuracy. Carrying out precise research requires that we are not sloppy. We should be able to point to data that we are analyzing, and that our analysis is based on this very specific evidence. Third, is the idea of being comprehensive. As in other fields of science, collaboration allows the researcher to ensure their genealogy is comprehensive (though not necessarily exhaustive). Some notion that major entities and ideas to the story of X were examined needs to be offered. More importantly, the alternatives that were present in those moments must be

specified so that one can identify how those alternatives were marginalized. At the same time, different researchers will read documents differently, so collaboration for the purpose of teasing out possible conceptual maps will be more necessary than usual (and unfortunately IR currently remains relatively closed off to this practice).

The use of genealogy expressed here arguably bears some family resemblance to its use in paleontology in at least one sense. The Tamba dragon found in a riverbed in Japan in 2009 drew this reaction in the US journal *Science*: "The pattern of genealogy is really important because it tells us about the timing and sequence of the appearance of certain characteristics... [clarifying] lineages and relationships," (Normile 2009, 169). If we observe patterns of behavior, in terms of language and practice, genealogy is one way to map out (the timing and sequence) through history. Being able to make associations and linkages helps us to identify with greater accuracy and precision (of course, not genetic lineages and relations), but social, political, and cultural lineages and relations. Spotting the appearance and disappearance of biological "characteristics" helps to understand the environment and habitat—perhaps the biological context—the animal is situated in at those moments in time. In a similar sense, the appearance and disappearance of observable uses of language and action, tells us something about the situation of the political entity. In both cases, we are interested in observations for the purpose of understanding evolution and adaptation, which are situated responses to the environment, not necessarily teleological ones.

In a sense, what differentiates a "history of multilateralism" from a genealogical analysis of it, is the claim that to get to this particular present situation we must demonstrate how other "presents" were rendered illegitimate. That is, to not just tell the story of how it happened, but recognize all the could-have-been moments where other pathways were recognizable. These

were made non-sensical *through* politics. In addition, we must specify the relations that made a particular policy legitimate, since no such policy stands on his own without a heritage.

As Thompson (2006), Goddard (2006), and Finnemore (2005) have pointed out, IR has neglected to rigorously examine how legitimacy is produced or not. In a sense, no new model of legitimation is being offered. That legitimacy is contingent and hinges on related words and action within a historical-cultural context is not a new idea, though a thesis with many variants (perhaps as old as early Chinese philosophy and Machiavelli). This chapter has specified one of those variants. At the same time, I am applying this theoretical device to "multilateralism," which is an original project. What results is an explanation—perhaps a kind of applied theory of legitimation—for the way in which multilateralism is understood today.[64]

An acknowledgment on Koselleck and *Begriffsgeschichte*

Much of what I have articulated as genealogical method bears a close family resemblance with Reinhart Koselleck's description of Begriffsgeschichte or "conceptual history." Certainly the similarities are clear, and I want to point out five of them. First, Koselleck (1985) does not see ideas as "constants." The point of his incorporation of diachronic analysis stems from a fundamental pre-supposition that the meaning of concepts is dynamic, not static. Second, historians doing conceptual history investigate how a term is situated in a broader political context. In this sense, sociology and politics are inter-woven into "historical time" (as opposed to "universal time"). Third, from this perspective, both the contemporaneous entities and historians are something like *brokers* to understand the relations with this concept at a particular moment in time. For Koselleck, we may think of this as a kind of "semantic anthropology." Fourth, the goal of conceptual history has to do with an analytical possibility rather than statistical probability.

[64] Wendt, for one, suggested that *Social Theory of International Politics* could be seen as a "work of applied social theory," (Wendt 1999, xiii).

This is based on the available discursive practical resources and tools, which are empirically identifiable. In other words, he is concerned with conditions of possibility. Fifth, as a result, analysis should not be evaluated "in terms of a reality which subsequently emerged." In discussing the work of Lorenz von Stein, he praises him for "clarifying the inevitable." Indeed, evaluation is measured in terms of precision. How well does the conceptual history bring "more clearly into view the contemporary intentional circumstances or relations in their form," (Koselleck 1985, 79).

In spite of these similarities, three points strike me as somewhat incompatible with what has been presented or, at least, should be considered points of tension. First, Koselleck's overarching concern is the condition of modernity. His conceptual historical work has led him to the conclusion that modernity demands greater knowledge, insight, and perhaps planning for the future. This experience of modernity, he argues, has caused an increase in our expectations of the future (perhaps both quantitatively and qualitatively). This long-term process may play a role "higher up" the scope of time, but not for the time frame here. Second, relations are important, but genealogy makes relations the heart of the analysis. For Koselleck, yes, the relation of experience and theory is ascertainable through the concept. Yet concepts do not stand alone, and in focusing on the history of concepts we may miss the relations between concepts and/or actions (though Koselleck does recognize this to an extent). Lastly, we must be careful in "extracting" meaning through context. Do we start from the concept or the context to temporarily fix the meaning of a concept? With genealogy, we need not bother with the ultimate adjudication of a concept's definition at any point in time because the point is to specify relations amongst the entity, the politics, and the context. For these reasons, Koselleck should be lauded, but with caution.

Explanatory results: analytical narrative

What output should we expect given the premises discussed so far? How should we evaluate these results? When Wendt (1998) distinguishes between causal and constitutive theories, he does so through a typology of questions: “why” versus “what” or “how possible?” Yet, Wendt considers them all explanatory—and this is the key notion for the results of this study. We want an account of events based on evidence, but with attention to how it came to be so and not otherwise.

Genealogical method provides a way to account for why particular avenues are closed off, while others held open, and an analytical narrative is used to pinpoint and connect these moments. The analytical narrative is a *situation* of data to make an argument that accounts for the conduct of politics through time. A narrative form permits a number of pieces of evidence to be woven together. It contains the researcher's analysis during a re-telling of history through one explanatory perspective. The analysis itself consists of the researcher's links above, across, and beyond the usual “here are the important events in chronological order” narrative to demonstrate how history came together as it did. This is not to state *how it really was* but to argue why it appears one way, and not another. As a result, figures that concisely illustrate the relationships instantiated in the political episodes will be produced to guide the reader.

So, how should this analysis be evaluated if not through statistical convention? The kind of knowledge produced is about how X exists as it currently does (Hacking 1999). Such an account could be useful for IR as it is likely causally relevant for other notions in world politics that enjoy wide circulation and legitimacy as endeavors, such as development or trade. In other words, how well the narrative accounts for the different strands used in instantiating “multilateralism” in the episodes is the primary way in which the account should be evaluated (see also Jackson 2006a) beyond the three dimensions articulated in the section on genealogical

method above (precise, accurate, comprehensive). It must be comprehensible as an explanatory account to the community in which an author is situated.

Discussion

In Kratochwil's (2006) brief genealogical chapter on multilateralism, he investigates "three different sites of multilateral claims," (Kratochwil 2006, 143). The "sites in which claims are made" are constituted by particular terms, such as "sovereignty" or "Concert of Great Powers." The links are constructed by Kratochwil as he attaches an "anti-imperialism" and an "anti-hegemony" to multilateralism in "sovereignty games," or linking the notion of Great Power with multilateralism at the turn of the 19th century. To go a step further in concretizing research, I specify actual uses of the term "multilateral" and its variants and consider the particular discursive practices paired with these. To be sure, the links are no less constructed by the researcher. However, in thinking of sites as *encounters* permits the researcher to capture a wide variety of phenomena. I am not contending that related terms, like sovereignty, do not provide a grammar for multilateralism. But if there is value in investigating use empirically, then it is sensible to focus research on use (and non-use) of the term itself. The links I make are what I read in the historical context, what I read as the perspective of entities in that setting based on primary and secondary accounts.

Everyday political living, such as diplomacy, exhibits patterns of behavior as political entities get on with their daily occupation. Talking about and conducting world politics today, particularly when addressing 'problems' in world politics, results in talk about 'multilateralism' or a 'multilateral approach'. To explain this pattern, this section specified methodology and method, and these topics are important to keep in mind and revisit in the process of analyzing the data. As Duncan Snidal (2008, 330) argued:

> ... our theory is not always sufficiently developed to provide strong guidance for empirical tests. Nor is the solution to suspend empirical work until we have such theory, because theory development depends on empirical findings. The relation of empirics to theory is somewhat like the chicken–egg problem, where the answer is ‘‘neither comes first; they evolve together.”

This approach might sound unsettling to some in IR.[65] However, the key remains to show how the history was not inevitable. There were points in time where things might have occurred differently. It is up to the research community to critically examine why. An analytical narrative that accounts for how multilateralism is used and made to fit its political context offers an explanation to a series of events from t1 to t2 through the use of a particular methodology (in this case, employing the concept of discursive practices understood in processes of legitimation). Such an account is not falsifiable in the classic Popperian sense in the context of hypothesis testing. Particular linkages that are made can, of course, be criticized as tenuous, unsubstantiated, weakly supported, imprecise, inaccurate, or superficial (or all of the converses of these descriptions).

Alternative analytical concepts like “incentives” in a bargaining process also can be employed to explain t1 to t2. Each methodology illustrates different aspects of the history. I am less concerned with the bargaining process because (as others have said) that once the incentives are identified as such, then it is fairly straight-forward. The question I seek to explore concerns how particular incentives become conceptualized as more appropriate than others. That is where I believe the methodology takes this research (see also Goddard's (2006) assertion that legitimation is inherent in any negotiation).

[65] I submit that it remains part of perceived ‘normal’ practice to design a theoretical apparatus and then simply apply it to data. Reason: to re-design the theoretical pieces after interacting with data may draw accusations of bias.

"Case Selection"

From the initial research question "how is multilateralism made to fit in world politics?" comes the related general proposition: "through discursive practices that mediate diplomatic relations." This generalized proposition can be broken into specific formulations, created by the researcher as the empirics and theory interact with each other. Through a reading of history, I came to investigate several episodes were diplomatic relations were mediated: the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the London World Monetary and Economic Conference, the creation of the IBRD and the IMF, and the discussion over multilateral aid in the debate over SUNFED and financing development.



Figure 7. Uses of the term 'multilateral' in the *New York Times*, 1923-1960.

My reading of the important periods of political history where we observe the use of "multilateral" is roughly supported by a glance at one of the primary mass media sources of the time. From the above figure, we can estimate the correlation between uses of multilateral and political events. In my reading of the data (see Appendix C for specifics), the peak of 1928-1929 corresponds to the Kellogg-Briand Pact being negotiated and consummated. The murmur of 1930 to 1943 refers to mentions of "multilateral trade" as well as "multilateral treaties"

stemming from the completion of the Pact and its use in world politics. The steep climb from 1944 to the peak of 1949 corresponds with “multilateral” economic planning after World War II (amongst other “multilateral” arrangements). Finally, the elevated murmur from 1950 to 1960 refers to the “multilateral” debate in development politics.[66]

In each episode that follows, I construct a genealogical reading of the history, specifying discursive practices that involved the use of multilateral, demonstrating how these uses mediated diplomatic relations and were consequential to political outcomes (whether defined as successes or failures contemporaneously or retrospectively).

One result is the following claim: “through differentiating bilateral and multilateral treaties, particular pieces of international law were connected to the term multilateral and privileged with automatic revival after the First World War.” Indeed, what is produced is a set of claims that challenges the notion that multilateralism naturally possesses legitimacy; an implicit assumption of much IR research, covering a range of topics and approaches. While assumptions should not be conflated with propositions as analytical tools (or propositions as “hypotheses”), IR all too often uses assumptions not as analytical tools, but inherently 'true enough' statements on which to make knowledge claims.

There are no propositions here that specify generalized, yet somehow differentiated, ways in which incentives can be constructed with the explanatory goal of eliminating all but one. The reason for this is simple. Social life results from a combination of factors that are unique in time and place. This does not mean that social life is chaos without order, as processes bear similarities. The point is that order is contextual and situational.

[66] Another peak in 1962-1963 occurs during the somewhat intensified discussion of a ‘multilateral’ nuclear NATO force.

On one hand, multilateralism is a term; a piece of language read in text or heard in conversation. On the other hand, we know that for language to have meaning in social life, it operates in tandem with cultural practice. On a third hand, language and practices operating in cultural space instantiate convention; articulate a “normal” idea; bring power to bear by legitimating a particular idea of the term and associated practice; making acting otherwise unthinkable and equally making acting so, potentially, non-thinking. This study of politics analyzes multilateralism from this perspective.

CHAPTER 4

MULTILATERAL TREATIES

Introduction

Recall that this study conceptualizes “multilateralism” as a social construction, whose use is a way to render and legitimate a particular way of conducting politics. The deployment of the term multilateral to describe “treaties” is the focus of this chapter. These uses here are tied to other notions, like peace, justice, or normal international relations to make them fit in the social and political context. Such uses instantiate appropriate relations, language, and practices, and are resources for the way in which such notions are comprehensible and politically useful. In this way, the adjectival form captures all of these discursive practical elements into a philosophical principle, an “-ism.”

Treaties have long been considered important for political analysis. For example, Ikenberry (2001) examines the "elements of institutional binding", where he notes the role of "agreements". He states (2001, 65-66):

> ... when institutional agreements are ratified as formal treaties, this strengthens the agreement as a legal contract… Treaties embed agreement in a wider legal and political framework that reinforces the likelihood that it will have some continuing force as state policy… At the very least, the rules of conduct laid down in general treaties and conventions tend to be understood by those states that sign them to be legally binding obligations.

It is precisely this study's objective to investigate not only the conduct inscribed within treaties, but treaty-making itself as a diplomatic practice, and the context in which that practice occurs.

Jeremy Bentham (1827) used the term 'multi-lateral' to specify contracts concerning multiple parties, and this instance pre-dates the Paris Peace Conference by almost a century. Though the context of his writing is domestic law, it is plausible that the philosopher who put the ‘international’ in ‘international relations’ would have perhaps considered its use at the level of

world politics. Indeed, in the footnote where this use is found (Bentham 1827, II, 495), he argues that such "multi-lateral" types of legal contracts, or "deeds," should not be wholly written by the party whose will it expresses. This suggests a sensitivity to power relations that reminds us of the politics involved in legal social action.[67]

However, searching the *American Journal of International Law* and the *American Political Science Review*, one observes the use of "multilateral treaties" to specify a type of treaty only beginning to occur in the analysis of the results of the Paris Peace Conference. Likewise, a search through the *New York Times* (NYT) results in the uses of multilateral in the same context. Looking through the *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) series also results in a first cluster of use during the Peace of Paris Conference. To be clear, this is a different approach than most studies concerning multilateral treaties. Indeed, most treaties that are retrospectively coded as "multilateral" (e.g. Denemark and Hoffman 2008) do not use the term at all in its text or title. If the specification of 'multilateral treaties' emerges from the analysis, reporting, and conduct of international relations, then these discursive practices are empirics.

This analytical narrative begins with the uses of multilateral to describe treaties at the end of the First World War. The specification and production of multilateral treaties by diplomats and heads of states emerged as part of the creation of a legitimated international order after the war. To be sure, what came to be called multilateral treaties were created before this episode, but

[67] Carl von Rotteck's multi-volume work *History of the World* went through dozens of editions (and continuations by multiple authors), and is noted in the OED as the first use of multilateral in the political sense. In reviewing the text, its use, though, is in line with the mathematical or figurative definition of "multi-faceted." In the introduction, the ethnographical, geographical, and synchronal approaches make the connections between nations multilateral. In this context, this means multi-faceted. Even the OED's citation of p. 135 in the 1858 edition concerning nations coming into commercial contact with India and enjoying multilateral relations, seems to suggest multi-faceted rather than with many other countries. See the OED entry multilateral for mathematical and figurative citations. The next use of multilateral in the political sense that the OED lists is actually in its legal sense in international law: the 1919 Charles G. Fenwick article in the *American Political Science Review*.

that term was not used to refer to them. In the interactions examined here, multilateral treaties are deemed logical--legitimate--in the context of contemporaneous world politics in particular ways. Particular language is used in conjunction with practices. The ways in which these discursive practices are conducted mark an empirical starting point.

After the Paris Conference, the term "multilateral" becomes a recognizable feature of mass media accounts and diplomatic documents during the negotiation of (what we call in the US) the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1927-1928). In this instance, a multilateral treaty was legitimated over other diplomatic options in discussions over renouncing war. To foreshadow, the use of multilateral to describe treaties created relations between this term and normal international relations, peace, justice, diffuse benefits, inclusivity—all powerful associations in the context in which they were used. These relations became important historical resources as international relations went on to negotiate "multilateral trade" in the early 1930s and 1940s and into the diplomacy over "multilateral aid" after World War II.

Connections were made to the political past to support the instantiations of "multilateral" in the two episodes investigated here. The task of the following analytical narrative is to show *how* these instantiations were able to facilitate the political outcomes that resulted. This involves a specification of not just a certain number of parties to a treaty, but particular notions that were associated with the term "multilateral" while other notions either implicitly or explicitly marginalized. Alternatives, including implied ones, should be specified and shown to be rendered non-sensical by political action. In identifying observable discursive practices, which gave these treaties meaning as *multilateral treaties* and not by some other description, conclusions are drawn as to how these instantiations are made sensible through their relations to other terms and actions.

A final point. Both the Treaty of Versailles and the Kellogg-Briand Pact are considered flawed political documents (though explanations of their flaws vary across theoretical approaches). As Schild (1995, ix) notes: "[Columbia University Professor Robert] MacIver and many other Americans considered the Treaty of Versailles... as the prime example of a futile peace." However, I want to be clear that adjudicating value based on a measure of meeting a political objective is not the role of the social scientist. In the words of the preface of the FRUS Paris Peace Conference (PPC) volumes (FRUS 1919, PPC, I, iii-iv):

> Whether a more effective peace settlement in 1919 or a more effective execution of that settlement would have saved us from the devastating war [World War II] in which we are now engaged is a question which it may not be possible even for the historians of later generations to settle beyond a doubt.
>
> … No treaty in history has produced so much comment, has been so freely criticized, and possibly so little read and understood as the treaty of peace signed at Versailles. … The treaty touched in one way or another almost every question that had come on to the international scene in the period before the war…

I view these two quotations above as part of the ancestry of our current world political situation, artifacts from which contemporary discursive practices have descended. Ultimately, explaining how the present is related and made possible is my objective.

Which treaties to revive? The setup for 1919

Treaties and international relations after war

> The outbreak of the war disrupted all business and all social relations between nationals of the belligerent states. One of the problems with which the Peace Conference had to deal was the re-establishment of these relations on a satisfactory basis. (Baruch 1920, 79)

Der Derian (1987, 133) proposes that the comprehensive Treaty of Utrecht (1713) constituted the legitimate joining of international law and diplomacy. This joining indicates how wide-ranging the political, economic, and social problems created by the outbreak of war are, and also marks an awareness for how this process is one that *repairs* international order. Indeed,

the restoration of peace, official relations, and commercial and financial relations were the first two points in Edward House's memo of subjects to be addressed in the preliminary treaty (see FRUS 1919, PPC, XI, 504-505). From the IR literature, we now contend that the practice of post-war settlement to re-start or re-form international relations has a history long enough to be comparatively studied (e.g. Ikenberry 2001; see Smith 1946 for an essay that considers an even longer spread of the effect of war on law and peace in general: from 1066). Making treaties through diplomacy became a common practice to make clear the re-instatement of international relations, to demarcate and validate legitimate instruments and processes (Der Derian 1987; see also Roberts' (2009) edited *Satow's Diplomatic Practice*).

War disrupts the political, economic, and social processes created and sustained by treaties, one of the primary sources of international law (see any international law textbook of the early 20th century, e.g. among several, see Hall 1909; Oppenheim 1912; Hershey 1912). One of the, perhaps off-and-on, debates in international legal scholarship from the 18th century through the first half of the 20th century was over the effect of war on treaties.[68] Did war abrogate treaties or merely suspend them? If so, did it do so for all kinds of treaties for all parties? Castel (1953) notes that Vattel and others writing in the 18th century considered the onset of war to abrogate treaties between belligerents—and this practice was generally continued through the 19th century (see also Hurst 1921). The problem of "neutrals" or "third parties" was a messy one, as they often were included in treaties with many signatories—what are later generally termed "multilateral treaties."[69]

[68] Perhaps part of the fuel for these debates is the difference in the conduct and outcomes of war in the 18th, 19th, and on into the 20th century.

[69] Note also the discussion in Plischke (1954, 248) of the 1935 Harvard Research in International Law (also in the *American Journal of International Law*), which suggests that the practice of "multi-partite" treaties in international affairs was *exceptional* before World War II--contra Denemark and Hoffman (2008, 187, passim), who argue that the exponential growth of multilateral treaties and the practice of multilateral treaty-making began in 1850.

At the start of the first World War, there were international legal scholars, such as Nicolas Politis, who argued that the practice of war would not necessarily interrupt broad legal understandings (and this was followed in some US courts; see the discussion in Castel 1953; see also Oppenheim 1912; Temperley 1920, I, 363-364). State practice up to World War I generally, though not always, indicates that most treaties were abrogated by war (for previous diplomatic proclamations that explicitly abrogated treaties, see Hurst 1921; Keeley 1926; Castel 1953). However, specifying the determinants for abrogation or revival remained a live debate for scholars. Indeed, Lesser (1953, 573) claims that the lack of scholarly consensus on the status of treaties after war led to the provisions in the Treaty of Versailles that explicitly managed the abrogation and revival of treaties (see the Articles quoted below; in addition, see also the text in Scott (1916, 173-174) that specifies particular stipulations "in default of a formal clause" in a treaty). This is in line with Foulke's (1918) early assertion that the kind of treaty, its topic, who are involved, and so on, determines its status, and should war cease, the revival and abrogation of treaties whose status is questionable is to be determined by the states involved. Most recently before the war (and cited in Hurst 1921) is a resolution at the Institute of International Law (see Scott's edited 1916 volume) that addresses the effect of war on treaties. Article 1 under "Treaties Between Belligerent States" asserts that the "opening and the carrying on of hostilities shall have no effect upon the existence of treaties, conventions and agreements," (Scott 1916, 172). Quickly, though the resolution lists exceptions based on categorizing belligerents and neutrals—a key difference in the identity of states in times of war and in the context of international order after war.

Temperley's edited history (1920) of the Paris Peace Conference summarizes how decisions regarding treaties after war could be made and offers an articulation of how this was

done in Paris. Recall that the *sanctity* of treaties was not in doubt (see Lloyd George's comment in Baker 1923, II, 252; see also Marburg 1917). It was only to determine *which ones* were essential or not. The key point here is that at Paris, unlike previous legal and diplomatic discussions, determining the status of treaties after war required some new categorical terms.

Temperley devotes an entire chapter to the "legal basis" of the international system and its restoration after war. Unlike other legal writings prior to World War I (e.g. Oppenheim 1912; Foulke 1918; Hall 1909), this chapter specifies a practical typology of how to manage treaties after war (Temperley 1920, I, 360-365). It suggests three methods of classification, and depending on the initial categories employed require particular sub-categories to be created and issues to be resolved. The first (following Lawrence 1910) starts from the position that there are treaties that involve belligerents only or belligerents and other parties. From this position, there are three categories of treaties (1) "great international treaties" and (2) "ordinary treaties" that both include belligerents and other parties, and (3) all treaties amongst belligerents (which are sub-divided into four more categories). The second (following Westlake 1907) starts from the position that all treaties involving any belligerents are abrogated with the exception of three particular cases. The three exceptions are 1) laws of war, 2) "transitory" or "dispositive" treaties, and 3) treaties that establish arrangements with third parties.

The last method divides treaties into three groups: 1) bilateral treaties among belligerents, 2) multilateral treaties where all parties are belligerents, and 3) multilateral treaties which include neutrals. This section in Temperley (1920) does not follow a particular international legal scholar. However, it notes that for bilateral treaties, "the view held by most jurists… is to terminate all such treaties," (Temperley 1920, I, 363). For multilateral treaties which include neutrals, it states that (Temperley 1920, I, 364):

> … the general view of the jurists is that such treaties are not terminated… they are merely suspended… while at the conclusion of peace they revive automatically and become operative upon all parties. In order to prevent the automatic revival of such [particular] treaties it is necessary to insert in the treaty of peace an express stipulation to this effect...

For multilateral parties amongst belligerents, "on principle it would seem possible to treat these treaties in the same way as bilateral treaties," (Temperley 1920, I, 364).

This is a sketch of what the Treaty of Versailles *actually* did (see also the annotated edition of the Treaty published by the State Department in 1947; FRUS 1919, PPC, XIII; Scott 1920). As part of the solution for the resumption of international relations that emerged from that conference, it became important to be able to differentiate which treaties were abrogated by war and which were to be revived. These corresponded to *bilateral* and *multilateral* treaties. This made it possible for politics to go onward, leaving thorny substantive issues aside. For example, the idea for an "equality in trade" agreement was discussed in Paris, but as Baker (1923, II, 485) reports:

> The Economic Commission, which dealt with the question of the revival of all these treaties, discussed the advisability of taking steps toward the immediate conclusion of a new convention [regarding trade], but decided to defer action and to continue the existing arrangements with such provisional modifications as might be necessary.

Treaties became very important for international relations not only after war, but for the functionality or operational capacity of international relations in general. Though McNair (1930, 101) may be overstating the case, the sentiment is apparent, that treaties are "the only and sadly overworked instrument with which international society is equipped for the purpose of carrying out its multifarious transactions." Interactions such as mediating territorial rights, or establishing international organizations, these are all commonly and legitimately done by treaty. After 1919, treaties are even more crucial because, as Lugard (1936) notes, the Treaty of Versailles

represented a change in the standing tradition of a "right of conquest".[70] Treaties appeared to be emerging as a more reliable basis of international relations, rather than the will of a small group of political elites (see also Redlich's (1928) polemical book). Moreover, the legitimate claim to consultation, if not participation, concerning treaties (see Rogers 1926 regarding Canada) is perhaps a first step in the claim to sovereignty—the key marker of the legitimacy of a state (see Wright 1917 on sovereignty and conflicts between international law and treaties).

The solution in the Treaty of Versailles differentiating between bilateral and multilateral treaties to define revival and abrogation was a new and unique diplomatic move. In exploring the instantiation of “bilateral” and “multilateral” types of treaties, this section not only details the relevant diplomatic activity—what happened, the way in which it happened, and paths not taken—but also identifies the discursive-practical resources inscribed in its conduct. These resources are key pieces in constructing an explanatory account of the outcome: the legitimate differentiation of treaties into bilateral and multilateral types for the purpose of defining which international law to be revived.

To be clear, this study does not challenge the notion of “victor's justice,” or adjudicate its definitive ethical content. It makes no argument against the idea that powerful countries determined the contours of political order after World War I in ways in which were deemed beneficial to them, even if they were bound to certain institutions and rules (see the thesis in Ikenberry 2001). However, this explanation operates at a rather “high” level of theory. Building order 'after victory' often entails creative politics, diplomacy, and communication. That there is a transcendental incentive to do so is not at all clear. Diplomatic action in the *interest* of the victors, such as reparations and the invention of new nations (though not new for those adopting a post-

[70] Though note that this shift in the understanding of rights was only one step toward the phenomenon of de-colonization.

colonial perspective), are often cited as the very terms that laid tracks down for future violent conflict. The theoretical precision that is attempted to be built here, at a 'lower' theoretical level, is to specify why the differentiation of treaties happened in the way in which it was done—and to see how that differentiation was useful (or not) in future politics.

The empirics presented detail the use of “multilateral treaties” as a useful diplomatic-legal notion for the proceedings of the Paris Peace Conference. The set of questions this section endeavors to answer are: 1) what evidence is there of the creation of “multilateral treaties” as a useful notion? and 2) for what reasons was this category created, and how was it carried out?

Starting point: International law… but which?

As Fenwick and others have noted, US President Woodrow Wilson's "'fourteen points...became... the definite program of America's conception of the proper terms," for a peace treaty (Fenwick 1919, 469; see also Ikenberry 2009). From this speech to Congress (January 8, 1918), a particular understanding of international relations and international law is outlined:[71]

> ... What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us. The programme of the world's peace, therefore, is our programme...
>
> I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.
>
> II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

[71] One may consult the 68-volume *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* from Princeton University Press (1966) or, as I have, the 1924 two-volume *The Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson*.

> III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.[72]

The point here is that while the subject of the speech is the "programme of the world's peace," what is considered a significant element is the body of international law expressed in "covenants," or more conventionally, treaties. More precisely, international relations is not only to be constituted by international law, but appropriate international relations *requires* it. Through the sometimes creative working practices of diplomacy, international law helps set the boundaries, specify propriety, and the normative standards of justice and fairness (Ikenberry 2001). Thus, international law, in this instance constituted by the Treaty of Versailles, is rendered an *indispensable* component of international relations post-1919.

We see this importance attached to law in the League of Nations Covenant (see also Wilson's speech to the Senate on the Treaty & Covenant on July 10, 1919). However, we most directly see the connection between law and international order in his speech at Mt. Vernon on July 4, 1918 (noted in Ikenberry 2001, 127): "What we seek [in world politics] is the reign of law based on the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind." As William Dodd (1923, 120) later put it "[Wilsonianism would] substitute a new international order for the old order. He would write a new international law." We should not overlook the fact that this was provocative and controversial at the time (see A.T. Mahan's 1911 essay titled "The Deficiencies of Law as an Instrument of International Adjustments" in Graebner 1964).

[72] Two other sections of note that appear to use some notion of communal guarantees and implicate some sense of required interaction in order to anything to be accomplished in international relations: "IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety... XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike."

Ending point: 'This' international law (and not that)

Part X (Economic Clauses), Section II (Treaties) of the Treaty of Versailles contains Articles 282-295.[73] These articles specified the conditions in which treaties are revived and abrogated as a result of the end of World War I. The text categorizes treaties into two types: "bilateral" and "multilateral." According to the type, hence the significance of the differentiation, legal stipulations are applied. The relevant sections are reproduced here:

> Article 282. From the coming into force of the present Treaty and subject to the provisions thereof the multilateral treaties, conventions and agreements of an economic or technical character enumerated below and in the subsequent Articles shall alone be applied as between Germany and those of the Allied and Associated Powers...
>
> Article 289. Each of the Allied or Associated Powers, being guided by the general principles or special provisions of the present Treaty, shall notify to Germany the bilateral treaties or conventions which such Allied or Associated Power wishes to revive with Germany... Only those bilateral treaties and conventions which have been the subject of such a notification shall be revived between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany; all the others are and shall remain abrogated.

To be clear, while debate raged over the League of Nations, reparations, colonies, and so forth, *very little* contention about these clauses was uncovered during the research process. It would be difficult to imagine text any more clear in disclosing the legal standing of treaties, but it begs the question of why divide international law in this fashion, particularly when the Fourteen Points seems to indicate that all international law is valuable? What caused the production of these categories? How were these categories rendered acceptable? How did politics connect an un-operationalized indispensable notion of international law to its practical realization: the differentiation through bilateral and multilateral types?

[73] One may consult a number of volumes for the text of the Treaty of Versailles, including Volume 13 of the FRUS on The Paris Peace Conference, 1919.



Figure 8. Relations of international law, war, and the outcomes of treaty revival.

Most of the analysis on the treaty is on reparations (e.g. Keynes 1920), the League of Nations (e.g. Carr 1939; see the APSR and AJIL notes by Fenwick 1919; Finch 1919a; 1919b), international security, or territory (see also the review of Schmitt 1945: 49-59). As the empirical narrative that follows demonstrates, there is simply no discussion about the abrogation and revival of treaties in mass media, diplomatic documents, or academic legal essays until the German note in response to the draft treaty. What we observe until then is only the seemingly natural and logical presentation of the differentiation of treaties (bilateral versus multilateral) and its consequences (universal abrogation with exceptions versus selected revival). There is instantiation; there is a functionalist rationale, but no extended justification.

This is the first instance of the use of multilateral to mediate politics not just after war, but at any time all. Retrospectively, whether or not multilateral treaties are legitimate seems to be already a settled matter, but upon closer inspection, in these moments there were reasons available for not holding this belief. The question is: how were these set sensibly aside?

Drafting the Treaty Text

Note on "public diplomacy"

The Paris Peace Conference of 1919, which produced the Treaty of Versailles, was subject to scrutiny unlike any other international conference (e.g. see the recent historical study by Macmillian 2001; also see Noble 1935, 302-304 on communiqués and the press). More than any other treaty to that point, every detail was assumed to be later held under the light of the public gaze (see Finch 1919a, 165-167; Noble 1935, 301-306; see FRUS 1919, PPC, III, 765-766 on the issue of colonies and "how it would look to the world"). Thus, we observe the production of a massive document, suggesting a condition of pressure for clarity of terms.[74]

In this section, I first utilized the Foreign Relations of the US series and the New York Times to construct my account. To flesh out particular instantiations, I relied on published primary sources from Baruch (1919; 1920), Temperley (1920), Miller (1924), Seymour and House (1921), Baker (1923), and "near" secondary sources in academic publications such as Finch (1919a; 1919b).

[74] A "final version" of the treaty was published by the *New York Times* on June 10, 1919 (via the US Senate). This copy differs very little from the final version of June 28. This early release of the text by Senate Republicans not only drew the ire of Woodrow Wilson, but a subpoena of the purported source of the text: a group of New York bankers, including one J.P. Morgan, see "Peace Treaty Made Public by Senate After Warm Debate; Vote 47 to 24; Bankers Summoned in Leak Inquiry." *New York Times*, 10 June 1919.

The Politics of Treaties

In Paris, economic concerns were extremely important, arguably just as contentious and momentous as the potential creation of the League of Nations (Macmillan 2001, xxv; Baruch 1920; Baker 1923, II, 410-414 and 418-423). The issue of reparations was the main economic concern, but underpinning this was the resumption of international commerce, the reconstruction of large parts of France and Belgium, and the inclusion of the German economy back into a system of world trade (see the list in Macmillan 2001: xxvi). *New York Times* coverage of a Department of Commerce monograph released in October 1918 reveals an interesting elevation of status of 'economic relations': "[a]uthorities in all the belligerent countries are agreed that, next to the conclusion of peace, the most important question involves the problems of production, trade, and commerce after the war."

It goes on to report: "Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan, as well as Austria-Hungary, have appointed economic commissions to make recommendations for after the war trade conditions, and the commissions in all these countries have made preliminary reports."[75] In the words of Secretary of State Lansing (FRUS 1919, PPC, I, 174-175) in December 1918:

> The British are bringing over a very large body of financial and economic representatives and we have simply got to be prepared to meet them and to advise our delegates. My personal opinion has always been… that economic questions will be at the basis of almost every dispute which will arise at the conference.[76]

While informal exchanges began well before the official beginning of the Paris Peace Conference (e.g. Macmillan 2001, xxviii), the minutes of the Council of Five on January 27, 1919 revealed that a committee should be formally instituted to consider financial questions. During this meeting, British Prime Minister Lloyd George remarked that Germany is “entitled to

[75] “Economic Problem After War Studied.” *New York Times*, 14 October 1918.
[76] Many scholars and private sector individuals doubled as advisers in the diplomatic entourage at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 (see organizational chart of American Commission to Negotiate Peace, FRUS 1919, PPC, XI, 550).

ask what her economic future is going to be," (FRUS 1919, PPC, III, 730). The same minutes see French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau proposing that a Commission be established on questions of a legal nature (settlement of private claims, the seizure of enemy ships, goods on enemy ships, contracts, etc.), including "reestablishment of the conventional regime of the treaties." While there was discussion of folding in "the question of general principles" with the topic of the League of Nations, Clemenceau's proposal was ultimately adopted (FRUS 1919, PPC, III, 733; Finch 1919a; Temperley 1920, III, 52).[77]

Treaties are thus on the agenda for the Paris Peace Conference as a topic for inclusion in the treaty that will end the war. Perhaps incidentally, the importance of clarity with reference to treaties is illustrated in the actions of the Council of Five on the next day, where the topic of German colonies is discussed. In this context, the French case for laying claim to German colonial territory (as per normal practice when making "sacrifices" in "conquering these territories from Germany") included the statement: "They would consider the treaties signed with Germany as abrogated," (FRUS 1919, PPC, III, 759; see also the logic of these claims in that the French were the "first to explore these territories... to sign agreements or treaties with the native races,"; note FRUS 1919, PPC, III, 760, where the French argue that it was German policy to remove sea access, which hindered the "development of French Equatorial Africa"). Indeed, it was treaties that instantiated and legitimated the division of territory into French and German colonies (e.g. see the entanglement of international law and colonies in Rogers 1926 or Robbins 1939). The potential French claim to German colonial territory necessitated the abrogation of various treaties (those relating to Togoland and Cameroon) in order to maintain legal consistency.

The point here is that the consequences of abrogating treaties are notable in terms of political legitimacy—and that the question of which treaties will be revived and which will be

[77] Also see Maia Davis Cross (2007, 135-136) on the Big Four's trust of the work of the diplomatic commissions.

abrogated, in general, between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany will be treated delicately. The question of colonial transfer demonstrates that all parties appear to be cognizant of this. In this particular discussion over colonies, treaties are instantiated as instruments to be used to legitimate appropriate political activity, which in this particular case is the ownership or acquisition of colonial territory of the defeated. This is evidence that treaties are of great importance, but not necessarily because they communicate credible commitments, but because they create or lay out the discursive-practical terrain over which processes of legitimation play out.[78] There is every reason to believe that the treatment of treaties, and its consequences, in the post-war context will be heavily scrutinized, as these discussions concerning colonies generated a great amount of reporting.

According to the FRUS minutes of February 21, 1919, the Economic Drafting Committee submitted "Draft Terms of Reference to the Proposed Economic Commission of the Peace Conference" to the Council of Ten.[79] Via Clemental, pressing issues of "transitory measures" (to be handled by the Supreme Economic Council) were differentiated from "permanent questions" (to be dealt by the Economic Committee, which included questions on "future permanent commercial relations, contracts and claims, and the abrogation or revival of economic treaties," see FRUS 1919, PPC, IV, 64). Thus, the Economic Committee of the Conference would have a substantial role in laying down the tracks for future international organization. It was standard diplomatic practice of the time to refer these kinds of questions to 'technical experts' first. As Temperley (1920, I, 244-245; see also Baker 1923, I, 114; Macmillan 2001, xxix) states: "the

[78] Fortna (2004) finds correlation between cease-fire mechanisms (peace-keeping, treaties, etc.) and the durability of peace. While these are important to highlight, here I adopt a different tactic to examining how these political mechanisms are even possible given the context. For example, the finding that "multilateral" wars have no effect on the durability of peace opens the possibility for situating what "multilateral" means and how it was used in particular cases to explain the observed variance (see Fortna 2004, 212).
[79] This committee included Bernard Baruch, see FRUS 1919, PPC, IV, 64.

British and American delegations were both especially strong in financial and economic questions," and in the footnote in the text goes on to assert: "e.g. other delegations attached much importance to the views of Professor Shotwell and David Hunter Miller of the USA delegation."

David Hunter Miller's (1924) 21-volume diary and documents relating to the Peace Conference discloses several moments relevant to this study. First, on February 27, he writes that Baruch was discussing with Sir H.L. Smith regarding "the question of the treaties now existing." In this conversation with Baruch, Smith informs him "the French had the view that in a general treaty of say 8 or 10 Powers in which were included say Germany and France, a war either wholly or partly ended the treaty," (Miller 1924, I, 139). Second, toward the end of February and into March, Miller notes several days where he is "considering" US treaties with belligerent countries (e.g. Miller 1924, I, 141, 149, and 152). On March 12, he advised Joseph Bailey Brown (a staff member of the international law group) on a memo regarding treaties with Germany (Miller 1924, I, 165). In this memo (Miller 1924, VI, 325-327 and 330-331), Brown considers whether or not particular agreements between the US and Germany are in force. He argues that "it seems to be established in international law that such private rights belonging to citizens of the enemy country are *suspended* by a declaration of war," (Miller 1924, VI, 325, emphasis in original) and goes on to cite Moore's Digest (a well-recognized international law publication), in addition to other legal notable texts (Halleck, Phillimore and Rivier). At the same time (Miller 1924, VI, 327):

> The difficulty is to determine whether or not such agreements are automatically restored to full force and effect upon the conclusion of peace. On this point there is considerable difficulty since the authorities do not agree upon the effect of war on treaties… as to the effect of the intermediate treaties have to do with commercial agreements, private property rights, etc., there may be some doubt.

He then musters evidence from more legal notables (Hershey, Oppenheim, and Wilson) to substantiate the idea that the debate on the status of treaties after war is a live one.

Interestingly, when it comes to "what the policy should be" Brown argues that (Miller 1924, VI, 330-331:

> ... these agreements are such as were mutually advantageous and proper for the conduct of commercial affairs between civilized nations, and have commercial dealings upon an equal basis with the United States, it would seem entirely proper to keep all of these agreements in effect for the future. They were considered fair before the war and the United States was under no disadvantage because of the existence of any one of them. In fact, if held to be absolutely annulled on account of the war, there is little doubt that similar agreements would be made to take their place, if normal relations between the two nations are re-established.

Here, it should be noted that the abrogation of all bilateral treaties might actually be non-sensical from a legal perspective. This demonstrates why we have detailed legal arguments such as the example from Temperley above. Indeed, Temperley (1920, III, 54-57) details the Economic Commission's work; the problems it managed and its proposed solutions. In short, the commission had to deal with "the past" and the "future". Economic and political relations were "regulated" by:

> ... a complicated network of treaties and conventions… some of these treaties were bilateral, and others multilateral. The question of the effect of war on treaties was one on which international lawyers were divided, but whatever the true doctrine, the Peace Treaty had to make provision by which it should be known, when intercourse with Germany recommenced, whether any particular one of these treaties, multilateral or bilateral, was alive or dead.

Later, Temperley (1920, IV, 79-81) argues that these clauses would be "carefully phrased so as to avoid any implication that a particular doctrine is adopted with respect to the termination or non-termination of commercial treaties by the fact of war." Perhaps this is because such a basis in the law opens lines of critique and variety of interpretations (as was discussed above in Brown's memo). As Temperley (1920, IV, 80) notes:

> ... the American delegates were unable to accept any of the proffered formulae [of general legal principles—ostensibly the French suggestion, see above], and held that it was both unnecessary and unwise to do more than deal with the specific problems in hand. This view, shared by the representatives of other States—Italy and Brazil, for example—prevailed.

This meant that no general treaty for the status of treaties during and after war would be created. The discussion of multilateral treaties to remain in effect is limited to a description of conditions, while "the fixing of the status of bilateral treaties was a difficult problem," (Temperley 1920, 81). It notes the "solution": "to give to each Allied or Associated Power the option of reviving or not, as it pleased, its former treaties with ex-enemy Powers," (Temperley 1920, VI, 81) but no details as to how that was mediated. The section on "general observations" give some indication of what was at stake (Temperley 1920, IV, 83):

> Taken as a whole… the commercial clauses of the treaties give an impression not so much of unnecessary harshness as of unnecessary and meticulous concern for the interests of the Powers that framed them… resulting from the heaping together of a mass of stipulations, many of which as of small importance in themselves… [is] in a part an inevitable outcome of the way in which the treaties were framed.

Perhaps the way to mediate amongst the Allies was to find a "lowest common denominator" solution (one might conceive of the treatment of multilateral treaties this way) and/or one in which they could make a decision on their own (as one may conceive of the treatment of bilateral treaties this way).[80]

Bernard Baruch was one of the US delegates involved with the Economic Commission and in the Economic Drafting Committee. His published memoir describes the work of the Economic Drafting Committee (Baruch 1920, 81):

> It embraced the work of laying the foundations for the renewal of private business and public and private intercourse generally between the two sets of enemy countries. The stipulations ultimately framed for this purpose doubtless affect directly a larger number of persons in the activities of their daily lives than do any other provisions of the treaty.[81]

---

[80] Temperley also notes that the idea of an "Equality of Trade Conditions" document was drafted by US and British delegations, but later dropped (a pre-cursor of worldwide 'multilateral trade' diplomacy). It also notes that the Economic Commissions eight sub-committees held almost 100 meetings in the six weeks of March and April (Temperley 1920, II, 56).

[81] Chandler P. Anderson (1921, 127), in his review of Baruch's book in the AJIL, concurs: "The reparation and economic clauses of the treaty deal with matters which vitally affect the whole world, as they furnish the terms upon which Germany makes restitution and resumes commercial relations with the other nations which have ratified the treaty."

The Economic Commission also had its own advisors, which included Fred K. Nielsen, solicitor for the State Department (see Scott 1923 stating that Nielsen dealt with treaties at Paris, esp. 307-308; see below for Nielsen's memo to Miller on the German reply to the Treaty articles on treaties). Indeed, it is the role of experts like these that ostensibly allows Baruch to make the following argument (Baruch 1920, 89):

> These provisions [Part X 'Economic Clauses'] are concerned largely with technical subjects that enter into international relations. Such subjects were dealt with by men possessing the necessary technical training...

Moreover, Baruch (1920, 89) asserts that they are not "unjustly onerous upon Germany. Nor are they in derogation of the letter or the spirit of any of President Wilson's Fourteen Points." With regard to the Treaties articles, Baruch (1920, 35) writes, "generally speaking, only those pre-war treaties and conventions are revived where it suits the Allied Governments to revive, and those in Germany's favor may be allowed to lapse." In defending this general approach, he states (Baruch 1920, 96):

> It was of course important that an arrangement should be provided for in the Treaty of Peace with regard to the status of treaties of all sorts to which Germany and the Allied and Associated Powers were parties before the war. The subject was very carefully dealt with by Articles 282 to 295 in a way that should leave little room for future complications.

This supports the earlier claim that the wording and phraseology was very intentional, attempting to strike sharp boundaries of meaning. The argument is that experts were involve and were very deliberate in their wording. Their participation and precision is notable to create a just, logical, and ultimately, legitimate peace.

Baruch notes that the actual multilateral treaties that were revived cover a wide range of issues (measures to waterways to abuse of children). Indeed, the fact of their revival renders these technical subjects, at least in some sense, important for international relations; and that international relations are constituted by a wide variety of political, social, and economic activity.

However, no rationale is given for the differentiation of treaties (Baruch 1920, 96) as ‘multilateral’ is given a basic quantitative definition, the general meaning of the term in international law:

> The treaty enumerates a very considerable list of so-called multilateral treaties that is, international agreements between three or more nations; and it is declared that such agreements alone shall be "applied between Germany and those of the Allied and Associated Powers who are parties thereto.”

The subject of bilateral treaties which Germany had concluded with each of the Allied and Associated Powers is dealt with in a different way (Baruch 1920, 96-97):

> The scheme for the revival of treaties furnishes a useful procedure for readjusting treaty relations with Germany. With regard to numerous treaties such a readjustment is doubtless highly desirable.[82]

In sum, Baruch contends that "the provisions in the Peace Treaty under the heading of Commercial Relations, taken as a whole, would adequately protect our Government's interests during a period in which treaty relations with Germany might be directly adjusted the two Governments on a more satisfactory basis than that existing before the war," (Baruch 1920, 98). Note his description of the terms as “just” (this might be considered a re-circulation of one of the counter-arguments to the German reply, see discussion below) and in accordance with Wilson's Fourteen Points. Use of the phrase "it was of course important" renders the status of treaties in international relations as indispensable—and this has consequences on legitimating “multilateral treaties” in general. Recall the notion that "men possessing the necessary technical training," were handed complex legal questions, suggesting that the revival of treaties was not done haphazardly, but reasonably and properly. Lastly, as noted, the specific rendering of the text by the “experts” suggests that clarity was an objective, thus the choice of words and Baruch's differentiation of kinds of treaties is likely strategic, not haphazard. In Miller’s notes on drafting

[82] The US revives just one treaty (see Lesser 1953), and negotiates a new treaty that reiterates several abrogated ones (see below).

that section of the Treaty (Hunter 1924, XIX, 411-414) all the articles are taken from the Commission's drafts, and there was hardly any debate at all regarding their content.

Before moving on to the legitimation of the differentiation between bilateral and multilateral treaties in the politics of Versailles, we should note Baruch's submission to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (1919). This passage confirms the general thrust of his statements on multilateral treaties, and adds a specific characterization of them as "not political," in addition to the inclusive, participatory nature of the topics that concern these kinds of treaties (Baruch 1919, 14):[83]

> The provisions in Part II raise few contentious questions. It is first provided that a considerable number of multilateral treaties, on matters of concern to all countries, and not political in character, shall be reviewed; such as postal, telegraph, sanitary conventions.

So far, this narrative has made six points, the last of which will be compared to the following section on the diplomacy between the Allies and Germany upon presentation of the Treaty text. First, at the end of war, there must be a transition to normal international relations. The most important aspects can be sub-divided into two related categories: political and economic relations. Second, political and economics relations are, in part, constituted by international law; which is itself composed of treaties. Third, thus the question of the status of treaties, as part of a larger question of how to transition to normal international relations, had to be faced by the drafters of the Treaty of Versailles. Fourth, there was not an obvious path forward given: a) the competing interests of the Allied countries, as expressed in the Council of Ten and in other exchanges on the status of treaties with Germany, and b) the live debate amongst international legal scholars, many of whom were advisors to delegations in Paris. Fifth, potential diplomatic tension was mediated by abrogating all bilateral treaties and reviving a list

[83] See also Baruch's statements in Congress regarding how the Economic Commission operated in *Treaty of Peace with Germany* published in 1919.

of multilateral treaties ones. There was no sign of contesting this decision in any of the sources examined. Lastly, the legitimation of this political path regarding “multilateral treaties” rests on three legs: a) justice and the spirit of Wilson’s Fourteen Points for world order, b) legal support determined by experts very great care and deliberation (due to public nature of Conference), and c) the topics of the treaties, which concerned all countries and were not political in nature.

Legitimating the Differentiation of Treaties: Tension and Mediation in the Exchange of Diplomatic Documents, May-June 1919

The Treaty of Versailles is a long document, one that created new dimensions of, and political terrain for, world politics. As with any creation, various sections either stood in need of explanation, or stood with the help of legitimate discursive practices. One prominent way to explain politics to audiences is through mass media. Indeed, the *New York Times* on May 8, 1919, published the “Official Summary of the Treaty of Peace Presented to the Germans at Versailles Yesterday.” In it, under Section X, Economic Clauses, are two paragraphs worth mentioning. The first, entitled "Multilateral Conventions", opens with, "some forty multilateral conventions are renewed between Germany and the allied and associated powers," before listing some conditions to which Germany must adhere. The second paragraph is entitled "Bilateral Treaties," and states: "each allied and associated State may renew any treaty with Germany in so far as consistent with the peace treaty by giving notice within six months... Treaties entered into by Germany since Aug. 1, 1914, with other enemy States... are abrogated..." No further justification is made. Simply, there are some multilateral conventions that will be renewed for all countries, and there are bilateral ones as well that require notification in order to be renewed.

This outcome, which resulted in the conditions stated in Section II of the Versailles Treaty, required the dismissal of, at least, two already present alternatives. The first was a complete re-start of international relations--the abrogation of all treaties. Hurst (1921, 38-39) is

useful to recall to highlight this line of thinking in international legal circles, and indeed, was the subject of debate (recall that Hurst drafts the League Covenant with Miller). To quote his opening lines:

> There are few questions upon which people concerned with the practical application of the rules of international law find the text-books less helpful than that of the effect of war upon treaties in force between belligerents. Both the practice of States, as exemplified in the provisions of treaties of peace, and the pronouncements of statesmen appear to conflict with the principles laid down by the text-books.

Even where there is general consensus that not all treaties are abrogated, there remains serious practical issues to resolve:

> ... no two writers seem agreed as to what is the correct rule, and the principles laid down by those who write with assurance scarcely commend themselves as workable rules which will meet the requirement of modern conditions... A thorough exploration of the whole question upon a scientific basis is much needed. Principles might then be formulated which would meet with general acceptance among the writers and students of international law, and would thus pave the way for a set of rules which would be universally adopted.

In the case of multilateral treaties, Hurst (1921: 40-41) specifically identifies the debate at the Paris Peace Conference:

> The recent world conflict [World War I] presented for the first time on a large scale the problem of multilateral treaties all the parties to which were belligerents. There seems in theory no reason why such treaties should not stand on the same footing as bilateral treaties between the belligerents. On the other hand, where there are third parties who have been neutral in the war, the reciprocal rights and duties between each belligerent and the third party, and the difficulty of terminating such rights and duties between any two parties when they are to continue in force between other parties, render it probable that when the treaty was concluded the intention was that, as between belligerent parties, war should not put an end to the treaty, even though while actual hostilities continued it might be difficult, or even impossible, to give effect to it as between the belligerents.

Indeed, he states that multilateral treaties should be further differentiated as to whether or not neutral third parties are present or not (Hurst 1921, 40-41). Even then, the character of the treaty in question, and the intention of the parties may create exceptions (Hurst 1921, 40-41).

Politically, however, the view that a debate was on-going in international law circles was marginalized by the drafters of the economic terms and is evident in the diplomatic interaction after release of the treaty's text between the Allied Powers and the German delegation. It was tacitly, without argument, agreed that to carry out international relations requires international law—as argued above—so the first alternative, a complete clearing of the decks, was not even publicly discussed as an option. How could it, given Wilson's Fourteen Points and German agreement that this be the basis for peace? The second alternative, a particular determination of the effect of war on treaties, was proposed in the German Note as a contender to what was offered in the draft Treaty. This required mediation because these options were, in particular ways, incompatible.

We can locate the tension in the diplomacy between Germany and the Allied Powers empirically. Through the FRUS, we hear the response of the German delegation (FRUS 1919, PPC, VI, 871-873) on May 29, 1919. In the "Remarks on the Conditions of Peace," hereafter the German note, specifically, Section VII on State Treaties, we observe a counter-argument (see also Luckau 1941; see also arguments about basic rights and dignity, FRUS 1919, VI, 817 and passim.) to the treaties decision in the draft text:

> The draft treaty apparently starts from the principle that...merely those multilateral treaties of an economic or technical character shall be revived as are expressly mentioned in the treaty, whereas all the remaining treaties of this character shall lapse. This principle does not seem to be appropriate; it would not supply the secure and reliable legal basis which is indispensable for the resumption of international relations... Thus, the examination of the scope of the draft... has shown that the list [of multilateral treaties] contained in Article 282 does not enumerate a whole number of multilateral conventions which ought especially to be included among the treaties therein mentioned... In the opinion of the German Delegation, it would therefore be preferable that, on the conclusion of peace, all multilateral treaties which were binding up to the outbreak of the war should in principle again enter into force.
>
> An emphatic protest must also be made against the proposals as regards the re-entry into force of bi-lateral treaties to which German is a party... [where] the decision is to rest exclusively with the Allied and Associated Governments as to which of the treaties which

> were in force... should be revived... [and] the Allied and Associated Powers who are parties are entitled... to indicate unilaterally those of the provisions therein contained which are to be excepted from application, if these, in view of the notifying Power, are not in harmony with the provisions of the Peace Treaty... it is not admissible that they should be split up in such an arbitrary manner that on the one side only the obligations should remain and on the other, only the right.

The German Note instantiates the entire mass of multilateral treaties hanging together as significant in creating a sense of, using the English of the German Note, security and legal reliability—certainty—in an otherwise anarchical political world. They are "indispensable" because they supply the "secure and reliable" basis for "international relations". Multilateral treaties function to provide certainty of the behavior of others in the system. In a sense, this is an early implication of the use of multilateralism for later IR. Multilateralism, characterized by many IR scholars as an "institution" functions to generate expectations, which make politics 'go on'. Without these, international relations has greater difficulty occurring because expectations are vague and there is less certainty regarding the behavior of others in the system. Similarly, for German diplomats in 1919, this is not an appropriate way to resume international political life. If this certainty were diminished, it calls into question, of how would world politics function at all. Appropriate international relations is then in some way dependent on this sense of certitude of following what we might call international norms.

Bilateral treaties, as part of the body of international law, are discussed as also being important—ostensibly for the very same reasons as multilateral treaties because selecting exceptions within these treaties is deemed not admissible as well. Indeed, the term "unilaterally" is used to describe an oppositional position to a more systemic or collective type.

What is being contested is which parts of international law should be revived in the post-war environment. This has consequences on the role of international law plays in world politics. The contending interpretations have to do with the consequential uses of categorizing treaties.

The German Note is an argument over the logical conclusion of the settled position that international law is *indispensable*. Because all treaties, whether bilateral or multilateral, are legitimate pieces of international law, why cannot they all be revived?

What is not being contested is differentiation between multilateral and bilateral types of treaties (nor that the victorious parties should not lay out terms of the post-war political environment). This is stable ground for both sides. The discursive practice of producing such treaties through conferences and written documents is not a locus of contention—in fact, its recession into the background constitutes its perceived stability. This is sufficient evidence for the legitimacy of categorizing treaties as "multilateral" and "bilateral," though it created problems for where the boundaries of those categories can legitimately be placed.

The minutes of the Council of Four meetings from May 24 to June 28, 1919, not only summarize the protestations from the German Note regarding State Treaties (a broader term than the previously used "Economic Treaties"), but also reveal a two-pronged counter-argument (FRUS 1919, PPC, VI, 426):

> The Allied and Associated Powers are certainly of the opinion that multilateral and bilateral treaties between peoples must exist, in times of peace, so that the principles of international law may be enforced and normal international relations maintained. They have therefore aimed at reapplying all multilateral treaties which seemed to them to be compatible with the new conditions arising out of the war.

Regarding bilateral treaties, they have reserved for each of the Allied and Associated Powers the right to decide the matter in conformity with the principles of the Treaty of Peace (FRUS 1919, PPC, VI, 426-428):

> … [We] could not permit the continuance of all the treaties which Germany imposed on her allies, on her temporarily defeated adversaries, and even in certain cases of neutral countries, with a view to securing particular favourable conditions and special advantages of all kinds the maintenance of which is incompatible with the re-establishment of the spirit of justice.

> This principle necessarily involves the rejection of the theory put forward by Germany in Section VII... and obviates the necessity for any negotiation on the matter. A general indiscriminate reapplication after the conclusion of Peace of all multilateral and bilateral treaties, even for a short time, cannot be accepted, and it is only just that the Allied and Associated Powers should have reserved and should reserve in the future the right to indicate which of these treaties with Germany they intend to revive or allow to be revived…
>
> The German objections to Article 289 appear to arise out of a misunderstanding of its intention. ...we are quite prepared to give an assurance that this provision not be arbitrarily used for the purpose of splitting up bilateral treaties in such a way that only the obligation should remain on one side and on the other side only the rights. The Allied and Associated Powers will themselves, through the League of Nations, exercise a surveillance to ensure that the provisions of Article 289 are loyally carried out.

The Allied counter-argument to the German Note instantiates treaties and its two types, bilateral and multilateral, as essential in times of peace. Note that this makes no claim to replace one with the other. This instantiation again draws on the notion that peace and 'normal international relations' requires international law to assist in its maintenance. However, for "multilateral treaties," the "new conditions" require a selection process, which in this case was determined by the Allied countries. This arguably links "multilateral treaties" with some kind of practical collective process.

The counter-argument for the "bilateral treaties" is more extensive as it appeals to notions of "justice." "Justice" is not served unless bilateral treaties are re-applied piecemeal. This draws on notions of injustice and common punitive practices during the course of "making peace," and even justifies the "right" of the Allies to select the "multilateral treaties" to be revived. Interestingly, the League is used as a mechanism to ensure that Article 289 is properly executed. This is an interesting move to monitor state practice using an international organization. Indeed, this instantiates the League as a legitimate, honest broker (and brackets any concerns of its efficacy as such).

Treaty draft text	Text on treaties is justified because it is: a) just and in the spirit of Wilson's Fourteen Points for world order; b) legally supported by experts, taking great care and deliberation (due to public nature of Conference), and; c) with regard to multilateral treaties, concerning topics which involve all countries and are not political in nature.
German response to draft text	All treaties are indispensable to international relations (they provide reliability and security). Therefore, revive all treaties, bilateral and multilateral.
Allied counter-response	Treaties are indispensable to international relations. It is right and just for the Allied countries to determine which bilateral and multilateral treaties fit the conditions of the post-war era.

TABLE 1. Legitimation moves involving multilateral treaties.

Miller (1924) also includes a memo written by Fred K. Nielsen of the US delegation on the German note regarding Treaties (presumably for Miller's comment; see Miller 1924, I, 329, right before his departure from Paris). It reviews the German objections, and provides a response. In particular, Nielsen argues that "[t]here is a strong suggestion of lack of sincerity in these objections in view of their indefiniteness… [and they] fail to mention a single additional agreement which they think should be added," (Miller 1924, IX, 465-466). While there is no mention of justice in these passages, keeping legal coherence is the justification for whatever diplomatic outcome results.

The analysis in various articles of the *American Journal of International Law* and *American Political Science Review* glosses over this interaction. In Fenwick's (1919) note in the APSR, he mentions the German Note, but goes no further. Finch (1919b) prints the text of cover letters by the German delegation and the Allies, but no specifics in their detailed diplomatic notes. The June 10 copy of the *New York Times* has the full text of the treaty. Indeed, with no further contestation, the legitimation of the abrogation of all bilateral treaties and the revival of a set of multilateral treaties was temporarily obtained. This stability is evident in the brief appearance of Mr. Nielsen in the FRUS July 1919 passage on 'economic clauses' (FRUS 1919, PPC, XI, 285):

> Lansing: I want to ask one thing. What treaties have we, the United States, got to negotiate directly with Germany? Treaties of commerce?
>
> Nielsen: That will depend on the status of the treaty that we want to maintain. Under certain [articles?] of the Economic Clauses all bilateral treaties are abrogated, with the right of any country to revive such treaty as they want to revive…

Discussion: legitimation of treaty differentiation

Baruch's (1920, 8) words (recounted in Chandler 1921) in his Introduction are worth recalling:

> It is a fundamental mistake to assume that the treaty ends where it really begins. The signing of the document on June 28, 1919, at Versailles did not complete its history; it really began it.

During these episodes, discursive practices permitted instantiations in the present, using the past to depart from it. In this sense, though the present is differentiated from the past there must be a line of relation to the past in some way (e.g. Jackson 2006a). We do not observe articles regarding UFOs in 1919; we observe discussions about the re-application of treaties. This is identified as contingent upon the diplomatic culture, as a part of the political landscape, in which discursive practices are understood. Much like the Congresses of Munster, Osnabruck,

and Vienna, the Paris Conference permitted, once again, an assembly of diplomats, heads of state, and their assistants (Macmillan 2001). The practice of making peace goes on—but there is possible variation.[84]

During the drafting of the Treaty text, no precise, unambiguous justification is given for the reasoning behind the differentiation of the treaties. Certainly, none was given to the public through mass media outlets. However, the diplomacy reveals that the German protestation to this differentiation (and linked practical consequences) had to be marginalized in some particular way: reference to justice and rights of the Allied countries to determine which fit the conditions of the post-war era. These references did not emerge from nothing, but rather, as the analytical narrative highlighted, from discursive-practical resources: Wilson's Fourteen Points speech, various international legal texts, the negotiation of treaties after war, the use of experts, the imperative to be clear in the light of public diplomacy, and the technical and apolitical nature of multilateral treaties. This analysis provides greater precision as to how processes of legitimation played out the way they did by specifying these resources and their linkage to the problem of resuming international relations, and in particular, the status of treaties, after World War I.

At the end of war, the practice of treaty-making for the specification of what future international relations will look like was relatively stable. Coupled with the relatively stable practice of using treaties in international relations, the move to categorize and then specify which treaties would be incorporated into future international relations was made to look natural and logical through the use of experts and proprietary notions of stability and justice. Indeed, the diplomats, politicians, and publics were far more interested in the radical change of the League of Nations and the imposition of reparations more than which multilateral treaties were to be

[84] Robert Lansing (1921) lamented Clemenceau's speech endorsing a "system of alliances"; that this could "transform the Conference into a second Congress of Vienna and result in a reversion to the old undesirable order."

revived. This implies that it could be considered a relatively easy task to legitimately classify treaties as such and revive them in the manner that they were.

The brief moment of tension over the revival of treaties can be usefully considered to be comprised of competing understandings of the importance of treaties in international relations; how treaties "fit" in world politics. In this instance, *multilateral treaties* are accepted as indispensable types. This negotiation, a series of articulations and counter-articulations, permitted the practice of making peace to go on, by discursively, and practically, linking *multilateral treaties* as indispensable pieces to re-forming international relations, and other pieces (*bilateral treaties*) as not. The diplomatic exchange permitted a number of lines of relation to be drawn to legitimate *multilateral treaties* in a particular way. This is an important moment of stability in terms of what multilateral means in world politics and what its appropriate usage is: just, stable, functional, and normal international relations.

To check ourselves, we can reflexively ask: how else could one ensure that the status of treaties with Germany could be left to individual Allies and also demonstrate the importance of treaties in re-constituting normal international relations, and not simply re-start international law in its entirety? At any point, any of the Allied Powers could have suggested a revival of a particular type of bilateral treaty with Germany. Perhaps this did not happen as such a move might lock-in rather than open or create space for a new arrangement with the defeated power (see also French economic proposals in Baker 1923, II, 420-421, as the Allies reserved their right to make adjustments). Perhaps moreover, such a move would have needlessly made matters more complicated, and ran contrary to the normalized diplomatic practices of the victor (as Baruch states above "readjustment" was probably "desirable"). Using multilateral *was* a convenient, recognizable way to categorize particular treaties, with precedent from international

law and diplomacy. It would not require resorting to a kind of revolutionary move. Baker (1923, II, 424) reports that Sir H.L. Smith states that there is urgency and questions of “permanent relations” will be set aside. One might argue that a consequence of culture is that creativity is situated from within a particular conceptual framework. In this case, it would be the effects of diplomatic culture, providing a conceptual framework, to address the problem of resuming normal international relations after war. Indeed, another reason may simply be to punish Germany. As Arthur Pearson Scott (1920, 173-175) notes in retrospect:

> The [economic] part of the Treaty is the longest and most complicated… In part these provisions are intended to bring about the resumption of normal international intercourse; in part, however they are designed to deprive Germany of all political and economic control in the territory of her former allies and in Russia.

Even so, punishment begs for justification when situated in the context of Paris 1919.

It is the residue of this instantiation of the difference between 'multilateral' and 'bilateral' treaties that links this section on the Treaty of Versailles to the next episode. That is, the rationale for moving from a “bilateral” to a “multilateral” treaty (and thus the logic of multilateral treaties, in general) is made explicit in the diplomacy involving the Kellogg-Briand Pact. For the moment, we can summarize the relations made to multilateral treaties in this narrative with the following figure.



Figure 9. Relations of multilateral treaties, ca. 1919.

Going multilateral: Setting up the Kellogg-Briand Pact (KBP)[85]

Treaties were once famously called "scraps of paper" (see Otte 2007, a recent historical account of the use of this phrase in 1914), because of the variability of their enforcement. Their power was thought to be dependent on the commitments of states to enforce them. This underlying idea is usually at the heart for why treaties are deemed invaluable as the major diplomatic product that ends war; because it binds states to specific commitments. For similar reasons it is often argued, treaties are also consummated during peace time; examples include military alliances, trade agreements, or other multilateral treaties like the subject of this section: the Kellogg-Briand Pact (as it is commonly known in the US).[86]

Treaties and international relations during peace

The 1919 Paris Peace Conference instantiated "multilateral treaties" as legitimate elements of international relations, international law, and international order. This does not mean that once

[85] Of course, there are other abbreviations in the literature, such as Roscher's use of BKP (Briand-Kellogg Pact).
[86] On the name of the treaty, see Miller's discussion of the term "multilateral treaty" as what the State Department "calls it" in Miller 1928, 11-12; FRUS 1927 labels the section under France concerning these encounters: "Counterproposal for Multilateral Treaty Renouncing War"; Ferrell 1952, 222 probably describes the ambiguity definitively: "The present writer [Ferrell] recently asked the Department of State for the correct title of the treaty. The Department replied that the treaty itself has no title but that, in accordance with the wording of the preamble, the accepted and proper designation is 'Treaty providing for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy.'"

a treaty is called multilateral that it obtains automatic legitimacy or that once it appears legitimate that it will always remain so. Stabilizing legitimate ways of doing politics and producing political outcomes require work, and the KBP illustrates this point. It is the first instance of the suggestion of making a *bilateral* treaty *multilateral* and re-articulates why a *multilateral* type is preferable. Though often considered a failure that epitomizes the problems of pure utopianism, however one judges the KBP it is nonetheless an important link between the meaning of "multilateral treaties" in 1919 and the meaning of "multilateralism" in economic affairs because it re-affirms the notion that benefits result from "multilateral" types rather than "bilateral" ones when all parties agree to the same set of principles. It provides resources and sets the terrain for both "idealists" and "realists" in their contestations over policy in the future (e.g. see Jessup's (1940) "Reality of International Law" in *Foreign Affairs*).

The KBP connects a specific state behavior to multilateral treaty-making by arguing that a multilateral treaty is essential to creating the desired behavior. To make the desired activity and understanding operationalizable, a multilateral treaty is made to make sense, that to not create a multilateral treaty ostensibly meant to doom the project. In other words, to outlaw war as an instrument of foreign policy, it was argued that a multilateral treaty was required.

In the context of the international politics of the 1930s, the KBP was an instrument of admonition and justification regarding the intervention in Manchuria (e.g. Wright 1932; Brown 1933). As Ferrell notes in his definitive historical account of the Pact, "the various 'invocations' of the Kellogg pact from the summer of 1929 onward... is an extremely interesting portion of history," (Ferrell 1952; see also Roscher 2002). Ultimately, this study agrees with Ferrell's claim that the invocations of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in future diplomatic interaction are interesting. However, this study attends to how the process of constructing a multilateral treaty like the Pact

plays a constitutive part of, and provides the resources for, future discursive practices, including invocations of multilateral kinds in politics.

Some basic aspects of the creation of the KBP will be considered. Why the proposed shift from a “bilateral declaration” to “an appropriate multilateral treaty”? What makes that a legitimate option to consider? How did a “multilateral treaty” become a pathway to peace? Why make the international relations between the US and France more complex? Indeed, why not a conference, like the Hague or Paris Conferences? After its conclusion, Briand refers to the treaty as a “multilateral pact” (Miller 1928, 258; Briand in the *New York Times* on August 28, 1928; see also Wickersham 1929; Borchard 1929; Colombos 1929), alongside various other descriptors such as “comprehensive” and “universal”. How could there be such an action when the embodiment of 'internationalism', the League of Nations, did not even have US participation? What explains the introduction of “multilateral” in the language and how was this carried out? How was 'multilateral' made to fit in this instance?

Because this is a section of a genealogical endeavor, answers to these questions begin from the available understandings of diplomatic language and practice from Briand's initial suggestion, made on April 6, 1927. This starting point contains no mention of multilateral anything. As the narrative of this interaction unfolds, the events will be explained through contingency of previous, culturally inscribed, discursive practices. The narrative will identify how events are related to provide an explanation for how “multilateral” was made to fit in this context. It examines the claim to a multilateral type as the legitimate mode of treaty-making for the management of a global issue: war. In short, an interpretation is constructed that temporarily fixes an intersubjective and legitimated understanding of what discursive practices were linked to multilateral types. This process of legitimation which employs “multilateral” can be identified

and empirically observed through examining diplomatic language and practices used by various political entities. It is these relations that are the focus on the analysis because these provide a logic for future use and political value.

Starting Point: "a US-France engagement"

On April 6, 1927, a statement by Aristide Briand was published in the New York Times, ten years after US entry into WWI.[87] He states:

> If there were any need between these two great democracies to testify more convincingly in favor of peace and to present to the people a more solemn example, France would be ready publicly to subscribe, with the United States, to any mutual engagement tending, as between those two countries, to 'outlaw war,' to use an American expression.[88]

It is clear from Briand's statement (and the English and French translations are very similar) that a *bilateral* type of agreement ("between these two countries") is being sought, that is, some kind of political-legal, or diplomatic, agreement between the two countries. He makes reference to the fraternity of the two nations, the commonalities in terms of goals and inspirations between the US and France, and indeed, his statement was not made to the State Department, the US President, the US Ambassador in Paris, or the French Ambassador in Washington—but to the American people—using the phrase "outlaw war."[89]

Ending point: "multilateral pact"

> When... I had the honor of proposing to the Hon. Mr. Kellogg the form of words which he decided to accept and embody in the draft of a multilateral pact, I never contemplated for one moment that the suggested engagement should only exist between France and the

[87] See Ferrell (1952, 72) for the claim that James T. Shotwell, professor at Columbia University temporarily in Berlin as a Visiting Professor of International Relations, actually wrote the statement, and even mentions this to philosopher John Dewey (see the similar claim in Lester H. Brune's *Chronological History of US Foreign Relations: 1607-1932*).

[88] This statement was made to the Associated Press (Miller 1928, 154) and printed in the *New York Times*. Ferrell relies on a State Department translation as a copy of the statement was delivered by Paul Claudel (the French Ambassador in Washington; see FRUS 1927, II, 611), while Miller uses the translation in *International Conciliation* No. 243 (note the author of the accompanying Historical Commentary is Dr. James T. Shotwell).

[89] "Says Peace Is Goal of Both Nations, but Approached by Different Roads -- Washington Recalls Events of Ten Years Ago." *New York Times*, 6 April 1927.

> United States. Indeed I have always thought that in one way or another... the proposed covenant would in itself possess an expanding force strong enough to reach rapidly all nations whose moral adhesion was indispensable. It was, therefore, a source of gratification to me to see Mr. Kellogg... advocate extension of the pact and assign to it that universal character... [90]

What began as a political statement on friendship resulted in a multilateral treaty for the renunciation of war as an instrument of policy. Explanations based on political incentives (e.g. Ferrell 1952) are offered as reasons for why this happened, but this is of little interest if our objective is to explain what made these incentives possible in the first place. The approach used here addresses this explanatory goal by examining how different language and practices served to negotiate what became a legitimate political outcome versus other possibilities. As in the last section, this part of the study will rely on creating an analytical narrative using the FRUS, NYT, and various primary and secondary sources to substantiate and identify usage and arguments.

April 1927-May 1927: A False Start?

The response of the US government to Briand's public statement via mass media like the NYT was silence. From a diplomatic practice perspective, to suggest interaction resulting in a diplomatic agreement in public is interpreted as out of the ordinary (see also Miller 1928, 9 and FRUS 1927, II, 618-619). Such messages are usually sent in telegraphic cables to embassies or foreign ministries (cf. Satow 1917, 68-69 on methods of communication). Indeed, it is only after the French Ambassador (Claudel) in Washington sends a copy of the NYT statement over to the Department of State almost two months later, on May 28 (See FRUS 1927, II, 611; this is two days after the Lindbergh lunch, see below), that a need to respond emerges. In some sense, as

[90] "Briand Never Doubted That America Eventually Would Show Her Love of Peace." *New York Times*, 28 August 1928.

Ferrell notes, this was an instance of a “new diplomacy,” where it is not clear how a government should respond given the channel of communication.[91]

Indeed, after the coverage of the anniversary of US entry into World War I, not much is made of Briand’s “proposal” in the NYT until Columbia President Nicholas Murray Butler’s editorial of April 25. From that point on, a steady stream of editorials are run.[92] In addition, a number of articles appear, covering the response of various US Senators, the “wait” in Paris, the response in France and Britain, and various suggestions by individuals in the US. By the time Charles Lindbergh lands in France on May 21, completing a historic transatlantic trip, in circulation amongst the public and diplomats is the knowledge of a potential “agreement” between France and US. The series of celebrations over the following week provides an opportunity for informal diplomatic interaction. Briand was able to speak directly to the US Ambassador to France (Myron T. Herrick) at a luncheon on May 26.

In Herrick's cable to Kellogg (May 27), he states that Briand wanted to speak to him about "his suggested pact between France and the United States," (FRUS 1927, II, 613). According to Ferrell (152, 85), "[t]his seemingly casual conversation with Herrick marked the first time Briand had mentioned his proposal to an American diplomat." This ostensibly results in Claudel sending a copy of Briand's interview of April 6 to the Department of State on May 28.[93] Besides covering the Lindbergh events, the NYT publishes a draft ‘model treaty’ for the “US and other first power nations” written by Shotwell and Butler on May 31.[94] Herrick speaks publicly with the media (see NYT on May 31), and mentions Briand’s April 6 suggestion. On June 2, the NYT reports

[91] In future instances, US writers would not refer to the April 6 interview, suggesting that this is not how things should be done, in spite of being confronted by new actions in international relations. For example, Kellogg's published speech on US policy (appearing in *Foreign Affairs*) regarding the renunciation of war in March 1928 does not mention Briand's statement of April 6. Instead, it points to the diplomatic note of June 20. Wickersham's *Foreign Affairs* article (1929) gives a similar treatment.
[92] See *New York Times* editorials in 1927 for the following dates: April 28, 30; May 2, 4-8, 10, 12, 20, 23.
[93] When Kellogg actually became aware of this is unclear.
[94] “'American Locarno' To Renounce War Offered In Treaty.” *New York Times*, 31 May 1927.

Briand's generally negative response to the fore-going, calling Shotwell's draft a "surprise." He states that for him the "concern is… solely for the conclusion of such an accord between America and France."[95] While the support is very wide-ranging for this kind of agreement, the focus is on not something like a resolution for making war illegal (which Senator Borah had attempted in February 1923), but rather a US-France agreement on "outlawing war."

Herrick writes a follow-up cable on June 2 asking about the willingness of the US to negotiate the kind of agreement sought by Briand. While no communication between Kellogg and Herrick would occur until June 10, the NYT continued to publish articles on the Briand proposal. The chance of a "world Locarno" (to deter "state aggression") was reported on June 5.[96] It reports on June 8 that the French government desired to "open discussion with the US for negotiation", that Briand had spoken to Herrick about this, and that the inquiry was transmitted to the State Department "by cable either at the end of last week or in the last two days."[97] The article on June 10 specifically states that the "French foreign minister, it is learned, has made his proposal in definite form and last Friday [June 3] handed to Ambassador Herrick a note setting forth his conception of how the compact should be framed. That note has been transmitted to Washington."[98]

The Secretary's cable to Herrick on June 10, Herrick's reply the next morning, the press release from the Department of State on June 11, and Kellogg's cable to Herrick on June 11 are unique enough to quote at length. First, Kellogg's cable to Herrick (FRUS 1927, II, 614):

> ...According to New York Times today Briand has made his proposal in definite form and on June 3 gave you a note explaining his idea of how the pact should be framed. It was also stated that the note has been forwarded to Washington. The Department wishes to be

[95] "Briand Awaits Hint On His Peace Move." *New York Times*, 2 June 1927.
[96] "Locarno For World Gains Wide Backing." *New York Times*, 5 June 1927.
[97] "Briand Takes Step For Treaty With Us To Outlaw War." *New York Times*, 8 June 1927.
[98] "Briand Peace Plan Explained In Paris." *New York Times*, 10 June 1927.

> informed whether such a note has been received. If it has, please telegraph summary of contents.

This is striking. Is it imaginable that the Secretary has asked an ambassador (described by Ferrell as the "suave, polished doyen of American diplomats" see Ferrell 1952, 69), if he could "please" forward a note that describes how a treaty should be written with a major world power, as the Department "wishes" to be kept informed? Such derelict in duty would have been a most egregious offense for an ambassador. Herrick's reply is quick and to the point (received the next morning), and illustrates why perhaps Ferrell is correct in his description of the ambassador (FRUS 1927, II, 614):

> ...No such note has been received. My telegram No. 231, June 2, 9 p.m., reports only overture which has been made. Briand will take no further steps until you reply to his proposal [implying that he has told the Quai to do this]. I have given the press no information.[99]

That same day, Kellogg cables Herrick and releases a State Department press release. Both instantiate how 'things ought to be done': through the diplomats, through properly authorized channels, not via mass media (cf. Roscher 2002). The press statement is perhaps the only place where the State Department references the NYT April 6 interview. It reads (as in Miller 1928, 9):

> In response to an informal inquiry made on June second by M. Briand, Foreign Minister of France, through Mr. Herrick, the American Ambassador, the latter has been authorized to say to M. Briand that the United States will be pleased to engage in diplomatic conversations on the subject of a possible agreement along the lines indicated by M. Briand's statement to the press on April sixth last.

Finally, a carefully worded cable goes to Herrick from the Secretary (FRUS 1927, II, 614):

> ...You may inform Briand orally that the American Government will be pleased to enter into diplomatic conversations with respect to his proposal. It is suggested that at first

[99] Herrick is somewhat vindicated with an admission that the Briand proposal was only made to him "orally and informally." See "Herrick Coming on Leave." *New York Times*, 14 June 1927.

> these conversations be of an informal nature and that they be carried on through the French Ambassador here when he returns to Washington, as you are soon to return to the United States on leave.

In this period of time, it is clear from the official diplomatic record that a US-France (what can be called a "bilateral" type of negotiation) agreement is the desired direction.[100] The NYT noted that Britain was "cool" to the idea,[101] yet there were individuals like Shotwell and Butler who offered the possibility of a much wider type of political agreement. We know that this diplomatic episode did not result in a bilateral agreement. What must happen is a greater specification of what a wider process would actually look like, how it can described, what advantages it entails, and how it would be preferable to a bilateral path. Without some statement of arguments and details that addresses these general aspects, there is no path, no possibility, for a multilateral product.

June-July 1927: Two paths (and their problems)

In his response to the Shotwell draft in the NYT, Briand reiterates in the press that the "best solution… would be a simple declaration."[102] Contrary to Briand, the draft text by Shotwell and Butler noted above, is for "wide application with many countries" not just between the US and France. At this early point, there appears to be a delineation between two paths that becomes sharper as the month of June goes on. In this sense, Ferrell (152, 139-141) is right to argue that the "idea of extension" is an old one. The task here is to specify the circulation of that idea, with an eye toward identifying what makes it logical or preferable over other options.

---

[100] Ferrell's description is worthy of a full review on how the pace of diplomacy was negotiated through discursive practices (see Ferrell 1952, 84-94). Before 1914, the normal way to minimize this problem would be to engage in secret arrangements. In 1927, this was certainly a possibility, but because of the experience of World War I, also conceived as something of a greater risk than in 1914. Later, Kellogg would publish all of the diplomatic notes. See the State Department's (1928) *General Pact for the Renunciation of War*.
[101] "Briand's Proposal Disliked By British." *New York Times*, 29 April 1927.
[102] "Europe's Attitude Changed by Fliers." *New York Times*, 12 June 1927.

In the NYT, Briand argues that the "professors have gone too far," that it "frankly appears dangerous," before finally ending with the suggestion "let us try this first… and if it works then let us extend the principle of the outlawry of war. But don't let us risk spoiling everything by going too far at first."[103] In this, we observe the counter-argument for a wider agreement, that it is better to start small first and attain something rather than nothing (cf. Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1998 on multilateral organizations). Still, the NYT reports on June 17 that Germany would likely want a treaty similar to the Briand proposal (coming from former member of the Versailles delegation, Professor Albrecht Mendelsson-Bartholdy). That same day, the NYT reports of Butler's visit to Paris where he urges inclusion of language drawn from the Locarno treaties; which defines an aggressor and binds parties to not aid the aggressor. This understanding and kind of agreement would *by its own terms* involve other countries besides the US and France.

On June 22, Briand sent a draft of a potential treaty to outlaw war to the chargé in Paris (Sheldon Whitehouse), who dutifully and immediately, translated the text in a cable (FRUS 1927, II, 615-616). It is notable that during this time (June 21-22), Kellogg wrote President Coolidge (who consents), asking permission to informally speak with representatives from Great Britain and Japan, given that negotiations with France had been agreed (see FRUS 1927, II, 615-616). This is, of course, not unusual given that talk of "balance-of-power" politics continued to be discussed and carried out (at least since the Treaty of Utrecht, see Der Derian 1987).

With a bilateral draft treaty submitted to the State Department, an internal response results. A memorandum (dated June 24) is written by (a "sophisticate" who was "skeptical" of the "outlawry" position, see Ferrell 1952, 114) J. Theodore Marriner, Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, the division deemed most appropriate to comment on the matter. In

[103] "Calls Briand Offer First of its Kind." *New York Times*, 12 June 1927.

this memo, Marriner elaborates on the potential “disturbances” of such a treaty upon US relations with other European countries and other major powers. Indeed, it is suggested here that "it would be incumbent on the United States at once to offer a treaty in the same terms to England and Japan," (FRUS 1927, II, 617). He also suggests that a “series of such [bilateral] agreements, unless it were absolutely world wide, would raise the same objections,” (ibid). This suggests that 1) the entities within the US government understood international politics as a struggle in a balance of state power system, and 2) related to this systemic view, that the bilateral intercourse had severe consequences on other relations. What is most striking is that in summarizing, the memo states that "it would seem that the only answer to the French proposition would be that... if any step further than this [that is, beyond the guarantees in the arbitration-focused Bryan Treaty] were required, it should be in the form of a universal undertaking not to resort to war, to which the United States would at any time be most happy to become a party," (FRUS 1927, II, 618). Here, the logic of universality is articulated—and in the future, its logic would be coupled to the notion of a *multilateral* type of treaty.

On this issue, on the renunciation of war as an instrument of policy, as far as the State Department was concerned, by June 24, a bilateral agreement limited to the US and France was riddled with problems. From this memorandum, the undesirability of a bilateral agreement is instantiated through reference to diplomatic relations with other countries (an expression of sociality through balance-of-power politics)—and that such disruption of relations caused by a US-French treaty is not appropriate (would create a response that consists of objections or resistance). Indeed, the diplomatic activity of the following three weeks included interactions between Kellogg and ambassadors from Japan and Great Britain. The fact that another

disarmament conference was commencing in Geneva at the end of June helped make such communication regarding the Briand proposal possible.

On June 30, Kellogg assured the Japanese ambassador (Tsuneo Matsudaira) that any treaty of this kind with France would be offered to Japan (FRUS 1927, II, 623; Ferrell 1952, 107-108). It is notable that Marriner was ostensibly present at the meeting (since he wrote the memorandum of the conversation, see Ferrell 1952, 108). On July 6, the British ambassador (Sir Esme Howard) met with Kellogg, and received a similar assurance: "I said that we would not desire to make any treaty with France which we would not be willing to make with Great Britain, Japan or any other country," (FRUS 1927, II, 624). In Howard's memoir, he recalls that Kellogg would support a generalized treaty (cited in Ferrell 1952, 108; see his brief account in Howard 1936, 521-523).[104]

During the course of June 1927, the logic for future legitimate diplomatic activity was constructed and put forth. The empirical account of the activities of US diplomats during June and July all note that the US would "make no treaty with France which it would not be willing to make with any other country," (Ferrell 1952, 108; cf. Miller 1928, 16). In Kellogg's cable to Coolidge on June 27, he states, "I have given considerable thought to this question of a treaty [with France]. The treaty situation between France, Great Britain, and Japan and the United States is as follows," (FRUS 1927, II, 619). These accounts legitimate the notion that bilateral agreements, especially those regarding war, have effects system-wide.

Because bilateral agreements have systemic effects, it was to become increasingly implausible for the US to only complete a US-France treaty that renounced war as an instrument of national policy. As Ferrell asserts, "such a pact was impossible because of its inherent nature

[104] While a lot of diplomacy is being conducted in the open, neither of these meetings were reported in the *New York Times*.

as a negative military alliance," (Ferrell 1952, 129), and this is precisely Marriner's wording in the June 24 memo. Note that this is despite public statements (see above) in the *New York Times* to the contrary; that the US continued to consider the Briand proposal. Acceptance of the argument in the June 24 memo by the Secretary of State, Coolidge, and the State Department dictated two broad diplomatic options for the US regarding Briand's US-France proposal in June 1927. The first entails a delicate path where multiple bilateral agreements are consummated in an appropriate sequence (a complex bilateral option). This is substantiated in the cables to Japan and Great Britain and internally. The second option entails a “universal undertaking,” noted by Marriner, where a single agreement is created (a multilateral option). The next section explains how this second option was legitimated, and the first rendered unacceptable.



Figure 10. Relations of outlawing war, peace-time diplomacy ca. 1927, and possible diplomatic outcomes.

Going 'multilateral'? July 1927-January 1928

As the above figure illustrates, in spite of on-going public and private discussions, there is little indication of which diplomatic option would ultimately be selected. The examination so far has indicated a French foreign ministry preference for a bilateral agreement, a preference for a world-wide agreement by some US academics, and the entertaining of either a series of bilateral treaties or a multi-party option by the US foreign policy apparatus. As a way to analyze the situation, we can interpret the options as either to involve only France and US or something that consisted of a wider diplomatic circle.

The circulation of ideas and arguments concerning these two diplomatic options is an empirical question that can be answered. Three illustrative instantiations are discussed here. First, there is extensive public discussion of “outlawry of war” in the US (as that term itself had a history in US public discourse) and links are made to the Briand proposal of June 1927—some of which call for broader diplomatic action, yet whose political logic remains under-specified. Second, there is discussion in the British House of Commons regarding the Briand proposal; a treaty that outlaws war (as noted in Ferrell 1952, 109). Third, there is discussion in the League of Nations in September regarding the prohibition of wars of aggression (Ferrell 1952, 109). These instantiations help make the concept of a *multilateral treaty* for the renunciation of war a possibility. Indeed, as I will show, as late as December 17, 1927, such an endeavor was not only very much in doubt, but had no clear way forward (and neither was the way forward clear for a bilateral treaty) (see also Ferrell 1952, 133). In this way, the circulation of both the problems of only a US-France bilateral treaty for the renunciation of war and the benefits of a similar multilateral treaty do not by themselves cause the outcome. However, through their circulation, a logic, a vocabulary, and a practice are made available for the legitimation of such a treaty. These circulations are the work, carried out by diplomats and journalists, required to stabilize their meanings and relations. In this sense, these uses are causally relevant, and justify their inclusion in this analytical narrative.

In Ferrell's estimation: "Aristide Briand's new proposition [of June 1927] had united the American peace movement as it never had been before... [into] an unprecedented coalition of peace forces," (Ferrell 1952, 98-99). The heads of the two 'rival' peace groups (Columbia Professor James T. Shotwell-Columbia University President Nicholas Murray Butler on the one hand, and lawyer Salmon O. Levinson-Senator William Borah on the other) embarked on a series

of speeches and publications to “get the word out.”[105] After a meeting with Kellogg, Levinson sent the Secretary his draft treaty on outlawing war on June 24, two days after Whitehouse had cabled over the Briand proposal, and the day of Marriner's memo. Charles Clayton Morrison published *The Outlawry of War* in late June 1927, including a section on the Briand proposal.[106] In mid-July, Shotwell attended a conference in Honolulu at the Institute of Pacific Relations. His remarks caused a study group to form to discuss the issue of permanent peace, "attended by an official of the Japanese Foreign Office," (see Ferrell 1952, 102).[107]

In Ferrell's words, "the *New York Times* in the East and the *Chicago Daily News* in the Midwest almost every day broke lances for the cause," (Ferrell 1952, 104). Indeed, in early October, Paul Scott Mowrer of the *Chicago Daily News* met with Marriner to discuss outlawry (see Ferrell 1952, 114-115; citing Memorandum by Marriner, 6 October 1927). The diplomatic traffic in the FRUS contains references to these newspapers as well (e.g. the June exchange between Kellogg and Herrick noted above (FRUS 1927, II, 614-615), and the exchange between Kellogg and Whitehouse (FRUS 1927, II, 625)).

To these peace groups, the Briand proposal was useful for promoting discussion and legitimating calls to renounce war, yet there were arguments over how to actually do this in practice. Though he would later prefer a series of bilateral agreements (see also Ferrell 1952, 130), Senator Borah's words stand in contrast to Levinson's enthusiasm (see Ferrell 1952, 101-102), "The more I study the Briand proposal, the more I think it is a piece of dynamite for outlawry... My opinion is that a two-power treaty is not an aid to outlawry but a distinct hindrance and embarrassment," (Ferrell 1952, 101; cites Borah to Levinson 12 July 1927, in

[105] This comes several years after an initial spark in 1923 (perhaps epitomized by John Dewey’s pamphlet *Outlawry of War: What It Is and Is Not* and Borah’s Senate resolution to criminalize war in February). Note also that Ferrell (1952) bemoans the lack of authoritative historical work on peace movements (and their opponents) in the 1920s.
[106] See the NYT review of the pamphlet “Can War Ever Be Outlawed?” *New York Times*, 11 September 1927.
[107] See also “Institute argues ‘Pacific Locarno’” *New York Times*, 28 July 1927.

Stoner 1943, 243). For Borah, if outlawry—the criminalization of war—is the goal, a different set of objectives and actions are required. In Stoner's words, Levinson thought that the "Briand proposal had given outlawry more publicity than could have been secured with five million dollars' worth of advertising," and moreover, Levinson argued that was not this step "A SOLEMN EXAMPLE TO OTHER PEOPLES?" (Stoner 1943, 244; capitalization in original letter). Borah's response delineates a possible alternative, "The thing for M. Briand to do is not to propose a two-power treaty but to propose that France join with the United States in asking for an international conference to codify international law," (Stoner 1943, 245). In a sense, one way to operationalize 'universal' is to call an international conference, rather than invite numerous parties to sign a treaty all have agreed upon (see discussion below).

Harrison Brown, a Briton who had worked on Levinson's Outlawry committee in Europe, and now was paid by Levinson to "buttonhole statesmen" in London, Paris, Berlin, and Geneva for the cause of outlawing war (see Ferrell 1952, 103) had an interesting meeting with the US justice on the World Court, John Bassett Moore, in late fall 1927. Ferrell's retelling is striking: "Brown asked Moore if perhaps making rules for war was a hopeless job. No, no, rejoined Moore. Not if you could persuade everyone to sign them," (see Ferrell 1952, 113-114; citing Harrison Brown to Levinson, 9 November 1927). Though Moore was very skeptical of the outlawry of war, clearly, he was cognizant of the idea of legitimating new international practices. It is certainly plausible to assume that this idea of getting 'everyone on board' is not simply in the mind of Moore. Benefits could be drawn if one could ensure collective participation.

While Borah's notion in July was not dominant and applying Moore's principle perhaps in the background, they bear a similar attitude to Marriner's internal State Department recommendation of June 24. The circulation of the move to “outlaw war” results in two linked

ideas, that 1) renouncing war is, in fact, a legitimate endeavor as a matter of policy, and 2) the actual diplomatic path proposed by Briand and interpreted by the State Department (a US-France bilateral treaty, or even a series of bilateral treaties) may have obstacles. The knowledge of the obstacles presented for a series of bilateral agreements is also noted by Assistant Secretary (Western European affairs) William R. Castle, who wrote, "If we made similar [bilateral] pacts with other nations France would lose interest immediately because it would give no particular advantage," (Ferrell 1952, 140; citing Castle's diary, 11 May 1927). This suggests that another path, a “universal undertaking” or “persuading everyone to sign,” could be legitimated as logical.[108]

On July 5, the US Ambassador in London (Alanson B. Houghton) spoke with the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Austen Chamberlain. The conversation reveals an awareness of the implications of the Briand proposal (Ferrell 1952, 109), and on July 11, during House of Commons debate, Chamberlain had to respond to the Briand proposal. In particular, he had to answer whether or not it was useful, and whether or not Britain should pursue a similar treaty with the US (Ferrell 1952, 109-110fn37). Chamberlain states that "War between this country and the United States is already outlawed in the heart and soul of every citizen of this country. I hope it is equally so in the great Republic of the United States of America."[109] He added that the conversations will likely take place, but would not comment on how they would proceed. Looking at the record itself, besides two comments on "why do we [Great Britain] hang back?" when we should look to enter into a similar agreement, one MP articulates the way in which this agreement has effects on the system (Hansard 1927, 5, 208, 1793):

[108] Though it should also be said that Moore likely saw such a world-wide treaty fantastical (see Moore's article "An Appeal to Reason" in *Foreign Affairs* 1933).
[109] “Sir Austen Tells of Policy.” *New York Times*, 12 July 1927.

> ... you have the beginnings of the outlawry of war... if nations like Germany... France... and the United States of America, with Holland and Switzerland, would make this declaration amongst themselves, many other things would solve themselves.

This suggests that from Britain's perspective, the debate and arguments concern not just a US-France treaty. Rather, it is an open question as to who can be involved and what diplomatic paths are possible.

The League of Nations Assembly in September 1927 passed a (non-binding) resolution declaring "all wars of aggression" prohibited (see League of Nations 1927, 1444). Recall that the notion of renouncing war was a common one in Europe following the Locarno Treaties of 1925. It concretely specified a new means of commitment. As Sir Edward Grigg commented on the Locarno Treaties in *International Affairs* (1935, 181):

> I suggest to you that the Locarno Pact is the first example of the application of that principle in treaties since the War. Instead of being, like the old guarantee pacts whose place it took, a guarantee merely of France and Belgium against Germany, it was a far better thing, not a unilateral guarantee, but a guarantee of Germany against France and Belgium just as much as a guarantee of these two countries against Germany, and in that respect it shows the wisdom and foresight of those who concluded it.

As Grigg (1935, 181) puts it, pacts containing security guarantees should be "multilateral in character", though bilateral treaties of "friendly understanding" were the most common practice during this timeframe (see Ferrell 1952, 126). The League's resolution here suggests two ideas. First, that there is a logic of diplomatic practice that seeks to involve as many parties as possible (as Grigg suggests). Second, that one way to address the problem of war is to turn on aggressors, in the same way as the Locarno treaties.

After September, the NYT continued to keep the idea of Briand's proposal in circulation. It ran a profile on Aristide Briand on October 9,[110] and an article later in October on Shotwell's speech to the Political Science Academy—on "An American Locarno"—which urged acceptance

[110] "The World's Greatest Voice For Peace." *New York Times*, 9 October 1927.

of the Briand proposal, and detailed the necessary revisions to third parties that it would entail.[111] On November 8, it reported that Senator Borah would renew his effort to 'outlaw war'. In that article, the NYT reports that "he would have his plan to outlaw war supplement the French plan, believing that it is more practical as it is more comprehensive."[112]

By December, the notion for renouncing war had advanced to the point that other Senators on the foreign relations committee (Borah was the chair) were ready to have their voices heard more definitively. These suggestions linked the Briand proposal with other nations besides France and the US. Senator Arthur Capper (Kansas), who had been in contact with Butler (to the point where Butler sent him draft text) and Levinson, introduced a resolution on December 8 that recommended concluding "renunciation of war treaties with France and other like-minded nations," (Ferrell 1952, 115; see also Capper's contribution to the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* in 1929 on the KBP). These nations (as reported in the NYT) included "Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Japan."

I am in agreement with Ferrell that Capper's resolution is probably a fair indication of widespread circulation of the outlawry notion. In Ferrell's words, "it indicated the West [that is, the Western US] awakening to the peace campaign... Capper... was a farmer of the farmers... people said he kept his ear so close to the ground that the grasshoppers often bit it. The administration had to take notice," (Ferrell 1952, 117). US House Representative Hamilton Fish Jr. (NY-R) requested a copy of the Briand proposal from the administration to consider for a joint Congressional resolution, introduced on December 7. As the NYT reports, it too envisioned "negotiation of treaties by the United States with Great Britain, Japan, Germany, and Italy."[113] This suggests the widespread circulation of this notion, that not just one treaty is needed because

[111] "Urges Renouncing Of War A 'Policy'." *New York Times*, 30 October 1927.
[112] "Borah Peace Move To Air Briand Plan." *New York Times*, 8 November 1927.
[113] "Requests Briand Plan Be Put Before House." *New York Times*, 8 December 1927.

more than just the US and France are involved, is linked to the Briand proposal. Though evidence of the linkage between other nations and the Briand proposal is there, this by no means renders the adjudication between a complex bilateral path and a multilateral one obvious or easy.

The December conversations between the French Ambassador to the US (Paul Claudel) and the Assistant Secretary of State for western European affairs (William R. Castle) suggest that for the French, a 'series of bilateral agreements' route could be acceptable in the future, though it comes with its own problems, and might not be possible at the moment. As Ferrell (1952, 132-133) notes of their conversation on December 10:

> ... [Claudel said] to embody the idea ["outlawry of war"] in a treaty might be very valuable... [however] he thought the world was obviously not yet sufficiently advanced to make a treaty of this nature acceptable. I [Castle] told him that... although such a treaty would do no harm and might be of some use in its appeal to sentiment, it could easily be of very real harm if it were a treaty concluded between two countries only, and that I could not see any particular harm in a treaty of this nature if it could be concluded between a great number of countries, but that even so in the present stage of world sentiment, these treaties would hardly be more than words. The Ambassador said he entirely agreed, but that after all I should not minimize the importance of words...

I agree with Ferrell that this memorandum suggests that both Claudel and Castle understood a “multilateral” treaty would be useful in the abstract, but not in practice. The result is that a new bilateral arbitration treaty would make reference to outlawing war in the preamble, which is generally non-binding. The State Department released this information to the press on December 17.[114]

NYT reporting between December 20 and December 31, demonstrates that a re-articulation of obstacles to a wider agreement, as Briand had done back in June, was in circulation and that France’s objective remains a bilateral-type of agreement that does not even have the status of a binding treaty. On December 21, the NYT notes that France desires a “simple agreement” like a “declaration” without “conditions and qualifications”, not a “full

[114] See “French Now Keener For Treaty With Us.” *New York Times*, 17 December 1927.

treaty." It notes that the present situation might be made "far more complicated and precarious."[115] At the same time, some entities note that such complications would not matter if many powers were involved. For example, on December 24, Borah states flatly that "The objections now being put forth… could be obviated… if France would propose the same treaty with the other leading nations, Great Britain, Germany, Japan and Italy. The United State would not likely make a treaty with France which she would not be ready to make with all other Governments."[116] On December 28, Borah reiterates his argument, yet also praises Briand: "Of course no two nations can outlaw war. But two powerful nations like the United States and France can make a glorious beginning. The United States should immediately propose the same treaty with all other governments."[117] Though still unsaid as to how a wider treaty would mitigate the—also vague—issues raised, what we observe is a sharpening of the consequences of this articulation. Up until December 31 (see the report that the administration's view was that "outlawry of war is virtually impossible of achievement"),[118] the public position of the US regarding whether or not to pursue a single declaration as part of a series of bilateral agreements, or a multilateral treaty, remained indeterminate.

Out of the public eye, on December 28, upon hearing that Claudel was to deliver a note from Briand that afternoon, Kellogg writes one himself, clears it with President Coolidge, and ostensibly couriers a copy to Claudel. In this note, Kellogg suggests the move to a "multilateral treaty." The first two paragraphs make clear the value of the current proposal in moving the world toward peace. The third paragraph contains the 'extension' to all (FRUS 1927, II, 626-627, emphasis added):

---

[115] "French Are Dubious Of Kellogg Plan." *New York Times*, 21 December 1927.
[116] "Borah For Widening Treaty Against War." *New York Times*, 24 December 1927.
[117] "Borah Lauds Briand Plan." *New York Times*, 28 December 1927.
[118] "Negotiations now Active." *New York Times*, 31 December 1927.

> … instead of contenting themselves [the two Governments] with a bilateral declaration... suggested by M. Briand, [the two Governments] might make a more signal contribution to world peace by joining in an effort to obtain the adherence of all of the principal Powers of the world to a declaration renouncing war as an instrument of national policy... the Government of the United States is prepared... to concert with the Government of France with a view to the conclusion of a treaty among the principal Powers of the world, open to signature by all Nations, condemning war... If the Government of France is willing to join with the Government of the United States in this endeavor, and to enter with the United States and the other principal Powers of the world into an appropriate *multilateral* treaty, I shall be happy to engage at once in conversations...[119]

A variety of explanations have been offered for this turnaround. Before turning to Ferrell, let us recall just two other explanations, the first is the effect of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting of December 22. Pearson and Brown (1935), in the *American Diplomatic Game*, probably drawing on Senator Borah himself, account for the Senator advocating a "counterproposal of extending the treaty to include all the nations of the world," (see also Ferrell 1952, 138-139), which is either tacitly or explicitly affirmed by the rest of the committee. This created the imperative for Kellogg to adopt a similar position. Second is simply the machinations of Kellogg's mind as he wrote that it "came to me as I pondered on the confused condition of the world, and the relation to it of United States policy," (Ferrell 1952: 1940; citing memorandum by Kellogg in Bryn-Jones 1937: 230-239).

Regardless of where credit belongs, this section has so far empirically shown that a number of arguments and ideas for something more than a 'bilateral' US-France treaty are in circulation, internally at least since Marriner's memo of June 1927. The idea of the *need* to include other powers was sustained by internal State Department ruminations, diplomatic exchanges, public and private discussion over outlawry, the Briand proposal, and world peace in general by government and non-government entities (see also the summary by Ferrell 1952, 139-

[119] Copied with this note is a "Draft Treaty of Arbitration" with the language inserted in the preamble to reflect the renunciation of war. However, this is related to continuing the practice of having treaties of arbitration between countries, not the multilateral treaty Kellogg is suggesting. See FRUS 1928, II, 810-811.

141). Indeed, world peace, in wide circulation since Wilson's Fourteen Points becomes a useful resource for Kellogg to draw upon (Miller 1928, 14 describes the “oceans of ink that had been poured out in the United States about peace plans”). While one can be skeptical of world peace (as John Bassett Moore typifies), who can argue against it and its desirability? Or as Houghton reports in a meeting with Czech Foreign Minister Eduard Benes later on May 9, 1928: "He [Benes] was in close touch with the sentiment in the French Foreign Office as well as with that in the British, and he thought his relations with the powers of Central Europe made him fully cognizant of their feeling also. Everybody, of course, wanted peace," (see FRUS 1928, I, 59). Ferrell is probably correct in suggesting that "the idea of extension came at different times to many other people, for various reasons," (Ferrell 1952, 141). Indeed, for this study however, it simply does not matter “who first thought of the idea.” Identifying this person does not constitute an explanation of its circulation or way in which it is used.

For Ferrell, explaining Kellogg's cable that suggests a “multilateral treaty” is ultimately about Kellogg's intentions and internal thought processes. He did not want to be outmaneuvered and felt influence from the building peace movement in the US. Ferrell posits that the combination of engaging in what Kellogg conceived as trying to “win” a diplomatic game to best balance power in US interests and domestic politics produced this “multilateral moment.” I claim that articulating precisely what Kellogg was thinking is an impossible task, and not the ground this study wishes to examine. Instead, I start from the analytical assumption that given the choice between complex bilateralism and multilateralism, the latter, somehow, must have made sense to Kellogg; indeed, greater sense than the complex bilateralist option. For whatever reason (for available ones, see Ferrell 1952, 140-143, 263-265; also Roscher 2002: 296), after this decision was made, Kellogg and others had to make this choice make sense in the world through

particular language and practice. That process is what this study focuses on to explain the outcome that we know occurred.

The following section empirically details this interaction. We can observe legitimation through 1) the use of “world peace” as a rationale, 2) the drafting of a treaty for principal Powers, but open to signature of any nation, 3) the updating through the press of diplomatic progress, 4) the formal invitation to countries to sign the document, and 5) the management of the effects of this multilateral suggestion with other countries via diplomatic telegraphic circulars. Investigating these empirics as constituting the legitimacy of the endeavor becomes the focus of an explanatory account for how and why multilateral is understood the way it was in this episode. That explanation is important because it discloses contingency, what precisely in the past mattered for the present to be made (because that is the understanding of “explanation” on offer). As Miller asserts, "Looking back at the surrounding circumstances, it may now seem that the answer of Washington to Paris... was an obvious one... this [the move to a 'multilateral treaty' or even a 'multilateralism'] may now seem a natural and logical answer to the French proposal... but it was none the less an answer then requiring in high degree both imagination and ability for its conception," (Miller 1928, 16-17). Explaining precisely how this move is made to appear 'natural' and 'logical' is important in order to understand how politics works. This is the kind of knowledge this study values. In this regard, the story after Kellogg consults at least Elihu Root (US Secretary of State during the Hague Conferences), and likely Charles Evans Hughes, and after Kellogg's note to Briand is cabled, is just as significant as the story up to the cable itself. It is the *aftermath* where legitimation goes on to stabilize an instantiation and marginalize competing alternatives and entities respond to accommodate or resist.

Sustaining legitimacy: making a 'multilateral treaty' acceptable

	Shotwell/Murray outlawry group	**France**
April – June 1927	Treaty that “extends” the renunciation of war “principle”	“dangerous”
		US-France declaration preferred; safer to start small
	State Department internal memo	
June 1927	Option A: Bilateral treaty	Option B: “universal” undertaking; could be series of bilateral or multilateral
	Practical result: 1) negative military alliance with France; 2) disturbances in international system	
	Would have to offer (and assured via diplomacy) similar treaties to UK and Japan	
	Peace groups	
June – November 1927	Revive outlawry notion via newspapers, books, scholars, Senators; State Department notices	
	But no consensus on Briand proposal	Either: bilateral treaty or international conference
	House of Commons	

June – November 1927	Why not a US-UK pact?	
	Why not add Germany, Holland, Switzerland?	"many things would solve themselves"
	League of Nations	
June – November 1927	Resolution prohibiting all wars of aggression	Locarno logic: all vs aggressor

TABLE 2. Discursive-practical summary of key relations until January 1928. Where bold denotes the entity/entities involved and normal text describes the piece of language, practice, or logic employed.

Legitimation I: France, December 1927-June 1928

What were the immediate consequences of the Kellogg note of December 28 that we should note? What did these consequences instantiate as legitimate? As the diplomacy unfolded, what was contested and what was accommodated? The segment analyzed here ends at the Briand note of January 5, where the Kellogg proposal is accepted, but a number of obstacles are noted. The primary obstacles to get to that point concern the relations between the US and the UK, the US and France, and the US and other countries.

First, there is demonstration of the repercussion this note to the French has on relations with Great Britain specifically. On the 28th, Kellogg met the British Ambassador to the US (Howard) and communicated the content of his note ("orally and confidentially"; although it is a presumption that Kellogg used the term "multilateral" in his description (see FRUS 1927, II, 629). As per usual practice, Howard suggests that a US diplomat should read out the note confidentially to the foreign secretary (Chamberlain). On the 29th, Kellogg cables a note to Howard (referring to their conversation on the 28th) proposing a similar bilateral arbitration treaty to London as the one enclosed to Briand (see FRUS 1928, II, 945; cf. Ferrell 1952, 148).

Second, there is demonstration of the expectation and related practice that there would be repercussions of this bilateral note on diplomatic relations with other countries besides France and the UK. Thus, US representation abroad needed to be kept informed. In order to this, Kellogg's note was not only sent to the French Ambassador in Washington, but also circulated to Embassies in France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan, and the Legation in Switzerland (see FRUS 1927, II, 626fn18; this note to Geneva is evidence for the on-going practical legitimation of the involvement of international organizations in world politics). Note that this also instantiates the powers most important is the consequences of this US-France interaction. According to the FRUS, instructions were forthcoming as to the release of this information to the press (ibid).

Third, the initial French response to the Kellogg note was not favorable (contra Briand's comments later in 1928). This is demonstrated in Claudel's meeting with Kellogg on the 30th, Briand's meeting with Whitehouse on the 31st, and the NYT reporting on the diplomacy starting January 1, especially regarding the general mood of the French Foreign Ministry. On the morning of the 30th, Claudel met with Kellogg, and, in a sense, challenged the move to a multilateral treaty—though not the term itself. During this conversation, Claudel stated that France *desired* a bilateral treaty, and that only a multilateral treaty would be considered if "it can be clearly explained why the United States would not be able to conclude a bilateral treaty," (FRUS 1927, II, 629). Kellogg replies that a US-France treaty, by itself, is not possible: "I have always said that this Government could not enter into a treaty with France that it would not enter into with other powers... a multilateral treaty of the nature proposed in my note would... have a profound world-wide influence in promoting the cause of peace," (FRUS 1927, II, 629). Part of what makes the shift to multilateralism sensible and the bilateral path apparently impossible, is

that it makes reference to the promotion of peace—something that was difficult to argue against, the kind of move “peace groups” which had been calling for consideration since Briand's proposal in the US. This is similar to the argument Castle makes to Claudel (see Ferrell 1592, 146-147 using Castle's diary) on January 1, 1928.

Whitehouse sees Briand on December 31 (notice of this interaction received in Washington, Jan 1, 1928). During this discussion, the charge reports that Briand 'objected to my using the word "treaty," (though Claudel appears to use the word “treaty” in his conversation with Kellogg) stating that he did not intend the proposed pact to take the form of a treaty," (FRUS 1927, II, 630). Briand's use of “declaration” rather than a whole new treaty, like the preamble addition to the arbitration treaty, suggests that a non-binding step be taken. Briand eventually suggests a “protocol” to outlaw war, with invitation to sign this document—not a multilateral treaty. He also expresses a preference for confidentiality until an agreement over what should be distributed to the press is finalized (FRUS 1927, II, 630). This consideration is in step with Kellogg, as he had to this point, given no instruction to release his note to the public.[120]

Because of Kellogg's instructions, the NYT only begins to report on the diplomatic interaction on January 1, a couple of days after Kellogg's note is received. It states that France has received Kellogg’s note and that it makes the suggestion of a treaty open for signature to all nations. It also reports (January 1) that many foreign ministries will analyze this diplomatic move.[121] As early as January 2, the French Foreign Office noted its dissatisfaction with Kellogg’s 15-page note, as the NYT states that the outline it articulates “will not be accepted" as

[120] Though Kellogg wished to keep these exchanges out of the press (FRUS 1927, II, 630; also Ferrell 1952, 147), after an erroneous leak to the French press regarding the US position (no date, no description), Kellogg decided to make public his proposal (Ferrell 1952, 147-148; FRUS 1927, II, 626fn18). While this is an interesting instance of diplomacy going public, the purpose of this investigation remains: to highlight what justification was circulated to, not just make possible, but now sustain the move to a 'multilateral treaty'.
[121] “France Gets Note On Treaty Proposal.” *New York Times*, 1 January 1928.

it stands.[122] This is consistent with Claudel's initial response noted above. The NYT also notes British skepticism (ibid). On January, the NYT notes the French suggestion of the US simply joining the League of Nations and reports their dissatisfaction with Kellogg's move.[123]

Now, Briand's reply of January 5 (delivered by Claudel January 6) should be noted in two respects. First is to note how the French Foreign Ministry went from dissatisfaction to acceptance in the NYT reporting. Second, to look at the reporting and Briand's note to see how the term "multilateral" is not contested, though its associations are being negotiated through diplomatic notes. We should note what is acceptable and what the obstacles are to a multilateral treaty in the diplomacy itself.

The NYT reports on January 5, "Spokesmen for the French Foreign Office tonight dropped all criticisms which have been made daily, of the multilateral compact outlawing war and announced flatly that the Government was all for the American plan now and forevermore."[124] The NYT also reports that Britain was uncertain and Japan and Germany were in support.[125]

The NYT also reports the link between the League resolution of last September and this multilateral move. However, Briand's note is hardly in total agreement. Indeed, the NYT reports that Japan is not sure "how it will work' (January 7; note the use of "puzzled," and again on January 15).[126] In these NYT headlines, the circulation of the pact as a *multilateral* one—as Kellogg had put it—is witnessed (e.g. January 4-8).

---

[122] "Briand To Propose Wider Peace Role By United States." *New York Times*, 2 January 1928.
[123] "Bryan's Compact, Still In Full Force, Preferred By Paris." *New York Times*, 4 January 1928; "Kellogg Broadens French Treaty Draft." *New York Times*, 4 January 1928.
[124] "French Accept Kellogg Proposal." *New York Times*, 5 January 1928.
[125] Note that the NYT reported that "French criticism hurt Washington" and see also its reporting on *Le Temps*. "Our Peace Treaty Proposal Accepted Formally By Briand." *New York Times*, 6 January 1928.
[126] "Washington Cold To Briand Response." *New York Times*, 7 January 1928. "Kellogg Plan Puzzles Tokio." *New York Times*, 7 January 1928.

In Briand's reply itself, he takes up the many of the notions communicated by Kellogg, ultimately agreeing to continue the discussion of a "multilateral treaty" (Miller 1928, 166; FRUS 1928, II, 2):

> ... [if France] agrees thus to join the Government of the United States and the other principal powers of the world in an appropriate multilateral treaty, your Excellency [Kellogg] would be happy to undertake immediately conversations leading to the elaboration of a draft inspired by the suggestions of M. Briand and destined to be proposed jointly by France and the United States to the other nations of the world...

However, a number of points are made against this endeavor. In his re-enactment of Kellogg's note, he calls for a "declaration" not a treaty (see FRUS 1928, II, 1-2). Indeed, he states that "such a declaration... could not fail to be an impressive example," (FRUS 1928, II, 2). This would be done "with a view to concluding a treaty" thus casting the drafting of such a document into the future. The second to last paragraph states that such a treaty can be signed by France and the United States straight away and then open to signatories afterward (FRUS 1928, II, 2). Moreover, it is a treaty against "wars of aggression" not outlawry or war as an instrument of policy.

The two primary accounts of the negotiations of this treaty, David Hunter Miller and Robert H. Ferrell, both recognize the "dilemma" faced by Briand in responding to Kellogg's note of December 28. Through Claudel, we know that the French position to the US was not to accept a "multilateral treaty" on December 30. However, by January 5, the French foreign minister was happy to undertake conversations toward a multilateral treaty. What accounts for this?

Date	
December 28 (Friday)	Kellogg delivers note to Claudel (relays to Paris) suggesting multilateral treaty, along with bilateral Treaty of Arbitration text. Cables US Embassies: Paris, Berlin, London, Rome, and Tokyo plus US Legation in Geneva. Kellogg also

	meets with Howard (UK Ambassador to US) and communicates note orally and confidentially. Howard suggests an oral presentation to Foreign Secretary in London (Chamberlain).
December 29	Kellogg writes note to Howard offering same bilateral Treaty of Arbitration terms to UK as offered to France.
December 30	Claudel meets with Kellogg to challenge “multilateral” move. Kellogg cables Whitehouse in Paris, instructs him to inform Briand of note to Claudel orally and directly. Kellogg cables Atherton to read out note to Chamberlain, as confidential. Actually read to Wellesley.
December 31 (Monday)	Whitehouse meets with Briand. Communicates Kellogg note. Briand offers obstacles and arguments against.
January 1	Claudel meets with Castle. Challenges “multilateral” move. NYT first reports on Kellogg note.
January 2	NYT reports that French MOFA finds note unacceptable, British skeptical.
January 3	Washington cables Embassies and Legation (see December 28). Text of Kellogg-Claudel December 28 note to be released on January 4.
January 4 (Friday)	NYT reports French MOFA dissatisfied. Washington releases full text of December 28 note.
January 5	Briand writes his reply Washington. NYT reports French MOFA drops criticism. British uncertain, Japan and Germany support.
January 6	Claudel delivers Briand note to Kellogg. Accepts multilateral move, with a suggested path forward, such as immediate US-French signing; notes obstacles.

TABLE 3. Event chain: the acceptance of a “multilateral” endeavor.

Like the previous discussion concerning Kellogg's note, Miller and Ferrell still are attempting to detect a moment of persuasion, a change of belief in the mind of politician. How we can know this remains a massive challenge. Miller recognizes this, and simply states flatly: "Under these circumstances the substance of the French Note of January 5 went perhaps as far as M. Briand could have been expected at the time to go; for he accepted the principle of a multilateral treaty through proposing a change in procedure and a substantive change in wording," (Miller 1928, 22). Ferrell is contradictory and vague, stating that "Briand could neither accept nor refuse Kellogg's offer," (Ferrell 1952, 146), and "Briand in his note had startlingly demonstrated the strange vagaries of what many Americans often described as the "European Mind," (Ferrell 1952, 152). Showing how Briand shifting discussion elsewhere says very little about why it became acceptable to adopt the language of what the product was going to be: a multilateral treaty.

It could be that Briand had some kind of epiphany in January, like Kellogg in late December. Since we can never reliably or adequately adjudicate the internal thoughts of politicians, we are left with analyzing what was employed and available in these moments, and paths not taken. Let us take seriously Ferrell's somewhat off-hand comment and create explanatory space between acceptance and refusal.

Let us first suppose that Briand could not accept Kellogg's offer in toto as it was presented. We may justify this because it may represent a complete reversal of his own overture dating to April 1927. Let us also assume that full acceptance was not possible because of the arguments he had been making since June 1927 in the press. These inconceivabilities can be

based on an inconsistency that runs counter to the identity of diplomats as reputable agents of their state.[127]

Because diplomacy is as much a social as a political institution, we do find diplomats in "hard" places. Given this tight space, where might Briand have found more rhetorical freedom, assuming that outright rejection was inconceivable, and also that full acceptance was not possible? Thinking prospectively, *selecting* "multilateral" and continuing the diplomatic dialogue using that term was sensible for two reasons. First, it had been used to describe particular treaties as indispensable and just, and had currency as a legitimate political endeavor (see last chapter). Second, it remained a relatively new term in political discourse (unlike in the academic field of international law where it enjoyed a well-established technical definition). How a multilateral treaty should be produced and who it would involve remained a topic to debate and negotiate. It is possible, he could have suggested a "multilateral declaration," but "treaties" as a final product were already in circulation and contradicting this could have resulted in the kind of diplomatic inconsistency that acculturated individuals seek to avoid.

Thus, the idea of a producing an '"appropriate multilateral treaty" was deemed legitimate. We know this because that piece of language is not being contested here. Two key points bear repeating. Briand states that we have an "immediate sanction of the general character of this procedure" by having the US and France sign the document straight away and a shift of renunciation of war to "renounce all wars of aggression" (FRUS 1928, II, 2). Here, the form of the "multilateral treaty" is no longer under negotiation. The process in which "multilateral

[127] Indeed, the diplomacy leading up to World War I contained all sorts of justifications by various diplomats for their actions. None would be caught *lying* in a verifiable way, or in some way that they could not plausibly deny (e.g. see Nickles 2002 on telegraphic practice). The "color" books published after 1914 go far to show how important it was that diplomats keep their "reputation." This is why and how discursive practices "lays tracks" for the present and future. As Neumann (2002) argues, there is a "repertoire" of actions available to diplomats, and others are unavailable.

diplomacy" occurs, that is, the sequence and timing of signatures is now being negotiated—and that could still fail. There is space for this to be determined, though the ultimate outcome, the production of a multilateral treaty, was still not inevitable at this point. However, it is important for this analytical narrative to note that this cable is one of the many pieces of discursive practice that legitimate the move to a *multilateral treaty* and leave a cultural residue upon which future interactions are understood and conceptualized (in particular, justified by the concern for "peace of the world," see FRUS 1928, I, 1). Indeed, Kellogg's reply of January 11 focuses on the "gratification" that France has accepted "in principle... [a] multilateral treaty open to signature by all nations," (see FRUS 1928, I, 3; see also the reference to accordance of the "multilateral feature").

From the NYT, we can make two points. We see that the form on offer from Briand—that the US and France produce a diplomatic document first, either declaration or treaty—is not acceptable to the US. Between January 6 and January 11, the NYT reported of Washington's "cold response" to the Briand reply: "the immediate reaction at the State Department was unfavorable."[128] Straight away was the "rejection" of a quick signing by just the US and France: "One decision was reached today... and that was to reject the suggestion of M. Briand that the treaty for renouncing aggressive war be signed forthwith by France and the United States, leaving until later the winning over of other countries to the idea through participation in the multilateral compact."[129] This suggests that the idea of multilateral diplomacy includes a certain notion of temporality; embodied by the previous practice of conference diplomacy.

The second key point in the Briand note that bears repeating is also covered in the NYT:

> ... [the] suggestion that France and the United States enter into the compact forthwith… the State Department holds, would amount to a defensive alliance, against the traditional

[128] "Washington Cold To Briand Response." *New York Times*, 7 January 1928.
[129] "Washington Cold To Briand Response." *New York Times*, 7 January 1928.

> policy of the United States. On the side of France, in official circles, it is not seen how that country could commit itself to a multilateral treaty broadly renouncing all war, because of the difficulties this would cause in the light of the French military treaties with Poland and the Little Entente.[130]

These notions suggested by France were attempted to be marginalized by the US. In his note of January 11, Kellogg insisted that the US, France, Germany, Britain, Italy, and Japan should sign together (see FRUS 1928, I, 3-5). Note that this is perhaps the first clear articulation of who could be justifiably included as a "Great Power" in 1928. From Ferrell, we know that Castle argues that Claudel "could well understand that we would not want to sign with France unless we knew that the others were going to sign also," (see Ferrell 1952, 149; citing Memorandum by Castle, 4 January 1928). This was articulated initially in the Marriner memo of June 27. Kellogg also counters in his January 11 reply that "Both France and the United States are too deeply interested in the success of their endeavors for the advancement of peace," (FRUS 1928, I, 4). Kellogg turns to re-circulate language already agreed upon: "renunciation of war", rather than "aggression" (which has links to the Locarno Treaties).

The NYT reports that these are at the crux of Kellogg's reply.[131] The US "Wants Big Powers to Join" is headlined on January 13 regarding the "multilateral treaty." The maneuvers of Briand and Claudel here are important for explaining how a multilateral treaty is made legitimate because it discloses how other alternatives were possible—on the table—in those moments. Earlier on, the US was in the midst of deciding between a complex of bilateral agreements or a universal undertaking. Now that the decision was made, it must prevail against other options (which must be marginalized using available arguments and resources), and associated language and practice must be defined and stabilized. Even when a party has agreed to the idea of "multilateral treaty," how it will be produced still must be negotiated in order for it to become a

[130] "French Note Asks Treaty Signing Now." *New York Times*, 8 January 1928.
[131] "New Kellogg Note Rejects Briand Plan." *New York Times*, 12 January 1928.

reality, and we observe this empirically in the cables and interaction over the next few months in this process of legitimation.

In spite of Briand's January 5 “acceptance,” reverting back to a bilateral declaration is still an alternative—and failure to conclude anything remained a possibility. Two events substantiate this claim. On January 7, Claudel meets with Castle and proposes a joint declaration of principles, as a “personal” idea—a normal diplomatic practice (see Ferrell 1952, 151-152). It is perhaps a consequence of this idea's lack of strength that no counter-argument was necessary to communicate an aversion to this idea. On January 19, the NYT interprets a British memorandum to the League that it would prefer “bilateral compacts” to wide-ranging multilateral treaties.[132]

On January 21, a response to Kellogg's January 11 is received. It lists further obstacles to the multilateral endeavor. First, it vaguely points out that "the new negotiation as proposed would be more complex and likely to meet with various difficulties," (FRUS 1928, I, 6). Second, it weakly held onto the idea that an immediate US-France signing was simply a matter of procedure than of consequence (it still could be part of a larger multilateral endeavor). Third, it, more substantially, pointed out that the League was working toward peace and that “aggressive war” was part of the language of the September 1927 League resolution. Indeed, these “complexities” were argued as part and parcel of "proposing a multipartite covenant," which required, "consideration [of] the relations existing among the various Powers," (FRUS 1928, I, 7). Offering a way out of these troubles associated with a “multilateral” path, France stood ready to conclude the “bi-lateral compact” rather than the multilateral initiative. As late as March 24, we observe a French move to simply make a joint declaration rather than a multilateral treaty (see Ferrell 1952, 168-169; citing Memorandum by Olds with Claudel).

[132] “Expect Briand Note To End Negotiation.” *New York Times*, 19 January 1928.

In the NYT, doubts persisted. For example, the headline of January 22 read: "Anti-War Treaty seen in Washington as Virtually Dead; French Note is thought to end all chances of multilateral accord." In spite of these circulations, Senator Borah wrote his support of Kellogg's proposal in the NYT on February 5 (and Shotwell on February 6).

More than a month after the French note of January 21, Kellogg stood firm in his February reply (FRUS 1928, II, 9-11). Here, he first brushes aside the vague "complexity" argument by simply aligning both countries with the cause of peace, then suggests that if a US-France signing is purely procedural, there is no reason why it cannot wait for others, and, more significantly then there is no reason why it cannot sign onto "renunciation of war" rather than banning "wars of aggression." He elaborates on his perspective (FRUS 1928, I, 9):

> France and the United States are of one mind in their earnest desire to initiate and promote a new international movement for effective world peace... As I understand your note of January 21... the only substantial obstacle... is your Government's doubt whether as a member of the League and a party to treaties of Locarno and other treaties guaranteeing neutrality, France can agree... not to resort to war... without ipso facto violating her present international obligations... I desire to point out that if those obligations can be interpreted so as to permit France to conclude a [bilateral] treaty with the United States... it is not unreasonable to suppose that they can be interpreted with equal justice so as to... conclude an equivalent multilateral treaty... The difference between the bilateral and multilateral form of treaty... seems to me to be one of degree and not of substance...

The NYT printed the note (as it had with other notes from Kellogg) on February 29. The next day on March 1 unexpected support came from Geneva. This is significant for it demonstrates the value of an international organization in diplomacy as a legal adjudicator. According to the NYT:

> international law experts attached to the League [of Nations] declared unanimously that in their opinion France, Britain, Italy, Germany, Japan and any other powers members of the League of Nations could sign a multilateral treaty with the United States outlawing

> war without any violation of the League Covenant or any other Geneva obligations--or Locarno obligations.[133]

Perhaps because of this Borah takes issue with a *London Times* editorial claiming that such legal conflicts exist.[134] This also helps to legitimate Kellogg's argument in his February 27 note in that the reason for not pursuing a multilateral treaty cannot be legal incoherence.[135]

Moreover, a meeting of the League Council in early March is of further assistance to facilitating delicate diplomacy. Here in Geneva, the League provided the diplomatic context (in that sense, causally relevant) for determining the course of action, given the legitimacy of a "multilateral treaty" for the renunciation of war as an instrument of policy.[136] The cable from the US Ambassador in Berlin (Schurman) notes that Briand had asked if the US had communicated to the various representatives (Germany, Britain, Japan, and Italy) concerning the Kellogg multilateral proposal. Three had (all not Italy) (see FRUS 1928, I, 15). Whatever this meant or signaled, Briand is later quoted in the New York Times on March 12: "There is every possibility of the conclusion of this treaty suggested by the United States... I am convinced we shall be able to find it. And such is the sentiment of other European nations."[137] This interaction with other European nations suggests that the process for completing the treaty requires a number of other parties to, at least, be consulted. As Ferrell (1952, 166) states: "the new [French] policy was to ascertain just what Kellogg wanted and thus what reservations would be necessary to make his proposal acceptable." Kellogg, for his part, gave a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations on March 15, and this is subsequently published in *Foreign Affair*s and the *American Journal of International Law*. This speech elaborates on his reply of February 27, against noting that the

---

[133] "Kellogg Proposal Approved In Geneva." *New York Times*, 1 March 1928.
[134] "Britain Sees Us Dropping Isolation." *New York Times*, 3 March 1928.
[135] Though note that Briand "urged" the "consultation of legal experts/jurists" and circulated his own draft text later. See "Briand Note Urges Consulting Jurists." *New York Times*, 21 April 1928.
[136] See also "Kellogg Peace Idea Meets With Favor In League Circles." *New York Times*, 6 March 1928.
[137] "Briand Sees Hope Of Making Treaty To Doom All War." *New York Times*, 12 March 1928.

distinction between the bilateral and multilateral form on the table is one of “degree, and not of substance.” This is related and compatible with his earlier claim that the grounds for not pursuing the multilateral form cannot be legal. In this sense, Kellogg has put multilateral and bilateral treaties on the same level; there may not be any underpinning norms that are reflected in multilateral treaties that are not already in bilateral ones. Note in the text below how the multilateral treaty ‘extends benefits’ perhaps more quickly and decisively that a series of bilateral agreements. Moreover, he ends with the claim that if the political will is not there for a multilateral treaty, it is of no real use to conclude a bilateral one since they are only different in degree, not substance (Kellogg (1928)):

> I warmly seconded M. Briand's proposition that war be formally renounced as an instrument of national policy, but suggested that instead of giving effect thereto in a bilateral treaty... an equivalent multilateral treaty be concluded among the principal powers of the world, open to adherence by any and all nations, thus extending throughout the world the benefits of a covenant... it seemed to me that the difference between the bilateral and multilateral form of treaty having for its object the unqualified renunciation of war, was one of degree and not of substance, and that a government able to conclude such a bilateral treaty would be no less able to become a party to an identical multilateral treaty... if members of the League of Nations could not... agree among themselves and with the United States to renounce war as an instrument of their national policy, it seemed idle to discuss either bilateral or multilateral treaties unreservedly renouncing war.

The NYT indeed reports on March 27 that Briand's response has "unexpectedly been delayed"; that a reply was expected to "come about this time" regarding the “multilateral treaty.”[138] Finally, Briand cables Kellogg on March 30, and assents (contra Miller 1928, 51, who claims this 'acceptance which was not an acceptance'), but with more specific reservations the multilateral option (see FRUS 1928, I, 15-19; though Miller 1928, 38 suggests that the multilateral form was not up for debate after Kellogg's reply of February 27).[139] The NYT (on

[138] “Briand Note Delayed.” *New York Times*, 27 March 1928.
[139] Such claims as to *what really happened* do not generally help us understand diplomatic interaction. Thus, I focus on use, for it is how it is used that instantiates what is considered legitimate. If it was not understood to be legitimate by the *user*, it would not be used.

March 29) writes that "In high official quarters it was said tonight that M. Briand's note represents as full acceptance of Mr. Kellogg's proposal to outlaw war as the French can make under existing world conditions."[140]

While noting that "an absolutely unconditional agreement" could have been obtained by just the two countries, the bulk of the March 30 note by Briand shifts the debate even further away *from* whether or not the treaty will be "multilateral," *to* what "multilateral" means. In this note, Briand again uses the "pursuit of peace" as the rationale for the interaction in the first instance, noting that again there will be difficulties with the '"contemplated multilateral treaty," (see FRUS 1928, I, 16-17). In spite of these difficulties, both the legitimate participants and how the countries have reached this point (telling the story of the story, rather publicly) are specified (FRUS 1928, I, 17-18):

> France... is wholly disposed... to suggest immediately to the German, British, Italian and Japanese Governments that they join in seeking, in the spirit and in the letter of the last American note, any adjustments which in the last analysis may be forthcoming with respect to the possibility of reconciling previous obligations with the terms of the contemplated new treaty... [and] would be prepare forthwith... in submitting for the consideration of the Governments of Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Japan, the correspondence exchanged between France and the United States since June, 1927, and in proposing at the same time for the assent of the four Governments.

The three fundamental reservations Briand states are: 1) the treaty should apply equally to all parties, 2) any breach releases parties from their obligations, and 3) parties retain the right of legitimate defense (FRUS 1928, I, 17-18). Indeed, later in April, Briand re-writes the articles to make these even more explicit (see FRUS 1928, I, 31-39), but the description, and use, of a 'multilateral' treaty to describe this endeavor never deviates after this point.

[140] "Briand Note Brings Peace Treaty Near." *New York Times*, 29 March 1928. In that same article, the NYT (Edwin James) also states that "in view of the conversations of the French Foreign Minister with other Foreign Ministers, the new French document may safely be taken to represent the position of England, Germany, Italy and Japan as well as that of France." The NYT also notes the anti-war resolution at the Pan-American Conference at Havana.

Legitimation II: A Particular Widening, April 1928-June 1928

Now that Germany, Britain, Italy, and Japan are now diplomatically and legitimately involved, facilitated by the diplomacy made possible by the League sessions in March, practical steps are taken for their inclusion in the process of creating the multilateral treaty. This involves confirmation from the French to publish diplomatic notes and the circulation of such notes through embassies. In spite of reports of "electioneering" for domestic politics (see NYT April 2 and April 3), Kellogg cables the ambassadors in the four capitals on April 5 that he had met with Claudel to get confirmation (Kellogg requests affirmation for release of the correspondence to Claudel on April 5, and Claudel responds affirmatively on April 7; see FRUS 1928, II, 21) for the dissemination of US-France diplomatic traffic (information to be used "discreetly").

On April 9, the State Department cables a note and the draft text is circulated to the four capitals, ready for the final release (FRUS 1928, I, 21-24). Notes, draft text, and correspondence are released to the four governments on April 13 (and the note and draft text to the press and the Information Section of the League of Nations) (see FRUS 1928, I, 27), and the NYT reports the commencement of negotiations on April 14, also noting Borah's approval "that the proposal to renounce war goes to the leading nations and is to be open to all nations."[141] As stated in the covering note: "The Government of the United States... desires to see the institution of war abolished and stands ready to conclude with the French, British, German, Italian and Japanese Government a single multilateral treaty open to subsequent adherence by any and all other Government binding the parties thereto not to resort to war with one another," (FRUS 1928, I, 22). Miller (1928, 51) notes that there was no joint invitation to include the new potential parties.

The NYT began reporting German agreement "in principle" to the Kellogg draft on April 22, and that Britain "prefers Kellogg's Treaty" on April 23 (Briand had circulated his own draft

[141] "America Starts Peace Negotiation With Great Powers." *New York Times*, 14 April 1928.

text).[142] In this note, the topic of 'Universality' is given its own paragraph (and later referenced in his memo to Herrick regarding Spain at the end of July). Kellogg states that the "proposed multilateral anti-war treaty should be world-wide in its application," (FRUS 1928, I, 38). However (FRUS 1928, I, 38):

> … from a practical standpoint it is clearly preferable... not to postpone the coming force of an anti-war treaty until all the nations of the world can agree upon the text... For one reason or another a state so situated as to be no menace to peace... might obstruct agreement or delay ratification... as to render abortive the efforts of all other Powers. It is highly improbable, moreover, that a form of treaty acceptable to the British, French, German, Italian, and Japanese Governments as well as to the United States would not be equally acceptable to most, if not all, of the other Powers of the world. Even were this not the case... the coming force among the above-named six Powers of an effective anti-war treaty and their observance thereof would be a practical guaranty against a second world war.

This articulates the logic of a particular widening of parties to sign the treaty, denoting their importance in world politics.

By the end of May, the other four countries originally envisioned (Germany, Italy, Great Britain, and Japan) had all responded in support of the general endeavor (see also League Secretary-General Drummond's May 2 comments to US Minister in Switzerland Wilson, FRUS 1928, I, 48). Here, it is important to note the re-circulation of key words and action, and the cognizance of the diplomats on what “formulas” were used and what interpretations this might render. Schurman cables the German reply to "the multilateral treaty for the renunciation of war," on April 27 (US Ambassador to UK Houghton uses 'multilateral anti-war treaty', see FRUS 1928, I, 39-41). In this document, German Foreign Minister Stresemann gives support to the "international pact" and that "the ultimate goal must be the universality of the new peace," (see FRUS 1928, I, 42-44).[143] The US Ambassador in Italy (Henry P. Fletcher) writes on May 2 that

[142] “German Note Coming Soon.” *New York Times*, 22 April 1928; “Britain Prefers Kellogg's Treaty.” *New York Times*, 23 April 1928.
[143] “Germany Accepts Our Anti-War Plan.” *New York Times*, 1 May 1928.

he was given a copy of a memorandum reply to London: "dated May 1st and states that in principle the Italian Foreign Office cannot help but consider with sympathy the American proposal of a multilateral anti-war treaty," (see FRUS 1928, I, 45). Officially, Mussolini (besides the President, also holder of several minister positions, including Foreign Affairs) writes to Fletcher on May 4, regarding the position of Italy to "the proposal of the United States Government regarding a multilateral anti-war treaty," where he offers "lively sympathy" and a move toward "reaching an agreement," (see FRUS 1928, I, 55-56).

On May 3rd, Houghton reports that Chamberlain cabled Stresemann to delay reply until they could have a discussion, but "the Government's reply had been accepted by the German Cabinet and could not be delayed... he [Chamberlain] had been relieved to note that the position of the German Government was very much like that of the British," (FRUS 1928, I, 50; see also Houghton's cable of May 9: "Chamberlain took me aside to say that he was preparing a note which he would base substantially upon the German formula," FRUS 1928, I, 57).

Given the circulation of these discursive practices to agree with the Kellogg text, present in particular notes to the US embassies using particular language including the term “multilateral,” it is notable that France makes the move to link this multilateral endeavor with others beyond the six powers already involved. On May 7, Houghton reports on his meeting with French Ambassador to the UK (Fleuriau), who points out that "France would not find it all easy to sign a treaty which Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia cannot also sign," (FRUS 1928, I, 54).

Kellogg responds that he is "willing to have any of the parties signatories to the Locarno treaties made parties to the proposed treaty, either in first instance or later," (FRUS 1928, I, 55). This is compatible with the NYT report on April 28. Here, at an American Society of

International Law dinner, Kellogg states that he would invite Locarno parties to adhere to the treaty (with Claudel in the audience) to make clear that no legal incongruences would stand in the way of the multilateral treaty.[144] Houghton's meeting with Czech Foreign Minister Benes on May 9 concludes that "he [Benes] would favor the treaty here in London and also in Paris, as well as at a meeting of the Little Entente Powers," (FRUS 1928, I, 59; and here Benes states, “of course, everybody wanted peace”). On May 14, the US Minister in Warsaw reports that the Polish Foreign Ministry wishes to be included as well as other signatories of the Locarno pact (see FRUS 1928, I, 63-64, though only Poland and Czechoslovakia are mentioned—suggesting that Poland believed Belgium to already be invited; also see Kellogg's affirmative reply to all the Locarno parties in FRUS 1928, I, 64-65; indeed, Kellogg's June 20 draft text includes the three Locarno parties in the dissemination).

On May 8, the US Minister in Canada (Phillips) reports that officials in Ottawa were uncertain whether "the United States would expect Canada to participate in the original treaty or whether Canada and other Dominions would be invited subsequently," (FRUS 1928, I, 57).[145] Kellogg's reply of May 9 states that this question is a matter of "Empire policy," (with its own distinctive diplomatic history and culture) though the US would "warmly welcome Canadian participation in the treaty at any time and in any manner that may be agreed upon by the Governments at London and Ottawa," (FRUS 1928, I, 58). Phillips cables the following day that "her [Canada's] initial inclusion in the treaty proposed to London would be desirable," (FRUS 1928, I, 60).

[144] “Kellogg Reassures France On Treaty.” *New York Times*, 29 April 1928.
[145] “Canada Weighs Plan Of Kellogg For Peace.” *New York Times*, 4 May 1928. The NYT notes that the Canadian minister in the US (Massey) forwarded the note to London from Washington to Ottawa.

Such a widening suggests itself the possibility of an established diplomatic practice already mentioned earlier: conference diplomacy.[146] Besides Borah's suggestion of this very method to Levinson back in July 1927, a number of diplomats consider and suggest this kind of approach since it had become part of the diplomatic repertoire.

Chamberlain, it is reported by Houghton in an April 27 cable, thought "that a meeting between the Foreign Secretaries probably would be necessary at some later date; he expressed his pleasure at your intimation to Sir Esme Howard that you might be willing to come here to meet with them," (see FRUS 1928, I, 40). Fletcher's cable of May 2 concerning communication to the British Ambassador in Rome suggests something similar (FRUS 1928, I, 45; Herrick in London reports that he had heard nothing of this sort, 49):

> The Italian memorandum further states that, as it believes uniformity of view amongst the powers called upon to participate is indispensable, it agrees that a preliminary meeting of the legal experts of the said powers should be held... [and] is also of the opinion that the conference of which Mr. Kellogg spoke to the British Ambassador in Washington could be held subsequently.[147]

The possibility of a conference reached Germany at some point, May 2 at minimum (see Fletcher-Kellogg FRUS 1928, I, 45-46), and the French Ambassador in Tokyo on May 2 "officially requested [the] Japanese Government to be represented on [a] commission of legal experts," (FRUS 1928, I, 52; and that "French Ambassador added that he understood the American Government was favorable to the proposal"). The NYT reports of the Japanese and British preference of the "French proposal" of a conference of jurists and ambassadors on May 4.[148] The source is a London correspondent (see the British retraction on May 5).[149] So, why *not*

---

[146] This is unlike the suggestion in Reus-Smit 1997. There is no intrinsic connection between conference diplomacy and multilateralism—one is a type of diplomatic method and practice, the other can be, but is not necessarily so (see the discussion in Chapter 2).

[147] This information regarding the conference is perhaps drawn from Howard's meeting with Kellogg back in July 1927, though Kellogg flatly states that "I am at a loss to know upon what the British Ambassador could have based any such report," see FRUS 1928, I, 46.

[148] "Says Britain Seeks Treaty Conference." *New York Times*, 4 May 1928.

a conference, an established practice since the turn of the century, to cement this multilateral treaty?

For Kellogg, in three separate cables to US ambassadors in capitals abroad on May 2 (Houghton in London, Herrick in Paris, and Fletcher in Rome, copied to Berlin, see FRUS 1928, I, 48), there was “absolutely no need” for a conference of jurists or foreign ministers. He argued that both the US and Germany had made their commitments, so it follows that other countries should be able to do the same (see FRUS 1928, I, 47). Houghton, in his meeting with Chamberlain on May 3, was confronted with the question of a conference of jurists. According to Houghton, Chamberlain "said that by bringing them together he thought he was really forwarding the acceptance of the treaty," (FRUS 1928, I, 50). The US Ambassador reiterated Kellogg's logic from March: "I inquired what on earth there was for the jurists to decide. The question was not juridical but political," (FRUS 1928, I, 50). In this manner, the question became one of political will to commit to what Kellogg calls a “simple position” (FRUS 1928, I, 46), through which, in Houghton's words, "[makes] possible... the solution of actual difficulties, as they arose, along peaceful lines," (FRUS 1928, I, 50).

This logic was not contested. On May 12, the British Embassy in Washington sent to Kellogg an 'aide memoire'. Its last sentence is clear: "On hearing, however, from the United States Ambassador that Mr. Kellogg was not favourably disposed towards a conference either of jurists or of Foreign Ministers, Sir Austen Chamberlain at once withdrew his suggestion," (see FRUS 1928, I, 62-63). This is important because it instantiates a particular logic for multilateral, yet non-conference, interaction.

---

[149] “British Will Back Kellogg.” *New York Times*, 5 May 1928; “Kellogg Bans Legal Parley On Treaty.” *New York Times*, 5 May 1928.

After the settlement of “no conference diplomacy” (see also Miller's claim that the diplomatic procedure would be advanced by the US in Miller 1928, 70), Britain assents to the Kellogg proposal for a "multilateral treaty"—with its own reservation regarding certain regions on May 19 (FRUS 1928, I, 68). The NYT writes on May 20 that Britain accepts in principle "the American proposal for a multilateral treaty among the World Powers."[150] However, he states that "the proposed treaty, from its very nature, is not one which concerns His Majesty's Government in Great Britain alone [note that this is after Canada has cabled its “desire” to be included], but is one in which they could not undertake to participate otherwise than jointly and simultaneously with His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions [Canada, Irish Free State, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa] and the Government of India," (see FRUS 1928, I, 69). Indeed, when Howard delivered Chamberlain's note, he also handed a separate note with specific instructions regarding the involvement of the Dominions and India (see FRUS 1928, I, 69-70). It states:

> ...His Majesty's Government wishes to stress the obvious necessity for the whole empire signing the treaty simultaneously... They would much prefer separate invitations being sent to each of the Dominion Governments and there would be no objection to the invitations to Canada and the Irish Free State being extended through the United States Legations in Ottawa and Dublin and the invitations to His Majesty's Governments in Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the Government of India through the United States Ambassador in London.

The NYT similarly writes that the British requested the Dominions to sign and Kellogg immediately assented. These invitations go out on May 22 (see Ferrell 1952, 182). Japan cables their sympathy and most cordial cooperation to Kellogg's "multilateral" proposal on May 26. New Zealand, Canada (who will "have pleasure in cooperating" to conclude the "multilateral treaty", see FRUS 1928, I, 77-79), and Irish Free State cable their acceptance on May 30. Australia agrees on June 2, India on June 11, and South Africa on June 15 (FRUS 1928, I, 87-90).

[150] “British Accept Principle Of Kellogg anti-War Plan.” *New York Times*, 20 May 1928.

It is to these countries (all told there would be 15 original signatories) that Kellogg's draft of June 23 is circulated--the text that becomes the multilateral treaty signed on August 27, 1928.[151]

Discussion: A numbers game?

Why 15, why not more? Were there protests from any countries, as one might suspect--even with Kellogg's April 1928 note on 'Universality' specified to the 'powers' that he named?

The FRUS discloses several exchanges in which justification is offered for the parties that are included. On June 28, 1928, the US Ambassador to Brazil (Morgan) cables that the local press has published articles questioning why Brazil has not been invited "to participate as an original signatory," (FRUS 1928, I, 98; no indication in NYT). Kellogg's response is circulated to capitals in Peru, Chile, and Argentina (see FRUS 1928, I, 100), and is worth quoting at length for its concision and precision. It elaborates on why the “multilateral” move and why it was done the way it was, it tells the diplomatic story with the purpose being to get to the ending (FRUS 1928, I, 99):

> The French Government originally proposed that France and the United States enter into a treaty in the same language that I have proposed for a multilateral treaty... I was convinced that the United States could not enter into a treaty with France that it would not be equally willing to enter into with all the other powers... I made the counter-proposal that... the Governments of the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan enter into a multilateral treaty which should be open to adherence to any other power in the world. The object of this restriction at the beginning... was to narrow the field of negotiation and to expedite conclusion of a treaty; if we undertook negotiations with all the world powers, result would be indefinite delay. The present fear of war... is principally in Europe, and it was deemed most important to get the leading European powers to sign the treaty and set forth this principle. Great Britain did not wish to sign for the Dominions and India... so the proposal was extended to them... In order to obviate the question raised by France I acquiesced in the suggestion that the Locarno countries [Poland, Belgium, and Czechoslovakia] be made parties to this treaty so that there could not be any conflict between the proposed treaty and the treaties of Locarno... Never has there been any intention of restricting it to the original signatories alone. The plan has been to submit the treaty... with an invitation to become a party to it.

[151] See Ferrell 1952 for an account of the ceremony. See also “15 Nations Sign Pact To Renounce War In Paris Room Where League Was Born.” *New York Times*, 28 August 1928.

The Spanish Ambassador in Washington met with Kellogg on June 14 and on June 28, 1928, expressing interest to be invited (see FRUS 1928, I, 105-106), to which Kellogg remained non-committal. In a cable to Herrick on July 16 he re-iterates that Spain has not been invited, contrary to some reports, but would bring it to the others for consideration once they all agreed to the treaty's text (see FRUS 1928, I, 109-110; see also Marriner's memo FRUS 1928, I, 120-121, which also mentions "one difficulty" that would not arise; that ratification would not be an issue since Spain had no Parliament). In another note to Herrick on July 23, Kellogg writes "[w]ere we now to extend the original signatories to take in Spain, the question will arise how many more powers will wish to come in, and whether with every additional party the risk of obtaining ratification would not be increased," (see FRUS 1928, I, 124-125). In Herrick's reply (July 26; FRUS 1928, I, 127-128), he notes that Briand is in favor of including Spain, but that since the US has issued invitations, the US should ultimately decide who the original signatories are. Atherton notes Chamberlain's position on July 26, that it be between the US and France, but that he would welcome Spain as an original signatory and that "he does not feel to include Spain [as this] … would mean a general extension to other countries," (FRUS 1928, I, 128).

Kellogg writes his official response in a memo to Herrick on July 31; that "careful consideration has been given to the procedure which should be followed in causing the Treaty to be signed and extending its application," (FRUS 1928, I, 130); that this specific point was addressed in April, and re-circulated in June under “Universality” (see above); that the "restriction of the number of original signatories is purely a matter of procedure calculated to expedite the consummation of the treaty and its coming into force," (FRUS 1928, I, 131; see also the exchange between the Spanish Ambassador and Castle and Kellogg, 132-134, the Portuguese call on 134-135; the report of Spain sending a delegate to Paris, and Kellogg's cable to all

missions except those who were invited to Paris on "practical considerations" FRUS 1928, I, 136-139). Kellogg's cable to Hammond in Spain again on August 18 notes that (FRUS 1928, I, 148):

> I could not enlarge the number of original signatories except in consultation with the other powers... there would have to follow [Spain's inclusion] a very general extension to other powers and, as a result, the renewal of negotiations with practically every power in the world. The signature of the treaty would thereby have been indefinitely postponed.[152]

As the NYT similarly reports on August 9:

> It was felt, also [in addition to recognition issues between the US and Russia], that the treaty already had so many signatories that the addition of others might threaten its success. For this reason it is understood here, Spain has not been invited to become a signatory... unless the line was drawn somewhere, it was argued, the chances for failure or delay would be greatly increased.[153]

In spite of these obstacles, by July 24, 1929, when the treaty was brought into force, it had a total of 46 signatories.

The purpose of this study is not to duplicate Ferrell and Miller's historical narration of how this treaty was completed. It is to give a response to Chamberlain's conclusion: "It may mean much, very much for the peace of the world. It may mean not much, even very little," (cited in Ferrell 1952, 205; see Hansard, 1928, 5, 220, 1842-1843). It is to arrange the historical empirics to show how this "multilateral treaty" was legitimated, and what about this instantiation of a "multilateral treaty" was particularly meaningful. To this point, we have observed various aspects of the treaty legitimated, that: 1) in spite of obstacles, a multilateral option where numerous parties simultaneously sign a single document is viable, 2) a conference is not necessary for a multilateral treaty, and 3) the particular number of parties to be included is a negotiated process, intended to address and ultimately dissolve diplomatic problems and issues.

[152] Note the late US attempt to include Morocco and French dissent, FRUS 1928, I, 150-153.
[153] "Kellogg Rules On Signers." *New York Times*, 9 August 1928.

This narrative disclosed that for particular issues, a single or series of bilateral treaties can be deemed nonsensical by arguing for the realization of benefits resulting from political action and rendering legal issues moot (and thus making them political). This process requires work by entities, arguments and illustrations, within recognizable diplomatic discursive practice, to make their understandings fit into the world. Conversely, this section also demonstrated how a multilateral treaty is made to be understood as capable of realizing collective benefits in unique ways, distinct from a series of bilateral treaties. This, too, requires work--drawing on available practices to legitimate a particular activity and concept as appropriate and operationalizable in world politics.

CHAPTER 5

MULTILATERAL TRADE AND MULTILATERALISM, 1933-1947

Introduction

Between 1933 and 1940, there was little need to talk about or describe anything as "multilateral" in security or economic policy. The League was unable to prevent Japanese military intervention into Manchuria or the establishment of the new state of Manchukuo. The London World Monetary and Economic Conference (WMEC) could not produce any policy coordination in response to the Great Depression. Indeed, after the Manchuria Crisis and the London World Monetary and Economic Conference, which produced only one minor agreement (on silver), talk of "multilateral treaties" as useful and effective instruments of diplomacy almost vanished in policy, public, and academic circles.[154] Simply put, we observe a distinct lack of use or deployment of "multilateral" in politics because its association with particular policies and diplomatic action helped very little in getting things done in the 1930s.

The exception concerns the discussion of "multilateral trade" at the WMEC. Talk of multilateral trade occurred as a far-off ideal. Some have simply pointed out that its presence is explained by its important, if sometimes lonely, proponent in the US government. Indeed, the *Washington Post* dubbed multilateralism: "Hullism," after the Secretary of State who served under Franklin D. Roosevelt for more than a decade (on Hull, see also Aronson 1991; Dam 2004).[155] When the discussion of multilateral trade arose in the 1940s, that talk generally did not come from government officials, but economists and political scientists thinking about future scenarios of world trade. They perceived a need after the US entry into the war to begin thinking

[154] To be sure, the State Department and foreign ministries around the world continued their work, negotiating, concluding, and signing "multilateral" agreements (see the series *Treaty Information Bulletin* running from 1929-1939).
[155] "Cordell Hull." *Washington Post*, 4 March 1941; "Hullism." *Washington Post*, 8 December 1944.

about post-war international order given the economic disaster of the Great Depression and subsequent measures to stimulate recovery.

In the service of planning for that particular future, policy ideas like “multilateralism” were revisited and a particular kind of argument was renewed; to describe the preferred system (multilateral) as distinguishable from the old, flawed system (bilateral). The goal of this chapter is to trace how that need came to be articulated the way that it was, what logics were utilized, and what practices and relations came with it.

Digging into the WMEC in 1933 is important for this study's explanation because it legitimated the idea of multilateralism; that multilateral products, arrangements, trade, and conventions are good for the growth of international trade as a policy goal. Between 1933 and 1945, the world still had not attained this collective goal, but it remained a legitimate, if “idealistic” objective. As James Miller (2000) noted, “definitions of multilateralism developed in relation to the trading system.” They were “invented” as recognizable words during this time frame. With the failure of the WMEC in 1933, multilateralism needed to be rehabilitated to become useful again in the 1940s. As with the previous chapter, I use discursive practices—a consequence resulting from my particular focus on use—as a lens to conceptualize and analyze politics. Purposeful negotiation concerning peace and economic welfare was conducted in ways to deem multilateralism compatible, yet different and distinguishable from other forms of policy. The previous chapter showed how the term “multilateral” was valuable in negotiating problems arising from questions of war and peace. Multilateral treaties—as opposed to bilateral ones—were rendered indispensable in 1919 (Treaty of Versailles), and viable, compatible, and logical for obtaining benefits (Pact of Paris) in 1928.

Like those episodes, addressing political issues came in the form of cultural diplomatic practices: public and private negotiation by particular diplomatic entities (diplomats and government officials with relations to economists and political scientists, sometimes one in the same, reported by mass media outlets). Pathways to address these issues were specified and "multilateral" was used to identify one particular route. The question is to analyze how and why particular pathways prevail. Resuscitating multilateralism after the WMEC began with the theory and planning of world politics after the Second World War, perhaps beginning with Ethel Dietrich's 1940 article in the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (see also Snyder 1940; Hilgerdt 1943).

In the next five years, the case is made for "multilateral trade" by both economists and policy-makers, and attending practices are specified to make this happen as a way to address economic issues that exacerbated economic nationalism, nationalism, fascism, and WWII. The mechanism, which itself becomes an objective, that makes this possible is multilateral clearing (synonymous with balance of payments) which requires some measure of stable currency convertibility. What results is the legitimation of multilateralism as a matter of policy for economic issues, particularly those that arose as causes of WWII, underpinned by requirements dictated by economic theory. This legitimation is concretized by the establishment of two inter-related international financial institutions at Bretton Woods, one for provision of capital and the other for currency stability. The third projected institution requires a separate conference, where the establishment of the institution is stalled, but a looser set of rules are promulgated.

Again, what matters is that multilateralism remained legitimate as a goal for international politics, if not yet fully realized. It is failures like the WMEC as much as successes that provide

politicians and diplomats with resources to produce policy through a negotiated process. This process stands in need of explanation.

IR has a long history of studying the politics of economic policy in the inter-war period (Carr 1939; see also Kindleberger 1986; Simmons 1994). Ruggie (1982) argues that the “compromise of embedded liberalism,” differentiated from orthodox liberalism, produced a different multilateralism in practice, though its essential character was unchanged. By a different practice, he means the way the rules were carried out, not the rules themselves. Multilateralism, then for Ruggie, appears to be a function of the form of liberalism. Whatever form that takes determines the multilateralism that expresses it. Rather than seeking to understand and explain multilateralism through unpacking how the particular form of liberalism came to be negotiated post-World War II, I first look to see how previous instances of use determine the possible ways in which multilateralism can be deployed, and then see how these competed against each other. While it is clear that liberalist language and action is often associated with multilateralism in practice, I am not focusing on this relationship for the moment. I should point out that it is not at all clear that multilateralism cannot be illiberal (see e.g. Cox 1992).

Odell (1988) is probably right to view the outcomes of the 1933 London Conference and the 1944 Bretton Woods agreement as contrasting cases. The question he asks is why agents used the different strategies they did when confronted with the same problem. Oye (1985, 173) is also probably right that the interwar years (1925-1939) saw a "full spectrum of international monetary cooperation and conflict." He seeks to "account for differences between these transitional periods [he identifies two opposing types], each study examines, in turns, intrinsic characteristics of international monetary politics, contextual determinants of national interests, and strategic

responses of the central monetary powers," (Oye 1985, 175).[156] In Ikenberry's (1992) work on the politics of Bretton Woods, he points to the common consensus among economists as an explanatory lever. Simmons (1994) argues that the primary influence on central bank behavior was domestic prices.

Unlike that body of research, this study seeks to disclose the conditions in which Oye's statement can be most useful (see also Simmons and Elkins 2004 as one statement on policy diffusion). Specifically, I attempt to explain what is characteristic about international monetary politics of the time by tracing backward and viewing politics prospectively to answer why particular contexts are influential in the production of interests, and how particular strategies are deemed acceptable versus others. I trace out strategic uses and analyze their effects rather than point to moments of change and label them as the alteration of payoffs. We should unpack how payoffs are altered and how problems that recur are perceived differently through their description and interpretation in a different context. This may help us in accounting for variation of diplomacy and policy.

The London World Monetary and Economic Conference: Multilateral agreements for economic problems

In the last chapter, treaties, as diplomatic products, were re-affirmed as indispensable pieces of international relations. In particular, "multilateral treaties" were instantiated as useful for obtaining system-wide benefits in addressing problems of war and peace. A little more than a year after the signing of the Pact of Paris (August 27, 1928), the US stock market suffered a collapse at the New York stock exchange at the end of October 1929. While the effects of the Great Depression world-wide are better covered elsewhere (e.g. Kindleberger 1986), the starting

[156] Oye does appear to seek to develop more precise theory, as he states: "The mere existence of a mutual interest does not guarantee realization of a common good."

observation for this chapter is the use of *multilateral* products as solutions to this "unprecedented" economic problem.

Figure 11. World unemployment (in thousands), 1925-1931. Source: *League World Economic Survey 1932*.

In an address given at Chatham House (and later published in the July 1933 issue of *International Affairs*, with Sir Walter Layton chairing the session), Sir Herbert Samuel calls the situation "grim", "catastrophic", and "nothing like it has ever been known in the whole economic history of the world, a collapse so sudden, so universal, and so extreme," (Samuel 1933, 441). Citing the League's report, he describes the stakes of the London 1933 conference: "[it] would shake the whole system of international finance to its foundations; standards of living would be lowered, and the social system as we know it could hardly survive," (Samuel 1933, 442; citing the League of Nations Monetary and Economic Conference Draft Annotated Agenda). One important factor that is specified to have caused this Great Depression was "economic nationalism", and this needed to be confronted.[157]

[157] In his comments on Samuel, John Maynard Keynes offers that the US and Britain must cooperate but that information about US policy was lacking.

In Franklin Roosevelt's inaugural address (March 4, 1933), he states that “only a foolish optimist can deny the dark realities of the moment.” Indeed, the situation in which he found himself as the incoming US President dictated action to deal with “unprecedented” “material difficulties.”[158]

Starting point: We need “a different outlook”

Writing in *Foreign Affairs* in April 1933, Sir Walter Layton (1933a, 406) wrote:

> None of the long and apparently interminable series of international conferences that have met since the war--with the exception of the Peace Conference itself--has been charged with more vital importance or anticipated with more hopefulness, not unmixed with anxiety, than the World Economic Conference which is to meet in London this year. This is due to the now almost universal recognition of the fact that the economic crisis cannot be solved, and can hardly even be palliated, by the action of individual governments...[159]

Moreover, he writes, "A study of the facts in this and similar cases will, I think, lead inevitably to the conclusion (which is, indeed, confirmed by the experience of the past ten years) that bilateral bargains within the framework of an intensely protectionist world cannot produce benefits at all commensurate with those which would follow from the adoption of an entirely different outlook," (Layton 1933a, 417).

The “old” way consisted of individual states determining their interests and acting on the basis of these. The “new” way is some other kind of philosophy. In this instance, it is specified as “internationalism.” Layton (1933a, 419), again, articulates this, that “real task before the statesmen … is to decide whether the future of the world is to take shape along the lines of "closed" national economies, dominated by aims and conceptions of self-sufficiency, or of an economic internationalism such as that to which we were tending in the days before the war.”

[158] Roosevelt, Franklin. 1938. *The public papers and addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*. New York: Random House.

[159] In addition, Layton, also an editor at the *Economist*, (1933, 407) writes that, "The Economic Conference need not wait for the final solution of the problems of disarmament and security," foreshadowing the ‘development need not wait for disarmament’ argument to be expressed in the debate over development finance.

“Internationalism,” in this instance, is the convenient short-hand that expresses the coordinated action for achieving common interests—oppositionally situated from protectionism and individualism. “Multilateralism” was not naturally that short-hand (or else Layton would have used it). However, as 1933 went on, *multilateral* products were associated with a possible response to the Great Depression. I seek to disclose the logic for this response and the arguments against opposing bilateral arrangements.

End point: the un-operationalization of multilateral kinds

In the aftermath of the primary sessions of the conference, a high-level US and British cable exchange went like this (FRUS 1933, I, 748-749; FRUS 1933, I, 751):

> Although the [British] Prime Minister said he only meant to discuss economic questions, he went on to express his personal disappointment that, after the hearty cooperation which existed between England and the United States at the time of the negotiations of the London Naval Treaty in 1929 [1930]... that with the breakdown of the Economic Conference there was no coordinated leadership today certainly among European nations, to lead the world towards economic reconstruction. ... From the point of view of achievement the Conference had been a failure and the personal blow he had received in the lack of cooperation from the United States made him at one time almost despair.
>
> …
>
> Please inform the Prime Minister that I heartily agree with his intention to devote himself... to an effort to take positive steps to carry forward the work of the Conference and that he may be assured of my whole-hearted cooperation. I share his belief that present troubled circumstances make more imperative than ever “close accord in leadership among the principal nations”. An ingenuity of mind an opportunity should be exercised to prevent the further spread of semi-hostile economic nationalism.

There was no multilateral action, much less bilateral action, and arguments were made for the impracticability of anything multilateral. In a sense, there was no leadership between the “Great Powers” and no coalition of smaller states, but this over-simplifies complex diplomatic and economic matters. For Layton (1933b, 20; 1933b, 21-22), because there was no general agreement at the outset, this led to the pursuit of individuated interests:

> The chief lesson of the World Economic Conference is to reinforce and drive home a conclusion which emerges from the history of all international conferences since the war, namely, that there is little hope of achieving agreement among a large gathering of statesmen or even of experts unless the ground has been thoroughly and systematically prepared beforehand and a general understanding reached by negotiation or otherwise as to the character and terms of the agreement to be concluded. …
>
> When the Conference came to discuss such matters as tariffs and exchange restrictions in the light of the knowledge that there could as yet be no general plan for reorganizing international economic intercourse, all the various national preoccupations and prejudices came to the surface and provided arguments for the cynics who have asserted that if America's monetary situation had not proved an insuperable barrier, there were a dozen different nations whose short-sighted economic policies would have ensured the Conference's failure.

The “failure” was, in a sense, two-fold. On the surface, there was a) an inability to translate the consensus of the ‘we can't do this alone’ logic to concrete agenda items to actually bargain over, and b) a resurgence of economic nationalism in short time frames (at least, what is often called the ‘short-run’). It is possible that multilateral meetings, conferences, or treaties can facilitate Great Power cooperation, as the previous chapter illustrated. Still, conferences are not the only multilateral procedure possible and Great Power leadership is not always required.

The key question to explore in this section is the use of 'multilateral' and what its role was in the outcome that resulted. This is not to show its impotence, but rather to show its role in the series of negotiations as a legitimate option, how it was used in the diplomatic interaction, and how its use affected political possibilities. In this case, multilateral possibilities were ultimately deemed impracticable avenues. This is a different explanation than those commonly offered, such as: a lack of leadership, the direction of Roosevelt's thinking, negotiation analysis, or some kind of not-yet embedded liberalism.

The primary question is to not to explain this as a singular event, but to see this event as a series of instantiations of 'multilateral' in world politics and bring to relief the relations that are made in this episode. By way of doing this, I still do offer an explanation that relies on the

vestiges of 'multilateral' in relation to treaties and the logics used in the Kellogg-Briand Pact and how those are connected to 'multilateral' in economic policy-making.

Again, I rely first on the *New York Times* and *Foreign Relations of the United States Series* to provide useful sources for data focused on how “multilateral” is used in the context of the London World Monetary and Economic Conference in 1933. While many of the revived “multilateral treaties” specified by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 concern international economic relations, the diplomats, statesmen, and media of the era hardly used the term at all. To justify the differentiation between bilateral and multilateral, ties to peace and justice were invoked. The Kellogg-Briand Pact as a *multilateral treaty* signifies, and solidifies, the differentiation from a bilateral treaty and more strongly invoked logics of inclusivity and obtaining benefits from multilateral products and action. In that case, the primary concern was the prevention of war, not the problem of economic relations. The use of “multilateral” in the following section, I argue, connects economic relations more decisively to this mass of discursive practices.

What results is a narrative to be analyzed and explained. The coding of events here is meant to be an interpretation of history to highlight particular aspects. In this case, the goal is to specify what diplomatic methods were available to address the problem compared to what was actually discussed and done. Indeed, in hindsight what appears obvious and natural had to 'win out' against available options. Writing in 1977, Maier (609) states:

> Wartime leadership and British dependence brought the opportunity to press for the Treasury and State Department's preferred multilateralism. These policies had not originally been ascendant. At its inception, the New Deal had adopted a course of monetary unilateralism as Roosevelt refused cooperation with the London Economic Conference in 1933 and embarked upon the almost capricious gold purchases of 1934.

Indeed, choice is one approach to take, focusing on an agent and her inferred preferences at a particular moment (e.g. Saunders 2009 on US Presidential leadership). Often though what

the agent perceives as choice is made possible by the context. Moreover, what “choice” is and what the consequences are of this “choice” can vary enormously (e.g. Schilling 1961 on Truman and the 'choice' of using atomic weapons).

From one perspective, there was great incentive to cooperate in 1933 (e.g. stated in Oye 1985) and there was consensus on the value of multilateral exchange (Maier 1977, 621). Yet, it is commonly argued that domestic politics intervened (e.g. Haggard 1988; Oye 1985; Maier 1977; also see Nichols 1951). In a sense, we know why the outcome of the World Monetary and Economic Conference resulted in just one minor agreement: the President made a choice. This is a proximate cause or a perspective of causality located at the highest level of government. Presidential minds are the causal factors of interest.

As Haggard (see below) also implies, I am not so much concerned with these factors as I am in the conditions in which that choice was legitimately possible, how that choice was legitimated after the fact, and the consequences it had on political and discursive arrangements. Oye is right. The presence of a mutual interest does nothing to guarantee the realization of a common good. The direction Oye takes to address this question is to consider what he calls the “iterativeness of monetary relations,” which means to prospectively examine likely future interactions, along with changing payoff structures (Oye 1985, 194).

I propose to go in a different direction to understand what terrain these interactions and the analyses conducted within them actually “sit” on top of (akin to Finnemore's (1996) “permissive conditions of action”). This is given a brief mention by Haggard (1988, 91) as part of his “institutionalist” argument in that institutions affect "even the discourse in which groups must frame their efforts to exercise influence." If Haggard is right that individuals doing politics, representing political entities, must employ language and practices in particular ways to exercise

influence (e.g. Jentleson 2004 on multilateralism), it is reasonable to conclude that we should examine what it is about these words and actions that make meaningful outcomes possible. One way to do this is to adopt the genealogical approach here.

The run-up, the conference, and the aftermath: laying out options, their characteristics, and explaining the outcome

Date	Description	Why? Circulation of what?
October 1929	US stock market collapse; onset Great Depression	Beginning of unprecedented economic problem (UEP)
January 1933	US State Dept. internal policy position	Bilateral = bad
March 1933	Roosevelt's inaugural address	UEP
March 1933	Inter-departmental group memo; NYT describes plurilateral plan	UEP; possible solution = plurilateral treaties
April 1933	NYT describes bill for multilateral treaty on tariff reduction	UEP; possible solution = multilateral treaty
April 1933	Layton Foreign Affairs	UEP; solution = new way
May – June 1933	US diplomacy: China, Poland, Japan, etc.	Solution = bilateral or multilateral (which may not be effective)
June 1933	NYT coverage of Conference	Top 2 issues: currency stability, tariff reduction
June 1933		Problem = trade barriers; could do multilateral reductions; bilateral or multilateral possibilities;

		multilateral = unwieldy
July 1933	FRUS London-DC cables; NYT continued coverage	Multilateral = naturally preferred; not practical; inherent difficulties; pluralilateral possibility; Silver multilateral agreement
September - October 1933	US-UK diplomatic exchange; Layton 1933b (Foreign Affairs)	Lamentations of no agreement
December 1933	Pan-Am Conference	Multilateral treaties vital instrument for trade; no benefits if parties refuse to extend advantages

TABLE 4. Events from October 1929 to December 1933.

To be sure, useful historical narrations of the WMEC exist elsewhere (e.g. Nichols 1951; Feis 1966 is the closest to a specific account). The objective of this narrative is to not re-tell the story. Rather it is to investigate the role of “multilateral trade” in making one historian's conclusion possible (Nichols (1951, 317)): "American diplomacy came to pivot around a [currency] stabilization objective [though later effectively scuttled by Roosevelt]; American diplomacy strove to help other nations to adjust their economies to changing world conditions, in order the better to preserve America's own prosperity and safety."

Besides the British academics writing in *International Affairs* and *Foreign Affairs* above, the FRUS at the start of 1933 discloses the framing of the problem of the world economy. Protectionism reigned as trade barriers were high around the globe, meaning that goods could not be exported without loss, and the cost of imported goods was great. Trade flows were dictated by various "bi-lateral agreements", which were considered "injurous hindrances." These were the

words of Cordell Hull, the new Secretary of State, in January 1933 (FRUS 1933, I, 452). In a report to the State Department, discussed internally and released to the *New York Times*, a recommendation for the form of action is offered:

> It will not in our judgment be possible to make substantial progress by piecemeal measures. A policy of nibbling will not solve this crisis. We believe the governments of the world must make up their minds to achieve a broad solution by concerted action along the world front.[160]

The FRUS mentions an expert group under the heading "Initiation of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Program" in a cable from March 6, reconstituted as an "Inter-Departmental Committee" (FRUS 1933, I, 921). They note two paths to tariff reductions: multilateral or bilateral-reciprocal agreements. It also notes the uncertainty of the future of the most-favored-nation clause, and "should the obligations of the clause, by general agreement, be cancelled with reference to the reciprocal favors of general conventions, it would seem feasible for the United States to enter into a horizontal reduction agreement with a few important countries," (FRUS 1933, I, 922).

Soon thereafter, the NYT reports that experts consulted by Roosevelt's administration believe that another path exists besides "concerted action along the world front." The headline and first sub-headline from the page 1 article reads: "Experts Perfect Reciprocity Plans--"Plurilateral" Pacts to Share Trade Advantage Urged by Roosevelt Aides."[161] In the view of these "technicians" or "experts" the most-favored-nation clause embedded in international agreements and "reciprocity systems" recently favored for economic security can be "reconciled" through "plurilateral" treaties. They are specified as treaties that "presuppose the adherence of a large number of countries, so trade advantages can be shared among them in such logical fashion as to permit their generalization without injuring the trade of the contracting

[160] "Economic Experts Ask Debt Revision." *New York Times*, 20 January 1933.
[161] "Experts Perfect Reciprocity Plans." *New York Times*, 24 March 1933.

parties.” The NYT article goes on to state that the aides are working toward identifying a group of suitable countries for such a treaty, one going so far to suggest that a "modus vivendi [compromise] defining most-favored-nation clauses as permitting such plurilateral agreements might be adopted at the World Economic Conference… this would avoid, he said, rewriting most of the trade treaties in the world and upsetting existing rate schedules."

In the months before the summer conference, various diplomatic meetings occurred in Washington that discussed options for addressing world economic issues For example, meetings were held with Chinese ambassadors and ministers in May 1933 (in which Bureau Chief for Far Eastern Affairs Stanley Hornbeck wrote the meeting memo—who had described the most-favored-nation clause as the “cornerstone of all modern commercial treaties” in 1910; see also Snyder 1940; note also that Herbert Feis, economic advisor, was present). In this discussion, talk about tariffs and procedures would comprise of the "continued use of multilateral and bilateral agreements", that "in principle" the US favors "the unconditional most-favored-nation clause... [and] bilateral treaties must be negotiated within the framework," (FRUS 1933, I, 523). A few days later, meeting with Polish diplomats, Hull states that there are three methods for tariff and trade barrier reduction: "autonomous action", "bilateral agreements or treaties," and "multilateral treaties". Hull states that the US favors the "bilateral" method, understood as treaties containing the unconditional most-favored-nation clause. In his words, this entails "a series of such treaties,” which would “extend the tariff reductions throughout the world," (FRUS 1933, I, 560). At the same time, the US would consider any multilateral proposal. This is akin to the possible methods in the Kellogg-Briand case: a series of bilateral treaties or a single multilateral one. Note that no references to ‘plurilateral’ methods are offered in these instances.

Indeed, when other countries speak to the US (such as Japan or the Central and Eastern European countries), the terms “multilateral” and “bilateral” are used to specify diplomatic procedure and negotiation. At a meeting with Japanese representatives in Washington, the Under Secretary of State (Frederick Livesey) stated that "it was our opinion that multilateral proposals would not obtain enough consents to be effective," (FRUS 1933, I, 545). No indication regarding what is “enough”. The sentiment against 'multilateral' proposals is again repeated in a meeting with Chilean representatives, that "multilateral treaties" would not be as "useful as bilateral ones," (FRUS 1933, I, 517). In Roosevelt's instructions to the US delegation, written at the end of May, however, he lays out six resolutions that he hopes the delegation will be able to have the conference delegates all assent to—usually the kind of action that is considered 'multilateral’ though Roosevelt does not employ this term.

The NYT describes the Tariff Board report to Roosevelt on June 8, noting *bilateral* and *multilateral* bargaining techniques. In the run-up to the conference, the WMEC was described as a “multilateral stage.”[162] At the top of the US agenda was tariff reduction to stimulate trade, and “bilateral” and “multilateral” “arrangements”, “treaties”, “conventions”, “accords”, and “proposals” are mentioned as available pathways.

[162] “High Tariffs, Quotas and Other Restrictions, Which Have Unsettled Currencies and Cut Down the Volume of World Trade, Represent Formidable Obstacles to the Recovery That the Conference Seeks.” *New York Times*, 18 June 1933.



Figure 12. ‘Pre-conference negotiation’, 1933.

What is observed is that non-binding and binding proposals or legal documents are the key products for this issue. In the empirics reviewed in the months before the conference, we observed three “methods” for conference outcomes: bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral. The State Department and President speak almost entirely in bilateral versus multilateral terms.

The Conference: Refining what is and what is not multilateral

The World Monetary and Economic Conference convened in London in the summer of 1933. In a full page layout feature in the June 18, 1933 edition of the NYT, Raymond L. Buell (at the time the Research Director at the Foreign Policy Association) began a nearly full page article with a declaration: "At the World Economic Conference a determined attack upon the obstacles to economic recovery is being made." The article is sub-titled in block letters, "Trade Barriers: A Baffling Task at London." One of, and perhaps the most, pressing issue was trade barriers, or rather simply, the decline of world trade. The NYT reports that bilateral and multilateral paths were identified, such as 'multilateral reductions' of tariffs. Indeed, the FRUS and NYT reveal that a combination of both paths is possible for particular issues.

While disagreements were frequent as the NYT notes on June 20 (Day 2 of the Conference) with reports already of a “standstill” (as Baruch “sits in”), discussion concerning topics, procedures, and outcomes remained common (see Nichols 1951; and various *New York Times* reports for the description of a 70-foot bar on the lower floor and for the Italian Finance Minister permitting smoking to occur during sessions).[163] On June 23, the NYT reports that currency stabilization was dropped, and Hull offers a tariff resolution (see Aaronson 1991; Dam 2003). Bilateral and multilateral agreements are offered as methods in the actual resolution itself. The NYT reports "while the British are urging bilateral agreements as the best method of reducing tariffs, the American resolution suggests that this be done by bilateral or multilateral agreements.”[164] Seeing as the conference is not necessary for bilateral agreements, and that the "French suggested gradual relaxation of these restrictions [tariffs] through bilateral agreements," the NYT concludes that "the discussion does not appear hopeful for the early elimination of emergency trade restrictions imposed in the last two years."[165] Indeed, as the Hull tariff resolution remained sidelined, the NYT reports on June 27 that the Japanese had become dissatisfied with "what was termed lack of progress" at the conference, and "believe that the unwieldy multilateral negotiation method might better yield to direct discussion of tariff problems by interested nations."[166] Sprague (FRUS 1933, I, 664; see also Moley's comment, 665-666)) also writes that negotiations with 'gold countries' might not be useful:

> Although action to check speculation would be helpful I do not think that this alone would insure the maintenance of the gold standard. On the other hand, I do not think it is necessary or desirable at this time to enter into specific arrangements of a tripartite character. Unilateral action can be more immediate and involves less publicity.

---

[163] “Drinks of World on Tap at Parley.” *New York Times*, 8 June 1933. “No Smoking Rule Waived To Speed Economic Parley.” *New York Times*, 20 June 1933.
[164] “Hull Tariff Plan Clarifies U.S. Aims.” *New York Times*, 23 June 1933.
[165] Ibid.
[166] “Japanese Urge Speed.” *New York Times*, 27 June 1933.

On June 30, the NYT reports that France suggests a pool of ships to be used for transportation of goods. They suggest that "the conference advise the governments to invite shipowners to come to multilateral agreements covering the main routes and limiting the tonnage of future ships."[167] Note that the methods themselves are not being contested, but which method best “fits into” the politics of the moment by linking it to particular entities and issues.

At this point, we observe two topics with discursive-practical associations with “multilateral” in the context of the diplomatic interaction at the WMEC as recorded in the NYT and FRUS.



Figure 13. Discursive-practical associations with 'multilateral' at WMEC in NYT and FRUS, June-July 1933.

This discussion in the public sphere about diplomatic options is reflected in the FRUS. These cables between Hull and the State Department in Washington, DC disclose that “multilateral” approaches are, of course, preferred, but impracticable. The tension between the two is mediated by this shared difficulty in “making multilateralism work” in practice.

[167] “French Urge World Ship Pool.” *New York Times*, 30 June 1933.

A proposed joint declaration with Great Britain is sternly rejected by Roosevelt on July 1 (see FRUS 1933, I, 669-670), in spite of his own delegation's endorsement and assertions. With perhaps every issue “dead,” Hull cables again possibilities concerning tariff reduction on July 2.[168] The move to adjourn the conference due to lack of movement on gold and currency stabilization increases, but it does not stop the proposal of "14 representatives of the 14 most important governments to continue work in committees," on July 4 (FRUS 1933, I, 684).

By July 6, Hull asks for instructions for the US joining in "any multilateral agreement for" reducing tariff rates (FRUS 1933, I, 696). In reply, the acting Secretary of State (Phillips) asserts that it is the US position that "the end we have in view would not alone benefit ourselves but the rest of the world," (FRUS 1933, I, 703). Directly speaking to “multilateral agreements” he, perhaps with a touch of flippancy, states, "3. Our policy *naturally* would be to reduce the level of tariffs by multilateral agreements, but we do not see how this can be dealt with in a *practical* way until we reach the stage where there is more or less a stationary price level and more stable currencies because fluctuating currencies can so modify tariffs as to upset any tariff arrangement which might be made," (FRUS 1933, I, 703-704, emphasis added). This links monetary policy, already contentious and sidelined, with trade policy (Hull's focus), and increases the possibility of it also facing a similar fate (see also Aaronson 1991).

Unabashed, Hull presses on and cables an outline of a resolution on July 11 (FRUS 1933, I, 799). In Section II (Positive Undertaking), Part 1, (Agreement for the reduction of duties), a parenthetical precedes the proposed text. It reads:

> It has been found difficult to formulate any feasible basis for a multilateral undertaking looking forward to a general reduction of duties both because of the inherent difficulties of any multilateral action and of the special circumstances set forth in your No. 121 (the Phillips cable of July 6).

[168] This originates from Hull’s statement of June 23. See also the lack of a return phone call concerning a 3 1/2 page manuscript written by Hull and Moley, as per telephone communication of July 5 (FRUS 1933, I, 689-692).

Phillips replies affirmatively on July 13 to this parenthetical, stating that (FRUS 1933, I, 714):

> … you point out the difficulty of formulating any feasible basis for a multilateral understanding looking forward to a general reduction of duties. It would perhaps be best that your resolution propose instead that all Governments undertake to reduce duties by negotiating bilateral treaties and generalizing the reductions by operation of the unconditional most-favored-nation clause.

In this statement, we clearly observe two diplomatic paths (bilateral and multilateral), where one is *naturally* preferred, but infeasible. Because of this impracticability, a *bilateral* path is favored.

Before the Conference would adjourn, a possible "plurilateral" path was also identified, somewhere in between bilateral and multilateral (see NYT 22 July 1933; FRUS 1933, I, 725-727; see also the above statement in the NYT 24 March 1933).[169] In times where flexibility is needed, adding this third way is politically useful, as multilateral approaches where inclusion is so apparently valued prove to be difficult. A slightly different third way is present in the NYT's review of the conference on July 30, 1933, where the Hull Plan might go forward with the "principle of the most-favored-nation clause in bilateral treaties and applying it to multilateral treaties where possible."[170]

In the end, none of the methods proved useful for dealing with economic issues of the time, whether trade barriers or currency stabilization. Still, the NYT dutifully reported Senator Pittman's words on the silver accord: "the most remarkable multilateral agreement ever entered into between governments and of itself alone it would have justified this conference."[171]

---

[169] "Experts Perfect Reciprocity Plans." *New York Times*, 24 March 1933. "New Tariff Truce Is Urged By Hull." *New York Times*, 22 July 1933.
[170] "Americans Proud of Parley Record." *New York Times*, 30 July 1933.
[171] "Pittman Says War Is Issue Of Parley." *New York Times*, 1August 1933.

Discussion

The deflection of the multilateral method was associated with its practicability, not its undesirability. This analysis is not about whether multilateralism does or does not matter to world politics. Instead, this analysis attempts to connect different diplomatic moments where "multilateral" is used, its meaning concretized, and its associations instantiated. During the diplomacy of the WMEC, "multilateral" was used to delineate a policy path and its related diplomatic practices. These moves were rendered as not fitting the politics of the context, and were marginalized by the instantiated virtues (practicability, less public notoriety) of other paths. Even in so doing, the peculiar issue of trade made it possible to retain "multilateral trade" as an ideal that could possibly be re-animated.

Bilateral approaches specifically involve two countries, and the rationale for this kind of approach is to get something done, to achieve some benefit. However, it is done with one eye toward third parties, other parties in the region, and other parties in the world. Bilateralism, in a sense, no longer operates in a purely bilateral political context—simply between two states and two states only—for matters of war and economics. The logic of multilateral approaches involve a theoretical benefit for every entity in the system, and it may be done via conference, treaty, or international organization. The "in-between" way of plurilateralism suggests that a group of states can perform a kind of leadership role to map out multilateral and bilateral approaches as well as regional or other group approaches (see later chapters).

The WMEC demonstrates that multilateralism remains an objective in an ideal sense. This is its political value. The apparent way to address world economic issues was to call a "multilateral conference," invite all the recognized countries (66 of them), and get a consensus agreement that everyone then must adhere to. Without this last clause—as the logic of multilateral agreements is said to dictate—the benefits do not obtain. These notions of inclusivity

and diffuse benefits remain linked to multilateralism in spite of the “failure” of the WMEC to achieve anything other than a single minor multilateral agreement (see Layton 1933b for another rehearsal of the “pre-negotiation” problem). In terms of stabilizing the idea of *multilateral* being linked to diffuse benefits and inclusivity, the WMEC episode 1) sustains a particular interpretation for future political use, and 2) decisively links “multilateral” methods to the domain of economic policy-making, in particular monetary policy.

An Aside: 7th International Conference of American States, Montevideo 1933.

In spite of the WMEC’s outcome, the use of “multilateral” in diplomatic interaction occurs later in 1933 at the Seventh International Conference of American States held in December in Montevideo.

In retrospect this seems somewhat surprising given the association between *multilateral* tariff reduction and a lack of any agreement at the WMEC. For the Roosevelt administration (FRUS 1933, IV, 42-43):

> … it seems impossible for the time being to make a proposal at Montevideo for the retention of the tariff truce or to commit this Government at the present moment to any multilateral commercial agreement.
>
> The only way open would seem to be the presentation of a strong resolution in favor of a vigorous endeavor to mutually lessen trade barriers and as a means thereto that they resolve to enter as promptly as possible into bilateral discussions and agreements for effecting that end.

In spite of this pessimism, the instructions from the White House do list a multilateral agreement as a possibility (FRUS 1933, IV, 85-86; see also the cable to Hull on December 13, FRUS 1933, IV, 186).

Hull states on December 12 that "I had a good day with the economic proposal," (FRUS 1933, IV, 178). Indeed, he had presented the US' economic proposal to a Subcommittee (supported by the Chairman, Dr. Saavedra Lamas, Foreign Minister of Argentina, see FRUS

1933, IV, 178, 182) on that day. The NYT reports of Hull's proposal on December 13 asking for "bilateral reciprocity treaties," and for the conclusion of "bilateral or multilateral agreements for the removal of prohibitions and restrictions and for the reduction of tariff rates to a moderate level."[172] Importantly, one paragraph opens with the following:[173]

> With a view to encouraging the development of unified and comprehensive multilateral treaties as a vitally important instrument of trade liberalization the advantages of which treaties ought not to be open to countries which refuse to confer similar advantages.

On December 19, Hull cables his proposed 'multilateral' move to Washington (FRUS 1933, IV, 199):

> It is highly desirable here and now to add confidence and realism to the situation by taking the initial step in respect of multilateral action carrying out my economic resolution which the Conference has adopted. Accordingly I wish to introduce into the Conference, urging signature prior to adjournment, a general agreement pledging the parties not to invoke the most-favored-nation clause of bilateral treaties to obtain the advantages of multilateral economic treaties.[174]

The logic of Hull's diplomacy is somewhat familiar by now: benefits drawn from inclusivity. This logic was implied in 1919 and fleshed out in 1928 and earlier in 1933.[175] This grounds his conception of *multilateral* action, which is now attempting to be tied to the bilateral reciprocal treaties that he proposes at the end of 1933. This logic, whether bilaterally or multilaterally operationalized, was sustained as legitimate and desirable because it relied on *reciprocity* as a principle. This demonstrates the fluidity of such terms to achieve political goals.

In the Final Act of the Pan-American Conference, two statements are notable for their reference to multilateral conventions and the associated logic. The first is a resolution which concerns “economic, commercial, and tariff policy” and makes reference to "the development of

---

[172] “Text of Hull Trade Proposal.” *New York Times*, 13 December 1933.
[173] Ibid.
[174] This is the source of the resolution of the conference noted above. The Departments general assent is given the next day (see FRUS 1933, IV, 204-205).
[175] In an editorial in the NYT on December 17, Edwin L. James calls this a “reversal” of US policy concerning the most-favored-nation clause (NYT 1933 December 19; see also Raymond Buell praiseful summary in NYT 1933 December 24, calling the WMEC a 'failure' as well; and the summary in NYT 1933 December 31).

economic relations among the peoples of the world by means of multilateral conventions, the benefits of which ought not to accrue to countries which refuse to assume their obligations," (see Scott 1934; 1940). The second statement, a recommendation on "multilateral commercial treaties," echoes this logic: that participation is obligatory to obtain benefits. It states, "The High Contracting Parties, desirous of encouraging the development of economic relations among the peoples of the world by means of multilateral conventions, the benefits of which ought not to inure to countries which refuse to assume the obligations thereof."[176] A draft convention drawn from this statement opened for signature in July 1934 (it garnered 8 signatures and 3 ratifications (Cuba, Greece, and the US) by July 1940; see Scott 1940; see also Ustor 1969).[177]

The question we should ask is not only why was this resolution produced, but why was it produced the way it was. What discursive-practical elements are at work in this instantiation? First, the forum is a "regional" diplomatic conference, attended by envoys representing countries in North and South America. Through the meeting of diplomats, international issues are discussed in the setting of a conference. This involved standard diplomatic practices: an agenda, communiqués, committee meetings, and informal gatherings in which backchannel information can flow (e.g. Berridge 2002). A common language is used to document the proceedings (e.g. Satow 1979). It is again instantiated as normal and appropriate to have a regional type of conference diplomacy—that in smaller groups, political issues can still be usefully discussed, and resolutions promulgated (a practice with a long history). The instructions given by Roosevelt note the importance of this conference in the wake of the London Conference (FRUS 1933, IV, 43; see also Hull's cable presenting US London proposal to "Pan America" FRUS 1933, IV, 42, and pessimistic reply on the same page). In this sense, the effects of the different diplomatic

[176] See U.S. Treaty Series no. 898.
[177] See FRUS 1934, IV, 1-31 concerning the diplomacy concerning European countries, the most-favored-nation clause, and this draft convention drawn from a 'regional' resolution.

contexts have consequences on each other--and we should not think of them as actually distinct arenas. Terms like “regional,” “bilateral,” and “multilateral” are useful for analytical, rhetorical, and ultimately political distinctions (e.g. Krebs and Jackson 2007), not as discrete phenomena with no effects on each other.

Second, and more specific to the resolution in question, it is publicly understandable and instantiated as legitimate that “multilateral conventions” can be used for the development of economic relations. This suggests that the near future of economic relations will consist of these kinds of instruments. Multilateralism, in this sense, becomes characteristic of a possible future.

Lastly, two related points on the resolution text. One, the use of “multilateral” specifies a particular set of international legal documents, ostensibly in contrast to “bilateral” ones. It is these documents that are being instantiated as a privileged set upon which only those who fulfill their requirements should be eligible for the benefits produced. Two, that those who do not fulfill their obligations as parties to these conventions should not benefit from it. That is, it is asserted that “free-riders” should not be tolerated; that it is unacceptable to not meet the obligations of multilateral conventions. Moreover, this implies that without all parties meeting their obligations these kinds of instruments may not be valuable. This links diffuse benefits with required participation and reciprocity. This may be conceived as an “embedded liberalism” that seeks benefits for selves and others in the system through “multilateralism” as an organizing principle requiring participation and reciprocity (Ruggie 1982; 1992).

After the WMEC—articulating a solution by resuscitating a “multilateral” objective and employing a “multilateral” logic

Recall the question: what does the use of “multilateral” do in world politics? What kind of products, action, and order result from these uses? The present section is dedicated to analyzing the resuscitation of the notion of “multilateral” kinds during World War II, notably its use in

discussing the institutions created at the Bretton Woods conference. This section's goal is not to re-count the Bretton Woods negotiations (e.g. Schild 1995 or van Dormalen 1978), nor the "failure" of the ITO (e.g. Gardner 1956). The purpose here is to disclose the relations of "multilateral" and see how they are marginalized or re-appropriated.

Between 1933 and 1940, the US completed several trade agreements that involved multiple parties, but any talk of a multilateral agreement was rare (see also the 1947 IMF Balance of Payments Yearbook). In 1940, Ethel Dietrich, writing in the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, notes the possibility and futility of a US move to get other countries to be 'multilateral'. In the "pre-1940 era," Dietrich (1940, 85) notes that:

> Cushioned by comfortable credit balances for both trade and financial commitments on foreign loans, it was possible for the United States to broaden the concept of bilateralism into multilateralism by tieing it to the most-favored-nation clause in the hope that her economic power was sufficiently great to bring other nations into line.

However, this is no longer the case at the time of writing, since the eschewing of multilateralism in 1933 and the development of regional blocs (see also Snyder 1940). She goes on to colorfully state (1940, 91):

> As a single nation, the United States has ranked as the world's greatest trader. She could afford to encourage small nations to unite in the hope that their increased well-being would offer better opportunities for her exports. But in the face of the large projected combinations including the other industrialized nations, her position would be dwarfed to insignificance. An effort singlehandedly to promote multilateral trade based on the most-favored-nation principle [Cordell Hull's position] would be as futile as an attempt to irrigate the Gobi Desert with a watering can. The only alternative would be to join the movement and to promote a hemispheric bloc of the Americas, which ipso facto would involve the abandonment of the reciprocal trade agreements program. The act could be allowed to stand on the statute books as a symbol of the type of commercial world which the United States would like to re-create in the future.

Here, the pathways for economic policy number two: multilateralism (embodied by the universal application of the most-favored-nation principle; note her association between "multilateral trade" and the "American way" on p. 87) or regional blocs. We can argue that

'bilateralism' in its traditional sense in 1940—the relations between two countries, and two countries only—may no longer be a useful option, either descriptively or policy-wise, when considering the world economic system. As this chapter notes, the academic community briefly debated between these two (the 'case for multilateral trade' ultimately gaining greater acceptance). To the point noted earlier, how did policy-makers legitimate a return to a policy that could be connected with the 'failed' London WMEC in 1933?

The 'theory' behind 'multilateralism' in economic affairs, pre-1941

The potential conditions of the post-war world—articulated by economists and circulated by diplomats and politicians—would make possible the return of a discussion about "world order," "international organization," and "multilateralism." We see this empirically in the diplomacy between the US and Great Britain (e.g. Gardner 1956). The capacity to order international affairs in new ways was enormous, such that broad sweeping notions that could describe novel ways of doing politics were now possible. Scholars like Gardner and Schild (1995, 19) talked of the embrace of multilateralism by various entities within the US government. But what does this mean and where does it come from?[178]

The operation of the international economic system circa 1940 can, for the purposes of this section, be put simply. In international commerce, exchange is conducted through the use of fiat currency. There is no common currency. Note that these exchanges are occurring under the gold standard, which meant that the value of currencies was generally determined by their relationship to dominant currencies, whose value was defined by its exchange rate to gold. After

[178] Boughton's (2004) IMF working paper tentatively takes a broader view of the impact of politics *and* the development of economic theory on the IMF. If Boughton (2004) is right, and "Keynesian Macroeconomics" is one of the 10 biggest ideas to shape the IMF, then how is full employment and income growth made possible by a *multilateral* solution? See next chapter.

1919, there were two dominant currencies, the US dollar and the British pound sterling, whose value compared to gold were the primary references for the value of all other currencies.

Now, transactions within international commerce at this time occurred in a way (with contracts and under state regulations), at a rate (the pace of post and shipping), and involving entities (such as firms, banks, governments) that made the notions "credit" and "debt" operationalizeable and useful (e.g. van Dormaelen 1978, 13 on contracts). These two notions on a balance sheet allow entities to continue to conduct commerce without waiting for physical payment of these transactions (to balance credits and debits, to balance payments, or to settle balances is known as clearing).[179]

A *multilateral* method does not eschew individual balance sheets, but rather allows for clearing to occur through 1) the existence, recording, and information sharing of debits and credits, and 2) the objective of *clearing* credits and debits on balance sheets. As Simmons (1994) notes, central banks were key players in this period as they controlled supplies of currency. As such, in a multilateral system, they needed to "trust" that other banks would: 1) not interfere with the currency rates of other countries by buying foreign currency or producing more of their own currency, or 2) deviate from the gold standard unilaterally (see Simmons 1994, 28-31). A similar kind of trust is required for a multilateral system so that such an equilibrium among balance sheets can be achieved.

To foreshadow, for economists and policy-makers (and those that manage both of these identities), the key basis for this trust is a logic of efficiency—ultimately to be contending against political practicability. I intend to focus on specifying how this efficiency came to be articulated. What was it about "multilateral clearing" that made it fit in this political context?

[179] Of interest is Cesarano (2006), who points out that the Bretton Woods revolution was about the move to fiat currency from commodity currency—and that this move was made possible by the development of a consensus amongst monetary theorists regarding the role of the gold standard.

This section is distinct from the previous section in that “multilateral clearing” becomes an essential part of an entire “multilateral system.” Indeed, currency stabilization was a dead issue (see previous section) that is re-animated in association with *multilateral* terms.



Figure 14. The need for balance sheets and the evolution of the clearing objective.

The above figure is an attempt to map out this section, to concisely lay out what the antecedents of multilateral clearing were and why they were developed. First, I want to unpack the “problem of exchange” and see what logics were instantiated with particular solutions to this problem in economic theory. In looking back retrospectively, can we identify related notions of inclusivity, diffuse benefits, and reciprocity in the still-born solutions that we can think of ancestors to a *multilateral* solution. Traynor (1949) notes that the “problem of exchange” elicited

agreements that go far back in history (Ionian cities around 499-498 BCE being perhaps the first instance of "monetary cooperation," (Traynor 1949, 3)). This problem remains an issue throughout European attempts from 1200 CE onward, as "the ultimate reason for these numerous attempts of monetary regulation was an existing discrepancy in monetary evaluation," (Traynor 1949, 12). The problem of exchange had to do with multiple currencies operating at different relational values in those moments and in the future. Agreements, like those between Hamburg and Lubeck fixed currency values to gold (Traynor 1949, 17) to solve this problem. Jules Bogen, writing in symposium later edited by Murrary Shields (1944), similarly noted that "the balance of payments problem, which lies at the root of external monetary stabilization, is as old as history."

Into the 20th century, the problem of exchange remained on the policy agenda, notably in the Western Hemisphere and in Europe. In 1899, at the 1st Pan American International Conference, a customs union and a common silver coin was suggested to facilitate greater integration in economic relations, for this would produce benefits both through market expansion and reduction of transaction costs (e.g. Fenwick's history of the OAS 1963; see also Helleiner 2003, 414 as he argues this occurred for the purpose of "eliminating currency-related transaction costs altogether"; and cf. Kemmerer 1916: 69-71, on common currencies, where the first four of five arguments are about a) increasing efficiency and information flows and b) reducing costs). Though a commission was setup to explore these ideas, no practical result was produced.

In 1915, the 1st Pan American Financial Conference convened, and this resulted in a draft treaty for an "International Gold Clearance Fund" (FRUS 1916, I, 18-21). This is noted in Willis' (1919) article on an international "gold fund" for payment clearance, where he notes that the Federal Reserve Board reviewed the idea of an internal fund in 1914. Such a fund was

established to keep transactions flowing domestically, turning over a billion dollars a week (Willis 1919, 172). In 1919, Willis identified the principle of clearing multiple currencies and asserts that it will 'undoubtedly' be adopted in the future (see also Rosenberg 1985; Seidel 1972).

The FRUS records the circulation of a draft convention for an "international gold-clearance fund" in December 1916 (FRUS 1916, I, 29). It was intended primarily for states in the Americas that were not part of the sterling currency zone. In 1919, the draft is revised in a circular to Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Salvador, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Chile, Panama, Haiti, Peru, Paraguay, and Colombia (15 countries plus the US). It states in Article 1 (FRUS 1919, I, 43):

> With a view to stabilize exchange and facilitate the settlement of balances, the High Contracting Parties agree that all deposits of gold, made in banks designated for the purposes of this Convention... in the course of private commercial and financial transactions, shall be treated by the respective governments as constituting an international fund, to be used for the sole purpose of effecting exchange.

According to the FRUS, five countries (of the 15) signed reasonably similar conventions (Guatemala, Haiti, Panama, Paraguay, and Ecuador), but the US did not follow (FRUS 1919, I, 42).[180]

Traynor's (1949) historical account of the economic conferences in Europe in the 1920s, in particular Brussels and Genoa, note the problem of debt-clearing as one of the major issues. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is created in 1930 to address this issue. E.L. Dulles' (1932) description of it as an “international clearing house” is simple, but appropriate. The BIS was mentioned in the NYT on February 21, 1929 as a possible solution to debt-clearing.[181] By

[180] Further details in Helleiner (2006).
[181] “Markets In London, Paris And Berlin.” *New York Times*, 21 February 1929.

1930, the NYT reported that the BIS was involved with the “first germ” of a “foreign exchange international clearing fund.”[182]

Another suggestion of such an “international fund” to facilitate exchange occurs in 1933, in a meeting between the US and Czechoslovakia (including Hull). The Czechoslovak minister (Veverka) "seemed to intimate that the matter of an international fund in connection with currency stabilization, to which we had taken a negative stand, might be favored by his Government," (FRUS 1933, I, 527; see also remarks of the Polish Ambassador in FRUS 1933, I, 560-561).

With the start of World War II, economists begin to take stock of future scenarios given German aggression and control over most of Europe. In Ethel Dietrich's account, “bilateralist” methods, just like “multilateral” ones, of course, served to facilitate clearing, the balancing of economic transactions: “Through them all ran the central thread or purpose of bringing into a value balance the exchange of commodities in order to circumvent the breakdown of the international financial community,” (Dietrich 1940, 85). Again, with one currency, blocs are unnecessary (Dietrich 1940, 88). As Simmons correctly points out, the original model dates to David Hume in 1752 (see Simmons 1994, 32). The logic is “obvious” for “if capital is not permitted to move freely in response to interest rates, the adjustment mechanism will not operate as smoothly as it should,” (see Simmons 1994, 32-34).[183] The main impediment for the movement of capital at the time was currency instability, demonstrated in the impasse at London in 1933.

[182] “T.W. Lamont Says Inopportune Tariff Hurt World Trade.” *New York Times*, 15 November 1930.
[183] Recall Hume (1752, 35), who writes that money “is the oil which renders the motion of the wheels [of international trade] more smooth and easy.”

In van Dormael's account of the Bretton Woods negotiations, Walther Funk, the German Minister for Economic Affairs (and President of the Reichsbank) clearly sees the operation of international trade in the same light. In van Dormael's (1978, 6 citing Funk 1940) words:

> The existing method of bilateral economic relations would be developed into a system of multilateral trade. Balance would be settled through an exchange clearing. Such a clearing system required fixed parties and stable exchange rates. Each government would manage its balance of payments, so that the problem of debits and credits would gradually disappear.[184]

Thus, the objective for both bilateral and multilateral methods is clearing debits and credits on the balance sheet and is made possible by currency stability. The difference is that *multilateral* methods are theoretically more efficient (see also Frisch 1947), yet less practicable. Ideally, a multilateral method requires currency stability and relatively unfettered currency exchange. The problem of clearing is intensified as there is pressure to pay off debt after the First World War (e.g. Shields 1944). Indeed, stability and payment balancing go hand in hand (see Jules Bogen's contribution in Shields 1944, 4-5).[185]

Thus in economic circles, the "problem of exchange" could be mitigated by either bilateral or multilateral methods, with the difference being that multilateral methods would be more flexible for clearing in a variety of currencies and thus be more efficient in reducing transaction costs. In order for this to happen, principles or rules must be adhered to by all in the system. Writing in the Oxford Economic Papers, Hitch (1942, 49) writes one of the first

---

[184] See *New York Times*, October 21, 1941 on how with accumulated gold at the Reichsbank for clearing, Funk asserts that "the system of multilateral clearings has now been perfected."

[185] The issue of trust, noted by Simmons, makes perfect sense when considering Dietrich's argument for the pound-sterling currency bloc after 1931. It "stemmed from the stability of the exchange rates among the members and the importance of intergroup trade as compared to trade with outsiders," (Dietrich 1940, 88). The members of the bloc trusted each other and found emerging trade relationships that made them less reliant on external trade relationships. The question of insiders and outsiders or bloc members and external parties, however, begs the question who would determine this, who would control the currency in these blocs, and where the financial center would be located. This is the primary difference between the German New Order and Keynes's response for Britain. Calling on van Dormael again: "[Keynes'] position was that Great Britain would offer 'the same as what Dr. Funk offers, except that we shall do it better and more honestly," (1978, 7; see also Cesarano 2006; Ruggie 1982, 377-378 on this similarity).

articulations of the principle of multilateralism. He states: "Two conditions must be fulfilled if the principle of multilateralism is not to be violated: (1) goods must be purchased in the cheapest market (i.e. there must be no discrimination); and (2) sellers must be permitted to use the sterling accruing from such purchases for any purpose whatever."[186] This perspective of multilateralism entails, by definition, a logic of efficiency, capital circulation, and numerous, iterated interactions between trading states.

These understandings are confirmed in the influential League of Nations volume "The Network of World Trade" (published by the League's Economic Intelligence Service, though known to be written by economist Folke Hilgerdt in 1942; see for example Rothchild 1944). The preface (by British economist Alexander Loveday) identifies its object of study ("world trade") and one of its constitutive properties—"multilateral settlement" (League 1942, 5; though this idea is discussed in other League reports, such as their Balance of Payments series):

> … as the title is intended to indicate, this volume is primarily concerned with the essential unity of world trade... viewed as a whole, the trade of the world has assumed a specific pattern... one of the main purposes of this study is to describe this system and its functioning not simply by the character of national needs for foreign goods but also by the much less adequately understood system of multilateral settlement of all classes of international accounts.

In the summary of findings, the report (League 1942, 9, emphasis added, cf. 76) notes that "cases of triangular or multilateral settlement *within small groups of countries* were relatively unimportant and that almost all balances belonged to a single world-wide system which also provided for the transfer, along round-about routes, of interest, dividends and other payments from debtor countries to European creditor countries, particularly the UK."

[186] Gardner (1956, 13) claims two advantages in 'multilateralism': "First, the most is made at any given time of the world's existing stock of productive resources. Second, that the stock of resources will be likely to increase over time more rapidly than under any alternative system."

This finding suggests that the operation of a *multilateral* system is global, not regional. The rationale for multilateral settlement and the condition in which balance of payments becomes a natural obstacle is again put simply (League 1942, 73): “a country's import markets naturally do not necessarily coincide with its export markets; hence multilateral settlement of obligations arising in trade is required.” For many countries, perhaps especially after the First World War, import markets and export import markets did not coincide.

While the network of world trade is complex, Hilgerdt seeks to show how it stands inextricably together (League 1942, 79): “this all goes to prove that what in Diagram 6 is shown as an export balance from the Tropics to the United States is in part the second (and in part even the third) link in chains of transfer originating in individual tropical countries.” He goes on to say (League 1942, 88) “we may imagine a system of bilateral exchange,” but “it is thus multilateral trade, in a general sense, that is responsible for the world-wide integration of the economy of different countries.”



Figure 15. Hildgerdt's (1943, 395) depiction of the system of multilateral trade. Source: *American Economic Review*

The consequences are massive, and his attempt at explanation hinges on currency management at the level of a world-system (League 1942, 88):

> ... [current attempts] do not go far to explain the working of the particular world-wide system of multilateral trade the outlines of which have been traced above. This system... performed a twofold task. It supplied numerous countries with currency for the acquisition of goods not easily obtainable through bilateral exchange. By rendering it possible to transfer debt service and dividend payments which could not be transferred through bilateral transactions between debtor and creditor country, it was also responsible for the structure of international financing and investment. All the nations involved in the system participated in these tasks.

He hammers home the world-system point by stressing the consequences of policy that is not at that "level" (League 1942: 96-97):

> … bilateral settlement... will fail not only to provide many countries with their requirements of foreign goods but will also fail to bring about anything like a sound equilibrium in international trade and finance. The establishment of a workable system of

> multilateral trade—not necessarily in all detail on the pattern of the old system—appears, therefore, to be an important object for post-war reconstruction.[187]

This brief review of economic thinking about clearing, international trade, and a potential "multilateral" method, marks the foundation in which the diplomacy about post-war economic arrangements can be situated. The desire to meet the clearing objective is met with possible solutions, one of which is associated with and utilizes "multilateral" as a way to articulate interaction and policy.

Starting point: Atlantic Charter 1941

Ideas over reducing transaction costs and participation in institutions like international funds and banks were not new, yet the creation of a "multilateral system"—as used by diplomats and politicians—complete with rules, expectations, and inter-governmental organizations at the end of WWII was not inevitable. The question to explore then is how ideas of an "international fund", the goal of "multilateral clearing" as part of currency management become part of a "multilateral system." What logic of argument is used when discussion of anything "multilateral" occurs, and does this usefully link other ideas and actions to it?

The politics of international economics, in a sense, is the name of the process we give in which these initiatives fail or succeed. However, this does not necessarily influence the idea of the problem itself, nor does it necessarily change the logic of solution. In fact, the failures and non-starters remain influential such that it is from their conceptual frameworks that policy makers, diplomats, and scholars revive solutions in new and fashionable clothing, in spite of their similarities to the past. This is all part of an explanation that focuses on how—in those moments—creative politics, requiring great imagination and innovation, can be made into

[187] The Proceedings of the 54th Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, published in the *American Economic Review*, include Hilgerdt's remarks on the consensus of multilateral clearing and trade as the future—though the panelists focus on the problems of exchange given the expansion of a totalitarian Germany.

something logical and reasonable in retrospect (and, of course, the faster and for a longer period of time, the more politically useful).

The Atlantic Charter is a useful place to start the account. Gardner (1956, 40) calls it the first "major attempt" to "define their common objectives in the int'l economic field." In Ikenberry's (2009) mapping of liberal internationalism, the Atlantic Charter "provided the vision" for what the world would look like after the Second World War (cf. Ikenberry 1992). To be clear, Ikenberry's article usefully highlights the moments that are important, and I have no issue with these “ideal-typical” models (Ikenberry 2009, 72). What remains unexplained is how the Atlantic Charter provided the vision for post-war international order, world reform, economic cooperation, and so on. How were these relationships activated and instantiated empirically? Ikenberry cites Viner (1942) to make the argument that depression and unemployment are “social evils, and that it is the obligation of governments... to prevent them,” (Ikenberry 2009, 77, citing Viner 1942, 168). This gives no indication that governments would attempt to solve the problem of employment through an International Conference on Trade and Employment. Again, this study's objectives are at the meso-level; choosing to explain why particular outcomes occurred through typifying general discursive practices and then tracing out how they were used to legitimate particular terms and actions that made the outcome “inevitable.”

During World War II, an unprecedented swath of economic issues was discussed, particularly between the US and the UK. Even before the US' formal diplomatic entry, the US and UK had already planned to meet and discuss "the problem of the defeat of Germany" (see FRUS 1941, I, 341). Churchill (in the cables, given the code name "Former Naval Person") and Roosevelt independently, yet simultaneously communicated this intention in January 1941.

In his conversation with Sir Alexander Cadogen (Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), Sumner Welles (Under Secretary of State and historical transcriber of the "Roosevelt-Churchill Atlantic Conference" in the FRUS) articulates a piece of the logic of post-war economic and political order. After a lengthy strategic discussion, Welles goes on with vigor (FRUS 1941, I, 353-354):

> I stated that I knew there was no need for me to undertake a dissertation upon fundamental economics in this conversation. I felt sure from my conversations with Sir Alexander during the past few years that he and I saw eye to eye with regard to the need, when the time came, for world reconstruction to be undertaken, of the freest possible economic interchange without discriminations, without exchange controls, without economic preference utilized for political purposes and without all of the manifold economic barriers which had in my judgment been so clearly responsible for the present world collapse... I said that it seemed to me that if any healthy world were to be reestablished, it would be imperative for Great Britain and the United States to have an identity of purpose insofar as healthy financial and economic policies were concerned. I did not see how we could possibly undertake divergent policies in that regard... Sir Alexander Cadogan said that on this particular matter he could only speak his personal opinion... He said he saw no hope for the future unless our two countries agreed no matter what the obstacles might later prove to press for the resumption of liberal trade practices and for the abolition of discriminations at the earliest possible moment.

This passage (August 9, two days before the meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill on substantive matters) articulates, at one general level, the problem and solution of international economic relations. It points out that these two countries must be in agreement for order to be produced—implying that the entire system depends on getting the policies of these two (and these two only) to converge. The importance of these two countries is not lost even after Bretton Woods is signed in 1944 (see discussion below).

With this tacit understanding in place (that the US and the UK are the two key policy coordinators), the final point in the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting of August 11 was to discuss the proposed joint declaration. This is an important second piece. Not only must Great Britain and the US agree on policy matters, but it must be communicated to the world; and they might need, at least, tacit agreement from the world in order for those policies to be operationalized. In

discussing the procedure for the declaration's release, already one observes the sociality involved in the practice of public declarations, as Churchill argues "any categorical statement of that character [in this case, that the US makes no “future commitments”] would prove deeply discouraging to the populations of the occupied countries, and would have a very serious effect upon their morale," (FRUS 1941, I, 360).

The conception of the future, though, is hinted in Roosevelt's point concerning the “fourth point” on "access without discrimination and on equal terms" to markets and raw materials for economic prosperity. Similar to Wilson’s 14 Points, this statement serves the identical function to point to the basis, however abstractly, for international economic order after war: “the President stated that he believed the point was of very great importance as a measure of assurance to the German and Italian peoples that the British and the United States Governments desired to offer them, after the war, fair and equal opportunity of an economic character,” (FRUS 1941, I, 361).

Sumner Welles' vociferous response to Churchill's hesitation regarding this point is worth quoting (FRUS 1941, I, 362; see also O'Sullivan's (2008) book on Welles):

> I said that if the British and the United States Governments could not agree to do everything within their power to further, after the termination of the present war, a restoration of free and liberal trade policies, they might as well throw in the sponge and realize that one of the greatest factors in creating the present tragic situation in the world was going to be permitted to continue unchecked in the post-war world...it seemed to be imperative that we try to agree now upon the policy of constructive sanity in world economics as a fundamental factor in the creation of a new and better world.

Like Wilson's 14 Points, the Atlantic Charter sets up a bundle of associations to which “multilateralism” later becomes connected. It laid out the principles that were to, not just “constrain,” but *re-define* international relations after massive conflict, as the joint declaration opens with the shared belief that the countries: "deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for

a better future for the world." After vigorous debate, and ultimately compromise (see Gardner 1956, 42-47 for a useful account), the set of principles includes the two following (as numbers four and five out of eight, FRUS 1941, I, 367-369):

> ...they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity; ...
>
> they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the objector securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security…

These put economic problems as well as problems regarding the "use of force" (emphasized in number eight) as the primary issues that must be managed in the post-war environment. The economic problems were common knowledge given the Great Depression—Welles' account confirms this as a commonplace. The primary problem identified by economists and tackled by politicians was the system of trade between countries, affecting monetary policy and social welfare (reiterating point five).

The full-blown position of an idealized multilateralism is not instantiated in these documents and accounts. What the Atlantic Charter did was provide and re-circulate the terms of the debate. The debate itself helps render what these terms mean, and what associated actions are legitimately wrapped up with them. It is then a point of departure for a not-yet-determined future.

The resolution at the Inter-Allied Meeting on September 24 (FRUS 1941, I, 378) confirms the common notions in the Charter—and in this respect is as important as the Charter itself:

> The Governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Yugoslavia, and representative of General de Gaulle, leader of Free Frenchmen, having taken note of the declaration recently drawn up by the President of the United States and by the Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill) on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, now make

> known their adherence to the common principles of policy set forth in that declaration and their intention to cooperate to the best of their ability in giving effect to them.

This evidence is part of a larger argument for why the Atlantic Charter is causally important. The ideas that were offered in that text came to be the argumentative, rhetorical, and political resources of a policy position that is now known as “multilateralism” (e.g. Ikenberry 2009).

The End Point: ~1947

Operating below the level of heads of state, a number of entities were discussing the possible forms of international order after this particular war. What we know is that by at least 1947 the 'case for multilateral trade' had been made and 'multilateralism' had become relatively well-defined and accepted in academic and policy circles. At some point, and in some way, the idea of organizing activity around a principle of non-discrimination had concretely migrated from a technical aspect of international trade into public policy.

From the academic side, Kalecki (1946; who would work within the UN Secretariat after the war) summarizes the definition of multilateralism in the *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*:

> Roughly speaking, the principle of multilateralism requires that each country should be guided in its purchases in other countries solely by the price and quality of goods without taking into consideration whether the supplying countries are or are not buyers of the product of the country in question.

The direction that multilateralism leans toward is efficiency over national preference. Mikesell (1947, 351; who was an adviser within the Treasury Department and attended the Bretton Woods Conference) confirms this:

> With few exceptions, the general desirability of a world organized on the basis of multilateral trade and a minimum of trade restrictions is not disputed.
>
> …

> Rather it [US economic policy] seeks to reconcile the principle of multilateral trade with the trend toward nationalization of production and commerce in the world today. This program is embodied in the International Monetary Fund and in the proposed Charter for an International Trade Organization.

Two examples can be offered from the *New York Times*. French negotiations with the US regarding trade in 1946 included a report that "without substantial American financial aid the French would be unable to fulfill the obligations of multilateralism and nondiscrimination in trade imposed by the Bretton Woods agreements and in the forthcoming "charter" on international trade."[188] In early 1947, the NYT reported on former Minnesota governor (and at the time Presidential hopeful and delegate to the San Francisco UN conference) Harold Stassen's speech in New York: "Mr. Stassen said that the United States was interested not only in the reciprocal relations of other nations toward us but in their nondiscriminatory relations to each other, because only by an increasing multilateralism of fair and equal trade can the peoples of all nations hope to restore and develop their standards of living."[189]

In Gardner's terms, in order for "multilateralism" to be operationalized, it had to be both grand (as in moving toward permanent stability), and practical (as in providing for liquidity and enabling balancing of payments to make transactions not only possible but beneficial, see Gardner 1956, 80). In the following, I investigate how this end point became legitimate after the "failure" of the London WMEC in 1933.[190]

---

[188] "Blum Bids Truman Help France Rise: French Officials Visiting President Truman." *New York Times*, 22 March 1946.
[189] "Stassen Assails High Tariff Policy." *New York Times*, 13 February 1947.
[190] In a sense, this study recognizes Odell's (1988, 293) argument to loosen the fixed preferences assumption in bargaining processes and Ikenberry's (1992, 290-291) assertion that we should direct our research to concern cases that are about "legitimating the exercise of American power." However, neither depart from this study's starting point: the use of 'multilateralism' in world politics in order to see how it fits in those particular contexts.

First encounters: participation, multilateral logic and a rebuttal (bilateralism)

Ruggie (1982) among others is right to say that the functioning of the world economy before 1914 heavily relied on the British Empire, and in the inter-war period this stability was severely shaken. However, it is worth re-stating here that ideas about authority in the international sphere were in competition. They were not pre-determined or inevitable. Because we have balances of payments that are instantiated as, in light of the First World War and subsequent Depression, appearing to require a greater degree of transnational management than before, some mechanism, perhaps an international fund re-animated from the past, is needed (see van Dormael's evidence that Keynes recognizes this, 1978, 32-33). This *need* as it is articulated through its logics, arguments, and associations must now be empirically shown in the cables and public reporting from 1942-1945 to justify policy.

Keynes had already by February 1942 internally circulated a revised draft (originally written September 1941, just after the Atlantic Charter) of his plan for an International Clearing Union that would rely on a universally acceptable, international means of payment. The revision of August 1942 is largely what was sent to the US for comment soon after (see van Dormael 1978, 32-39, citing Keynes' files). Here he already discusses the "difficulties and complications" that should a series of bilateral agreements occur to rectify balance of payments issues (ibid, 37). Indeed, the consequences of the rules were important, as membership required conformity to "certain general principles and standards of international economic conduct," (van Dormael 1978, 38). White, who had already drafted a plan for an inter-allied bank and fund in December 1941, was in the process circulating for revision (van Dormael 1978, 42-45). One of the criteria for membership was "not to enter upon any bilateral clearing arrangements," (van Dormael 1978, 44; citing US Treasury, memorandum 29 December 1941).

The *New York Times*, on March 2, 1942, took the temperature of London's attitude toward post-war planning. The London financial district's understanding of the objective of “multilateral trade” coincides with the academic understanding and recognizes the policy implications for Britain:

> Naturally the City [short-hand for the financial district in London] is interested most in and also is impressed most by the insistence on elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, including reductions of tariffs and other trade barriers. This is taken to mean that multilateral trade after the war is envisaged, with elimination of imperial preferences.[191]

FRUS cables around this time show that informal discussions concerning post-war economic order were occurring. An April 12 cable (which included Keynes, see FRUS 1942, I, 163) discloses that the US-UK exchanges, building on the experience of the Atlantic Charter, discuss a widening of the circle: "with a view to working towards the principles of arrangements that may subsequently be developed into agreed proposals which the two countries can recommend to other countries."[192] At this point in time, the safely shared feeling in the diplomatic interaction is that on some economic questions the proposed future arrangements that might ultimately be reached would be dependent on acceptance by other countries. The cable goes on to note that "Keynes and other Treasury officials expressed an interest in the suggestions in the article of Dr. Feis in the January issue of *Foreign Affairs*," (FRUS 1942, I, 163-164).

Here, three points can be made. First, there is only little evidence here of the use of the term “multilateral” in connection with post-war planning. Second, the above quotation is evidence that British officials read *Foreign Affairs*, or at least, noted when a government official wrote in it. Related to this, a third point: that it seems that government officials write in *Foreign Affairs*, and while the author notes that his views do not express those of the US government,

[191] “London Commends Lend-Lease Terms.” *New York Times*, 2 March 1942.
[192] Note the similarity between this method and the proposition of Briand in January 1928.

they nonetheless are indicative of one employee's personal views (see Parmar's review in 1999 and Schulzinger 1984 on the Council on Foreign Relations).

Feis (1942, 282) stated:

> My aim is to advance for critical consideration a suggestion for improving the basis of international economic relations. In essence, it is a suggestion for what might be termed a "Trade Stabilization Budget or Fund". In form it may appear to be novel. But most of its elements have in substance already made their appearance in agreements and actions of the United States.

The first objective articulated in the cables concerns an institution for monetary cooperation. As indicated in the economic history presented and in Feis' *Foreign Affairs* article, this is not a new idea (see also van Dormael 1978), and is somewhat similar to what White and Keynes had already drafted (see above; indeed, Feis could be considered a convenient reference for both to understand each other before exchanging plans). Indeed, this is described as some of kind of "stimulus" for morale to touch the "imagination of the world" (FRUS 1942, I, 166):

> The memorandum... asked for an exploratory approach to the general questions of Anglo-American and world economic relations with a view to ultimately working out in line with American thought the principles of an agreement that will appeal to the imagination of the world, serve as a stimulus to all the forces fighting aggression and provide an answer to the question: "what are we fighting for?"

The link between US-UK diplomacy and wide participation is clearly made, though without use of the term multilateral, in the exchanges that result in the Lend-Lease Agreement in August 1942, particularly Article VII (in which Keynes was also involved, see van Dormael 1978, 21-28). The Department of State Bulletin (DSOB) reports on the general ideas that were agreed preceding the document and includes a copy of the document (the text appears to not be in the FRUS, see FRUS 1942, I, 537). The DOSB states (1942, 190-192):

> the agreement lays down certain of the principles which are to prevail [concerning aid]. … The fundamental framework of the final settlement which shall be sought on the economic side is given in article VII. … To that end article VII provides for the early commencement of conversations, within the framework which it outlines, with a view to establishing now the foundations upon which we may create after the war a system of

> enlarged production, exchange, and consumption of goods for the satisfaction of human needs in our country, in the British Commonwealth, and in all other countries which are willing to join in this great effort.
>
> Article VII: … In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the USA by the Government of the UK in return for aid… the terms and conditions thereof shall be such as not to burden commerce between the two countries, but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the betterment of world wide economic relations. To that end, they shall include provision for agreed action by the USA and the UK, open to participation by all other countries of like mind, directed to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods, which are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples; to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers; and, in general, to the attainment of all the economic objectives set forth in the Joint Declaration made on August 12, 1941…

This document determines that aid between two countries *necessarily* involves third countries and indeed involves an understanding of economics that is drawn from a perspective of the *system* first (world trading system), not the *unit* first (states). Interestingly, British media hardly discussed Article VII, while US media championed it (see Gardner 1956, 64). I agree with Gardner (1956, 66) that "the Article was designed to chart the way in general terms toward the [already] agreed objective of multilateral trade." In this sense, multilateralism needed not only participation, but also to be non-discriminatory—to address preferences in this context. It had to be sensitive as participation necessarily draws on parties that would be affected changes in preferences.

At the same time, it became clear that other countries would wait to see what US-UK diplomacy would suggest. In subsequent meetings with officials from the Dominions and other Allies in December 1942, the question of who should multilateral talks engage is asked. Winant's cable (written by First Secretary W.J. Gallman) to Hull, listing participants, suggests one view (FRUS 1942, I, 241):

> The meeting [on Post-War Commerical Policy with Allied Governments established in London, British representatives, with observers from the US, Soviet Union, China, and

> various Dominions] failed to bring out decisive and detailed expressions of the views of the Allied Governments in London on commercial policy, and the general impression left by it was summed up during a personal conversation after the meeting by the leading Board of Trade official as follows: "What it really means is that they are waiting for you and for us (i.e. the United States and Britain) to go ahead and formulate our views."

This viewpoint received some support from personal talks with Allied representatives concerned with economic matters. Recall, there is no ruling out of hegemony in multilateral talks. Though the task of getting Soviet involvement suggests an inclusivity (see FRUS 1943, I, 1097-1098 on getting experts to Washington), that was not strictly necessary as meetings went on, at times, without Soviet participation.

The key point is to note the link between a “multilateral” endeavor and conference diplomacy. In this case, because of the reach of the endeavor, it would require all Allied states to participate. Even though there was an awareness of the economies of Germany and Japan, their hypothetical membership in the institutions being proposed was not a topic of discussion in my reading of the documents (note that they both join the Bretton Woods institutions in 1952).

Now, of course, there is resistance to the logic of multilateralism. An example of this resistance is reported by Gardner (1956, 30, in January 1943) with a memo written by Herbert Henderson (an economist) of the British Treasury:

> The history of the inter-war period provides no support for the view that we should attempt once again to reconstruct a war-shattered world on the basis of a freely working economic system, international credits, the reduction of trade barriers, and the outlawry of quantitative regulation. To attempt this would be not to learn from experience but to fly in its face.

How would the US and UK proceed to do this in the context of diplomatic practices? In the FRUS, the informal discussions to formulate a common approach occur, and in this case, the bilateral option is identified and hopefully discarded (FRUS 1942, I, 167-168):

> … from direct statements in a number of informal conversations with Keynes and from reliable evidence from talks with other economists who are in close enough with him, it can be said that Keynes has abandoned support of bilateral discriminatory arrangements

> to meet balance of payments difficulties and has energetically worked on other solutions. James Meade, who has become increasingly influential and who powerfully influenced Keynes to abandon bilateralism, says confidentially that Keynes' attitude is now all that can be desired on the matter.

Indeed, early talks “should be largely in a sense academic and completely informal, the objective being to find out from the British what they consider their post-war problems," (FRUS 1942, I, 192; on Canada, 193-194). What a multilateral option would actually entail needed flesh on bones later.

This option would have to defeat alternatives. Gardner is right again to report that other options were available. Henderson's memo (with the British Treasury in January 1943), again repeated the connection between international trade and balance of payments, but sought a solution through a reduction of import duties (Gardner 1956, 38). No one assumed that simply applying *multilateral* policies would automatically fix the clearing problem. Individuals were cognizant of “practicability.”



Figure 16. Relations 1941-1942: links between *New York Times* reporting and diplomacy in FRUS to Keynesian rejection of bilateralism.

Multilateral clearing in the Keynes plan

The figure above illustrates several different aspects and interactions in the political context of 1941-1942. It can be seen as an attempt to broadly capture this section's answer to: how did "multilateral" re-enter the picture in 1942? If the way of international monetary coordination had failed in the 1930s, what could bring it back?

Morgenthau presented Harry Dexter White's proposal for the Bank and the Fund in May 1942 and is told by Roosevelt to consult with Hull.[193] In his memo, White calls for the creation of a "Stabilization Fund," in the face of "certain" and "inescapable problems": disruption of foreign exchanges, credit, and monetary systems, trade barriers, and capital for economic

[193] The views of US economic policy in the post-war environment of Morgenthau and Hull are perhaps nonchalantly asserted to be linked with Wilsonian globalism in Maier (1977, 610-611). Yet how they were understood as such and how this had effects is not sufficiently explored.

recovery. The solution, in one respect, is deemed obvious: "clearly the task can be successfully handled only through international action," (FRUS 1942, I, 173).

At this time, two agencies are proposed, the Fund and the Bank, and they are not inseparable (FRUS 1942, I, 175):

> While either agency could function without the existence of the other, the creation of both would nevertheless aid greatly in the functioning of each. Doubtless one agency with the combined functions of both could be set up, but it could operate only with a loss of effectiveness, risk of over-centralization of power, and anger of making costly errors of judgment. The best promise of successful operation seems to lie in the creation of two separate institutions, linked together by one or two directors in common.

The document notes the politics involved in such an endeavor (FRUS 1942, I, 176-177):

> It is certain that some of the powers and requirements included in the outline of the Fund and the Bank will not survive discussion, prejudice and fear of departure from the usual. Some may not stand the test of political reality, and some may be unacceptable on technical grounds, while others may be generally regarded as going too far toward "internationalism." Yet most of them appear as desirable objectives in most writings or conferences on post-war economies and are worth considering...

Note that White recognizes three possible and legitimate reasons for revision of his plan: political reality, technical grounds, or 'internationalism'. All three had been associated with 'multilateral' at some point. Hilgerdt had argued that a system of “multilateral trade” was already political reality. Note that on technical grounds it was argued *multilateral* trade is realizable only with general participation. Note that “internationalism” had been linked to the wide political cooperation that is also required of a system of multilateral trade. This awareness of the context in which policies are competing against marginalizing arguments is why the associations being made to the Plan to legitimate it are key factors.

In White's text, “multilateral” only makes an appearance to describe an understanding of “sovereignty” that is currently in place that does not yet have room for the coordination envisioned in his plan. The current state of “multilateral sovereignty” needed to be expanded to include instruments like the Fund and Bank to “pave the way and make easy a high degree of

cooperation and coloration among the United Nations in economic fields," (FRUS 1942, I, 177).[194]



Figure 17. White's plan does not yet fit, and can be revised based on three potential reasons.

While White's plan is discussed internally, at the end of August, Keynes' "International Clearing Union" plan is forwarded to Washington. In this document, he outlines 8 "needs" in which there is a wide measure of agreement. They involve monetary policy, exchange, trade, credit, and trust. He also states that (FRUS 1942, I, 204-205):

> ... there is also a growing measure of agreement about the general character of any solution of the problem likely to be successful... the idea underlying such a Union is simple, namely, to generalise the essential principle of banking as it is exhibited within any closed system. This principle is the necessary equality of credits and debits.

The form of Keynes' proposal was that "it is fully international, being based on one general agreement and not on a multiplicity of bilateral arrangements," (FRUS 1942, I, 205). This was another option—of course: "doubtless proposals might be made by which bilateral arrangements could be fitted together so as to obtain some of the advantages of a multilateral

[194] That sovereignty should be re-constituted such that it has a "multilateral" dimension is clear in Kratochwil (2006), though this particular piece of evidence is not cited in that study.

scheme," (FRUS 1942, I, 205). The appearance of 'multilateral' here implies a particular logic. The full realization of benefits of a “multilateral scheme” is obtainable only through collective principled participation. Some benefits can be obtained in a series of bilateral arrangements, but this is not optimally efficient. This logic is articulated later in the memo under “Some Advantages of the Plan,” point 12 in particular (FRUS 1942, I, 210):

> It should be much easier, and surely more satisfactory for all of us, to enter into a general and collective responsibility, applying to all countries alike, that a country finding itself in a creditor position against the rest of the world as a whole should enter into an arrangement not to allow this credit balance to exercise a contractionist pressure against [the] world economy and, by repercussion, against the economy of the creditor country itself. This would give everyone the great assistance of multilateral clearing, whereby (for example) Great Britain could offset favourable balances arising out of her exports to Europe against unfavourable balances due to the United States or South America or elsewhere. How, indeed, can any country hope to start up trade with Europe during the relief and reconstruction period on any other terms?

“Multilateral” here is used to describe a kind of politics deemed beneficial and applicable to all countries alike, and this is repeated in association with “clearing” as an economic objective.[195] Looking at the phrasing of the last question in this paragraph suggests that there are only less desirable alternatives. Point 17 makes this explicit by comparing multilateral and bilateral agreements (FRUS 1942, I, 211-212):

> The Clearing Union restores unfettered multilateral clearing between its members. Compare this with the difficulties and complications of a large number of bilateral agreements... If the argument is used that the Clearing Union may have difficulty in disciplining a misbehaving country and in avoiding consequential loss, with what much greater force can we urge this objection against a multiplicity of separate bilateral payments agreements.

Keynes' memo claims that "we should not only obtain the advantages, without the disadvantages, of an international gold currency, but we might enjoy these advantages more widely than was ever possible in practice... In conditions of multilateral clearing, exchange

[195] Note the problem of sterling debt, see below--have figures of debt as percentage of GDP. See also Gardner (1956, 84) who argues that: "the Treasury planners were concerned with the problem of the sterling balances from the very beginning. They sought to solve it through the mechanism of the Stabilization Fund."

dealings would be carried on as freely as in the best days of the gold standard, without its being necessary to ask anyone to accept special or onerous conditions," (212). Note that the logic of "multilateral clearing," in both of these passages, includes its "disciplining" yet non-conditional nature, by virtue of "being against" all others.

In the meantime, the *New York Times* reports on the response to a League of Nations document on post-war economic and financial problems:

> [the] League of Nations report, the opening section of which was made public here yesterday. … reviews the League study of post-war problems through its economic and financial committees... [the study's second chairman was Henry F. Grady, former Asst. Sec of State] … The succeeding, or reconstruction, period is to proceed to the "restoration of an effective system of international payments and a reopening of multilateral channels for world trade." The League... "We feel convinced that if individual enterprise is to be preserved and multilateria[sic]l trade restored, the transition from a war to a peace economy must be effected by a gradual and internationally coordinated process of decontrol.[196]

While the NYT is interpreting the US preference in post-war economic organization, the current situation cannot allow this for many countries. What is interesting is that even countries that adopt policies not in favor of multilateralism, the preference in an ideal world is clear for public consumption. An example of what this looks like is described and reported in the NYT on September 6, 1942. In this article, a bilateral trade agreement between Spain and Argentina is reached. Under a "system of barter", destroyers are traded for grain and tobacco. However, the Argentinean foreign minister prefers "multilateral trade on the basis of equal opportunities insured by the unconditional and unlimited most-favored-nation clause." He goes on to state that "difficulties of the present moment obliged the Argentine Government to apply certain limitations which it was hoped to eliminate in the future."[197]

---

[196] "World Regulation of Economy Urged." *New York Times*, 10 August 1942.
[197] "Argentina, Spain Sign Barter Deal." *New York Times*, 6 September 1942.

The meeting between British and US officials in September discloses that the proposals were similar to several in circulation from a number of different entities (FRUS 1942, I, 223). The US' list of questions on the Keynes' proposal was cabled in October. It demonstrates that the underlying principles or general objectives were not the subject of inquiry—these are settled ideas. Rather, the notes concerned the practical machinations of the fund itself (FRUS 1942, I, 224-226).



Figure 18. Logic of multilateral clearing" in Keynes plan, 1942.

Circulating the logics in the White and Keynes plans

Gardner is correct to point out that the plans of the US and UK were strikingly similar in that "the major purposes of the Clearing Union were essentially the same as those of the Stabilization Fund." Both were "aimed to promote a system of multilateral payments in which

external equilibrium could be maintained at levels of domestic full employment," (Gardner 1956, 80). Both the US and UK recognized that the plans needed to be held up as legitimate.

In January 1943, the American Economic Association annual convention becomes the site for a number of economists, government officials, and economist-officials to offer arguments relevant to post-war planning (they are reproduced in the *American Economic Review*).

Harry Dexter White (1943, 382) himself re-capitulates a number of policy points already in circulation within the US government and in various diplomatic and mass media circles:

> ... international cooperation for the stabilization of currencies is generally admitted to be an essential part of any effective program for postwar reconstruction. Without it a large part of the world cannot escape severe monetary disorders; and even countries amply provided with gold and foreign exchange assets will feel the unfortunate effects of currency disturbances.

Moreover, he argues for how adjustments and order should be undertaken (White 1943, 383 and 386):

> ... if left to unilateral action it is likely to be ill-done, and is likely to foster international bickering and retaliation; if undertaken by a group of governments acting together there is a good chance that it will be well done, and an excellent chance that it will stimulate more extensive international collaboration.
>
> … One of the serious dangers accompanying alternation of exchange rates is the fact that it has in most cases been a unilateral decision made without adequate attention being paid to the impact of such change... One of the advantages of requiring multilateral approval as a condition of alteration of currencies would be to assure joint consideration of the merits of the proposed action and thereby avoid unilateral action taken to obtain presumed competitive short-run advantages irrespective of the impact of the step on other countries or even the same country.[198]

More evidence of these ideas as already settled notions regarding *multilateral* politics can be found in Folke Hilgerdt's (1943, 407) "The Case for Multilateral Trade":

> The international integration we have in mind will have to be achieved by co-ordination of national economic policies, particularly in the field of foreign trade. We have already

[198] Note here the early link between currency stability and full employment, a topic for the International Trade Organization Charter: "stabilization of currencies is not an end in itself, but only a means to full employment and a rising standard of living," (White 1943, 387).

> found that the trade restrictions imposed since the early thirties cannot easily be removed by unilateral or bilateral action; and the changes in world economy taking place during the present war afford additional reason for believing that the restoration of multilateralism on sound principles will require international planning on an extensive scale.

Because exchange had become so routinized, "what has been said may be enough to show that there is hardly any important aspect of modern economy that is not adversely affected by the breakdown of the system of multilateral trade," (Hildgerdt 1943, 405).

The response to Hilgerdt is even more telling. Among a set of summary points in an introduction to the "Roundtable on Bases of International Economic Relations," Leo Pasvolsky and H.J. Wadleigh (1943, 455) state:

> Bilateralism and stringent control of imports-whatever may be said for them as emergency measures during and immediately after the war-are, in the long run, restrictive of trade. Hence, multilateralism is the desirable-in fact, the essential-basis of expanding trade.

The *New York Times* reported on the annual meeting "Commission to Study the Organization of Peace" on February 28, 1943. With luminaries like Shotwell and Quincy Wright in the group, the statement put pressure on Congress to allow the Administration to negotiate freely as "trade agreement powers are essential if the United States is to negotiate the kind of multilateral trade based on equality of trading opportunity, which is essential to its economic interests."[199]

To re-iterate, these uses of *multilateral* tied to what was deemed essential and possibly practicable goals, were not automatically legitimate. There needs to be connections between these descriptions and policy objectives; and disconnections between other options and those same objectives. Gardner (1956) highlights the remarks of the Chancellor of the Exchequer on

[199] "Planning for Peace Seen Gaining in U.S." *New York Times*, 28 February 1943.

February 2, 1943, in the House of Commons that more precisely discloses how this notion is being communicated to national policy-makers (Hansard 1943, 386, 826):

> We want a system in which blocked balances and bilateral clearances would be unnecessary. We want an orderly and agreed method of determining the value of national currency units, to eliminate bilateral action and the danger which it involves that each nation will seek to restore its competitive position by exchange depreciation. Above all, we want to free the international monetary system from those arbitrary, unpredictable and undesirable influences which have operated in the past as a result of large-scale speculative moments of capital. We want to secure an economic policy agreed between the nations and an international monetary system which will be the instrument of that policy.

Meanwhile, within the US government, after the revised Keynes plan was forwarded in last August, the US government responds with a plan of their own (based on White's internal memo) open for comments (and circulated to the UK, China, and Russia). The conference that was initially proposed would include at least these countries (see FRUS 1943, I, 1055; van Dormael (1978, 66-67) states that the Dominions had reviewed Keynes plan in December 1942). In simple terms, with these logics in circulation, the question that concerned officials now was a recurring one in the politics of international diplomacy: who would be involved (see the formal designations in FRUS 1943, I, 1099)?

The plans are released to the public in early April 1943 (see van Dormael 1978, 76-78 for a useful account). However, since internal debates were on-going, the press articles on the publication do not disclose any use of “multilateral,” or much analysis of interest. Winant's cable to Hull on April 15, 1943, gets at the “confusion” concerning invitations and voices concerning post-war economic planning or “international monetary cooperation” (see FRUS 1943, I, 1067, 1069; see also the White note of April 29 concerning invites regarding establishing the Stabilization Fund, 1073). Hull's note of April 21 states that "we should like to complete bilateral [US-UK] exploration discussions before beginning informal group meetings of experts," (FRUS

1943, I, 1070). Indeed, much the following traffic consists of reports of small group discussions (though these are not strictly bilateral, e.g. FRUS 1943, I, 1100).

The question of participation creates a subtle tension that can be read in the determination of the role of Canada within the negotiation proceedings, cables, and meetings that occurred between the US and Great Britain. In June, a cable from the US legation in Ottawa summarized the recent London meetings between Britain and the Dominions: "the Canadians had gone to London for purely preliminary and exploratory discussions on the relation in the post-war period of multilateral agreements to the existing system of bilateral agreements," (FRUS 1943, I, 1100-1101). It is reported that Canadian envoy Norman Robertson (Under Secretary of State for External Affairs), "feels that effective post-war commercial policy may require bold measure," and that "multilateral agreements may replace bilateral agreements in commercial policy, but... also that multilateral agreements might be on broad bases implemented by bilateral agreements," (FRUS 1943, I, 1100-1101). Hull follows-up on this exact wording to challenge this notion (FRUS 1943, I, 1102):

> The Legation is requested, if it perceives no objection, to take a suitable opportunity to ask Mr. Robertson to elaborate on his comments relative to multilateral agreements and bilateral agreements. It would be helpful, for instance, if he would indicate by concrete examples a little more specifically what he means by expressing the feeling that multilateral agreements might be on broad bases implemented by bilateral agreements.

In other words, why not multilateral agreements? At the very least, this suggests that a reason is warranted for not creating “multilateral” agreements. Clark's follow-up with Robertson re-states the Canadian position (FRUS 1943, I, 1104-1105):

> … the old methods of trade negotiation, he feels, are too cumbersome and should be abandoned [i.e. the current US trade agreements program] ... he suggested the possibility of concluding a broad multilateral agreement under which each nation would agree to a progressive reduction in all tariffs or in certain categories of tariffs... Such a multilateral agreement could, he thought, be supplemented by bilateral agreements between countries, possibly worked out under some such system as our existing trade agreements program...

Thus for Canada, "negotiation under our [US] trade agreements program was too cumbersome and too limited in scope to make it interesting for Canada to enter upon further trade negotiations with us," (FRUS 1943, I, 1105). Robertson notes that "much will depend, he admits, upon policies followed by the creditor nations [US and, to a lesser degree, Canada] after the war... and believes that his suggested multilateral agreement providing a progressive reduction of tariffs might help the situation," (FRUS 1943, I, 1105).

Operationalization issues: John H. Williams (plus Canada and France), the circulations of multilateral logic, steps to a conference, and the “transition” period

As these circulations are occurring, Gardner (1956) notes that there was "considerable scepticism" in the UK regarding White's plan (see 95-96) and general fear in the US of Keynes' plan (97-98). Plus, there were “isolationists.” Now, Gardner (1956) argues that "isolationist forces alone, however, were not enough to doom the prospects for collaboration." He goes on to state "a considerable majority of the American people were now convinced of the necessity for full participation in international organizations to promote peace and prosperity after the war."

The greater challenges would be more specific than isolationism and would come from within the financial community (similar in van Dormael 1978, see 97). Gardner, for example, cites the American Bankers Association. Indeed, there was even a call (again) for an institutionalized gold standard for currency stability. The most prominent of alternative plans would come from John H. Williams (economics professor at Harvard and affiliated with the Federal Reserve of New York), articulated in three outlets in 1942 and 1943.

Williams (1942, writing in the *American Economic Review*) rightly noted that banks had begun to increase their investments, in particular, “with the aid of the new Reserve System, [banks] bought government securities for their own account and made loans to finance purchases by the public," (Williams 1942, 235). The implication here is made obvious: "as bank

investments increased [even after WWI], long-term interest rates have shown increased sensitivity to changes in bank reserves, and the emphasis in monetary theory has shifted to the need for controlling the long-term rates," (Williams 1942, 236). He then raises (240) the question of economic sovereignty in the post-war period:

> The question which I raise is whether a large and growing public debt [see above] which continues to be financed to a large extent by the banking system does not make impossible a general monetary policy and deprive us of the power to vary the interest rate and the money supply as instruments of control of economic fluctuations. That such a control is not feasible in war appears to be amply indicated by the fact that all countries at war... are pursuing an easy money policy.

This suggests that this war has created an environment that has put limits on a country's monetary policy, even if the country emerges victorious and wealthy.

Now in 1943, writing in *Foreign Affairs* (with a brief note in the NYT on 16 June 1943),[200] the specific plan put forward by Williams is described by Gardner as a "key country" or "key currency" proposal. For Gardner, it was "the only constructive alternative to the Bretton Woods agreements," (Gardner 1956, 132).

First, Williams points to the similarities (as others have) between the Keynes and White plans: 1) the necessity of controlling short-term capital movements, 2) the necessity for international cooperation in determining exchange rates, and providing machinery for adjustment, and 3) the recognition of the breakdown of international trade, if you have "freely flexible exchange rates." Contrary to Gardner's typification of the positive British attitude and negative American toward re-establishing the gold standard, Williams writes: "Not only are the plans fundamentally similar in their mechanical aspects but the monetary mechanism provided in both is essentially a gold standard mechanism." The fact that new units of account are created is "unimportant" because the whole idea hinges on currencies fixed to a unit of account, that the

[200] "Postwar Money Plan Suggested." *New York Times*, 16 June 1943.

point is to settle accounts between currencies via the unit of account, with an adjustment mechanism (Williams 1943a, 649-650).

Therefore, there will be "key countries, or central countries" whose currencies will be manifestly important to balance of payments and currency stability (Williams 1943a, 654; see also 656-657). Because Williams foregrounds this notion, the distinction can be made as to the primary difference between the Keynes and White plans and what Williams is offering. The leading powers with "international currencies" need to coordinate their rates and policies. In doing so, they make it possible for lesser countries to adjust their rates and policies properly. The Keynes and White plans de-emphasize the roles of leading countries, relying on the disciplining effects of multilateral clearing.

It should be said though, that the problems identified, the key concepts and notions, and the practical mechanisms for adjustment are quite similar in the all plans. Indeed, Williams closes by saying that "the Keynes or the White proposal on the one hand and [his plan] the closer collaboration among leading countries on the other, there may be no inherent or fundamental disagreement," (Williams 1943a, 657).

In another paper (in the *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*), Williams discusses the meaning of “discipline” in international economics. The mechanism that produces this discipline, either through a gold standard or through multilateral clearing is perhaps the key puzzle for post-war policy-making (Williams 1943b, 136):

> But one fundamental tenet of the gold standard must not be lost sight of. The maintenance of stable exchange rate requires a two-sided process of international adjustment. This was what was meant by the "discipline" of the gold standard, or by living up to the “rules of the game.”

In this piece, Williams recognizes the critique of “bilateralism” that his plan may attract: "Suggestions of this character sometimes give rise to the charge of bilateralism, which has

become, and deservedly, an ugly word... wisely managed, this general method could bring into existence a workable world-wide monetary system," (Williams 1943b, 137-138). Note that the solution to the post-war economic environment in these proposals remains focused on transactions and mechanisms of exchange among the world's nations. The question is not only which nations and how will they be included, but once they are involved, what will the dynamics of adjustment look like?



Figure 19. Issues in operationalization: J.H. Williams, Canada, and France.

Beside the Keynes and White proposals, Gardner (1956, 110) mentions a Canadian plan (along with plans from France and USSR). He states that "for obvious reasons, however, the crucial decisions continued to be made in bilateral negotiations between Britain and the United States," (Gardner 1956, 110). While it is not crucial to view the French or Canadian plans as

serious competitors to the Keynes and White plans, it is important to seek out what notions actually resonated.[201]

The French commentary (see Horsefield 1969, III, 97-102; see also the summary in the *New York Times*) opens with a warning to what seems to be an already acceptable goal:[202] "There seems little doubt that a return to a generalized system of multilateral international trade… cannot be expected for some time after the end of hostilities," (Horsefield, 1969, III, 97). It specifies conditions for "satisfactory monetary relations." These are: a) the continuance of commercial treaties for "a rational distribution of productive activities among nations"; b) certain international regulations; c) international long term credit; and d) methods to remedy disequilibria of balances of payments (Horsefield, 1969, III, 98). It draws on the experience of the tripartite agreement for the purpose of clarifying currency stability through exchange certainty and balancing. But it notes that the "Franco-British agreement specified an unlimited mutual assistance, which implies risks unsuitable to a peace-time system; it specified also a prohibition of utilizing in third markets the other partner's exchange, which constitutes a bilateral regulation incompatible with the multilateral character of international trade and credit," (Horsefield, 1969, III, 99).

The Canadian plan correctly identifies the main objectives of the Keynes and White plans: "the establishment of an international monetary mechanism which will aid in the restoration and development of healthy international trade after the war, which will achieve a high degree of exchange stability, and which will not conflict with the desire of countries to carry out such policies as they may think appropriate to achieve, so far as possible, economic stability at a high level of employment and incomes," (Horsefield 1969, III , 104). It argues against "bilateralist

[201] The Federal Reserve Board apparently also had a plan of its own (see Horsefield 1969, I, 39-40), but this was subsequently dropped in favor of trying to influence the White plan. This is not mentioned in Gardner (1956).
[202] "Post-War Financing for World Proposed by French Economists." *New York Times*, 9 May 1943.

trade practices" for the purpose of balance of payments, as that would doom any international monetary organization (ibid; see also 105).

By July, there is a push for consensus on the international fund being *vital* (see FRUS 1943, I, 1080). Winant also confirms after the June meetings with the Dominions (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa) and India, that "it is believed that the British Government will suggest as a basis for discussion a plan for some form of international union on commercial policy," (FRUS 1943, I, 1103). Such a plan includes suggested topics of: 1) a ceiling on tariffs, 2) reduction of tariffs, and 3) use of quantitative limitation of imports. Winant also reports that reciprocal trade agreements are sound, but not the complete answer (FRUS 1943, I, 1103), and that Britain sees "serious disequilibrium in its international balance of payments" as a large enough problem to take limitation of imports as a necessary measure. Of course, "the period in which imports may have to be limited will be greatly reduced if a satisfactory international monetary plan can be established," (FRUS 1943, I, 1103). Indeed, Winant states that the British want to discuss "postwar commercial policy" before negotiating reciprocal trade agreements.

This constitutes an interesting exchange because the problem of clearing is not simply solved by forming multilateral arrangements for trade. Because of the circumstances during the *transition period* immediately after the war, some extra measures are considered "necessary" which stand in contradiction to multilateral trade (in this case, import restrictions). Determining how these can stand side-by-side is a key process.[203]

On August 4, the British formally (via an Aide-Memoire) propose to meet to "pave the way for a general monetary conference which might be followed by further international conferences on other post-war monetary and economic problems which call for solution," (FRUS

[203] Note that bilateral interaction is on-going, and that this should not be taken as a "test" for the hypothesis that bilateral build-up is required for multilateral action. I would argue that they happen concurrently, not sequentially.

1943, I, 1106-1107). Unlike the KBP episode and like the WMEC instance, the political action associated with addressing monetary problems is ultimately the conference, not a treaty open for all to sign.[204]

A seminar (noted by Gardner as well) in October 1943 between US and British representatives (FRUS 1943, I, 766-768) is the first step toward a major conference on international trade issues. Technically speaking, they gathered to discuss a memorandum in relation to Article VII of Lend-Lease, but these representatives discussed the practicability of issues that would later be crystalized in the ITO charter. They included: commercial policy, international commodity arrangements, cartels, and measures to promote employment. "Multilateral" methods are specifically discussed in relation to the first issue. These talks "revealed a wide measure of agreement on the broad outlines of—and possible options for—commercial collaboration." As Horsefield notes (1969, I, 54), these constituted the rough outline of the Joint Statement of 1944 (see below).

A draft statement amongst US and British experts (11 October 1943) reads that the "International Stabilization Fund is designed as a permanent institution for international monetary cooperation," (FRUS 1943, I, 1084). Point 6 concerns "multilateral clearing," a term from the August 1942 Keynes proposal. This mechanism is what makes such an institution distinctive and unique. The conversation between Keynes and White on October 11 (FRUS 1943,

[204] In addition, the British ask to keep the USSR and China informed of the discussions with the US, to which the US responded by agreeing to extend invitations to discuss similar matters with both countries (see FRUS 1943, I, 1110-1113). Questions of method are evident in the US-USSR cables at the end of November 1943, as Zarubin asks "whether it was contemplated that the discussions would be on a bilateral basis only or whether they [sic] were to be preliminary to some general conference which would also include other governments," (FRUS 1943, I, 1116-1117). Hull responds to this point in particular in a December 2 cable: "Such bilateral discussions are all that are contemplated for the immediate future, although we do not exclude the possibility of multilateral discussions at a later date," (FRUS 1943, I, 1118-1119).

I, 1092; see also 1095) ends on whether or the not the draft was too “loose” or “tight” in relation to the politics of getting “everyone” on board, it seems.[205]

The struggle to make multilateralism fit: the Economist’s familiar alternative, counter-argument, and the 1944 Joint Statement

In the NYT, the monetary plans of the US, Britain and Canada were discussed at a meeting arranged by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago in August 1943. This re-iterated the goal of post-war planning, "the first purpose of all the plans is to promote multilateral trade, said D. H. Robertson, one of the British representatives.”[206] At this meeting, on August 26, 1943, Robertson also criticized the French and “key currency” plans and his speech is re-printed in *Economic Journal*. In this article several important points are made, the most important for this study is the necessity of multilateral trade (Robertson 1943, 353):

> The main purpose of the Plan is to assist the nations of the world in reaping to the full the advantages of mutual trade. Those advantages cannot be reaped unless trade (and in “trade,” of course, I include the exchange of services as well as goods) is multilateral--that is, unless each nation can be assured of facilities for spending in one part of the world what it is earning in some other part of the world.

In December 1943, Hull outlines topics for discussion concerning economic matters (as they arose under Article VII discussions with the British). For this study, important matters included: 1) "general effectiveness of multilateral method of reducing tariffs compared with the bilateral method," (FRUS 1943, I, 1119-1125). On December 12, 1943, Senator Pepper writes a piece published in the NYT that marks the circulation of “multilateral” in domestic political circles: “Today, as in 1920, the treaty which will embody the peace of the world will be multilateral—that is, a settlement and agreement not between two nations but many.”[207]

---

[205] A possible notion of *everyone* is indicated as a memo to embassies in the Dominions (Australia, S. Africa, New Zealand, Canada) is forwarded in November.
[206] “3 Monetary Plans Put Up to Midwest.” *New York Times*, 27 August 1943.
[207] “A Summons Against the ‘Kiss of Death’” *New York Times*, 12 December 1943.

Multilateral had gained airplay in both political and economic planning settings and had entered non-technical circles.

In order to operationalize “multilateralism,” Gardner suggests that a grand compromise between the US and the UK occurred. In his examination of British attitudes in 1944 in response to the Bretton Woods agreement (Gardner 1956, 123):

> Earlier in the war the choice had been between multilateralism and bilateralism, and nearly all but the extremists had been willing to choose the former. Now there was a tendency to look for a middle way--a method by which Britain could enjoy the advantages of multilateralism without its attendant risks.

The *Economist* (1944), in its Principles of Trade series running from January through March, described this position as "less-than-fully-multilateral". In other words, multilateral in some way. The article of January 22, 1944 (in the middle of the string of articles (the 4th) on international trade) entitled "The Multilateral Approach" does not suggest different objectives than what we have seen circulated. Balance of payments is the primary problem it identifies, with an eye toward full employment as the larger goal. It asserts: “Both in general and also more particularly for a country in the position of Great Britain, a world-wide, multilateral system, if it can be attained is very much to be preferred to a system of barter or of restricted bargains.”[208] It states three main reasons for this preference: a) benefits derived from wider exchanges (division of labour); b) that bilateral arrangements are more likely to involve "sectional Interests" rather than maintaining economic equilibrium amongst all accounts; c) that the Americans want it. It argues that the Keynes and White plans are too limited, that “down-ward” spiraling is just as likely as an “up-ward” escalation of trade to balance accounts: “it is even less likely that the element of management that is to be injected into the multilateral system of world trade will be sufficient to make it serve the purposes either of full employment within countries or of

[208] “The Multilateral Approach.” *Economist*, 22 January 1944.

expanding balanced trade between them."[209] This "sin" of contraction leads the *Economist* to the following statement:

> First, no system will better suit the interest of Great Britain than a universal system… Second, there are means by which a multilateral system could be made to serve the interests of a general policy of economic expansion [read: growth]… third, these means are not at present attainable, partly because of a lack of agreement upon them, partly because of the magnitude of the present dislocations. The course of British policy is thus, in outline, clear. The re-establishment of a universal system, with an expansionary focus, should be the objective of our long-term policy and we should do everything in our power to persuade the commercial world to accept the means by which it can be established. But until this agreement is attained, and until the present enormous gaps in the nation's balances of payments can be closed, we have no option but to examine the less-than-universal, the less-than-fully-multilateral, the less-than-completely-orthodox alternatives.[210]

To this perspective of finding a 'middle way', Louis Rasminsky (former League of Nations, Canadian economist with the Bank of Canada, and future executive director for the IMF and IBRD) responds in an article in *Foreign Affairs*. In any "conceivable arrangement" he notes, "there will be stresses and strains," (Rasminsky 1943, 598). The logic of "multilateral trade" appears to be sound, and is distinct from an opposing method, as he argues that (1943, 598) "generally acceptable solutions are more likely to be found through the machinery of consultation, warning and advice provided by an international agency such as the Fund than as a result of the uncoordinated unilateral action of individual countries."[211]

Rasminsky (1943, 602-603) argues that the *Economist's* string of "multilateral trade" articles is "interesting" in that they appear to favor "a form of sterling area isolationism." This

[209] "The Multilateral Approach." *Economist*, 22 January 1944.
[210] "Planned Expansion." *Economist*, 29 January 1944.
[211] Note the following regarding the Canadian position (Rasminsky 1944, 602): "for Canada, multilateral clearing is the chief merit of any form of international monetary organization."

contestation of what really is "multilateral,"[212] and how to realize this, goes on in the next paragraph (Rasminsky 1944, 603):

> The virtue of going ahead with international monetary plan at once is that every country's flag would thereby be nailed firmly to the mast of genuine multilateralism and that the responsibility for creating conditions which permit all to accept the plan's objectives would be pooled. Unless commitments are given now… it seems almost inevitable that bilateral or "plurilateral" techniques adopted in the immediate postwar period to meet transitional balance of payments difficulties will turn out to be of very long duration.

For Rasminsky and others, the time is now for all countries to commit to objectives. The *Economist's* argument is premised on not being able to a reach a multilateral agreement straight away, and Rasminsky simply defies this.

In a sense, there remain two kinds of support for multilateral trade. The first relies simply on economic logic, while the other—and perhaps more useful of the two—combines this with a view of practicability. Consider first the support to oppose the bilateral path from the League of Nations (1944). It utilizes the kind of sound logic of efficiency (not waste) that has now underpinned arguments for multilateral trade for years:

> … it is clear that the structure of such bilateral equilibrium rates between pairs of countries would not be arithmetically consistent. This lack of consistency would, of course, be of no consequence—indeed, it would be natural—in a system in which multilateral payments are impossible. … The waste of economic resources and the loss of economic welfare inherent in what is essentially a system of international barter need not be further dwelt upon. … It is the most elementary function of a currency system, national or international, to make barter unnecessary and multilateral exchange possible. (182-183).

Compare with Halm (1944, 170) writing about the proposed International Monetary Fund in the *Review of Economic Statistics*, where he flatly states that for multilateralism to "win" it will have to result positively in a cost-benefit analysis (cf. Hitch 1942 above):

[212] Recall that this study views the analyst's job to study these contestations of what "really is" multilateral; not to stand detached from the situation and apply one's pre-conceived notions about what "really is" multilateral (cf. Finnemore 2005).

> Only a compromise [proposal] has a chance to be endorsed by all countries and the cooperation of all countries is required for the creation of a truly multilateral payment system. A multilateral payment system provides that what is earned in selling to one country can be used to purchase from any other country. All members of a multilateral payment system have, therefore, to desist from discriminatory policies; but desist they will only if the price for multilateralism is not considered worse than bilateralism.

The January 1944 meeting of the American Economic Association was a joint one with the American Political Science Association and the American Society for Public Administration. Here again, common nemeses were identified and attempted to be out maneuvered through common refrains. On the one hand, *multilateral* products and procedures are good, they provide for the theorized benefits of political objectives. They satisfy the common sense bar of positive results in a cost-benefit analysis. On the other hand, "bilateral" or "unilateral" types are posited as always sub-optimal.

Percy Bidwell of the Council on Foreign Relations writes (1944, 343) that we "shall certainly need also a multilateral agreement for exchange stabilization." He goes on to explain his thinking (345-346):

> ... in practice, bilateral negotiations involved treating with each important trading country successively... Apart from the question of time, the bilateral approach seems ill-adapted to the problems of the postwar world. We have already recognized, or are in the process of recognizing, that the stabilization of exchange rate, the development of industrially backward areas, and the stabilization of prices of primary commodities cannot be dealt with effectively through negotiations between pairs of countries. ... The aim of American policy, repeatedly expressed, has been the development of international trade on a truly multilateral basis. For that purpose, only multilateral agreements are adequate. This view rests not only on formal logic and common sense; it can be supported also by examination of some of the outstanding problems of post war trade.
>
> ... no country will want to retain its restrictive policies, but none will dare to move to liberalize its policy until it knows what others will do. This is the situation which it seems to me can be handled satisfactorily only by a multilateral agreement. We dare not risk the delay inevitable in the bilateral process. ... Take another example: the problem of finding a solution within the framework of multilateral trade for the acute problem of bringing the British balance of payments into equilibrium.

John H. Williams offered that current thinking on the gold standard “must be modified,” (Williams 1944, 375). A *multilateral* arrangement is fine, but the main question is what is actually entailed in the practice of adjustments (Williams 1944, 375): “the difficult question is how far to go without undermining and defeating the process of mutual adjustments in a multilateral trading system." This is a repetition of his argument on mechanisms above.

Another participant was British economist and Treasury adviser Redvers Opie (in Opie and Graham 1944, 398) who goes on to almost plead (in his response paper): “let us at least try an international scheme before we give up a system of multilateral trade on the easy assumption that it is incompatible with the at degree of rigidity in domestic cost-price structures which existing political conditions are likely to impose.” He goes to respond that Williams’ alternative is compatible with a “full international scheme” whose objective is multilateral trade (Opie and Graham 1944, 398-399):

> ... I see no conflict between the key country approach and the establishment of a full international scheme. Professor Williams himself emphasises the responsibility of the major industrial countries to take the lead in establishment world economic conditions which the younger countries have little power to control. ...Indeed, unless major countries lived up to their responsibility, an international scheme would not work. Moreover, the practical necessity of bringing countries into the scheme only as conditions made it possible for them to conform to the rules would, in actual fact, as Professor Williams recognizes, make for similarity between the key country and the full international approach.

In the FRUS, there are several uses of “multilateral” during this time. However, these simply perpetuate the meanings involved in previous cables, referring to a method of diplomacy—whether or not speak with just the British or include other parties, such as Canada. For example, Winant (in London) cables to Washington (FRUS 1944, II, 1-2):

> As the success of most of the international economics measures depends on multilateral agreement, the British are anxious to have the Dominions keep in agreement with Britain and the United States at each stage in the economic talks. They feel, however, that there are disadvantages in having large numbers around one table in the early stages of formulation of the economic measures…

A joint statement on the Keynes and White proposals in the run-up to the Bretton Woods conference is released on April 22, 1944. Again, one of the stated purposes is "multilateral clearing," (see FRUS 1944, II, 27-28).[213] Point 5 encapsulates the arguments from economists: "to assist in the establishment of multilateral payments facilities on currency transactions among member countries and in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade."

The *New York Times* provides two pieces that touch on "multilateral" procedures in June before the Conference. On the occasion of a tax agreement between the US and Canada in Ottawa, Ray Atherton (US Ambassador) stated:

> Fiscal and other necessary measures in the field of international economic cooperation cannot succeed unless the nations of the world agree on trade-expanding commercial policy. Multilateral reduction of trade barriers such as tariffs, quotas and private restrictions on trade will also be essential to the establishment of a permanent foundation for the post-war economy of the world. The functioning of the machinery for monetary stabilization and for international investment will depend in the long run on the success achieved in reducing trade barriers, both governmental and private, on a world-wide basis.[214]

On June 18, 1944, Edward A. Morrow writes:

> ...there still remains the question of what Britain will decide on the "unfreezing" of such funds to permit multi-lateral trade... Asserting that Britain's decision on the unfreezing of such holdings will show whether that country intends to pursue a multilateral system of international trade or a bilateral system…[215]

These two pieces demonstrate the circulation of the association between post-war economic growth through trade and a multilateral system, whose first step appears to be mechanisms of management for all currencies. This is, unsurprisingly, one of the primary purposes of the Bretton Woods Conference.[216]

---

[213] See also "Proposals of Monetary Experts for World Stabilization." *New York Times*, 22 April 1944.
[214] "Canada, U.S. in Tax Pact." *New York Times*, 9 June 1944.
[215] "New Opportunities Seen By Exports." *New York Times*, 18 June 1944.
[216] Though note that for Keynes "currency multilateralism" and "commercial multilateralism" do not go hand-in-hand (see Keynes 1981, XXVI, 25-26).

Bretton Woods and the use of “multilateral convertibility”

In the opening of the Bretton Woods conference, Treasury Secretary Morgenthau trumpets once again the kind of problem and kind of solution (UN 1948, 81-82):

> To deal with the problems of international exchange and of international investment is beyond the capacity of any one country, or of any two or three countries. These are multilateral problems, to be solved only by multilateral cooperation.
>
> …
>
> In 1941, we began to study the possibility of international cooperation on multilateral basis as a means of establishing a stable and orderly system of international currency relationships and to revive international investment... It is the consensus of these technical experts that the solution lies in a permanent institution for consultation and cooperation on international monetary, finance and economic problems.

On July 2, the NYT carried the opening Bretton Woods conference on its front page. However, the daily reporting focused on the bargaining over quotas, distribution of voting, and “technical” aspects, not whether or not a “multilateral” basis was going to be the foundation of the agreement. The Proceedings of the Conference published by the US Government does not disclose many uses of the term “multilateral” either. But the few instances of its use are telling.

White in a committee meeting on July 3 gave the following remarks, repeated the possibilities and desirably of multilateral products (UN 1948, 96-97):

> A unilateral or bilateral approach to our trade problems cannot produce the highest benefits for the peace-loving nations. The approach must be multilateral. The proposal for an International Monetary Fund... would promote exchange stability, assure multilateral payment facilities, help lessen international disequilibrium, and given confidence to member countries. Only by developing the necessary machinery to maintain multilateral non-discriminatory trading among nations can we hope to avoid resort to exchange restrictions, quotas, and other devices...

One instance where we observe the term “multilateral convertibility” as part of a policy that is not preferred by either the US or Great Britain, is the comment from India on July 10 (UN 1948, 424-426; by A.D. Shroff)

> ... the very casual fashion in which it was disposed of has caused serious disappointment... The delegate from the USA raised the objection that if the foreign credit balances accumulated ruing the war were to be given multilateral convertibility through the Fund, they would unduly overload the Fund. The UK delegate put forth the view that this was a matter for bilateral arrangement between the parties and interests concerned...
>
> During the war we have build up... large foreign exchange balances in London and if we cannot make any use of them through the machinery of the IMF I cannot comprehend how a country situated as we are can be enthusiastically interested in the establishment and operation of such a Fund... We plead for the assistance of the Fund spread over a period of years to secure multilateral convertibility of at least a portion of our foreign balances. I say this because with the long standing relationship between India and the UK and the traditional commercial ties between the two countries, I take it that a large portion of our sterling balances will ultimately be utilised in obtaining capital goods from the UK.

This is quite interesting because the notion of "multilateral clearing" is being used in what seems to be an appropriate way to argue against the US and Britain. Shroff's proposal (and reported in the NYT)[217] starts from the perspective of the logic of multilateral clearing in situations of disequilibrium. India held British debt. Shroff suggested that multilateral clearing is the solution; to move toward equilibrium by using that debt to finance industrialization, i.e. convert that debt to the US' balance in exchange for dollars to spend on Indian modernization. As Gardner notes, these debts were treated like any other debts on a ledger (see Gardner 1956, 167-174). But the treatment of these internationally is rejected (Gardner 1956, 169). The reason is that war debts are extraordinary, and should be settled between the nations, not in this setting. Keynes says as much in his response. I regard this as one place where the limits of multilateralism are being formed.

Legitimation after Bretton Woods Conference

Now, even with the Bretton Woods Conference coming to an agreement, scholars still worried over the "key currency" proposal as competitors. More work needed to be done to continue the process of legitimating the Bretton Woods agreement.

[217] See "Monetary Parley Bars India's Plea." *New York Times*, 11 July 1944.

Jacob Viner (a Canadian economist at the University of Chicago and Treasury advisor) reviewed John Williams' collection of essays published in 1944 in the NYT on August 20. The entire second half of the review deals with his comments on post-war monetary planning. He shares a trepidation with Williams regarding the fund in the transition period, in particular safeguards in the adjustment process. However:

> The American negotiations, no doubt, got into the draft agreement as much provision for such corrective measures and for exchange stability as they could. On both points I would have wished for stronger provisions for the post-transition period. But given the state of British and other foreign opinion I am impressed rather by the degree of success of the American negotiators than by their failure... The key-country approach seems to me objectionable both as a method of negotiation and as a principle of limitation of area of international monetary stabilization. Exchange stability of the currencies even of small countries is important to other countries. Exchange depreciation is contagious. Almost every country, no matter how small, is a key country for some other countries.[218]

In addition to the Williams proposal, because the operational link between the now negotiated Articles of Agreement and post-war trade was becoming clearer, the practical aspects became increasingly important for the business community. These are perhaps the most skeptical of the Articles for the post-war world economy (again, perhaps because they have the most at stake). This is evident in a number of instances in the *New York Times* where those involved with finance and commerce question "multilateral trade."

On October 26, 1944, the President of the American Chamber of Commerce in London noted the importance of multilateral trade for clearing in Britain in the NYT:

> To balance the British payments with the United States, multilateral trade must come to the rescue. The US must buy more tea and jute from India, rubber and tin from South Africa and Britain must, in turn, export to those countries.[219]

[218] "Money and the World." *New York Times*, 20 August 1944.
[219] "Says U.S. Must Buy More British Goods." *New York Times*, 26 October 1944.

In November, the International Business Conference opened. Here, W.W. Aldrich (chairman, Chase National Bank) argued for some variant of Williams' "key-nation" approach for currency stability. In his words, he wants:

> … a specific approach to the problem of currency stabilization [he is most interested in dollar-sterling stability], as opposed to the global approach of the Bretton Woods plan for an international monetary fund. It is opposed, he added, to the automatic granting of credits provided for in the Bretton Woods proposal, in which credit quotas bear no relationship to credit needs.[220]

Other participants, such as Sir Peter Frederick Bennett (representing Great Britain) have their anxieties about Bretton Woods: "while we believe in working for multilateral trade we are not prepared to do it unilaterally but rather are waiting for general agreement on the subject." The key question remains how this will work in practice particularly in the immediate post-war economic and political environment. Sir Chunilal Mehta (India) declared that a multilateral system of world trade would be acceptable to India "only with certain definite reservations and safeguards." He went on to say "that these safeguards would naturally involve tariffs 'necessary for the protection of India's existing industries and development of new ones.'"[221]

What is most interesting is that the US delegation on November 18 refused to endorse the IBRD:

> … the general feeling of the group, it was said, was that gold should be kept as a monetary metal and used as a constituent part of the post-war monetary system. It was fully recognized that a stable relationship between the US dollar and the pound sterling is an essential condition of international monetary stabilization.[222]

On November 22, John Dodd (President of the Association of the British Chambers of Commerce), declares:

> … there must be no post-war division of world markets between the two leaders. Trade, he said, should be conducted as far as possible on a multilateral basis. ... Fundamentally,

[220] "Indian Delegates to IBC Hit Cartels." *New York Times*, 14 November 1944.
[221] "Indian Delegates to IBC Hit Cartels." *New York Times*, 14 November 1944.
[222] "Rye Parley Defers World Bank Stand." *New York Times*, 18 November 1944.

> Mr. Dodd said, world reconstruction comes down to an agreement between the US and the UK...[223]

After the Bretton Woods agreement, the primary entities in ensuring its legitimacy and utility would be the United States and the United Kingdom. There remained resistance within the US and the UK concerning the Bank and the Fund. Simultaneously, business leaders appeared to coalesce around the objective of "multilateral trade." Concern was linked to the sterling debt issue which many countries had a stake in. Yet, for these business (and political) leaders achieving multilateralism in the long-term was dependent on a bilateral-type of diplomacy in 1944-1945, not a multilateral one. In a sense, this issue of US-UK leadership would be embodied in the bilateral diplomacy concerning the UK's successful attempt to obtain a US loan in 1945 as a means to the end of multilateral trade.

To foreshadow the extensive conversations between the US and Britain in 1945, the New York Times reports on January 19:

> British financial and political circles are awaiting with impatience the introduction in Congress of legislation to implement the Bretton Woods pact to see whether it embodies changes which will make the agreement more acceptable here. It is understood that Lord Keynes, while in Washington recently negotiating a new lend-lease agreement, discussed such modifications with the US Treasury authorities. ... It is assumed that at the very least an attempt was made to reconcile the difference in the interpretation of the proposed final act which seem to exist on either side of the Atlantic.[224]

This impatience is derived from the practical anxiety of sterling debt and how will normal transactions look like after the war. Will the operationalization of "multilateral trade" really allow balancing of accounts and economic growth? Cables between London and Washington disclose knowledge about the anxiety of the practicability of multilateral trade in the aftermath of Bretton Woods. A September 8 memorandum by Hull reads (FRUS 1944, III, 60; see also discussion of multilateral agreement regarding oil, 110-127):

---

[223] "Anglo-U.S. Division of Trade Opposed." *New York Times*, 22 November 1944.
[224] "British Look Here for Monetary Pact." *New York Times*, 19 January 1945.

> The British may seek to take the position that unless wholly satisfactory financial arrangements are made for assisting them in meeting their admittedly serious balance-of-payments problems, they cannot pursue the liberal, multilateral trade polices we have advocated. That position would not be sound and we should not accept it. Our position should be that whatever the British balance-of-payments problems may be and to whatever extent they may receive our help in meeting them, those problems will in our view be less difficult in a world in which the US and Britain take the leadership in bringing about the greatest possible expansion of International trade on a multilateral nondiscriminatory basis; that balance-of-payments problems will be more difficult to meet if bilateralistic practices on the German pattern, high tariffs, quotas and discriminations result in a scramble among nations for a diminishing volume of world trade.

In order to make this fit, a “multilateral-bilateral” method is discussed. The binding of opposing conceptions of diplomatic methods after such strenuous public and private distinctions is an interesting phenomenon. In Winant to Washington in late November 1944 (FRUS 1944, II, 99):

> We touched upon the question of the so-called multilateral-bilateral approach to the reduction of trade barriers. Liesching said that so far as he knew there has been no change in the British attitude, which was one of opposition to this method. He also mentioned in passing the technical and negotiating difficulties of the comprehensive multilateral approach.

This approach is a two-step process based on an expanding a bilateral reciprocal trade agreement universally to obtain multilateral benefits. The trade agreements program in the 1930s in the US was the basis for this suggestion. Note that this suggestion was kept private as the New York Times reports no negotiation using this “multilateral-bilateral” method. Politically, it could not be made to fit, but the anxiety that brought it out in the diplomacy between the US and UK was undeniable (see below). As Winant wrote Hull in a cable on December 7: “it was necessary to prevent unlimited protection and preserve multilateralism, but at the same time to take care of stability and the political factors bound up with it," (FRUS 1944, II, 100).

Just after the new year, Senator Vandenberg (labeled an "isolationist") gave a remarkable speech on demilitarized foes and post-war foreign policy, reported by the New York Times (11 January 1945):

> … no such treaty... could be expected to work unless it canceled out the old habits of unilateral and bilateral action among the large states of Europe. The United States had no right, he said, to expect any nation to rely for its safety upon a system of collective security which depended on an enigmatic US. There he proposed to remove the uncertainty about where we stood. But at the same time he insisted, justice was the essence of realism, and if there was to be multilateral force it must be put at the service of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. The US, he added, should not ask for itself, or tolerate in others, unilateral privilege in a multilateral peace.[225]

This instantiation should be noted that even for politicians with a history of "isolationist" thinking, the term "multilateral" to describe a kind of product, where interaction is based on multiple entities is known, and is legitimately used (see also positive Senate reaction).[226] Moreover, this usage de-legitimizes "unilateral" politics as opposed to "multilateral peace."

Also in January, *Foreign Affairs* publishes a piece by White that specifically addressed criticisms of the monetary fund. Here, he employs a number of counter-arguments to address these. First, he re-states the basic foundation (White 1945, 196):

> The proposal for an IMF rests on two premises. The first is the need for stability, order and freedom in exchange transactions; without these we cannot have the expansion of world trade and the international investment essential to the attainment and maintenance of prosperity. The second is that stability in the international exchange structure is impossible of attainment without both international economic cooperation and an efficient mechanism... [it is a] necessary instrument... and the most logical and effective means for adopting and maintaining mutually advantageous policies.

Note that the IMF is both necessary, and logical and effective. These characteristics rest on arguments made for more than a decade in economic and policy communities. Moreover, White (1945, 203) later links "common interests," with the logic of multilateral trade in his piece:

[225] "Vandenberg Offers a Joint Plan To Demilitarize Foe." *New York Times*, 11 January 1945.
[226] "Senate Majority Backs Vandenberg." *New York Times*, 4 February 1945.

> But the greatest safeguard is the common interest of all countries in maintaining a Fund that will become the basis for stable and orderly exchange arrangements without which the world cannot have the expansion of international trade and the resumption of international investment essential to a prosperous world economy.

Like Senator Vandenberg, White (1945, 205) argues against “unilateral” action:

> … The technical representatives of the United States have made it clear to other countries in a number of memoranda that a scarcity of dollars cannot be accepted as evidence of our responsibility for the distortion of the balance of payments. I quote from such a memorandum: "It should not be overlooked that the disequilibrium in the balance of payments cannot be manifested as a problem peculiar to one country. … in such cases the responsibility for the correction of the maladjustment is not a unilateral one.

The most prominent feature in monetary relations that has been debated since, at least 1919, is the gold standard. This feature was used as part of an alternative to Bretton Woods. White (1945, 197) takes on this argument by making it “compatible”:

> … that gold standard [in the 19th century and early 20th century] was never even in its heyday an automatic and self-correcting mechanism, but one requiring a considerable amount of supple management. ... Fundamentally the stability of the decade before the First World War was due not to the gold standard but to the fact that the world economic structure was sufficiently resilient and adaptable to permit playing the game according to gold-standard rules.

He takes on the key currencies approach by marginalizing it, and connecting this marginalization with the logic of the inter-connectedness of currencies, a unity of economics, and the anti-thesis of logic: fear. This is worth quoting at length (White 1945, 206):

> In part this exclusive concern with the key currencies reflects a fear that exchange stability and freedom in exchange transactions are not universally desirable politics; that many countries should be permitted to have fluctuating currencies and to use exchange control to manage their international payments. Whether this objection to the Fund is well taken is a matter of opinion. Regardless of the degree of stability or freedom one may prefer, few will deny that orderly exchange arrangements are essential, and such arrangements are practicable only through cooperation on a multilateral basis. The emphasis on the key currencies in which international payments are made seems to me completely mistaken. ... the currencies of other countries also are important to the extent that they affect volume of international trade and investment. ... The fact is that we are directly interested in the exchange rates of all countries, because all countries are either our customers, competitors or suppliers.

Winant continues extensive conversations with the British in London in January 1945 after preliminary discussions on nondiscrimination (see FRUS 1944, II, 103-104). He notes that "the subject of discussion was exchange controls in relation to a multilateral commercial convention," (FRUS 1945, VI, 14). After further conversation, he cables a summary of their discussion. These passages illustrate how "multilateral" is being stretched and practically negotiated. The multilateral approach to a commercial policy that "fits" with Bretton Woods in the post-war environment is detailed. It is complex, but appropriate in light of the failures of bilateral or multilateral-bilateral approaches (seen as "last resorts"). In this case, the British see a joint statement followed by a general conference. This is followed by the creation of an international organization, whose function is to then actually work out the practical bits to make the abstract principles operational.[227] Winant writes (FRUS 1945, VI, 15-16):

> ... The UK officials compared the multilateral approach with the bilateral and multilateral-bilateral approaches. While appreciating the complexities of the first approach, they believe that the last two approaches have such serious disadvantages that they should only be considered as a last resort in the event of a breakdown of attempts at the multilateral approach. They point out that in the bilateral approach concessions are narrowed down because of the obligation to generalize them under the MFN principle. Second, the principle of "equivalence of concessions" raises difficulties. Efforts had been made after 1860 and to some extent in the 1920's to get around these difficulties by trying to negotiate a string of bilateral agreements. But the results were largely destroyed by subsequent depressions. In any case, the approach failed to meet satisfactorily the objections to the pure bilateral approach. ... UK officials have come to the conclusion that the best procedure is to start with a statement of principles and attempt to get international agreement first on the principles and second on the establishment of an international organization charged to translate them into a detailed convention. ... The UK officials conceive of the proposed statement of principles, not in the form of vague resolutions in general terms, but as concrete and specific, involving an outline of definite government commitments, and carrying with it the obligation to set up an international trade organization to work out the multilateral framework needed for the application of the principles in detail.

[227] See the *New York Times* for another refrain on adherences to obligations in multilateral conventions—a repeat of the 1933 clause above—in order obtain benefits. "Tariff Reduction Viewed as Vital." *New York Times*, 4 March 1945.

In February 1945, Keynes tells Winant that Britain is committed to this against the alternatives (FRUS 1945, VI, 19-20):

> ... Britain, said Keynes, is a traditionally free trade country and has a fundamental and inescapable interest in the multilateral organization of world trade. ... Much nonsense has been written and said in favor of bilateral bargaining and restriction by a vocal minority in Britain who have had a somewhat open field because of the absorption of economists and administrators in government. Keynes added that he and others will shortly organize a counter offensive to offset the effects of this restrictionist propaganda and to demonstrate to the public the necessity of multilateral economic relations to serve the interest of Britain.[228]

Alongside this conversation is the upcoming ratification debate in the Senate for Bretton Woods. In a special to the NYT, house writer John Crider notes the critical principle in post-war planning:

> The Administration's objections to this approach ['key country' approach espoused by John Williams], aside from technical considerations, is that the whole post-war international structure is based upon the concept of multilateralism if not universalism, and that to limit such an important part [that is, the IMF] of the total economic structure as currency stabilization to a few countries would be diametrically opposed to that principle.[229]

Even if the logic of multilateralism is widely circulated, it remained contentious in practice. Statements by Leon Fraser, former President of the BIS, highlight this. In these Congressional statements reported in the *New York Times*, he criticizes the practicability of the Bretton Woods Articles:

> One thing I learned as president of the Bank for International Settlements… is that the weakest reed you can lean upon for currency stabilization is credit... Instead of the fund as proposed, [Fraser] would substitute the proposed bank, giving it authority to deal with the currency stabilization problem, and then make each loan on its merits, obtaining an agreement from the countries in advance not to indulge in practices of economic

[228] See also the UK cable of March 1945, which states that "bilateralism and regional preferential systems were considered by the present Government as poor alternatives to full international collaboration on a non-preferential basis," (FRUS 1945, VI, 28-29).

[229] "World Watches Debate on Bretton Woods Bill." *New York Times*, 18 February 1945. Also, by March 27, 1945, "multilateral trade" was such a widely agreed objective, and international organizations a widely agreed means to achieve that objective that counsel for Socony-Vacuum Oil urged that one of ECOSOC's first tasks should be the facilitation of multilateral treaties of commerce, see "Would Counteract Nationalism Trend." *New York Times*, 27 March 1945.

> warfare ... This scheme [Bretton Woods] pushes managed currencies to their logical conclusion… You ultimately come down to the question who are the mangers? Who are these fellows who know how to run the world better than anyone else? And then you have to have a Gestapo to protect the managers. [230]

George Halm writing in the NYT's editorial section summarizes the American Banking Association's criticism of Bretton Woods ("unsound" "unproved" "too complicated" and "too large"; thus including Fraser's practicability criticism).[231] At the same time, he notes that the goal is perfectly fine for the ABA:

> The ABA approves of the Fund's main objective, which is a multilateral payments system, or, in the words of Lord Keynes, a system in which money earned in selling goods to one country can be spent on purchasing the products of any other country. Indeed, the ABA takes this aim so much for granted that it believes it can endanger the compromise of Bretton Woods and still have multilateral trade. Other countries have already served notice, however, that they will either have the Bretton Woods plan or else a less-than-multilateral, perhaps even a bilateral, system of payments and of trade.

Halm ultimately notes that funds must be available as soon as possible after the war to deal with the sterling debt and argues that the ABA simply does not understand the different functions of the Fund and the Bank.[232]

The US-UK loan and fitting that bilateral deal into multilateralism

Now, Gardner (1956, 189) argues that Keynes became interested in the idea of a US loan only in September 1945. At Bretton Woods, the problem of sterling war debt was declared to be a bilateral matter. The rapid end of the war and the end of lend-lease left Britain in a very time-sensitive position. Seeing how long multilateral discussions and conferences can take, it perceived no other option to address its debt issues other than financing from the US during the early autumn of 1945 (Gardner 1956, 188-190). Though Gardner's conclusion is to again call the outcome sub-optimal that only "multilateral objectives could be served in this case by

[230] "Bankers Win Point on Monetary Plans." *New York Times*, 23 March 1945.
[231] "International Monetary Fund is Favored as it Stands." *New York Times*, 8 April 1945.
[232] "International Monetary Fund is Favored as it Stands." *New York Times*, 8 April 1945.

multilateral negotiations," (see Gardner 1956, 220) the US loan to Britain did allow politics to go on. What role did 'multilateral', which was heavily circulated for Bretton Woods, play in the diplomacy of this loan?

In a memorandum dated June 25, 1945, Clayton (Assistant Secretary of State; FRUS 1945, VI, 54-56) notes the problem of Britain's accounts in the transition period, which make possible a diversion from multilateralism. The answer is not a multilateral one, yet this should still be done for the sake of the future multilateral system.

> The British financial problem is admittedly the greatest present barrier to rapid progress towards free multilateral payments and relaxation of barriers to trade. ... It is, therefore, definitely in our interest to give Britain the financial help required to bridge the transition to peacetime equilibrium. It would be quite unwise, however, to consider making Britain an outright gift of the required several billion dollars, as has been recently suggested by certain critics of Bretton Woods. It would be unwise even to supply the funds as a credit without laying down conditions that would insure a sound advance towards our post-war objectives. On the other hand, it will be difficult to persuade the British to accept dollar credits rather than work out their financial problems within the Sterling Area by the devices of blocked balances, exchange control, exchange pooling, bilateral clearing arrangements and forced exports in liquidation of sterling balances. Hence the terms of the credit we offer Britain and the conditions we lay down for granting it must be devised very carefully... It is nevertheless of the utmost importance to accelerate Britain's reconversion to multilateralism in this way, both because of the danger that bilateralism and restrictionism might otherwise become firmly imbedded in British policy during the transition, and because the American business public will demand early evidence that Britain is going to go along with us in our post-war trade policy if they are to continue to support it.

The *New York Times* carried various responses from the business community as well regarding aid to Britain. On July 1, it reported on comments by Allen Sproul (President of the Federal Reserve of New York). He said that the US should "attack the British problem as an absolutely essential prerequisite to currency stabilization…. That, in my opinion, includes finally wiping out the debts of the last war, a liberal definitive settlement of lend-lease obligations,

agreement and perhaps help on a program of liquidating the blocked sterling balances, and help on meeting the deficit in the balance of payments in the immediate post-war year."[233]

In late June conversations over trade continued, and Winant records the lengthy discussion which includes how important—indeed, necessary—multilateralism is to not just the US and Britain to world (in spite of the simultaneous necessity of US aid in the transition period; FRUS 1945, VI, 57-58):

> … Robbins said there were 3 very great objections from UK point of view to multilateral bilateral approach. First there was the length of time required to implement it. To negotiate such a multiplicity of bilateral agreements in a reasonable time was "a nightmare conception"; there were not enough qualified people to do the job. Second this approach requires negotiators to enter into a sea of general commercial policy obligations without knowing where they will, in fact, land. Third, he said, it has nothing like the psychological advantages of a uniform percentage reduction. ... Eady said that abandonment of the multilateral approach with its general tariff cut "would be the end of all we hope to achieve". The whole impact of a new approach would be lost. ... To start out with multilateral bilateral approach would be "the end of everything worth having".[234]

On July 25, 1945, in the editorial section of the *New York Times*, economist Philip Cortney discloses a reply letter from Keynes that demonstrates the common currency convertibility objectives and stresses that the only way for this to happen is a US aid package:

> In a letter addressed to me Lord Keynes makes the following important and timely statement; he wrote this letter pursuant to my essay on the consequences of his theories: "And I can end up by most fully endorsing the last sentence of your preface—that 'in order of urgency the main objective to be attained is the free convertibility of the pound sterling.'" … There is, I believe, general agreement among experts that the Bretton Woods plan cannot fufill its promises, namely, eradication of exchange controls and resumption of multilateral international trade, until and unless Great Britain has recovered the free convertibility of her currency. ... The only country able to extend to Great Britain the grant-in-aid sufficient to permit her to remove her exchange controls and resume multilateral international trade is the United States. The pertinent question is therefore what is bound to happen if the Congress and the people of the US are later unwilling to extend to GB the grant-in-aid she so badly needs? The answer, I believe, is

[233] "Question of Huge Grants to Great Britain for Restoration of Her Economy Discussed by Senate Banking Committee." *New York Times*, 1 July 1945.
[234] See similar remarks by Canadian diplomats in FRUS 1945, VI, 61-66.

> obvious. Bretton Woods would be a failure, and this very failure would prove a serious handicap to future attempts toward international monetary and economic cooperation.[235]

The diplomatic dialogue arising from this public policy issue in the FRUS during August 1945 confirms the gravity of the situation. Keynes states that "there were two basic problems; the handling of the accumulated blocked sterling balances and the continuing problem of deficits in the post V-J day period," (FRUS 1945, VI, 80).

The practical matters of trade after the cessation of hostilities became evident, as the New York Times reports on August 11, 1945: "Multilateral exchange has arrived as a permanent factor with respect to imports into the US, it was said in customs circles here yesterday, with the financial and economic reconstruction of Europe to see rates tied in with goods in a widespread seeking for the American dollar so badly needed abroad for continental reconstruction."[236]

The question of who or what and how sterling debt would be managed here and now in August 1945 remained a live one. Though many hinted at a US package, other possibilities were there, such as the IMF, the UN, the conference on trade and employment, or simply British bilateral agreements. On August 13, 1945, Clayton's remarks to the NYT disclose this indeterminacy:[237]

> … it is argued that any attempts to solve the problem by a system of governmental controls, of bilateral trade agreements and strictly channelized trade, can only tend ultimately to lower the level of Britain's total trade below what it might be under a wide-open, competitive and multi-lateral system… The Bretton Woods conference a year ago by-passed the problem of Britain's frozen sterling balances as being not an international problem, but one the British must solve for themselves. However, it is generally recognized to have a vital effect upon foreign trade, and solution of the problem is of interest to all trading nations.[238]

---

[235] "Britain and Bretton Woods." *New York Times*, 25 July 1945.
[236] "Foreign Scramble for Dollars Looms." *New York Times*, 11 August 1945.
[237] In the diplomatic discussion, Clayton tells the British on August 17 that "in his opinion the straight multilateral basis [on tariff reduction] was probably impossible of agreement," (FRUS 1945, VI, 99).
[238] "Clayton in London Seeks Trade Paths." *New York Times*, 13 August 1945.

Later that month, the NYT reports again the link between aid and getting Britain "to multilateralism":

> … if she does get help she can accept in the real spirit, looking toward restoring sterling's multilateralism within a few years. Britain wants and needs multilateralism more than any country in the world—though this is another point whereon Washington apparently needs convincing.[239]

On September 13, the NYT runs the title for an article: "Multilateral trade given as Canada's Aim". It goes on to state that Canada, "plotting an unprecedented expansion of her foreign trade, wants a multilateral system and world agreements freeing international commerce." The Deputy Trade Minister (Mackenzie) is quoted as saying that "our interest can lie only in the direction of a multilateral system of international trade, so that individual countries overseas are not driven to balance their international payments one with the other."[240]

Again, the British moves in bilateral diplomacy are worrying for many. The NYT reports of a Dutch-British monetary accord on September 17:

> The Britain-Netherlands monetary pact is meeting a mixed reception. On the one side the pact is hailed as introducing freer commercial intercourse between Britain, Holland and the Dutch Indies while creating hopes of early restoration of private commercial initiative. On the other side it is criticized, first, because it links Holland to the sterling bloc and somewhat limits Holland's freedom regarding the Bretton Woods Agreements and conflicts with the American conception of the freest possible world trade as opposed to the British desires for multilateral clearing; and, secondly, because the Dutch and Dutch Indian exchange rates are decidedly unfavorable.[241]

On September 22, the NYT describes the high stakes involved in the US-British talks on sterling debt, and the kinds of conditions that ought to be included in an aid package:

> … some officials feel so strongly on the subject that they are advocating that such a voluntary scaling down of the debt should be a condition onto any aid supplied by the

[239] "British Hopes Rise Over Truman Plan." *New York Times*, 31 August 1945.
[240] "Multilateral Trade Given as Canada's Aim." *New York Times*, 13 September 1945. See also the NYT on December 7: "James MacDonnell, for the Progressive Conservatives, who are a traditionally high tariff party, said that the only hope for the world and for Canada lay in the encouragement multilateral trade," ("Ottawa Takes Up Bretton Woods." *New York Times*, 7 December 1945).
[241] "Dutch Money Call Will Be Thorough." *New York Times*, 17 September 1945. See also the NYT noting an increase in these types of bilateral accords in "Trade Agreements Increasing." *New York Times*, 19 November 1945.

> United States to the United Kingdom, particularly if any of the aid granted should be used by the British to unfreeze a part of the blocked sterling, held to the account of sterling-area countries in London. ... the unfreezing of this debt, in other words the giving to the sterling creditor countries of at least enough dollars or other desirable currencies to buy what they need during the transitional period, is regarded as one of the principal problems of the current negotiations.
>
> ... There appears to be little doubt among the American experts that out of the current negotiations will come an agreement, either between the United States and Great Britain, or between the United States and all of the sterling-area countries, under which aid in some form will be granted. The prevailing American view appears to be that unless the world's two greatest trading nations come to an agreement which will enable the world to resume multilateral trade at an early date, the alternative will be the division of the world into two currency blocks—dollar and sterling—and one of the most bitter eras of economic warfare in world history. ... While the British attempt in their negotiations always to talk of the UK problem, the problem of the sterling area as a whole is said to creep inevitably into the discussions. This is because the huge sterling debt constitutes probably the primary obstruction to a return to anything like normal multilateral trade.[242]

This is reiterated as the NYT reports a speech given by the president of the International Chamber of Commerce (and Chase National Bank chairman of the board), Winthrop Aldrich in October 1945, which claims that "bilateralism" and "a trade war" will result unless financial assistance to England is put in place along with the elimination of exchange controls and closed monetary areas.[243]

By late October, something "in between" had been conceived:

> … a short-term economic policy will be worked out. They do not believe it will be the multilateral trade solution some hope for nor the rigid bilateralism that others prefer, but something in between.[244]

On December 7, the NYT reported that a 4.4. billion (USD) loan was arranged to "facilitate an early resumption of unrestricted multilateral world trade." Besides agreeing to the

---

[242] "Ask Empire Ease British War Debt." *New York Times*, 22 September 1945.
[243] "Aldrich Demands End of Trade Bars." *New York Times*, 5 October 1945. In the meantime, the FRUS records a meeting with the Belgians and the Dutch for the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment (FRUS 1945, II, 1335). Also, like the 1933 resolution a direct link is made to policy action and 'benefits' arising from the multilateral agreement: "new members adhering to the proposed multilateral arrangements on trade barriers would be required to make adequate tariff reductions in order to receive the benefits of the arrangements," (FRUS 1945, VI, 138).
[244] "World Aims Unite U.S. and Britain." *New York Times*, 21 October 1945.

charter of "liberal trade principles" and participating in the conference on trade and employment, Britain will "take steps at once to unfreeze, fund, and have cancelled various parts of the $14 billion sterling indebtedness... Multilateral sterling convertibility is a major object of the current loan transaction."[245]

At the signing of the agreement, a joint statement was released by Truman and Atlee:

> Both sides have … had continuously in view the common interest of their governments in establishing a world trading and monetary system from which the trade of all countries can benefit and within which the trade of all countries can be conducted on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis. ... Agreement... to facilitate purchases by the UK of goods and services from the US, to assist the UK to meet transitional post-war deficits in its current balances of payments, ... and to assist the UK to assume the obligations of multilateral trade. This credit would make it possible for the UK to relax import and exchange controls... and generally to move forward with the US and other countries toward the common objective of expanded multilateral trade.[246]

On December 9, the New York Times runs a piece with the title "British loan opens way to economic peace", and goes on to argue that:

> It seems clear that the alternative to granting this assistance to Great Britain is a return to the very economic warfare of the Thirties which thrived on bilateralism, on Government trade controls, on barter, multiple currencies, and discriminations of every kind. At these things the Nazis were masters, and to their kind of a world we would return.[247]

Moreover, the author, frequent international affairs reporter John Crider argues that the central notion in the key currencies path is compatible with Bretton Woods, and this agreement is evidence of that:

> … It is significant in this connection that governmental action and preachments have now proved correct the contention of John H. Williams dean of the Harvard School of Public Administration, vice president of the NY Federal Reserve Bank, and long a principal "brain truster" of the Wall Street community, that the "key" world currencies of the US and Great Britain would have to be stabilized before there could be much hope of attaining the Administration's objective of non-discriminatory, multilateral world trade. … Probably a more precise way of stating the "key currency" idea would have

[245] "British Get 55-Year 2% Loan." *New York Times*, 7 December 1945.
[246] "Text of the Joint Statement by Truman and Attlee on the American Loan to Britain." *New York Times*, 7 December 1945.
[247] "British loan opens way to economic peace." *New York Times*, 9 December 1945.

> been to say that no world-wide currency agreement would be workable /o first stabilizing the dollar and pound relationship. This would not have overlooked the desirability of multilateralism in currency cooperation. … What the loan to Britain does in technical parlance, is to endow the pound sterling with "multilateral convertibility." This means simply that it will change the pound from something nobody wanted, least of all persons in a position to trade dollars for sterling, into something into which everybody will want and can use.[248]

In a different article on that same day:

> Under the agreement the British are obliged to undertake negotiations with India and other holders of the $14 billion blocked sterling balances in London in an effect to have them partly written down... Some difficulty is expected in getting the agreement of India in particular. The British hope, however, that India will be responsive to the argument that if part of the debt is written off, she can use some immediately for purchases she wants to make in this country for industrialization and development purposes.[249]

This appears to be *exactly* what India wanted to do at Bretton Woods in 1944, only to be denied by the US and UK.

The agreement is hailed, even by its critics. On December 13, the NYT reports the statement of the President of the American Chamber of Commerce in London (Phillips), as he says that Britain needs three times as much aid. However, the "greatest benefit that will accrue to the countries as a result of the loan agreement is that multilateral world trade is again possible."[250]

The disorganization of the economies after the war—and even after this agreement—is perhaps most evident on a January 1 article in the NYT. Currency "chaos" is described as there are shifting prices of goods and unstable currency exchange rates. In this situation, a "black market" emerged:

> Despite the devaluation of the French franc, a large gap still separates most European currencies from the promised land of free multilateral convertibility envisaged in plans for an international stabilization fund about to take concrete form. ... While the problems differ in detail, there are common factors. The most serious of these is the absence of a

[248] "British loan opens way to economic peace." *New York Times*, 9 December 1945.
[249] "Keynes Sees Pact as Vital to Peace." *New York Times*, 9 December 1945.
[250] "Loan to Britain Called Inadequate." *New York Times*, 13 December 1945.

> recognizable price system. ... The most spectacular common factor is the black market in dollar and pound notes. Prices up to 120 times the official exchange rates have been reported for dollar currency.[251]

Discussion: Dimensions of multilateralism at the end of 1945

At the end of the war, Vera Michaels Dean (1945) writes that:

> One of these lessons we have learned in part: that no nation, no matter how rich or powerful—neither the United States, nor the British Commonwealth of Nations, nor Russia can win the war alone. But not all of us have drawn the corollary from that lesson: that no nation, no matter how rich or powerful, will be able to win the peace alone.

This central logic that underlies the objective of multilateral clearing and multilateral trade appeared unassailable at the end of 1945. How this logic would work out in practice seems translatable enough in practice. As van Dormael writes (1978: ix):

> The Bretton Woods agreements were the first successful attempt consciously undertaken by a large group of nations to shape and control their economic relations. The stated objective of BW was 'the expansion of balanced growth of international trade'. The principal method used to achieve this end was the restoration of orderly exchanges between member countries: 'stability without rigidity and elasticity without looseness.'

This occurred not outside politics, but within diplomatic negotiations of what it means to operationalize a 'multilateral' system.

The economic plans of Keynes and White, the apparent consensus for a *multilateral* trading system within economic circles in the US, and the apparent need for economic cooperation (again) circulated in mass media pieces all needed to be realized within the political context of the time. The Bretton Woods agreement diplomatically formalized some principles of economic order. However, the rapid end of the war and the inability to manage the magnitude of sterling debt made a "bilateral" US-UK loan operating outside of the IMF a logical fit. Indeed, the "competing" idea of "key currencies" was rendered compatible with a multilateral trading system so long as currency convertibility could be realized. Once this could not be guaranteed in

[251] "Currency Chaos in Europe Traced." *New York Times*, 1 January 1945.

the months after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, countries, particularly Great Britain, began to make bilateral accords, which moved the US to make a bilateral loan. This may have ultimately saved the system which many thought would be the key to peace in the future.

The next chapter will start with the ITO, the “third leg” of Bretton Woods, as it specifically deals with commercial policies, and the relationship between domestic and international economics. The related “problem” of “financing development” will be linked to the ITO negotiations, ultimately later connected to a policy of “multilateral aid.”

CHAPTER 6

DESCENDING FROM MULTILATERAL TRADE: MULTILATERAL AID AND DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, 1945-1960

Introduction

> 16. We therefore resolve to create a more peaceful, prosperous and democratic world and to undertake concrete measures to continue finding ways to implement the outcome of the Millennium Summit and the other major United Nations conferences and summits so as to provide multilateral solutions to problems in the four following areas:
>
> • Development
>
> • Peace and collective security
>
> • Human rights and the rule of law
>
> • Strengthening of the United Nations
>
> UNGA 2005

In the process of preparing for the summit on "financing for development" (which would result in the Monterrey Consensus in 2002), the UN Secretariat conducted a survey across a number of delegations to draw out "recurring themes and key elements". In their index report,[252] four 'multilateral' elements are specified: multilateral investment agreements, multilateral assistance, multilateral public sector debt, and multilateral trading arrangements. In the Monterrey Consensus itself, participants are determined to pursue "vigorous multilateral action" in response to the problem of financing for development. Multilateral financial institutions, multilateral trade, multilateral bodies, and multilateral fora are mentioned as entities, arenas, and tools to address financing for development. Notable, however, is that the history of “financing for development” in the UN extends much further back than 1997 (cf. e.g. Clark, Rich, and Heninger 1999; see also UN website—Financing for Development documents), and the introduction of *multilateral* sources for development, “multilateral aid,” and even a “multilateral

[252] UNGA 1998 A/53/470.

approach” to development, which involved ECOSOC and the UN General Assembly, dates to the 1950s. Of course, other options were available and, indeed, “multilateral” is by no means an omni-present notion in the discussion of development policy and practice. Yet, its use in particular settings to describe the broad character of political action to address the new problem or issue of “development finance” stands in need of explanation.

The empirical starting point for this section is the use of “multilateral” in discussing problems of development, in particular, “multilateral aid.” The suspicion that I pursue here is that this use is not random; that an increasingly interdependent world does not make its logic and circulation naturally correct, powerful, or inevitable. Therefore, its use is intentional, meant to associate and disassociate it with particular other notions and actions for the purpose of accomplishing political goals.

During the 1940s, the idealized logic of multilateral trade was resuscitated from the London World Economic Conference. This logic was operationalized in a multilateral trading system through the Bretton Woods Agreement. This agreement included a fund to facilitate "multilateral clearing" and a bank for the provision of capital. The premise of these organizations was their capacity to rectify long-standing economic issues concerning balance of payments, currency stability, and capital investment. With the case for multilateral trade relatively settled as the appropriate objective for restoring the world economy after Bretton Woods, the logic of this notion is available for other issue areas, such as employment. Indeed, the notion of a bilateral loan deal between the US and the UK was necessary for the facilitation of “multilateral trade” demonstrates this notion’s capacity to incorporate a diverse set of diplomatic actions into itself as an objective.



Figure 20. Relations from "multilateral trade" to "development."

To reiterate, the use of "multilateral trade" drew, among other things, on a logic of participation. Unlike the context in which the Kellogg-Briand Treaty was negotiated and consummated, not only would "principal Powers" be involved, but all Allied countries participating in the world economy—that is, having accounts comprised of debits and credits—would be invited participants to this conference on trade and employment.[253] Keynes drew on the notion of the benefits in terms of economic growth, derived from the balancing of accounts to facilitate trade, only optimally realizable if all countries participated in "multilateral clearing." It was anticipated that the Bretton Woods Agreements would be linked to a multilateral convention on trade, which would codify the principle of reciprocity to enable the efficient idealized benefits

[253] To be sure, the non-participation of various countries in economic arrangements after 1945 would become an issue that had to be addressed.

of multilateral trade (for which the GATT would temporarily serve as a management mechanism).



Figure 21. The difference in participatory practices between "multilateral treaties" and "multilateral trade."

Again, note that previous use, such as "multilateral treaties" at the Paris Peace Conference, are context dependent. In 1919, we observe relatively vague arguments for the *indispensability* of such treaties and the *just* peace that allowed the victors to determine which treaties were to be revived. The meaning of this descriptor in world politics has evolved to adapt to political contexts over time (previous sections).

Related to this section, one observes the use of "multilateral" in the discussion of development in the 1950s, and in particular, financing for development. The empirical question to answer is: what particular problems, solutions, logics, and arguments were associated with the use of "multilateral"? What justifications were employed and associated with it?

To be sure, after 1945, continued use of "multilateral" to describe trade occurs, notably in the context of the ITO and the GATT as well as among countries receiving assistance under the

Marshall (European Recovery) Plan. Multilateral is used in the context of potential treaties on disarmament in the 1950s and to describe multi-national NATO military groupings in the early 1960s. For this study, these uses stand less in need of explanation than the migration of the term involving issues concerning development.

In discussing the notion of poverty and its association with the World Bank's activities, Finnemore (1996, 125) makes the seemingly obvious claim that "the fact that the Bank was a multilateral entity created less suspicion about its moral and humanitarian motives." Those that contest this claim—specifically, that an entity's action is more genuine by virtue of it 'being multilateral'—do so on the basis that either the Bank has its own interests or is the function of hegemonic structures (e.g. Therien 1999; Stiglitz 2002). In other words, the counter-claim is that the Bank "really isn't" multilateral. The assumption persists that anything genuinely "multilateral" is good and that is why it has utility (cf. Cox 1992).

Rather than accepting this, we can get a better understanding of how political utility and legitimacy are created by exploring the relations and associations made in political processes. For this section, this study adopts an approach that examines key moments in the process of making 'multilateral aid' a line item in the US foreign aid budget, and an identifiable "multilateral approach to development," that requires us to look at the relations of "multilateral," both discursively and practically. In doing so, contemporary usage can be more precisely explained.[254]

During the Second World War, "multilateral" was not used in describing appropriate development practice, much less the identification of one approach to the problem of development. If anything was a problem, it was how to organize relations that avoided

[254] Today, at the very least after 1999, "multilateral institutions" have become important locales for research on development and foreign aid (Hattori 2001; Therien 2002). "Multilateral rules" were considered for foreign direct investment by transnational corporations (see e.g. UNCTAD 2004).

depression or to permit trade that was comparatively advantageous or permitted balance of payment equilibria (e.g. Atlantic Charter 1940; Dietrich 1940; Hilgerdt 1943; Kindleberger 1950; Mikesell 1954; of interest from sociology is Watkins 1943). What is needed, and what this section investigates then is how "multilateral," is legitimated in the politics of development and development finance versus other options, roughly between 1945 and 1960.

The context of post-war international relations, 1945

By the end of 1945, there was broad consensus that international trade needed to be addressed and some policy at the international level must be put in place for its resuscitation and growth in the post-war era. Indeed, the US-UK loan finalized in 1945 included coordination of commercial policy and the stipulation that there would be a conference on trade and employment (see the Australian note, FRUS 1945, II, 1328-1330).

First, it should be noted that the link between trade and employment and development is not a natural one. As Arndt states in his economic history of development (1987, 43-44; see also e.g. Viner 1947):

> Economic development in the Third World as a major interest of Western governments, of economists, and of public opinion generally, was born during World War II. It was the need of the Western Allies to formulate war aims… which in the span of a few years promoted development economics from the most neglected to the most written-about branch of the discipline.

So important was trade after World War II, that Tryvge Lie, the first UN Secretary-General, is quoted in the *New York Times* stating that:

> Prosperity, like peace, is indivisible... One part of the world cannot enjoy durable economic welfare if other sections of the world suffer from poverty and depression. The restriction of international trade not only prevents the normal development of international relations. It is bound to lead to aggressive economic foreign policies... [which] lead to war.[255]

[255] "World Conference on Trade, Jobs, To Be Held by U.N. Soon, Lie Says." *New York Times*, 15 May 1946.

And later in the same NYT article, Winthrop Aldrich, chairman of the International Chamber of Congress goes on to say:

> It becomes increasingly evident that multilateral trade is the antithesis of imperialism... It is the sole basis of peace. The International Chamber of Commerce is prepared to participate wholeheartedly in the world trade conference. We believe that world trade, prosperity, economic security and peace are indivisible.[256]

Here, we observe instances of linkages between multilateral trade and development on the one hand, and anti-imperialism and peace on the other. This, among other instances, creates a bundle of associations that hang together in policy discussions to make the previously imaginary real.

At this time, "multilateral trade" remained the objective, but any link between multilateral to aid or development had not been made.[257] Economic development (much less multilateral development) was not central to League of Nations economic groups (e.g. Toye and Toye 2006)). The IBRD had not yet even begun to describe itself as a 'multilateral development bank', though its focus was on 'economic development' (and generally not reconstruction; see Kindleberger 1950; ECOSOC 1948 Resolution 167(VII); Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997). By 1949, scholars (e.g. Balogh 1949) were already suggesting a reform in name and purpose of the Bretton Woods institutions. Economic cooperation was key, but prioritizing the development of less industrialized countries over issues like currency stability or balance of payments had not yet arrived as normalized language and practice (e.g. though it was certainly a persistent agenda item in Western Hemispheric diplomacy before 1939). As Keynes wrote in 1944, currency multilateralism does not guarantee commercial multilateralism (see last chapter).

---

[256] "World Conference on Trade, Jobs, To Be Held by U.N. Soon, Lie Says." *New York Times*, 15 May 1946.
[257] By the time of the UNCTAD Geneva Conference in 1964, the link was less so decisive to *multilateral* trade for certain entities.

Now, the roots of a discernible “financing for development” objective began to appear in the discussion of post-war economic policy, in particular the discussions concerning the Bretton Woods conference and agreement. In 1943, Keynes is quoted in the *New York Times* (26 April 1943) describing one purpose of the British post-war economic plan:

> … International investment, the object of which is to develop backward countries and to provide for the capital requirements of financially poor countries in general. This scheme is also linked with the currency plan, in that proposed multilateral clearing would break down unless deficit countries received financial support through the proposed investment board.[258]

In Roosevelt's message to the participants at Bretton Woods in June 1944, he mentions the problems of "relief and rehabilitation", the distribution of food ('food' is also central to Truman's articulation of his Point Four program in 1949), "economic cooperation", and "economic health." For "only through a dynamic and a soundly expanding world economy can the living standards of individual nations be advanced to levels which will permit a full realization of our hopes for the future," (UN 1948, 71). Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, in his opening message as newly-elected President of the Conference, speaks of an agenda "specifically" concerned with "the monetary and investment field," but "part of a broader program of agreed action among nations to bring about the expansion of production, employment, and trade contemplated in the Atlantic Charter," (UN 1948, 79). Goals are prosperity, high levels of production and consumption, and a "satisfactory standard of living for all people of all countries," (UN 1948, 80-82).

The use of the term “development” as a goal in discussions regarding international policy had not yet been normalized. Rather the concern was industrial production, currency stabilization, trade promotion, investment, credit, and the increase of income levels. In spite of this, Morgenthau uses the term “multilateral” to distinguish a kind of “cooperation.” As noted in the

[258] “World Aid Looms on Capital Needs.” *New York Times*, 26 April 1943.

previous chapter, he states "These [problems of international exchange and international investment] are multilateral problems, to be solved only by multilateral cooperation," (UN 1948, 81). This section explores how the notion *multilateral* becomes involved with “development” and “aid,” and what its purpose was in political discussions.

Starting point: ITO charter (1945-1948)

> "What, before 1945, did the mainstream of Western economists have to say about underdevelopment outside Europe and development economics? The answer is, very little." (Arndt 1987, 29)

The starting point for this section is a brief review of the negotiation of the International Trade Organization (ITO) charter. It is through this diplomacy that the link between multilateral trade, an apparently stable objective of international post-war economic policy, and development is instantiated. In this interaction, “principles of multilateralism” are “compromised” for the purpose of creating a charter for global trade (Gardner 1956). What results is that the concern of “under-developed” countries for their development is legitimated over these principles, which were also presented as the basis for lasting peace and prosperity during World War II.

In his analysis of the ITO, Gardner (1956) lists the incongruencies between the outcome charter in Havana (1948) and the principles of multilateralism that he lays out at the beginning of the book and throughout. His position is clear (1956, 365). Until the London Conference to draft a charter from the proposals generated by the US, “economic development” had "played a comparatively minor role in Anglo-American planning." Moreover, these considerations for economic development required a compromise of the principles of multilateralism.

In looking at the initial proposals (published by the State Department in November 1945) on which an ITO draft would be created, this claim appears to be correct. There are no clauses of “exceptions” for “economic development,” which would appear later. A brief mention of

“development” comes in Chapter 1 (Purposes), Point 2, which states that the ITO will "enable" members to expand "opportunities for their trade and economic development," (US Department of State 1945, 11).

At the London Conference, the first preparatory conference for the ITO, we observe reporting from the NYT and memoranda in the FRUS that substantiate Gardner's perspective that “development” became an important consideration for the charter here. The NYT confirms that "most of the other nations here" at the London Conference think that "the United States proposals pay too little attention to the problems of industrially backward or war-weakened countries." The article goes on, stating that "the Cuban delegate, Guillermo de Blanck, summed up the case of the under-developed nations,” by stating that objectives should be "not only for those countries that possess an economic structure and are already highly developed but also for others, like ourselves, faced by the urgent necessity of setting on foot their internal industrial developments and of obtaining for their people a higher standard of life." The NYT is optimistic at the end of the report, that "in the figurative sense at least the delegates were talking the same language and about the same world."[259] On November 24, 1946, the paper stated: "there has not been a real good row in the whole conference." It flatly states that the conference ended in "complete agreement" including clauses on "the economic development of backward areas."[260]

In Paul Nitze's December 5 memo to Clayton (Head of the US Delegation) on the London Conference (FRUS 1946, I, 1359), he states that among the agreed points is a chapter on "recognizing the importance of fostering economic development throughout the world and providing means by which countries desiring to use protective measures to encourage the development of industries may secure from the ITO a limited release from their obligations

[259] “U.S. Trade Code Hit at London Parley.” *New York Times*, 18 October 1946.
[260] “17 Nations Agree on Major Details of Trade Charter.” *New York Times*, 24 November 1946.

under the Charter for that purpose." Clair Wilcox's later (December 27, FRUS 1946, I, 1360) memo to the Secretary of State (Marshall) notes that import quotas (one type of 'quantitative restriction') for industrialization and economic development became one of the principal issues of debate. He describes the process where the US delegation created new text for the charter, which Wilcox importantly notes, was critical in order to get agreement on other parts of the draft (FRUS 1946, I, 1361):

> The Australians, with the support of the Indians, Chinese, Lebanese, Brazilians, and Chileans, urged that affirmative provision be made for the industrialization of undeveloped areas. It was the real purpose of this drive to obtain freedom to promote industrialization by using import quotas. Initially this appeared to be the most difficult problem before the Committee. It was resolved, however, when the United States delegation drafted and introduced a new chapter on economic development. In the course of this chapter a procedure is provided whereby the International Trade Organization can grant an undeveloped country, in a particular case, permission to make a limited use of import quotas. This was the only important concession made by the United States during the meeting and it was this that brought about the virtually unanimous acceptance of the charter as a whole.

This is roughly confirmed by Gardner in his account (1956, 365) and the Congressional monograph on the ITO (US Congress 1948, e.g. 49).

The second and final conference on the ITO draft charter in Geneva sees further discussion. The NYT reports that undeveloped countries, India is pointed out in particular, came to Geneva to negotiate escape clauses in favor of industrialization and development.[261] In the minutes of the US Delegation Meeting in Geneva (July 2, 1947; after Clayton returns to Geneva from DC; FRUS 1947, I, 962-963), Wilcox details the negotiation of “escape clauses” which took the form of employing quantitative restrictions:

> ... there are a number of serious problems still ahead of us; the most serious of which is the one dealing with the continuous assaults that are being made from all sides upon the controls developed at the London Meeting dealing with the use and imposition of quantitative restrictions. ... One of the most difficult compromises developed... at the London Meeting was the concession in favor of backward and underdeveloped

[261] “U.S. Ready to Offer Low-Tariff Scales.” *New York Times*, 15 April 1947.

> countries. ... There is now developing a mounting drive, Mr. Wilcox said, against the requirement in the Charter that before a country may impose quantitative restrictions prior permission must be obtained from the ITO upon a showing of a bona fide need for such action within the provisions of the Charter. What these countries want is an absolute free hand to impose quantitative restrictions without prior consultation with the ITO. ... This issue is a fundamental issue on which the United States can give no further ground. It was pressed vigorously in London. The same countries that pressed the matter at the London Meeting are pressing it in Geneva using the same arguments. ... Among such provisions are: state trading, economic development, and balance of payments. The countries that are leading the fight are New Zealand, Cuba, China, Chile, India, and Czechoslovakia.

While the NYT reporting includes a conciliatory speech by an Indian delegate, the Wilcox account seems more confrontational. This negotiation would have its final curtain call in the follow-up conference in Havana.

In November, the NYT reports that the underdeveloped countries intended to be hard negotiators as the issue of escape clauses were "the most controversial subject of the Geneva debates and apparently will require much diplomatic finesse for settlement here."[262] During this diplomacy, the “probable consequences” of the failure of the Havana negotiations are presented in an FRUS memo (30 December 1947; FRUS 1948, I, 825; the Economic Adviser, Office of International Trade Policy (Coppock) to the Acting Director of the Office of International Trade Policy (W.A. Brown)):

> ... C. The non-Russian world would be without a rudder in the international economic sea. Economic warfare, as depicted in Wilcox's speech of December 23, 1947, at Habana, would be the order of the day.
>
> ... E. Capitalism, or free enterprise, would suffer a decided set-back, for although the Charter has been tailored to accommodate some state-trading, the Charter is the very embodiment of economic liberalism in the international realm, adapted to present-day conditions.
>
> ... G. Liberalism, and free institutions generally, would suffer a set-back because of the close affiliation of capitalistic economic arrangements and political and civil liberties.

[262] “Old Issue Enters Cuba Trade Talks.” *New York Times*, 27 November 1947.

Note also, Nufer's memo (Political adviser to US delegation in Havana) of February 6, 1948 (FRUS 1948, I, 850):

> An open break with the Latinos [would]… inevitably be exploited by the Soviet Union and by the Communist groups… that the Conference failed because the "Capitalist" powers in general and the U.S. in particular had tried to force their views upon the small underdeveloped countries in order to keep them in a semi-colonial state and to prevent them from industrializing.

The diplomats at this conference were dedicated to multilateral trade, and as a consequence, became entangled with the issue of development. In this political context, they were evidently also cognizant of the potential effects the negotiation would have on the relations between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world as the shift toward an ideological divide between “Capitalism” and “Communism” began to place in diplomatic discursive practice. The logic of multilateralism, which requires equally applicable rules and participation of all countries for economic benefits, had to be amended to fit into a new “Cold War” era that was exclusionary by design, and this is seen again later on in the discussion regarding SUNFED.

This would be a difficult task without some compromise, for at the end of 1947, a number of countries were “probably opposed” to the draft, including Ceylon, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Poland, and Switzerland (7). Twenty more were identified as “uncertain,” including Chile, China, India, Burma, Pakistan, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Costa Rica, San Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Haiti, and Iran (see FRUS 1948, I, 828). At Havana, compromise was achieved on the issue of quantitative restrictions (see Mallory's (US Charge Cuba) descriptions of issues to Marshall on January 1, 1948, FRUS 1948, I, 827). The NYT reports in February that the "problem of industrialization" has brought up many issues. The key, according to the report, is the issue of criteria, where if certain pre-determined criteria are met, then the ITO would consider national

measures to utilize the “escape clause” to be automatically approved.[263] The extended Brazilian amendment of January 26 was eventually largely accepted by the US and incorporated in the committee report of March 2.[264]

On March 21, the NYT details the compromises that made the Havana Charter possible. The four major trade “problems” (clearing, reconstruction, development, and export surpluses) "had to be solved by a compromise between the ideal of a moral code based on multilateral non-discriminatory principles for the reduction of trade barriers and the reality of the current world situation." In short, a *moral multilateral code* was not practicable (see the use of the word below in US Congress 1948). Still, these compromises mean that "the charter establishes broad principles of fair trading but permits certain exceptions... to meet the conditions that exist today and may continue or recur in the future".[265]

The Department of State Bulletin from April 4, 1948 contains press releases from various entities describing the diplomatic achievement. In the State Department's press release, it is stated that "the main objective of the charter is the raising of living standards throughout the world. It proposes to do this by promoting the expansion of international trade on a basis of multilateralism and general nondiscrimination, by fostering the growth of production and employment, and by encouraging the economic development of backward areas," (DSOB 4 April 1948, 441). Note that the direct aim of the charter in this passage is not 'multilateral trade'; that is the mechanism through which the over-arching objective is achieved. In his statement, Clayton (DSOB 4 April 1948, 444) is clear about the alternative: "The world will be a better place to live

[263] “World Trade Charter Now in the Balance.” *New York Times*, 15 February 1948.
[264] See ITO documents: E/CONF.2/C.2/C/13 for the Brazilian amendment; E/CONF.2/48 for the US commentary; E/CONF.2/45/Rev.1 for the committee report, and annex for the text; E/CONF.2/C.8/19 for the final draft text of March 16 that is virtually identical to the approved Charter; these are available at: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/gattdocs_e.htm and http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/1946_50.htm.)
[265] “Four Major Trade Problems Settled at Havana Parley.” *New York Times*, 21 March 1948.

in if nations, instead of taking unilateral action without regard to the interests of others, will adopt and follow principles." Interestingly, he goes on to explicitly discuss the 'sovereignty' issue, which is countered by a resort to reciprocal relations. He states (DSOB 4 April 1948, 444):

> Each [country] will surrender some part of its freedom to take action that might prove harmful to others, and thus each will gain the assurance that others will not take action harmful to it. This may well prove to be the greatest step in history toward order and justice in economic relations among the members of the world community and toward a great expansion in the production, distribution, and consumption of goods in the world.

This is an echo of the reciprocity argument regarding aggressors in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and noted by White and Keynes in their proposals on new economic institutions after the war.

In the FRUS, Wilcox notes the inconsistency between the final ITO draft and "multilateral principles." In a note to W.A. Brown in February (FRUS 1948, I, 873) he writes that "we receded from our impossible position on occupied areas, we got a draft on relations with non-Members... a solution on non-discrimination... [and] we got the Latins and the other undeveloped countries into an apparent mood of compromise." In discussing protective quantitative restrictions for developmental purposes (to Secretary Marshall) he states that (FRUS 1948, I, 876): "[it] is true that draft is inconsistent in principle with Washington proposals." He goes on to say though that these clauses were "adopted in London and Geneva with active participation ... [and that the] Present draft of Article 13 is the one crucial compromise which will enable us to obtain almost complete agreement between developed and undeveloped countries here."

This is in spite of the fact that (which Wilcox also notes, see FRUS 1948, I, 877) undeveloped countries complained, to which Wilcox seems sympathetic, that they must get ITO

permission to use escape clauses, whereas countries that adopt preferences such as the UK do not (the idea of the British Empire as a "region" is also present, see FRUS 1948, I, 880 and 882).[266]

The Congressional monograph is clear about the inconsistencies involved in the Havana Charter. In the Appraisal section, under Quotas--Exceptions for Economic Development the text reads (US Congress 1948: 48):

> Judged theoretically from the standpoint of the charter as a program for unshackling international trade, one of the vulnerable and disappointing provisions is that of Article 13... It should be understood that the US proposals in 1945 did not contain an economic development chapter and did not provide an escape clause for quantitative restrictions imposed for the purposed of economic development.

It goes on to state that (US Congress 1948: 49):

> The view of this Government was, and still is, that trade quotas for economic development should be outlawed except under highly exceptional circumstances. The US, however, has compromised on this view in the various stages of negotiation of the ITO charter. ... The final result at Havana represents the maximum practicable concession to the viewpoint of the underdeveloped countries.

[266] Interestingly, when the UK dissented in this final stage, the Atlantic Charter and Article VII are invoked to show the lineage of the ITO. See notes in FRUS 1948, I: 874 and 876; see also Clayton's press release in DSOB 4 April 1948 for another invocation.



Figure 22. The relational outcome of the ITO Charter, 1946-1948.

Gardner's (1956, 368; also see 365-368) conclusion is in step with the contemporaneous accounts of the diplomats in the FRUS and in the published US Congress appraisal. The exception clauses in the ITO for the purpose of economic development represented "a major compromise of the multilateral conceptions shared by Britain and the United States," (see also W.A. Brown writing for the Brookings Institute in 1950 on the 'London Compromise'). Indeed, for Gardner, the ITO charter "permitted departures from multilateralism" (Gardner 1956, 370). The reason for him was simple: "it was no longer good politics to make a strong case for multilateral trade," (Gardner 1956, 371; see also 372; also business groups attacked the ITO for departure from multilateral principles, see 376; cf. Ikenberry 2001). In other words, “multilateral trade” had value as an ideal goal to bring countries together and permit the creation of two new international institutions at Bretton Woods. For it to be maintained as a valuable political notion,

it needed to be linked to new terms and actions. When a relation to development is articulated, its meaning and utility consequently shifts.[267]

This negotiation of escape clauses for development legitimated a departure from multilateral principles. The actual references to "finance for development" as a goal appear in Articles 1, 12, and 72. However, how to operationalize financing for development in practice had not been put into the ITO Charter.[268]

Three points can be made for justifying this ITO negotiation as a starting point. First, we observe not only the emergence of the idea of "development" as an issue in world politics, but that its emergence is entwined with its association with (to be a diplomatic issue in the first place) and disassociation from (as an exceptional activity worthy of the suspension of multilateral 'principles' in the conduct of trade) "multilateral trade." To recount, here it was argued that to be able to "get development done" these principles needed to be bent.

Second, the idealized notion of multilateral trade was judged to be impracticable. Compromise, in order to gain adequate participation, required the acceptance of quantitative restrictions, which were in contradiction to multilateral principles. This meant that conjectural outcomes might not be achieved. However, this was not enough to scuttle the ITO negotiation in Havana. In defense of the 'compromise' on exceptions for economic development, the Congressional monograph (1948) argues:

---

[267] See also Philip Cortney's NYT op-ed, where he states that 1) Havana was "completely at variance" to the Proposals by Department State from November 1945; and 2) there was "no hurry" to establish ITO "as long as the Marshall Plan is influencing the currents of trade to the extent it does presently." "International Trade Charter." *New York Times*, 4 January 1949.

[268] The text which mentions finance for development are as follows: Article 1, Point 2: To foster and assist industrial and general economic development, particularly of those countries which are still in the early stages of industrial development, and to encourage the international flow of capital for productive investment. … Article 12: International Investment for Economic Development and Reconstruction; 1. The Members recognize that: (a) international investment, both public and private, can be of great value in promoting economic development and reconstruction, and consequent social progress; … Article 72 [functions of ITO] ... to promote and encourage establishments for the technical training that is necessary for progressive industrial and economic development.

> ... first is that the underdeveloped countries are so numerous and so determined in their position that anything less would have made the obtaining of agreement impossible. It must be remembered that more than two-thirds of the world's people live in countries which consider themselves underdeveloped. ... second... is that products included in trade agreements are not subject to escape... third... even with the compromise, the charter provisions are a substantial advance over the present situation...

So, while the ITO was not subsequently ratified by the US Congress, the success of various logics and arguments in Havana amongst diplomats produced discursive practical vestiges from which future diplomacy would evolve.

The third point is the relationship between the agreement objective and participation. In this instance, this kind of agreement requires participation of all again, but involved greater diplomatic activity by the "developing countries," compared to earlier diplomatic encounters. This re-instantiates what diplomacy would and should look like if we are discussing economic problems of trade, employment, and development amongst states.

So, after the signing of the ITO Charter in Havana, how would, then, the relationship between "multilateral" notions and "development" proceed? Further exploration of what would this look like and how would it, as in previous instances, be made to fit the political context through time is the task of this section.

End point: "multilateral aid" as a development solution and a "multilateral approach" to development (~1960)

In 1958, the UN General Assembly passed UNGA Resolution 1317, which acknowledged the "bilateral, regional and multilateral efforts to advance international co-operation in the field of financial assistance for the economic development of the less developed countries."[269] In 1959, David Owen (a British diplomat at the head of the UN's Expanded Programme of Technical

[269] UNGA Resolution A/RES/1317 (XIII) "UN Capital Development Fund," 12 December 1958.

Assistance) laid out a “multilateral approach” in the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*.

Indeed, in 1961, the General Assembly declared a United Nations Development Decade where it was "convinced of the need for concerted action... through the United Nations system and on a bilateral or multilateral basis."[270] These proclamations suggest that an association between the notion of “multilateral” kinds and “development” had been made in world politics (see also the IDA's first annual report in 1960; FRUS 1961-1963, IX, Document 191); Nkrumah 1965; Milner 2006 also asserts that bilateral aid was traditional practice until the 1960s; symposium on the Clay Report in *Political Science Quarterly* 1963).

By 1960, the 'de-colonization' phenomenon had momentum, and coupled with this was the need for countries to speak the language of 'development'. This need required sources for hard capital: money in the form of grants and loans to accelerate development (as well as soft capital like technical skills and administrators) (see also Murphy 2006). The dominance of the state at this juncture made for complex power relations because of the history of colonialism and the effects of a bipolar system. Put another way, the independence movements after 1945 created not only an increase in the number of states, but also a great demand for a mechanism through which economic development can actually occur that was distinct from previously existing colonial structures. What this would mean was to be determined by the practice of economic politics after 1945, and an initial tension did occur in terms of multilateral clearing during Bretton Woods (as raised by the Indian delegation, see previous section).

In this post-1945 context, international organizations became *multilateral* mechanisms through which countries could acquire hard (finance) and soft (technical assistance) capital for economic development. The UN TAP/ETAP, the UN Special Fund (SUNFED), the IFC, and the

[270] UNGA Resolution A/RES/1710 (XVI), “United Nations Development Decade,” 19 December 1961.

IDA, (leading to UNCTAD and the merger of the ETAP and Special Fund into UNDP in the mid 1960s) all represent attempts to remove the former colonial powers and other powerful states from direct influence (Murphy 2006; Manzer 1965, Baldwin 1961, Owen 1959). Thus, development utilizing these mechanisms required a description that could differentiate it from resources coming directly from another country—in particular, resources coming through the United Nations and its specialized agencies. “Multilateral aid” and a “multilateral approach” to development conveniently established this boundary of practice as it was used to legitimate collectivized political action. In Asher's 1962 article in *International Organization* on "Multilateral Versus Bilateral Aid: An Old Controversy Revisited", he characterizes the early understanding of the terms as such: "Multilateral meant "UN"; bilateral meant "US" (Asher 1962, 699).

Owen's (1959) statement is worth recalling in detail as instantiating a distinct link between the UN (and UN-related machinery) and a distinguishable 'multilateral approach' to development. Indeed, for him "the word "multilateral" has come into its own" as a useful notion for a "new kind of assistance" that gives "every country the opportunity of being a partner in economic development," (Owen 1959, 25). To support this new kind of assistance, he asserts its legitimacy. Owen (1959, 26) concludes that:

> … it has become evident that the international organizations which take part in the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance provide a "most acceptable"--frequently the most acceptable--form of outside assistance. This aid is acceptable because it comes from an indisputably impartial source, because it offers a partnership approach to development and--most important of all--because it has proved itself effective in actual operation.

The “guiding principles” (Owen 1959, 28) he offers discloses the characteristics of a *multilateral* approach, that governments themselves make the "request" of assistance, determine "specific obligations" for local costs in conjunction with this assistance, and utilize "counterpart

personnel" for that transfer of expertise is "perpetuated." Moreover, he goes to state that every request must be "justified" by its relationship to the "economic development" of the country, and "needless to say, the aid given is free of any political consideration," (Owen 1959, 28).

President Eisenhower's speech to the UN General Assembly in September 1960 states it simply in discussing the US' African program (cf. FRUS 1958-1960, II, 255):

> The President said bilateral and multilateral aid would be needed in Africa. He emphasized help from the United Nations, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund.[271]

In a nutshell then, this section seeks to answer: how did the use of the term 'multilateral' in currency stability problems in 1944 later come to be used to distinguish a "partnership approach to development" in 1959? First, in the above discussion, I attempted to demonstrate a link--tension and subsequent negotiation--between the multilateral trading system and development (instantiated by the ITO negotiations). Below I narrate how a *need* for capital for development arises during and after the ITO negotiations. To meet this need, "multilateral aid" is suggested alongside other sources of aid as not only fruitful and efficient (drawing on earlier logics), but also "apolitical" (also drawing on earlier logics).

We know that an early sentiment linking multilateral trade and development with efficiency can be seen at the International Business Conference in 1944: "The restoration of a multilateral trading system permitting the resources of the world to be utilized in the most efficient manner is an indispensable condition of the raising of the standard of living of all peoples," (IBC 1944, 29). How is this reproduced in future diplomacy? After an examination of the use of "multilateral," this section ends with the establishment of the Development Advisory

[271] "Appeal to World." *New York Times*, 23 September 1960.

Group (DAG; later DAC) and the International Development Association (IDA) as moments where “multilateral” was linked to notions of the "Free World" and the "West."[272]

The Development of the Politics of Development

Point Four, the multilateral UN, and multilateral aid in the US Budget, 1949-1953 (NYT/FRUS)

The Point Four program detailed in Truman's speech of January 1949, re-produced the division between developed and undeveloped countries (see ITO negotiations above; cf. Arndt 1987, 1 and passim.). It also contributed to the addition of development as a legitimate part of US foreign policy. In his economic history, Arndt (1987, 2) recalls: "During and immediately after World War II, the adoption of economic development as a policy objective in and for the ‘underdeveloped’ countries of the world coincided almost fortuitously with the elevation of economic growth to the status of prime economic policy objective in the developed countries."[273] Financing development was a relatively peripheral diplomatic issue during the Bretton Woods discussions and only gained prominence during ITO negotiations. The Point Four program carried it further up the US government's agenda.

Truman stated (20 January 1949) that a "bold new program" must commence for the "improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas." He also states that the US should "foster capital investment in areas needing development" and links the endeavor--"a cooperative enterprise"--to "the United Nations and its specialized agencies wherever practicable," (DSOB 30 January 1949, 124).

Such an agenda requires practices to operationalize. What funds would be utilized, from what sources, and for what precise purpose? In his note to Truman, Secretary of State Acheson writes that funds for Point Four programs would be allocated to various "United States and

[272] In 1966, an editorial in the *New York Times* was published titled, “The Multilateral Way.”
[273] See also Helleiner 2009.

multilateral program activities," (FRUS 1949, I, 775). Writing on the 'substance' of the program, Acheson goes on to note (FRUS 1949, I, 779) that "it is particularly important that agreements--either bilateral or multilateral--be sought that would encourage the international flow of private investment capital."

While the FRUS reveals much concern within the State Department over how to implement Point Four, the key point is that previous episodes demonstrate the emergence of the objective for under-developed countries to obtain greater financial resources for their development and Point Four explicitly states this to be one of its two objectives. How to achieve resource availability is separated into determinate US "bilateral" aid and aid distributed through the United Nations and its agencies, what Acheson calls "multilateral" sources. Early in the planning for implementing Point Four was cognizance of UN involvement. This is noted not only by Truman in his speech, but also by Acheson and Thorp (see esp. FRUS 1949, I, 759-764).

In the *New York Times*, the objective of Point Four is raised in relation to the European Recovery Program in March 1949.[274] It is meant to provide "aid to backward areas" or "underdeveloped areas" through "technical knowledge" and to "foster capital investment."[275] In this same piece, US official Willard L. Thorp (who is meant to implement the program from within the State Department) initiates a dialogue with UN Secretary-General Lie to prepare "a comprehensive plan * * * for economic development and for methods of multilateral financing of such a plan."[276] This leads to the UNTAP (Technical Assistance Programme) in October 1949.[277]

---

[274] "Success of First ERP Year Creates Issue for Second." *New York Times*, 27 March 1949.
[275] "Plans Are Underway to Implement Point 4." *New York Times*, 10 April 1949.
[276] Ibid.
[277] On May 24, 1949, the NYT publishes an article entitled "Bilateral Pacts Urged on Point 4." This direction was urged by National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) as it would be "would be far more practical than attempts to formulate an economic assistance program multilaterally" and that such a method had "failed in producing an effective program of trade for countries in the International Trade Organization."

This reporting is important as it reflects discussion within the State Department as to what "multilateral" means in these contexts. Throughout 1950, a number of documents demonstrate this negotiation taking place. In a MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) between the State Department and the ECA in April, it is noted that (FRUS 1950, I, 862):

> The foregoing arrangement between Point IV and ECA do not cover multilateral technical assistance activities for which Point IV funds may be contributed. As now foreseen, multilateral activities in the ECA area of interest would be limited to those of the UN expanded program and possibly of the Caribbean Commission and the South Pacific Commission. The Department of State will arrange appropriate exchange of information and consultation with ECA on these activities.[278]

Later in a May 1950, a memo from the Chief of the Division of Organizations (Gordon) to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Howell) includes the following footnote on the 'UNA' (FRUS 1950, I, 854):

> Refers presumably to multilateral programs for technical assistance under the auspices of the United Nations, which would be a concern of the Department's Bureau of United Nations Affairs.

We see this again in September 1950, when Truman orders implementation of Point Four programming. As the NYT reports on September 9:

> Part of the funds appropriated by the Congress for Point Four are to be devoted to the United Nations Technical Assistance Program, which is supported by contributions from other United Nations members as well. The bilateral arrangements between the United States and other Governments will be supplemented by multilateral arrangements under the UN auspices.[279]

In the FRUS (1950, II, 29-30), the State Department repeats this. Under the topic of "United Nations" a footnote states:

> This paper on the United Nations is intended to complement the regular series of annual country policy reviews. It therefore follows the general outline of those statements although it necessarily differs from them in content to suit the multilateral character of the UN.

[278] See also "Vital Role for ECA -- Expansion Multilateral Trade." *New York Times*, 20 August 1950.
[279] "Texts of Truman Orders to Implement Point 4 Plan." *New York Times*, 9 September 1950.

In the text itself, it asserts that the United Nations is "a unique medium of universal character for the general expression of US policy, especially in its global or multilateral aspect, whatever the direction it may take." "Multilateral" is meant to be associated with the character of the United Nations (FRUS 1950, II, 29-30).

"Multilateral" also would be used to describe different amounts in the US aid budget from 1952 onward as the debate over "how to aid" would gain prominence in US politics. In 1952, one can point to New York Times reports on March 7, April 29, May 1 and 24, and June 10 and 29. In these instances, we observe the use of "multilateral assistance, "multilateral technical assistance" or "multilateral technical cooperation programs", and "multilateral aid". In the May 1 piece, "multilateral aid" is cut from $17 million to $14.848 million. This does not include $10 million for emigration, $2.8 million for ocean freight for relief supplies, or the US contribution to UNICEF.[280] It also is now for programs "other than Point Four", which became known under the descriptor "bilateral" or simply "foreign aid" (see FRUS 1952-1954, I, 248-249; for a June 9, 1952 memo that claims that "one of the major unsolved problems of the Point 4 program is the need for a clear definition of its scope and philosophy in relation to other United States foreign assistance activities.")

In January 1953, Truman expected to increase "financing multilateral technical aid programs."[281] Eisenhower's election did not mean the elimination of a "Multilateral Aid" line in the US budget. On May 6, the NYT reports of an "Aid Plan Summary" and includes the specific

[280] "Cites Peril of Reds." *New York Times*, 7 March 1952. "Itemized Effect of Cuts in Foreign Aid Program." *New York Times*, 29 April 1952. "Senate Unit Votes 6.9 Billion for Aid." *New York Times*, 1 May 1952. "Aid Bill is Passed by House With Cut Raised to 1.7 Billion." *New York Times*, 24 May 1952. "6.5 Billion in Aid Passed by Senate, Sent to President." *New York Times*, 10 June 1952. "Aid Voted by House with New Slashes." *New York Times*, 29 June 1952.
[281] "Foreign Aid Need Set at 7.6 Billion." *New York Times*, 10 January 1953.

(more specific than the Truman budget) breakdown: “Military,” “Defense Payments,” and “Multilateral Aid.”

The “financing for development” debate in ECOSOC and the UNGA, 1949-1953

> “But it also became increasingly evident that the developing countries generally preferred money to advice and that technical assistance was much more difficult than had initially been realized." (Arndt 1987, 65)

While ECOSOC was involved with the planning and recording of the ITO conference, it had little involvement in the positions articulated by the various parties. In the aftermath of Havana, gloomy perspectives could have prevailed at ECOSOC and the UN Secretariat. However, development problems were legitimated as important policy issues to be addressed in that context with a role for these entities. Trade was considered the primary aspect of the solution to development, though “employment” became a part of this as Williams (1951) concisely points out so long as Keynesian economic doctrine remained in the discussion (see Toye and Toye 2006 for the Keynesian slant versus the classicists; Williams 1951; see also Cesarano 2006; Boughton 2004).

The introduction of the Point Four program, which affirmed the legitimate presence of “development” in global policy discussions, contributed to conditions where ECOSOC and the UNGA could increase the intensity of their pursuit of development finance. The debate over sources for development finance (and the turn to *multilateral* sources) plays itself out in the interaction within the UNGA and ECOSOC.[282] Before Point Four, but after Havana, in 1948,

[282] See UNGA Resolution A/RES/4(I) “Representation of non-governmental bodies on the Economic and Social Council,” 14 February 1946; UNGA Resolution A/RES/6(I) “United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA),” 1 February 1946; UNGA Resolution A/RES/47(I) “Report of the Committee on UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration),” 11 December 1946; UNGA Resolution A/RES/48(I) “Relief Needs after the Termination of the UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration),” 11 December 1946; UNGA Resolution A/RES/49(I) “Activities of the Economic and Social Council,” 15 December 1946; UNGA Resolution A/RES/52(I) “Provision of expert advice by the United Nations to Member States,” 14 December 1946; UNGA Resolution A/RES/58(I) “Transfer to the United Nations of the

two resolutions in particular were adopted that specifically use the term “development” and identify two distinct concerns for carrying out this practice: capital and technical expertise.

Resolution 198 (4 December 1948), titled “Economic development of under-developed countries,” states that low standards of living create conditions of instability that may hinder peaceful relations, which sound familiar to the starting point of the ITO. It directs ECOSOC to develop measures to promote development.[283] Moreover, it endorses ECOSOC's Resolution 167/VII. In this resolution, the problem of financing is specified in ECOSOC's reaction to the IBRD’s report concerning this issue, as it noted “statements made by high officials of the Bank on recent occasions to the effect that, other sources of financing now being available for a substantial part of reconstruction needs, the Bank is contemplating paying more attention to the problems of development hereafter.”[284] The UNGA resolution “expresses its hope that the IBRD will take immediate steps... to facilitate the early realization of development loans, particularly those in areas economically under-developed.”[285]

UNGA Resolution 200, titled “Technical assistance for economic development,” is specific about the obstacles faced by developing countries in pursuing economic development: "The lack of expert personnel and lack of technical organization are among the factors which impede the economic development of the under-developed areas." This resolution becomes well-cited for those that follow which address the matter of technical assistance.[286] Indeed, in 1949 after the Point Four speech, a UNGA resolution sets up a “special account” for technical

---

advisory social welfare functions of UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration),” 14 December 1946; and UNGA Resolution A/RES/123(II) “Report of the Economic and Social Council,” 17 November 1947.

[283] UNGA Resolution A/RES/198(III) “Economic development of under-developed countries,” 4 December 1958.

[284] ECOSOC Resolution 167/VII “Reports of the Specialized Agencies,” 28 August 1948.

[285] UNGA Resolution A/RES/198(III) “Economic development of under-developed countries,” 4 December 1958.

[286] UNGA Resolution A/RES/200(III) “Technical assistance for economic development,” 4 December 1958.

assistance.[287] Note that the UNGA does not specify or associate the Point Four speech with its activities. Reason is that favoring one country over another within the context of the UN was not standard practice.



Figure 23. The linkage from “development” to “finance,” 1947-1953.

The UNGA continued to engage with ECOSOC to investigate obstacles to development, and I focus on this issue of “multilateral” sources of development finance. In UNGA Resolution 306 in 1949, the Assembly stated that it "looks forward specifically to receiving the Council's studies of and recommendations for international action concerning the urgent problem of the financing, in all its aspects, of economic development in under-developed countries."[288] Indeed, if only an implication of the problem of financing development was given in 1948, an explicit identification of this problem is articulated in 1949.

[287] UNGA Resolution A/RES/304(IV) “Expanded programme of technical assistance for economic development of under-developed countries,” 16 November 1949.
[288] UNGA Resolution A/RES/306(IV) “Economic development of under-developed countries,” 16 November 1949.

UNGA Resolution 307 (16 November 1949) confirms that there are two primary issues that UN entities will tackle—and specifies entities that will be involved: "the tasks hitherto entrusted to the ECOSOC, the Secretary-General and the specialized agencies in connexion with the economic development of under-developed countries have been concentrated especially on the study of problems connected with technical assistance and with the financing of economic development."[289] At the same time, the UNGA recognized that policies of individual countries exert a powerful influence on development process and recommends that ECOSOC explore this in forthcoming studies. This would begin with the Report on Full Employment, commissioned late in 1949.[290]

After this report, the UNGA passes a resolution titled "Financing of economic development of under-developed countries."[291] This resolution does not, yet, differentiate between bilateral, multilateral, and regional sources of financial resources for development. It simply states that the resources are not available "domestically," from governments "abroad," or in terms of "private capital." After ECOSOC publishes its expert report *Measures for the Economic Development of Under-developed Countries*, the UNGA responds in January 1952, with Resolution 520.[292] It requests ECOSOC to submit a plan for establishing a "special fund" for grants and low-interest loans for financing development projects (these are taken up by the US later to be the 'Special Fund' and the IDA, see below).[293]

---

[289] UNGA Resolution A/RES/307(IV) "Economic development and international economic and commercial policy," 16 November 1949.
[290] To be released as *National and International Measures for Full Employment*.
[291] UNGA Resolution A/RES/400(V) "Financing of economic development of under-developed countries," 20 November 1950.
[292] UNGA Resolution A/RES/520(VI) "Financing of economic development of under-developed countries," 12 January 1952.
[293] See "U.N. Told U.S. Opposes New Aid Proposals." *New York Times*, 12 December 1951, for initial US opposition to the 'special fund'.

The UN Bulletin of February 1, 1952 neatly summarizes all the UNGA discussion on development obstacles and solutions, including "financing for development." The Special Fund is given its own attention as one mechanism for addressing the financing issue (see UNB 1 February 1952, 126-128, see discussion below). In the FRUS, talk of this "special fund" occurs in a memo from Thorp to UNA Assistant Secretary Hickson (22 April 1952; see FRUS 1952-1954, I, 227).

While "multilateral" is not used in these discussions, this section supports three related points. First, that *financing* is one of two key issues, if not the key issue, for developing countries conducting diplomacy within the UNGA and ECOSOC. The other issue, *technical assistance*, is being actively addressed with the establishment and operations of the UNTAP, and so addressing development finance is more convoluted. Second, the establishment of *financing* as a problem or obstacle creates a reciprocal relationship between the UNGA as a global political forum and ECOSOC as an issue-driven policy forum. Third, these inter-governmental entities create products, such as resolutions and reports, that substantiate a) specific discursive practical resources for addressing this issue, and b) record what they are intending to do or actively doing to address it.

The debate over SUNFED as a fight for 'multilateral aid', 1952-1960



Figure 24. The descent of SUNFED relative to US aid.

As the debate over how to finance development continued, the idea of a "special fund" for the public international financing of development was considered. The UNGA's Resolution 520 in 1952 recalled all of the previous ECOSOC and expert reports on the issue, including the most recent *Measures for the Economic Development of Under-developed Countries*. This report, in particular, called on the IBRD to make available resources (cf. Frankel's critique in 1952; see also Frankel's interpretation that the report's authors were extremely skeptical of the increase in private sector investment in under-developed areas; note that this is contrast to public-private partnerships in "new multilateralism" e.g. Ban 2009; see also Brazil statement in UN Bulletin 1952 (UNB 1 December 1952, 546) on IFC as supplement to "special fund").[294]

[294] UNGA Resolution A/RES/520(VI) "Financing of economic development of under-developed countries," 12 January 1952.

Though the IBRD did not reject such a call, ECOSOC took up the debate over potential sources, noted as the primary problem for financing development. The UN Bulletin (February 1, 1952) details some of the debate in ECOSOC, which began with the question of whether or not it was "practicable" to draw up a plan for "a special fund" for "the economic development of under-developed countries and to finance non-self-liquidating projects basic for such development," (UNB 1 February 1952, 126). In this instance, there was "much disagreement over this question," (UNB 1 February 1952, 126).

Here, a US delegate (Senator Mansfield (D-MT)) argued that the US "was not prepared to commit" to the fund when states were "forced to devote large amounts of their resources to fighting aggression and to their defence requirements," (UNB 1 February 1952, 126). Note that this logic would be repeated by President Eisenhower in April 1953 (see below). Other problems he stated were the already present difficulties in getting country commitments to UNTAP, how to get new voluntary contributions, and the convertibility of currencies in public international finance (UNB 1 February 1952, 126). At the same time, Mansfield noted that development was important and ultimately linked to peace (UNB 1 February 1952, 126). Beyond these arguments, the representatives from Australia, Canada, France, and the UK all agreed that to create a special fund at this point "would be impractical". The Chilean representative presented nine points in support of the fund, including that it was essential to peace and security and that international experts had studied the issues and suggested "an international fund to finance development schemes." Other notable points were made by the Indian delegate who stated that "a new organization" may not be necessary. The outcome of the vote resulted in ECOSOC Resolution 416/XIV (23 June 1952) which established a committee to plan for "a special fund".[295]

[295] It noted that there were "many alternative approaches" and that there were "complex aspects" involved with issue of "financing economic development" (see the myriad reports and commentaries in economic journals, e.g. Frankel

Whether or not financing development was an issue was not the debate. Whether or not a 'special fund' would assist and ultimately be useful was not the debate. The debate was over whether or not plans for a special fund should be drawn up at that moment in 1952, and the vote of 30 to 16 in favor (with 11 abstentions) demonstrated a divide. This divide amongst UN Members split them into two groups with discursive precedents: the “industrialized” and the “under-developed.” This categorization hinged on where the capital would come from for development. For those with capital, reasons needed to be offered for this lack of availability: disarmament and lack of evidence of commitment from the “industrialized” countries as a group. In Ruth Gold's position paper (FRUS 1952-1954, I, 230-235), written in May 1952, she notes that "over the last five years, pressure has been building up in the UN for the creation of an international agency to distribute grant aid for economic development," (FRUS 1952-1954, I, 231).

It is interesting to note that the impetus for financing development as an issue was made up of a diverse set of reasons and events: the Marshall Plan, the unmet expectations of the IBRD and private sector capital flows, the Point Four program, the Report on Measures for Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries, the Colombo Plan, IBRD sympathy, and "in particular, by the United States Government bilateral program of grant aid to accelerate economic development in selected countries," (FRUS 1952-1954, I, 231). Despite this impetus, the State Department remained divided (see FRUS 1952-1954, I: 235-239). By May 20, only 'participation in discussions' was to be permitted for such a ‘special fund’ (FRUS 1952-1954, I, 239).

1952; Kriz 1952; Kindleberger 1950; Viner 1950; Rostow 1950; Robert Scheyven, a Belgian diplomat and ECOSOC President, later notes that this appeared to be "tantamount" to "burying the idea" see UNB 14 August 1953, 141).

In the UN Bulletin of July 15, 1952, it is flatly stated that "the most effective means for financing basic economic development projects, according to many representatives of under-developed countries, is a special international fund," (UNB 15 July 1952, 68). It goes on to report that "the under-developed countries are not convinced by the arguments of the industrial countries" against the "special fund" and that "rearmament or defence programs" should not postpone development (UNB 15 July 1952, 69). For many of the developing countries, "the cold war will continue for a long time," (UNB 15 July 1952: 69). In a section titled, "United States View", the UN Bulletin reports that the US cannot support a 'special fund' but will "continue to bear its part of the burden incumbent upon industrialized countries, and it will continue giving technical and financial aid," (UNB 15 July 1952, 72).

In spite of the problem and the deadlock in debate, the NYT reports (18 October 1952; see also the news story of 17 October 1952 on the proposals in general) that Sweden now supported the "special fund". The initial lack of support stemmed from a desire to see "more efficient use of existing agencies through liberalization of their policies." However, with proposals gaining "wide support" the "Swedish delegation does not wish to dispute about the forms [of development assistance]." In the UN Bulletin (1 December 1952), the Swedish representative also states that "it is essential to remove from the relations between the highly industrialized countries and the under-developed countries anything which might give rise to a sort of class struggle on the international plane," (UNB 1 December 1952: 549). The NYT also reports that Chile, Brazil, and Cuba submitted proposals for a "special fund" at the United Nations (see various NYT reports in late 1952 into 1953 on the 'special fund').[296] The UNGA, in reading its Resolution 622, appears to sympathize with the back-and-forth in the ECOSOC

[296] "3 Nations Ask Speed on Aid to Poor Areas." *New York Times*, 18 November 1952. [Netherlands should be noted as well, here.]

debates, noting that "for reasons beyond its [ECOSOC's] control, there was no plan yet for SUNFED."[297]

Though a resolution on "Question of the establishment of a special United Nations fund for economic development" is passed in 1954,[298] the next UNGA Resolution that is under the title "Financing for Economic Development" would occur five years later in 1957. The “special fund” topic, for the moment, was uncomfortably sidelined. Though there is no mention of “multilateral” in the 1954 resolution, hope is expressed that such a fund such be established "as soon as practicable". It is likely not a coincidence that several questions concerning "private sector" investment and capital are the subject of UNGA resolutions during this timeframe.

A clear articulation of US policy is instantiated in early 1953. Shortly after Eisenhower is elected, he gives a speech in mid-April. The debate over a US response to financing for development from the US drew on this speech and the logic it provided (see below). He states that:

> This government is ready to ask its people to join with all nations in devoting a substantial percentage of any savings achieved by real disarmament to a fund for world aid and reconstruction. The purposes of this great work would be: To help other peoples to develop the undeveloped areas of the world, to stimulate profitable and fair world trade, to assist all peoples to know the blessings of productive freedom.[299]

It became a reference and resource for why US should *and* should not do aid, particularly *multilateral* aid. On the one hand, the US stands ready to begin a global “fund” for aid. On the other hand, such a fund is to be conditional upon disarmament. This use of this condition would delay discussion over financing for development and prolong it in the debate over SUNFED. This condition needed to be marginalized in such a way that a “multilateral” approach, in some

[297] UNGA Resolution A/RES/622(VII) “Financing of economic development of under-developed countries,” 21 December 1952.
[298] UNGA Resolution A/RES/822(IX) “Question of the establishment of a special United Nations fund for economic development,” 11 December 1954.
[299] “Text of Speech by Eisenhower Outlining Proposals for Peace in World.” *New York Times*, 16 April 1953.

way related to SUNFED, could be successfully articulated as legitimate in spite of a lack of disarmament.

The US ECOSOC Delegation reports on August 5, 1953 that the SUNFED item was the item of the “greatest interest,” (FRUS 1952-1954, I, 277). Refusal since 1952 to support the establishment of such a fund had led to “resentment.” Indeed, under-developed countries "were prepared even to accept some reduction in the total amount of assistance available to them, provided that a part of this assistance moved through a United Nations fund," (FRUS 1952-1954, I, 278). Eisenhower's speech is noted as "an important change in the position of the United States on this matter", but this was regarded "without enthusiasm", likely because the same view toward the practicability of the special fund within ECOSOC prevailed (FRUS 1952-1955, I, 278-279).

In the UN Bulletin of August 15, 1953, Raymond Scheyven (current President of ECOSOC) contributed a piece on the ECOSOC session in the late summer. He notes that the idea of a “special fund” was re-born in ECOSOC, taking Eisenhower's April address of 1953 and giving it life. For him, this fund would "come within the framework of the United Nations, thus conferring upon it the truly international character which the nations wish it to have," (UNB 15 August 1953, 141). At the same time he also notes that the fund will not exist until "real progress" is made on disarmament (UNB 15 August 1953, 141).[300]

NYT reports continued US opposition to the "special fund." Zellerbach (member US Delegation to UN) stated that the US:

> ... could not contribute to any new international development programs until a general disarmament would bring about a cut in the arms budgets of the major capital-exporting

[300] Nothing on the establishment of the IFC that the author unearthed used the term “multilateral.” Perhaps this is because the distinctive tension with the IFC was the move to increase private sector funding for development through this mechanism.

> countries. He stressed that efforts should be concentrated at present on making more effective use of existing programs and sources of financing economic development.[301]

The NYT also notes that despite this statement "several delegates of smaller nations made it clear today that a concerted effort would be launched to keep alive the fight for the fund." On October 22, the NYT reported the counter-punch from other countries: “It is indeed disheartening for the underdeveloped countries to see this—their white hope—wither away under the cold indifference of some of the metropolitan industrial powers.”[302] The NYT repeats Zellerbach recounting Eisenhower, that general disarmament should precede a fund for development. This produced a response of "indefinite" postponement: "The United States might just as well have said, 'We'll support the fund when the moon turns blue.'" The article ends by stating how the special fund can carry out development work not currently being done.

On October 24, the NYT reports that "two factions of underdeveloped nations" made proposals to "unhinge" development from disarmament (as noted above).[303] On November 21, the NYT reports that ECOSOC had kept alive the pursuit for a "special fund for economic development," if at a standstill.[304]

The UN Review succeeded the UN Bulletin (as a monthly, rather than bi-weekly, publication) in 1954, and included in the August 1954 edition an article titled "International Aid in Search for International Funds." Under the title it reads: "Finding the money needed to speed economic progress is a major problem for less developed countries," (UNR August 1954, 6). The text begins with: "The need for outside capital to help speed economic progress in the world's less developed areas is becoming more and more obvious." Reason that underlies this obvious need: domestic savings have remained low because incomes in those areas have remained low

[301] “30 Nations to Push New U.N. Aid Fund.” *New York Times*, 19 October 1953.
[302] “Rich Lands Urged to Aid Poor in U.N.” *New York Times*, 22 October 1953.
[303] “Small Lands Make 2 U.N. Bids for Aid.” *New York Times*, 24 October 1953.
[304] “U.N. Program for Aid Kept Alive for Year.” *New York Times*, 21 November 1953.

(UNR August 1954, 6). It reiterates the disarmament-savings argument from industrialized countries, and the “accommodation is possible” argument from under-developed countries (UNR August 1954, 10-12).

On September 3, 1954 the State Department circulates a note to some 58 embassies (FRUS 1952-1954, I, 290). Contained within are statements on SUNFED and the IFC. It again notes that "both SUNFED and IFC have been under consideration in the GA and ECOSOC for several years." These, at that moment, were not supported, nor "feasible" or "practicable", by the US (FRUS 1952-1954, I, 293).

The NYT published an article on Scheyven's follow-up report to ECOSOC on October 6, 1954. It states that the "situation has not developed as favorably as the General Assembly had hoped." Thus, "essential conditions" do not yet exist for the setup of the special fund.[305] These conditions were defined in the survey as, again, "internationally supervised world-wide disarmament."[306]

The NYT records John Foster Dulles' testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (May 6, 1955) on foreign aid allocation. At this session, the NYT reported that he "urged the Senators to continue foreign aid, which he said had resulted in this change in [as in “more peaceable”] Communist attitudes."[307] On June 18, 1955, NYT reports that creating a Special Fund is urged by international economic experts (see also UNR August 1955, 73-75;

---

[305] Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., the US Representative at the UN (appointed in 1953) began to urge the US to change its policy regarding the IFC in an October 8 memo (FRUS 1952-1954, I, 295; State and Treasury would agree to some change in November 1954, see FRUS 1952-1954, I, 298-301). This was "largely because of the importance to the United States of avoiding a perpetual negative position," (see National Advisory Council meeting, November 3, 1954; FRUS 1952-1954, I, 303). Changing the SUNFED position was not discussed at this time.

[306] “U.N. Finds Barrier to Economic Aid.” *New York Times*, 6 October 1954. Also, a regional "special fund" for Asia is discussed in the NYT (see 19 December 1954; 2 March 1955; 6 March 1955; the Simla Conference, 9 May 1955). The emergence of regionalism here is related to how to get the most out of every dollar (see also “balk at regional economic cooperation” in the NYT, 15 May 1955 and the follow-up report (20 May 1955) that Simla had rejected regional organization, therefore no Asian special fund.

[307] “Dulles Discerns Red Peace Signs.” *New York Times*, 6 May 1955.

note "vicious circle" argument for inability of under-developed countries to increase savings for development because of continuing low incomes, which would increase with development).[308]

With the continuing debate over SUNFED, the State Department produces a position paper on the initiative in June 1955. It simply maintains the policy of not establishing the fund until disarmament (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 339). However, a meeting at the end of year would bring this issue back to the forefront within US policy circles. The NYT reports on November 6, 1955 discussion continues at the UN and ECOSOC regarding the "special aid fund." While both the US and the UK "have undertaken a qualified commitment to support the plan," countries are still waiting for a disconnection between development finance and disarmament as a matter of policy. Like Dulles' statement in May, the link of development and security is again made explicit, and is again related to rivalry with the Soviet Union:

> From the strategic aspect, British and United States authorities hope to gain some diplomatic leverage by linking the special fund with controlled disarmament. They hope the Soviet Union will agree to a realistic negotiation on disarmament when it becomes obvious to world opinion that only Soviet intransigence blocks the aspirations of underprivileged peoples.[309]

This last twist in the argument for the special fund is a wrinkle that would be repeated in the debate moving forward; that is, the association of support for some kind of action through the UN—linked to "multilateral aid"—and this move against the Soviet Union (perhaps first articulated by Dulles in May 1955).

[308] "U.N. Experts Urge Needy-Land Fund." *New York Times*, 18 June 1955.
[309] "U.N. Group Pushes Special Aid Fund." *New York Times*, 6 November 1955.



Figure 25. Relations of multilateral aid and bilateral aid; note disconnect of SUNFED.

Within US foreign policy-making and diplomatic circles, the debate over “multilateral aid” plays out over the next two years, from December 1955 to the end of 1957. In the FRUS, we observe the ECOSCO representative (Baker) writing to Wilcox (December 7, 1955) using notions of “multilateral technical assistance through the UN,” and “multilateral action for economic development” in the debate over SUNFED (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 345-349). In the internal memo on "Current Economic Developments" (December 20, 1955) the FRUS notes (1955-1957, IX, 360) that the focus was "more on efforts to expand multilateral programs to assist the underdeveloped countries through the UN."

Arguments against SUNFED come from the Treasury (Humphrey, 26 January 1956; he is later replaced by Anderson who makes similar statements), which calls for the US to determine where and how money should be allocated (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 364-365). Indeed, in 1956, a number of cables between Washington and New York articulate the benefits of “multilateral aid,” aiming for a tight relationship between a) “multilateral aid” and UN machinery, b) US foreign policy objectives and both bilateral and multilateral aid, and c) benefits of “multilateral

aid” in terms of its use as a diplomatic tactic against the USSR and its apolitical nature to build positive “credit” with other countries (see figure above).

In his reply on SUNFED, Cabot Lodge, Jr. the US representative to the UN, cables his recommendation upon hearing the Yugoslav Mission has urged the Soviet Union to support SUNFED (2 February 1956). He uses a notion of “multilateral aid.” He states: "a. We should, as a minimum, reject any policy whereby the US would appear to be opposing multilateral aid," (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 365). The argument for “multilateral aid” is articulated and associated with a tactic against the Soviet Union, when he states that the rejection of such a policy (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 365):

> ... would hand the Soviet Union a propaganda advantage, the value of which could only be measured in millions of dollars. … Those who say that opposition by the Soviet Union to multilateral aid gives US a chance to oppose multilateral aid also are looking through the wrong end of the telescope and are missing a wonderful opportunity.

The logic of multilateral aid is here attached not only to increase the incomes of “less developed countries” but also to a new diplomatic tactic.

At the same time, Treasury Secretary Humphrey states that "we had a firm policy of spending our own money by ourselves" as a way to counter the logic of multilateral aid. Lodge counters this by stating that this is "not strictly accurate" and goes on to say (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 370):

> We have been engaged for about five years now in United Nations Technical Assistance, which is a multilateral program (and which, incidentally, up to now has been run pretty much as we wanted it run). There is also the I.F.C, in which you [Humphrey] played such a decisive part--not to mention the Specialized Agencies.

Again, though the logic of efficiency is linked to a 'multilateral' program again at the end of another note, “there is reason to believe that to engage in a limited and carefully controlled multilateral program would actually be cheaper in dollars than to succumb to the type of

blackmail which is now in prospect [refers to defense dollars and military bases]," (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 371).

A later note from Dulles to Humphrey seeks to link the position of "our money" to the "national interest" and make this compatible with a foreign economic aid policy that has room for both bilateral and multilateral programs (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 377-378):

> … I certainly agree that we must manage our foreign economic aid in such ways as will best serve our national interests. No element of foreign policy could possibly be built on any other premise. At the present time it is vitally important that the impulse towards economic development in many lands should neither be channeled in directions prejudicial to our security nor frustrated so as to make the aspiring peoples easy prey to the illusory promises of those hostile to us. Our capabilities of furthering our objectives along this line by sheer argument or diplomatic intervention are limited. For this reason, among others, we have resorted to economic programs of both a bilateral and multilateral nature.

The NYT reports on March 29, 1956, that the US delegation to the UN suggested that US foreign aid should be dispensed multilaterally, and not concern itself with "getting the credit for it." The report calls for an "adoption of the United Nations system of dispensing aid multilaterally instead of bilaterally."[310] The report participants included Representative Brooks Hays (D-AR) and Chester Merrow (R-NH). Interestingly, the balancing of the Soviet Union is again invoked:

> … such ["multilateral"] sponsorship does not give us the advertising and goodwill that bilateral programs provide. However, we would point out that the basic reason for our program of economic assistance is not to purchase affection but rather to strengthen the free world, eliminating the vacuums of weakness into which the Soviet power is trying to move.

A March 30 memo authored by Wilcox, summarized arguments presented for and against SUNFED. The gist is that "multilateral assistance" is useful, but perhaps not SUNFED as currently debated and envisioned (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 372):

[310] "Foreign Aid Plan of U.N. Is Backed." *New York Times*, 29 March 1956.

> … I should add that most people who have studied the problem do not necessarily subscribe to the SUNFED proposal as it has been put forth in New York. Indeed I think it is more appropriate to talk in terms of a multilateral assistance program without specific reference to SUNFED inasmuch as that term has fallen into disrepute in some quarters. If we should decide to offer to participate in a multilateral assistance program... You may have noticed that Congressmen Hays and Merrow in their report to Congress on the Tenth General Assembly commented very favorably on multilateral aid programs. They state:
>
> "It is our conviction that the delegation's statement should have included emphasis of the need for utilizing multilateral programs to an increasing degree. It is urgently necessary that in the future we make far greater use of the United Nations system for foreign aid than we have in the past. This would not mean an increased amount of money appropriated for foreign aid but rather the channeling of a part of existing appropriations through United Nations machinery."

Eisenhower himself in late April 1956 makes clear that the United Nations is important for technical assistance, specifically because it can be apolitical. From Eisenhower's Public Papers (430-431):

> Q. Carleton Kent, *Chicago Sun-Times*: Mr. President, have you formed any conclusion on the suggestion that the United States and her allies distribute foreign aid through the United Nations? If so, could you discuss it for a minute?
>
> THE PRESIDENT. Well, the United States has always been, I think, by far the biggest contributor to important matters of this kind in the United Nations. I believe we have put in 50 percent, at least, of the money that has gone into the technical assistance program of the United Nations, and I think we pay 60 percent of the freight in the child welfare program. We would be very happy to see the United Nations take a bigger and firmer hold and get more nations that are capable of contributing, more nations into the thing, if for no other reason than to make certain there was no political purpose behind it. In the meantime, we are constantly studying our own methods to see how we can promote mutuality of interests and not merely be in the position of attempting to dictate or to bribe somebody. Far from seeing anything against it, I would be in favor of seeing the United Nations take a more active interest in this business.

Lodge raises this point in a cable on the same day (April 25; FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 378-379):

> 888. For Secretary and Wilcox. Re foreign economic aid. In view of President's statement at press conference today supporting idea of multilateral fund for economic aid under auspices of UN, I recommend that US Representative at summer session of ECOSOC, which begins first week July, be authorized to announce US willingness to support creation of such fund. … At no extra cost, therefore, we would stand to gain

> much. I have assurances from Secretary-General that a US citizen would be appointed to administer program. … US support of such a multilateral fund would, if proclaimed promptly, counteract present shift in USSR tactics.

Two logics of the “multilateral fund” are in play here. First, it is *efficient*. Second, if "proclaimed promptly", it will have a positive effect as a *diplomatic tactic* against the Soviet Union. In addition, the notion of a US administrator in charge of such a “multilateral fund” is presented as a good thing. Presumably, this allows for greater control of the “multilateral” organization by the US government to ensure that it is operating properly and in accordance with its objectives. Note that, at the same time, it could also appear to have greater influence over an entity attempting to be apolitical. Eisenhower stated that operating through the United Nations is useful specifically because it is not political.

Lodge's statement of April 30, 1956 might be the most clear statement of the advantages of “multilateral aid” that stemmed from this debate over SUNFED, particularly in contrast to “bilateral aid” (though not so that such aid should be eliminated; FRUS 1955-1957, Vol IX, 379):

> A program to which many nations contribute under the auspices of the United Nations has some real advantages over a program sponsored by the United States alone. That is the difference so-called “multilateral” aid and “bilateral” aid. Multilateral aid offers a way to prevent the so-called “auction” which some are trying to promote between the United States and USSR as to which will spend the most in an underdeveloped country. A multilateral program supplies no cover for engaging in political penetration, which is what the communists do and which we are unjustly suspected of wanting to do. We thus get credit for unselfish motives in contributing to such a fund; yet we can influence it constructively. The percentage which a country like ours contributes to a multilateral program is less than it would be under a bilateral program because more countries are sharing the expenses. … We need both bilateral and multilateral programs. But the present world situation is one which requires our giving new emphasis to multilateral programs. We can do this without any additional expense by diverting a percentage of our foreign aid funds to multilateral channels.

Humphrey's letter to Eisenhower on May 7 (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 380-383) counters the notion of creating SUNFED from a “participatory” angle. In his perspective, the US has given much, and others much less. The argument is that the machinery is in place, and what we need is

greater efficiency through participation in the form of burden-sharing. Funds for the World Bank, for example, are "multilaterally supplied by the participating countries," (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 381). He goes on to argue that if "countries are anxious to engage in multilateral loans, it would be much more appropriate for them, instead of starting a new institution, to first pay up what they already owe in the ones we now have," (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 381). Humphrey's concludes with "there is nothing any of these proposed schemes can do which cannot be done better by a combination of the World Bank, the Monetary Fund, and the International Finance Corporation, as multilateral agencies, supplemented by our own Export-Import Bank, the ICA, and P.L. 480 agricultural sales and loans," (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 382).

In order to distinguish SUNFED from one of many “multilateral” possibilities, Lodge writes a note re-iterating his counter-proposal to the SUNFED proposal, creating an entity which he calls for a "UN Multilateral" (May 11, 1956; FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 383-385; the move to have the World Bank approve projects first makes this proposal resemble what would become the IDA). In this note, he counters Humphrey’s arguments by showing that such a fund would effectively supplement existing organizations.

There would be no competition amongst entities. He first states, that the "subject of economic aid to underdeveloped countries cannot be dealt with adequately solely from the standpoint of so-called "orthodox" financing; but must be viewed from the standpoint of the Soviet threat," (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 383). The question for Lodge is not "how much?" but "how?" (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 384). In general, the argument is again that there is a value to having "UN multilateral" because it 1) is complementary, not redundant, 2) requires World Bank approval, and 3) does not require more money (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 384-385). In terms of the larger political context, though, Lodge identifies added value (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 384):

> The aim of "UN Multilateral" is to spend what we do spend differently, exercising actual control, but gaining all the credit which comes from helping an apparently unselfish international program which supplies no cover for penetration. ... "UN Multilateral" is justifiable on psychological grounds alone. It would not surprise me to learn that the US spends more now for psychological programs which are not as promising as this.

Finally, he adds an emerging perspective, paralleling an increasing divide that was characteristic of Cold War politics: that developing countries would "prefer aid through the UN to aid from the Soviet Union," and that "this is true of other countries which are not Soviet satellites, but are tender and whom we do not want to lose," (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 385).

A memo to Wilcox (by Director of the Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Kotsching, June 13, 1956) restates the US position that it "recognizes the need for multilateral action to aid underdeveloped countries, including the eventual establishment of an international aid fund in keeping with the President's speech of April 16, 1953," (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 387). It also states that the US "should state that in recognition of the desire and need for multilateral aid to underdeveloped countries, it is prepared to consider alternative forms of aid which might be realizable at this stage and of immediate benefit to the underdeveloped countries," (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 387-388). Moreover, distinctive in this memo is that a notion of a "multilateral approach" and a "truly international character" of technical assistance are instantiated. Technical assistance (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 387-388):

> ... should be guided by a determination to maintain and strengthen the multilateral approach and truly international character of technical assistance. Thus it should be made clear that no country could or should be expected to contribute more than 50% of the additional funds needed; that these funds should be freely convertible into usable currencies or given in the form of supplies considered helpful by international authorities responsible for the program.

Wilcox's note of July 3, 1956 reiterates the efficient benefits of “multilateral organizations,” particularly in relation to “bilateral” ones (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 390-392). However, Wilcox does not marginalize bilateral aid in the least. In fact, both are important to US

foreign policy. The key is to marginalize the argument that multilateral aid is inefficient and does not make a policy contribution without also marginalizing bilateral aid (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 390-391):

> ... With respect to some phases of economic development, the multilateral organizations may be relatively quite efficient... there are also strength in multilateral organizations which we feel make their support an integral part of U.S. foreign policy. ... [costs] may seem high, but I believe it is not excessive when compared to comparable operations on a bilateral basis... My own experience with these programs--both at home and abroad--has convinced me that the bilateral and multilateral forms both have important contributions to make to our foreign policy. Moreover, a good many investigations made by objective individuals have led me to believe that United Nations' efforts compare pretty favorably with our own bilateral efforts. Take, for example, the recent Technical Assistance report of Senator Green. ... "the UN technical assistance program produces more per dollar expended than does the bilateral program of the United States. The explanation may be that the UN has less money and selects both its project and its personnel more carefully."

Clarence Randall, as the new Chair of the Council on Foreign Economic Relations, visits missions abroad (Western Europe and Moscow), and asks about “multilateral channels” (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 22-26) for economic development in September 1956. Among current institutions, NATO is not favored, and the OEEC is considered a "white man's club" (contra later establishment of DAG/DAC in 1960/1; Randall's December report on his trip to Asian missions notes "Private foreign investment, to them, is a threat to their independence. They regard it as a form of colonialism. They want to control the development of their own resources." FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 37; note also contra 'public-private partnerships' in 'new multilateralism'). A UN mechanism "was not generally favored". The missions actually preferred "regional" initiatives. A “multilateral mechanism” was discussed to review needs, but have no allocation power.

Discussion over SUNFED intensified in the Eisenhower administration at the end of 1956. The FRUS (1955-1957, IX, 396-398) details a meeting between the President's Citizen Advisers and Cabot Lodge, Jr. on November 30. Here, Lodge reiterates the benefits of multilateral aid and link to objectives of US foreign policy (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 396-398):

> ... Mr. Lodge replied that the man who ran it would be responsible for carrying out the necessary coordination. It would be under the aegis of the United Nations without being under the control of the United Nations. Mr. Dupree commented that he couldn't see that it would be under any control. ... Mr. Lewis remarked that some countries didn't like to accept bilateral aid for political reasons. Mr. Lodge said that that statement was correct, that the newly independent nations were afraid of being dominated or taken over when aid was proffered under bilateral arrangement. Mr. Lewis asked what the United States would get out of a multilateral aid program. Mr. Lodge replied that we would have helped countries to get on their feet and to be in a position to fight for themselves, if there were a war. ... Mr. Lewis asked what the arguments would be in favor of maintaining both multilateral aid as Mr. Lodge proposed and bilateral aid as it was dispensed by ICA. Mr. Lodge replied that there was a definite need for both kinds. There was a limit to what could be done multilaterally because of the convertibility clause. On the other hand, there were also limits to what could be done bilaterally because of touchy political situations such as that in the Near East. Mr. Reid asked in what other areas multilateral aid would be useful. Mr. Lodge said that it would be a valuable approach in weak countries along the Russian border.

In this exchange, three points should be highlighted. First, that the power relations to be instantiated between the US and newly independent countries—and all countries in general—are considered in policy discussions. Multilateral aid offers a way to get around this issue, unlike bilateral arrangements.[311] Second, that multilateral aid would be useful for "weak countries" to "get on their feet" in case of war. A proposed region for aid would be countries bordering the Soviet Union. Third, note that *bilateral* and *multilateral* aid can co-exist, and indeed in this context, should co-exist.

Wilcox, in his discussion with the same group on December 14, 1956, repeats the argument that the question of choosing between "bilateral" or "multilateral" aid is not useful: "actually the question of how aid ought to be extended was not an either/or question; both forms of aid were necessary," (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 401-402). Though not explicitly stated, the implied advantage of multilateral aid was the buy-in, investment, participation, and interaction for the widest possible variety of countries (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 401; again "multilateral"

[311] This is echoed in a Lodge cable to Dulles on December 4, 1956 (see FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 399-400).

approach is linked to specific organizations: UN TAP, WHO, ILO, FAO, and UNESCO, 401-402):

> Multilateral aid had certain advantages. For instance, the TAP of the UN during its six years of existence had received contributions from 78 different countries to the amount of $142 million. 131 countries and territories had helped in carrying out the program. 505 thousand experts had served it in an advisory capacity of one form or another. Over 10 thousand fellowships had been awarded for study abroad.

In addition, it is re-iterated that newly independent countries that were known to shy away from bilateral aid, might not shy away from multilateral aid (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 402; see also Dulles to Eisenhower, January 10, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 412):

> Many of the newly independent countries were allergic to conditions that were often imposed with bilateral aid. Sometimes other countries were apprehensive about bilateral aid. For instance, aid to Morocco or Tunisia would raise apprehension in France.

In line with the creative arguments being made is Randall's comment in a meeting on January 3, 1957 (included Lodge, Dulles, Humphrey, Paul Hoffman, and Wilcox). He (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 410), "urged that we keep open the idea of some multilateral assistance disassociated from the United Nations ... North Africa, for example, might well be developed by the countries of Western Europe." The array of opinions at this meeting led to the conclusion that no changes in terms of public policy could be made for the next UNGA session (see also the statement in DSOB 23 September 1957, 502-504).

In February 1957, Paul Hoffman publishes a piece in the *New York Times* Magazine titled "Blueprint for Foreign Aid." Here, Hoffman (former ERP administrator, current US delegate to the UN and future UNDP Co-Administrator) makes an argument to the public. He claims that, as Dulles, Lodge, and Wilcox had been arguing internally, looking at aid as a *choice* between *bilateral* and *multilateral makes no sense* as both have contributions to make to attaining US policy objectives:

> … We have directly supervised the expenditure of most of these billions, although something over $100,000,000 has been channeled through the United Nations and the Organization of American States. As a consequence, our Government has had a vast experience not only with varied programs, but also with multilateral as well as bilateral aid. … To me the debate as to whether aid should be administered bilaterally or multilaterally seems an empty one. Some of the aid will have to be direct bilateral aid; some of it will have to be multilateral to create a sense of community and cooperation among the people we help. Circumstances will decide the appropriate method.[312]

The final series of notes that most directly details how the "multilateral" approach linked to the "special fund" becomes an acceptable basis for a US counter-proposal to present at ECOSOC begins with the cable drafted by Ruth Gold on September 26, 1957 (Dulles approves in principle October 1, see FRUS 1955-1957, IX: 431; proposed at ECOSOC on November 18, see FRUS 1955-1957, IX: 445). Avoiding "isolation" is central to the opening paragraph as it notes that "even the U.K. is presently considering only an abstention," (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 421). Once the current SUNFED proposal passes, "the pressure for the U.S. to participate might become very difficult to resist," (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 421). The counter-proposal adds money to the current UNTAP and sets up a "special fund" or "special projects fund" within UNTAP (see FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 424). This "offers a practical and constructive way to promote economic development through UN machinery," (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 422). Perhaps moreover, "it has the advantage over bilateral technical assistance" in several ways. It increases the pool of experts and the pool of countries who can contribute to the fund. It will not require much new "machinery" and is "realistic" (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 422).

In October, a confidential memo notes the opposition to the State Department proposal coming from the Treasury, that the counter-proposal sets the stage for "disillusionment", is tantamount to a concession on SUNFED, and is unrealistic in terms of contributions from other countries (see FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 430-431). A paragraph that distinguishes the counter-

[312] "Blueprint for Foreign Aid." *New York Times Magazine*, 17 February 1957.

proposal from the SUNFED one is later inserted (see FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 434-435). In Dillon's note to Dulles on October 31, he urges final approval and details the positive discussion with other entities in the US government. He argues, in particular, that (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 433):

> There was strong feeling that, apart from the economic merits of the proposal, it was responsive to political necessity and helpful in counteracting Soviet political and economic penetration of the under-development countries. These political considerations outweighed any reluctance to provide additional US funds to a multilateral program of assistance.

After what appears to be an awkward phone conversation between Treasury Secretary Anderson and Secretary of State Dulles (Anderson "mentioned also the Sputnik thing") on December 6, Dulles cables him to inform the Department's authorization of the counter-proposal. The logic of this counter-proposal as a diplomatic tactic against the Soviets in the second paragraph dominates the short note (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 439):

> I have, as I say, doubts that this is really a sound project, but as Sputnik has taught us, we cannot safely avoid the propaganda aspects of what we do. To be a minority of practically one on the SUNFED resolution would be extremely bad at this juncture.

In a later cable on December 20, from New York to Washington, the story of the counter-proposal winning support at ECOSOC is narrated. Of importance is the response of those for SUNFED, those that had "behind them six years of campaigning," (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 445). In order to make the US counter-proposal fit in this context, reference was added to the proposal concerning financing for development to "save face for those who had for so long supported SUNFED," (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 446). In addition, the "Special Fund" would not be under UNTAP, but a separate entity with a "minimum of new machinery". Later in the note, it identified two specific factors that were critical for those who had argued for SUNFED. The first was to "bring the U.S. along" further for UN projects concerning development. If the US proposal were rejected, it might mean dis-engagement from international affairs. The second was

the lobbying of the delegation to "almost all delegations outside the Soviet bloc," (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 449).

Lodge's provocative note of December 14, the day after the US counter-proposal wins acceptance at ECOSOC, details why Anderson and others should be praising the delegation's work in New York, rather than accusing them of failing to "maintain US position" against SUNFED. He states that "what can be wrong about outcome that gives more sound aid to underdeveloped countries, gives US more control, more good will and leadership and no increased commitment to capital development fund," (FRUS 1955-1957, IX, 442). This is paralleled in the NYT, as the paper quotes Lodge stating that proposal:

> ... provides a new way to strengthen underdeveloped countries against subversion from abroad. It could greatly improve prospects for solving the big political problems. It creates, and will create, new goodwill for the United States.[313]

There are two key points to reiterate. The first is that "multilateral" is linked to "UN." The second is that the US-proposed "UN machinery" is linked to a diplomatic tactic to oppose the Soviet Union and, relatedly, is apolitical and efficient. This stands in contrast with previous instantiations, where political contexts and arrangements differed and gave rise to particular ways of making "multilateral" fit.

Future "multilateral funds"

UNGA Resolution 1240 establishes the Special Fund (with Paul Hoffman appointed Director) in October 1958. In the text it states that the "multilateral character of the Special Fund shall be strictly respected, no contributing country should receive special treatment with respect to its contribution nor should negotiations for the use of currencies take place between contributing and receiving countries." In addition the Annex reads that the Special Fund "shall be

[313] "U.N. Cites Gain of 12th Assembly." *New York Times*, 16 December 1957.

a multilateral fund."[314] This reiterates the rules and logic of inclusion, non-discrimination, and diffuse benefits, common features in contemporary understandings of multilateralism.

Further articulation of what a *multilateral* fund for development is like is instantiated in the discussion of the IDA (originated as the Eisenhower-proposed Development Loan Fund, passed by Congress, August 15, 1957, see FRUS 1958-1960, IV, 289) and the DAG (Free World Development Fund; see FRUS 1958-1960, IV, 295). Three documents indicate what relationships are envisioned.

In the NYT during July 1958, Senators passed a resolution to explore an "international development fund" as a source for "multilateral development loans." Senator Monroney states that "in the face of the current economic offensive, it is more than ever important that nations devoted to liberty and individual dignity work together to help newly development countries meet the challenge of economic growth under a free system."[315]

A June 9, 1959 State Department memo (see FRUS 1958-1960, IV, 336) notes that:

> ... in summary, the US believes that Western interests can be advanced effectively in the field of multilateral aid to underdeveloped countries through cooperative Western arrangements such as the proposed International Development Association, but that a Western proposal for joint Soviet-Western participation in such aid, implying endorsement by the West of Soviet aid, would be dangerous to the interests of the West.

In Treasury Secretary Anderson's note to Eisenhower (December 2, 1959) he argues that (FRUS 1958-1960, IV, 356):

> ... Europe's strong financial position, the Free World's political objectives in less developed areas, and the need to keep world trade in balance at a high level all require increased European financing for less developed areas—both multilaterally (through support of World Bank activities and the proposed International Development Association) and also through a substantial increase in bilateral European lending to such areas at long term.

[314] UNGA Resolution A/RES/1240(XIII) "Establishment of the Special Fund," 14 October 1958. See also UNR January 1958: 8-16.
[315] "Senate for Study of Foreign Loans." *New York Times*, 24 July 1958.

Even as “multilateral aid” was used to diplomatically out-flank the Soviet Union, and increasingly became associated with notions like the "free world" and "the West", it also was instantiated with, in contrast to bilateral aid, logics of efficiency, participation, and apoliticization. These aspects, too, would be utilized in later circulations.

The establishment of SUNFED and the creation of the IDA and the DAC soon after shifted the discursive practice of “multilateral aid”. A multilateral approach to development was explicitly argued in diplomatic circles to have political effects in the context of the Cold War. The public justification of SUNFED, the IDA, and DAC was that they were apolitical. Multilateralism, as relying on notions of inclusion, participation, obtaining benefits for all in the system, were publicly available and deployed. However, diplomats tied new notions of politics to it in their political arguments.

How multilateralism is made to fit varies by its context, and one dominant feature of political contexts are the problems faced by diplomats and policy-makers. The major problem during the Cold War was the balancing against Soviet Union, which required support from other countries in the system. While not all states have the same capabilities the lure of multilateral rules is that, in some way, states are meant to be equal, not differentiated. In practice, initial critiques of multilateralism in the Cold War took as their starting point instances of state inequality.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

Opening note

At the end of the introduction, I narrated a brief field note on “new multilateralism” at an event in Washington, DC. One of the distinguishing characteristics of the “new multilateralism” of the past 10 years (e.g. Ban 2009; UNDP 2009) has been public-private partnerships. While living in Bolgatanga, Ghana, I received this SMS message (or text message) on October 28, 2010:

> Kindly take all children age 9 mths - 5 yrs. to the nearest health centre from Nov. 03 - 06 2010 for their measles vaccination - Power to You.

My old, but trusty, German-made Nokia phone[316] told me that the sender was “Vodafone,” one of the top telecommunications companies in Ghana, and a major player in the global market. “Power to You” is one of their marketing phrases.

How did it come to pass that I received this text message? Upon my return to North America, several documents helped me understand this. In October 2010, Ghanaian government officials briefed the media on its mass measles immunization campaign (Government of Ghana 2010). In Vodafone's own documentation on corporate social responsibility, it noted MDG #4 “Reduce Child Morality.” To help countries meet this goal, the company’s report states that the Vodafone Foundation is the largest supporter of the Measles Initiative (Vodafone 2010). This project assists governments in vaccination campaigns. Vodafone was also involved in mHealth, which utilizes mobile technology for public health issues. So, I inferred a partnership was struck: the government of Ghana created a plan for a measles vaccination campaign, and Vodafone assisted through an awareness initiative by writing SMS messages to all on its network. This seems like a relatively clear case of the kind of public-private partnership for development that is

[316] It survived a soaking in Burkina Faso only to be lost in a taxi afterward.

the foundation of new multilateralism. Such an expansion of the universe of agents involved in social processes makes sense as it provides greater benefits, expanding reach more efficiently, for the population.

During my time in Ghana, though, not once did anyone talk about "new multilateralism" without my prompting and those who knew to what I was referring were embassy workers who followed these topics. This suggests that the value-added of "multilateralism" amongst development personnel working "in the field" is quite low, whereas in the context of global policy discussions involving the UN, it is higher. The audience then, as much as the speaker, is a constitutive part of social interaction. The audience is part of that context, recognizable as such by the speaker. Though a tentative conclusion, this supports one of the primary ideas that motivates this dissertation. Use is circumstantial to get politics done. We should attend to the circulations of particular language and practices and see what they do in those instances.

In this dissertation, I have attempted to, with some systematicity, trace the use of the "multilateral" in world politics in available US-based diplomatic (e.g. FRUS) and mass media (e.g. NYT) sources. What has resulted is a series of analytical narratives that illustrate a variety of instances of use. The table below illustrates what I mean by this. It demonstrates the varied, non-linear descent of multilateralism.

Year(s)	Event/Document	Finding
1919	Paris Peace Conference, Treaty of Versailles	First diplomatic use of multilateral; to identify treaties that concern all entities in the system; to mediate treaty status post-war
1927-1928	Kellogg-Briand Pact	Instance of "going multilateral" in the negotiation of a treaty; evidence of a logic of diffuse benefits obtained

		only through inclusion
1933	London World Economic Conference	First diplomatic use of multilateral trade as an economic objective; evidence of a countervailing logic of practicability
1942-1945	Post-war economic order planning	First use of multilateral clearing as part of a plan for world economic order; re-affirms logic of diffuse benefits obtained through inclusion and reciprocity; to more decisively link policy to economic theory and a logic of efficiency
1946-1960	Multilateral aid in development	First use of multilateral to describe sources of funding or aid in development; introduction of an association with a diplomatic logic in countering the Soviet Union

TABLE 5. Summary of findings.

Issues Put Aside

Several issues with associations to "multilateral" have been set aside. Four broad instances are notable. The first concerns disarmament and armament, particularly during the 1920s regarding international conferences, and in the 1960s concerning the Cold War and related to the operationalization of NATO. This would be a useful area to explore. However, the logic seemed instantiated already in the Kellogg-Briand discussions.

The second issue area that is related to "multilateral" is interventions (e.g. Kreps 2008), particularly shortly after 1945 in South America (see e.g. NYT 20 December 1945, 9 January 1946), the NATO operations in the former Republic of Yugoslavia in the late 1990s, and the US-UK led intervention in Iraq in the 2000s (interestingly, see the prominent mention of "multilateral" in the Bush-Blair joint statement of August 2003). The debate over whether or not

multilateral interventions are legitimate appears to be a relatively settled issue; but it was not always this way. Examining an emerging "doctrine" of "multilateral intervention" that perhaps began in the mid to late 1940s might be more useful to understanding how "multilateral interventions" have such a strong legitimating force. This also would be an interesting avenue to explore, but the link between the UN and multilateral (which Kreps highlights) was already being made in the multilateral trade and multilateral approach to development instantiations.

A third area is how the Soviet bloc during the Cold War operated on a "multilateral system of payments" (see e.g. NYT 22 December 1962, 3 October 1962). This is interesting because it demonstrates how a logic of efficiency can be used in a somewhat different political and economic context. Still, this logic was grounded in the 1940s regarding Bretton Woods. The fourth area is the debate over a common market to operationalize '"multilateral trade" in Latin America in the 1950s (see e.g. NYT 25 October 1952, 17 May 1957), and related to this were the "currency clubs" formed between the EPU and various countries in the late 1950s as well (see e.g. NYT 22 April 1956, 1 June 1956, 23 October 1956, 22 September 1957). This interesting set of interactions gave rise to how "regionalism" could fit with "multilateralism" in one area of the world. However, the logics were again first used in the 1940s.

This genealogical account of multilateralism in world politics has aimed to explain politics by virtue of the associations being made in the use of the term *multilateral*.[317] This approach that focuses on creative moments that allow unique politics moved my analysis toward relationships between *multilateral* and other ideas and actions. This explains my attention to the relationship between "multilateral treaties" and a just post-war system of international relations in 1919, between a "multilateral treaty" and the diffuse benefits involved with the Kellogg-

[317] I believe that in taking this empirical approach one need not worry about science becoming simply a series of popularity contests. Should evidence emerge of use that I have overlooked, I would welcome the engagement.

Briand Pact, between “multilateral clearing” and efficiency and prosperity, and between “multilateral aid” and a diplomatic tactic to out-maneuver the USSR in the late 1950s.

Sources of change as combinatory (not adjudicating between agents and structures)

If the meaning of multilateral shifts over time, we can theorize sources of change, and in IR, we can typify this as a turn to either, or both, agents and structures. Since Waltz‘s (1979) explication of agents and structure and the emergence of “constructivism” as a response to Waltz (e.g. Wendt 1987), IR uses these categories to organize empirical research by noting when entities exercise their agency and when they do not; that is, when they feel the effects of structure. In these commonly created accounts, agents make political decisions, specified by available “logics” and “constraints.”

In the case of multilateralism, the most likely common understanding of shifts in meaning can be put this way: shifts in meaning are related to different ways in which its legitimacy is understood. Such legitimacy is related to its efficacy. Thus, 1) when things are no longer “effective” their meaning shifts to recover that efficacy, and 2) for those that are effective again, their legitimacy is revived. For most IR research approaches, agents make these decisions within a structural environment. There are norms, rules, and identities that reduce decision-making to the selection of already defined choices. Agents decide which will be most effective given the normative and incentive structures in place.

Here, in IR, the story though is either agents defying structures or structures exerting powerful constraints upon such agents such that they “had no real choice.” As Jackson (2006a, 34), among others, has pointed out, the requirements of following Giddens to do both strategic and institutional analysis simultaneously are difficult to achieve. That is, to look at the intersection of agents and structures, rather than determining which one “wins out.” We can

think of how these explanations might be offered to the various instances where ‘multilateral’ is used in this dissertation. Briand “had no choice” but to sign the Pact of Paris as he already initiated the negotiation to renounce war. Kellogg was a norm entrepreneur. New norms were created by virtue of diplomatic agents creating linkages between multilateral trade to employment and then development.

In this dissertation, I have not employed an agent-structure model to avoid this favoring one over the other as much as one can. Because the potential for social change is inherent in every social interaction, I have preferred Neumann’s (2002) circuit. In addition, a circular model nicely illustrates how every interaction is potentially creative in the present and yet also feeding back into future. To reproduce the circuit requires work in every instance, thinking or non-thinking. That reproduction inherently means change is possible, though stability might be probable.

If “structures” can be translated out of my approach it is the cultural resources available to actors in particular moments plus the contextual situation of entities conducting politics. These resources and their availability are determined by contingent, historical use and the situation of the entity. These arrangements may be translated as structure. Still, holding structure “constant” in some way is too far removed from the potential creativity in human action. The circuit, I think, allows for circularity of human action; its stability and feedback effects. It also draws our attention to relations in every instantiation, between the words we say and the things we do.

Unlike the usual story in explanations offered by IR, this dissertation attempts to be more precise in viewing how “multilateral,” is always being reproduced to “fit” a context by virtue of its active associations with appropriate questions, solutions, language, and practices. These linkages and fittings may not be decision-based, but based on previous instances to become

routinized. Some of these instances are arguments over fit. As I have attempted to specify, for every episode researched, possible alternatives existed. In most of the instances, these alternatives were subject to debate, often in the public sphere as well as the diplomatic one. These debates are important if legitimacy is at stake.

To sum up, multilateralism's effectiveness is dependent on how it is able to address new and evolving politics. Thus, that it has such a varied heritage should not be surprising. Let me clarify further by saying that agentic or structural explanations can only be so precise before their holding of preferences or arrangements constant collapses as politics is reproduced in every instance. Greater precision can be had by digging into individualized usage: instantiations. These instantiations have relations that are historical, both in the past and projecting into the future. This processual approach can better capture the dynamism in politics and social action by answering the question of how politics happens in practice, rather than: do agents or structures "win". Efficacy and legitimacy are thus products of use: arguments, counter-arguments, and situated entities making and breaking relationships and associations. Unlike the usual explanation, legitimacy is produced via efficacy in the particular moments. The Kellogg-Briand Pact was hailed in its time, its legitimacy during those days reproduced effectively as policy for a number of states. Its collapse in legitimacy is, of course, linked to its efficacy. This efficacy is reducible to arguments, counter-arguments, and situated entities—observers and practitioners of politics—making and breaking relationships. In this dissertation, I have looked at these relations in terms of discursive practices in political action, which like any institution has goals, problems, and solutions derived from within and imported from outside—and cultural forces that reproduce particular elements, but there are other ways to organize the analysis. Sources of change are the combination of problems encountered by diplomats and politicians plus the contemporaneous

discursive-practical configuration, which delineates elements to fit into the politics of the time. While not as parsimonious, this more complex, holistic perspective takes seriously the notion that disentangling agents and structures, discourses and practices, entities from their context, etc. only serves to lead social science astray. There are no politics without problems. There are no diplomats without mutual estrangement. This is the precision we can add to our knowledge of politics in adopting the stance of this dissertation because it is committed to the relatively well-accepted notion that people produce qualified effects in this world by virtue of their creativity.

Explaining change not through negotiating "good" multilateralism

Critical theorists (e.g. Cox 1992) have argued that multilateralism can be a force for sustaining dominant-subordinate structures of power. It can also be a force for political change that is cognizant of its ethics. This assertion has motivated normative critical theorists to assert and investigate new multilateralism, a "good" version. Others in IR posit that multilateralism itself is a good thing because it is premised on participatory democracy. This "institution" makes possible the mediation of politics and allocation of resources peacefully and efficiently. What is "bad" is that institutions and organizations are sometimes designed poorly or operationally go "off the rails." They, then, no longer align with the ideal of multilateralism. A metric for "success" or "failure" is implied.

This approach to conclusions in historical studies, one of ascribing "success" or "failure," particularly concerning international organizations and norms, overlooks what the cases being examined can tell us about the politics of the time. This study adopts the perspective that multilateralism can be good or bad depending on the interpreter's worldview and interests. From this position, it is possible to bracket the question of whether it is *really* good or bad in particular cases, for it is good or bad for someone in every case. To get away from having to adjudicate an

ethical position for so many parties, which comes with its own ethical baggage because it requires speculation as to what a party's ethical position ought to be, I adopt an agnostic position that focuses on the use of multilateralism for political objectives without adjudicating what the ethical content is of those objectives. Though this may appear to be an overly rationalistic view of politics, it is not necessary to deny that politics reflects ethics and objectives. Through relational analysis, this dissertation has been meant to grasp how the term is helpful in politics by instantiating and legitimating particular connections. This can tell us something interesting and useful without having to adjudicate the ethical content of the action or notion itself.

Thus, my use of "negotiation" is meant to capture how the notion and its associations are flexible, creating a durability in its capacity to be defined and re-defined to fit different political contexts. This on-going set of interactions in which we observe the use of "multilateral" constitutes its historical negotiation. This covers then both stability and change over time. If negotiation is about anything, it is the contention of perspectives through arguments and relationships. Thus, this dissertation considers a broad view of the notion's conceptual negotiation in the 20th century to be useful to highlight the processes in which unique, perhaps strange, arguments and relations are made normal. If culture, inclusive of discursive practices, is analytically helpful, it is because it can disclose processes of familiarization and disclose how the strange became normal.

Causes can be thought of to operate at different levels. Yet, because social action is causal, it is through processes that causality and consequences are produced. This is distinctive from identifying causes as particular agents or structural elements. If agents and structures are combinations, then it is the process in which agents conduct politics within contexts that is causal.

Norms research in IR has entailed the identification of a norm and then tracing its spread and utility through cascading, boomerang effects, and S-shaped curves. While this is a well-cited perspective on how norm diffusion occurs, there are other directions for “norms” research to explore. Unpacking how norms penetrate context and are grasped and re-deployed by different entities, generates new relations and associations. These new relations are strange at first since they are new in that context. Norms research that discloses how these strange uses of political notions are normalized is a direction to which we should devote more attention.

Final note: the durability of multilateralism

Multilateralism is un-natural. It is made, used, constructed for the purpose of political action: to mediate tension or create alienation. The causal account here is one of how this particular present was made.

Multilateralism demands participation. This is not simply an 'institutional form' but a practice informed by history and specified by language and the conduct of action. This is why it remains ‘impracticable’ for certain practices (such as world government, see Weiss 2009) to be operationalized. As Weiss (2009, 264) argues it appears that “enhanced multilateralism” is sorely required, yet he also claims that expressions of this (inter-governmental organizations) seem to be sidelined more and more. Paradoxically, this occurs when contemporary political life appears to make “something resembling institutions with at least some characteristics of supranationality appear feasible.” This moves Weiss to argue a break, a “Philadelphia moment,” as current international organization, as global governance, appears to be inadequate.

I think more than “break” is needed. The role of multilateral treaties in the Versailles Treaty was purely imaginary in 1919. To help make it understandable, law scholars continued their debate over the status of treaties after war. The creation of a multilateral treaty to renounce

war as an instrument of policy was a figment of a lawyer's imagination in 1927. IR scholars have called it failure in their debate over how peace is created (among others). A system of multilateral trade was imagined in 1933 and attempted to be realized after World War II. A multilateral approach to development was unheard of until David Owen put it into words and context. These do not spring from nothing, and they cannot have value or persist unless relations are instantiated. This study has attempted to specify these relations as explanatory for the emergence, decline, and re-emergence of particular notions in politics. Thus, Weiss does not just need a "critical juncture" but one that can include relation-building to make a notion like "world government" fit into the context at hand (his conclusion hints at this).

Diplomacy has been conceived as discursive practices that enable policy-making at the international and global levels. They constitute relations between and among states and other political entities. As such, the diplomatic record is one of the prime places to examine historical relations to see how they were made. It is here where an explanation of durability, the characteristic of social and political life to fit and re-fit ideas and actions into new context, can be created.

The motivation for this genealogy has been two-fold. First, it has been to call attention to multilateralism's past. In a sense, the empirics confirm a common, if often tacit, pre-supposition: the easiest attributes to link to multilateralism are (as Ruggie 1992 highlights) non-discrimination, inclusion, and that diffuse benefits follow with these. That the reason for this was "embedded liberalism," a grand compromise that figured in "domestic interventionism" driven by a mass shift in understanding the "social purpose" of power, operationalized in re-configuring relations between states, markets, and societies stands as a useful, if very broad reason. While this is

probably correct, I have attempted to provide greater detail in the diplomacy and arguments in mass media to trace out how this happened.

Robert W. Oliver's (1975: xiii) characterization is helpful in framing this:

> Permanent, organized, intergovernmental economic co-operation was so revolutionary an idea in 1919 that it was not even considered by the statesmen who drafted the Treaty of Versailles. By 1945, however, it was an idea acceptable to most of the people of the world, and its acceptance has become institutionalized through special agencies of the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the World Bank (the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), and the (International) Monetary Fund.

A caveat is needed. I agree with Oliver that the form of economic co-operation was revolutionary. The ideas—theoretical notions—that made it possible had a long history of development to meet particular problems in economics and politics. The interwar period, including the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the London Conference of 1933, and various Western Hemispheric initiatives, made it possible for a "case for multilateral trade" to be made formally in 1943 by Folke Hilgerdt at the American Economic Association annual convention and widely accepted by his respondents and other scholars.

The second motivation was to see where this went in the near-future of that time. I then traced this out in the immediate post-war period to see the effects of this wide acceptance. Here, I observe the link between "multilateral trade" to employment and development through the ITO discussions and financial sources of development. These "multilateral funding sources" fall into the category "multilateral aid" as part of a "multilateral approach" to development, which also has political value in the Cold War environment against the Soviet Union.

What was imaginary in historical moments was made real through the construction of relations (again recall Hunter 1928). To make the imaginary real in politics requires work. For international relations, this is diplomatic work. It requires building connections to other concepts and practices. Even "seeing" the imaginary in art requires brush to canvas that may not be

particularly explainable in those moments. As Magritte wrote to Foucault in 1966 (Foucault and Howard 1976, 20):

> ... Your question (about my painting Perspective, The Balcony by Manet) asks what it already contains: what made me see coffins where Manet saw white figures, is the image shown by my painting in which the setting of the "Balcony" was suitable for the placing of coffins.

Art, in particular Magritte, spurred some thinking; and these thoughts were perhaps more often than not ‘answers’, but pointed to enduring questions, which helped make the art that produced these reflections sensible and understandable. In commenting on Magritte, Foucault reveals: “and now I catch myself confusing be and represent as if they were equivalent, as if a drawing were what it represents,” (Foucault and Howard 1976, 6).

APPENDIX A

SPEECHES BY HEADS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, 2008-2009

List of selected speeches by Robert Zoellick, Ban Ki-moon, Dominque Strauss-Kahn, and Pascal Lamy.

Speaker	Date	Location
Zoellick	2008/10	Washington
Ban	2008/10	New York
Lamy	2008/11	Geneva
Ban	2008/11	New York
Lamy	2008/11	Geneva
Strauss-Kahn	2008/12	Madrid
Lamy	2009/02	London
Zoellick	2009/03	London
Ban	2009/04	Princeton
Strauss-Kahn	2008/12	Madrid
Lamy	2009/02	London
Lamy	2009/04	Washington
Strauss-Kahn	2009/05	Vienna
Ban	2009/06	New York
Zoellick	2009/09	Washington
Strauss-Kahn	2009/09	New York

Note: Compiled from un.org, worldbank.org, imf.org and wto.org.

APPENDIX B

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH CLUSTERS ON MULTILATERALISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Characterization of literature review.

Cluster	Question	Empirics	Variation?	Value
1	When does multilateralism happen (systemic factors)?	Official documents and activities of IOs and governments	DV: Multilateralism (0-1); IV: # of IOs, size of IO budgets, membership in IOs, issue areas of IOs, # of economic sanctions involving IOs, etc.	Can specify environmental forces
1.1	When does multilateralism happen (the choices of agents)?	Official documents and activities of IOs and governments	DV: Multilateral / regional / bilateral outcomes (0-2); IV: # of PTAs/FTAs, involvement of IOs, hierarchy (0-1), public opinion (domestic)	Can specify possible needs of entities being examined
2	What are different multilateralisms?	Official documents and activities of IOs, governments, and NGOs	Outcome: Multilateralism (top-down) or new multilateralism (bottom-up); Factor: participation of civil society	Can specify possible alternative conceptions of multilateralism
3	How can we explain the various uses of multilateralism?	Uses of 'multilateral' in official documents, mass media, and activities of IOs, governments, and NGOs	Outcome: varieties of multilateralism; Factors: not yet specified	Can be more precise in explaining why particular conception of multilateralism is utilized

Note: See Chapter 2 for detailed explication.

APPENDIX C

HITS ‘MULTILATERAL’ NEW YORK TIMES/PROQUEST, 1923-2008

year	hits
1923	1
1924	1
1925	2
1926	2
1927	3
1928	296
1929	123
1930	35
1931	17
1932	24
1933	52
1934	30
1935	46
1936	41
1937	25
1938	26
1939	20
1940	30
1941	20
1942	5
1943	10
1944	77
1945	109
1946	132
1947	189
1948	162
1949	232
1950	128
1951	81
1952	71
1953	83
1954	75
1955	74
1956	79
1957	82
1958	73
1959	77
1960	93
1961	74
1962	103
1963	279
1964	185
1965	117

1966	101
1967	96
1968	67
1969	119
1970	67
1971	105
1972	81
1973	70
1974	72
1975	78
1976	63
1977	84
1978	52
1979	80
1980	43
1981	89
1982	80
1983	72
1984	97
1985	114
1986	104
1987	109
1988	120
1989	137
1990	122
1991	112
1992	109
1993	118
1994	74
1995	44
1996	47
1997	41
1998	49
1999	54
2000	29
2001	59
2002	81
2003	171
2004	59
2005	56
2006	70
2007	58
2008	44

Note: Conducted using ProQuest search query, March 16, 2012. Sorted, stored, and charts created using GoogleDocs.

APPENDIX D

MULTILATERAL TREATIES REVIVED IN TREATY OF VERSAILLES

The establishment of a concert pitch

The protection of literary and artistic works

The redemption of the Stade Toll on the Elbe.

Sanitary Conventions

The redemption of the toll dues on the Scheldt.

Opium convention

The protection of industrial property

The North Sea liquor traffic

The international circulation of motor-cars.

The unification of commercial statistics.

The raising of the Turkish customs tariff.

The sealing of railway trucks subject to customs inspection.

The publication of customs tariffs and the organisation of an International Union for the publication of customs tariffs.

The redemption of toll dues on the Sound and Belts.

The fisheries in the North Sea outside territorial waters.

Telegraphic Conventions

The Universal Postal Union agreements

The International Radio-Telegraphic Convention

The protection of submarine cables.

The suppression of nightwork for women.

The suppression of obscene publications.

The exemption of hospital ships from dues and charges in ports.

The protection of minors.

The suppression of the White Slave Traffic.

The suppression of the use of white phosphorus in the manufacture of matches.

Hague Convention on civil procedure

The unification and improvement of the metric system.

The unification of pharmacopoeial formulae for potent drugs.

The creation of an International Agricultural Institute at Rome.

Precautionary measures against phylloxera.

The protection of birds useful to agriculture.

The tonnage measurement of vessels for inland navigation.

The establishment of a definite arrangement guaranteeing the free use of the Suez Canal.

The technical standardisation of railways.

The unification of certain regulations regarding collisions and salvage at sea.

REFERENCES

Aaronson, Susan. 1991. “How Cordell Hull and the Postwar Planners Designed a New Trade Policy.” *Business and Economic History* 20: 171-179.

Adler, Emmanuel. 1997. "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics." *European Journal of International Relations* 3(3): 319-363.

Adler, Emmanuel, and Vincent Pouliot, eds. 2011. *International Practices*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Alker, Hayward. 1990. “Rescuing ‘Reason’ from the ‘Rationalists’: Reading Vico, Marx, and Weber as Reflective Institutionalists.” *Millennium* 19(2): 161-184.

Arndt, Heinz. 1987. *Economic Development: The History of an Idea*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Baker, Ray. 1923. *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*. 3 vols. Garden City: Doubleday, Page, & Company.

Baldwin, David. 1961. “The International Development Association: Theory and Practice.” *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 10(1): 86-96.

Balogh, Thomas. 1949. *The Dollar Crisis: Causes and Cure*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Barnes, Barry. 2001. "Practice as Collective Action." In *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory*, eds. Theodore Schatzki, Karin Knorr Cetina, and Eike von Savigny. London: Routledge, p. 25-38.

Bartleson, Jens. 1995. *Genealogy of Sovereignty*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Baruch, Bernard. 1919. *Economic clauses. Provisional draft of the economic clauses of the Treaty of peace with Germany with explanatory headings and marginal comments for the use of the American delegates.* Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

Baruch, Bernard. 1920. *The making of the reparation and economic sections of the Treaty*. New York: Harper & Bros.

Bennett, Andrew, and Colin Elman. 2006. "Qualitative research: Recent developments in case study methods." *Annual Review of Political Science* 9: 455-476.

Bentham, Jeremy. 1827. *The Rationale of Judicial Evidence*. 5 vols. London: Hunt & Clarke.

Berridge, Geoff. 2002. *Diplomacy: theory and practice*. 2nd edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Berridge, Geoff, Maurice Keens-Soper, and T.G. Otte. 2001. *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bevir, Mark, and Asaf Kedar. 2008. "Concept formation in political science: An anti-naturalist critique of qualitative methodology." *Perspectives on Politics* 6(3): 503-517.

Bhagwati, Jagdish. 1990. "Departures from multilateralism: Regionalism and aggressive unilateralism." *Economic Journal* 100(403): 1304-1317.

Bhagwati, Jagdish. 1992. "Regionalism versus Multilateralism." *World Economy* 15(5): 535-556.

Bidwell, Percy. 1944. "A Postwar Commercial Policy for the United States." *American Economic Review* 34(1, part 2): 340-353.

Borchard, Edwin. 1929. "The Multilateral Treaty for the Renunciation of War." *American Journal of International Law* 23(1): 116-120.

Boughton, James. 2004. "The IMF and the Force of History: Ten Events and Ten Ideas That Have Shaped the Institution." *IMF Working Paper WP/04/75*.

Briggs, William. 1906. *The Law of International Copyright*. London: London: Stevens & Haynes.

Brooks, Stephen, and William Wolfforth. 2005. "International Relations Theory and the Case Against Unilateralism." *Perspectives on Politics* 3(3): 509-524.

Brown, Philip Marshall. 1933. "Japanese Interpretation of the Kellogg Pact." *American Journal of International Law* 27(1): 100-102.

Bryn-Jones, David. 1937. *Frank B. Kellogg: A Biography*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons.

Caporaso, James. 1992. "International relations theory and multilateralism: the search for foundations." *International Organization* 46(3): 599-632.

Capper, Arthur. 1929. "Making the Peace Pact Effective." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 144: 40-50.

Carr, E.H. 1939. *Twenty Years' Crisis*. London: Macmillan.

Castel, Jean-Gabriel. 1953. "International Law: Effect of War on Bilateral Treaties: Comparative Study." *Michigan Law Review* 51(4): 566-573.

Cesarano, Filippo. 2006. *Monetary Theory and Bretton Woods*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Clark, Sarah, Anna Rich, and Lori Heninger. 1999. *Building a Common Future: United Nations Work on Financing for Development*. New York: Quaker United Nations Office.

Clarke, Kevin, and David Primo. 2007. “Modernizing Political Science: A Model-Based Approach.” *Perspectives on Politics* 5(4): 741-753.

Claude, Inis. 1958. "Multilateralism--Diplomatic and Otherwise." *International Organization* 12(1): 43-52.

Coate, Roger, W. Andy Knight, and Andrei Maximenko (2001) "Requirements of Multilateral Governance for Promoting Human Security in a Postmodern Era." In *Adapting the United Nations to a Postmodern Era: Lessons Learned*, ed. W. Andy Knight. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 11-27.

Colombos, C. John. 1929. "The Paris Pact, Otherwise called the Kellogg Pact." *Transactions of the Grotius Society* 14: 87-101.

Cooper, Andrew. 2004. "The Making of the Inter-American Democratic Charter: A Case of Complex Multilateralism." *International Studies Perspectives* 5(1): 92-113.

Copeland, Dale. 2000. "The constructivist challenge to structural realism: A review essay." *International Security* 25(2): 187-212.

Copeland, Dale. 2003. "A realist critique of the English School." *Review of International Studies* 29(3): 427-441.

Corbetta, Renato, and William J. Dixon. 2004. "Multilateralism, major powers, and militarized disputes." *Political Research Quarterly* 57(1): 5-14.

Cox, Robert. 1987. *Production, Power, and World Order*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Cox, Robert. 1992. “Multilateralism and World Order.” *Review of International Studies* 18(2): 161-180.

Cox, Robert. 1997a. "An Alternative Approach to Multilateralism in the Twenty-first Century." *Global Governance* 3(1): 103-116.

Cox, Robert. 1997b. "Introduction." In *The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order*, ed. Robert Cox. London: Macmillan, xv-xxx.

Cox, Robert. 1997c. "Reconsiderations." In *The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order*, ed. Robert Cox. London: Macmillan, 245-262.

Cross, Ma'ia Davis. 2007. *European Diplomatic Corps.* Basingsoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Cunningham, Kevin, and Robert Tomes. 2004. "Space-time orientations and contemporary political-military thought." *Armed Forces & Society* 31(1): 119-140.

Dam, Kenneth. 2004. “Cordell Hull, the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, and the WTO.” John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 228.

Dean, Vera Michaels. 1945. "After Victory." Headline Series. Number 50. Washington, DC: Foreign Policy Association.

Denemark, Robert, and Matthew J. Hoffmann. 2008. "Not Just Scraps of Paper: The Dynamics of Multilateral Treaty-Making." *Cooperation and Conflict* 43(2): 185-219.

Der Derian, James. 1987. *On Diplomacy*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Der Derian, James. 2008. "Critical encounters in international relations." *International Social Science Journal* 59(191): 69-73.

Dietrich, Ethel. 1940. "Foreign Trade Blocs." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 211: 85-91.

Dodd, William. 1923. "Wilsonism." *Political Science Quarterly* 38(1): 115-132.

Doty, Roxanne Lynn. 1993. "Foreign policy as social construction: a post-positivist analysis of US counterinsurgency policy in the Philippines." *International Studies Quarterly* 37(3): 297-320.

Downs, George, David Rocke, and Peter Barsoom. 1998. "Managing the evolution of multilateralism." *International Organization* 52(2): 397-419.

Duffield, John. 2007. "What are International Institutions?" *International Studies Review* 9(1): 1-22.

Dulles, Elizabeth. 1932. *The Bank for International Settlements at Work.* New York: Macmillan.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. 1961. *Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight David Eisenhower 1953-1961*. 8 vols. Washington, DC: National Archives.

Enloe, Cynthia. 1989. *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Feis, Herbert. 1966. *1933: Characters in Crisis*. Boston: Little, Brown.

Fenwick, Charles. 1919. "Notes on International Affairs." *American Political Science Review* 13(3): 468-483.

Fenwick, Charles. 1963. Organization of American States. Washington, DC: Kaufman.

Ferrell, Robert. 1952. *Peace in their Time*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Fierke, Karin. 2002. "Links Across the Abyss: Language and Logic in International Relations." *International Studies Quarterly* 46(3): 331-354.

Finch, George. 1919a. “The Peace of Paris Conference, 1919.” *American Journal of International Law* 13(2): 159-186.

Finch, George. 1919b. "The Peace Negotiations with Germany." *American Journal of International Law* 13(3): 536-557.

Finnemore, Martha.1996. *National interests in international society*. Ithaca,N Y: Cornell University Press.

Finnemore, Martha. 2003. *The purpose of intervention: changing beliefs about the use of force*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Finnemore, Martha. 2005. “Fights about rules: the role of efficacy and power in changing multilateralism,” *Review of International Studies* 31(supplement): 187-206.

Finnemore, Martha. 2009. "Legitimacy, hypocrisy, and the social structure of unipolarity." *World Politics* 61(1): 58-85.

Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 2001. “Taking stock: the constructivist research program in international relations and comparative politics.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 4: 391-416.

Fortna, Virginia. 2004. *Peace Time*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Foucault, Michel and Richard Howard. 1976. “Ceci n'est pas une pipe.” *October* 1: 6-21.

Foucault, Michel. 1977. *Discipline and Punish*. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Penguin.

Foucault, Michel. 1980. *Power/knowledge*. Trans. Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon.

Foulke, Roland. 1918. "Treaties." *Columbia Law Review* 18(5): 422-458.

Frankel, S. Herbert. 1952. “United Nations Primer for Development.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 66(3): 301-326.

Friedrichs, Jörg, and Friedrich Kratochwil. 2009. "On acting and knowing: how pragmatism can advance International Relations research and methodology." *International Organization* 63(3): 701-731.

Frisch, Ragnar. 1947. “On the Need for Forecasting a Multilateral Balance of Payments.” American Economic Review 37(4): 535-551.

Gardner, Richard. 1956. *Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Geertz, Clifford. 1973. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books.

Goddard, Stacie. 2006. “Uncommon ground: Indivisible territory and the politics of legitimacy.” *International Organization* 60(1): 35-68.

Graebner, Norman, ed. 1964. *Ideas and Diplomacy*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Grigg, Edward. 1935. “The Merits and Defects of the Locarno Treaty As a Guarantee of World Peace.” *International Affairs* 14(2): 176-197.

Guzzini, Stefano. 2005. "The concept of power: a constructivist analysis." *Millennium* 33(3): 495-521.

Hacking, Ian. 1999. *Social Construction of What?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hafter-Burton, Emily, Jana von Stein, and Eric Gartzke. 2008. "International Organizations Count." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(2): 175-188.

Haggard, Stephen. 1988. “The institutional foundations of hegemony: explaining the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934.” *International Organization* 42(1): 91-119.

Hall, Peter, and Rosemary Taylor. 1996. "Political science and the three new institutionalisms." *Political Studies* 44(4): 936-957.

Hall, William Edward. 1909. *A Treatise on International Law*. 6th edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Halm, George. 1945. *International Monetary Cooperation*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

Hansen, Lene. 2006. *Security as Practice*. London: Routledge.

Harvard Research in International Law. 1935. "Article 35. Effect of War." *American Journal of International Law* 29(supplement): 1183-1204.

Hattori, Tomohisa. 2001. “Reconceputalizing Foreign Aid.” *Review of International Political Economy* 8(4): 633-660.

Helleiner, Eric. 2009. “The Development Mandate of International Institutions: Where Did It Come From?” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 44(3): 189-211.

Helleiner, Eric. 2006. "Reinterpreting Bretton Woods: International development and the neglected origins of embedded liberalism." *Development and Change* 37(5): 943-967.

Helleiner, Eric. 2003. "Dollarization diplomacy: US policy towards Latin America coming full

circle?" *Review of International Political Economy* 10(3): 406-429.

Hemmer, Christopher, and Peter Katzenstein. 2002. "Why is there no NATO in Asia? Collective identity, regionalism, and the origins of multilateralism." *International Organization* 56(3): 575-607.

Hershey, Amos. 1912. *The Essentials of Public International Law*. New York: Macmillan.

Herz, John. 1950. “Idealist internationalism and the security dilemma.” *World Politics* 2(2): 157-180.

Hilgerdt, Folke. 1943. "The case for multilateral trade." *American Economic Review* 33(1, part 2): 393-407.

Hitch, Christopher. 1942. "The Controls of Post-War Reconstruction." *Oxford Economic Papers* 6: 43-56.

Hollis, Martin, and Steve Smith. 1996. *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hoole, Francis, and Harvey Tucker. 1975. "Data on International Organizations: Availability and Needs." *International Studies Quarterly* 19(2): 212-227.

Hopf, Ted. 2010. "The logic of habit in International Relations." *European Journal of International Relations* 16(4): 539-561.

Horsefield, J. Keith. 1969. *The International Monetary Fund, 1945-1965: Twenty Years of International Monetary Cooperation, Volume I.* Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.

Horsefield, J. Keith, ed. 1969. *The International Monetary Fund, 1945-1965: Twenty Years of International Monetary Cooperation, Volume III.* Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.

House, Edward and Charles Seymour, eds. 1923. *What Really Happened at Paris: The Story of the Paris Peace Conference, 1918-1919*. New York: Charles Scribner's.

Howard, Esme. 1936. *Theatre of Life*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company.

Hudson, Manley O. 1925. "The Registration and Publication of Treaties." *American Journal of International Law* 19(2): 273-292.

Hume, David. 1752. *Political Discourses*.

Hurd, Ian. 1999. “Legitimacy and authority in international politics.” *International Organization* 53(2): 379-408.

Hurst, Cecil. 1921. "The Effect of War on Treaties." *British Yearbook of International Law* 2: 37-47.

Ikenberry, G. John. 1992. “A world economy restored: expert consensus and the Anglo-American postwar settlement.” *International Organization* 46(1): 289-321.

Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. *After Victory*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Ikenberry, G. John. 2003. "Is American Multilateralism in Decline?" *Perspectives on Politics* 1(3): 533-550.

Ikenberry, G. John. 2009. "Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order." *Perspectives on Politics* 7(1): 71-87.

Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 2006a. *Civilizing the Enemy*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 2006b. “Making Sense of Making Sense: Configurational Analysis and the Double Hermeneutic.” In *Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn*, eds. Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 264-280.

Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 2008a. "Foregrounding ontology: dualism, monism and IR theory." *Review of International Studies* 34(1): 129-153.

Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 2008b. “Hunting for Fossils in International Relations.” *International Studies Perspectives* 9(1): 99-105.

Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 2011. *Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations*. New York: Routledge.

Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus and Daniel Nexon. 1999. "Relations before States: Substance, Process, and the Study of World Politics." *European Journal of International Relations* 5(3): 291-332.

Jentleson, Bruce. 2003. “Tough Love Multilateralism.” *Washington Quarterly* 27(1): 7-24.

Jervis, Robert. 2005. “APSA Presidents Reflect on Political Science: Who Knows What, When, and How?” *Perspectives on Politics* 3(2): 315-316.

Kalecki, Michal. 1946. "Multilateralism and full employment." *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science / Revue canadienne d'Economique et de Science politique* 12(3): 322-327.

Kapur, Devesh, John Lewis, and Richard Webb. 1997. *The World Bank: Its First Half-Century*.

Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Keeley, James 1926. "The Effect of End of War on Pre-War Treaties between the Belligerents." *Transactions of the Grotius Society* 12: 7-17.

Kellogg, Frank. 1928. “The War Prevention Policy of the United States.” *Foreign Affairs* 6(3): i-xi.

Kemmerer, Edwin. 1916. "A Proposal for Pan-American Monetary Unity." *Political Science Quarterly* 31(1): 66-80.

Keohane, Robert. 1986. "Reciprocity in International Relations." *International Organization* 40(1): 1-27.

Keohane, Robert. 1990. "Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research." *International Journal* 45: 731-764.

Keohane, Robert. 2006. "The contingent legitimacy of multilateralism." In *Multilateralism Under Challenge? Power International Order and Structural Change*, eds. Edward Newman, Ramesh Thakur, and John Tirman. Tokyo: UNU Press, 56-76.

Keohane, Robert, Stephen Macedo, and Andrew Moravcsik. 2009. "Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism." *International Organization* 63(1): 1-31.

Keynes, John Maynard. 1981. *Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes*. 25 vols. ed. Donald E. Moggridge. London: Macmillan.

Kindleberger, Charles. 1986. *The World in Depression 1929-1939*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Kindleberger, Charles. 1950. “International Disequilibrium.” *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science / Revue canadienne d'Economique et de Science politique* 16(4): 529-537.

King, Gary, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Klotz, Audie, and Cecilia Lynch. 2007. *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

Koselleck, Reinhart. 1985. *Futures past: on the semantics of historical time*. Trans. Keith Tribe. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Kratochwil, Friedrich. 2000. “Constructing a New Orthodoxy? Wendt'sSocial Theory of International Politics' and the Constructivist Challenge.” *Millennium* 29(1): 73-101.

Kratochwil, Friedrich. 2006. “The genealogy of multilateralism: Reflections on an organizational form and its crisis.” In *Multilateralism Under Challenge? Power International Order and Structural Change*, eds. Edward Newman, Ramesh Thakur, and John Tirman. Tokyo: UNU Press, 139-159.

Krebs, Ron and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson. 2007. "Twisting tongues and twisting arms: The power of political rhetoric." *European Journal of International Relations* 13(1): 35-66.

Kreps, Sarah. 2007. "The 1994 Haiti intervention: A unilateral operation in multilateral clothes." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30(3): 449-474.

Kreps, Sarah. 2008. "Multilateral Military Interventions: Theory and Practice." *Political Science Quarterly* 123(4): 573-603.

Laffey, Mark, and Jutta Weldes. 1997. “Beyond Belief: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies in the Study of International Relations.” *European Journal of International Relations* 3(2): 193-237.

Lake, David. 2010. "Rightful rules: Authority, order, and the foundations of global governance." *International Studies Quarterly* 54(3): 587-613.

Lansing, Robert. 1921. *The Peace Negotiations*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Lawrence, Thomas J. 1910. *The Principles of International Law*. 4th edition. Boston: D.C. Heath & Co.

Layton, Walter. 1933a. “The Tasks of the World Economic Conference.” *Foreign Affairs* 11(3): 406-419.

Layton, Walter. 1933b. “After the World Economic Conference.” *Foreign Affairs* 12(1): 20-29.

Lesser, Stanley. 1953. "International Law: Treaty Provisions Dealing with the Status of Pre-War Bilateral Treaties." *Michigan Law Review* 51(4): 573-582.

Luckau, Alma. 1941. *German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Lugard, Lord. 1936. "The Basis of the Claim for Colonies." *International Affairs* 15(1): 3-25.

Mac Ginty, Roger. 2010. "No war, no peace: Why so many peace processes fail to deliver peace." *International Politics* 47(2): 145-162.

MacMillan, Margaret. 2001. *Paris 1919*. New York: Random House.

Maier, Charles. 1977. “The politics of productivity: foundations of American international economic policy after World War II.” *International Organization* 31(4): 607-633.

Manzer, Ronald. 1965. “The United Nations Special Fund.” *International Organization* 18(4): 766-789.

Marburg, Theodore. 1917. *League of Nations*. 2 vols. New York: Macmillan.

Mansfield, Edward, and Helen Milner. 1999. "The Political Economy of Regionalism,” *International Organization* 53(3): 589-627.

Mansfield, Edward, and Eric Reinhardt. 2003. "Multilateral determinants of regionalism: The effects of GATT/WTO on the formation of preferential trading arrangements." *International Organization* 57(4): 829-862.

Martin, Lisa. 1992a. "Interests, Power, and Multilateralism." *International Organization* 46(4): 765-792.

Martin, Lisa. 1992b. *Coercive Cooperation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Martin, Lisa, and Beth Simmons. 1998. "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions." *International Organization* 52(4): 729-757.

McGuinness, Margaret. 2006. "Multilateralism and War: A Taxonomy of Institutional Functions." *Villanova Law Review* 51(1): 149-228.

McNair, Arnold. 1930. "The Functions and Differing Legal Character of Treaties." *British Yearbook of International Law* 11: 100-118.

Miller, David Hunter. 1924. *My Diary at the Conference of Paris*. 21 vols. New York: Appeal Printing Company.

Miller, David Hunter. 1928. *The Peace Pact of Paris*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons.

Miller, James N. 2000. "Origins of the GATT: British Resistance to American Multilateralism." Jerome Levy Economics Institute Working Paper No. 318.

Milner, Helen. 2006. “Why multilateralism? Foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems.” In *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, eds. Darren Hawkins, David Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael Tierney. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 107-139.

Mikesell, Raymond. 1954. “Economic Doctrines Reflected in UN Reports.” *American Economic Review* 44(2): 570-582.

Mikesell, Raymond. 1947. "Quantitative and Exchange Restrictions under the ITO Charter." *American Economic Review* 37(3): 351-368.

Modelski, George. 1970. "The world's foreign ministers: a political elite." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 14(2): 135-175.

Molloy, Sean. 2006. *The Hidden History of Realism: A Genealogy of Power Politics*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Murphy, Craig. 2006. *The United Nations Development Programme: A Better Way?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Neumann, Iver. 2002. “Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy.” *Millennium* 31(3): 627-651.

Neumann, Iver. 2003. "The English School on Diplomacy: Scholarly Promise Unfulfilled." *International Relations* 17(3): 341-370.

Neumann, Iver. 2005. "To Be a Diplomat." *International Studies Perspectives* 6(1): 72-93.

Neumann, Iver. 2007. "'A Speech That the Entire Ministry May Stand for,' or Why Diplomats Never Produce Anything New." *International Political Sociology* 1(2): 183-200.

Newman, Edward, Ramesh Thakur, and John Tirman. 2006. "Introduction." In *Multilateralism Under Challenge? Power International Order and Structural Change*, eds. Edward Newman, Ramesh Thakur, and John Tirman. Tokyo: UNU Press, 1-18.

Nexon, Daniel. 2001. "Which historical sociology? A Response to Stephen Hobden's 'Theorising the International System'." *Review of International Studies* 27(2): 273-280.

Nichols, Jeannette. 1951. “Roosevelt's Monetary Diplomacy in 1933.” *American Historical Review* 56(2): 295-317.

Nkrumah, Kwame. 1965. *Neo-colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism*. London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd.

Noble, George. 1935. *Policies and Opinions at Paris, 1919*. New York: Macmillan.

Normile, Dennis. 2009. "The 'Tamba dragon' has Japanese dinosaur hunters all fired up." *Science* 324(5924): 169.

O'Brien, Robert, Anne Marie Goetz, Jan Aart Scholte and Marc Williams. 2000. *Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

O'Neill, Kate, Jörg Balsinger, and Stacy VanDeveer. 2004. "Actors, Norms, and Impact: Recent International Cooperation Theory and the Influence of the Agent-Structure Debate." *Annual Review of Political Science* 7: 149-175.

O'Sullivan. 2008. *Sumner Welles, postwar planning, and the quest for a new world order, 1937-1943*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Odell, John. 1988. "From London to Bretton Woods: Sources of Change in Bargaining Strategies and Outcomes." *Journal of Public Policy* 8(3/4): 287-315.

Oliver, Robert. 1975. *International Economic Co-operation and the World Bank*. London: Macmillan.

Opie, Redvers and Frank D. Graham. 1944. "Discussion." *American Economic Review* 34(1, part 2): 396-401.

Oppenheim, Lassa. 1912. *International Law: A Treatise*. 2 vols. 2nd edition. London: Longmans, Green and Co.

Otte, T.G. 2007. "A "German Paperchase": The "Scrap of Paper" Controversy and the Problem of Myth and Memory in International History." *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 18(1): 53-87.

Overbeek, Henk. 2004. "Transnational class formation and concepts of control: towards a genealogy of the Amsterdam project in international political economy." *Journal of International Relations and Development* 7(2): 113-141.

Owen, David. 1959. "The United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance—A Multilateral Approach." *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science* 323(1): 25-32.

Oye, Kenneth. 1985. "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies." *World Politics* 38(1): 1-24.

Pahre, Robert. 1994. "Multilateral Cooperation in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2(38): 326-352.

Pahre, Robert. 1999. *Leading Questions: How Hegemony Affects the International Political Economy*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Pasvolsky, Leo. 1933. "The Gold Standard Before and After the War." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 165: 171-175.

Pasvolsky, Leo and H. Julian Wadleigh. 1943. "Round Table on Bases of International Economic Relations." *American Economic Review* 33(1, part 2): 455-456.

Pearson, Drew and Constantine Brown. 1935. *The American Diplomatic Game.* Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc.

Pelc, Krzysztof. 2010. "Constraining Coercion? Legitimacy and Its Role in US Trade Policy, 1975–2000." *International Organization* 64(1): 65-96.

Phillips, Alastair. 1982. *Glasgow's Herald 1783-1983*. Glasgow: Richard Drew Publishing.

Plischke, Elmer 1954. "Reactivation of Prewar German Treaties." *American Journal of International Law* 48(2): 245-264.

Pouliot, Vincent. 2007. "'Sobjectivism': Toward a Constructivist Methodology." *International Studies Quarterly* 51(2): 359-384.

Pouliot, Vincent. 2008. "The logic of practicality: a theory of practice of security communities." *International Organization* 62(2): 257-288.

Putnam, Robert. 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games." *International Organization* 42(3): 427-460.

Rancatore, Jason. 2009. "Using 'Pace' in Diplomatic Analysis." *Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 4(3): 283-305.

Rancatore, Jason. 2010. "It is Strange: A Reply to Vrasti." *Millennium* 39(1): 65-77.

Rasminsky, Louis. 1944. "International Credit and Currency Plans." *Foreign Affairs* 22(4): 589-603.

Redlich, Marcellus. 1928. *International Law as a substitute for diplomacy*. Chicago: Independent Publishing Company.

Roberts, Ivor, ed. 2009. *Satow's Diplomatic Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Robertson, D.H. 1943. "The Post-War Monetary Plans." *Economic Journal* 53(212): 352-360.

Robbins, Robert. 1939. "The Legal Status of Aden Colony and the Aden Protectorate." *American Journal of International Law* 33(4): 700-715.

Rodrik, Dani. 1996. “Why is There Multilateral Lending?” In *Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1995*, eds. Michael Bruno and Boris Pleskovic. Washington, DC: World Bank, p. 167-193.

Rodrik, Dani. 2010. “A Research Agenda in Economic Diagnostics.” SBE 2020 White Paper. Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation.

Rogers, Norman. 1926. Notes on the Treaty-Making Power. *Canadian Historical Review* 7(1): 27-33.

Roosevelt, Franklin. 1938. *The public papers and addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*. New York: Random House.

Roscher, Bernhard. 2002. "The 'Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy'." *Journal of the History of International Law* 4(2): 293-309.

Rosenberg, Emily. 1985. "Foundations of United States International Financial Power: Gold Standard Diplomacy, 1900-1905." *Business History Review* 59(2): 169-202.

Rostow, Walt. 1950. “The Terms of Trade in Theory and Practice.” *Economic History Review* 3(1): 1-20.

Rothchild, K.W. 1944. “The Small Nation and World Trade.” *Economic Journal* 54(213): 26-40

Ruggie, John. 1982. "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order." *International Organization* 36(2): 379-415.

Ruggie, John. 1992. "Multilateralism: the anatomy of an institution." *International Organization* 46(3): 561-598.

Ruggie, John. 1994. "Third Try at World Order? America and Multilateralism after the Cold War." *Political Science Quarterly* 109(4): 553-571.

Safire, William. 1993. *Safire's New Political Dictionary*. New York: Random House.

Samuel, Herbert. 1933. “The World Economic Conference.” *International Affairs* 12(4): 439-459.

Sartori, Giovanni. 1970. "Concept misformation in comparative politics." *American Political Science Review* 64(4): 1033-1053.

Saunders, Elizabeth. 2009. “Transformative Choices Leaders and the Origins of Intervention Strategy.” *International Security* 34(2): 119-161.

Schechter, Michael, ed. 1998. *Future Multilateralism*. London: Macmillan.

Schild, Georg. 1995. *Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Schilling, Warner. 1961. “The H-bomb decision: How to decide without actually choosing.” *Political Science Quarterly* 76(1): 24-46.

Scott, Arthur. 1920. *An introduction to the peace treaties*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Scott, James Brown, ed. 1916. *Resolutions of the Institute of International Law dealing with the law of nations*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Scott, James Brown. 1923. "The Solicitor for the State Department." *American Journal of International Law* 17(2): 307-309.

Scott, James Brown. 1934. "The Seventh International Conference of American States." *American Journal of International Law* 28(2): 219-230.

Scott, James Brown, ed. 1940. *The International Conferences of American States, first supplement 1933-1940*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Searle, John. 1995. *The Construction of Social Reality*. New York: Free Press.

Seidel, Robert. 1972. "American Reformers Abroad: The Kemmerer Missions in South America, 1923-1931." *Journal of Economic History* 32(2): 520-545.

Shapiro, Michael, G. Matthew Bonham, and Daniel Heradstveit. 1988. "A Discursive Practices Approach to Collective Decision-Making." *International Studies Quarterly* 32(4): 397-419.

Shapiro, Michael. 1992a. *Reading the Postmodern Polity*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Shapiro, Michael. 1992b. "Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences: Insights, Inroads, and Intrusions by Pauline Marie Rosenau and Political Theory and Postmodernism by Stephen K. White." *American Political Science Review* 86(3): 787-789.

Shields, Murray, ed. 1944. *International Financial Stabilization*. New York: Irving Trust Company.

Simmons, Beth. 1994. *Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years, 1923-1939*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Simmons, Beth and Zachary Elkins. 2004. "The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy." *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 171-189.

Singer, J. David. 1961. "The level-of-analysis problem in international relations." *World Politics* 14(1): 77-92.

Singer, J. David. 1965. "Data-making in international relations." *Behavioral Science* 10(1) : 68-80.

Smith, Willis. 1946. "War's Aftermath in Law." *Annual Report of the American Bar Association* 71: 282-292.

Snidal, Duncan. 2008. "Commentary on the Special Issue." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(2): 326-333.

Snyder, Richard. 1940. "The Most Favored Nation Clause and Recent Trade Practices." *Political Science Quarterly* 55(1): 77-97.

Stiglitz, Joesph. 2002. *Globalization and Its Discontents*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Stiles, Kenneth. 1995. "The ambivalent hegemon: Explaining the 'lost decade' in multilateral trade talks, 1948–1958." *Review of International Political Economy* 2(1): 1-26.

Stone, Randall, Branislav Slantchev, and Tamar London. 2008. "Choosing How to Cooperate: A Repeated Public-Goods Model of International Relations." *International Studies Quarterly* 52(3): 335-362.

Stoner, John. 1943. *S. O. Levinson and the Pact of Paris*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Temperley, Harold, ed. 1920. *A history of the Peace Conference of Paris*. 6 vols. London: H. Frowde, and Hodder & Stoughton.

Therien, Jean-Philippe. 1999. "Beyond the North-South Divide." *Third World Quarterly* 20(4): 723-742.

Therien, Jean-Philippe. 2002. "Multilateral Institutions and the Poverty Debate." *International Journal* 57(2): 233-252.

Thompson, Alexander. 2006. "Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the logic of information transmission." *International Organization* 60(1): 1-34.

Traynor, Dean Elizabeth. 1949. *International Monetary and Financial Conferences In The Interwar Period*. Washington, DC: Catholic University Press.

Underhill, Geoff. 2000. "State, market, and global political economy: genealogy of an (inter-?) discipline." *International Affairs* 76(4): 805-824.

Ustor, Endre. 1969. *First report on the most-favoured-nation clause*. A/CN.4/213. New York: United Nations.

van Dormael, Armand. 1978. *Bretton Woods: birth of a monetary system*. London: Macmillan.

von Rotteck, Charles with continuations by Charles J. Peterson. 1858. *Rotteck's History of the World*. 4 vols. 28th ed. Philadelphia: Leary & Getz Publishers.

Verdier, Daniel. 2008. "Multilateralism, bilateralism, and exclusion in the Nuclear Proliferation Regime." *International Organization* 62(3) 439-476.

Viner, Jacob. 1947. "International Finance in the Postwar World." *Journal of Political Economy* 55(2): 97-107.

Viner, Jacob. 1950. "Full Employment at Whatever Cost." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 64(3): 385-407.

Vodafone. 2010. Pressing Forward. Vodafone Group PLC Sustainability Report.

Vucetic, Srdjan. 2011a. "Bound to follow? The Anglosphere and US-led coalitions of the willing, 1950–2001." *European Journal of International Relations* 17(1): 27-49.

Vucetic, Srdjan. 2011b. "Genealogy as a research tool in International Relations." *Review of International Studies* 37(3): 1295-1312.

Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Watkins, James. 1943. “Regionalism and Plans for Postwar Reconstruction: The First Three Years.” *Social Forces* 21(4): 379-389.

Weber, Steve. 1992. "Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO." *International Organization* 46(3): 633-680.

Weiss, Thomas. 2009. “What Happened to the Idea of World Government.” *International Studies Quarterly* 53(2): 253-271.

Weldes, Jutta. 1996. "Constructing national interests," *European Journal of International Relations* 2(3): 275-318.

Weldes, Jutta, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson, and Raymond Duvall, eds. 1999. *Cultures of Insecurity*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Wendt, Alexander. 1987. “The agent-structure problem in international relations theory.” *International Organization* 41(3): 335-370.

Wendt, Alexander. 1989. *The States System and Global Militarization*. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Minnesota.

Wendt, Alexander. 1992. "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics." *International Organization* 46(2): 391-425.

Wendt, Alexander. 1998. "On constitution and causation in International Relations." *Review of International Studies* 24(special issue): 101-117.

Wendt, Alexander. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Westlake, John. 1907. *International Law: War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

White, Harry Dexter. 1943. “Postwar Currency Stabilization.” *American Economic Review* 33(1, part 2): 382-387.

White, Harry Dexter. 1945. "The Monetary Fund: Some Criticisms Examined." *Foreign Affairs* 23(2): 195-210.

Williams, John H. 1942. "The Implications of Fiscal Policy for Monetary Policy and the Banking System." *American Economic Review* 32(1): 234-249.

Williams, John H. 1943a. "Currency Stabilization: The Keynes and White Plans." *Foreign Affairs* 21(4): 645-658.

Williams, John H. 1943b. "Problems of Post-War International Monetary Stabilization." *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 87(2): 133-138.

Williams, John H. 1944. "The Postwar Monetary Plans." *American Economic Review* 34(1, part 2): 372-384.

Williams, John H. 1951. "International Trade Theory and Policy—Some Current Issues." *American Economic Review* 41(2): 418-430.

Willis, Henry. 1919. 'An International "Gold Fund".' *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 83: 167-178.

Wiseman, Geoff. 2004. "Pax Americana: Bumping into Diplomatic Culture." *International Studies Perspectives* 6(4): 409-430.

Wickersham, George. 1929. "The Pact of Paris: A Gesture or a Pledge?" *Foreign Affairs* 7(3): 356-371.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1953. *Philosophical Investigations*. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Wright, Quincy. 1917. "Conflicts Between International Law and Treaties." *American Journal of International Law* 11(3): 566-579.

Wright, Quincy. 1932. "The Manchurian Crisis." *American Political Science Review* 26(1): 45-76.

Woods, Ngaire. 2010. "Global Governance after the Financial Crisis: A New Multilateralism or the Last Gasp of the Great Powers?" *Global Policy* 1(1): 51-63.

Yanow, Dovra, and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea, eds. *Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.

OTHER INSTITUTIONAL REFERENCES

____. 1944. *International Business Conference*. Rye, NY: The Conference.

American Journal of International Law, 1907-1960

American Political Science Review, 1906-1960

Economist, 1944-1945

International Development Association Annual Report. 1960. Washington, DC: International Development Association.

IMF Balance of Payments Yearbook, 1948-1950

League of Nations Economic Survey, 1931-1935

League of Nations Official Journal. 1927-1928.

League of Nations 1944. *International currency experience*. Geneva: League of Nations.

League of Nations. 1942. *Network of World Trade*. Geneva: League of Nations Intelligence Service.

New York Times, 1851-2008.

Oxford English Dictionary

U.K. House of Commons Hansard, 1927-1928, 1943

United Nations. 1948. *Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference.* 2 vols. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

United Nations Bulletin, 1952-1954

United Nations Review, 1954-1960

World Investment Report. 2004. Geneva: UNCTAD.

U.S. Congress (Fulton, James G. and Jacob Javits). 1948. *International Trade Organization.* Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of State. 1928. *General Pact for the Renunciation of War*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of State. 1942. *Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States 1927. 3* vols. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of State. 1943. *Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States*

1928. 3 vols. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of State. 1945. *Proposals for expansion of world trade and employment*. Publication 2411.

U.S. Department of State. 1947. *The Treaty of Versailles and after*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

U. S. Department of State. 1947. *Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1919. The Paris Peace Conference*. 13 vols. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of State. 1950. *Foreign relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers 1933*. 5 vols. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of State. 1951. *Foreign relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers 1934*. 5 vols. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of State. 1958. *Foreign relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers 1941*. 7 vols. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of State. 1960. *Foreign relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers 1942*. 7 vols. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of State. 1963. *Foreign relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers 1943*. 10 vols. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of State. 1966. *Foreign relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers 1944*. 8 vols. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of State. 1969. *Foreign relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers 1945*. 9 vols. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of State. 1969. *Foreign relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers 1946*. 11 vols. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of State. 1972. *Foreign relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers 1947*. 8 vols. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of State. 1972. *Foreign relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers 1948*. 9 vols. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of State. 1974. *Foreign relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers 1949*. 9 vols. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of State. 1976. *Foreign relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers 1950*.

7 vols. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of State. 1981. *Foreign relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers 1952-1954*. 16 vols. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of State. 1992. *Foreign relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers 1955-1957*. 27 vols. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of State. 1996. *Foreign relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers 1958-1960*. 19 vols. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of State. 2001. *Foreign relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers 1961-1963*. 25 vols. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of State Bulletin (DSOB), 1948-1960

U.S. Treaty Series, no. 898. 1935. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

Washington Post, 1918-1960