

SUPERIORITY AND SUBORDINATION IN U.S. – LATIN AMERICA RELATIONS: A
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF PLAN COLOMBIA

By

Johnny Holloway

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of American University

in Partial Fulfillment of


the Requirements for the Degree of


Doctor of Philosophy


In

International Relations

Chair:



Clarence Lusane, Ph.D.


Carolyn Gallaher, Ph.D.


John M. Richardson Jr., Ph.D.


Dean of the School of International Service

Date



2012

American University

Washington, D.C. 20016

© COPYRIGHT

by

Johnny Holloway

2012

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my wife Marjan, the greatest person I have ever known and ever hope to know.

SUPERIORITY AND SUBORDINATION IN U.S. – LATIN AMERICA RELATIONS: A
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF PLAN COLOMBIA

BY

Johnny Holloway

ABSTRACT

Conceptions of Latin inferiority and concurrent American superiority have been foundational elements of U.S. – Latin American relations throughout its more than 175 year history. Clearly articulated in the Monroe Doctrine, these taken for granted, interrelated themes figured prominently in a consistent U.S. foreign policy of direct and indirect interventions in the 19th and 20th centuries designed to ensure American dominance within the hemisphere. This dissertation focuses on drug policy as one means of evaluating U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century. Specifically, it takes as its object of investigation the American component of Plan Colombia in 2000 and (re)situates the discourse constituting this federal legislation in the wider social and historical context of U.S. foreign policy toward Colombia and Latin America generally. Rather than unproblematically searching for the reasons why this intervention occurred, this dissertation instead questions how this intervention *was possible*. Focusing on texts produced by the most powerful actors, transmitted most effectively, and interpreted by the most recipients, a multimethod approach is employed drawing on historical material and on data from two important institutions – government and the media. Via analytical tools and methods from drawn poststructuralism, critical discourse analysis, sociolinguistics, and critical media studies, this dissertation examines Plan Colombia relevant congressional hearings and newspaper coverage to evaluate whether historical representations of American superiority/Latin inferiority conditioned the terms of the debate surrounding this contemporary legislation. It argues that representations of Latinos as incapable of self-control and effective governance, of Latin

America as a breeding ground for regional instability, and of the “natural” hemispheric leadership and authority of the U.S. combined to create the logical, “common sense” supporting a billion dollar, militarized aid program for Colombia. This reading of the data is supported by the failure of an identified competing discourse (informed by representations of U.S. culpability and weakness) to frame the logical necessity of a large scale domestic medical intervention to address the American drug problem. In broad terms, these findings underline the utility of social constructionist oriented analyses in the study of international politics and U.S. foreign policy that identify specific societal puzzles and challenge the existing accounts and frameworks that constitute them. More narrowly, the findings of this dissertation highlight the continuing significance of historical conceptions of American superiority/Latin subordination in the context of contemporary U.S. drug policy and overall relations with Latin America. Because it effectively shapes the very conditions of its possibility, the formulation of United States drug policy cannot be adequately explained without fundamentally addressing this core binary opposition. The dissertation concludes with a brief consideration of the utility of this analytical framework for evaluating analogous U.S. drug policy interventions directed towards Latin America.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am extremely grateful for the support and guidance provided by my committee members. Dr. Clarence Lusane (chair) and Dr. Carolyn Gallaher stuck with me through all my trials and tribulations. Dr. John Richardson was instrumental in helping me to bring this long journey to an end.

From the administration of the School of International Service, I want to thank Dean Louis Goodman for his generosity, wise counsel, and enduring optimism; Dean Maria Green Cowles for continually supporting me as an adjunct at SIS and helping me pay the bills; and Doctoral Advisor Jim Gilbert for cheerfully navigating me through the bureaucratic maze that is the administrative side of the doctoral program.

I am very appreciative of the feedback and suggestions I received from a number of my colleagues in the SIS doctoral program who preceded me to the finish line. A special thank you goes out to Narendran Kumarakulasingam, Dylan Craig, and Mark Hamilton

Outside of the School of International Service, I am very grateful to Dr. Celine Pascale and Dr. Michael Lempert who both generously provided me with their time, sage advice, and moral support when I was faltering and losing hope that my project would ever see the light of day.

On a personal note, I am grateful for the continual support of my family and friends. I greatly appreciate my mother and step-father who consistently encouraged me throughout this process. I also want to thank my mother-in-law. She was an unflagging cheerleader who never lost faith that I would finish. G.L. Fisher and Adele Asimow put me back on course at a point when I had lost my bearings and were absolutely essential elements of my ultimate success.

Given all their unwavering and unconditional love and emotional support, my dogs Chloe and Jake should probably be listed as co-authors; they sat by the computer just as much as I did.

Finally, I must extend my most sincere and profound gratitude to my beautiful wife Marjan. She is my harshest critic, my strongest advocate, and the only person whose opinion I truly care about. She has been with me every step of the way and I simply could not have done this without her. Mersi Azizam.

LIST OF TABLES

Table

Table 1 Articulating “Land” as a Business Opportunity	31
Table 2 “Land” as a Floating Signifier	33
Table 3 Three Textual Mechanisms.....	130
Table 4 Initial Coding Sheet Format.....	132
Table 5 Revised Coding Sheet Format	133
Table 6 Excerpt from 3/23/2000 House Armed Services Committee Hearing	133
Table 7 Excerpt of Colombia Coding Sheet	136
Table 8 Subjects and Respective Themes Identified within Hearings.....	137
Table 9 Linguistic Functions of Headlines	171
Table 10 Discriminatory Macro Strategies	172
Table 11 Brief Excerpt from Chicago Tribune Coding Sheet	174

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Illustration

Figure 1 1898	68
Figure 2 1896	68
Figure 3 1898	69
Figure 4 1899	70
Figure 5 1898	71
Figure 6 1899	71
Figure 7 1898	73
Figure 8 1904	74
Figure 9 1904	75
Figure 10 1961	81
Figure 11 1963	82
Figure 12 1915	88
Figure 13 1927	89
Figure 14 1947	89
Figure 15 1960	90
Figure 16 1981	90
Figure 17 1988	91
Figure 18 1904	92
Figure 19 1903	93
Figure 20 1901	93
Figure 21 1924	95
Figure 22 1901	96

Figure 23 1954	96
Figure 24 1886	140
Figure 25 1903	140
Figure 26 1928	141
Figure 27 1960	141
Figure 28 1985	142
Figure 29 2000	143
Figure 30 1965	144
Figure 31 1916	153
Figure 32 1910	156

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	iv
LIST OF TABLES.....	vi
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.....	vii
Chapter	
1. INTRODUCTION: LOCATING HISTORICAL NOTIONS OF LATIN INFERIORITY IN MODERN AMERICAN DRUG POLICY.....	1
2. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND A MULTIMETHOD APPROACH.....	20
3. U.S. – LATIN AMERICA RELATIONS: HISTORICAL PATTERNS OF SUPERIORITY AND SUBORDINATION.....	56
4. PLAN COLOMBIA: HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF U.S. DRUG POLICY AND COLOMBIA (1970 – 1999).....	97
5. PLAN COLOMBIA: ANALYZING CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS (2000).....	127
6. PLAN COLOMBIA: ANALYZING NEWSPAPER COVERAGE (2000).....	164
7. CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF LATIN “INFERIORITY” IN ANALYSES OF CONTEMPORARY U.S. DRUG POLICY.....	197
APPENDICES.....	211
REFERENCES.....	325

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: LOCATING HISTORICAL NOTIONS OF LATIN INFERIORITY IN MODERN AMERICAN DRUG POLICY

For nearly two centuries, U.S. policy has invariably intended to serve the interests of the United States – interests variously related to our nation’s security, to our domestic politics, or to our economic development... Although these three interests are central to any explanation of United States policy toward Latin America, there is a more full explanation. Underlying these three interests is a pervasive belief that Latin Americans constitute *an inferior branch of the human species*... A belief in Latin American inferiority is the essential core of the United States policy toward Latin America because it determines the precise steps the United States takes to protect its interests in the region. (Schoultz 1998, xv, emphasis added)

That all countries have interests and that they all actively work to secure them is no revolutionary concept. Indeed, affirming that a desire for security or economic development is implicated in a given state’s foreign policy does not say very much. Instead, what is significant is how that state *constructs* its interests in line with the core beliefs of its leadership and citizenry. “National interests ... are social constructions that emerge out of a ubiquitous and unavoidable process of representation... through which meaning is created” (Weldes 1999, 15). As Schoultz argues in the excerpt above, United States interests in Latin America historically have been articulated in distinct terms predicated on the fundamental belief in Anglo-Saxon superiority. Predating the American Revolution and continuing into the present day, the “truth” of a superior American *Self* and an inferior Latino *Other* is an integral element of American policies in the Western Hemisphere. The racial and religious prejudices held by seminal leaders like Thomas Jefferson and John Quincy Adams, embodied in their embrace of the “black legend” (a portrait of a papist, servile, cruel, and bigoted people), figured significantly in American policymaking toward Spain, and, subsequently toward its regional colonies (cf., Hunt 1987; Johnson 1980). From the time of their independence in the beginning of the 19th century, the Latin American

republics were openly greeted with doubt and derision as United States emissaries and policymakers argued that they lacked the ability to sustain legitimate democratic governance (Schoultz 1998).¹ Constructions of Latinos (as infantile, unstable, savage, weak, etc) figured prominently in the United States military interventions in Mexico, the Caribbean, Central and South America, and Asia² that were carried out in the 19th and 20th centuries (Hunt 1987; Pérez 2008). The influence of such thinking on past American policies is not unexpected within a legal, political, and cultural framework based on Anglo-Saxon supremacy and “American Exceptionalism.” What is noteworthy, however, is its apparent persistence into the present day. Perhaps most notably in the area of drug policy, Latin American states continue to receive much different political, military, and economic treatment from the United States compared to other countries (Stokes 2004).³ This inconsistency is strikingly illustrated in United States policy towards Colombia.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the relationship between Colombia and the United States was marked by both direct and indirect American intervention. In 1903, in exchange for a guaranteed trans-isthmus canal route, the United States conspired with separatists to forcibly break (what would become) Panama away from Colombia (Crandall 2002). Immediate American diplomatic recognition of an independent Panama, along with the force of the United States Navy, prevented Colombia from making any move toward restoring its lost province. Nearly 20

¹ For example, an American emissary to Venezuela in 1813 described the people as “timid, indolent, ignorant, superstitious, and incapable of enterprise or exertion. From the present moral and intellectual habits of all classes, I fear they have not arrived at that point of human dignity which fits man for the enjoyment of free and rational government” (Scott quoted in Schoultz 1998, 7).

² I refer here to the Philippines in the context of the Spanish-American War (1898).

³ For example, America leverages a great deal of financial and diplomatic pressure so that Colombia’s military literally attacks cocaine production in that nation but does not demand that the same tactics be plied by the government of the Netherlands – the global supplier of MDMA (“Ecstasy”) (Vaicus and Isaacson 2003; Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 2003).

years would pass before the United States would seek to make amends by paying an indemnity (Schoultz 1998). Over the course of the 20th century, American interests in Colombia evolved, from securing trade in the 1920s and 1930s, to fighting fascism during World War II, to defeating communist expansion in the region during the Cold War (Simons 2004). With the decline and demise of the Soviet Union and the concomitant marginalization of Cuba, the United States began to focus its considerable diplomatic and economic resources on the new national emergency – cocaine production in the Andean region of South America. By the mid 1990s, United States efforts at fighting this drug production centered predominantly on Colombia (Crandall 2008). Much like its beginning, the end of the 20th century again witnessed a major American intervention in that country.

My dissertation considers the centerpiece of this modern intervention – the American orchestrated strategy of Plan Colombia – and uses it as a research site to consider the impact of notions of Latin inferiority on United States drug policy. In 1998, President Andres Pastrana unveiled and advocated for his *Marshall Plan for Colombia* (*Plan Marshall para Colombia*), a multibillion dollar, multilateral blueprint designed to end the decades long civil conflict in Colombia by focusing primarily on economic development and social reform (Fukumi 2008). However, it was the fundamentally revised *Plan Colombia: Plan for Peace, Prosperity and the Strengthening of the State* (authored in Washington⁴) – with its focus on the Colombian military

⁴ Murillo and Rey Avirama (2004) argue that the original focus of President Pastrana's plan – increasing rural economic development, reforming local and national government institutions, and ensuring basic human rights (and *not* the eradication of cocaine) as the linchpin for lasting peace and security – did not survive contact with policymakers in the Clinton Administration intent on fighting drugs. "His proposed \$7 billion reconstruction program emerged with a commitment from Washington to the tune of \$1.3 billion in aid, more than 70 percent of which would be directed toward military and security measures designed to fight the 'drug war'" (127, emphasis in original). Livingstone (2004) concurs with this assessment of two, largely separate, plans with the American focus on drugs winning out. Crandall (2002) also agrees, arguing that Plan Colombia from the beginning "was basically a Washington creation" and that "many U.S. officials readily admitted that it was essentially devised by the United States" (149).

eradicating coca production and combating drug trafficking – that became a central element of the United States’ drug control strategy for the new millennium. Beginning in July 1999, prominent U.S. government and military officials orchestrated a robust public relations drive that characterized the violence in Colombia as an imminent national security threat and pushed for a new strategy (combined with a massive aid increase) to deal with it. Plan Colombia was unveiled two months later (Crandall 2002; LeoGrande and Sharpe 2000; Rohter 1999). After a high profile lobbying campaign, the Clinton administration announced in January 2000 its intentions to create a two year, \$1.6 billion aid package to finance Plan Colombia (Crandall 2002). This proposal was submitted to Congress in February as part of the administration’s annual budget request and

contained over \$954 million in supplemental FY2000 funding and over \$318 million for FY2001 spending. (This was in addition to about \$150 million allocated and planned for existing programs in each fiscal year.) The proposal’s centerpiece was the “Push into Southern Colombia” program, which was intended to enable the Colombian government to extend CN [counter narcotics] activities throughout southern Colombia. There, coca cultivation was expanding rapidly throughout areas where the Colombian guerrillas have operated. The core of the Southern Colombia program included training and equipping two new army CN battalions, and purchasing Blackhawk and Huey helicopters to transport them (Serafino 2001, 6, emphasis in original).

Consisting primarily of military oriented aid and dictating a specific armed forces campaign targeting guerrilla-held territory, the Plan Colombia legislation marked a major escalation in United States involvement in the internal affairs of the Colombian state (Livingstone 2009; Tickner 2007). Underscoring the broad bipartisan support in Congress for this intervention, the different bills comprising this aid package passed through the House and the Senate with negligible opposition and became law in July. With a pen stroke, Colombia became the largest recipient of American aid in the world after Israel and Egypt (Crandall 2002; Serafino 2001). Set against the backdrop of rapidly increasing violence between leftist guerrillas and right wing paramilitaries aligned with the government of Colombia, an internally displaced population numbering in the hundreds of thousands, and a deepening economic recession, Plan Colombia

injected America's single-minded drive to eliminate domestic drug consumption⁵ into a complex, unpredictable foreign conflict with deep historical and ideological roots (Murillo and Rey Avirama 2004). Given this set of circumstances, it is logical to ask why this particular strategy was adopted. In the next section, I review a sample of texts (drawn from different literatures) that pursue this question.

Why Plan Colombia?

Analyses of Plan Colombia (individual or as an element of a broader study) that address the decision to intervene, the form of this intervention, and/or its outcomes figure in works spanning a number of different disciplines. I identify some of them here under the general auspices of US Foreign Policy Analysis, Security Studies, Drug Trafficking and Drug Control Policy, and Human Rights. Within the realm of U.S. foreign policy analysis, Crandall (2002, 2008) largely credits the post-Cold War policy shift away from the existential threat of communism to a focus on intermestic issues. He argues that American actions in Colombia were a result of the intermestic nature of the drug trade where perceived domestic ills fuelled an interventionist foreign policy designed to serve the national interest of ending drug use. Citing a convergence of destabilizing factors (e.g., the drug trade, government corruption, increasing violence, illegal armies, economic recession), DeShazo et al. (2007) identify Colombia at the end of the 20th century as a rapidly failing state. At that juncture, they credit the introduction of the \$1.3 billion aid package as the watershed moment in U.S. – Colombia relations. Ultimately, they conclude that American intervention in the form of Plan Colombia was a foreign policy success

⁵ Tokatlian (1990) writes that the drug trade in its early stages was only a tangential issue within United States – Colombia relations. However, by the mid 1980s, it completely dominated every aspect of American policymaking regarding Colombia. See also, Crandall (2002).

that pulled Colombia “back from the brink” and sowed the seeds for advances in human rights, security, governance, and economic development. Marcy (2010) also concludes that United States intervention was a necessary response by the Clinton administration faced with a Colombia sliding into the “abyss” of increasing economic decline, lawlessness, and internecine violence. However, the author criticizes the military orientation of Plan Colombia. Marcy cites it as one more example of the narrowly focused, Cold War oriented long term militarized drug war that has consistently failed because it overlooks the domestic economic and security needs of the states of the region. Taking an even more critical approach, Stokes (2008) characterizes Plan Colombia as the logical outgrowth of the U.S. Cold War era counter insurgency (CI) agenda cloaked in the modern day rhetorical mantle of humanitarian intervention. As evidence of the falsity of its humanitarian based claims, he cites the weak oversight controls (e.g., weak or absent human rights provisions, the reliance on Colombia to vet its own military personnel, the use of private contractors not subject to congressional oversight, an unconditional presidential waiver) built into the legislation and the strategy’s focus on the FARC rebels and not the government-aligned paramilitary groups who were clearly understood to be the primary agents of the Colombian drug trade.

Writing from the perspective of security studies, Franke & Reed (2005) examine the U.S. strategy designed to address the emerging security challenge of drug trafficking emanating from Colombia. They specifically focus on the merits of Plan Colombia as an element of that strategy. However, while the authors provide extensive background information as the context to question whether Plan Colombia is an appropriate and effective policy to address this challenge, they fail to provide any actual conclusions. In his study of a ten year period of U.S. support for the Colombian military, Ramsey (2009) highlights the obvious and imminent security threat posed

by the Colombian state on the brink of failure at the end of the 1990s. Given the ill-equipped and ill-trained Colombian military, the weakness of the Colombian government, and the single minded nature of the FARC guerrillas and narcotraffickers, he evaluates the components included within the Plan Colombia legislation designed to address this threat. Ramsey concludes that the militarized strategy born out of Plan Colombia gave the Colombian state essential breathing room and enabled the Colombian armed forces to dramatically turn around the security situation. Employing the revolution in military affairs (RMA) as a conceptual vehicle to explain change, Rochlin (2007) characterizes Colombia in 2000 as an inept, failed state plagued by “supersubversive” groups (i.e., guerrillas, paramilitaries) whose deteriorating condition rightfully alarmed the Clinton administration. In his analysis, the author points to a series of societal ruptures in Colombia throughout the 20th century that served as precipitators of a modern RMA in the form of Plan Colombia. Rochlin argues that this strategy created in Washington was designed to secure the United States’ economic and security interests in Colombia and the region as a whole. In his comparative analysis of the Mérida Initiative and Plan Colombia, Bailey (2011) also emphasizes that the latter was devised essentially to advance an American agenda. He argues that the United States’ militarized focus on the FARC guerrillas and coca production consistently overrode Colombian concerns with human rights, justice reform, and social development.

Writing within the literature on drug trafficking and drug control policy, Mejía (2010) employs game theory to establish a model of the war against illegal drugs in producer states to analyze why Plan Colombia strategies have proved ineffective in reducing the quantity of drugs reaching consumer countries. Using this model to map the strategic interplay between the disparate actors (e.g., governments, traffickers) involved and to identify their responses to

changes in policy, Mejía concludes that the generally inefficient and costly nature of current drug war policies are explained by specific factors including the ability of drug producers and traffickers to readily adapt to Plan Colombia's particular policies, the inelastic demand for drugs, the ineffectiveness of U.S. and Colombian resources devoted to reducing illegal drug production, and the priority placed on eliminating the supply of (and not the demand for) illegal drugs.

Guizado (2005) posits that particular changes in the Colombian drug trade (e.g., fragmentation of the market, trafficker alliances with the formal business sector, increasing demand from Europe, taxation by illegal armed groups) that led to increasing instability in Colombia are at the core of current U.S. policy. The author maintains that the focus on aerial fumigation of the coca crops in insurgent territory in the south of the country— as outlined in the U.S. designed Plan Colombia strategy – reflects America's overriding interest in reducing the drug supply and weakening the FARC “narco-guerrillas.” Drawing on the Industrial Military Complex concept, Guizado concludes by warning that America's increasing reliance on militarized policy solutions like Plan Colombia and the subsequent Andean Region Initiative (ARI) runs the risk of institutionalizing an International Drug Complex (IDC) that will only intensify coca production and insecurity in Colombia and the region. In a broad based, historically informed analysis of the effectiveness of the modern global system of drug control policies, Buxton (2006) attributes its consistent failures to the high level of United States ideological and institutional control. She argues that every country is compelled to adhere to the American model of drug criminalization and supply eradication regardless of its particular domestic context or national priorities. The author identifies Plan Colombia as symptomatic of America's militarized prohibitionist strategy that actually exacerbates the harms it is designed to eliminate. For example, Buxton maintains that the plan's focus on security sector reform in Colombia – at the expense of alternative

development programs – helps ensure that high levels of poverty and unemployment continue to incentivize increasing coca production in rural areas. Fukumi (2008) does not posit a monolithic, American dominated global system of drug control. Instead, the author identifies distinct United States policies (emphasizing repressive law enforcement) and European Union policies (emphasizing development) and seeks to explain why these two entities adopt different approaches to their common goal of reducing drug production in (and trafficking from) the Andean region. In the context of Plan Colombia, Fukumi concludes that its militarized form and its overriding focus on serving American policy interests (combined with the plan's disregard for economic development and the lack of consultation with local governments, NGOs, and EU members with regard to its design) effectively precluded EU participation. Ultimately, a multilateral project organized around securing Colombian peace and stability was transformed into a bilateral aid program designed to attack coca production.

In the context of human rights, Restrepo-Ruiz & Martinez (2009) highlight the plight of the growing number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Colombia. They argue that IDPs are an unintended byproduct of American policies that consistently seek to resolve conflict through military (rather than political) means. Specifically, the authors maintain that the Plan Colombia strategy – with its focus on strengthening the Colombian military and police, and the forced eradication of coca production – is central to the worsening civilian security crisis embodied in the millions who have been forcibly displaced. The injection of American military equipment, weapons, and advisors into an already violent environment increases internal displacement as civilians flee from the growing crossfire between government forces, insurgents, and paramilitaries. Moreover, the destruction of legitimate food crops and the widespread poisoning of people and livestock caused by aerial fumigations designed to eradicate coca plants

drives more and more Colombians out of their homes and into internal exile. The authors conclude with a call for a rights based approach to the conflict in Colombia to replace the failed American militarized strategy embodied in Plan Colombia. Calloway & Matthews (2008) study the impact of U.S. foreign aid on the human rights condition in recipient states. They employ a multivariate analysis to examine the relationship between U.S. economic & military aid and human rights in Latin America and find that (irrespective of rhetoric, intent, or purpose) this aid consistently has negative effects on security rights in the region. Using Plan Colombia as a case study to further elaborate on their findings, the authors conclude that its policies substantially worsened the human security environment in Colombia resulting in short term increases in murders, disappearances, kidnappings, and forced displacements and in long term insecurity brought about through state repression. Despite the plentiful human rights rhetoric employed in its formulation, Calloway & Matthews find that all human rights issues were ultimately sublimated to the U.S. focus on reducing drug cultivation and trafficking. In an analysis of U.S. – Colombia relations, Tickner (2007) argues that American policies are structured by a realist informed, state centered ideological framework that differentiates between issues of “high” politics” (e.g., security) and “low” politics (e.g. human rights). From this perspective, drug trafficking is understood as an externally based, national security threat. As such, coercive diplomacy is the preeminent mechanism for compelling cooperation from drug producing states like Colombia – whose human rights concerns are of secondary importance. Consequently, the author concludes that Plan Colombia was developed to enforce U.S. policies by equipping and directing the Colombian military in a specific campaign to eliminate coca production in guerrilla held territory in southern Colombia. In turn, the Colombian state’s “improved” violations record (achieved by outsourcing its historical pattern of systematic violence against the civilian

population to its paramilitary allies) served as a fig leaf to cover human rights concerns associated with funding its military.

A Different Approach

The subset of works detailed above (representing several academic fields of study) are extremely illustrative of the complexities associated with Plan Colombia. Via a variety of methods, each of the different authors' analyses provide useful (and often complementary) ways to better understand the development, implementation, and/or results of this U.S. policy action (without necessarily agreeing on its utility). However, these works also share a specific limitation that impacts the scope of their analyses – they generally take for granted the inherent *logic* of an American intervention in Colombia. As a rule, the possibility of this specific intervention (or any type of intervention) is not open to question. To be clear, this is not a question of the perceived moral rightness or wrongness of Plan Colombia. Instead, regardless of whether the particular author is supportive, neutral, or disparaging of the Plan Colombia strategy, the “common sense” undergirding American interference in the internal affairs of this particular sovereign peer is never fundamentally challenged. On the whole, these texts function under a framework in which attempted American control is unproblematically assumed as the natural and inevitable result of a predetermined U.S. foreign policy operating within an objective social reality (i.e., “the international system of states”) where motives and meanings are mostly transparent. In this manner, explaining “why” the United States intervened in Colombia in the way it did in 2000 is necessarily relegated to a process of identifying and invoking the particular conditions (e.g., prohibitionist oriented drug control policies, the threat posed by impending Colombian state failure, path dependence resulting from the United States' long term counter

insurgency (CI) strategy, America's preference for resolving conflict via military means) as evidence that this specific outcome was predictable (Doty 1993). Within this framework, the subjects of analysis (e.g., United States, Colombia, Latin America) are presented as fully realized with preexisting identities and interests. They pursue rational and self-interested objectives (e.g., the national interest) in accordance with the "rules of the game" and their individual abilities afforded by their relative position within its hierarchy (Weldes et al. 1999). Consequently, any effort to understand the influence of conceptions of United States superiority and concordant Latin American inferiority in the case of Plan Colombia from this perspective is necessarily limited. Whether overlooked, accepted, or decried, such conceptions of identity are simply elements of the commonsense recognition of "this is the way the world works."

This dissertation takes a different approach by employing a social constructionist framework that allows for a broader, more encompassing examination of the notions of superiority/subordination in the context of Plan Colombia and American drug policy more generally. This begins with the foundational shift away from the question of *why* this intervention occurred to the question of *how* this intervention *was possible*. Why-questions are limited in that they presuppose the identities of actors and a background of social meanings thus taking for granted the possibility of particular policies and practices. Conversely, how-questions examine how meanings are produced and attached to different actors in ways that allow for some possibilities while ruling out others (Doty 1996a).

The difference between why- and how-questions is important in judging a successful explanation. This difference can be illustrated with a brief example. One could pose the question "Why did the United States invade Panama?" Some possible explanations might point to the U.S. desire to stop the drug trafficking of Noriega, Bush's desire to overcome his "wimp" image, or the U.S. desire to overcome the Vietnam "syndrome." All of these explanations are incomplete in that they take as unproblematic the possibility that the invasion could take place. One could point to U.S. military capabilities as an explanation for the how-possible question. Still, this is incomplete in that the U.S. does not imagine invading every country to which it is militarily superior and with which it has a serious grievance. The possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine

certain courses of action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in place (Doty 1993, 298, emphasis in original).

Accordingly, analyses that pose how or how-possible questions are inherently more critical because more of the facets of policy making are made problematic. “When we pose a how-possible question, *we can still ask why*, but must in addition inquire into the practices that enable social actors to act, to frame policy as they do, and to wield the capabilities they do” (Ibid, 299, emphasis added). This why-question/how-question distinction underscores the constructionist view “that social and political life comprises a set of practices in which things are constituted *in the process of dealing with them*” (Campbell 1998, 5, emphasis added).⁶ Briefly put, from this perspective the United State’s identity (for example) is not fixed. Neither are United States interests objectively determined. Instead, as an “imagined community,” its identity is never complete. It is always in flux, constantly producing and reproducing itself via “the ritualized performances and formalized practices that operate in its name or in the service of its ideals” (e.g., foreign policy) (Ibid, 130). Similarly, its national interests emerge out of an intersubjective process of discursive practices. The particular representations of states, of relations among the states, and of the international system utilized by policymakers in this process are derived from (and also limited by) a large assortment of preexisting cultural and linguistic resources⁷ (Weldes 1999).

At its core, a constructionist view emphasizes the contingent nature of knowledge, and thus the social world (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). Inherent in this how-question oriented approach is the idea that Plan Colombia was not inevitable. Granted, “particular actions had to be

⁶ The epistemological and ontological foundations of the how-question will be addressed in detail in Chapter 2.

⁷ Weldes (1999) conceptualizes this collection of linguistic and cultural resources as the “security imaginary.”

performed in particular ways in order to bring these structural elements together in *precisely* the way that they were in fact brought together, but these actions were not themselves predetermined” (Jackson 2006a, 37, emphasis in original). For example, eleven separate amendments to the Plan Colombia legislation were proposed in the House and the Senate designed to restrict, repurpose, reduce, or completely eliminate the funds designated for the aid package. However, all eleven amendments were ultimately rejected (Serafino 2001; Vacius and Isacson 2000). Likewise, several prominent publications (e.g. *New York Times*, *Boston Globe*, *Chicago Tribune*) with national standing published editorials expressing their fundamental opposition to Plan Colombia (Vacius and Isacson 2000). Nevertheless, the legislation comprising the aid package was still signed into law. Concurrent with the recognition of the contingent disposition of knowledge within a constructionist framework is the recognition of its historical and cultural specificity (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). This has important implications for research objectives and methodology. While the central concern of conventional scholarship is to build universal theories – largely via procedures of falsification – in order to explain and predict policy outcomes (Jackson 2008; Neack, Hey, and Haney 1995), constructionist approaches are necessarily problem-driven and perspectival. As such, the empirical accounts these approaches produce “have to be evaluated as particular interpretations of the research objects they have constructed, and not as confirming or refuting instances of a separately constituted empirical theory” (Howarth 2000, 130).

With these points in mind, this dissertation considers the role of traditional American conceptions of Latin inferiority in the formulation of contemporary United States policy by posing the following questions. How was it determined that United States intervention in Colombia was necessary or permissible? More to the point, in the context of a longstanding

historical relationship between two regional republics, how were American and Colombian attributes, abilities, interests, and concerns constructed within the discourse on Plan Colombia to make possible the United States' active and dramatic interference in the internal affairs of a hemispheric neighbor and ostensible sovereign peer? And, of the myriad different ways to potentially intervene, how did Plan Colombia's military oriented approach come to present itself as the most reasonable path to success? Specifically, how were American and Colombian attributes, abilities, interests, and concerns constructed within the discourse on Plan Colombia such that a militarized option was embraced as a logical and common sense solution while other options (e.g. a billion dollar *economic* aid package for Colombia, universal domestic drug treatment) were rejected as too radical or impractical? To address these how/how-possible questions, I employ a discourse analytical methodology that draws on the work of critical/poststructuralist theorists of foreign policy and international relations including Campbell (1998), Doty (1996a, 1993), Epstein (2008), Jackson (2006a), and Weldes (1999). I also draw upon the considerable literature on historical U.S. – Latin America relations – focusing on the work of Kenworthy (1995), Pike (1992), and Schoultz (1998) – to establish the necessary long term context for analysis. Using specific, clearly defined methods consistent with its discourse analytical methodology and constructionist research framework, this study examines in detail the text of Plan Colombia related congressional hearings and newspaper coverage over a three month period – from February 1 through the end of April 2000.

While recognizing that there are many different factors that constitute the policymaking process, I argue that policymakers in this instance drew upon – and were constrained by – specific conceptions of Latinos and Latin America and of the United States. This particular repertoire of linguistic and cultural resources influenced both the decision to intervene and the

nature of the intervention itself. Specifically, the discursive construction of Colombia (and to a lesser extent, the region) in line with historical tropes or rhetorical commonplaces of Latin Americans (e.g., child-like, incapable, out of control, requiring tutelage) created a specific meaning – a crisis – for ongoing events while concurrently legitimizing Plan Colombia and proscribing other, non-military, options. On the strength of these representations, this became the dominant discourse⁸ on Plan Colombia – effectively winning this specific policy debate and marginalizing the opposition with the successful passage of the legislation. In sum, these representations functioned to create the *sufficient* conditions⁹ for America’s intervention in the specific form of Plan Colombia. Without them, the decision of whether or not to intervene – and of what form that intervention should take – would have been predicated on different reasoning that in turn would produce different policy outcomes. By highlighting the continuing influence of historical conceptions of Latin inferiority/American superiority in contemporary policymaking in this specific research site, the dissertation offers a pathway to broader understanding of United States drug policy in Latin America and drug policy more generally.

The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Methodology and research design are addressed in Chapter 2. Emphasizing its status as a research paradigm, I outline the philosophical assumptions of the constructionist framework embodied in a discourse analytical methodology. The “idealism” critique is examined as are its foundational social theories. I delineate the concepts developed by discourse scholars to describe the different processes

⁸ A discourse is dominant, according to Epstein (2008), when its “statements are experienced as ‘obvious,’ ‘true,’ and even ‘necessary’” and “its frames of thought and action become entrenched as the only possible ones. Thus routinized, these frames become modalities of social regulation” (10, emphasis in original). It is important to note (as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2) that dominance does not equal absolute control or permanence. So, while my focus is the identification and analysis of the dominant discourse on Plan Colombia, this is in no way a denial of the existence of other, competing discourses in this domain within the United States, Latin America, and elsewhere. See, for example, Livingstone (2004, 2009), Murillo & Rey Avirama (2004), and Simons (2004).

⁹ Sufficient, but not necessary. See, Jackson (2006a, 42-43)

operating within the perspective's theoretical social framework. This section concludes with a list of the specific benefits a language based approach brings to this study of Plan Colombia and a summary of the specific standards of evaluation it employs to justify its knowledge claims. Explication of the research design begins with the choice of Plan Colombia as the research site. Reflecting specific practical and theoretical considerations, I detail the four central factors (geographic relevance, institutional scale, intermesticity, methodological alignment) for its selection. I next outline my multimethod or multiperspectival approach and distinguish it from the more conventional notion of triangulation. Drawing upon the contextualized knowledge generated by the historical analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 (and with a focus on the texts "produced by the most powerful actors, transmitted through the most effective channels, and interpreted by the most recipients" (Phillips and Hardy 2002, 75)), this study examines the congressional hearings and newspaper coverage related to Plan Colombia from February 1, 2000 through April 30, 2000 via a specific set of interpretive methods.

The next two chapters function as what Jackson (2006b) terms a **rhetorical topography**¹⁰ – a clear demarcation of the cultural resources (most specifically the tropes and commonplaces) utilized by the actors in the specific historical situation under investigation. To be clear, this is not a simple catalogue of statements. "What is important here is not the presence or absence of a particular commonplace among the arguments used by partisans of one or another course of action, but the *pattern of commonplaces* that is characteristic of those arguments" (272, emphasis added). In Chapter 3, I consider the historical context of American beliefs regarding the inferiority of the peoples of Latin America. Consistent with the discourse

¹⁰ "A rhetorical topography serves as an interpretive tool, and is produced through an encounter between the theoretical concerns of the analyst and the textual record of debates and discussions relevant to some specific issue" (Jackson 2006b, 273).

analytical methodology outlined in Chapter 2, I employ a genealogical approach¹¹ that problematizes these beliefs by underscoring the contingent and contested nature of their construction over time (Howarth 2000). Drawing from the literatures of American diplomatic history, foreign policy, and U.S. – Latin America relations, I trace these beliefs via text and image from the colonial era, through the expansionary period of the 19th century, to the height of the Cold War in the 20th century, and demonstrate the different ways in which representations of American superiority and Hispanic subordination figured in the articulation of United States policy actions in the region. Moreover, I catalog these representations and identify the dominant historical tropes or rhetorical commonplaces (e.g., the child, America as natural leader) employed by U.S. policymakers for use in my analyses of congressional hearings and newspaper coverage in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, respectively. Plan Colombia was the culmination of decades of American policy efforts directed towards ending the Colombian drug trade. In Chapter 4, I complement the genealogy of American conceptions of Latin inferiority with a detailed chronology (1970 – 1999) of contemporary United States – Colombia relations. While initially a tangential concern, I explore the circumstances in which the issue of drugs came to dominate *every* aspect of this relationship by the middle of the 1980s. Subsequently, I detail the conditions in Colombia leading to its precarious security situation at the end of the 1990s and outline the creation and implementation of the American engineered solution – Plan Colombia. By examining the political, cultural, and economic impact of drugs over this period, I am able to map out the production and deployment of both traditional tropes and new representations (e.g.,

¹¹ Developed by Michel Foucault, a genealogical approach “investigates the unpredictable events that form entities, and stresses the eruption of clashing political forces in key historical conjunctures as the driving element of history. Moreover, while traditional historians adopt a ‘suprahistorical’ point of view, taking history as an objective process separate from the historian’s gaze, genealogy is committed to a thoroughgoing ‘perspectivism’ in which events are perceived from the particular point of view of a ‘situated’ researcher” (Howarth 2000, 71, emphasis in original).

narco-guerrilla, narco-terrorist, narco-democracy) for use in the analyses in the next two chapters.

In Chapter 5, the collected congressional hearings addressing Plan Colombia are examined via the analytical concept¹² of positioning. For this analysis, I adopt Doty's (1993) extremely detailed framework of positioning, described as a Discursive Practices Approach. In Chapter 6, I examine the coverage of Plan Colombia in five major American newspapers. To carry out the analysis, I employ a complementary set of analytical tools drawn from the literatures of critical discourse analysis, critical cultural studies, sociolinguistics, and critical media studies. In Chapter 7, I summarize the findings of my analyses and place them within the larger historical context of U.S. – Latin America relations and American drug policy. I consider the implications of these results for future research by reflecting briefly on a subsequent militarized American drug policy intervention in Latin America – the Mérida Initiative (also known as Plan Mexico).

¹² Independent from the notion of mechanically applied categories, analytical concepts are sensitizing tools that “can suggest what to look for and help us to interpret what we see” (Wood and Kroger 2000, 99). To be clear, these concepts should not be viewed as predetermined, exclusive categories but as tools for informing analysis.

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND A MULTIMETHOD APPROACH

Discourse analytical approaches take as their starting point the claim of structuralist and poststructuralist linguistic philosophy, that our access to reality *is always through language*. (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 8, emphasis added)

Qualitative research is inherently multimethod in focus. However, the use of multiple methods, or triangulation, reflects an attempt to secure an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon in question. Objective reality can never be captured. We can know a thing only through its representations. Triangulation is not a tool or strategy of validation, but an alternative to validation. The combination of multiple methodological practices, empirical materials, perspectives, and observers in a single study is best understood, then, as a strategy that add rigor, breadth, complexity, richness, and depth to any inquiry. (Denzin and Lincoln 2000, 5)

This chapter is organized in two parts. **Part one** focuses on methodology. I begin with a brief overview of discourse analysis that emphasizes its status as a research paradigm and not simply a collection of methods. Next, I address the central philosophical assumptions of discourse analysis by juxtaposing its epistemological and ontological commitments with those of positivism and discussing their methodological implications. As “idealism” is a common critique of constructionist approaches, I then consider the relationship between ideas and material reality within this perspective. This is followed by an explication of those elements of structuralist and poststructuralist linguistic theory which constitute the basis of the social theories that sustain discourse analysis. After a brief summary, I deploy the concepts developed by discourse scholars to help describe the different processes (including the making of meaning, individual and collective identity formation, and the mechanisms for social continuity and change) operating within the perspective’s theoretical social framework. However, its specific orientations toward the production of social knowledge dictate that traditional standards of evaluation (i.e., validity and reliability) cannot be blithely applied. To this end, I list in detail the specific standards of

evaluation that discourse analysis employs to justify its knowledge claims (i.e., warranting). I finish this section by specifically outlining the value that a discourse approach brings to this study of Plan Colombia and U.S. drug policy generally. **Part two** of the chapter addresses the dissertation's research design. I first speak to the choice of Plan Colombia as the primary research site. Reflecting specific practical and theoretical considerations, I detail the four central factors (geographic relevance, institutional scale, intermesticity, methodological alignment) for its selection. After underscoring the problem-driven nature of my research design, I describe the utility of its multimethod or multiperspectival approach while clearly differentiating it from the more conventional notion of triangulation. Within this framework, the debate surrounding Plan Colombia is conceptualized as an order of discourse – a social space where two or more discourses each struggle to control the same domain by fixing particular meanings. I conclude the chapter by delineating the data identification and collection process. With a focus on “important” texts, I draw my discursive data for this study of Plan Colombia from two prominent platforms of discursive formation – the government and the mass media – with a separate interpretive method of analysis used for each data source.

Part One – A Discourse Analytical Methodology

Any discussion of discourse analysis logically requires consideration of what is meant by *discourse*. The term is used in many different ways in the social sciences and definitions vary. Nevertheless, “in many cases, underlying the word ‘discourse’ is the general idea that language is structured according to different patterns that people’s utterances follow when they take part in different domains of social life, familiar examples being ‘medical discourse’ and ‘political discourse’” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 1, emphasis in original). While this definition is a

useful first step, ultimately, the meaning of discourse – and, therefore, discourse analysis – is dependent upon the research context and the theoretical system employed so it incumbent upon the researcher to specify them (Howarth 2000; Wodak 2008). This necessary methodological clarity, however, is not always present in scholarly work. For example, Jackson (2008) argues that in the social sciences (including the study of international politics), philosophical concepts are largely avoided while *methods* are often conflated with *methodology* despite the crucial distinction between the two. Instead, “because of the dominance of classically objective methodology, our putative ‘methodological’ discussions in IR have largely been method discussions: how best to achieve ‘progress’ in accurately representing the world in our accounts, how to select cases so as to most efficiently test hypotheses, and so forth” (131, emphasis in original). To clarify, whereas methods are techniques for collecting and analyzing small portions of data, methodology is a concern with the overall structure and practice of scientific inquiry (Ibid). To this point, it is important to note that discourse analysis as employed in this dissertation is not simply a method for examining language use that can be used with any theoretical framework. It is better understood as a research paradigm or program¹³ consisting of specific philosophical, theoretical and methodological commitments that dictate the type of methods of analysis selected and the manner in which they can be employed (Howarth 2005; Milliken 1999).

Philosophy & Methodology

¹³ While there is some variation among the social constructionist approaches to discourse scholarship (see, for example, Torfing 2005), Milliken (1999) argues for its general paradigmatic status. “Like other research programmes, [sic] its adherents attend to, cite and follow up on the work of knowledge producers socially acknowledged as important for the research programme. As part of a shared 'argumentation format' demarcating the programme, scholars in this area also acknowledge and build their research upon a set of theoretical commitments that organize discourse studies and implicitly restrict appropriate contexts of justification/discovery” (228, emphasis in original).

To elaborate on these specific philosophical commitments, it is useful to first provide a familiar but differing set of philosophical assumptions as a point of comparison. To wit, (neo)positivist approaches to politics presuppose “an external world with a more or less determinate essential character” (Jackson 2008, 136). The social world is understood as objective – free standing, fully formed, and separate from human experience and knowledge. Consequently, from this perspective “the goal of social science is to explain phenomena and events in objective universal terms” (Howarth 2000, 126). Drawing on methodologies from the physical sciences, researchers seek to uncover the causal relationships at work in the world in order to make accurate predictions of (and possibly prevent) future events (Taylor 2001b). This search for universal laws is largely carried out through procedures of falsification – “the testing of hypothetical conjectures about the world against that world, and seeing which conjectures survive the process” – in the drive to come closer and closer to revealing the foundational knowledge that explains the one, true world (Jackson 2008, 135). “The whole or final truth about the world may not be attainable, but successive researchers attempt to approach it, testing hypotheses and taking a fallibilistic approach in which previous findings are treated as provisional and open to further testing” (Taylor 2001b, 11). Knowledge derived in this manner is understood as both universal (i.e., holding across time and space) – and as such, readily generalizable to other contexts – and value free in that the researcher serves merely as a neutral conduit for the revealed truth (Jackson 2008; Taylor 2001b).

By contrast, discourse analysis (with its constructionist orientation) maintains a commitment to an (overlapping) anti-foundationalist epistemology and an anti-essentialist ontology (Torfing 2005). Discourse analysis is anti-foundationalist in that it rejects the possibility of a single, universal truth transcending human action. In other words, no account of

the social world can escape the influence of the pre-existing beliefs, values, and interests of the observer (Taylor 2001b). Instead, knowledge – as a product of human interchange – is understood as “historically and culturally specific and *contingent*: our worldviews and our identities could have been different, and they can change over time” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 5, emphasis in original). Accordingly, knowledge derived through discourse analytic research is assumed to be partial, situated (in the specific contexts outlined), and relative (to the researcher’s views and values) (Taylor 2001b). As a result, according to Torfing (2005, 13-14), truth “is always local and flexible.” This also speaks to the anti-essentialism of discourse analysis in that multiple truths reflect multiple social realities (Taylor 2001b). Since knowledge is contingent, there is no transcendental center that dictates the essential interests and preferences of social actors or the essential functions of social systems (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000; Torfing 2005). These epistemological and ontological commitments prescribe a methodological approach for analyzing the social world that is fundamentally different from conventional thinking.

Traditional qualitative approaches often assume a social world and then seek to understand the meanings of this world for participants. Discourse analysis, on the other hand, tries to explore how the socially produced ideas and objects that populate the world were created in the first place and how they are maintained and held in place over time. Whereas other qualitative methodologies work to understand or interpret social reality as it exists, discourse analysis endeavors to uncover the way in which it is produced. This is the most important contribution of discourse analysis: it examines how language constructs phenomena, not how it reflects and reveals it. In other words, discourse analysis views discourse as constitutive of the social world – not a route to it – and assumes that the world *cannot be known* separately from discourse (Phillips and Hardy 2002, 6, emphasis added).

From this perspective, there is no inherent distinction between the world and knowledge of the world – that is, between things (objects of investigation) and thoughts (representations of those objects) (Jackson 2008). Social reality is not seen as a fixed entity whose “true,” essential meaning can be understood through revelatory examination but is instead actually constructed and mediated via language. A distinction is made between trying to discover “truth” and trying to understand how “truth” is formed (Wetherell and Potter 1992). But, if the world cannot be

known separately from discourse, does this deny material reality? Does nothing then exist separate from human thoughts and ideas?

Ideas and Reality

A discourse analytical methodology does not deny the existence of a material world or suggest that everything is ideas – “the position here is not that the world (things) is simply a function of what the researcher thinks about it (thoughts)” (Jackson 2008, 133). Instead, sidestepping the materialist/idealist divide altogether, it maintains that discursive and material practices are interconnected and coconstituted (Epstein 2008). Put another way, real things exist, but *their meanings* are constituted within discourse. “Hence, a particular piece of land can be constructed as habitat for an endangered species by a group of biologists, a recreational facility by the urban population, fertile farm land by the local farmers, or a business opportunity by urban developers” (Torfing 2005, 18). To be clear, it is not that language (like a magician pulling a rabbit out of hat) literally creates physical matter where there was none. This hypothetical piece of land exists outside of human experience but what it *is* (its identity) is contingent on the specific contextualized meaning constituted by a discourse. In this sense, a discourse is “a cohesive ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations about a specific object that frame that object in a certain way and, therefore, delimit the possibilities for action in relation to it” (Epstein 2008, 2). So, to continue with Torfing’s example of a particular piece of land, applying for building permits, clear cutting trees and poisoning wildlife, and posting For Sale signs are just some of the (both linguistic and material) social practices that would constitute it as an business opportunity (and not as fertile farmland or as a recreational area). In an illustration of an event in

the Caribbean in 1983, Doty (1996a) further underscores this relational understanding of the material and the discursive:

So, for example, when U.S. troops march into Grenada, this is certainly “real,” though the march of troops across a geographic space is in itself singularly uninteresting and socially irrelevant outside of the representations that produce meaning. It is only when “American” is attached to the troops and “Grenada” to the geographic space that meaning is created. What the physical behavior *is*, though, is still far from certain until discursive practices constitute it as an “invasion,” a “show of force,” a “training exercise,” a “rescue,” and so on. What is “really” going on in such a situation is inextricably linked to the discourse within which it is located (5, emphasis in original).¹⁴

This idea that the discursive and the material are “tightly bound up and mutually constitutive” (Epstein 2008, 5) and that “physical reality is totally superimposed by the social” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 35), is based on a particular view of language. Traditional approaches view language as referential. From that perspective, language is understood as “transparent in that it reflects perceptions, motivations, and belief systems” and “merely gives names to the meanings already possessed by actors” (Doty 1993, 301). That is, words merely correspond to the essential meanings of objects already existing in the objective world. Conversely, discourse scholars maintain that language is *constitutive*. “With language, we create representations of reality that are never mere reflections of a pre-existing reality but contribute to constructing reality” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 9). Consequently, discourse analysis requires a shift from distinguishing between talk and action to the recognition that talk *is* action. Words (like all semiosis¹⁵) are not only *about* things, they also *do* things (Wood and Kroger 2000).¹⁶ For this

¹⁴ For a similar argument and examples see also, Wendt (1999, 176-178).

¹⁵ “Semiosis includes all forms of meaning making – visual images, body language, as well as language” (Fairclough 2001a, 122).

¹⁶ “For example, speech act theory focuses on the fact that by saying something we are also doing something. When someone utters a statement such as ‘I promise’ or ‘I name this ship the Queen Mary’, and meets their requisite ‘felicity conditions’ – in other words, they do intend to keep their promises or are authorized to name ships – they are also performing an act” (Howarth 2000, 6, emphasis in original).

shift towards a constitutive understanding of language, and thus, the contingency of the social domain, discourse analysis draws from structuralist and post-structuralist linguistic theories.

Language as an Open and Unstable System

Drawing on the work of structuralist Ferdinand de Saussure, discourse scholars view language *as a system* where ideas are expressed via signs that are comprised of a sound-image (signifier) and a concept (signified) (Howarth 2000). Challenging traditional notions of language, “Saussure’s analysis of *signification* had shown that the relationship between the word and the object, or the *signifier* and the *signified*, far from being ‘innate’ or ‘automatic’ is purely arbitrary, since different languages each feature their own sign for the same object” (Epstein 2008, 7, emphasis in original). This logic underscores the contingency of meaning in that words cannot *objectively* represent anything. They are intrinsically empty in that the

world does not dictate the words with which it should be described, and, for example, the sign ‘dog’ is not a natural consequence of a physical phenomenon. The form of the sign is different in different languages (for example, ‘chien’ and ‘Hund’), and the content of the sign also changes on being applied in a new situation (when, for example, saying to a person, ‘you’re such a dog’) (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 10, emphasis in original).

Consequently, language – in addition to being constitutive – is conceived as both *relational* and *differential*. That is, signs (words) only have meaning when they are set into relations with other, different signs within a discourse. “For instance, ‘mother’ derives its meaning not by virtue of its reference to a type of object, but because it is differentiated from ‘father’, ‘grandmother’, ‘daughter’ and other related terms” (Howarth 2000, 20, emphasis in original). However, while discourse scholars adopt these conceptualizations from structuralism, they reject its deterministic view in favor of poststructuralism’s view of language as an *open, unstable* system. Specifically, they question Saussure’s conception of the closed structure of a language system. To extrapolate from Saussure’s assumption that all signs are secured into fixed, consistent relationships with

each other, Jørgensen & Phillips (2002) use the metaphor of a fishing net (with each sign as a knot in the net) to explicate his view of language as an unchangeable and totalizing structure. “When the net is stretched out, the knot is fixed in position by its distance from the other knots in the net, just as the sign is defined by its distance from other signs” (11). However, poststructuralist scholars hold that this “fishing net” notion of language as one general system of meaning is untenable because it cannot account for structural change. Instead, they maintain that language should be seen as open and unstable because “while a sign gets its meaning from its relationships with other signs in a particular context, every sign can break with that context and function differently in new situations. If I shout out the word ‘Fire!’, it has different meanings relative to the context in which it is uttered” (Howarth 2000, 39, emphasis in original). Therefore, structure (far from being fixed) is always provisional as it is built, replicated, and transformed via discursive practices. “In specific speech acts (and writing), people draw on the structure – otherwise speech would not be meaningful – but they may also challenge the structure by introducing alternative ideas for how to fix the meaning of signs” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 11-12). Due to this perpetual state of contingent possibility, poststructuralists do not view language as one universal system of meaning per Saussure. Rather, the structure of language is understood as a series of differential systems of signification (i.e., discourses) where meanings change from discourse to discourse (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002; Milliken 1999). In this sense, “language use is *a social phenomenon*: it is through conventions, negotiations, and conflicts in social contexts that structures of meaning are fixed and challenged” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 25, emphasis added).

To summarize the points made so far, discourse analysis rests on assumptions that humanity’s sole access to reality is through language and that all knowledge about reality is

necessarily partial, situated, and contingent. While real things like whales, mountains, and the moon exist outside of human experience, they only achieve specific meaning *as* whales, *as* mountains, and *as* the moon via language. Rather than merely reference or reflect it, language – understood as an array of open ended, unstable systems of signifying differences (discourses) – actually constructs the social world by ascribing meaning (identities) to the different subjects and objects within it. Because their meaning relies upon a socially constructed set of rules and significant differences, all objects are understood as objects of discourse. This discursive construction underscores the provisional nature of the social world. For example, Torfing’s (2005) aforementioned particular piece of land was characterized for demonstrative purposes as a “business opportunity.” Yet, it *could have been* “farmland,” or a “recreational area,” or something else entirely – depending upon the discursive practices constituting it. But, if meaning is so contingent, how does something ever actually mean anything? How precisely do language practices work? Who gets to make the final decision on what things truly mean?

Theoretical Concepts

Arguing for the ultimately contingent character of the social world may, at first glance, seem to be a losing proposition. While some things do change, so many more things – the state, war, capitalism, children, taxes, etc, etc – seem to endure unaltered. Discourse theorists counter this critique with two clarifying points about contingent meaning. First, contingency does not equal chaos. Just because fundamentally things could always have been different doesn’t portend that change is necessarily constant or simple. Second, meanings can and must be fixed for any identity or social formation to be possible. They just can’t be fixed permanently, only *partially* (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000; Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). As addressed above, this is the

inevitable result of language's open and unstable structure. However, the impossibility of fixing specific meanings does not stop humans from constantly striving to do it. According to

Jørgensen & Phillips (2002):


The creation of meaning as a social process is about the fixation of meaning, *as if* a Saussurian structure existed. We constantly strive to fix the meaning of signs by placing them in particular relations to other signs; returning to the metaphor, we try to stretch out the fishing-net so that the meaning of each sign is locked into a specific relationship to the others. The project is ultimately impossible because every concrete fixation of the sign's meaning is *contingent*; it is possible but not necessary (25, emphasis in original).

It is through the processes that underlie this Sisyphean struggle to seal off the perpetually open and unstable system of signs that specific meanings are fixed, reproduced, and changed in the social domain. To better explain these processes, discourse scholars have developed specific theoretical concepts.

Articulation refers to the general practice of establishing chains of connotation among a given set of signs to fix their identity. "In this way, different terms and ideas come to connote or to 'summon' one another, to be welded into associative chains that make up an identifiable, if not logically consistent, whole" (Weldes 1999, 98, emphasis in original). A discourse is an articulatory practice in that it strives to fix meaning within a specific sphere (e.g., the discourse of medicine) separated from the general *field of discursivity* (i.e., the universe of all possible meanings about everything) (Howarth 2000). Partial fixation of meaning in a discourse is made possible via **nodal points**. "A nodal point is a privileged sign around which the other signs are ordered; the other signs acquire their meaning from their relationship to the nodal point" (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 26). Consider once again Torfing's (2005) example of a piece of land. In that context, the hypothetical "urban development" discourse can be seen as the effort to articulate a specific set of related meanings ordered around the nodal point of "land" – specifically represented as a business opportunity. In this discursive reality therefore, the identities of humans as "customers" or "residents," wild animals and insects as "pests," acres of

overgrown trees, weeds, and wild flowers as “obstacles to construction,” etc, crystallize around

Table 1. Articulating “Land” as a Business Opportunity



the notion of this parcel of earth as an exploitable commodity. [See Table 1]

So, in practice, a particular discourse (operating as if complete closure was possible) seeks to stretch out and seal off the Saussurian fishing net. It tries to fix the specific meaning of each sign in its relations to other signs by *excluding all other possible meanings*. “It is an attempt to stop the sliding of signs in relation to one another and hence to create a unified system of meaning” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 27).

However, as already discussed at length, the ultimate contingency of meaning makes this impossible. “Moreover, as discourses are relational entities whose identities depend on their differentiation from other discourses, they are themselves dependent and vulnerable to those meanings that are necessarily excluded in discursive articulation” (Howarth 2000, 103). More specifically, the articulation of the “urban development” discourse outlined above requires the exclusion of incompatible meanings (e.g., old growth forest as a symbol of national heritage, wildlife as integral elements of the ecosystem) *to be* the urban development discourse – and not something else. And yet, the alternate possibilities represented by those same excluded, incompatible meanings pose a permanent barrier to its efforts to fix meaning. “Hence, there is always room for *struggles* over what the structure should look like, what discourses should


prevail, and how meaning should be ascribed to signs” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 29, emphasis in original).

The four discourses (i.e., biologist, urban population, local farmer, & urban developer) proposed in Torfing’s example struggling to fix the meanings associated with the “particular piece of land” constitute the *order of discourse* (or social ordering) of that specific domain (Fairclough 2001b; Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). The concept of the order of discourse – “a limited range of discourses that struggle in the same terrain” – provides the necessary intermediate analytical category to separate a specific discourse from the general field of discursivity (i.e., the universe of all possible meanings) (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 27).¹⁷ A particular privileged identity of “land” (respectively – habitat; recreational facility; fertile farmland; business opportunity) serves as the nodal point that regulates the internal structure of each of these four discourses. However, “land” also acts as a key site of contestation or *floating signifier*¹⁸ (Epstein 2008) in the ongoing struggle *between* the different discourses to fix meaning. [See Table 2]

¹⁷ For instance, an order of discourse of medicine could contain both open heart surgery and acupuncture (as potentially competing (i.e., Western versus Eastern) systems of meaning within medical practice) while excluding, say, barbecue grills and high performance tires.

¹⁸ Instead of floating signifier, Hansen and Sørensen (2005) use the term *organizing metaphor* for this concept.

Table 2. “Land” as a Floating Signifier



From the perspective of discourse analysis, this ongoing struggle (like all such struggles) is inherently *political* in that its (temporary) outcome will be *hegemony*. Politics, in this sense, is not “about conscious decisions taken by some central decision makers on the basis of rational calculation, but rather about an endless series of de facto decisions, which result from a myriad of decentred [sic] actions undertaken by political agents aiming to forge a hegemonic discourse” (Torfing 2005, 15). For instance, should the urban development discourse’s articulations – of the four discourses that comprise this particular hypothetical order of discourse – win out and become the dominant meanings, this will shape the social in one way that suppresses all others (Howarth 2000; Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). Hegemonic or dominant discourses fix meanings by naturalizing, by creating a “common sense” that circumscribes all action in that sphere (Epstein 2008; Torfing 2005). When discourses are so firmly established that they appear factual, unchangeable and their inherent contingency is forgotten, they are no longer political but are *objective*.

Objectivity is the historical outcome of political processes and struggles; it is *sedimented* discourse. The boundary between objectivity and the political, or between what seems natural and what is contested, is thus a fluid and historical boundary, and earlier sedimented discourses can, at any time, enter the play of politics and be problematised [sic] in new articulations (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 36, emphasis in original).

That some discourses become sedimented, that some meanings become partially fixed, is a function of *power*. Power, in this context, does not refer to a tangible resource that pre-existing actors use to dominate others. “Rather, it is a kind of power that produces meanings, subject identities, their interrelationships, and a range of imaginable conduct” (Doty 1996a, 5). Discourses, therefore, can be understood as sets of socially and historically constructed rules that create knowledge by effectively designating what is and what is not (Carabine 2001). Consequently, the “construction of discourses always involves both inclusion and exclusion of identity and this means that discourse and power are intrinsically linked with each other” (Torfing 2005, 23). In this way, power is both *enabling* in that it creates the social order in which humans live and *constraining* in that it creates that same particular social order by excluding all alternative possibilities (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002).

Social Stability and Social Change

As should be clear at this point, the continuous struggle to fix meaning in the social world is a central principle of discourse analysis and understanding the processes by which meaning is fixed and/or changes is a central goal. Discourse analysis sees human (individual and group) action as the motor that drives this struggle but this view is based on a particular understanding of the constitution of social actors. From this perspective, actors are not wholly formed, autonomous (individual or groups of individual) agents with pre-given interests that form social structures. Neither are they collective entities whose identities and interests are solely determined by existing (economic and material) structures (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000; Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). Instead, actors are understood as subjects constituted and relationally positioned with other objects within discourse. Consequently, the interests and identities of actors are

partially determined by the *subject positions* carved out by specific discourses (Epstein 2008).

By way of illustration, consider how

at a medical consultation the positions of ‘doctor’ and ‘patient’ are specified. Corresponding to these positions, there are certain expectations about how to act, what to say and what not to say. For instance, the doctor has the authority to say what is wrong with the patient; the patient can only guess. If the doctor does not believe that the patient is sick, and the patient insists on it, then the patient has exceeded the boundary for what is allowed in the patient position and is branded a hypochondriac (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 41, emphasis in original).

The process by which actors identify themselves and their place in the social order via subject positions is called *interpellation* (Weldes 1999). In other words, by participating in the medical consultation and implicitly accepting its particular logics, customs, and rules, these two actors have subscribed to or recognized themselves in (i.e., interpellated) the specific identities (subject positions) of “doctor” and “patient” created by this discourse along with the attendant interests, privileges, and obligations of those identities. In this way, identity is always acquired via *representation* and is relationally organized. In this case, the subject “doctor” is determined both by the cluster of specific signifiers (e.g., “medical school graduate,” “professional practice,” “designated office,” “authority on disease,” etc) that constitute it and the presence and positioning of the contrasting subject “patient” (or “not-doctor”) (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). This is not, however, the likely sum of these two actors because a single agent can be produced in a multitude of ways. “A particular social actor may regard herself as ‘black’, ‘working class’, ‘Christian’ or a ‘woman’, or a particular combination of these identities, depending on the availability of these subject positions, a point around which these different subject positions can be articulated and the existence of sustaining practices” (Howarth 2000, 108, emphasis in original). Consequently, the subject is always *fragmented* – a bundle of different identities that generally appear completely natural, coherent, and stable until they are not (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). To this point, the notion of subject positions in discourse analysis speaks to the different ways agents are constituted *as actors* but *political subjectivity* speaks to the ways in

which *they act* in terms of the choices they make. For example, the hypothetical subject of Howarth's example above chose to identify with "black" and not "Negro" or "African-American" or some other available position. In this way, the "actions of subjects emerge because of the contingency of those discursive structures through which a subject obtains its identity" (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 13).

Discourse analysis extends the same principles to the process of collective identity. Meaning is fixed by eliminating alternative possibilities. "People are constituted as groups through a process by which some possibilities of identification are put forward as relevant while others are ignored" (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 44). Moreover, group identity stems not from some internal essence but from differences from (and relations to) other identified groups. In this sense, the boundaries of "Us" are circumscribed by the articulation of a "Them." For example, Howarth (2005) relates how, in the 1970s, the discourse of South Africa's Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) tried to form a new social order in South Africa by collapsing all of the different groups variably oppressed by apartheid into one universal identity of "blacks" – defined in opposition to white racism's monolithic oppression. "They did this by articulating and reiterating a discourse of Black Consciousness that valorized black identity and culture, while negating white racism in its various guises" (324). Discourse scholars conceptualize the dissolution of the particular identities of subjects within a discourse by the formation of a purely negative, threatening external identity as the *logic of equivalence* (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000). By contrast, the apartheid era government of South Africa sought to maintain and reinforce the ethnic and racial divisions of the country by privileging certain non-white groups (e.g., Indians, "coloreds") with (limited) rights, privileges, and resources that were denied to the balance of the population (Howarth 2000; Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000). This is

conceptualized as the *logic of difference* – an effort to disperse polar oppositions (in this case, the black/white divide) by articulating a multiplicity of different identities (i.e., subject positions) and their attendant interests (Clohesy 2005). These two logics are not mutually exclusive but are instead complexly interrelated. For example, the BCM’s efforts to foster a “black” identity painted over existing social inequities between nonwhites while the different groups that the South African government articulated resulted in resources and political space that helped some nonwhites to work against the apartheid system (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000).

These two examples underscore how *social antagonisms* resulting from mutually exclusive identities are central to discourse analysis’ theory of social formation (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). At certain points in time, some discourses become so sedimented that the meanings and identities they articulate take on the status of facts and “common sense” until a situation emerges that these discourses cannot address. This *dislocation* reveals the contingent nature of meaning – rupturing the “normal” order and inducing a crisis as the subject is no longer able to fully attain her identity (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000; Stavrakakis 2005). As an example, Jørgensen & Phillips (2002) consider the relationship between the discourses of socialism and nationalism in the period just prior to World War I:

Although a subject has different identities, these do not have to relate antagonistically to one another... one can be a ‘worker’ and a ‘Scot’ at the same time. But, if the worker identity excludes obligations to the country in war, for instance, or if the national identity summons people to kill those whom they consider to be fellow workers in other countries, then the relationship between the two identities becomes antagonistic. The two identities make contrasting demands in relation to the same actions within a common terrain, and inevitably one blocks the other. The individual discourses, which constitute each of the identities, are part of each other’s field of discursivity, and, when an antagonism occurs, everything the discourse has excluded threatens to undermine the discourse’s existence and fixity of meaning (47-48, emphasis in original).

Dislocations shatter existing social structures and identities and result in antagonisms – colliding discourses seeking to establish their particular social order. Subject positions (e.g., worker, Scot) become political subjectivities in the wake of these structural failures as the actor *is forced to*

identify with one of the competing political projects (and its immanent discursive structure) in order to repair the tear in the social order (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000). In this sense, the subject is not determined by the structure. She decides ultimately which identity to interpellate. Neither, however, does the subject constitute the structure. The decision she ultimately makes is necessarily conditioned by the possibilities immanent in the existing order of discourse (in this case, socialism versus nationalism) (Howarth 2000). As addressed above, these struggles may be resolved via hegemonic intervention – a dominant discourse that successfully removes ambiguity and restores objectivity through the sedimentation of particular meanings. It is at that point that the now stabilized political subjectivities become the subject positions that construct actors with particular interests and characteristics (Hansen and Sørensen 2005; Howarth 2000). To continue with their example from above, Jørgensen & Phillips (2002) maintain that ultimately “in the First World War the reason why soldiers could be recruited among the ‘workers’ was that the already established worker identity was suppressed through a hegemonic intervention in favour [sic] of a national identity” (48, emphasis in original).

It can be readily inferred that not all discourses are equally powerful or capable at any given time. Only those discourses that “manage to provide a credible principle upon which to read past, present, and future events, and capture people’s hearts and minds, become hegemonic” (Torfing 2005, 15). In the face of dislocation, *myths* form the core of every discourse competing for hegemony. “In other words, when a society comes face to face with the collapse of its hegemonic political order... then this structural dislocation has to be administered through the formation of a new myth if social coherence is to be restored” (Celik 2005, 194-195). As previously discussed, discourse analysis rests on the assumption of a perpetually open society – the fishing net can never be stretched out, sealed off, and locked in place – but humans

continuously operate *as if* society and all things social were fixed, stable, and real. In that vein, a myth is a specific floating signifier (i.e., a point of contestation among discourses) that represents a *totality*.

With words like ‘the people’ or ‘the country’ we seek to demarcate a totality by ascribing it an objective content. But the totality remains an imaginary entity. If, for instance, a Labour politician in a British electoral campaign announces that ‘we will do the best for the country’, and a Conservative politician says the same thing, then it is most probably very different images of the country, and very different plans, they have in mind (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 39, emphasis in original).

With their specific frameworks of meaning, myths provide a space to incorporate different social demands and to neutralize dislocations. Myths that succeed in this become *imaginaries* (Howarth 2005). Specifically, an imaginary is conceived as “the structuring principle underlying a set meanings and social relations and constituting them into an organized set of understandings and social identities that are productive of worlds” (Muppidi 1999, 124). In this sense, Howarth & Stavrakakis (2000) cite the Enlightenment, the Christian Millennium, and positivism’s specific representation of progress as examples of social imaginaries.¹⁹ This conceptual distinction permits analysis of hegemonic formation as a process (as myths beat out their competitors to become imaginaries and imaginaries devolve into a contest of myths) and not simply a condition (Norval 2000). However, it must be stated again that the inherent contingency of the social world as understood by discourse analysis does not mean that change is necessarily constant or easily accomplished. Jørgensen & Phillips (2002) emphasize that while meanings are never totally fixed, they are also never wholly fluid. “The social is always partly structured in particular ways; discourses have, so to speak, a weightiness and an inertia in which we are more or less caught up, and there is at all times a vast area of objectivity which it is hard to think beyond” (38).

¹⁹ Weldes’ (1999) elucidation of the “security imaginary” is another, more general example of the concept.

To recapitulate, discourse analysis holds that all social practice takes place against a backdrop of historically contextualized discourses in a hegemonic struggle to naturalize meanings within a specific domain by excluding (logic of equivalence) or co-opting (logic of difference) all other possible meanings. Discourses are understood as complete systems of differential meanings internally organized around key signifiers or nodal points (e.g. “land”) that in turn serve as points of contestation between the particular discourses (e.g., urban development, local farmer, etc) in an order of discourse. Individual and collective identity is the product of both the different subject positions (e.g., mother, wife, feminist, Catholic, Bolivian) created by discourses and the agent’s subjective decision to interpellate them (or not). When hegemonic discourses are dislocated by events they cannot address or encompass, newly mutually exclusive identities result in social antagonisms. To restore social order, hegemonic interventions rely on myths and imaginaries. Finally, while everything social is theoretically contingent, existing discursive structures do strongly condition the possibilities for social change. All told, the philosophical, methodological, and theoretical commitments that underlie discourse analysis clearly separate it from traditional approaches to the study of politics. With this understood, what is the entry point for empirical analysis?

Access to Discourse

The empirical data generated for the study of discourse is derived from texts – a loose term that encompasses a broad range of semiotic forms including written documents, spoken words, interviews, pictures, symbols, survey data, and observed and unobserved social practices (Hansen and Sørensen 2005; Howarth 2005; Stillar 1998). Discourses are located and performed

in a variety of texts, yet they exist beyond the individual texts that constitute them (Phillips and Hardy 2002).

From this perspective, a 'text' is a text, and a 'discourse' a discourse, as both terms refer to two different realities. The first is textual. The second, wider term, is multitextual: it is *intertextual*. From this discursive standpoint, what is a text? First, the text is the basic unit of a *textual class*: it is a *discursive unit*. Second, a text is the *material manifestation* of a discourse. Unlike its individual components, a discourse is a concrete but not a material entity. As an *entirety of texts*, a discourse is not material, like its components, the texts. It is concrete however, since it is an historical and social reality (Chalaby 1996, 688, emphasis in original).

The notion of intertextuality – that is, the manner in which texts “always refer back to other texts which themselves refer to still other texts” (Doty 1993, 302) – highlights how individual texts are by themselves meaningless. They are made meaningful only via their interrelation with other texts, the different discourses on which they draw, and the manner of their construction, distribution, and consumption. Discourse analysis therefore focuses on tracing the constitutive effects of discourse through the structured and methodical examination of texts (Phillips and Hardy 2002). Moreover, discourses, like texts, possess no independent meaning. Instead, they are made meaningful by virtue of their location in and relation to their broader historical and social context (Reisigl and Wodak 2001). Therefore, the study of discourse can be envisioned as three dimensional as texts are connected to discourses, that are placed in historical and social context, and serve as reference points for the specific actors, relationships, and procedures that distinguish the particular issue under examination (Phillips and Hardy 2002). Consider a practical example:

To understand from a discourse analytic perspective why a particular person is a refugee, we need to explore how discourses such as asylum, immigration, humanitarianism, and sovereignty, among others, serve to make sense of the concept of a refugee. To learn how such discourses have evolved over time, we study texts such as cartoons, newspaper articles, and international conventions. We must also examine the social context – wars, natural disaster, court decisions, international agreements, the government of the day, political events in other countries – to see how they are brought into play in particular discursive events. This interplay between text, discourse, and context help us understand not only how an individual comes to be a refugee, but also how the broader “reality” of refugee policy and refugee determination procedures is constructed and experienced (Ibid, 4-5, emphasis in original).

This line of reasoning helps to illustrate the general analytical entry point for the practical study of discourse. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that there is no single, fixed procedure in which discourse analysis is carried out. Instead, the manner of investigation and the specific methods employed vary as researchers' selections are designed primarily to address the particular problems inherent to their chosen research site (Howarth 2000). As long as they are employed in a manner consistent with constructionist philosophical and methodological tenets, the researcher is able to draw upon a wide range of theories and methods derived from both discourse analytical and non-discourse analytical approaches (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). However, it is important to note that its procedures for justifying knowledge claims (or warranting) are also fundamentally different (Wood and Kroger 2000).

Warranting in Discourse Analysis

As discussed above, conventional (e.g., (neo)positivist) analyses in political science are based on the assumption of the world existing independent from all knowledge of it (Jackson 2008). The analyst is an objective observer – distanced from the object of study both physically and cognitively – strictly adhering to unambiguous, codified procedures to generate claims about the world (Yanow 2006). Falsification is the prescribed manner to establish the true nature of things. The primary tool of falsification is hypothesis testing, where conjectures are framed so they might be refuted by some set of accumulated data. Those conjectures are then used to produce observable implications that can be measured against the actual state of the world whether past, present, or future (Jackson 2008). From this perspective, the results of all research are necessarily evaluated by two key criteria – *reliability* (i.e., the degree of stability/repeatability across practitioners, measures, and time) and *validity* (i.e., the degree of correspondence with the

real world or “truth”) (Taylor 2001a; Wood and Kroger 2000). By employing hypothesis testing to eliminate falsehoods and evaluating their findings in terms of their reliability and validity, scholars continuously strive to improve their map of the world and identify the causal laws that regulate it. In this manner, even “if we are not likely to have a complete or final picture of the world at any time in the foreseeable future, the practice of falsification ensures that at the very least we will continue improving that picture instead of simply substituting one set of assumptions for another one in a faddish manner” (Jackson 2008, 135). Knowledge, in this sense, is derived through a process of discovery – clearing away the impediments to a clear view of reality (Yanow 2006).

“Reliability and validity presume there is an objective world to be known, and, therefore, the replicability and accuracy of one’s observations need to be, and can be, assessed” (Tracy 1995, 209). However, from the perspective of discourse analysis, knowledge is not “out there,” waiting to be discovered. Knowledge is instead the product of specific collective social interactions where contending “truths” compete for dominance (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). Consequently, research claims cannot be taken to be objective but are rather situated and contextualized (Tracy 1995). The conventional conception of reliability becomes useless with the understanding that the shifting, diversified nature of meanings makes different interpretations of findings *both natural and inevitable*. Moreover, the analyst as an detached observer is an impossibility as she is always implicated in the shaping of the very social reality she is examining (Yanow 2006). Likewise, validity in this sense is not relevant when “the world” is understood to be a highly contextualized, contingent social construction. Absent the ideal of a fixed, objective reality, there can be “no basis for selecting one account over another on the grounds that one is a truer or more valid version of the world” (Wood and Kroger 2000, 166). In

sum, given its constructionist epistemological and ontological positions, reliability and validity (as conventionally construed) cannot serve to warrant discourse analytic research. Nevertheless, this does not mean that anything goes. The results of discourse scholarship still have to meet specific standards to “count as qualified academic research” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 171). It is just that different tools for evaluation must be employed.

Rather than using reliability and validity, Wood & Kroger (2000) argue that claims derived via discourse analysis should be judged on the basis of being both *trustworthy* and *sound*²⁰:

In a general way, we mean that trustworthy claims are those that can be depended upon not only as a useful way of understanding the discourse at hand, but also as a possible basis for understanding other discourse, for further work, and so on (because they are derived from accountable procedures, are systematic, etc), whereas sound claims are solid, credible, and convincing (because they are logical, based on evidence, etc) (167).

They maintain that the requirements for trustworthiness and for soundness can be differentiated “in terms of process versus product (or what is done vs. what is accomplished)” (Ibid, 168).

Trustworthiness, in this context, is similar to conventional reliability with its focus on rigor (Taylor 2001a). “It offers a way to talk about the many steps that researchers take throughout the research process to ensure their efforts are self-consciously deliberate, transparent, and ethical – that they are, so to speak, enacting a classically ‘scientific attitude’ of *systematicity* while simultaneously allowing the potential *revisability* of their research results” (Schwartz-Shea 2006, 101, emphasis in original). **Orderliness** and **documentation** are the two main criterion for assessing trustworthiness. Orderly research is presented in an explicit and well organized

²⁰ Schwartz-Shea (2006) argues that due to the predominant understanding that methodological positivism must be employed for research to be “scientific,” discourse scholars are confronted with a dilemma when selecting evaluatory tools. They have “either to reclaim and redefine recognized, methodologically positivist terms in order to communicate with researchers across the board... or to invent new terms that better fit research conducted within an interpretive gestalt” (97). I concur with Wood & Kroger (2000), that employing tools (i.e., trustworthiness & soundness) that are distinctly and fundamentally different from reliability and validity maintains both methodological integrity and analytical transparency.

manner. Documentation involves the clear cut explication of *all* elements of the research project including data collection and the process of analysis (Wood and Kroger 2000). This is the researcher's "audit trail" made ready for peer review (Schwartz-Shea 2006). Moreover, to the extent possible, the reader should be given access to the empirical data so that she may evaluate the claims made utilizing the same analytic framework outlined (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). The fulfillment of these criteria (the documentation of procedures, the display of arguments, and the provision of data) both underscores the accountability of the researcher and contributes to the reader's trust that the analysis was assiduously carried out (Wood and Kroger 2000). Ultimately, as Schwartz-Shea (2006) argues, "if the results of a study are judged trustworthy, they can be implemented or built upon" (103).

Demonstration, according to Wood & Kroger (2000), is the central criterion for evaluating the soundness of a particular piece of analytical work.

It is crucial to show the argument through presenting the steps involved in the analysis of excerpts rather than simply telling the reader about the argument and pointing to an excerpt as an illustration... In providing an opportunity to check the analysis (effectively redoing and refining it), it serves both to ensure the soundness of claims and to display their soundness. This does not involve reproducing the whole analysis, but it does mean demonstrating the sequences of analysis that capture the logic of the argument (170).

In this way, demonstration allows the reader to answer the all important question –

"Does the researcher do what she says she does?" (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 174). Another important assessment criterion is **coherence**. The results of discourse research should not be a bundle of disparate segments of analysis. Instead, a coherent study will consist of a set of clearly formulated interrelated analytic claims that come together to advance a reasoned argument (Tracy 1995; Wood and Kroger 2000). Moreover, a coherent study will account for the presence of those elements of the analysis out of line with its narrative, increasing the likelihood of readers accepting the analysis (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). A further criterion for soundness is **plausibility** (Phillips and Hardy 2002). Plausible research is both praiseworthy (in the sense that

it presents new and meaningful interpretations of social phenomena) and credible (in the sense that its claims resonate within the larger body of existing work in the field) (Howarth 2000; Wood and Kroger 2000). Finally, whereas the plausibility of work is related to its fit with existing research, the **fruitfulness** of work is a function of its implications for future research (Wood and Kroger 2000). Tracy (1995) argues that fruitful work will “suggest productive ways to reframe old issues, create links between previously unrelated issues, and raise new questions that are interesting and merit attention” (210). In sum, the results of discourse research should be evaluated in terms of being trustworthy (via orderliness & documentation along with the provision of data) and in terms of being sound (via demonstration, coherence, plausibility, and fruitfulness). However, this must be done always with the understanding that such evaluations are never solely tied to any single criterion and are never divorced from independent scholarly judgment (Wood and Kroger 2000). It must be also be emphasized that the employment of these tools in this dissertation does not then require the reader to personally adopt them (along with their underlying ontological and epistemological assumptions). She must simply understand how they are supposed to function in order to evaluate the research in question. As Jackson (2008) argues, the “general point – that even someone who rejects our values should be able to appreciate the results that we produce by systematically applying those values to the study of empirical reality – remains valid regardless of the specific differences of value-orientations involved” (148). But what specifically makes discourse analysis the approach best suited for this dissertation?

Discourse Analysis and Plan Colombia

A discourse analytic approach adds value to the study of U.S. drug policy in general – and to my examination of Plan Colombia specifically – in a number of interrelated ways. Because “it seeks to identify specific empirical, analytical, or societal puzzles,” discourse analysis is **problem driven** (Torfing 2005, 22). Unlike traditional approaches, its goal is not to confirm any one general theory of politics or to establish a system of covering laws (Jackson 2006a). Its epistemological and ontological commitments forestall the possibility of universal truths in favor of contextualized, historicized knowledge production and the contingency of social phenomena. A key aim of discourse analysis is to illuminate carefully problematized objects of investigation – like Plan Colombia – by seeking their description, understanding, and interpretation in order to draw out larger indications for the study of similar issues in the future (Howarth 2005; Torfing 2005).

Already alluded to in Chapter 1, discourse analysis holds an edge over traditional (e.g., behaviorist, rational choice) approaches in that it poses **different types of research questions** (Torfing 2005). For example, in a conventional study that seeks to explain *why* the United States’ relationship with Colombia has become “narcotized”, Crandall (2002) argues that American actions in regards to that country are a result of the intermestic nature of the drug trade where perceived domestic ills fuel an interventionist foreign policy designed to serve the national interest of ending drug use. Consequently, through a variety of means (e.g. decertification, undermining/bypassing the civilian leadership of Colombia, Plan Colombia), the United States exercises its considerable power in the effort to achieve this goal. This type of analysis operates from a basic *presupposition* of interaction between fixed, predetermined subjects and objects (in this case, America, Colombia, the national interest) whose motives and meanings are mostly

transparent and objective. Conversely, via a constructionist discourse approach, this dissertation's investigation of Plan Colombia problematizes these subjects and objects by questioning *how* the specific outcomes *were possible*. In this manner, the “naturalness” of the social world is rejected and the “black boxes” of this interaction (e.g., United States, Colombia, the international system) are opened to examination.

With its focus on social antagonisms, discourse analysis puts **the struggle for power** at center stage. As discussed above, power in this sense is understood not a tool of domination but rather a byproduct of discourses. “Power is conceived in terms of the political acts of *inclusion* and *exclusion* that shape social meanings and identities and condition the construction of social antagonisms and political frontiers” (Torring 2005, 23, emphasis added). In other words, the discursive spaces (i.e. the categories, concepts, and other elements of meaning) placed within (and forced out) of a given discourse compel adherence to a specific “reality” and circumscribe what is possible (e.g. natural, unremarkable) and what is not possible (e.g. deviant, illogical) within it. While generally overlooked by why questions, how or how-possible questions highlight this way that power works to form particular modes of political subjectivity within a boundary of imaginable conduct (Doty 1996a). For the purposes of this dissertation, this means trying to understand how the dominant Plan Colombia discourse fixed particular meanings and identities to establish both the playing field and the rules of the game that generated a militarized United States intervention (and not something else).

Also in this context of the productive nature of power, discourse analysis' highly developed theories of social formation (including the constitution of individual and group identity) are extremely useful tools for studying how political alliances, social groups, political communities, etc, **are both formed and held together**. Understanding how political actors were

interpellated into specific individual and collective identities in the context of Plan Colombia is a major focus of this dissertation. Torfing (2005) maintains that discourse analysis offers a three step approach to facilitate such analyses. First, dislocations (like the ostensible drug emergency originating in Colombia) generally set the stage for these formations with particular nodal points – encompassing common experiences of negation, frustration, and hope for the future – functioning as a catalyst. Second, since communities often cohere around particular identities, vocabularies, and narratives, examination of these is essential to apprehend how the boundaries of communities are drawn and what is embraced and what is rejected in the process. Third, the collection of meanings that the community is formed around generally proffers a totalizing vision of a true and complete identity. Consequently, myths and social imaginaries are important conceptual tools for analysis.

The importance that discourse analysis places on both **change and continuity** makes it a valuable approach for studying the specific research site of Plan Colombia within the larger historical contexts of American drug policies and Colombia and general United States – Latin American relations. From this perspective, history is not regarded as some gradually unfolding teleological certainty. Rather, history is conceptualized as periods of objectivity (i.e., sedimented discourses) punctuated by dislocations that call into question the legitimacy of structures and spur hegemonic struggles to restore order (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002; Torfing 2005). It is important to note, that while “in principle, meanings are always in flux ... this does not mean that they are not fixed through power arrangements institutionalized in various ways at various historical junctures, such that it is possible to theorize about replicable patterns of social conduct over time” (Hopf 2004, 32-33). Moreover, as Torfing (2005) argues, most dislocations do not spark revolutionary wars but rather local struggles that only scratch the surface of the hegemonic

system. As a result, every discursive formation struggling to suture over those rifts will continue to be evaluated via the rules (e.g., ideas, norms, beliefs, etc) of the *established* order. In this sense, a discourse approach can consider the impact of Plan Colombia as a dislocating event on the one hand and the mechanisms employed by the dominant United States drug policy discourse to maintain its control over the production of meaning on the other.

Finally, and most fundamentally, the emphasis that discourse analysis places on **language use** permits the incorporation of elements of policymaking into the analysis not possible via traditional approaches (Doty 1996b). For example, Milliken (1996) uses this approach to turn the established realist notions of national prestige and reputation as objective conditions upside down. By analyzing the public and private statements of American policy makers during the Vietnam conflict, she demonstrates how prestige and reputation (as the basis of the United States' credibility) are largely the objects of metaphor (e.g., commerce, personal honor, position) and thus socially constructed. By exploring the ways constructions of "the Self" and "the Enemy" are employed in wartime, Carpentier (2008) analyzes how the Bush administration used the media to articulate and re-articulate its hegemonic vision of the legitimacy and necessity of the 2003 Iraq War. In their narrative analysis of a 1990 congressional hearing on Cambodia, Beer & Boynton (1996) reveal how United States senators used specific storylines ("policy stories") to discursively form a particular social reality and its corresponding political logics. Jackson (2007) examines texts produced between 2001 and 2007 by public officials, think tanks, journalists, and scholars to deconstruct the concept of "Islamic Terrorism" as a prominent feature of contemporary discourses on terrorism. In the same vein as these studies, this dissertation focuses on historical conceptions of Latin American inferiority (as the product of particular historical social struggles to sediment meanings) in order to better

understand its role in the constitution of Plan Colombia and contemporary United States drug policy.

Part Two - Research Design

Choosing a Research Site

“Research projects in discourse analysis,” according to Fairclough (1992) , “are most sensibly defined first in terms of questions about particular forms of social practice, and their relations to social structure” (226). In line with this thinking, this study is not an exercise in theory testing but rather is problem driven. In this dissertation, I focus on the discursive practices surrounding a major piece of American drug legislation, Plan Colombia. Phillips & Hardy (2002) maintain that the choice of research sites in discursive studies should be based on theoretical considerations as well as practical concerns. They pose five questions for researchers considering site selection:

Does the research site have particular characteristics that make it likely to produce interesting results? Are research sites sufficiently similar or different along theoretical dimensions for comparative analysis? Is the research site likely to produce “transparent” findings? Has a good source of discursive data presented itself? Has a crisis occurred that will reveal insight into discursive activity? (71, emphasis in original)

Keeping these questions in mind, I have chosen to concentrate on this specific site within the spectrum of all possible cases of United States drug policy for four main reasons. One, Plan Colombia’s particular geographic orientation makes it a logical choice for an examination of notions of Latin American inferiority in the context of U.S. drug policy. Two, it marks a major milestone in the history of American drug prohibition. Plan Colombia signaled a major escalation in United States drug control policies (Crandall 2002; Vaicius and Isaacson 2003). Three, this research site highlights the intermestic nature of the drug issue. It was a clear a reflection of domestic concerns interacting with foreign policy objectives (Crandall 2008). Four,

Plan Colombia was formulated as a response to a perceived national crisis where the “natural” identities of subjects and objects were called into question and ostensibly objective knowledge subjected to challenge. As such, I expect the number of texts relevant to my analysis to dramatically increase as a reflection of the ostensible emergency environment.²¹

Determining Manner of Analysis

As addressed above, the philosophical presuppositions of discourse analysis construe social science as an irreducibly limited and perspectival undertaking (Jackson 2008).

Consequently, in my examination of Plan Colombia, I utilize a multimethod approach or what Jørgensen and Philips (2002) characterize as a *multiperspectival framework*.

Rather than drawing on different discourse analytical approaches, it is often more common for discourse analysts to use a single discourse analytical approach and to supplement it with non-discourse analytical theories about the specific social phenomenon under study... By combining different approaches – whether they may be different discourse analytical approaches or different analytical and non-discourse analytical approaches – to form a multiperspectival framework, research can cast light on a phenomenon from different angles and thus take more account of the complexity of the phenomenon (153-154).

A multiperspectival framework should not be confused with the conventional positivist conception of “triangulation” where information from different sources or angles is expected to help the researcher zero in on the one, correct approach to apprehending reality (Wood and Kroger 2000). In the interpretive context, triangulation (or a multimethod approach) is not employed as a means of eliminating complexity but rather *in recognition of it*. Confusion related to the conflation of terminology in this instance can be avoided. Instead of triangulation, a

²¹ Consistent with Phillips & Hardy, Doty (1996a) argues that rhetoric is intensified during times of crisis, provoking “discussion, debate, directives, and other forms of discourse that provide a source of ‘data’ from which to examine the representational practices that attempt to reaffirm or reconstruct identities” (13, emphasis in original). Likewise, Fairclough (1992) recommends “moments of crisis” because they “make visible aspects of practices which might normally be naturalized, and therefore difficult to notice” (230). Campbell (1998) takes this argument even further, maintaining that “crisis mode” is actually the norm as the state continually engages in discourses of danger to secure its identity (i.e. we are *Us* because we are threatened by *Them*) (48-51).

multiperspectival framework is better understood as an effort at what Richardson (2000, 934) calls *crystallization* – a reference to the “infinite variety of shapes, substances, transmutations, multidimensionalities, and angles of approach” immanent in the production of knowledge. A focus on crystallization is consistent with the critical aims of discourse scholarship as “different perspectives demonstrate that the social world can be understood and constructed in various ways, thus pointing out that things could be different and opening up for the possibility for social change” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 155).

The multiperspectival framework employed for this dissertation centers on the debate surrounding Plan Colombia – conceptualized as an *order of discourse*. As described above, an order of discourse represents a social space where two or more discourses partly encompass the same terrain, the meanings of which they struggle to hegemonize (Fairclough 1998; Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). “By concentrating on different, competing discourses within the same domain, it is possible to investigate where a particular discourse is dominant, where there is a struggle between different discourses, and which common-sense assumptions are shared by all prevailing discourses” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 142). As already discussed at length, an analysis of the different discourses within a specified order of discourse can never be divorced from the historical and cultural context in which those discourses are located. To this end, the comprehensive examinations in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of American conceptions of superiority in the history of U.S. – Latin America relations and contemporary U.S. – Colombia relations (along with the assembled catalogue of specific tropes or rhetorical commonplaces identified) serve as the rhetorical topography (Jackson 2006b) that provides the necessary context for my analyses.

Data Collection

The scope and nature of the data collection process is similarly circumscribed in accords with a discourse approach. This dissertation examines data derived from the period from February 1, 2000 through April 30, 2000. This particular time period for data collection resulted from a combination of theoretical and practical considerations. Wood and Kroger (2000) argue that given the highly labor intensive and time consuming nature of discourse analysis, sample size is relatively limited. “The endpoint is not that one stops finding anything new with further cases, but that the analysis of the cases considered to date has been thorough. The researcher must judge whether there are sufficient data to make an (interesting) argument and to warrant or justify that argument” (80-81). The debate about increased funding for Colombia began in earnest in the fall of 1999. The American component of Plan Colombia was introduced as part of the Clinton administration’s annual budget request in February 2000 and by the end of April, the spending package had been debated in both the House and the Senate and covered widely by the media (Serafino 2001; Vacius and Isacson 2000). As such, I was able to draw a sample size of discursive data from the stated time period sufficient to make interesting and warrantable arguments.

To focus data collection efforts, Phillips & Hardy (2002) argue that discourse analysts should seek to incorporate “important” texts. They maintain that important texts are generally those that are produced by the most powerful actors, most widely distributed and received through the most effective channels, associated with changes in practices, and/or generated in reaction to a specific event. Keeping with this proposition, I draw my discursive data for this study of Plan Colombia from two prominent platforms of discursive formation – the government (in the form of congressional hearings) and the mass media (in the form of newspaper coverage).

Over this three month period in 2000, I identified via physical and electronic database research twenty congressional hearings (ten in the Senate and ten in the House of Representatives) relevant to the Plan Colombia legislation then working its way through Congress. The newspaper corpus – *the Washington Post*, *the New York Times*, *the Miami Herald*, *the Chicago Tribune*, and *the Los Angeles Times* – was established via four criteria²² – geography, population density, daily publication, and circulation rate. Once identified, I conducted a detailed search of each newspaper for coverage during the three month period relevant to the Plan Colombia legislation. The search resulted in a combined total of 133 separate articles for analysis. In line with my multiperspectival framework, I use a separate interpretive method of analysis for each data source. In Chapter 5, for the examination of the congressional hearings, I utilize the analytical concept of positioning. In Chapter 6, the newspaper coverage is examined via a multidisciplinary composite model of media analysis. Each approach is consistent with the underlying assumptions of constructionism and is described in extensive detail in their respective chapters as part of the necessary step by step explication of each analysis.

²² The geographical focus was designed to secure a general representation of the coverage across the entire country (the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, Midwest, South, and West, respectively). Population density reflected the expectation that metropolitan areas would have more people and thus more newspaper readers. Requiring daily publication would produce the periodicals that reach the most people, the most often, with the most regularity. Circulation rate was likewise a logical criterion in this regard.

CHAPTER 3

U.S. – LATIN AMERICA RELATIONS: HISTORICAL PATTERNS OF SUPERIORITY AND SUBORDINATION

A history of the present does not try to capture *the* meaning of the past, nor does it try to get *a* complete picture of the past as a bounded epoch, with underlying laws and teleology. Neither is a history of the present an instances of presentism – where the present is read back into the past – or an instance of finalism, that mode of analysis whereby the analyst maintains that a kernel of the present located in the past has inexorably progressed such that it now defines our condition. Rather, a history of the present exhibits an unequivocally contemporary orientation. Beginning with an incitement from the present – an acute manifestation of a ritual of power – this mode of analysis seeks to trace how such rituals of power arose, took shape, gained importance, and effected politics. In short, this mode of analysis asks how certain terms and concepts have historically functioned within discourse. (Campbell 1998, 5-6, emphasis in original)

Genealogy – A History of the Present

As part of the rhetorical topography (Jackson 2006b) underlying my analysis of Plan Colombia, in Chapter 3 I consider the historical context of American attitudes and assumptions regarding its neighbors to the south as evidenced in text and image. In keeping with the methodological tenets of discourse analysis discussed in Chapter 2, I seek to contextualize America's Plan Colombia legislation in 2000 with a genealogical account of United States relations with Latin America operating as a specific "history of the present." As Campbell argues in the excerpt above, such an approach is rooted in a decidedly non-teleological view of history. Rather, it orients the researcher towards its contingent and perspectival nature by problematizing the various social processes that constituted its particular "truths" while precluding other possibilities (see also Howarth 2000; Jackson 2006a). Predating the American Revolution and continuing into the present day, the "truth" of a superior American *Self* and an inferior Latino *Other* is an integral element of United States policies in the Western Hemisphere (Johnson 1990; Pike 1992; Schoultz 1998). Yet, these policies cannot be seen simply as the rational and self-interested actions of a preexisting and fully realized nation. Instead, a genealogical approach

highlights how the functions of United States foreign policy constitute part of a continuous process of identity formation where negative characterizations of Latinos work to identify “America” by circumscribing **them** in order to define **us**. However, this process – so central to American relations with Latin America – was at work long before the formation of the United States.

The Black Legend²³

The origins of American views on Latin America lie in cultural and religious prejudices leveled against Spain by the English beginning in earnest in the 16th century. A summary of charges – that would come to be characterized in the 20th century as the Black Legend – held that the Spanish were responsible for widespread religious persecution (embodied in the Spanish Inquisition), had conducted a genocidal imperial campaign in their conquest of the Americas and were particularly brutal in their ensuing exploitation of the indigenous populations there (Johnson 1990). These views of Spanish infamy, not surprisingly, found great purchase among the English settlers in America and were consistently reinforced throughout the colonial era by the widely available works of British authors like Richard Hakluyt and Thomas Gage (Hunt 1987; Johnson 1990).

Even after independence from Britain, these beliefs did not waver as “North American negative perceptions of Spaniards and Spanish institutions, kept alive for two centuries by Black

²³ The Black Legend is a twentieth century term coined by “a conservative Spanish Crown official, Julián Joverías” in his 1914 book *La leyenda negra y la verdad histórica* (The Black Legend and Historical Truth), to decry the negative depictions of Spain and Spaniards in the anti-Spanish literature that began in the sixteenth century (Keen 1969, 705-706). However, that the validity of the claims embodied in this literature has been disputed is irrelevant to the purposes of this text. What is pertinent is that these claims were widely accepted and taken as fact by the English speaking populace of the Americas and woven into the tapestry of international and intercultural relations in the Western Hemisphere. It should also be noted that the “Black” in Black Legend is synonymous with diabolical or evil and should not be mistaken for a reference to skin color or race.

Legend literature, were sharpened during several decades of uneasy relations between Washington and Madrid” (Johnson 1990, 50). From the time of the Revolutionary War²⁴ through the second decade of the 19th century, these beliefs were implicated in American accusations of Spanish weapons sales to Indian tribes, struggles over navigation rights to the Mississippi river and commercial access to New Orleans, competing territorial claims, and multiple border incidents including the ostensibly unauthorized invasion of Florida by the forces of Andrew Jackson (Johnson 1990).

When the Iberian colonies in the Americas began to rebel in 1808, the Black Legend viewpoint was also implicated in the vacillating United States response. Acute disdain for Spain coupled with public outrage over its reported savage conduct in fighting the insurgencies engendered sympathy for the Latin America rebels but resulted in no direct support. “The United States favored Latin American independence but would not recognize the fledgling revolutionary governments, nor would the private American businessmen who sold to them (such as John Jacob Astor) assume unnecessary risks” (Langley 1989, 37). While Spain was decidedly wicked from the view of the United States, it was the Iberian heritage of the revolutionaries that made their republican bona fides and their ability to govern any future states suspect in the minds of the American elite. Thomas Jefferson, writing in 1813, predicted that the rebels would be victorious but was despondent about the prospects of that outcome noting that history had “no example of a priest-ridden people maintaining a free civil government” (quoted in Smith 2005, 9). In 1816, Congressman John Randolph of Virginia echoed this view when he declared “you cannot make liberty out of Spanish matter” (quoted in Hunt 1987, 59). John Quincy Adams, as

²⁴ Despite joining its war against the British, Johnson (1990) argues that Spain was an ally *of France* in that conflict, and – in light of its initial refusal to recognize the new republic – was perceived as markedly unfriendly by the fledgling United States.

secretary of state from 1817 to 1825 and president from 1825 to 1829, was a central figure in the formation of United States relations with the emerging Latin republics and a major architect of the principles embodied in the Monroe Doctrine that would greatly shape the future of Latin America. When writing in 1821 of the new republics, central to his assessment (and thus arguably America's expectations) of their future promise was their Black Legend birthright.

They have not the first elements of good or free government. Arbitrary power, military and ecclesiastical, was stamped upon their education, upon their habits, and upon their institutions. Civil dissension was infused into all their seminal principles. War and mutual destruction was in every member of their organization, moral, political, and physical. I have little expectation of any beneficial result to this country from any future connection with them, political or commercial. We should derive no improvement to our own institutions by any communion with theirs. (quoted in Schoultz 1987, 122-123)

From their birth, the countries of Latin America were tarred by their blood and cultural ties to the Iberian Peninsula. Their inhabitants, suffering guilt by association for many of Spain's perceived crimes and vices, were consequently stereotyped as "superstitious, obstinate, lazy, cowardly, vain, pretentious, dishonest, unclean, impractical, and corrupt" (Hunt 1987, 59). Necessary, but not sufficient, Spanish blood was not the sole criterion for this calculated opprobrium.

The Color Line

By 1830, the die was cast and the existence of the new Latin republics was firmly recognized. Also decidedly part of the landscape by 1830 (after fermenting for the balance of the 18th century) was racial consciousness in the United States. The majority of Americans had come to believe in the primacy of a distinct Anglo-Saxon race – to which they belonged – whose very blood was the driving force behind its continuous military, political, and economic triumphs (Horsman 1998). Sitting atop a perceived racial hierarchy with the darkest (and least fit) at its base and the lightest (and most able) at its apex, the United States of the 19th century was

obsessed with the color line and reacted severely when it was not observed – “the darker the complexion of the people in question, the sharper was the attack” (Hunt 1987, 59).

Prevailing prejudices against racial crossing ill-prepared Anglo-Americans for the universal profligacy of interracial sex in Latin America, where the Iberians’ casual attitude toward race mixing had made miscegenation the very basis of Spanish American and Brazilian society. Nowhere else in the Western world had interracial mixing taken place on such a scale. After three centuries of mixed marriages, concubinage, simple promiscuity, and outright violence against Indian and black women, miscegenation was everywhere visible (Johnson 1990, 70).

American policymakers looking south had already had their racial fears stoked by the successful slave rebellion in Haiti in 1804. Reports of mindless violence and destruction of property in the aftermath of that revolution predisposed the United States to view the political strife and economic stagnation of the newly formed Latin countries as the inevitable result of their racial impurity (Pike 1992). Moreover, within the United States, “the expansion of slavery and the decline of the Indian drew upon and contributed to a racist ideology justifying subordination, dispossession, or even elimination of nonwhite peoples” (Hietala 1998, 134). From this perspective, their intermixing with African slaves and the indigenous populations of their countries imbued Latins with the savagery and inhumanity already deemed intrinsic to those races (Hunt 1987).

The state of nature

We, meaning most Americans most of the time, like to see ourselves as prime exemplars of all that it means to be civilized. Always up to date and scientific, we successfully pursue linear progress, measured most readily by material accomplishments but always accompanied by moral, spiritual, and cultural advancement. In contrast, Latin Americans, as we are wont to see them, remain static; they are trapped in a *primitive state of nature*, the victims of rather than the masters of nature. Attainment of full human potential always eludes them, for that potential is only realizable in proportion to the degree to which people manage to conquer nature, both within and without. (Pike 1992, xiii, emphasis added)

That their racial composition (i.e., a mixture of Spanish, Native American and/or African blood) essentially marked them as subhuman is at the core of United States’ representations of

Latinos and thus Latin America. Pike (1992) expounds on these representations in his articulation of the “state of nature” concept in the excerpt above. He argues that beginning with the earliest Anglo-Saxon colonization of America, the settlers equated the natural with anarchy, savagery, and the loss of control and viewed it as a thing to be feared, dominated, and ultimately eliminated. Consequently, those who lived in harmony with (or otherwise seemed attuned to) it were immediately suspect. “Since their earliest arrival in the New World, Americans tended to equate wilderness and Indians, seeing the latter as the personification of the former; and from this equation derived the race-war aspects of America’s frontier expansion” (4). From this perspective, Pike argues, the mark of civilization was the ability to contain and control nature, not only the wildness of the external world embodied in untamed forests and unexplored ranges but also the wildness inherent in human nature and rampant personal desires. This was something white men could do but of which the Native American was simply incapable. This conventional wisdom concerning the red man is perfectly captured in this excerpt from General George Custer’s memoirs in 1874,

Nature intended him for the savage state; every instinct, every impulse of his soul inclines him to it. The white race might fall into a barbarous state, and afterwards, subjected to the influence of civilization, be reclaimed and prosper. Not so the Indian. He cannot be himself and be civilized; he fades away and dies... He can hunt, roam, and camp when and wheresoever he pleases, provided always that in so doing he does not run contrary to the requirements of civilization in its advancing tread (quoted in Carlson and Colburn 1972, 23).

Ultimately, it was the natives’ inability to leave the nomadic life and build farms, roads, towns, etc – and to adopt the firm moral strictures of Protestant Christianity to govern their personal behavior – that marked them as less than human and not deserving of the territories they inhabited (Pike 1992).

Identified even more closely with the state of nature than the Indian and completely repressed within the United States, enslaved blacks offered even greater evidence of the superiority of Anglo-Saxons and the importance of maintaining racial purity. “According to the

prevailing wisdom, blacks were emotionally unstable, superstitious, capricious, overly assertive, improvident, sensual, and criminally inclined. They were also deficient in the skills associated with the arts and sciences and were generally incapable of elevation and improvement” (Johnson 1990, 66). These feelings were shared even among those who did not support slavery.²⁵ The forces of slavery and the forces of abolitionism in the United States – fiercely opposed in principle – both had powerful voices among the elite and strong advocates in government by the third decade of the 19th century. Nevertheless, the common wisdom in both the North and the South held that blacks were members of an inferior race (Williams 2003).²⁶ The regional differences lay primarily in the preferred choice for the ultimate fate of the black population of the United States – the continuation and expansion of slavery or some sort of exodus of blacks from white America (Schoultz 1998).

It was with these views of the red and black races, and the knowledge of widespread miscegenation in the new republics, that the United States began to seriously engage Latin America.

The history of the Latin American republics was viewed as a sorrowful chronicle of disorder and endless instability, of a mixed-race population incapacitated by centuries under the yoke of Spanish colonial rule. It was a history from which the Americans inferred certain truths, namely, that Latin Americans were a people without the aptitude and lacking the attributes necessary for successful self-government (Pérez 2008, 39).

²⁵ Many in the Northern states feared that freed slaves would migrate en masse northward and become a source of instability. Slavery advocates played upon these fears by painting lurid portraits of legions of dark skinned people – prone to disease, mental defect, and criminality – swarming into Northern cities by the millions (Schoultz 1998).

²⁶ There were Radical Republican politicians (like Thaddeus Stevens and Charles Sumner) opposed to racial hierarchy and who advocated for genuine racial integration in the United States (Monroe and Tap 2005; Williams 2003). Nevertheless, it is still important to note, as Williams (2003) argues, that support for an abstract principle of equality – even by some of its most prominent citizens – did not translate into a societal embrace of actual practice. She maintains that “the disjunction between the celebrated American abstract ideal of individualism and actual understanding and expectations was apparent from the beginning of the nation” with race “the prevailing idiom for discussing both citizenship and the relative merits of a given people” (29).

As American settlers moved into the (then) Mexican territory of Texas in the 1820s and 1830s, the “folklore about ‘niggers’ and ‘redskins’ that many of them had brought from their homes along the Southern frontier predisposed them to a low regard for another dark-skinned people, the Mexicans, who stood in their way” (Hunt 1987, 60, emphasis in original). From the American perspective, that Mexico should lose Texas (at first to the Texans in 1836 and then) to the United States in 1845 and then the entire southwest in 1848 came as no surprise. It was simply a logical outcome. “Latinos left themselves unimproved, in a state of nature. And, in consequence of their moral, cultural, and possibly racial debasement, they also left the land they claimed in an unimproved state of nature, thereby virtually inviting *civilized men* to seize and improve it” (Pike 1992, 99, emphasis added). For the expansionists in the United States coveting the southwest territories, it was the essential savagery of the Mexican people (e.g., “colored mongrel race”; “imbecile and indolent race”; “ignorant, prejudiced, and perfectly faithless”; “aboriginal Indians”) that voided their territorial claims and decided their fate (Hunt 1987, 60). These discursive representations of Latinos as savage (at worst) or simply inferior (at best) worked not only to define Latin America but also *to define and position* the United States in relation to the rest of the hemisphere. America, as a white Anglo-Saxon nation was inherently superior to any and all of the Latin republics filled with a mix of degenerate Creoles, swarthy mulattoes and mestizos, and near bestial Africans and Indians. From the perspective of Americans, their “earthly fortunes confirmed that they were the elect” (Johnson 1990, 45). In contrast to the near anarchy that reigned to the south, America’s rule of law, bustling economy, and peaceful transitions of power demonstrated its virile prowess at conquering nature. This ability marked the United States as not only civilized but as the inevitable and natural leader of the hemisphere.

Destined to Lead

God has not been preparing the English-speaking and Teutonic peoples for a thousand years for nothing but vain and idle self-contemplation and self-admiration. No! He has made us the master organizers of the world to establish a system where chaos reigns. He has given us the spirit of progress to overwhelm the forces of reaction throughout the earth. He has made us adepts in government that we may administer government among savage and senile people. Were it not for such a force as this the world relapse into barbarism and night. And of all our race He marked the American people as His chosen nation to finally lead in the regeneration of the world. This is the divine mission of America, and it holds for us all the profit, all the glory, all the happiness possible to man. We are the trustees of the world's progress, guardians of the righteous peace. (Beveridge 1900, 711)

Long before journalist John O'Sullivan coined the phrase "Manifest Destiny" in 1845, American elites had recognized the exceptional nature of the United States and its divinely ordained future as a transcontinental power. Writing in the *Federalist Papers*, Alexander Hamilton envisioned a hemispheric America capable of dictating terms to the Old World (Kenworthy 1995, 25). Both Thomas Jefferson and John Quincy Adams embraced the vision of a northern continental United States made up of one nation with a uniform culture and political philosophy (McDougall 1997). Both also conceived of that nation extending to some or all of the territory of Latin America (Kenworthy 1995; McDougall 1997). It was never a question of *if* this would happen but simply when. John Quincy Adams' statement in an 1819 cabinet meeting emphasizes this inevitable "truth." "From the time when we became an independent people it was as much a law of nature that this should become our pretension as that the Mississippi should flow into the sea" (quoted in Kenworthy 1995, 24). The Monroe Doctrine served as a global announcement that the New World would be regulated by a new form of government – republicanism. Absent interference from the Old World, this system – its superiority exemplified by the nation whose rapid progress was unrivalled in "the history of world" and whose population independently transformed "a wilderness" into a thriving power – would certainly be adopted by all the countries to the south (Holden and Zolov 2000, 13-14). While the United States lacked the capacity to enforce the doctrine at the time of its declaration, its authors and

advocates clearly believed that that strength would come in short order. These were the architects of the hegemonic tradition of American policy towards Latin America that continues to hold sway in modern times (Schoultz 1998).

Viewed in historical context, Manifest Destiny – holding “that Anglo-Saxons were a superior race, that Protestant Christianity held the keys to heaven, that only republican forms of political organization were free, and that the future, even the predestined future, could be hurried along by human hands” – was the exercise (and the mass marketing) of the long standing American teleology embodied in Monroe’s document (Johnson 1990, 45). Its power having advanced significantly by the mid 1840s, the United States was then able to “hurry along” the inevitable. Marching under the banner of Manifest Destiny, President James Polk’s administration annexed Texas and wrested away half of Mexico’s territory after provoking that neighboring *republic* into war and crushing it militarily (Langley 1989).²⁷ By 1848, the United States controlled the American southwest and had effectively become a continental power. And in “their country’s phenomenal expansion, Americans saw the hand of God rewarding them for their proved success in taming wilderness and its barbaric inhabitants” (Pike 1992, 100).

Nevertheless, in spite of all their gains, the war with Mexico dealt a crippling blow to the expansionists’ dreams of a transcontinental United States extending into the southern hemisphere. In the midst of the conflict, the All Mexico Movement was born. Invoking the messianic power of American liberty, its members (including notables like Walt Whitman)

²⁷ Langley (1989) argues that O’Sullivan’s original vision of Manifest Destiny was a peaceful territorial expansion, where the populations of the neighboring states and territories of the continent would recognize the virtues of “republican liberty” and *voluntarily* join the United States so to enjoy those benefits. However, he was later convinced of the merits of the more “muscular” and involuntary form of the doctrine. For the Latin and indigenous populations incorporated into the United States following the war, the introduction of republican liberty brought them no virtues. Instead, they faced widespread discrimination and suffered greatly from extrajudicial violence in the form of lynching and similar means of summary execution for petty crimes, real or imagined (Pike 1992).

advocated the complete occupation of Mexico in order to reform and regenerate that suffering and incompetent nation (McDougall 1997). However, during the Congressional debates in 1847 concerning the resolution of the war (i.e., what territory the victorious United States would ultimately appropriate) an unfortunate fact dominated the discussion – *Mexico was full of Mexicans* (Schoultz 1998). American perceptions of that population as “part Negro, part Indian, filthy and greasy in appearance” quickly coined a catch-all phrase for Mexicans – greasers (Pike 1992, 100). To annex all (and not just the sparsely settled north) of Mexico would mean incorporating into America the same half-breed, misanthropic, and backwards people that had earned such derision in the run up to the war. Argued one Florida member in opposition, “shall we by an act of Congress, convert the black, white, red, mongrel, miserable population of Mexico – the Mexicans, Indians, Mulattoes, Mestizas [sic], Chinos, Zambos, Quinteros – into free and enlightened American citizens, entitled to all the privileges we enjoy?” (quoted in Schoultz 1998, 36). While strongly divided over the issue of slavery and the legitimacy of the war with Mexico, the need to keep the United States’ bloodline pure was a sentiment the overwhelming majority of Congress shared. Observance of the color line soundly overcame the expansionist credo and the movement to annex all of Mexico quickly dissolved with the ratification of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (Langley 1989; Schoultz 1998).

This tension – between America’s belief in its ordained civilizing mission and its natural hemispheric leadership on the one hand and its belief in Latin inferiority and the dangers of racial pollution on the other – was again present in the circumstances surrounding the United States’ next major conflict in Latin America. “Contemplating events on their southern doorstep in the closing years of the nineteenth century, Americans saw alien disorder; savage Spanish colonial rule in Cuba and Puerto Rico, lawless frontier lands in Central America. There were two

ways to respond: go in and clean these countries up, or stay out for fear of being contaminated” (Black 1988, 11). The United States had long been convinced of its essential right to Cuba. John Quincy Adams had opined in 1823 that the island was a natural appendage of North America “of transcendent importance” and once freed would naturally gravitate towards the United States (Holden and Zolov 2000, 8-9). However, other than intermittent offers to purchase the island (all rebuffed by Spain) and sporadic rumblings by expansionists for annexation, the United States over the succeeding decades was largely content with continued Spanish rule (Schoultz 1998). By 1895, when Cuban rebels once again took up arms against Spain, American sentiment had dramatically changed.

To defeat this uprising, the Spanish instituted policies of extreme repression. Villagers were forcibly removed to concentration camps and tens of thousands died from hunger and disease (McDougall 1997). By 1896, American support for Cuban independence was widespread, largely fed by yellow journalism and the Cuban exile community (Schoultz 1998). The Black Legend was rediscovered and reissued for a new generation as the modern penny press’ headlines trumpeted to millions of readers sensationalized stories of Spanish atrocities against daring republican minded revolutionaries (Black 1988). “In their struggle against Spanish rule, the rebels assumed mythically heroic proportions as valiant warriors for freedom hurling themselves against an archaic political and economic system that, Americans believed, had brutalized the island for four centuries” (Langley 1989, 98). Acceding to claims that a trifecta of factors (Cuban lobbyists, yellow journalists, and jingoistic politicians) inflamed public opinion and precipitated the United States’ war against Spain in 1898, Schoultz (1998) posits an additional reason. He argues that the McKinley administration feared for “the fate of U.S. strategic and economic interests under an *independent* Cuban government” (135, emphasis

added). While the Spanish had to go, the Cubans could not be trusted to govern themselves (Pérez 2008).

Nevertheless, in the run-up to the war and during its prosecution, the Spaniards (true to Black Legend form) were the perceived villains and the Cuban people were defenseless victims as demonstrated in the following series of political cartoons published during this period. In Figure 1²⁸, Spain's behavior in Cuba is tied directly to its imperial past as



Figure 1. 1898

the name of the architect of the modern counterinsurgency, General Weyler, is added to the historical roster of the conquistadors who mercilessly subjugated Latin America by faggot and sword. Cuba is represented as a supine, emaciated female corpse. Cuba is once again a defenseless female in Figure 2²⁹, this time vibrant and voluptuous and kneeling adoringly at the feet of a virile United States fending off a predatory Spain. This repeated feminine characterization of Cuba was no



Figure 2. 1896

²⁸ "Spain's 'Sense of Justice.'" From *New York World* (1898), reprinted in Johnson (1980, 85).

²⁹ "The Cuban Melodrama." From *Puck* (1896), reprinted in Johnson (1980, 81).

coincidence. “Above all, American middle-class men esteemed the so-called manly qualities, as opposed to the feminine weakness and emotionalism and childish fecklessness and fantasizing. Qualities that Americans admired, they consistently failed to find among Latin Americans” (Pike 1992, 48). Historically seen as inherently passionate, feeble, unpredictable, and lacking in intellect and foresight, the female – like the Indian and the African – had always been understood as close to nature and thus in need of masculine control and protection (Ibid). Not surprisingly, this imagery of Latin America as a seductive and/or desperate woman in need of succor was quite popular among the expansionist ranks (Hunt 1987). A bestial Spain (“the brute”) is indicted in Figure 3³⁰ not only for the murder of those aboard the exploded USS Maine but also for mutilating the bodies of American soldiers fallen in battle.




Figure 3. 1898

However, just as in the old military maxim that no plan survives contact with the enemy, America’s increased familiarity with the Cubans (and Puerto Ricans and Filipinos) during combat and after the war’s end resulted in very different appraisals of the Spanish and their erstwhile victims. Expecting noble warriors gallantly fighting Spanish oppression, American troops arrived in Cuba in 1898 and instead found dark skinned irregulars (both officers and enlisted) fighting from the jungle. “Before long U.S. officers were casually ridiculing the fighting spirit of their putative allies and praising the bravery of the Spanish enemy” (Langley

³⁰ “The Spanish Brute Adds Mutilation to Murder.” From *Judge* (1898), reprinted in Hunt (1987, 65).

1989, 101). Those officer's revised beliefs were quickly reflected in American newspapers as the images presented of Cubans changed from light skinned and noble to dark skinned and savage (Johnson 1980). This is clearly illustrated in Figure 4³¹, a contemporaneous political cartoon. Here ostensibly wounded Cuban fighters (markedly swarthy and simian in appearance) – money (not patriotism) being their true motivation – are “miraculously” healed and throw away their crutches as soon as they receive a veteran’s pension from the United States. Not surprisingly, the Cuban contribution to the victory over Spain was never acknowledged by the United States (Schoultz 1998).³²



Figure 4. 1899

The American forces, many of whom were veterans of the Civil War and the military campaigns against the Indians in the plains states, brought the historical color line along with flag to the Caribbean and the Philippines. In the latter case this was especially virulent given that the Filipinos had the temerity to resist American annexation by force of arms. To the occupying forces, the Filipinos were “niggers,” “gugus,” “black devils,” “Apaches,” and “Comanches”

³¹ “This Style of Plaster Will Cure All Their Wounds.” From *Detroit Journal* (1899), reprinted in Johnson (1980, 165).

³² Consider that even the name of the conflict – the Spanish-American War – rejects the status of the Cubans and Filipinos as legitimate combatants and completely denies their role in the ultimate victory over Spain.

(Krenn 2006, 48; Weston 1998, 303).³³ Faced with such a “savage” enemy, the United States forces had no qualms relying on torture and concentration camps to crush the insurgency (Brands 1992). By the time the insurgency was stamped out, hundreds of thousands of Filipinos had been killed (Ninkovich 2001).

In a reprise of the wrangling in Congress that followed the war with Mexico, victory over Spain in 1898 set off a titanic battle between the (now titled)

imperialism and anti-imperialism blocs. And once again, as in that previous struggle, both sides shared a view of the peoples in question as

less than human. As demonstrated in the following cartoons published in 1898 and 1899, the image of the alluring,

defenseless and (generally) white seniorita was replaced by the image of the savage, the child, or the savage child. Figure 5³⁴

constitutes a warning to America’s



Figure 5. 1898



Figure 6. 1899

³³ This racial denigration was readily apparent to the members of the black regiments sent to fight the Filipinos. Many American blacks, both civilians in the United States and troops in the Philippines, felt a sense of solidarity with the rebels and a small number of black soldiers deserted to fight for the other side (Weston 1998).

³⁴ “How Some Apprehensive People Picture Uncle Same After War.” From *Detroit News* (1898), reprinted in Black (1997, 15).

pretension to empire as it depicts Uncle Sam's forthcoming struggle with his new infant charges. This echoed a key accusation of the anti-imperialism forces. Should America incorporate and make citizens of these debased and infantile peoples, it would suffer the contaminating effects of their primitive cultures (Pike 1992, 169). The supporters of imperialism (in line with Rudyard Kipling's *The White Man's Burden*) countered that the United States was duty bound to spread liberty and that by its greatness it would lift up these lesser peoples from squalor and ignorance (Hunt 1987). This is the inspiration behind Figure 6³⁵, where Uncle Sam (following in the footsteps of imperial Britain) doggedly carries the savage Philippines, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Hawaii past the jagged peaks of barbarism, superstition, oppression, vice, and cannibalism (!), on the long climb towards distant civilization. Ultimately, the pro-imperialism forces proved victorious with Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines becoming literal or de facto American possessions (Langley 1989, 101).

However, their individual reactions to this fate varied. Figure 7³⁶, depicting a class on good governance taught by Uncle Sam, reflects this. Those possessions ("pupils") who do as they are told (e.g., Puerto Rico and Hawaii) are portrayed well while those who disobey (e.g., the Philippines) are seen as disheveled and truculent or violent. Nevertheless, regardless of their individual behavior, *all* of the new possessions are represented as subject to America's tutelage. Writing on the historical use of the child metaphor for colonized peoples, Perez (2008) argues that this

³⁵ "The White Man's Burden." From *Judge* (1898).

³⁶ "Uncle Sam's New Class in the Art of Self-Government." From *Harper's Weekly*, reprinted in Hunt (1987, 84).

...imagery served to validate power as a matter of binding reciprocity: authority, properly exercised by adults, and obedience, commonly expected of children. To depict colonized people as children was to evoke metaphor as a moral, a way to insinuate normative plausibility into the logic by which power was exercised and experienced. The norms of conduct expected of adulthood and behavior associated with childhood – no less than the conventions that defined the private interaction and public practice between parents and children, including matters of duty and responsibility; issues of care, conduct, and control; and questions of obedience and deference – constituted discursive spaces into which to inscribe the plausibility of colonial hierarchies (105).

The terms of the victory over Spain made the United States an imperial power and also cemented American views about Latin America. Ultimately, fear of contamination made the outright



Figure 7. 1898

incorporation of additional territory *and their populations* into the United States unthinkable and thus impossible (Schoultz 1998). However, this did nothing to stifle American efforts towards regional hegemony in the 20th century which were carried out through a combination of economic and military means (Livingstone 2009).

Roosevelt Corollary to the Good Neighbor Policy

American perceptions of Latin states as infantile – and as such unreliable, defenseless, and in need of direct supervision – were heavily implicated in the long series of direct and indirect United States interventions in Latin America in the 20th century. Cuba’s “independence” in 1902 came only with assurances of continued American control built into its constitution. In addition to the right to intervene militarily at will, the United States was given power over Cuba’s treaty-making and foreign borrowing decisions as well as rights to military bases. “The Platt amendment effectively made Cuba a protectorate of the United States, a state that was

independent in name but less than sovereign in foreign policy and in domestic affairs” (Ninkovich 2001, 98). In the discursive spaces created by the child metaphor, “disciplining offspring is an act of love, not power” (Kenworthy 1995, 31). As such, United States actions towards Cuba (like the military interventions in 1906 and 1912) were not seen as the exercise of American control but rather the dutiful dispensation of parental authority (Pérez 2008). Despite some cosmetic changes³⁷, the pattern of American control over (and concurrent interventions in) the island remained essentially the same until the late 1950s.

Piqued by Colombia’s refusal to accept American terms on a trans-isthmus canal, in 1903 the Roosevelt administration showed up the “jackrabbits,” “greedy little anthropoids,” and “Dagoes³⁸ in Bogota” by orchestrating – complete with American naval support – the secession of that country’s northernmost province. The new state of Panama received official American diplomatic recognition less than two hours after announcing its independence and with United

States recognition came an immediate canal agreement (Ninkovich 2001, 108-110). President Roosevelt justified this intervention in part by arguing that Colombia had proven itself incapable of controlling its territory and therefore America’s actions served the interests of



Figure 8. 1904

³⁷ The Platt Amendment was abrogated by treaty in 1934 but the United States retained numerous other means to intervene in Cuba (Ninkovich 2001; Pérez 2008).

³⁸ According to Schoultz (1998), “‘Dago,’ a corruption of the Spanish ‘Diego,’ was originally used in the mid-19th century as a derogatory reference to Mexican men in the U.S. Southwest” (177).

civilization (Schoultz 1998). Figure 8³⁹ illustrates how Colombia's protests of this violation of its sovereignty were dismissed with ridicule.

Latinos were perceived as too close to nature, too uncivilized, and consequently could not be trusted to make the right decisions in important matters by themselves. The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (put forth in 1904) enshrined the principle of direct American intervention in the affairs of Latin



Figure 9. 1904

American states deemed to have fallen off the path of civilization. The United States would act as regional policeman, in the words of Roosevelt, to “show those Dagos that they will have to behave decently” (quoted in Livingstone 2009, 15). Internal instability and runaway foreign debt that courted European involvement would not be tolerated. This sentiment is demonstrated in Figure 9⁴⁰, where the USS “Debt Collector” and Teddy Roosevelt’s Big Stick patrol the Caribbean to ensure stability.

Along with military means, American suzerainty was exercised through economic mechanisms. “One of the most common and ingenious forms of control devised by the US in the first two decades of the twentieth century was the imposition of customs receiverships over small Caribbean republics” (Ninkovich 2001, 118). When a foreign debt crisis erupted in the Dominican Republic in 1904, the United States had no faith in that country’s leadership. Noted

³⁹ “Uncle Sam: ‘If you are determined to finish me up, sail in; this suspense is something awful.’” From *St. Paul Pioneer Press* (1904), reprinted in Johnson (1980, 181).

⁴⁰ From *New York Herald* (1904).

one American diplomat, “In times of stress they practically revert to more primitive ways of thinking and acting. In a word they are like children” (quoted in Schoultz 1998, 188).

Succumbing to American pressure, the Dominican Republic signed away its customs rights in 1905. When a subsequent administration in 1916 refused to relinquish control over its customs, treasury, and military, American forces seized control and occupied the country for eight years (Livingstone 2009). Ostensibly a means to prevent European intervention to collect debts, control over customs translated into American dominance of the country’s economy (Ninkovich 2001). The implementation of these policies, argues Schoultz (1998), set the stage for President Taft’s Dollar Diplomacy and established the common wisdom still governing modern American perceptions of Latin America – only the guidance of the United States prevents the region from devolving into economic chaos.

Between 1903 and 1934, under the aegis of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine and Dollar Diplomacy, the United States engaged in military interventions and/or occupations in Cuba (1906-1909; 1912; 1917-1922), the Dominican Republic (1904; 1914; 1916-1924), Guatemala (1920), Haiti (1915-1934), Honduras (1907; 1911; 1912; 1919; 1924; 1925), Mexico (1913; 1914; 1916-1917; 1918-1919), Nicaragua (1909-1910; 1912-1925; 1926-1933), and Panama (1903-1914; 1921; 1925) (Livingstone 2009). Discursive constructions of these states as home to truculent children or bestial savages were consistently implicated in these policy decisions. For example, the need for the continued occupation of Haiti after securing control of the country’s customs in 1915 was justified by American military officials because that country’s residents, no matter their outward appearance, were “savage under the skin” and could “revert in a few minutes to the mental state of a savage in the heart of Africa” (Schoultz

1998, 254).⁴¹ In the case of the Dominican occupation, the successes of the armed resistance to American rule were not credited to the actual Dominican guerrilla fighters but were instead chalked up to the certain belief that white men (ostensibly Germans) were really calling the shots (Pike 1992). The policy of Dollar Diplomacy, ostensibly a means to ensure financial order in struggling Caribbean states (and thus regional stability), was in reality United States diplomatic efforts made in support of private American investment. “Every case began with U.S. government intervention, after which government officials brokered a financial arrangement between the intervened Latin American government and the U.S. private sector” (Schoultz 1998, 209). Said Taft’s Assistant Secretary of State of the policy in 1916, its object was “to create a material prosperity which should wean the Central Americans from *their usual preoccupation of revolution*” (Holden and Zolov 2000, 118, emphasis added).

By the mid 1930s, the economic contraction forced by the Great Depression set limits on available funds to deploy American troops and on the patience of the American public for interventions abroad. Starting with the Hoover administration in 1929, the face of American policy toward Latin America began to change as the Roosevelt Corollary was formally disavowed (Ninkovich 2001). By 1936, under the auspices of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy, the United States had signed declarations renouncing its right to intervene in the states of the region, abrogated the Platt Amendment, set limits on its actions in Panama, and ended its long running occupations of Haiti and Nicaragua (Livingstone 2009). “There was however, relatively little change in the underlying belief in the inferiority of Latin American peoples, a condition that was usually attributed to a combination of climatic, racial,

⁴¹ Moreover, the color line was again transported with the flag as the military occupation leadership enforced strict Jim Crow racial segregation rules in the country and reintroduced a system of corvee labor where civilians were forced to build roads without payment (McPherson 2006).

and cultural handicaps” (Ninkovich 2001, 143). The pull of the White Man’s Burden and its civilizing mission remained. Moreover, better public relations notwithstanding, American efforts at regional hegemony did not diminish. Instead, less overt mechanisms of control were employed. For example, concurrent with the end of the Platt Amendment in 1934, an agreement struck under the aegis of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act effectively cemented American control over Cuba’s future economic development in exchange for lower tariffs on Cuba’s primary product exports (e.g., sugar). Comparable agreements were made with other states in the region with a net effect of furthering “the dominant U.S. role in Latin American markets” (Schoultz 1998, 305). Rather than engage in direct military intervention, with all its accompanying bad press, the United States came to increasingly rely on indigenous authoritarian leaders (e.g. Somoza in Nicaragua, Trujillo in the Dominican Republic) to quell domestic unrest, protect American investments, and to ensure regional stability (Livingstone 2009) .

World War II and the Cold War

In the years immediately prior to America’s entrance into World War II, the United States, fearing Nazi adventurism, began to establish strong ties with the militaries of all Latin American states by establishing American military advisory groups and opening its military academies to students from throughout the region. After the war, these links would prove a ready means of transplanting America’s Cold War ideology to those same militaries (Schoultz 1998). During the war, Latin America, with its supply of vital raw materials (e.g. oil, tin, copper), was of vital strategic importance to the United States (Livingstone 2009). What was not in high demand to support the war effort was the services of the Latin Americans themselves.

It is true that the United States was willing to feign military partnership in order to obtain Latin America’s raw materials and military bases, as well as its cooperation in the suppression of fifth-column movements – but always with the tacit understanding, as one 1940 memo noted, that “our

objective does *not* comprise expectations on our part of being able to use Latin American forces as effective allies in war” (Schoultz 1998, 314, emphasis in original).

This perception of the essential uselessness of Latinos in regards to the war effort was summed up by the conclusions of the National Security Council in 1950 that no country in the region, save Brazil, was able “to make any contribution to Western Hemisphere defense” (Ibid). By the end of the war, the familiar disparaging stereotypes of Latin Americans that had been played down in the Good Neighbor era reemerged once again in the public sphere and popular media (Pike 1992).

The Cold War saw a return to active United States intervention in the region. While fear of communist expansion had replaced concerns about reactionary European power, the guiding principles of American regional hegemony and Latin American subordination remained. Although the Latin republics sought economic developmental assistance from the United States akin to the Marshall Plan, aid on that scale was reserved for the modern, civilized states of Europe (Langley 1989). Instead, Latin America received in 1947 a regional defense treaty (the Rio Pact) and in 1948 a regional intergovernmental organization (the Organization of American States) that were both designed to promote an anti-communist agenda in – and foster American control of – the hemisphere (McPherson 2006, 23). The promotion of democracy, conversely, was never genuinely considered for Latin America states because – as children – they were not deemed capable of arriving at that system of government. Writing in *Foreign Affairs* in 1950, a member of the State Department’s Policy Planning opined that Latin Americans were too wild, too child-like in nature and so lacked the requisite temperament for democracy.

Democratic government is the outward and visible sign of this inward and spiritual grace. The overthrow of dictators, as we have so often seen, may result only in the chaos that leads to renewed dictatorship. By getting rid of its dictator a nation gains nothing but the opportunity which it may not be prepared to exploit. Self-government has an inward as well as an outward sense, and the inward comes first. The enjoyment of freedom, among peoples as among

individuals, *demands an acquired capacity for responsible behavior*. This capacity is the mark of *maturity*, which in mortal men is the final product of slow growth *from helpless and irresponsible infancy* (Halle, 568, emphasis added).

That same year, George Kennan, the architect of America's strategy to contain Soviet expansion, toured Latin America. In the trip report subsequently filed, he concurred that the peoples of the region could not be trusted with a republican system of government (Holden and Zolov 2000). "It is better to have a strong regime in power than a liberal government if it is indulgent and penetrated by Communists" (quoted in McPherson 2006, 24). Not surprisingly, Washington was content to support any compliant government in the region with the proper anti-communist credentials. Moreover, if any government appeared to deviate in any way from rigid anti-communism, its behavior was deemed a legitimate justification for American intervention.

When President Arbenz of Guatemala initiated a program of moderate agrarian reform, the Eisenhower administration perceived it as a threat to America's regional leadership and prestige. Via a concerted diplomatic, economic, and clandestine military strategy, Arbenz was driven from power in 1954 (Grow 2008). From the seeds of this intervention grew a bloody civil war that would last for 36 years and kill hundreds of thousands of Guatemalans (Livingstone 2009). In Cuba, after the overthrow of the dictator Batista in 1959, Washington's initial cautious optimism was replaced with shock and anger by Fidel Castro's fiery denunciations of America's historical suzerainty over the island and his plans to radically restructure Cuban society (Langley 1989). Long wrapped in the mythos of its selfless sacrifice to liberate Cuba from Spain, policymakers saw Castro's attack on America's civilizing mission as the basest ingratitude and a sure sign of irrationality (Brenner and Castro 2009). This, combined with Castro's leftist policies, spurred calls in the United States to intervene *to protect the Cubans from themselves*.

Having won freedom for Cuba, the Americans – as bestowers of Cuban freedom – thus claimed the moral authority to unilaterally defend that freedom. The logical conclusion of North American claims was that Cubans could not be permitted to squander the freedom that the United States – at such great cost – had obtained for them in 1898 (Pérez 2008, 225)

Intervention ultimately came in the form of the 1961 “Bay of Pigs” operation which failed disastrously to depose Castro. However, while its dramatic failure was widely viewed as an embarrassment among the American media, few questioned the *propriety* of the military invasion of Cuba (Black 1988).

The Kennedy administration’s response to the success of the Cuban revolution was a dramatic restructuring of military and economic aid to the region. The orientation of military support shifted from hemispheric defense to a focus on internal security and the need “to fight Castro-type guerrilla insurgencies” (Schoultz 1998, 357). On the ostensible economic front, the Alliance for Progress was created to provide a stable model of development and social welfare to compete with Castro’s revolutionary brand (Black 1988). The Alliance was much more than a program for development, however. “From the beginning, the Alliance for Progress was a two-pronged strategy: it sought to undercut support for the Left through economic development, while using military methods to suppress guerillas and other ‘subversives.’ The reforms petered out, but the military side of the Alliance

endured” (Livingstone 2009, 40, emphasis in original). As part of the bureaucratic framework for the Alliance, the Agency for International Development (AID) was created to administer the American assistance programs. But “by 1966 AID’s police assistance bureau, the Office of Public Safety, was spending 38 percent of



Figure 10. 1961

the *entire economic assistance budget for Latin America* to conduct counterinsurgency training

in every country except Cuba” (Schoultz 1998, 359-360, emphasis added). Between 1964 and 1968, over 20,000 armed forces personnel from Latin America received training at the School of the Americas and other American military schools (Livingstone 2009, 40). While the military to military relationships flourished, political support for the Alliance for Progress declined precipitously. Irritated at the perceived failure of the region to avail itself of American capital and guidance, by 1963




Figure 11. 1963

the “old attitudes about the slothfulness and incompetence of Latin American politicians were resurrected” (Black 1988, 114). As illustrated in Figures 10⁴² and 11⁴³, the ability of the United States to guide and teach during this period was never at issue. The problem lay with Latin America’s inherent deficiencies.

To stop a perceived drift towards the political Left in Brazil, the Johnson administration coordinated with that country’s military to overthrow its democratically elected government in 1964 (Livingstone 2009). With strong public support, the United States invaded the Dominican Republic with 20,000 troops to prevent the reinstatement of its democratically elected president and demonstrate that it would not accept “another Cuba” in the region (Black 1988, 120). The Nixon administration worked diligently to prevent the 1970 presidential election of socialist

⁴² “A Little More Effort, Señor.” From *Philadelphia Inquirer* (1961), reprinted in Johnson (1980, 67).

⁴³ “The Class Will Please Come to Order – Somebody?” From *New York Times* (1963), reprinted in Johnson (1980, 69).

Salvador Allende in Chile. The Central Intelligence Agency invested one million dollars in a covert propaganda campaign to discredit the candidate while secretly channeling hundreds of thousands of dollars from United States corporations operating in Chile to Allende's opposition (Livingstone 2009). When that failed, the United States began a systematic effort to destabilize the country's economy while coordinating with the elements of the Chilean military that would overthrow and murder Allende in 1973 (Grow 2008). National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger's now infamous remarks in a White House meeting at the time voiced once again the predominant belief that Latin Americans had to be protected from themselves. "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people" (quoted in Schoultz 1998, 361).

Under his administration, President Carter was responsible for decisively integrating the push for human rights into American foreign policy but continued the practice of "uncritically accepting the hegemonic tradition of U.S. policy" (Ibid, 363). By the end of his term in office, the United States was sending millions of dollars in aid and military advisors to prop up the right wing regime in El Salvador and funding efforts to destabilize the new leftist Sandinista government in Nicaragua (Cottam 1992; McPherson 2006). During the Reagan years, interest in human rights was jettisoned in favor of a strict Cold War ideology that viewed instability in Latin America – most notably the Caribbean region – as a test of America's global power and commitment by the Soviet bloc (Dominguez 1999). This commitment was demonstrated by the invasion of Grenada and overthrow of its left leaning government in 1983 (Grow 2008). In a televised national address in 1984, President Reagan clearly outlined the nature of the perceived threat and the vehicle of its delivery.

Central America is a region of great importance to the United States. And it is so close – San Salvador is closer to Houston, Texas, than Houston is to Washington, D.C. Central America *is* America; it's at our doorstep. And it has become the stage for a bold attempt by the Soviet Union,

Cuba, and Nicaragua to install communism by force throughout the hemisphere... What we see in El Salvador is an attempt to destabilize the entire region and eventually move chaos and anarchy toward the American border (Quoted in Holden and Zolov 2000, 295, emphasis added).

As in previous historical interactions, Latin America was viewed as both a natural extension of the United States – “at our doorstep” – and a potential source of infection (in this case, from communism) that endangered Americans. To stave off the threat of “chaos and anarchy” spreading to the United States, the Reagan administration financed the Contra insurgency inside Nicaragua, mined the country’s harbors, and orchestrated a devastating international economic embargo against it (Livingstone 2009). Millions in military aid and advisors were channeled to El Salvador to support that government’s fight against its leftist insurgency. Its open collusion with death squads and widespread use of torture had little impact on levels of financial assistance (McPherson 2006). Not simply a matter of national security, the Reagan administration publically claimed that America’s task was “to transform the crisis in Central America into an opportunity... and to use this to help our neighbors not only secure their freedom from aggression and violence, but also set in place the policies, processes, and institutions that will make them both prosperous and free” (Holden and Zolov 2000, 293-294). The states of Latin America required proper tutelage and could not be trusted to handle important matters on their own. Not surprisingly, indigenous local and regional efforts to resolve the conflicts in El Salvador and Nicaragua – at variance with American ideas and ideals – were “systematically opposed and undercut” by Washington (Dominguez 1999, 44).

The Drug War and Economic Integration

Although first promulgated under the Reagan administration⁴⁴, the Bush presidency made the newest contagion emanating from Latin America – the “drug threat” – the centerpiece of its post Cold War regional strategy (Lehman 2006; Youngers and Rosin 2005). As ruler of Panama, Manuel Noriega’s support of United States policy in Central America and the Caribbean during the Cold War was considered so important “that by the mid-1980s CIA and Pentagon officials regarded him as an indispensable and crucial ally” (Grow 2008, 162). As a valued asset, his deep and blatant connections to the drug industry were overlooked by Washington during this period (Coerver and Hall 1999). However, by the end of the Reagan administration the increasing publicity surrounding Noriega’s drug trafficking and his defiantly brutal methods of governance had transformed him from an important ally to “an embarrassing political liability” for the United States (Grow 2008, 168). After his capture during the American invasion of Panama⁴⁵ in 1989 (officially condemned by the OAS), he stood trial in Miami for drug trafficking and was sentenced to 30 years in federal prison (Grow 2008; Livingstone 2009; McPherson 2006). The process of “certification” (where the United States annually evaluated the drug control efforts of individual Latin American states), initiated under the Reagan administration, continued under Bush. “Governments that failed to meet these certification standards faced sanctions that included a cutoff of most forms of U.S. aid and trade benefits and, within multilateral lending institutions, an automatic ‘no’ vote by the influential U.S. representative on loan requests from the offending nation” (Isaacson 2005, 22). Seeing Latin America (and not domestic

⁴⁴ In 1986, under National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 221, President Reagan declared drugs and the drug trade a threat to United States national security (Loveman 2006). However, aside from “Operation Blast Furnace” (a joint exercise that saw American armed forces deployed in Bolivia in an attempt to capture traffickers), the administration did not greatly expand its anti-drug activities in the region (Isaacson 2005; Lehman 2006).

⁴⁵ Ostensibly designed to rid Panama of a dictator brutalizing his people, the American invasion resulted in thousands of civilian deaths (Livingstone 2009).

consumption) as the cause of America's drug woes, the Bush administration initiated the Andean Strategy – a highly militarized program designed to attack drug production on the ground in the source countries of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. Levels of military assistance to those states increased dramatically (Isaacson 2005; Loveman 2006). On the economic front, the “Washington consensus” (emphasizing deregulation, privatization, and exportation), was prescribed by the United States as the proper solution to Latin America's financial woes (McPherson 2006, 112).

The push for regional economic integration continued under the Clinton administration with the advent of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) comprising Canada, Mexico, and the United States that went into effect in 1994 (Bulmer-Thomas and Page 1999). With Mexico generally perceived as “a low-wage, socially troubled, environmentally polluted country that exports illegal aliens to the United States” (Lewis and Ebrahim 1993, 829), the proposed high level integration with this Latin republic initiated a national argument within the United States. While couched in the language of labor standards, environmental damage, job growth or loss, etc, central to this debate – reminiscent of those held after the wars with Mexico and Spain in the 19th century – were the historical representations of American superiority and Latin subordination. The positions of both sides were clearly represented in the November 9, 1993 debate on NAFTA between Vice President Al Gore (in support) and former presidential candidate Ross Perot (in opposition) televised on Cable News Network (CNN) (Rosenbaum 1993; Skonieczny 2001). As in the previous debates centering on increasing connection with Latin America, both sides agreed on the central premise of Mexico's essential inferiority⁴⁶ and the concurrent exceptional nature of the United States. And, once again, advocates argued that

⁴⁶ For example, at one point during the televised debate, Perot exhibited a photo showing a Mexican resident making a shack out of cardboard to visually represent the economic conditions of that country. Gore did not take issue with this representation of Mexico and its workers, instead only asking Perot how *he* proposed to help Mexico and its workers without out the aid of NAFTA (1993).

America's exceptional nature would rehabilitate and renew Mexico while opponents maintained that Mexico would infect the United States and ruin that same exceptionalism (Lotz 1997; Skonieczny 2001). In the same year NAFTA went into effect, the Clinton administration sent troops ostensibly to restore the deposed Aristide government in Haiti. However, Aristide had actually been deposed and exiled in 1991 and neither the Bush nor the Clinton regimes were interested in becoming involved (Coerver and Hall 1999). It was only when an exodus of Haitians refugees descending on Florida caused a domestic furor that Washington decided to act (Livingstone 2009). Consistent with historical patterns, instability in Latin America was expected but when it threatened American interests it would not be tolerated.⁴⁷

Conclusion – Patterns in the United States' Vision of Latin America

To summarize, this chapter has explored via a genealogical approach the production and deployment throughout the 19th and 20th centuries of particular meanings attached to Latins, Latin America, and the United States and the implication of these representations in the formulation of American policy towards the region. I have advanced Pike's (1992) "state of nature" thesis as a mechanism to address the foundations of American perceptions of Latin American inferiority. As discussed above, civilization (that is, escaping the state of nature) necessitates both control over one's external environment and one's internal passions. Latin Americans, due to the social and cultural baggage associated with mixed Iberian, African, and indigenous parentage, have been consistently characterized over the period reviewed as unable to do either. The United States, conversely, is held up as the paragon of external and internal

⁴⁷ While the restoration of democracy in Haiti was a stated aim, according to Coerver and Hall (1999), "Clinton stressed the importance of the Haitian situation to U.S. domestic affairs, emphasizing the intervention as a way to stop the flow of Haitian refugees to the United States" (193).

development. This distinction – primitive/civilized – served as a core logic or guiding opposition (Doty 1993) that functioned discursively to establish the terms of American policies towards the region. To be clear, I am not stating that this solely determined particular historical outcomes. Rather, this logic provided different United States policymakers at different historical junctures with particular logics and “truths,” creating specific subject positions that both enabled and circumscribed the range of possible policy actions. In this manner, for example, the backwardness of the Mexican people in the 19th century (in their failure to properly realize the



Figure 12. 1915

potential of their abundant resources) served to some to justify annexation after the Mexican-American War while others cited *that same backwardness* as the central reason to not bring them into the Union (Hunt 1987; Schoultz 1998). So, while Latin subordination and United States superiority (the commonsensical extension of the primitive/civilized binary

opposition) have been consistently articulated over the period examined, the implications of these representations have always been the subject of contestation. Nevertheless, it still possible to identify particular patterns in the use of these representations and their corresponding logics.

One prominent image of Latinos already discussed above is *the child*. Until the racial climate in the United States modified somewhat in the 1930s, the image most typically employed was the black child (Ibid). As demonstrated in figures 12⁴⁸ and 13⁴⁹, the physical, intellectual,

⁴⁸ “I’m In for Something Now.” From *St. Joseph News-Press* (1915), reprinted in Johnson (1980, 205).

and cultural attributes stereotypically assigned to American blacks – dark skin, big lips, bare feet, unkempt hair, savage nature, minstrel show slang English, love of watermelon, etc – were transplanted onto the denizens of the Latin republics. “In brief, a black face and a foreign dialect symbolically transformed Latin America into a stereotype that paralleled the condition of, and evoked from prejudiced White North American society the same responses as Blacks in the United States at a time when



Figure 13. 1927

the prevailing ethic was ‘keep them in their place’” (Ibid, 158, emphasis in original).

Nevertheless, while the blatant allusions to blackness ended with the cultural shift away from overt racism (at least in print) with the arrival of the Good Neighbor policy, the image of the infantilized Latin (as demonstrated in Figures 14⁵⁰, 15⁵¹, and 16⁵²) did not. If, as



Figure 14. 1947

⁴⁹ “To the Rescue!” From *Rochester Democrat and Chronicle* (1927), reprinted in Johnson.(1980, 207)

⁵⁰ “The New Good Neighbor Policy.” From *Washington Post* (1947), reprinted in Johnson (1980, 293).

Weston (1998, 195) argues, the “peoples of the tropics were to [Theodore] Roosevelt like

children,” then the words of later

policymakers like Jeanne Kirkpatrick and

George H. W. Bush indicate a similar

mindset. Writing in 1981 on the civil war

in El Salvador (a country she had never

visited), Kirkpatrick ascribed the vicious

nature of that conflict to a political and

social culture stuck in perpetual

adolescence (valuing “machismo”)

(Schoultz 1987). During a press



Figure 15. 1960

conference in 1989, President Bush (piqued at an announcement by the leader of Nicaragua at

odds with American interests) took pains

to repeatedly refer to President Daniel

Ortega as a “little man” (after earlier

calling him “that unwanted animal at a

garden party”) (Schoultz 1998, xi).

If the United States, as in

Campbell’s (1998) aforementioned

argument, is defined more by absence than



Figure 16. 1981

by presence, what identity for America do these childlike images of Latin Americans convey?

⁵¹ “Spare the Rod and Spoil the Child.” From *Charleston News and Courier* (1960), reprinted in Pérez (2008, 242).

⁵² “Sam’s Sitting Service.” From *Orange County Register* (1981), reprinted in Kenworthy (1995, 33).

Consider again figures 12 – 16. The ubiquitous Uncle Sam is the American representative in the majority of these illustrations and “with the Latin children Uncle Sam acts the tutor, disciplinarian, babysitter, or referee” (Kenworthy 1995, 30). Either visually present or implied, the always mature Uncle Sam sets rules, provides guidance, makes the hard decisions, metes out punishment, and protects the household from intruders. In other words, the United States is the parent to the Latin American child. Understood as infantile, the Latin America countries cannot be trusted to act responsibly and are thus denied agency. The United States, on the other hand, is understood not only to have the ability to maintain order and further progress but also to have the responsibility to do so (Weston 1998).

This underscores another central element – *America as the natural leader of the hemisphere*. While the basis of Latin inferiority lies in its continual miscegenation, the basis for




Figure 17. 1988

the vanguard region of a hemisphere that, *following its leadership*, is the vanguard region of the world” (Kenworthy 1995, 18, emphasis added). Consider figures 17⁵³ and 18⁵⁴, where

America’s preeminence lies in its (ostensibly) pure Anglo-Saxon biological and cultural heritage (Pike 1992). This heritage permits the United States to readily escape the state of nature and is the central explanation of America’s perception of its role in the western world as a civilizing force. “The United States is

⁵³ “America Squeezes Panama.” From *Washington Post* (1988), reprinted in Black (1988, xx).

⁵⁴ “Room for All, If They’re Careful.” From *New York Herald* (1904), reprinted in Johnson (1980, 45).

America's superiority and hegemony over the lesser peoples of the region (and to a certain extent of the world) is represented through such visual tropes as gigantic size, massive strength and power, global reach, and geographic

personification. From the advent of the

Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe

Doctrine in 1905 through the present, the

United States, in loco parentis, has deemed

itself the sole legitimate arbiter of events

in the western hemisphere. "In effect, the

corollary established that quarrelsome



Figure 18. 1904

Caribbean countries would no longer be allowed to pursue internecine wars that interfered with their progress – and that invited European powers to fish in troubled waters in ways that might altogether threaten U.S. security and economic interests" (Pike 1992, 172). Regardless of the apparent concern – reactionary European powers, communism, drugs, economic decline – the United States is understood as the natural and highest authority in the region.

Despite being composed of a strikingly diverse group of countries with disparate histories, cultures, peoples, languages, customs, etc, the United States has often viewed Latin America *as a single entity*. "Public officials who would be most unlikely openly to suggest a single policy for a region as diverse as western Europe repeatedly have created the impression that the United States has a single policy for the vast and varied Latin American area, based at different times on the Monroe Doctrine, the Big Stick, the Good Neighbor, or the Alliance for Progress, to mention only four of the better known 'cornerstones'" (Johnson 1980, 30, emphasis

in original). As demonstrated in figures 19⁵⁵ through 20⁵⁶, the Latin states were frequently represented in an undifferentiated manner. When visually personified, the figures of Latin America in these images are typically small, childlike figures (contrasting with the usually giant sized Uncle Sam or similar symbol of the United States) that are virtually identical no matter their individual national provenance. Black skin and watermelons are replaced by ubiquitous sombreros and mustachios as




Figure 19. 1903

visual cues for Latin identity. When symbolically represented in these images, all of Latin



Figure 20. 1901

America is lumped into a single figure or symbol. The certainty of 19th century policymakers like Thomas Jefferson and John Quincy Adams about the essential inferiority of all Latinos stemmed from this presupposition of sameness (Schoultz 1998). In 1982, President Reagan echoed this identical presupposition when, at the

conclusion of a tour of Latin America states, he exclaimed to reporters “you’d be surprised, yes, because, you know, they’re all individual countries” (quoted in McPherson 2006, 89). The net

⁵⁵ “Five Battleships Ordered, - a Few More Supports for the Nest.” From *Philadelphia Inquirer* (1903), reprinted in Johnson (1980, 43).

⁵⁶ “The Great Balancing Act at Buffalo.” From *Harper’s Weekly* (1901), reprinted in Johnson (1980, 35).

effect of this undifferentiated construction of Latin America was to deny the states of the region a truly individual identity and orchestrate a schema where a few universal cultural traits and attributes summarize essentially the southern half of the western hemisphere.

One such commonly perceived trait is instability or irrationality, stemming from the belief in the Latin's essential "fiery" nature. *Latin America: Our Volatile Neighbors* – examining "the controversial and divisive questions surrounding our southern neighbors, who sometimes seem mysterious and even threatening to us" (Trager 1987, 1) – is one contemporary scholarly example of this familiar presupposition of an incendiary and unpredictable Latin America. Likewise, the thesis in *Underdevelopment is a State of Mind: The Latin American Case* (Harrison 1985, 2000) is that a Latin American culture (e.g., backward looking, apathetic, shiftless) is the central cause of regional underdevelopment and volatility. This notion of Latin weakness and dependency is implicated in all of the images above.

A corollary to this monolithic view of Latin America by the United States is a perception of an instinctive hemispheric (the Americas) unity around a specific set of (North American) values. From exporting democracy and promoting capitalism to protecting human rights and fighting drug trafficking, presidents from Roosevelt through Clinton have promulgated American policy interests as the proper and natural code of conduct for *all* the states of the region (Kenworthy 1995). Deviation from this code of conduct indicated a break with civilization and obligated United States intervention in the hemisphere because *the Americas* (the region as a whole) belong to *Americans* (the United States) (Ibid). The people of Latin America may live there but the territory – along with its abundant resources – is not truly perceived as their own. Moreover, with their unseemly attributes, at best they hold little value, at worst they are a threat. As a result, United States

policymakers focus upon the territory rather than its inhabitants... [T]hey say, “If Central America were to fall...” not, in contrast, “If Central Americans were to fall...” They talk about “our backyard,” not “our neighbors”. They say, “if we cannot defend ourselves *there*, we cannot expect to prevail *elsewhere*.” “There” and “elsewhere,” like “backyard,” “doorstep,” and “neighborhood,” are places, territory. Policymakers do not say, “If we cannot maintain the allegiance of Central Americans, we cannot expect to maintain the allegiance of our allies elsewhere” (Schultz 1987, 297, emphasis in original).

This notion of its relative **proximity** to the borders of the United States – understood as in its (back or front) “yard” or on its “doorstep” – cuts two ways as Figures 21⁵⁷, 22⁵⁸, and 23⁵⁹ illustrate. On the one hand, the region is understood as a natural, commonsensical extension of the United States and thus, its proper domain (Kenworthy 1995). On the other hand, the perpetual immediacy of Latin America serves as a continuous source of anxiety that some *contagion* (e.g., economic instability, communism, drugs) emanating from the region will infect

the United States (Black 1988). From Wilson and Mexico, through Reagan and El Salvador to Clinton and Colombia, proximity has been a constant theme in United States interventions in Latin America (Crandall 2002; Holden and Zolov 2000; Langley 1989).




Figure 21. 1924

⁵⁷ “Another Little Touch of Sore Throat.” From *Louisville Times* (1924), reprinted in Johnson (1980, 61).

⁵⁸ “There Seems to Be a Southern Gentleman in the Melon Patch.” From *St. Paul Pioneer Press* (1901), reprinted in Johnson (1980, 193).

⁵⁹ “Weakening Link” From *New York Journal* (1954), reprinted in Black (1988, xvi).

For the purposes of my examination of the discourse surrounding Plan Colombia from February through April 2000, I look to these specific historical commonplaces of the child, monolithism, proximity, and America regional suzerainty identified in speech, text, and image – alongside the more general representations associated with Latin America’s affinity with “the natural” (e.g. savagery, femininity, instability, etc) – to inform my analysis of the collected data in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.



Figure 22. 1901




Figure 23. 1954

CHAPTER 4

PLAN COLOMBIA: HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF U.S. DRUG POLICY AND COLOMBIA

(1970 – 1999)

An American Vision of Regional Drug Control

As discussed in the last chapter, the United States has long viewed Latin America (given its proximity) as a source of dangers that threaten its security and sanctity. Discursively constructed as a “breeding ground” or a “nesting place,” whether it be the Bolshevik virus in the 1920s, the Castro cancer in the 1960s, or the Managua malignancy in the 1980s, the region has consistently been characterized as a Typhoid Mary (Kenworthy 1995). Drug trafficking is simply another iteration in the history of perceived plagues understood by America to originate in the states to its south and cited by its policymakers as a warrant for intervention. Cocaine from South America first achieved national notoriety within the United States at the turn of 20th century when its use was linked to immigrants and blacks in the South (Reinarman 2000). Reports that the drug drove blacks to crime – including emboldening black men to rape white women – were widely circulated to support the enactment of the first federal anti-drug law, the Harrison Act, in 1914 (Musto 1999). In 1937, similar claims linking marijuana use among Mexican-Americans, Latin migrant workers, and blacks to violent crime spree aided passage of federal legislation outlawing that substance (Duster 1970; Jensen and Gerber 1998). The United States, from the 1930s onwards, pressured governments in the Caribbean and Central and South America to draw on their own already scarce funds to adopt and enforce American-style prohibitionist policies (Walker 1989). From its outset in the first decades of the 20th century, the central tenets of United States drug policy toward Latin America were clear in the minds of its policymakers.

One, the ultimate responsibility for America's drug problems lay firmly *outside* of United States and two, drugs should be eliminated at their source – regardless of the political, economic, or social costs to producer or transit states (Musto 1987; Walker 1996).

Mexico, as one case in point, has long felt the impact of American pressure and punishment in this context. Directly bordering the United States, its policies were especially scrutinized by Washington which regularly exerted its influence to keep them consistent with America's goals (Ryan 1998). Deviation would not be tolerated. For example, after Mexican officials declined to allow United States reconnaissance flights over suspected drug fields in 1969, the Nixon administration responded with *Operation Intercept* to punish this recalcitrance by effectively shutting down the border and crippling Mexico's economy.

Automobiles and trucks crossing the border were delayed up to six hours in 100-degree temperatures. Travelers who seemed suspicious – or who dared complain – often were strip searched. Thousands of Mexican workers lost their jobs in the United States because of the customs delays at the border. Ultimately more than 5 million citizens of the United States and Mexico were caught up in that nightmarish dragnet before it finally ended (Carpenter 2003, 13).

Overwhelmed, Mexico quickly acceded to Washington's demands and *Operation Intercept* was immediately transformed into *Operation Cooperation* which supplied United States advisors, training, aircraft, weapons, and money for the purposes of crop eradication inside of Mexico (Walker 1989). While the urgency of America's drug policies fluctuated over time in line with changing actors and events, this pattern of influence and intervention to ensure that Latin states comply with United States' policies has largely been consistent. It against this backdrop that United States drug policies towards Colombia emerged and evolved over time (Loveman 2006; Ramirez Lemus, Stanton, and Walsh 2005)

Moving beyond the last chapter's broader genealogical analysis of historical United States relations with Latin America, Chapter 4 narrows the focus to the more immediate context of contemporary American drug policy in Colombia and addresses the central research site of the

dissertation – Plan Colombia. The chapter is organized in two parts. I first provide an overview of the contemporary history of illicit drugs in the context of United States – Colombia relations. From the 1970s through the 1990s, the drug issue moved from a peripheral concern to become the one all-encompassing element of this relationship. As it is shown below, at the core of this hierarchical association is a disconnect between the harsh reality of Colombia – massive human dislocation and political instability brought about by an ever evolving series of drug fueled intrastate conflicts between the government and myriad combatants with shifting goals and loyalties – and the unyielding, unequivocal American demand for an end to all drug exports to the United States no matter the consequences to the Colombian people. Secondly, I detail the more immediate circumstances in both Colombia and the United States in 1999 that prompted the drafting of Plan Colombia. I illustrate the process by which it was formulated and provide a brief summary of its major goals. Its introduction into the federal legislative process in January 2000, its route through Congress, and the terms and conditions of its ultimate passage are described.

A Modern History of the Drug Trade: Contemporary U.S. – Colombia Relations

The 1970s – A Blip on the Radar Gets Noticed

Starting from low levels of cultivation for export to the United States at the beginning of the 1960s, by 1970 marijuana was a firmly established cash crop comprising a significant source of foreign currency for the Colombian economy (Melo 1998). However, in spite of a 1973 bilateral agreement to channel antidrug aid and the stationing of a small contingent of Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents at the embassy in Bogota, narcotics was not deemed a

central issue by the United States in its relations with Colombia for the majority of that decade (Crandall 2002). Likewise, the Colombian government during this period, focused on the ongoing low level leftist insurgency⁶⁰ in the countryside, did not perceive the burgeoning marijuana trade as a potential domestic threat. Tokatlian (1988) argues that Colombian policy at this time “was dominated by a certain socio-economic rationale, marked by a strong vein of pragmatism” where the government was more interested in facilitating the flow of the millions of dollars of profits back into the economy than in cracking down on the cultivation and export of the drug itself (139). This attitude dramatically changed in the face of the massive influx of Colombian grown marijuana into the United States and the beginnings of the cocaine trade and “by 1978 drug trafficking had emerged as a crucial topic in U.S.-Colombian interaction” (Tokatlian 1990, 59).

The central focus of American drug policy toward marijuana at this time was supply reduction (Jensen and Gerber 1998). Responding to pressure from the Carter administration, the Colombian government under President Turbay (1978-1982) directly engaged its military in antidrug operations, sprayed the herbicide Paraquat over areas of suspected marijuana production, and entered into an extradition treaty with the United States in 1979 (Palacios 2006; Livingstone 2004).⁶¹ For its cooperation with the antidrug effort, Colombia received approximately 30 million dollars in additional aid from the United States between 1979 and 1981 (Tokatlian 1988). The centerpiece of Colombian action during this period was Operacion Fulminante, a massive two-year effort by the military to crack down on marijuana production

⁶⁰ Since the 1960s, left wing revolutionary groups, the largest being the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) or FARC, had conducted guerrilla operations against the central government (Murillo and Rey Avirama 2004; Simons 2004).

⁶¹ The extradition treaty was ratified by the Colombian government in 1980 and by the United States government in 1981 (Tokatlian 1990).

and trafficking on the Guajira Peninsula, the hub of Atlantic Coast production (Sharpe 1988; Tokatlian 1990). While thousands of tons of marijuana were seized and numerous arrests were made by the time it concluded in 1980, this did not signal the demise of the drug industry.

Instead,

the end result of the Turbay administration's escalation was that, in addition to moving marijuana cultivation to other areas of the country, the drug traffickers focused more on cocaine production, making it more mobile and utilizing small-scale processing labs that were harder to detect and destroy. Moreover, rampant corruption and ineptitude within the military prompted the Colombian government to shift central antidrug authority to the National Police (Crandall 2002, 27).

The aftermath of the Guajira operation played out in a pattern that would be repeated over and over again over the next three decades. Any seizure by the Colombian military or National Police would simply push the cultivation of cocaine into more remote sections of the country and any crops destroyed would be replanted as soon as the security forces moved on (Simons 2004).

Moreover, this crackdown served up a number of additional unintended and unforeseen consequences for the both Colombia and the United States. First, it worked to place the onus of America's perceived drug problems on Colombia "since by cooperating in U.S. antidrug efforts, the Colombian government was conceding that the drug issue had a large supply component" (Crandall 2002, 28). This meshed neatly with the perceptions in Washington that drugs were an external threat where foreign supply fueled domestic consumption (Tokatlian 1988).⁶² Second, this offensive fostered the end of the marijuana era and the beginning of the large scale trafficking of cocaine into the United States that would come to dominate the relationship between the two countries throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Much easier and exponentially more

⁶² Tokatlian (1988) argues that this understanding of drug use as a consequence solely of "external factors and variables" formed the foundation of American thinking on this issue and fostered a specific drug war vocabulary for United States policymakers. He cites as an example, "the term *drug trafficking*, which suggests the external dimension of the issue: i.e., that the core of the problem is the *traffic in* and transport of drugs, rather than their consumption" (134, emphasis in original). Moreover, according to Crandall (2002), from that time forward there "has been surprisingly little debate in either Washington or Bogota as to whether supply reduction should be a fundamental component of the war on drugs" (28).

profitable to smuggle than large, bulky bundles of marijuana, the drug cartels had already begun exporting cocaine via their existing smuggling routes by the middle of the 1970s (Melo 1998).⁶³ Rather than crush the drug trade as intended, the crackdown demanded by the United States actually accelerated the ongoing transition to the higher yield, lower risk commodity of cocaine – the profits of which would dramatically empower the country's two major drug cartels located in Medellin and Cali (Ibid). Finally, the ratification of the extradition treaty by the Turbay administration both signaled Bogotá's basic acceptance of Washington's specific drug war philosophy and established the precedent for continuing American intervention into the internal affairs of the Colombian state:

The underlying implications [of the treaty] were that tough law enforcement was the best alternative to eliminate drug supply, that the U.S. government had no confidence at all in the Colombian judicial system, and that the U.S. official diagnosis on drugs was the correct one. It also provided the U.S. administration with an instrument (a "stick") to determine unilaterally Colombian collaboration on drugs (Tokatlian 1990, 95, emphasis in original).

While the extradition policy would be discontinued and reinstated multiple times over the next eighteen years by Turbay's successors, its enactment effectively signaled the end of Colombia's autonomy over its drug policies (Crandall 2002).

The 1980s – Narcotization, Narco-Guerillas, and the Start of Militarization

The issue of illegal drugs, according to Jensen and Gerber (1998), did not constitute a major issue in the minds of the general American public in the early 1980s. It did, however, figure prominently in the rhetoric of the Reagan administration which began to play up the drug

⁶³ While Colombians began planting coca leaves in the mid 1970s, the vast majority of coca growers (until the 1990s) were in Peru and Bolivia, respectively. The Colombian cartels at the time specialized in processing this raw coca and exporting the finished product, cocaine, to the United States and Europe (Simons 2004).

threat to the United States and publically linked communist countries⁶⁴ with international drug trafficking. (Scott and Marshall 1998). From its onset, the Betancur government (1982-1986) faced tremendous pressure from Washington to cooperate with American drug control efforts, most notably by extraditing Colombian cartel figures to the United States to stand trial (Melo 1998). Ideologically opposed⁶⁵ to this tactic, the Betancur government rejected repeated requests for extradition in late 1983 – an action which led to mounting tension between the two countries. The American reaction ranged from diplomatic letters of protest to “punitive measures undertaken by U.S. Customs against legal Colombian exports and Colombian tourists” (Tokatlian 1990, 118). A far cry from Washington’s simplistic Cold War homilies, the situation on the ground in Colombia was complicated and decidedly precarious. As the Betancur administration tried to deescalate the decades-long conflict with the country’s multiple insurgent groups,⁶⁶ it struggled to govern a country increasingly beset by the power of the drug cartels.

The traffickers were creating a complex network of companies with growing influence in the financial sector, sports clubs, mass communications media, the arts, and the cooperative sector. Penetration of the export sector gave the traffickers an even greater influence in the Colombian economy, just as drug money increasing fuelled corruption in the justice, police, and political structures of the country (Simons 2004, 62).

⁶⁴ Contrary to this public rhetoric, and with Washington’s tacit approval, the true major players in the drug trade were often America’s Cold War allies and instruments like the Contras in Nicaragua and Manuel Noriega in Panama (See, for example, Scott and Marshall 1998; Walker 1989).

⁶⁵ Livingstone (2004) maintains that Betancur “was keen to follow an autonomous foreign policy and keep his distance from the hardline Reagan administration. He took Colombia into the non-aligned movement and played a leading role in the Contadora peace process in Central America” (58). This disinclination towards extradition was in line with the administration’s nationalist philosophy which argued that the drug problem was driven by unchecked demand in consumer countries like the United States (cf., Murillo and Rey Avirama 2004).

⁶⁶ Stepping back from the domestic repression of the Turbay years, the new government declared an amnesty and freed many of the political prisoners arrested by the previous administration. “This was the beginning of the period Betancur named the ‘political opening.’ Here was a window through which demilitarization of political life and a serious discussion of problems – political exclusion, lack of education, service, and infrastructure, violent dispossession and government neglect in the countryside, unemployment as well as shrinking industrial manufacturing jobs in the cities – could be glimpsed” (Hylton 2006, 70, emphasis in original).

Moreover, at this time the leaders of the drug trade began allying themselves with the large scale ranchers and other members of the landed elite – forming death squads to fight the leftist guerrillas that extorted them and to intimidate and murder members of the labor groups and indigenous organizations whose political activities threatened their holdings (Hylton 2006; Palacios 2006; Simons 2004).⁶⁷ These death squads were the forerunners of the right-wing paramilitary groups that – financed by drug revenues and aligned with elements of the military and the government – would be at the center of much of the violence in Colombia during the 1990s (Murillo and Rey Avirama 2004).

To fight this growing influence, the Colombia government opted to strengthen its *internal* efforts of control by cracking down on domestic production, increasing interdiction efforts; and strengthening controls over its borders (Melo 1998; Tokatlian 1988). In 1984, the Medellin cartel responded to the seizure and destruction of their largest cocaine processing laboratory by assassinating the Colombian Minister of Justice, Rodrigo Lara. They also killed the head of the police narcotics unit the following year (Hylton 2006; Simons 2004). Immediately responding to the Lara murder, the Betancur government reversed course and started extraditing wanted Colombians to the United States to stand trial (Melo 1998). This policy reversal touched off a seven year period of open warfare between the Medellin cartel (the “Extraditables”) and the Colombian government and other public figures critical of the drug trade.

During the 1980s and early 1990s, close to 500 policemen were killed by drug traffickers; between 1984 and 1990 a minister of justice, the director of the newspaper El Espectador, a supreme court justice, a leader of the UP⁶⁸, a governor of the department of Antioquia, an attorney general, and

⁶⁷ Medellin cartel leaders, including Pablo Escobar, formed Muerte a Secuestradores (“Death to Kidnappers”) or MAS to eliminate “subversives” in 1981. At first a regional actor, MAS efforts quickly expanded across the country. (Hylton 2006).

⁶⁸ The Unión Patriótica or UP was the political party formed in 1984 by the oldest and largest insurgent group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) or FARC, in order to engage in mainstream politics and to take advantage of the cease fire with the government declared that year (Murillo and Rey Avirama 2004, , 62; Tokatlian 1990, , 110).

the leading Liberal Party presidential candidate in 1990 were all assassinated by the cartels (Crandall 2002, 78).

Reeling from cartel violence, a major economic decline, and the failure of ceasefire agreements⁶⁹ with the insurgent groups to deliver lasting peace, by 1985 the Betancur administration had completely abandoned its initial attempts at charting an independent path and fully embraced the American vision of the “war on drugs” (i.e., source country eradication, militarization, and extradition) and Colombia’s subordinate place within it (Tokatlian 1990). The relations between the two states became utterly “narcotized” from that point forward with everything and anything in question boiling down to the subject of drugs. “If Colombia wanted good relations or support from the United States on a certain issue, it was clear to all that it first had to be perceived by Washington as cooperating in the war on drugs” (Crandall 2002, 30).

The emergence of crack cocaine in the United States in the mid 1980s brought even more pressure to bear on Colombia to curtail the flow of drugs. In 1984, the United States ambassador to Colombia – introducing the term “narco-guerrilla” – announced that the drug cartels and the left-wing FARC revolutionaries were closely coordinating their efforts inside the country and beyond its borders (Morales 1989).⁷⁰ This ostensible “FARC-NARC” (Americas Watch Committee 1989) connection in Colombia was part of a broader discursive strategy in Washington to tie revolutionary communism to terrorism and the drug trade (Scott and Marshall 1998). For example in 1986, President Reagan publically argued that the “link between the governments of such Soviet allies as Cuba and Nicaragua and international narcotics trafficking

⁶⁹ Fearing the prospect of political and economic (especially agrarian) reforms, the peace process was actively undermined by the Colombian military and police leadership and the Liberal party elite who actively collaborated with the drug cartels. On the other side, the FARC and other insurgent groups used the opportunity to expand their political influence but refused to fully embrace the process and forgo the armed struggle (Hylton 2006; Murillo and Rey Avirama 2004).

⁷⁰ The fact that this connection was discredited at the time (and many times subsequently) had no effect on its continued use by officials from successive American administrations (Americas Watch Committee 1989; Crandall 2002; Morales 1989).

and terrorism is becoming increasingly clear. These twin evils – narcotics trafficking and terrorism – represent the most insidious and dangerous threat to the hemisphere today” (Boyd 1986, 9).⁷¹ The mass media seized on these representations of Latin based danger (“narco-terrorism”) and the very public deaths of a few celebrity athletes and began a feeding frenzy that captured the American public’s imagination and produced a climate in Congress that clamored for strong, military supported action against the drug trade (Elwood 1994; Reinerman and Levine 1997).⁷²

In April 1986, National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 221 declared drug production and trafficking a national security threat and emphasized the need for source country control (Crandall 2002). Likewise, the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act characterized drugs as a threat to national and regional security (Belenko 2000). Operation Blast Furnace (1986), a joint American-Bolivian military operation that targeted Bolivian traffickers, was followed by Operation Snowcap (1987, 1989) which expanded operations to include Peru and Colombia (Ibid).⁷³ In 1988, Congress certified the military’s increasing antidrug role by designating the Pentagon “the ‘single lead agency’ for detecting and monitoring illegal drugs transiting to the United States by air or sea” (Isaacson 2005, 28, emphasis in original). The Anti-Drug Acts of 1986 and 1988 formalized and refined⁷⁴ the process known as “certification” that would come to

⁷¹ “The term ‘narcoterrorism’ also soon became an essential adjunct to the doctrine of national security developed by right-wing Latin America military forces to rationalize their repressive domestic activities and seizures of power” (Scott and Marshall 1998, 24, emphasis in original).

⁷² My delineation of this “drug scare” (Reinerman 2000) is not an effort to deny the existence of a drug problem during this period. Instead, I am trying to demonstrate how an outsized, overblown, and hysterical perception of that problem worked in conjunction with certain ideological and structural constraints to formulate a specifically militarized response.

⁷³ For a detailed review of Operation Blast Furnace, see Fishel (1991).

⁷⁴ The linking of foreign aid to a given nation’s anti-drug efforts was first codified in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Crandall 2002). However, the Anti-Drug Act “provisions represent a major policy reversal of roles previously played by the Congress and the president in the decision to deny assistance to certain drug-

symbolize the asymmetric nature of the drug war relationship between the United States and Colombia. Tying continuing foreign assistance directly to a state's drug prohibition performance, Joyce (1998) argues that certification provides Washington with a heavy stick:

Countries regarded by the USA as major drug producing or transit countries are examined for their efficiency in drug control during the previous year. If their efforts are judged to have been unsatisfactory, the offending countries are "decertified." This may render them ineligible for US aid and invoke a US boycott on loans from multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) (200, emphasis in original).

During the Barco administration's tenure (1986-1990), American sentiment towards Colombia swung back and forth on a pendulum from outrage to anxious support. The 1987 decision of the Colombian Supreme Court declaring the extradition treaty unconstitutional⁷⁵ prompted anger and economic retaliation from the United States while the assassination of Liberal party presidential candidate Luis Galan in August 1989 by the Medellin cartel shocked the new Bush administration and resulted in a dramatic increase in counternarcotics aid (Crandall 2002; Tokatlian 1988). Galan's murder revived extradition, authorized now via executive order, and brought about a large scale crackdown by the Colombian government but this only stoked the violence. In addition to continuing to assassinate government officials and public figures, the cartel carried out a yearlong bombing campaign that not only attacked numerous urban targets but also destroyed an Avianca airliner en route from Bogota to Cali and demolished the headquarters of the national security police (DAS), producing massive casualties (Kline 1999; Livingstone 2004). At the same time that the Medellin cartel was terrorizing the urban

producing or drug-transiting countries. Under previous legislation, the president took the initiative in determining whether or not a country would be eligible for foreign assistance. Under the new law, Congress now takes the initiative in making the determination as to which categories of countries will not receive aid, while the role of the president has been reduced to either enforcing the terms of, or seeking exceptions to, this congressional determination" (Perl 1988, 24).

⁷⁵ It has been argued that this decision was strongly influenced (via the ongoing murder of judges, death threats, bribery, etc) by the Medellin cartel (Livingstone 2004; Simons 2004).

population and battling the government to stop extradition, the cartel-funded paramilitary armies were engaged in a lethal campaign (with direct and indirect support from the Colombian military) in the countryside. They targeted anyone deemed sympathetic to the FARC and other leftist insurgent groups: teachers, labor unionists, advocates for campesinos and agrarian reform and especially members of the UP – which they murdered by the thousands (Kline 1999; Palacios 2006; Simons 2004).

The United States' fundamental response to the complex, drug fueled mix of instability, violence, political inaction, military corruption, and economic inequality in Colombia was to increase *military* aid. As the perceived Soviet threat quickly receded towards the end of the decade, the ostensible danger to the United States from drug trafficking – described in dire, apocalyptic terms – became the preeminent national security issue. For example, in a Washington Post Op-Ed following the assassination of Luis Galan, a congressman likened Colombia to a wobbly tile in a set of Latin American dominoes.

Through a well-timed brutal assault unleashed on Colombian officials in the streets, the drug traffickers again remind us that they will stop at nothing to maintain their empires of doom... Our national security and future as a stable government are at stake... If Colombia falls, the other, smaller, less stable nations in this region would become targets. It is conceivable that we could one day find ourselves an island of democracy in a sea of narco-politico rule, a prospect as bad as being surrounded by communist regimes... If there is nothing to stop the drug lords ... then tomorrow they could rule the world (Rangel 1989, A23).

In a United States Senate report issued in 1989, a former head of the military's Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) emphasized the increasing danger of this new threat. "The American people must understand much better than they ever have in the past how our safety and that of our children is threatened by *Latin drug conspiracies* which are dramatically more successful at subversion in the United States than any that are centered in Moscow" (quoted in Cottam 1994, 162, emphasis added). To be certain that Americans understood the specific origins of "our most serious problem today," that same year George Bush singled out Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru –

“where the crack and cocaine bought on America’s streets is grown and processed” – in his first presidential address to the nation (Bush 1989, 1136, 1138). The Bush administration’s five year, \$2.2 billion Andean Initiative in 1989 underscored both America’s newly preeminent focus on the “drug war” in the Andes (and away from the quickly fading Cold War in Central America) and the stark belief that only by forceful action carried out by (and in) source countries could the drug problem be eradicated (Crandall 2002).⁷⁶

The 1990s – Narcodemocracy, Decertification, and Increasing Intervention

In its drive to attack the drug trade, Washington (under the auspices of its Andean strategy) pressured the states in the region to engage their armed forces in anti-drug operations in ways that would never be tolerated in the United States. “With U.S. training, equipment, and diplomatic backing, Latin American militaries on counterdrug missions began to mount roadblocks, perform internal surveillance (including wiretaps), execute searches and seizures, force down suspicious aircraft, eradicate crops (or support police eradication), patrol rivers, and, in some cases, arrest and interrogate civilians” (Isaacson 2005, 23).⁷⁷ To further support this agenda, the Bush administration modified the rules of engagement for American military advisors to allow armed United States personnel to accompany host country units on patrols (Carpenter 2003). This push to militarize, however, came at a particularly poor time for the Colombia government engaged in a national strategy of de-escalating violence and resolving longstanding internal conflicts.

⁷⁶ From fiscal year 1990 to fiscal year 1994 (of the counter-narcotics money allocated for the Andean countries in the Initiative), Colombia received approximately \$630 million dollars of which 68% was military related (e.g., military equipment, advisors) (Crandall 2002).

⁷⁷ By strong contrast, the Andean nations’ preference was for economic solutions. According to Isaacson (2005), in 1990 the ambassadors from all three Andean states asked Washington to forgo the military aid and instead provide their exports greater access to United States markets.

From its onset, the Gaviria administration (1990-1994) advanced major government initiatives designed to restore the balance of law and order in Colombia by addressing the multiple (i.e., guerrilla, paramilitary, and cartel) sources of violence plaguing the country (Kline 1999). Foremost, in 1990-1991, a popularly elected⁷⁸ Constituent Assembly – made up in large part by representatives of heretofore marginalized social groups (e.g., indigenous peoples, demobilized insurgents⁷⁹, trade unionists) – met to revise the nation’s constitution (Palacios 2006). To address the concerns of the Extraditables, a structured amnesty was offered by the government that reflected a clear distinction made between ending the violence of narcoterrorism and eliminating drug trafficking. “The Gaviria government, with the blessings of public opinion, offered drug traffickers the option of ‘submitting to justice’ – voluntarily surrendering and making a full confession in exchange for a substantial reduction in sentence” (Palacios 2006, 254, emphasis in original). For the leaders⁸⁰ of the Medellin cartel, this meant the end of the threat of extradition – provided they complied fully with the terms of the surrender agreement. For the Gaviria administration, it meant both an end to the cartel’s violence against the state and ostensibly breathing room to improve its law enforcement and judicial systems’ capabilities to combat the drug trade (Melo 1998).

On the insurgent front, the formation of the Assembly was intended “to entice the guerrilla groups to lay down their arms and participate in this opportunity to construct a ‘new

⁷⁸ While ostensibly a democratic process, the election of the Constituent Assembly was approved via a national referendum with only 26% of the population showing up – “one of the lowest voter turnouts in Colombian history” (Palacios 2006, 247).

⁷⁹ Representatives from the disbanded guerrilla group M-19 managed to win the second highest number of seat in the Assembly (Livingstone 2004).

⁸⁰ While some of the Medellin leaders had earlier agreed to the government’s terms and surrendered, Pablo Escobar (unwilling to simply take the government’s promise on faith) waited until the revision of the constitution was complete in 1991, and extradition was legally prohibited, before turning himself in to the authorities (Melo 1998).

Colombia” (Crandall 2002, 71, emphasis in original). In addition to eliminating extradition, the new constitution reformed the scope and powers of the government and enshrined many new rights for the Colombian people. A single term limit was placed upon the executive⁸¹ and the emergency decree powers of the office were severely curtailed. The powers of the Congress were strengthened and the duties of individual members formalized. The electoral rights of the people were expanded with the implementation of direct election of governors, recall votes, national referenda, opposition rights, and the requirement of a plurality (not a simple majority) of votes to win the presidency (Kline 1999). However, even as the new constitution created hope for a genuine resolution to the country’s multiple violent social conflicts, the government’s initiatives ultimately failed to successfully end cartel violence or to bring about a negotiated settlement with the major guerrilla groups.

While the introduction of the amnesty policy (with its accompanying prohibition of extradition) may have brought about the conclusion of the long era of cartel attacks, it soon became apparent that its “secondary operational stages were carried out with remarkable negligence and irresponsibility” (Melo 1998, 74). For example, under the terms negotiated for his surrender, Pablo Escobar was permitted such a wide latitude⁸² in his imprisonment that it quickly became a public embarrassment (Kline 1999). When Bogotá ultimately attempted to regain control by moving Escobar to a secure military base, he and fourteen associates easily escaped (Simons 2004). After almost 17 months on the run with a multimillion dollar price on his head, Escobar was finally located and shot dead by security forces in Medellin on December

⁸¹ The constitution would be amended in 2005 to allow presidents to be directly reelected (Palacios 2006).

⁸² For example, during his approximately thirteen months of imprisonment, Escobar “would frequently leave the prison to watch football games and had access to a bank of telephone lines and an arsenal of firearms” (Livingstone 2004, 60).

2, 1993 (Crandall 2002; Simons 2004). While Washington was pleased with the final dissolution of the Medellin cartel, it resulted in no appreciable dent in the American drug supply. Moreover, the Clinton administration quickly grew disaffected with Gaviria's apparent toleration of the Cali cartel during his last year in office and his public discussion of drug legalization in Colombia as a legitimate, long term solution to narcotrafficking (Crandall 2002; Melo 1998). Both congressional legislators and executive branch officials (like the head of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) at the time) began to openly describe Colombia as an impending or actual *narco-democracy* – "that is, a system actually influenced and controlled by drug traffickers (Farah 1993, A14).⁸³ For the remainder of the decade, Colombia would be regularly characterized in the North American press in this same manner (Scott 2003).

While the new constitution addressed some of the concerns of the guerrillas and the Gaviria administration successfully negotiated the disarmament and demobilization⁸⁴ of the smaller, second generation insurgent groups, the effort to end the decades long conflict with the largest (and oldest) organizations – the FARC and ELN – was not successful (Crandall 2002). Instead of enticing these groups to engage in the Constituent Assembly, the government – with a markedly inconsistent strategy that combined military assaults on rebel targets with peace overtures – could not even secure a stable cease-fire as a foundation for peace talks (Kline 1999). Talks between the government and the insurgents (under the umbrella group CGSB⁸⁵) did take place in Mexico and Venezuela from 1991 to 1992 but always set against a destabilizing backdrop of military offensives, paramilitary attacks, and guerrilla bombings, assassinations, and

⁸³ See also, for example, Kerry (1994).

⁸⁴ Gaviria even invited the 1990 presidential candidate of the demobilized insurgent group M-19 into his cabinet as Minister of Health (Crandall 2002, 71).

⁸⁵ An acronym for the Simón Bolívar Guerrilla Coordination Group (Palacios 2006).

kidnappings. They ultimately collapsed amidst mutual recriminations (Kline 1999; Palacios 2006). While the government subsequently resumed full scale military action against the insurgencies, the end of the Gaviria administration saw the guerrillas stronger than ever (Hylton 2006).⁸⁶

In its first term, the Clinton administration sought to exploit the post-Cold War peace dividend with declining levels of aid to Latin America and the Caribbean (Isaacson 2005). Changes came to drug control policy but they were inconsistent. For example, Drugs dropped from third to 29th (out of a total of 29) on the National Security Council's list of national priorities (Farah 1996). After internal review, the Andean Strategy was deemed largely ineffective and anti-drug aid to those countries was cut by more than half for the projected 1993 budget. Also, the staff of the Office of National Drug Control Strategy (ONDCP) was cut by more than eighty percent (Crandall 2002). Nevertheless, the rhetoric about the importance of source country eradication persisted and Clinton's "overall drug-fighting budget continued the upward spending trend of his predecessors" (Carpenter 2003, 58). Ultimately, any apparent deviation from longstanding drug control doctrine ended with the Republican victory in the 1994 midterm Congressional elections. Unwilling to concede the drug issue to the political opposition, the Clinton administration quickly ramped up its operations, most notably its interdiction and eradication efforts in the source countries of Latin America (Bouley Jr. 2001). By the beginning of 1996, with the appointment of General McCaffrey – a former SOUTHCOM commander – to head the ONDCP, Washington had clearly signaled its focus on a military oriented anti-drug strategy (Friesendorf 2007)

⁸⁶ For example, while "in 1978, the FARC had 17 fronts in peripheral regions, by 1994 it had 105 fronts and operated in 60 per cent of Colombia's 1071 municipalities" (Hylton 2006, 89).

While initially pleased with the departure of the increasingly uncooperative Gaviria government, the incoming Samper administration (1994-1998) was tainted in the eyes of American officials even before that president was seated in office (Farah 1996). Audio evidence of multimillion dollar financial links between his campaign and the Cali cartel surfaced immediately after the presidential vote. This started a two year long political scandal – complete with criminal proceedings⁸⁷ – that served to delegitimize the government in the eyes of the Colombian people. Perhaps more significantly, it effectively poisoned the relationship between the Samper administration and Washington – especially within the newly elected United States Congress (Livingstone 2004; Palacios 2006). From that point, the

U.S. war on drugs increasingly became a war against Ernesto Samper. The transfer of the congressional majority from the Democrats to the Republicans in 1994 meant that Congress would press a hard line on the drug issue. Thus, compared to his predecessor, Cesar Gaviria, ... Samper would have to deal with a Republican Congress – and by extension with a brand of U.S. policy that was much more inclined to take a hard stand against any suspected lapses in fighting the war on drugs (Crandall 2002, 108-109).

Convinced of his corruption, agitation among the new Republican majority in Congress (along with long standing doubts in the State Department about the new president's reliability⁸⁸) combined to put tremendous pressure on Samper to adhere to every American demand put to the Colombian government. His lack of legitimacy left him no room maneuver (Crandall 2008). At Washington's insistence, the head of the national police was replaced (Melo 1998). This new figure, General Serrano, although technically a subordinate of the president, quickly became the

⁸⁷ After being cleared in the initial investigation, Samper was again charged in 1995 (where the process stalled) and then in 1996 after both his party's treasurer and his former presidential campaign manager (then defense minister) turned state's evidence against him. Despite their testimonies and other evidence, he was absolved of all wrongdoing in a vote by the lower house of Congress on June 12, 1996. Since the lower house was packed with members also suspected of ties with the Cali cartel, this outcome did nothing to improve his standing with the United States who declared the vote a sham (Crandall 2002; Livingstone 2004).

⁸⁸ Because of the favorable position he had publicly held towards drug legalization in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Crandall (2002) contends that many in the United States government were already of the view that Samper was ideologically "soft" on drugs.

major beneficiary of American goodwill and financial support while Samper was increasingly isolated (Crandall 2002).⁸⁹

From 1994 to 1997, the Samper administration started programs of aerial fumigation (Operations Splendor and Condor) in the southern coca growing regions, dismantled the Cali cartel and imprisoned its leadership, pushed a drug asset forfeiture law through the Colombian Congress, and successfully amended the constitution to revive extradition for drug traffickers (Crandall 2002; Simons 2004; Hylton 2006). In essence, the Colombian government did almost everything the United States demanded of it on the drug front. Nevertheless, despite these accomplishments, Colombia was characterized as a “narco-democracy” in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee report and threatened with decertification in 1995 and formally decertified⁹⁰ in both 1996 and 1997 (Crandall 2002; Friesendorf 2007; *USA Today* 1995). While his administration had done more to implement America’s drug policy agenda than any other in its contemporary history, it “had become obvious that the USA was opposed to Samper himself” (Melo 1998, 77).⁹¹ To this point, Crandall (2002) argues that because Samper was deemed so politically weak, the United States had no compunction about continuously pushing the goal post down the field. For example, the publicly stated 1995 requirement to dismantle the Cali cartel to avoid decertification in 1996, once accomplished, was promptly dismissed as insufficient and Colombia was decertified anyway.

⁸⁹ “U.S. policy – which was essentially U.S. counternarcotics policy – gradually developed a bifurcated nature whereby the United States would support and cooperate with the ‘good guys’ such as General Serrano and Chief Prosecutor Alfonso Valdivieso, while attacking the ‘bad guys’ such as Samper and his Interior Minister, Horacia Serpa” (Crandall 2002, 106, emphasis in original).

⁹⁰ Ironically, due to the vague language of the law, the decertifications in 1996 and 1997 also ended up suspending anti-drug funding for several months (Crandall 2002).

⁹¹ The Clinton administration even took the unprecedented step in 1996 of cancelling Samper’s visa, effectively banning him from the United States (Farah 1996).

Despite its marked success in advancing its policy interests in Colombia, the actions of the United States had unintended consequences for both countries. The informal American policy of isolating Samper, along with the formal mechanisms of the two annual decertifications, diverted resources and political support from the Colombian army to the more trusted (by Washington) National Police (Crandall 2002). However, this only decreased the already low levels of ability and morale of the military and helped to create a power vacuum in the rural areas of the country which was quickly filled by the expanding insurgent groups (primarily the FARC) and the burgeoning paramilitary forces (Crandall 2008). Battles between these two adversaries over territory and control over coca growing regions plus their independent attacks against the civilian population resulted in a huge spike in violence and massive internal displacement as tens of thousands fled their homes to escape the fighting (Hylton 2006; Simons 2004). Negotiations to end the fighting went nowhere as a weakened Samper could not muster the political capital to overcome the objections of his own military leadership while the insurgents would not enter into serious talks with a discredited president (Livingstone 2004). For Washington, its policy victory was equally hollow. The culmination of the long demanded decapitation of the Cali cartel did not result in the implosion of the drug industry anticipated by the United States (Friesendorf 2007). Instead, the drug trade “atomized,” breaking up into a large number of smaller groups whose organizations were heavily decentralized to avoid detection and arrest. Meanwhile, the flow of drugs to the Europe and the United States continued unabated (LeoGrande and Sharpe 2000).

Recognizing some of the failures associated with isolating and thus weakening the Colombian state, the Clinton administration sought to soften its highly aggressive stance before the next president came into office in Bogotá. Colombia was certified as cooperating in the war on drugs for 1998 and its counternarcotics efforts were publically praised (Crandall 2002;

Simons 2004). That same year, Conservative Party candidate Andres Pastrana was elected president by a wide margin running on a platform that promised peace talks⁹² with the insurgent groups (LeoGrande and Sharpe 2000). By defeating the Liberal party candidate (former interior minister Horacio Serpa), and thus eliminating the specter of a Samper administration redux, Pastrana jumpstarted normalized relations with the United States. A Harvard graduate and fluent English speaker, he had always been America's preferred candidate and the already warming relationship was quickly cemented with the new president's general agreement "to implement and support the basic tenets of U.S. drug policy" (Crandall 2002, 145).⁹³ Pastrana was invited to the White House just prior to his inauguration in August and again two months later, becoming the first Colombian president in 23 years to make an official visit to Washington (Livingstone 2004). To underscore its commitment to strengthening relations, the Clinton administration swallowed the most controversial aspect of Pastrana's peace initiative – the government's three month term territorial concession to the FARC of a demilitarized zone (the *despeje*) equal in size to Switzerland⁹⁴ – and even engaged in secret, direct negotiations with the insurgent group in December 1998⁹⁵ (Crandall 2002; Hylton 2006).

However, actors and events conspired to undermine the peace process and the overall level of stability of the country. As in previous attempts at talks, the central obstacle to the

⁹² Just weeks after the vote, the President-elect met in a secret location with the leader of the FARC where an agreement to enter into formal negotiations was reached (Simons 2004).

⁹³ According to Crandall (2002), "Pastrana well understood the message from Washington: he must cooperate with the United States on drugs or he would become another Ernesto Samper" (146).

⁹⁴ "By giving the FARC a sanctuary, the government wanted to reduce pressure on the rebels and thus induce them to negotiate some form of power-sharing" (Friesendorf 2007, 127). However, since only the FARC had ever actually governed this territory, Hylton (2006) argues that this "concession" was really just a basic acknowledgement of the existing facts on the ground.

⁹⁵ This two day meeting, between a State Department representative and a high ranking FARC leader, took place in Costa Rica (Crandall 2002). Given that the FARC had been on the State Department's Foreign Terrorist Organization list since 1997, this meeting was inherently controversial (Kraul 2008).

process was the inability of both the government and the FARC to agree to terms for a ceasefire. Consequently, all negotiations took place against a backdrop of continuing violence that repeatedly undermined the talks. Moreover, each side would not or could not meet the necessary terms to truly move the process forward (Murillo and Rey Avirama 2004). The Pastrana administration suffered from internal institutional discord, consistently demonstrated military weakness, and faltering American support. It suffered a major blow in May 1998, when Colombia's defense minister, along with fourteen generals and 200 other military officers, tendered their resignations in protest of the government's concession of the *despeje* to the FARC (Simons 2004). Integral to this frustration was the consistent demonstration of the Colombian military's weakness and inability to fight the guerrillas. While ostensibly given a 90 day time limit, the deadline for the end of the demilitarized zone was repeatedly extended – with nothing for the government to show for it – simply because the Colombian military was incapable of retaking this area by force of arms (Crandall 2002). In a further show of weakness, the military was unable or unwilling to actively fight and dismantle the burgeoning paramilitary groups⁹⁶ that attacked the FARC and also massacred hundreds of civilians (deemed “collaborators”) across the country (Hylton 2006). Moreover, the initial, tempered endorsement by the United States of the peace initiative ended in February 1999 when three American human rights activists working with the indigenous U'wa people were abducted and murdered by elements of the FARC.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ Extremely cognizant of Colombia's recent history (where many hundreds of demobilized guerrillas from the FARC and other insurgent groups were murdered by right wing death squads), the FARC insisted that the government had to dismantle the paramilitaries before they would make any major concessions on the road to a final peace agreement (Simons 2004). While a legitimate concern, Simons (Ibid) argues that the FARC also foresaw potential short term benefits if this demand was met because any action taken against the paramilitaries would force the already stretched thin Colombian military to deploy troops away from guerrilla territory.

⁹⁷ After initially denying involvement, the FARC leadership ultimately admitted that some of its members had committed these crimes. However, they refused to turn those accused over to the United States or Colombian governments, insisting that they would be punished via an internal process (Crandall 2002).

Washington's limited role in the peace process ended as all contact with the FARC was immediately cut off (Friesendorf 2007; Livingstone 2004). Instead, the United States began to push Pastrana to take a harder line against the guerrillas (Murillo and Rey Avirama 2004).

For their part, the FARC to many observers seemed to be more interested in taking advantage of the trappings of peace talks while not actually delivering on anything (LeoGrande and Sharpe 2000). Understandably paranoid about security, the *despeje* had been the FARC's central, nonnegotiable condition for signing onto the Pastrana peace agenda (Simons 2004). However, it became quickly apparent that the demilitarized zone was not being utilized as a secure region to pursue peace but as a staging area "to cultivate coca and train troops, two things that were expressly forbidden when the deal was negotiated" (Crandall 2002, 73). In addition to this financial and military buildup, the group regularly broke off and resumed talks with the Colombian government while consistently engaged in military action designed to strengthen its bargaining position (Simons 2004). As it had through much of latter 1990s, the FARC continued its pattern of successful attacks against military installations and police stations, killing or capturing scores of soldiers and police (Murillo and Rey Avirama 2004). Heretofore primarily a rural threat, the FARC launched a major offensive in July, 1999 that targeted "more than 20 towns throughout the country, bombing bridges, banks, army bases and oil installations, blocking roads and assaulting police barracks" (Simons 2004, 203-204). By the end of the summer of 1999, both the Pastrana administration and the FARC – reacting to the mounting American pressure to crackdown on the insurgents on the one hand and the prospect of increasing American military involvement in Colombia on the other – became increasingly belligerent in word and deed (Murillo and Rey Avirama 2004; Simons 2004).

Plan Colombia – One author, Two plans

Crandall (2002) contends that by the summer of 1999 the combination of FARC military successes, a dramatic growth in coca cultivation, and the ever increasing signs of instability fostered an mounting sense in the United States that Colombia posed a serious national security risk. As a reflection of this concern, more “high-level U.S. diplomats, congressional delegations, CIA officials, and military officers visited Colombia in 1999 than at any other time in recent history” (Human Rights Watch Staff 1999, 122). Consequently, the Clinton administration set the stage for a dramatic escalation in aid to Colombia with a memo “leaked” in July by the drug czar, General McCaffrey, calling for a \$1 billion increase in support (LeoGrande and Sharpe 2000).⁹⁸

Key to the policy shift was the contention, forwarded by the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), which oversaw U.S. military activities and assistance in South America, that guerrillas were “narco-traffickers” and legitimate targets of the drug war. The contention was supported by influential voices in the State Department, Congress, and the policy world. In the words of Gen. Charles Wilhelm, SOUTHCOM commander, “I think the connection between the insurgents and the narco-traffickers has been very clearly demonstrated” (Human Rights Watch Staff 1999, 122, emphasis in original).

As early as 1996, McCaffrey, in his capacity as head of the ONDCP, had begun framing the civil conflict in Colombia in terms more amenable to a militarized U.S. drug policy by characterizing the FARC as “a narco-guerrilla force” (Schemo and Golden 1998). This narco-guerrilla representation by McCaffrey continued over the following two years and was echoed regularly by other policymakers in Washington as well (*Buffalo News* 1997; Farah 1997). By 1999, the narco-guerrilla trope effectively dominated the discourse on Colombia and United States drug policy (Ramirez Lemus, Stanton, and Walsh 2005). Visits to Colombia by McCaffrey and other top officials over the weeks subsequent to the release of the memo were accompanied by

⁹⁸ According to Crandall (2002), there was ongoing internal dispute in the Clinton administration about how to address the “drug emergency” emanating from Colombia, with the hawks ultimately coming out on top. Because McCaffrey had the ear of the president, he had the political support necessary to push for the massive increase in American aid and military assistance.

numerous public statements stressing the urgent need for a new strategy underpinned by a massive increase in military aid (Crandall 2002).

Coincidentally, the Colombian president had already outlined a broad new strategy⁹⁹—*Plan Marshall para Colombia* (Marshall Plan for Colombia) – in 1998 but it bore no resemblance to the militarized anti-drug plan proposed by the United States (Vacius and Isacson 2000). Instead, Pastrana’s blueprint

was a development strategy for the areas most affected by the conflict and most marginalized in terms of basic human necessities. Modeled after the ... Marshall Plan..., it addressed the many conditions behind the drug trade and the internal armed conflict, such as economic inequality, lack of opportunities for progress, especially for Colombian youth, and an unequal distribution of land. It also addressed questions relating to the collapse and general lack of institutional legitimacy and the minimal capacity to govern on the part of the local and national authorities. It raised issues such as respect for human rights and the creation of truly participatory democracy as necessary steps in eradicating the fundamental seeds of the conflict (Murillo and Rey Avirama 2004, 127).

Candidate Pastrana had campaigned largely on a peace platform and the recognition of the impossibility of a military solution to Colombia’s fundamental problems was at the core of his strategy unveiled in 1998 (Fukumi 2008). However, his peace plan did not survive contact with the Clinton administration which was not interested in funding a development program (Livingstone 2004; Vacius and Isacson 2000). Instead, pressure from the United States and from his own military leadership “pushed Pastrana towards a strategy of escalating the counterinsurgency war” (LeoGrande and Sharpe 2000, 6). Although written extensively (if not exclusively) in Washington¹⁰⁰, Pastrana presented *Plan Colombia: Plan for Peace, Prosperity*

⁹⁹ A complete copy of this Spanish language document – *Plan Marshall para Colombia* – is available online via the Center for International Policy’s website (<http://ciponline.org/colombia/index.htm>).

¹⁰⁰ According to LeoGrande & Sharpe (2000), “U.S. and Colombian officials cooperated closely on the design of ‘Plan Colombia’” (6, emphasis in original). Livingstone (2004) states flatly that it was “written by U.S. officials” (125). Crandall (2002) calls the plan a “Washington creation” that numerous American officials concede was concocted by the United States and points out that a Spanish language version did not exist until months after its release (149-150). It is also important to note that this new strategy “was only minimally circulated in Colombia, received spotty media coverage, and was never discussed in the Colombian Congress” (Ramirez Lemus, Stanton, and Walsh 2005, 107-108).

*and the Strengthening of the State*¹⁰¹ as his own strategy on September 18, 1999 (Livingstone 2004; Rohter 1999). In this iteration, the drug trade (and not the fundamental inequality and underdevelopment in the countryside) was identified as the principal source of Colombia's problems and the focus shifted from peace to the strengthening of the state and military (Livingstone 2004; Vacius and Isacson 2000). It was determined that the United States would fund the military components of this \$7.5 billion strategy while Colombia and other international donors would finance the remainder¹⁰² (Simons 2004).

After a strong public relations campaign carried out by President Pastrana¹⁰³ and members of the United States government through the end of 1999, the Clinton administration submitted a \$1.6 billion funding request for the American component of Plan Colombia to Congress on January 11, 2000 (Crandall 2002). The proposal

contained over \$954 million in supplemental FY2000 funding and over \$318 million for FY2001 spending. (This was in addition to about \$150 million allocated and planned for existing programs in each fiscal year.) The proposal's centerpiece was the "Push into Southern Colombia" program, which was intended to enable the Colombian government to extend CN [counter narcotics] activities throughout southern Colombia... The core of the Southern Colombia program included training and equipping two new army CN battalions, and purchasing Blackhawk and Huey helicopters to transport them (Serafino 2001, 6, emphasis in original).

This strategy specifically targeted the coca growing regions in the south (e.g., Putumayo, Caquetá) under the control of the FARC (Hylton 2006; Rabasa and Chalk 2001). Attacking their

¹⁰¹ The full text of this plan can be found on the Center for International Policy's website (<http://ciponline.org/colombia/plancolombia.htm>) .

¹⁰² As outlined, the plan required a total of \$7.5 billion with Colombia committed to providing \$4 billion and the balance coming from the international community (Simons 2004). However, Colombia's ability to fund its share effectively ended when it fell into a major economic recession in 1999 and was forced to borrow money from the International Monetary Fund. Moreover, the other major (non-U.S.) anticipated donors (i.e., the European Union and Japan) were extremely reluctant to finance what appeared to be an American war plan and only provided a small percentage of the originally estimated funds. Consequently, only the *military* aspects of the plan were fully funded (Livingstone 2004; Ramirez Lemus, Stanton, and Walsh 2005).

¹⁰³ Not surprisingly, given the significantly different policy preferences of the donor audiences Pastrana was actively courting, while "Plan Colombia was presented in the United States as a key component of a counter-narcotics strategy, it was presented in Europe as a means of furthering the peace negotiations and economic reconstruction" (Rabasa and Chalk 2001, 64).

ostensible major source of revenue, the newly formed Colombian army battalions would ostensibly move in to secure this territory for successful aerial fumigation of the illicit crops (LeoGrande and Sharpe 2000). With its funding focus on the Colombian armed forces, and not the Colombian National Policy as in years past, this strategy clearly indicated the American preference for a military based solution. (Ramirez Lemus, Stanton, and Walsh 2005).

The House Appropriations Committee took up the request in March 9 2000 and the measure passed a full vote of the House of Representatives on March 30 after the efforts of a few members to severely curtail or eliminate the funding via amendments were easily defeated (Crandall 2002; Serafino 2001). The legislation moved to the Senate in May where funds for military aid were slightly decreased (and human rights funding correspondingly increased) compared to the House version (Crandall 2002). Most notably, the Senate bill required the State Department to certify that the Colombian government had met a series of specific human rights conditions¹⁰⁴ (i.e., the “Leahy amendment”) or military aid would be suspended. However, the bill granted the president a waiver to override these conditions if deemed necessary (Serafino 2001). The addition of these conditions in no way signaled the Senate’s displeasure with the bill itself. While there had been determined opposition to the bill by some Democrats in the House, Crandall (2002) maintains that “the *full* Senate was strongly behind a version similar to the original Clinton proposal” (152, emphasis added).¹⁰⁵ The final version of the bill passed the full Senate almost unanimously (Ibid). The conference report was passed by both chambers of Congress at the end June and the president signed the bill into law on July 13, 2000 (Rabasa and

¹⁰⁴ The conditions included the requirement that military personnel accused of human rights abuses be tried in civilian courts and the demonstrated cessation of any collusion between the armed forces and the paramilitary groups (Crandall 2002).

¹⁰⁵ The real debate in the Senate centered on whether Colombia should receive older Huey or the newer (and much more expensive) Blackhawk helicopters (Crandall 2002; Serafino 2001).

Chalk 2001; Serafino 2001). Coming very close to the terms outlined in the original funding request, the Plan Colombia legislation (combined with the funds already approved for 2000) provided approximately \$1.3 billion to Colombia¹⁰⁶ over two years – making that country the third largest recipient of American aid after Israel and Egypt (Murillo and Rey Avirama 2004; Serafino 2001).

Conclusion: Patterns in the Modern History of U.S. – Colombia Relations

As part of the effort to map the rhetorical topography of Plan Colombia, the chronological review in Chapter 4 has sought to illustrate the particular ways in which the historical representations derived from the core (U.S. superiority/Latin inferiority) opposition identified in the last chapter were articulated and re-articulated within the context of contemporary American relations with Colombia and the drug trade. Only a blip on the radar in the early 1970s, by the middle of the next decade this relationship was completely “narcotized” with the Colombian state effectively held hostage by United States militarized, source country drug eradication strategies irrespective of the political, social, and economic damage inflicted as a result. Colombia’s challenging and evolving domestic problems (e.g., limited government authority and legitimacy, underdeveloped or absent democratic institutions, increasing rates of interpersonal and intergroup violence, high levels of socio-economic inequality) identified over the approximately three decades reviewed called out for nuanced, complicated, and time consuming solutions. Instead, the shades of gray inherent to Colombian social reality were subordinated to the clear black and white of the perceived drug threat to the United States constructed via particular interrelated tropes and commonplaces.

¹⁰⁶ The legislation also provided roughly \$130 million in regional aid to Bolivia and Ecuador, respectively (Serafino 2001).

Consistent with historical patterns, drugs were regularly identified as a **foreign** based danger. Likewise, Colombia's inherent **instability** and **proximity** to the United States (like the rest of Latin America) marked it as a continual source of infection or a **breeding ground**. In the 1980s under the aegis of the Cold War, the drug threat was characterized by the Reagan administration as part of a larger Soviet strategy to export its revolution across Latin America, undermining democracy and endangering vital American assets like the Panama Canal (Kenworthy 1995; Livingstone 2009). Identified as communist bloc proxies, **narco-guerrillas** and **narco-terrorists** functioned in this capacity to destabilize both Colombia and the region with violence and corruption and to subvert the youth of America with narcotics (Americas Watch Committee 1989; Collet 1988; Marcy 2010; Morales 1989). The discursive dimensions evolved with the end of the Cold War as representations of hyper-violent Latin "drug lords" and prospects of the United States alone in a "sea of narco-political rule" (Rangel 1989) effectively displaced the menace of communism with a different kind of subversion – **narco-democracy**. Inherent in this particular commonplace (along with the notion of a failed state) is the historical presupposition of Latin inferiority embodied in such traits as corruption, weakness, permissiveness, and ineptitude. As the "leading 'narco-democracy'" in the region, a contemporaneous *Washington Post* editorial argued that no "country has been criticized more severely and more aptly for succumbing to the drug trade than Colombia" (1995, A20, emphasis in original).

This perceived failure by the Colombian state (and other states in the region) to address "the leading hemispheric threat to democracy" (Ibid) underscored the necessity of continuing **American leadership** to instill discipline and self-control. In this effort, the threat of decertification served as a key stick to ensure strict adherence to American policy while the

promise of increased levels of aid served as the primary carrot (Marcy 2010). United States policymakers in the 1990s – reflecting the recognition of the country’s long democratic tradition on one hand and the perceived blatant corruption of elements of its government on the other – re-articulated the traditional representations of the **good** (i.e., cooperative) Latin and the **bad** (i.e., resistant, unruly) Latin in their deliberations regarding Colombia. For example, General Serrano (head of the CNP), as one of the “good guys,” was publically lauded and his agency showered with funding. Conversely, President Samper, as one of the “bad guys” was publically castigated and politically isolated at every possible juncture (Crandall 2002; Stokes 2004).

Finally, as the security conditions in Colombia began to seriously deteriorate towards the end of the decade, officials in the Clinton administration redeployed the narco-guerrilla commonplace in midst of the debate to radically increase military aid (Farah 1999). In this iteration, the FARC-NARC connection worked discursively to delegitimize the insurgents in Colombia by representing them as violent criminals motivated solely by money while at the same positioning their domestic activities as a central element of the international drug threat targeting the United States (Friesendorf 2007; Stokes 2004). To inform my analysis of the collected data in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, I add the particular narco-guerrilla, narco-terrorist, and narco-democracy tropes and the contemporary patterns of representations (e.g., proximity) identified here to the list of historical commonplaces assembled in the last chapter.

CHAPTER 5

PLAN COLOMBIA: ANALYSIS OF CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS

Thinking in terms of representational practices calls our attention to an economy of abstract binary oppositions that we routinely draw upon and that frame our thinking. Developed/underdeveloped, “first world”/“third world,” core/periphery, metropolis/satellite, advanced industrialized/less developed, modern/traditional, and real states/quasi states are just a few that readily come to mind. While there is nothing natural, inevitable, or arguably even useful about these divisions, they remain widely circulated and accepted as legitimate ways to categorize regions and peoples of the world. Thinking in terms of representational practices highlights the arbitrary, constructed, and political nature of these and many other oppositions through which we have come to “know” the world and its inhabitants and that have enabled and justified certain practices and policies. (Doty 1996a, 2-3, emphasis in original)

So while in the immediate sense the grammar of any language is neutral, in that you can use it to produce discourse supporting every possible subject positioning and ideological stance, at another level it is highly partial: it construes the world from the standpoint of a given moment in history, and in ways that are geared to survival under those particular historical conditions. (Halliday and Webster 2003, 284-285)

We go over and we bomb these other countries Libya and all these places because they are making weapons of mass destruction that might some day hurt Americans; they may some day be used on our friends. At the same time we are turning our heads and our backs on what is really going on and that is this poison that is being created in Colombia and other countries in our hemisphere which is coming in and poisoning our kids and destroying their future. (Shaw 2000, 1525-1526)

I sense that we are fighting a couple of battles down there. One is we’ve seen this huge tide of nationalism, which you certainly saw in your Panama Canal negotiations, where they probably would have been willing to negotiate, but basically popular will is rising up. Then, when we go to get another base, we can’t find anybody that will allow our military base in all of Central and South America, so we negotiate working out with multiple use of airports and off islands and all kinds of stuff. Clearly a meeting with President Chavez, it is not the kind of—you don’t detect a really anti-American tone, even by him, about whom many people have concern; *but more of how they want to do their own thing, they want to have pride. It is almost like they feel one way to assert that is kind of, once of a while, to do something to spite us. At the same time, they’re really very strong supporters of the United States. They understand our importance in this zone and they kind of think that, so how they relate to us has become a huge problem.* (U.S. House 2000, 197-198, emphasis added)

The last two chapters functioned to map out the rhetorical topography of Plan Colombia and provide the necessary context for analysis. As discussed in Chapter 3, the literature on the United States’ historical relations with Latin America amply demonstrates the consistent use of a particular lens for constructing policies towards that region. In speech, text, and image, the Latin states were characterized as unstable and inferior. Conversely (and simultaneously), the United States was identified as innately superior to those countries. I argued that these representations (e.g., the child, proximity), spanning countless different texts and withstanding the test of time,

constituted a *dominant discourse*¹⁰⁷ (Doty 1993; Epstein 2008) that shaped American views of Latin America and its peoples. Consequently, a specific “common sense” dictated America’s hegemony over the region – on paper beginning with the Monroe Doctrine and in practice during the latter 19th century and through the balance of the 20th century. The subsequent chronology of U.S. – Colombia relations from 1970 to 1999 in Chapter 4 supplemented this broader view of historical patterns with a tighter focus on the contemporary representations of Colombia (and the region) in the context of the drug trade. I demonstrated the ways in which the “classical” commonplaces of Latin inferiority were articulated and deployed in the Cold War setting and also how they were re-articulated and re-deployed in novel ways (e.g., narco-guerrilla, narco-democracy) to adjust to evolving post-Cold War perceptions. In sum, the (both general and specific) patterns identified in this topographical outlay demonstrate a core binary opposition (Latin inferiority/United States superiority) that circumscribed the particular range of imaginable possibilities available to American policymakers.

In Chapter 5, I examine empirically the discursive practices that worked to construct and define Colombia (and other related subjects) during the legislative formulation of the Plan Colombia aid package in the effort to understand if and how this core opposition remains a component of contemporary United States drug control policy. Specifically, I analyze the language in use during the identified House and Senate hearings for the designated three month period in 2000. For this I employ the specific analytical concept¹⁰⁸ of positioning. In general

¹⁰⁷ “If the same kinds of subjects, objects, and relations are found to exist in different texts, this is indicative of a particular logic at work. We can think of texts that illustrate the same kind of logic as constituting a controlling or dominant discourse... If differences are constructed according to the same logic in a variety of texts, we can reasonably suggest that there is a dominant discourse” (Doty 1993, 308-309).

¹⁰⁸ Independent from the notion of mechanically applied categories, analytical concepts are sensitizing tools that “can suggest what to look for and help us to interpret what we see” (Wood and Kroger 2000, 99). To be clear, these concepts should not be viewed as predetermined, exclusive categories but as tools for informing analysis.

terms, positioning can be understood as “the constitution of speakers and hearers in particular ways through discursive practices, practices that are at the same time resources through which speakers and hearers can negotiate new positions” (Wood and Kroger 2000, 100). For example, Laffey & Weldes (2004) maintain that the dominant American discourse of the Cold War created particular subjects called “the United States” and “the Soviet Union” and positioned them in opposition to one another. For my analysis, I adopt Doty’s (1993) extremely detailed model of positioning, described as a Discursive Practices Approach.¹⁰⁹ Ultimately, I argue that while times (and as largely reflected in the language used in open hearings) have changed, the representations employed within this discourse on Plan Colombia bear striking resemblance to historical understandings of Latin America. Chapter 5 is organized as follows. I first describe in detail the analytical concept of positioning and specific methodology underlying Doty’s Discursive Practices Approach. Next, I outline the specific steps that make up the analysis of the congressional hearings. I then review the results of the analysis and detail the findings in terms of the historical context of United States – Latin America relations.

Positioning

To analyze the data derived from the corpus of congressional hearings, I employ the analytical concept of positioning. Specifically, I adopt Doty’s (1993) Discursive Practices Approach. Within this approach, positioning is conceptualized as a function of three textual mechanisms: presupposition, predication, and subject positioning. These mechanisms are illustrated in Table 3. Although treated as separate for the purposes of analysis, Doty maintains

¹⁰⁹ For more on the theoretical concepts related to positioning and its application to foreign policy analysis and the study of international relations, see also Doty (1996a), Harré & Moghaddam (2003), Milliken & Sylvan (1996), and Slocum & Van Langenhove (2003).

that these mechanisms work together and simultaneously.

Table 3. Three Textual Mechanisms

Presupposition	Predication	Subject Positioning
<p>Background knowledge taken to be true</p> <p>Creates specific reality where certain things are “known”; necessary for statements to “make sense”</p>	<p>Linkage of specific qualities to specific subjects</p> <p>Assigns a quality, attribute, or property to person or thing (e.g. a country)</p>	<p>Relationship between subjects & between subjects & objects</p> <p>E.g. opposition, identity, similarity, complementarity</p>

Any statement made brings with it certain **presuppositions** or background knowledge taken to be true. Consequently, “[w]hen one uses language, one is implying something about the existence of subjects, objects, and their relation to one another” (Doty 1993, 306).¹¹⁰

Predication entails the connection of specific qualities to subjects via the use of predicates along with modifying adverbs and adjectives (e.g. prone to violence, tribal, on a noble mission). The subject is “characterized as *being* something, *having* something, or *doing* something” (Epstein 2008, 168, emphasis in original). Finally, **subject positioning** refers to the establishment - via presupposition and predication - of various kinds of relationships (e.g. opposition, identity, similarity) between subjects and between subjects and objects. “What defines a particular kind of subject is, in large part, the relationships that subject is positioned in relative to other kinds of subjects” (Doty 1993, 306). In total, Doty argues that “[t]aken together, these textual

¹¹⁰ See also Wendt’s (1999, 175) discussion of presupposition.

mechanisms ... produce a 'world' by providing positions for various kinds of subjects and endowing them with particular attributes" (306-307, emphasis in original).

Although broadly organized using Doty's discursive practices approach, the overall process of my analysis is essentially inductive as my structure is guided by the data within the corpus I have identified. At the foreground are the commonplaces, tropes, metaphors, and other rhetorical elements (e.g., the child, state of nature, instability, narco-democracy) I delineated in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. To identify the focus and proper areas of analysis of each text, they were given what Wood & Kroger (2000) characterize as an *initial reading* (i.e. a detailed examination) to help organize the data for formal analysis. They argue that this step is essential to avoid a predetermined view of what elements of the data are important and thus the proper focus of analysis. "There are so many aspects to discourse that even when you think you know what you want to look at, you must be prepared to change your mind when you hear or see the data" (87). In addition to the initial reading, I relied on my earlier work with a subset of this same data (Holloway 2008) for insights into the construction of subject identities within the entire data set. The examination of the complete data set began with predicate analysis. Before proceeding, an important point must be noted. The description that follows is presented in a generally linear fashion for the sake of coherence and consistency. However, the actual practice of my analysis is very much a *recursive* process. This type of analytical process can be likened to an instructor's method for grading essay assignments. Rather than simply going through the stack of papers and grading everything uniformly, she will "read a few answers, develop a rough key (here a set of interpretations), read a few more, refine the key, read a few more, adjust the key further, go back to the beginning and read all of the answers again, and so on" (Wood and Kroger 2000, 97).

Predicate Analysis

As detailed in Chapter 3, I searched all congressional hearings held from the beginning of February through the end of April 2000 that referenced Colombia, Latin America, and/or United States drug policy. After eliminating unrelated cases, I identified a total of twenty Congressional hearings (10 in the Senate and 10 in the House) related to Plan Colombia and/or the much publicized¹¹¹ (then) ongoing crisis in Colombia. These documents were saved in PDF format in preparation for predicate analysis. This type of investigation specifically

focuses on the language practices of predication – the verbs, adverbs and adjectives that attach to nouns. Predications of a noun construct the thing(s) named as a particular sort of thing, with particular features and capacities. Among the objects so constituted may be subjects, defined through being assigned capacities for and modes of acting and interacting (Milliken 1999, 232).

During my preliminary work assessing Plan Colombia (Holloway 2008), I identified four recurring subjects within the subset of the hearings examined – **United States, Colombia, Colombians**¹¹², and **FARC**.¹¹³ For both organizational purposes and in the effort to ensure transparency, an initial coding sheet for each of the full set of twenty hearings was prepared using a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. Its specific format is illustrated in Table 4.

Table 4. Initial Coding Sheet Format

Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC
-----------------	-------------------	----------------------	-------------

In keeping with the tenets of Doty's (1993) Discursive Practices Approach, all twenty hearings were analyzed for predication (i.e. predicates & practices assigned) with a focus on these

¹¹¹ See, for example, Crandall (2002) and LeoGrande & Sharpe (2000).

¹¹² The categorical distinction between Colombia (the state and its administrators) and Colombians (the people) was made based on the language practices at work identified in the texts.

¹¹³ Guided by my research focus, historical context, and the research method adopted, I read through each hearing looking for the predominant subjects consistently constituted through the discursive practices at work in the texts (e.g., United States "52,000 dead" or Colombia "nothing like Vietnam"). This process is explained in greater detail below.

subjects and coded accordingly. During those readings and re-readings, I identified an additional three subjects – **Paramilitaries, Region, World** – recurring within the texts. As a result, all of the individual coding sheets were revised and expanded. [See Table 5.]

Table 5. Revised Coding Sheet Format

Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
----------	------------	---------------	------	----------------	--------	-------

Ultimately, predicate analysis was carried out in line with these seven subjects on the complete set of congressional hearings. These initial results were coded by individual hearing. The complete coding sheets for all twenty hearings are located in Appendix A. Table 6, a *very* brief excerpt from the March 23, 2000 hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, illustrates the organizational structure of each coding sheet and provides examples of the types of predicates and practices assigned to each subject within this discourse.¹¹⁴

Table 6. Excerpt from 3/23/2000 House Armed Services Committee Hearing

Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
Colombia's civil conflict that has raged for decades and killed over 30000 people. (H 3/23, 1278)	Colombians do not take this very seriously (H 3/23, 1298)	the correct solution to assist the Colombian government in reestablishing sovereignty over their southern areas (H 3/23, 1277)	the distinction between drug traffickers and guerrillas simply does not exist (H 3/23, 1278)	dramatic increase in human rights violations attributed to both the paramilitaries and insurgents (H 3/23, 1341)	drug trafficking and the other corrupting activities it breeds are weakening the fabric of democracy in other nations in the region. (H 3/23, 1284)	The amount of drugs available to the United States and to the rest of the world is going to increase. (H 3/23, 1286)

¹¹⁴ Each entry is identified by chamber (H or S), date of hearing, and specific page number.

While this excerpt is far too limited to provide warrantable results, its small size makes it useful for illustrating how a predicate analysis would proceed. The “nature” of each subject can be directly read or readily inferred from each entry. *Colombia* is constructed as a place of long-term instability, violence, and death, a situation to which the *Colombian people* remain apathetic. The *FARC* guerrillas are drug criminals and the right-wing *Paramilitaries* are war criminals. Both the *Region* and the *World* are characterized as vulnerable and at risk from the increasing Colombian drug traffic. Implicitly, the *United States* is identified as powerful and capable, an agent that can readily handle situations where the Colombian government has proven itself powerless. While these subject representations – and the hazy outline of the discursive “world” they create (e.g., a strong America confronting a Colombian drug threat fueled by instability, weakness, apathy, greed, and violence that endangers both the region and the world) – are suggestive, they remain decidedly untrustworthy absent a complete analysis of the entire set of hearings. As Milliken (1999) argues, since

discourses are social systems of signification, it will not do (as sometimes appears to be the case) to base a discursive analysis only on one text, even some ‘key’ document (e.g. NSC-68, the Caribbean Basin Report). A single text cannot be claimed to support empirically arguments about discourse as a social background, used regularly by different individuals and groups. Instead, if the analysis is to be about social signification, a discourse analysis should be based upon a set of texts by different people presumed (according to the research focus) to be authorized speakers/writers of a dominant discourse or to think and act within alternative discourses (1999, 233, emphasis in original).

However, even when coded by hearing, the sheer volume of individual entries for all of the subjects identified made systematic interpretation of the discursive practices at work within these texts extremely challenging. The data needed to be made more manageable.

Consequently, the process of coding for predication was further refined. A new, individual coding sheet was created for each identified subject (e.g., Colombia, Colombians, United States). From each of the original hearing coding sheets, all of the entries for a *single subject* (e.g., Colombia) were re-read and analyzed. These entries were then placed within the

new coding sheet into thematic categories inductively derived from the additional analysis of the entries. To ensure the reader's complete comprehension, I will describe this process step by step.

I started with the coding sheet of the February 15, 2000 hearing in the House of Representatives and the subject **Colombia**.¹¹⁵ Starting from the top of the column, I evaluated each entry, copied it, and then categorized it within the new coding sheet based on its evaluation and also on the evaluations of subsequent entries. In the process of these evaluations, I looked for "evidence of a coherence among them" (Doty 1993, 310) or a family resemblance that would indicate patterns of predication within the discourse. For example, the first few entries ("in crisis," "Latin America's oldest democracy") cohered around a theme of governance so a tentative¹¹⁶ category Governance was employed. Subsequent types of entries ("supplies 80 percent of the world's cocaine," "matters both economically and strategically") prompted the employment of two additional categories – Drug Threat and U.S. Interest. When all of the Colombia entries were coded from the February 15, 2000 hearings, I repeated the process for the remaining House hearings and then all the Senate hearings, in turn. Over the course of the analysis, I determined that the category Governance could not be sustained based on my reading of the data. Rather, what emerged from the texts were two divergent constructions of Colombia cohering around a theme of governance. The predominant series of features and capacities attached to the subject (e.g., "governance almost impossible," "beleaguered Andean nation," "armed forces have long history of human rights violations," "net importer of food") instantiated

¹¹⁵ Methodologically speaking, I could have started with any hearing coding sheet and any subject. Wood & Kroger (2000) argue that "because analysis involves recycling and iteration, there is no necessity to begin analysis at the beginning of the data set... or to focus the analysis on any particular level" (96). Nevertheless, I started with the first hearing (chronologically) in the House and with the first subject (when viewed from left to right on each hearing coding sheet) primarily to stay organized and to minimize the chance of overlooking and thus omitting data.

¹¹⁶ I say tentative because each category was initially adopted based on interpretations of the data with the knowledge that they could very likely change over the course of the coding/analysis process.

a Colombia without leadership and in chaos – a geo-political black hole. However, a secondary series of representations (e.g., “heroic efforts of the government,” “police high integrity high courage force,” “pretty decent democratic government,” “responsible democratic government”) constructed a Colombian state that was striving, dedicated, and deserving of support. Consequently, Governance was replaced with two new categories – Out of Control and Worthy. The final configuration of the Colombia coding sheet was organized around four distinct subject identities. Table 7 is a brief excerpt from this coding sheet.

Table 7. Excerpt of Colombia Coding Sheet

Out of Control	Worthy	Drug Threat	U.S. Interest
in crisis	Latin America's oldest democracy	supplies 80 percent of the world's cocaine	matters both economically and strategically
no doubt there is a crisis	heroic efforts of the government	accounts for 75 percent of heroin on US streets	20 percent of US daily supply of oil imports
35 year civil war has killed 30,000 people and displaced over a million	have come up with a conceptual document	supplies 80 percent of the world's cocaine	a major national security concern
governance almost impossible	police high integrity high courage force	producing more than 400 tons of deadly cocaine annually	America's backyard
unlikely civil war can be changed by \$1.6 billion	pretty decent democratic government	cocaine production gone up 140 percent in less than 4 years	national security regional threat

I then moved to the next subject, “Colombians,” and repeated the same procedures, looking for patterns in the predicates and practices assigned to this subject and moving back and forth between the data and the inductively derived categories as I worked through each of the original hearing coding sheets. In the end, coding sheets for all seven subjects were completed following this process. The complete coding sheets are located in Appendix B. Ultimately, twenty seven themes were identified and used to organize the predicates and practices discursively assigned to the seven subjects within the texts of the twenty Congressional hearings. Table 8 shows all seven

subjects with their respective themes organized in terms of their prevalence within the analyzed texts.

Table 8. Subjects and Respective Themes Identified within Hearings

Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
Out of Control	Victim	Regional Overseer	Powerful	Savage	Threatened	Threatened
Worthy	Feckless	Victim	Criminal	Criminal	Unstable	
Drug Threat	Feudal	Capable	Savage	Powerful	Strategic Importance	
US Interest	Amenable	Culpable	Regional Threat			
		Self-Interested	Marxist			
		Besieged				
		Noble				

It is important to note that while they are separated here for the purposes of analysis and illustration, no one subject in a given discourse can be viewed in isolation. “Instead, in implicit or explicit parallels and contrasts, other things (other subjects) will also be labeled and given meaningful attributes by their predicates. A set of predicate constructs defines *a space of objects* differentiated from, while being related to, one another” (Milliken 1999, 232, emphasis in original). In other words, each subject constituted in this discourse on Plan Colombia can only be understood as they relate to all the others. It is the predicates and practices that are assigned to each subject that are key to apprehending this relationship.

Colombia/Colombians

As stated above, the practices and predicates attached to the subject of Colombia within these hearings cohered around four themes – Out of Control, Worthy, Drug Threat, and U.S. Interest – that worked to create a specific (and relatively uncomplicated) identity for that subject.

Understood as both the nexus of America's illegal drug threat ("the center of mass of illegal drugs" (H 2/15, 37), "the biggest trafficker of heroin and cocaine to our country" (H 3/29, 1482), "Eighty percent of the cocaine is grown in Colombia" (S 2/24, 8) and as an important element of its national interest ("America's backyard" (H 2/15, 24), "Vietnam was half the world away. Colombia is as close as Denver" (H 3/23, 1285), "fifth largest economy in Latin America" (H 2/15, 165)), Colombia is presented as a dramatic challenge to the safety and security of the United States. Moreover, no independent, indigenous solution to this problem will present itself inasmuch as Colombia is a country where "today's democratic leaders are tomorrow's drug barons" (H 2/29, 43) and that "has enormous problems of poverty, corruption, and the lack of control of its own territory" (H 3/29, 1529). However, while Colombia cannot be trusted to autonomously resolve this challenge, there is a sufficient degree of correspondence in the history of its political institutions ("hemisphere's oldest functioning democracy" (S 2/22, 21)) and in the thinking of its current political leadership ("partner that shares our determination to put the drug traffickers out of business" (H 3/29, 1545)) to suggest that bold action taken *by the United States* would be a worthwhile endeavor.

This pattern continues with the construction of the Colombian people (Victim, Feckless, Feudal, and Amenable). Long suffering victims and enduring widespread hardship ("peaceful people involved in savage violence" (H 2/29, 51)), the condition of the people is understood as a reflection of the chronic instability of the country. However, while ostensibly innocent of malice ("only 4 percent of the people support the FARC" (H 3/29, 1531)), two other aggregated characteristics, interconnected, provide further evidence for why an indigenous solution to the crisis will not be forthcoming. Divided into a feudal system of elites and peasants, Colombian society lacks the means of the modern state to genuinely mobilize the people for shared duty and

sacrifice. Consequently, many (especially those of means) cannot be relied upon to act in the interests of their own country (“the ruling elite in Colombia, their sons do not serve in combat” (H 3/29, 1504)). And yet, ultimately, the people are viewed as amenable to an external solution (“the package ...has the support of the Colombian people” (H 2/16, 37)).

The pattern that emerges from the attributes and abilities designated to Colombia and its (non-guerrilla) people seems at first glance inconsistent. On the one hand, the nation is a walking disaster – plagued by violence, corruption, volatility, backwardness, and the inability to get things done – that strongly threatens the security of the United States. On the other hand, it possesses attributes (e.g., a history of democracy, cooperation with the United States, bravery, sacrifice, resources, and geographical proximity) that are deemed positive and impel commitment to its future. I argue that the dichotomous subject – both a source of fear and a sign of hope – created by this discourse is not new but well represented in the historical context of United States relations with Latin America. This subject is **the child**. Hunt (1987) argues that this image of the infantilized Latin was the ideological rationalization for America’s necessary “tutelage and stern discipline” in the region (62). A Colombia that cannot do for itself is consistent with Schoultz’ (1998) position that the essence of United States policy that justifies continual intervention has been the fundamental certainty that Latin peoples are inherently inferior.

FARC/Paramilitaries

But what if the child will not suffer proper discipline and guidance? What are the consequences for the United States of a Colombia left to its own devices? In this context, the FARC (Powerful, Criminal, Savage, Regional Threat, Marxist) and (to a lesser extent) the

Paramilitaries (Savage, Criminal, Powerful), represent the inherently flawed nature of the Colombians on the one hand and the ongoing security threat Colombia poses on the other.

Understood as rejecting the proper norms

and conduct of civilization, the FARC

(“responsible for massacres, executions,

torture” (2/25, 321) “insurgents in the

jungle” (2/24, 11); “savage nature” (H

2/15, 85)) and the Paramilitaries (“trying

to win through savagery” (H 2/15, 66);

“the primary agents of violence and

disorder” (H 3/29, 1513); “feudal armies” (2/25, 329)) as instantiated in this discourse embody

(to borrow from Pike (1992)) the historical perception of Latin Americans’ affinity with the




Figure 24. 1886

natural. Without appropriate oversight, as

illustrated in figures 24¹¹⁷, 25¹¹⁸, and 26¹¹⁹

a reversion to wildness and savagery is

understood as the inevitable result. It was

this same perception of innate instability

that dissuaded Washington from actively

supporting the Latin republics in their

rebellions against Spain and that also



Figure 25. 1903

¹¹⁷ “It’s ‘Cutting.’” From *Harper’s Weekly* (1886), reprinted in Johnson (1980, 213).

¹¹⁸ “Held Up the Wrong Man.” From *Harper’s Weekly* (1903), reprinted in Johnson (1980, 221).

¹¹⁹ “Sandino Comes to Chicago.” From *Los Angeles Times* (1928), reprinted in Johnson (1980, 233).

convinced Washington of the necessity to actively intervene in (and sometimes occupy) the Latin republics in the 19th and 20th centuries (Livingstone 2009; Ninkovich 2001; Van Tassel 1997).

Figures 27¹²⁰ and 28¹²¹ further illustrate the United States' historical image of the feral Latin American – typified in the disheveled, wild-eyed, heavily bearded bandit or revolutionary – and also its historical fear of that feral Latin American being left to his own devices. These same fears are evoked in the predications (“40



Figure 26. 1928

years in the bush and have little understanding of the 21st century” (S 2/22, 107); “have walked from ideology to banditry” (H 2/15, 61) “Marxist guerillas” (S 2/22, 1)) employed in this Plan Colombia discourse.

Moreover, note in these five illustrations how a particular attribute – the untamed beard – functions discursively



Figure 27. 1960

to underscore the savagery and disorder inherent to Latin Americans and thus, the logical

¹²⁰ “I got my job through the New York Times.” From *National Review* (1960), reprinted in Black (1988, 105).

¹²¹ “He mentioned a cousin in Orange County... but I never knew about any brothers in Nicaragua.” From *Boston Globe* (1985), reprinted in Kenworthy (1995, 42).

necessity of subjecting them to Washington's controls. Symbolic of his failure of personal self-control (i.e., escaping the state of nature),

the beard in this context marks the Latin as a subject beyond the pale in the eyes of the

United States. To this point, Weldes

(1999) argues that in the tense period

leading to the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban

Missile Crisis, the Kennedy administration

and the American media consistently and

continually seized upon the style of facial

hair worn by the Cuban revolutionaries as

evidence of their inherent deviance, untrustworthiness, and barbarism. "When Castro's

beardedness was invoked, that is, it simultaneously carried with it (among other things) the

connotation that Castro was irresponsible, uncivilized, and *a danger to the United States*" (98,

emphasis added).



Figure 28. 1985

In this vein, consider the following posed by Republican Representative Bob Barr to high ranking officials of the Clinton administration¹²² during the February 15, 2000 hearing in the

House of Representatives entitled *The Crisis in Colombia: What are we facing?*

If I could ask Mr. Macklin to put up two pictures, if you could put them both up, maybe hold the other one. We talk about negotiating with terrorists, and it's sort of a theoretical discussion that we've had. My view is you negotiate with terrorists and you lose, and I think that's the experience of people that have tried that. These two pictures are Jorge Briceno Suarez, alias Mono Jojoy, chief military officer of the FARC, and No. 2 is Henri Castillanos, alias Remanya, Eastern Bloc commandante for FARC. Would any of the four of you like to sit down with these gentlemen and

¹²² The witnesses in attendance were the commanding general (CINC) of the United States Southern Command (SouthCom) and ranking officials from the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Department of Defense (DoD), and the State Department.

think you would be successful in negotiating with them? [There is a pause. The witnesses remain silent.] I didn't think so.

By employing these particular images of the guerrilla leadership shown in Figure 29¹²³,

Representative Barr invokes the representations of the bearded Latin revolutionary (demonstrably shared by the witnesses addressed) – as treacherous, primitive, and out of control – to underscore the obvious futility of bargaining with the FARC. With a negotiated solution impossible, a military option becomes the only logical choice. In



Figure 29. 2000

the Plan Colombia discourse, the FARC and the Paramilitaries represent the inherent danger of allowing Latin America to operate autonomously. With Colombia understood as the child, these armed subgroups represent the consequences of letting that child run wild.

It is (primarily) the FARC – the child left unchecked – that is identified as the agent for the threat posed to the security of the United States. A formidable adversary (“force is between 17,000 and 30,000 and growing every single day” (H 2/15, 22); “insurgents have surface to air missiles” (H 3/23, 1291); “probably the best in South America today” (S 2/24, 31-32)), the group remains, nevertheless, only a vehicle or carrier. In this Plan Colombia discourse the threat itself is identified (in often vivid, apocalyptic terms) as narcotics. However, (as illustrated by Figure 30¹²⁴) while the identity of the threat is different from the previous historical iterations of

¹²³ Video footage of this entire exchange – including the image shown here – is available from C-Span (<http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/155423-1>).

¹²⁴ “Why Not Get The Breeding Ground?” From *Chicago Tribune* (1965), reprinted in Black (1988, 119).

perceived national security emergencies emanating from Latin America (e.g., reactionary European powers, Bolshevism, Nazism, Communism), the configuration of the threat remains



Figure 30. 1965

essentially the same. Traditionally, the perceived danger has never been invading armies of Latin Americans conquering the United States but Latin America as the staging ground, breeding ground, or incubation area for the external threat (Kenworthy 1995; Ninkovich 2001; Schoultz 1998). Consequently, it is the FARC's capacity to spread instability *in*

Colombia ("40 percent of Colombia's territory is controlled" (H 2/15, 16); "acting with outrageous impunity" (H 2/15, 75); "conducting nationwide offenses nationwide attacks" (H 2/29, 9); "we may have a narcoguerrilla government running Colombia" (H 3/29, 1529)) and *throughout the region* ("killing Americans, Venezuelans, and Colombians throughout the hemisphere" (H 2/15, 67); "projecting out beyond the borders of Colombia and may be creating dissension and discord in other nations" (H 3/23, 1311); "localized threat to Panamanian sovereignty and citizens in the border region" (H 3/23, 1346); "expanding beyond Colombia's borders" (H 2/15, 15)) that is at issue.

Region/World

The subjects of this discourse constituting the area beyond Colombia's borders – Region (Threatened, Strategic Importance, Unstable) and to a lesser extent World (Threatened) – are

constructed along similar lines to Colombia. The region is understood as endangered (“this is a regional and hemispheric problem” (H 2/15, 162); “entire region is at risk”(H 2/16, 18); “we don't want our 34 democratic allies in the hemisphere to go under and become narco states” (H 2/29, 39)) by the chaos emanating from Colombia. The planet as a whole is also at risk (“most of the world's coca is now grown in Colombia” (H 3/23, 1335); “war on drugs... is being fought and must be fought throughout the world” (S 2/24, 45)). Moreover, the region instantiated here is of vital national interest to the United States (“vitally important Panama Canal located just 150 miles north” (H 2/15, 15); “15 to 18 percent of our imported oil needs each month are met from Venezuela” (H 3/23, 1293)). Finally, like Colombia, the region is deemed innately unsound (“rising tide of nationalism” (H 2/15, 80); “bribery at all levels of officialdom in Mexico and to a lesser extent the Caribbean ensure that drugs reach their target” (S 2/2, 6); “Ecuador for example is on the brink of chaos. The jury is out on Venezuela. The legitimacy of Peru's upcoming elections is open to question.” (H 2/16, 3)). As constructed, the region (along with, to a certain extent, the world) is understood as both an asset of – and a liability to – the United States. While its specific attributes (e.g., Panama's canal, Venezuela's oil) may be physically located outside of the borders of the United States, the region – as America's “backyard” (Van Tassel 1997) – and its resources are understood to be the property of Washington. And yet, there is no apparent local responsible party to shepherd these resources. Not only can the nations to the south not be trusted to safeguard them, the instability endemic to the region actively puts those resources, and thus the security of the United States, at risk. In terms of agency, neither the region nor the world constituted in this discourse are capable of acting independently to effect change.

United States

In contrast to the other subjects instantiated via this discourse, the United States possesses a complex, multi-faceted identity (Regional Overseer, Victim, Capable, Culpable, Self-Interested, Besieged, Noble). The United States is powerfully constructed as a victim of the drug trade (“children dying all over this country” (H 2/15, 33); “when our kids drop dead of an overdose the heroin came out of Colombia” (H 2/29, 9); “thousands of lives lost and costing our country billions of dollars annually” (H 3/23, 1334); “we have worked hard to stop genocide in other countries... we now must stop this senseless slaughter of a generation of Americans” (H 3/29, 1513); “drug trafficking and abuse cause the enormous social health and financial damage to our communities” (S 2/24, 13)) with its security under siege (“facing one of the greatest challenges to its security” (H 2/15, 1); “we are in perhaps the fight of our lives in terms of the challenge with narcotics” (H 3/23, 1310); “we face an insidious national security threat” (H 2/15, 15)). Solely in the context of these particular predications, it is an ostensible peer of Colombia. However, unlike Colombia, the United States produced by this discourse is not paralyzed and made helpless by the damage (“52,000 dead a year” (H 2/15, 37)) and danger (“influx of illegal drugs is our greatest central challenge” (H 2/15, 15)) that impacts it. Instead, the predicates and practices assigned to America create a subject imbued with awareness, ability, and agency. This subject recognizes its interests (“primary concern is the enormous increase of the flow of drugs” (H 2/15, 16); “helping Colombia is in our fundamental national interest” (H 3/29, 1530)) and possesses the unique capability to decisively achieve them where others cannot (“we have achieved successes in Peru and Bolivia” (H 2/15, 36); “with our help Colombia can succeed” (H 3/23, 1345)). An outgrowth of its innate perception and ability to accomplish – and the stated or inferred absence of indigenous capacity – the United States created in this Plan Colombia

discourse is the recognized regional leader (“has a great responsibility in addressing crisis” (H 2/15, 16); “about to potentially lose Colombia” (H 2/15, 146); “people expect us to lead and we should” (H 2/15, 138); “we need a regional strategy” (S 2/24, 2)) bearing the ultimate responsibility for matters that threaten the stability of the hemisphere. Moreover, while possessing national interests, the motives for American actions are also understood as noble and altruistic (e.g., “we could not come up with a strategy and impose it upon Colombia” (H 2/29, 10-1); “need to respect Colombian systems” (H 2/15, 138)). Finally, the United States is also understood as worthy of some blame (“we export the chemicals, we export the weapons, we export the dollars” (H 2/15, 28); “problem is US demand” (H 2/29, 32)) in the context of the perceived crisis.

Overall, the predicates and practices assigned to the United States in this Plan Colombia discourse present a complex, sometimes contradictory, subject imbued with agency and ability. Nevertheless, the discursive representations of America cohere into a recognizable pattern. Despite being burdened by a heavy cost in blood and treasure because of Colombia, the United States stands in marked contrast to that other subject. It neither surrenders its decency and duty nor its ability to get things done regardless of the direst circumstances. It duly and ably protects not only its own interests but also the interests of the region (and the world) – which are assumed to be the same. This United States is consistent with the subject constructed via the larger historical narrative of American exceptionalism (Hunt 1987). Kenworthy (1995) summarizes this narrative of exceptionalism through the four points of what he characterizes as the America/Américas myth.

1. The Western Hemisphere is the geographical *tabula rasa* on which God (Providence, History) demonstrates civilization’s advance through agents understood to be the descendants of Europeans.

2. The content of this advance is freedom and progress: forms of association favoring self-determination of peoples and the liberty of individuals, which are linked to advances in material well being.
3. The United States of America is where this project first began and where it still excels. The United States is the vanguard of a hemisphere that, following its leadership, is the vanguard region of the world.
4. Such an advance in civilization provokes enmity from an old world that clings to ways that are the antithesis of the new ways described in (2). The new world may be endangered by the old. (18, emphasis in original)

The notion of *vanguard* that Kenworthy introduces in the context of the America/Américas myth neatly captures the complexity of the America subject identified in the congressional hearings analyzed in this text. An intricate blend of unique capability, moral obligation, civilizing mission, self-sacrifice, global symbol, and divine intervention, this concept goes beyond mere leadership. As vanguard, America holds a special value that distinguishes it from the other countries of the Américas and which also distinguishes the Américas from the rest of the world. “The United States is of the hemisphere and for the hemisphere but not just another hemispheric nation. The same holds true... for the hemisphere in relation to the planet” (Ibid, 19).

Presupposition

A given discourse is meaningless without context, without an underlying logic to its essential elements. Basic background knowledge must already exist for ideas and concepts presented to make sense and fit not only within a specific discourse (e.g. Plan Colombia) but also the broader discourses (e.g., U.S - Latin America relations, world politics, national security) of which that specific discourse is a part. This begs the question, what presuppositions are necessary for the cluster of attributes and abilities assigned to each of the subjects identified in these hearings on Plan Colombia to make sense? One core “truth” required for coherence in this discourse is *the inherent superiority* of America to Colombia and the (southern region of the) western hemisphere. On the face, both countries are suffering horrible consequences (with

“52,000 dead a year” and its children specific targets of Andean cocaine, America ostensibly much more than Colombia) resulting from the ongoing war on drugs. And yet, while Colombia sits on the brink of disaster, the United States does not. The Colombian leadership discursive constructing may be deserving of American support but it is also dependent on that support – the necessary money, knowledge, technology, even ideology, commensurate to the task. Colombia cannot do for itself. It suffers armed insurgents and militants because it cannot control its territory or its peoples’ passions that engender widespread violence and corruption. Nor can the region independently be trusted to act appropriately. It too is a source of value (resources) and danger (instability) that cannot do for itself. By contrast, America needs no outside help, no guidance, no lessons on how or when to act. The United States is the recognized authority and necessary actor to effect change (“we have a decent plan to allow Colombians to establish control” (H 2/29, 27); “we created the first Colombian counter-narcotics battalions” (S 2/22, 72); “with our help Colombia can succeed” (H 3/23, 1345)). Absent the underlying logic of American superiority, the practices and predicates assigned to the subjects in this discourse become unintelligible. As a matter of methodology, discourse theorists view the structuring of discourses generally as a series of binary oppositions that form a relation of power where one element of the binary is favored over the other (Milliken 1999; Doty 1996a). Unpacking this idea of a superior United States reveals a series of complementary and overlapping oppositions – primitive/modern, reason/passion, parent/child – distinguishing America from Colombia and the rest of the region. These oppositions served as the key operative principles¹²⁵ that framed the structure and logic of this discourse on Plan Colombia.

¹²⁵ “The principle according to which things are given meaning and simultaneously positioned vis-a-vis other things” (Doty 1993, 312).

The distinction between primitive and modern – that is, the absence or presence of civilization – underwrites the perceived gap in economic and political development. A country that is “a net importer of food” (H 2/15, 38) and is the “third largest recipient of assistance” (H 2/15, 59), Colombia’s backwardness is the antithesis of a United States that can spend billions of dollars a year fighting its war on drugs and still employ “highly skilled professionals” (S 2/25, 292) to protect the region. Colombia is a feudal society of peasants and elites that lacks the “institutional infrastructure that we see in countries that have more well developed systems” (H 3/8, 28) while the United States’ modern democratic capitalist arrangement “works better than anything else anybody in the world has tried in our lifetimes” (H 3/15, 27). Colombia is a country “with trackless jungles and rivers for highways” (H 2/15, 61) that is “mired in an intractable and longstanding civil war” (H 3/23, 1279) where armed groups “murder and kill civilians largely because of their political beliefs” (H 2/15, 16). By contrast, not only does the United States govern itself, it can manage events across the entire region. “We now have democracies throughout the whole hemisphere except for one and we have militaries that by and large behave themselves. And I think a lot of that credit is due to the United State military over time” (H 3/23, 1307).

Consistent with this binary of primitive/modern is another opposition – reason/passion. As Pike (1992) argues, the historical criticism of Latin Americans’ inability or unwillingness to tame nature was not limited to perceptions of their control of the physical world. Control over the natural also required disciplining human nature and, in terms of governing their passions, Latinos were found wanting. The distinction between reason and passion is central to this discourse on Plan Colombia. Clearly, the absence of reason is essential to the articulations of the FARC (“cannot be negotiated with” (H 2/15, 132); “narcoguerrillas that enforce the state of

lawlessness there” (H 3/29, 1522); “insurgents in the jungle” (S 2/24, 11)) and the Paramilitaries (“some of the most brutal people imaginable” (H 2/15, 66); “primary agents of violence and disorder” (H 3/29, 1513); “feudal armies” (S 2/25, 329)). However, it is not only the outlaw, armed groups that are understood to lack emotional control. Many of the practices ascribed to Colombia’s institutions and citizens (“armed forces have a long history of human rights violations” (H 2/15, 29); “judicial system is woefully weak (H 2/15, 201); “most violent country in the hemisphere” (H 3/29, 1489); “today’s democratic leaders are tomorrow’s drug barons” (H 2/29, 43); “elite do not have the will” (H 2/29, 6)) are fueled by the basest human tendencies – hate, fear, greed, apathy, etc – that defy the norms and ethics required for civilization (and thus the control of nature). Conversely, the United States instantiated via this discourse is in (inner) control. Arguably, based on suffering billions of dollars in losses and thousands of children dead annually from Colombian cocaine (“\$100 billion per year, 15,000 young American lives each year” (H 3/29, 1509)), the United States could justifiably declare war and start carpet bombing the Andes. And yet, despite its horrific ongoing suffering, America refrains from savage reprisal. Its response is firm (“we need to show some force” (H 2/15, 148) but measured (“need to respect Colombian systems” (H 2/15, 138) and not altogether uncritical (“our money fuels crime and has a corrosive impact” (H 2/15, 36). In keeping with its civilized status, reason – not passion – governs the actions of the United States even under the most threatening circumstances.

Despite developmental shortcomings and a perceived tendency towards the irrational, Colombia and its citizens (and by extension, the region) are not necessarily a lost cause. A mature, responsible party could still educate, help, and guide them to the correct path. Alluded to earlier in the text, the inherent tension in this discourse between “parent” and “child” is in sync with the primitive/modern and reason/passion oppositions. The United States instantiated in this

Plan Colombia discourse is the dutiful parent expected to provide aid (“goal is to see Colombia supported” (S 2/22, 2)) but at the same time expecting to be obeyed (“they know what the U.S. expects from them” (S 3/21, 14)). The necessity of American tutelage – and the concurrent impossibility of a purely indigenous solution – is understood as an elementary fact (“with our help Colombia can succeed” (H 3/23, 1345); “we can start treating the cause in Colombia” (H 2/15, 27); “with our strong support... Colombia can be successful” (H 3/29, 1513); “we have developed what we call a counter-narcotics campaign plan which is a regional plan” (S 2/24, 34); “we created the first of the Colombian counter-narcotics battalions” (H 3/23, 1283); “given the right resources and proper training the Colombian military can be effective” (S 2/24, 36-37)). Colombia – as child – is evaluated primarily in terms of obedience. When it obeys and follows instructions, it is good and praiseworthy (“your president has courageously declared the war on narco-traffickers” (2/24, 47); “Colombia has been heroic in its efforts” (S 2/8, 53); “President Pastrana has taken bold action” (H 3/29, 1530)). When it deviates from American tutelage and refuses or otherwise fails to adhere to directions (“until 1 year ago there was a President Samper in Colombia whose least interest was in cooperating” (S 2/24, 24); “government has not gotten its act together” (S 2/22, 99); “appease the guerrillas and narcotraffickers” (H 2/15, 83)), it is scolded for misbehaving. As a general rule, Colombia is graded favorably when it is perceived to most closely correspond with the United States’ model of political culture (“Colombia is an open democratic system” (H 3/23, 1308)), ideology (“partner that shares our determination to put the drug traffickers out of business” (H 3/29, 1545)) and instruction (“we rarely find a leader so willing to do what we want” (S 2/25, 318)). However, when Colombia and/or the region engage in disruptive behavior (“rising tide of nationalism” (H 2/15, 80)), are resistant to American direction (“deny us extradition” (H 2/15, 85)), or otherwise fail to live up to Washington’s

expectations (“Colombia is the third largest recipient of our foreign aid and no net reduction in coca production” (H 3/29, 1534)), the grade is poor. This notion (historically illustrated in Figure 31¹²⁶) of Latin Americans as Uncle Sam’s pupils is implicated in the institutionalized practice of certification (discussed in Chapters 3 and 4) where Washington delivers annual “report cards” to the states of the region evaluating their respective levels of compliance with America’s drug policy directives. Those with passing marks are praised and rewarded. Those who fail are scolded and punished (Crandall 2008; Livingstone 2004).




Figure 31. 1916

Subject Position

As explained above, a given subject’s relative position within a discourse circumscribes its specific range of possible social actions, both real and imagined (Harré and Moghaddam 2003). As can readily be inferred from the process of analysis up to this point, the assignments of attributes and abilities for each subject in this Plan Colombia discourse – framed by its underlying logics – worked to define them while simultaneously positioning them within a clear hierarchical relationship. This hierarchical arrangement is revealed in the relative degree of complexity of the identified subjects. The position of a given subject in a particular discourse is explicitly understood in relation to its recognized innate characteristics and ability, and thus its

¹²⁶ “It’s for His Own Good.” From *Chicago Tribune* (1916), reprinted in Johnson (1980, 149).

degree of agency, compared to the other subjects (Doty 1996a). The United States instantiated here – a planning, thinking, acting subject – naturally stands at the apex of this arrangement. For example, Colombia cannot even maintain the most elementary necessities of the modern state (“Colombian Navy lacked gas” (H 4/12, 81)) while the region as a whole is as unstable as the sea (“democracy ebbs and flows on about a 20 year cycle” (H 3/23, 1352)). By contrast, the United States has the power to adeptly “shape the international security environment” (H 3/23, 1359). It is America’s ability – along with Latin America’s inability – to *independently, appropriately, and effectively* plan and act to address the crisis that positions it as superior within this Plan Colombia discourse.

Correspondingly, Colombia and the region as a whole, lacking agency, are positioned as subordinate. In other words, Latin America’s inability to autonomously effect positive change ensures its inferior status by foreclosing on *the possibility* of it being considered a genuine partner in America’s drug war. Consequently, the Latin republics are largely relegated to the status of inanimate objects. Whether likened to chessboard pawns (“if we lose it, we are in deep trouble” (H 2/15, 139); “about to potentially lose Colombia” (H 2/15, 146); “don’t want our 34 democratic allies in the hemisphere to go under” (H 2/29, 39)), a private candy machine (“20 percent of US daily supply of oil imports” (H 2/15, 15); “wealthy in natural resources” (H 2/15, 37); “15 to 18 percent of our imported oil needs from Venezuela” (H 3/23, 1293)) or an invasion staging ground (“Colombia is as close as Denver” (H 3/23, 1285); “specter of a consolidated narcostate only 3 hours from Miami” (H 3/29, 1509); “Colombia is in our backyard” (H 3/23, 1310)), Colombia and the other states of the region are represented not as sovereign peers but as objects governed by the whims, needs, and fears of the United States.

Moreover, a “recurring metaphor for the international relations of the region is a family in which the United States appears as brother while using the voice of father” (Kenworthy 1995, 30). Constantly evaluated in terms of filial obedience, the Latin republics served as children within that historical image of the “family” of the *Américas* (as embodied in Figures 35 and 36). Kenworthy argues that this “metaphor strengthens the sense of a common project... while accounting for the existence of the vanguard nation within the vanguard region, inasmuch as *families are not run democratically*” (Ibid, 31, emphasis added). Consistent with that traditional hierarchy, this Plan Colombia discourse also creates different subject positions that delineate and evaluate Latin Americans as wards of the United States. When Latin nations, institutions, and citizens follow American guidance and adhere to the civilizational norms and values (e.g., stability, democracy) it promulgates, they are deemed reasonable and worthy of consideration (“Ecuadorians have been very good... an island of calm between Peru and Colombia” (H 2/29, 46); “Colombia is not Central America. Colombia is an open democratic system” (H 3/23, 1308)). This is the good child. In this subject position, Latinos are not independently capable but their efforts to correspond with American ideals demonstrate potential for improvement if given the proper assistance (“with our strong support Colombia can be successful” (H 3/29, 1513)).

When these states, institutions, citizens deviate from acceptable behavior (“President Samper tainted by narcotrafficking dollars” (H 3/23, 1287)) or call into question the essential propriety of American regional leadership (“rising tide of nationalism” (H 2/15, 80)), they are sources of disappointment and disillusionment that test the patience and understanding of the United States. Consider Congressman Mark Souder’s pique and confusion regarding the perceived contrary behavior of Latin Americans:

[Y]ou don’t detect a really anti-American tone ... but more of how they want to do their own thing, they want to have pride. It is almost like they feel one way to assert that is kind of, once of a while, to do something to spite us. At the same time, they’re really very strong supporters of the

United States. They understand our importance in this zone and they kind of think that, so how they relate to us has become a huge problem (U.S. House 2000, 197-198).

This is the wayward child. An

embarrassment to the family, this child must be disciplined until it corrects its mistakes and its actions are back in line with American directives (“finally they have come around” (H 2/15, 147)). This disciplining is not considered power politics but is rather considered a dutiful parent’s act of *affection* (Kenworthy



Figure 32. 1910

1995). As Figure 32¹²⁷ illustrates, to spare the rod is to spoil the child. In this vein, Washington’s deliberate isolation of President Samper during his tenure as leader of Colombia in the mid 1990s can be readily inferred as an institutional “timeout” (see, for example, Crandall 2002).

The armed groups, the FARC and the Paramilitaries, represent the Latin as the savage child. As constituted in this Plan Colombia discourse (“ferociously well armed and savage” (S 2/22, 97); “win through savagery” (H 2/15, 66)), their embrace of the natural and complete rejection of civilization marks these groups as the justification for America’s continuing doubts about Latin America and its people. While the United States has been certain of its suzerainty over *the territory* of Latin America since its birth, it has been equally certain of the inherent inferiority of *the peoples* of Latin America (Hunt 1987; Ninkovich 2001). Their mixed blood and skewed cultural values made for low odds of genuine human development (Pike 1992). Along these lines, the outlaw groups instantiated here are not truly human. Eschewing the basic tenets

¹²⁷ “Cutting a Switch for a Bad Boy.” From *Baltimore Sun* (1965), reprinted in Johnson (1980, 141).

of civilization (“beheaded the chief of police and killed four children” (H 3/29, 1493); “cannot be negotiated with” (H 2/15, 132)), they are likened to dangerous beasts complete with “deadly venom” (H 2/15, 31) and “tentacles” (H 2/15, 30). The FARC and the Paramilitaries serve as an ongoing remainder of the dangers of an unsupervised Latin America.

And yet, the region *is* supervised, by Uncle Sam. This begs the question of how this Plan Colombia discourse can accommodate both the continued existence of these groups *and* the superlative power and capability of vanguard America to lead, regulate, exemplify, etc.

Kenworthy (1995) argues that the United States has traditionally explained the continued persistence of “bad” Latins amongst the “good” Latins in terms of external influences. In other words, the true source of the infection, virus, or cancer in the region lay elsewhere. For example, armed resistance to the American occupation of the Dominican Republic in 1916 could not be an indigenous project. In Washington’s eyes it had to be the work of Imperial Germany (Pike 1992). Likewise, the meddling hand of the Soviets – not the efforts of the Nicaraguans themselves – was the logical explanation for the overthrow of the Somoza regime in 1979 (Grow 2008). Consistent with this pattern, the discursive constructions in these congressional hearings of the FARC (“trained by the Cubans” (H 3/29, 1529); “marxist guerillas” (S 2/22, 1); “totalitarian Marxists” (S 2/22, 109)) and the Paramilitaries (“narcoterrorists on the right” (H 3/29, H1484); “terrorist groups” (H 2/15, 37)) linked them to ideologies and tactics closely identified with established, *external* dangers.

Conclusion

The representational practices invoked in this discourse on Plan Colombia worked to create a specific social reality – a regime of truth – that legitimated certain actors while denying

others, that suggested some actions while foreclosing on others, that made certain ideas rational and commonsensical while pushing others beyond the pale. With this particular regime of truth delineated, it is now possible to consider the central research questions posed by this dissertation. First, how was it determined that a large scale intervention in the internal affairs of Colombia by the United States was a necessary and legitimate course of action? On paper, these states were peers, just two of the many, ostensibly equal, republics in the New World. With its bona fides as “the oldest democracy in Latin America” (H 3/29, 1512) and possessing a “first class civilian and military leadership team” (S 2/22, 73), shouldn’t Colombia be left to handle its own internal affairs? In the context of his America/Americás myth conception outlined above, Kenworthy (1995) argues that the United States is considered the vanguard nation of the vanguard hemisphere. However, he also highlights the central contradictions of this tenet. “If the ‘new world’ is so special, ... why must one nation monitor, tutor, and discipline the others?” (19). Moreover, if advancing “the self-determination of peoples” (Ibid) – i.e., sovereignty – is a central element of the vanguard’s mission, how can such interference be justified? Ultimately, Kenworthy maintains that the United States must act in this capacity because it is understood that Latins cannot be trusted to resist the influence of external forces (the “old world”) or to overcome their own natural inclination to deviate from the appropriate (i.e., American prescribed) path. The discursive practices at work within these congressional hearings on Plan Colombia support this reading of American exceptionalism and concurrent Latin inferiority.

America’s inherent uncertainty of Latins is central to the construction of Colombia (“very turbulent and violent history” (H 3/23, 1294); “enormous problems of poverty, corruption, lack of control” (H 3/29, 1529)) and the region as whole (“the wave of democracy in Latin America may be cresting” (H 2/16, 3); “doubts about the depth and durability of democracy in the region”

(H 3/23, 1344); “leaders could assume authoritarian powers with popular support” (S 2/2, 9)) in this Plan Colombia discourse. While their efforts at institutional correspondence with American ideals (e.g., democracy, free market capitalism) make them worthy of support, that is not enough to overcome Washington’s longstanding fears that the Latin states will fail when left to their own devices. One State Department official in the 1980s neatly summed up the logic underlying this anxiety. “What screws up Latin America is the Latin Americans. And they’ll *always* screw it up, because *they’re* screwed up” (quoted in Schoultz 1987, 127 , emphasis in original). In short, Latins are – uniformly – unreliable. The drugs emanating from Colombia are framed as a central threat to the United States’ national security (“a clear and present threat to the well-being of American society” (H 3/29, 1506)), and a danger to the security of the region (“entire region is at risk” (H 2/16, 18)). Latins, as constructed and positioned within this discourse, could not reasonably be depended upon to address the problem. Correspondingly, intervention by the United States becomes logical, appropriate, and *necessary*. Another way to look at this question of the propriety of American action in Colombia is to envision a discourse where the two countries were constructed and positioned *as equals*. How would this impact the range of permissible actions by the United States? Arguably, intervention would become very improbable while doing nothing and relying on Colombia to resolve the issue becomes a rational option.

The predicates and practices assigned to the United States, Colombia, and the region in these congressional hearings created a particular social imaginary. As discussed in Chapter 2, an imaginary is the principle that structures a particular collection of meanings and relations and forms them into an system of social understandings and identities (Muppidi 1999). In the discursive “world” instantiated by this specific imaginary, a massive crisis threatened hemispheric security. This crisis situation demanded action; doing nothing was not an option.

Moreover, this Plan Colombia discourse constructed Colombia and the other Latin republics as inherently incapable of addressing this complex emergency. Positioned as regional leader with both unique capability and responsibility, American intervention became the commonsense prescription for this problem. But, what kind of intervention? This leads to the second research question concerning the nature of this intervention. How did Plan Colombia's military oriented approach come to present itself as the most reasonable path to success? Indeed, during the legislative process, efforts were made by a handful of individual lawmakers in the House – citing America's culpability in the drug problem (e.g., "problem is US demand" (H 2/29, 32)) and the overwhelming superiority of a medical approach (e.g., "23 times more effective than eradication" (H 2/15, 29)) – to strip the package of its \$1.3 billion funding and shift those monies to domestic treatment programs. However, all such efforts were overwhelmingly defeated (Crandall 2002; Serafino 2001). Moreover, in the Senate, only *the size* of the aid package was ever at issue, never its military oriented composition (Crandall 2002).

The dominant discourse on Plan Colombia, as evidenced by the congressional hearings analyzed here, created a space for certain interpretive possibilities for addressing the drug crisis. This space did not allow for genuine consideration of the utility of domestic treatment or deep reflection on American culpability in its internal drug woes. Instead, the construction and positioning of the subjects involved worked to articulate and sediment particular meanings such that a predominantly militarized effort became the logical, commonsense approach. The predicates attached to the United States instantiated a subject under horrible threat ("we face an insidious national security threat" (H 2/15, 15)) and suffering tremendous losses at the hands of a *foreign* enemy ("thousands of families are destroyed because of Colombian drugs" (H 3/29, 1523)). This America is being invaded ("drugs and death spilling onto our shores" (H 2/15, 13);

“threat that reaches across borders for its victims” (S 2/2, 13)). Moreover, American “property” beyond its physical borders is also under threat (“vitally important Panama Canal located just 150 miles north” (H 2/15, 15)) and the survival of the entire region is in question (“don’t want our 34 democratic allies in the hemisphere to go under and become narco states” (H 2/29, 39)). Ongoing, devastating, wide ranging, and potentially catastrophic, this crisis is framed to support strong, decisive action to protect Americans at home and American resources abroad (e.g., Panama Canal, Venezuelan oil) from a foreign aggressor.

As the identified primary agent of this crisis, the discursive constructions of the FARC at work in these congressional hearings also structured the composition of America’s response. The ostensible leftist ideology (“totalitarian Marxists” (S 2/22, 109)) of the group marked it as inherently suspect. The source of much of America’s angst, anxiety, and anger concerning Latin America for decades, this Marxist identity positions the FARC as a type of adversary that must not be tolerated. Furthermore, its direct and indirect behavior in the United States (“killing our children” (H 2/29, 30)), in Colombia (“they castrated the men” (H 3/29, 1529)), and the region (“killing throughout the hemisphere” (H 2/15, 67)), instantiates a wild, savage subject far removed from the norms of civilization (“40 years in the bush” (S 2/22, 107)). Consequently, the value of honest talk is lost on the FARC (“cannot be negotiated with” (H 2/15, 132)). All this group respects is power (“they understand one thing” (S 2/24, 9); “only deal with them from a position of strength” (H 2/15, 198)). Finally, it is the power ascribed to the FARC relative to the governments of the region (“more machine guns than the infantry battalions” (H 2/15, 37); “conducting nationwide offenses” (H 2/29, 9); “violate the borders of Panama with absolute impunity” (H 3/23, 1293)) that positions this subject as an obstacle that can only be overcome by force.

This raises the question of who should do the fighting. Since representations of the depth of the crisis, the strength of the FARC, and the weakness and/or unreliability of Colombia and the other states of the region created a discursive space that obligated both a forceful response and American action, could the introduction of a large contingent of the United States military into Colombia and/or the region have been possible? I argue no, for two reasons. First, this dominant discourse on Plan Colombia lays the ultimate responsibility for America's national and regional security crisis squarely at the feet of Latin America. With Colombia as "ground zero" (H 3/29, 1530) and "the center of gravity" (S 2/22, 27) of this crisis and other states "content to ignore local drug production" (S 3/21, 2), this is a problem created and fostered by Latins. The United States should not risk its own "lifeblood down there" (H 3/29, 1529) and suffer "the grave consequences" (H 2/15, 16) of introducing American troops into Colombia. Colombians should *and can* bear the brunt of this fight – as "a partner who shares our concerns" (S 2/25, 288) and "with our strong support and the financial assistance contained in this bill, Colombia can be successful" (H 3/29, 1513). Second, the introduction of American troops is not within the range of interpretive possibilities circumscribed by this discourse because it runs counter to the construction of the United States and its superior position relative to the other states of the region. This use of force would not merely highlight the weakness and instability of Latins. It would constitute an admission that the vanguard – the country "morally obligated and responsible to ensure the general welfare" (S 3/21, 2), "best equipped at helping nations strengthen democratic institutions and practices" (S 4/13, 206), and "expected to lead" (H 2/15, 138) – had *failed*. In her study of its post-colonial relations with the Philippines in the 1950s, Doty (1993, 1996a) argues that the United States faced a similar dilemma when confronted there with the activities of an indigenous, communist oriented guerrilla group, the Huks. On the one

hand, the government of the Philippines could not be trusted to properly address the problem alone and the failure of a former possession would call into question the legitimacy of the American model of political development and “the value of Western democratic systems” (1996a, 84). Consequently, inaction was not option. On the other hand, direct military intervention by the United States would “call into question the ‘sovereignty’ and ‘independence’ of the Philippines” (1993, 315, emphasis in original) and provide evidence for Soviet claims of America’s imperial agenda. Ultimately, a middle path, a program of counterinsurgency, was taken. Similarly in the case of Colombia in 2000, the impossibility of both doing nothing (“we cannot simply put our head in the sand” (H 3/29, 1487)) and an armed invasion (“need to respect Colombian systems” (H 2/15, 138)) framed the middle path of Plan Colombia – a massive infusion of military aid to be used *by* the Colombians but *under the guidance* of the United States – as the proper and logical choice.

CHAPTER 6

PLAN COLOMBIA: ANALYSIS OF NEWSPAPER COVERAGE

For many people the mass media are a crucial source of the beliefs and values from which they develop their pictures of their social worlds. People turn to their newspaper or the evening broadcast news to learn about the events, issues, and stories that are unfolding in their immediate social world and beyond. They turn to the news to gain an understanding of not only events but also people, *especially those belonging to groups with whom they rarely interact*. (Henry and Tator 2002, 5, emphasis added).

The ability to supply large audiences with information about the world beyond their direct experience is a considerable if unintentional source of power, helping to make the media an important part of the terrain in which other social actors and institutions, including government, pursue their purposes. The news media affect political life not only by consciously championing political causes in the editorial pages or elsewhere. They also exert political influence – however unwittingly – by virtue of their news gathering routines, their access to mass audiences, their capacity to act as a channel for other political actors, and their ability *to ignore, select, and interpret policy-relevant events*. (Hackett 1991, 12-13, emphasis added).

The news media select events for reporting according to a complex set of criteria of newsworthiness; so news is not simply that which happens, but that which can be regarded and presented as newsworthy. These criteria, which are probably more or less unconscious in editorial practice, are referred to by students of the media as ‘news values’; and they are said to perform a ‘gate keeping’ role, filtering and restricting news input. The more newsworthiness criteria an event satisfied, the more likely it is to be reported. (Fowler 1991, 13, emphasis in original)

Continuing to evaluate Plan Colombia in light of the historical representations of Latin Americans that formed the dominant United States discourse on the region, I round out my multiperspectival methodological approach in chapter 6 by shifting from the domain of government to the domain of media. Two key factors support such a media focus. First, in the broad context of discourse, the media play a significant gatekeeper role. Such attributes as their widespread dissemination and extensive reach, authority to designate legitimate acts and actors, and capacity to structure the flow of and access to information readily empower the media to influence knowledge, values and beliefs, identities, and social relations – in local, regional, and global terms (Fairclough 1995; Hackett 1991). Second, in the specific context of this dissertation, the mass media (as the series of political cartoons, caricatures, and illustrations included in the previous chapters starkly attest) have long been an important agent in the articulation of those particular representations of inferiority that constituted the predominant American

understandings of Latinos and Latin America – especially in times of crisis. As illustrated above, from the time of the Spanish-American War through the end of the Cold War, the media's images and other discursive constructions of Latinos (e.g., helpless female, merciless savage, truculent child, bearded revolutionary) have consistently shaped American perceptions and subsequent policy decisions. Consequently, an examination of media coverage should offer additional insights into the discursive construction of Plan Colombia.

In this chapter, I examine the discursive practices that worked to construct and define Colombia (and other related subjects) in the media coverage of the Plan Colombia aid package in the effort to understand if and how these historical understandings of Latin America remain a component of contemporary United States policy. Bell (1995) maintains that the mass media both mirror and shape the formation and expression of the cultural, political, and social. From the news media domain, I specifically focus on newspaper reporting. In terms of agenda-setting power, newspapers continue to be the chief source of public affairs information for both policymakers and the most politically aware members of society. Moreover, as a source for detailed current events information widely available to a mass audience, the daily newspaper has very few competitors (Hackett 1991). Finally, given that the print media strongly reflect the social mainstream(s), newspapers represent a key data source for a study (like this one) “interested in dominant discourses, rather than dissident or idiosyncratic voices” (Mautner 2008, 32).

But, how can the analyst infer particular patterns of representation from a series of fact based news reports? After all, isn't professional journalism defined by its dutiful adherence to a specific ethical code and a set of institutional practices designed to ensure value-free, balanced reporting. Indeed, objectivity is arguably the foremost professional norm of modern American

journalism (Hackett and Zhao 1998; Schudson 2001). And yet, consider that news reports, in terms of language and structure, are not “reports” at all. “Instead, they are conceived of as ‘stories’, a term used by journalists themselves” (Teo 2000, 35, emphasis in original). Moreover, journalists write these stories “with structure, order, viewpoint, and values” (Bell 1995, 26) derived from such domains as established newsroom procedures, editorial demands, peer review, and common cultural wisdom (Hall et al. 2000). Consequently, Hackett & Zhao (1998) – drawing on the work of Foucault – argue that the news media’s overriding emphasis on “impartiality” should be understood as a discursive regime in that it directly shapes the production and distribution of knowledge. They classify it as a *regime of objectivity*. “As a way of producing that-which-can-be-regarded-as-valid accounts of the world, journalism’s objectivity regime is entrenched in news workers occupation routines and norms, the economic and other organizational imperatives of news media, and in broader cultural understandings and relations of social power” (7). In this sense, the examination of “news” about Plan Colombia can offer insights into the patterns of representation present during the period in question.

Using the criteria outlined in chapter 2, five newspapers (the *Washington Post*, the *New York Times*, the *Miami Herald*, the *Chicago Tribune*, and the *Los Angeles Times*)¹²⁸ were selected to serve as the aggregate data source for the three month period in 2000. To carry out the analysis, I draw on studies of media analysis from the literatures of critical discourse analysis (e.g., Fairclough 1995; van Dijk 1991, 1998), critical cultural studies (Hall 2000; e.g., Hall et al. 2000), sociolinguistics (e.g., Bell 1991, 1995), and critical media studies (e.g., Hackett 1991; Hackett and Zhao 1998) and employ analytical tools consistent with the philosophical and methodological tenets outlined in chapter 2. Ultimately, I contend that the broad pattern of

¹²⁸ Hereafter, the newspapers are abbreviated as WP, NYT, MH, CT, and LAT, respectively.

representations within this media discourse on Plan Colombia draw upon and effectively reproduce the historical understandings of the inferior Latin Other well documented in the literature of United States – Latin America relations. Chapter 6 is organized as follows. First, I outline the components of the newspaper coverage (headlines and leads) assessed, their analytical significance, and the respective methods employed to assess them. Next, I provide a step by step explanation of the process of each analysis in turn. Finally, I review the results of the analysis and detail the findings in terms of the historical record of United States – Latin America relations.

Newspaper components – headlines & leads

What is the scholarly value of examining headlines and leads of newspaper articles? The immediately obvious function of the headline and lead paragraph (theoretically) is to serve as an abstract of the entire story. They provide a condensed summary of the information contained in the article that accompanies it (Bell 1991; Henry and Tator 2002). Consequently, simply “by scanning through the headline and the lead, readers can easily and immediately catch the main points of the news” (Flowerdew, Li, and Tran 2002, 331). However, there are additional important discursive functions that are not readily apparent. With their specific structure and placement, headlines serve as *advertisements* for their stories (and thus their publications) designed to grab the reader’s attention. Extremely conspicuous by design, they feature large, bold type, are prominently placed, and sometimes spread across several columns (van Dijk 1991). Likewise, larger type or spacing is often used to set leads off from the remainder of major news stories (Bell 1991). These attributes serve to attract the attention not only the of the immediate reader, but also passers-by (e.g. adjacent passengers on a train), granting the headline

a potentially much larger audience than those *who actually read the article* (Develotte and Rechniewski 2001; van Dijk 1991). Moreover, headlines regularly feature flashy rhetorical devices (e.g., alliteration, pseudo-direct quotes, punning, emotive language) designed to stand out and stick in readers' minds (Bell 1991; Develotte and Rechniewski 2001). Operating within a format with severely limited space, every word must be carefully selected and structured for maximum effect. As a result, headlines and leads tend to reflect the *underlying values and beliefs* of the newspaper as an institution (Teo 2000). This is due to the collaborative nature of news production where many different hands shape the overall process (Bell 1991; Harrigan and Dunlap 2004). Bell (1991) stresses that while journalists write the lead and body of stories, headlines are written by the paper's copy editors – who may also revise or rewrite the leads. Headlines therefore provide a mechanism for individual newspapers to put their specific house brand “on what is otherwise a mass-produced product” – the news (186).

The daily press typically is organized around the principle of the “inverted triangle” with the most newsworthy information placed at the top and the least important at the bottom (Teo 2000). Headlines and leads in this context serve to highlight only the most vital aspects of the story. Yet, the interpretation of what is important (and therefore included) and what is not (and therefore omitted) is mediated by the ideological structure of *the institution* as it articulates specific meanings for events and actors (Hall et al. 2000). For example, a minor element of a story may be elevated to headline status, marginalizing the central topic (van Dijk 1995a). The structure (e.g., letter size, font choice) and placement (e.g., the top versus the bottom of the page, the A section versus the D section) of newspaper headlines establishes a clear hierarchy of importance on information. In this way, the succession of headlines printed in a given newspaper can be seen to circumscribe its specific institutional worldview (Develotte and Rechniewski

2001; van Dijk 1998). In turn, the decisions that are the product of that institutional worldview inevitably impact *the reader's interpretation of the news event*. Generally, the first words to catch the eye, the “information expressed in the headline is strategically used by the reader during the process of understanding in order to construct the overall meaning, or the main topics, of the rest of the text *before the text itself is even read*. Indeed, often readers do not read more than the headline of a news report” (van Dijk 1991, 50, emphasis added). Consequently, the lexical choices (e.g., discursively constructing a particular group of people as “a mob” as opposed to “demonstrators”) made by a newspaper works to construct a “preferred model” of the subject matter that shapes perceptions (van Dijk 1995b). Likewise, since the story lead functions discursively as a “*directional* summary, a lens through which the point of the story is focused and its news value magnified” (Bell 1991, 183, emphasis in original), its particular composition invariably shapes the reader’s perception of events. Through repetition (i.e., similarly structured headlines repeating within a single issue and across successive issues of a paper), the reader is conditioned towards certain expectations and to make specific connections and interpretations (Develotte and Rechniewski 2001). Given that the headline typically is what readers remember most about a story, this influences how the reader will use that information provided in the future (van Dijk 1991, 2000). In sum, headlines “provide the semantic framework for readers’ interpretation of the news story, and search and retrieval of old information. Thus, headlines can take up a central and revealing role in the production and reproduction of discriminatory ideologies in the press” (Flowerdew, Li, and Tran 2002, 331). For the specific repertoire of tools for my examination of newspaper headlines and story leads during this three month period, I draw on Develotte & Rechniewski’s (2001) study on national representations in newspaper headlines and Flowerdew, Li, & Tran’s (2002) study on discriminatory news discourse.

Newspapers – Analytical Models

As part of a larger cross-cultural media study of the nuclear testing crisis in Franco-Australian relations in 1995, Develotte & Rechniewski (2001) examine how each nation was discursively represented in the headlines of prominent French and Australian newspapers in the weeks following the announcement of the plan to recommence detonations in the Pacific Ocean. They draw on Moscovici's (1973, 1984) conception of social representations as information systems comprised of unproblematic and mutually accepted conventions, images, ideas, etc, through which people interpret and react to events. In this sense, representations “‘establish an order’, they make the unfamiliar, familiar, enabling the new and the unknown to be included in a pre-established category; and they enable communication to take place, communication based on a shared code” (Develotte and Rechniewski 2001, section 3, emphasis in original). Extending Moscovici's concept, the authors coin the term *national representation*. They use this expression “to refer to the knowledge systems that encapsulate knowledge about other nations and nationalities. The term can apply both to representations of one's own nation, people and country, and to representations of other nations” (section 3). Develotte & Rechniewski argue that newspaper headlines are a useful medium for identifying national representations. Since it provides no explanation, the headline *depends on the reader* to immediately recognize the domain, events, references, etc, present in order to apprehend the article content. Therefore the

advantage of analysing [sic] headlines is that they refer to and encapsulate this 'knowledge', ... they rely on widely disseminated cultural knowledge in order to be understood. They thus constitute a kind of 'shorthand', a simplification and condensation of ideas. They play, moreover, both a passive and an active role: they depend on and mobilise [sic] this knowledge but also in turn help to disseminate and reinforce it, they create new associations and networks of meaning. They also seek to exploit representations for pragmatic effect (section 3, emphasis in original).

Given the important historical context of specific representations of Colombia (and Latin America nations generally) within the United States addressed in earlier chapters, this concept is particularly well suited for this dissertation. In their study, Develotte & Rechniewski identify

three key linguistic features/functions of headlines – **designation**, **appraisal**, and **presupposition** (outlined in Table 9).

Table 9. Linguistic Functions of Headlines

Designation	Appraisal	Presupposition
Nominalization Generalization Personification	Predication via adjectives, verbs, & adverbs	Background knowledge as unproblematic truth

The core of the newspaper headline is generally “the main action and its actor” (Bell 1991, 189).

Designation or nominalization of the actor(s) in a headline, according to Develotte & Rechniewski, allows for both understated and more obvious vilification or praise (e.g., “les kangaroos” in lieu of “the Australian government”). Two further elements of designation are the processes of generalization and personification. They maintain that the use of catch-all actor labels (e.g. “the French,” “French decision”) constructs the actions of a relative few as the responsibility of the entire group. The entire group, in turn, is typically personified with the traits properly attributed to the few becoming the defining and perennial characteristics of the nation. “A further result of such a procedure may be to associate all members of a nationality with traits of character or actions attributed to the objectified national community, and thus to justify general retaliation” (section 4). *Appraisal* refers to the particular forms of predication employed in the headline. Develotte & Rechniewski argue that it is important to identify the specific adjectives, verbs, and adverbs assigned to agents (e.g., “heavy-handed,” “defiant”) that convey the perspective of the writer. Finally, the authors argue that headlines typically reveal the use of *presupposition*, where background knowledge is presented as self-evident and uncomplicated. “The power of all forms of implicature and presupposition derives from the fact that they remove

what is presupposed or implied from direct contestation” (section 4). For example, in a headline from their corpus, *Why the French don’t care*, French apathy is put forth as an unproblematic certainty with only the particular reason for that indifference open to question. A focus on presuppositions, Develotte & Rechniewski contend, will expose what is likely to go unquestioned – the collection of national representations circulating in a society.

In their study of discrimination towards mainland Chinese in the Hong Kong media, Flowerdew, Lin & Tran (2002) examine the discursive practices of an elite English language newspaper – the *South China Morning Post* (SCMP) – in its reporting on a major immigration news event, the 1999-2000 right of abode controversy. Drawing from a diverse range of scholars of discriminatory discourse (e.g., Fowler 1991; van Dijk 1991; Wodak et al. 1999; Bar-Tal 1989; Teo 2000), they formulate a composite taxonomy of the different models of discriminatory strategies proposed by these authors. This in turn forms the basis of their analysis of SCMP article headlines and leads. Their taxonomy consists of four general categories of discriminatory macro strategies – **negative other presentation**, **scare tactics**, **blaming the victim**, and **delegitimation** (outlined in Table 10) – each comprised of related and/or overlapping micro strategies.

Table 10. Discriminatory Macro Strategies

Negative Other Presentation	Scare Tactics	Blaming the Victim	Delegitimation
Highlight negative characteristics of “them”	Exaggerated figures & statistics; threat focus	Scapegoating; justification based on out-group offenses	Disempowerment; outcasting; problematization

Flowerdew, Lin & Tran organize several complementary micro-strategies – a focus on negative social or cultural differences, deviance or threats ascribed to Them, a focus on the positive

attributes of Us and the negative attributes of Them, and the assignation of negative traits via predication – under the rubric of *negative other presentation*. Examples from their study include the use of negatively connoted metaphors (e.g., “a flood,” “an exodus”) in SCMP headlines and leads to characterize immigrants. They maintain that the “spread of negative attributes will gradually result in the formation of stereotypes in the readers’ attitudes towards the ‘other’ group” (328, emphasis in original). The use of inflated figures and statistics in headlines and leads to create panic and the exaggeration of threat to public order fall under the category of *scare tactics*. They cite SCMP headlines like *Extra \$300m may be needed for migrants* and *Influx may send jobless rate spiraling to 25%* as clear examples. Flowerdew, Lin & Tran argue that the “use of scare tactics in the media discourse can stir up panicky emotions among the general public and thus foment a collective hostile attitude” (328). The general category of *blaming the victim* consists of micro-strategies that utilize scapegoating (e.g., shifting blame/responsibility) and justification based on the perceived ongoing transgressions of the out-group and the legitimacy of past acts and attitudes of the in-group. Finally, minimization and disempowerment, outcasting (e.g., identifying the out-group as violators of pivotal social norms), and problematization are the micro-strategies that comprise the category of *delegitimation*. Finally, while the macro strategies categories are presented separately here for analytical purposes, it is important to note that different strategies can be at work simultaneously within the same headline and/or lead.

Analysis – Headlines & Leads

As addressed in Chapter 2, an electronic database search of all of the five newspapers for the period February 1 through April 30, 200 was carried out focusing specifically on hard news articles. For the purposes of methodological consistency, only those articles (on the front and

internal pages) which directly addressed the Plan Colombia legislation then working its way through Congress and/or contextually relevant events (e.g., Colombia's civil war, Latin American drug trade, etc) were included. Relevant information presented without recognizable headlines, along with the news summary pages (i.e., excerpts referencing the complete headlines and articles printed further back in the paper), were excluded from consideration. From the five publications, a total of 133 separate articles¹²⁹ were identified resulting in a final, combined total of 266 headlines and leads for analysis. Every article was saved in full electronically and organized by individual newspaper and date. For both organizational purposes and in the effort to ensure transparency, a coding sheet was prepared for each newspaper outlining headline, lead, date, and location using Microsoft Excel software. The complete coding sheets for all five newspapers are located in Appendix C. A brief excerpt from one coding sheet is provided in Table 11 to illustrate the format.

Table 11. Brief Excerpt from Chicago Tribune Coding Sheet

CHICAGO TRIBUNE			
Headline	Lead	Date	Location
TO SOME, AID TO COLOMBIA A RISKY MANEUVER FOR U.S	It was an extraordinary gesture intended to create momentum for peace, but the government decision to cede an area the size of Switzerland to Marxist rebels in the coca-growing region of southern Colombia seems to have backfired.	2/18/2000	Page 1

Following an initial reading (Wood and Kroger 2000), the article headlines and leads were examined considering the three linguistics features (designation, appraisal, & presupposition) identified by Develotte & Rechniewski (2001) and the four macro-strategies (negative other presentation, scare tactics, blaming the victim, & delegitimation) derived from Flowerdew, Lin & Tran's (2002) composite taxonomy. To both clarify and underscore my analysis, I have

¹²⁹ CT-12, LAT-24, MH-43, NYT-26, & WP-28, respectively.

boldfaced the relevant elements of the headlines and leads that follow.

Designation, Appraisal, & Presupposition

As expected, the designation of actors figured prominently in the headlines printed in the five newspapers comprising the corpus. Also as expected given the subject matter, Colombia (or variant) was the agent identified in the majority of headlines. Unlike Develotte & Rechniewski's findings, however, the use of openly demeaning terms (e.g., lexical replacement) as a means of naming was not found. The most frequent aspect of designation observed was *generalization*. However, this aspect was found to be nearly exclusive to the identification of Colombia in headlines. Mirroring Develotte & Rechniewski's findings, the nationality adjective "Colombia" or "Colombian" was overwhelmingly used as a type of synecdoche with the whole nation representing the actions of a few (e.g., government representatives, insurgents, paramilitaries). The following are some typical examples of this process of generalization identified in the headlines.

- ***Colombia*** Political Violence Kills 27 (LAT 021900)
- ***Colombia*** Aid Package Gets House Approval (LAT 033100)
- ***COLOMBIA AID PUSHED*** (MH 032400)
- ***COLOMBIA ANTI-DRUG EFFORT FALTERS*** (MH 042900)
- ***Colombia*** Anti-Drug Aid Tangled Up in Senate (NYT 040500)
- *Drugs, Politics and Family Ties Figure in **Colombia** Extradition Case* (NYT 041300)
- *U.S. Reports Major Rise In **Colombian** Drug Output* (WP 021500)
- *U.S. Colonel To Plead Guilty In **Colombia** Drug Probe* (WP 040400)

In this manner, Colombia as a whole is the Other inextricably linked with drugs, violence, instability, and dependency – both reflecting and reproducing the commonplace representations of the country and its people circulating among the paper's targeted audience. To a lesser extent, this generalization is extended to the region as well, with headlines like ***\$1.7 BILLION OKD FOR LATIN DRUG FIGHT*** (MH 033100) and ***Andes in Tumult, Shaken by Political Tremors***

(NYT 042300) identifying a particular locus of danger and volatility. By contrast, the literal handful of instances of generalization of the United States (e.g., *COLOMBIANS SEEKING U.S. HAVEN FROM WAR* (MH 021300)) in the corpus of headlines are neutral or positive.

In addition to generalization, *personification* is another aspect of designation employed in these headlines – specifically in relation to Colombia. Stripped of all its nuance, complexity, and context in this process of objectification, Colombia is reduced and reified to something recognizable and understandable (e.g., *Colombia Agrees to Turn Over Territory to Another Rebel Group* (NYT 042600); *Colombia Refuses to Extradite Rebel* (WP 021200); *Colombians Agree to Rebel Haven* (WP 021800)). When a nation is named and personified, according to Moscovici (1984), its motives and actions are often then characterized in pop psychology terms. To this point, I found headlines suggesting different pathologies like anxiety (e.g., *U.S. Drug Czar Reassures Colombia on Aid* (NYT 022500)) and mendacity (e.g., *DRUG CZAR URGES COLOMBIAN OPENNESS* (MH 022400)) ascribed to the entity “Colombia.” It is in this manner, according to Develotte & Rechniewski (2001), that the motivations and processes which might “explain actions at an individual level are thus attributed to countries, to provide explanations of geopolitical phenomena” (section 4). Conversely, the United States – personified in only two instances in the entire corpus – is characterized exclusively in positive terms of action or ability (*U.S. Reports Major Rise In Colombian Drug Output* (WP 021500); *International Raids Nab 2,331 Suspects; U.S. Coordinates Drug Operations* (WP 033000)). While generalization is the norm for representations of Colombia, it is precisely the opposite in the case of the United States. Rather than a reified “U.S.,” individual or institutional American agents are identified within the headlines of all five papers with a only a small number of exceptions. These are typical examples.

- *White House Certifies Colombia, Mexico Anti-Drug Efforts* (LAT 020500)
- *MCCAFFREY WARNS ANTI-DRUG BATTALION OF 'GREAT DANGER'* (MH 022500)
- *GOP Plans Funding Boost for Military, Drug War* (WP 030800)
- *U.S. Officials Cite Trend in Colombia; Lack of Air Support Hindering Drug War* (WP 031300)
- *Senate Fight Snags Aid Bill For Kosovo And Colombia* (NYT 032200)
- *HOUSE OKS MILITARY, ANTI-DRUG MONEY, REJECTS CURB ON KOSOVO FUNDING* (CT 033100)
- *Lott Assures Colombian President on \$1.6 Billion to Fight Drugs* (NYT 041300)
- *SENATOR CHIDES ADMINISTRATION ON HANDLING OF AID TO COLOMBIA* (MH 041400)

The consistent naming in these headlines of the multitude of individual and institutional actors engaged in American foreign and domestic policy draws upon and reproduces particular social representations of the United States. It is a sophisticated, multifaceted, dynamic (yet stable) entity that effectively governs via rules, laws, and procedures. It has both agents and agency. Specific reasons and intentions can be seen or readily inferred from the decisions and actions (almost invariably neutral or positive) attributed to its agents. In the rare instance of reported villainous behavior by one of those agents, the act is not classified as “American” or even institutional (e.g., “American military”) in nature but rather pointedly ascribed to a precise offender (e.g., *U.S. Colonel To Plead Guilty In Colombia Drug Probe* (WP 04/04/2000)). By contrast, the (apparently indiscriminate and unfathomable) violence and instability that characterize Colombia and Latin America as a whole are presented as integral attributes of the nation and the region. The few instances of specified actors only reinforce this particular knowledge system as Colombia’s authorized agents underscore its dependency (e.g., *COLOMBIAN OFFICIAL SEEKS HELP FOR AID PLAN* (MH 032500); *U.S. FUNDS TO FIGHT DRUGS ARE NEEDED NOW, COLOMBIAN LEADER SAYS* (MH 041200)) and deviance (e.g., *Colombian Military Aiding Death Squads, Report Says* (LAT 022400); *COLOMBIA MILITARY CRITICIZED OVER ESCAPES* (MH 031800)). Meanwhile, its

unauthorized agents highlight its impotence (e.g., *COLOMBIA: **REBELS KILL POLICE CHIEF*** (NYT 040800); *COLOMBIA **REBEL BOMBINGS CAUSE WIDESPREAD BLACKOUT*** (MH 032200); *Colombia Sets Negotiations With a Second Rebel Group; Army Forces to **Pull out of Guerrilla Stronghold*** (WP 042800)).

Unlike Develotte & Rechniewski's findings, appraisal (i.e., the use of particular verbs, adjectives, and adverbs) as a function of national representations does not figure prominently in this corpus of headlines. There are only a few examples (like *U.S. Drug Czar **Reassures Colombia on Aid*** (NYT 022500) and *DRUG CZAR URGES **COLOMBIAN OPENNESS*** (MH 022400)) that directly work to demean Colombia. The instances of its use focus primarily on Colombia's subnational agents and serve primarily to identify them as particular types of subjects.

- *PARAMILITARY LEADER ADMITS **RUTHLESS ACTS** BUT COLOMBIAN SAYS HIS GOAL IS HELPING PEOPLE* (CT 021800)
- *Colombia Political Violence Kills 27; Latin America: **Slayings** by rebel, paramilitary groups come as government prepares to begin talks with second **leftist** organization* (LAT 021900)
- *A **Chilling** Crime Network Rears Its Head in Colombia; Latin America: Tactics used by the **powerful** group La Terraza recall the days of the Medellin cartel* (LAT 031600)
- *COLOMBIAN REBELS **MASSACRE POLICE 21 IN REMOTE GARRISON HACKED, BURNED*** (MH 032800)

The lexical choices in these headlines construct subnational subjects – adhering to deviant or disavowed ideologies and engaging in brutal, malevolent acts – that are indirectly, but inextricably, linked to the country and the region as a whole by virtue of their designation.

Presupposition, the “discursive ‘sleight of hand’” that slips in a presumption as a hard fact” (Develotte and Rechniewski 2001, section 4, emphasis in original), does figure prominently in the headlines of the corpus. They are, in fact, essential for these headlines to be understood at all (Keenan 2000). The identification of implicature starts from a central question – what must

the reader “know” in order for the information presented in these headlines to make sense? Most centrally, readers of these headlines must understand four specific things about Colombia and the region. First, the source of the crisis that plagues America is *foreign*. The drugs that necessitate a “drug war” originate in Colombia and Latin America.

- *Colombia Aid Package Gets House Approval; Congress: Clinton plan would give \$1.7 billion to fight drug trafficking* (LAT 033100)
- *COLOMBIA'S WAR ON DRUGS GOES AIRBORNE* (MH 021100)
- *A Web of Drugs and Strife in Colombia; Cocaine War* [a special report] (NYT 042100)
- *Colombia Anti-Drug Plan Draws Hill Fire* (WP 021600)
- *HOUSE APPROVES AID FOR COLOMBIAN DRUG FIGHT* (MH 033030)
- *Colombia Anti-Drug Aid Tangled Up in Senate* (NYT 040500)
- *CLINTON IRKED BY DELAY OF ANTI-DRUG SPENDING FOR COLOMBIA* (MH 040500)
- *\$1.7 BILLION OKD FOR LATIN DRUG FIGHT \$12.7 BILLION AID PACKAGE HEADS FOR RESISTANCE IN SENATE* (MH 033100)

Second, Colombia (along with the rest of the region) is *out of control*. Latin America is typified by violence and instability and cannot manage even that most basic function of civilized states – governance.

- *U.S. DRUG SUSPECT FLEES COLOMBIAN PRISON IN A MATTRESS* (CT 030200)
- *VENEZUELA FARC REBELS RELEASE SPANIARD, VENEZUELANS* (MH 041700)
- *Colombians Agree to Rebel Haven* (WP 021800)
- *REBEL THREAT IN COLOMBIA: PAY TRIBUTE OR BE KIDNAPPED* (CT 042700)
- *COLOMBIANS SEEKING U.S. HAVEN FROM WAR* (MH 021300)
- *Colombians Flee Into Panama as War Fears Rise* (NYT 042200)
- *Colombia Sets Negotiations With a Second Rebel Group; Army Forces to Pull Out Of Guerrilla Stronghold* (WP 042600)
- *Andes in Tumult, Shaken by Political Tremors* (NYT 042300)

Third, the specific agents of this violence and instability – identified as irrational (e.g., *DESPITE MOVE INTO POLITICS, COLOMBIAN REBEL CHIEF TALKS OF WAR* (MH 043000); *Battling in Colombia but Touring Together in Europe* (NYT 022800)), murderous (e.g., *Apparent Rebel Blast Kills 2 in Colombia* (LAT 031500)), powerful (e.g., *COLOMBIA: REBELS KILL POLICE CHIEF* (NYT 040800)), and primitive (e.g., *AMERICAN ONLINE*

TUTORS COLOMBIAN REBELS IN WORKINGS OF CAPITALISM (MH 030500)) – are *savages*. Beyond the pale in terms of civilization, they constitute a dangerous threat. Fourth, and finally, Colombia and the region are *incapable of independent action*. They are dependent on the largesse and ability of the United States to address their crises.

- ***U.S. FUNDS TO FIGHT DRUGS ARE NEEDED NOW, COLOMBIAN LEADER SAYS*** (MH 041200)
- ***U.S. ANTIDRUG PLAN TO AID COLOMBIA FACES SKEPTICISM; PENTAGON IS RELUCTANT*** *Some Fear \$1.3 Billion Effort Will Draw American Troops Into 40-Year Civil War* (NYT 020600)
- ***\$1.7 BILLION OKD FOR LATIN DRUG FIGHT \$12.7 BILLION AID PACKAGE HEADS FOR RESISTANCE IN SENATE*** (MH 033100)
- *Colombia Anti-Drug Plan Draws* ***Hill Fire*** (WP 021600)
- ***COLOMBIAN OFFICIAL SEEKS HELP FOR AID PLAN*** (MH 032500)
- *Colombia Defense Chief* ***in U.S. Lobbying for Aid*** (LAT 031600)
- ***CLINTON IRKED BY DELAY OF ANTI-DRUG SPENDING FOR COLOMBIA*** (MH 040500)

These four factors underscore the “truth” of the essential inferiority of Latins. The logical corollary to Latin inferiority is of course American superiority. The fact that the United States is *the natural leader* of the region is the other central presupposition required to comprehend these headlines. It is not just that the United States (directly or via its agents) is inherently capable (e.g., ***Navy Adding Muscle to Drug War; Crime: High- tech gear and firepower are increasingly being put to sea to help the Coast Guard stop the flow of narcotics from Latin America*** (LAT 032800)) where Colombia (along with the rest of Latin America) is largely impotent. In its capacity as hemispheric leader, it is only logical that America reviews and evaluates the performance of its subordinates – the other states of the region (e.g., ***U.S. Reports Major Rise In Colombian Drug Output*** (WP 021500); ***White House Certifies Colombia, Mexico Anti-Drug Efforts*** (LAT 020500); ***U.S. Officials Cite Trend in Colombia; Lack of Air Support Hindering Drug War*** (WP 031300)). The imperative nature of American financial assistance is readily inferred in the numerous headlines cited above but a leader is not only responsible for supplying

material aid. The superior also provides the subordinate with guidance (e.g., *MCCAFFREY WARNS ANTI-DRUG BATTALION OF 'GREAT DANGER'* (MH 022500); *DRUG CZAR URGES COLOMBIAN OPENNESS* (MH 022400)) and emotional support (e.g., *Lott Assures Colombian President on \$1.6 Billion to Fight Drugs* (NYT 041300); *U.S. Drug Czar Reassures Colombia on Aid* (NYT 022500)). Moreover, the United States is understood as leader because without its firm hand the region cannot (e.g., *PANAMA SEES RISE IN DRUG FLIGHTS CLOSING OF U.S. BASE OPENS DOOR TO TRAFFICKERS* (CT 043000); *COLOMBIA ANTI-DRUG EFFORT FALTERS U.S. BUDGET TROUBLE TAKES TOLL* (MH 042900)) or cannot be trusted to (*Cultivating New Allies in Cocaine War; U.S.-Backed Program Urges Colombians to Replace Coca With Legitimate Crops* (WP 041600)) act appropriately. In sum, the functions of designation, appraisal, and presupposition arrayed in these headlines reflect and reproduce representations of Colombia and the other states of Latin America as a largely undifferentiated source of danger, instability, violence, and deviance while simultaneously representing (directly or via logical inference) the United States as multifaceted, capable, stable and the intuitive leader of the region.

Negative Other Presentation, Scare Tactics & Delegitimation

I now turn to Flower, Li & Tran's (2002) composite taxonomy of discourse strategies to extend my analysis beyond the article headlines to also include the article leads. In their findings on the discursive practices of the Hong Kong print media, the use of metaphors played a significant role in the process of negative other presentation. In the context of the Plan Colombia related coverage analyzed here, *metaphors* also played a significant role. Metaphors, essentially a means of "understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another" (Lakoff and

Johnson 1980, 5), are discursive tools used to present complex or foreign concepts in terms that can be easily understood by the general public. “In media discourse the use of metaphors is an important part of making problematic political and moral concepts...readily accessible for evaluation” (Santa Ana 1999, 196). Unsurprisingly, the most prominent metaphor utilized in the headlines and leads of these five newspapers is war.

- *Pullout From Panama Hampering Drug War; Colombia: Smugglers taking advantage of base closures, official says. U.S. hoping for buildup of new airfields* (LAT 020500)
- *Drug War Funding Faces Delay; Hastert Agrees With Senate Holdup of Colombia, Kosovo Aid* (WP 032700)
- *HOUSE APPROVES AID FOR COLOMBIAN DRUG FIGHT* (MH 033000)

Out of the total number of headlines and leads, war or a variant (fight, battling, struggle, operation, combat, military, attack) was used 51 times to characterize the issue of drugs. This is significant because wars “involve clearly-defined sides; the war metaphor thus promises a clear narrative of aggressors and victims, winners and losers, soldiers and insurgents” (Steuter and Wills 2010, 154). The use of the war trope marks drugs as a particular type of menace to America – a national security threat. With its ubiquity along with its unproblematic presentation (i.e., it is never bracketed in quotation marks) in these headlines and leads, the war metaphor functions discursively to circumscribe a nuance free, commonsense binary reality of Self imperiled by Other. Carpentier (2008) maintains that antagonistic “discourses on the enemy (and on the self) tend to become hegemonic very quickly, defining the horizon of our thought and excluding other discourses” (30). The nature and source of this “enemy” is represented via a set of complementary tropes. The most prominent of these is what van Dijk (1988) terms the “aquatic disaster” metaphor.

- *Counter-narcotics surveillance flights--a key element of U.S. efforts to curb **the flow of cocaine and heroin from South America**-- ceased last year, when the base was turned over to Panama along with other Panama Canal operations* (CT 043000) [Lead]

- *Colombia and Mexico again won President Clinton's certification Wednesday as fully cooperating partners in the war on drugs, despite government figures showing that **the flow of illicit narcotics from the two countries** has reached new heights* (LAT 030200) [Lead]
- *Navy Adding Muscle to Drug War; Crime: High- tech gear and firepower are increasingly being put to sea to help the Coast Guard stop **the flow of narcotics from Latin America*** (LAT 032800)
- *Operation Aimed at Drugs for U.S. Is Cited as Model; Caribbean Basin: Dozens of nations join effort to cut off **flow of narcotics from Colombia**, netting 5 tons of cocaine and 2,331 suspects, DEA says* (LAT 033000)
- *Drug enforcement officials Wednesday unveiled the results of what they called the biggest international effort ever to **stem the tidal wave of Colombian drugs** flowing through the Caribbean to U.S. shores.* (LAT 033000) [Lead]
- *President Clinton's long-delayed plan to combat drug trafficking in Colombia cleared its first major hurdle Thursday as the House approved providing \$1.7 billion to help the beleaguered South American country **dry up a major source of cocaine and heroin**.* (LAT 033100) [Lead]
- *Arresting a record 2,331 suspected narcotics traffickers, law enforcement agencies from the United States and other Western Hemisphere nations have completed a massive bust they hope will at least temporarily restrict **the flow of illegal narcotics from the Caribbean to Central and South America**, officials announced yesterday.* (WP 033000) [Lead]
- *This remote area in southwest **Colombia** is the testing ground for a U.S.-backed plan to persuade small farmers to grow legitimate crops instead of coca, the raw material for **U.S.-bound cocaine**, and to spray the traffickers' large coca plantations with herbicides to cut off **the destructive flow**.* (WP 041600) [Lead]

Via this discursive mechanism, the complex subject of the drug trade is immediately reduced to a few simple “truths.” Drugs are a menace of overwhelming proportions that threatens America. America is the victim. This menace comes from outside; it is foreign. The origin and (active and passive) agents of this menace are indisputably Latin. The United States must act. The aquatic disaster trope meshes neatly with the logic of the war metaphor. You cannot negotiate or come to terms with a tidal wave. Nor does the exigent circumstances of a flood allow time for critical reflection on causes or ultimate responsibility. The proper, rational response is to mass resources and cut the problem off at the source. In his analyses of the social representations of Hispanics in the United States, Santa Ana (1999, 2002), identifies the widespread use in the media of the aquatic disaster metaphor – and to a lesser extent the war metaphor – to construct another

celebrated Latin threat to the American way of life – immigration. He argues that this particular mechanism for socially constructing Latin immigrants contains three important presuppositions.

First, by way of the IMMIGRATION AS DANGEROUS WATERS metaphor, aggregates of human beings are reduced to or remade into an *undifferentiated* quantity that *is not human*. Second, as this mass moves from one contained space to another, some sort of kinetic energy is released. The contained space referred to is California, the United States, Los Angeles, or other polities... Third, such movements are inherently powerful, and if not controlled, *they are dangerous* (2002, 76, emphasis added).

Similarly (by conceptualizing the issue of drugs as one undifferentiated, threatening mass), the aquatic disaster metaphor in the Plan Colombia related headlines and leads creates a specific logic of equivalence and resulting social antagonism. The varied and unique countries and cultures of Latin America are all lumped together into a monolithic category – “drug source/enemy” – and set in opposition to the United States. This image of a natural disaster emanating from the south explicitly connotes Latins as out of control (i.e., in a state of nature) and the necessity of America to act. In addition to the water and invasion tropes, Santa Ana also finds the widespread use of animalizations (Reisigl and Wodak 2001) (e.g. prey, quarry, lure, etc) in the media that work to further underscore the Self/Other distinction between “real” Americans and immigrants by dehumanizing Latins. He identifies a clear association in American public discourse – “Immigrants correspond to citizens as animals correspond to humans” (1999, 203) – that undergirds this cultural frame. In a similar fashion, animal metaphors also figure in the headlines and leads from the newspaper corpus under review here.

- *A Chilling Crime Network **Rears Its Head** in Colombia; Latin America: Tactics used by the powerful group La Terraza recall the days of the Medellin cartel* (LAT 031600)
- *The Valley Forge will not be **on the prowl** for the Soviets or the armed forces of Third World nations considered by the United States as potential adversaries. Rather, **its quarry** will be one of the most elusive on the high seas: the "go-fast" boats of drug smuggling cartels in the eastern Pacific and the Caribbean.* (LAT 032800) [Lead]
- *White House drug policy director Barry McCaffrey visited **rebel-infested** southern Colombia on Thursday and warned that a U.S.-trained and equipped military unit faces “great danger” as it mounts operations to take control of the lawless region.* (MH 022500) [Lead]

- *Drug War **Ensnares** an Army Colonel Who Fought It* (NYT 041600)

The use of these various metaphors in the headlines and leads addressing Plan Colombia specifically, and the international drug trade more generally, draws upon and reinforces a long standing representation of the United States as a victim of (and not a participant in) the Latin drug trade and that frames the issue as a matter of national security. Completely obfuscated through these specific articulations is the possibility that the United States – with its insatiable demand for narcotics – could constitute a threat to the security of *Latin America* (Hesselroth 2003).

Predication (i.e., “linguistically assigning qualities to persons, animals, objects, events, actions and social phenomena” (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 54)), also played a prominent role in the process of negatively presenting the Latin Other in these headlines and leads. One significant quality typically assigned to Latins to mark them as separate and inferior was ideological radicalism.

- *At least 17 people died Friday in attacks by **leftist** and **right-wing** gunmen in Colombia, including a 6-year-old boy killed by a car bomb detonated by suspected **Marxist** rebels.* (WP 020500) [Lead]
- *Suspected **right-wing** paramilitary gunmen executed 21 unarmed residents of a small town near the Venezuelan border Thursday, officials said.* (MH 040700) [Lead]
- *It was an extraordinary gesture intended to create momentum for peace, but the government decision to cede an area the size of Switzerland to **Marxist** rebels in the coca-growing region of southern Colombia seems to have backfired.* (CT 021800) [Lead]
- *Fighters of the **leftist** National Liberation Army kidnapped 23 motorists and hampered road and river traffic in central and northern Colombia.* (NYT 040500) [Lead]

Within the total of all headlines and leads, such allusions to political extremism were utilized 48 times. These predication draw upon and reproduce the continuing belief within the United States that political pluralism is incompatible with a “traditional Hispanic culture” that is “anti-democratic, anti-social, anti-progress, anti-entrepreneurial, and, at least among the elite, anti-

work” (Harrison 2000, 165). Unable to govern their internal passions, and thus conquer nature and achieve civilization, Latins have long been seen to vacillate between the extremes of communism and fascism (Pike 1992). Within this frame, only the American political model is understood as valid (e.g., *REBELS SEEK **LEGITIMACY**, LAUNCH POLITICAL PARTY* (CT 043000)).

Another general pattern found within the headlines and leads analyzed was the assignments of general attributes of social disorder like corruption,

- *Colombian Military **Aiding Death Squads**, Report Says* (LAT 022400)
- *Units of the Colombian Army continue to **work closely with right-wing paramilitary forces** that are involved in killings of civilians and threats against government human rights investigators, according to a report made public today.* (NYT 042400) [Lead]
- *The White House drug policy director on Wednesday played down a blistering report that **links a handful of U.S.-trained army officers in Colombia to death squads**, saying that the real menace to human rights in that country is its narcotics trade.* (MH 042400) [Lead]

criminality,

- *In a brazen threat to Colombia's wealthy elite, leftist rebels have announced they will **begin kidnapping** millionaires and corporate executives who refuse to **pay tribute** to the guerrillas.* (CT 042700) [Lead]
- *A Chilling **Crime Network** Rears Its Head in Colombia; Latin America: Tactics used by the powerful group La Terraza recall the days of the **Medellin cartel*** (LAT 031600)
- *A U.S. counter-drug program in Colombia faces a sudden and unexpected budget crisis that is giving **coca farmers** a chance to **expand their crops** nearly unimpeded.* (MH 042900) [Lead]

and general anarchy.

- *Rioting that broke out after an inmate's body was found stuffed in a prison sewer pipe led to 26 deaths before the unrest ended Friday, the **worst violence** in Colombia's **notorious prison system**.* (CT 042900) [Lead]
- *The Colombian government, **appearing to bow** to a campaign of hijackings, kidnappings and sabotage, said yesterday that it would **grant safe haven** to the country's second-largest rebel group to kick-start peace talks.* (WP 021800) [Lead]
- ***Storming a provincial jail**, guerrillas of the National Liberation Army and the People's Liberation Army detonated a powerful car bomb that ripped a hole in the prison wall, **allowing 74 prisoners to escape**, officials said.* (LAT 040300) [Lead]

In some instances, as demonstrated in these different delayed¹³⁰ leads, the writers manage to include just about every negative characterization of violence, corruption, criminality, and instability possible within the first few sentences of the article.

- *In Colombia, a country of fallen heroes*, Victor Tafur's case normally might not have caused more than a flutter. Sure, he is the son of an **assassinated anti-drug crusader**, and he is still recovering from injuries he sustained in a near-fatal plane crash while working on an **anti-narcotics** project. But **Colombia is a nation** where **former guerrillas** now in Congress are routinely accused of **ties to drug cartels**, where a daring **police pilot** was **charged with embezzling anti-narcotics funds** and where **more than a dozen politicians** have gone to jail for **accepting drug money**. The difference is that Tafur was in the United States when Colombian police found checks written by him in the account of a **company linked to the largest shipment of cocaine ever confiscated** in Colombia. Now, for the first time, Colombian authorities are asking that a suspect in a drug case be extradited to their country from the U.S (LAT 042200) [Lead]
- Sen. Piedad Cordoba knew **she was a target**. As chairwoman of the Senate Human Rights Committee in this country where **politicians are regularly kidnapped or assassinated**, she had alienated **guerrillas, right-wing private armies** and even members of the government. Still, Colombians were shocked when she and her bodyguard were **surrounded by 15 armed people in uniforms** of national investigative police at a clinic in the fashionable El Poblado district of this **violent city**. With **so many powerful enemies**, who had pulled off the audacious **midday kidnapping**? (LAT 031600) [Lead]
- On March 6, 1992, Victor Manuel Tafur-Dominguez heard gunfire outside his home in Cali, Colombia, and dashed out in time to see his father, a **former senator** who had helped draft a treaty allowing for the **extradition of drug dealers**, slump **mortally wounded** to the pavement by his car. During the ambulance ride to the hospital, the young man later told friends and family members, he **felt his father's final shivers**. Now, eight years later, Mr. Tafur-Dominguez, a student at Pace University Law School here, is accused of **financing a multimillion-dollar shipment of cocaine** seized at a Colombian port. The **Drug Enforcement Administration**, which **arrested him** on March 4, said he would be the first Colombian **extradited** home under the treaty that his father, Donald Rodrigo Tafur, helped write and, people in Colombia believe, **died for**. (NYT 041300) [Lead]
- When Rosemberg Pabon was **elected mayor** of this city three years ago, one of his goals was **to stay alive**. He had **reason to fear**. Once one of Colombia's most prominent **leftist guerrillas**, Pabon led the daring **takeover of the Dominican Embassy** in Bogota in 1980, **taking the U.S. ambassador and half of Colombia's diplomatic corps hostage**. He also briefly **seized Yumbo** in 1984. After turning to politics, he found it was his turn to be **a target**. Wherever he went, **four bodyguards** clustered around him. He traveled in an **armored car**. "My **life** has been **threatened more** while I've been mayor than when I was in the mountains," Pabon said. "**I have to sleep with one eye open**." (MH 040900) [Lead]

¹³⁰ The direct or breaking news lead "sets readers up for a fast-moving report of what happened" while the delayed lead "promises a more leisurely examination of the situation" (Harrigan and Dunlap 2004, , 208).

According to van Dijk (1998, 2000), the *positive* presentation of Self in media coverage of ethnic affairs is an integral complementary strategy to the negative presentation of Others. This strategy figures prominently in the headlines and leads analyzed where the United States (generally via its agents) is invariably presented in affirmative terms. Latin America is the “Wild West” (LAT 031200). Typified by political extremism and impotence, it is locked in the state of nature ((Pike 1992). By contrast, the United States is civilized. Its identity readily incorporates both disagreement (e.g., *Drug War Funding Faces Delay; Hastert Agrees With Senate Holdup of Colombia, Kosovo Aid* (WP 032700)) and decision making ability (e.g., *House Keeps Colombia Aid Plan Intact* (LAT 033000)). The United States carries out analyses (CT 022300), issues estimates (WP 021500), and conducts procedures of certification (LAT 030200) that (can and should) evaluate the conduct of Latin American countries. By contrast, the only studies released by Latin states detail how they are torturing and murdering their people less often than in the past (e.g., *Colombia Military, in Report, Says Its Rights Abuses Are Down* (NYT 032100)). Colombia – a beleaguered (LAT 033100), battered (NYT 042300) and violent nation (LAT 031600) – is weak and dependent. It must constantly seek help (MH 032500), lobby for aid (LAT 031600), win assurances (NYT 041300). The United States, by comparison, is inherently powerful and self-reliant. It has military muscles (LAT 032800) to flex and a seemingly endless fortune to spend (e.g., ***\$1.7 BILLION OKD FOR LATIN DRUG FIGHT \$12.7 BILLION AID PACKAGE HEADS FOR RESISTANCE IN SENATE*** (MH 033100)). While Colombia cannot even police itself, the United States coordinates *hemispheric* drug operations that capture thousands of suspects (WP 033000). Whatever apparent deficiency or defect the Latin countries possess, the United States instantiated in these leads and headlines can handle it. The Colombian military is weak and ineffective? America has the proficiency to train and equip (NYT 041300) it to win.

Colombia cannot stop farmers from growing coca? The United States has a plan (WP 041600) to make it happen. Latin America cannot stop the flow of drugs? America has the high-tech gear and firepower (LAT 032800) to control the high seas. Moreover, the instances of apparent mistakes made by the United States cited in the headlines and leads are invariably revealed to be its failure to recognize the inherent deficiencies (complicity, weakness, incompetence, apathy) of Colombia and the region.

- ***Pullout From Panama** Hampering Drug War; Colombia: Smugglers taking advantage of base closures, official says. U.S. hoping for buildup of new airfields* (LAT 020500)
- *Buzzards are the only things taking off and landing these days on Howard Air Force Base's deserted runway. Counter-narcotics surveillance flights--a **key element of U.S. efforts** to curb the flow of cocaine and heroin from South America--**ceased** last year, when the base was turned over to Panama along with other Panama Canal operations.* (CT 043000) [Lead]
- *The area planted with coca in Colombia is likely to increase this year, partly because of the **delay in U.S. financial support** for President Andres Pastrana's Plan Colombia, a U.S. official said.* (WP 042700) [Lead]

The discursive strategy of scare tactics, according to Flower, Li & Tran ((2002), centers around the use of “quasi-objective” figures and statistics and exaggerated threats to public order and political stability in news presentations. This pattern was also identified in the Plan Colombia related headlines and leads analyzed.

- *U.S. Reports **Major Rise** In Colombian Drug Output* (WP 021500)
- *A CIA analysis made public Tuesday says that the cultivation of the opium poppy **rose 23 percent** in Colombia last year and that Colombian heroin **increasingly** joined cocaine in reaching U.S. streets.* (CT 022300) [Lead]
- *Government officials told Congress on Tuesday that coca production in Colombia is **up sharply**, and the Clinton administration's efforts to deal with the problem drew fire from both Republicans and Democrats at a congressional hearing.* (LAT 02100) [Lead]
- *Colombian President Andres Pastrana, appealing for swift congressional approval of a two-year, \$1.3 billion emergency counterdrug package, said Tuesday that delays will only perpetuate **skyrocketing** coca production in his country.* (MH 041200) [Lead]
- ***OPIUM CROP ROSE 23% LAST YEAR, CIA TELL U.S. SENATE*** (CT 021500)
- *A U.S. counter-drug program in Colombia faces a sudden and unexpected budget crisis that is giving coca farmers a chance to **expand their crops nearly unimpeded**.* (MH 042900) [Lead]
- *The Clinton administration launched a campaign yesterday for swift congressional approval of its massive aid package for Colombia, issuing new estimates that cultivation of coca, the*

raw material of cocaine, has **increased 140 percent** there over the past five years. Actual cocaine production was estimated to be **up by 126 percent** over the same period. (WP 021500) [Lead]

- A key element of the drug war in Colombia is faltering because **U.S. surveillance flights** over major cocaine-producing regions have **declined by two-thirds** over the past year, according to administration officials. (WP 031300) [Lead]
- Colombian authorities arrested 49 suspected members of the country's largest heroin ring today, including the cousin of slain drug kingpin Pablo Escobar. Police officials said the suspects had been using a network of human "mules" to transport **110 pounds of the narcotic a month** to the United States and Europe. (WP 041300) [Lead]

We see here a coherence around the general theme of a mounting drug threat to the United States emanating from Latin America. Notice that each instance contains an indicator of movement or growth (e.g., up, expanding). van Dijk (2000) refers to this rhetorical device as a *number game*, where figures are used in news reports "to suggest precision and objectivity, and hence credibility" (46). In their study of the print media's use of government drug statistics, Orcutt & Turner (1993) identified a general institutional practice of emphasizing dramatic numbers and alarming trends without providing background information. Devoid of any context (e.g., a "23% increase" from what?), the figures and predictive trends outlined above work to incite "panic and anxiety among the general public" (Flowerdew, Li, and Tran 2002, 335). The use of hyperbole and melodramatic narratives in these headlines and leads also work to construct a discourse of danger and vulnerability.

- When they come looking for him **at the shopping mall**, federal drug agent Bernie Minarik slips out a back way. When his wife drops him off at work, **she takes a roundabout route back home in case she's being followed**. But when he discovered a highway flare that **Mexican drug traffickers** had planted in the gas tank of his car in an attempt to **blow him to bits**, Minarik nearly called it quits. Minarik has been a Drug Enforcement Administration agent in Arizona's border country for eight years, and he didn't take the job expecting it to be danger-free. But he didn't count on the **violence seeping into his home life**, on **his kid going to school scared**, on **his wife biting her lip** as she watches him fasten **his bulletproof vest** every morning. (LAT 031200) [Lead]
- Arresting a **record 2,331** suspected narcotics traffickers, law enforcement agencies from the United States and other Western Hemisphere nations have completed a massive bust they hope will **at least temporarily** restrict the flow of illegal narcotics from the **Caribbean to Central and South America**, officials announced yesterday. (WP 033000) [Lead]

- *War on Drugs Taking Toll on Border Agents; The Southwest reverts to the **Wild West** as federal officers encounter increasing violence from **Mexican traffickers**. One county in Arizona **feels the heat*** (LAT 031200)

Blackledge (2006) argues that “discourse may become increasingly powerful and authoritative as it is restated and transformed in increasingly authoritative contexts” (65). In the context of the Plan Colombia related news articles analyzed here, the continuous reporting and restating of sweeping government predictions, alarming official statistics, and frightening personalized anecdotes cultivates an atmosphere of fear, distrust, and anxiety inextricably associated with the peoples of Latin America.

Finally, the strategy of delegitimation offers additional insights into the representations of Latins within this Plan Colombia discourse. Key elements of delegitimation, according to Flowerdew, Li & Tran (2002) include “outcasting” along with “discrediting and disempowering” (330). Outcast groups are characterized as violators of fundamental social norms (Bar-Tal 2000). In this sense, the constant and consistent characterizations of criminality (e.g., *COLOMBIA: MOTORISTS **KIDNAPPED*** (NYT 04050)), corruption (e.g., *Colombian Military **Aiding** Death Squads, Report Says* (LAT 022400)), and violence (e.g., *COLOMBIA REPORTER’S **BODY FOUND IN UNMARKED GRAVE*** (MH 031500)) across all of the newspapers’ headlines and leads detailed and discussed at great length above mark Colombians specifically, and Latins generally, as outcasts. They are discredited, and thus disempowered, through constant representations of their primitiveness. With a population of peasants (NYT 042100; LAT 021900; NYT 042200), Colombia is presented as a feudal society. The Colombia instantiated in these headlines and leads is a lawless (MH022500) land of equatorial wilderness (NYT 042100), remote areas (WP 041600; NYT 042300), mountains (MH 030500), jungle bases (NYT 022500), and jungle towns (MH 032800). It is home to death squads (LAT 022400) and infested (MH

022500) by savage (MH 042800), bearded (WP 041000) narco-guerrillas (WP 020600) incapable of independently comprehending abstract concepts like democracy (MH 020800) and capitalism (CT 030500). The following delayed lead encapsulates this general theme of a primordial and savage land.

- *Nearly **half the world's supply of cocaine** originates within 150 miles of this **isolated** Colombian military outpost **on the Putumayo River**. So when Lt. German Arenas and his anti-drug troops recently set out **by boat**, they knew that finding a target would be the easy part. **Four hours later**, his squadron of young marines stopped and marched into the **equatorial wilderness**, guns at the ready. By nightfall, they had found three crude cocaine-processing laboratories **in the jungle**, more than **6,000 seedlings** of a new, more potent variety of coca plant, a **half-dozen large fields** brimming with ripening coca bushes and four **hapless peasants**. But after they destroyed as much as they could, arrested the **peasants** and **headed back downriver**, the soldiers left behind **at least 200 more labs** hidden in the **dense, trackless jungle** and **thousands more acres of coca plants**, visible from the air **everywhere across southern Colombia**. (NYT 042100) [Lead]*

With a steady stream of atavistic imagery and fraught with overtones of menace and foreboding, this lead from the New York Times reads like a passage from Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*. More precisely, it fits neatly into the larger historical pattern of American perceptions of political, social, and economic retardation immanent in Latin American culture (Pike 1992; Schoultz 1998). Its discursive structure is representative of the general lexical choices employed in this corpus of headlines and leads that characterize Latins as unable to control nature – whether their own or what lay around them – branding them as primitive, savage and alien to “American” culture, values, and beliefs.

All told, the four general categories of discriminatory macro strategies (negative other presentation, scare tactics, blaming the victim, and delegitimation) employed in this corpus of Plan Colombia related headlines and leads delineate the terms of a specific social antagonism as they summon and reproduce specific representations of the United States, Colombia, and the region. In the context of this “drug emergency,” the infinite differences of hundreds of millions

of people are transformed by clearly articulated chains of equivalence (e.g., disorder, corruption, impotence) that link together the identities of Colombia and the other states of Latin America. In turn, this aggregated Latin subject is positioned in opposition to the United States, where its negative attributes serve to interpellate a completely inverse American (e.g., leader, virtuous, resolute) subject identity.

Conclusion

Returning now to the dissertation's two central questions, what can this media analysis tell us about the conditions of possibility that made massive American intervention in Colombia – in the form of an enormous military aid package – the logical, commonsense decision? From the time of its origins, the United States in the formulation of its foreign policy has always looked at Latin America through a particular lens, assigning its peoples qualities (e.g., infantilism, indolence, barbarism, superstition, volatility, etc) commensurate with its perceived Iberian, African, and indigenous bloodlines (DeConde 1992; Pike 1992). In travelogues, history texts, works of fiction, and especially in news reporting, this commonplace “knowledge” of the region and its peoples has always been reflected and reproduced in the American media (Carlson and Colburn 1972; Pike 1992; Schoultz 1998). And, while overtly racist language and imagery is no longer used in contemporary news media, this analysis of newspaper headlines and leads related to Plan Colombia suggests that the historical pattern of representations of Latin as inferior and subordinate continues to operate through the use of metaphors and other discursive devices.

The pattern of specific representations (both explicit and implied) of the United States, Colombia, and Latin America identified here reveals the terms of a particular social imaginary. An imaginary, you will recall, is the structuring principle that underlies a set of meanings and

social relations and constitutes them into an systemized set of social understandings and identities which construct a “world” (Muppidi 1999). Within the imaginary instantiated by these headlines and leads, each subject is assigned an identity with specific roles and responsibilities – deviation from which is incomprehensible. We can effectively test this argument by simply rewriting a few headlines in a manner inconsistent with the essential logics of this social imaginary.

- *Drug War Ensnarers an Army Colonel Who Fought It* (original NYT 041600)
- *American Military Corrupted by Drug Money* (**revision**)
- *War on Drugs Taking Toll on Border Agents; The Southwest reverts to the Wild West as federal officers encounter increasing violence from Mexican traffickers. One county in Arizona feels the heat* (original LAT 031200)
- *United States Exports Death and Destruction; Latin America becomes the new Killing Fields as insatiable American demand for drugs and an endless flood of U.S. weapons fuels increasing violence and instability* (**revision**)

The sheer impossibility of the revised headlines presented here being printed in any mainstream¹³¹ media format is immediately obvious. They could never be printed because they defy the sedimented knowledge or “common sense” at work in the discursive world created by this social imaginary. Yes, there can (possibly) be *individual* American malfeasance (“a few bad apples”) in this particular grid of intelligibility but American *institutions* cannot be corrupted. And, even in those rare instances of identified individual American corruption, the transgressor’s actions are seen primarily as the result of Latin America’s contaminating influence. Conversely, Latin institutions are understood as inherently corruptible, if not intrinsically corrupt. These particular representations can be readily inferred from the annual process of certification which “requires the President of the United States to submit to Congress an annual determination of the

¹³¹ By contrast, the decidedly non-mainstream media source, StoptheDrugWar.org, maintains a regular weekly column highlighting the corruption endemic in the United States’ local, state, and federal agencies and institutions tasked with drug prohibition (see, for example, Smith 2011).

counter-narcotic cooperation of major narcotic-producing and narcotic-transiting countries” but brings with it no concomitant obligation to a public determination of *America’s* complicity (as both a major narcotic-using and narcotic-producing country) in the drug trade (Hesselroth 2003, 3).

In this discursive reality, the United States could never be a source of regional disorder. As the acknowledged hemispheric policeman (e.g., *International Raids Nab 2,331 Suspects; U.S. Coordinates Drug Operations* (WP 033000)), it is the linchpin of regional security. It is Latin countries that are the typical and consistent sources of turmoil and danger in the region (e.g., *Andes in Tumult, Shaken by Political Tremors* (NYT 042300)). These logics are consistent with van Dijk’s (1991, 1998, 2000) findings that, in media discourse, an emphasis is placed on the presentation of Our good actions and Their bad actions, while attention to the reverse is decidedly minimized. In the discursive world instantiated via these headlines and leads, the issue of drugs is clearly constituted as an external national security crisis that endangers the United States. We “know” it is *external* because the America represented here is not a conceivable place of drug lords or narco-guerillas. Instead, as van Dijk (2000) notes, in media reports “drug barons are always Latin men in South America, never the white men who are in the drugs business within the US itself” (39). Moreover, drugs are an avowedly foreign-based scourge. Grown in “jungles” (MH 032800) and “equatorial wilderness” (NYT 042100), far from civilization, drugs are “Colombian” (WP 021600) or “Latin” (MH 033100). That is the source of the threat. We “know” it is a matter of *national security* (and not, for instance, public health) because of the ubiquity and seamless incorporation of the war metaphor throughout the entire corpus of headlines and leads. As Shimko (1995) argues,

Perhaps more than anything else people associate war with insecurity, violence, and the use of military force to achieve certain objectives. In war, problems are usually viewed as having military dimensions and military solutions. This being the case, we might hypothesize that when a situation

that is not a war is framed as a war, there is the possibility that it may come to be viewed as having a military component. Thus, framing an issue as a war, I would suggest, may increase the likelihood that people *will look for a forceful or military approach*. (79, emphasis added)

It is clear from these newspaper headlines and leads that drugs are something to be warred against, fought, combated, battled, attacked. We “know” it is a *crisis* because it is already overwhelming (e.g., “tidal wave” (LAT 033000)) and only growing larger (e.g., “up by 126 percent” (WP 021500)).

Of the subjects identified in these Plan Colombia related reports, who is equipped to address such a devastating threat? Via the attributes and abilities (or deficiencies) allocated within this social imaginary, it is patently understood that Latin America cannot be trusted to deal with this crisis on its own. Colombia, typifying all Latin countries, is a primitive society with a weak government, corrupt and inept military, and a long cultural tradition of violence and criminality. As a rule, when the government of Colombia acts it is to “demilitarize” (MH 042500), “agree” (NYT 042600), “cede” (CT 021800), “bow” (WP 021800), “appeal” (MH 041200), “withdraw” (LAT 042500), “win assurances” (NYT 041300), “seek help” (MH 032500), or “pull out” (WP 042600). Logic dictates that such a weak, vacillating, and unreliable entity cannot rationally be depended upon to unilaterally address such a crisis. The United States, possessing among its many virtues ability, wealth, integrity, and wisdom, is positioned as the logical, natural, and *necessary* actor to intercede. Both the violent, anarchic nature of Colombia (and the region) and the inherent savagery of the identified prime agents (“narco-guerillas”) of the crisis reasonably dictate that this intercession be overwhelmingly military in nature.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF LATIN “INFERIORITY” IN ANALYSES OF CONTEMPORARY U.S. DRUG POLICY

Organizational Summary and Review of Findings

This dissertation explored the salience of the traditional conceptions of Latin inferiority and U.S. superiority as a mechanism for a broader understanding of contemporary American drug policy. By examining how specific meanings were produced and attached to different social subjects over the identified three month period in 2000, this dissertation sought to identify the patterns of discursive practices that made Plan Colombia (i.e., a militarized intervention by the United States in the internal affairs of a neighboring sovereign republic) possible while effectively precluding other outcomes. After identifying Plan Colombia’s selection criteria (geographic relevance, institutional scale, intermesticity, methodological alignment), I laid out a design of research centered around the Plan Colombia debate – conceptualized as an *order of discourse* – employing a social constructionist analytical framework. A genealogy of historical United States relations with Latin America and a detailed chronology of contemporary American drug policy and Colombia functioned as the necessary rhetorical topography for my investigation. With a focus on important actors, congressional hearings and newspaper coverage – representing the government and the media spheres, respectively – were selected as the sources of the data for analysis. Further in keeping with this dissertation’s multiperspectival approach, each data set was examined via different analytical tools (positioning for the congressional hearing data and a compilation of media strategies for the newspaper data). In accordance with the warranting commitments required for discourse scholarship to be considered qualified

academic research, the analyses were carried out in a transparent and orderly fashion. Moreover, the documents and tables provided (both within the text and within the dissertation's appendices) contain the complete data sets used – allowing for the ready evaluation of the research claims made. Likewise, the detailed explication of the methods employed and the clear demonstration of the sequence of steps involved in each provides the straightforward means to check these analyses by effectively redoing them. As a result, the plausibility and persuasiveness of my particular reading of the data can be readily assessed in an “oranges to oranges” fashion.

The research findings drawn from my analyses of congressional hearings (Chapter 5) and newspaper coverage (Chapter 6) relevant to Plan Colombia demonstrate a consistent, intertextual pattern of representations within this particular order of discourse. This dominant or hegemonic discourse worked to effectively structure the terms of intelligibility surrounding this issue and thus shaped the conditions of its possibility. Immanent in these representations were specific historical commonplaces (e.g., the child, American superiority, bearded, narco-guerrilla) – along with the more general tropes of Latin inferiority (e.g., venality, savagery) – identified in the rhetorical topography charted in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. I maintain that predictions of Colombia's imminent collapse in 1999 functioned as a dislocation or social crisis that called into question America's ideological framework. Arguably, the failure of any state in the Western Hemisphere would disrupt its traditional narrative by calling into question the United States' established identity as “vanguard” (i.e., regional leader, social/economic exemplar, and security guarantor) (Kenworthy 1995). The failure of Colombia, an ostensible fellow republic that had received American support and tutelage *for decades*, could potentially destroy it. In this manner, Plan Colombia can be seen as an attempt to repair this dislocation via a hegemonic project

designed to articulate or fix meanings in a manner that reaffirmed and reinforced traditional notions of an American Self by delineating particular notions of a Latin Other.

As discussed in Chapter 2, hegemony or dominance in this sense requires the presentation of a coherent, nearly unimpeachable system of meanings that actively represses any competing discourse(s) (Carpentier 2008). Essential to the dominant discourse identified here was the articulation of particular *logics of equivalence* and *logics of difference* in the congressional hearings and newspaper coverage that served to both construct the terms of the situation (i.e., a national security crisis) and to shape the terms of the response to the situation (i.e., a militarized aid package). You will recall that a logic of equivalence “functions by splitting a system of differences and instituting a political frontier between two opposed camps” (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 11). In the dominant Plan Colombia discourse, this logic functioned to reproduce and reaffirm a unified United States identity by articulating a single homologous Latin identity arrayed in opposition. Tied together via specific chains of equivalence (e.g., drug producer/distributor, impotent, unstable, corrupt, indifferent, backward, subordinate, resource-rich, ward), this composite subject position (typified by Colombia) served as the object of pure negation (Other) upon which the corresponding representations (e.g., drug victim, powerful, controlled, honorable, motivated, modern, superior, resource-entitled, guardian) of the United States (Self) were based. In this context, drugs were framed as an external security threat to (and not, for example, a longstanding, internal vice of) the United States. Furthermore, the articulation of negative attributes assigned to the threat’s point of origin (Colombia<Latin America) – along with the articulation of positive American attributes – effectively dictated the disposition of the response to this threat. Within this dominant frame, a United States funded, equipped, and directed militarized intervention in Colombia/Latin America became the logical,

commonsensical, and *imperative* solution. However, while the representations of Latin (Other) flaws and American (Self) virtues were essential elements to both define the situation and prescribe the appropriate solution, they were not solely adequate.

To completely write off Colombia (and the rest of Latin America) would be an acknowledgment of American impotence in its own “backyard” and the end of its vanguard status in the eyes of the world. Moreover, absent proxies in Colombia/the region, the only option to “fight” the drug war remaining would be the direct introduction of the armed forces of the United States – another clear indicator of American failure in its civilizing mission. Some means of keeping the baby while still throwing out the bath water was required. Therefore, concurrent with its logic of equivalence, this dominant Plan Colombia discourse employed a specific logic of difference. To review, a logic of difference functions by “breaking existing chains of equivalence and incorporating the ‘disarticulated’ elements into the expanding formation” (Howarth 2000, 107, emphasis in original). In this case, that meant discursively separating the “bad” (i.e., inherently irredeemable) Latin from the “good” (i.e., inherently flawed but redeemable) Latin. Accordingly, the FARC is identified and positioned within this discourse as the primary, active agent responsible for the national security threat facing the United States. This subject is constructed via particularly demonizing representations that draw from historical discourses (e.g., savage, treacherous, primitive), Cold War discourses (e.g., Marxist, narco-guerilla) and contemporary discourses of danger (e.g., narco-terrorist). To be clear, the government and regular citizens of Colombia (along with the rest of Latin America) remained generally complicit in this menace to the United States by virtue of their failure to end it. However, as the data demonstrates, this failure is largely understood within this dominant discourse as the logical result of their essential *inferiority* vis a vis the United States. It is also

mitigated by their avowed adherence to the “proper” political and economic models (i.e., democracy and neoliberal capitalism) and recognition of the “natural” regional order (i.e., American hegemony). In this manner, the Colombian government (for example) can be constructed as “compliant ally” – and correspondingly positioned as separate from/superior to the FARC – while at the same time Colombia generally can be tied by chains of equivalence to the composite, antagonistic Latin identity.

In sum, I maintain that this dominant discourse functioned as a hegemonic project (organized around a core binary opposition of American superiority and concurrent Latin inferiority) to both define and effectively suture over the “crisis in Colombia” dislocation. By successfully naturalizing its specific articulations (and suppressing alternatives), this project established a hegemonic formation (or social order) rooted in – and circumscribing the boundaries of – a common social imaginary or “field of intelligibility” (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000). The success of this dominant Plan Colombia discourse is readily apparent – the legislation itself passed through Congress with overwhelming majorities and signed into law with very little alteration from its original composition. The depth of *its power* (that is, its ability to produce “meanings, subject identities, their interrelationships, and a range of imaginable conduct” (Doty 1993, 299)) is revealed in the congressional and newspaper research findings in terms of the abject failure of competing projects to rearticulate meanings and therefore reframe the terms of the debate.

For example, during the period the legislation was debated in the U.S. House of Representatives, a handful of members sought to radically alter the composition of the bill by introducing amendments to (among other steps) re-allocate the more than \$1 billion proposed for Plan Colombia to domestic drug treatment programs (Crandall 2002; Serafino 2001). In this

effort, “the United States” – in particular – served as a floating signifier or point of contestation (in the Plan Colombia order of discourse) between the militarized intervention model frame and what I will loosely characterize as the “medical model” frame. Within the logics of its push for a massive, *medicalized* intervention *inside America* to address the drug issue, this medical model discourse necessarily constructed the United States via a series of representations (e.g., drug trade culpability, individual and collective failure, flawed national character) that challenged America’s historical individual and regional superiority. In the end, as evidenced in the hearing data analyzed and demonstrated by the bill’s decisive victory, a near unanimity of members rejected this attempted rearticulation and identified with (interpellated) the America subject – and corresponding Latin subjects – constructed and positioned by the dominant discourse.

The findings from the analysis of newspaper headlines and leads are also strongly suggestive of its power. To be clear, I am not referring to “the kind of power that works through social agents, a power that social actors possess and use. Rather, it is a kind of power that is productive of meanings, subject identities, their interrelationships, and a range of imaginable conduct” (Doty 1993, 299). While a challenge (however meager) to its logics and systems of representations did arise in the government sphere, the specific articulations of meanings constructed by the dominant Plan Colombia discourse were presented as self evident, natural, and essentially undisputed in the media realm. Throughout the three month period reviewed, its system of representations (organized around the central opposition of American superiority/Latin inferiority) remained consistent as both journalists and their readers interpellated the specific subject identities presented. The few published instances of doubts regarding Plan Colombia in the identified corpus of headlines and leads did not question the logic of American exceptionalism but rather (drawing upon the historical tropes embodied in the dominant

discourse) expressed fears of its potential contamination via increased contact with Latin America. In both the government and media context, this successful articulation of the “traditional” conception of America served as a nodal point for the Plan Colombia discourse to underpin and organize its particular hegemonic formation. Ultimately, conditioned by the terms of its particular “grid of intelligibility” (Milliken 1999), this formation instantiated a crisis in Colombia that required a militarized United States intervention.

In broad terms, these findings (as a complement to the growing body of work of critical/poststructuralist scholars (e.g., Doty 1996a; Campbell 1998; Epstein 2008; Milliken and Sylvan 1996; Weldes 1999)), underline the continuing utility of social constructionist oriented analyses in the study of international politics and U.S. foreign policy. Eschewing the drive to develop universal laws that underwrites positivist research, a social constructionist research program identifies specific societal puzzles and challenges the existing accounts and frameworks that constitute them. Rejecting existing structures or interests as the logical entry to analysis, it constitutes new objects of inquiry by problematizing or denaturalizing the conditions that gave rise to them (Howarth 2005; Torfing 2005). As an approach that makes more of the elements of policymaking uncertain, it provides an avenue toward more comprehensive analyses (Doty 1993). For example, in a study of contemporary American policy toward Colombia (and Latin America more generally), Stokes (2005) seeks to explain why the United States continues to fund the Colombian military despite the horrific cost in human life resulting from its support of abusive Latin American militaries during the Cold War. He rejects the discontinuity thesis (rooted in academia, the press, and the policy community) that characterizes American policy objectives as shifting from an anticommunist counter insurgency focus after the dissolution of the Soviet Union to an anti-drug and anti-terrorist orientation. Instead, through an examination of

its policy actions during and after the Cold War, Stokes maintains that the United States – in order to defend its economic and security interests in Latin America – prosecuted (and continues to prosecute) a strategy of state terrorism in Colombia. A social constructionist approach, shifting its gaze from why this happened to how it was possible, would not necessarily argue against this reading or discount its usefulness. Instead, it would propose that there is more transpiring than meets the eye. By deconstructing, for instance, the ostensibly fixed subjects located within his research site, this approach could add to the plausibility and persuasiveness of Stokes findings by not only explaining America’s actions in terms of its interests but also in what ways those interests were produced and continue to be reproduced.

More specifically, these findings highlight the continuing significance of historical conceptions of American superiority in the context of contemporary U.S. drug policy and relations with Latin America. It also underscores the notable absence of this critical analytical frame in the majority of scholarly works on the subject. For instance, in an assessment of the underlying framework of Plan Colombia, Oehme (2010) narrows Washington’s possible options regarding Colombia in 2000 to three choices – intervene to solve the crisis, do nothing and watch it worsen, or rely on indigenous regional efforts and lose influence in the hemisphere. He maintains that “Washington policymakers wisely chose the first route” (227). In this manner, the implications of identity construction (that is, of an exceptional America) are completely overlooked. Instead, his evaluation of the Plan Colombia strategy centers strictly around its effectiveness “in pursuing courses of action that have the highest cost-effectiveness and the most favorable cost-benefit ratios” (232).

Clearly, the “truth” of the essential superiority of the United States – most commonly articulated as “American Exceptionalism” – continues to function today *as a central and*

unproblematic organizing element of its identity in the dominant political narrative. For example, consider the multitude of different ways in which public officials regularly pay homage to the exceptionalism ideal in text and speech (e.g., “Only in America...”).¹³² It is simply a taken for granted element of United States politics that candidates for high office must kneel at this altar in order to be deemed worthy by the electorate. Likewise, any apparent deviation from the fundamental gospel of superiority by their political opponents can be seized upon in order to call into question their legitimacy as “real Americans” in the eyes of the voters (Memoli 2012).¹³³ With only its “rightness” or “wrongness” typically subject to debate, the contingent and arbitrary nature of American Exceptionalism remains effectively sedimented and obscured. Nevertheless, the continual production and reproduction of this social “fact” generates real and significant consequences in myriad different ways because the United States cannot be exceptional **in a vacuum**. It cannot “be” anything at all. As “the imagined community par excellence,” America’s identity “can only be secured by the effective and continual ideological demarcation of those who are ‘false’ to the defining ideals”(Campbell 1998, 91, emphasis in original). In other words, there can be no “America” without some sort of “not America.” In the specific context of formulating hemispheric drug control strategies (the subject of this dissertation), such a superlative American *Self* – linked as it is to “an extroverted, missionary, and ultimately global U.S. foreign policy” (Weldes 1999, 101) – cannot exist without the presence of a corresponding inferior Latin Other. Because this core binary opposition effectively shapes the very conditions of its possibility, the formulation of United States drug policy cannot be adequately explained

¹³² For some interesting permutations of this phenomenon, see Burns (2009) and Weatherford & Barrett (2010).

¹³³ In this vein, consider the specific articulation of “apology” employed as part of the Republican discursive strategy in the 2012 U.S. presidential contest (Friedman 2012; Lindsay 2012).

without taking into account the continuing “pervasive belief that Latin Americans constitute an inferior branch of the human species” (Schoultz 1998, xv).

Directions for Future Research

Wood and Kroger (2000) maintain that the fruitfulness of work is a function of its implications for future. As such, fruitful work will “suggest productive ways to reframe old issues, create links between previously unrelated issues, and raise new questions that are interesting and merit attention” (Tracy 1995, 210). Since this dissertation considered the Plan Colombia legislation during its formulation in 2000, the examination of those discourses (re)constituting it during the designated period of its implementation (2001 – 2005)¹³⁴ would be a logical future direction of study. It is important to note in this context, however, that the 9/11 terrorist attacks (occurring just over a year after this legislation was signed into law) marked a significant shift in the Plan Colombia order of discourse. Under the Clinton administration, all military aid (including those financed by Plan Colombia funds) to Colombia was ostensibly only permitted to support that country’s counter-drug – and specifically *not* its counterinsurgency – operations (Rabasa and Chalk 2001; Ramirez Lemus, Stanton, and Walsh 2005). For example, the United States military at this time was proscribed under executive order from disseminating non-drug related intelligence to its Colombian counterparts (Ramirez Lemus, Stanton, and Walsh 2005).¹³⁵ Already under internal review at the start of the Bush administration, this policy

¹³⁴ While still widely referred to as Plan Colombia, starting in 2002 the aid program to Colombia was subsumed into the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) which also provided counterdrug funding and training to its neighbors (Ramirez Lemus, Stanton, and Walsh 2005).

¹³⁵ Nevertheless, this policy was widely understood as a distinction without a difference. Pizarro & Gaitán (2006) maintain that in “influential U.S. military and academic circles the Colombian conflict began to be defined as an ‘ambiguous war’ because of links between the guerrillas and narco-traffickers, providing the analytical rationale for displacing the counternarcotics war with a counterinsurgency war” (58, emphasis in original). Livingstone

distinction was officially discarded immediately after the events of September 11, 2001

(Isaacson 2005; Loveman 2006). According to Isaacson (2005),

Executive and legislative officials immediately began drawing parallels between Colombia's armed groups – particularly the FARC – and Al Qaeda. "There's no difficulty in identifying [Osama bin Laden] as a terrorist, and getting everybody to rally against him," said Secretary of State Colin Powell in October 2001. "Now, there are other organizations that probably meet a similar standard. The FARC in Colombia comes to mind..." Added CIA Director George Tenet the following February, "The terrorist threat also goes beyond Islamic extremists and the Muslim world. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia poses a serious threat to the U.S. interests in Latin America because it associates us with the government it is fighting against" (50).

Accordingly, via these chains of equivalence and with new and novel articulations (e.g., drugs as "weapons of mass destruction" (Loveman 2006)) and rearticulations (e.g., the FARC as narco-terrorists (Crandall 2008; Isaacson 2005)), the War on Drugs (WOD) discourse is neatly merged with/subsumed into the new War on Terror (WOT) discourse. An examination (that also derived its data from the government and media realms) of the intertextual¹³⁶ (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002) practices after 9/11 involved in suturing over this new WOT dislocation as it related to Colombia would offer a point of comparison to test the plausibility and persuasiveness of the claims made in the current study.

Moreover, in the years subsequent to its implementation there has been a prominent narrative in official and academic circles that frames America's militarized intervention (under the rubric of Plan Colombia) as a dramatic "foreign policy success story" – that kept Colombia from state failure (Charles 2008; DeShazo et al. 2007, 54; Oehme 2010; Villiers Negroponte 2009).¹³⁷ Isaacson (2005) argues that this perception of success in Colombia has significant implication for broader United States policy.

(2009) goes further, arguing that from the start, the true aim of Plan Colombia "appeared to be defeating the guerrillas rather than ending the drug trade" (118).

¹³⁶ See Chapter 2 for a further elaboration of the concept of intertextuality.

¹³⁷ Villiers Negroponte (2009, 8) expressly credits it for the "Colombian Turn-Around" while the title of DeShazo, Primiani, and McLean's (2007) work, *Back from the Brink*, requires no further elaboration.

Colombia... is not only the region's largest recipient of U.S funds and attention. It is also setting the context for how the United States *understands the region*, as well as the way in which the concepts of drug war, counterinsurgency, and antiterrorism are converging to define the broad framework for U.S. policy. In particular, the case of Colombia illustrates how the U.S response to the September 11 attacks served *to reinforce the already strong tendency to view the region largely in terms of security threats and to emphasize military initiatives* over broader approaches to regional security (44, emphasis added).

To address this point, a cross country comparison of Plan Colombia with a militarized United States aid package to another ostensibly failing Latin country identified as a security threat would not only offer the means to confirm or refute the claims in the current study but would also offer the chance to test the generalizability of those claims beyond Colombia. Stake (2000) refers to this type of project – where a number of cases are studied “in order to investigate a phenomenon, population, or general condition” (437) – as a *collective case study*. Based on my preliminary research, the 2008 Mérida Initiative would be one logical choice for such a companion research site. (Abbot 2011). Set against the immediate backdrop of the extremely vociferous 2007 immigration debate in the United States as well as the larger context of historical Mexican – American relations, the Mérida Initiative is an ideal site to further investigate the impact of the patterns of historical representations identified here on the formulation of contemporary United States drug policy. Moreover, the particular discursive practices at work in the constitution of the circumstances relating to this legislation – indeed often characterized as “Plan Mexico” (Carlsen 2007) – appear to closely correspond with those of Plan Colombia.

As initially proposed in October 2007, the funding request from the State Department in support of the Mérida Initiative called for \$1.4 billion in aid over a three year period with the bulk of the funds designated for Mexico, with the rest divided among Haiti, the Dominican

Republic, and the Central American states (Villiers Negroponte 2009).¹³⁸ A long series of negotiated revisions followed, resulting in limited human rights conditions attached to a small percentage of the total allocated funds. Ultimately, the Merida Initiative to Combat Illicit Narcotics and Reduce Organized Crime Authorization Act of 2008 was approved with bipartisan support in the House of Representatives and the Senate. It was signed into law on June 30, 2008 with very few changes made to the terms of the original proposal (Abbot 2011; Villiers Negroponte 2009)

Just as in Colombia at the end of the 20th century, Mexico, beginning in late 2006, was repeatedly characterized in American policy and media circles as teetering on the edge of collapse from drug fueled violence. According to Abbot (2011), the “growth and dramatic character of violence in Mexico led some U.S. officials and observers to question the strength of the Mexican state. Although vehemently denied by [Mexican] President Calderón, many U.S. journalists were reporting that Mexico was reaching the threshold of a failing state”(2). In this vein, the issue of proximity also appears to be significant. Colombia – although characterized as in America’s “backyard” in the representations of danger that marked it a security threat – is, after all, on a separate continent. Mexico, by contrast, is fully contiguous with the United States and as such its immediacy would suggest an even larger role in representations of Latin fueled American insecurity. Further in tandem with Colombia, Mexico (in response to the increasing civil disorder) opted to shift its antidrug strategy away from a focus on law enforcement and to directly engage its Mexican military to fight drug trafficking and increase public security – a policy resulting in widespread human rights abuses (Human Rights Watch 2009). Again like Plan Colombia, the Mérida Initiative – the result of private consultations between the Calderon

¹³⁸ For example, in fiscal year 2008, \$400 million was authorized for Mexico, \$60 million for Central America, and \$5 million for Haiti and the Dominican Republic (Villiers Negroponte 2009, 2).

and George W. Bush administrations – was produced largely in secret (Abbot 2011; Carlsen 2009). Moreover, while officially presented in October 2007 as a Mexican plan, evidence suggests that it was actually penned in Washington (González Torres 2010). Finally, as the role of both historical and contemporary images in the discursive construction of Latinos and Latin America has been an important element of this dissertation, the deployment of such images in the media and government domains would constitute a central focus in any analysis of the Mérida Initiative.

APPENDIX A – CONGRESSIONAL HEARING CODING SHEETS

House Committee on Government Reform February 15, 2000 Crisis in Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
in crisis (1,1)	narco-based war raging and the good guys, our friends and neighbors, are losing (1/27)	facing one of the greatest challenges to its security (1,1)	narco-terrorist threat (1,1)	murder and kill civilians largely because of their political beliefs (1/16)	facing one of the greatest challenges to its security (1,1)	
Latin America's oldest democracy (1,1)	people who have sacrificed so much (1/30)	torrent and glut of deadly narcotics pouring across our borders (1,13)	largest group of drug trafficking guerillas (1/13)	known involvement in the drug trade (1/29)	vitaly important Panama Canal located just 150 miles north (1/15)	
supplies 80 percent of the world's cocaine (1,13)		drugs and death spilling onto our shores (1/13)	17,000 Marxist narco-terrorist guerillas (1/15)	terrorist groups (1/37)	Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela are at risk as well (1/21)	
accounts for 75 percent of heroin on US streets (1,13)		influx of illegal drugs is our greatest central challenge (1/15)	controls nearly 40 percent of the countryside (1/15)	have tremendous wealth (1/37)	narco-guerillas increasing control (1/30)	
matters both economically and strategically (1/15)		we face an insidious national security threat (1/15)	expanding beyond Colombia's borders (1/15)	47 percent of displacement created; 78 percent of rights violations (1/65)	tentacles of FARC loom over all (1/30)	
20 percent of US daily supply of oil imports (1/15)		has a great responsibility in addressing crisis (1/16)	40 percent of Colombia's territory is controlled (1/16)	some of the most brutal people imaginable (1/66)	Panama Canal questionable whether it can be defended (1/33)	
no doubt there is a crisis (1/16)		has tremendous demands (1/16)	well funded by the drug cartel; \$100 million a month (1/22)	these are criminals (1/66)	problem is regional (1/38)	
supplies 80 percent of the world's cocaine (1/16)		primary concern is enormous increase of the flow of drugs (1/16)	force is between 17,000 and 30,000 and growing every single day (1/22)	trying to win through savagery (1/66)	rising tide of nationalism (1/80)	

House Committee on Government Reform February 15, 2000 Crisis in Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
35 year civil war killed 30,000 people and displaced over a million (1/16)		must consider the grave consequences of introduction of US personnel (1/16)	appeasement is not going to work (1/22)	deeply dependent on narcotrafficking (1/163)	huge tide of nationalism; assert pride by spiting us (1/197-8)	
governance almost impossible (1/16)		long standing skepticism about intervention (1/16)	can't trust those guys (1/22)	do not depend on government support (1/163)		
unlikely civil war can be changed by \$1.6 billion (1/16)		must justify military action in terms of national security	have to deal with them from a position of strength (1/22)	very little attention paid (1/165)		
will draw us further into the internal political situation (1/17)		primary interest is to stop cocaine and heroin (1/17)	\$1 million to \$2 million a day from trafficking (1/27)	part of the problem (1/201)		
a major national security concern (1/24)		war in Colombia is our war (1/21)	threatens nation's survival (1/27)			
producing more than 400 tons of deadly cocaine annually (1/26)		people dying in the US a result of the flood of drugs and we haven't been doing anything about it (1/21)	best armed, best trained, best equipped guerrillas in the world (1/27)			
America's backyard (1/24)		if we don't do something we may have to be involved (1/23)	venom increasing its deadly toll on our young people (1/31)			
beleaguerd Andean nation (1/26)		slow to react to the threat to our Nation's security (1/26)	more machine guns than the infantry battalions (1/37)			
national security regional threat (1/27)		now that we have admitted the serious problem exists we can start treating the cause in Colombia (1/27)	assassinating mayors intimidating journalists corrupting officials (1/37)			

House Committee on Government Reform February 15, 2000 Crisis in Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
the courageous Colombians (1/27)		we export the chemicals, we export the weapons, we export the dollars (1/28)	have tremendous wealth (1/37)			
narco-based war raging and the good guys, our friends and neighbors, are losing (1/27)		we have a deep moral obligation to help our brothers and sisters in the south fight (1/28)	thousands armed to the teeth targeting our aircraft (1/39)			
negotiation undermined by rising narcotics trade (1/28)		demonstrated failure of militarized efforts (1/29)	have walked from ideology to banditry (1/61)			
armed forces have long history of human rights violations (1/29)		ethical to escalate the war to prevent Americans from buying cocaine? (1/29)	growing rapidly and getting resources from cartels (64)			
beautiful country mired in crisis after crisis (1/30)		study of cocaine found treatment 23 times more effective than eradication (1/29)	trying to win through savagery (1/66)			
heroic efforts of the government (1/31)		hemispheric stability very important to interests (1/30)	killing Americans Venezuelans and Colombians throughout the hemisphere (1/67)			
second biggest supplier of oil by-products (1/33)		our colleague Presiden Fujimori (1/32)	acting with outrageous impunity (1/75)			
the problem (1/36)		children dying all over this country (1/33)	drug thugs (1/78)			
cocaine production gone up 140 percent in less than 4 years (1/36)		in 1997 15,973 lost their lives to drug related causes (1/35)	savage nature (1/85)			
the nexus, the center of mass of illegal drugs (1/37)		have an overall drug strategy (1/35)	protect cocaine labs in south (1/103)			

House Committee on Government Reform February 15, 2000 Crisis in Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
decades of endemic violence (1/37)		our money fuels crime and has a corrosive impact (1/36)	have rhetoric (1/124)			
wealthy in natural resources oil, gas, flowers, coffee beans (1/37)		we have achieved successes in Peru Bolivia (1/36)	cannot be negotiated with (1/132)			
in economic crisis (1/38)		52,000 dead a year (1/37)	stronger and better financed than ever (1/150)			
net importer of food (1/38)		stand with democratic partners (1/37)	no evidence is seriously interested in a solution (1/152)			
have come up with a conceptual document (1/39)		we cannot substitute US thinking for their own approach (1/38)	not close to taking power (1/162)			
police high integrity high courage force (1/39)		we are not going to save Colombia; Colombians are (1/40)	heavily involved in narcotics; they're narcotraffickers (1/163)			
huge national security health educational threat (1/41)		50,000 and 15,900 direct deaths ravages of drugs on our streets (1/60)	only deal with them form a position of strength (1/198)			
third largest recipient of assistance (1/59)		policy of interfering in civil war (1/64)				
giant country with trackless jungles and rivers for highways (1/61)		pressure Pastrana (1/72)				
pretty decent democratic government (1/62)		don't want a narco-state right on our doorsteps (1/82)				
dispute that is 40 years old (1/64)		no. 1 objective is reduction of cocaine and heroin destroying American people (1/83)				

House Committee on Government Reform February 15, 2000 Crisis in Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
responsible democratic government (1/65)		principal responsibility ought to be to reduce consumption of drugs (1/83)				
have a huge drug abuse problem (1/68)		US cannot substitute our own calculus (1/84)				
is not El Salvador isn't Vietnam (1/75)		forced to rely upon GOC (1/86)				
no shortage of courage political will (1/75)		we vet every person that receives USG training (1/106)				
lost whole elite counterinsurgency battalion (1/75)		need to respect Colombian systems (138)				
President is now clean (1/79)		if we lose it, we are in deep trouble (139)				
on the brink of disaster (1/83)		about to potentially lose Colombia (1/146)				
efforts to appease guerrillas (1/83)		can only do what the Colombian Government is ready to accept finally they have come around (1/147)				
deny us extradition (1/85)		we need to show some force (1/148)				
always been world's No. 1 producer of cocaine (1/103)		must fight demand while attacking drugs at source (1/152)				
military is very backward (1/139)		we have to see adjustment by Pastrana (1/164)				
enormous bravery of the people (1/150)		confronting a crisis in our own backyard (1/167)				

House Committee on Government Reform February 15, 2000 Crisis in Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
always been violent (1/150)		people expect us to lead and we should (1/138)				
government lost confidence of the people (1/150)		we have never experienced anything domestically like the deadly poison pouring out of Colombia (1/202)				
government squandered its negotiating advantage (1/151)		deluge of drugs on our streets killing our young people (1/202)				
can confront the narco-guerilla threat (1/162)						
Congress disgracefully weak (1/164)						
fifth largest economy in Latin America (1/165)						
they're not fighting narcotics for us but for them (1/138)						
judicial system is woefully weak (1/201)						

House Committee on International Relations February 16, 2000 President's FY 2001 International Affairs Budget Request						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
drug crisis that grips Colombia --3	We had worked with him as he developed Plan Colombia and I have been very pleased with the way that the package has been put together because it has the support of the Colombian people and it deals with all these aspects--37	supportive of Plan Colombia--20			But we must not ignore the rest of the region. Funding to support Mexico's elections should be a priority. We are concerned that the wave of democracy in Latin America may be cresting. How our nation directs or withholds resources can make a difference. Ecuador for example is on the brink of chaos. The jury is out on Venezuela. The legitimacy of Peru's upcoming elections is open to question. --3	So there is really a sense that this is not just a problem for Colombia not even just a problem for the Western Hemisphere because of the way narco traffickers are now also moving into Europe.--37
key democracy --6		Are we monitoring the peace process?--36			Paraguay remains fragile. Property issues in Nicaragua continue to fester. And after closing our bases in Panama the Administration has done very little to try to get them reopened. We must address escalating drug trafficking and drug corruption in Haiti. We are not doing enough to discourage violence and have not provided promised resources to level the playing field for Haiti's upcoming elections an important election and the hour is late--3	
important in its region and at a pivotal point in its democratic growth--7		our efforts in Peru and Bolivia were highly successful--37			that entire regions is at risk--18	

House Committee on International Relations February 16, 2000 President's FY 2001 International Affairs Budget Request						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
drug war is about out of control--18		we are talking about aid that helps America and if we talk about the drug issue as we have been on Colombia we want to make sure that our children are protected--41			I also am very concerned about the fact that we have been celebrating Latin American democracy but each of the countries in one way or another has a variety of threats to that because of the economic situations within them--46	
police cannot protect itself as it goes into the southern region-37						

House Committee on Appropriations February 29, 2000 Presidents FY 2000 Emergency Supplemental Request for Assistant to Plan Colombia and Related Counternarcotics Program						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
judicial authorities overwhelmed by chaos (H 2/29, 4)	elite do not have the will (H 2/29, 6)	problem is of own making (H 2/29, 2)	conducting nationwide offenses nationwide attacks (H 2/29, 9)		drug problems in Caracas Rio and Lima are awful (H 2/29, 28)	
in the midst of a rapidly evolving emergency 3/8)	peaceful people involved in savage violence (H 2/29, 51)	pushing with direct confrontation with FARC (H 2/29, 4)	is going to fight (H 2/29, 52)		argument for support is we don't want our 34 democratic allies in the hemisphere to go under and become narco states (H 2/29, 39)	
it is a nightmare (H 2/29, 9)	fleeing their homes (H 2/29, 52)	when our kids drop dead of an overdose the heroin came out of Colombia (H 2/29, 9)			Ecuadorians have been very good; an island of calm between Peru and Colombia (H 2/29, 46)	
unique place empty,desolate land (H 2/29, 33)		we could not come up with a strategy and impose it upon Colombia (H 2/29, 10-1)				
high school grads exempt from combat (H 2/29, 36)		national interest to reduce production of cocaine heroin in Latin America (H 2/29, 27)				
that is where the heroin that is killing our children is coming from (H 2/29, 43)		we have a decent plan to allow Colombians to establish control (H 2/29, 27)				
today's democratic leaders tomorrow's drug barons (H 2/29, 43)		this is what is killing our children (H 2/29, 30)				
giant roadless area with jungle (H 2/29, 47)		problem is US demand (H 2/29, 32)				
in an emergency (H 2/29, 52)		our purpose is counterdrug only (H 2/29, 66)				

House Committee on Appropriations February 29, 2000 Presidents FY 2000 Emergency Supplemental Request for Assistant to Plan Colombia and Related Counternarcotics Program						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
institutions under pressure, economy staring to unwind, net importer of food (H 2/29, 52)						

House Committee on International Relations March 8, 2000 Country Reports on Human Rights						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
I want to call particular attention to the close collaboration of the Colombian military with paramilitary groups that are responsible for massacres and widespread human rights violations against the civilian population--7			Government security forces paramilitary groups guerrillas and narcotics traffickers all continued to commit numerous serious abuses including extra judicial killings and torture--12	Government security forces paramilitary groups guerrillas and narcotics traffickers all continued to commit numerous serious abuses including extra judicial killings and torture--12		
Based on the State Department report on Colombia it is clear that a massive influx of weapons will do nothing to quell the Colombian government's thirst for violence--7				But in the meantime we continue to document one paramilitary massacre after another in Colombia.--65		
Government security forces paramilitary groups guerrillas and narcotics traffickers all continued to commit numerous serious abuses including extra judicial killings and torture--12				On the 29th of February paramilitary members entered a community finding that all the inhabitants had been wise enough and had fled and proceeded to burn the village to the ground. What's telling is that the paramilitary presence had been denounced repeatedly to the Colombian authorities and the paramilitaries camped out for a full month about two miles from the Colombian army detachment Heroes of Saraguro Battalion----65		
And I think it's important to understand too that they in many cases are new to Colombia because historically Colombian governments have not invested in the more rural areas.--25						

House Committee on International Relations March 8, 2000 Country Reports on Human Rights						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
is there is a problem with democracy in Colombia and it's not elections. They have elections regularly. It's that they simply do not have the kind of legal infrastructure and institutional infrastructure that we see in countries that have more well developed systems of checks and balances judicial independence the rule of law and that's what they need to build--28						

House Committee on International Relations March 15, 2000 - President Clinton's FY 2001 Foreign Assistance Budget Request						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
		We wait for an enormous problem to be on our hands and then we rush to pump in money to try to solve it money that while certainly we need to do something with Colombia the question in Colombia's case it will be over \$1 billion. That is far beyond the \$600 some odd million that exists for the rest of the hemisphere.--26				
		I think people are beginning to realize that our system-our economic system and our political system which are multi-party liberal democratic and a free market-that our system works better than anything else anybody in the world has tried in our lifetimes.--27				

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
To date the Department has been able to avoid becoming entangled in Colombia's civil conflict that has raged for decades and killed over 30000 people. However the administration's latest proposal will significantly increase United States military involvement in Colombia and may as a practical matter increase the number of United States military personnel on the ground.-- 1278	That poll said that only two percent of the population of Colombia approved in any way of the activities of the insurgent groups the FARC the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the relationship that they have forged with the narco-traffickers--1301	Proponents of this proposal believe it is the correct solution to assist the Colombian government in reestablishing sovereignty over their southern areas of the country where narcotic and guerilla activities are found.-1277	However in some parts of Colombia the distinction between drug traffickers and guerrillas simply does not exist-- 1278	I am also alarmed by the reported dramatic increase in human rights violations attributed to both the paramilitaries and insurgents -- 1341	In recent months I have become increasingly concerned about Colombia's neighbors. The adverse social economic and political positions spawned wholly or in part by drug trafficking and the other corrupting activities it breeds are weakening the fabric of democracy in other nations in the region. For this reason while I endorse a Colombia-centric approach to the drug problem I caution against a Colombia-exclusive approach.--1284	If we do not do anything now what we can contemplate is that the 25 percent increase in coca cultivation is going to continue. The amount of drugs available to the United States and to the rest of the world is going to increase.-- 1286

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
Colombia's increased drug production is fueling the vast criminal enterprises of drug traffickers guerrillas and paramilitary groups within and outside Colombia's borders.--1278	But again as I said if you go and spend any time in Colombia it's no fun being in their elite class. It's not like they don't have their worries--1302	However critics believe that the plan is not well thought out and involves the risk of deepening United States Military involvement in the largely civil internal conflict that has plagued Colombia for decades-1277	The ability of the traffickers and their support is going to increase their ability to corrupt and undermine societies Colombia's society other societies including possibly the United States will only increase-1286	paramilitary leader Carlos Castano has publicly admitted taxing the drug trade. As a result these groups are well funded and well armed--1365	If we just look at the nation of Venezuela and give at least passing attention to the fact that that is our primary source of imported oil. Somewhere between about 15 to 18 percent of our imported oil needs each month are met from Venezuela.--1293	Most of the world's coca is now grown in Colombia and over eighty percent of the cocaine consumed in the US is manufactured in Colombia--1335

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
Colombia is mired in an intractable and longstanding civil war--1279	I tell you that we were out there red baiting and saying any kind of insurgent back then was declared a communist and now any kind of insurgent is declared drug traffickers. And I would attest to you that there have been some legitimate insurgents because Secretary Sheridan you've indicated and you gave a little brief description of how the elite- and you didn't talk to much about the peasants-but you do have a disparity in wealth throughout those countries of those that have and those that don't have. --1306	the toll that illegal drug use takes upon our Country thousands of Americans killed every year whole communities damaged and destroyed over \$100 billion worth of damages to our economy incarceration costs treatment productivity losses and so on--1280	We've received numerous reports that the insurgents have surface-to-air missiles. We've heard everything from U.S. Redeye missiles on up to SAM-16s from Eastern Europe. We have yet to confirm any of these reports but we can certainly not discount the notion that they may in fact have these weapons right now.--1291	The State Department and several human rights organizations agree that the vast majority of terrorist killings in Colombia (over 70%) are at the hands of the paramilitaries. --1384	We look at the torment in Ecuador right now-another long-time partner. And of course Ecuador took a three hour vacation from democracy during January. I don't mean that to sound-I'm not taking that lightly. That was a very tension filled evening. And since that time the FARC have even made representations that they did in fact play some role in the disquiet that was developed in Quito among the indigenous people.--1293	President Pastrana has asked for international support to address an internal problem that has international dimensions-1342

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
<p>The human rights situation in Colombia is complicated. Colombia is a very very violent country. Over 20000 people get murdered there a year. They get murdered on all sides for all reasons. Political killings are actually a small fraction of the total number of killings and homicides in Colombia every year.--1281</p>		<p>But if you look at the southernmost portion of Colombia on the border of Ecuador we have seen over the last several years an explosion in cocaine production capacity. That cocaine unchecked right now in southern Colombia is headed to the United States. It ends up on our streets. It ends up destroying our families our communities. And that's what this package is all about.--1280</p>	<p>ties between the FARC and the drug trade is that it is complicated it is decentralized. some parts of Colombia we think the FARC simply derive revenue almost in the form of taxes. They control an area. You pay a certain amount of money for planes to go in and out. You pay a certain amount of a tax on cultivation there. And in that sense they're involvement may be more indirect. other parts of Colombia particularly in the south an increasing body of evidence suggests that they're far more directly involved in controlling production and controlling the first several steps of the cocaine production process --1292</p>		<p>All of these countries sir-and I haven't discussed Peru and Panama-the need to confront the spreading stain of contamination that comes from the drug industry simply deducts resources that could be applied by their governments to social programs all of which would strengthen the democracy and the emerging economies of those and in the free-market economies of those nations all of which play I think powerfully in the future prosperity of this country.--1294</p>	

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
The political killings in Colombia which aren't in any way attributed to the security forces at one time in the early 1990s over 50 percent of those were in some way attributed to security forces. Last year according to the State Department Human Rights Report that number is down to less than 2 percent. So the Colombian military has made dramatic progress in its current conduct.--1281		Let me again note that Plan Colombia was developed over the last number of months by the Colombians and by us on an interagency basis the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) people the judicial people the State Department the military with Colombian counterparts.--1282	the insurgents from Colombia principally the FARC violate the borders of Panama with absolute impunity.--1293		but I recall one person telling me very specifically and it was in the form of a stereotype and he said we basically have three factions in this country and it kind of applies to all the Latin American countries at least the ones that are small and the ones that we're involved and that is we have the government and we have the military. And there's a third faction the United States. Where the United States sides with whether it's with a government or with a military has a big impact in terms of where things go--1307	

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
The Colombian Congress is now studying the implementing legislation that the Colombian military provided. If WE get speedy action by the Colombian military by the Colombian Congress rather WE hope to start soon a training program and help the Colombian judicial military authorities bring about the reform that we're currently waiting on the legislation for.--1282		During 1999 WE we created a first of the Colombian counter-narcotics battalions. This 931-member unit is composed of professional soldiers all of whom have been vetted to eliminate human rights abuses. The battalion has been trained by members of the U.S. Southern Special Forces Group and is designed to interact with and provide security for elements of the Colombian National Police conducting counter-drug operations.--1283	By the best information I've been able to get a freshly recruited member of the FARC can make as much as \$550 a month. So that's double what a young professional soldier in the Colombian armed forces would make another indicator of the amount of wealth that the drug trade generates--1295		During the past twenty years we have seen the hemisphere shed its robes of military dictatorships and communist governments and attire itself with cloth cut from the bolts of democracy rule of law and human rights--1344	

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
re-assert control over the narcotics-rich departments of Southern Colombia-1284		To seize the initiative in a struggle which according to the director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy claims the lives of as many as 52000 of our citizens each year--1285	FARC is a large band of murderous thugs who have virtually no legitimacy in Colombia. They regularly attack democratic institutions. they had a whole campaign nationwide to assassinate local government officials candidates for mayor candidates for governor. They assassinated scores because they don't want a democratically elected government at any level in Colombia. the FARC are illegitimate. They're involved in drug trafficking. They have no public support in Colombia. Why? Because they kidnap they murder they ransom and they are without ideology --1308		Recent events in several countries raise doubts about the depth and durability of democracy in the region as well as the future growth of free market economies .--1344	

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
Vietnam was half the world away. Colombia is as close as Denver--1285		If we do not do anything now what we can contemplate is that the 25 percent increase in coca cultivation is going to continue. The amount of drugs available to the United States and to the rest of the world is going to increase.--1286	The most recent indicators that I have seen are that the FARC are actually projecting out beyond the borders of Colombia and may be creating dissention and discord in other nations.--1311		Spillover from violence in Colombia threatens Panama--1346	
Colombia's a worthy cause. It's the second most populous nation in all of South America. Next to the United States it is the oldest democracy in our hemisphere. It is centrally located on the Andean ridge a region of strategic importance to the United States--1285		We have an opportunity now with the President of Colombia which we have not had before. We have not had a President in Colombia in recent history that we could work with. President Samper if you will all recall was tainted by narco trafficking dollars in winning his presidency. And we were unable to work with him. You have to go back another presidency to Guaveria before him before we had someone we could work with--1287	I am also alarmed by the reported dramatic increase in human rights violations attributed to both the paramilitaries and insurgents -- 1341		Historical analysis reveals that in terms of governance this is a tidal region. Democracy ebbs and flows on about a 20-year cycle.-- 1352	

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
The value of their dollar in terms of drug trafficking in the United States is estimated to be as much as \$110 billion a year for all drug trafficking in Colombia. Just within Colombia not even the money the traffickers control outside the country is estimated to be as high as \$10 or more billion within the Colombian economy. This kind of dollar availability is something that's going to risk the undermining of Colombian society.--1286		I frequently think we don't do enough for our neighbors in the south--1293	Colombian insurgents constitute a localized threat to Panamanian sovereignty and citizens in the border region-1346		Colombia and its Andean Ridge neighbors fully appreciate the regional problems that are caused by the illegal drug industry and have demonstrated the willingness to pursue solutions at the regional level--1354	
despite the very turbulent and violent history of Colombia it's economy has always done very well. Like they had a six to seven percent annual growth rate throughout all of these last couple of decades of extreme violence and unrest.-1294		And I think that what we need to do Mr. Chairman is to address the problem of consumption that we have in our country. Because if we didn't have this consumption there wouldn't be a growth of the poppy fields and the cocaine and heroin trafficking into this country--1295				

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
I continue to think that the Colombians do not take this very seriously--1298		This is about drug production cocaine production drugs that are coming to the United States that end up on our streets destroying our families and our communities. If there were not drug production in Colombia we wouldn't all be sitting here. So I don't view this as a foreign aid bill I don't view this as bailing out the Colombian elite class I view this as in our national interest to destroy drug production of cocaine that otherwise would be on our streets-1301				

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
the Colombian Congress budgeted \$1.6 billion for their banking system to make up for what had been embezzled. That's almost the same amount of money. And if they hadn't been embezzling money they'd been a little tougher on their own people for enforcing the law they would have had an additional \$1.6 billion.--1299		I think our relationship with Latin American countries in the last century has not always been a positive one. I think there's a history of human rights abuses continued frustration with our American appetite for drugs I think has been frustrating--1303				

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
Colombia is not Central America. Colombia does not have a military dictatorship or some kind of despotic repressive regime. Colombia is a democracy forty years of uninterrupted presidential elections. If you want more social development you want more education you want more roads developed go to the ballot box and you can vote. Colombia is an open democratic system.-- 1308		And 80 percent of our people in jails are using drugs. So we really do have a very serious problem. And I believe that there has to be a multiple approach not only in our backyards but also throughout-- 1305				

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
And that's why I get sensitive even to the discussion of a civil conflict. A civil conflict almost implies you are two sides. There is not in Colombia. There is one band of outlaws and there is a civil society in Colombia.--1308		I think the U.S. military has had a very positive effect throughout this region over the last 20 or 30 years not a negative effect. We now have democracies throughout the whole hemisphere except for one and we have militaries that by and large behave themselves. And I think a lot of that credit is due to the United State military over time--1307				
Colombia is in our back yard--1310		We cannot afford to ignore this kind of problem for two reasons: One national security obviously and the fact that we don't want an anarchy established in Colombia; second because we are in perhaps the fight of our lives in terms of the challenge with narcotics and we cannot afford to turn our back on that issue and that problem--1310				

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
We are here precisely because drug production in Colombia is out of control.--1319		There is far-this is much easier to sell to my constituents in Indiana. They understand the vital national security they understand these drugs find themselves on every street corner of America. They can touch it. They can feel it. It's kids. It's young adults. But everyone knows someone who has been affected some way or another by drugs--1313				
Colombia's civil conflict that has raged for decades and killed over 35000 people--1327		As you are aware drug abuse is an undeniable threat to our national security that is measured in thousands of lives lost and costing our country billions of dollars annually.--1334				
Colombia has become the center of the cocaine trade--1335		The United States the nation with the greatest cocaine demand--1335				
Served by first class civilian and military leaders--1345		fueled in part by our country's demand for cocaine--1342				
Colombia is key to the region' s stability--1352		With our help Colombia can succeed--1345				

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
The Colombian Government is unable to exert effective control over thousands of square miles of its own territory--1364		I am convinced that if we shape international security environment skillfully we will respond to fewer crises and the uncertain future for which we are preparing will be far less uncertain--1359				
tainted Samper administration--1364		The situation in Colombia poses a considerable number of direct threats to U.S. national security interests as well not the least of which are the thousands of Americans killed by drugs and drug-related violence each year the losses to our economy from drug-related accidents and inefficiency in the workplace and the social and human costs of abuse and addiction--1364				
At this moment Colombia is partner who shares our counter narcotics concerns and possesses the will to execute needed reforms and operations--1369		We have all seen how these drugs have poisoned entire American communities shattering families and destroying lives--1365				

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
There is \$1.6 billion for Colombia who is the biggest trafficker of heroin and cocaine to our country-H1482	the innocent people of Colombia.--1487	the flow of drugs into the U.S. poses a direct threat to our children. One in every two American school kids will try illegal drugs before graduating high school unless we reverse the trends. We also know that the potency of Colombia's cocaine today and heroin today is rising making it even more likely that today's curious kids under peer pressure in school seeking to try something cool or something new could get hooked more easily and become tomorrow's addicts.--1486	vicious guerilla band of people that this past weekend killed 26 policemen in Colombia in one city in Bahia del Puerto. They beheaded the chief of police and killed four children between the ages of 3 and 7 to say nothing of their mothers and other innocent victims.--1493	narcoterrorists on the right--H1484		

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
the amount of drugs coming from Colombia is rising dramatically. Colombia now produces 60 percent of the world's cocaine crop an astounding 90 percent of which makes its way here to the United States--1486	ruling elite in Colombia their sons do not serve in combat. Because if one is a high school graduate one is exempted from having to serve in combat in the Colombian armed forces--1504	Illegal drug use costs U.S. society a staggering \$110 billion a year right now and results in more than 14000 American deaths each year. I am going to say that again: 14000 American deaths each year; primarily our youth. That is unbelievable. I cannot seriously believe that any Member is going to pull out the flag of surrender and say we are quitting on the war on drugs with those kinds of statistics--1486	face of a terrorist insurrection against a democratic government.--1493	paramilitaries committed 19 separate massacres leaving 143 people dead and hundreds more displaced from their homes. And just last month Mr. Speaker paramilitaries linked to the Colombian army danced and drank as they tortured as they beheaded at least 28 villagers in northern Colombia.--1487		
Democratically elected government--1486	Heroes like Colombia's antidrug leader General Jose Serrano--1509	We cannot simply put our head in the sand and pretend that the emergence of a narco-State in our own back yard would not adversely impact our national security--1487	narcoguerrillas that enforce the state of lawlessness there--1522	drug lords--1509		

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
the political situation in Colombia has spiraled out of control--1487	only 4 percent of the people support the FARC--1531	the serious and growing threat that one of our close southern neighbors is being overrun by the drug traffickers who have sat their sights on unfettered access to the impressionable youth of America--1487	the FARC and the revolutionaries are right now controlling about a third of the country protecting the drug lords and getting money in return for that to allow their operations to continue--1528	the primary agents of violence and disorder in this region--1513		
the sincere efforts of a friendly Democratically-elected government--1487	patriotic Colombians who are sacrificing their lives because of our abuse--1532	American demand is at the root of the drug problem more than Columbian supply--1493	the FARC guerillas who are and I hope my colleagues will get this are getting as much as \$100 million a month from the drug cartel. That is a billion dollars a year--1529	well known to be involved in the drug trade and responsible for over 70% of human rights violations. The paramilitaries continues to thwart and attack government investigators reformist politicians and human rights monitors--1513		

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
This bill will provide \$1.3 billion to a military with one of the worst human rights' records in that hemisphere the Colombian military over which neither the Colombian government nor the United States Armed Forces have much control.--1487	wealthier Colombians are leaving that country in droves. Apparently they are more than willing to fight to the last drop of American blood.--1536	what does this matter to the average American who does not necessarily know where Colombia falls on the map of the world? I will tell Members what it matters it matters about our kids our kids who are tempted by the scourge of drugs. We are dealing with our children and our grandchildren and their future.--1493	The FARC guerillas who have been trained by the Cubans who are Marxist oriented they may very well take over that country. We may have a narcoguerrilla government running Colombia. There will be no impediment to the heroin and the cocaine coming out of that country into the United States-1529	The rebels in Colombia and the paramilitaries already control an area the size of my home State of Illinois--1534		

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
The Colombian military has strong ties to paramilitaries which commit unspeakable atrocities--1487	The people of Colombia have suffered so many years because of drugs and because of the civil war whatever they are calling it down there and so we want to help them.--1539	Illicit drugs pose a clear and present threat to the well-being of American society as well as our entire hemisphere. In 1999 drugs killed 52000 Americans approximately and caused more than \$10 billion in damage to our country. The number of drug arrests and percentage of teens using drugs has steadily risen since President Clinton took office in 1993. The streets of America are literally awash in drugs--1506	After 36 hours after the Colombian National Police ran out of ammunition they came in and they hacked them to death 26 people with machetes; they castrated the men; they chopped off the heads of the mayor and the head of the Colombian National Police there; they put them on spikes in the middle of the town as a warning to anybody that gets in the way of the FARC guerillas down there--1529	we know that the paramilitaries in Colombia are involved in the drug traffic and that they are the ones who are responsible for 70 percent of the human rights abuses and civilian murders in that country?--1534		

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
murderous Colombian military with a list of human rights' violations a mile long--1487	We have not seen the elites of Colombia stand up to the occasion and meet the needs of the poor people in that country. The disparity in income and the poverty level there is so oppressive yet the elites are running off to Florida.--1540	Illegal drugs have been costing our society more than \$100 billion per year costing also 15000 young American lives each year--1509	The rebels in Colombia and the paramilitaries already control an area the size of my home State of Illinois--1534	The rebels in Colombia and the paramilitaries already control an area the size of my home State of Illinois--1534		

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
the most violent country in the hemisphere--1489	the Colombian people who have the most to lose seem to be doing less. In the past month or so they have changed their constitution so that people who have a high school diploma are no longer eligible for the draft. They have changed their laws to decrease the amount of money they are spending on defense. One cannot help but be left with the feeling that the Colombians are expecting the United States of America brave young Americans to fight their war for them--1543	The specter of a consolidated narcostate only 3 hours by plane from Miami has made it patently clear that our Nation's vital security interests are at stake--1509	Horrific acts of violence are visited on Colombians by insurgent and paramilitary groups--1544	Horrific acts of violence are visited on Colombians by insurgent and paramilitary groups--1544		

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
more than any other country in the world Colombia supplies the heroin and the cocaine that has infested our families and our neighborhoods across America--1490		how many more hundreds or thousands of our kids are going to get hooked on drugs or die from overdoses or get shot up in a raid or a drug bust that went bad before we eliminate this terrible terrible problem? It is essential to the future of this Nation that we eliminate the scourge that is illegal drugs and the trafficking of illegal drugs in the United States. We need to wipe out the source of these terrible drugs and we need to eliminate those killing fields where the drugs are grown--1510				
the democratically-elected government of Colombia is serious today about fighting the war on drugs--1506		much of the turmoil in Colombia is our fault.--1513				

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
the President of Colombia is a brave and courageous man.--1508		illegal drugs are killing our kids at an alarming rate. Every year we lose 52000 young lives to drugs nearly equal to the number of Americans killed in Vietnam over ten years. That means every day 143 of our young people will die from drug-related causes. In the time it takes us to debate this bill 12 or more children will perish due to drug addiction. According to the U.S. Drug Czar one of every two Americans kids will try illegal drugs by the time they reach the 12th grade. Many will become habitual users leading to a life of crime or worse a miserable lonely death.--1513				

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
our allies in Colombia who are all on the front lines in the war against illegal drugs--1509		With our strong support and the financial assistance contained in this bill Colombia can be successful in slowing the flow of drugs from their country to our school and communities. Failing to provide this important aid now may result in the loss of Colombia to the drug cartels leaving them free to turn the once prosperous and democratic nation into a large narcotics nursery laboratory and distribution center. Without this help we will leave generations of Americans vulnerable to the hopelessness of drug addiction--1513				
Eighty percent of the cocaine 75 percent of the heroin consumed in our Nation comes from Colombia.--1509		We have worked hard to stop genocide in other countries Mr. Chairman we now must stop this senseless slaughter of a generation of Americans. If we love our children we must ensure that Colombia receives the help it needs.--1513				

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
Colombian drug-fueled crisis--1509		the supplemental that we are considering today is about our children and whether we want our children to grow up in a society free from the scourge of drugs.--1522				
this Colombia situation is a civil war--1509		Thousands of families are destroyed because of what Colombian drugs and others but mainly Colombian drugs are doing in this country--1523				
Colombia's brutal military-1510		ally of the Colombian government--1526				
Colombia is the oldest democracy in Latin America and is clearly under siege--1512		We all know people who are addicted we know families and children that have been devastated by the drugs from Colombia.--1526				
ongoing cooperation between elements of the Colombian military and the paramilitary organizations--1513		I would rather have my son or my daughters if I knew they were going to get the mumps or the measles I would rather prevent them from getting the mumps or the measles in the first place as I would like to stop our children from getting drugs--1527				

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
abusive military regime--1513		There has been among 12- to 17-year olds and I want my colleagues to hear this number now from 1992 to 1998 an increase in drug use heroin use specific heroin use among 12- to 17-year olds of 875 percent an absolutely astounding number--1528				
Colombia is a hemispheric neighbor-1513		I am saying to my colleagues today we can either deal with the problem today as the President has now seen fit to do and give them this \$1.3 billion or we can wait around another 4 or 5 years until the matter gets so bad that we have to send our lifeblood down there to fight these guerillas. I think it is better to do it now. It is the prudent thing to do.--1529				

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
Of these amounts 90% of the cocaine and 75% of the heroin originate in Colombia--1513		Helping Colombia is in our fundamental national interest. The scourge of drugs is tearing at the fabric of our society and Colombia is ground zero in the fight against drugs: More than 80% of the cocaine and much of the heroin that arrives on our shores comes from or through Colombia--1530				
There is an explosion of coca cultivation taking place in southern Colombia--1521		The reason we have not put in all these dollars into Colombia over the years is because we had a legitimate human rights objection to how their military was being handled and because drug money had gotten into the previous government of Colombia--1531				
Colombia is the source of 90 percent of the cocaine that comes into this country. Colombia is the source of 65 percent of the heroin that reaches our neighborhoods our schools and our children.--1522		what we can do in terms of aiding Colombia to fight our war against drugs to save our children's lives-1533				

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
flow of coca leaves to the United States.- -1524		cocaine and heroin travels from Colombia to this country but it is also true that those are not the only drugs that are causing problems for us here in America. There are domestically generated drugs like methamphetamines-- 1533				
Colombia is the oldest democracy in South America-- 1525		We are about to go to war in the jungles of Colombia.--1553				

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
We go over and we bomb these other countries Libya and all these places because they are making weapons of mass destruction that might some day hurt Americans; they may some day be used on our friends. At the same time we are turning our heads and our backs on what is really going on and that is this poison that is being created in Colombia and other countries in our hemisphere which is coming in and poisoning our kids and destroying their future.-1525-26		Can you define an interest that can be more vital to all of us than the drugs and the effects they have upon our children?--1553				
heroin is produced in Colombia. In fact in the eastern half of the United States almost the entire heroin supply coming into this country is from Colombia--1528		If we are going to eradicate the crops we have got to teach the camposinos how to grow something as an alternative--1555				

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
It is a country that has enormous problems of poverty corruption lack of control of its own territory. Forty percent of Colombia is under the control of the rebels--1529						
Colombia's President Pastrana has taken bold action--1530						
it is the longest standing democracy under siege--1531						
We have a stable democracy that even goes through transition of power. -1532						
According to a February report by Human Rights Watch half of Colombia's 18 brigade level army units are linked to paramilitary activity. Military support for paramilitary activity remains national in scope and includes the areas where Colombian units are receiving or will receive U.S. military aid.--1532						

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
the Colombian military is involved and key financial government officials must be involved or the drug trade would not be able to flourish--1532						
Colombia has had a 40-year civil war an ongoing drug problem and an army and a police force that have not worked together--1534						
Colombia is already the third largest recipient of our foreign aid in the whole world and there has been no net reduction in coca production in Colombia or cocaine availability in the United States--1534						
A military with the worst record of human rights abuses in this hemisphere--1534						

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
the Colombian military has been known to cooperate with drug traffickers. Colombian military officers also provide support to rightwing paramilitary organizations that traffic in illegal drugs and carry out extrajudicial killings and other gross violations of human rights--1535						
a corrupt military in Colombia to deal with drug interdiction? A military that is part and parcel of the drug problem itself because they have been involved with drug dealing and selling and shipment over and over again in addition to being involved with some of the worst human rights abuses that have taken place in that country--1536						

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
Colombia is a beautiful country. It is one of the most diverse countries in the world. It is one of the oldest democracies in Latin America. It is now plagued; it is torn apart--1542						
One of the most dangerous places on earth--1542						
Colombia our troubled Andean neighbor--1544						
A partner that shares our determination to put the drug traffickers out of business--1545						
The military in Colombia has had an abysmal human rights record. It has been appalling. Until recently the majority of human rights abuses better than 50 percent were perpetrated against the civilian population by the Colombian military.-1545						

House Committee on Armed Services March 23, 2000 - FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act - U.S. Policy toward Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
Colombia is now the source of 80 percent of the cocaine and 75 percent of the heroin coming into the United States both significant increases the \$600 million spent notwithstanding. That is what \$600 million in Colombia has done--1552						

House Committee on Appropriations April 6, 2000 Foreign Operations, Export Financing Programs Appropriation for 2001 -- Security Assistance						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
While Plan Colombia does not include major security assistance funds, I want to take this opportunity to thank you for supporting this strategy that will complement President Pastrana's courageous steps to address the complex and daunting problems in Colombia. 8		First is Plan Colombia and our urgent and clear stake in supporting Colombian Pastrana's efforts to battle the scourge of cocaine. 7			Our Latin American and Caribbean neighbors have made historic strides in building democracy over the past 2 decades, but this amity continues to be threatened by economic disparities that erode support for democracy and undermine capabilities to combat grave threats. 8	
The big mystery is, where does the, does the money come from in Colombia? 60		How detrimental would that be to the overall Plan Colombia to wait until the regular 2001 appropriation bill passes with it included in there? Is this going to seriously erode the political environment of Colombia to the point where President Pastrana might have political problems if indeed we don't respond so he can then go to the other nations who are participating? 48				

House Committee on Appropriations April 6, 2000 Foreign Operations, Export Financing Programs Appropriation for 2001 -- Security Assistance						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
In the case of Colombia, the circumstance is clouded by the fact that there is an enormous drug problem that has direct implications for U.S. interests and for the American people, and that is a major proportion of our own direct involvement. But the program is much broader than that. It is a prodemocracy transition program that I think could spell the difference between success and failure for the oldest democratic society in the Western hemisphere or--I am sorry--in South America. 65-66		U.S. contribution is one; Colombia is contribution two. Are there any other countries making such a commitment to this plan? 59				
		But I can tell you, gentlemen, that there is considerable doubt among Members who voted to go forward with this program as to the advisability of our involvement in Plan Colombia. 65				
		I wish the President and General McCaffrey would go on nationwide TV and, if this is a drug war, make the case to the American people that this is a war. Tell us what our expectations are in Colombia. Tell us realistically what the truth is and what we can expect this investment to be in terms of years and dollars. 65				

House Committee on Appropriations April 6, 2000 Foreign Operations, Export Financing Programs Appropriation for 2001 -- Security Assistance						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
		We have ... tried to stress in particular a focus with substantial resources on democracies or potential democracies in transition. That has included Indonesia, Ukraine, Nigeria and Colombia. They also are all countries that have the potential for either succeeding or failing in brave, potential, democratic efforts. 65				
		Plan Colombia is a mile wide and an inch deep, and there are a lot of questions. 67				

House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources April 12, 2000 - the Emerging Drug Threat from Haiti						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
Colombian drug lords have once again shifted a large portion of their operations and they have chosen Haiti as a site of those operations--2		The United States drug czar now estimates that there are over 52000 drug-related deaths in this country every year. The social cost of illegal drugs-some of the lower figures are \$110 billion a year and I have seen that figure with everything taken into consideration almost double. More importantly over half of our Nation's young people will try illegal drugs before they finish high school.--2			The United States and our hemisphere are facing some of the greatest challenges ever to our security interests. Just look at the turmoil in Colombia--4	
coordination with the Colombian Air Force--35						
most of the drugs transiting through Haiti coming to the United States originate in northern Colombia?--80						
good Colombian police--80						
we have greater cooperation with Colombia--85						

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 2, 2000 - Current & Projected National Security Threats to the US						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
There is some good news in Colombia. Under President Pastrana's leadership Bogota is beginning to improve on its 1999 counterdrug efforts. In November Pastrana approved the first extradition of a Colombian drug trafficker to the United States since passage of a 1997 law--13		Mr. Chairman let me now turn to another threat that reaches across borders for its victims: narcotics--13	Drugs fund insurgent groups warring against the Columbian government--6		Despite antinarcotics successes notably in Bolivia and Peru illicit drugs from Latin America constitute the primary drug threat to the United States--6	The problem we face has become considerably more global in scope and can be summed up like this: narcotics production is likely to rise dramatically in the next few years and worldwide trafficking involves more diverse and sophisticated groups--13
Terrorism will be a serious threat to Americans especially in most Middle Eastern countries North Africa parts of Sub-Saharan Africa Turkey Greece the Balkans Peru and Colombia--24		Give us your assessment. Are we winning? Are we losing? Are we holding our own?--50	more and more of that country seems to have been taken over in a de facto sense at least by the guerrilla movements--50		Bribery at all levels of officialdom in Mexico and to a lesser extent the Caribbean ensure that drugs reach their target--6	

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 2, 2000 - Current & Projected National Security Threats to the US						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
the government itself tends to be more cooperative in terms of extraditions and other kinds of activity--50		But it is a constant and indeed a growing problem. As you know our assessments of the amount of cocaine produced in South America have risen recently. So I would agree with your assessment that this is a growing threat to our well-being. It's not one that we can say we are winning the war against--52	The rebels the insurgents have used the demilitarized zones disproportionately to their advantage in the field of military activity and so they continue to be a challenge for Colombian security forces--50		A decade into the democracy and market revolution the vast majority of Latin Americans have experienced little or no improvement in living conditions. Recent economic troubles have fueled unemployment crime and poverty undermining the commitment of many Latin Americans to free-market economic liberalization. While Latin Americans are committed in principle to democracy many question how successful democracy has been in their own countries because of slow progress in alleviating wide social inequities and in curbing corruption--9	

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 2, 2000 - Current & Projected National Security Threats to the US						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
I think that the government of Colombia and specifically their security force is enormously challenged in dealing with the insurgent threat in rural Colombia which of course is fueled by narcotics and other criminal activity. They're trying hard and have made some improvements but are still challenged by mobility and flexibility and command-and-control and intelligence shortfalls against a difficult adversary--50					Another concern is that legitimately elected leaders could assume authoritarian powers with popular support. Peruvian President Fujimori provided a model with his "selfcoup" in 1992 and Venezuela under President Chavez bears careful watching. In none of the other major countries of Latin America-Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia and Mexico-is democracy threatened in the short or medium term--9	
The Colombian Army while it appears able to protect large cities and the urban environment is not able to control the countryside where the insurgents operate--50						

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 2, 2000 - Current & Projected National Security Threats to the US						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
So I think I would say that while they are certainly not winning they're trying very hard to hold their own in a very difficult situation even as the President tries to put together a political process that will reach some type of peace agreement in the future with the insurgents--51						

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations February 8, 2000 - 2000 Foreign Policy Overview and President's FY 2001 Foreign Affairs Budget Request						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
Our democratic allies in Colombia who are fighting the narco traffickers--6		we have an urgent and obvious stake in aiding Colombian President Pastrana and his plan to rescue his country and thereby help rescue ours from the scourge of cocaine--9			this is a regional issue-54	
key countries of Colombia--12		threat from Colombia to us in terms of drug production is huge. This is one of those foreign policy problems that has a huge domestic impact--43				
Whit regard to the problems in Colombia everything seems to be interwoven the narco traffickers and corruption and the paramilitaries.--52		this is an American problem. We always talk about the linkage between domestic and foreign policy. There is no clearer example than this. This is one that I think is explicable to the American people because this is how we are protecting our children.--55				
I have great respect for President Pastrana. I think he is a remarkable leader--53						
Colombia has been heroic in its efforts--53						
more than half of the world's coca production. Maybe as much as 80 percent of it Mr. Chairman are coming out of Colombia now that Bolivia and Peru are being shut down--53						
the government in Bogota does not have control over large portions of its country--54						
total production in Colombia has increased at an explosive rate--85						

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations February 10, 2000 - US Agency for International Development						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
The administration has identified- the Secretary of State in a visit here a couple of days ago identified four countries Nigeria Colombia Indonesia and the Ukraine for special attention in the fiscal year 2000 2001 budget relationship aid program. And as the chairman said earlier these four countries I would worry about Swiss bank accounts- Colombia Indonesia Nigeria and Ukraine (2/10, 167	Some of them are just not going to be able to stay where they are. Some of them were sort of like day workers anyway. They are not really committed to that part of the land but they are there for the money they can make (2/10, 173	And in Colombia we are working with President Pastrana to eliminate the production of narcotics and to foster a secure and responsive governmental structure (2/10, 150				
Colombia I think is a country of emphasis for the obvious reason of the drugs-coca and poppy grown there and the freedom with which it finds its way into the United States (2/10, 168		Building on the success of this approach the Administration is initiating comprehensive support in FY2000 for President Pastrana's "Plan Colombia." As an integral component of the USG support USAID will help Colombia provide people with viable alternatives to illicit drug production and strengthen the country's democracy by assisting the people displaced by violence and improving human rights and rule of law. (2/10, 155-156				

Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control February 22, 2000 - US Assistance Options for the Andes						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
high murder rate and endemic violence (2/22, 1)		principal target of drugs in Colombia (2/22, 1)	marxist guerillas aligned with drug pushers; drug thugs (2/22, 1)	nothing more than bandit formations (2/22, 22)	economic, social, security problems particularly intense (2/22, 60)	
300,000 acres of coca under cultivation in the jungles and mountains (2/22, 21)		goal is to see Colombia supported (2/22, 2)	transformed into Mafia-like organizations (2/22, 21)	actively engaged in drug trafficking (2/22, 101)	trafficking weakening the fabric of democracy (2/22, 74)	
hemisphere's oldest functioning democracy (2/22, 21)		should guard against being pulled into guerrilla war (2/22, 19)	act with relative impunity (2/22, 21)			
the center of gravity (2/22, 27)		at a critical juncture (2/22, 21)	ferociously well armed and savage forces fuelled by drug money and production (2/22, 97)			
Colombian cocaine and heroin cause of much of the crime, violence, health problems, welfare problems in US (2/22, 27)		52,000 [killed] \$100 billion in damages (2/22, 21)	not democrats, marxists connected to drug industry (2/22, 98)			
world's greatest expansion in narcotics cultivation (2/22, 46)		we created the first Colombian counter-narcotics battalions (2/22, 72)	actively engaged in drug trafficking (2/22, 101)			
most threatened nation (2/22, 73)		we will build two additional counter-narcotics battalions and a brigade headquarters (2/22, 73)	40 years in the bush and have little understanding of the 21st century (2/22, 107)			
first class civilian and military leadership team (2/22, 73)		give us an unusual opportunity for them to defend themselves (2/22, 98)	totalitarian Marxists who want to destroy Colombian democracy (2/22, 109)			

Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control February 22, 2000 - US Assistance Options for the Andes						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
turning the corner (2/22, 74)						
a Colombian problem (2/22, 92)						
incapable of defeating the guerrillas (2/22, 97)						
if it gets its act together (2/22, 97)						
nation of good people (2/22, 99)						
government has not gotten its act together (2/22, 99)						
they don't have capacity to absorb this (2/22, 103)						

Senate Committee on Appropriations February 24, 2000 - Joint Hearing on Supplemental Request for Plan Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
While the CNP deserves credit for arresting kingpins and shutting down trafficking routes coca growth and cocaine production as we know have exploded. The more the Administration spends in Colombia the more coca is grown (2/24, 2	But I am worried that some people down there may give lip service but then when pushed to actually do something are unwilling to do it. And that is what worries me-29	drug lords guerrillas and the paramilitaries are all profiting and part of the same problem. Our narco-security strategy must reflect that fact (2/24, 2	Who are we kidding? Our strategy will have to change to succeed. We cannot pretend the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) are not tied to traffickers (2/24, 2	We cannot ignore the increase in paramilitary involvement in the drug trade. These are the same extremists with close ties to Colombian military which we plan to train (2/24, 3.	there is no substitute for aggressive political leadership in Colombia Peru Bolivia and Ecuador (2/24, 2	The war on drugs is not a war in Colombia. It is a war that is being fought and must be fought throughout the world. (2/24, 45
If the Colombian government meets the test and demonstrates political will the Administration should acknowledge that we are prepared to do whatever it takes to support a serious effort that goes after the entire problem traffickers guerrillas and paramilitaries (2/24, 3	Colombia law prohibits sending high school graduates or above into combat (2/24, 30	containing one country only shifts the problem elsewhere. We need a regional strategy (2/24, 2	Everyone runs. And you cannot countenance running and face these cartels and narcoterrorists. They understand one thing (2/24, 8	Paramilitary groups also have clear ties to important narcotics traffickers and paramilitary leaders have even publicly admitted their participation in the drug trade. (2/24, 17	We have invited leaders from Bolivia Ecuador and Peru to address their national needs. I do not view this as a choice between support for Colombia or her neighbors. Each has important interest. All have a common stake in success. (2/24, 3	Colombia is a matter of serious concern not only for the United States but also for the international community (2/24, 64

Senate Committee on Appropriations February 24, 2000 - Joint Hearing on Supplemental Request for Plan Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
There is no dispute that the 40-year civil war and the violence and the corruption associated with the drug trade has inflicted a terrible toll on that country (2/24, 5.	nearly 40 million law-abiding and peace-loving citizens of Colombia (2/24, 45	while it seems the most obvious it seems the least observed the American public must be told the truth about what lies ahead (2/24, 2	The cartels are more sophisticated than they have ever been before. Our intelligence intercepts are down because they utilize highly encrypted computer systems. They have the most updated military equipment. And they are on a march. (2/24, 8	the paramilitaries are deeply involved in the drug trade. (2/24, 26	When there is an effort made to curtail the supply coming out of a country like Colombia it is like pushing air in a balloon. It goes to Peru or to Venezuela or to Ecuador or to some other country (2/24, 8.	
This is an institution that has a sordid record of human rights violations corruption and even involvement in drug trafficking. Today while the Army's direct involvement in human rights violations has fallen sharply-I give them credit for that-there is abundant evidence that some in the Army regularly conspire with paramilitary death squads who like the guerrillas are also involved in drug trafficking. (2/24, 5	Successive generations of Colombian children are growing up in a country where profits from illegal drugs fuel daily violence weaken government institutions and finance terrorist activities that threaten human rights and the future of our democracy (2/24, 45	As a result many now argue that we-we must carefully concentrate only on the Colombian drug war and avoid any involvement or support of efforts which target the paramilitaries or guerrillas. Hence we must not step up military training support or presence of U.S. troops (2/24, 2	insurgents in the jungle (2/24, 11	the paramilitaries have increased their strength increased their position and increased their control and operation of the trade (2/24, 26	our partners in Latin America in our common fight against the scourge of illegal drugs (2/24, 11	

Senate Committee on Appropriations February 24, 2000 - Joint Hearing on Supplemental Request for Plan Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
And I am concerned about the stability of Colombia (2/24, 8		If we proceed the public deserves to know that we cannot succeed overnight. In fact I believe we will be well past this election year before we can expect any results whatsoever. Not only should we avoid a half-hearted effort in Colombia we should avoid a halfbaked strategy in the region. The emphasis on Colombia must not overshadow requirements in Bolivia Ecuador and Peru. Without a regional strategy an attack on production in one country will only push the problem over to another country (2/24, 3	leftist rebels (2/24, 11	paramilitaries are directly involved in the narcotics trafficking enterprise. I think we can deduce that from their own admission. They have openly acknowledged their involvements and their links with drug traffickers- 26	In recent months I have become increasingly concerned about Colombia's neighbors. The adverse social economic and political conditions spawned wholly or in part by drug trafficking and the other corrupting activities it breeds are weakening the fabric of democracies in other nations in the region (2/24, 22	

Senate Committee on Appropriations February 24, 2000 - Joint Hearing on Supplemental Request for Plan Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
30 to 40 percent of the land mass of Colombia is today controlled by narcoterrorists; how 1500 citizens are held as hostages; 250 military 250 soldiers.- 8		what is happening on the borders of this country the Southwest border is the spread of the corruption from the Southwest through the border into the United States. With customs agents with local public officials the money for bribes is so enormous and I happen to believe that it is within our national interest to be helpful. It is not within our national interest to see the drug cartels and the narco-terrorists penetrate this country. And believe me they will and they are trying now. (2/24, 8	Estimates of guerrilla income from narcotics trafficking and other illicit activities such as kidnapping and extortion are unreliable but clearly exceed \$100 million a year and could be far greater. Of this we estimate some 30-40 percent comes directly from the drug trade (2/24, 17	Narcotics money funds the guerrillas funds the paramilitaries and fuels the violence that is tearing at the fiber of Colombia (2/24, 34	This is by every measurement a regional problem. As such I think we must pursue regional solutions (2/24, 23	

Senate Committee on Appropriations February 24, 2000 - Joint Hearing on Supplemental Request for Plan Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
Eighty percent of the cocaine is grown in Colombia (2/24, 8		we either sit back and let this march take place because we are worried that there is not a 100 percent guarantee of success or we are willing to play a role to back an ally that wants to be helpful; and the victims are right here on our side of the border-8	We know that fully one half of the FARC fronts derive their principal financial support from their links with narcotraffickers (2/24, 27	continuing ties between the military and paramilitary groups and specifically ties that go right through the whole structure of the army (2/24, 64	It does not work if the countries themselves are not prepared to gear up and do the job (2/24, 23	

Senate Committee on Appropriations February 24, 2000 - Joint Hearing on Supplemental Request for Plan Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
<p>we have to provide the kind of aid to an ally who has been a stalwart ally of this country to a president who is doing his utmost to prevent human rights abuses; to change a pattern of corruption; and to stand tall in a situation in which it is very difficult to stand tall (2/24, 8</p>		<p>I'm not sure we're doing enough here at home to reduce the demand for drugs. In particular we need to ensure that everyone who wants help to escape drug addiction can get into a treatment program and help educate our youth to stay free of drugs. Otherwise our efforts in Latin America run the risk of simply raising the price addicts pay for drugs (2/24, 11</p>	<p>The FARC guerrillas get \$100 to \$600 million a year. I am told that those insurgents do not have a restriction on not having people who have got higher degrees in their midst that they are probably the best equipped the best trained even to their modernization in terms of communications and command and control they are probably the best in South America today (2/24, 31-32</p>		<p>There is a regional strategy. to fight this on a regional basis. increase cooperation. make sure that all the left hands and all the right hands know what is going on and are working together to try to deal with this problem; and that our assistance gets targeted first where the problem is worst but next is second order of priority to where it might go. the Andean Region unfortunately has the climate the disparities in economic status and all the other things you know that make it a convenient and very productive area for this kind of activity. So we have to work it on a regional basis (2/24, 33</p>	

Senate Committee on Appropriations February 24, 2000 - Joint Hearing on Supplemental Request for Plan Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
a country torn by decades of fighting (2/24, 11		The importance of fighting the scourge of illegal drugs as we have just heard from you is an issue on which we can all agree. The cost is of on an annual basis 52000 dead and \$110 billion each year due to the health costs accidental costs lost time and so on. If my historical recollection is correct these are the numbers respectively that we lost in Vietnam and Korea (2/24, 12	Between 40 and 50 percent and I would not say the guerrillas control it. I would say that the government does not control it. It is contested territory (2/24, 32		To poison the young people of America of the Americas. North America Central America South America. But especially in the consumer countries-57	
Colombia itself will bear most of the cost to implement Plan Colombia (2/24, 11		After the terrible relations with the Samper Administration President Pastrana's tenure offers the United States and the rest of the international community a golden opportunity to work with Colombia in confronting these threats. (2/24, 13	Narcotics money funds the guerrillas funds the paramilitaries and fuels the violence that is tearing at the fiber of Colombia (2/24, 34			

Senate Committee on Appropriations February 24, 2000 - Joint Hearing on Supplemental Request for Plan Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
Colombia is currently enduring a critical societal national security and economic series of problems that stem in great part from the drug trade and the internal conflict which is financed by that trade. This situation has limited the government of Colombia's sovereignty in large parts of the country. These areas have been becoming the prime coca and opium poppy producing zones (2/24, 13		This problem directly affects the United States as drug trafficking and abuse cause the enormous social health and financial damage to our communities (2/24, 13	the FARC now controls an area within Colombia the size of Switzerland (2/24, 37			
Over 80 percent of the world's supply of cocaine is grown processed or transported through Colombia. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency estimates that up to 75 percent of the heroin consumed on the East Coast of the United States comes from Colombia although Colombia produces less than 3 percent of the world's heroin (2/24, 13		Our challenge is as a neighbor and as a partner. And it is to identify the ways in which the U.S. Government can assist Colombia in resolving these problems (2/24, 15	The FARC has often claimed that it supports eradication efforts while at the same time earning millions from drugs (2/24, 38			

Senate Committee on Appropriations February 24, 2000 - Joint Hearing on Supplemental Request for Plan Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
The plan itself was formulated drafted and approved in Colombia by President Pastrana and his team. Without its Colombian origins and its Colombian stamp it would not have the support and commitment of Colombia behind it. Colombian ownership and vigorous Colombia implementation are essential to the future success of the Plan (2/24, 13		We are not content to allow cultivation and production of narcotics to simply be displaced from one Andean country to another (2/24, 18	The FARC has consistently demonstrated their unwillingness to cooperate with the Government of Colombia against the narco traffickers. More than half of the FARC fronts receive support from and provide protection to Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs). Drug money provides a major portion of the FARC's war chest and is the FARC's primary source for sustaining forces conducting combat operations and purchasing weapons (2/24, 38			
Complicity by elements of Colombia's security forces with the right wing militia groups called paramilitaries remains a serious problem. (2/24, 15		The counter-drug struggle provides the underpinning for most of our military engagement activities in the Andean region (2/24, 21				

Senate Committee on Appropriations February 24, 2000 - Joint Hearing on Supplemental Request for Plan Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
<p>Pastrana believes and the U.S. Government agrees that ending the civil conflict and eliminating all of that conflict's harmful side effects is central to solving Colombia's multi-faceted problems (2/24, 15</p>		<p>We have developed what we call a counter-narcotics campaign plan which is a regional plan. Phase one which is about 2 years in length we call the regionalization and stabilization phase. During that phase we would work not just with Colombia but with the other nations in the Andean region to help them to develop the capabilities that they would need to successfully contend with the drug threat. Phase two we call the decisive operations phase. That is when the nations and the region working in a coordinated way would strive to drive a wedge between the various operating modes of a narco trafficking industry. Be it cultivation be it production or be it transport. (2/24, 34 [part 1]</p>				

Senate Committee on Appropriations February 24, 2000 - Joint Hearing on Supplemental Request for Plan Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
At this moment Colombia is a partner which shares our counternarcotics concerns and possesses the will to execute the needed reforms and operations (2/24, 15		Then in phase three we would go to what we call a sustainment phase which would emphasize intelligence collection and sharing where the security forces of the region both military and police would demonstrate the ability to adapt to the changing patterns of activity that the narco trafficking industry has demonstrated it is capable of doing (2/24, 34 [part 2]				
Action now could return Colombia to its rightful historical place as one of the hemisphere's strongest democracies (2/24, 16		I must first emphasize that we recognize clearly the limits of our involvement in Colombia. Our roles are limited to providing training technical advice and equipment support to Colombia's security forces exclusively for counterdrug operations. (2/24, 36				

Senate Committee on Appropriations February 24, 2000 - Joint Hearing on Supplemental Request for Plan Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
Colombia's national sovereignty is increasingly threatened by well-armed and ruthless guerrillas paramilitaries and the narcotics trafficking interests to which they are inextricably linked. Although the Government is not directly at risk these threats are slowly eroding the authority of the central government and depriving it of the ability to govern in outlying areas. It is in these lawless areas where the guerrilla groups paramilitaries and narcotics traffickers flourish that the narcotics industry is finding refuge. As a result large swathes of Colombia are in danger of being narco-						
districts-17						

Senate Committee on Appropriations February 24, 2000 - Joint Hearing on Supplemental Request for Plan Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
There has been an explosive growth in the coca crop in Putumayo in southern Colombia and to a lesser extent in Norte de Santander in the northeast. Putumayo is an area that remains beyond the reach of the government's coca eradication operations. Strong guerrilla presence and weak state authority have contributed to the lawless situation in the Putumayo (2/24, 18						
Colombia has the fourth largest population of displaced persons in the world (2/24, 20						
you and I know that until 1 year ago there was a president by the name of Samper in Colombia whose least interest was in cooperating and taking that personal responsibility or the national responsibility to work on drugs (2/24, 24						

Senate Committee on Appropriations February 24, 2000 - Joint Hearing on Supplemental Request for Plan Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
the reason why we are now up with a very large request is both the character of the problem in Colombia after many years of the Samper Administration a guerrilla movement and now a paramilitary movement that are deriving enormous benefits and so they are seeking to spread this as widely as possible (2/24, 24						
The record shows the military justice system invariably drops charges or fails to prosecute serious cases of abuses. I know there are a few officers who have lost their positions but that falls far short of appropriate legal action (2/24, 25						
General Tapias has developed a 6-year strategy which supports Plan Colombia (2/24, 26						

Senate Committee on Appropriations February 24, 2000 - Joint Hearing on Supplemental Request for Plan Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
there are not institutional linkages between the Armed Forces of Colombia and the paramilitaries. Having said that I cannot rule out local collusion (2/24, 29						
Sir it is not a Vietnam again. I spent 1965 1966 1969 and 1970 in Vietnam and I think I will know it when I see it happening again. When I go to Colombia I do not feel a quagmire sucking at my boots (2/24, 32						
Colombia has a horrible problem (2/24, 33						
Narcotics money funds the guerrillas funds the paramilitaries and fuels the violence that is tearing at the fiber of Colombia (2/24, 34						

Senate Committee on Appropriations February 24, 2000 - Joint Hearing on Supplemental Request for Plan Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
given the right resources and proper training the Colombian military can be effective against the narcotraffickers which increasingly have symbiotic links to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) National Liberation Army (ELN) and paramilitary organizations-36-37.						
Coca production in Colombia has doubled in the past decade and recent estimates have indicated that production may be increasing at even higher rates due to the increased productivity of new crops and a lack of eradication capability (2/24, 39						
We are asking the United States to help provide us with tools to do the job of fighting drugs not to intervene under internal conflict (2/24, 43						

Senate Committee on Appropriations February 24, 2000 - Joint Hearing on Supplemental Request for Plan Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
In spite of the gravity of our problems we are very optimistic. We see the problems clearly and have the will to find and implement necessary solutions (2/24, 44						
President Pastrana has repeatedly made it clear that Colombia is not seeking and will not accept any direct U.S. military intervention in our internal conflict (2/24, 44						
Your president has courageously declared the war on narco-traffickers and certainly we all applaud that (2/24, 47						
Mr. Ambassador as a friend and you are a good friend personally and to our country (2/24, 50						

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations February 25, 2000 - Proposed Emergency AntiDrug Assistance to Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
Colombia biggest supplier of illicit drugs to US (5/283)		drug abuse costs Nation over \$100 billion a year (5/283)	linked up with drug production (5/285)	linked up with drug production (5/285)		
source of 80% of cocaine coming in (5/283)		drug abuse caused immense hardship on millions of Americans (5/284)	protect cocaine labs (5/298)	feudal armies (5/329)		
drug production fuels lawlessness and corruption (5/285)		a neighbor (5/288)	some directly involved in trafficking (5/298)			
farmers cut down rain forest, a world resource (5/286)		thousands of Americans killed every year (5/292)	part and parcel of the drug trade (5/311)			
Government prepared to deal with problem; never happened before in region (5/286)		we have highly skilled professionals down there (5/292)	responsible for massacres, executions, torture (5/321)			
plan is a Colombian plan (5/286)		other problems are significant but our focus is on the drug side (5/308)	criminal terrorists, drug protecting gangs (5/329)			
is a partner who shares our concerns (5/288)		all individuals we train are vetted (5/311)				
military forces have cleaned up their act (5/293)		we know exactly what our role is (5/312)				
problems took them 40 years to get into (5/293)		we are up against traffickers for as long as demand in US (5/313)				
leading source of heroin in US (5/297)		overwhelmingly interests are antidrug (5/316)				
world's No 1 producer of cocaine (5/297)		has unique opportunity (5/321)				
1/3 of country under control of insurgents (5/306)						
CNP ability almost unsurpassed in the world (5/307)						
fragile nature (5/308)						

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations February 25, 2000 - Proposed Emergency AntiDrug Assistance to Colombia						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
poor country (5/308)						
last bastion of coca production in Andean region (5/310)						
their corruption and trafficking sympathies (5/311)						
nothing like Vietnam (5/316)						
nature of the Colombian people to do things in the right way (5/316-7)						
many prefer paramilitaries over guerrillas (5/317)						
many previous leaders frightened (5/318)						
[Pastrana] we rarely find a leader so willing to do what we want (5/318)						
very close to the US closer than Vietnam (5/318)						
directly affects the interests of the US in terms of peace, democracy, human rights, trade, protection of investments, and most importantly drugs (5/318)						
democracy in danger (5/321)						
many levels of violence at work (5/321)						
security forces major source of violence; linked to massacres, executions, torture (5/322)						
serious problems of justice and impunity (5/330-1)						

Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control March 21, 2000 - A Review of the President's Annual Certification Process						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
So I have been hearing these speeches since the 1980s 1970s. I have been reading and following the testimony in these hearings and Mexico and Colombia have promised to do better and better but it hasn't gotten any better--9	It would be better for the United States and for all nations of the world if other markets for cocaine and illegal drugs are not created. It is not going to help us if the Colombians begin to focus on other countries around the world and create additional markets. They will just be stronger. And those nations many of whom are our allies are going to be damaged by this and it is just not good for anybody--65	Most drugs consumed in this country are produced overseas and smuggled here. Those drugs actually kill thousands of Americans and endanger many more every year--1	Marxist group of drug traffickers--66			these drugs got there because some drug thug is pushing them and in most cases the fields and the labs for making the drugs are overseas--2

Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control March 21, 2000 - A Review of the President's Annual Certification Process						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
Colombia as we know has had a huge increase in the last year I believe nearly double the increase in exporting and production of cocaine to the United States. How can that be considered progress?--9		We have a moral obligation and responsibility to ensure the general welfare and of course that general welfare involves the lives of our young people and the safety of our schools and streets--2	Marxist drug traffickers and protectors and kidnappers--66			It was also clear that many of the producing and transiting countries for those drugs did not much care either. Corruption and intimidation of local officials accounted for much of the indifference. But in many cases local authorities were content to ignore local drug production. Doing this required ignoring or not enforcing local laws international agreements and bilateral agreements with our country. That was then and still is not acceptable--2
We are not going to be able to blame our drug problem on Colombia--10		Prior to the March 1 deadline for certification we see countries introducing legislation passing laws eradicating drug crops and capturing elusive drug kingpins. The timing is no coincidence. These countries know that their actions will have an impact on their certification decision. They also know what the U.S. expects from them.--14				

Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control March 21, 2000 - A Review of the President's Annual Certification Process						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
Some people that I respect have told me the Colombian police by and large have been courageous and some of the best support we have gotten in the war against drugs is from the Colombian police department--46		We have conducted major operations inside the United States that have wiped out Colombian and Mexican-controlled cells operating here in this country--18				
to echo your statements about the Colombian National Police. Under the leadership of General Serrano that organization has paid a tremendously high price. They have faced the problems down there- assassinations bribes intimidation that sort of stuff-they have faced it with the utmost courage and the majority of the men and women of that organization are nothing short of heroic--46		If I have a criticism of the war on drugs I think it is that we are looking for causes outside ourselves--67				
Colombia has a responsibility to defeat the insurgents and it is astounding to me that they have granted a safe harbor within the nation of Colombia the size of Vermont--46						
second oldest democracy in the Western Hemisphere--66						

Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control March 21, 2000 - A Review of the President's Annual Certification Process						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
and Colombia have promised to do better and better but it hasn't gotten any better--9						

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations March 23, 2000 - Business Meeting to Mark Up the Technical Assistance, Trade Promotion, & Anti-Corruption Act for FY 2001						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
Colombia has a military it has a police force both that is overwhelmed but also portions of which have been corrupt and engaged in activities that are-now I happen to by the way support the aid package to Colombia.. And yet they are a corrupt operation themselves theoretically--459-460		The point is I would make the case to my colleagues that the certification process which precluded us from dealing with Colombia for a period of 4 or 5 or 6 years in fact contributed to the very quagmire that exists today because we were precluded dealing from it--463			The challenges to governments in our own hemisphere are in many ways greater today than ever before and while we are fortunate that all but one of the nations in this hemisphere have democratically elected governments we cannot ignore the fact that many of them are grappling with serious economic social and political challenges that are putting enormous pressures on their institutions. And we are seeing that today in Ecuador Venezuela Colombia not to mention in Bolivia Peru and there is a long list--467	
In the case of Colombia I know as part of a program here down in the Yanos area of Colombia in the flat areas there are just thousands and thousands of miles of rivers which are a great source where the drug trafficking moves. The ability to patrol those rivers is awesome literally thousands of miles of navigable waters. I know that part of the plan or program to provide assistance includes I think some of these vessels for that particular effort--476						

Senate Committee on Appropriations April 6, 2000 - H.R. 4871/S. 2900						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
Poor Colombia is in an emergency--237	They are wonderful people. They have a million internal refugees. A half-million have fled the country.--237	Illegal drugs kill 52000 Americans a year--238				
They have lost control of 40 percent of the land area of their nation. They are now the dominant producer of the cocaine and heroin that come into the United States. Ninety percent of the cocaine in America originated in or transited through Colombia and some 70 percent of the heroin seizures in the United States last year--237		An estimated 90 percent of the cocaine that enters the United States originates in or passes through Colombia. Up to six metric tons of heroin is produced annually in Colombia and much of this total is shipped to the United States. Colombian heroin comprises 65 percent of the heroin seized today in the United States.--243				
Colombian democratic partner--238						
If unchecked the rapid expansion of coca crops and cocaine production in Colombia threatens to increase significantly the global supply of cocaine over the next several years--243						
democratically elected government of Colombian--243						
No single solution can cure all of Colombia's difficulties--243						

Senate Committee on Appropriations April 13, 2000 - H.R. 4811 and 5526/S. 2522						
Colombia	Colombians	United States	FARC	Paramilitaries	Region	World
More than four-fifths of the cocaine flooding our Nation either comes from Colombia or passes through it and most of Colombia's heroin production also ends up here--204	Only Colombians can devise a solution for Colombia's ills--207	request includes funds to help the people of Colombia reclaim their country from drug criminals--204				
I met with Colombian President Pastrana and some of you may also have had that opportunity. I find him a courageous leader with a bold plan for lifting his country up--204		investments in promoting democracy in key countries such as Colombia. No country is better equipped than ours at helping nations to strengthen democratic institutions and practices--206				

APPENDIX B – CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS: INDIVIDUAL SUBJECT CODING SHEETS

COLOMBIA			
Out of control	Worthy	Drug Threat	US Value/Interest
in crisis (H 2/15, 1)	Latin America's oldest democracy (H 2/15, 1)	supplies 80 percent of the world's cocaine (H 2/15, 13)	matters both economically and strategically (H 2/15, 15)
no doubt there is a crisis (H 2/15, 16)	heroic efforts of the government (H 2/15, 31)	accounts for 75 percent of heroin on US streets (H 2/15, 13)	20 percent of US daily supply of oil imports (H 2/15, 15)
35 year civil war killed 30,000 people and displaced over a million (H 2/15, 16)	have come up with a conceptual document (H 2/15, 39)	supplies 80 percent of the world's cocaine (H 2/15, 16)	a major national security concern (H 2/15, 24)
governance almost impossible (H 2/15, 16)	police high integrity high courage force (H 2/15, 39)	producing more than 400 tons of deadly cocaine annually (H 2/15, 26)	America's backyard (H 2/15, 24)
unlikely civil war can be changed by \$1.6 billion (H 2/15, 16)	pretty decent democratic government (H 2/15, 62)	cocaine production gone up 140 percent in less than 4 years (H 2/15, 36)	national security regional threat (H 2/15, 27)
will draw us further into the internal political situation (H 2/15, 17)	responsible democratic government (H 2/15, 65)	the nexus, the center of mass of illegal drugs (H 2/15, 37)	narco-based war raging and the good guys, our friends and neighbors, are losing (H 2/15, 27)
beleaguered Andean nation (H 2/15, 26)	is not El Salvador isn't Vietnam (H 2/15, 75)	always been world #1 producer cocaine hydrochloride (H 2/15, 103)	second biggest supplier of oil by-products (H 2/15, 33)
narco-based war raging and the good guys, our friends and neighbors, are losing (H 2/15, 27)	no shortage of courage political will (H 2/15, 75)	that is where the heroin that is killing our children is coming from (H 2/29, 43)	wealthy in natural resources oil, gas, flowers, coffee beans (H 2/15, 37)
negotiation undermined by rising narcotics trade (H 2/15, 28)	President is now clean (H 2/15, 79)	Colombia's increased drug production is fueling the vast criminal enterprises of drug traffickers guerrillas and paramilitary groups within and outside Colombia's borders. (H 3/23, 1278)	fifth largest economy in Latin America (H 2/15, 165)
armed forces have long history of human rights violations (H 2/15, 29)	can confront the narco-guerilla threat (H 2/15, 162)	We are here precisely because drug production in Colombia is out of control. (H 3/23, 1319)	key democracy (H 2/16, 6)
beautiful country mired in crisis after crisis (H 2/15, 30)	they're not fighting narcotics for us but for them (H 2/15, 138)	Colombia has become the center of the cocaine trade (H 3/23, 1335)	important in its region and at a pivotal point in its democratic growth(H 2/16, 7)

COLOMBIA			
Out of control	Worthy	Drug Threat	US Value/Interest
Colombia is the problem (H 2/15, 36)	the Colombian military has made dramatic progress in its current conduct. (H 3/23, 1281	Colombia is the biggest trafficker of heroin and cocaine to our country (H 3/29, H1482	Vietnam was half the world away. Colombia is as close as Denver (H 3/23, 1285
decades of endemic violence (H 2/15, 37)	Colombia's a worthy cause. the oldest democracy in our hemisphere. (H 3/23, 1285	the amount of drugs from Colombia is rising dramatically. Now produces 60 percent of the world's cocaine crop an astounding 90 percent of which makes its way here to the United States (H 3/29, 1486	Colombia's a worthy cause. It's the second most populous nation in all of South America...the oldest democracy in our hemisphere. It is centrally located on the Andean ridge a region of strategic importance to the United States (H 3/23, 1285
in economic crisis (H 2/15, 38)	despite the very turbulent and violent history of Colombia it's economy has always done very well. (H 3/23, 1294	more than any other country in the world Colombia supplies the heroin and the cocaine that has infested our families and our neighborhoods across America (H 3/29, 1490	Colombia is in our back yard (H 3/23, 1310
net importer of food (H 2/15, 38)	Colombia is not Central America. Colombia is an open democratic system. (H 3/23, 1308	Eighty percent of the cocaine 75 percent of the heroin consumed in our Nation comes from Colombia. (H 3/29, 1509	Colombia is key to the region's stability (H 3/23, 1352
huge national security health educational threat (H 2/15, 41)	There is not [a civil conflict] in Colombia. There is one band of outlaws and there is a civil society in Colombia. (H 3/23, 1308	Colombian drug fueled crisis (H 3/29, 1509	At this moment Colombia is partner who shares our counter narcotics concerns (H 3/23, 1369
third largest recipient of assistance (H 2/15, 59)	Served by first class civilian and military leaders (H 3/23, 1345	Of these amounts 90% of the cocaine and 75% of the heroin originate in Colombia (H 3/29, 1513	The specter of a consolidated narcostate only 3 hours by plane from Miami has made it patently clear that our Nation's vital security interests are at stake (H 3/29, 1509
giant country with trackless jungles and rivers for highways (H 2/15, 61)	Colombia possesses the will to execute needed reforms and operations (H 3/23, 1369	There is an explosion of coca cultivation taking place in southern Colombia (H 3/29, 1521	Colombia is a hemispheric neighbor (H 3/29, 1513

COLOMBIA			
Out of control	Worthy	Drug Threat	US Value/Interest
dispute that is 40 years old (H 2/15, 64)	Democratically elected government (H 3/29, 1486)	Colombia is the source of 90 percent of the cocaine that comes into this country. Colombia is the source of 65 percent of the heroin that reaches our neighborhoods our schools and our children. (H 3/29, 1522)	Colombia is third largest recipient of our foreign aid and no net reduction in coca production or cocaine availability in the US (H 3/29, 1534)
have a huge drug abuse problem (H 2/15, 68)	the President of Colombia is a brave and courageous man. (H 3/29, 1508)	flow of coca leaves to the United States. (H 3/29, 1524)	Colombia our troubled Andean neighbor (H 3/29, 1544)
lost whole elite counterinsurgency battalion (H 2/15, 75)	our allies in Colombia who are all on the front lines in the war against illegal drugs (H 3/29, 1509)	poison created in Colombia and other countries in our hemisphere is coming in and poisoning our kids and destroying their future. (H 3/29, 1525 (H 3/29, 26	Our democratic allies in Colombia who are fighting the narcotraffickers (2/8, 6
President is now clean (H 2/15, 79)	the sincere efforts of a friendly Democratically elected government (H 3/29, 1487)	heroin is produced in Colombia. In fact in the eastern half of the United States almost the entire heroin supply coming into this country is from Colombia (H 3/29, 1528)	key countries of Colombia (2/8, 12
on the brink of disaster (H 2/15, 83)	the democratically (H 3/29, elected government of Colombia is serious today about fighting the war on drugs (H 3/29, 1506	Colombia is now the source cocaine and heroin coming into the US. That is what \$600 million in Colombia has done (H 3/29, 1552	Colombia is a partner which shares our counternarcotics concerns (2/24, 15
appease the guerrillas and the narcotraffickers (H 2/15, 83)	A partner that shares our determination to put the drug traffickers out of business (H 3/29, 1545)	Colombian drug lords have shifted their operations and chosen Haiti (H 4/12, 2	very close to the US closer than Vietnam (2/25, 318)
deny granting us extradition (H 2/15, 85)	Colombia is the oldest democracy in Latin America and is clearly under siege (H 3/29, 1512)	most of the drugs transiting through Haiti to the US originate in Colombia (H 4/12, 80	directly affects the interests of the US in terms of peace, democracy, hr, trade, protection of investments, and most importantly drugs (2/25, 318)

COLOMBIA			
Out of control	Worthy	Drug Threat	US Value/Interest
military is very backward (H 2/15, 139)	Colombia is the oldest democracy in South America (H 3/29, 1525)	more than half of the world's coca production. Maybe as much as 80 percent of it are coming out of Colombia (2/8, 53)	
always been violent (H 2/15, 150)	Colombia's President Pastrana has taken bold action (H 3/29, 1530)	total production in Colombia has increased at an explosive rate (2/8, 85)	
government lost confidence of the people (H 2/15, 150)	it is the longest standing democracy under siege (H 3/29, 1531)	Colombia is a country of emphasis for the drugs-coca and poppy grown there and the freedom with which it finds its way into the United States (2/10, 168)	
government squandered its negotiating advantage (H 2/15, 151)	a stable democracy that even goes through transition of power. (H 3/29, 1532)	300,000 acres of coca under cultivation in the jungles and mountains (2/22, 21)	
Congress disgracefully weak (H 2/15, 164)	President Pastrana's courageous steps to address the complex and daunting problems in Colombia. (H 4/6, 8)	the center of gravity... a massive U.S. threat posed by cocaine and heroin production (2/22, 27)	
judicial system is woefully weak (H 2/15, 201)	the program [Plan Colombia] is a prodemocracy transition program that could spell the difference between success and failure for the oldest democratic society in South America. (H 4/6, 65-66)	Colombian cocaine and heroin cause of much of the crime, violence, health problems, welfare problems in US (2/22, 27)	
drug crisis that grips Colombia (H 2/16, 3)	coordination with the Colombian Air Force (H 4/12, 35)	world's greatest expansion in narcotics cultivation (2/22, 46)	
drug war is about out of control (H 2/16, 18)	good Colombian police (H 4/12, 80)	coca growth and cocaine production as we know have exploded. The more the Administration spends in Colombia the more coca is grown (2/24, 2)	

COLOMBIA			
Out of control	Worthy	Drug Threat	US Value/Interest
police cannot protect itself as it goes into the southern region(H 2/16, 37	we have greater cooperation with Colombia (H 4/12, 85	Eighty percent of the cocaine is grown in Colombia (2/24, 8	
judicial authorities overwhelmed by chaos (H 2/29, 4)	Under President Pastrana's leadership Bogota is beginning to improve on its 1999 counterdrug efforts. (2/2, 13	up to 75 percent of the heroin consumed on the East Coast of the United States comes from Colombia although Colombia produces less than 3 percent of the world's heroin (2/24, 13	
in the midst of a rapidly evolving emergency 3/8)	the government itself tends to be more cooperative in terms of extraditions and other kinds of activity (2/2, 50	There has been an explosive growth in the coca crop in Putumayo in southern Colombia and to a lesser extent in Norte de Santander in the northeast. (2/24, 18	
it is a nightmare (H 2/29, 9)	while they are certainly not winning they're trying very hard to hold their own in a very difficult situation (2/2, 51	Coca production in Colombia has doubled in the past decade and recent estimates have indicated that production may be increasing at even higher rates due to the increased productivity of new crops and a lack of eradication capability (2/24, 39	
unique place empty,desolate land (H 2/29, 33)	I have great respect for President Pastrana. I think he is a remarkable leader (2/8, 53	Colombia biggest supplier of illicit drugs to US (2/25, 283)	
high school grads exempt from combat (H 2/29, 36)	Colombia has been heroic in its efforts (2/8, 53	source of 80% of cocaine coming in (2/25, 283)	
today's democratic leaders tomorrow's drug barons (H 2/29, 43)	hemisphere's oldest functioning democracy (2/22, 21)	leading source of heroin in US (2/25, 297)	
giant roadless area with jungle (H 2/29, 47)	first class civilian and military leadership team (2/22, 73)	world's No 1 producer of cocaine (2/25, 297)	
in an emergency (H 2/29, 52)	turning the corner (2/22, 74)	last bastion of coca production in Andean region (2/25, 310)	

COLOMBIA			
Out of control	Worthy	Drug Threat	US Value/Interest
fleeing their homes, institutions under pressure, economy starting to unwind, net importer of food (H 2/29, 52)	has been a stalwart ally of this country a president who is doing his utmost to prevent human rights abuses; to change a pattern of corruption; and to stand tall (2/24, 8	Colombia has had a huge increase in the last year nearly double the increase in exporting and production of cocaine to the United States. (3/21, 10)	
close collaboration of the Colombian military with paramilitary groups responsible for massacres and widespread human rights violations against the civilian population (H 3/8, 7	Colombia itself will bear most of the cost to implement Plan Colombia (2/24, 11	It would be better for the United States and for all nations of the world if other markets for cocaine and illegal drugs are not created. It is not going to help us if the Colombians begin to focus on other countries around the world and create additional markets. They will just be stronger. (3/21, 65	
a massive influx of weapons will do nothing to quell the Colombian government's thirst for violence (H 3/8, 7	The plan itself was formulated drafted and approved in Colombia by President Pastrana and his team. (2/24, 13	They are now the dominant producer of the cocaine and heroin that come into the United States. Ninety percent of the cocaine in America originated in or transited through Colombia and some 70 percent of the heroin seizures in the United States last year (4/6, 237	
Government security forces continued to commit numerous serious abuses including extra judicial killings and torture (H 3/8, 12	Colombia possesses the will to execute the needed reforms and operations (2/24, 15)	the rapid expansion of coca crops and cocaine production in Colombia threatens to increase significantly the global supply of cocaine (4/6, 243	
historically Colombian governments have not invested in the more rural areas. (H 3/8, 25	Action now could return Colombia to its rightful historical place as one of the hemisphere's strongest democracies (2/24, 16	More than four-fifths of the cocaine flooding our Nation either comes from Colombia or passes through it and most of Colombia's heroin production also ends up here (4/13, 204)	

COLOMBIA			
Out of control	Worthy	Drug Threat	US Value/Interest
do not have the kind of legal infrastructure and institutional infrastructure that we see in countries that have more well developed systems of checks and balances judicial independence the rule of law (H 3/8, 28	General Tapias has developed a 6-year strategy which supports Plan Colombia (2/24, 26		
To date the Department has been able to avoid becoming entangled in Colombia's civil conflict that has raged for decades and killed over 30000 people. (H 3/23, 1278	it is not a Vietnam again. When I go to Colombia I do not feel a quagmire sucking at my boots (2/24, 32		
Colombia is mired in an intractable and longstanding civil war (H 3/23, 1279	given the right resources and proper training the Colombian military can be effective against the narcotraffickers (2/24, 36-37)		
Colombia is a very very violent country. Over 20000 people get murdered there a year. (H 3/23, 1281	We are asking the United States to help provide us with tools to do the job of fighting drugs not to intervene under internal conflict (2/24, 43		
If WE get speedy action by the Colombian military by the Colombian Congress rather WE hope to start soon a training program and help the Colombian judicial military authorities bring about the reform that WE'RE currently waiting on the legislation for. (H 3/23, 1282 [emphasis added]	In spite of the gravity of our problems we are very optimistic. We see the problems clearly and have the will to find and implement necessary solutions (2/24, 44		
reassert control over the narcotics-rich departments of Southern Colombia (H 3/23, 1284	President Pastrana has repeatedly made it clear that Colombia is not seeking and will not accept any direct U.S. military intervention in our internal conflict (2/24, 44		

COLOMBIA			
Out of control	Worthy	Drug Threat	US Value/Interest
The money the traffickers control is estimated to be as high as \$10 or more billion within the Colombian economy. This is something that's going to risk the undermining of Colombian society. (H 3/23, 1286	Your president has courageously declared the war on narco-traffickers and certainly we all applaud that (2/24, 47		
President Samper if you will all recall was tainted by narcotrafficking dollars in winning his presidency. And we were unable to work with him. (H 3/23, 1287	Mr. Ambassador as a friend and you are a good friend personally and to our country (2/24, 50		
the Colombian Congress budgeted \$1.6 billion for their banking system to make up for what had been embezzled. (H 3/23, 1299	Government prepared to deal with problem; never happened before in region (2/25, 286)		
Colombia's civil conflict that has raged for decades and killed over 35000 people (H 3/23, 1327	plan is a Colombian plan (2/25, 286)		
The Colombian Government is unable to exert effective control over thousands of square miles of its own territory (H 3/23, 1364	is a partner who shares our concerns (2/25, 288)		
tainted Samper administration (H 3/23, 1364	military forces have cleaned up their act (2/25, 293)		
the political situation in Colombia has spiraled out of control (H 3/29, 1487	CNP ability almost unsurpassed in the world (2/25, 307)		
military with one of the worst human rights' records in hemisphere; not controllable by government nor US military (H 3/29, 1487	nothing like Vietnam (2/25, 316)		
The Colombian military has strong ties to paramilitaries which commit unspeakable atrocities (H 3/29, 1487	nature of the Colombian people to do things in the right way (2/25, 316-7)		
murderous Colombian military with a list of human rights' violations a mile long (H 3/29, 1487	[Pastrana] we rarely find a leader so willing to do what we want (2/25, 318)		

COLOMBIA			
Out of control	Worthy	Drug Threat	US Value/Interest
most violent country in the hemisphere (H 3/29, 1489	the Colombian National Police. the majority of the men and women of that organization are nothing short of heroic (3/21, 46		
this Colombia situation is a civil war (H 3/29, 1509	the Colombian police have been courageous and some of the best support we have gotten in the war against drugs is from the Colombian police department-46		
Colombia's brutal military (H 3/29, 1510	second oldest democracy in the Western Hemisphere (3/21, 66		
Colombia is the oldest democracy in Latin America and is clearly under siege (H 3/29, 1512	Colombian democratic partner (4/6, 238		
ongoing cooperation between elements of the Colombian military and the paramilitary organizations (H 3/29, 1513	democratically elected government of Colombian (4/6, 243		
abusive military regime (H 3/29, 1513	Colombian President Pastrana... a courageous leader with a bold plan for lifting his country up (4/13, 204		
country has enormous problems of poverty corruption lack of control of its own territory. Forty percent is under control of the rebels (H 3/29, 1529			
it is the longest standing democracy under siege (H 3/29, 1531			
brutal antidemocratic corrupt military works hand in hand with paramilitary groups deeply implicated in drug trade. Military support for paramilitary remains national in scope (H 3/29, 1532			

COLOMBIA			
Out of control	Worthy	Drug Threat	US Value/Interest
Colombian military, key government officials must be involved or the drug trade would not be able to flourish (H 3/29, 1532)			
Colombian civil society has raised serious questions about the U.S. aid proposal. (H 3/29, 1532)			
Colombia has had a 40 year civil war an ongoing drug problem and an army and a police force that have not worked together (H 3/29, 1534			
Colombia is third largest recipient of our foreign aid and no net reduction in coca production or cocaine availability in the US (H 3/29, 1534			
A military with the worst record of human rights abuses in this hemisphere (H 3/29, 1534			
the Colombian military has been known to cooperate with drug traffickers. Colombian military officers also provide support to rightwing paramilitary organizations that traffic in illegal drugs and carry out extrajudicial killings and other gross violations of human rights (H 3/29, 1535			
a corrupt military in Colombia to deal with drug interdiction? A military that is part and parcel of the drug problem itself because they have been involved with drug dealing and selling and shipment over and over again in addition to being involved with some of the worst human rights abuses that have taken place in that country (H 3/29, 1536			

COLOMBIA			
Out of control	Worthy	Drug Threat	US Value/Interest
Colombia is a beautiful country. It is one of the most diverse countries in the world. It is one of the oldest democracies in Latin America. It is now plagued; it is torn apart (H 3/29, 1542			
One of the most dangerous places on earth (H 3/29, 1542			
The military has had an abysmal human rights record. (H 3/29, 1545			
President Pastrana's courageous steps to address the complex and daunting problems in Colombia. (H 4/6, 8)			
The big mystery is, where does the money come from in Colombia? (H 4/6, 60)			
Colombian Navy lacked gas to pursue the many fast boats carrying drugs to Haiti. (H 4/12, 81)			
Terrorism will be a serious threat to Americans especially in Colombia (2/2, 24			
the government of Colombia and specifically their security force is enormously challenged in dealing with the insurgent threat in rural Colombia (2/2, 50			
The Colombian Army while it appears able to protect large cities and the urban environment is not able to control the countryside where the insurgents operate (2/2, 50			
With regard to the problems in Colombia everything seems to be interwoven the narcotraffickers and corruption and the paramilitaries. (2/8, 52			
the government in Bogota does not have control over large portions of its country (2/8, 54			

COLOMBIA			
Out of control	Worthy	Drug Threat	US Value/Interest
the conflict in Colombia has forced thousands of civilians from their homes. (2/10, 172			
high murder rate and endemic violence (2/22, 1)			
most threatened nation (2/22, 73)			
a Colombian problem (2/22, 92)			
incapable of defeating the guerrillas (2/22, 97)			
if it gets its act together (2/22, 97)			
government has not gotten its act together (2/22, 99)			
they don't have capacity to absorb this (2/22, 103)			
If the Colombian government meets the test and demonstrates political will the Administration should acknowledge that we are prepared to do whatever it takes (2/24, 3			
40-year civil war and violence and corruption associated with the drug trade has inflicted a terrible toll on that country (2/24, 5.			
This is an institution that has a sordid record of human rights violations corruption and even involvement in drug trafficking. (2/24, 5			
And I am concerned about the stability of Colombia (2/24, 8			
30 to 40 percent of the land mass of Colombia is today controlled by narcoterrorists. (2/24, 8)			
a country torn by decades of fighting (2/24, 11			

COLOMBIA			
Out of control	Worthy	Drug Threat	US Value/Interest
Colombia is currently enduring a critical societal national security and economic series of problems. This has limited the government's sovereignty in large parts of the country. (2/24, 13			
Complicity by Colombia's security forces with the called paramilitaries remains a serious problem. (2/24, 15			
Pastrana believes and the U.S. Government agrees that ending the civil conflict is central to solving Colombia's multi-faceted problems (2/24, 15			
Colombia's national sovereignty is increasingly threatened by well-armed and ruthless guerrillas paramilitaries and the narcotrafficking interests (2/24, 17)			
Putumayo is an area that remains beyond the reach of the government's coca eradication operations. Strong guerrilla presence and weak state authority have contributed to the lawless situation in the Putumayo (2/24, 18			
Colombia has the fourth largest population of displaced persons in the world (2/24, 20			
until 1 year ago there was a president Samper in Colombia whose least interest was in cooperating and taking that personal responsibility or the national responsibility to work on drugs (2/24, 24			
the reason is both the character of the problem in Colombia after many years of the Samper Administration a guerrilla movement and now a paramilitary movement that are deriving enormous benefits (2/24, 24			

COLOMBIA			
Out of control	Worthy	Drug Threat	US Value/Interest
The military justice system invariably drops charges or fails to prosecute serious cases of abuses. (2/24, 25)			
there are not institutional linkages between the Armed Forces of Colombia and the paramilitaries. Having said that I cannot rule out local collusion (2/24, 29)			
Colombia has a horrible problem (2/24, 33)			
Narcotics money funds the guerrillas funds the paramilitaries and fuels the violence that is tearing at the fiber of Colombia (2/24, 34)			
continuing ties between the military and paramilitary groups and specifically ties that go right through the whole structure of the army (2/24, 64)			
drug production fuels lawlessness and corruption (2/25, 285)			
farmers cut down rain forest, a world resource (2/25, 286)			
problems took them 40 years to get into (2/25, 293)			
1/3 of country under control of insurgents (2/25, 306)			
fragile nature (2/25, 308)			
poor country (2/25, 308)			
their corruption and trafficking sympathies (2/25, 311)			
many previous leaders frightened (2/25, 318)			
democracy in danger (2/25, 321)			
many levels of violence at work (2/25, 321)			
security forces major source of violence; linked to massacres, executions, torture (2/25, 322)			

COLOMBIA			
Out of control	Worthy	Drug Threat	US Value/Interest
serious problems of justice and impunity (2/25, 330-1)			
I have been hearing these speeches since the 1980s 1970s. Mexico and Colombia have promised to do better and better but it hasn't gotten any better (3/21, 9			
Colombia has a responsibility to defeat the insurgents and it is astounding to me that they have granted a safe harbor within the nation of Colombia the size of Vermont (3/21, 46			
and Colombia have promised to do better and better but it hasn't gotten any better (3/21, 9			
Colombia has a military it has a police force both that is overwhelmed but also portions of which have been corrupt and engaged in activities that are- they are a corrupt operation themselves theoretically (3/23, 459-460			
in the Yanos area of Colombia in the flat areas there are just thousands and thousands of miles of rivers which are a great source where the drug trafficking moves. (3/23, 476			
Poor Colombia is in an emergency (4/6, 237			
They have lost control of 40 percent of the land area of their nation. (4/6, 237			
They have a million internal refugees. A half-million have fled the country. (4/6, 237			
No single solution can cure all of Colombia's difficulties (4/6, 243			

COLOMBIANS			
Feckless	Amenable	Victims	Feudal
elite do not have the will (H 2/29, 6)	the package ...has the support of the Colombian people (H 2/16, 37)	narco-based war raging and the good guys, our friends and neighbors, are losing (H 2/15, 27)	elite do not have the will (H 2/29, 6)
Colombians do not take this very seriously (H 3/23, 1298)	Only Colombians can devise a solution for Colombia's ills (4/13, 207)	people who have sacrificed so much (H 2/15, 30)	in Colombian it's no fun being in their elite class. It's not like they don't have their worries (H 3/23, 1302)
ruling elite in Colombia their sons do not serve in combat. (H 3/29, 1504)		enormous bravery of the people (H 2/15, 150)	Secretary Sheridan you've indicated and you gave a little brief description of how the elite - and you didn't talk too much about the peasants - but you do have a disparity in wealth throughout those countries of those that have and those that don't have. (H 3/23, 1306)
wealthier Colombians are leaving that country in droves. Apparently they are more than willing to fight to the last drop of American blood. (H 3/29, 1536)		peaceful people involved in savage violence (H 2/29, 51)	ruling elite in Colombia their sons do not serve in combat. (H 3/29, 1504)
We have not seen the elites of Colombia stand up to the occasion and meet the needs of the poor people in that country. The disparity in income and the poverty level there is so oppressive yet the elites are running off to Florida. (H 3/29, 1540)		only two percent of the population of Colombia approved ... of the activities of the insurgent groups ... and the relationship that they have forged with the narco-traffickers (H 3/23, 1301)	We have not seen the elites of Colombia stand up to the occasion and meet the needs of the poor people in that country. The disparity in income and the poverty level there is so oppressive yet the elites are running off to Florida. (H 3/29, 1540)
the Colombian people who have the most to lose seem to be doing less...the Colombians are expecting the United States of America brave young Americans to fight their war for them (H 3/29, 1543)		only 4 percent of the people support the FARC (H 3/29, 1531)	

COLOMBIANS			
Feckless	Amenable	Victims	Feudal
Some of them are just not going to be able to stay where they are. Some of them were sort of like day workers anyway. They are not really committed to that part of the land but they are there for the money they can make (2/10, 173		patriotic Colombians who are sacrificing their lives because of our abuse (H 3/29, 1532	
some people down there may give lip service but then when pushed to actually do something are unwilling to do it. (2/24, 29)		millions of Colombians have taken to the streets demanding an end to the violence. (H 3/29, 1532)	
Colombians do not support fumigation and crop eradication. (H 3/29, 1532		The people of Colombia have suffered so many years because of drugs and because of the civil war whatever they are calling it down there and so we want to help them. (H 3/29, 1539	
Colombia law prohibits sending high school graduates or above into combat (2/24, 30		Successive generations of Colombian children are growing up in a country where profits from illegal drugs fuel daily violence weaken government institutions and finance terrorist activities that threaten human rights and the future of our democracy (2/24, 45	
many prefer paramilitaries over guerrillas (2/25, 317)		nearly 40 million law-abiding and peace-loving citizens of Colombia (2/24, 45	
		They are wonderful people. They have a million internal refugees. A half-million have fled the country. (4/6, 237	
		the innocent people of Colombia. (H 3/29, 1487	

UNITED STATES						
Besieged	Victim	Capable	Regional Overseer	Self-Interested	Culpable	Noble
facing one of the greatest challenges to its security (H 2/15, 1)	people dying in the US a result of the flood of drugs and we haven't been doing anything about it (H 2/15, 21)	have an overall drug strategy (H 2/15, 35)	has a great responsibility in addressing crisis (H 2/15, 16)	primary concern is enormous increase of the flow of drugs (H 2/15, 16)	slow to react to the threat to our Nation's security (H 2/15, 26)	we cannot substitute US thinking for their own approach (H 2/15, 38)
torrent and glut of deadly narcotics pouring across our borders (H 2/15, 13)	children dying all over this country (H 2/15, 33)	we have achieved successes in Peru Bolivia (H 2/15, 36)	war in Colombia is our war (H 2/15, 21)	must consider the grave consequences of introduction of US personnel (H 2/15, 16)	we export the chemicals, we export the weapons, we export the dollars (H 2/15, 28)	we are not going to save Colombia; Colombians are (H 2/15, 40)
drugs and death spilling onto our shores (H 2/15, 13)	in 1997 15,973 lost their lives to drug related causes (H 2/15, 35)	we vet every person that receives USG training (H 2/15, 106)	if we don't do something we may have to be involved (H 2/15, 23)	long standing skepticism about intervention (H 2/15, 16)	study of cocaine found treatment 23 times more effective than eradication (H 2/15, 29)	need to respect Colombian systems (H 2/15, 138)
influx of illegal drugs is our greatest central challenge (H 2/15, 15)	52,000 dead a year (H 2/15, 37)	must fight demand while attacking drugs at source (H 2/15, 152)	now that we have admitted the serious problem exists we can start treating the cause in Colombia (H 2/15, 27)	must justify military action in terms of national security (H 2/15, 16)	ethical to escalate the war to prevent Americans from buying cocaine? (H 2/15, 29)	can only do what the Colombian Government is ready to accept finally they have come around (H 2/15, 147)
we face an insidious national security threat (H 2/15, 15)	50,000 and 15,900 direct deaths ravages of drugs on our streets (H 2/15, 60)	Colombia can confront the current narco-guerrilla threat, ... if it has the ... support of the United States (H 2/15, 162)	we have a deep moral obligation to help our brothers and sisters in the south fight (H 2/15, 28)	primary interest is to stop cocaine and heroin (H 2/15, 17)	demonstrated failure of militarized efforts (H 2/15, 29)	we could not come up with a strategy and impose it upon Colombia (H 2/29, 10-1)

UNITED STATES						
Besieged	Victim	Capable	Regional Overseer	Self-Interested	Culpable	Noble
has tremendous demands... limiting the production and transport of these dangerous drugs into the United States.(H 2/15, 16)	we have never experienced anything domestically like the deadly poison pouring out of Colombia (H 2/15, 202)	our efforts in Peru and Bolivia were highly successful(H 2/16, 37)	hemispheric stability very important to interests (H 2/15, 30)	no. 1 objective is reduction of cocaine and heroin destroying the region and the American people H 2/15, 82-83)	our money fuels crime and has a corrosive impact (H 2/15, 36)	If we are going to eradicate the crops we have got to teach the camposinos how to grow something as an alternative (H 3/29, 1555
if we lose it, we are in deep trouble (H 2/15, 139)	deluge of drugs on our streets killing our young people (H 2/15, 202)	pushing with direct confrontation with FARC (H 2/29, 4)	our colleague President Fujimori (H 2/15, 32)	we are talking about aid that helps America and if we talk about the drug issue as we have been on Colombia we want to make sure that our children are protected(H 2/16, 41	policy of interfering in another country's civil war (H 2/15, 64)	goal is to see Colombia supported (2/22, 2)
we are in perhaps the fight of our lives in terms of the challenge with narcotics and we cannot afford to turn our back on that issue and that problem (H 3/23, 1310	when our kids drop dead of an overdose the heroin came out of Colombia (H 2/29, 9)	we have a decent plan to allow Colombians to establish control (H 2/29, 27)	we have acheived successes in Peru Bolivia (H 2/15, 36)	national interest to reduce production of cocaine heroin in Latin America (H 2/29, 27)	principal responsibility ought to be to reduce consumption of drugs (H 2/15, 83)	Our challenge is as a neighbor and as a partner. And it is to identify the ways in which the U.S. Government can assist Colombia in resolving these problems (2/24, 15

UNITED STATES						
Besieged	Victim	Capable	Regional Overseer	Self-Interested	Culpable	Noble
the flow of drugs into the U.S. poses a direct threat to our children... We also know that the potency of Colombia's cocaine today and heroin today is rising making it even more likely that today's curious kids ...could get hooked more easily (H 3/29, 1486	this is what is killing our children (H 2/29, 30)	our system-our economic system and our political system which are multi-party liberal democratic and a free market-that our system works better than anything else anybody in the world has tried in our lifetimes. (H 3/15, 27	stand with democratic partners (H 2/15, 37)	our purpose is counterdrug only (H 2/29, 66)	US cannot substitute our own calculus (H 2/15, 84)	we recognize clearly the limits of our involvement in Colombia. Our roles are limited to providing training technical advice and equipment support to Colombia's security forces exclusively for counterdrug operations. (2/24, 36
We cannot simply put our head in the sand and pretend that the emergence of a narco-state in our own back yard would not adversely impact our national security (H 3/29, 1487	toll that illegal drug use takes upon our Country... thousands of Americans killed every year whole communities damaged and destroyed over \$100 billion worth of damages to our economy (H 3/23, 1280	if we shape international security environment skillfully we will respond to fewer crises and the uncertain future for which we are preparing will be far less uncertain (H 3/23, 1359	pressure Pastrana (H 2/15, 72)	Proponents of this proposal believe it is the correct solution to assist the Colombian government in reestablishing sovereignty over their southern areas of the country where narcotic and guerilla activities are found. (H 3/23, 1277	forced to rely upon GOC (H 2/15, 86)	request includes funds to help the people of Colombia reclaim their country from drug criminals (4/13, 204

UNITED STATES						
Besieged	Victim	Capable	Regional Overseer	Self-Interested	Culpable	Noble
Illicit drugs pose a clear and present threat to the well-being of American society as well as our entire hemisphere. (H 3/29, 1506	cocaine unchecked right now in southern Colombia is headed to the United States... It ends up destroying our families our communities. And that's what this package is all about. (H 3/23, 1280	Plan Colombia was developed over the last number of months by the Colombians and by us on an interagency basis ... the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) people the judicial people the State Department the military with Colombian counterparts. (H 3/23, 1282	don't want a narco-state right on our doorsteps (H 2/15, 82)	However critics believe that the plan is not well thought out and involves the risk of deepening United States Military involvement in the largely civil internal conflict that has plagued Colombia for decades (H 3/23, 1277	problem is of own making (H 2/29, 2)	
Without this help we will leave generations of Americans vulnerable to the hopelessness of drug addiction (H 3/29, 1513	in a struggle which according to the director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy claims the lives of as many as 52000 of our citizens each year (H 3/23, 1285	During 1999 we created the first of the Colombian counter-narcotics battalions. (H 3/23, 1283	if we lose it, we are in deep trouble (H 2/15, 139)	The specter of a consolidated narcostate only 3 hours by plane from Miami has made it patently clear that our Nation's vital security interests are at stake (H 3/29, 1509	problem is US demand (H 2/29, 32)	

UNITED STATES						
Besieged	Victim	Capable	Regional Overseer	Self-Interested	Culpable	Noble
we can either deal with the problem today... or we can wait around another 4 or 5 years until the matter gets so bad that we have to send our lifeblood down there to fight these guerillas. (H 3/29, 1529)	This is about drug production cocaine production drugs that are coming to the United States that end up on our streets destroying our families and our communities. (H 3/23, 1301)	With our help Colombia can succeed (H 3/23, 1345)	about to potentially lose Colombia (H 2/15, 146)	Helping Colombia is in our fundamental national interest. The scourge of drugs is tearing at the fabric of our society and Colombia is ground zero in the fight against drugs: (H 3/29, 1530)	We wait for an enormous problem to be on our hands and then we rush to pump in money to try to solve it (H 3/15, 26)	
let me now turn to another threat that reaches across borders for its victims: narcotics (2/2, 13)	these drugs find themselves on every street corner of America... It's kids. It's young adults. But everyone knows someone who has been affected some way or another by drugs (H 3/23, 1313)	With our strong support and the financial assistance contained in this bill Colombia can be successful in slowing the flow of drugs from their country to our school and communities. Failing to provide this important aid now may result in the loss of Colombia to the drug cartels (H 3/29, 1513)	we need to show some force (H 2/15, 148)	Can you define an interest that can be more vital to all of us than the drugs and the effects they have upon our children? (H 3/29, 1553)	I frequently think we don't do enough for our neighbors in the south (H 3/23, 1293)	

UNITED STATES						
Besieged	Victim	Capable	Regional Overseer	Self-Interested	Culpable	Noble
this is a growing threat to our well-being. It's not one that we can say we are winning the war against (2/2, 52)	thousands of lives lost and costing our country billions of dollars annually. (H 3/23, 1334)	The reason we have not put in all these dollars into Colombia over the years is because we had a legitimate human rights objection to how their military was being handled and because drug money had gotten into the previous government of Colombia (H 3/29, 1531)	we have to see adjustment by Pastrana (H 2/15, 164)	First is Plan Colombia and our urgent and clear stake in supporting Colombian Pastrana's efforts to battle the scourge of cocaine. (H 4/6, 7)	if we didn't have this consumption there wouldn't be a growth of the poppy fields and the cocaine and heroin trafficking into this country (H 3/23, 1295)	
threat from Colombia to us in terms of drug production is huge. This is one of those foreign policy problems that has a huge domestic impact (2/8, 43)	thousands of Americans killed by drugs and drug related violence each year (H 3/23, 1364)	We are about to go to war in the jungles of Colombia. (H 3/29, 1553)	confronting a crisis in our own backyard (H 2/15, 167)	there is considerable doubt among Members who voted to go forward with this program as to the advisability of our involvement in Plan Colombia. (H 4/6, 65)	our relationship with Latin American countries in the last century has not always been a positive one. (H 3/23, 1303)	

UNITED STATES						
Besieged	Victim	Capable	Regional Overseer	Self-Interested	Culpable	Noble
this is an American problem. We always talk about the linkage between domestic and foreign policy. There is no clearer example than this. This is one that I think is explicable to the American people because this is how we are protecting our children. (2/8, 55)	We have all seen how these drugs have poisoned entire American communities shattering families and destroying lives (H 3/23, 1365)	U.S. contribution is one; Colombia is contribution two. Are there any other countries making such a commitment to this plan? (H 4/6, 59)	people expect us to lead and we should (H 2/15, 138)	I wish the President and General McCaffrey would go on nationwide TV and, if this is a drug war, make the case to the American people that this is a war. Tell us what our expectations are in Colombia. Tell us realistically what the truth is and what we can expect this investment to be in terms of years and dollars. (H 4/6, 65)	And 80 percent of our people in jails are using drugs. So we really do have a very serious problem. (H 3/23, 1305)	
principal target of drugs in Colombia (2/22, 1)	it matters about our kids our kids who are tempted by the scourge of drugs. We are dealing with our children and our grandchildren and their future. (H 3/29, 1493)	Give us your assessment. Are we winning? Are we losing? Are we holding our own? (2/2, 50)	our efforts in Peru and Bolivia were highly successful(H 2/16, 37)	Plan Colombia is a mile wide and an inch deep, and there are a lot of questions. (H 4/6, 67)	The United States the nation with the greatest cocaine demand (H 3/23, 1335)	

UNITED STATES						
Besieged	Victim	Capable	Regional Overseer	Self-Interested	Culpable	Noble
at a critical juncture (2/22, 21)	Illegal drug use costs U.S. society a staggering \$110 billion a year right now and results in more than 14000 American deaths each year... primarily our youth. (H 3/29, 1486	USAID will help Colombia provide people with viable alternatives to illicit drug production and strengthen the country's democracy (S 2/10, 155-156)	supportive of Plan Colombia(H 2/16, 20	we have an urgent and obvious stake in aiding Colombian President Pastrana and his plan to rescue his country and thereby help rescue ours from the scourge of cocaine (2/8, 9	fueled in part by our country's demand for cocaine (H 3/23, 1342	
these drugs got there because some drug thug is pushing them and in most cases the fields and the labs for making the drugs are overseas (S 3/21, 2)	the drug traffickers who have sat their sights on unfettered access to the impressionable youth of America (H 3/29, 1487	we created the first Colombian counter-narcotics battalions (S 2/22, 72)	Are we monitoring the peace process?(H 2/16, 36	should guard against being pulled into guerrilla war (S 2/22, 19)	American demand is at the root of the drug problem more than Columbian supply (H 3/29, 1493	

UNITED STATES						
Besieged	Victim	Capable	Regional Overseer	Self-Interested	Culpable	Noble
It was also clear that many of the producing and transiting countries for those drugs did not much care either... But in many cases local authorities were content to ignore local drug production. Doing this required ignoring or not enforcing local laws international agreements and bilateral agreements with our country. (S 3/21, 2)	In 1999 drugs killed 52000 Americans approximately and caused more than \$10 billion in damage to our country... The streets of America are literally awash in drugs (H 3/29, 1506	we will build two additional counter-narcotics battalions and a brigade headquarters (2/22, 73)	we have a decent plan to allow Colombians to establish control (H 2/29, 27)	give us an unusual opportunity for them to defend themselves (S 2/22, 98)	much of the turmoil in Colombia is our fault. (H 3/29, 1513	

UNITED STATES						
Besieged	Victim	Capable	Regional Overseer	Self-Interested	Culpable	Noble
	Illegal drugs have been costing our society more than \$100 billion per year costing also 15000 young American lives each year (H 3/29, 1509	drug lords guerrillas and the paramilitaries are all profiting and part of the same problem. Our narco-security strategy must reflect that fact (S 2/24, 2)	Plan Colombia was developed over the last number of months by the Colombians and by us on an interagency basis ... the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) people the judicial people the State Department the military with Colombian counterparts. (H 3/23, 1282	As a result many now argue that we-we must carefully concentrate only on the Colombian drug war and avoid any involvement or support of efforts which target the paramilitaries or guerrillas. Hence we must not step up military training support or presence of U.S. troops (2/24, 2	There are domestically generated drugs like methamphetamines (H 3/29, 1533	
	how many more hundreds or thousands of our kids are going to get hooked on drugs or die from overdoses or get shot up in a raid or a drug bust that went bad before we eliminate this terrible terrible problem? (H 3/29, 1510)	while it seems the most obvious it seems the least observed the American public must be told the truth about what lies ahead (2/24, 2	During 1999 we created the first of the Colombian counter-narcotics battalions. (H 3/23, 1283	It is not within our national interest to see the drug cartels and the narco-terrorists penetrate this country. And believe me they will and they are trying now. (2/24, 8	I'm not sure we're doing enough here at home to reduce the demand for drugs. (2/24, 11	

UNITED STATES						
Besieged	Victim	Capable	Regional Overseer	Self-Interested	Culpable	Noble
	illegal drugs are killing our kids at an alarming rate. Every year we lose 52000 young lives to drugs nearly equal to the number of Americans killed in Vietnam over ten years. (H 3/29, 1513	If we proceed the public deserves to know that we cannot succeed overnight. (2/24, 3	If we do not do anything now what we can contemplate is that the 25 percent increase in coca cultivation is going to continue. The amount of drugs available to the United States and to the rest of the world is going to increase. (H 3/23, 1286	other problems are significant but our focus is on the drug side (2/25, 308)	we are up against traffickers for as long as demand in US (2/25, 313)	
	We have worked hard to stop genocide in other countries... we now must stop this senseless slaughter of a generation of Americans. If we love our children we must ensure that Colombia receives the help it needs. (H 3/29, 1513	we either sit back and let this march take place because we are worried that there is not a 100 percent guarantee of success or we are willing to play a role to back an ally that wants to be helpful; and the victims are right here on our side of the border (S 2/24, 8)	We have an opportunity now with the President of Colombia which we have not had before. We have not had a President in Colombia in recent history that we could work with. (H 3/23, 1287	overwhelmingly interests are antidrug (2/25, 316)	We are not going to be able to blame our drug problem on Colombia (3/21, 10	

UNITED STATES						
Besieged	Victim	Capable	Regional Overseer	Self-Interested	Culpable	Noble
	the supplemental that we are considering today is about our children and whether we want our children to grow up in a society free from the scourge of drugs. (H 3/29, 1522	We have developed what we call a counter-narcotics campaign plan which is a regional plan. (2/24, 34)	We now have democracies throughout the whole hemisphere except for one and we have militaries that by and large behave themselves. And I think a lot of that credit is due to the United State military over time (H 3/23, 1307		If I have a criticism of the war on drugs I think it is that we are looking for causes outside ourselves (3/21, 67	
	Thousands of families are destroyed because of what Colombian drugs and others but mainly Colombian drugs are doing in this country (H 3/29, 1523	we have highly skilled professionals down there (S 2/25, 292)	With our help Colombia can succeed (H 3/23, 1345		the certification process which precluded us from dealing with Colombia for ... years in fact contributed to the very quagmire that exists today (3/23, 463	
	We all know people who are addicted we know families and children that have been devastated by the drugs from Colombia. (H 3/29, 1526	all individuals we train are vetted (2/25, 311)	We cannot simply put our head in the sand and pretend that the emergence of a narco-state in our own back yard would not adversely impact our national security (H 3/29, 1487			

UNITED STATES						
Besieged	Victim	Capable	Regional Overseer	Self-Interested	Culpable	Noble
	my son or my daughters if I knew they were going to get the mumps or the measles I would rather prevent them from getting the mumps or the measles in the first place as I would like to stop our children from getting drugs (H 3/29, 1527	we know exactly what our role is (2/25, 312)	the serious and growing threat that one of our close southern neighbors is being overrun by the drug traffickers (H 3/29, 1487			
	There has been among 12 to 17 year olds...an increase in drug use heroin use specific heroin use ... of 875 percent (H 3/29, 1528	has unique opportunity (2/25, 321)	The specter of a consolidated narcostate only 3 hours by plane from Miami has made it patently clear that our Nation's vital security interests are at stake (H 3/29, 1509			

UNITED STATES						
Besieged	Victim	Capable	Regional Overseer	Self-Interested	Culpable	Noble
	More than 80% of the cocaine and much of the heroin that arrives on our shores comes from or through Colombia (H 3/29, 1530)	We have conducted major operations inside the United States that have wiped out Colombian and Mexican-controlled cells operating here in this country (3/21, 18 [cells? terrorist implication])	It is essential to the future of this Nation that we eliminate the scourge that is illegal drugs and the trafficking of illegal drugs in the United States. We need to wipe out the source of these terrible drugs and we need to eliminate those killing fields where the drugs are grown (H 3/29, 1510)			
	what we can do in terms of aiding Colombia to fight our war against drugs to save our children's lives (H 3/29, 1533)	investments in promoting democracy in key countries such as Colombia...No country is better equipped than ours at helping nations to strengthen democratic institutions and practices (S 4/13, 206)	With our strong support and the financial assistance contained in this bill Colombia can be successful in slowing the flow of drugs from their country to our school and communities. Failing to provide this important aid now may result in the loss of Colombia to the drug cartels (H 3/29, 1513)			

UNITED STATES						
Besieged	Victim	Capable	Regional Overseer	Self-Interested	Culpable	Noble
	there are over 52000 drug-related deaths in this country every year. The social cost of illegal drugs-some of the lower figures are \$110 billion a year... More importantly over half of our Nation's young people will try illegal drugs before they finish high school. (H 4/12, 2		ally of the Colombian government (H 3/29, 1526			
	52,000 [killed] \$100 billion in damages (2/22, 21)		Is this going to seriously erode the political environment of Colombia to the point where President Pastrana might have political problems if indeed we don't respond...? (H 4/6, 48)			

UNITED STATES						
Besieged	Victim	Capable	Regional Overseer	Self-Interested	Culpable	Noble
	The cost is of on an annual basis 52000 dead and \$110 billion each year due to the health costs accidental costs lost time and so on... these are the numbers respectively that we lost in Vietnam and Korea (2/24, 12)		We have ... tried to stress in particular a focus with substantial resources on democracies or potential democracies in transition. That has included Indonesia, Ukraine, Nigeria and Colombia. They also are all countries that have the potential for either succeeding or failing in brave, potential, democratic efforts. (H 4/6, 65)			
	drug trafficking and abuse cause the enormous social health and financial damage to our communities (2/24, 13)		And in Colombia we are working with President Pastrana to eliminate the production of narcotics and to foster a secure and responsive governmental structure (2/10, 150)			

UNITED STATES						
Besieged	Victim	Capable	Regional Overseer	Self-Interested	Culpable	Noble
	drug abuse costs Nation over \$100 billion a year (2/25, 283)		USAID will help Colombia provide people with viable alternatives to illicit drug production and strengthen the country's democracy (S 2/10, 155-156)			
	drug abuse caused immense hardship on millions of Americans (2/25, 284)		we created the first Colombian counter-narcotics battalions (S 2/22, 72)			
	thousands of Americans killed every year (2/25, 292)		we will build two additional counter-narcotics battalions and a brigade headquarters (2/22, 73)			
	Most drugs consumed in this country are produced overseas and smuggled here. Those drugs actually kill thousands of Americans and endanger many more every year (3/21, 1)		containing one country only shifts the problem elsewhere. We need a regional strategy (2/24, 2)			

UNITED STATES						
Besieged	Victim	Capable	Regional Overseer	Self-Interested	Culpable	Noble
	Illegal drugs kill 52000 Americans a year (4/6, 238		we should avoid a half baked strategy in the region. The emphasis on Colombia must not overshadow requirements in Bolivia Ecuador and Peru. Without a regional strategy an attack on production in one country will only push the problem over to another country (2/24, 3			
	90 percent of the cocaine that enters the United States originates in or passes through Colombia. Up to six metric tons of heroin is produced annually in Colombia and much of this total is shipped to the United States. (4/6, 243)		President Pastrana's tenure offers the United States and the rest of the international community a golden opportunity to work with Colombia in confronting these threats. (2/24, 13			

UNITED STATES						
Besieged	Victim	Capable	Regional Overseer	Self-Interested	Culpable	Noble
			We are not content to allow cultivation and production of narcotics to simply be displaced from one Andean country to another (2/24, 18			
			The counter-drug struggle provides the underpinning for most of our military engagement activities in the Andean region (2/24, 21			
			We have developed what we call a counter-narcotics campaign plan which is a regional plan. (2/24, 34)			
			a neighbor (2/25, 288)			

UNITED STATES						
Besieged	Victim	Capable	Regional Overseer	Self-Interested	Culpable	Noble
			We have a moral obligation and responsibility to ensure the general welfare and of course that general welfare involves the lives of our young people and the safety of our schools and streets (S 3/21, 2)			
			These countries know that their actions will have an impact on their certification decision. They also know what the U.S. expects from them. (3/21, 14			
			investments in promoting democracy in key countries such as Colombia...No country is better equipped than ours at helping nations to strengthen democratic institutions and practices (4/13, 206			

FARC				
Regional Threat	Powerful	Criminal	Marxist	Savage
narco-terrorist threat (H 2/15, 1)	largest group of drug trafficking guerillas (H 2/15, 13)	well funded by the drug cartel; \$100 million a month (H 2/15, 22)	17,000 Marxist narco-terrorist guerillas (H 2/15, 15)	appeasement is not going to work (H 2/15, 22)
expanding beyond Colombia's borders (H 2/15, 15)	17,000 Marxist narco-terrorist guerillas (H 2/15, 15)	drug thugs (H 2/15, 78)	The FARC guerillas who have been trained by the Cubans who are Marxist oriented (H 3/29, 1529)	have to deal with them from a position of strength (H 2/15, 22)
threatens nation's survival (H 2/15, 27)	controls nearly 40 percent of the countryside (H 2/15, 15)	protect cocaine labs in south (H 2/15, 103)	marxist guerillas (2/22, 1)	can't trust those guys (H 2/15, 22)
assassinating mayors intimidating journalists corrupting officials (H 2/15, 37)	40 percent of Colombia's territory is controlled (H 2/15, 16)	The guerrillas are not close to taking power in Colombia. In fact, if it were not for the great wealth accumulated from their criminal activities, the guerrillas would not be the threat that they are today. (H 2/15, 162)	not democrats, marxists (2/22, 98)	venom increasing its deadly toll on our young people (H 2/15, 31)
killing Americans Venezuelans and Colombians throughout the hemisphere (H 2/15, 67)	They have planes and helicopters (H 2/15, 22)	heavily involved in narcotics; they're narcotraffickers (H 2/15, 163)	totalitarian Marxists who want to destroy Colombian democracy (2/22, 109)	have walked from ideology to banditry (H 2/15, 61)
The ability of the traffickers...is going to increase their ability to corrupt and undermine societies Colombia's society other societies including possibly the United States will only increase (H 3/23, 1286)	force is between 17,000 and 30,000 and growing every single day (H 2/15, 22)	However in some parts of Colombia the distinction between drug traffickers and guerrillas simply does not exist (H 3/23, 1278)	leftist rebels (2/24, 11)	trying to win through savagery (H 2/15, 66)

FARC				
Regional Threat	Powerful	Criminal	Marxist	Savage
the insurgents from Colombia principally the FARC violate the borders of Panama with absolute impunity. (H 3/23, 1293	\$1 million to \$2 million a day from trafficking (H 2/15, 27)	the ties between the FARC and the drug trade is that it is complicated it is decentralized. some parts of Colombia we think the FARC simply derive revenue almost in the form of taxes... other parts of Colombia particularly in the south an increasing body of evidence suggests that they're far more directly involved (H 3/23, 1292	Marxist group of drug traffickers (3/21, 66	savage nature (H 2/15, 85)
the FARC are actually projecting out beyond the borders of Colombia and may be creating dissention and discord in other nations. (H 3/23, 1311	best armed, best trained, best equipped guerrillas in the world (H 2/15, 27)	the FARC... protecting the drug lords and getting money in return for that to allow their operations to continue (H 3/29, 1528	Marxist drug traffickers and protectors and kidnappers (3/21, 66	if you peel away FARC rhetoric (H 2/15, 124)
Colombian insurgents constitute a localized threat to Panamanian sovereignty and citizens in the border region (H 3/23, 1346	more machine guns than the infantry battalions (H 2/15, 37)	the FARC guerillas who are.. getting as much as \$100 million a month from the drug cartel. That is a billion dollars a year (H 3/29, 1529		cannot be negotiated with (H 2/15, 132)
We may have a narcoguerrilla government running Colombia. There will be no impediment to the heroin and the cocaine coming out of that country into the United States (H 3/29, 1529	have tremendous wealth (H 2/15, 37)	Drugs fund insurgent groups warring against the Columbian government (2/2, 6		no evidence is seriously interested in a solution (H 2/15, 152)
	thousands armed to the teeth targeting our aircraft (H 2/15, 39)	marxist guerillas aligned with drug pushers; drug thugs (2/22, 1)		only deal with them form a position of strength (H 2/15, 198)

FARC				
Regional Threat	Powerful	Criminal	Marxist	Savage
	growing rapidly and getting resources from cartels (64)	transformed into Mafia-like organizations (2/22, 21)		Government security forces paramilitary groups guerrillas and narcotics traffickers all continued to commit numerous serious abuses including extra judicial killings and torture (H 3/8, 12)
	acting with outrageous impunity (H 2/15, 75)	connected to drug industry (2/22, 98)		FARC is a large band of murderous thugs who have virtually no legitimacy in Colombia. They regularly attack democratic institutions... they are without ideology (H 3/23, 1308)
	stronger and better financed than ever (H 2/15, 150)	actively engaged in drug trafficking (2/22, 101)		I am also alarmed by the reported dramatic increase in human rights violations attributed to both the paramilitaries and insurgents (H 3/23, 1341)
	conducting nationwide offenses nationwide attacks (H 2/29, 9)	We cannot pretend the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) are not tied to traffickers (2/24, 2)		vicious guerilla band of people that this past weekend killed 26 policemen in Colombia in one city in Bahia del Puerto. They beheaded the chief of police and killed four children (H 3/29, 1493)
	is going to fight (H 2/29, 52)	Estimates of guerrilla income from narcotics trafficking and other illicit activities such as kidnapping and extortion are unreliable but clearly exceed \$100 million a year (2/24, 17)		face of a terrorist insurrection against a democratic government. (H 3/29, 1493)

FARC				
Regional Threat	Powerful	Criminal	Marxist	Savage
	the insurgents have surface to air missiles. We've heard everything from U.S. Redeye missiles on up to SAMs from Eastern Europe. (H 3/23, 1291	We know that fully one half of the FARC fronts derive their principal financial support from their links with narcotraffickers (2/24, 27		narcoguerrillas that enforce the state of lawlessness there (H 3/29, 1522
	a freshly recruited member of the FARC can make as much as \$550 a month...double what a young professional soldier in the Colombian armed forces would make (H 3/23, 1295	Narcotics money funds the guerrillas (2/24, 34		they hacked them to death 26 people with machetes; they castrated the men; they chopped off the heads of the mayor and the head of the Colombian National Police there; they put them on spikes in the middle of the town as a warning to anybody that gets in the way of the FARC (H 3/29, 1529
	the FARC and the revolutionaries are right now controlling about a third of the country(H 3/29, 1528	The FARC has often claimed that it supports eradication efforts while at the same time earning millions from drugs (2/24, 38		Horrific acts of violence are visited on Colombians by insurgent and paramilitary groups (H 3/29, 1544
	The rebels in Colombia and the paramilitaries already control an area the size of my home State of Illinois (H 3/29, 1534	The FARC has consistently demonstrated their unwillingness to cooperate with the Government of Colombia against the narcotraffickers (2/24, 38		ferociously well armed and savage forces fueled by drug money and production (2/22, 97)
	more and more of that country seems to have been taken over in a de facto sense at least by the guerrilla movements (2/2, 50	More than half of the FARC fronts receive support from and provide protection to Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs). Drug money provides a major portion of the FARC's war chest and is the FARC's primary source for sustaining forces conducting combat operations and purchasing weapons (2/24, 38		40 years in the bush and have little understanding of the 21st century (2/22, 107)

FARC				
Regional Threat	Powerful	Criminal	Marxist	Savage
	The rebels the insurgents have used the demilitarized zones disproportionately to their advantage in the field of military activity and so they continue to be a challenge for Colombian security forces (2/2, 50	linked up with drug production (2/25, 285)		Everyone runs. And you cannot countenance running and face these cartels and narcoterrorists. They understand one thing (2/24, 9
	act with relative impunity (2/22, 21)	protect cocaine labs (2/25, 298)		insurgents in the jungle (2/24, 11
	The cartels are more sophisticated than they have ever been before...They have the most updated military equipment. And they are on a march. (2/24, 8	some directly involved in trafficking (2/25, 298)		responsible for massacres, executions, torture (2/25, 321)
	The FARC guerrillas get \$100 to \$600 million a year...they are probably the best equipped the best trained even to their modernization in terms of communications and command and control they are probably the best in South America today (2/24, 31-32	part and parcel of the drug trade (2/25, 311)		
	Between 40 and 50 percent and I would not say the guerrillas control it. I would say that the government does not control it. It is contested territory (2/24, 32	criminal terrorists, drug protecting gangs (2/25, 329)		
	the FARC now controls an area within Colombia the size of Switzerland (2/24, 37			

PARAMILITARIES		
Savage	Criminal	Powerful
murder and kill civilians largely because of their political beliefs (H 2/15, 16)	known involvement in the drug trade (H 2/15, 29)	have tremendous wealth (H 2/15, 37)
terrorist groups (H 2/15, 37)	these are criminals (H 2/15, 66)	do not depend on government support (H 2/15, 163)
47 percent of displacement created; 78 percent of rights violations (H 2/15, 65)	deeply dependent on narcotrafficking (H 2/15, 163)	very little attention paid (H 2/15, 165)
some of the most brutal people imaginable (H 2/15, 66)	drug lords (H 3/29, 1509)	What's telling is that the paramilitary presence had been denounced repeatedly to the Colombian authorities and the paramilitaries camped out for a full month about two miles from the Colombian army detachment Heroes of Saraguro Battalion (H 3/8, 65)
trying to win through savagery (H 2/15, 66)	well known to be involved in the drug trade and responsible for over 70% of human rights violations. The paramilitaries continues to thwart and attack government investigators reformist politicians and human rights monitors (H 3/29, 1513)	paramilitary leader Carlos Castano has publicly admitted taxing the drug trade. As a result these groups are well funded and well armed (H 3/23, 1365)
part of the problem (H 2/15, 201)	nothing more than bandit formations (2/22, 22)	The rebels in Colombia and the paramilitaries already control an area the size of my home State of Illinois (H 3/29, 1534)
Government security forces paramilitary groups guerrillas and narcotics traffickers all continued to commit numerous serious abuses including extra judicial killings and torture (H 3/8, 12)	actively engaged in drug trafficking (2/22, 101)	
But in the meantime we continue to document one paramilitary massacre after another in Colombia. (H 3/8, 65)	We cannot ignore the increase in paramilitary involvement in the drug trade. These are the same extremists with close ties to Colombian military which we plan to train (2/24, 3.	
I am also alarmed by the reported dramatic increase in human rights violations attributed to both the paramilitaries and insurgents (H 3/23, 1341)	Paramilitary groups also have clear ties to important narcotics traffickers and paramilitary leaders have even publicly admitted their participation in the drug trade. (2/24, 17	

PARAMILITARIES		
Savage	Criminal	Powerful
The State Department and several human rights organizations agree that the vast majority of terrorist killings in Colombia (over 70%) are at the hands of the paramilitaries. (H 3/23, 1384	the paramilitaries are deeply involved in the drug trade. (2/24, 26	
narcoterrorists on the right (H 3/29, H1484	the paramilitaries have increased their strength increased their position and increased their control and operation of the trade (2/24, 26	
paramilitaries committed 19 separate massacres leaving 143 people dead and hundreds more displaced from their homes. And just last month Mr. Speaker paramilitaries linked to the Colombian army danced and drank as they tortured as they beheaded at least 28 villagers in northern Colombia. (H 3/29, 1487	paramilitaries are directly involved in the narcotics trafficking enterprise. I think we can deduce that from their own admission. They have openly acknowledged their involvements and their links with drug traffickers-26	
the primary agents of violence and disorder in this region (H 3/29, 1513	Narcotics money funds the guerrillas funds the paramilitaries and fuels the violence that is tearing at the fiber of Colombia (2/24, 34	
well known to be involved in the drug trade and responsible for over 70% of human rights violations. The paramilitaries continues to thwart and attack government investigators reformist politicians and human rights monitors (H 3/29, 1513	linked up with drug production (2/25, 285)	
we know that the paramilitaries in Colombia are involved in the drug traffic and that they are the ones who are responsible for 70 percent of the human rights abuses and civilian murders in that country (H 3/29, 1534		
Horrific acts of violence are visited on Colombians by insurgent and paramilitary groups (H 3/29, 1544		
feudal armies (2/25, 329)		

REGION		
Threatened	Strategic Importance	Unstable
facing one of the greatest challenges to its security (H 2/15, 1)	vitaly important Panama Canal located just 150 miles north (H 2/15, 15)	rising tide of nationalism (H 2/15, 80)
Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela are at risk as well (H 2/15, 21)	Panama Canal questionable whether it can be defended (H 2/15, 33)	huge tide of nationalism; assert pride by spiting us (H 2/15, 197-8)
narco-guerillas increasing control (H 2/15, 30)	If we just look at the nation of Venezuela and give at least passing attention to the fact that that is our primary source of imported oil. Somewhere between about 15 to 18 percent of our imported oil needs each month are met from Venezuela. (H 3/23, 1293	the wave of democracy in Latin America may be cresting. How our nation directs or withholds resources can make a difference. Ecuador for example is on the brink of chaos. The jury is out on Venezuela. The legitimacy of Peru's upcoming elections is open to question. (H 2/16, 3 (part 1)
tentacles of FARC loom over all (H 2/15, 30)	All of these countries... need to confront the spreading stain of contamination that comes from the drug industry simply deducts resources that could be applied by their governments to social programs ...which would strengthen the democracy and the emerging economies of those and in the free market economies of those nations all of which play I think powerfully in the future prosperity of this country. (H 3/23, 1294	Paraguay remains fragile. Property issues in Nicaragua continue to fester. And after closing our bases in Panama the Administration has done very little to try to get them reopened. We must address escalating drug trafficking and drug corruption in Haiti. We are not doing enough to discourage violence and have not provided promised resources to level the playing field for Haiti's upcoming elections an important election and the hour is late(H 2/16, 3 (part 2)
problem is regional (H 2/15, 38)	The United States and our hemisphere are facing some of the greatest challenges ever to our security interests. Just look at the turmoil in Colombia (H 4/12, 4	I also am very concerned about the fact that we have been celebrating Latin American democracy but each of the countries in one way or another has a variety of threats to that because of the economic situations within them(H 2/16, 46)
This is a regional and hemispheric problem. (H 2/15, 162)	Despite antinarcotics successes notably in Bolivia and Peru illicit drugs from Latin America constitute the primary drug threat to the United States (2/2, 6	It does not work if the countries themselves are not prepared to gear up and do the job (2/24, 23
that entire regions is at risk(H 2/16, 18		drug problems in Caracas Rio and Lima are awful (H 2/29, 28)
there is no substitute for aggressive political leadership in Colombia Peru Bolivia and Ecuador (2/24, 2		Ecuadorians have been very good; an island of calm between Peru and Colombia (H 2/29, 46)

REGION		
Threatened	Strategic Importance	Unstable
We have invited leaders from Bolivia Ecuador and Peru to address their national needs. I do not view this as a choice between support for Colombia or her neighbors. Each has important interest. All have a common stake in success. (2/24, 3		we basically have three factions in this country and it kind of applies to all the Latin American countries ... we have the government and we have the military. And there's a third faction the United States. Where the United States sides with whether it's with a government or with a military has a big impact in terms of where things go (H 3/23, 1307
our partners in Latin America in our common fight against the scourge of illegal drugs (2/24, 11		During the past twenty years we have seen the hemisphere shed its robes of military dictatorships and communist governments and attire itself with cloth cut from the bolts of democracy rule of law and human rights (H 3/23, 1344
argument for support is we don't want our 34 democratic allies in the hemisphere to go under and become narco states (H 2/29, 39)		Recent events in several countries raise doubts about the depth and durability of democracy in the region as well as the future growth of free market economies . (H 3/23, 1344
The adverse social economic and political positions spawned wholly or in part by drug trafficking and the other corrupting activities it breeds are weakening the fabric of democracy in other nations in the region. (H 3/23, 1284)		Historical analysis reveals that in terms of governance this is a tidal region. Democracy ebbs and flows on about a 20 (H 3/23, year cycle. (H 3/23, 1352
Ecuador took a three hour vacation from democracy during January... since that time the FARC have even made representations that they did in fact play some role in the disquiet that was developed in Quito among the indigenous people. (H 3/23, 1293		Our Latin American and Caribbean neighbors have made historic strides in building democracy over the past 2 decades, but this amity continues to be threatened by economic disparities that erode support for democracy and undermine capabilities to combat grave threats. (H 4/6, 8)
Spillover from violence in Colombia threatens Panama (H 3/23, 1346		Bribery at all levels of officialdom in Mexico and to a lesser extent the Caribbean ensure that drugs reach their target (2/2, 6

REGION		
Threatened	Strategic Importance	Unstable
Colombia and its Andean Ridge neighbors fully appreciate the regional problems that are caused by the illegal drug industry and have demonstrated the willingness to pursue solutions at the regional level (H 3/23, 1354		A decade into the democracy and market revolution the vast majority of Latin Americans have experienced little or no improvement in living conditions. Recent economic troubles have fueled unemployment crime and poverty undermining the commitment of many Latin Americans to free-market economic liberalization. (2/2, 9
this is a regional issue (2/8, 54)		Another concern is that legitimately elected leaders could assume authoritarian powers with popular support. (2/2, 9
trafficking weakening the fabric of democracy (2/22, 74)		economic, social, security problems particularly intense (2/22, 60)
When there is an effort made to curtail the supply coming out of a country like Colombia it is like pushing air in a balloon. It goes to Peru or to Venezuela or to Ecuador or to some other country (2/24, 8.		the Andean Region unfortunately has the climate the disparities in economic status and all the other things you know that make it a convenient and very productive area for this kind of activity. So we have to work it on a regional basis (2/24, 33
I have become increasingly concerned about Colombia's neighbors. The adverse social economic and political conditions spawned wholly or in part by drug trafficking and the other corrupting activities it breeds are weakening the fabric of democracies in other nations in the region (2/24, 22		The challenges to governments in our own hemisphere are in many ways greater today than ever before ... many of them are grappling with serious economic social and political challenges that are putting enormous pressures on their institutions. (3/23, 467
This is by every measurement a regional problem. As such I think we must pursue regional solutions (2/24, 23		
To poison the young people of America of the Americas. North America Central America South America. But especially in the consumer countries-57		

WORLD
Threatened
this is not just a problem for Colombia not even just a problem for the Western Hemisphere because of the way narcotraffickers are now also moving into Europe.(H 2/16, 37
If we do not do anything now... The amount of drugs available to the United States and to the rest of the world is going to increase. (H 3/23, 1286
Most of the world's coca is now grown in Colombia and over eighty percent of the cocaine consumed in the US is manufactured in Colombia (H 3/23, 1335
President Pastrana has asked for international support to address an internal problem that has international dimensions (H 3/23, 1342
The problem we face has become considerably more global in scope and can be summed up like this: narcotics production is likely to rise dramatically in the next few years and worldwide trafficking involves more diverse and sophisticated groups (2/2, 13
The war on drugs is not a war in Colombia. It is a war that is being fought and must be fought throughout the world. (2/24, 45
Colombia is a matter of serious concern not only for the United States but also for the international community (2/24, 64

APPENDIX C – NEWSPAPER (HEADLINES AND LEADS) CODING SHEETS

CHICAGO TRIBUNE			
Headline	Lead	Date	Location
TO SOME, AID TO COLOMBIA A RISKY MANEUVER FOR U.S	It was an extraordinary gesture intended to create momentum for peace, but the government decision to cede an area the size of Switzerland to Marxist rebels in the coca-growing region of southern Colombia seems to have backfired.	February 18, 2000	Page 1
PARAMILITARY LEADER ADMITS RUTHLESS ACTS BUT COLOMBIAN SAYS HIS GOAL IS HELPING PEOPLE	Ramon Isaza, a small, handsome, dark-skinned man with a crown of curly black hair, greets a visitor to his second-floor patio wearing black Top-Siders, black jean shorts, and a black-and-white T-shirt. As the sounds of Colombian music float in from the living room, his wife, Estermila, walks around in a red-checkered dress with cups of coffee for him and his guests. Everyone around Isaza, 59, addresses him with the title of Don as a sign of respect. An admirer tells a visitor how Doradal, a village of 3,000 people in the mountains of northern Colombia, loves Isaza. On a recent breezy afternoon, Isaza retraced his life story. He talked about growing up in abject poverty, about marrying because he needed a cook, about whiling away the time singing and playing the guitar. Before too long, he began talking about the men he has killed. "I told my men to hold him," he says, remembering a messenger for the late drug kingpin Pablo Escobar. "I killed him and we tossed his body into the river." Isaza speaks without a tinge of remorse.	February 18, 2000	Page 10
OPIUM CROP ROSE 23% LAST YEAR, CIA TELLS U.S. SENATE	A CIA analysis made public Tuesday says that the cultivation of the opium poppy rose 23 percent in Colombia last year and that Colombian heroin increasingly joined cocaine in reaching U.S. streets.	February 23, 2000	Page 8
U.S. DRUG SUSPECT FLEES COLOMBIAN PRISON IN A MATTRESS	An American suspect escaped Wednesday from a maximum-security prison in Bogota by asking for a new mattress and then having himself ferried out of the facility wrapped in the old one.	March 2, 2000	Page 7
COLOMBIAN REBEL CHIEF MEETS WITH AOL EXEC SOCIALISTS' DIALOGUE WITH CAPITALISM CONTINUES	Leftist guerrillas continued a running dialogue on the workings of international capitalism Friday--this time with the chairman emeritus of America Online.	March 5, 2000	Page 9
HOUSE OKS MILITARY, ANTI-DRUG MONEY, REJECTS CURB ON KOSOVO FUNDING	The House on Thursday approved a \$13 billion measure for the Pentagon, Colombia and recovery from Hurricane Floyd after refusing to threaten European allies with a pullout of U.S. peacekeepers from Kosovo.	March 31, 2000	Page 22

CHICAGO TRIBUNE			
Headline	Lead	Date	Location
ARMY'S ANTI-DRUG ENVOY IN COLOMBIA GUILTY IN LAUNDERING	An Army officer who once commanded the military's anti-drug operation in Colombia pleaded guilty Monday to a federal charge, admitting he knew his wife was laundering drug money but failed to turn her in.	April 18, 2000	Page 17
REBEL THREAT IN COLOMBIA: PAY TRIBUTE OR BE KIDNAPPED	In a brazen threat to Colombia's wealthy elite, leftist rebels have announced they will begin kidnapping millionaires and corporate executives who refuse to pay tribute to the guerrillas.	April 27, 2000	Page 18
26 INMATES KILLED DURING PRISON RIOT IN COLOMBIA	Rioting that broke out after an inmate's body was found stuffed in a prison sewer pipe led to 26 deaths before the unrest ended Friday, the worst violence in Colombia's notorious prison system.	April 29, 2000	Page 4
REBELS SEEK LEGITIMACY, LAUNCH POLITICAL PARTY	In a quest for legitimacy that could mark a new phase in peace efforts, 4,000 fighters and the entire leadership of Colombia's most powerful rebel army massed here Saturday for the launch of a new political party.	April 30, 2000	Page 9
PANAMA SEES RISE IN DRUG FLIGHTS CLOSING OF U.S. BASE OPENS DOOR TO TRAFFICKERS	Buzzards are the only things taking off and landing these days on Howard Air Force Base's deserted runway. Counter-narcotics surveillance flights--a key element of U.S. efforts to curb the flow of cocaine and heroin from South America-- ceased last year, when the base was turned over to Panama along with other Panama Canal operations.	April 30, 2000	Page 17

LOS ANGELES TIMES			
Headline	Lead	Date	Location
Pullout From Panama Hampering Drug War; Colombia: Smugglers taking advantage of base closures, official says. U.S. hoping for buildup of new airfields	The closure of U.S. military bases in Panama last year has opened a "window of opportunity" in western Colombia for drug smugglers, this country's defense minister told a small group of foreign reporters Friday.	February 5, 2000	Page A8
Drug Czar, Congress Tangle on Colombia	Government officials told Congress on Tuesday that coca production in Colombia is up sharply, and the Clinton administration's efforts to deal with the problem drew fire from both Republicans and Democrats at a congressional hearing.	February 16, 2000	Page 4
Colombia Political Violence Kills 27; Latin America: Slayings by rebel, paramilitary groups come as government prepares to begin talks with second leftist organization.	At least 27 people died in the latest outbreak of political violence across Colombia, including 20 peasants who were shot and hacked to death by members of a right-wing paramilitary death squad, authorities said Friday.	February 19, 2000	Page 7B
Colombian Military Aiding Death Squads, Report Says;	Military officers have continued to work directly with right-wing death squads despite government efforts to purge the armed forces of human rights violators, according to a report released Wednesday by Human Rights Watch/Americas.	February 24, 2000	Pag 4
5 Bomb Blasts in Colombia Injure 2;	Five bombs packed with up to 2.2 pounds of dynamite exploded almost simultaneously Thursday night outside banks and a supermarket across Bogota, injuring two passersby and causing widespread damage, police said.	February 25, 2000	Page 13
White House Certifies Colombia, Mexico Anti-Drug Efforts	Colombia and Mexico again won President Clinton's certification Wednesday as fully cooperating partners in the war on drugs, despite government figures showing that the flow of illicit narcotics from the two countries has reached new heights.	March 2, 2000	Page 6
War on Drugs Taking Toll on Border Agents; The Southwest reverts to the Wild West as federal officers encounter increasing violence from Mexican traffickers. One county in Arizona feels the heat.	When they come looking for him at the shopping mall, federal drug agent Bernie Minarik slips out a back way. When his wife drops him off at work, she takes a roundabout route back home in case she's being followed. But when he discovered a highway flare that Mexican drug traffickers had planted in the gas tank of his car in an attempt to blow him to bits, Minarik nearly called it quits. Minarik has been a Drug Enforcement Administration agent in Arizona's border country for eight years, and he didn't take the job expecting it to be danger-free. But he didn't count on the violence seeping into his home life, on his kid going to school scared, on his wife biting her lip as she watches him fasten his bulletproof vest every morning.	March 12, 2000	Page 1

LOS ANGELES TIMES			
Headline	Lead	Date	Location
Cut in Spy Flights Hurts U.S. Drug Fight; Crime: Without radar planes, the military is unable to detect the low-flying aircraft of Colombian smugglers.	A key element of the drug war in Colombia is faltering because U.S. surveillance flights over major cocaine-producing regions have declined by two-thirds over the past year, according to administration officials.	March 13, 2000	Page 11
Apparent Rebel Blast Kills 2 in Colombia	At least two civilians died and 14 others were badly injured Tuesday when Marxist rebels tried to fire three homemade missiles from a truck into an army barracks here, authorities said.	March 15, 2000	Page 11B
A Chilling Crime Network Rears Its Head in Colombia; Latin America: Tactics used by the powerful group La Terraza recall the days of the Medellin cartel.	Sen. Piedad Cordoba knew she was a target. As chairwoman of the Senate Human Rights Committee in this country where politicians are regularly kidnapped or assassinated, she had alienated guerrillas, right-wing private armies and even members of the government. Still, Colombians were shocked when she and her bodyguard were surrounded by 15 armed people in uniforms of national investigative police at a clinic in the fashionable El Poblado district of this violent city. With so many powerful enemies, who had pulled off the audacious midday kidnapping?	March 16, 2000	Page 1
Colombia Defense Chief in U.S. Lobbying for Aid; Drugs: Dispute over who deserves blame for deaths and kidnappings is key, as critics of anti-narcotics pact try to tie human rights conditions to \$1.3- billion package.	Trying to pacify U.S. critics of Washington's proposed anti- narcotics aid package to Colombia, Defense Minister Luis Fernando Ramirez traveled to Los Angeles on Wednesday to argue that Marxist guerrillas are responsible for most human rights abuses in his violent nation.	March 16, 2000	Page 12
California and the West; Navy Adding Muscle to Drug War; Crime: High- tech gear and firepower are increasingly being put to sea to help the Coast Guard stop the flow of narcotics from Latin America.	Under gray skies and light rain, the guided missile cruiser Valley Forge, built to do hull-to-hull combat with the Soviet navy, set sail Monday for six months in hostile waters. The Valley Forge will not be on the prowl for the Soviets or the armed forces of Third World nations considered by the United States as potential adversaries. Rather, its quarry will be one of the most elusive on the high seas: the "go-fast" boats of drug smuggling cartels in the eastern Pacific and the Caribbean.	March 28, 2000	Page 3
Operation Aimed at Drugs for U.S. Is Cited as Model; Caribbean Basin: Dozens of nations join effort to cut off flow of narcotics from Colombia, netting 5 tons of cocaine and 2,331 suspects, DEA says.	Drug enforcement officials Wednesday unveiled the results of what they called the biggest international effort ever to stem the tidal wave of Colombian drugs flowing through the Caribbean to U.S. shores.	March 30, 2000	Page 4
House Keeps Colombia Aid Plan Intact	The House refused Wednesday to slash a planned \$1.7 billion for battling drug lords in Colombia and edged toward approving a \$13- billion bill that would also finance U.S. peacekeepers in Kosovo and aid victims of natural disasters at home.	March 30, 2000	Page 24

LOS ANGELES TIMES			
Headline	Lead	Date	Location
Colombia Aid Package Gets House Approval; Congress: Clinton plan would give \$1.7 billion to fight drug trafficking; Democrats divided. Fate in Senate is unclear as Lott says bill is too pork-laden.	President Clinton's long-delayed plan to combat drug trafficking in Colombia cleared its first major hurdle Thursday as the House approved providing \$1.7 billion to help the beleaguered South American country dry up a major source of cocaine and heroin.	March 31, 2000	Page 22
World IN BRIEF / COLOMBIA; Rebels Attack Jail, Freeing 74 Inmates	Storming a provincial jail, guerrillas of the National Liberation Army and the People's Liberation Army detonated a powerful car bomb that ripped a hole in the prison wall, allowing 74 prisoners to escape, officials said.	April 3, 2000	Page 4
21 Colombia Villagers Killed, Officials Say	Suspected paramilitary gunmen executed 21 unarmed residents of a small town in an oil- and cocaine-producing region near the Venezuelan border Thursday, officials said.	April 7, 2000	Page 5
Major Heroin Ring Busted, Colombia Says	Anti-narcotics police dismantled a major heroin smuggling ring Wednesday in a predawn sweep that spanned four cities and led to the capture of 46 alleged drug traffickers, law enforcement authorities said.	April 13, 2000	Page 4
Nation IN BRIEF / NEW YORK; Anti-Drug Colonel Pleads Guilty	An Army colonel who once commanded the military's anti-drug operation in Colombia pleaded guilty to a federal charge in New York City, admitting that he knew his wife was laundering drug money but failed to turn her in.	April 18, 2000	Page 18
World Perspective; DRUGS; In Extradition Case, Colombia Says Turnabout Is Fair Play	In Colombia, a country of fallen heroes, Victor Tafur's case normally might not have caused more than a flutter. Sure, he is the son of an assassinated anti-drug crusader, and he is still recovering from injuries he sustained in a near-fatal plane crash while working on an anti-narcotics project. But Colombia is a nation where former guerrillas now in Congress are routinely accused of ties to drug cartels, where a daring police pilot was charged with embezzling anti-narcotics funds and where more than a dozen politicians have gone to jail for accepting drug money. The difference is that Tafur was in the United States when Colombian police found checks written by him in the account of a company linked to the largest shipment of cocaine ever confiscated in Colombia. Now, for the first time, Colombian authorities are asking that a suspect in a drug case be extradited to their country from the U.S.	April 22, 2000	Page 2
World IN BRIEF / COLOMBIA; Plan for a 2nd Rebel Zone Announced	President Andres Pastrana announced a preliminary agreement with Colombia's second-largest rebel army--the leftist National Liberation Army, or ELN--to withdraw government troops from a northern region as a condition for opening peace talks.	April 25, 2000	Page 6

LOS ANGELES TIMES			
Headline	Lead	Date	Location
Colombia Prison Riot Leaves 26 Dead	Rioting that broke out after an inmate's mutilated body was found stuffed in a prison sewer pipe led to 26 deaths before the unrest ended Friday, the worst bloodletting in Colombia's violent prison system.	April 29, 2000	Page 11
World IN BRIEF / COLOMBIA; Guerrillas Launch New Political Party	In a quest for legitimacy that could mark a new phase in peace efforts, 4,000 members of Colombia's most powerful rebel army massed at San Vicente del Caguan to launch a new political party.	April 30, 2000	Page 10

MIAMI HERALD			
Headline	Lead	Date	Location
COLOMBIA REBELS, OFFICIALS START SWEDEN, NORWAY TOUR	Government and rebel negotiators flew to Sweden and Norway this week for a look at how Scandinavian societies balance economic competition with social justice.	February 3, 2000	9A
REBELS, OFFICIALS START SWEDEN, NORWAY TOUR	They read like postcards from an educational study trip to Europe. ``Today, Sunday, we began work at 10 a.m. and we expanded our knowledge of how the Swedish parliament functions," one said. ``Tomorrow, we'll begin work at 8 a.m." But the messages being sent home to Colombia come not from university students or professors, but rather from hardened guerrilla commanders who are being exposed to the workings of Scandinavian democracy in the hope that some of what they witness will rub off on them.	February 8, 2000	1A
COLOMBIA'S WAR ON DRUGS GOES AIRBORNE	Taking a cue from neighboring Peru, Colombia says it will force down - or shoot down - more aircraft suspected of carrying narcotics.	February 11, 2000	12A
COLOMBIANS SEEKING U.S. HAVEN FROM WAR	More than 1,000 people crowded into West Miami City Hall on Saturday in an attempt to get the Clinton administration to allow Colombians in the United States on temporary visas - and even those here illegally - to remain and not be forced to return to the civil-war torn nation.	February 13, 2000	3B
COLOMBIAN REBEL SLAMS U.S. INTENTIONS AID `VIETNAMIZING' CIVIL WAR, HE SAYS	The new \$1.3 billion the Clinton administration has promised the Colombian government is a down payment on the ``Vietnamization" of the civil war, says a spokesman for the National Liberation Army, one of the two Colombian guerrilla factions	February 15, 2000	7A
COLOMBIA SECOND REBEL ZONE AGREED ON IN NORTH	The government and the country's second-largest rebel group have agreed to create a ``coexistence zone" in the north to facilitate Colombia's peace process, Interior Minister Nestor Martinez announced Friday.	February 19, 2000	14A
DRUG CZAR URGES COLOMBIAN OPENNESS	The White House drug policy director on Wednesday played down a blistering report that links a handful of U.S.-trained army officers in Colombia to death squads, saying that the real menace to human rights in that country is its narcotics trade.	February 24, 2000	6A
MCCAFFREY WARNS ANTI-DRUG BATTALION OF `GREAT DANGER'	White House drug policy director Barry McCaffrey visited rebel-infested southern Colombia on Thursday and warned that a U.S.-trained and equipped military unit faces ``great danger" as it mounts operations to take control of the lawless region.	February 25, 2000	7A
COLOMBIA PRISONERS SIGN NONAGGRESSION PACT	More than 4,000 inmates at Modelo Prison, the country's most important, signed a nonaggression pact Tuesday, giving up their weapons and agreeing to live in peace in Colombian prisons.	March 1, 2000	9A

MIAMI HERALD			
Headline	Lead	Date	Location
PARAMILITARY CHIEF HOPEFUL ABOUT COLOMBIAN PEACE TALKS	The secretive chief of Colombia's brutal right-wing paramilitary army let his face be shown in a rare television interview in which he offered an upbeat assessment of peace talks, admitted relying on money from the drug trade and acknowledged a personal distaste for killing people.	March 3, 2000	8A
AMERICAN ONLINE TUTORS COLOMBIAN REBELS IN WORKINGS OF CAPITALISM	Leftist guerrillas continued a running dialogue on the workings of international capitalism Friday - this time with the chairman emeritus of America Online.	March 5, 2000	7A
COLOMBIA NATIONAL CYCLING HERO SEIZED BY KIDNAPPERS	Army troops and police combed the mountains south of Bogota on Saturday after suspected leftist rebels kidnapped a national cycling hero - the second to be abducted this year.	March 5, 2000	9A
CYCLIST FREED ONE DAY AFTER BEING KIDNAPPED	Former cycling champion Luis ``Lucho" Herrera was freed Sunday by kidnappers who had captured him at gunpoint on his farm a day earlier, police said.	March 6, 2000	10A
COLOMBIA 2 REBEL FIGHTERS KILLED IN CLASH AT ROADBLOCK	Two leftist guerrillas died in a clash with army troops trying to remove a rebel roadblock on the main Medellin-Bogota highway, military spokesmen said Tuesday.	March 8, 2000	6A
JOURNALIST FLEES COLOMBIA AFTER THREATS	A prominent journalist and peace activist, Francisco Santos of El Tiempo newspaper, has fled the country because of death threats, relatives and co-workers said Saturday.	March 12, 2000	11A
COLOMBIA 11 MEN SHOT TO DEATH	Right-wing paramilitary groups killed 11 men suspected of being leftist sympathizers, authorities said Sunday.	March 13, 2000	10A
HOPES HIGH AS COLOMBIAN PEACE EFFORTS MOVE FAST JOINT EUROPE TOUR RAISED TRUST	An unusual 25-day tour of Europe last month by government negotiators and leftist insurgents has produced a new atmosphere of trust that could speed up talks designed to end Colombia's 35-year civil war.	March 14, 2000	6A
COLOMBIA REPORTER'S BODY FOUND IN UNMARKED GRAVE	A body buried in an unmarked grave in northwest Antioquia state has been identified as missing journalist Maria Elena Salinas Gallego, officials confirmed Tuesday.	March 15, 2000	11A
COLOMBIA MILITARY CRITICIZED OVER ESCAPES	The military has allowed a stream of officers and soldiers linked to human rights crimes to flee army bases where they were detained, letting them avoid criminal trials, the nation's top prosecutor says.	March 18, 2000	6A
COLOMBIA REBELS PLEDGE PULLBACK TO HELP OUT PEACE TALKS	Right-wing Colombian guerrillas said Sunday that they were withdrawing from a small area along the country's northern coast to help facilitate government peace talks with leftist rebels.	March 20, 2000	6A
COLOMBIA REBEL BOMBINGS CAUSE WIDESPREAD BLACKOUT	Sabotage bombings by leftist rebels caused a blackout Tuesday in most of Bogota and large portions of central and northeastern Colombia, officials said.	March 22, 2000	7A

MIAMI HERALD			
Headline	Lead	Date	Location
COLOMBIA AID PUSHED GRAHAM, OTHERS STRESS URGENCY OF OVERCOMING POLITICAL IMPASSE	Former national security advisor Brent Scowcroft, Florida Sen. Bob Graham and a group of Latin America policy experts and former officials called on Congress Thursday to urgently pass a massive aid package for Colombia, while their report acknowledged limitations in the assistance plan.	March 24, 2000	3A
COLOMBIA REBEL LEADER ARRESTED IN DEATH OF AMERICANS	Police on Thursday arrested a man they identified as the guerrilla commander responsible for the kidnap-slayings of three Americans.	March 24, 2000	16A
COLOMBIAN OFFICIAL SEEKS HELP FOR AID PLAN	Colombian Foreign Trade Minister Martha Lucia Ramirez urged the Miami business community Friday to throw its backing behind an emergency aid package languishing in Washington and step up investments during this critical moment for the South American country.	March 25, 2000	3C
COLOMBIAN REBELS MASSACRE POLICE 21 IN REMOTE GARRISON HACKED, BURNED	In a savage attack, guerrillas overran a jungle town in northwest Colombia over the weekend and killed 21 police officers stationed there, hacking many with machetes and burning their corpses, authorities said Monday.	March 28, 2000	11A
HOUSE APPROVES AID FOR COLOMBIAN DRUG FIGHT	The House refused Wednesday to slash a planned \$1.7 billion for battling drug lords in Colombia and edged toward approving a \$9 billion bill that would also finance U.S. peacekeepers in Kosovo and aid victims of natural disasters at home.	March 30, 2000	10A
\$1.7 BILLION OKD FOR LATIN DRUG FIGHT \$12.7 BILLION AID PACKAGE HEADS FOR RESISTANCE IN SENATE	After two days of debate, the House on Thursday approved a \$12.7 billion emergency spending bill whose centerpiece commits the United States to train and equip Colombia's security forces to combat drug traffickers in a country where the narcotics trade and guerrilla insurgency have blurred.	March 31, 2000	1A
COLOMBIA TRUCK BOMB KILLS 4, INJURES AT LEAST 14	A powerful truck bomb exploded in a tourist town west of the capital on Thursday, killing four people and injuring at least 14 others, officials said.	March 31, 2000	6A
CLINTON IRKED BY DELAY OF ANTI-DRUG SPENDING FOR COLOMBIA	The Clinton administration blasted a plan by Senate leaders to delay a \$12.7 billion emergency spending bill that includes money for combating drugs in Colombia, peacekeeping in Kosovo and cleaning up after Hurricane Floyd.	April 5, 2000	5A
COLOMBIA SUSPECTED RIGHTISTS KILL 21 IN SMALL TOWN	Suspected right-wing paramilitary gunmen executed 21 unarmed residents of a small town near the Venezuelan border Thursday, officials said.	April 7, 2000	6A

MIAMI HERALD			
Headline	Lead	Date	Location
FROM REBEL TO MAYOR: EX-FIGHTER RUNS DEMOCRACY IN COLOMBIA	When Rosemberg Pabon was elected mayor of this city three years ago, one of his goals was to stay alive. He had reason to fear. Once one of Colombia's most prominent leftist guerrillas, Pabon led the daring takeover of the Dominican Embassy in Bogota in 1980, taking the U.S. ambassador and half of Colombia's diplomatic corps hostage. He also briefly seized Yumbo in 1984. After turning to politics, he found it was his turn to be a target. Wherever he went, four bodyguards clustered around him. He traveled in an armored car. ``My life has been threatened more while I've been mayor than when I was in the mountains," Pabon said. ``I have to sleep with one eye open."	April 9, 2000	1A
COLOMBIA GUERRILLAS CAPTURE TOP POLICE OFFICIAL	Leftist guerrillas captured a top Colombian police official and three officers after their helicopter was shot down, police said.	April 9, 2000	13A
U.S. FUNDS TO FIGHT DRUGS ARE NEEDED NOW, COLOMBIAN LEADER SAYS	Colombian President Andres Pastrana, appealing for swift congressional approval of a two-year, \$1.3 billion emergency counterdrug package, said Tuesday that delays will only perpetuate skyrocketing coca production in his country.	April 12, 2000	10A
COLOMBIA REBEL GROUP ANNOUNCES EASTER WEEK CEASE-FIRE	Leftist guerrillas of the National Liberation Army announced a Holy Week cease-fire Wednesday and said they plan to release the crew of an airplane they hijacked a year ago.	April 13, 2000	7A
SENATOR CHIDES ADMINISTRATION ON HANDLING OF AID TO COLOMBIA	A senior Democratic senator accused the Clinton administration on Thursday of slighting Congress while seeking its support for a \$1.3 billion emergency aid package for Colombia and said he would do nothing to get the request approved.	April 14, 2000	11A
VENEZUELA FARC REBELS RELEASE SPANIARD, VENEZUELAN	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebels have released a Spaniard and five Venezuelans they abducted a year ago, the intelligence agency said Sunday.	April 17, 2000	10A
COLOMBIA ELN REBELS MAY GET DEMILITARIZED ZONE	The National Liberation Army (ELN) announced Monday a pact with the government to create a demilitarized zone in Bolivar and Antioquia departments where bilateral peace talks would be held.	April 25, 2000	5A
PASTRANA MAY DEMILITARIZE REGION COLOMBIAN ENCLAVE RICH IN GOLD	President Andres Pastrana said Tuesday he may soon demilitarize a small, gold-rich region of central Colombia to facilitate peace talks with the National Liberation Army, a weak but vexatious leftist insurgency.	April 26, 2000	3A
NARCOTICS CASE ANGERS COLOMBIANS U.S. ANTI-DRUG OFFICIAL SNARED IN RACKET FACES 18-MONTH TERM	Some prominent Colombians are outraged that a U.S. Army colonel who helped his wife hide drug-trafficking profits last year while he headed U.S. counter-drug operations in Colombia may get only a slap on the wrist - an 18-month jail term or less.	April 27, 2000	3A
COLOMBIA ANTI-DRUG EFFORT FALTERS U.S. BUDGET TROUBLE TAKES TOLL	A U.S. counter-drug program in Colombia faces a sudden and unexpected budget crisis that is giving coca farmers a chance to expand their crops nearly unimpeded.	April 29, 2000	3A

MIAMI HERALD			
Headline	Lead	Date	Location
COLOMBIA 26 PRISONERS ARE KILLED IN PENITENTIARY RIOT	Rioting that broke out after an inmate's mutilated body was found stuffed in a prison sewer pipe led to 26 deaths before the unrest ended Friday, the worst bloodletting in Colombia's violent prison system.	April 29, 2000	12A
DESPITE MOVE INTO POLITICS, COLOMBIAN REBEL CHIEF TALKS OF WAR	Even as Colombia's largest guerrilla force unveiled its new political wing Saturday, its military chief was quoted as ordering stepped-up attacks and kidnappings in preparation for a fall offensive.	April 30, 2000	16A

NEW YORK TIMES			
Headline	Lead	Date	Location
U.S. ANTIDRUG PLAN TO AID COLOMBIA FACES SKEPTICISM; PENTAGON IS RELUCTANT Some Fear \$1.3 Billion Effort Will Draw American Troops Into 40-Year Civil War	The Clinton administration's \$1.3 billion plan to help Colombia fight drug trafficking and leftist insurgents is facing skepticism from military and law-enforcement officials concerned that the United States could be dragged into a long and costly struggle that may ultimately have little impact on the drug trade.	February 6, 2000	1
Colombian Army Still Aiding Paramilitary Forces, Report Says	Units of the Colombian Army continue to work closely with right-wing paramilitary forces that are involved in killings of civilians and threats against government human rights investigators, according to a report made public today.	February 24, 2000	A5
U.S. Drug Czar Reassures Colombia on Aid	The White House's top official on drug policy capped a three-day visit here today by touring a jungle base from which a new Colombian Armed Forces unit hopes to attack Marxist guerrillas involved in the cocaine trade. Aside from that excursion, however, most of his time here was devoted to maneuvering through the thickets of Colombian and American politics.	February 25, 2000	A8
Battling in Colombia but Touring Together in Europe	Officially, peace talks between the Colombian government and the largest rebel group are stalled, with no date set for them to resume. Yet just the other day, the government's chief negotiator boasted that "we have advanced further this month than in 40 years of conflict."	February 28, 2000	A4
Colombia And Copters And Clash Over Choice	For most of the last three years, Clinton administration officials battled tirelessly with Republicans in Congress over what might be the right helicopters for Colombia's fight against illegal drugs. When the Republicans sought six top-of-the-line helicopters for the Colombian police, administration officials insisted that a rebuilt version of the old Vietnam-era workhorse, the UH-1H Huey, would do fine. They said that buying the more expensive aircraft, which cost roughly five times as much, would throw the State Department's drug-enforcement budget out of whack. Then, in late December, White House officials confirmed a change of heart. Going beyond their aides' most ambitious recommendation, officials said, senior officials proposed immediately buying 30 of the helicopters they had once rejected, the Sikorsky UH-60L Blackhawk, at a cost of almost \$400 million. It was Christmas not only for the much-criticized Colombian military, which is to receive the aircraft, but also for United Technologies Corporation, the Connecticut-based conglomerate that makes the Blackhawk and has been struggling with declining orders from the Pentagon.	March 6, 2000	A6

NEW YORK TIMES			
Headline	Lead	Date	Location
Colombian Military, in Report, Says Its Rights Abuses Are Down	Colombia's minister of defense said today that human rights violations by the country's armed forces had declined significantly, despite reports by the State Department and human rights groups that the problem is growing.	March 21, 2000	A11
Senate Fight Snags Aid Bill For Kosovo And Colombia	A \$9 billion spending bill to help Colombia combat drug traffickers and to pay for American military operations in Kosovo is imperiled because of stiff opposition from Senator Trent Lott, Republican of Mississippi, the majority leader, and fiscal conservatives in the House and Senate.	March 22, 2000	A5
House Passes Bill to Help Colombia Fight Drug Trade	After two days of debate, the House today approved a \$12.7 billion emergency spending bill whose centerpiece commits the United States to train and equip Colombia's security forces to combat drug traffickers in a country where the narcotics trade and guerrilla insurgency have blurred.	March 31, 2000	A11
U.S. Colonel Is Accused of Delay In Reporting Crimes by His Wife	A United States Army colonel who once led the government's antidrug campaign in Colombia was linked yesterday for the first time to an international drug-smuggling case in which his wife has pleaded guilty.	April 4, 2000	B4
Colombia Anti-Drug Aid Tangled Up in Senate	Senate Republicans have indicated that they will delay consideration of drug-fighting aid to Colombia, money for Kosovo peacekeeping operations and help for victims of recent weather disasters, and President Clinton said today that he was disappointed.	April 5, 2000	A4
COLOMBIA: MOTORISTS KIDNAPPED	Fighters of the leftist National Liberation Army kidnapped 23 motorists and hampered road and river traffic in central and northern Colombia.	April 5, 2000	A8
COLOMBIA: REBELS KILL POLICE CHIEF	A regional police intelligence chief and two other officers died when Marxist rebels shot down their helicopter over a combat zone in Valle del Cauca Province, in southwest Colombia.	April 8, 2000	A6
Lott Assures Colombian President on \$1.6 Billion to Fight Drugs	President Andres Pastrana of Colombia won assurances today from the Senate majority leader that Congress would approve \$1.6 billion in aid to help train and equip Colombian security forces to fight the drug war, but not until late spring or early summer.	April 13, 2000	A16

NEW YORK TIMES			
Headline	Lead	Date	Location
Drugs, Politics and Family Ties Figure in Colombia Extradition Case	On March 6, 1992, Victor Manuel Tafur-Dominguez heard gunfire outside his home in Cali, Colombia, and dashed out in time to see his father, a former senator who had helped draft a treaty allowing for the extradition of drug dealers, slump mortally wounded to the pavement by his car. During the ambulance ride to the hospital, the young man later told friends and family members, he felt his father's final shivers. Now, eight years later, Mr. Tafur-Dominguez, a student at Pace University Law School here, is accused of financing a multimillion-dollar shipment of cocaine seized at a Colombian port. The Drug Enforcement Administration, which arrested him on March 4, said he would be the first Colombian extradited home under the treaty that his father, Donald Rodrigo Tafur, helped write and, people in Colombia believe, died for.	April 13, 2000	B1
COLOMBIA: LIMITED TRUCE	The second-largest leftist guerrilla group, the Army of National Liberation, has announced a limited 10-day Easter truce and said it would release the four-member crew of an Avianca Airlines flight hijacked a year ago	April 14, 2000	A8
Delay Granted In Extradition Of Colombian	The son of a murdered Colombian senator will have to wait another month to find out whether he will be the first Colombian drug-trafficking suspect extradited from the United States under a treaty his father helped to write. Federal prosecutors sought and were granted a 30-day extension in the case.	April 14, 2000	B5
COLOMBIA: RIGHTS RECORD CONDEMNED	The United Nations human rights chief, Mary Robinson, said the situation in Colombia had deteriorated greatly in the past year, with killings, including massacres, and kidnappings on the rise.	April 15, 2000	A4

NEW YORK TIMES			
Headline	Lead	Date	Location
Drug War Ensnarers an Army Colonel Who Fought It	<p>When Army investigators arrived at the American Embassy in Bogota last spring to interrogate Laurie Ann Hiatt, they were faced with a delicate task. Mrs. Hiatt was not only the wife of the military officer who oversaw the Army's entire antidrug campaign in Colombia, but also the major suspect in a heroin-smuggling case in which drugs were being sent via diplomatic mail from Colombia to Manhattan and Queens. According to an affidavit from one investigator, Mrs. Hiatt grew more and more agitated as the interview, inside a quiet room in the embassy, continued, particularly when her questioners confronted her with evidence that she routinely bought cocaine in La Zona Rosa, Bogota's notorious drug bazaar.</p> <p>And toward the end of the questioning, court documents say, Mrs. Hiatt rose without warning and left the room for the one place the investigators dared not follow: a nearby office that belonged to her husband, Col. James C. Hiatt. No one can say for sure what happened there, but even before Mrs. Hiatt pleaded guilty to drug trafficking earlier this year, civilian authorities were convinced that Colonel Hiatt, formerly in charge of all United States military operations in Colombia, was aware of his wife's illegal dealings. Although the Army conducted its own investigation and cleared the colonel, Raymond W. Kelly, commissioner of the United States Customs Service, has said that his own agents have long suspected that Colonel Hiatt "had knowledge of his wife's actions and may have even had some complicity."</p>	April 16, 2000	36
Colonel Says He Used Cash From Wife's Drug Smuggling	A United States Army officer who once oversaw the government's antidrug wars in Colombia admitted yesterday that he had paid his household bills with thousands of dollars he knew his wife had received from smuggling heroin from Bogota to Manhattan and Queens.	April 18, 2000	B2
COLOMBIA: TOP REBEL SEIZED	The police have announced the arrest of a leftist guerrilla leader who they say directed the kidnapping of 160 middle-class churchgoers in Cali nearly a year ago.	April 19, 2000	A6

NEW YORK TIMES			
Headline	Lead	Date	Location
A Web of Drugs and Strife in Colombia; Cocaine War [a special report]	Nearly half the world's supply of cocaine originates within 150 miles of this isolated Colombian military outpost on the Putumayo River. So when Lt. German Arenas and his anti-drug troops recently set out by boat, they knew that finding a target would be the easy part. Four hours later, his squadron of young marines stopped and marched into the equatorial wilderness, guns at the ready. By nightfall, they had found three crude cocaine-processing laboratories in the jungle, more than 6,000 seedlings of a new, more potent variety of coca plant, a half-dozen large fields brimming with ripening coca bushes and four hapless peasants. But after they destroyed as much as they could, arrested the peasants and headed back downriver, the soldiers left behind at least 200 more labs hidden in the dense, trackless jungle and thousands more acres of coca plants, visible from the air everywhere across southern Colombia.	April 21, 2000	A1
Colombians Flee Into Panama as War Fears Rise	Bertilda Castro Tejada and her family are living in this small Panamanian village where time and trouble are all they have. The place may be dreary, but, unlike the home they left in Colombia, it is not deadly. At least not yet. They fled to Panama from their home in Jurado, Colombia, soon after leftist guerrillas overran the police station and military barracks there in December. After enduring an 18-hour siege, they feared that they would not survive the inevitable: right-wing paramilitary death squads that were sure to arrive, dispensing vengeance on those who had helped the guerrillas. "There are no police in Jurado," Mrs. Castro said, sitting outside a friend's cramped home, where she and her family live for now. "The guerrillas are in the mountains. When the paramilitaries come they beat up the peasants, asking, 'Where are the guerrillas?' We are defenseless. They do whatever they want with you because a town without law is not worth anything."	April 22, 2000	A3
Andes in Tumult, Shaken by Political Tremors	Guerrillas and the cocaine trade batter Colombia. A strongman rides roughshod over a discredited Congress and courts in Venezuela. Ecuador reels from an economic crisis and a coup. Bolivia has just emerged from a state of siege. And Peru awaits an election between an autocrat accused of trying to steal the presidency and a political firebrand.	April 23, 2000	3
Colombia Agrees to Turn Over Territory to Another Rebel Group	Hoping to advance peace talks aimed at ending 35 years of fighting, the government of Colombia has agreed to withdraw its troops from a remote but strategically situated northern region and turn the area into a safe haven for the country's second-largest guerrilla group.	April 26, 2000	A5

NEW YORK TIMES			
Headline	Lead	Date	Location
COLOMBIA: PEACE AIDE QUIT	The government's top peace official resigned after rebels of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia threatened to step up a longstanding campaign of extortion and kidnapping against the rich.	April 27, 2000	A6

WASHINGTON POST			
Headline	Lead	Date	Location
Colombian Rebels Visit Scandinavia	Six commanders of Colombia's main Marxist rebel force have quietly left the country, under police escort, to study economic development models in Scandinavia as part of a new plan to negotiate an end to their war against the state, authorities said.	February 3, 2000	A18
At Least 17 Killed in Colombia Violence	At least 17 people died Friday in attacks by leftist and right-wing gunmen in Colombia, including a 6-year-old boy killed by a car bomb detonated by suspected Marxist rebels.	February 5, 2000	A14
Q&A: Colombia's President; The Guerrillas 'Will Never Win'	Narco-guerrillas threaten Colombia's survival as the oldest democracy in South America.	February 6, 2000	B1
Colombia Refuses to Extradite Rebel	President Andres Pastrana said he will not extradite to the United States a guerrilla commander accused of ordering the murders of three American activists last year.	February 12, 2000	A16
U.S. Reports Major Rise In Colombian Drug Output	The Clinton administration launched a campaign yesterday for swift congressional approval of its massive aid package for Colombia, issuing new estimates that cultivation of coca, the raw material of cocaine, has increased 140 percent there over the past five years. Actual cocaine production was estimated to be up by 126 percent over the same period.	February 15, 2000	A1
Colombia Anti-Drug Plan Draws Hill Fire	Members of Congress opened fire on the Clinton administration's \$1.6 billion anti-drug plan for Colombia yesterday, with wide-ranging concerns that it is too little, too much, too late, too ambitious and not ambitious enough.	February 16, 2000	A18
Colombians Agree to Rebel Haven	The Colombian government, appearing to bow to a campaign of hijackings, kidnappings and sabotage, said yesterday that it would grant safe haven to the country's second-largest rebel group to kick-start peace talks.	February 18, 2000	A18
Colombian Army Tied To Abuses; Rights Group Faults Links With Militias	The Colombian army, which the Clinton administration proposes to supply with up to \$1 billion in training, equipment and other assistance over the next two years, maintains close operational ties to Colombian right-wing paramilitary groups responsible for extensive human rights abuses and escalating involvement in drug trafficking, according to a report released yesterday.	February 24, 2000	A1
Colombia Aid Questioned	The administration's plan to boost anti-drug aid to Colombia met with skepticism among senators worried about getting caught in a South American version of Vietnam.	February 25, 2000	A5
Drug Policy Director Ends Colombia Visit	White House drug control policy director Barry McCaffrey ended his two-day stay in Colombia by visiting the nerve-center of this country's drug war and wishing the U.S.-trained special anti-narcotics battalion good luck.	February 25, 2000	A18
Colombia Aid Plan Draws Skeptics	Senators expressed skepticism about the Clinton administration's \$1.6 billion plan to help Colombia fight drug traffickers and leftist guerrillas, saying it could put American forces in danger.	February 26, 2000	A9

WASHINGTON POST			
Headline	Lead	Date	Location
GOP Plans Funding Boost for Military, Drug War	House GOP leaders intend to press this week for approval of nearly \$9 billion of additional spending this year for anti-drug efforts in Colombia, military operations in Kosovo and dozens of other programs and initiatives that far exceed the funding sought by President Clinton.	March 8, 2000	A10
Panel Approves \$9 Billion in Spending; House Committee Adds Supplement for Kosovo	With budget surpluses mounting, the House Appropriations Committee last night approved \$9 billion of additional spending this year for Colombian anti-drug efforts and military operations in Kosovo and jettisoned several controversial budget gimmicks that were used to get around spending limits.	March 10, 2000	A9
U.S. Officials Cite Trend in Colombia; Lack of Air Support Hindering Drug War	A key element of the drug war in Colombia is faltering because U.S. surveillance flights over major cocaine-producing regions have declined by two-thirds over the past year, according to administration officials.	March 13, 2000	A1
Colombian Military States Its Case; Rights Advances Cited in Report	Assailed for human rights violations by the State Department, independent rights groups and the United Nations, the Colombian military put out its own report today, declaring impressive improvements in human rights observance and evenhandedness in pursuing armed groups on the left and right.	March 16, 2000	A22
Drug War Funding Faces Delay; Hastert Agrees With Senate Holdup of Colombia, Kosovo Aid	The Clinton administration's drive for emergency funds to combat Colombia drug traffickers and to cover military costs in Kosovo was apparently thwarted yesterday, after House Speaker J. Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.) said he agreed with Senate leaders that a final decision on such financing should be put off until later this year.	March 27, 2000	A4
House Approves Additional \$4 Billion for Defense; Nearing Passage, \$12.6 Billion Emergency Spending Bill Has Funds for Colombia, Non-Emergencies	The House last night approved \$4 billion in extra money for the Pentagon as part of an emergency spending package that appears set for final approval today. Part of the overall \$12.6 billion bill would be used to finance the Clinton administration's efforts to shore up Colombia's beleaguered government and combat Latin American drug traffickers.	March 30, 2000	A6
International Raids Nab 2,331 Suspects; U.S. Coordinates Drug Operations	Arresting a record 2,331 suspected narcotics traffickers, law enforcement agencies from the United States and other Western Hemisphere nations have completed a massive bust they hope will at least temporarily restrict the flow of illegal narcotics from the Caribbean to Central and South America, officials announced yesterday.	March 30, 2000	A7
U.S. Colonel To Plead Guilty In Colombia Drug Probe; Officer Said to Help Wife Hide Money Laundering	The former commander of the U.S. Army's anti-drug operation in Colombia--whose wife pleaded guilty in January to smuggling drugs into the United States while he was stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Bogota--has agreed to plead guilty to failing to turn her in for money laundering, according to court documents filed yesterday.	April 4, 2000	A1

WASHINGTON POST			
Headline	Lead	Date	Location
For Rebels, It's Not a Drug War; Colombian Government Agrees Conflict Has Other Causes	<p>For nearly 40 years, Colombians rarely saw the faces of the men who run the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the country's most powerful guerrilla group. Today, they are hard to avoid.</p> <p>Manuel Marulanda, the rumpled, 69-year-old founder of the FARC, as it is known by its initials in Spanish, appears regularly in the Colombian media, meeting with government officials and business leaders here in the Switzerland-size demilitarized zone the government has turned over to the rebels as a venue for peace talks.</p> <p>Bearded, bespectacled Raul Reyes, another member of the seven-man FARC leadership, began a recent interview by inviting e-mail messages to his Hotmail account. Commander Joaquin Gomez promised to introduce foreign visitors to local peasants growing coca, the raw material of cocaine. Reyes, Gomez and other rebel leaders calmly discussed the finer points of peace and their objections to a proposed \$1.6 billion emergency U.S. aid package that could bring Washington deeper into Colombia's civil war.</p> <p>But there is a through-the-looking-glass quality to life inside the demilitarized zone. Outside, in the rest of Colombia, the guerrillas have stepped up a campaign of killing, kidnapping and extortion. According to the government, they "assassinated" 42 police officers and 39 soldiers in the first three months of this year. The FARC continues to reject a cease-fire. And it is making more money than ever from cocaine smuggled to the United States.</p>	April 10, 2000	A1
Colombia Arrests 49 in Heroin Sweep	Colombian authorities arrested 49 suspected members of the country's largest heroin ring today, including the cousin of slain drug kingpin Pablo Escobar. Police officials said the suspects had been using a network of human "mules" to transport 110 pounds of the narcotic a month to the United States and Europe.	April 13, 2000	A28
Cultivating New Allies in Cocaine War; U.S.-Backed Program Urges Colombians to Replace Coca With Legitimate Crops	This remote area in southwest Colombia is the testing ground for a U.S.-backed plan to persuade small farmers to grow legitimate crops instead of coca, the raw material for U.S.-bound cocaine, and to spray the traffickers' large coca plantations with herbicides to cut off the destructive flow.	April 16, 2000	A33
Colombian Citizens Join Peace Process; Government, Guerrillas Stage Forums	Try as they might, the government officials and left-wing rebels could not get the labor unionists to be quiet and listen to proposals from the businessmen. "Please! Please show respect for the speaker," pleaded Ivan Rios, a leader of the country's largest guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.	April 20, 2000	A30
Colombia Sets Negotiations With a Second Rebel Group; Army Forces to Pull Out Of Guerrilla Stronghold	President Andres Pastrana has launched a new set of peace negotiations, this time with Colombia's second-largest guerrilla group, and vowed to pull the army out of parts of a central mountain range to foster the peace process and give the guerrillas free range	April 26, 2000	A28

WASHINGTON POST			
Headline	Lead	Date	Location
Colombia Fund Lag Decried	The area planted with coca in Colombia is likely to increase this year, partly because of the delay in U.S. financial support for President Andres Pastrana's Plan Colombia, a U.S. official said.	April 27, 2000	A6
Colombia's Negotiator With Rebels Steps Down; Successor Will Press Talks With Two Guerrilla Groups	The government peace commissioner, who pioneered talks with Colombia's main Marxist rebel group, stepped down today just as President Andres Pastrana has launched a new set of parallel negotiations with the second-largest guerrilla group.	April 27, 2000	A21
Rebels Launch Political Effort In Colombia; Thousands Attend Public Rally For New Clandestine Movement	Seeking to boost their campaign of land reform and social and economic equality, Colombia's largest rebel group kicked off a new political movement today.	April 30, 2000	A25

REFERENCES

- Abbot, Philipp K. 2011. "The Merida Initiative: a flawed counterdrug policy?" *Small Wars Journal* (January 6):1-11.(Accessed May 1, 2012).
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-merida-initiative-a-flawed-counterdrug-policy>.
- Alexander Jr., Rudolph, and Jacquelyn Gyamerah. 1997. "Differential punishing of African Americans and whites who possess drugs: A just policy or a continuation of the past?" *Journal of Black Studies* no. 28 (1):97-111.
- Americas Watch Committee. 1989. *The Killings in Colombia, An Americas Watch report*. Washington, DC: Americas Watch Committee.
- Bailey, John. 2011. "Plan Colombia and the Mérida Initiative: policy twins or distant cousins?" In *National solutions to trans-border problems?: the governance of security and risk in a post-NAFTA North America*, edited by Isidro Morales, 149-160. Farnham ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
- Bar-Tal, Daniel. 1989. "Delegitimation: the extreme case of stereotyping and prejudice." In *Stereotyping and prejudice: changing conceptions*, edited by Daniel Bar-Tal, 169-182. New York: Springer-Verlag.
- . 2000. *Shared beliefs in a society: social psychological analysis*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.
- Beer, Francis A., and G. R. Boyton. 1996. "Realistic rhetoric but not realism: A senatorial conversation on Cambodia." In *Post-Realism: the rhetorical turn in international relations*, edited by Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman, 369-383. East Lansing: Michigan State University press.
- Belenko, Steven R. 2000. *Drugs and drug policy in America: A documentary history*. Westport: Greenwood Press.
- Bell, Allan. 1991. *The language of news media*. Oxford, UK; Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- . 1995. "Language and the media." *Annual Review of Applied Linguistics* no. 15:23-41. doi: doi:10.1017/S0267190500002592.
- Beveridge, Albert J. 1900. Senator Beveridge of Indiana speaking for the Joint Resolution on Policy Regarding the Philippines. S.J. Res. 53. 56th Cong., 1st sess. *Congressional Record*. January 9.
- Black, George. 1988. *The good neighbor: how the United States wrote the history of Central America and the Caribbean*. 1st ed, *A New look at history*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Blackledge, Adrian. 2006. "The racialization of language in British political discourse." *Critical Discourse Studies* no. 3 (1):61-79.
- Bouley Jr., Eugene E. 2001. "The drug war in Latin America: Ten years in a quagmire." In *Drug war, American style: The internationalization of failed policy and its alternatives*, edited by Jurg Gerber and Eric L. Jensen, 169-196. New York: Garland Publishing.
- Boyd, Gerald M. 1986. "Reagan accuses Soviet Union, Cuba of aiding Latin terrorists." *Times-News*, January 3, 9.
- Brands, H. W. 1992. *Bound to empire: the United States and the Philippines*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Brenner, Phillip, and Soraya Castro. 2009. "David and Gulliver: Fifty years of competing metaphors in the Cuban–United States relationship." *Diplomacy & Statecraft* no. 20 (2):236-257.
- Buffalo News*. 1997. "drug czar, meets with Colombia president." October 21, 2A.
- Bulmer-Thomas, Victor, and Sheila Page. 1999. "Trade, investment and NAFTA: The economics of neighbourhood." In *The United States and Latin America: the new agenda*, edited by Victor Bulmer-Thomas and James Dunkerley, 75-98. London: Institute of Latin American Studies.
- Burns, Judith. 2009. "Obama Hails Sotomayor as an 'Only in America' Success Story." *Washington Wire* (August 12).(Accessed May 1, 2012).
<http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2009/08/12/obama-hails-sotomayor-as-an-only-in-america-success-story/>.
- Bush, George. Address to the nation on the National Drug Control Strategy. In *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush, 1989*. Book 2. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1135-1140
- Buxton, Julia. 2006. *The political economy of narcotics: production, consumption and global markets*. London ; New York: Distributed in the USA by Palgrave Macmillan.
- Callaway, Rhonda L., and Elizabeth G. Matthews. 2008. *Strategic US foreign assistance: the battle between human rights and national security*. Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
- Campbell, David. 1998. *Writing security: United States foreign policy and the politics of identity*. revised ed. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.
- Carabine, Jean. 2001. "Unmarried motherhood 1830-1990: A genealogical analysis." In *Discourse as data: a guide for analysis*, edited by Simeon Yates, Stephanie Taylor and Margaret Wetherell, 267-310. London; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE.
- Carlsen, Laura. 2007. "Plan Mexico." *Foreign Policy In Focus* (October 29).(Accessed May 1, 2012). http://www.fpif.org/articles/plan_mexico.
- . 2009. "House and Senate pass new military aid to Mexico." *The Americas Program* (May 18).(Accessed January 20, 2011). http://americas.irc-online.org/am/6122?utm_source=streamsend&utm_medium=email&utm_content=4144072&utm_campaign=House%20and%20Senate%20Pass%20New%20Military%20Aid%20to%20Mexico.
- Carlson, Lewis H., and George A. Colburn. 1972. *In their place: White America defines her minorities, 1850-1950*. London: John Wiley & Sons.
- Carpenter, Ted Galen. 2003. *Bad neighbor policy: Washington's futile war on drugs in Latin America*. 1st ed. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Carpentier, Nico. 2008. "Dichotomized media discourses of war: The construction of the Self and the Enemy in the 2003 Iraq War." In *Discourse theory and cultural analysis: media, arts and literature*, edited by Nico Carpentier and Erik Spinoy, 29-54. Cresskill, N.J.: Hampton Press.
- Celik, Nur Betül. 2005. "The constitution and dissolution of the Kemalist imaginary." In *Discourse theory in European politics: identity, policy, and governance*, edited by David R. Howarth and Jacob Torfing, 194-2004. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Chalaby, Jean K. 1996. "Beyond the prison-house of language: Discourse as a Sociological Concept." *The British Journal of Sociology* no. 47 (4):684-698.

- Charles, Robert B. 2008. "The U.S.'s Andean Counterdrug Initiative is Reducing Drug Production in Latin America." In *Drug trafficking*, edited by Julia Bauder, 27-36. New York: Greenhaven Press; Thomson/Gale.
- Clohesy, Anthony M. 2005. "The Human Rights Act: Politics, power, and the law." In *Discourse theory in European politics: identity, policy, and governance*, edited by David R. Howarth and Jacob Torfing, 170-189. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Coerver, Don M., and Linda B. Hall. 1999. *Tangled destinies: Latin America and the United States*. 1st ed, *Diálogos*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- Collet, Merrill. 1988. "An international story: the myth of the 'narco-guerrillas.' (Colombia)." *the Nation*.
- Cottam, Martha L. 1992. "The Carter administration's policy toward Nicaragua: images, goals, and tactics." *Political Science Quarterly* no. 107 (1):123-146.
- . 1994. *Images and intervention: U.S. policies in Latin America*, *Pitt Latin American series*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Crandall, Russell. 2002. *Driven by drugs: U.S. policy toward Columbia*. Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc.
- . 2008. *The United States and Latin America after the Cold War*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- 106th Congress. House. 2000. Committee on Government Reform. Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources Subcommittee. *The crisis in Colombia: What are we facing?* 2nd sess. February 15, 2000.
- DeConde, Alexander. 1992. *Ethnicity, race, and American foreign policy: a history*. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
- Denzin, Norman K., and Yvonna S. Lincoln. 2000. "The discipline and practice of qualitative research." In *Handbook of qualitative research*, edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, 1-28. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.
- DeShazo, Peter, Tanya Primiani, Phillip McLean, and Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington D.C.). Americas Program. 2007. *Back from the brink: evaluating progress in Colombia, 1999-2007, CSIS report*. Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press.
- Develotte, Christine, and Elizabeth Rechniewski. 2001. "Discourse analysis of newspaper headlines: a methodological framework for research into national representations." *The Web Journal of French Media Studies* no. 4 (1). (Accessed January 3, 2011). <http://wjfms.ncl.ac.uk/enframes.htm>.
- Dominguez, Jorge I. 1999. "US-Latin American relations during the Cold War and its aftermath." In *The United States and Latin America: the new agenda*, edited by V. Bulmer-Thomas and James Dunkerley, 33-50. London: Institute of Latin American Studies.
- Doty, Roxanne Lynn. 1993. "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines." *International Studies Quarterly* no. 37 (3):297-320.
- . 1996a. *Imperial encounters: the politics of representation in North-South relations*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- . 1996b. "The logic of différance in international relations: U.S. colonization of the Philippines." In *Post-Realism: the rhetorical turn in international relations*, edited by

- Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman, 331-346. East Lansing: Michigan State University press.
- Duke, Steven B., and Albert C. Gross. 1993. *America's longest war: Rethinking our tragic crusade against drugs*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons.
- Duster, Troy. 1970. *The legislation of morality: Law, drugs, and moral judgment*. New York: The Free Press.
- Elwood, William N. 1994. *Rhetoric in the war on drugs: The triumphs and tragedies of public relations*. Westport: Praeger.
- Epstein, Charlotte. 2008. *The power of words in international relations: birth of an anti-whaling discourse, Politics, science, and the environment*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Fairclough, Norman. 1992. *Discourse and social change*. Cambridge, UK ; Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.
- . 1995. *Media discourse*. London; New York: E. Arnold.
- . 1998. "Political discourse in the media: An analytical framework." In *Approaches to media discourse*, edited by Allan Bell and Peter Garrett, 142-152. Oxford ; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
- . 2001a. "Critical discourse analysis as a method in social scientific research." In *Methods of critical discourse analysis*, edited by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, 121-138. London: SAGE.
- . 2001b. "The discourse of New Labour: Critical Discourse Analysis." In *Discourse as data: a guide for analysis*, edited by Simeon Yates, Stephanie Taylor and Margaret Wetherell, 229-266. London; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE.
- Farah, Douglas. 1993. "Colombian drug flow unabated; Cali-based caretakers supplant Medellín." *Washington Post*, March 9, A14.
- . 1996. "The Crackup." *Washington Post*, July 21, W11.
- . 1997. "United States resumes aid to Colombia; threat from guerrillas overrules White House's concerns over military." *Washington Post*, December 27, A01.
- . 1999. "Pact near on aid to Colombia; Hill, White House want \$1 billion-plus for anti-drug effort." *Washington Post*, October 9, A02.
- Fishel, John T. . 1991. "Developing a drug war strategy, Lessons learned from Operation *Blast Furnace*." *Military Review* no. 71:61-69.
- Flowerdew, John, David C. S. Li, and Sarah Tran. 2002. "Discriminatory news discourse: some Hong Kong data." *Discourse & Society* no. 13 (3):319-345.
- Fowler, Roger. 1991. *Language in the news: discourse and ideology in the press*. London; New York: Routledge.
- Franke, Volker, and Justin Reed. 2005. "Squeezing a balloon: Plan Colombia and America's war on drugs." In *Terrorism and peacekeeping: new security challenges*, edited by Volker Franke, 175-194. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.
- Friedman, Emily. 2012. "Obama Owes Americans an Apology, Romney Says." *The Note* (March 23). (Accessed May 1, 2012). <http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/03/obama-owes-americans-an-apology-romney-says/>.
- Friesendorf, Cornelius. 2007. *US foreign policy and the war on drugs: displacing the cocaine and heroin industry, CSS studies in security and international relations*. London ; New York: Routledge.

- Fukumi, Sayaka. 2008. *Cocaine trafficking in Latin America: EU and US policy responses, Global security in a changing world*. Aldershot, Hants, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
- González Torres, Jonathan A. 2010. "U.S.-Mexico military cooperation: from WWII to the Merida Initiative." *Americas Program*, December 10.(Accessed May 1, 2012). <http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/3365>.
- Grow, Michael. 2008. *U.S. presidents and Latin American interventions: pursuing regime change in the Cold War*. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas.
- Guizado, Álvaro Camacho. 2005. "Plan Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative: the ups and downs of a policy." In *Elusive peace: international, national, and local dimensions of conflict in Columbia*, edited by Cristina Rojas and Judy Meltzer. New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hackett, Robert A. 1991. *News and dissent: the press and the politics of peace in Canada, Communication and information science*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Pub. Corp.
- Hackett, Robert A., and Yuezhi Zhao. 1998. *Sustaining democracy?: journalism and the politics of objectivity*. Toronto: Garamond Press.
- Hall, Stuart. 2000. "Racist ideologies and the media." In *Media studies: a reader*, edited by Paul Marris and Sue Thornham, 271-282. New York: New York University Press.
- Hall, Stuart, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferon, John Clarke, and Brian Roberts. 2000. "The social production of news." In *Media studies: a reader*, edited by Paul Marris and Sue Thornham, 645-652. New York: New York University Press.
- Halle, Louis (aka "Y"). 1950. "On a Certain Impatience with Latin America." *Foreign Affairs* no. 28 (July):565-579.
- Halliday, M. A. K., and Jonathan Webster. 2003. *On language and linguistics, Collected works of M.A.K. Halliday*. New York: Continuum.
- Hansen, Allen Dreyer, and Eva Sørensen. 2005. "Polity as politics: studying the shaping and effects of discursive politics." In *Discourse theory in European politics: identity, policy, and governance*, edited by David R. Howarth and Jacob Torfing, 93-116. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Harré, Rom, and Fathali M. Moghaddam. 2003. "Introduction: the self and others in traditional psychology and in positioning theory." In *The self and others: Positioning individuals and groups in personal, political, and cultural contexts*, edited by Rom Harré and Fathali M. Moghaddam, 1-12. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.
- Harrigan, Jane T., and Karen Brown Dunlap. 2004. *The editorial eye*. 2nd ed. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's.
- Harrison, Lawrence E. 1985. *Underdevelopment is a state of mind: the Latin American case*. Lanham, MD: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University and University Press of America.
- . 2000. *Underdevelopment is a state of mind: the Latin American case*. Lanham, MD: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University and University Press of America.
- Henry, Frances, and Carol Tator. 2002. *Discourses of domination: racial bias in the Canadian English-language press*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Hesselroth, Alba. 2003. "Struggles of security In US foreign drug policy towards Andean countries." *Peace, Conflict & Development* (5).(Accessed January 5, 2011). <http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/edition/17>.

- Hietala, Thomas R. 1998. "Continentalism and the color line." In *Race and U.S. foreign policy from colonial times through the age of Jackson*, edited by Michael L. Krenn. New York: Garland Pub.
- Holden, Robert H., and Eric Zolov. 2000. *Latin America and the United States: a documentary history*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Holloway, Johnny 2008. Race in US – Latin American relations: A critical discourse analysis of Plan Colombia. In *the 49th annual meeting of the International Studies Association*. San Francisco, California.
- Hopf, Ted. 2004. "Discourse and content analysis: Some fundamental incompatibilities." *Qualitative Methods* no. 2 (1):31-33.
- Horsman, Reginald. 1998. "Liberty and the Anglo-Saxons." In *Race and U.S. foreign policy from colonial times through the age of Jackson*, edited by Michael L. Krenn, 99-120. New York: Garland Pub.
- Howarth, David R. 2000. *Discourse, Concepts in the social sciences*. Buckingham England ; Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press.
- . 2005. "Applying discourse theory: The method of articulation." In *Discourse theory in European politics: identity, policy, and governance*, edited by David R. Howarth and Jacob Torfing, 316-349. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Howarth, David R., and Yannis Stavrakakis. 2000. "Introducing discourse theory and political analysis." In *Discourse theory and political analysis: identities, hegemonies, and social change*, edited by David R. Howarth, Aletta J. Norval and Yannis Stavrakakis, 1-23. Manchester Manchester University Press.
- Human Rights Watch Staff. 1999. *Human rights watch world report, 2000*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- Hunt, Michael H. 1987. *Ideology and U.S. foreign policy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Hylton, Forrest. 2006. *Evil hour in Colombia*. London ; New York: Verso.
- Isaacson, Adam. 2005. "The U.S. military in the War on Drugs." In *Drugs and democracy in Latin America: the impact of U.S. policy*, edited by Coletta Youngers and Eileen Rosin, 15-60. Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner.
- Isacson, Adam. 2005. "The U.S. military in the War on Drugs." In *Drugs and democracy in Latin America: the impact of U.S. policy*, edited by Coletta Youngers and Eileen Rosin, 15-60. Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner.
- Jackson, Patrick T. 2006a. *Civilizing the enemy: German reconstruction and the invention of the West*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- . 2006b. "Making sense of making sense: configurational analysis and the double hermeneutic." In *Interpretation and method: empirical research methods and the interpretive turn*, edited by Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea, 264-280. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
- . 2008. "Foregrounding ontology: dualism, monism, and IR theory." *Review of International Studies* no. 34 (01):129-153.
- Jackson, Richard. 2007. "Constructing enemies: 'Islamic Terrorism' in political and academic discourse." *Government and Opposition* no. 42 (3):394-426.
- Jensen, Eric L., and Jurg Gerber. 1998. "The social construction of drug problems: An historical overview." In *The new war on drugs: Symbolic politics and criminal justice policy*, edited by Eric L. Jensen and Jurg Gerber, 1-24. Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Co.

- Johnson, John J. 1980. *Latin America in caricature*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- . 1990. *A hemisphere apart: the foundations of United States policy toward Latin America, The Johns Hopkins symposia in comparative history*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Jørgensen, Marianne, and Louise Phillips. 2002. *Discourse analysis as theory and method*. London; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.
- Joyce, Elizabeth. 1998. "Conclusions." In *Latin America and the multinational drug trade*, edited by Elizabeth Joyce and Carlos Malamud. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Keen, Benjamin. 1969. "The Black Legend revisited: Assumptions and realities." *Hispanic American Historical Review* no. 49 (4):703-719.
- Keenan, Edward L. 2000. "Two kinds of presupposition in natural language." In *Pragmatics: Critical concepts, Vol. IV: Presupposition, implicature and indirect speech acts*, edited by Asa Asher, 8-15. London: Routledge.
- Kenworthy, Eldon. 1995. *America/Américas: myth in the making of U.S. policy toward Latin America*. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Kerry, John F. 1994. "Law enforcement a kingpin could love." *Washington Post*, April 6, A19.
- Kline, Harvey F. 1999. *State building and conflict resolution in Colombia, 1986-1994*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Kraul, Chris. 2008. "Chavez keeps up campaign to get rebels off terrorist list; The leader's efforts bring Venezuela's relations with neighbor Colombia to what may be a new low." *Los Angeles Times*, January 20, A4.
- Krenn, Michael L. 2006. *The color of empire: race and American foreign relations*. 1st ed, *Issues in the history of American foreign relations*. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books.
- Laffey, M., and J Weldes. 2004. "Methodological reflections on discourse analysis." *Qualitative Methods* no. 2 (1):28-30.
- Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. 1980. *Metaphors we live by*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Langley, Lester D. 1989. *America and the Americas: the United States in the Western Hemisphere, The United States and the Americas*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Lehman, Kenneth. 2006. "A medicine of "death"? U.S. policy and political disarray in Bolivia, 1985-2006." In *Addicted to failure: U.S. security policy in Latin America and the Andean Region*, edited by Brian Loveman, 130-168. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- LeoGrande, William, and Kenneth Sharpe. 2000. "Two wars or one? Drugs, guerrillas and Colombia's new Violencia." *World Policy Journal* no. 17 (3):1-11.
- Lewis, Charles, and Margaret Ebrahim. 1993. "Can Mexico and Big Business USA buy NAFTA?" *The Nation* no. 256:826-839.
- Lindsay, James M. 2012. "Gauging Foreign Policy in Obama's Address." *The Atlantic* (January 25).(Accessed May 1, 2012).
<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/obamas-no-apologies-foreign-policy-in-the-state-of-the-union/251964/>.
- Livingstone, Grace. 2004. *Inside Colombia: drugs, democracy, and war*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press.
- . 2009. *America's backyard: the United States and Latin America from the Monroe Doctrine to the War on Terror*. London; New York: Zed Books.

- Lotz, Hellmut. 1997. "Myth and NAFTA: The use of core values in US politics." In *Culture & foreign policy*, edited by Valerie M. Hudson, 73-96. Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner Publishers.
- Loveman, Brian. 2006. "U.S. security policies in Latin America and the Andean Region, 1990-2006." In *Addicted to failure: U.S. security policy in Latin America and the Andean Region*, edited by Brian Loveman, 1-52. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Marcy, William L. 2010. *The politics of cocaine: how U.S. foreign policy has created a thriving drug industry in Central and South America*. Chicago, Ill.: Lawrence Hill Books : Distributed by Independent Publishers Group.
- Mautner, Gerlinde. 2008. "Analyzing newspapers, magazines and other print media." In *Qualitative discourse analysis in the social sciences*, edited by Ruth Wodak and Micha Krzyżanowski, 30-53. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire England ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- McDougall, Walter A. 1997. *Promised land, crusader state: the American encounter with the world since 1776*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- McPherson, Alan L. 2006. *Intimate ties, bitter struggles: the United States and Latin America since 1945*. 1st ed, *Issues in the history of American foreign relations*. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books.
- Mejía, Daniel. 2010. "Evaluating Plan Colombia." In *Innocent bystanders: developing countries and the war on drugs*, edited by Philip Keefer and Norman Loayza, 135-164. Basingstoke; New York Washington, DC: Palgrave Macmillan; World Bank.
- Melo, Jorge Orlando. 1998. "The drug trade, politics and the economy: the Colombian experience." In *Latin America and the multinational drug trade, Institute of Latin American Studies series*, edited by Elizabeth Joyce and Carlos Malamud, 63-96. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Memoli, Michael A. 2012. "Obama dismisses Romney charge on belief in American exceptionalism." *Los Angeles Times*, April 2.(Accessed May 1, 2012). <http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/02/news/la-pn-obama-romney-exceptionalism-20120402>.
- Milliken, Jennifer. 1996. "Metaphors of prestige and reputation in American foreign policy and American realism." In *Post-Realism: the rhetorical turn in international relations*, edited by Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman, 217-238. East Lansing: Michigan State University press.
- . 1999. "The study of discourse in International Relations: A critique of research and methods." *European Journal of International Relations* no. 5 (2):225-254.
- Milliken, Jennifer, and David Sylvan. 1996. "Soft bodies, hard targets, and chic theories: US bombing policy in Indochina." *Millennium* no. 25 (2):321-359.
- Monroe, Dan, and Bruce Tap. 2005. *Shapers of the great debate on the Civil War: a biographical dictionary, Shapers of the great American debates*,. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
- Morales, Waltraud Queiser. 1989. "The War on Drugs: A New US National Security Doctrine?" *Third World Quarterly* no. 11 (3):147-169.
- Moscovici, Serge. 1973. Foreword. In *Health and illness; a social psychological analysis*, edited by Claudine Herzlich. London, New York: Published in cooperation with the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology by Academic Press.

- . 1984. "The phenomenon of social representations." In *Social representations*, edited by Robert M. Farr and Serge Moscovici, 3-69. Cambridge; New York; Paris: Cambridge University Press; Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme.
- Muppidi, Himadeep. 1999. "Postcoloniality and the production of international security: the persistent puzzle of U.S.-Indian relations." In *Cultures of insecurity: states, communities, and the production of danger*, edited by Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall, 119-146. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Murillo, Mario, and Jesus Rey Avirama. 2004. *Colombia and the United States : war, unrest, and destabilization, Open media book*. New York: Seven Stories Press.
- Musto, David F. 1987. *The American disease: Origins of narcotic control*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- . 1999. *The American disease: Origins of narcotic control*. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Neack, Laura, Jeanne A. K. Hey, and Patrick Jude Haney. 1995. *Foreign policy analysis: continuity and change in its second generation*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
- Ninkovich, Frank A. 2001. *The United States and imperialism, Problems in American history*. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers.
- Norval, Aletta J. 2000. "Trajectories of future research in discourse theory." In *Discourse theory and political analysis: identities, hegemonies, and social change*, edited by David R. Howarth, Aletta J. Norval and Yannis Stavrakakis, 219-236. Manchester Manchester University Press.
- Oehme, Chester G. 2010. "Plan Colombia: Reassessing the Strategic Framework." *Democracy and Security* no. 6 (3):221-236. doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2010.521055>.
- Orcutt, James D., and J. Blake Turner. 1993. "Shocking numbers and graphic accounts: Quantified images of drug problems in the print media." *Social Problems* no. 40 (2):190-206.
- Palacios, Marco. 2006. *Between legitimacy and violence: a history of Colombia, 1875-2002*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Pérez, Louis A. 2008. *Cuba in the American imagination: metaphor and the imperial ethos*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Perl, Raphael Francis. 1988. "Congress, international narcotics policy, and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988." *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* no. 30 (2):19-51.
- Phillips, Nelson, and Cynthia Hardy. 2002. *Discourse analysis: investigating processes of social construction*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Pike, Fredrick B. 1992. *The United States and Latin America: myths and stereotypes of civilization and nature*. 1st ed. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Pizarro, Eduardo, and Pilar Gaitán. 2006. "Plan Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative: lights and shadows." In *Addicted to failure: U.S. security policy in Latin America and the Andean Region*, edited by Brian Loveman, 53-79. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Rabasa, Angel, and Peter Chalk. 2001. *Colombian labyrinth: the synergy of drugs and insurgency and its implications for regional stability*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.
- Ramirez Lemus, Maria C., Kimberly Stanton, and John Walsh. 2005. "Colombia: a vicious cycle of drugs and war." In *Drugs and democracy in Latin America: the impact of U.S. policy*, edited by Coletta Youngers and Eileen Rosin, 99-142. Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner.

- Ramsey, Robert D. 2009. *From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque: the Colombian security force experience, 1998-2008, Occasional paper*. Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute Press; US Army Combined Arms Center.
- Rangel, Charles. 1989. "Yes we can do something for Colombia." *Washington Post*, August 24, A23.
- Reinarman, Craig. 2000. "The social construction of drug scares." In *Constructions of deviance: Social power, context, and interaction*, edited by Patricia A. Adler and Peter Adler, 147-158. Belmont: Wadsworth.
- Reinarman, Craig, and Harry G. Levine. 1997. "The crack attack: Politics and media in the crack scare." In *Crack in America: Demon drugs and social justice*, edited by Craig Reinarman and Harry G. Levine, 18-51. London: University of California Press, Ltd.
- Reisigl, Martin, and Ruth Wodak. 2001. *Discourse and discrimination: rhetorics of racism and antisemitism*. London ; New York: Routledge.
- . 2009. "The impact of Plan Colombia on forced displacement." In *International migration and human rights: the global repercussions of U.S. policy*, edited by Samuel Martínez. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Richardson, Laurel. 2000. "Writing: A method of inquiry." In *Handbook of qualitative research*, edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, 923-948. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.
- Rochlin, James Francis. 2007. *Social forces and the revolution in military affairs: the cases of Colombia and Mexico*. 1st ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Rohter, Larry. 1999. "Plan to strengthen Colombia nudges U.S. for \$3.5 billion." *New York Times*, September 15.
- Rosenbaum, David E. 1993. "The Vice President accuses foe of taking stance for personal gain." *New York Times*, November 10, A1; B15.
- Ryan, Kevin F. 1998. "Globalizing the problem: The United States and international drug control." In *The new war on drugs: Symbolic politics and criminal justice policy*, edited by Eric L. Jensen and Jurg Gerber, 141-156. Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Co.
- Santa Ana, Otto. 1999. "'Like an animal I was treated': anti-immigrant metaphor in US public discourse." *Discourse & Society* no. 10 (2):191-224.
- . 2002. *Brown tide rising: metaphors of Latinos in contemporary American public discourse*. 1st ed. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Schemo, Diana Jean, and Tim Golden. 1998. "Uneasy allies: a special report.; Bogata aid: to fight drugs or rebels?" *New York Times*, June 2, A1.
- Schoultz, Lars. 1987. *National security and United States policy toward Latin America*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- . 1998. *Beneath the United States: a history of U.S. policy toward Latin America*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Schudson, Michael. 2001. "The objectivity norm in American journalism." *Journalism* no. 2 (2):149-170.
- Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine. 2006. "Judging quality: Evaluative criteria and epistemic communities." In *Interpretation and method: empirical research methods and the interpretive turn*, edited by Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea, 89-113. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.

- Scott, Peter Dale. 2003. *Drugs, oil, and war: the United States in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Indochina*, War and peace library. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Scott, Peter Dale, and Jonathan Marshall. 1998. *Cocaine politics: drugs, armies, and the CIA in Central America*. Updated ed. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Serafino, Nina M. 2008. *Colombia: Plan Colombia legislation and assistance (FY2000-FY2001)*. Congressional Research Service - Library of Congress, July 5 2001 [cited March 1 2008]. Available from <http://www.fas.org/asmp/resources/govern/crs-RL30541.pdf>.
- Sharpe, Kenneth. 1988. "The Drug War: Going after supply." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* no. 30 (2-3):77-86.
- Shaw, E. Clay. 2000. Congressman Shaw speaks for the Assistance Plan for Plan Colombia and for Andean Regional Counternarcotics Activities. 106th Cong., 2nd sess. *Congressional Record*. March 29.
- Shimko, Keith L. 1995. "Foreign policy metaphors: Falling "dominoes" and drug "wars"." In *Foreign policy analysis: continuity and change in its second generation*, edited by Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey and Patrick Jude Haney, 71-84. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
- Simons, G. L. 2004. *Colombia: a brutal history*. London: Saqi.
- Skonieczny, Amy. 2001. "Constructing NAFTA: Myth, representation, and the discursive construction of U.S. foreign policy." *International Studies Quarterly* no. 45 (3):433-454.
- Slocum, Nikki, and Luk Van Langenhove. 2003. "Integration Speak: Introducing positioning theory in regional integration studies." In *The self and others: Positioning individuals and groups in personal, political, and cultural contexts*, edited by Rom Harré and Fathali M. Moghaddam, 219-234. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.
- Smith, Joseph. 2005. *The United States and Latin America: a history of American diplomacy, 1776-2000*. London ; New York: Routledge.
- Smith, Philip. 2011. *This week's corrupt cops stories* StoptheDrugWar.org 2011 [cited March 5 2011]. Available from http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/2011/mar/01/weeks_corrupt_cops_stories.
- Stake, Robert E. 2000. "Case studies." In *Handbook of qualitative research*, edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, 435-454. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.
- Stavrakakis, Yannis. 2005. "On the emergence of Green ideology: the dislocation factor in Green politics." In *Discourse theory in European politics: identity, policy, and governance*, edited by David R. Howarth and Jacob Torfing, 100-118. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Steuter, Erin, and Deborah Wills. 2010. "The vermin have struck again': dehumanizing the enemy in post 9/11 media representations." *Media, War & Conflict* no. 3 (2):152-167.
- Stillar, Glenn F. 1998. *Analyzing everyday texts: discourse, rhetoric, and social perspectives, Rhetoric & society*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.
- Stokes, Doug. 2004. *America's other war: terrorizing Colombia*. London; New York: Zed Books : Distributed in the USA exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan.
- . 2005. *America's other war: terrorizing Colombia*. London; New York: Zed Books: Distributed in the USA exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan.
- . 2008. "Beyond geopolitics and solidarism: interpenetrated sovereignty, transnational conflict and the United States' "Plan Colombia"." In *National interest and international solidarity: particular and universal ethics in international life*, edited by Jean-Marc Coicaud and Nicholas J. Wheeler, 176-204. New York: United Nations University Press.

- Taylor, Stephanie. 2001a. "Evaluating and applying discourse analytic research." In *Discourse as data: a guide for analysis*, edited by Simeon Yates, Stephanie Taylor and Margaret Wetherell, 311-330. London; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE.
- . 2001b. "Locating and conducting discourse analytic research." In *Discourse as data: a guide for analysis*, edited by Simeon Yates, Stephanie Taylor and Margaret Wetherell, 5-48. London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE.
- Teo, Peter. 2000. "Racism in the news: a critical discourse analysis of news reporting in two Australian newspapers." *Discourse & Society* no. 11 (7):7-49.
- Tickner, Arlene B. 2007. "US foreign policy in Colombia: bizarre side effects of the 'War on Drugs'." In *Peace, democracy, and human rights in Colombia*, edited by Christopher Welna and Gustavo Gallón Giraldo. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Tokatlian, J. G. 1988. "National security and drugs: Their impact on Colombian-US relations." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* no. 30 (1):133–160.
- Tokatlian, Juan G. 1990. *The political economy of Colombian - U.S. narcodiplomacy: A case study of Colombian foreign policy decision-making, 1978-1990*. PhD diss., Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore.
- Torring, Jacob. 2005. "Discourse theory: Achievements, arguments and challenges." In *Discourse theory in European politics: identity, policy, and governance*, edited by David R. Howarth and Jacob Torring, 1-30. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Tracy, Karen. 1995. "Action-implicative discourse analysis." *Journal of Language and Social Psychology* no. 14 (1-2):195-215.
- Trager, Oliver. 1987. *Latin America: our volatile neighbors, An Editorials on file book*. New York, N.Y.: Facts on File Publications.
- USA Today. 1995. "'narco-democracy' in Colombia -- report." March 1, 8A.
- Vacius, Ingrid, and Adam Isacson. 2000. "Plan Colombia": the debate in Congress, 2000. Washington, D.C.: Center for International Policy.
- Vaicius, Ingrid, and Adam Isaacson. 2003. The "War on Drugs" meets the "War on Terror": The United States' military involvement in Columbia climbs to the next level. In *International Policy Report*. Washington DC: Center for International Policy.
- van Dijk, Teun A. 1988. *News analysis: case studies of international and national news in the press*. Hillsdale, N.J.: L. Erlbaum.
- . 1991. *Racism and the press*. London; New York: Routledge.
- . 1995a. "Discourse analysis as ideology analysis." In *Language and peace*, edited by Christina Schäffner and Anita Wenden, 17-36. Aldershot, Hants, England; Brookfield, Vt., USA: Dartmouth.
- . 1995b. "Power and the news media." In *Political Communication and Action*, edited by David L. Paletz, 9-36. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.
- . 1998. "Opinions and Ideologies in the press." In *Approaches to media discourse*, edited by Allan Bell and Peter Garrett, 21-63. Oxford; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
- . 2000. "New(s) racism: a discourse analytical approach." In *Ethnic minorities and the media*, edited by Simon Cottle, 33-49. Milton Keynes, UK: Open University Press.
- Van Tassel, Darin H. 1997. "Operational code evolution: How Central America came to be "our backyard" in U.S. culture." In *Culture & foreign policy*, edited by Valerie M. Hudson, 231-264. Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner Publishers.

- Villiers Negroponte, Diana. 2009. "The Merida Initiative and Central America: The Challenges of Containing Public Insecurity and Criminal Violence." *Foreign Policy at Brookings*, 1-76. (Accessed May 1, 2012). <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2009/05/merida-initiative-negroponte>.
- Walker, William O. 1989. *Drug control in the Americas*. Rev. ed. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- . 1996. "Introduction: Culture, drugs, and politics in the Americas." In *Drugs in the Western Hemisphere: an odyssey of cultures in conflict*, edited by William O. Walker. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources.
- Washington Post*. 1995. "Colombia's fight against drugs." June 15, A20.
- Weatherford, Carole Boston, and Robert Barrett. 2010. *Obama: only in America*. 1st ed. New York: Marshall Cavendish.
- Weldes, Jutta. 1999. *Constructing national interests: the United States and the Cuban missile crisis*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Weldes, Jutta, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson, and Raymond Duvall. 1999. "Introduction: constructing insecurity." In *Cultures of insecurity: states, communities, and the production of danger*, edited by Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall, 1-34. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Wendt, Alexander. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Weston, Rubin F. 1998. "Racism and the Imperialist Campaign." In *Race and U.S. foreign policy in the ages of territorial and market expansion, 1840 to 1900*, edited by Michael L. Krenn, 189-207. New York: Garland Pub.
- Wetherell, Margaret, and Jonathan Potter. 1992. *Mapping the language of racism: discourse and the legitimation of exploitation*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Williams, Linda F. 2003. *The constraint of race: legacies of white skin privilege in America*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Wodak, Ruth. 2008. "Discourse studies - important concepts and terms." In *Qualitative discourse analysis in the social sciences*, edited by Ruth Wodak and Micha Krzyżanowski, 1-29. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire England ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Wodak, Ruth, Rudolf de Cillia, Karin Liebhart, and Martin Reisigl. 1999. *The discursive construction of national identity*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Wood, Linda A., and Rolf O. Kroger. 2000. *Doing discourse analysis: methods for studying action in talk and text*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.
- Yanow, Dvora. 2006. "Neither rigorous nor objective? Interrogating criteria for knowledge claims in interpretive science." In *Interpretation and method: empirical research methods and the interpretive turn*, edited by Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea, 67-88. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
- Youngers, Coletta, and Eileen Rosin. 2005. "The U.S. "War on Drugs": Its impact in Latin America and the Caribbean." In *Drugs and democracy in Latin America: the impact of U.S. policy*, edited by Coletta Youngers and Eileen Rosin, 1-14. Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner.