

SOCIAL MOVEMENT SUCCESS IN AUTHORITARIAN SETTINGS:

KIFAYA AND THE ARAB SPRING IN EGYPT

2004-2011

By

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
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
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
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Dedicated to those who hoped and risked so much  
as they dreamed of a better world.

# SOCIAL MOVEMENT SUCCESS IN AUTHORITARIAN SETTINGS

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### ABSTRACT

What determines the outcome of social movements in authoritarian contexts? I advance an argument that demonstrates that in order to be successful in authoritarian contexts, social movements need to possess prior organizations and networks with weak ties that are capable of transmitting protest tactics. To demonstrate this, I employ a comparative case study whereby I examine two social movements that took place in Egypt between 2004 and 2011. Though both movements sought similar political reforms, only the Arab Spring era movement succeeded in achieving them. I use the comparative failure and success of these two movements to illustrate how these components are necessary for the success of a social movement. I find data for my argument by using news publications of events in both movements, and comparing the role each of these components played in each social movement. The findings contribute to our understanding of the operations and chances for success of social movements in non-western, non-democratic situations.

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## INTRODUCTION

What determines the outcome of social movements in an authoritarian context? This is the central question that motivates this paper. Do the same factors that drive social movements – informal groups of actors attempting to enact some sort of political, social, or economic change – in democratic contexts also drive social movements in authoritarian settings? What factors mean the difference between defeat and success for a social movement? I argue that in order to be successful – that is, to enact the state goals of the movement – social movements in authoritarian contexts require prior organizations and networks with weak ties capable of transmitting protest tactics.

To show this, I exploit an excellent comparative case offered by social movements of the Kifaya era and the Arab Spring era, two movements that took places in Egypt between 2004 and 2011. Both movements sought similar political reforms in Egypt; however, only the Arab Spring era movement succeeded in achieving those reforms. I will use the failure of the Kifaya and the success of the Arab Spring era social movements to illustrate how these components are necessary for the success of a social movement.

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is one region that has been particularly overlooked by the social movement literature. In part this is because there seemed to be no, or very few, social movements in the MENA. Academics and regional experts had spent years trying to understand the persistence of authoritarianism and the dearth of democratic development in the region. Until the uprisings that flared across the Arab world in the winter and spring of 2011, a consensus had grown that the MENA was “exceptional,” that there was some quality to the cultures, histories, and societies of the region that had and would continue to prevent the region from moving out of authoritarian forms of government and into democratic



ones, whether by way of social movements or otherwise (Bellin 2004; Crystal 1994; “The Emergency Law in Egypt” 2011).

The popular uprisings of 2011 turned that thinking on its head and ushered in a new era of government for the region, and scholarship for academia. The Arab Spring, as it soon came to be called, overturned decades of literature explaining why the MENA was not democratic and never would be, and scholars looked for explanations to understand the apparently sudden advent of democracy in a region they had consigned to eternal dictatorship. Existing work on the MENA region cannot explain why pro-democratic social movements emerged, and existing social movement work cannot explain why any social movements succeeded in the authoritarian context of the Middle East and North Africa.

I argue that two components are necessary for a successful social movement, and offer a conception of each of them. The components of a social movement network that are necessary for a network to be successful are 1) Prior organizations. Social movements must involve and incorporate pre-existing social organizations into the movement. 2) Networks with weak ties that are capable of transmitting protest tactics. Social movements must involve the participation of actors from both mass and elite sectors of society (connected by weak ties) and be able to transmit tactics between social movement actors.

By examining the presence of and role played by each of these factors during each movement, I will show that they are both necessary for a successful social movement in an authoritarian context. I also argue that these components are what make social movements in an authoritarian context effective. These factors were not present, or were severely limited, during the Kifaya era of protest, which led to the failure of that social movement. During the Arab Spring era social movement had prior organizations and cross-sector coalitions with weak ties

capable of transmitting protest tactics, which resulted in the success of the Arab Spring movement

I conducted a comparative case study to examine this question. Since the Kifaya era social movement and the Arab Spring era social movement both occurred in the same country, within ten years of each other, they offer excellent cases for a comparative case study. There is very little variation in country, cultural, or regional factors between the two movements, which makes it easier to isolate those factors which made a difference in the relative outcome of the two social movements. My findings support my argument that the Kifaya era of protest failed because these two factors were not present, and that the Arab Spring social movement succeeded because both of these factors were present.

What factors determine the outcome of a social movement in an authoritarian context? Previous research on social movements explores the roles of internal resources, elite allies, opportunity structures, grievances, and repression on the emergence and internal processes of social movements (Morris 1984; Morris 1984; McCarthy and Zald 1973; McAdam 1983; Gurr 1968; Oberschall 1973; Tarrow 1993); however, little literature focuses on how these factors impact the success or failure of a social movement, or how these factors function in social movements in authoritarian context.

Previous models of social movement theory lay out a variety of conceptions and descriptions of social movement mechanisms. Collective behavior models liken social movement activity to mob action and delinquent criminal activity; The relative deprivation approach connects the outbreaks of social movements to grievances born of frustration. In the rational choice model, social movement actors are rational individuals who make cost-benefit analyses in order to decide whether to participate in a social movement, and the resource mobilization model

emphasizes the resources, such as elite support, external allies, and funding, available to a social movement. Finally, the political process model focused on the internal resources and organization of a movement, and examines how prior organizations and expanding political opportunities aid a social movement. However, this literature is not sufficient to explain the outcome of social movements, or how social movements behave in authoritarian settings.

The existent literature focuses primarily on the internal processes of social movements instead of on the factors which determine their success or failure (Andreas 2007; Gould 1991; Snow et al. 1986; Tarrow 1993; Walsh 1981). Moreover, what research does exist focuses heavily on social movements in western, democratic states, paying less attention to the workings of social movements in non-democratic states in other areas of the world (Koopmans 1993; Kriesi et al. 1992).

These findings are important because they show what qualities of social movements are necessary for those social movements to be successful and how social movements function and can succeed in authoritarian contexts. These are both important consideration as more social movements arise every year in countries all around the world in many different political contexts.

This paper proceeds in four parts. First, I lay out the theoretical background of my hypothesis and the theoretical basis for each of my propositions. Second, I lay out my research design for my comparative case study. Third, I conduct the case study and lay out the results, addressing each social movement component (prior organizations, and networks and tactical diffusion) separately. I will also lay out the results of my investigation of the internal organization component. Lastly, I conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for other social movements, particularly Arab Spring movements in other countries in the MENA.

## THEORY

Social movements are “a series of contentious performances, displays, and campaigns by which ordinary people make collective claims on others (Tilly 2004). They can manifest in a variety of ways, in a broad range of circumstances.

Theory regarding social movements has changed over the past half-century. As theory has developed, our understanding of social movements and how they operate has improved.

### Collective Behavior and Relative Deprivation Models

The first model of social movements was the collective behavior model, which stated that social movements had little in common with institutionalized social behavior. Instead, the drivers and mechanisms of social movements were similar to those of crime, delinquency, and mob behavior. Social movements were seen as unstructured and spontaneous events, and social movement actors were viewed as nonrational actors. (Blumer 1946; Turner and Killian 1957; Lang and Lang 1961; Smelser 1963; Durkheim 1997).

After the collective behavior model, Gurr (1968) developed the relative deprivation theory of social movements, which argues that mobilization in social movements is driven by grievances born of frustration - that is, the gap between what people expect to have and what they actually have. The model was abandoned by Gurr and its other proponents after subsequent quantitative analyses disproved the relative deprivation theory (Brush 1996).

Though collective behavior and relative deprivation theory are now little used in social movement theory, they are still popular in accounts of social movements, particularly initial accounts of the Arab Spring in Egypt. Early accounts of the Arab Spring described it as grievance-based and spontaneous, lacking organization. Khouri writes that grievances “caused people to go into the streets, knowing they risk death” (2011, 44). Rosenberg notes that “the

price of food was widely seen as a significant, if not principal, factor in prompting the unrest” (2011, 69). Rosenberg also connects the intensity of the revolutions, and the swiftness with which they spread from one country to another, to the depth of the grievances.

However, the movements that arose in 2004 and 2010 in Egypt were neither grievance-based nor spontaneous. I will be critiquing these accounts of social movements as I explore the role prior organizations and planning played in the movements.

### Critique of Collective Behavior and Relative Deprivation: The Resource Mobilization Model

The resource mobilization emerged as a critique of the collective behavior model. Unlike collective behavior theory, resource mobilization argues that social movements are not either unorganized or spontaneous. Rather they have an internal logic consistent with institutionalized social behavior (McCarthy and Zald 1973; Oberschall 1973; Gamson 1975; Tilly 1978).

Some writers (McCarthy and Zald 1973; Oberschall 1973; Jenkins and Perrow 1977) who endorse the resource mobilization model emphasize the importance of external resources; that is, they argue that the scope and outcome of social movements is determined by resources available to the movement from outside the movement itself. In this view, elite and external actors (those groups, individuals, and organizations who take action within or related to a social movement) are seen as particularly important. Elite actors are actors outside a social movement, such as political allies or wealthy sympathizers.

This elite-centrism has raised critiques of the resource mobilization model. Morris (1984) in particular criticizes the elite bias of the resource mobilization literature. He argues that social movements can occur even in the absence of elite and external resources, and fail even where elite resources are present. Morris emphasizes instead internal resources, chiefly pre-existing social structures and internal organization which include mass (grassroots) actors.

Goldstone (2011) presents another critique of the elite centrism of the resource mobilization model. He emphasizes the importance of cross-class coalitions, which are coalitions of actors that unite actors from many different backgrounds. He argues that cross-class coalitions are necessary for the success of a social movement. Though he uses the term “class,” for the purposes of my research I expand this definition to explicitly include groups that are defined not only by economic status but also religion, ethnicity, geographic location, and profession. I refer to such groups as sectors. This sorting into sectors is based on externally identifiable traits.

#### Critique of Resource Mobilization Theory: The Political Process Model

The political process model arose as a critique of the elite-centered resource mobilization model and has become one of the dominant theories of social movements. McAdam (1983) formulated the first version of the political process model (Political Processes and the Origin of Black Insurgency) The political process model contains three components: 1) political opportunity structure 2) prior organizations, skilled grassroots activists and networks and 3) cognitive liberation. Political opportunity structures relates to McAdam’s argument that opportunities for opposition varies over time, and that social movements emerge when political opportunities are expanding.

Both the cognitive liberation and political opportunity structures aspects of the political process model have received extensive criticism. The political opportunity structure has been critiqued as overly structural, with a reliance on structural features, and treating non-structural features as structural ones. It has also been critiqued for being tautological, by arguing that mobilization is reliant on opportunities to mobilize - that social movements will emerge when social movements *can* emerge (Goodwin, Jasper, and Khattri 1999).

However, parts of the political process model are very helpful for understanding social

movements. One of the most important of these is the role of prior organizations. Morris (1981), whose work is a strong critique of both the resource mobilization and political process model, emphasizes the importance of prior organizations. Social organizations which predate a social movement, such as churches, labor unions, or even pre-existing opposition organizations, provide a framework on which subsequent opposition can be organized and mobilized. Prior organizations provide indigenous resources, such as people, institutional support, and pre-existing social networks that strengthen and support social movements. Pre-existing social institutions and networks provide a framework through which messages can be spread, people recruited, and resources mobilized.

This is not to say that a first-time social movement cannot succeed, but an effective movement cannot exist in a vacuum and must be structured around something, be it a neighborhood organization, a religious institution, a labor union or a web forum. If pre-existing organizations are in place, there will be institutions - houses of religion, schools, unions, political parties, etc - and protest movements will graft themselves onto these institutions, mobilizing their populations, resources, and connections in service to the social movement (Tilly 1978; Morris 1981; McAdam 1983). In addition to internal organization and cross-sector coalitions, successful social movement networks need to contain prior organizations.

Repertoires of contention are “the whole set of means that a group has for making claims of different kinds on different individuals/groups” (Tilly 1986). Repertoires are important for social movements because they are the “toolboxes” of the movement. They comprise every tactic movement actors know how, and are able, to utilize as they make their claims. These tactics are vital because them, actors are unable to take any action that makes claims on other individuals and groups.

Tactics can either be invented by a group on the spot - innovation - or adopted from tactics used by other groups. Innovative tactics are more likely to escape repression, because security forces will not at first know how to suppress new tactics effectively. Since new tactics are also attention-catching for the social movement, they tend to draw new members into a social movement by raising the profile of the movement. The pace at which social movements spread is determined by the level of innovation of its tactics (Tarrow 1993). Moreover, social movement networks make innovation possible, by bringing together actors and allowing them to exchange and implement ideas (Morris 1981). This is particularly important in repressive contexts, where continual innovation is necessary to avoid repression by security forces, who are less able to adapt to and respond effectively to new tactics they have not previously faced.

McAdam (1983) also writes about how the innovation and use of tactics is tied to the success of social movements. The pace of insurgency, he argues, is linked to “a) the *creativity* of insurgents in devising *new tactical forms* and b) the ability of opponents to neutralize these moves” (1983, 736).

Repertoires of contention are, by nature, limited. Technically any social movement actor could use any form of contention anywhere at anytime. However in reality repertoires are limited by “what they [the protesters] *know how to do* and what society *expects them to choose to do* from a culturally sanctioned and empirically limited set of options” (Tilly 1978, 151) [emphasis added]. This limits repertoires to tactics understandable within a given social, political, and cultural context. Social movement actors, therefore, are constantly trying to steer between innovation - creating new tactics to draw in new members and confound security forces - and meaning - ensuring that the tactics are used are something that people understand.



Diffusion is the spreading of tactics from one group to another, and it is determined by the quality of the networks that link different social movement actors. In effective social movements, networks will diffuse tactics of contention between groups (Morris 1981). If a tactic is effectively diffused, after its initial use it will be used again, multiple times, by different actors in different places. Without diffusion, there is no way for new tactics to be transmitted to other actors. If tactics are not transmitted, they cannot be used by anyone other than the originating actor, which severely limits the range of tactics available to any given actor.

Morris's critique of resource mobilization theory's overemphasis on external actors illuminates another resource vital to the success of social movements: internal organization. For Morris, internal, indigenous resources were more critical for the success of a social movement. Internal organization is one of these resources. Morris also emphasized the importance of planning, writing that protest movements would emerge in setting characterized by careful planning by close-knit groups of politically committed activists (1984). Hirsch (1990) further discusses the importance of planning. He adds that movements often have group discussions about whether to initiate, continue, or end a given protest action (246). Planning and organization is also important in consciousness-raising efforts and in framing campaigns, as movements try to spread awareness of their existence and shape their cause to appeal to potential supporters.

## ARGUMENT

This study focuses on the aforementioned aspects of social movements: prior organizations and networks with weak ties capable of transmitting protest tactics. I use a comparative case study of two social movements, the social movement of the Kifaya era in Egypt in 2004-2005 and the social movement of the Arab Spring era in Egypt in 2009-2011 to make my argument.

I argue that, in order to be successful, social movements need prior organizations and mass/elite cross-sector coalitions that form networks with weak ties capable of diffusing protest tactics.

Not all organizations in a social movement need have existed prior to the movement itself; new social organizations and new protest organizations are created all the time. However because of the importance of the resources and organizing capability provided by prior organizations, social movements need prior organizations in order to be successful.

In order to be successful, social movements must also be able to diffuse protest tactics between actors. Protest tactics are vital for successful social movements because they consist of what a social movement actually does when it makes claims against another actor. Without tactics, actors are unable to press claims and a social movement cannot succeed.

Networks are vital for diffusing the tactics that comprise a movement's repertoire. Networks can consist of strong ties, which connect actors to those closest to them, such as family and close friends, and weak ties, which connect actors to individuals they are not close to; for instance, colleagues or friends-of-friends. It is through these connections that tactics are diffused.

Mass/elite coalitions are vital for social movement success because it is these coalitions which form weak network ties between actors. Cross-sector coalitions must be comprised of *both* mass and elite actors. If a movement has cross-sector coalitions, it includes the participation of

people and groups that cross social, economic, religious, and/or political lines. Either a movement involves one group that represents all (or most) of these sectors, or it involves many groups, each representing a different sector, cooperating with one another. Without broad-based appeal, participation in a movement is limited to a single (or a very few) sectors. We may also see individuals and organizations from different sectors participating, but without cooperating or coordinating with each other, or even competing outright. This is particularly important in authoritarian contexts, where non-regime actors have little or no normal access to the mechanisms of government. The participation of elite actors lends legitimacy to the social movement, combined with the widespread mobilization brought on by the participation of mass actors creates a level of mobilization high enough to convince the ruling forces to capitulate.

Elite groups working alone are mainly connected by strong ties. For social movements in authoritarian contexts, weak ties are more important for diffusing protest tactics. Though strong ties connect actors closely, they do not extend beyond a given circle of actors. If that circle is limited to begin with, tactics will not be diffused broadly to a population. And if tactics are not diffused broadly, they will not be used in a social movement, and the social movement will not succeed because actors have no tactics with which to make their claims. If weak ties exist, networks connect actors in a movement to many other actors not directly involved in the movement. When movement actors use a tactic, and have weak ties to actors outside of the movement, that tactic is diffused through the weak ties to the unaffiliated actors, who subsequently employ them. In this way tactics are diffused and used broadly throughout a population. Wider tactical diffusion provides movement actors with a wider range of tactics to choose from, which allows them to be flexible in the face of opposition and increases their ability to be successful.

By applying previously studied aspects of social movements to a region of the world where they have not been utilized in depth, I am contributing to a burgeoning literature on protest in authoritarian regimes. I also offer a new understanding of the role weak ties play in social movements in authoritarian contexts. This increases our understanding of social movements as a whole as well as understanding the workings of social movements in contexts that have not previously been studied.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Almeida (2003) and Kurzman (2006) are exceptions to this; Almeida studies the relationship between authoritarian repression and activism cycles in El Salvador, and Kurzman studies structural opportunities under a repressive regime in Iran.

## RESEARCH DESIGN

The methodology that I will employ in this research design is a comparison of two similar social movements that occurred in Egypt at different points in time, only one of which was successful. The comparative case study methodology is appropriate for this research design because it provides conditions under which it is possible to test variables and processes. The flaws and shortcomings of this method largely ensue from the fact that this it is impossible to find real-world cases that differ in all variables but one, or to conduct real-world experiments holding all other variables constant while we rigorously test each variable of interest individually. However, comparative methodology is still the best we have for investigating our messy, uncontrollable world outside of the laboratory.

### Data

I obtained the data for this study from articles from a variety of newspaper sources. For the Kifaya period, I searched articles ranging from July 1, 2004 to September 30, 2005. These dates correspond to two significant events for the Kifaya movement: the first protest activity taken by Kifaya activists and the election where President Hosni Mubarak was re-elected for a fifth term. In August 2004 Kifaya activists circulated a petition asking for reform; and the presidential election was held on September 7, 2005. In order to catch all news coverage of these dates, I expanded my search period to include dates up to a month before the first date (August) and a month after the last date (September 7). Table 1 summarizes these date ranges.

Table 1. Date range of Kifaya and Arab Spring Social Movements

	Kifaya Era	Arab Spring Era
Start Date	July 1 2004	December 1 2009
End Date	September 30 2005	February 28 2011

Since this date range covered a period of fifteen months, I searched articles for an equivalent length of time from the Arab Spring period. Since February 11, 2011 was the date of Mubarak's resignation from the presidency, I extended my search to the end of February 2011 and then to the fourteen previous months, up through the beginning of December 2009.

I used four separate publications to find the articles: Al-Ahram Weekly, an English-language weekly publication published in Egypt; Mideast Wire, a daily collection of briefs translated from a range of key publications from MENA countries and the Arab diaspora; Arab West Report, a weekly digest of articles translated from Egyptian newspapers; and the New York Times. I selected these publications because they were printed either in English or provided English translation of articles, which is a language easily understandable and skimmable by me. These four databases also cover a range of sources, including government-run papers, opposition papers, and independent journals. In order to keep the volume of articles I searched manageable, I used either weekly news summaries or weekly publications, or Friday editions of daily publications. I selected articles from the databases based on their headlines, picking out those that had words that keyed that they contained content of interest to me.

The aspects of prior organization in the researched newspapers were indicated by such terms as:

- Names of groups which existed prior to event
- Evolved from

The aspects of cross-sector coalitions are indicated in the researched newspapers were indicated by such terms as:

- Common objectives
- Bring together
- Names of multiple groups taking action together
- Launch campaign
- Names of multiple groups organizing something together
- United in action
- Backing
- In support of
- Cooperating over
- Torn
- Solidarity
- Agreed to form

Non-cooperation was indicated by such terms as:

- Mudslinging
- Attacked
- Accused
- Multiple groups “reject idea”

The aspects of tactics and innovations in the researched newspapers were indicated by such terms as:

- Press release
- Statement
- Signature collection drive
- Court
- Poll
- Civil disobedience
- Slogans
- Stickers
- Novel strategies
- Tool
- Breaking taboo
- Symbolic
- Petition
- Tactics
- First time
- Public rally
- Mobilize
- New platform
- Protests
- Rally
- Demonstrate
- Leaflets
- Demonstration
- Signatures
- Training
- Hold conferences
- Introduces
- Conference

- Demonstrations
- Shift in policy
- Peaceful protest
- New activist
- Protest
- Previously unheard of

- Boycott
- Sit in
- Staging protests
- Hunger strike
- March
- Positive boycott

The aspects of planning and internal organization in the researched newspapers were indicated by such terms as:

- Intend
- Set agenda
- Plan/planning
- Scheduled
- Reaction
- Invite
- Announce

- Determined to pursue
- Organizing
- Conference
- Decided
- Elected
- Manage
- Day-to-day activities
- Called



## RESULTS

On December 12, 2004, a group of several hundred protesters stood on the steps of the High Court in Cairo. Their mouths taped shut in silent protest, the protesters held signs emblazoned with the word that, in its pithy summary of their grievances and demands, soon became the name of a new opposition group: Kifaya! – *Enough!* Kifaya was the first group in Egypt to ever call for the end of the reign of Hosni Mubarak, who had been president in Egypt since 1981.

Kifaya's initial protest soon led to others, and other groups, organizations, and individuals came together to call for reforms to the Egyptian constitution and an end to the Emergency Laws, which greatly expanded the repressive powers of the regime and had been in effect continuously since the beginning of Mubarak's presidency. Much of the opposition activity that took place during this time period was focused on two elections: first, a referendum held on May 25, 2005 to approve constitutional changes that would allow direct, multi-candidate presidential elections for the first time; the second, on September 7, 2005, was the presidential election itself. Kifaya and other groups organized regular protests in the weeks leading up to the constitutional referendum, which was passed, allowing the presidential elections in September to be contested.

The referendum was a victory for the burgeoning social movement, but in the weeks before the election unity began to break down amongst the groups and the Kifaya era of protest could not sustain itself. Faced with heavy government repression at the polls, and amidst widespread allegations of electoral fraud against the regime, Mubarak was announced winner of the fall elections. Despite widespread mobilization efforts, the opposition groups were unable to bring about the change they had sought.

Five years later, another round of opposition ushered in the social movement of the Arab Spring era. Though the January 25 Revolution was the most dramatic event of the Arab Spring era of protest, opposition activity had been growing dramatically in the months before the mass protests that would ultimately end the Mubarak Regime.

Over the summer of 2010, opposition activity reached new peaks in Egypt. Labor groups and political activists went on strike and held demonstrations in Cairo and across Egypt, making demands that were nearly identical to those made by the opposition groups of the Kifaya era: an end to the Emergency law, constitutional reform, and an end to the reign of Mubarak. The death of a young blogger, Khaled Said, at the hands of security officers ratcheted tensions between the regime and the opposition to new heights.

By the winter of 2010 and the beginning of 2011, those tensions were ready to snap. Following the swift, successful revolution by pro-democratic forces in Tunisia in December, protesters took to the street in Egypt. Beginning with protests held on “Police Day” - January 25, a national holiday meant to commemorate the sacrifices of Egyptian police officers that had since become a day for Egyptians to protest the abuses of that same security force - opposition forces touched off three weeks of protests. Millions of Egyptians took to the streets, not only in Cairo but in other cities around Egypt, in mass demonstrations that demanded democratic reforms and the resignation of President Mubarak. The Arab Spring protests finally succeeded on February 11, 2011, when Mubarak’s vice president announced that Mubarak would resign the presidency. Whatever developments were to come in the following weeks and months, the resignation of Mubarak was a signal victory for the Arab Spring social movement and a resounding success for the Egyptian pro-democracy opposition.

## I. PRIOR ORGANIZATIONS

Both the Kifaya and Arab Spring eras of protest saw the participation of prior organizations. These organizations were significant for a number of reasons. First, organizations capable of planning and carrying out opposition activity are a vital resource for social movement groups. When social movement networks are comprised of groups with sufficient internal organization social movement actors will be able to maintain solidarity, communication, and planning, enabling them to continue carrying out opposition activity. This characteristic is particularly important in authoritarian contexts, where social movement actors confront greater repression from regime forces. While protest activity can occur without organization, such spontaneous activity cannot be sustained in the face of repression. Second, organizations which can plan and carry out opposition activity are also important because protests that are planned are not spontaneous. The presence of organization and planning in both eras refutes narratives of Kifaya and the Arab Spring that paint these movements as spontaneous uprisings.

Although prior organizations capable of planning and carrying out opposition activity existed during both the Arab Spring era and the Kifaya era, the Arab Spring era boasted significantly more prior organizations than the Kifaya era. In fact, many of the prior organizations that participated in the Arab Spring era had been formed during the Kifaya era, or in the years following it. Table 2 shows an inexhaustive list of groups that participated in one or both movements. Below are descriptions of each group, how and when it formed, and how it participated in one or both eras. As shown by the table, the Arab Spring era had at its disposal a significantly greater number of prior organizations. This means that the Arab Spring era movement had at its disposal a much greater range connections, actors, resources, and planning capability with which to carry out opposition activity.

Table 2. Participating Organizations

Kifaya Era	Arab Spring Era
20 March Movement for Change* Alexandria Judges Club* Bar Association* Communists* Hisham Mubarak Law Center* Kifaya March 9 Movement for the Independence of Universities* Muslim Brotherhood* Nasserists* National Coalition for Democratic Change Popular Campaign for Change The Street is Ours	Alexandria Judges Club* April 6* Bar Association* Communists * Copts for Egypt* Egyptian Campaign Against Bequeathal* HASHD* Hisham Mubarak Law Center* Kifaya* March 9 Movement for the Independence of Universities * Muslim Brotherhood* My Name is Khaled Said Nasserists* National Action Group National Assembly for Change Unions*

\*Indicates prior organization

Groups formed prior to Kifaya era:

- Muslim Brotherhood: The Muslim Brotherhood is the oldest and best-organized opposition group in Egypt. Though outlawed and technically banned from participating in government, many members of the Brotherhood ran for and held seats in Parliament as independents. The Muslim Brother played significant roles in organizing protests during both the Kifaya and Arab Spring eras of protest.
- Communists are another outlawed political party. Communists also took part in the Popular Campaign for Change as well as Kifaya, and joined in popular protests during both the Kifaya and Arab Spring eras of protest.
- Nasserists are an Egyptian political group with leftist, socialist, nationalist affiliations based on the ideology of Gamal abd al-Nasser, Egypt's second president and a strong

proponent of Egyptian nationalism. Individuals who belonged to the group took part in Popular Campaign for Change, which formed in September 2004 and eventually took part in Kifaya.

- The Hisham Mubarak Law Center (HMLC) is an Egyptian law firm based in Cairo and Aswan. It is a major advocate for human rights issues in Egypt, and took part in the PCC, as well as demonstrations during the Kifaya and Arab Spring eras. During the January 25 Revolution, the HMLC provided legal support to protesters and institutional support to members of April 6.
- Bar Association: The Bar Association is a body of Egyptian lawyers. Members of the Bar Association pushed for legal reforms throughout the Kifaya and Arab Spring periods, and supported advocates of reform.
- The 20 March Movement (20 March) began as an anti-war movement - its name was derived from a massive anti-war protest held on March 20, 2003. As rumors arose that the presidency was going to be passed from Hosni Mubarak to his son Gamal when Mubarak retired, 20 March morphed into a domestic protest group. It took part in the PCC and was one of the groups that formed the backbone of Kifaya.
- Alexandria Judges Club: An organization of judges in Alexandria, the Judge's Club was a primary actor during the Kifaya era of protest, when it threatened to boycott judicial supervision of the presidential election in September of 2005.

Groups formed during Kifaya era:

- The Popular Campaign for Change (PCC) was formed on September 9, 2004, when a wide variety of groups and organizations issued a statement denouncing hereditary

succession of the presidency and calling for popular election of the president. The PCC took part in many demonstrations demanding political reform, and was comprised of 20 March, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Communist Party, the HMLC, and many other groups.

- Kifaya was the first opposition group to call for the end of the presidency of Hosni Mubarak. It unified a variety of actors, and held its first protest in December 2004, ushering in a new era of social movement opposition in Egypt. Kifaya remained active throughout the Kifaya era and played a significant role in organizing and carrying out protests during the Arab Spring era five years later.
- The March 9 Movement for the Independence of Universities (March 9) was formed by university professors who organized to protest regime security controls of Egyptian universities. March 9 took part in campus protests in early winter 2005 and was involved in the Arab Spring era of protest.
- The National Coalition for Democratic Change (NCDC) was founded by a former Egyptian foreign minister. It united lawmakers, economists, political analysts, and intellectuals in an attempt to coordinate with existing political forces to press for constitutional reform.
- The Street is Ours is a group of female reform advocates formed in the wake of the May 2005 constitutional referendum. During the referendum, many female voters were beaten and sexually harassed and abused by members of the Egyptian security forces, sparking widespread outrage.

Groups formed following the Kifaya era and prior to Arab Spring era:

- The April 6 Youth Movement (April 6) was an activist group founded in April 2008 in support of striking workers in El-Mahalla El-Kubra. Their support touched off a large wave of strike activity and labor unrest over the next three years, and April 6 was heavily involved in planning and organizing the protests of the January 25 Revolution.

Groups formed during the Arab Spring era:

- Copts for Egypt was a political group formed by young Coptic Christian activists in 2009. It called for a general strike on the Coptic New Year (September 9, 2009), one of the first protest activities of the Arab Spring era, to protest sectarian violence and discriminatory laws regulating the building of churches.
- The National Assembly for Change (NAC) was founded by Mohammed El-Baradei, a former director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in February 2010 to press for constitutional reform and social justice. The NAC participated in rallies and demonstrations throughout 2010, and, along with its founder, was a leading player during the January 25 Revolution.
- The National Action Group (NAG) was formed by a group of political activists in March 2010 to press for reform. It include TV broadcasters and well know Nasserists, retired former judges, and George Ishaq, a founding member of Kifaya.
- My Name is Khaled Said was a group of young internet activists. It was founded as a Facebook page following the killing of a young blogger by security forces in Alexandria in June 2010. Also referred to as We Are All Khaled Said, the group was heavily involved in organizing protests throughout the summer and fall of 2010, and was one of the primary organizers of the protests of the January 25 Revolution.

- The Popular Democratic Movement for Change (HASHD) was founded in July 2010, and advocated social justice and democratic reforms. It participated in the protests that Kifaya held on their sixth anniversary in December 2010, as well as the January 25 Revolution protests.

### *Kifaya Era Opposition was Planned Not Spontaneous*

The presence of prior organizations and the wealth of planning that took place indicates that protest action in both eras was undertaken deliberately, to achieve specific goals or governmental changes. The protests that broke out in Egypt from 2004 – 2005 and again from 2009 – 2011 were not spontaneous.

Planning was extensive during the Kifaya era of protest. For example, the Kifaya group intended to influence public opinion in favor of reform whenever they organized their demonstration in February 2005. Changing public sentiment was recognized as a strategy that would both be crucial to the success of the movement and would take time and organized action - such as demonstrations - to achieve.

Kifaya itself was deliberately created to carry out such long-term strategies. Kifaya was brought into being with the intention of not only performing one-off demonstrations, but of holding conferences and introducing a modified constitution. Kifaya was playing the long game, attempting to look toward the future and making those plans and decisions that they thought would best serve their interests in the long run, and not just immediately reacting to events in the present.

All of Kifaya's events were planned, and even advertised, beforehand, in an attempt to draw in the greatest number of participants. Their second protest rally, held on January 18, 2005, was planned in advance, as was the demonstration they held the following month. In fact, a



number of members of the Kifaya movement were arrested at the Cairo International Book Fair for handing out leaflets that advertised the February protest, a clear signal that these individual events were coordinated in advance of the events themselves. At the beginning of May, Kifaya planned protests in fourteen different cities, and spread word of the event beforehand, thereby encouraging participation, by handing out by stickers emblazoned with the word “kifaya” - emblematic of the stickers protesters had used at the first Kifaya protest the previous December. At the protest itself, banners and other devices that would have required advance preparation were present.

Other groups also planned protest events. When the Muslim Brotherhood, along with the Communists and civil society organizations, launched a campaign for reform in September 2004, they intended to push for modification of the constitution. When the MMC and other groups came together to launch a popular campaign for reform, each group that made up the campaign sent representatives, who worked together to set an agenda and plan a political rally.

Planning is particularly important for protest action that needs to follow a set of rules and procedures that can take a lengthy period of time to fulfill, such as running for political office or circulating petitions. The occurrence of these tactics indicates, again, that planning and organization was at work.

However, because fewer prior organizations were involved in the Kifaya era, when some of these organizations were faced with repression and internal divisions their ability to organize activity was weakened, and efforts to organize activity fails. This failure to sustain opposition activity in the face of internal divisions and repression shows that though protest activities may arise spontaneously, it cannot be sustained without internal organization and planning.

### *Repression, Internal Divisions, and the Failure of Organization in Kifaya Era*

Beginning in the summer of 2005, planning began to unravel and protests began to dwindle as the internal organization of social movement organizations proved to be too weak to continue planning and sustain protest action in the face of repression. Specifically, it was over the question of the boycott tactic that internal organizations began to fail.

Boycotts, naturally, require coordination and planning. Though the instance of a boycott occurs only on the day of an election itself, it requires extensive coordination and campaigning in order to conduct a campaign to convince people that they should not participate in an election. The Kifaya movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, and other opposition groups called for a boycott of the parliamentary and presidential elections in May 2005.

However, internal divisions within social movement organizations, particularly within the Muslim Brotherhood, over the boycott began to surface. The Muslim Brotherhood was split: one faction wished to boycott the elections, and another wished to participate in the electoral process, rejecting the boycott. It was here that the formal organization of the Muslim Brotherhood began to be a detriment, rather than an asset, as the internal split kept the group from taking cohesive collective effort. Eventually, in fact, the Muslim Brotherhood as a whole rejected the boycott as a tactic and participated in the election, severely weakening the coalition of social movement groups who had together planned to use the boycott as a protest tactic. As calls for a boycott among the electorate began to fall silent, and the Muslim Brotherhood and Egyptian judges dropped their own calls and threats of boycott, the outcome of the approaching election began to seem all but certain.

As the elections approached, the failure of the internal organization of the social movement groups revealed itself as opposition weakened and then grew nearly silent. When the

elections - the first contested electoral contests in Egypt during Mubarak's tenure - were won by the incumbent, protest seemed to fizzle. They were unable to sustain protest even through the presidential election. On the day of the presidential elections, voters faced repression from regime elements that prevented people from voting, intimidated and even beat voters not voting for Mubarak, and stuffed ballot boxes. The social movement groups of the Kifaya era, whose internal organizations had failed to sustain protest through a boycott, were in no position to launch opposition against the electoral fraud and abuse of the regime.

When Mubarak was victorious in the elections, even amongst allegations of fraud, the Kifaya movement pledged to continue its struggle. It was a pledge that did not bear fruit. In the weeks after the election, no protest activity took place. Though organized protest events would eventually be held again, the sudden drop of them after the presidential elections indicates a failure of organization, and a failure of opposition.

#### *Arab Spring Era Opposition Was Planned Not Spontaneous*

The social movement organizations of the Arab Spring era demonstrated many of the same planning techniques as the groups of the Kifaya period. However, unlike during the Kifaya era, the Arab Spring era groups were more numerous and were able to sustain protests even in the face of government opposition.

Much of the opposition activity during the Arab Spring era was planned and organized in advance. The first "Copts for Egypt" strike, held during this period, and the series of protests that occurred alongside it, were planned in advance. The demands presented by the striking workers had been agreed on beforehand, and coordination and planning was necessary to conduct the strike. The National Action Group, which consisted of the NAC and other activists including a former judge and a television broadcaster, also met to discuss strategy. This planning and

discussion of strategy shows that protest activity taken by these groups was not spontaneous, but was organized in advance.

After the fall of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, invitations to protest began circulating on Facebook. The choice of January 25 as the day of protest was an important one for two reasons. First was the symbolic implications of the date - the holiday honored the lives and sacrifices made by an often hated police force. In recent years it had become a day on which Egyptians protested the abuses and corruption of the police forces who were supposed to protect them. The second was the planning inherent in selecting such a date ahead of time. The protests that arose in Cairo on the appointed day seemed spontaneous. They were, however, far from spontaneous, and anything but unplanned.

The calls to protest spread rapidly across Facebook, Twitter, and other social media sites. A Facebook page with an invitation to protest also posted links listing the time and location of demonstrations, a clear signal that these events were planned in advance. Also posted was the contact information of protest coordinators, as well as the phone numbers of lawyers and doctors in case demonstrators were hurt or arrested and needed help. Dates, times, contacts: all were planned in advance.

After the protests began, a combination of planned and on-the-spot organization continued, with other web-based activists, like April 6, posting continuous updates about the status of the protests across Egypt. Organization and coordination took place outside of cyberspace, as well, especially after internet service was cut. The same type of organization that could be seen online in April 6 and My Name is Khaled Said could also be seen in the streets of Cairo.

Each Friday was the nexus for ongoing demonstrations organized by the protesters. Each was planned, even named, in advance. The first Friday after the Police Day protests, January 28, was dubbed the “Day of Rage,” and saw increased protests across Cairo and other cities in Egypt. The following week, protesters organized demonstrations for what they called the “Day of Departure,” with even-larger demonstrations calling for an end to the Mubarak regime. And as the protests escalated to what would become the final Friday - February 11, the day on which Mubarak would ultimately resign from office - protesters planned rallies at six sites throughout Cairo, which were to converge on Tahrir Square as well as the Parliament building and the state television headquarters.

### *The Success of Organization in the Arab Spring Era*

During the Arab Spring era far more prior organizations were operating, utilizing their resources to plan and carry out opposition. The ongoing planning that went on after the initiation of the Police Day protests on January 25 allowed the protests to be sustained for three long weeks, until the ultimate resignation of Mubarak and collapse of his regime.

Prior organizations operated in both the Arab Spring and Kifaya era movements. The planning and organization that these groups carried out demonstrates that opposition activity during these periods was not spontaneous. However, the Arab Spring had far more prior organizations at its disposal. When Kifaya era organizations faced repression and internal divisions, they were not numerous enough to overcome those divisions or organize effectively in the face of repression in a way that could thwart the repression and sustain protest. The more numerous prior organizations of the Arab Spring era movement, on the other hand, were able to continue planning and carrying out activity even in the face of repression, ensuring that protest was sustained until the movement’s goals were achieved.

## II. NETWORKS AND TACTICAL DIFFUSION

The Kifaya era movement was characterized by predominantly strong ties between actors, while the Arab Spring era movement was characterized by weak ties. The groups that participated in the Kifaya era were mainly elite-based groups with strong ties only with other elite actors.

Cross-sector coalitions are a necessary condition for successful social movements. However, it is not merely enough for a social movement to unite actors from across a number of sectors. The particular identity of the sectors involved in coalitions is also important. Successful social movements will be comprised of cross-class coalitions that include both elite and mass actors. Only in mobilizing both elite and mass actors can a social movement achieve a level of mobilization great enough to make their claims on their government.

Mass/elite cross-sector coalitions are particularly important in repressive and authoritarian contexts. A social movement requires a critical mass of support from the populace to achieve its goal, either by convincing the regime it opposes to capitulate or to overwhelm the regime with its sheer volume. The participation of elite allies is likewise critical for the success of a social movement. Elite allies lend movements legitimacy in the eyes of the regime, encouraging settlement or compromise, and elite defections isolate the regime. Alternately, elite actors within the government itself can actively manipulate government policy to aid the movement, either by reducing repression or meeting demands.

The particular identity of which actors are “mass” actors and which are “elite” will vary from state to state and from situation to situation. In the case of Egypt, “elite” actors include those found in formal political parties and organizations, professionals, academics, and religious leaders. “Mass” actors are members of the Egyptian public at large and include those unaffiliated

with professional organizations, laborers, students, and ordinary (non-clerical) members of religious communities.

Both the Kifaya and the Arab Spring era of protest saw the formation of cross-sector coalitions that united different ethnic, political, and professional groups. However, only the Arab Spring protests brought together actors from both mass and elite sectors of society. This distinction is critical in understanding why the Arab Spring protests succeeded as a social movement and the Kifaya protests did not. In the Arab Spring era, elite groups and mass-based groups worked together to form opposition coalitions. These coalitions were important because the participation of both mass and elite elements strengthened the opposition and increased the isolation of the regime. Also, mass-based groups had weak ties with nonaffiliated actors, and these weak ties allowed tactics to be diffused thoroughly throughout the population. The use of these tactics overwhelmed and isolated the regime, forcing Mubarak to resign.

Actors in both the Kifaya and Arab Spring era social movements had a variety of tactics at their disposal. Not all tactics were diffused to the same extent, however. During the Kifaya era, some tactics were diffused but most were not; in the Arab Spring era, many tactics were diffused. Wider tactical diffusion provides movement actors with a wider range of tactics to choose from, which allows them to be flexible in the face of opposition. Since diffusion of tactics is necessary for an effective social movement, the difference in diffusion levels between the Kifaya and Arab Spring eras is a distinguishing factor that helps explain the difference in outcomes between them.

#### The Kifaya Era: Elite Actors, Strong Ties

The Kifaya movement saw the creation of cross-sector coalitions that united actors from different social and political backgrounds. However, the Kifaya era cross-sector coalitions did

not include a coalition between mass and elite actors. Most of the Kifaya era opposition groups were elite-based, and the absence of mass actors weakened their efforts and made their ultimate attempts unsuccessful.

The failure of the elite-based social movement organizations of the Kifaya era does not mean that mass actors, working alone, could succeed where elite actors working along had failed. The lack of mass/elite cross-sector coalitions limited the mobilization of the Kifaya era social movement, and ultimately contributed to its failure.

### *Political Cross-Sectors*

Most of the actors who participated in the Kifaya era of protest were from elite sectors of Egyptian society. While their presence was important for the advent of the social movement, elite actors alone were not enough to enable success. It was not only the absence of mass actors from the protest scene that doomed the movement; elite groups are also necessary, though not sufficient, for success.

The group that became known as Kifaya was the first group in Egypt to openly criticize President Mubarak. It demonstrated a high level of political diversity, bringing together actors from a wide range of political persuasions. Nasserists, leftists, and Islamists, as well as students and intellectuals, all took part in Kifaya. However, this cross-sector coalition was only diverse in terms of its politics. All of the individuals and organizations who participated were members of elite sectors. Nasserists, leftists, and Islamists were all members of elite formal political institutions. Intellectuals were likewise an elite cadre. Students were a more mass element, but did not make up a significant part of Kifaya. It was diversity only amongst an already elite group, representing educated, highly motivated, and relatively small groups of sectors.

Other 2005 groups that held protests comprising only or primarily elite actors include:



- The March Movement for Change (MMC), another group which, like Kifaya, united a diverse band of political sectors but did not cross the mass/elite divide. Members of the MMC represented a motley group of different political ideologies, including right as well as left leaning tendencies along with Islamists and Nasserists.
- The March 9 Movement for the Independence of Universities, which had been founded in 2003. It brought together both students and professors from a wide variety of political backgrounds together to demand academic and political reform. Some of the professors who participated were politically conservative, and had been appointed to their positions by the government. Others were more liberal and were members of the Muslim Brotherhood and Kifaya, groups that worked openly for government reform. Professors joined members of the Kifaya movement and the Muslim Brotherhood to express their support for a proposed boycott of the constitutional referendum.
- The National Coalition for Democratic Change. Founded by a former Egyptian Prime Minister, the NCDC brought together lawmakers, economists, political analysts, and intellectuals with the goal of coordinating with existing political forces to press for constitutional reform.
- Judges, who put themselves at the forefront of activists pushing for change when they threatened to boycott upcoming elections. In Egypt, elections are monitored and administered by judges, and if the judges had refused to oversee the upcoming constitutional referendum, as well as the parliamentary and presidential elections, it would have thrown the results of the elections into question. The judges were joined in their call for a boycott by other elite groups. The professors of the March 9 Movement for

the Independence of the Universities demonstrated in support of the boycott, and Kifaya staged sit-ins to show their solidarity with the judges.

When Mubarak announced that he would run for an unprecedented fifth term in office, Kifaya, along with the PCC and other elite-centric groups such as Writers for Change, organized protests against the president.

While these protest actions were significant in that actors were taking action to make claims against the state, they did not involve more than elite actors groups, individuals, and organization, nor did they achieve the movement's goals.

#### *Kifaya and the Muslim Brotherhood*

The Muslim Brotherhood was one group active during the Kifaya period that might have been able to represent the masses in cross-sector coalitions. Egypt's oldest opposition group, members of the Muslim Brotherhood come from all socioeconomic classes and all walks of life. Had they been able to form a coalition with the elite actors of the Kifaya era, the alliance would have been a crucial instance of a cross-sector coalition. However, despite several opportunities, the Muslim Brotherhood was unable to join in a lasting coalition with elite-based opposition groups.

Though Kifaya and the Muslim Brotherhood nominally shared interests - opposition to the regime and a desire for reform - coordination between them, and between each group and other opposition groups, was inconsistent at best, and at worst nonexistent. Although they at times attempted to work together, their inability to cooperate effectively thwarted the development of a coalition between the sectors they represented.

At the beginning of April 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood held a demonstration in Cairo protesting for constitutional reform and an end to the Emergency Law that was attended by 3,000 people. Though spokesmen for the Brotherhood stated that their goals were the same as Kifaya's, the two groups did not coordinate for the protest, presaging an uncertain start for cooperation.

A month later, following the arrest of fourteen judges affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Brotherhood staged demonstrations in eight provinces. They were joined by Kifaya activists, who held two protests in solidarity with the arrested lawyers and the Brotherhood, an overt demonstration that the two groups shared interests. Cooperation between the two groups took another step forward the following week, when the two groups protested jointly the detention of hundreds of members of the Brotherhood, calling for their release and shouting shared slogans.

However, this show of solidarity belied uncertainty and mistrust of the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the burgeoning opposition movements. While some welcomed the Brotherhood's protests, other feared its involvement as an attempt to hijack the reform movement for itself, capitalizing on the slowly-growing momentum for its own ends. As the Kifaya movement wound to a close at the end of the summer of 2005, disagreements over tactics drove a wedge between the Muslim Brotherhood and other opposition organizations, weakening chances of a successful cross-sector coalition. Though the Brotherhood's involvement and cooperation with Kifaya would have been a significant step towards a cross-sector coalition, its mixed record of coordinating with other opposition groups, as well as the suspicion with which other groups regarded the Brotherhood, prevented this from happening.

### *Lack of Common Interests between Elite and Mass Actors*

Popular, grassroots (i.e., mass) opposition groups existed in Egypt during the Kifaya period, but they did not play a large role in the protests of the era. Elite protest actors did not ally with them primarily because elite and mass groups had significantly different goals. The popular protest movements that had formed between 2000 and 2003 had been founded to protest international issues and did not concern themselves with domestic issues. These grassroots organizations had formed chiefly to support the Second Palestinian Intifada and to protest the American invasion of Iraq. By contrast Kifaya and the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as the multitude of other groups which were formed during the Kifaya period, were distinctly domestic-oriented in nature. The anti-war and pro-Palestinian movements were comprised mainly of ordinary Egyptians. This “popular” population would remain untapped for the movement as long as their interests did not align with those of Kifaya’s and their allies, and a coalition between them would remain elusive.

### *The Absence of Labor*

Because labor groups, like anti-war protesters, had different goals than Kifaya and other elite actors, labor organizations did not participate in formal protest movements during the Kifaya era. Kifaya and the groups it formed coalitions with had goals inherently political in nature: reform to the constitution and an end to the Emergency Law. The interests of labor in this period were more economic and social than political, with wages and working conditions taking primacy over political reform. Lacking a common interest with the opposition movements, labor, a significant sector of society was not mobilized, and no coalition was formed between labor and other opposition groups, be they elite or mass.

This is not to say that labor was inactive during this period. Among other events, workers staged a sit-in at al-Amrya for three days in June. However, they took this action on their own, with no coordination with any other group. Even cooperation within the labor force was limited; when workers from the Osra-Misir company staged a sit-in in front of the headquarters of the General Federation of Trade Unions, their efforts were rejected by union leadership. Such a conflict may have been inevitable, since the unions in Egypt are under state control, but such a disconnect within a group between its leadership and membership does not make it any easier for that group to coordinate or cooperate, within itself or with any other group. The absence of labor from any protest coalition was a heavy blow for any cross-sector mass/elite unity.

#### *The Tentative Involvement of Women*

The vote on May 25, 2005, held on the constitutional referendum to allow contested presidential elections, was marred by a series of violent and sexual assaults on women voters. The attacks united a diverse group of protesters. A group of women, calling itself the Egyptian Mother's Union, was joined by lawyers and professors in their protests against the security forces that perpetrated the assaults. Groups as politically diverse as the Muslim Brotherhood and communists came together to condemn the attacks, and the wave of female mobilization in the wake of the assaults opened a new female movement, The Street Is Ours. The addition of a new class - women - with specific demands and concerns (namely, the treatment of their sex at the hands of security services) to the growing opposition movement was a significant step towards mass/elite cross-sector coalitions.

Protests against the Egyptian security apparatus continued in the following weeks, when demonstrators from several groups held protests outside the headquarters of the State Security Investigations. The demonstrators represented a growing coalition of groups and interests, as

they were organized by the Hisham Mubarak Law Center - an elite legal institution - and included representatives from more popular mass movements, like Youth for Change and The Street is Ours. Here, groups representing more elite classes - like the Law Center - and popular groups found common cause and worked, at least for the moment, together. The summer ended with Kifaya staging what was described as one of its best protests to date, with thousands of young people gathering in to protest.

The size and weight of these protests, which did include actors from both mass and elite sectors, was a promising start of a cross-sector coalition. They also demonstrated the power opposition could have when both mass and elite actors participated. However, this temporary alliance did not mitigate differences between the sectors over interests and preferred tactics, and it did not last.

### *The End of Cooperation*

Such a promising beginning for greater mass/elite cooperation did not last. After the referendum vote, as the parliamentary and presidential elections approached in the fall of 2005, coalitions among elite actors and tentative alliances between elite and mass actors cadres began to fall apart. Without labor or grassroots support, the coalitions formed by opposition groups during the Kifaya era were already weak and non-comprehensive. The lack of mass/elite coalitions was compounded as the elite elements of the Egyptian opposition fractured on the question of boycotting the constitutional referendum scheduled for May 25, and the presidential election in September.

The threat of a boycott came first from judges, 2,500 of whom threatened not to supervise the referendum and elections if their demands were not met. Their stance was backed by many reform-minded groups, among them professional syndicates and human rights organizations, but

the judges deliberately avoided overtly allying themselves with other groups, announcing instead that they were not part of any opposition movement.

Despite the judge's rejection of cooperation with other opposition groups, Kifaya and the Muslim Brotherhood seemed at first to be in agreement over calling for a boycott of the presidential elections. At the time it seemed to be a major victory for the opposition, as different groups representing different sectors were uniting to make the same demand on the government and enact the same strategy.

However, just weeks before the elections, the Muslim Brotherhood broke with other opposition groups calling for a boycott and endorsed instead what it called a "positive boycott," encouraging participation in the election but refusing to endorse a particular candidate.

Judges, too, also ultimately supported the elections and supervised the process, without receiving satisfaction on the demands they had made on the government. The unity that had seemed promising between mass and elite groups, and the more uncertain unity between the Muslim Brotherhood and the rest of the opposition movement, ultimately fell apart at a crucial moment. On the eve of the election, Kifaya issued a flurry of statements calling on Egyptians to boycott the vote, but without the support or solidarity of the judges and the Muslim Brotherhood the efficacy of the tactic was limited. On the day of the presidential elections themselves, there was only one instance of protest: The Kifaya group, alone, held a demonstration where they walked from Tahrir Square to Ataba. Where thousands had been in the streets only weeks previously, protesting against Mubarak, now the turnout was limited to only a few hundred.

While the cross-class coalitions of the Kifaya era protests had a promising beginning, uniting individuals and groups from diverse political sectors, they were not comprehensive enough. Lacking the involvement of mass-based actors alongside elite actors, mobilization was

limited and protesters were unable to overcome divisions between and among themselves. The coalitions that did form were limited to educated, politically-minded elite cadres. The absence of popular and grassroots movements, as well as the lack of representation for labor groups, were critical weaknesses of the opposition movements of this period.

### Kifaya Era: Strong Ties, Limited Tactic Diffusion

Because the Kifaya era movement was comprised chiefly of elite actors, and these elite actors were connected only by strong ties, opposition tactics did not diffuse widely. There was little tactical innovation and most of the tactics used by the Kifaya era were not widely diffused, limiting the effectiveness of the social movement in pressing their claim against the regime.

Table 2 shows the tactics that were used during the Kifaya era of protest, the time they first appeared, and the groups to which each tactic was diffused. Table 3 shows the tactics that were used during the Arab Spring eras of protest.

### *Diffused Tactics*

Though the Kifaya movement did not invent public demonstrations, the social movement actors of the period were the first to use this tactic to express their dissatisfaction with Mubarak and the current regime.

In 2004, Kifaya held the first anti-Mubarak demonstration. On December 12 they stood on the steps of the High Court in Cairo, wearing stickers emblazoned with the word “Kifaya” and holding a silent protest against the Mubarak regime. At another protest in January, held at the Cairo International Book Fair, Kifaya handed out leaflets and used the popular nature of the book fair to expand the range of people who were exposed to their demonstration.

Kifaya again expanded the range of their repertoire in July, when they held a demonstration in front of the presidential palace - the first time that any demonstration had been



held outside of Mubarak's home. And at the end of July, Kifaya, along with PCC and Youth for Change, held a demonstration in Cairo, in response to Mubarak's announcement that he would run for another term in office.

Though the Muslim Brotherhood is the oldest opposition group in Egypt, they had not previously held public demonstrations against the Mubarak regime. But following Kifaya's first protest, the Brotherhood held its first demonstration at the beginning of April, advocating political reform.

Previously, the Brotherhood had had a policy of avoiding confrontational tactics, limiting their opposition to such methods as discussed above - press releases and petitions. The use of public demonstrations, therefore, represented a significant shift in policy. The demonstration began as a march, and was intended to converge on the People's Assembly Building; however, protesters were prevented from reaching their destination by security forces. Never daunted, the Muslim Brotherhood simply proceeded with the demonstration, holding their protests in the street where they had been stopped. In May, the Brotherhood held another demonstration outside of the al-Fath Mosque, calling for an end to the hated Emergency Law.

In fact, after the Kifaya movement expanded the repertoire of opposition groups by holding public demonstrations, the Muslim Brotherhood - one such group that had avoided tactics of civil disobedience in the past - explicitly called for such tactics. Towards the end of May, Muhammad Ahdi Akif, a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, called for civil disobedience after seeing the effectiveness of the Kifaya protests.

The demonstrations that followed this call were, according to newspaper accounts, unprecedented in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood, with its wide range of influence and organization, gripped Egypt with demonstrations in eight provinces. Unprecedented, and

Table 2. Tactics used during Kifaya era

Tactic	Originating Group	Time Tactic was First Used	Groups Tactic Diffused To	Time Tactic Subsequently Used
Press Release	- Civil society organizations - Communist Party - Muslim Brotherhood	September 2004	March 20	September 2004
Petition	- 20 March - Muslim Brotherhood - Communist Party	September 2004	- NGOs - Human rights activists	September 2004
Boycott	- Cairo Bar Association	April 2005	- Kifaya - Muslim Brotherhood	- April 2005 - April 2005 (Withdrew May 2005)
Hunger Strike	- Journalists	July 2005	None	Did not diffuse
Public Demonstration	- Kifaya	December 2005	- Muslim Brotherhood - PCC - Youth for Change - Hisham Mubarak Law Center - al-Nadeem Center for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Torture	- April 2005  - July 2005 - July 2005  - July 2005 - July 2005

Table 3. Tactics used during Arab Spring Era

Tactic	Originating Group	Time Tactic was First Used	Groups Tactic Diffused To	Time Tactic Subsequently Used
Petition	- Cairo Bar Association	June 2010	- Human Rights Activists - Muslim Brotherhood - NAC	- July 2010 - July 2010 - July 2010
Boycott	- Muslim Brotherhood	February 2010 (Withdrew December 2010)	- NAC	- September 2010
Hunger Strike	- Lawyers	June 2010	None	Did not diffuse
Shadow Parliament	- Former Members of Parliament - Kifaya - April 6	December 2010	None	Did not diffuse
Public Demonstrations	- Kifaya - April 6	April 2010	- NAC - Muslim Brotherhood - Many more - Unaffiliated individuals	- May 2010 - December 2010 - Throughout this period - January 2011
Marches	- NAC	April 2010	- April 6 - Lawyers - Muslim Brotherhood - Communist Party	- May 2010 - July 2010 - February 2011 - February 2011 - February 2011
Sit-Ins	- April 6	April 2010	- Handicapped workers - Bar Association - Textile workers - Other labor groups	- February 2010 - May 2010 - May 2010 - May 2010
Strikes	- Coptic Christians	January 2010	- Handicapped workers - Lawyers - Truckers	- February 2010 - July 2010 - December 2010

Tactic	Originating Group	Time Tactic was First Used	Groups Tactic Diffused To	Time Tactic Subsequently Used
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Journalists</li> <li>- Public sector workers</li> <li>- Transport workers</li> <li>- Suez Canal workers</li> <li>- Egyptian security forces</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- February 2011</li> <li>- February 2011</li> <li>- February 2011</li> <li>- February 2011</li> <li>- February 2011</li> </ul>
Cyberactivism	- April 6	December 2009	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- NAC</li> <li>- My Name is Khaled Said</li> <li>- Muslim Brotherhood</li> <li>- HASHD</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- March 2010</li> <li>- July 2010</li> <li>- July 2010</li> <li>- January 2010</li> </ul>
Vigils	- My name is Khaled Said	July 2010	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- April 6</li> <li>- Activists in Cairo, Gharbiya, Beni Sweif, Assiut, Faylou, Moufiya</li> <li>- Coptic Christians</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- July 2010</li> <li>- July 2010</li> <li>- January 2011</li> </ul>

unexpected: with these massive protests, the Brotherhood showed itself capable, in a way it had not before, of mobilizing large numbers of people in the streets.

A month later, more groups broke the taboo on public demonstrations by holding a protest outside of the headquarters of the State Security Investigations. Like Mubarak, the SSI had never been publicly opposed. A group of about 150 protesters, from such groups as the Hisham Mubarak Law Center and the al-Nadeem Center for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Torture, used the public-demonstration tactic to protest another aspect of the Mubarak regime. The rapid spread of public demonstrations from one social movement actor to another indicated, at least, the presence of social movement actors capable of diffusing tactics to at least some extent.

As the presidential elections approached in September of 2005, instances of demonstration and civil disobedience began to wane. Groups such as Kifaya and the Muslim Brotherhood had sometimes held protests weekly. But after Mubarak's rigged victory at the polls in September, activities began to wane.

### *Tactics Not Diffused*

Most of the tactics utilized by groups in the Kifaya era of protest were not diffused. Press releases are a low-level oppositional tactic. They are not a confrontational action, but a platform on which actors can state their beliefs and aims for reform. In September 2004, a group of civil society organizations, members of the outlawed Communist Party, and the Muslim Brotherhood issued a press release stating that they would be advocating for reform of the constitution. A few weeks later, March 20 issued another press release along with the Brotherhood and the Communist Party. No other opposition groups utilized press releases during the Kifaya period, indicating a very low level of diffusion.

Like the press release, the petition was a legal means of expressing desires for reform and putting pressure on government officials by demonstrating popular support for an idea. Along with their press release, 20 March, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Communist Party ran a signature collection drive to garner and show support for reform. A group of NGOs and human rights activists also ran a petition drive, but the tactic never became widespread.

The boycott was a tactic that actually was diffused to a number of groups during the Kifaya era. However, disputes between and within groups over its implementation limited its spread and displayed a continued weakness of the Kifaya era networks.

Judges of the Bar Association in Cairo were the first to use this tactic as a contentious one against the regime. Constitutional law required the parliamentary and presidential elections, as well as referendums such as the one proposed by Mubarak on constitutional change, to be supervised by judges. The Bar Association, however, threatened a boycott, refusing to supervise elections unless their demand for reform was addressed. Though this particular type of boycott - by an entity with a prescribed formal role in the electoral process - is one that not every opposition actor can take, boycotting elections by abstaining from participating in them is one that can be taken by any group allowed by law to vote.

Kifaya openly supported the judges' threatened boycott and calling for a boycott of their own on the upcoming constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections. However, as the elections themselves approached, one group and then another backed down from the threat. The Muslim Brotherhood, which had been conflicted internally over the proposed tactic, withdrew its support and advocated instead a "positive boycott," where they urged participation in the presidential election but refused to support or endorse any one particular candidate. The Bar Association also did not follow through on their proposed boycott, withdrawing their demands

and supervising both the parliamentary and presidential elections. Even though the boycott existed as a theoretical option for these groups to take, they ultimately did not utilize this tactic.

The first (and only) use of hunger strikes as a protest tactic during the Kifaya period was by journalists. Angered about the over Article 48 of the constitution, which limited freedom of the press, journalists went on hunger strike in an attempt to persuade Mubarak to live up to his campaign promises to eliminate jail sentences for journalists. No other groups adopted this tactic, however, and hunger strikes went undiffused.

There had been a rush of protest activity in the week immediately preceding the election; on the Friday before had been a demonstration supporting Egyptian judges, a press conference had been held on Sunday, and on Monday had been the first public demonstration ever held by a new opposition group, Children for Change. And even as the judges and the Muslim Brotherhood backed down, the Kifaya movement called for a boycott.

On election day, however, and in the days following, very little happened. One small protest was launched by Kifaya, and after Mubarak's win Kifaya pledged a new campaign of civil disobedience, to challenge Mubarak and keep the opposition alive. It didn't happen. Where before protests, demonstrations, and other opposition activity had happened weekly, if not more frequently, the weeks following Mubarak's victory were silent.

Networks had managed to spread protest tactics during the Kifaya era of protest, disseminating both pre-existent tactics and ones that the Egyptian opposition groups were using against Mubarak for the first time. Because networks did not diffuse tactics between organizations, they had fewer tools to work with. At this point, public demonstrations are all that they have spread, and so when those stop working, the movement had no other tools with which to build a cohesive movement with, and so it failed.

### Arab Spring Era : Mass and Elite Actors, Weak Ties

The Arab Spring era social movement, on the other hand, was comprised of social movement groups that were based in both mass and elite populations and worked together for change. These cross-sector coalitions were connected by weak ties that allowed for the diffusion of opposition tactics that were capable of diffusing tactics between actors.

The opposition networks of the Arab Spring were able to harness a wider range of society, incorporating individuals and organizations that broadly and deeply represented many different sectors of Egyptian society. The cross-sector coalitions of the Arab Spring era were more diverse across many dividing lines, and incorporated different political, religious, and ethnic sectors. Most importantly, the protests united actors from both sides of the mass/elite divide. These mass/elite cross-sector coalitions were critical to the success of the Arab Spring movement.

### *Religious Sectors*

While the Kifaya movement did not see a high level of involvement from many different religious groups, the Arab Spring era saw the participation of actors from many different religions, including Muslims, Coptic Christians, and Sufis.

The involvement of Coptic Christians in the Arab Spring protests was particularly significant for a number of reasons. Coptic Christians are a small but significant minority of the population in Egypt, and their rights as citizens and their religious freedom have long been contentious issues in Egyptian politics. The Arab Spring era, however, saw Copts joining forces with members of the Muslim majority to protest. The year 2010 began with a strike called for by a group called “Copts for Egypt,” which presented a series of demands relating to Coptic equality and treatment under the law. Copts for Egypt was, as most of the groups of the Kifaya



era, composed chiefly of elite actors, including lawyers and human rights activists. However, the entrance of a religious minority group onto the protest scene was an important one, as it added a sector to the coalition of protest and introduced another population to the opposition. Though traditionally supportive of Mubarak, members of the Sufi community also hedged their support, rejecting the extension of a president's tenure past two terms, implicitly calling for an end to Mubarak's regime.

Tragedy strengthened the ties beginning to form among and between religious sectors. At a New Year's mass in Cairo in 2011, 21 Copts were killed by a suicide bomber. Hundreds of people - Copts as well as their Muslim friends and neighbors - attended a candlelight vigil in their honor. Though this vigil was not yet an overt act of protest, later vigils held for victims of violence and police brutality did turn into active protest events. On a very small scale, the vigils brought members of mass sectors together in protest. Though they had not yet joined forces across mass and elite lines, the mobilization of mass elements through religious sectors was vital for the burgeoning Arab Spring movement. It informally joined mass actors to groups with goals shared with elite sectors, which would prove vital in later mobilization efforts.

### *Ethnic Sectors*

In addition to religious diversity, the Arab Spring era saw an increase in the ethnic diversity of protesters. Actors involved in the different ethnic sectors were often mass elements. By expanding across ethnic sectors, the opposition movement drew in more elements of the mass sectors. Of particular note are the Nubians, who, in May 2010, staged a large demonstration in front of the People's Assembly building in Cairo, complaining about discrimination in Aswan, the governorate where most Nubians live.

### *Elite Elements*

In addition to these new classes, the period preceding the Arab Spring era saw the return of elite groups that had participated in the Kifaya era protests, particularly judges and lawyers. Though the Kifaya era boycott had fallen flat when judges had withdrawn their own threat of a boycott in 2005, lawyers were back in force organizing protest against the government in 2010. When the chairman of the Bar Association proposed controversial laws designed to regulate the legal profession, hundreds of lawyers participated in a sit-in demanding the proposal be withdrawn. Later, when two lawyers were arrested on charges of assault and libel, hundreds and then thousands of lawyers engaged in hunger strikes, sit-ins, and work stoppages in their protests to demand their colleagues receive a fair trial. Since the withdrawal of the lawyers from the protest scene had proved so fatal to the cross-sector coalitions of 2005, their return to the protest scene in 2010 was significant for the future success of the opposition.

### *Mass and Elite Finally Join Forces*

Where mass/elite cross-sector coalitions were absent or quickly fell apart during the Kifaya era, they were deep and extensive in the Arab Spring era of protest. During the Arab Spring, elite sectors - political cadres, educated academics, intellectuals, and professional experts - joined with popular, grassroots movements that drew their constituents from less elite cadres.

### *El-Baradei and the National Assembly for Change*

Founded in 2010 by Mohammad El-Baradei, a former chairman of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the National Assembly for Change (NAC) was one of the first groups that incorporated some and worked closely with other elite and mass elements.

From its inception, the NAC worked closely with the Kifaya movement to push for political change and reform. El-Baradei - himself certainly an elite actor - also regularly met with a wide and diverse array of opponents to the regime, among them the chairman of the No to Inheritance Movement, the former spokesman of Kifaya, George Ishaq, as well as retired judges and founders of official political parties.

Perhaps even more importantly, however, in regards to cross-sector coalitions, the NAC was supported by significant mass elements. The NAC worked closely with, and was supported by, a number of young cyberspace activists. These cyberspace grassroots (or “cyberroot”) activists were mostly students and young people and were mass-based actors, not elites. They founded the Popular Campaign for the Nomination of El-Baradei and ran a Facebook group in support of him. The April Sixth movement, another mass-based organization, also supported El-Baradei and worked with the NAC.

El-Baradei and the NAC also worked closely with the Muslim Brotherhood. When the NAC launched a signature drive to petition for constitutional reform, the Muslim Brotherhood lent its support and helped circulate the petition, and even launched a website promoting and supporting El-Baradei’s manifesto for political reform. The April 6 movement also joined in the campaign, hanging posters of El-Baradei across Cairo. This unity between groups with different backgrounds and constituents - the elite activists of the NAC, the labor- and grassroots-based members of April 6, and the Muslim Brotherhood - was an active illustration of a cross-sector coalition that bridged the mass/elite divide. Not only did these groups actively work together, cooperating on efforts like websites and signature drives, they also supported and promoted each other’s efforts in strong displays of solidarity.

### *Involvement of Labor*

The Arab Spring era of protest also involved labor, a group that had been sorely missing from the protest coalitions of the Kifaya era. Labor's participation in the Arab Spring period was a significant step forward for the cross-sector coalitions, bringing one of the traditional bastions of the mass sectors of society into the opposition movement.

In the Kifaya period, labor action had been limited to strikes aimed at their own unions, and had carried no political flavor. In 2010, though, labor involvement in the opposition movement grew exponentially, and, during the Arab Spring period, made demands on the government directly to the government. Labor groups staged sit-ins in front of the People's Assembly and held demonstrations where they demanded pay increases, medical insurance and housing. Handicapped workers held a lengthy sit-in demanding better housing and accessibility. When new traffic laws were enacted, 70,000 truckers went on strike in protest. No longer was it just political elites pressing for political reform; in 2010, workers and laborers, substantial representatives of the mass elements of society, were pressing for social and economic reforms of their living and working conditions. For the first time workers were united in their demands, with laborers from many different sectors came together to press the same demands on their government. This unity within the labor class made it stronger and better able to work together.

Beyond worker unity, though, was something even more significant for the development of cross-class coalitions. Labor groups were not acting only on their own, or on their own behalf: They joined forces with other politically-oriented opposition groups to demand change. In May 2010, the first major protest effort that joined elite political actors and mass labor workers was held. Independent labor unions held a strike and were joined by members of Kifaya, the Muslim Brotherhood, April 6, and the NAC, as well as Nasserists and socialist activists. The presence of

political activists from groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and Kifaya signaled a shift in the protest movement: For the first time, labor (a mass-based element of society) and political activists (an elite based element) were working concertedly together to demand change. This unity between political and labor demands had been noticeably lacking during the Kifaya era, but in 2010 this joint protest - which in the end drew 30,000 people, one of the largest demonstrations to date - was present and strong.

### *Khaled Said*

On June 6, 2010, a young blogger named Khaled Said was dragged from an internet cafe in Alexandria and beaten to death by Egyptian police for the apparent crime of uploading a video showing police abuse to the internet. Said's death was a flashpoint, both for the growing opposition movement as a whole and for the strength and diversity of cross-class coalitions. Demonstrations and shows of solidarity for the "Martyr of the Emergency Law" quickly emerged both in the streets and online and united both mass and elite actors in the common cause of protesting his death.

On the first Friday after Said was killed, hundreds of sympathizers, dressed in black, held a silent vigil in his honor. On Saturday and Sunday, hundreds more protesters, including members of the April 6 movement, demonstrated outside of the police station in Sidi Gaber, the Alexandria neighborhood where Said had been killed. Cyberroot activists also joined in, forming a Facebook page called My Name is Khaled Said. And at the Press Syndicate, human rights activists launched a campaign protesting Khaled Said's death at the hands of the police. The following week even more groups joined in the protests. Elite figures, including El-Baradei, joined a demonstration protesting the killing, and demonstrations grew in size, with as many as 3,000 people participating, including members of Kifaya and the April 6 movement. Protests

outside of the Sidi Gaber mosque grew from hundreds to thousands of participants, and demonstrations began to spread to other cities as well. Human rights and internet activists, including the new and rapidly growing group My Name is Khaled Said, called for silent vigils. Vigils were held across Egypt in eight different governorates, including in Cairo and Alexandria.

These protests were notable because they represented the first time the “masses” - members of the non-elite classes of Egyptian society - united and acted in support of a human rights issue (the unity demonstrated by Christians and Muslims in the wake of the Coptic New Year’s bombing came a few months later, in January 2011). They were equally significant because they joined ordinary Egyptians together with established opposition groups, including the Kifaya and the April 6 movements. This was a significant change in the cross-class coalition of the opposition, uniting mass-based popular protesters and opposition groups with established elite actors to work together against the regime. The death of Khaled Said was also significant because it brought elite actors into the protests. Since Said was from an elite background himself, the death of one of their own motivated elite actors to mobilize against the regime in the wake of his death.

### *The Importance of Elites*

The Kifaya era protests demonstrated that elite actors alone were not enough to create a successful social movement. But it should be noted that while the growing participation of mass elements was important for the success of the Arab Spring era opposition, both mass and elite participation (and cooperation between the two groups) are necessary for a successful movement. As the furor of protest in the immediate aftermath of Khaled Said’s death faded, other opposition activity, particularly among elite elements, continued with renewed energy and purpose. After parliamentary elections in December 2010, a group of former Members of Parliament staged a

demonstration protesting the results and announced that they would form their own shadow parliament, declaring the elections to be rigged and unfair and the parliament to have no legitimacy. This act brought a new class of protesters - former government officials and Members of Parliament - into the protest movement, and aligned them with other groups within the movement. Other groups, including Kifaya and the April 6 movement, also aligned with the MPs, saying that they would participate in the shadow parliament. The Muslim Brotherhood, for the moment, abstained from saying whether it would join the shadow parliament or not.

The addition of such elite elements as former members of the government was highly significant for the cross-sector coalitions of the Arab Spring era. They indicated that high-level officials of the government aligned with the opposition movement, simultaneously weakening the regime and strengthening the opposition with the presence of such highly situated and influential figures.

### *Lingering Divisions*

While this unity and cooperation signaled strong cross-class coalitions in the months leading up to the January 25 revolution, some divisions between and within groups still lingered. Splits between groups over methods, tactics, or ideology, plagued the movement throughout its existence. However, these divides were not significant enough to weaken the growing coalition between mass and elite sectors of society.

In December 2009, at the very beginning of the Arab Spring period, Kifaya withdrew from the Egyptian Campaign Against Bequeathal, a group formed to oppose Gamal Mubarak's feared inheritance of power from his father.

Another split occurred - once again - over a proposed election boycott announced by the NAC. As in 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood hedged its support and then, a few weeks after the

announcement, broke away from the NAC and announced it would not participate in the boycott. As it toed the line of the official opposition political parties instead of the opposition movement, the Brotherhood put itself and the opposition in an awkward position, and weakened their coalition. The Muslim Brotherhood also announced that it would not hold street protests for domestic or constitutional demands, further weakening the ties within the opposition movement. Although street protests and demonstrations were growing in frequency and volume during this period, attracting more and more groups and individuals, the Muslim Brotherhood refrained from joining other groups with similar interests who employed that method of protest, opting instead only to take to the streets for issues related to Palestine. The Muslim Brotherhood, which managed to unite both mass and elite elements within its organization, would have been a powerful force for solidifying a coalition that spanned elite and mass sectors had it participated consistently throughout this period. However, even in its absence, coalitions between mass and elite elements managed to strengthen and grow.

Opposition groups also faced internal divisions that threatened the stability of the groups themselves and the coalitions they had formed with other groups. The Muslim Brotherhood, for one, having already split with the rest of the movement over tactics, faced internal division as well. In January, conservative members of the Brotherhood, who had been elected to internal positions, clashed with younger, more liberal elements. Even the question of the election boycott was a dividing one within the Brotherhood, splitting the leadership who rejected and members who supported the proposal to boycott. A wing of the group even broke away from the main body, forming its own organization that rejected participation in politics or voting in the elections. The internal divisions within the Brotherhood affected not only its own cohesion and



efficacy, but its ability to coordinate with other opposition groups and participate in a cross-class coalition.

Divisions were also present within another large opposition group, the Egyptian Bar Association. Internal elections for leadership positions had split the group in 2009, dividing along political lines those who sided with the Nasserists, with the NDP, and with the Muslim Brotherhood into opposing camps with different attitudes towards protests and tactics. When two lawyers were arrested by Egyptian security forces, the head of the Bar Association itself came under fire from members, with more than 10,000 lawyers complaining and accusing him of oppressing and humiliating lawyers and pressing for a vote of no-confidence in the leadership. As with the splits within the Muslim Brotherhood, divisions within the Bar Association threatened not only the group's cohesion but its ability to work consistently with other opposition groups and figures.

However, in the case of the Arab Spring, these divisions did not prove fatal, either to the groups themselves or to the cross-class coalitions that were rapidly growing between them. Events were soon to follow - what would become the January 25 Revolution - that overcame divisions and strengthened the ties and unity between groups of different sectors, rather than weakened them.

### *The January 25 Revolution and Cross-Sectors*

As the opposition movement began to build toward the ultimate outbreak of the January 25 Revolution, cooperation between mass and elite actors swelled. On December 12, 2010, Kifaya celebrated the sixth anniversary of its first protest by demonstrating in front of the Court of Cassation, the supreme court of Egypt, voicing discontent with the results of the recent election and chanting that Parliament was void. Two thousand people took part in this

demonstration, including members of the April 6 movement, the Popular Democratic Movement for Change (HASHD), the Muslim Brotherhood, and the NAC, groups which spanned the mass/elite divide and united actors from different sectors. It was amid this atmosphere - with a wide range of groups coming together to protest the death of Khaled Said and rally against the results of the parliamentary election - that the January 25 Revolution began.

After the fall of the dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, calls to protest began circulating among many opposition groups. A young woman named Asmaa Mahfouze seems to have been first to set the date for the protests, writing online that she would demonstrate against the government on January 25, Police Day. The April 6 movement and the My Name is Khaled Said page quickly picked up the call, announcing protests for the 25th. They were joined by other opposition groups - Youth for Freedom and Justice (YJFM), HASHD, the NAC, the Free Front for Peaceful Change, the Popular Front for Freedom, and Kifaya. All of these groups shared similar goals and interests and had, in the past, pressed for governmental and constitutional reform. Taken together, these groups represented all parts of the mass and elite sectors. With the call to protests on January 25, however, all of these groups were, for the first time, working in concert with each other to launch a massive demonstration against the government. It was a significant increase both in the quality and volume of the cross-class coalitions pushing for change. In the past, hundreds and thousands of people had participated in demonstrations; now tens of thousands of people, from mass and elite sectors, were taking to the streets in Cairo demanding reform.

The January 25 uprising saw unity between many diverse sectors of Egyptian society, but, most importantly, between mass and elite sectors. Though the Tunisian Revolution was an important signaling event that influenced the timing out the outbreak of protests in Egypt, the

subsequent revolutionary protests could not have occurred as successfully as they did without the previously-constructed coalitions of mass and elite actors. When the Muslim Brotherhood ended their official non-participation on the first Friday of the protests, they brought a significant opposition group back into the opposition coalition.

Strikes from labor groups and the working class soon followed the protests that erupted on January 25, and were a vital element of the mass-based sector of the Arab Spring coalition. Strikes soon followed the protesters, and workers from many different public institutions, including the postal service, walked out on the job. There was a veritable coup at the offices of the state-run newspaper, al-Ahram, as workers overthrew their own dictator, the pro-Mubarak chairman of the paper. Strikes spread from Cairo to other cities in Egypt, and workers from different sectors, from manufacturing plants like textile and cement factories, to high-tech industries such as telecommunications, took up the strike. Labor activism was not isolated in one part of the country, or limited to major cities like Cairo and Alexandria. Strikes were occurring from Suez, in the east, all the way to New Valley, west of the Nile River.

In striking, labor added a significant mass-based element to the protests sweeping across the country and expanded the demands of the opposition from constitutional and political demands to economic concerns. They ensured that earlier labor involvement with opposition continued, and that labor was a part of the cross-sector coalitions of the Arab Spring.

### *Nonaffiliated Mass Participation*

In the days immediately following January 25, many of the protests organized across Egypt on January 27 and 28 - the “Day of Rage” - were organized by people who had no prior affiliation with any political groups or any of the youth movements that had driven the initial protests. This inclusion of “the masses” - those individuals with no obvious association to any

particular elite sector or group - in the protests was a strong indication of weak ties, since it was weak ties that connected movement actors to those who had not, previously, taken part.

### *Elite Involvement*

As the January 25 Revolution continued into February, the protests drew in more and more elite actors, who formed coalitions with mass elements. The Egyptian political establishment itself seemed to fracture, and those that broke off joined the protesters, and leaders of the Communists, Muslim Brotherhood, and the NAC joined protesters in Tahrir Square. As they joined forces with other coalitions and mass-based actors, these elite strengthened cross-sector coalitions and further isolated the regime. Amr Moussa, a former foreign minister of Egypt and the Secretary General of the Arab League, also joined the protests. High level defectors from the government weakened the regime twofold, by weakening and isolating the regime and by strengthening the protesters. These defections were critical to bringing about the resignation of Mubarak, and provided a critical elite element to the mass/elite coalitions that allowed the Arab Spring movement to be successful.

The social movement of the Arab Spring era was able to unite actors from across religious, political, and ethnic divides and incorporate both mass and elite elements. This mass/elite cross-sector coalition was critical to the success of the Arab Spring. By uniting actors from both elite and mass cadres, the Arab Spring was able to reach a critical mass of mobilization. The presence of elite actors, including those which had defected from the regime, increased the legitimacy of the movement in the eyes of the regime and encouraged Mubarak to resign, while the presence of mass actors formed a critical mass large enough to convince the regime to capitulate.

### The Arab Spring: Weak Ties, Tactical Diffusion

The weak ties at work during the Arab Spring era allowed tactics to diffuse broadly through networks. On April 14, 2010, Kifaya and April 6 staged a demonstration. Public demonstrations began to spread from there: on May 3, the NAC, April 6, and other groups held a march that was ultimately cancelled by security forces. When the separate groups were not allowed to converge on their intended destination, the protest turned into a stationary demonstration on the spot. Not only were these groups using tactics, such as marches and demonstrations, they were able to adapt from one tactic to another on the spot if one was not effective - a crucial benefit of having a large repertoire.

After the death of Khaled Said at the hands of the Alexandria police, public demonstrations spread rapidly. Kifaya organized a protest decrying his death and brought thousands of people to the street, demonstrating against police forces and the regime. They were joined by cyberactivists and other opposition activists. And later, on December 12, 2010 Kifaya celebrated its sixth anniversary by holding demonstrations across Cairo, alongside the Muslim Brotherhood, NAC, April 6, and others.

Newspapers of the time offered some revealing statistics as they provided a broader context in which to understand the protest events they were commenting on. At least 300 demonstrations took place across Egypt between January and June, 2010, according to *Al-Ahram Weekly*, though the paper noted that the actual number might be closer to 900 or 1,000.

Public demonstrations were not ubiquitous. The Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, abstained from holding protests for any issue other than the Palestinian question, deciding not to engage in any public demonstrations for domestic reform or against Mubarak and the regime as late as December 2010.

The most dramatic expansion of public demonstrations, however, did not come until January 25, 2011. January 25 was the day that had been set by opposition groups as a day on which to mobilize for mass protests against the Mubarak regime. Most of the protests that were held on January 25 - and there were dozens, in Cairo and across Egypt - were, however, not held or organized by major opposition groups. Kifaya, the April 6 movement, even the Muslim Brotherhood, had little to do with planning and executing the demonstrations that sprang up across Egypt on Police Day. Instead, networks had diffused the tactic of public demonstrations from the established groups to individuals in Alexandria, Mansoura, Suez, and other cities. Many individuals who had heard the call for the Police Day protests volunteered to lead demonstrations in their own hometowns. And most of the demonstrations in the days immediately following Police Day, particularly those held on Thursday and the first Friday after the 25th, were organized locally, by individuals who had not previously been affiliated with any of the political or youth opposition movements who were so visible in those days. "Egyptians," said Matthew Cassel, an American journalist reporting on the protests said, summing up the phenomenon, "became professional revolutionaries in only a week."

The biggest public demonstration to date in Egypt was held on February 8, with over a million people turning out in downtown Cairo to protest against the regime. Newspaper rhetoric of the time crackles with the awareness of demonstration tactics spreading to all parts of Egyptian society. The protest, wrote Assem El-Kersh, a correspondent for *Al-Ahram Weekly* on February 16, 2011, "overturned all established political norms in this 7,000-year-old country. The radical change switched the public mood, ways of thought and the behavior of rulers and the ruled. It altered the political air Egyptians breathe, the types of aspirations they cherish and the way they claim their rights."

Though they peaked in late January and early February, public demonstrations continued even after Mubarak's resignation on February 11. On February 25, a month after the first Police Day protests, tens of thousands of people held a demonstration in Tahrir Square, demanding the resignation of high-ranking officials associated with the Mubarak regime.

A subset of public demonstrations, "peaceful" marches - those that involved no violence, and were less dramatically civilly disobedient than public demonstrations - were a favorite tactic of some groups during the Arab Spring. While some groups, such as April 6, preferred to use more confrontational tactics, other groups, such as the NAC, used mostly marches to protest. Though both April 6 and the NAC ostensibly had the same repertoire of opposition tactics to choose from, each group, guided by its own internal preferences, chose to use different tactics. Because different organizations - based on what they know to do and what the society understands and expects them to do - have different preferences, it is essential to have a large range of tactics and networks with weak ties, so the right tactics can diffuse to the right organizations.

Other groups used marches as well. During their protests demanding justice for two lawyers detained by government security forces, lawyers held a peaceful march in which they demanded an investigation of the individuals who had initially detained the jailed lawyers.

Marches were even used during the three weeks of the January 25 Revolution, sometimes as a show of solidarity between different groups. In one example, members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Communist party, and El-Baredai walked across Tahrir Square arm-in-arm to show their support for each other and the opposition. And, on February 10, thousands of protesters marched to, and surrounded, the television building in downtown Cairo. Thousands more marched to the presidential palace, the first time the home of Mubarak had been targeted

during the protests.

The first instance of a sit-in during the Arab Spring era was on fifth of April, 2010, when April 6 called for a sit-in in front of the People's Council to advocate for political reform.

Workers soon adopted this tactic. In February, there was another sit-in, this time in front of the People's Assembly, as workers, handicapped individuals, and their families, broadcast their demands for pay increases, health insurance, and access to - in the case of the handicapped - appropriate housing. This particular sit-in went on for weeks.

From workers, the sit-in tactic spread to legal professionals. In May the lawyers of the Bar Association held protests against a controversial proposed law that would increase government control of the Association and limit its independence. The protests lasted a week and then culminated in a sit-in in front of the Press Syndicate to demand the withdrawal of the proposal. Later, lawyers held another sit-in, this time to protest the detention of two lawyers who had been arrested following an altercation in court.

Soon after, sit-ins continued to spread as a protest activity as workers at a private spinning and weaving company held a sit-in as they protested for better pay and working conditions outside of the People's Assembly. So many sit-ins, in fact, were taking place during this period that people began to refer to the pavement in front of the People's Assembly as "Egypt's Hyde Park," so called for the park in London where labor demonstrations had often been held.

Sit-ins evolved during the Arab Spring period into what activists termed "sleep-ins," a subset of the massive, lengthy sit-ins protesters staged by occupying Tahrir square for three weeks in the early spring of 2011. This extended occupation of the square, twenty four hours a day, seven days a week, was a tactic protesters developed early after the initial Police Day



demonstrations. At first, the protesters left the square at night, which made it easier for government forces and “thugs” to begin to reclaim the contested space. After nearly losing their occupation of the square on Tuesday, protesters began sleeping in the square overnight to maintain their occupation.

Sit-ins, like public demonstrations, continued in Egypt after the resignation of Mubarak. On February 25, a month after the first Police Day demonstrations, protesters returned to Tahrir square and staged protests outside of the Parliament building in Cairo, demanding the resignation of Mubarak’s prime minister and cabinet. The continuation of sit-ins even after the initial goal of the revolution - the removal of Mubarak - had been achieved demonstrates the extensive diffusion of this tactic.

Beginning with a New Year’s strike in January 2010 called for by Egyptian Coptic Christians, strikes quickly diffused to other Arab Spring era organizations. February alone saw 40 strikes and sit-in, including the protests by handicapped workers and their families.

Strikes took on a new significance in early 2010 when strikers spread from laborers to legal professionals and political activists. In the wake of the arrest of two lawyers in June on charges of libeling and assaulting a senior prosecutor, lawyers across Egypt went on strike, with more than 10,000 lawyers filing complaints and conducting a partial work stoppage. When the partial work stoppage did not bring about the results they sought from the administration - a fair hearing for the two detained lawyers - they shifted to a general work stoppage, effectively going on strike.

Meanwhile, strikes were spreading to other sectors of the economy. In early December, 70,000 heavy goods truckers went on strike, protesting a new traffic law they felt was detrimental to their businesses. Though the law was not directly related to political goals or

governmental reform, the truckers' strike was another instance of a group opposed to the government and protesting its policies, using a tactic that was spreading through networks to try to bring about their desired outcome.

At al-Ahram, a state-run newspaper, journalists rebelled against the pro-Mubarak chairman of the paper and took over the publication. Postal workers also went on strike, as well as many other public sector workers.

As with previously mentioned tactics, strikes continued even after Mubarak resigned. Workers at the Suez Canal went on strike, as did workers in the transport sector, at banks, in the chemical industry, and at textile mills and pharmaceutical plants. Widespread enough to threaten the stability of the Egyptian economy, these strikes further demonstrated the thoroughness with which networks had propagated the tactic.

Even the hated Egyptian security forces went on strike; after Mubarak resigned, Egyptian police officers struck for the first time. This was particularly significant because, throughout most of the protests leading up to Mubarak's resignation, the police forces had been on the side of the regime, not the protesters. After Mubarak fell, strikes also spread to widely divergent regions in Egypt, with strikes breaking out among the Bedouins of Egypt and el Arish of North Sinai. More public workers went on strike, including workers on the Cairo public transit system and the Cairo stock exchange.

The extensive strike activity during this period is one of the most significant differences between the Kifaya period and the Arab Spring era of protest. Strikes, and the deep involvement of labor, continued well past the resignation of Mubarak in February 2011, demonstrating the depth and breadth of its diffusion. The effective networks of this period allowed this tactic to diffuse to a wide range of actors in an even wider range of locations.

Cyberactivism was a new form of protest, organizing resources and disseminating information in a new way, unprecedented in the history of Egypt. The social movement networks of the period were strong and well-suited for the transmission of these new tactics.

Cyberactivism began in earnest in Egypt with the April 6 movement in 2006, when a group of young activists used ICTs to create links between political activists, and labor activists at a manufacturing plant in El-Mahalla El-Kubra. From there, cyberactivism spread to many different groups that took part in the Arab Spring era of protest.

Created on Facebook after Khaled Said was beaten to death by the police, the My Name Is Khaled Said (alternately called We Are All Khaled Said) group had over 150,000 members by the end of its first week in existence. Later, the group grew to 350,000 members. It was a new kind of activism; posts on the Facebook page covered a wide range of topics of politics and dissent beyond the issue of Khaled Said's death or the policies of the security forces. The large participation signaled by such a large number of followers was likely because online participation is both easy and anonymous. While it might not translate directly into street participation - getting someone to join a group online is one matter, getting them to risk their lives in a possibly violent street demonstration is another - cyberactivism and online groups like April 6 and My Name Is Khaled Said were a new and effective way to coordinate and protest. Because online participation was relatively safe and easy, cyberactivism spread rapidly to many different protest groups.

The Muslim Brotherhood soon launched a website in support of Muhammad Al-Baradei's manifesto for political reform. No longer a tactic used solely by the young and the anonymous, the Muslim Brotherhood was an established opposition group using a tactic that had initially been used only by technology-savvy youth.

Another aspect of cyberactivism was using high-tech but common devices - like cell phones - to document ongoing protests. This was particularly relevant during the three weeks between the Police Day demonstrations and the downfall of Mubarak, as protesters recorded and broadcast their own actions from Egypt across the world.

The call to the initial Police Day protests, and many of the subsequent demonstrations in the weeks that followed, came from cyberactivists. The invitation to the January 25 protests in Cairo originated on the Khaled Said Facebook page, and the invitation itself soon attracted more than 50,000 subscribers. The internet was even used to train activists, with April 6 and HASHD offering online training courses for protest organizers, including lessons on how to best avoid clashes with security forces.

The cyberactivist tactics of the Arab Spring period were significant in part because they allowed the demonstrations to be leaderless; instead of needing a steering committee or a formal internal organization, cyber tactics allowed anyone with internet connection or a cell phone to be involved in the planning and execution of protest activities. The chief tactics of the cyberactivists, including posting photographs, videos, and updates on marches and demonstrations, needed no centralized leader, and were actions that could be taken individually to great effect; iconic images and videos quickly spread across the internet to the rest of Egypt and the world at large.

Once the protests broke out on and after January 25, demonstrations grew and spread as videos and other information about the ongoing activities spread over the internet, particularly such ICTs as Facebook and Twitter. On Facebook a “situation room” was created where individuals could post video, photographs, and text posts, allowing protesters and the general public to monitor the progress of the demonstrations.

Cyberactivism and the use of Facebook and Twitter was not, however, the definitive or deciding tactic of the Arab Spring era of protest. The use of cyberactivist tactics shaped, in large part, the beginning of the January 25 protests, but on January 28, the regime struck back. Cognizant of the role ICTs were playing in the hands of the protesters to both organize and advertise their demonstrations, the regime cut the internet and disabled cell phone networks, plunging Egypt into technological darkness while, as Injy El-Kashef wrote in al-Ahram on February 16, “the global community’s jaw dropped in disbelief.” The scale of the crackdown on telecommunications was unprecedented. But the opposition movement did not collapse when the internet went down.

Some work-around solutions were offered; Google and Twitter offered a “text to tweet” service where activists could send out tweets by calling a number via a landline, a service that played a large role in keeping the rest of the world out of the dark in regards to what was happening in Egypt. But events on the ground had superseded the need for high-technology solutions to communication and organization.

In fact, cutting internet and cell phone service in Egypt may only have backfired on the regime. Though newspaper accounts of the time do not offer precise statistics, there is anecdotal evidence that when the internet went down, people turned instead to less high-tech methods of communication, namely land-line phones and word of mouth. Most significantly, with the internet down people could no longer sit inside their homes and use their computer to find out what was happening on the streets. In order to follow what was going on many people who had previously sat at home went into the streets themselves, adding to the growing mass of demonstrators demanding an end to the Mubarak regime. Without cyberactivist tactics, the only tactics left were to directly participate.

While cyberactivism was undoubtedly an important protest tactic during the Arab Spring period, one that shaped the nature of the protests themselves, it was not the sole or deciding tactic of the era. It was, however, an important part of the large repertoire that helped the Arab Spring era movement to succeed. The choice - while it lasted - to use cyberactivism allowed activists to be flexible in what tactics they used, and allowed protests to survive.

Primarily a social event, vigils are not necessarily venues for political sentiments or demands, but the course of events and the known repertoire of opposition groups during this period resulted in their use as explicit protest tactics.

Vigils were held during the Arab Spring principally in response to the death of Khaled Said. Socially, vigils were a way for the public to express their grief over the death of Said and express solidarity with his family and community. However, since Said's death had come at the hands of hated security forces, opposition groups appropriated vigils and used them as a forum in which to express dismay at and opposition to regime security policies and forces.

After Said's death, calls for vigils began on the internet; many were held on multiple days and in many places, in the following weeks. A vigil, organized on Facebook, was held outside the Sidi Gaber Mosque in Alexandria. Ostensibly to show solidarity with Khaled Said's family, participants carried banners expressing political dissent. The vigil was also attended by El-Baredei and other opposition leaders.

On July 15 more vigils were held, organized by April 6 and the My Name is Khaled Said Facebook group. And as the policemen charged with Said's death were brought to trial, hundreds of people gathered across Egypt. From Alexandria to Cairo, Gharbiya to Beni Sweif, and in Assiut, Faylou, and Mouifya, protesters held vigils in memory of Khaled Said and to express opposition to Egyptian security forces.

Vigils are a simple tactic to execute and one that already existed in the social repertoire of Egyptian society. It was easy to adopt as a protest tactic, and the ease with which it spread via networks is evident by the number of groups who held vigils and the large number of locations across Egypt in which vigils were held.

Vigils were not only used to protest Khaled Said's death; they also spread to the religious communities of Egypt, when a suicide bomber killed 21 Coptic Christians at a New Year's mass in Cairo in January 2011. Vigils that had been held by Egyptians in solidarity with Khaled Said and his family were now being used, by Christians and Muslims alike, to mourn and protest the death of Copts. And though the Copts died from a suicide attack, and not at the hand of government forces, the vigils for their death nonetheless became a locus for anti-government sentiment. The mood of the vigils is summed up in a newspaper article of the period: Gigi Ibrahim, an Egyptian-American blogger, observed the vigils in Cairo and wrote: "Some were chanting against the government, holding it responsible for the tragedy among other things, while others were just there holding a candle mourning the dead in silence. Whether angry, silent, marching, protesting, signing or simply just being there, all the 400 attended were mourning Egypt." Their use of vigils took something that did not necessarily have political overtones and adapted it for the repertoire, using an established event and making it into a political act, a place where protest could be focused and conducted.

Weak ties also allowed for the innovation of tactics. The greatest innovation of the Arab Spring era was that of the occupation of Tahrir Square. While occupations have been used as a tactic by social movement actors in the past, never before had protestors occupied a public area like the square, for weeks on end.

Tahrir Square quickly became the epicenter of the Arab Spring era protests. Protesters organized their own community of activists within the square. Weak ties brought casual observers and those who had heard about the occupation on the news to the square. They set up checkpoints at entrances to the square and checked anyone entering for weapons, in order to reduce the chance of violence and to root out agitators. They even organized a warning system in case government forces attacked, using the simple expedient of striking metal with metal bars. Protesters set up supply networks by which to bring goods and medicine into the square, and doctors set up makeshift clinics to treat the sick and injured. Volunteers kept the camps clean, sweeping the streets. The protestors even fought to defend the square against security forces which sought to reclaim the space for the regime. This community of protesters was able to sustain protests throughout the Arab Spring, planning and carrying out protest events across the city. Their very existence and continued presence within the square acted as a perpetual protest against the regime, and it was made possible by weak ties.

### *Tactics Not Diffused*

The petition was first used during the Arab Spring era by a group of lawyers who launched a petition against a member of their own group, the head of the Bar Association, collecting signatures with the intention of pressing for a vote of no confidence in the Association leader. Human rights activists also made use of petitions, particularly after the death of Khaled Said. The petition as a social movement tactic had a limited range of diffusion during the Arab Spring era, much as it had during the Kifaya period.

Only two groups - the Muslim Brotherhood and the NAC - attempted to utilize electoral boycotts during the Arab Spring era. As during the Kifaya era, the Muslim Brotherhood suffered



internal splits over the question of whether to boycott or participate in parliamentary and presidential elections. While some wanted to participate, other factions wanted to abstain from the elections, an internal division that would limit both the spread of the tactic and its effectiveness.

Because holding a boycott meant that the Brotherhood could not field candidates, ultimately it decided as a collective to participate in, rather than boycott, the parliamentary elections in December. (Mubarak resigned before the question of whether to boycott the presidential election could become an urgent one.) The NAC, on the other hand, which did not customarily run candidates for parliament, did call for a boycott of the parliamentary elections.

The limited spread of boycotts - no other organized opposition group called for a boycott of the parliamentary elections at this time - and continued dissension within the Muslim Brotherhood over the tactic demonstrates a limited level of tactic diffusion.

In June 2010, a group of lawyers threatened to go on hunger strike in protest over the detention of two of their colleagues. The single instance of hunger strikes during this period indicates the limited transmission of this tactic.

After the fraudulent parliamentary elections in December, a group of former MPs, along with members of Kifaya and the April 6 movement, came together to create a shadow parliament that they claimed represented the true will of the Egyptian people. Locked out of representation in the official parliament, this group attempted to claim legitimacy in governance from the regime for itself. The shadow parliament did not catch on widely, and did not ultimately gain the legitimacy they were seeking from the populace.

More social movement tactics diffused much farther, to many more groups, across a wider geographic area for a longer period of time during the Arab Spring than during the Kifaya

era of protest. The Kifaya period saw a limited diffusion of tactics, particularly public demonstrations, but even this tactic did not spread beyond a limited group of actors. More tactics, such as the press release, petition, and the hunger strike, barely diffused, if at all, and other tactics, such as the boycott, raised controversy within the movement and were eventually abandoned altogether.

The Arab Spring also saw the use of tactics that had a limited range of diffusion - the petition, boycott, and hunger strikes saw limited use by a very limited number of groups. But other tactics, particularly public demonstrations, marches, sit-ins, strikes, cyberactivism, and vigils, spread across many groups and between a broad range of social movement actors for an extensive period of time. Thanks to strong social movement networks, broad diffusion of these tactics was possible. This diffusion gave social movement actors a strong, varied repertoire of tactics that could be used effectively in opposition to the regime. And because different social movement actors have different preferences as to which tactics they use, large, varied repertoires and strong networks like the ones available to the Arab Spring era actors was essential, so that tactics can diffuse to groups which will use them.

Though not all of the tactics innovated and utilized during the Arab Spring were diffused, many more were. Petitions, boycotts, and hunger strikes, as during the Kifaya period, were not widely diffused among protest actors. But public demonstrations were diffused successfully, as were marches, sit-ins, strikes, cyberactivism, and vigils. The wide range of diffusion of these tactics, between groups and across a wide range of time, helped the Arab Spring era movement to succeed. And it was weak ties that made this diffusion possible, as mass groups, with weak ties to other non-affiliated participants, enabled these tactics to spread.

## CONCLUSION

What factors determine whether a social movement succeeds or fails? How do social movements function in authoritarian contexts? I argued that in order to be successful in an authoritarian context, a social movement needs to possess two components: prior organizations and mass/elite cross-sector coalitions with weak ties.

I have argued that the Kifaya era social movement did not succeed because it was built on few prior organizations, and because it was unable to unite actors from different sectors into cross-sector coalitions. Only elite actors took part, and, since these actors were linked only by strong ties, the Kifaya era networks were ineffective in diffusing protest tactics. The Arab Spring era social movement succeeded in its goal of ending the Mubarak regime because it had both of these components. Prior organizations provided structure and resources on which to build movement mobilization and operations. Cross-sector coalitions ensured that a critical mass of the population, from a wide enough variety of the population to demand a response from the regime, participated. It also ensured the weak ties that allowed tactics to be diffused to broad swaths of the population. Tactic diffusion provided social movement actors with a variety of tactics to employ, and continue employing even in the face of repression.

From this investigation, we gain insight into two necessary components of social movements, and how they affect their outcomes. In a successful social movement such as the Arab Spring era movement, prior organizations form the backbones of social movements; their members, resources, connections, and networks form the raw materials from which social movements emerge. The more prior organizations participate in a movement, the better the movement's chances of success, because that much more resources are available to the movement. From these organizations emerge cross-sector coalitions, as different groups, organizations and institutions from different backgrounds but with similar interests work

together for a common goal. These cross-sector coalitions were able to build weak ties between organizations and individuals, enabling the spread and innovation of opposition tactics. The wide variety of tactics available to social movement actors allowed actors to choose the tactics they preferred and to use alternate tactics if any part of their repertoire met repression by security forces.

Given what I have found about social movements in Egypt, it is possible to extrapolate these findings to other social movements in repressive contexts. Any social movement in an authoritarian context, regardless of what region it is in, needs these three factors succeed. These findings will be useful to academic researches and regional experts, but also to policymakers and even to social movement participants as they attempt to navigate outcomes and solutions to both new and ongoing social movements.

And though these results are not limited to MENA-area movements, they are particularly relevant for those other movements that arose as part of the Arab Spring and are still ongoing. In Syria the opposition movement that broke out in early 2011 has turned into a prolonged civil war. In Bahrain, smaller instances of protest have taken place more or less continuously since a brutal crackdown by security forces ended the initial wave of Bahraini Arab Spring protests in March 2011. From my findings, both external and domestic policymakers and social movement actors can draw lessons on how best to control mobilization and operate effectively to achieve the desired outcome.

In order to be successful, social movements in these countries must find common interests between these different sectors to bring them together in a common cause. Once these cross-sector coalitions are formed, it will become much easier for networks between actors to be formed and for tactics of contention to flow among them, as weak ties will broaden the range of

diffusion. Improved tactic diffusion will give actors a greater range of options in the face of repression.

External actors and resources are not necessary for a social movement victory. However, for external actors who wish to influence the outcome of a social movement, there are some options available for taking action that can help a social movement succeed. Though prior organizations develop internally, external actors can assist these groups, with funding or other resources, to improve their development and the range of resources they have at their disposal. Groups involved in ongoing social movements, like the Syrian National Council or the Bahrain Debate, might benefit from external funding and resources. Sectarian conflicts are often present within populations undergoing a social movement that can divide potential actors and weaken mobilization. In these cases, external actors can act as impartial mediators and help resolve conflicts, mitigating divisions and helping populations find common ground on which they can mobilize together to achieve a shared interest. In the case of Syria, for example, external mediators might help resolve tensions and divisions between the ruling Alawite minority and the Sunni opposition.

External actors can be particularly helpful in strengthening tactics of protest when a movement faces repression. Earlier movements and external social movement actors can act as passive examples or active teachers of tactics. They can also help social movement actors avoid authoritarian responses to their tactics. For example, when the Mubarak regime cut off internet and cell phone access in during the January 25 revolution, Google and Twitter set up services that activists could continue to use during the blackout to continue to broadcast their message and experiences during the revolution.

For those internal actors who wish the social movements to succeed, several things need to be done within the social movement. First, pre-existing organizations must be brought into the movement, to lend it their resources and organizing abilities. This has already been achieved to some extent in Syria; the Free Syrian Army is built around a group of military officers who defected from the Syrian Army in protest over the repressive tactics the regime was enforcing. Second, sectarian divides must be overcome. In both Bahrain and Syria deep divides along sectarian lines, have fractured social movements and divided large segments of the country against itself. Bahrain is divided between a majority Shi'a population, and a Sunni minority that largely backs the government, a split that weakened the nascent social movement from the beginning. More recently, however, members of the Bahraini opposition have made efforts to overcome these divides. A group called "Youth for Youth" has organized the "Bahrain Debate," which is intended to bring together Bahrainis from a variety of political and socioeconomic backgrounds to work together for reform. Efforts like this should be continued and expanded, in order to bridge divides between sectors and unite a variety of potential social movement actors. Syria faces similar problems: the civil war itself the country is now undergoing has pitted minority Alawite Christians – who control most of the government – against the majority Sunni population.

The defection of high-ranking military officials to the side of the Syrian rebels helped the cause of the social movement, as it lent the movement legitimacy and resources. However, other aspects of the opposition are still divided; the Syrian National Council, which has attempted to carry out opposition to the regime from exile in Turkey, suffers deep divides along ethnic, religious, and ideological lines. In order to build strong cross-sector coalitions, groups like the Syrian National Council must work to overcome internal divisions, and find common interests on

which they can build opposition to the regime. More groups like this, which bring together diverse actors, would strengthen the movement further, and also expand the networks of weak ties which allows for tactical diffusion.

Tactical diffusion has been one of the most difficult factors of success for the social movements in Bahrain and Syria to achieve. In large part, this is because of the severe repression the regime has used in the wake of protests: the brutal military backlash to nascent protest efforts obviates many of the more peaceful tactics the Egyptian Arab Spring era used to such great effect. In Syria, where protest escalated into civil war when military defectors formed the Free Syrian Army, tactics such as marches and demonstrations are now met by gunfire. And in Bahrain, initial protest was all but wiped out when the Bahraini government brought in the military assistance of the Gulf Cooperation Council. However, this does not mean that these social movements are hopeless. Other tactics, widely diffused enough, could make a difference for the movements. Cyberactivism is one tactic that has spread widely and easily across and within other movements, and other tactics which do involve force could be utilized. Activists should look at tactics they themselves have used that have had a modicum of success, and should look to other social movements in similar situations, to gain more tactics. With a broad and well-diffused repertoire, even in the face of oppression these movements will be able to find tactics that their respective regimes cannot combat effectively.

Significantly, these policy implications are not limited only to social movements in western, democratic contexts, as early the findings of social movement literature were. This study has built on earlier models and applied them to non-western, non-democratic cases, and found the components that are necessary for social movement success in authoritarian cases. The findings of this study, and its policy implications, therefore, are applicable to all social

movements, even those that do not occur in the west, and those which occur in authoritarian contexts; they are generalizable.

The argument that I have advanced here expands our understanding of social movements both from an academic and from a policy point of view. It shows that in order to succeed, a social movement in an authoritarian context must be built on pre-existing organizations, must unite diverse actors into a broad coalition that cuts across social, political, and economic divides, and must develop and diffuse a varied repertoire of tactics. Without these factors, social movements cannot succeed. As social movements have broken out in regions that had been consigned by experts to eternal dictatorship, the world has turned its attention to these new, seemingly surprising, developments. By understanding the factors that determine the success of these social movements, we can move further into the 21<sup>st</sup> century with a better comprehension of how people all over the globe can achieve their dreams and fulfill their hopes of a brighter future.



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