PROXY WAR BY AFRICAN STATES,

1950 – 2010

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
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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to its sponsoring powers.

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ABSTRACT

The low number of recognized <u>interstate</u> wars in Africa since 1950 suggests three interlinked (but false) conclusions i.e., that African states are uniquely pacifistic, that they are particularly constrained against waging interstate war, and that whatever wars do take place are of necessity occasioned by the failure to restrain violent internal challengers such as warlords, secessionists, or dissident political factions. In contrast to these positions, my extensive analyses of primary and secondary data on African wars clearly indicate that African states frequently deploy violent means against one another, albeit through armed intermediaries in multi-actor wars. African 'multi-actor wars' are thus overwhelmingly <u>proxy wars</u>; and this, given the predominance of multi-actor wars in the African war record, merits the selection of proxy wars as the phenomenon of interest in the study of African wars from 1950 to 2010. In order to examine the <u>nature</u> of this form of war, and explain <u>when, where and why</u> the use of proxies by states against one another constitutes a compelling explanation of empirical reality, I constructed an original dataset of major African conflicts using <u>conventional (i.e., theory-neutral) indicators of war</u> during the period under examination. This 'Events List' contains 27 unique conflicts featuring 101 partnerships between a sponsoring state and one or more intermediaries. For each of these conflicts and partnerships (i.e., levels of analysis for multi-actor war) I added data on relevant variables and deployed a two-stage mixed-methods design to test particular rival hypothesis against my own theoretical propositions about proxy war.

The prevalence of this form of war in Africa is not questionable: fully 96% of African states have sponsored proxies outside their own territories. Thus, it is <u>how</u>, <u>when</u>, <u>where</u> and <u>why</u> they do so that are the focal points of the conclusions reached here. I show that the conduct of proxy war by African states is <u>instrumental</u>, i.e. intended to overcome and exploit specific geopolitical constraints and in order to achieve the aims of the state; and thus, that whenever or wherever African states are <u>extranationally committed</u> to the pursuit of their strategic and survival aims, they will conduct proxy war, establishing strategic alliances and militarizing intermediaries in geopolitical spaces existing neither 'in' one sovereign territory nor another: spaces I call "<u>sovereign interstices</u>".

PREFACE

Given the absence of an existing dataset on the object of study, the need to construct an original dataset produces particular challenges for adhering to the strictures of a scientific study: first, the challenge of producing a definition and description of the phenomenon of interest and, second, the challenge of deriving from this a (testable/ falsifiable) theory or set of theoretical propositions about the phenomenon. These challenges were met through a series of dialogues or 'moves': moves between theory and data, between the literature on war in general and war in Africa in particular, and between data on wars in Africa and sources of data on relevant variables on the seemingly significant events. In the Introduction which follows, I outline these moves by way of producing an <u>introduction</u> (pp. 1 to 18) to the three parts (I, II, and III) which make up the dissertation as a whole.

This introduction lays bare a 'hidden history' of interstate conflict in Africa, outlines three myths about African war, and presents my ideas about how to proceed from myth, to description, to explanation; thus, using the 'moves' introduced above to examine Africa's multi-actor wars since 1950 in terms of my own proxy war perspective. For readers who find the idea that apparently 'internal' African conflicts are primarily proxy wars, skipping these introductory comments in favor of going straight to the literature reviewed in Chapter 1, the empirical findings presented in Chapters 3 to 8, and the conclusions presented in the final two chapters, will occasion no loss. For others, the Introduction sets my argument up against existing and alternative explanations of violence and (mostly) civil wars in Africa, thereby 'setting the bar' in terms of the facts which <u>any</u> theory of African multi-actor wars must explain, i.e., specifying what defines these wars, when or where they occur, and why states become involved in them. In attending to this, I also attend to a related question: how African is African proxy war?

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INTRODUCTION

A Hidden History

On February 8, 1958, units of the French air force bombed the Tunisian village of Sakiet Sidi Youssef, killing 69 civilians in reprisal for Tunisia's support of Algerian rebel groups.[1] Fifty-three years later, in March 2011, a debate about whether – or, more accurately, how best – to arm and/or support sub-state rebel groups in Libya, dominated not only the media reports on this civil conflict,[2] but also policy discussions in a variety of military and security-related fora.[3] Between these two moments in time lies a 'hidden history' of <u>external aid to rebel groups in Africa</u>: a phenomenon well recognized in terms of its individual occurrences, but almost entirely understudied as a <u>form of war for African states</u> in general.

Three Myths about African War

Although African states are frequently the sites of communal and political violence, wars on the continent have primarily been designated as <u>intrastate</u> (i.e., civil) or <u>extra-systemic</u>, with the former largely associated with post-independence fights for control of the state, and the latter with struggles between colonial powers and indigenous polities.[4] The number of recognized

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[1] For a detailed discussion of France's extraterritorial forays against the FLN, and its creation of the heavily-mined 'Morice Line' along the Tunisian border, see Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* (PaperMac, 1987), pp. 263-267

[2] See, for instance, Mark Landler, Elisabeth Bumiller and Steven Lee Myers, 'Washington in Fierce Debate on Arming Libyan Rebels,' *New York Times* (March 29, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/30/world/africa/30diplo.html?_r=2&hp

[3] Jamsheed K. Choksy and Carol E. B. Choks, Libya's Rebel Leaders and Western Assistance, *Small Wars Journal* (March 27, 2011). The SWJ is also maintaining a list of arguments for and against sponsoring the anti-regime forces at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/03/fierce-debate-on-arming-libyan/

[4] Lotta Themnér and Peter Wallensteen, 'Armed Conflicts, 1946-2010', *Journal of Peace Research*, 48:4 (2011).

<u>interstate</u> wars on the continent of Africa since 1950, by contrast, is conspicuously low.[5] This state of affairs suggests three interlinked conclusions: <u>first</u>, that African states are either uniquely pacifistic regarding one another, or uniquely constrained against waging interstate war by (for example) a variety of anti-war regimes; <u>second</u>, that violent internal challenges should thus be a far more pressing concern to African states than violent external challenges; and <u>third</u>, that the persistence of violence in Africa over the previous 60 years must therefore derive from a failure, by various interested actors including African states themselves, to restrain violent internal challengers such as warlords, secessionists, or dissident political factions.

In this dissertation, by elucidating the use of proxies (i.e., violence-capable intermediaries who are most often nonstate actors) as a substitute for direct <u>interstate</u> violence by African states, I show that these three conclusions – whether singly or in concert – do not in fact correspond to the reality of war for the African continent as a whole. <u>First</u>, I find that African states are neither pacifistic (i.e. threatened externally, but unwilling to respond to these threats violently), nor entirely constrained by anti-war regimes (i.e. willing to use violence, but incentivized against doing so). Rather, African states frequently deploy violent means against one another, albeit by means of proxies rather than their own conventional forces. In point of fact, fully 96% of African states have used proxies at least once, compared to just 9% that have waged conventional war. Regardless of how one categorizes this practice of intermediarized violence (i.e., whether as war, or as criminal activity using state agencies), what cannot be ignored is its prevalence. African states, in other words, cannot be seen as pacifistic; rather, they are highly disposed to conduct covert war against one another.

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[5] Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, 'A Revised List of Wars Between and Within Independent States, 1816-2002,' *International Interactions* 30 (2004), 231-262

Second, I show that regardless of the proliferation of domestic challengers within the African political landscape, African states do indeed have much to fear from their (non-pacifistic) neighbors. In total, 66% of African states have been targets, i.e., experienced foreign intervention in one or more of their 'internal' wars and crises; and despite the difficulty of establishing whether it should be 'intervention' or 'intensity' which has the bulk of causal primacy in any hypothesis linking the two,[6] what can be said without doubt is that wars involving these external interveners are longer and more severe than wars which do not involve them.[7] Indeed, my dataset of incidents of this type – i.e., multi-actor wars in which one or more external actors becomes a belligerent in an otherwise 'internal' conflict – accounts for fully 70% of all African conflict dyads attaining the level of minor armed conflict since 1950, and 100% of those attaining the level of war.[8] The capacity for external interventions to produce severe conflicts for their targets, or to intensify existing conflicts, thus provides a clear indication that this prevalent form of war-making deserve scholarly and practical attention in its own terms.

Third and finally, I address the notion that African wars featuring intermediaries necessarily break out because of the presence of recruitable nonstate actors in 'failed states'. I do this in two ways: first, by showing that multi-actor wars are more often associated with the continent's militarily strong states than with its weak ones;[9] and second, by examining the clustering exhibited by the continent's most prolific sponsors and its most frequently targeted

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[6] I.e., answering the question, 'do intense wars provoke intervention, or does intervention provoke intense wars?'

[7] Aysegul Aydin and Patrick Regan, 'Networks of Third-Party Interveners and Civil war Duration', *European Journal of International Relations* (June 10, 2011)

[8] For these figures, see Chapter 5; also, Appendices A and B of this dissertation.

[9] See Chapter 3, below for a discussion of measures of state weakness and strength, and the caveat in this regard as outlined by Atzili, Boaz. *Good Fences, Bad Neighbors: Border Fixity and International Conflict* (University of Chicago Press, 2004), pp. 31 – 33.

states. Just eleven African states[10] account, between them, for 53% of all sponsorship of multi-actor wars in Africa; similarly, just nine states[11] account for 49% of all states targeted in Africa, as a function of time spent targeted. These clusters indicate that the persistence of African war is a far more complex phenomenon than a simple correlation between the presence of sub-state actors and the incidence of multi-actor war would allow us to explain, <u>even if such a correlation were visible in the data</u>. Rather, some states seem to become serial sponsors, forging partnership after partnership with intermediaries abroad; other states, regardless of their degree of 'strength' or 'failure,' are marked for repeated proxy war attack, sometimes by means of globally or regionally recruited groups of fighters rather than disaffected locals. The persistence of war in Africa must thus (at least partially) be a function of factors pertaining to these states; the task thus illuminated is determining what (beyond 'state failure') these factors are.

It bears underlining that my intention – both here and in the dissertation more generally – is not to negate existing explanations of <u>intrastate</u> (i.e., civil) war in Africa; nor has it been to negate the applicability of what I go on to call 'rival theses' below (i.e., resource wars, wars resulting from state weakness, and wars based around cross-border identities) in terms of their ability to explain <u>particular</u> wars, or even in explaining <u>categories of war</u> in Africa (e.g. wars of plunder). The fact that the meddling hand of African states in each other's wars is understudied, does not mean that our theories of civil war are overstudied, or somehow wrong from the outset. Rather, what I am responding to is the absence of studies on the role of the African state as an agent in war. It is this absence which underpins the 'three myths' discussed here, but more problematically, from the perspective of scholars of Africa, this absence arbitrarily reduces the

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[10] In decreasing order of frequency: Libya, South Africa, Morocco, Ethiopia, Chad, Tanzania, Sudan, Angola, Burkina Faso, Zaire/DRC, and Zambia; see Chapter 5.

[11] In decreasing order of frequency: Mauritania, Ethiopia, Chad, Zaire/DRC, Uganda, Sudan, Somalia, Morocco, and Angola; see Chapter 5.

African state to a site of conflict rather than an agent in conflict. This, in turn, limits the potential for works dealing with 'African war' to establish connections with (i) studies of war by states in other regions,[12] or (ii) studies of the African state as an agent in other spheres of action.[13]

<u>Moving from Myth to Description and Explanation</u>

While my findings regarding these three myths clearly indicate the need to update our understandings of African war, it is one thing to problematize existing accounts and another to move forward with a better alternative. Accordingly, in this dissertation I produce a <u>theory of African war</u>; more specifically, I produce not only a <u>description</u> of what proxy war is, and how, when and where it is conducted; but also an <u>explanation</u> of why it is used. The description casts African multi-actor wars as <u>proxy wars</u>, i.e., strategic alliances between states and nonstates, aimed at overcoming and exploiting particular, geopolitical constraints. My explanation for why so many African wars feature <u>the meddling hand of other states</u>, is that in supporting foreign rebel groups as proxies, African states are pursuing 'politics by other means' in the classic Clausewitzian sense. More particularly, the central concluding, findings of the work reported on here are: African states use proxies <u>instrumentally</u>, i.e., to overcome and exploit specific geopolitical constraints and in order to achieve the aims of the state; and that it is justifiable to predict that wherever and whenever African states are <u>extra-nationally committed</u>, they will conduct proxy war. These, testable propositions or central tenets of my theory of Proxy War,

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[12] E.g. works studying how the US's use of tribal groups and private security contractors ties into its overall strategy in Afghanistan and elsewhere; see P.W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry* (Cornell University Press, 2003).

[13] See, for example, Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument* (Indiana University Press, 1999); Jean-Francois Bayart, Steven Ellis and Beatrice Hibou, *The Criminalization of the State in Africa* (Indiana University Press, 1999).

require further examination in sites <u>outside</u> Africa, and also with data <u>other</u> than the original dataset constructed for the work reported here.

The conduct of proxy war by African states is instrumental both at the level of structures and of (state) agents. Specifically, with regard to <u>structure</u>, I show how the local, international, and global geopolitics of Africa provide a variety of affordances (i.e., positive and negative constraints[14]) for war-making, to which proxy war represents an instrumental response. At the level of <u>agency</u>, I show that proxy war serves the aims of the state in a variety of ways: for example, by allowing states to destroy rival regimes and secure important resources. I combine these two levels of analysis to argue that African states use proxy war because they can and because they must; i.e., that proxy war represents both a strategy for states and a self-perpetuating system for the continent as a whole.

<u>Testing Rival Theses</u>

Alongside the production and defense of my own proxy war thesis, I also identify and test three rival theses relating to (i) the 'resource curse', (ii) the role of cross-border identities, and (iii) state weakness, as explanations of multi-actor wars.

These theses serve as prominent explanations of two salient aspects of multi-actor wars: <u>first</u>, the distribution of *casus belli*[15] and sub-state groups willing to pursue these in Africa, and <u>second</u>, the attractiveness of state-nonstate partnerships in wartime. So, for example, the 'resource curse' thesis explains the meddling hand of foreign states in civil wars by examining

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[14] The notion of an *affordance* is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6; briefly, the concept is defined as 'a quality of an object, or an environment, which allows an individual to perform an action. For example, a knob affords twisting, and perhaps pushing, while a cord affords pulling', and is drawn from John Gibson, 'The Theory of Affordances' in Robert Shaw & John Bransford (eds.) *Perceiving, Acting, and Knowing: Toward an Ecological Psychology* (Lawrence Erlbaum), pp. 67-82.

[15] Latin: 'cause for war.'

the role of conflict commodities such as diamonds; these constitute a *casus belli* in that rebels may fight to seize them from governments, and they explain why a foreign state might choose to establish links with these rebels through reference to the profitability of serving as a conduit for conflict commodities. The cross-border identity and state weakness theses operate in similar ways – in each case, explaining what there is to fight about, and why states might choose to get involved.

What gives these three theses the status of 'rivals' with respect to my own proxy war explanation, is they all depict the presence of foreign parties in intrastate as being <u>less than political</u>, or at the very best, 'political' only in the sense of the individual politics of identity or plunder. In other words: instead of acting by a Clausewitzian logic and using war (regardless of type) to serve the politics of the <u>state</u>, in these rival theses interveners are either (i) primarily seeking personal or personalistic gain (resource curse), or (ii) motivated not by interstate relations, but personal and affective ones (cross-border identities), or (iii) responding not strategically but opportunistically to the presence of chaotic and ungoverned hinterlands, whether in their own territory or their neighbors' (weak states). However, even when these theses have merit, the question of explanatory emphasis must be asked: i.e., <u>obviously</u> resources, shared identities, and state weakness each plays a role in all the wars under study, but do they go far or deep enough into describing and/or explaining the <u>entire</u> list of wars before us? This brings me to the question about Africa as a place-name or a label for a unique set of factors and constraints.

How African is African Proxy War?

I argue in the conclusion to this dissertation that, at least, in terms of contemporary trends in war, the African experience highlights the likely <u>future</u> for war, rather than its primeval past as

is sometimes suggested.[16] Nonetheless, there clearly are Africa-specific features worth taking

note of both theoretically and practically.

My analyses suggest that it is both the absence of resilient continental and local political

orders in Africa, and the presence of particular geopolitical configurations receptive to the use of

intermediaries, which explain why proxy wars dominate the African war record. For the time

being, this combination of interstate anarchy and pro-proxy geopolitics is most clearly

exemplified in Africa, but as more and more of the resilient political orders which characterize

<u>non-African regions</u> are eroded by the leveling forces of globalization, 'African' forms of

conflict – specifically, the use of proxies – may once again come to dominate battlefields in other

regions of the globe.

The nature of proxy wars, involving strategic, military alliances between states and

nonstate actors, has a long history of elsewhere in the world; clearly, European states have been

more than willing to fight each other with proxies when this practice was seen as militarily

worthwhile.[17] However, for these states proxy war was one of several violent ways to effect

'unilateral, but binding, political decisions.'[18] And, critically, in the older regions of the world (I

specifically have states in mind that existed before the post-World War Two ban on aggressive

wars), centuries of states effecting such 'binding decisions' on one another slowly produced a

more or less stable political order. This order can be characterized as one in which 'survivor

states' were those who had been most able reach a balance between internal and external

challenges and opportunities. Phrased differently, a stable balance of a more-or-less complete

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[16] See Chapter 1 for a review of this 'new barbarism' thesis.

[17] Dylan Craig, 'Ultima Ratio Regum, Remix or Redux? State Security Policy and Proxy Wars in Self-Governing Africa,' *Strategic Insights*, 9:1 (Spring/Summer 2010)

[18] John Vasquez, *The War Puzzle* (Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 36

war-derived contiguity between the state-on-paper (*de jure*) and the state-on-the-ground (*de facto*), or more precisely, between the claims of the state and what it could hold against challengers.[19]

This contiguity produced two centuries (the 19th and 20th) in which states were able to specialize their coercive means: an army, for external deployment, and a police force or *gendarmerie* for internal use. Such a division meant few opportunities for the productive use of violent intermediaries who were neither 'army' nor 'police'; and because these intermediaries also threatened the state by their very existence, they were consequently outlawed and disbanded. But this era is now apparently, coming to an end; and as the intense intermediarization of the US's wars in Iraq and Afghanistan makes clear, even the world's strongest states are now once again seek intermediaries to fight their wars.[20]

Inarguably, part of this change has to do with the importance of domestic constituencies to late-stage democracies, and also the search for military efficiency through private-sector partnerships;[21] but the more intriguing part has to do with what these states are fighting for: the securitization of extranational resources upon which states rely, but over which they can no longer exert direct military power. This indicates a reversal in the 'war-derived contiguity' discussed above: i.e., although the 'strong selection' effect of centuries of conquest and extermination in Europe initially winnowed out those states that could not take, hold, and

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[19] Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990)

[20] Gregory Dixon, 'Achilles Doesn't Live Here Anymore: Why the West Fails, and Will Continue to Fail, at Nation-Building' Paper presented at ISA Annual Conference, Montreal (March 2011)

[21] Singer, *Idem.*

'sovereignize' the resources they needed to survive,[22] the growing reliance of modern states on transnational flows (e.g. migrant labor), and extranational resources (e.g. oil) or institutions (e.g. democracy), has once again produced a world full of fundamentally insecure states – only this time, without legal recourse to conquests and annexation.

Between developed democracies, at least, liberal institutionalism predicts that such insecurities can be attended to by means of treaties and regimes; but the rest of the world (and especially the relations between these developed states and the ubiquitous 'semi-free' state on the global periphery) is more clearly beginning to resemble the African political reality depicted in this dissertation. That is to say: modern states are increasingly called on to defend extranational resources, but given global prohibitions on the exercise of conventional force, the only available means for doing so is to forge partnerships (whether explicit or covert) with nonstate actors or some other kind of proxy (multinational corporations, terrorist groups, activists); and in so doing, these states – like African states – find themselves militarizing a space which exists neither 'in' one sovereign territory or another: a sovereign interstice.

Sovereign interstices, in other words, spring up around the mismatch between the territorialized institutions and resources that states wish to dominate, and the legal limits of their sovereign capacity to do so. And unlike sovereign incongruities in previous eras (e.g. bilateral or multilateral interstate disputes over trade and territory), contemporary sovereign interstices are complex social spaces in which states are not the only actors. If proxy war can be said to have a modern 'home', it is these complex social spaces, their violence-capable inhabitants, and the channels which connect them to the rest of the globe; and as more and more states are forced into (or choose to enter) sovereign interstices to conduct the violent defense of their extranational

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[22] Tanisha Fazal's examination of 'state death' (in *State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2007)), provides a methodical recounting of states who failed in one way or another, and were consequently extinguished and swallowed up by their compatriots.

goals, so too will the model of proxy war developed here become more and more applicable beyond its original African context.

Layout of the Dissertation

This dissertation is divided into four parts. Part I contains the literature review (Chapter 2) and methodological discussion (Chapter 3). Part II contains the quantitative component of the data analysis (Chapters 3-5). Part III includes the (primarily qualitative) case-study component of three exemplar wars (Chapters 6-8). Part IV contains the final discussions of the data and my final refinements to my theory of proxy war (Chapter 9), as well as a conclusion on the relevance of my findings to African war scholarship and policy-making (Chapter 10). This structure is further developed under individual chapter headings below.

Chapter 1: The Literature Review

I begin by using existing literature to develop a two-part conceptual foundation for my notion of 'proxy wars.' This step is necessary because although 'proxy war' has an extant meaning,[23] this formulation is under-theorized in the sense that it is dominated by examinations of superpower involvement during the Cold War. Re-theorizing what exactly counts as a 'proxy war' and how this fits into broader historical trends in the militarization of intermediaries is needed to ensure the concept's applicability to a broader range of states in Africa, from the very strong (i.e., quasi-superpower or regional hegemon) to the very weak. I do this in two steps.

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[23] 'Great-power hostility expressed through client states … [the] phrase may be rooted in proxy fight, an attempt to get control of a corporate management through a contest for stockholders' proxy votes. Proxy war has also been taken to mean both "localized conflict" with outside sponsors and "brush-fire war" (a war likely to spread quickly unless put out.' William Safire, *Safire's Political Dictionary* (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 584

First, I use literature on the instrumentality of war (especially Clausewitz, Holsti, Kaldor, and van Creveld[24]) to defend a view of war as still being a 'continuation of politics by other means.' In order to link this to a discussion of war in Africa, I draw on the literature concerning African politics (especially Herbst, Bratton, Migdal, and Unger[25]) to show that many of the ways in which politics in independent Africa have deviated from the ideal-typical (and Eurocentric) Weberian state, are the result of the geopolitical incongruities between human space and the institutions of rule associated with the extension of power in Africa. I combine this with Reno and Boone's models of how African states outsource their institutions of rule to 'shadow states' or civil society middlemen,[26] to produce a model of intermediarized and geopolitically informed multi-actor wars – i.e., of interstate war reshaped to circumvent and exploit geopolitical constraints.

In this model, the tendency of African states to seek partners in institutionalizing their key institutions does not stop at their *de jure* borders, but extends beyond them and into the interstate realm. Instead, according to my model, these states go beyond their borders to 'militarize people/groups and places/spaces' both for defensive and offensive purposes. The notion that violence by states involves militarization is uncontentious; but as I show both in my literature review and in my analysis of the data, it is the degree to which African states have rewritten the constitutive rules of militarization – rules which relate to who is militarized, and where – that constitutes the core of the practice of proxy war on the continent.

Second, I use existing works on African war to develop the rival explanations for the empirical reality of multi-actor wars already discussed. Initially, five rival explanations are

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[24] For full citations, see Chapter 1, pp. 8-14.

[25] See Chapter 1, p. 15-21.

[26] See Chapter 1, p. 22-28.

derived in this manner, with two being discarded as outside the scope of the research being conducted here: these discarded perspectives are military intervention (i.e., recognized and/or internationally sanctioned military actions) and state-sponsored terrorism (i.e., non-revolutionary violence aimed at constraining target state policy).[27] The remaining three explanations are state weakness (i.e., that the absence of military power either makes states more likely to initiate or be targeted in multi-actor wars), the resource curse (i.e., that multi-actor wars are an epiphenomenon of cross-border looting campaigns), and cross-border identities (i.e., that multi-actor wars occur because of kinship ties between intervening states and minorities at risk within a conflict-affected country). These rival explanations thus become the benchmark against which my own proposed theory ('proxy war') is to be measured in order to display its superior explanatory power.

Chapter 2: Research Design

In brief, my approach to the research topic of this dissertation is a two-stage mixed-methods design, in which successive kinds of analytic tools are used to progressively develop the core theory of proxy war, and to indicate the limits of existing (rival) theories.

Stage 1 involves two kinds of quantitative testing (i.e. inferential and descriptive statistics), performed on an original dataset produced specifically for the study of multi-actor wars in Africa. This dataset, which I refer to throughout as the 'Events List,' draws from three extant datasets[28] and from secondary literature[29] to produce a theory-neutral sample for analysis; that is to say, this is not a list of 'proxy wars' as much as it is a list of significant wars as far as

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[27] The rationale for discarding these is provided on p. 54.

[28] These were (1) the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (www.ucdp.uu.se/database), Uppsala University; (2) The Correlates of War Project (Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman, *Resort to War: 1816 – 2007* (CQ Press, 2010); and Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfield, *A Study of Crisis* (University of Michigan Press, 1997)

[29] See Chapter 2, p. 67.

battle deaths and other markers for <u>war</u> are concerned. These are the 'multi-actor wars' to which both my own theory (proxy war) and the three rival theories must respond. Overall, the Events List holds 101 partnerships between a foreign belligerent and a local one (a 'proxy relationship,' or PR, in my theory's terms); these 101 relationships span 27 unique conflicts from 1954 to 2010.

 <u>Stage 2</u> involves a case-study approach to proxy war, by means of a historical reading of three African wars in and around South Africa (1975-2002), Somalia (1973-2010) and Chad (1972-1988). For each of these wars, the overall dynamics are sketched by relying on a combination of secondary sources and aggregated primary sources.[30] Each war is then analyzed in terms of four considerations; first, the <u>actions of states</u> as sponsors and targets in the conflict in question; second, the <u>actions of the intermediaries</u> themselves (i.e., the proxies, in terms of my theory); third, the <u>mechanisms</u> by which state-intermediary partnerships were forged (e.g., by 'militarizing people and places,' as my model would have it); and fourth, the degree to which <u>the three rival theses</u> have purchase on the war in question. These three wars, then, serve both as a conceptual refining stage for my theory of proxy war, and as a qualitative check on the general trends identified during the quantitative portion. The point to make is that the refinement was possible in view of my developing set of theoretical propositions about the nature of proxy war, and when, where and why it is used, as well as an ongoing move between theory, the literature on war in general and African wars in particular, and the data in the Events List, and in other primary and secondary sources. The qualitative analyses of the three selected wars are thus <u>interpretative</u> but the findings checked by the need for an adequate theory-data fit at every moment of interpretation.

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[30] For example: aggregated summaries of newspaper reports compiled by the Keesings Record of World Events.

<u>Chapters 3-5: Quantitative testing and the production of a basic model of proxy war</u>

In Chapter 3, I subject the 101 relationships laid out in the Events List to regression testing, both to assess the explanatory fit of the three rival theses, and to generate second-order data (i.e., identify patterns and distributions in the raw data) for inclusion in my own theory. To very briefly summarize the results of this testing: in Chapter 3, I find that there is no overall relationship between the predictions of the rival theories, and the events being studied.

In Chapters 4 and 5, I subject the Events List to further quantitative testing, using descriptive statistical techniques to determine various significant features of the data; for example, the proportion of partnerships that were 'forged in battle,'[31] versus those who were constituted in advance of the fighting to come. I use this, along with the findings of Chapter 3, to generate (in Chapter 5) a set of generalizations about the behavior of states and their intermediaries in multi-actor wars.

Specifically, I show that wars involving alliances are by far the dominant configuration for Africa's most serious and long-lived wars; further, that these wars are demonstrably political, in that they serve (albeit not always exclusively) state-level strategic goals; and lastly, that many aspects of their makeup (such as relations between the actors, and various interaction effects the conflict process and the geopolitics of the conflict area) are regular across the wars studied. This, when combined with my literature-derived conceptualization of the pursuit of (wartime) politics by other means in Africa, enables me to produce a model of intermediarization as it is found in the 101 relationships and 27 wars present in the dataset.

This model is based on the data-demonstrated salience of dynamics related to the militarization of people/groups and places/spaces; accordingly, the generalizations derived from

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[31] Here, I make reference to one of the proxy groups studied in Chapter 8: South Africa's '32 Battalion', whose Latin unit motto was *Proelio Procusi* – 'forged in battle.'

Chapters 4 and 5 are arranged in a 7-cell schema for states and proxies respectively, and this schema is used to refine and check my proxy war model in the subsequent qualitative section:

The sponsoring state militarizes…			
… people/groups, by	…arming them E.g. provision of weapons (guns, vehicles, machetes)	…agitating them E.g. use of broadcast propaganda, aid in founding rebel groups	… mobilizing them E.g. provision of trainers, advisors, leaders, liaisons
… places/spaces, by	…denying them to the enemy E.g. depopulation; use of terrain denial tactics (landmines and air defense systems); de-legitimization		… zoning them for battle E.g. declaration of certain areas as 'fronts,' objectives, or free-fire zones; identification of the enemy

Chapters 6-8: Qualitative analysis of three wars

The qualitative portion of this dissertation uses wars in and around South Africa (1975-2002), Somalia (1973-2010) and Chad (1972-1988) in order to sharpen and check my proxy-war based description and explanation of multi-actor wars in Africa. In this regard, I adopt Gerring's perspective that the core aim of case studies is the 'in-depth study of … a relatively bounded phenomenon … where the scholar's aim is to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomena';[32] I also leverage the comparative advantage of the case study approach in terms of 'exploring causal mechanisms … [and] modeling complex causal relations.'[33]

As discussed above, militarization is the causal mechanism with which I connect the empirical reality of proxy wars to its theoretical explanation as the continuation of 'politics by other means.' In these case studies, I assess 'militarization' in two ways: first, with reference to

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[32] John Gerring (May 2004). 'What is a Case Study and What is It Good for?' *American Political Science Review*, 9(2), p. 341.

[33] Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (MIT Press, 2005), p. 20-21

the actions of state sponsors and their intermediaries toward one another, and second with regard to how these actions (together with any responses/retaliations by the targeted state) were played out in the (local, national, global) battlespace itself. Conducting my assessment on these two levels allows me to address both the structural and agent-level aspects of the militarization process, thereby highlighting the geopolitical regularities to which belligerents respond, and which serve as <u>affordances</u> (positive and negative constraints) for their strategy; these were then used to constitute the notion of the 'sovereign interstice,' as clarified in Part IV of this dissertation.

With reference to the pitfalls of case selection bias, it should be noted that studying these three 'wars' is not the same as studying just three of the proxy relationships upon which my Events List is built; rather, each of these wars contains a cluster of sponsors and proxies locked into a wide variety of violent partnerships; thus, to study 'The Toyota Wars' is simultaneously to study the involvement of Sudan, Egypt, Benin, Libya, and Nigeria in the country, and so on. Thus, while it is always challenging to select 'representative' cases for a case study approach, the complex realities of multi-actor wars in Africa to some extent ameliorate this from the outset.

<u>Chapters 9-10: Theorizing proxy war in Africa, and the implications of this</u>

In these concluding chapters, I describe the nature of proxy war, and present an causal explanation of the many empirical regularities observed in my data, including not only the links between sponsorship and proxy war (both for the sponsor and the target), but also between militarization and proxy war. In brief, my model of proxy war consists of six theoretical propositions:

1. **ADVENT**: Proxy war (PW) begins with the advent of a proxy relationship (PR), even when focused hostilities do not occur until later. This is because sponsors often form PRs proactively, in response to perceived future threats or opportunities; thus, establishing a

PR is the conceptual equivalent of an armament purchase or mobilization order in conventional warfare.

2. **ACTORS**: the parties to this PR fall into a tripartite division, i.e. sponsors (the actors who extend concrete support to proxies so as to facilitate an attack on a potential target); proxies (who accept this support in some or other form of agreement); and targets (who enter the PR when its designated representatives respond to or clash with the proxies).[34]

3. **SUPPORT**: the levels and nature of support which the sponsor commits to their proxies, serve as a clear signal not only (i) of the commitment of the sponsor the war, but (ii) of their intended goals for the proxy war (e.g. regime change, destabilization).

4. **CONSTRAINTS**: PRs are shaped by the positive and negative constraints present in the area of conflict, considered locally, nationally, and globally. These constraints may be *negative* (i.e. constraints which prevent states from using conventional war, or existing vulnerabilities and or sources of conflict/violence outside the sovereign boundaries of the sponsor and thus not securable using the conventional arms of the state) or they may be *positive* (i.e. specific opportunities for exploitation in the form of militarizable places and people).[35]

5. **SYSTEM**: Proxy wars in Africa are not unitary events; individual PRs are the constitutive dynamics of a continent-wide system of PW, in which reciprocal, retaliatory, and pre-emptive proxy wars have over time produced an 'evolutionary stable strategy.' Put simply, this means that proxy wars produce the very conditions to which PW-using states respond; this, in turn, suggests that in African PW, we are seeing a 'weak selection process'[36] which affects the state-making process for African states in general.

6. **EFFECTIVE TOOL**: Lastly, my data shows that the use of proxy war follows on from the degree to which PW is an effective tool for participating in African conflicts. This effectiveness is derived from five characteristics of PW:

   o <u>flexibility</u>, i.e. that it can achieve multiple kinds of objective;
   o <u>concurrency</u>, i.e. it can go hand-in-hand with other forms of violent or non-violent statecraft, such as diplomacy or invasion;
   o <u>modulability</u>, in that its intensity can be adjusted up and down (modulated) as conditions require;

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[34] This structure notwithstanding, 'nested PRs' sometimes generate 'nested PWs,' where sponsorship from one state cascades down through several actors (each serving, in turn, a *proxy* of one state and the *sponsor* of other actors). See Chapter 10 for a discussion of how subsequent research on PW should attend to this finding.

[35] The subjectivity of 'positive and negative,' when combined with the Luttwakian concept of strategic paradox, is one reason why I use the term 'affordances' rather than 'positive and negative constraints'; see p. 140 for a more detailed development of this distinction.

[36] This concept is Hendrik Spruyt's, and is discussed in more detail in Chapter 9.

- suitability to conditions, i.e. that it is an efficient way to interact with the CONSTRAINTS specified above. This efficiency explains why states do not simply respond to the constraints with other (non-PW) strategies; and
- responsiveness to global networks, i.e. that it is an efficient way to interact with the SYSTEM specified above. This efficiency explains why states do not simply respond to the constraints with other (non-PW) strategies.

In the dissertation's concluding chapter, these six elements are used to outline a view of African proxy war as a stable system based in the 'sovereign interstices' between states. The six theoretical propositions are doubly testable, i..e in sites other than Africa, and with data different from those on the Events List; this is envisioned for future work. I conclude the dissertation with suggestions regarding a potential strategy for intervening in the African proxy war system – given my notion of a continental (perhaps, increasingly, a global) 'system in balance.'

PART I:

DEFINING TERMS AND COUNTING WARS

I begin, in Chapter 1, by reviewing the literature on theories of <u>war</u>, the <u>state</u>, wars in <u>Africa</u>, and various kinds of <u>wartime alliance</u> between states and armed nonstate actors, particularly in Africa. Most neutrally, these partnerships can be referred to as 'multi-actor wars;' but in this chapter, I provide my justification for referring to them by another term: proxy wars. In Chapter 2, I outline the research design and the construction of the list of multi-actor wars that I have used to conduct my study.

Multi-actor wars have occurred throughout the historical record, forming a more or less intrinsic element of state strategy for much of human history. As just one example, we find the 'Sun King', Louis XIV of France, who during his 72-year reign <u>not only</u> deployed his state's professional soldiery against his foes, <u>but also</u> provided financial and material support to armed nonstate actors in Scotland and Ireland, militarized North American tribes as agents with which to attack English settlements, and maintained an extensive network of privateers for use as commerce raiders in the Atlantic and elsewhere.

For these reasons, we must suppose that when Louis ordered his cannon engraved with the Latin phrase *ultima ratio regum*, which means 'the final argument of kings,' he did not mean that war could only be fought, feudal-style, by and between kings and their official designees. Instead, the phrase should be taken to mean that regardless of who bears the tools of war, it is the degree to which the ensuing violence <u>serves the sovereign</u> that makes it the ultimate, the conclusive, and the final argument of kings. It was the outcome of war, not the constitution of its forces, to which Louis was referring in his slogan. We might well ask: would the Sun King recognize the wars examined in this dissertation? And, is proxy war still best thought of as the 'final argument of kings'? I attend to these and other questions in what follows.

CHAPTER 1

WAR, STATES, AND WARS IN AFRICA

Introduction

In his 1964 introduction to the new edition of Quincy Wright's *A Study of War*, Karl Deutsch wrote that '[nothing] less than ... the understanding of war and the possible ways to its abolition ... is on the agenda of our time.'[37] Almost five decades later, we are still trying to 'understand' war; however, the important thing about Deutsch's statement is not just its ambition (i.e., that war would be understood for once and for all during 'our time'), but rather the very notion that war could be treated as a multivariate phenomenon in its own right rather than only a by-product of bigger structures such as politics, human nature, class exploitation, or 'racial destiny.' Reductionist views of this kind are clearly visible in classical studies of war: from the perspective of the military theorist, for example, Clausewitz had famously made the case that war was simply 'the continuation of politics ... [with] an admixture of different means,'[38] while Marxist theories relegated both war and politics to the status of an epiphenomena.[39]

Before works such as *A Study of War*, therefore, the notion that two regionally and historically distinct wars might be assigned functional equivalence through their reduction into a set of salient characteristics (e.g. type of regimes at war, number of fatalities), and directly studied, was unknown. Less than fifty years later, however, this practice is so common as to be second nature to the war enumerator. In this regard, Wright and those who have continued to build on his work (such as Small and Singer) have indeed changed the way that we study war.

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[37] Karl W. Deutsch, 'Quincy Wright's Contribution to the Study of War,' in Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. xi

[38] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, (Penguin Classics, 1992)

[39] Vladimir Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (Penguin Classics, 2010)

While the epistemological (and moral) underpinnings of Wright and Richardson's work is an interesting topic in its own regard, and one to which I will briefly return at the end of this section, let us for now take them at their word, and accept the notion that 'war' is a regular enough phenomenon that scholars <u>should</u> direct effort towards enumerating wars, assembling them into datasets, and comparing them. We soon find that the very task of defining what counts as an incidence of 'war,' is a process bedeviled by different and competing perspectives on, theories of, methods for the study of, and thus definitions of war.

Wright and Richardson confronted this challenge by their own methods, but not in ways that have settled the question, 'what is war?' Different perspectives on this question thus persist: and in choosing between (or combining) these competing perspectives, we find ourselves having to ask a range of questions. Is war to be primarily understood in terms of the actors/agents involved (who fights, why they fight, how they fight), or is it caused by various systemic features? Has war changed in nature over time and depending on context, or is its nature timeless? Last, and specifically important given the particular focus of the present project: how can we decide whether a given sequence or cluster of widespread, violent events (for example, as occurred in Africa during decolonization) is best understood as (i) war, (ii) some particular or unique kind of war, distinct from other particular/unique kinds, or (iii) some other kind of phenomenon entirely?

For example: with regard to the first of these points, i.e. actors, we find ourselves struggling to determine whether 'war' should be a term restricted to the actions of only some kinds of actors, such as formally constituted states. Joseph Salerno, arguing in favor of a broader definition, argues that war obtains whenever some have power and others do not:

> We thus arrive at a universal, praxeological truth about war: it is the outcome of
> ... conflict inherent in the political relationship—the relationship between ruler

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and ruled ... [the] parasitic class—the rulers; their police, military, and civil servants; and their supporting special-interest coalition(s)—makes war with purpose and deliberation in order to conceal and ratchet up its exploitation ... the conflict between ruler and ruled is a permanent condition.[40]

A similarly cross-cutting perspective is employed by Robert Layton when he argues, from an anthropological perspective, that:

> Human warfare arises when the web of social relationship is compromised. Human societies are complex systems and vulnerable to periods of disorder … [the] manipulative activities of leaders play a part in fomenting war, <u>whether they are local Big Men in small-scale, decentralized societies or the leaders of nation states</u>. [41]

Lastly, Charles Tilly takes a different route than Salerno and Layton, but arrives at the same destination, i.e., that we should loosen the strictures around what we count as 'war,' and what kinds of groups can be thought of as waging it. In <u>The Politics of Collective Violence</u>,[42] for example, Tilly identifies six different types of collective, interpersonal violence: broken negotiations, opportunism, brawls, scattered attacks, violent rituals, and coordinated destruction.[43] When the latter three kinds of violence co-occur, Tilly calls this composite phenomenon 'war,' and in so doing produces a conception of war that applies to the contemporary, High Modern, and classical battlefield alike.

Various approaches to capturing the diversity of 'war' thus exist, but none that settles the debate around what to think of as war. As Vasquez points out, some of our difficulties in defining war stem simply from the fact that 'war' is a <u>noun</u> in the English language rather than a

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[40] Joseph Salerno, 'Imperialism and the Logic of War Making,' *The Independent Review*, 12:3 (Winter 2008), p. 450

[41] Robert Layton, *Order and Anarchy. Civil Society, Social Disorder and War* (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 171. Emphasis added.

[42] Charles Tilly, *The Politics of Collective Violence* (Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 34-31

[43] A seventh type (individual aggression) is identified but not explicated, because Tilly's concern is only with those kinds of violence which advance collective goals, and which require *collective* organization.

verb.[44] After all, war conceived of as an institution, or phenomenon, in its own right (i.e., 'war' used as a noun), permits different routes of inquiry than war conceived of as a kind of relational,[45] inter-institutional behavior (i.e., 'war' used as a verb).

However, this distinction (and the associated definitional back-and-forth over 'war') notwithstanding, we still find ourselves in need of some kind of working definition of war in order to identify it for further study. Wright and Richardson inaugurated the use of deaths in battle as the sign that a war was taking place, and many (starting with Small and Singer) have followed their route. However, I want to specifically draw attention to Istvan Kende's operationalization of war as useful for the study I conduct here. Kende writes:

> We define war as any armed conflict in which all of the following criteria obtain:
>
> 1. Activities of regular armed forces (military, police forces, etc.) at least on one side - that is, the presence and engagement of the armed forces of the government in power;
>
> 2. A certain degree of organization and organized fighting on both opposing sides, even if this organization extends to organized defence [sic] only;
>
> 3. A certain continuity between the armed clashes, however sporadic. Centrally organized guerilla forces are also regarded as making war, insofar as their activities extend over a considerable part of the country concerned.[46]

This operationalization of war is particularly interesting to me because Kende was attempting to fit a concept dominated by its statist origins (i.e., war) around a body of empirical

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[44] John Vasquez, *The War Puzzle* (Cambridge University Press, 1993) pp. 38-40

[45] I.e., founded in a *relationship* between entities (as in 'a state of war exists between...'), rather than what I call an *attributive* view of war which makes it an attribute of a region and/or time (e.g., 'The Second Schleiswig-Holstein War' or 'The Vietnam War').

[46] Istvan Kende, 'Wars of Ten Years (1967-1976),' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (1978), pp. 227-241

data in which states were playing an increasingly non-exclusive role.[47] Indeed, writing in 1978, Kende saw in his data the emergence of a very <u>particular</u> kind of war:

> The current main type of wars is the anti-regime (A) type war, mainly with foreign participation (Category A/I) ... [we] have stressed the importance of the change which made this kind into the main type of war instead of the border wars which dominated in the past. The fact that type A but mainly type A/I wars are in such a majority is an unequivocal consequence of the current political situation.[48]

Kende's 'Category A/I' wars embody many of the features of 'new' war theories to be discussed below. For now, I tend to agree with Kende's implication (via the first element of his definition) that whatever else we think we 'understand' about war, we can be confident that it in some way continues to feature the hand of the state.

In concluding this introduction, it is also important to note that the very identification of war as a free-standing object of study grew, to some extent, out of Wright and Richardson's pronounced distaste for the very <u>notion</u> of war.[49] This is understandable, given that Wright and Richardson had witnessed for themselves (i) the enormous human cost of the great ideological battles[50] conducted between 1900 and 1945, and (ii) the increasingly perilous nuclear standoff associated with the Cold War. However, in the time since *A Study of War* was published, war has shifted its configuration in a variety of ways: under this heading I include the spread of specifically <u>intra</u>state violence since 1990, the proliferation of technological means for

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[47] I take up the issue of the 'role' of states in wars in which they are not the only combatants, in my analysis of African proxy wars conducted in Chapter 5.

[48] Istvan Kende, 'Wars of Ten Years,' p. 232

[49] Richardson had what he called an 'intense objection to killing people' (*Statistics of Deadly Quarrels*, 'Biographical Note,' p. xxiv); it is also clear that Wright strongly approved of Richardson's anti-war stance, comparing his refusal to accept US military funding to offset his publication costs, to Leonardo da Vinci's suppression of his own design for a submersible warship rather than permit its violent use.

[50] Between indigenous authority and imperial/colonial expansion, between fascism and liberal democracy, and between all of these and revolutionary socialism. See Phillip Bobbit, *The Shield of Achilles* (Knopf, 2002).

coordinating violence, and the advent of person-portable weapons of mass destruction (WMD). These have greatly extended the list of 'distasteful social problems we are identifying as categories in order to address them'; and yet, although systematically studying war is inarguably a more complex task now than when Deutsch delivered his injunction to 'understand' war, it is a no less pressing task. It is to a review of such attempts to understand war, both now and in the past, which I now turn.

Old and 'New' Theories of War

Carl von Clausewitz's *Vom Kriege* ('On War') represents as good a place as any to begin a review of attempts to theorize war. This is not only so because of the number of scholars who argue for Clausewitz's ongoing relevance in war studies,[51] but also because of the weight of subsequent scholarship which has concerned itself with <u>refuting</u> his assertions. Somewhere between Clausewitz and his critics, then, must lie at least <u>part</u> of the answer we are looking for when attempting to make sense of war.

Clausewitz' most central claims about war have to do with its <u>instrumentality</u> and, thus, its <u>rational character</u> and <u>political aims</u>. Moreover, he emphasized the centrality of violence in war, calling it 'an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.'[52] Clausewitz did not fail to notice differences in wars across time and place,[53] but maintained that the essence of war was constant, derived from the interactions between a 'marvelous trinity' of people, state, and army.

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[51] For a broad review of Clausewitz and his critics, see Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom, *Rethinking the Nature of War* (Frank Cass, 2005)

[52] Clausewitz, *On War*, p.83.

[53] 'The half-civilized Tartars, the republics of antiquity, the feudal lords and commercial cities of the Middle Ages, kings of the eighteenth century, and, finally, princes and peoples of the nineteenth century all waged war in their own way, conducted it differently, with different means, and for different aims.' Quoted in Antulio J. Echevarria, II, 'On the Clausewitz of the Cold War: Reconsidering the Primacy of Policy in *On War*,' *Armed Forces & Society* 34 (2007), p. 90

The people, in his view, furnished the <u>motive</u> force for war, the government served as the <u>rational</u> force, and the army served as war's <u>creative</u> (i.e. reactive) force.[54] On Clausewitz's battlefield, the side with the more committed people, the more prescient government, the more skilful army, and the most effective coordination between these, would always triumph.

<u>On War</u> has been the subject of substantial criticism as a work of theory. Inarguably, it is both incomplete and haphazardly edited; it has also been pointed out that the 'old Clausewitz' and the 'new Clausewitz' contradict each other on the relative importance of fighting and politics, and that many of his critics fundamentally misunderstand what exactly he meant by the 'trinity.'[55] Furthermore, those who see the world as fundamentally different from the 19th century context in which <u>On War</u> was written, question whether Clausewitz's fixed notion of the state flies in the face of modern conditions, such as globalization, technology, the disintegration of the nation-state, and various other features of our postmodern and/or post-geographical world. I review works by three such critics below.

Kalevi J. Holsti's <u>The State, War, and the State of War,</u> Martin van Creveld's <u>The Transformation of War</u>, and Mary Kaldor's <u>New and Old Wars</u> each address the effects of global changes in war-context on the nature of war.[56] Each theorist is bold in his/her assault on the very idea that 'war,' as the kind of theoretical <u>constant</u> which it is made out to be in <u>On War</u>, might apply to both the wars of Clausewitz's time, and to those being fought around the turn of the 21st Century. And, although they do not always do so explicitly, Clausewitz's critics tend to focus

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[54] Duyvesteyn and Angstrom, *Rethinking the Nature of War*, p. 5.

[55] See Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the State: The Man, his theories, and his time* (Princeton University Press, 1985), and Christopher Bassford, *Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). A more recent, revised version of the latter essay is available online at http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Cworks/Works.htm

[56] Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (The Free Press, 1991); Kalevi J. Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of* War (Cambridge University Press, 2001); and Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Stanford University Press, 2007).

their disagreements on his all-important <u>trinity of people, government, and army</u>: I therefore use this trinity as an analytic framework for dividing the arguments of the 'post-Clausewitzians' into three categories: 'post-motive,' i.e., theories addressing the people in Clausewitz' trinity, 'post-rational,' i.e., those theories questioning the state's sole aims in war, and 'post-creative,' i.e., those who emphasize that the fighters in war are no longer formal armies.

<u>Post-motive objections to Clausewitz: Holsti</u>

In *The State, War, and the State of War*, Kalevi Holsti argues for the recognition of 'wars of the third kind;' i.e., wars whose spread after 1945 has, in his analysis, heralded the end of Clausewitzian thinking about <u>the people</u> who fight and their motives for doing so. This view is firmly stated, at the end of the first chapter, as follows:

> The Clausewitzian image of war, as well as its theoretical accoutrements, has become increasingly divorced from the characteristics and sources of most armed conflicts since 1945 … [are] we to understand the Somalias, Rwandas, Myanmars, and Azerbaijans of the world in classical European terms?[57]

Wars of the third kind, according to Holsti, are the latest (and, presumably, last) phase of a gradual transformation of war that has been occurring in war since the mid-17th Century. They are the successors to 'institutional wars' and 'total wars,' which dominated the battlefield from 1650-1900 and 1900-1945 respectively; furthermore, they are 'People's Wars,' in which the issues at stake are not monarchical self-enrichment or even the destiny of nation-states, but issues such as self-rule and national identity. For Holsti, then, the idea that the only role of the 'people' in war is to serve as cheering crowds while governments lead and armies fight, is dated to the point of uselessness. Hence, his primary objection to Clausewitz, is thus set in terms of the radical changes which Holsti perceives in the <u>motive forces</u> behind war.

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[57] *Ibid.*, p.14

Martin van Creveld[58] frames his objection to Clausewitz in slightly different terms to Holsti's. For van Creveld, what is most outdated in On War is its depiction of war as the rational pursuit of interest. In The Transformation of War, van Creveld discusses the clash between the logic of political wars (or, 'wars of interest') and the logic of non-political ones ('wars of existence').[59] In wars of interest, the spoils of victory are valued in discrete terms: call this amount, 'X.' X represents the level of domestic discord, material and human expenditures, etc., which the combatants will tolerate in pursuit of victory: when X is reached, war-makers will attempt to disentangle themselves. Clausewitz depicts all wars as wars of interest; while the most successful trinities are the ones who will suffer most (and exert most) in pursuit of military victories, these victories are to be weighed (by the leaders, i.e. the rational force of the trinity) against the costs both of defeat and of fighting at all.

Given this, where van Creveld considers the Clausewitzian perspective to have dated most severely, is in its failure to predict the emergence of a second kind of war: the war of existence. In wars of existence (and van Creveld believes that all wars eventually turn into wars of existence, given enough time and violence) no such cost-benefit calculation is conceivable. Combatants in a war of existence, whether the issue at stake is self-determination, religious identity, or ethnicity, will tend to fight harder as the costs of war get steeper, if only because every casualty further underscores the desirability of continued existence in whatever terms (e.g. religious, ethnic) the group uses to define itself. In a clash between war-makers of these two

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[58] Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (The Free Press, 1991).

[59] *Ibid.*, pp. 125-146

types, therefore, the war-of-existence fighters will always triumph.[60] It is for this reason that van Creveld considers war to have entered a new phase that has rendered von Clausewitz's ideas about war irrelevant.

<u>Post-rational objections to Clausewitz: Kaldor</u>

While Holsti primarily objects to the Clausewitzian perspective's depiction of motive forces, and van Creveld to its depiction of rationality, for Mary Kaldor,[61] contemporary war is different from the wars of the 19th and early 20th century primarily in terms of <u>why</u> it is fought, and <u>by whom</u>. Each of these informs the other; in other words, it is <u>because</u> '[the] goals of the new wars are identity politics, in contrast to the geopolitical or ideological goals of earlier wars,'[62] that those wars end up being fought not by regular armies but by '… horizontal coalitions of breakaway [regular] units, local militia or self-defence units, criminal gangs, groups of fanatics, and hangers-on, who have negotiated partnerships, common projects, divisions of labour, or spoils.'[63]

In Kaldor's reading, the drift away from war-as-state-monopoly (i.e. the drift towards war-as-free-for-all) is most strongly linked to two processes: (i) the increasing collapse of state power, or more specifically the growing gap between the Weberian model of the state and the reality of modern governance;[64] and (ii) the globalization of war economies and transsovereign

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[60] *Ibid.*, pp. 144-146

[61] Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Stanford University Press, 2007)

[62] *Ibid.*, p6

[63] *Ibid.*, p 95

[64] *Ibid.*, p 35

identities, which link nonstate actors together into powerful coalitions.[65] As a result of these processes, Kaldor argues, 'new wars' are different enough from the wars studied by Clausewitz to constitute their own category in the study of war.

Clausewitz: down, or 'down but not out'?

The three kinds of arguments against Clausewitz, which I have used Holsti, van Creveld, and Kaldor's theses to showcase, all single out the demise of the 19th century <u>state</u> as an explanation for the disappearance of 19th century <u>war</u>, i.e. war conducted by regular armed forces supported by a unified citizenry and directed by a legitimate government. However, each also highlights particular changes regarding the motive force behind war (*viz.*, the people involved, the interests pursued, and the why and how of war) to indicate the need for, at least, a review of (and possibly a total rejection of) the classical view. On the other side of the debate, Clausewitz's defenders have argued that modern political collectives – including nonstates – can still be thought of as operating under those tensions, motivations, rationality, and creativity, which constitute Clausewitz's 'marvelous trinity.' Isabelle Duyvensteyn, for example, has identified behavior among rebel factions during the Liberian civil war that clearly instantiates Clausewitzian ideas about war.[66]

While the debate on how to theorize war *after* Clausewitz can thus be said to have ended in a stalemate, albeit a productive one in terms of the wealth of ideas and counterarguments provoked, his basic point that 'war is political' is thus too compelling to dismiss out of hand, especially given his concession that different kinds of political units fight different kinds of

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[65] *Ibid.*, p 107

[66] Isabelle Duyvesteyn, *Clausewitz and African War. Politics and strategy in Liberia and Somalia* (Frank Cass, 2005)

war.[67] At the same time, the importance of wars involving different actors than states, the changing role of the state, globally, and other significant changes (e.g., modes of real-time communication across vast distances) cannot be ignored when considering war in Africa or elsewhere.

In particular, the empirical reality of an indisputably complex contemporary 'world at war' demands an examination not only of wars conducted symmetrically between states (or at least between alternative collective forms exhibiting many of the characteristics of states, as Layton and Salerno suggest), but also of those conducted asymmetrically between governments and rebels,[68] states and networks,[69] or ideological formations and 'cultures.'[70] A common theme running throughout these discussions and debates about war, and Clausewitz's ongoing relevance or increasing irrelevance to it, thus has to do with the 'state of states.' Of particular interest within this common theme, are those theories which are concerned with charting how 'the state' of Clausewitz's time has evolved into a profusion of alternative collective forms and styles of communal politics in the modern world. I thus turn to a review of what we currently mean when we talk about 'states,' and hence what is to be understood by the idea of war (or, indeed, anything) as an activity of states.

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[67] In addition to Clausewitz's observation about 'half-civilized Tartars' (see Footnote 53), it is also difficult to imagine that Clausewitz was entirely blind to the strategic potential of nonstates, given that the army he was serving in at the time he wrote *On War*, included a large contingent of nonstate auxiliaries – Cossack tribal cavalry.

[68] This is the standard vision of 'civil war,' which I discuss again on p.28.

[69] For example, the 'War on Drugs' or the 'War on Terror.'

[70] Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?,' *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1993)

Max Weber's <u>Politics as a Vocation</u> outlines four characteristics of a state: (i) it is constituted by its means rather than its goals; (ii) that these means are founded in violence; (iii) that the violence must be acceded to or legitimated by the governed; and that (iv) a clear differentiation is to be found between different states based on the overlap between ownership of the material and immaterial technologies of violence.[71] Thus, for Weber, the institutional and territorial boundaries of the associated society are the same. Indeed, '[t]erritory is a characteristic of the state.'[72]

With reference to the specific issue of how to define the state, it must be noted that subsequent work on the state has focused on different characteristics. Unger's model of the waxing and waning of social plasticity in <u>Plasticity into Power</u>, for example, depicts a very different kind of state than the coercion-dependent one depicted by Weber. Unger draws a distinction between states that <u>escape</u> the cycle of 'reversion to the natural economy,' and states that are <u>caught up</u> in it.[73] For Unger, an escape from reversion – i.e., an escape from the pure use of force, by rulers and the elite, to ensure the domination of the governed classes – depends on the creation of what he calls social plasticity: bargaining power and the capacity for self-defense based within the governed classes. Where Weber identifies the establishment of a coercive monopoly as a key element in the creation of what we today recognize as 'states,' Unger is thus suggesting the opposite: polities in which the rulers found it too easy to defend themselves

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[71] Max Weber, *Politics als Beruf*, accessed online at
http://www.ne.jp/asahi/moriyuki/abukuma/weber/lecture/politics_vocation.html

[72] *Idem.*

[73] This flexibility is usually associated with the growth of a money economy and the development of a bourgeoisie capable of collective bargaining. See Unger, *Plasticity into Power*, p. xx

against the people are precisely those which tended to stagnate and fragment in favor of more egalitarian polities.

While Unger and Weber are arguing from different positions on the role of coercion, they share the idea that its use and distribution across society influences the operations and developments of the state. In contrast, Joel Migdal's work on the state advances a 'state-in-society' model, in which (rather than being an actual or would-be coercive monopolist), the state is just one (albeit usually the most powerful) actor in a '*mélange*' of competing institutions. Rather than attempting to discredit the coercion-related analyses of Unger and others,[74] Migdal cautions against becoming confused between models or ideal types of the state, and attempts to characterize *actual* states: '[in] short, Weber's ideal state when taken as the normal state obscures as much as it illuminates by continually measuring actual states against the ideal version of what states are or ought to be.'[75]

To account for these variations, Migdal attempts to capture their conclusions in a broader framework capable of going beyond the ideal-typical, European-pattern state of Weber, or ignoring possible deviations from the ideal type or stereotype as pointed out by Unger. This model allows Migdal to track and account for those legitimacy-based struggles within a society that defines the 'state-society boundary.'[76] Migdal's *mélange*, although he does not put it in exactly these terms, reverses Weber's assertion about territory being a characteristic of the state, and instead asks 'how are we to describe those situations where, as a consequence of various

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[74] For example, as conducted in Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Beacon Press, 1993).

[75] Joel Migdal, *State in Society: studying how states and Societies Transform and Constitute one Another* (Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 15

[76] *Ibid*., p. 47. I use this concept again in Chapter 5, to discuss the ways in which the 'sovereign interstices' which I argue characterize the use of proxy war by African states, define (and occasionally entirely envelop) zones of 'state' and 'nonstate' control.

limitations on the exercise of state power, the formal state is just one characteristic of a territorially bounded *society*?' I refer to these situations, and to the strategies states use to survive the particular limitations on the exercise of their power as 'accommodations,' and discuss this further below.

Following the insights of Migdal, Unger, and other scholars, three major approaches can thus be said to exist as far as defining the state goes: (i) that the state is a cluster of <u>territorialized institutions</u> backed up by their monopolized command over the legitimacy of coercion; (ii) that the state is an exerciser of social power, fulfilling 'key functions' and <u>providing collective goods</u> to its subjects; and (iii) that the state is just one element in a 'web of state-society relations,' serving as <u>a broker and representative</u> to a range of groups within its jurisdictions.[77]

Although these three approaches highlight different aspects of the state, in the case of many states these are not mutually exclusive. These states can, for example, employ coercive monopolies as well as provide public goods and coordinate the activities of sub-state interest groups. On the other hand, these conceptions do not accord well (either individually or together) with the specific realities of 'limited,' 'weak' or 'failed' states, such as many in Africa. Indeed, these definitions fall conspicuously short when applied (for example) to much of the developing (or, postcolonial) world.

In these areas, states neither have coercive monopolies, nor much social power, nor even a privileged relationship of brokerage with their citizens as such. Instead, the 'politics of dysfunction' sustain the operation of 'kleptocracies' or 'chaosocracies,'[78] in which the organs of state (including the <u>means to war</u>) are little more than neopatrimonial currency, parceled out to

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[77] OECD, *Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility: Policy Guidance, DAC, Guidelines and Reference Series*, (OECD Publishing, 2011)

[78] For definitions of these, see Juan Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (Lynne Rienner, 2000), p. 34

promising clients. Migdal's work, for example, gives five examples of the strategies officeholders use to keep the state-in-society functioning. Five strategies in particular constitute the 'the politics of survival:' these are (i) 'The Big Shuffle' (keeping office-holders in motion between posts, to disrupt attempts at fief-building); (ii) 'Nonmerit Appointments' (the strategic use of patrimony and neo-patrimony); (iii) 'Overlapping Bureaucratic Functions' (decentralizing the state so that no one part is strong enough to rebel against the center), (iv) 'Dirty Tricks' (including incarceration and assassination); and (v) 'Building Coalitions and a Domestic Balance of Power' (analogous to the balancing and bandwagoning strategies of realist theory, but occurring within the state[79]).

Despite the sometimes dramatic nature of the failing and failed states in the developing world, it would not serve our purpose as theorists of the state (and in my case, of the state *at war*) to only understand African states in terms of their <u>deviation</u> from models derived from more (apparently) functional states elsewhere in the world. To do so is to ignore the possibility that, as Unger points out, it is likely 'strong' states which are the deviant cases, not 'weak' ones:

> Whatever departs from [the Western] stereotype is made to appear a deviation, qualifying or delaying an inexorable developmental tendency. But the argument of this essay turns this prejudice upside down ... [the] supposed anomalies were and are the real Western thing.[80]

With this caution, and the problems posed to theorizing the limited state in Africa in mind, I now turn to the 'state of the state' in Africa.

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[79] A similar kind of 'sub-state Realism' is employed by Barry Posen, in 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,' *Survival* 35:1 (Spring 1993), pp. 27-47.

[80] Unger, *Plasticity into Power*, p. 8

The state in Africa

An extensive field of literature exists on the kinds of alternative political orders which have sprung up within the limited state in Africa.[81] Migdal, Kohli and Shue's edited volume, *State Power and Social Forces*, contains chapters by Chazan and Bratton that focus on precisely this issue.[82] These chapters attribute particular importance to those networks of relations between people in African societies *other* than those underwritten by formal associations with the state, and on the mutually limiting or enabling environment created between the state and civil society. Bratton's chapter, for instance, juxtaposes state engagement or withdrawal from land reform, with peasant engagement or withdrawal from the same process. He thereby generates a matrix of possibilities (state engages/peasants withdraw; both engage; peasants engage/state withdraws) for the outcome of this 'collision of interests,' thereby directly addressing the strategic interaction between different kinds of actors increasingly involved in local and global exchanges.

Naomi Chazan, on the other hand, moves on from the agricultural sector to society at large, and attempts to specify how one might sensibly speak of 'civil society' in postcolonial Africa. The many associational bodies present both *beyond* and *within* the African state all have cultural and historical bases; Chazan explores not only these bases, but also their implications for studying the state. Four such implications are that:

    a. 'civil society,' i.e. groups that 'address the state,' is only one part of an extremely broad and diverse associational 'scene' in African societies,

    b. the growth of civil society is linked to very specific societal factors, such that '[b]oth statism … and state decay … stymie the growth of civil society,'

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[81] See, for example, Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument* (Indiana University Press, 1999); Jean-Francois Bayart, Steven Ellis and Beatrice Hibou, *The Criminalization of the State in Africa* (Indiana University Press, 1999.

[82] Michael Bratton, 'Peasant-state relations in postcolonial Africa: patterns of engagement and disengagement' and Naomi Chazan, 'Engaging the state: associational life in sub-Saharan Africa,' in Migdal, Kohli and Shue (eds.), *State Power and Social Forces* (Cambridge University Press, 1994).

c. external relations, such as commercialization, are also of relevance to the growth of civil society, and

d. states and civil society are highly interdependent, reinforcing and empowering one another.[83]

Migdal, Bratton, and Chazan's analyses of the constrained African state, like Unger's of states more generally, clearly demonstrate why the Weberian model of a state in full and monopolistic control of all its territories and the people in them, can not be incautiously applied to African states. Rather than a widespread approximation of the ideal-type (i.e. territorialized coercion-monopolizers), therefore, we find in Africa a range of states that have employed coping strategies (i.e., accommodations) to ensure their continued function and to get around their inability or unwillingness to follow the Western route.

While many analyses have been undertaken of the particular conditions which produce/produced this inability and/or unwillingness, I want to single out two for further review: the effects of <u>territory</u>, and the effects of <u>globalization</u> on state formation in Africa.

<u>States, territory, and power</u>

The concluding chapter of Jeffrey Herbst's *States and Power in Africa*, revisits the thorny issues related to the national borders inherited by postcolonial African states:

> The fundamental problem with the boundaries in Africa is not that they are too weak but that they are too strong. It is not that they are artificial in light of current political systems but that they are too integral to the broadcasting of power in Africa. It is not that they are alien to current African states but that African leaders have been extraordinarily successful in manipulating the boundaries for their own purposes of staying in power …[84]

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[83] Chazan, 'Engaging the State,' pp. 278-80

[84] Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 253. Other works dealing with the political geography of the African state are reviewed in Paul Nugent, *Africa Since Independence: A Comparative History* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 71-105.

A major innovation of the argument that brings Herbst to this conclusion, is its use of geopolitical analyses and population density data to link the pre-colonial, colonial, and postcolonial *political* dispensations of African states, to the challenges of broadcasting power over a distance. Not only do many states in Africa grapple with political geographies which make this task harder than it might otherwise be – such as remote and hard-to-govern hinterlands, a lack of transport infrastructure, and so on – but the difficulties of taxing hinterland populations, as well as the imperatives associated with Migdal's 'politics of survival,' mean that there are precious few incentives to reverse this situation. Between the internationally-guaranteed (*de jure*) borders of the state and the practical (*de facto*) extent of metropolitan interest/power, thus spring up the modern equivalents of those areas that French colonizers once called *Africa inutile*: 'useless Africa.' These areas are stuck in a vicious circle: they are not worth governing because they have no infrastructure, and they have no infrastructure because they are not worth governing.

We can thus add another dimension to our assessment of accommodation in the African state. Not only do the socio-infrastructural factors discussed by Migdal, Chazan, Bratton and Unger matter in explaining why African states depart from the Weberian ideal, but physical and human geographies also play a role. Sometimes the state is <u>infrastructurally</u> unable to govern all its space; and sometimes, it is <u>geographically</u> unable to do so.[85]

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[85] As far as the interactions between these two sources of dysfunction goes, there is the intriguing possibility that the twin tasks of 'mastering one's environment,' and 'developing a strong state' are linked by precisely the same kind of ratchet effect that Tilly uses to describe the growth of the European state, i.e., the interlinked evolution of capital and coercion. Certainly, in early Medieval Europe the destruction of the wild, ungoverned spaces and their subsequent penetration by the forces of order, produced a series of benefits for those forces; which in turn enabled them to deforest more effectively. It is this linkage between the extension of state power and the mastery of the environment which is responsible for the opprobrium associated with the English words, 'pagan' and 'heathen,' for these words meant both an enemy of the (Christian) state, but also someone who dwelled in the wild spaces (Latin: 'paganus'; English, 'heath') outside society. See Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, *Civilizations* (Macmillan, 2000), p. 137-47.

<u>The role of globalization</u>

Modern states, however, exist neither entirely on an abstract plane of institutions, nor in complete geographic isolation from one another; rather, they exist in a world containing many other states, groups, and entities. Of the various analyses which are concerned with how interactions between these other states, groups and entities may affect the degrees of accommodation present in the African state, I single out William Reno's *Warlord Politics* for review here.[86]

Reno is concerned with explaining how 'tax evasion, barter deals, illicit production, smuggling, and protection rackets ... have become widespread and integral to building political authority in parts of Africa.'[87] Primarily, he says that this is because of an interaction between particular state inability (e.g., an inability to extract wealth from one's hinterland), on the one hand, and the constant presence of external actors – IGOs, criminal networks, and foreign multinationals – who *are* capable of this. Reno's recognition of this global dimension brings to our understanding of accommodations an awareness of the fact that African states have more options on hand than simply to 'govern' vs. 'not govern.' That is to say: they can also make partnerships outside the state (either territorially, institutionally, or both), thereby 'renting' (although perhaps 'pawning' is a better term) their troublesome, valuable, or hard-to-exploit national assets to intermediaries who are willing to pay for the privilege of extracting value from them.

The reason that Reno considers these partnerships to be problematic is that they reinforce the very kinds of state weakness which made them possible (or attractive) in the first place. Because these intermediaries provide an easy alternative to the difficult 'politics of survival,'

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[86] William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Lynne Reinner, 1998)

[87] *Idem*., ix

rulers are tempted to engage with them (thereby building a 'shadow state') rather than working to construct the kinds of domestic partnerships that would serve to strengthen state-society relations. Thus:

> The feature that most distinguishes the building of political authority in weak states and warlord political units in Africa from the early modern European experience is the absence of an indigenous social alliance with which rulers must bargain in exchange for resources. The use of external actors as stand-ins for mobilizing local populations makes violence in warlord strategies rather different from that in early modern European state building.[88]

If Herbst's analysis, reviewed above, established the salience of geography in explaining the various weaknesses and incapabilities to which states might respond through the creation of accommodations, Reno's work on the shadow state highlights the fact that in a globalized world, it is not only domestic, civil-society groups who can be partnered with in such accommodations, but also foreign states, actors outside the state (such as warlords), and the representatives of international or transnational groups.

Catherine Boone's work on land politics in Senegal asks precisely these kinds of consent-, authority-, and rule-related questions about state-society interactions. Boone's primary concern, both in her essay in Migdal *et al,* and in her follow-up book, <u>Political Topographies of the African State</u>,[89] is with the extension of state power beyond the metropolis and into the agricultural heartland.

For Boone, this process of extension is generally one of fracture and fragmentation, as metropolitan and rural elites struggle to set the rules by which they will interact with one

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[88] Reno, *Warlord Politics*, p. 38

[89] Catherine Boone, 'States and ruling classes in postcolonial Africa: the enduring contradictions of power,' in Migdal, Kohli and Shue (eds.), *State Power and Social Forces*; Catherine Boone, *Political Topography of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice* (Cambridge University Press, 2003).

another. This struggle can be 'won' by either side, or by neither: in 'States and ruling classes in Africa,' Boone characterizes the extension of metropolitan power as doomed from the outset, for *all* participants, resulting in '[f]orms of rural decay, impoverishment, and de facto resistance that often … made it increasingly difficult to reproduce the political and economic relationships that shored up the postcolonial regimes.'[90] In <u>Political Topographies</u>, however, <u>four</u> outcomes rather than one are hypothesized, depending on the concentration of administrative infrastructure, market centralization, and coercive power in rural localities. These four outcomes include two generally positive outcomes: (i) 'Powersharing' (where state and local elites cooperate in administering a particular region); and (ii) 'Non-Incorporation' (where the presence of powerful local elites keeps state interests at bay). Two negative outcomes ('Usurpation' and 'Administrative Occupation') cover the lose-lose outcome she predicted in 'States and ruling classes.'[91]

Boone's analysis suggests a compelling combination of the arguments reviewed above. From Migdal, Kohli, Shue, Chazan and Unger we know that the African state makes accommodations in order to survive, or to avoid having to interrupt the 'politics of survival' by building the capacity of its institutions. Furthermore, we know that sometimes these accommodations take the form of partnerships. From Herbst, we know that one clear constraint in explaining which parts of the state are weak (i.e., most susceptible to the imposition of accommodations) is the physical and human geography within which the state exists.

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[90] Boone, 'States and Ruling Classes,' p.134

[91] Boone, *Political Topography*, p.33

<u>Questions about sovereignty</u>

'Sovereignty,' like the state, is a concept that is approached from various perspectives. One might say, as David Lake does, that sovereignty is simply a 'type of authority relationship,' in which A (for example, a citizen) obeys B (a ruler) through some combination of coercion and authority.[92] 'Stronger' actors in such relationships can give more extravagant orders and count on them being obeyed. They can also (depending on the proportion of force to authority which constitutes their 'strength') achieve this obedience more or less smoothly, that is, via more or less voluntary than coerced compliance. Lake concedes, however, that in the international relations context, sovereignty also has an important reciprocal dimension, in that states (in the roles of A and B from the example above) exercise their claims to sovereignty through some combination of coercive and authoritative means. This leads Lake to a definition of state sovereignty as 'an attribute entailing relationships of hierarchy and anarchy.'

Stephen Krasner takes a slightly more involved approach to sovereignty, distinguishing between four different types of sovereignty.[93] Christopher Rudolph summarizes Krasner's types as follows:

> Whereas "domestic sovereignty" refers to the organization of government authority within a state, "Westphalian sovereignty" is defined as those aspects that exclude external actors from a state's domestic authority configuration. "Interdependence sovereignty" refers to the control of transborder movements, and "international legal sovereignty" is limited to those factors that involve the mutual recognition of states within the nation-state system.[94]

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[92] David Lake, 'The New Sovereignty in International Relations,' *International Studies Review* 5:3 (September 2003), pp. 303-323

[93] Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton University Press, 1999)

[94] Christopher Rudolph, 'Sovereignty and Territorial Borders in a Global Age,' *International Studies Review* 7 (2005), p. 3

Lake and Krasner both single out 'authority' as an important component of sovereignty. Sovereignty, in this sense, is not simply a system of coercion-based rule, but also (and this returns us the definitions of the state, above) involves the interplay between the expectations of the governed and the capacities of the governors.[95] This prompts the question: given that the African state tends towards accommodations rather than monopolies in its structure, and given that sovereignty involves precisely the blend of state capacity and state legitimacy which theorists of the African state claims it lacks, how do African states <u>exercise sovereignty</u>?

From Reno, we know that partnerships made outside the state can be more attractive than partnerships made inside it; and from Lake, Krasner and Boone we see that it is possible to include examinations of center-periphery deals (in which the state takes what it can get away with, and rents or ignores the rest) in an examination of what constitutes 'sovereignty' in Africa. There is, however, still some ground to cover in getting a grasp of state and even nonstate control, authority, or the exercise of sovereignty in postcolonial Africa. For this I rely on the work of John Agnew.[96]

John Agnew's notion of a 'sovereignty regime' is based on his assessment that a direct correspondence between the political (i.e., authoritative) and spatial (i.e. physical) dimensions of the 'state' upon which most of our ideas of 'sovereignty' are based, is both a recent and historically bounded phenomenon. Instead of such contiguities, Agnew argues, for the majority of humanity's existence in groups larger than the 'band,' these dimensions have specifically *not* been the same, whether the political unit in question was a cattle-patronage monarchy in

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[95] See Amartya Sen, *The Idea of Justice* (Allen Lane, 2009) for an interesting account of the centrality of considering capabilities as part of a creating a 'good' society.

[96] John Agnew, 'Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics,' *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 95(2), 2005, pp. 437–461. See also Agnew, *Globalization and Sovereignty*, pp. 47-96

Rwanda, a multiple-jurisdiction guild city in Renaissance Italy, a 'failed state,' or a modern 'hyperpower.' Indeed, for every 'failed' state whose core institutions occupy *less* space than its territorial boundaries (e.g. Afghanistan), Agnew points out that there are many states (e.g., the United States) whose institutions are so fundamentally *globalized* that these states are constantly embroiled in battles, whether military or political, to defend them. No-one would call the US a 'failing' or a 'quasi'-state, but the fact remains that its juridical and empirical sovereignties are just as dramatically incongruous as Somalia's – albeit that its empirical reach overshadows its juridical reach and not the other way around.

Agnew has produced a typology of these variations, which he calls a typology of 'sovereignty regimes.'[97] In only one of the four variants Agnew proposes is the state-as-institutional-cluster contained within its own territory alone. In the other three variants, at least some of the institutions upon which the state depends (i.e., which it wishes to dominate, resist, or profit from) lie <u>outside</u> its borders. Thus, for Agnew, sovereignty is a notion best expressed in regional or even global terms, i.e. as mixture of domestic/internal and foreign/external relations between the state, and the various sources of power or peril which it must manage (i.e. within which it must fight for recognition, control, power, etc.) to survive.

This is a useful concept for examining, as Boone does, center-periphery accommodations engaged in by the state, while also acknowledging the availability of external (global, regional, criminal) partnerships described by Reno. Accordingly, I rely on the idea of a 'sovereign regime' in investigating the 'where' of proxy war in Part II and III. In particular, I will use the notion of 'sovereign interstices' to indicate those geopolitical spaces defined by some combination of (i) limited or absent *de facto* state control, (ii) competing claims for authority, and/or (iii) the

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[97]John Agnew, 'Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics,' *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 95(2), 2005, pp. 437–461. See also Agnew, *Globalization and Sovereignty*, (Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), p. 47-96

presence of specific sources of strategic vulnerability and/or opportunity. I hypothesized that states militarized these places and spaces, i.e., made them ready for war.

Wars in Africa

Accounts of mass violence in postcolonial Africa often focus on three things: (i) the brutality of the violence;[98] (ii) its internal character (i.e. repression and genocide rather than invasion and conquest); and (iii) its origins in weak structures of one form or another (e.g., social, political, economic). A worthwhile question to ask, therefore, is where these characteristics come from. Are African states specifically prone to violence and failure primarily because they all share some set of characteristics (e.g. the postcolonial legacy, or ethnic fractionalization), or is this rather because of some set of continental or global conditions (i.e., overarching conditions) which are capable of causing even very diverse states to manifest similar conflicts or disorders? My own view favors the latter possibility, i.e. that wars in Africa capture factors of importance about modern war as such, and also that specific geopolitical conditions surrounding African states are increasingly characteristic of global states and any state at war under conditions of globalization. In what follows, as well as subsequent chapters, I address this very issue from a number of perspectives including, below, the increasing involvement of nonstate actors in war.

Richard Jackson's list of the fourteen most lethal conflicts in Africa between 1960 and the present would provoke little disagreement from scholars of African war, including (as it does) the continent's most frequently mentioned and frequently studied wars.[99] Jackson estimates that these exemplar wars have produced somewhere between 4.6 and 7 million casualties in

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[98] The archetypal work in this vein is Robert Kaplan, 'The Coming Anarchy,' *The Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994.

[99] Richard Jackson, 'Managing Africa's Violent Conflicts,' *Peace and Change* 25:2 (April 2000), p. 211

Africa since 1960; they are, thus, clearly 'severe' wars, if we trust the scale of human death as an indicator of severity. However, Jackson's list also picks out, inadvertently, the particular problem posed by inadvertent underrepresentation of the role of states in the deadliest episodes of African war, in terms of our quest to understand war in general, and wars in Africa, in particular.

Specifically, of the fourteen wars Jackson selects, he refers to seven explicitly as civil wars, (e.g. 'Ugandan Civil War'), four simply as 'conflicts' occurring within a certain state (e.g. 'Angolan Conflict'), and only three as taking place between opposing political units (Nigeria-Biafra, Portugal-African Colonies, and Ethiopia-Eritrea). Of these three, only the last involves fighting between two independent African states. Jackson's list, therefore, while picking up important episodes of African conflict, might leave the observer with the notion that only two African states (Ethiopia and Eritrea) have ever used violence against one another in ways that produced severe human casualty. This bias goes much further than Jackson's list. For example: the Correlates of War dataset (COW) for Africa[100] finds only three interstate wars (i.e., those producing more than 1000 battlefield deaths) after 1957: these are the first and second Ethiopia-Eritrea war, and the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda in 1979.

Between the COW data and more qualitative assessments such as Jackson's, then, one can only draw the conclusion that African states are: (i) comparatively pacific or conflict-averse in regard of external/inter-state war, given the higher proportion of 'interstate' wars reported in other continents during this period; and also (ii) immensely prone to severe wars within states/territories. While the latter conclusion is certainly backed up by studies of the peculiarities of the postcolonial African state, the former seems implausible. While few African states hold a monopoly of violence, does that mean that they have forgone the use of violence as a tool of the

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[100] Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, 'A Revised List of Wars Between and Within Independent States, 1816-2002,' *International Interactions* 30 (2004)

state?[101] The presence of other forms of state-sponsored violence in the African political landscape (e.g. politicides and genocides) argues against such an interpretation, but the problem demands further examination.

Leaving the question of how to overcome this challenge aside for now, it is clear at the outset that wars in Africa have been studied under a variety of headings. These include:

1. Small wars[102]
2. Liberation struggles[103]
3. Civil wars and 'People's Wars'[104]
4. Wars against criminal networks[105]
5. Tribal/ethnic warfare[106]
6. Greed and grievance wars[107]
7. Wars over resources[108]
8. Failed and failing states [109]
9. Fighting across colonial borders[110]

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[101] Here I am reminded of David Bell's work on the Enlightenment ideal of war, in which he argues that it was specifically the misguided attempt to enshrine into common practice the exhortations of Isaiah 2:4 ('They will beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks. Nation will not take up sword against nation, nor will they train for war anymore') which opened the way for the killing fields of Napoleonic warfare. C.f. *The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe, and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It* (Mariner, 2008).

[102] Roger Beaumont, 'Small Wars: Definitions and Dimensions,' *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 541 (Sep., 1995), pp. 20-35

[103] Paul Nugent, 'Second Liberation: Guerilla Warfare, Township Revolt and the Search for a New Social Order,' in Nugent, *Africa Since Independence* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)

[104] Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War*

[105] Mark Duffield, 'War as a Network Enterprise: The New Security Terrain and its Implications,' *Cultural Values* 6:1 (2002), pp. 153-165; also, Willen van Schendel, and Itty Abraham (eds.). *Illicit Flows and Criminal Things: States, Borders and the Other side of Globalization* (Indiana University Press, 2005)

[106] James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,' *American Political Science Review* 97:1 (2003) pp. 75-90; also, Kaplan, 'The Coming Anarchy'

[107] Paul Collier, 'Doing well out of war: an economic perspective,' in M. Berdal and D. Malone (eds.) *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* (Lynne Rienner, 2000).

[108] Filip Reyntjens, *The Great African War. Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006* (Cambridge University Press, 2009); Enough Project, 'A Comprehensive Approach to Congo's Conflict Minerals' (April 2009), United Nations, *UN Report S/2003/1027, Final report by the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo*; Filip Reyntjens, Public Address at SAIS-JHU, Washington D.C. (3 December 2009)

[109] Robert I. Rotberg, *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* (Princeton University Press, 2003)

These perspectives on African war have many useful concerns in common, such as: <u>who</u> fights in war, <u>how</u> they do this, and the <u>why</u>, <u>where</u> and <u>when</u> of the warring. Moreover, as I will point out below, numbers 6 to 9 offer particularly useful insights regarding the present study but do not cover all relevant issues or data about wars in Africa.

Before proceeding any further with my review of literature on war in Africa, it is important to address the question of how much weight to give to the <u>state</u> when studying African wars. This focus implies the question: is there something particular about African <u>wars</u>, to the same extent as there are things which are particular about African <u>states</u>?[111]

The role of African states in war

Outside of studies of military intervention, the role of the state in African war is studied in three ways: (i) its susceptibility to wars over rulership, e.g. via civil wars and coups; (ii) its tendency to feature factional conflict alongside the operation of its internal processes, e.g. corruption and electoral violence; and (iii) its use of violence as a form of state-making, e.g. the elimination of domestic rivals.

What these three approaches have in common is their interest in the role, in African war, of the particular institutions through which states impose control within their territories. Studies of statemaking, for example, are concerned with the violent use of coercive institutions in service of the state;[112] studies of coups/civil war study conflicts over the ownership (centrally or

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[110] Mi Yung Yoon, Internal Conflicts and Cross-Border Military Interventions in Sub-Saharan African in the Post-Cold War Era, Journal of Political and Military Sociology 33:2 (Winter, 2005), 277-293; Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton University Press, 2002)

[111] As I have mentioned previously, my intuition in this regard is that wars in Africa say more about global trends that they do about continental ones *per se*; I pick this discussion up again in Chapter 5.

[112] Michael Niemann, 'War Making and State Making in Central Africa,' *Africa Today* 53:3 (Spring 2007), pp. 21-39; William Reno, 'Order and commerce in turbulent areas: 19th century lessons, 21st century practice,' *Third*

provincially) over particular institutions, such as the government or the armed forces;[113] and studies of factional conflict study the subversion and/or globalization of these mechanisms, for example through the use of paid militias to affect the internal balance of power during elections.[114] These three approaches are thus closely related, although they focus on different aspects of the state and different aspects of its coercive function, and it is thus possible to combine them. For example: William Reno's seminal Warlord Politics, as discussed previously, does so by charting the withdrawal of legitimate authority (statemaking, or more properly state-*unmaking*) from the productive areas of the African nation-state, and its replacement with a neo-patrimonially constituted shadow government (subversion) composed of specialists in violence, in order to explain the persistence of various kinds of resource-based conflicts in Africa (ownership).

The state is privileged as a level of analysis in our examinations of mass violence in Africa, because so many of Africa's conflicts in the 1990s followed a period of internationally-mandated reforms which specifically targeted (and affected the internal dynamics of) states. These reforms emerged from the interactions between two global trends: (i) the Washington Consensus, which preached a slimmer, streamlined state form as the best way to ensure growth and prosperity; and (ii) the post-Cold War 'New World Order' which mandated democracy and

World Quarterly 25:4 (2004), pp. 607–625; and Cameron Thies, 'The Political Economy of State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa', *The Journal of Politics* 69:3 (August 2007), pp. 716-731

[113] Patrick J. McGowan, 'Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004: Part II, Empirical Findings,' *Armed Forces & Society* 32 (2006); James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, 'Violence and the Social construction of Ethnic Identity', *International Organizations* 54:4 (Autumn 2000), pp. 845-877

[114] John Lwanda, 'Kwacha: The Violence of Money in Malawi's Politics, 1954–2004,' *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 32:3, September 2006, p. 126

the dismantling of autocracies.[115] What was not apparent at the time was the extent to which these reforms might disrupt the patrimonial networks that had become the basic engine of state function across Africa. When these networks failed, or were threatened, the result was not peace and prosperity but civil unrest and genocide, from Sierra Leone to Rwanda.

However, although much work has been done on African states as the <u>sites</u> of conflict, this work shares a vision of the African state as primarily beset by internal violence resulting from weakness or corruption. In this fundamentally intrastate vision of African war, corrupt and impotent African governments cower at the edge of anarchic hinterlands whose innate violence they sometimes cannot, sometimes dare not, but more often *choose not* to subdue. Within such ungoverned spaces, new actors in violence (such as warlords, ethnic militias, and criminal gangs) flourish.[116] Most crucially, in this view of African war, the government makes no attempt to reassert its <u>monopoly over legitimate violence</u> as conceived in Weberian terms. Governments fearful of Ceasarist coups may even play off factions within their own armed forces against one another, consciously blunting their capacity to act as coercive implements.[117] At other times, a subtle live-and-let-live dynamic may even exist between the warlords and the government (or at

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[115] Goran Hyden, *African Politics in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge University Press, 2006); also, Nugent, *Africa Since Independence*, and (for a more journalistic account) Martin Meredith, *The Fate of Africa: From the Hopes of Freedom to the Heart of Despair* (PublicAffairs, 2005), especially pp. 378-442

[116] It is worth noting that this view of failed states as a generative locus for various kinds of insecurity, is far more widely applied than just to Africa. For a critical view of this view's application to another endemic conflict (in Lebanon), see Boaz Atzili, 'State Weakness and "Vacuum of Power" in Lebanon,' *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 33 (2010), pp. 757-782

[117] Erik Doxtader, and Charles Villa-Vicencio (eds), *Through Fire with Water: the Roots of Division and the Potential for Reconciliation in Africa* (Africa World Press, 2003)

least its officials), with regular civilians caught in the crossfire.[118] The result is endemic war, or at best an uneasy peace punctuated by violence.

Avenues of inquiry into African war that attempt to site themselves elsewhere than the state, do so in two main ways. The first of these two alternate routes gives causal priority to groupings such as the tribe, clan, language group, or *ethnie*.[119] For Richard Jackson, for instance:

> … it is interesting to note that very few of the seventy-nine African conflicts [after 1945] were fought over territory or ideology, the issues most often at the heart of interstate conflicts. … [most] conflicts in Africa have been independence or secessionist conflicts, and have involved intangible elements such as ethnicity, identity, and nationalism.[120]

David Walsh, in a similar vein, compares postcolonial Africa to post-Garibaldi Italy, of which Massimo Tapparelli famously said, 'we have made Italy, now we have to make Italians;'[121] in other words, from this perspective the reason we cannot hope to establish satisfactory causal accounts between African <u>states</u> and African <u>war</u> is that <u>Africans themselves have little loyalty to their states</u>, and as such are more likely to defend (or commit to defend) the customary, communal groupings which lie under the surface of what Bull and Watson call the 'nascent,' i.e. uncompleted state.[122] Mahmood Mamdani's investigation of the civil war and genocide in Rwanda also falls, I would argue, into this category. As Mamdani makes clear in the

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[118] A contemporary example might be found in the actions of the Sudanese *janjaweed*, who the government claims to be unable to restrain – but who almost certainly operate with covert air and logistical support from the government.

[119] A 'named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories, and … a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites' Peter Turchin, *Historical Dynamics: why states rise and fall* (Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 36

[120] Richard Jackson, 'Managing Africa's Violent Conflicts', *Peace & Change* 25:2, (April 2002), pp. 208–224

[121] David Welsh, 'Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa,' *International Affairs* 72:3, Ethnicity and International Relations (Jul., 1996), pp. 477-491

[122] Bartosz H. Stanislawski, 'Para-States, Quasi-States, and Black Spots: Perhaps Not States, But Not "Ungoverned Territories," Either,' *International Studies Review* 10 (2008), pp. 366–396

introduction: 'It soon became clear to me that just because the genocide took place within the boundaries of Rwanda, it did not mean that either the dynamics that led to it or the dynamics it unleashed in turn were confined to Rwanda.'[123]

This leads us to the second of the nonstate perspectives on war, i.e. accounts which investigate the effects of environmental factors (specifically, configurations of human or physical geography) on war. Such accounts <u>tend</u> to dovetail with an assumption of African state pathology already discussed, in the sense that more functional states (one assumes) are better at managing environmental challenges (drought, deforestation, crop failure) or adverse human geographies (e.g. the presence of remote hinterlands) and preventing the worst effects of these challenges on society;[124] but this need not be the case. For example, examinations of the role of water scarcity in provoking conflict in Africa deal with some very strong states.[125] Similarly, Atzili's investigation of the role of borders in African war identifies the prospect that strong, i.e. well-enforced, border regimes may produce more instability when combined with socio-politically curtailed states, than weak regimes.[126] Thus, what identifies these studies is not the weakness or strength of the states, but their assertion that strong and weak states alike are embedded in a world of environmental challenges which can provoke and prolong war.

To start with the issue of physical geography and environment: two examples of works embodying this view are Buhaug and Rød's work on the effects of terrain and remoteness on the incidence of civil war in Africa, and Ian Brown' assessment of the links between desertification and conflict in Darfur. Both works highlight the importance of physical and human geography.

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[123] Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, p. xiii

[124] Jared Diamond, *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed* (Penguin, 2004)

[125] Peter Vale, *Security and Politics in South Africa: The Regional Dimension* (Lynne Reinner, 2002)

[126] Boaz Atzili, 'When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors: Fixed borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict ', *International Security*, 31:3 (Winter 2006/7), pp. 139-173

The former does so by dividing Africa into a grid of 100 x 100km squares, each of which is then assigned a numerical values based on the presence of natural resources, population density, distance from a capital city, and so on;[127] the latter, by using NASA satellite imagery to assess whether declining grazing potential was a good indicator of the patterns of pastoralist-agriculturalist conflict in western Sudan after 1985.[128]

However convincing these results, of course, the question remains: how far can, and should, one go to draw general conclusions about African war purely from the physical geography of the continent? In his 1996 book on the civil war in Sierra Leone, Paul Richards cautions against the geographically-informed determinism of what he calls the 'New Barbarism thesis.' This thesis, which Richards largely attributes to Robert Kaplan's 1994 essay 'The coming anarchy,' is based on a vision of Africa which Richards calls 'Malthus-with-guns.' Put differently, through the lens of New Barbarism, Africa is:

> [I]nherently, a wild and dangerous place … driven by environmental and cultural imperatives which the West has had no hand in shaping, and now has no responsibility to try and contain. These violent urges are politically meaningless and beyond the scope of conventional diplomacy or conciliation. They are best understood as natural forces – the cultural consequences of a biological tendency by Africans to populate their countries to the point of environmental collapse.[129]

Although Richards disagrees with the New Barbarism thesis on multiple points, the criticism which I will focus on here is that it posits a direct link between population pressure and (i) environmental collapse, (ii) the consequent appearance of large numbers of potentially violent

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[127] H. Buhaug, J.K. Rød 'Local determinants of African civil wars, 1970-2001' *Political Geography* 25 (2006) 315-335. For a complete list, see their Table 3 on p. 328.

[128] Ian A Brown 'Assessing eco-scarcity as a cause of the outbreak of conflict in Darfur: a remote sensing approach,' *International Journal of Remote Sensing*, 31: 10, (2010) 2513 – 2520

[129] Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest. War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone* (James Currey, 2002), p. xiii

young men into urban areas, and (iii) the subsequent waves of anarchic violence perpetrated by these young men.

To confront this claim, Richards uses ethnographic techniques to construct the 'forest' as a social space rather than simply a resource-bearing one. In other words, he constructs a detailed <u>human</u> geography of the Sierra Leonean conflict as a counter to the <u>physical</u> geography that Kaplan favors.[130] Across several chapters, Richards examines the forest as a <u>mystical</u> space, showing how the monetization of traditional medicine practices cut young men loose from codes of behavior and absolution which might have constrained mass violence; he shows the forest as a <u>gendered</u> space, in which 'boys' learn bushcraft and become 'men;' and he shows that the predominant explanation offered by Sierra Leoneans of the conflict has little to do with the forest *per se*, and more to do with the patrimonial political system under which the country was run at the time. These webs of significance are used to argue that it was social factors, rather than environmental degradation, which caused the civil war.

However compelling Richards' argument against over-determining the role of physical geography, however, we are still confronted by the fact that scholars and practitioners of war have been drawing links between terrain and war since the classical era, in what (at times) begins to resemble an unbroken line of cautionary sayings about terrain stretching back into the distant past. Thus, the Roman historian Flavius Vegetius' observation that the presence of 'the sea, a river, a lake, a city, a morass or broken ground inaccessible to the enemy' would assist in

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[130] Of course, neither account confines its explanation *entirely* to physical or human dimensions; even Kaplan's account includes information on how the forests are used, rather than just stating that they exist and are diminishing in size. Greater sensitivity to geographies of *use*, then, could be used to bring a discussion of culture and practice into our attempts to understand deforestation's links to conflict; but Richards' point is specifically that Kaplan does not produce this side of the story.

delivering victory even when one's army was 'inferior both in numbers and in goodness,'[131] connects relatively seamlessly with Mao Zedong's 1937 observation that '[the] advantages of bases in mountainous areas are evident … these bases are strongly protected. Similar bases should be established in all enemy rear areas,'[132] to sustain a common insight: terrain matters in war, *especially* in the kind of asymmetrical conflict variously referred to as guerilla war, small war, brushfire war, and so on.[133] These are wars in which maneuver, surprise and unconventional tactics take precedence over force size *per se*; and hence, they are wars in which the skilful and constant use of contextual advantages like terrain, take precedence over the more classical objective of confronting the enemy's main body in order to destroy it.[134]

The particular relevance of terrain to guerilla or anti-guerilla warfare was picked up by the first generation of counter-insurgency scholars (e.g. Lyautey, Liddell Hart, and Thompson), who confronted this issue amid the ideological clashes of the Cold War and the beginning of the postcolonial era. Terrain, in such a world, had become important not just as something which might break up army formations or shelter hostile forces, but as a site in which the complex struggle for control of entire societies and regions might be won or lost.[135] At the same time, wars involving a primarily conventional clash of symmetrical forces – wars that had previously

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[131] Flavius Vegetius, 'Military Instructions,' in Basil Liddell Hart, *The Sword and the Pen* (Thomas Y. Crowell, 1976), p. 60

[132] Mao Tse-Tung, *On Guerilla War*, Chapter 7: 'The Strategy Of Guerrilla Resistance Against Japan'; accessed online at http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-warfare/ch07.htm

[133] Beaumont, 'Small Wars'

[134] Military doctrine recognizes this distinction via the trinity of 'maneuver,' 'fire,' and 'shock': *maneuver* positions one's forces relative to the enemy, *fire* fixes them in place, and *shock* – the frontal assault, cavalry charge, or tank rush – destroys their unit cohesion and inflicts casualties. Guerilla warfare privileges maneuver over fire and shock. See Harry Turney-High, *Primitive War: Its Practice and Concepts* (University of South Carolina Press, 1991).

[135] See, for example, the Kennan 'Long Telegram' which is credited with setting up the global race for prominence between the US and USSR: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm

served as the dominant opposition to the complex asymmetries of clandestine or irregular warfare – were becoming less and less frequent.[136] Hence, much of the work done on the role of terrain in war during this period, focused on how terrain might expedite the kind of irregular guerilla warfare prescribed by Mao and Guevara[137] – or, in the more reactionary West, on how to interdict this process and thereby suffocate nascent Marxist insurgencies.[138]

In contemporary war scholarship, on the other hand, the potential for remote/precision warfare associated with the revolution in military affairs, and the postmodern turn in political geography,[139] have combined to result in less work being done on Vegetius' 'morass and broken ground,' and more being done on the 'human terrain' of conflict.[140] As Metz and Millen put it:

> There are fewer geographically remote areas outside government control where insurgencies can gestate, so the initial stages of development tend to take place 'hidden in plain sight' … [the] ability of governments, particularly those affiliated with the United States, to find and destroy targets from a distance has made embedding and dispersal the preferred forms of protection for insurgents rather than isolation.[141]

Although this de-territorialization of terrain studies opens up interesting kinds of inquiry (into, for example, the geography of drone warfare[142]) it also downplays the volume of warfare

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[136] Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, 'Armed Conflict, 1989–2006,' *Journal of Peace Research* 44:5 (2007), pp. 623–634.

[137] Mao, *On Guerilla War*; also, Che Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare* (Ocean Press, 2006) and *The African Dream: The Diaries of the Revolutionary War in the Congo* (Grove Press, 2001)

[138] Molnar, Andrew M (ed.) *Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare* (Special Operations Research Center, American University, 1963), p.36

[139] Dylan Craig, 'With Savage Pictures Fill Their Maps: Prospect and Pitfalls in Conflict Studies' Rediscovery of Geography,' paper presented at the ISA-Northeast Conference, Baltimore, MD (October 2010).

[140] See for example, http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/

[141] Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, 'Insurgency And Counterinsurgency In The 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat And Response,' http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB586.pdf

[142] See William Fisher, 'Drone Strikes Draw Int'l Scrutiny,' http://globalgeopolitics.net/wordpress/2010/05/31/u-s-drone-strikes-draw-intl-scrutiny/

conducted, now and through recent history, by states with more limited capacities for 'post-geographical' military operations of the kind discussed by Metz and Miller. For these states, terrain presumably still plays the role it did for Vegetius: sheltering small armed groups, exposing enemy lines of resupply to attack, and confounding the attempts of counterinsurgent forces to establish anything resembling 'control.'[143]

Because Africa is a continent in which human infrastructural penetration of difficult territory has been extremely limited,[144] and also one in which few continental armies seem to operate according to the minimal-casualty, remote-war doctrines of the global North, it is quite plausible to assume that African states might still be fighting wars of the more classical kind, i.e. wars in which geography serves to protect irregular groups, both against regular (e.g. counter-insurgent [COIN]) forces and other irregular opponents. In addition, the ostensible prevalence of 'civil' war in Africa provides many of the kind of strong-versus-weak conflicts that might gravitate towards the use of remote territory in the vein of Mao, Guevara, and Vegetius.

However, while strong correlations have been found between the human geography of Africa and the outbreak of civil war (e.g. negative correlation between local road density and outbreak of civil war[145]), and between some dimensions of <u>physical</u> geography and civil war (e.g. positive correlation between distance from capital city and outbreak of civil war[146]), similar

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[143] Buhaug and Gates restate this conventional understanding as follows: 'Rough terrain is ideal for guerrilla warfare and difficult for a government army to control. Mountain areas, giving advantage to rebel troops, allow the rebels to expand the scope of conflict, whereas forests provide cover, particularly against detection or aerial attack. This aids in the freedom of movement and shipment of arms, thereby associated with a wider zone of conflict.' Halvard Buhaug and Scott Gates, 'The Geography of Civil War,' *Journal of Peace Research* 2002; 39; 417

[144] Dylan Craig, 'The Geopolitics of State Failure,' Midwest Political Science Association (Chicago, IL, Apr 2007)

[145] Buhaug and Rød, 'Local determinants of African civil wars'

[146] Halvard Buhaug and Scott Gates, 'The Geography of Civil War,' p. 417

covariations have not yet been found between the specific physical geography represented by terrain, and the outbreak of violence.[147]

This absence is surprising, given the clear strategic role envisioned for rough terrain in the practical and scholarly works cited above, and also given the strong relationships between terrain and violence which have been asserted in other, more qualitative investigations of civil wars.[148] Scholars of (a) war, (b) guerilla war, (c) guerilla war in the developing world, and finally (d) guerilla war in Africa, are thus confronted with a contradictory set of literatures on the role played by terrain.

On the one hand, the technologically-saturated wars of the Global North appear to be occurring in ways which relegate physical geography, and hence terrain, to a bygone era of warfare. On the other hand, significant regions of the world still seem to languish in a previous form of territorialized war. Africa bears this difference out well, with the last two decades of African conflict having heralded not only the most extensive use of trench warfare since World War 1 (during the Second Ethiopian-Eritrean War), but also through the depredations inflicted by mobile columns of roving bandits in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), who use territorial vastnesses to shield them from government (or United Nations) intervention[149]. Certainly, we have it from the classical war studies and manuals that 'terrain matters;' and to the extent that we can empirically assess this it appears to be as true for war as it is for government. However, our instruments of quantitative analysis are, for now, still too crude to settle the issue

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[147] Buhaug and Rød, 'Local of African civil wars'

[148] For example, the links between remoteness and denouncement in the Greek civil war detailed by Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge University Press, 2006).

[149] As RMA theorists might have predicted, the UN's response to this tactic has been to lean more heavily on high-tech, remote-warfare tactics such as air strikes: http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/279925 . To this development, Martin van Creveld might reply (as he has in response to the air-power-against-guerillas approach in Afghanistan): 'one does not know whether to laugh or cry.' Martin van Creveld, "The Transformation of War Revisited." *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 13:2 (2002), pp. 1-15

for once and for all. I return to this question of data gathering in Chapter 6; for now, suffice it to conclude that because of the impasse identified above (i.e. we suspect that terrain matters, but we don't know how to assess this), a more focused, qualitative assessment of the role of terrain (both human and physical) in African war is called for. In addition, we have the technological means to map human movement during conflicts very accurately – but only once we know who to count, what to focus on, and where to look.

So far, I have approached the question about wars in Africa versus African wars from the following perspectives: the seeming absence of interstate wars, the role of the African state in explaining war, and lastly, the human and physical geography of war. I now turn to the role of nonstate actor in wars. This is not only pertinent to the question addressed in Section C of this chapter, but also central to my own ideas about a prevalent form of war in Africa.

The complex resurgence of the nonstate actor

Part of the problem in telling 'interstate' wars apart from 'intrastate' ones is the presence of nonstate actors. In Clausewitz's time (and, consequently, in much of our contemporary war vocabulary), the use of formally constituted state armies was what signaled a war as interstate; but very few wars nowadays are fought only by soldiers, as the post-Clausewitzian perspectives of Holsti, van Creveld and Kaldor all indicate. Instead, nonstate actors have crossed over from always being the opponents of the state (i.e., rebels to be subdued), to sometimes being its powerful allies, as part of a global trend which has been minutely examined under headings such as 'Fourth Generation,' 'Hybrid,' or 'privatized' war.[150]

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[150] Reviewed in Duyvesteyn and Angstrom, *Rethinking the Nature of War*

One thing which is new about these nonstates, as opposed to their Clausewitzian forebears, is the global connectedness of these new actors: whether the group in question is a paramilitary group in Kenya, a pirate operation in Somalia, or a warlord in the Eastern DRC, it is transnational (i.e. global) exchanges of money, drugs, stolen goods, weapons, fighters, and military expertise which are critical in explaining how and why the group is able to continue its operations.[151] This all seems to support the post-Clausewitzian predictions about the increasing irrelevance of the state as the primary site of inquiry for understanding war.

In addition to this: while classic studies of insurgency and revolutionary undergrounds focused, as we have already seen, on rebel groups' gradual takeover of areas previously garrisoned by the state (e.g., via the establishment of 'liberated zones' under direct rebel control) we are nowadays more concerned with groups who exist despite the absence of an obvious 'liberated zone' or clear base of operations. Of course, this shift is partly because liberated zones and visible headquarters make for bad strategy in an era of drone warfare and precision-guided munitions (PGMs);[152] but in other cases, nonstates have simply found that some kinds of power (e.g. the economic power associated with access to alluvial diamonds) do not require constant administrative control over the areas these resources are derived from.[153] In these cases, the insurgents are free to adjust their 'front lines' to evade counterinsurgency efforts, without losing access to their sources of power. Given this, we might add to Mancur Olson's model of 'static'

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[151] van Schendel and Abraham, *Illicit Flows and Criminal Things*

[152] Remarks made during panel on 'Recent Trends in Foreign Fighter Source Countries and Transit Networks' at the Foreign Policy Research Initiative's Sept 2010 Conference on 'The Foreign Fighter Problem.,' Washington, DC.

[153] Thomas Dempsey, 'Counterterrorism In African Failed States: Challenges And Potential Solutions' (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, April 2006), p. 10-11

versus 'roaming' bandits[154] a third possible strategy: that of the 'semi-static' bandit, who is able to draw on a variety of sources of power, but is not forced to co-exist with them spatially in a way which would render the bandit permanently open to attack by competitors. A good example of this kind of relationship is a diaspora network: where, precisely, does one aim a PGM if one is trying to shut down an entire remittance system?[155]

All of this points to a change in the 'rules of the game' between states and nonstates. When states last excluded nonstates from war in Clausewitz's day, the kinds of territorialization required to exploit significant sources of power (e.g. agriculture, industry) heavily favored the bureaucracies and standing armies of the state. Competing political collectives (e.g. nonstates) either had to fight the state for territory, or be excluded from the institutions they were competing for – regardless of whether these institutions revolved around human or material resources. Significantly, the nonstates that held on the longest in this fight were the *maritime* nonstates (i.e. pirate bands), precisely because of the difficulties of establishing zones of control over diffuse resources such as shipping lanes.[156] But nowadays, globalization has made the entire world a 'shipping lane' in which nonstates can operate without needing to displace (and openly fight) states for territorial dominance.

It is therefore clear that one avenue for improving on the understanding of war in Africa, is to specifically focus on the relationships between states and nonstates at war. I review appropriate literature, and present my own alternative hypothesis, in what follows.

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[154] Mancur Olson, *Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships* (Oxford University Press, 2000)

[155] For an example of how difficult it is to target criminal finances without causing financial 'collateral damage,' see Roland Marchal, 'Somalia: A New Front Against Terrorism' (at http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/marchal/printable.html) for an examination of the US's freezing of the *Al-Barakat* banking network in Somalia.

[156] Janice E. Thomson, *Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 108

Proxy War

In this last section of Chapter 1, I want to examine an alternative to the various conceptions of war (and African wars) introduced above. This involves a resuscitation of a term developed in order to specifically refer to Cold War alliances[157] and somewhat incoherently applied ever since: *proxy war*. My use of this term is not intended to negate the various productive conceptions of and debates around war introduced above: I regard the works introduced above as crucial for understanding war, and war in Africa, but it must also be conceded that the focuses and concerns which each of them brings to the study of 'war,' do not necessarily make them appropriate to a new form – if indeed I can make the case that there is such.

The use of the term 'proxy,' in 'proxy war,' highlights what is particularly interesting about a prevalent form of multi-actor war in Africa, i.e. the existence of multiple levels of involvement by different kinds of actors. While many wars feature alliances or coalitions, when we specifically speak of a 'proxy war' I mean a war in which a party 'outside' the conflict (either spatially, politically, or both) pursues its own goals by attempting to influence the course or outcome of a contestation between local parties.[158] 'Proxy,' in these terms, is in fact a qualifier derived from the language of business, in which it is used to describe the factional behavior of shareholders within publically traded companies.[159]

I have chosen to only study proxy wars in which states are the sponsors of violence. I justify this move, i.e. what amounts to a 'statist' turn in my conception of war, as follows: when

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[157] William Safire, *Safire's Political Dictionary* (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 584

[158] This is the substance of Loveman's definition of a 'proxy war intervention,' to which I am not substantially opposed. C. Loveman, 'Assessing the phenomenon of proxy intervention,' *Conflict, Security and Development* (2002), pp. 29-48, p 30.

[159] Safire, *Idem*.

state actors contribute to a war and have a stake in that war's outcome, even if the war is not conducted using their regular forces and/or does not take place on their border(s), it seems pointless to insist that the fighting is a 'civil war' somehow distinct from 'interstate' war. As I have argued above, and will further elaborate in my analyses in Chapters 4 and 5, many of our conventions for coding and recognizing wars are built around notions derived from 19th century experiences of the state, war, and the state at war.

These rules are useful in some (perhaps even many) wars, and the fact that I consider them largely inapplicable to <u>hybrid</u> wars in Africa does not mean that I think they should be discarded wholesale. But we should also concede that they contribute, both methodologically and discursively, to an underrepresentation of the involvement of African states in war, either in pursuing their own aims albeit in non-conventional yet violent means, or as 'meddling hands' in promoting wars to further their own ambitions; this is the gap which I wish to mend. And I aim at closing this gap not only for theoretical and definitional reasons, but also because in undertaking a close scrutiny of the wars in Africa it became evident that there is a clear case to be made for multi-actor wars, exhibiting what could be called a hybrid form, i.e., war not according to Clausewitz's ideas, and not clearly instantiating any of his critics' views on war.

I also distance myself from any notion that to call something a 'proxy war' is to in any way to fundamentally remove agency from the nonstate intermediary. This debate has been a part of studies of proxy war from their outset, leading Bertil Dunér to suggest that 'military co-operation' is a better way of capturing the material support, power relations and shared interests moving between different agents involved in conflict with a shared enemy.[160]

However, it does not appear to be the case that by calling what one studies 'proxy war' one is forced to discard the buy-in of the 'proxy.' Indeed, Dunér, Kende, Loveman, Minter and

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[160] Bertil Dunér, *Military Intervention in Civil Wars: The 1970s* (Gower, 1985)

other theorists of covert inter-state warmaking have been able to proceed with their substantial examinations of so-called proxy wars without feeling the need to exhibit such reductionism.[161] One might even speculate that states sometimes serve revolutionaries, rather than the other way around: certainly, Cuba's revolutionaries dominated the imaginations of their Soviet patrons during the early years of this partnership.[162] In contemporary Africa, we have the case of the Chadian Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), a resilient and well-armed group who can in no way be said to be the 'puppets' of the unstable and under-strength Déby regime.

Thus, while it is empirically difficult to exclude the agency of the so-called 'proxy,' i.e. the local intermediary through whose actions the foreign intervener hopes to attain its goals, from any explanation of the war itself, I will simply treat this as a caution towards the importance of the relationship between the actors/agents involved in the war alliance, to any study of 'proxy war.' In other words, despite the centrality of state-vs.-state violence in my notion of what a proxy war entails, we cannot identify proxy wars only through the presence of meddling states: instead, we must identify them based on the existence of some kind of strategic partnership, variously configured, between a state external to the site of the fighting (the 'sponsor'), its local partner in violence in the site of the fighting (the 'proxy'), and the polity against which that violence is directed (the 'target').

I therefore approach the problematic of war in Africa with the following working definition of proxy war: that these are wars where (i) one or more states feature in the

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[161]Bertil Dunér, 'The Many-Pronged Spear: External Military Intervention in Civil Wars in the 1970s,' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1983; Kende, 'Wars of Ten Years (1967-1976)'; Loveman, 'Assessing the phenomenon of proxy intervention'; Minter, *Apartheid's Contras*

[162] Phillip Knightley and Peter Pringle, 'The Cuban Missile Crisis 1962: The world at death's door,' *The Independent*, (5 October 1992): 'The mystery of the [Cuban Missile Crisis] is: why did Khrushchev initiate it? One theory is that the Cuban revolution aroused a powerful sentiment in die-hard Bolshevik leaders. Anastas Mikoyan said: "We've been waiting all our lives for a country to go Communist without the Red Army. It's happened in Cuba and it makes us feel like boys again."'

confrontation, and (ii) at least one sovereign boundary is crossed – regardless of how many other

nonstate actors are also sponsored, involved, or co-opted through agreement with explicit goals.

<u>Drawing on three clusters of theories for an initial grasp of proxy wars in Africa</u>

Winrich Kuehne, head of the German Center for International Peace Operations, wrote in

his introduction to a March 2008 monograph on the role of armed movements in the Sudanese

conflict, that:

> The regionalization of the conflicts in the Greater Horn of Africa into a highly
> complex, interactive and disruptive system is caused by a variety of reasons, in
> particular:
>
> - increasing scarcity of land and water
> - tribalisation of conflicts due to competition for these resources, failing state
>   structures and manipulation of ethnic diversity for political purposes
> - discovery of raw material deposits, in particular oil, stretching across borders
> - the spill-over effect of the unsolved Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict into the region
>   exacerbating the efforts of Khartoum's strategy to use destabilisation as a
>   mean to ensure its dominance
> - and - last but not least - a galloping proliferation of armed militia and rebel
>   movements[163]

This statement highlights many of the well-worn assertions regarding unsanctioned wartime

partnerships between states and nonstates in Africa. In terms of the literature reviewed above, it

is apparent that Kuehne mixes interstate rivalry, ecological and identity-based conflict promoters

(such as water scarcity and tribalism), the presence of exploitable resources (oil, water) and an

argument about state failure (in respect of the 'galloping profusion' of nonstate groups). Some of

these I have already dealt with: the others (resources, state failure, and cross-border identity) I

will review in what follows, with an eye towards using them to inform my own formulation (i.e.,

'proxy war'). I also review three theoretical clusters that I do not consider productive avenues of

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[163] Gérard Prunier, 'Armed Movements in Sudan, Chad, CAR, Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia,' Center for
International Peace Operation (ZIF) February 2008

inquiry for understanding African multi-actor wars, i.e. studies of the domestic use of proxies, studies of military intervention, and studies of state-sponsored terrorism, and explain why these avenues are excluded from quantitative and qualitative assessment as rival hypotheses. Lastly, I examine the notion of the 'network' as a new kind of global actor; not because studies of networks specifically inform my interaction with the problem at hand, but because various trends in the evolution of war generally indicate the rise of networks as an important potential development in the wars of the future.

(a) The Resource Curse

It is axiomatic that rational actors seek available resources, and to say that war involves the violent pursuit of wealth and power, or attempts to maintain these, is similarly unproblematic. 'Resource curse' explanations of the role of state-nonstate partnerships in war focus on the capacity of the nonstate to go where the state cannot (for instance, into the territory of a rival) in order to extract these desired resources, or to provide cover for agents of the state to do so covertly.[164] The plunderers have access to or possess a cache of illegal goods, while states (or the corrupt elite which have captured them) have the capacity both to inject these goods onto the world markets, and to forge or fake registration certificates, statements of provenance, and end-user certificates such that the goods can go from being illegal, to being semi- or fully legal commodities capable of being sold on the global market.[165]

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[164] Michael L. Ross, 'What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?' *Journal of Peace Research* 41:337 (2004)

[165] Ian Smillie, 'Criminality and the Global Diamond Trade: A Methodological Case Study,' in van Schendel and Abraham, *Illicit Flows and Criminal Things*.

These relationships are held to be problematic because they produce a 'conflict economy' which depends on war to operate and, as such, gives the extractors an interest in prolonging the condition of state failure, civil war, or civil discord that gave them access to the resources in the first place.[166] Consequently, actors like Uganda and Guinea, who show willingness to process black-market goods derived from ongoing conflicts throughout Africa (and who thus serve, in terms of my analysis, as the state partners of the violent nonstate actors which extract these resources) have repeatedly been targeted for criticism and reproach by non- or inter-governmental organizations (NGOs or IGOs), who accuse them of perpetuating and exacerbating civil war and political repression.[167] In addition, it is worth noting that this kind of resource-based alliance partnership has at times provoked retaliation by the targeted state, spreading a 'local' conflict further afield. Angola, for instance, intervened in both Zaire and the Republic of Congo in order to topple regimes that had been selling diamonds on behalf of Angolan rebels.[168]

(b) State weakness and/or state failure

The second cluster of theories purporting to explain the role of state-nonstate partnerships in war, relate to the proliferation of <u>armed groups</u> in failed or failing states. In these theories, the

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[166] The choice for the plunderers is generally 'compete violently or be excluded,' as governments that *can* exert monopolies over easy-to-harvest goods like alluvial diamonds, tend to show little compunction in exercising deadly force in doing so. For a report on how the Zimbabwean security forces killed over 100 illegal miners during 'Operation You Would Never Go Back to the Diamond Fields,' see David Farira, 'Eerie Silence at Zimbabwe mine,' *BBC News (Africa)*, 4 December 2008. Retrieved online at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7761268.stm>. Even Namibia, peaceful as it is, has a *Sperrgebiet* ('Forbidden Zone') covering its coastal Diamond Area 1, within which travel without a permit, and unsanctioned prospecting, is strictly prohibited.

[167] For a collection of reports on this type of behavior by combatants in the DRC, see Global Witness, 'Natural Resources in Conflict,' accessed online at <http://www.globalwitness.org/pages/en/natural_resources_in_conflict.html>

[168] Assis Malaquias, 'Diamonds are a guerrilla's best friend: the impact of illicit wealth on insurgency strategy,' *Third World Quarterly* 22:3 (2001), pp. 311-325.

appearance of such groups simultaneously constitutes a strategic vulnerability for the state in which they operate, and for its neighbors.[169]

The explanations and predictions derived from theories focusing on the former condition (i.e. 'weak states have more available proxies') generally treat state weakness as an enabling rather than a causal factor in the establishment of violent state-nonstate partnerships; in other words, once the loss of the weak state's ability to maintain a coercive monopoly vis-à-vis armed groups results in a proliferation of violence-capable groups, this in turn opens the door to the establishment of partnerships between these nonstate actors and a range of foreign patrons. State failure and widespread violence, in these terms, not only expedites the creation of links between nonstates and states (by removing government border controls), but also incentivizes it (because the meddling state can serve as a broker for extracted goods and/or produce) and make it a necessity (because the failed state can no longer provide the collective good of security).

The second way in which these theories argue for a link between failed states and state-nonstate partnerships in war, is through the spillover effect or so-called 'bad neighborhood.'[170] In this depiction, states in chaos become 'Black Spots'[171] which threaten other states: for example, by providing a refuge for insurgent groups. Because of the difficulty of launching sanctioned interventions already discussed above, affected states then turn to into partnerships with sub-state factions who can serve as de facto border guards. From the neighbor's point of view, the border

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[169] 'Armed Violence Reduction identifies a number of significant emerging trends. Firstly, conflict and crime are increasingly linked. Secondly, levels of armed violence are a severe challenge in many non-conflict countries. Thirdly, increasing youth populations in the global South and the emergence of ungoverned urban spaces and youth gangs are a growing reality in many parts of the world. Alongside this, there are increasing links between local, national, regional and global security issues, for example through the trafficking of drugs, arms or people' http://www.oecd.org/document/21/0,3746,en_2649_33693550_42281877_1_1_1_1,00.html

[170] Nicholas Sambanis, 'Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1),' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45:3 (June 2001), p. 259-282

[171] Stanislawski, 'Para-States, Quasi-States, and Black Spots'

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zone is thus 'secured:' but this occurs at the cost of adding to the coercive power of an already-unrestrained nonstate intermediary in the weak or failing state.[172]

(c) Cross-Border Identities

The last cluster of theories pertaining to the establishment of state-nonstate partnerships in African war, has to do with the somewhat-nebulous issue of 'identity.' In part, theories focusing on identity stress affiliations which are stronger than the bonds of loyalty to the state, and which (consequently) Africans are willing to fight for or to defend.

What is new in the application of such theories to the kinds of state-nonstate partnership in war that I discuss here, is that these are transborder identities which simultaneously crosscut conflicting affiliations in both the intermediaries (who weigh their cross-border identity attachments more strongly than their civic duty to the state in which they reside) and the patrons (who value these same attachments enough for them to contravene sovereign conventions in their defense). In these theories, identity is also held to be salient in explaining why failed states, specifically, produce the kind of severe and transgressive violence (e.g. ethnic cleansing) most likely to draw in interveners; specifically, that as national bonds of civic identity weaken in favor of more contentious bonds such as tribe, race, or religion, violence becomes more extreme and human rights abuses become more commonplace. Identity-based interveners, in this latter case,

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[172] For an exemplary work on the links between internal discord and external conflict, see Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan, and Kenneth Schultz, 'Fighting at Home, Fighting Abroad: How civil Wars Lead to International Disputes', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52:4, pp. 479-506. Gleditsch at al recognize five different configurations between civil and interstate war: opportunism, diversion, externalism, intervention, and spillovers. These five divisions are compatible with my own scheme, and although Gleditsch et al use a different dataset to investigate the phenomenon of intervention, my findings that what I call proxy wars are the result of states knowingly pursuing political aims connected to the war, are congruous with their finding that interventions are not simply the result of 'increasing incentives to engage in militarized action on other issues' (p. 501).

are not only saving their fellow group members from generalized chaos, but from actual or incipient genocide.[173]

The three theory-clusters which I identified above (that is: resource curse theories, failed state theories, and cross-border identity theories), all address the role of states as <u>meddlers</u> in each other's internal wars, whether as patrons of criminal enterprise, interveners on behalf of co-ethnics, or self-interested stabilizers of their neighbors' unstable border regions. It is important to note that these three clusters, as well as those reviewed in Section C above, overlap with and draw on each other; in addition, they continue the divide between primarily state-focused explanations and primarily nonstate explanations which, I contend, can be found throughout war scholarship, from the broadest discussions of 'war' as such, to the specific question of why African states enter into military alliances with nonstates. These divisions are indicated in the following table:

Table 1.1 Resource Curse, Failed State and Cross-Border Identity Theory-Clusters

Primary motivation of the meddler is…	Applicable Theory-Cluster		
	Resource Curse	Failed State	Cross Border Identities
Personal or Neopatrimonial	(1) Greedy elites make illegal war profits through criminal links	(3) Weak states result in a proliferation of potential partners in personalistic violence	(5) Strong nonstate identities are more important than weak state ones
Institutional or 'For the State'	(2) Predatory states seize weak neighbors' resources by proxy	(4) States make cross-border security deals to protect themselves from weak neighbors	(6) States intervene on behalf of co-ethnics in neighboring states

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[173]Barry Posen, 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict'

(d) Exclusions

As previously mentioned on page xxiii, I exclude three particular kinds of state-nonstate partnership from my analysis by way of delineating what seems to be a prevalent form of war in Africa. These exclusions are the entirely domestic use of nonstate intermediaries, military alliances between states and nonstates within the context of sanctioned military interventions, and state-sponsored terrorism. I also conceptually distinguish proxy wars from 'civil wars with foreign intervention', even though the two categories share many empirical instances. I detail these moves below.

Domestic Use of Proxies

The use of nonstate intermediaries to stabilize troubled states is a well-researched phenomenon. P.W. Singer's book *Corporate Warriors* sums up many of these debates. For example, does the privatization of internal security help or harm states in terms of their eventual development of their own means to enforce the rule of law? Are private security companies the right kind of partners for (a) ending civil wars, and (b) reconstructing states? And, where does one draw the line between private security companies and 'mercenaries?'[174] Similar questions are asked for states that use (or resist the use of) less formally constituted intermediaries such as paramilitaries, religious movements, or self-defense units: how are the actions of these violent actors likely to affect the states and societies in which they operate?[175]

This debate provides not only an interesting window into the end of state monopolies on violence both globally and in Africa, but also indicates a pressing issue given the important roles envisioned for tribal actors in the eventual securitization of two of the world's most intensely-

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[174] P.W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors,* pp. 29-39

[175] Doxtader and Villa-Vicencio, *Through Fire With Water*, especially the sections dealing with Sierra Leone and the fate of the militarized *kamajor* hunting societies.

scrutinized conflict spaces, i.e., Iraq and Afghanistan.[176] However, discussions of how and why African states might partner with nonstate intermediaries to conduct domestic policy, and how and why they might partner with such groups outside their own borders, seem to exist on either side of a 'fork in the road.' If one is interested in internal accommodations – sometimes violent, sometimes not – one is faced with a different universe of cases than if one is interested (as I am) with incidents of inter-state violence involving intermediaries. I therefore exclude internal accommodations from the study to be conducted here.

Military Interventions

Turning to the second category of events to be excluded: these are those partnerships formed between foreign powers and nonstate actors, which take place <u>entirely</u> within the context of a sanctioned military intervention, i.e. the entry of military forces belonging to one state (or to an IGO like the UN), into the sovereign territory of another state, in pursuit of some broadly conceived 'legitimated purpose.'[177] It is this appeal for legitimacy that I use as the defining characteristic of intervention. Certainly, enough supposedly fair-minded interventions involve partnerships with nonstates: the Rwandan intervention in Zaire during the First Congo War,[178]

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[176] Dylan Craig, 'Lines in the Sand and the Instrumentality of War,' paper presented at the International Security Studies conference, Providence, RI (October 2010)

[177] This definition is far from the last word, as might be imagined given the ongoing debates around where and when global norms trump sovereignty, as in the ongoing crisis in Darfur. For a brief treatment of the terms of this debate, see Sean Murphy, *Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), pp. 11-18 (especially the footnotes on p.11).

[178] John Pomfret, 'Rwandans Led Revolt In Congo,' *Washington Post*, July 9 1997. Possibly alarmed at the world's response to his bellicose statements of Rwandan martial prowess during this interview ('[people] thought of Mobutu as a big monster who wouldn't be defeated, with his big hat and his big stick. They thought little Rwanda and big Zaire," Kagame said with a smile. "Only when we started did they look at the map and see the possibilities."'), Kagame issued a corrective a week later in which he downplayed Rwanda's role, giving most of the credit to the 'Congolese liberators' of Kabila's AFDL. See IRIN Emergency Update No. 212 on the Great Lakes (Wednesday 16 July 1997), accessed online at <http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin212.html>. See also Asteris Huliaras, '(Non)policies and (Mis)perceptions: The United States, France, and the Crisis in Zaire,' in Howard Adelman,

the Tanzanian invasion of Idi Amin's Uganda,[179] and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervention in Liberia[180] serve as clear examples. However, each of these intervention-alliances was able to successfully defend its presence in the conflict by means of international law: for instance, by means of a UN mandate, or in accordance with the sovereign right to self-defense. As I will demonstrate in Chapters 4 and 5, far fewer incidents of state meddling are accorded legitimacy than make an appeal for legitimacy; that is to say, attempts to wrap self-serving interventions in a cloak of legitimacy via terms such as 'intervention' are commonplace, and almost every meddler will claim a sovereign justification for its actions.[181]

Nonetheless, it is possible to make a rough distinction between regionally and/or internationally sanctioned interventions, which I exclude from analysis, and those widely regarded to be illegal, which I do not. As with the issue of domestic intermediaries, above, I make this exclusion because it seems to bring on board other issues (e.g. peacekeeping and the role of IGOs) than the ones I feel to be understudied in Africa. In other words, I discard intervention-alliances not because these are insignificant, but in the interest of sharpening my focus on state-nonstate partnerships for the purposes of African states at *war*.

Govind C. Rao (eds.), *War and peace in Zaire-Congo: analyzing and evaluating intervention, 1996-1997* (Africa World Press, 2003), especially pp. 283-286.

[179] Simon Chesterman, *Just War or Just Peace: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law* (Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 77-79

[180] Wentworth Ofuatey-Kodjoe, 'Regional Organisations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia,' *International Peacekeeping*, 1:3 (Autumn 1994), p. 263

[181] This was certainly the case around the 2003 invasion of Iraq by a 'Coalition of the Willing.' Arundhati Roy, for example, referred to this coalition as the 'Coalition of the Bullied and the Bought,' and other commentators were equally uncharitable. These critics were attempting to contest the US's claim that the *multilateralism* of the war against Iraq meant that it was therefore *legitimate*; this is the kind of contestation which I argue that all interventions must face, but which not all interventions are able to overcome. See James A. Swanson, *The Bush league of nations: the coalition of the unwilling, the bullied and the Bribed*, (e-book: Lulu.com, 2008), pp. 99-100

State-Sponsored Terrorism

Proxy war in Africa, as I show in Parts II and III of this dissertation, has an inarguably revolutionary cast, in that the aims of the belligerents (either for the sponsor, the proxy, or both) generally include a stark revision of the political authority of the target state. Sometimes, this revision involves the exclusion of the target state's sovereign rule from a secessionist province; at other times, it involves an attempt to depose the target state regime entirely, usually in order to place the proxy in power in their stead. This must be contrasted with state-sponsored terrorism, where the primary goals of sponsors and terrorists may have less to do with revising the political authority of the target state, than simply with attempting to *alter* these policies through acts of violence against its constituents. The presence of a feedback system between the aggrieved civilian victims of terrorist violence, and the decision-makers of the targeted government, is crucial in explaining why SST is used at all; indeed, as Robert Pape has pointed out, the polity-type of states on the receiving end of terrorism may be one of the best predictors available for forecasting what kinds (and levels) of terror are employed against these states.[182]

In the case of Africa, however, we find (in contrast to other regions of the world) relatively few *non-revolutionary* terror campaigns since World War 2.[183] Most likely, this is because of the complex nature of state-society relations on the continent. Given that acts of terror depend on the aforementioned feedback system between civilian victims and governmental power-holders, such that attacks against the civilians place pressure on the government to (for example) change or ameliorate its policies, one would expect (*vide* Pape) terrorism to be most

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[182] Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (Gibson Square, 2006)

[183] This state of affairs is (arguably) coming to an end since the appearance of Al Qaida in Africa; but even here, the target of Al Qaida's most spectacular attacks in Africa have not been African electorates, but the United States. For more on this trend in Africa and elsewhere, see Adrian Guelke, *Terrorism and Global Disorder: Political Violence in the Contemporary World* (I.B. Tauris, 2006).

effective in media-saturated polities with a responsive electoral system; but this is precisely the opposite kind of environment found in most African states for much of the last 60 years. African states, as illiberal democracies or outright autocracies, have thus proved to be a poor target for terrorism.[184]

None of this means that PWs do not involve the spread of terror, nor does it mean that SST organizations do not occasionally seek to rule, or find rulership (perhaps unexpectedly) within their grasp. However, the examination I have conducted in this chapter, both in terms of *defining* war and SST, and in terms of my assessment of the *scarcity of terrorism* in the African historical record, suggests that for Africa at least, the phenomena of state-sponsored terrorissm and PW are separate enough that not including state-backed terror campaigns (e.g. Libyan sponsorship of the Palestine Liberation Organization) in the Events List is both methodologically and theoretically defensible.[185]

Concluding Comments

In concluding this review of the varied types of scholarly literature that can be applied to the study of multi-actor wars, I wish to make a few remarks about the 'network as actor' in war studies generally.[186] This is not because transnational and/or subnational networks are necessarily held to be crucial in explaining proxy war.[187] Instead, I mention them here because of

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[184] Even at its highest point in the early 1990s, incidents of terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa accounted for only one out of every 9 terror incidents worldwide – this despite Africa holding a quarter of the world's states and one sixth of its population. Source: START Global Terrorism Database (http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/)

[185] Certainly, I envision a prominent role for a more in-depth discussion of the differences between SST and PW in follow-up work to this dissertation.

[186] Duffield, Mark 'War as a Network Enterprise: The New Security Terrain and its Implications,' *Cultural Values* 6:1 (2002), pp. 153-165

[187] Neither are their status as networks held to be irrelevant; but even works which specifically address the networked proxy, such as Idean Salehyan, *Rebels Without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics*

the growing weight of scholarship which is concerned with exploring how warfare involving networks – distributed, amorphous organizations composed of interdependent nodes rather than hierarchical institutions – is different from previous forms of warfare.

In general, these differences are held to fall into two categories. <u>First</u>, as we have seen in the work of Kaldor, networked coalitions of actors are thought to respond to different *casus belli* than states – responding more strongly, for example, to the call of identity rather than the call to exert or maintain geopolitical dominance. <u>Second</u>, wars involving networks are thought to produce different strategic environments than wars fought either by existing states, or by nascent ones (e.g., rebels who are attempting to become the state). These differences are not the sole preserve of networks – states not only <u>can</u>, but (according to some analyses) <u>must</u> learn to fight in the same way[188] – but they do change the way that actors, for example, treat the importance of holding territory in war.

Combining these perceived differences in war during the era of the network, and acknowledging the possibility that even states may start mimicking networks in this regard, leads to the conclusion that the role of actors other than the state in defining war is of growing importance in war studies. I have shown in this chapter, the slow drift of war studies from recognizing war only when it was fought between states (interstate and extrasystemic wars), to acknowledging that war could also be fought for the state (interstate war) or within and despite the state (state failure). What an awareness of the role of networks suggests is that contemporary models and theories of war should make some space, if only speculatively, for the possibility of

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(Cornell University Press, 2009), primarily see the 'networked' dimension of these groups as a constitutive feature of what he calls transnational rebels or TNRs, rather than as a condition applying not only to these actors, but also to their state sponsor(s) and the geopolitical configurations of the environment in which these exist. In this regard, my own model of the 'sovereign interstice' (see Chapter 10) takes the concept of the network one step further.

[188] Stanley A McChrystal, It Takes a Network: The new front line of modern warfare', *Foreign Policy* (March/April 2011), accessed online at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/it_takes_a_network (Nov 28, 2011)

the complete exclusion of the state as a critical element of wars fought between networks. States may still fight war, but the presence of violence-capable networks (who do not seek to become states) in these wars should thus prompt the question: how should we understand 'war' if we wish to include both states and networks under this term?

How is a 'Civil War' different from a 'Proxy War'?

In any social-scientific project, various analytic decisions – delineations of what to study, and how – must be made if the complex, undeniably multivariate nature of social processes (such as war) is to be modeled in a sufficiently abstract manner to allow its methodical study. These delineations, in turn, are governed (i.e., defended) through reference to methodological principles, and expedited (i.e., made productive) by the use of specific methods.

While I will return to these considerations in detail in Chapter 2 and elsewhere, one aspect of the conceptual delineations upon which my thesis rests merits special discussion here, because it has to do with distinguishing the focus of this dissertation from other, equally valid delineations. This is necessary in order to explain to the reader what this dissertation is not: i.e., that it is not a new explanation of 'why civil wars happen in Africa'. Rather, it is an explanation of 'why African states employ proxies.' These two questions are related, and their answers interwoven – civil wars give sponsors the opportunity to intervene, and the presence of proxies produces civil war – but they are better conceived of as *complementary* accounts of the same (complex, multivariate) phenomenon, than rivals.

As Vasquez points out,[189] 'war' can be both a noun and a verb, depending on the language. Similarly, the study of war as an IR process can select its unit of analysis in at least two ways: war as a *policy* (verb) or war as an *event* (noun). Contemporary war scholarship,

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[189] Vasquez, *The War Puzzle*, p. 38-40

especially since war's drift from being treated as the 'final argument of kings' and an acceptable tool of statecraft, to it's being treated as a dysfunction of the liberal world order, has tended to favor the latter encapsulation; after all, few states now will admit to the kind of relish which surrounded war in von Clausewitz's day and before, and more will describe war as something unfairly forced upon them by factors outside their control. Thus, the unit of our study more often becomes 'The Vietnam War,' i.e. an event in which the actions of (more or less willing) belligerents is showcased, rather than 'American foreign policy in Vietnam, 1961-73,' i.e. a set of policies which produced (among other things) a war in Vietnam. Certainly, very good exceptions to this trend exist; but the constraints of the dataset model mean that broad surveys of multiple wars involving multiple belligerents can be conducted most easily by seeing wars as (quantifiable) events, while the work of connecting policy to (violent) practice is confined to the single-case or single-administration studies of historians and political biographers.

From this state of affairs flows the need to typologize wars: scholars are interested in different kinds of violence, of course, and thus 'war' as a single type of event is broken up into multiple types of event spread across a variety of axes. Because our models of war (both as policy and as event) bear the imprint of the dominant sociopolitical structures during the time that these models were created, our typologies in turn duly reflect these; and hence, we (more or less uncritically) sort wars into 'intrastate', 'interstate', and so on, before going on to generalize about their correlates and theorize about their mechanisms.

I discuss the problems inherent in the use of preexisting notions of the 'state at war' as a basis for such typologies in Chapter 9, but to return to the distinction between 'studies of civil war' and the 'study of proxy war' which I conduct here: it is undeniable that, whatever the status and merit of such delineations, the studies which rely upon them are constrained in what they can

say about factors external to the affected state – for example, pertaining to the intervention of third parties. Primarily, this is a problem of endogeneity; so, for example, if we study civil wars and find that co-religionist interveners are a prominent feature of these wars, some ways of trying to investigate this feature would court an endogeneity bias, while others would not. Specifically: if our study remains focused on correlations operating within the war event under examination, we would have no problem, as events – things which do or do not take place – construct their own antithesis by definition (e.g., in the case of civil war, flagging certain years as 'war years' constructs the rest of the available years as non-war). Thus the correlation between 'presence of co-religionist neighbors' and 'presence of civil war' can be duly assessed either longitudinally or cross-sectionally, and found to favor one interpretation ('states in which a vulnerable minority could count on co-religionist support were at a higher risk for civil war') or another.

However, if we were to turn our gaze from the event in question to the policies of the (supposed) co-religionist intervener, and thereby attempt to conclude that religion motivates intervention in the civil wars of other states, this conclusion would be immediately confronted by the possibility of an endogeneity bias: we would, in effect, be studying the wrong sample of events and potentially drawing spurious inferences there from. To bypass this, we would need to broaden our study to include non-intervening co-religionists, intervening non-co-religionists, and so on. Indeed, we would need to look not only at civil wars – an event for which a range of coding schemes and operationalizations exist – but at entirely peaceful relationships too (the 'dogs that did not bark'[190]) before we could assess whether religious states are more likely to

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[190] David Collier introduces the notion of a 'dog that does not bark' to illustrate the problems associated with endogeneous research design; the metaphor is drawn from the famous Sherlock Holmes story, 'Silver Blaze', in which the *absence* of barking by guard dogs is *incorrectly* used to confirm the hypothesis that no intruder could have entered a particular garden to commit a crime. In fact, it is the *presence* of silent dogs – not the absence of barking

intervene than non-religious ones, even if we found that a majority of civil wars featured religious interveners. Put simply, a correlation stretching one way does not imply a correlation stretching the other way; for this, a new focus is required. Hence, in this project, I am explaining not civil war but proxy war, even though many civil wars are also proxy wars, and even though all proxy wars are also civil wars.

ones - which provides the key clue: the intruder was known to the dogs, i.e. was not a stranger. See Collier, 'Process Tracing: Introduction and Exercises', supplement to Henry E. Brady and David Collier, *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH DESIGN

<u>Introduction</u>

Lewis Richardson can be thought of as the founding father of modern conflict studies. An aeronautical engineer by profession, Richardson's own work only attained its full prominence in the field of international relations after his death in 1953, when his two major works, <u>Arms and Insecurity and Statistics of Deadly Quarrels</u>,[191] were both posthumously edited together from manuscripts left in his estate.

Richardson's conclusions regarding trends in war will not be detailed here.[192] Instead, what I wish to underline about Richardson's work is the way in which his methods for war enumeration, and then Quincy Wright's continuation of these, have fixed <u>war-deaths</u> and <u>dyadic measurements</u> as the standards for conflict studies datasets ever since. For example, Wright and Richardson's influence is to be found in the largest war-studies database of our time: Melvin Small and David Singer's <u>Correlates of War</u> project. Singer and Small built their initial 1972 dataset directly from the 300 conflicts recognized by Richardson, as well as the entries in Appendix B of Wright's <u>A Study of War</u>.[193]

Because of this line of descent, typical conflict data sets[194] are coded in terms of combatant dyads, and derive their classification of wars from the two primary actors involved, in terms of whether these are both states ('interstate war'), one state and one sub-state faction

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[191] In addition, Wright found considerable congruence between Richardson's statistical assessments and mathematical expressions of trends in war, and his own historically-based comparative work. In 21 footnotes scattered throughout the twelve-page editor's introduction, Wright references his own work eighteen times in support of Richardson's various conclusions.

[192] Wright summarizes these in ix-xii of the editor's introduction.

[193] Vasquez, *The War Puzzle*, 26-7

[194] E.g. Correlates of War, MIDs, UCDP-PRIO, and other widely used datasets.

('intrastate war') or one state and one political unit not possessing sovereign status ('extrasystemic war').[195] This primary-actor format does not lend itself to capturing the complexities of third-party intervention into conflicts, and is part of the reason why (as discussed in Chapter 1) we under-represent states at war in Africa.

As an example, in a war taking place between a government of a given state (A) and a foreign-backed rebel group (B) within A's own territory; based on the primary dyad (i.e. A vs. B, or government vs. rebels) this conflict would be expressed as a 'civil war;' and this, while remaining true to the incompatibility between some of the combatants involved, downplays the role of third-party meddling hands. Comprehensive attention to historical data on African wars may correct this problem over time,[196] but for now our in-depth studies of interventions by <u>African</u> states tend to focus on single conflicts[197] (and thus lack continental scope), while studies with an adequately continental scope tend to be preoccupied with the <u>super-power interventions</u> associated with the Cold War, and hence lack a perspective from which to comment on why <u>African</u> states might favor such tactics – if indeed they do.[198]

These shortcomings in quantitative (i.e., dyadic) assessments of African data are common to most available datasets. However, the particular format used by the UCDP-PRIO dataset proved most receptive to my efforts to correct for this hypothesized bias, because its coding rules allow for the roles of incumbent and opposition supporters (such as foreign interveners) to be

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[195] See Meredith Reid Sarkees, Frank Whelon Wayman, J. David Singer, 'Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-State Wars: A Comprehensive Look at Their Distribution over Time, 1816-1997,' *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Mar., 2003), pp. 49-70

[196] I return to this idea in Chapter 6.

[197] For example, Minter, *Apartheid's Contras*

[198] For example, Piero Gleijeses, 'Moscow's Proxy? Cuba and Africa 1975 – 1988,' *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 8:4 (Fall 2006); Edward George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale* (Frank Cass, 2005); Andrew Harder, '"Make Them Bleed:" Shortcomings of US Covert Operations in Afghanistan, 1980-1989,' *Swords and Ploughshares* 15:2 (Spring 2006).

captured for each conflict. Truncating the UCDP-PRIO list to include only African wars started what amounted to an extensive scrutiny of multiple data sources to check and re-check the actors involved in African wars; this led to the construction of a new data set (see Appendix A), as already mentioned. I clarify this process below. Indeed, what this stage of the research made clear is that <u>wars featuring multiple combatants across multiple sites of conflict</u> (e.g. in more than one state) are overrepresented in the African war record. Of the 25 most serious (i.e. longest and most casualty-producing) wars fought in independent Africa, <u>all 25</u> featured one or more external intervener(s).[199]

In <u>The State, War, and the State of War</u>, Kalevi Holsti defends his own use of multiple data sources to construct a new war list as follows:

> The list of wars … [errs] if anything on the side of caution … [for example], it does not include limited armed interventions. What is important from these figures is not the precision of details, but the broad pattern that emerges. If we were to add or delete a few more cases, the percentages would not change significantly.[200]

Holsti's sentiments in this regard seem worth noting before outlining my own efforts in constructing a new data set.

Before concluding this introduction, however, it is worth noting that the research design I adopt for this study is best characterized as a <u>case study</u> in the terms outlined by Gerring:[201] i.e. an 'in-depth study of a single unit (a relatively bounded phenomenon) where the scholar's aim is

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[199] Dylan Craig, 'Other People's Wars: The African Proxy War in Theory and Practice,' Paper presented at the International Studies Association conference (New Orleans, LA), February 2010

[200] Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of* War, p. 21

[201] John Gerring 'What is a Case Study and What is It Good for?' *American Political Science Review*, 9:2 (May 2004), p.342

to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomena.'[202] For Gerring, the method of <u>data analysis</u> used for a case study is a separate issue from the research design as such, with the former being tied (at best) only to the kind of questions asked and the data available for answering these. To call something a 'case study' is thus not to preclude the use of quantitative assessments; Gerring takes pains to point out that 'one cannot substitute case study for qualitative, ethnographic, or process-tracing without feeling that something has been lost in translation.' (p. 342). The research design I propose is therefore best described as a case study, using mixed methods of data analyses. I expand on this below.

Creating A New Data Set of Multi-Actor Wars

The phenomenon of interest in the present study is the prevalence of multi-actor wars in Africa, and PWs in particular; the data set I constructed involves 47 states, 101 Proxy Relationships (PR = sponsor + target + proxy), and 27 conflicts (see Appendix B). The aim in examining these cases is, after Gerring, to 'elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomena,' i.e., African war, modern war, or merely wars in Africa after independence.

Creating a new data set for this study culminated in a fusion of the Uppsala Conflict Database Project's <u>Armed Conflict Dataset</u> (UCDP),[203] Kristian Gleditsch's modified *Correlates of War* dataset (COW),[204] and the Brecher and Wilkenfield 'Crisis Events' dataset for Africa,[205] and proceeded as outlined below.

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[202] *Idem.*, p. 341.

[203] Project homepage: http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/

[204] Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, 'A Revised List of Wars Between and Within Independent States, 1816-2002,' *International Interactions* 30 (2004),

[205] Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfield, *A Study of Crisis* (University of Michigan Press, 1997)

I began with the most recent (2009) release of the UCDP conflict dataset. This global dataset includes 260 conflicts, split up into 1957 dyad-year observations between 1946 and 2008. A dyad is included if at least 25 battle deaths resulted from fighting between the actors involved in that year. Dyads are clustered together in discrete 'conflicts' based on the *casus belli*. Because of the dataset's coding rules, at least one of the actors in any dyad (the government of the affected territory) is always a state.

Restricting the dataset to only those conflicts occurring in Africa reduced the dataset to 576 dyadic observations spanning 80 conflicts. I then further reduced the dataset to only wars involving three or more actors, regardless of whether these were states or nonstates (e.g. rebel groups). The UCDP dataset distinguishes between the following kinds of actors: the government of the territory at war (Column A), those fighting alongside the government (Column A2, which I call 'incumbent support'), the main opposition to the government (Column B), and those fighting alongside the opposition (Column B2, which I call 'opposition support'). The opposition between A and B is the basis of each observed conflict dyad year (CDY). To meet my criteria for inclusion, a conflict had to feature either (a) at least one dyad in which an actor appeared in Column A2 or B2, or (b) multiple actors in Column B (which I call an 'opposition alliance'). This step excluded 35 wars, accounting for 81 CDY, from the sample. The remaining dataset thus comprised 45 wars, accounting for 495 CDY.

Following this, I used the COW dataset to sort the remaining conflicts by intensity, i.e. highest level of annual fatality reached. I distinguished those wars with 1000 battle deaths in any single year during their entire duration, from those that never reached this level of fatality. This split the dataset into 25 high-intensity multi-actor wars accounting for 406 CDY, and 20 low-intensity multi-actor wars accounting for 89 CDY. Reviewing the data at this point suggested

that this step had also served to sort long-duration conflicts from shorter ones, i.e. that intensity and duration seem to be positively correlated. This, in turn, suggested that the 25 high-intensity multi-actor wars are the most significant ones for the study of warfare in Africa in general. Having excluded 55 of Africa's 80 violent conflicts since 1946, the fact that the remaining 25 conflicts account not only for the majority (70%) of observed CDY, but also the most high-fatality ones, argues in favor of demarcating these 25 conflicts as a good place to start the proposed study.

To the culled UCDP/COW data I added Brecher and Wilkenfield's list of African 'crises.' This added 30 events to the list. These were added because Brecher and Wilkenfield's definition of a crisis[206] includes such events as attempted coups, revealed plots, and failed raids; which did not generate enough battlefield deaths to merit inclusion under the UCDP coding rules, but which were nonetheless instances of violent state action by means of nonstate actors. In other words, they were the kinds of events with which I am concerned; however, including these also served the purpose of diversifying the sample of conflicts under study in terms other than my own conception of proxy wars. In other words: adding crises to the list of recognized wars served to sketch the population of events for which any theory of African war must account. It therefore serves to guard against the problem of endogeneity.

Lastly, I compared the new list (UCDP + COW + Crisis) against a 40-item list of 'proxy-war type events' generated by a broad search of secondary literature on African wars since

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[206] 'There are two defining conditions of an international crisis: (1) a change in types and/or an increase in intensity of disruptive, that is hostile verbal or physical interactions between two or more states, with a heightened probability of military hostilities; that, in turn (2) destabilizes their relationship and challenges the structure of an international system … [in] terms of formal logic, these are **necessary and sufficient** conditions: that is, a crisis follows whenever they occur, and whenever a crisis erupts it must be preceded by them…' *A Study of Crisis*, p. 4

1954,[207] while simultaneously cleaning the events-list thus constructed by removing duplicates, folding crises into parent conflicts, collapsing separately coded and recurring conflicts into single extended conflicts, and removing all multi-actor wars which did not feature any African sponsors). This 'cleaning' of the data produced a final list of 27 discrete conflicts spanning 64 years of African history (1954-2010),[208] and featuring 101 unique PRs all involving a sponsor, proxy, and target. See Appendix A for the first generation data set, and Appendix B for the list of wars included for analysis.

I made three decisions regarding this coding: first, on occasions when a proxy organization split or fragmented, I considered the PR to be 'shared' by all factions which continued to cooperate militarily with the sponsor. This prevented conflicts in which the nonstate actors exhibited considerable dynamism without ever changing sides (e.g., Rwanda's allies in the eastern DRC) from generating multiple PRs within the data set. Second, I elected to count the South African and Rhodesian regimes as 'African' states, despite their settler minority governments. Third, I elected to use decades as the primary periodization of each PR and PW.

As I discuss in Chapter 6, this was in part a necessary response to the often-unclear conditions under which PRs begin and sometimes end, such that it is not always clear whether (for example) South Africa had established military links with Angolan rebel groups as early as 1974, or whether this only took place in 1975. However, it also allowed me more latitude in my use of CINC (i.e., re-periodized COW National Military Capability) scores as a proxy variable for military capability. Put simply, a finer resolution on CINC scores for states at war (e.g., per

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[207] Dylan Craig, 'Ultima Ratio Regum, Remix or Redux? State Security Policy and Proxy Wars in Self-Governing Africa,' *Strategic Insights*, 9:1 (Spring/Summer 2010)

[208] To clarify this: the first recorded PR begins in 1954, giving my record of PRs a timespan of 1954-2011. However, because of the periodization of variables into decades, the events list itself runs from 1950-2010. Last, the three wars studied as tokens of the proxy war type (Part III) run from 1971 to the present.

year instead of per decade) would have brought up a 'chicken-egg' problem: do states that become sponsors or targets have higher/lower CINC scores overall, or is this simply because of (i) their response to military necessity, or (ii) their loss of men and material on the battlefield? By averaging out CINC scores per decade, I was able to derive a single assessment for a state's overall military capacity for each decade of its existence, and overcome the problem of spikes in capacity caused by fresh outbreaks of violence. I discuss this further below.

Quantitative Analyses of Events List

My initial interactions with the event list made it clear that I would be requiring two *kinds* of variable in order to conduct the kinds of examination I had in mind for each PR. First, I would need traditional contextual variables relating to the actors in the conflict; these variables were theory-independent, in that they did not pertain to the causal mechanisms of the hypothesis I intended to investigate (states exploit geopolitical conditions to secure resources and eliminate rivals). I used a variety of existing datasets to create these theory-independent contextual variables; I detail this process further below.

The second kind of variable I needed to interact with the events list were variables which described each PR in terms of: (i) its chronological juxtaposition with the (often larger) conflict within which it took place, i.e., did it predate/postdate this conflict; (ii) the coherence in proxy and sponsor objectives in the PR; and (iii) its outcome in terms of whether either, both, or neither the sponsor and proxy achieved their objectives.

Regarding the three wars submitted to historical-comparative analysis, suffice it to illustrate the dynamics as follows: Libya's sponsorship of the National Liberation Front of Chad

(FROLINAT)[209] during the Toyota Wars indicated a 'lagging, symbiotic, dual-failure' PR, while Somalia's sponsorship of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) in Ethiopia was a 'leading, symbiotic, proxy-sacrifice' PR. Furthermore, these three variables allowed me to sort the 101 PRs which I identified into clusters, and to begin to examine the kinds of covariance[210] to be found between different constituent elements of the PRs.

I elected to use a combination of descriptive statistics (for the theory-dependent variables mentioned above) and statistical inference (for the theory-independent variables) to test my data. This meant that each entry (i.e., each row in the dataset) would have 13 variables (columns). Six of these variables were subdivided by decade, as already discussed. In addition, each state (whether a sponsor, proxy, or neither during this period) was indicated in separate rows, thus, permitting an examination of the covariance between unit-level characteristics (i.e., those applying to the sponsors and targets alone, rather than to their individual PRs).

This led to the following list of entries on each of the 148[211] rows in the dataset:

1. Name of state, e.g., <u>Algeria</u> (47 unique states listed)
2. <u>Proxy</u> involved, e.g. <u>POLISARIO</u> (69 unique proxies listed)
3. Location, e.g. Western Sahara (31 unique locations listed)
4. Highest Level of Sponsor Support given in this PR (Dunér's Levels 1-5)
5. Mean CINC score (per decade)
6. Was State A Sponsor During this Period? (per decade)
7. Was State a Target During This Period? (per decade)
8. Overseas Direct Assistance (ODA) this period (per decade)
9. Minorities at Risk During This Period (per decade)
10. Aftermath (theory-dependent variable: did the war result in changes of political authority, territorial integrity, or economic status for any of the states involved?)

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[209] See Appendix C for a list of all abbreviations used in this dissertation.

[210] 'All empirical evidence of causal relationships is covariational in nature. A purported cause and effect must be found to covary. They must appear and disappear, wax and wane, or perform some other transformation in tandem or at some regular, more or less predictable, intervals. Even where this covariation is imagined, as in a counterfactual thought experiment, the evidence we imagine is of a covariational sort. Conversely, the absence of such covariation is taken as disconfirming evidence.' Gerring, 'What is a case study?,' p. 342.

[211] 47 state-only rows, 101 rows for PRs

11. Typological Assessment (theory-dependent variable: fit, partnership, and outcome)
12. Lootability (per decade).
13. Contiguous? (for each PR, were the sponsor and target geographically contiguous)

In Gerring's terms, then, the entries for each case are the <u>variables</u> and the cells (columns X rows) thus constitute <u>observations</u>.[212] Each observation was derived from existing data, whether this was already in dataset form (for Variables 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, and 12), present in secondary sources (2, 6, 7), or qualitative assessment by the author (4, 10, 11).

I go into more detail on the derivation of these observations in Chapters 4 and 5. However, to briefly outline this here: for 'sponsor support' I used Bertil Dunér's 5-level scheme for 'instruments and levels of involvement' in military intervention;[213] for 'lootability' as a proxy for the presence of <u>lootable resources</u> in the target state, I used World Bank World Development Index (WDI) data;[214] and for state military capacity (as a proxy for state 'weakness'), I used the aforementioned COW NMC dataset.[215] The remainder of the data was hand-coded.

<div align="center">Qualitative Analysis of Three Wars</div>

After having constructed the data set and some initial testing of my intuitions regarding multi-actor wars, I was in a position to select three significant wars for qualitative analysis. I

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[212] John Gerring (May 2004). 'What is a Case Study and What is It Good for?' *American Political Science Review*, 9(2), p.342. He writes: 'I propose to define the case study as an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of similar units. A unit connotes a spatially bounded phenomenon - e.g., nation-state, revolution, political party, election, or person - observed at a single point in time or over some delimited period of time. (Although the temporal boundaries of a unit are not always explicit, they are at least implicit),' Gerring refers to King, Keohane and Verba (pp.76-77) for a similar understanding of the term 'unit.'

[213] Dunér, 'The Many-Pronged Spear'

[214] World Bank Development Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators

[215] Correlates of War National Material Capabilities (NMC)
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/nmc3-02.htm

performed in-depth, comparative-historical examinations of the three selected wars, viz.: the 'Toyota Wars' in Chad, the 'Border War' in Southern Africa, and the 'Somali Vortex' in the Horn of Africa. The outputs of these three examinations, which I refer to here as 'historical narratives,'[216] were used to achieve two main goals.

First, these narratives served to provide a qualitative foil to the quantitative analyses (and vice versa), inasmuch as the conclusions derived from each could be checked against the conclusions derived from the other. This proved important in, for example, assessing whether the presence of plunder was best understood as a co-occurring factor, or as an enabling, causative factor in proxy war. Second, while the quantitative analysis was an appropriate tool for determining <u>patterns</u> in the data and for assessing the challenge posed to my hypothesis by three rival accounts of wartime partnerships, the problem of endogeneity[217] meant that I could not use a dataset *of* proxy wars (because all multi-actors wars in my event list are proxy wars, by my definition) to answer questions about the *causes* of proxy war. I therefore adopted a complementary, but non-dataset based approach (i.e. the historical narratives) to guide my investigation of <u>why</u> proxy war broke out in each of the three cases, and to speculate about the causal dynamics at play. This is the topic of the final chapter of this dissertation.

Further to this point: I selected the three wars because they showed different configurations on what appeared (from my initial review of the wars included in the list, and the qualitative data) to be key explanatory variables of proxy war: specifically, they varied in terms

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[216] As Samuel Clemens put it: ' … a narrative was simply a statement of consecutive facts ….' Samuel Clemens, *Autobiography of Mark Twain*, 100th Anniversary Newly Edited and Commented Edition, edited by Albert Bigelow Paine (Literary Classics Press, 2010)

[217] Gary King, Robert O. Koehane, and Verba Sindney. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton University Press, 1994)

of specific dynamics between how the sponsor(s), target(s) and proxies involved in a war.[218] I detail this process below (Section C), and then take up the actual 'typological analyses,' which capture these dynamics in Chapters 4 and 5.[219]

<div align="center">Concluding Comments</div>

In conclusion, allow me to note that the process of creating the data for this examination of proxy war was neither entirely smooth, nor entirely unidirectional. Some variables (such as 'Aftermath') were intended to form more central elements of the eventual analysis than they ended up being. Furthermore, as patterns became apparent in the narratives, this argued for different tests to be run on the quantitative data. This back-and-forth between data and method, also data and theory and observations and the import of these, however, is entirely appropriate for an investigative project in which an underspecified phenomenon is simultaneously being delineated and subjected to a case-study-based examination. Gerring, in this vein, reminds us that a 'good deal of authorial intervention is necessary in the course of defining a case study topic, for there is a great deal of evidential leeway.'[220]

Lastly, as Holsti's defense of the (at times, Sisyphean) task of dataset construction with which this chapter began reminds us, the point is not to produce the 'perfect' dataset – for no such dataset exists. Rather, it is to make as good progress as one can in uncertain conditions, before proceeding to the more important task of making sense of the phenomenon at hand. It is to this task which I now turn.

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[218] *Ibid.*, p. 139. In terms of King, Keohane and Verba's account, mine is an 'intentional observation selection' approach.

[219] For a further examination of this variant of the Millsian 'method of difference' and its antecedents in qualitative research, see James Mahoney, Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative Appraisal in Macrocausal Analysis,' *American Journal of Sociology*, 104:4 (January 1999): 1154–96

[220] Gerring, 'What is a Case Study?'

PART II:

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES OF THE EVENTS LIST

In this section, in Chapter 3, I start by examining what can and cannot be said about the multi-actor wars included in the Events List from the perspective of three prominent theory-clusters: 'resource curse', 'failed states', and 'cross-border identities'. These rival theses provide some point of entry, if not quite a benchmark upon which my alternative conception has to improve[221] in order to meet the criterion of productive scholarship. I believe that there is much about these theories that is useful in understanding particular multi-actor wars; however, each fails in some more or less significant degree to describe and explain the patterns in multi-actor wars in general. It is here that my ideas about 'proxy war' have a chance to improve on existing scholarship; more about this shortly.

In Chapters 4 and 5, I undertake a quantitative analysis of key questions regarding the wars under study. I utilize descriptive statistics and statistical testing[222] via SPSS to investigate various patterns on the Events List (Appendix B). Central to this examination is the question: what about PW makes it an important concept for explaining war in independent Africa? Or, to ask the same question in a different way: which aspects of African war are more effectively thrown into relief by a notion like 'proxy war,' than by other available theoretical constructs? Furthermore, what is the theoretical scope of proxy war both as a description and as an explanation of the wars under study? In answer to these questions, Chapters 4 and 5 will serve to fill out the view of PW as 'war' both in terms of the number of casualties and according to the

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[221] That is, include more data about the wars, and/or achieve a level of explanation that includes FS, RC, and CBI as contributing factors to these wars.

[222] I used two-tailed Pearson Correlations and a 5% level of significance throughout.

age-old aims and ambitions of war;[223] and second, that it is a strategy of choice because of how closely it fits into the geopolitics of African states.

The guiding theoretical proposition is that a proxy war starts when the three core elements (sponsor, proxy, target) are functioning as a <u>relationship</u>. This means that central to the examination conducted in this part of the dissertation is outlining the different kinds of relationship between the co-combatants (sponsors and proxies). Moreover, I do not believe this tripartite relationship between sponsor, proxy, and the potential or actual target is circumscribed by: (i) the number of parties involved in a proxy relationship or that (ii) the designations are permanents. It is entirely likely that the designated status of any one of these actors can change over the course of a protracted proxy war (e.g., a sponsor can become a target). Also, these designations do not necessarily refer to single, unitary entities, and unchanging role-occupancy; and also not to possible factions within a belligerent grouping. Describing and testing the propositions against the data on the wars under study is aimed at unraveling the complexities in the alliances between states and nonstates. The point is particularly to generate a set of generalizations about the behavior of states and their intermediaries in the wars under study. I do not promise definite answers, but regard the work reported as part of the ongoing process of clarification and refinement of the phenomenon of proxy war. In support of this critical task, I note the following:

> … science identifies a phenomenon (or range of phenomena), constructs explanations for it and empirically tests its explanations, leading to the identification of the generative (causal) mechanisms at work, which now becomes the phenomenon to be explained, and so on. In this continuing process, as deeper levels or strata of reality are successfully unfolded, science must construct and test its explanations with the cognitive resources and physical tools as its disposal, which in this process are themselves progressively transformed, modified and refined.[224]

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[223] It involves organized fighting and a continuity between clashes (see Kende, and Chapter 10).
[224] Roy Bhaskar, *The Possibility of Naturalism. A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Science* (The Harvester Press,1979), p.15

The 'cognitive resources' available for the task at hand have already been reviewed in Chapters 1 and 2; and it is thus with an eye on the 'progressive transformation, modification and refinement' of my ideas about proxy war that I now proceed.

CHAPTER 3

RIVAL THESES

Introduction

As discussed in Chapter 1, prevalent explanations of African wars involving partnerships between states and nonstates have thus far been examined in terms of five main theory-clusters: the resource course, failed states, cross-border identities, military intervention and state-sponsored terrorism. As previously discussed, I excluded the latter two theory-clusters from further examination in this dissertation because of their emphasis on sovereignty-building and policy-modification respectively. This leaves the resource curse, failed state, and cross-border identity theses to be examined here.

It bears repetition that my intention – both here and in the dissertation more generally – is not to negate existing explanations of <u>intrastate</u> (i.e., civil) war in Africa; nor has it been to negate the applicability of what I call 'rival theses.' Resources, identities, and state weakness clearly are involved in the wars under discussion as well as others regarded from different perspectives than the one I am proposing. Rather, what I am responding to is the absence of studies on the role of <u>the African state as an agent in war</u>. It is this absence that arbitrarily reduces the African state to a site of conflict rather than an agent in conflict. This, in turn, limits the potential for works dealing with 'African war' to establish connections with (i) studies of war by states in other regions,[225] or (ii) studies of the African state as an agent in other spheres of action.[226] It will ultimately be these kind of studies that will allow definitive tests of the

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[225] E.g. works studying how the US's use of tribal groups and private security contractors ties into its overall strategy in Afghanistan and elsewhere; see Singer, *Corporate Warriors*.

[226] See, for example, Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument* (Indiana University Press, 1999); Jean-Francois Bayart, Steven Ellis and Beatrice Hibou, *The Criminalization of the State in Africa* (Indiana University Press, 1999.

theoretical propositions advanced in this dissertation regarding the nature and explanation of PW as a strategic tool in the hand of African <u>states</u>.

<center>The Resource Curse</center>

The presence of lootable commodities in African states has been linked to proxy war via a cluster of theories addressing the 'resource curse.' The explanatory mechanism in these theories is <u>the opportunistic use of violence for profit</u>: specifically, that states seek to derive revenue from specific resources by forming wartime partnerships with nonstate actors capable of excluding the target state from areas rich in these resources.

For this explanation to have purchase on the phenomenon of proxy war, however, we would expect to see a positive correlation between the presence of lootable resources, and a state being targeted in proxy war. To test this, I used the World Bank's World Development Indices to generate the net worth, in constant 2000 US$, of each target state's mineral and agricultural exports in each of the six decades (1950-2010) of the study. This figure was then used to construct, as per Collier, an index of 'lootability' for each country. It bears mentioning that not only are many agricultural and mineral resources intrinsically valuable and thus worth looting in and of themselves, but that the sedentary populations of farmers, miners, and technical specialists associated with these two industries <u>themselves</u> constitute a kind of resource for extortion, press-ganging, and kidnapping. Multiple reasons thus exist for us to expect sponsoring states to favor the use of proxy war against targets with high lootability. Despite this, no strong and consistent correlation was found between this variable and that state being targeted for proxy war in any given decade:

<center>79</center>

Table 3.1 Regression Analysis of Covariance between Target Status and Lootability Index

	1960-69	1970-79	1980-89	1990-99	2000-09
Pearson Correlation	-.091	.114	.417[*]	-.150	-.143
Sig. (2-tailed)	.652	.540	.024	.382	.385
N	41	45	45	47	47
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).					

Further examination of the distribution of lootability for the <u>most</u> and <u>least</u> targeted states

in Africa suggests the lack of a clear link between these two measures overall:

Figure 3.1 Lootability Index, per decade, for states targeted in multiple (>2) PRs227

Lootability of Non-Targeted States

Figure 3.2: Lootability Index, per decade, for states not targeted by any PRs

Do these findings mean that resources are irrelevant for proxy war? This would be surprising, given that (i) a relationship has already been established between *civil* war and available resources,[228] and (ii) various anecdotal links[229] have been established between the trade in illegally extracted commodities, and some of the most high-profile wars in my dataset. This, in turn, highlights a particular advantage to using a proxy war lens in understanding wars involving resources: i.e., because this lens specifically treats the sponsor-proxy relationship as an important aspect of the hostilities which follow, it is better suited to explore the clearly complicated link between resources and conflicts involving multiple actors in Africa. As this data shows, PWs often involve resources as a co-occurring factor or *enabling* factor rather than a *causal* one, in the sense that such availability tended to configure the sponsor-proxy relationship in a particular

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[228] Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, 'Understanding civil war: A new agenda', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (2002), pp. 3-12

[229] For example, Global Witness, 'Natural Resources in Conflict,'

way, but did not cause it to come into existence; and this goes further in explaining why lootable resources are important in some, but not all, multi-actor wars.

Cross-Border Identities

We have it from multiple sources that ethnicity is a prominent provoker of violence in Africa, whether this violence is interstate or intrastate in nature.[230] When the violence in question occurs between states, however, a specific set of additional explanations are leveraged to explain the war-provoking effects of ethnicity: specifically, explanations relating to the bisection of identity groups and/or ethnic identities by arbitrary colonial boundaries, such that powerful ethnic or identity-groups in one country are both able and inclined to intervene across borders in support of their fellows.

To investigate this, I used the Minorities at Risk (MAR)[231] dataset to assign a binary value to each state (i.e., presence/absence of one or more at-risk minorities) in my dataset, per decade.[232] A moderate and statistically significant positive correlation was found between this variable and states being targeted for proxy war in all decades except the 1980s:

Table 3.2 Regression Analysis of Covariance between Target Status and MAR

	1960-69	1970-79	1980-89	1990-99	2000-09
Pearson Correlation	.414**	.912**	.166	.389**	.359*
Sig. (2-tailed)	.007	.000	.275	.007	.013
N	41	45	45	47	47
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).					

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[230] Michael Brown (ed.) *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton, USA: Princeton University Press,1993)

[231] Minorities at Risk Project. 'Minorities at Risk Dataset.' College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. (2009) Retrieved from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/ on Nov 16, 2011

[232] See Chapter 2 for a more detailed description of how these scores were derived.

However, further exploration of the data indicates that this link is more complex than formulations such as 'interveners cross borders to defend co-ethnics' allow. Firstly, there is no way to statistically assess which condition preceded the other: do states which are targeted for proxy war produce more risks for minorities, or do at-risk-minorities make a state more susceptible to being targeted? Second and more importantly, in terms of the 'cross border identity' hypothesis' status as a rival explanation for proxy war, no strong link is visible between the presence of MARs, and proxy war directed against the target by a geographically contiguous sponsor.

In other words: there appears to be <u>no support for the notion</u> that arbitrary colonial borders in Africa have bisected groups with common identities in ways which lead majorities in sponsor countries to embark on proxy wars in defense of at-risk minorities in others. While the proportion of PRs featuring both a common border and a MAR in the target has grown from 46% in the 1960s to 49% in the 2000s, this is partially a reflection of the fact that more African states had MARs in 1990 than in 1960. Furthermore, and more importantly, the percentage of contiguous versus non-contiguous PRs has not varied during this time:

Figure 3.3: Percentage of Proxy Relationships involving contiguity and at-risk minorities

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No <u>clear</u> relationship was thus observed between the outbreak of proxy war, and the *dual condition* of contiguity and a MAR in the targeted state. I highlight 'dual condition' because a link <u>was</u> observed between MAR and proxy war generally; however, when the effects of sponsor-target discontiguity are brought forward in these analyses, this link becomes less plausible. This suggests that 'kinship bonds stretching across arbitrary colonial boundaries' is not a significant causal mechanism in PW, and that while sponsors do indeed respond (even if only opportunistically) to minorities at risk, this does do not feature a prominent link between local actors and a proxy with cross-border ties.[233]

As with the Resource Curse, above, this shortcoming in the CBI hypothesis with respect to explaining outbreaks of multi-actor wars in Africa, once again suggests that the kind of assessment of the roots of war that my proxy war perspective provides, is a better way to get at the complex role of identity. This is because PW not only accounts for the role of ideological bonds which stretch beyond the local (e.g. transnational identities such as Islam), but also permits a broader approach than CBI to the issue of <u>which</u> identities become salient in a particular war – i.e., potential common interests between sponsor and proxy, or a potential clash of identities between the sponsor and target, or simply an assertion of ascriptive identity by the target which throws the sponsor and proxy together as 'strange bedfellows.'[234]

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[233] This finding corresponds with Gleditsch et. al, 'Fighting at Home, Fighting Abroad: How civil Wars Lead to International Disputes', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52:4, p. 496, in which an initially strong and statistically significant correlation between MIDs and the presence of civil war disappears when a conditional, fixed effects logit model is used to restrict the sample to interventionary dyads only. Thus: while most civil war interventions feature contiguous states, most contiguous states do not experience civil war interventions.

[234] This latter example occurred, most prominently, in the Border Wars (Chapter 7), where the role of nationalist narrations issuing from target states was a clear factor in pushing the South African, Rhodesian, and Portuguese settler regimes together into the 'Zambezi River Alliance.'

<center>Weak States</center>

The consensus that African *civil wars* are produced or exacerbated by state weaknesses is empirically well-grounded, although many of the predictions flowing from this, as well as the adequacy of the explanation, remain issues for debate (for example, the relative strength and potential interactions between state failure and the 'greed' and 'grievance' motivations for war[235]). Generally speaking, though, it is thought that state weakness or failure in Africa posits a kind of contagion or conveyor-belt effect between states' inability to maintain a coercive monopoly, and a higher incidence of war (of whatever kind) involving that state.

In terms of multi-actor wars, then, the state failure perspective predicts that militarily weak states are more likely to be sponsors or proxies in PW for three reasons. <u>First</u>, because their inability to restrain violent actors in their hinterlands draws in neighboring states who wish to securitize these ungoverned locations against violent transborder actors which might affect the security of the neighbor. <u>Second</u>, the weakness of the target state may serve as a multiplier for the cross-border identity or resource curse mechanisms already discussed, in that weak states cannot resist illegal extraction schemes, and cannot protect (or are motivated to oppress) the kinds of hinterland minorities who may have powerful and co-optable allies in neighboring states. <u>Third</u>, the failed state perspective would predict that military weak states might rely on PW as a force multiplier in their struggles with other states, given the relative incapability of their own armed forces compared to warlords or rebels able to be deployed in their stead.

One would thus expect, given the failed state perspective, a clear relationship between state military capacity and the incidence of PW featuring weak states either as sponsors or targets. To investigate this, I used the Correlates of War dataset on National Military Capacity to

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[235] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 'Greed and grievance in civil war', *Oxford Economic Papers*, 56:4, pp.563-595, (2004)

<center>85</center>

assign values to each state in my dataset (which I referred to as CINC scores[236]). Inarguably, this metric is an imperfect one for describing the many senses in which a state can be 'weak' or strong. Specifically, in the NMC rankings a heavily-armed state that is engaged in an ongoing counterinsurgency campaign in its uncontrolled hinterlands would rate as 'stronger' than a peaceful state with a small army, even though the second state is clearly less at risk of failure than the first. However, until such time as better conceptualizations of state strength (e.g., as the intersection of horizontal and vertical interpenetration of sociopolitical institutions by the government and its agents[237]) are coded into dataset form, the NMC data must serve as an acceptable proxy.

This caution offered, the results of my regression analyses indicate a complex and ambiguous relationship between PW incidence and the 'strength' or 'weakness' of sponsor states:

Table 3.3 Regression Analysis of Covariance between Sponsor Status and CINC

	1950-59	1960-69	1970-79	1980-89	1990-99	2000-09
Pearson Correlation	-.153	.178	.415**	.360*	.081	-.027
Sig. (2-tailed)	.672	.265	.005	.015	.588	.859
N	10	41	45	45	47	47
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).						

The results above show that one cannot infer a clear relationship of any kind between military capacity and PW sponsorship: it would therefore be incorrect to say that PW is necessarily either a 'weapon of the strong' or a 'weapon of the weak.' In addition, checking the correlation between military capacity and being the <u>target</u> of PW, shows a similar lack of evidence for the predictions of the FS hypothesis regarding who is targeted for PW:

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[236] See Chapter 2, for a more detailed description of how these scores were derived.

[237] Boaz Atzili, *Good Fences, Bad Neighbors: Border Fixity and International Conflict* (University of Chicago Press, 2004), pp. 31 – 33.

Table 3.4 Regression Analysis of Covariance between Target Status and CINC

	1960-69	1970-79	1980-89	1990-99	2000-09
Pearson Correlation	.306	.281	.126	.024	.078
Sig. (2-tailed)	.051	.061	.410	.871	.602
N	41	45	45	47	47
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).					

Both in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, therefore, we note a gap between data on state failure and data on states at war as sponsor and targets. Therefore, we can infer that no clear correlation exists between state weakness and being targeted for PW.

It should be pointed out that my work is not intended to challenge the importance of state failure as an account of (among other things) why rural constituents may become disaffected with their governments, or why African states are unable to maintain effective coercive monopolies in the face of warlordism. However, as the analyses above show, there is inarguably space in our account of multi-actor wars in Africa, for better assessment of how (or why) African states lose (or are forced to give up) control of those parts of their state in which wars take place. Given this goal, we should revise our sense not of whether state weakness provides a fertile ground for civil dissent and violence (as it may indeed do), but instead of how (or under what conditions) states will respond to their own weakness, or the weakness of a rival, by means of proxy war. This involves treating state weakness not as *causal* factor but an *enabling* one; and hence, the broader research question becomes not 'does state weakness cause war', but 'under what conditions of strength do states use proxy war against one another?' To answer this more nuanced question requires a finer set of tools for linking the presence of proxies in a war to the geopolitical conditions of the area of conflict, than is made possible by a blanket term such as 'state failure;' and it is that the notion of proxy war which I advance in this dissertation is well-suited to provide such tools. A PW perspective specifically examines variations in the spaces that

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are used for PW (e.g. the proxy base of operation, the sponsor-target border, and the target capital city). My findings in this regard are that the spaces for war are both configured by, and configurative of PW; thus, that 'strong' and 'weak' states alike can share the geopolitical conditions that are associated with becoming targets of PW.

Concluding Comments

It is clear that the three theory-clusters leave some scope for an alternative thesis regarding the wars in question. However, it is important to reiterate that this goal – i.e., improving on our existing accounts of multi-actor war – is not the <u>only</u> goal of this dissertation. Rather, my four primary goals are: to enumerate <u>the phenomenon of interest</u> (involving the construction of an Events List, as discussed in Chapter 2; (ii) to conduct a <u>quantitative</u> assessment of various aspects of these wars, and (iii) a <u>qualitative</u> investigation of three significant PWs in the next part of this dissertation; and, finally, (iv) to present <u>a theory of proxy war</u> in Chapters 9 and 10.

With regard to the <u>first</u> of these goals, i.e. enumeration: it should be noted again that, because almost no quantitative work has yet been done on the topic of multi-actor wars in Africa, my construction of a list of multi-actor wars from 1954 to the 2003, in and of itself, represents a contribution to the study of war in Africa. So, while my intention in Sections II, III and IV is to <u>advance</u> our understanding of multi-actor wars *beyond* what can currently be said about them, the dataset stands independently of the success and/or failure of the hypothesis under investigation.

I now turn to the quantitative part of an examination of my own hypothesis, in particular, the roles (both as sponsors and targets) of <u>African states</u> in their exploitation of proxies.

CHAPTER 4

A TYPOLOGY OF MULTI-ACTOR WARS

<u>Introduction</u>

My investigation of proxy war included a typological analysis of the event list (including 47 states) in terms of three areas of interest: <u>outcome</u> (whether and how the sponsor and proxy's strategic goals were achieved), <u>fit</u> (how each PR related, chronologically, to the period of actual fighting in the area of conflict), and <u>partnership</u> (how did the strategic objectives of these two actors overlap during the period in which the PRs existed?). Clarifications of these terms, and the results of the analyses, are graphically represented in the three charts below.

<u>Outcomes</u>

I coded each PR in terms of whether the sponsor and proxy's strategic goals were achieved, either: (i) at the moment of war-termination, or (ii) at the moment of the PR's dissolution. I used secondary sources to determine these.

In some instances, this was an easy task: in the case of formally constituted rebel groups with an explicit political platform, such objectives were usually spelled out in propaganda or articulated in speeches, and hence well represented in secondary-source analyses of the group, the associated conflict, or both. In other cases, especially in the case of sponsored coups in which the plotters were captured and executed, such a fine-grained understanding of desired outcome was not possible to achieve. I therefore elected to conduct my analysis at the broadest, informative level possible: did the sponsor or the proxy seek to bring about <u>regime change</u> in the target? Did the sponsor or the proxy seek to bring about a change in <u>target state territorial integrity</u>, e.g. through secession? Did the sponsor or proxy seek to <u>access resources</u> (whether these were concrete, e.g. diamonds, or not, e.g. reputation)? In asking these questions for the

sponsor or the proxy, I was able to get a sense of whether or not, from each of these actors' perspectives, <u>the PR had fulfilled its reason for existence</u> by providing the actors with what they wanted at the outset of the PR.

Not all PRs, however, outlasted the wars they were constituted to fight. This required me to make a decision about when exactly to consider a PR 'over' – in other words, the key date at which to site my assessment of whether or not the strategic goals discussed above, had been attained. To determine this, I elected to use the moment at which one of the three actors present in each PR – sponsor, proxy, and target – became *irreversibly incapable* of affecting events in the conflict area. Sometimes, this involved the complete withdrawal of sponsor forces, e.g. advisors, from the conflict; in other cases, this involved the collapse of the target state regime; in yet others, it was the defeat or disintegration of the proxy which signaled the end of the PR.[238] With regard to the latter, I considered all proxies who were eliminated militarily, to have *failed* to achieve their objectives.[239]

For the purpose of this study, I am specifically interested in the patterns of *combinations* between sponsor outcomes and proxy outcomes: partly because of the debate surrounding the role of 'proxy' agency in studies of proxy war, and partly because of the role I assign to the exploitation of proxies by meddling states in the wars under investigation.

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[238] Other kinds of PR termination (e.g. proxy is expelled from conflict area and seeks refuge in the sponsor state; or, sponsor disavows proxy, but proxy continues fighting) required a more fine-grained assessment of when to consider the PR as 'concluded,' and hence when to determine whether the actors' objectives had been met: however, this chronological dimension of PRs is examined in more detail in 'Fit,' below.

[239] While it is conceivable that some kinds of nonstate actor may pursue strategic goals which involve the death of their members (see Pape, *Dying to Win*), it does not seem sensible to imagine that this self-sacrificing logic applies to the decision-making of collective actors: hence, I assume that even when individual members are happy to die, proxy actors (collectively) always seek to continue to exist. This is not so far from the precedent set up in warfare itself: as Martin van Creveld points out (see Chapter 1), soldiers across history have been required to privilege the survival and interests of the *patria* (fatherland) over their own. This may be more or less clearly articulated: even evolutionary biologists have a term for the kind of 'violent altruism' being discussed here: kin selection (Layton, *Order and Anarchy*, p57).

The first typological assessment I conducted was an assessment of how PR outcome, from the sponsor and proxy's points of view, were distributed. In terms of these combinations, three possible outcomes were observed: 'Both Lose' (neither sponsor nor proxy achieves their military goals), 'Both Win,' and what I called 'Proxy Sacrifice' (sponsor achieves its goals, proxy does not). I also coded several PRs as 'Not concluded,' for those ongoing conflicts in which the end-condition discussed above had not been observed.

A fourth result, 'Sponsor Sacrifice,' (proxy achieves its goals, sponsor does not) was not observed in the data. I discuss the implications of this at length in Chapter 10, but for now suffice it to point out that in none of the PWs observed did a sponsoring state do the worst of all involved actors. Certainly, sponsoring states sometimes failed to meet their objectives; but their proxies were always left worse off, either becoming refugees outside the conflict area or being abandoned to their fate within it. Conversely, although proxies sometimes won, this was only true when their 'winning' also served the sponsor, i.e., when the proxy attaining its goals also helped the sponsor. Admittedly, in some prominent PWs, sponsors who withdrew from the conflict sometimes left behind fairly resilient proxies who proceeded to fight on for considerable periods of time, and these 'leftover proxies' come closest to providing us with a record of 'proxy wins, sponsor loses.' Perhaps the clearest example of this kind of outcome occurred in the case of Angola, where UNITA remained in the field for fourteen years after the withdrawal of its South African sponsors. However, even UNITA was eventually defeated after the death of its leader at the hands of government forces in 2002. Lastly, in the conditions of what I call 'proxy sacrifice,' sponsor states often appeared to gain their desired outcome regardless of the proxy failing to achieve theirs. I return to this seemingly crucial dynamic between sponsor and proxy in the last part of this dissertation.

Figure 4.1, below, shows the distribution of the outcomes across the 101 PRs studied:

Figure 4.1: Outcome distribution across 101 PRs

As the figure above makes clear, the establishment of a PR does <u>not</u> guarantee victory for either the sponsor or the proxy. In fact, 'Both Lose' outcomes occurred with slightly more frequency (38% of all PRs) than 'Both Win' outcomes (34% of all PRs). What tips the balance, however, in the sponsor's favor is the proportion of PRs which end in 'Proxy Sacrifice:' including these shows sponsors achieving their goals in 51% of PRs, compared to proxies achieving their goals in just 34% of PRs. This is a most interesting finding. I would argue that it means that there is something else at stake, something that makes warring important enough for belligerents to suffer the cost. Just what this means is a question which is obviously open to further empirical scrutiny, but at this stage I would claim that it has to do with <u>the nature of PW</u>, and the <u>kind of the power-struggles</u> among states in Africa that operate behind these states' decisions to go to war. It does not require much to justify a claim that African states are not stable entities, or clearly entrenched in local support or within regional power-bases and, as such, they are often under threat of rivals from within and without. This would certainly provide some argumentative support for the idea that victory in battle is not all that matters in 'winning' wars.

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Ten percent of the PRs in my dataset exist within conflicts that were ongoing at the time of writing (May 2011). The effects of any termination in these conflicts on the data patterns remain, obviously, to be seen: as do the effects of any new PRs that are revealed through contemporary or historical investigation. However, even if all these ongoing PRs were to end in a manner which contradicted the trends thus far (for example, involving a string of proxy victories combined with sponsor defeats), this would not overturn the general trend observed, i.e. that <u>the outcomes of PRs have historically favored the sponsor</u> by a more or less significant margin. As I will discuss in Chapter 10, the desirability of destabilization as a strategy for some sponsors, means that in some cases intractable, ongoing conflicts which grind on without a clear termination, should actually be seen as sponsor victories – perhaps even at the expense of those proxies which would presumably prefer to be victors rather than perpetual underdogs. If this is the case, then most of the 10% of PRs that have not yet been concluded should be assigned to the 'proxy sacrifice' outcome, further widening the apparent trend of sponsor advantage.[240]

<u>Fit</u>

As the second typological analysis of the Event List, I coded each PR in terms of how each PR related, chronologically, to the period of actual combat between the proxy and the target. As with 'outcome,' above, I used secondary sources to determine this. Four variations in fit were observed, representing the interaction between when the PR started (and ended), and whether these dates fell before, within, or after the period of fighting. I referred to these four types of fit as '<u>Leading</u>' (PR predated combat, and ended before combat ended), '<u>Lagging</u>'

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[240] I am, of course, aware of the argument by Collier and others that 'conflict economies' sometimes provide incentives for all combatants to stay at war; and I do not have significant objections to this insight. However, we also note that it is easier for sponsors to withdraw from unfulfilling wars than for proxies; and in this regard, the continued presence of sponsors in interminable conflicts is more indicative of the likelihood that the interminability itself is acceptable state of affairs for the sponsor, than for the proxy.

(combat predated PR, and ended before PR), 'Envelope' (combat both predated *and* outlasted the PR), and 'Overlap' (PR both predated *and* outlasted combat).

I considered PRs to have begun as soon as sponsor support for the proxy exceeded the level of simple rhetorical support, i.e. as soon as it reached Level V in Bertil Dunér's scheme of 'Instruments and Levels of Involvement.' This, however, presented a challenge in terms of separating target state propaganda from reality. The exclusive nature of sovereignty (at least, in what Krasner would identify as the Westphalian sense of this term) has meant that for states under pressure (e.g. in the midst of civil war) to assert that local challengers have links to foreign powers does double duty: it delegitimizes the challengers as 'puppets'[241] rather than as the designated representatives of aggrieved domestic constituencies, and it also serves to make allies of the accused meddler's own enemies.[242] This dual payoff for target states to 'cry wolf,' meant that I could not without qualification treat target-state reports of sponsor presence as authoritative. Instead, I relied on eyewitness accounts by more neutral third parties such as journalists and NGO staffers, as well as UN reports.

One benefit of the long historical reach of my study is that, over the decades, rumor and speculation can slowly be verified or discarded as higher-level sources (e.g. declassified government archives) become available for triangulation;[243] this may serve to improve data quality, but must be weighed against the tendency for obscure wars to slip out of the public eye. My approach was thus to count assertions of the presence of a PR *forward* in time, i.e., from the first recorded third-party assertion that such a link existed; but to count denials or dismissals

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[241] And, as already discussed, 'proxy war' itself has over time been used in just this same pejorative way.

[242] This behavior, of course, is known as 'balancing and bandwagoning' in more conventional studies of interstate war: see Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Cornell University Press, 1987).

[243] See Glesijes, *Moscow's Proxy?*

backward in time, i.e. weighing the most recent scholarship <u>more heavily</u> than scholarship conducted contemporaneously with the war. This combined the benefits of contemporaneous focus on since-forgotten wars, with the benefits of new archives and post-retirement tell-all memoirs.[244]

The results of this assessment are shown in Figure 4.2, below. On the face of it, a clear majority of proxy relationships (61%) pre-dated the outbreak of violence between the proxy and the target (i.e. were of the 'Leading' or 'Overlap' types). This, however, is partly due to the existence in the dataset of multiple groups who were specifically formed for a certain task by the sponsor, such as mercenaries tasked with affecting a coup. If one restricts the dataset to self-created proxies, the ratio of leading to lagging PRs approaches 1:1.

Figure 4.2: Fit distribution across 101 PRs

This parity between the proportions of PRs which predate and postdate conflict, means that it is not possible to identify, at this stage, a strong trend in terms of whether sponsoring states have tended to seek alliances with groups <u>already engaged in fighting</u>, or whether they have tended to <u>form alliances first and strike second</u>. Certainly, it is plausible to assume that

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[244] Especially important in the case of South Africa because of the TRC. See Nortje, *Buffalo Battalion*.

Overlap and Leading-type PRs, of necessity, give the aggressors (i.e., the sponsor and proxy) more latitude in choosing where and when to open a front against the target.

What can be said with confidence at this stage of my engagement with the Events List is that the data show a clear preference for PRs that terminate along with the conflict with which they are associated. If one excludes 'victorious' proxies who went from being nonstate to state allies of the sponsor, relatively few PRs (7%) involved sponsors who were willing to stick with their proxies after these groups had been defeated or expelled from the target state. The main players are therefore the sponsors, but they are clearly not the only ones. Moreover, the data on the fit between PR and actual combat again underlines the importance of tracking the PR before, during and after focused hostilities. These conflict dynamics are of considerable importance when examining a given PW in depth, as I do in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.

Partnership

The last dimension of my typological assessment dealt with the alignment between sponsor and proxy goals: specifically, how did the strategic objectives of these two actors overlap during the period in which the PRs existed? As I have already discussed, the notion that a particular conflict can simultaneously serve different interests (or come about through the existence of multiple unrelated separate *casus belli* or 'incompatibilities'[245]) gets at the core of

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[245] This is the terminology of the UCDP datasets with which my study began, and I replicate it here as follows:

> The concept of an incompatibility is central to the UCDP's gathering of data on armed conflict, being an essential part of the definition. Theoretically an incompatibility is a disagreement between at least two parties where their demands cannot be met by the same resources at the same time. In other words, their positions are incompatible, since both sides lay claim to the same scarce resource/resources.

The UCDP distinguishes between incompatibilities relating to government (i.e. rule) and territory (i.e. resources). In practice, of course, these concepts are intertwined, as establishing and defending the 'right to rule' generally also involves establishing the 'right to exploit resources' from the ruled territories; and, vice versa, access to resources

the colloquial use of terms like 'proxy war.'[246] Indeed, when 'proxy war' is used simply as a term of opprobrium, the discursive strategy being employed implies a particular condition of the partnership: specifically, that the proxy has no clear strategic objectives of its own, but rather serves only as the puppet of the sponsor.

As with Fit and Outcome, discussed above, several coding decisions had to be made about how to fit complex wars into a simplified typology. The primary challenge in this respect was how to separate the stated objectives of actors (e.g. 'defend our clansmen from violence') from the objectives imposed on these actors by external observers, or speculated about in post-facto analyses. To deal with this challenge, I elected to simplify the issue of 'partnership,' focusing not on what each actor 'wanted' (and/or claimed it 'wanted'), but rather on the kinds of war-termination condition which satisfied (for successful PWs) or seemed likely to satisfy (for failed or ongoing PWs) the actors. Examples of termination-conditions included 'proxy seizes control of target state;' 'resource fields are wrested away from government control;' 'area of conflict gains home rule;' and so on.

Approaching the issue of partnership in this way replaced a hard-to-assess 'why' question ('why did the actors go to war?'), with a far more objectively determinable 'what' question ('what outcomes was the fighting aimed at producing?). I then used the answers to this question to ask another for each PR: 'how did what the sponsor wanted, and what the proxy wanted, overlap in this particular PW?'

(whether concrete, e.g. resource wealth, or abstract, e.g. prestige as a conqueror/defender) sustains and enables rulership. (http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/faq/?languageId=1#What_is_an_incompatibility)

[246] But also 'polywar'; see Dan Fahey, 'Explaining Uganda's Involvement in the DR Congo, 1996-2008,' paper prepared for the International Studies Association conference, New York, February 2009.

I identified three different kinds of overlap in the data: 'mutualistic,' 'symbiotic,' and 'opportunistic.' A symbiotic PR was one in which the desired termination condition was identical for the sponsor and proxy: for example, where both of these parties were colluding to enable illegal extraction from the area of conflict. A mutualistic PR, on the other hand, involved termination conditions which were compatible but not identical: for example, when the proxy wished to achieve self-rule, and the sponsor wished to deprive the target state of important resources in the area to which the proxy was laying claim. Lastly, opportunistic PRs involved incompatible termination conditions; the most frequent example of this kind of partnership involved the proxy fighting to replace the government of the target state, but the sponsor seeking only to keep the target state weak and conflict-ridden, in such a way that they actively stopped short of giving the proxy the resources it might have needed to achieve its goal – even when these resources were available.

The respective distribution of these three kinds of PR is presented in Figure 4.3, below.

Figure 4.3: Partnership distribution across 101 PRs

While half of PRs surveyed (50%) involved featured symbiotic PRs, this number was not strikingly in excess of the proportion of mutualistic PRs (42%). Furthermore, one of the

continent's most extensive proxy wars – the seven-nation intervention in the DRC after 1997 – is located in the mutualistic category, which argues in favor of the importance of this category in understanding partnerships in PW. This is a fascinating finding, and suggests at least that (i) not only is the PR in itself an important marker of war, but also that (ii) the relationship between the belligerents can be qualified in terms of the similar goals and strategies seemingly at play among belligerents; that is to say, too many and too often the actors seem to aim at the same thing through war for this to be an insignificant finding. This again suggests that there is more at stake in warring than the war itself; phrased differently, using violence to position yourself as a legitimate contender for power – whether locally among rivals, or regionally as a linchpin, and whether as a state or nonstate – seems central to the dynamics exposed in this analysis.

In addition to this high proportion of mutualistic alliances, the relatively small number of opportunistic PRs (8%) observed in the data, while generally confirming Dunér and Kende's caution that we should not assume that all proxies are puppets, nonetheless suggests that in some cases, the proxies are either (i) deceived into thinking that their alliance with sponsor runs deeper than it really does, or possibly (ii) know that the sponsor's goals do not match theirs, but see the alliance as militarily expedient regardless. This reinforces a point which I made in my examination of the phenomenon of 'proxy sacrifice,' above, which is that – leaving aside whether or not they are independent 'agents' or merely 'puppets' – proxies inarguably exhibit a range of vulnerabilities (e.g. to target-state reprisal[247]) which are not shared by the sponsor.

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[247] It bears pointing out that a mirror-image to this kind of asymmetry exists, which has been studied (e.g. by Atzili, 2010, ref and new terminology) under the heading of 'triangular deterrence.' This strategy involves deterring *proxy* action by targeting *sponsors*, e.g. launching retaliatory bombing against those states who harbor or fund insurgents. This is a mirror image of the vulnerabilities being discussed here, because rather than the specific vulnerabilities of proxies being at stake, in triangular deterrence it is the victims of PW or SST that exploit, through their reprisal attacks against the sponsor, those vulnerabilities which states have but do not share with their nonstate partners: e.g. fixed and valuable territorial assets such as cities. One prominent example of 'triangular deterrence' in Africa is the French bombing of Tunisian hamlets during the Algerian civil war with which I introduced this study. However, a

Asking about any causal links between the variables involved in PW is obviously central to the study of PW. It is clear from the charts presented in Figures 4.1-4.3, and the PRs examined by way of the typological analysis conducted here, that there are clear grounds for stating that <u>African states conduct covert, interstate war, i.e. that they thus 'bleed' across their borders into affairs and conflicts outside their jurisdiction.</u> This is justifiable in the way that (i) state objectives shape the PR through which the subsequent PWs are fought (both in terms of 'Fit' and 'Partnership'), and (ii) state-sought outcomes dominate the termination conditions of PW (in terms of 'Partnership' and 'Outcome'). These evidential supports for what African states achieve through the use of proxies outside their jurisdiction do not, however – in fact cannot, methodologically speaking – answer the question about whether states, as such, cause PW (as outcome of their objectives) because, as stated in Chapter 2, the Events List is made up of data on states. How they enter and exit conflicts, exploit proxies against targets, and open themselves to further or counter violence from targeted states, for example, are of course informative of the topic under examination.

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full examination of the use of 'triangular deterrence' in Africa, i.e. how targets may use sponsor vulnerabilities to constrain proxies, falls outside the scope of this study.

CHAPTER 5

THE DYNAMICS OF PROXY WAR

Introduction

In this chapter, I move from the assessment of patterns in proxy war <u>in general</u>, to the assessment of patterns in four <u>specific elements</u> of proxy war: states, proxies, targets and locations. As stated in the introduction to this part of the dissertation, the PR, and the changing nature of it, the parties to the PR, and the dynamic context in which it operates is central to my model of PW. I define the PR in terms of the following:

1. Actors becoming <u>sponsors</u> when they extend concrete support to another actor, in order to facilitate an attack on a potential target

2. Actors becoming <u>proxies</u> when they accept the proffered support

3. A potential target becoming a <u>target</u> when its designated representatives (e.g. its legislative, executive, administrative functionaries, or even armed forces) respond to, or oppose the representatives of the sponsor and/or proxy.

A proxy war (PW) can therefore be said to exist in my view of the dynamics involved when the three core elements (sponsor, proxy, and target) are functioning in a <u>relationship</u>, and as such, participating in hostilities. The different kinds of relationship between the co-combatants (sponsors and proxies) have been captured in Chapter 4 above; here, I turn to the particular roles played by the belligerents.

Phrased differently, what is at issue in this chapter is how PW shapes and is shaped by the belligerents involved, and the context of operations. The aim is to outline what the data analysis adds to my proposed model of PW, and what the data suggests regarding the nature of PW as a tool in the hands of states.

<u>States at War</u>

There are 47 states in my dataset (see Appendix B). This list grew from 10 members in the 1950s to 47 in 2009, and includes North African states (e.g. Egypt), but excludes island states (e.g. Madagascar); the proxy wars thus included run from 1954 to the present, including the three token wars (1971 – present).

African states are clearly active participants in this form of war: of the 47 states in my dataset, 42 (89%) <u>sponsored</u> at least one proxy during the period under examination. Breaking this figure down by decade, we find that between 24% and 37% of African states engaged in *one or more proxy wars* in any given decade. The decade in which <u>most</u> African states engaged in proxy war was the 1980s: during this period, 17 of 47 states were sponsors of at least one proxy faction in a conflict outside their own borders. On the other hand, the decade during which the <u>fewest</u> African states engaged in proxy war was the 1960s (10 out of 41 states).

On the other hand, thirty-one (31) of Africa's 47 states (66%) were <u>targeted</u> for proxy war at some point during their existence. Most states experienced proxy war as *targets* during the 1990s and 2000s (18 out of 47 states, or 38% of African states overall). The decade in which the fewest states experienced proxy war as targets was the 1960s (12 out of 41 states, or 29% of African states overall). I do not count the 1950s in this assessment, as the only state targeted was the French colonial regime in Algeria, which was targeted by the National Liberation Front (FLN) and Algerian National Movement (MNA) supported by Morocco and Tunisia; this is excluded because although the Algerian administration of the time struggled to reconcile local, i.e. African, concerns with French dictates, it still cannot be counted as an 'African state.'[248]

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[248] I distinguish here between the French, British and Portuguese colonial attitudes regarding the relative independence of their colonial possessions. Portugal exhibited extreme reluctance to permit any kind of self-rule in Angola and Mozambique, and the Portuguese colonists never experienced the same kinds of lukewarm treatment

Considering these figures through the lens of PW makes a certain <u>dynamic</u> between the actors clear. Two observations stand out. <u>First</u>, it is noteworthy that <u>fewer African states have experienced proxy war (31%) than have used it (89%)</u>. The fact that sponsorship and target percentages are so different from one another certainly supports the idea that there must be *some* explanation of why specific states use PW and others do not, and why some are targeted and others are not. As I discussed in Chapter 3, this distribution is not well (or at times, at all) explained by the cross-border identity, failed state, and resource curse theses, leaving it to approaches such as mine to go further.

The <u>second</u> observation has to do with the <u>variations in sponsorship and targeting over successive decades.</u> I would argue that the ebbs and flows are the result of <u>interactions</u> between the three elements, rather than simply a product of one or the other of these. In other words, the distribution of PW in Africa (whether in chronological and geographic terms), cannot merely be explained either by (i) theories which confine themselves entirely to the motivations of the sponsor or the conditions of the target (e.g., the cross-border identity, failed state, and resource curse theses), or (ii) by theories which focus on continental or global factors affecting all African states equally (e.g. the Cold War). Had the data supported explanations of this kind, we would expect to see a smooth rise and fall of PW levels with rises in sponsorship being matched by equivalent rises in targeting. Instead, the data portray an asynchronous relationship between sponsorship and targeting: first, a rise in <u>sponsorship</u> in the 1980s, followed by a rise in <u>targeting</u> in the 1990s and 2000s.

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from the Lisbon regime before 1974 as was extended to the Algerian *pieds noir* by France. For this reason, I consider the Portuguese colonial administrations (but not the French and British) to be an African 'actor,' i.e. one whose <u>local</u> strategic concerns and <u>local</u> search for security produced <u>local</u> (i.e. African) interstate relations.

Asynchronicities of this kind either indicate the presence of a dynamic system,[249] i.e. one in which feedback loops mean that variations in important factors influence one another in a bidirectional way; or one in which fluid rearrangements enable multiple actors to interact with one another over time.[250] This certainly underlines the ideas that states, proxies and locations <u>shape and are in turn shaped by</u> the causal interactions around which PW is constituted, as introduced above. This is where I will add the sponsor-proxy-target dynamic as a qualifier in predicting that the advent of a PR signals war so as to point in the direction of looking for patterns in relationships as shown in Figure 5.1 below.

An asynchronous relationship between sponsorship and targeting is the easiest to assess numerically, because we know what to look for. For example, the fact that in the 1980s there were comparatively many <u>sponsors</u> of PW but comparatively few <u>targets</u>, could be explained by a scenario in which the dominant configuration of PW during that decade involves multiple sponsors attacking (i.e., 'ganging up on') single targets. Similarly, the 'low incidence of sponsorship, high incidence of targeting' results associated with the 1990s and 2000s could be explained by a scenario in which a few 'serial sponsors' use PW against multiple targets, as shown in Figure 5.1 below:

Figure 5.1 Graphical representations of Ganging Up and Serial Sponsorship

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[249] Turchin, *Historical Dynamics*

[250] Dawkins, Richard. *The Selfish Gene* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989)

However, while these two scenarios certainly merit further investigation, even if we *were* to accurately tally instances of 'ganging up' versus 'serial sponsorship,' we would still not be any closer to explaining why certain decades favored a certain pattern of PW over another. For this we need to take our analysis deeper. To cast more light on the sponsor-proxy-target dynamic I examined the covariance of state capacity and proxy war from the perspective of funding provided to African countries. Overseas Direct Assistance (ODA) funding levels for each country was gathered from the OECD dataset and statistically tested for covariance, per decade, between ODA received and that state serving as a sponsor or target in proxy war.

We note in Table 5.1 below, moderately strong and statistically significant covariances between target status and ODA levels. However, in the 1980s, a moderate and significant covariance was also observed between sponsor status and ODA received. This suggested a further avenue for inquiry, viz.: whether the states receiving increasing levels of ODA in the 1960s and 1970s, were also those conducting (or being targeted by) proxy war in the 1980s. In general, this was not found to be the case:

Table 5.1 Regression Analysis of Covariance between Sponsor Status and ODA

	1970-79	1980-89	1990-99	2000-09
Pearson Correlation	.195	.364[*]	-.081	-.033
Sig. (2-tailed)	.199	.014	.590	.828
N	45	45	47	47
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).				

Table 5.2 Regression Analysis of Covariance between Target Status and ODA

	1970-79	1980-89	1990-99	2000-09
Pearson Correlation	-.074	.101	-.002	.081
Sig. (2-tailed)	.628	.511	.988	.589
N	45	45	47	47
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).				

What was observed was that *some* states which repeatedly used proxy war, were *also* among those singled out for increased ODA in the 1980s and 1990s: Uganda, Rwanda, South Africa, and other states fall into this category. Of the 21 states whose ODA levels exhibited a general upward trend, all 21 were also sponsors at some stage in their existence, while only 80% of these states were or had been targets. Thus, to the extent that ODA represents a 'stamp of approval' from the international community, this suggests that the use of proxy war and the establishment or maintenance of international status as a regional or continental linchpin are connected in some way. This, in turn, alerts us to the possibility that African states, since independence, function like other, nonstate 'contenders for power' – they too have to secure and maintain their wherewithal to rule, which includes people, places and institutions.

Unpacking the sponsor-target dynamic

The data show three interesting patterns of correlation between CINC score and use of PW: (i) sponsors are more often strong states than weak ones; (ii) sponsors are often targeted for PW; and (iii) kinds of sponsorship given does not vary with sponsor military capacity or over time. In two of the five decades assessed, a moderately strong (0.3-0.6) and statistically significant (<0.05) covariance was observed between military capacity and sponsoring proxy war; in other words, stronger states tended to engage in proxy war.

Table 5.3: Regression Analysis of Covariance between Sponsor Status and CINC

	1950-59	1960-69	1970-79	1980-89	1990-99	2000-09
Pearson Correlation	-.153	.178	.415**	.360*	.081	-.027
Sig. (2-tailed)	.672	.265	.005	.015	.588	.859
N	10	41	45	45	47	47
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).						
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).						

This pattern is interesting because we would expect militarily strong states to have a wider range of coercive options on hand than weaker states; in other words, to have less need of partnerships with violent nonstate actors, precisely because their own instruments of coercion were sufficient to the task. Furthermore, autocratic states with large armed forces have often been, in part or in whole, 'captured' by those armed forces, to the extent that the needs of the military (e.g., opportunities for self-enrichment) can be said to drive state foreign policy.[251] This latter condition makes it doubly surprising that the armed forces of militarily capable states would permit foreign intermediaries to play a role in war, if only to prevent them from taking a share of the spoils of war. One must then ask: what is it that makes militarily capable states use PW, when we would not (for a variety of reasons) expect them to do so? This question again turns us towards two issues: the nature of PW as a tool, and the issue of what else is at stake in PW than fighting a <u>war</u>?

We note in the data presented in Table 5.4 below, that in two of the four decades assessed, a moderately strong and statistically significant covariance was observed between sponsoring a proxy war and being the *target* of proxy war; in other words, <u>states using proxies tended to have proxies used against them</u>:

Table 5.4: Regression Analysis of Covariance between Sponsor Status and Target Status

	1960-69	1970-79	1980-89	1990-99	2000-09
Pearson Correlation	-.185	.314[*]	.109	.356[*]	.344[*]
Sig. (2-tailed)	.247	.035	.474	.014	.018
N	41	45	45	47	47
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).					

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[251] Reyntjens, *The Great African War*.

The data in both tables above clearly underlines the dynamic that keeps PWs going on the continent. We note in this regard that 'strong states tend to sponsor' but also that 'sponsors are often targeted.'

A continental system composed of four kinds of state – strong sponsors, strong non-sponsors, weak sponsors, and weak non-sponsors – could easily generate the puzzling distribution highlighted by the correlations discussed above. I represent this configuration graphically as follows:

Fig 5.2: Graphical Representation of Optimal Configuration of States to Produce Overlap

7 PRs; 4 strong sponsorships; 3 weak sponsorships
4/7 sponsors are also targets; some never sponsor, some never target

In Figure 5.2 above, we see that the presence of multiple strong sponsors who prey on many other states in the system, multiple strong states who do not sponsor at all, and a few weak states who only prey on strong states, produces exactly the configuration of correlations discussed above, such that <u>sponsoring, strong states</u> are predominantly targeted over non-sponsoring, strong states. This pattern in the analysis points towards what I will henceforth refer to as a "bully-revenge" system, i.e., a pattern state-level interactions across Africa where the

strong states are both sponsors and targets of PW. Strong states fall into this system because they

can,[252] because they must,[253] and because PW:

- is a 'delicate tap,' i.e., it can be turned on and off according to the aims of the sponsor, the capacities of the proxies, or the vulnerabilities of the target
- can be used concurrently with other strategies (of different kinds, e.g., military, diplomacy, etc.).
- is a tool open to the deliberate modulation of the sponsor(s) of the war.

Proxies at War

The first thing to note from this data is that although nonstate actors are the most frequent

kind of actor to which the label 'proxy' can be applied, other kinds of political collectives have

also been held to be proxies. This is usually by virtue of being seen to 'do the work of' an

external sponsoring power. Of the 66 proxies surveyed, 60 (91%) were nonstate actors. The

remaining six proxies included governments-in-exile (e.g., the Somali Transitional Federal

Government or TFG), fragile settler regimes backed by South Africa (e.g. Rhodesia), and

government factions during contested civil wars (e.g. the Mobutu faction during the Katangese

Secession). Fifteen proxies (23%) were backed by multiple sponsors, while the remainder

exhibited strong links to only one sponsor.

How do these findings advance our knowledge of PW? Most strikingly, they indicate the

need to pursue a better understanding of the specific vulnerabilities exhibited by proxy groups,

i.e., the deficits of capacity and/or legitimacy that drives them to enter military partnerships with

sponsors. On the one hand, it is obvious to state that proxies are given whatever resources that

sponsor can and wishes to provide to them; but this does not get us any closer to understanding

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[252] Because PW suits local conditions where there are available people, spaces and resources for exploitation; see Chapter 1.

[253] Because PW is appropriate in a globalized, 'networked society'[253] increasingly defined by significant trans-national and cross-border networks of exchange (e.g., ideas, money, weapons).

why the proxy finds what the sponsor has to offer attractive, or why the sponsor is willing to part with the resources it does. The results of my initial investigation into these questions are outlined in Table 5.1 above, in which I track the distribution of military objectives against the level of sponsor support, but to take this further requires more fine-grained analyses than the quantitative tools on hand can provide. I thus conduct this analysis using qualitative techniques in the next section (Part III) of this dissertation.

Turning to the issue of what proxies hope to gain through their participation in PW, I identified three recurring objectives. These were: a change in the political authority of the target state, i.e. who ruled the state; a change in the territorial integrity of the target state, i.e., where its borders were; and a change in the economic status for the sponsor, proxy and/or target, i.e. who benefited from (or carried the economic cost of) the fighting. Coding decisions were based on reports in secondary literature, and on the apparent strategic objectives of the proxies (e.g., attacking the capital = change in the political authority, taking over resource fields = a change in the economic status, seizing control of a province = a change in the territorial integrity. In all cases, these objectives were coded as zero-sum: for example, in wars in which the proxy attempted to remove the target regime from power, either the proxy succeeded in altering the target's political authority by destroying the target regime, or the target succeeded in maintaining or strengthening its political authority by holding off or destroying the proxy.

Coding these three objectives for the 101 proxy relationships included in the event list produced the following distribution of (non-exclusive) outcomes for the war: 90% of PRs involved a change in the political authority of the target state, 12% involved a change in the territorial integrity of the target, and 16% involved a change in the economic status of the sponsor, proxy and/or target. These figures are interesting for several reasons. Firstly, we see that

affecting border adjustments and ensuring access to resources (as we might expect after the findings of Chapter 3) were not prevalent elements of proxy strategy. More importantly, however, we see an incredible predominance of attacks on the political authority of the target state, with almost all identified PWs involving direct threats to the target state.

Before proceeding, a note of methodological caution regarding the number of PRs which were coded 'targeting the political authority of a state' is merited. This is so because according to my model, challenges to the state's sovereign monopoly over resources or the limits of its *de jure* sovereignty are, by the definition of what a state is,[254] also challenges to its <u>political authority</u>. My coding rules would therefore render a PW, in which proxies attempted to seize a diamond field, but were expelled by the target states, as both '<u>political authority</u>' and '<u>economic status</u>' – the latter from the proxy's point of view, the former from the target's point of view. This may have produced a higher number of 'political authority' results than otherwise.

This caution notwithstanding, the Events List has no shortage of proxy groups explicitly focused on political-authority goals, and while the 'true' ratio of <u>political authority</u> goals to economic and territorial goals might be less extreme than 90:12:16, it is clear that for most proxies, a fundamental alteration of the political dispensation within the target state is an explicit goal of the war. This tells us two things about PW; <u>first</u>, that African states are <u>worth capturing</u>. It is an often-remarked on irony of international relations that for every piece of scholarship declaiming the 'end' or 'irrelevance' of the nation-state, there is one investigating some nonstate's desperate (and often violent) attempts to attain precisely this status.[255] With respect to the zero-sum issue mentioned above, it is easy to see that capturing the 'throne' automatically captures the 'treasury;' this is especially true of the quintessential African *rentier* state, which

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[254] According to the Montevideo Declaration, a state has <u>territory</u>, <u>people</u>, and a <u>government</u>.

[255] See, for example, the statements to this effect by the Unrecognized People's Organization at <u>www.upo.org</u>

produces little in the way of collective goods but rather exists as an kind of sanctified customs apparatus, using its legitimacy as the 'sovereign' to collect cuts, taxes, and duties from foreign interests.[256] For this reason, proxies who wish to achieve economic or territorial goals have a strong incentive to adopt a political-authority-focused strategy as well.

The <u>second</u> point worth making about the high incidence of political-authority objectives is a methodological one. The predominance of fights over 'who will rule' explain why PW has often been categorized (in Africa, at least) as a sub-phenomenon of civil or intrastate war; I return to this in the last section of this dissertation. As we can see here, scholars who make such a categorization are not entirely wrong, because proxies are indeed more likely to be fighting over 'government' (to use the UCDP's term) than over wealth or territory. But 'more likely' is not the same as 'necessarily;' and we must concede that for some nonstates who act as proxies, the attaining of political authority (whether in the capital city or in the hinterland) is at best irrelevant, and at worst a hindrance to their operations. Furthermore, to use proxies' pursuit of PA as a justification that these episodes of conflict are <u>primarily</u> to be understood as civil wars, excludes two potentially important relationships from the realm of explanations for the conflict; i.e. the sponsor-target and sponsor-proxy relationships.

As shown in Figure 5.3 below, striking levels of diversity can be observed in the types of support given by sponsors to proxies, ranging from the purely rhetorical (i.e., ideological support) all the way to the provision of regular forces to fight alongside the proxy. In order to investigate this diversity, I used Bertil Dunér's 5-level model for 'external military support' to

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[256] This is the argument of Reno and others: see Chapter 2.

assess the extent of sponsor support provided within all 101 PRs.[257] These results were used to graphically represent the level of support provided to proxies by their sponsors, producing the distributions given in Figure 5.3 below.

Fig. 5.3 Variation in levels of sponsorship over time

The compacted data in Figure 5.3 show all PRs in each decade of this study, representing each PR as a vertical line of length equal to the highest level of sponsorship (I-V) recorded. These lines are arranged from lowest to highest, to provide a visual profile of *all sponsorship* per decade. Thus, the first 'step' in each profile holds the vertical lines reflecting Level I sponsorship; the second holds all vertical lines reflecting Level II sponsorship, and so on. The data show that since 1960, most sponsorship has fallen between Dunér's 'Type I' and 'Type III,' i.e. not exceeding the provision of arms and non-combatant advisors to the proxies. Eighty six

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[257] See Bertil Dunér, The Many-Pronged Spear: External Military Intervention in Civil Wars in the 1970s, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1983. Dunér's five levels are:

    I. Direct combat involvement (e.g. Regular invasion, Specialist functions)
    II. Indirect combat involvement (e.g. Irregular invasion, Shelling)
    III. Direct para-combat involvement (e.g. Advisory functions, Arms supply)
    IV. Indirect para-combat involvement (e.g. Military training, Armed blockade, Financial support)
    V. Direct supporting activities (e.g. Military warning, Transport, Base functions

percent of PRs reached this level, while only 20% exceeded it. It is therefore clear that for the most part, sponsors play the game of proxy war through the provision of weapons.

In my theory of PW the kind of support given to proxies is a clear indication of what is at stake for the sponsor in particular: i.e., the time and resources it is willing to commit to the war and or the outcome of the PW. One would expect that more powerful states would give more significant (i.e. Level I and Level II) support; however, this is not the case. As shown in Table 5.4 below, regardless of decade and sponsor military capacity, the majority of the sponsorship captured in my data has remained at Level III or below:

Figure 5.4: Mean Military Capacity of Sponsors, by Decade

What is particularly noteworthy about this figure, is not the trends its *shows*, but the trend it *fails* to show. To wit: given that one might assume states with higher CINC scores to have more powerful armies (and larger stockpiles of divertable munitions), one would also expect them to have more sophisticated logistical arms with which to deploy these munitions and armies, and hence that strong states would more often provide Type IV and V support than weak ones. However, once again the data support a counterintuitive reading of the relationship

between military capacity and proxy support. As Figure 5.4 shows, the proxies of strong states do not enjoy substantially better support from their patrons than the proxies of weak states; and indeed in some decades (e.g. the 1960s) a proxy receiving Type IV or V support was more likely to be receiving this from a weak state than a strong one, while the proxies of strong states tended to receive predominantly Type II support.

The absence of a positive relationship between sponsor strength and sponsorship level, or a relationship of any kind between time (as indicated by data recorded per decade) and sponsorship level, are thus once again clues that the outcome we are interested in – i.e., the use of PW – is not a simple phenomenon which can be thought of as being 'produced' by a single cause, whether derived from conditions in the target or the sponsor state. Instead, the unchanging nature of the kind of support given over time as shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.4 above, suggest that something else is at play: i.e., that there is something *about* providing weapons to a proxy (but going no further than that) which suits the sponsors of PW, and at least appeases the proxies who must make do with what they get. And indeed, this idea is borne out by my data, as shown below:

Table 5.5 Distribution of military objectives per level of sponsor support

Sponsor goal	Level I (e.g. invasion)	Level II (e.g. shelling)	Level III (e.g. arms)	Level IV (e.g. training)	Level V (e.g. camps)
Destroy target regime	14%	11%	50%	48%	52%
Support target regime	29%	56%	0%	0%	0%
Support target faction	36%	33%	28%	14%	10%
Implement secession	21%	0%	22%	38%	38%
n =101	14	9	36	21	21
Dark shaded areas represent instances in which a majority (or, near-majority) of the PRs that featured a particular level of support were associated with a particular military objective.					

To create the data presented in Table 5.5, above, I used secondary sources to code each PR for one of four 'sponsor objectives.' As I discussed under the heading of 'Objectives' in Chapter 2, in the interests of not delving too deeply into qualitative interpretation at this stage of the research, I did not concern myself with asking *why* a certain objective was pursued, for example, by asking what the long-term military utility of keeping a faction 'in the fight' (which I coded as 'support military faction) versus assisting it in delivering a knock-out blow to the target (which I coded as 'destroy target regime'). These are indeed interesting questions to ask, and go to the heart of the question about whether states primarily resort to war in order to serve their strategic/long-term interests, or their short-term/operational-tactical interests – but this is beyond my focus here.

The findings in Table 5.5 above show a link between the military objectives sought, and the kind of support given to the proxy. We see that for PWs in which the sponsor's aim was the destruction of the target state, or its destabilization, sponsorship tended to take a more remote form, i.e. the provision of arms, training and bases. Level III sponsorship, the most common form across the 101 PRs examined, tended to be associated with exactly this objective. On the other hand, sponsors who wished to back a specific faction in its bid for power opted for more direct forms of sponsorship, such as the provision of specialized units (e.g. air support). This makes *prima facie* sense: there is more at stake so the sponsor is willing the wager more. Once again, then, we see the outline of such a thing as a *strategy of PW*: i.e., that sponsors use available proxies instrumentally rather than through simple constraint or happenstance, in this case by tailoring the kinds of armament and support provided to the particular purpose of the sponsor.

My theory of PW would therefore make the following strong prediction: when states provide high levels of support, they are doing so in pursuit of a discrete and (hopefully, from their point of view) short-term goal such as backing a civil war faction in its grab for power. On the contrary, when support levels are more muted (Levels III-V), sponsors have a more long-term objective in mind, i.e., one to which they do not wish to contribute significant immediate resources. Either way, the analysis conducted above suggests that PW represents a response to *opportunities*; furthermore (given Table 5.5 at least), that these *opportunities* have to do with durable, or persistent features of the environments (whether local, regional, global or all three) in which African states operate.

Locations and Targets

The 27 proxy wars represented in the Events List took place in 31 'locations' during the period assessed. In all but one of these wars, the 'location' of the fighting (as assessed from secondary sources) was simply the target state.[258] The sole exception was the insurgency in Western Sahara, which has to date taken place in a juridical gray zone because ownership of the region remains disputed.

This finding, while obvious on one level, is important because it shows the difficulty of defending any notion of 'intrastate' and 'interstate' wars simply by recourse to the geographic location of the fighting. The origins of this approach to war go back, as I discussed in Chapter 1, to the modernist depiction of war upon which many of our subsequent IR models have been constructed, such that fighting 'inside' a state's borders was assumed to be an exclusively

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[258] I did not count rear bases located within the sponsor state, or target-state reprisal against these, as 'zones of fighting' unless these were the only place where proxy-target hostilities took place. Some wars involved fighting in multiple locations, which is why the number of locations is larger than the number of conflicts (27).

domestic affair; but as the 101 PRs surveyed here show, this is not the case in African multi-actor wars.[259]

If there is indeed more to the issue of location than simply which side of a border it takes place on, then, what more does my data allow us to say about 'where' PW takes place?[260] To investigate this, I used secondary sources to code each of the 101 PRs in terms of *where* the fighting occurred, as we note in Table 5.6, below.

In protracted campaigns, multiple results were possible for any given PR. Three different locations (geopolitically speaking) were observed: the target's 'seat of power', e.g., the capital city; the sponsor-target border, e.g., areas where there are limited or absent *de facto* state control, or competing claims for authority; and the proxy's base of operations, e.g. 'liberated zones' administered by the proxy. The respective distribution of these three locations was found to be as follows:

Table 5.6. Distribution of sites of fighting across all proxy relationships

Seat of Power (SOP)	Sponsor-Target Border (STB)	Proxy Base of Operations (PBO)
41	38	25

From this table, we see that, albeit by a rather slight margin (39%), most PWs involved fighting for the capital city or some other significant nexus of centralized power. By a similarly slim margin, the location associated with the fewest PWs was the proxy's base of operations

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[259] And may indeed not have been the case for the vast majority of human history; see Dylan Craig, 'Ultima Ratio Regum, Remix or Redux?'

[260] Mindful, of course, of the difficulties of linking where the fighting takes place to the broader range of spaces and places which are drawn together to sustain the conflict – c.f. Buhaug and Rod's argument about civil war, discussed in Chapter 2.

(24%). However, the distinction between these two figures is accentuated if we look more closely at the third location, the sponsor-target border. Without exception, PW fighting that took place at the sponsor-target border involved attempts by the target state to interdict incoming proxy and sponsor forces on their way to some other objective.[261] We can therefore treat cases of border fighting as 'incipient' seat-of-power or proxy-base-of-operation fighting. Making this assumption – and further assuming that the ratio of seat-of-power fights versus proxy-base fights would be preserved had these incipient fights not been pushed to the border regions by target-state resistance – gives a more striking ratio of seat-of-power versus proxy-base: 64:40, or 3:2. In other words: my data show that the majority of PW involved fighting not in distant hinterlands or rogue provinces, but in the metropoles and centers of the targeted state. This gain makes PW similar to what war is and always has been about: states wanting to gain power over a target; when the target is another state, we are indeed talking about interstate war.

This is an interesting finding as is, but its implications become even more striking when this data is cross-tabulated with the distinction introduced in Table 5.x (Section A, above) between what *kinds* of support sponsors provide and what their military objectives are. To accomplish this cross-tabulation, I broke up the 101 observed PRs[262] and assigned them to the four sponsor objectives (destroy regime, support regime, support faction, effect irredentism). I then further differentiated these four clusters in terms of the kinds of support given by the sponsor and the location of the fighting (SOP = Seat of Power; STB = Sponsor-Target Border; PBO = Proxy Base of Operations) to produce the following table:

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[261] In the South African case, these operations were given the somewhat poetic name of 'hakkejagoperasies' – most sensibly translated as 'biting-at-their-ankles-operations.'

[262] I condensed the 3 multi-location PRs down to a single 'primary location' to enable the data on 104 locations to be cross-tabulated with the data on 101 sponsorships.

Table 5.7: Site of fighting per objective and level of sponsor support

	Level I (invasion)	Level II (shelling)	Level III (arms)	Level IV (training)	Level V (camps)
Destroy existing state (n=42)	2 SOP = 2	1 STB = 1	18 STB = 8 SOP = 4 PBO = 6	10 SOP = 8 STB = 2	11 STB = 6 PBO = 4 SOP = 1
Support existing state (n=9)	4 SOP = 4	5 SOP = 2 PBO = 3	0 0	0 0	0 0
Support faction (n=23)	5 SOP = 3 PBO = 2	3 STB = 2 PBO = 1	10 SOP = 7 PBO = 2 STB = 1	3 SOP = 3	2 SOP = 1 STB = 1
Support secessionist (n=27)	3 PBO = 3	0 0	8 PBO = 6 STB = 2	8 SOP = 3 PBO = 5	8 STB = 2 PBO = 6
n =101	14	9	36	21	21
Shaded cells identify disproportionate clustering of data around specific outcomes					

Several by-now-familiar aspects of PW are highlighted by this distribution of the Events List data. First, we once again see that the majority of PWs, from the sponsors' point of view, are launched with the aim of <u>destroying the target regime, thus conducting interstate war though proxies</u>. Second, we see sponsorship corresponding to Dunér's Level III (provision of arms) to once again be the predominant tool used by sponsors. These conclusions are not unique to this section, but their reappearance following this second sweep through the data in pursuit of a different question, strongly validates the coherence of the dataset and of my coding methods.

Of equal importance to the reappearance of previously established patterns, however, are the new patterns that are brought forward by this data. Three conclusions, in particular, can be drawn from the data in Table 5.7 above. <u>First</u>, and most obviously: PWs in which the goal of the sponsor is to effect the secessionist (or irredentist) goals of the proxy, tend to involve more

localized fighting than other forms of PW. In tandem with this, they also involve less direct sponsor involvement, with only three of the 27 secession-focused PRs observed (8%) involving Level I or II support.

Second, with respect to PWs that focus on the destruction of the target state (row 1), we see an unusual cluster of sponsor-target border fighting in conjunction with Level III (provision of arms) and IV (indirect para-combat involvement, e.g. military training) sponsorship. From this it is possible to generalize that proxies who are being groomed to take power are either: (i) subject to more aggressive interdiction efforts by the target state, resulting in more border fighting; or (ii) have a harder time smuggling supplies into the area of operations because they require heavier kinds of armament (or more substantial volumes of weapons) in order to achieve military victory.

Third, and least obviously, we see a distinction between the 'faction support' sponsor objective and the 'effect secession' objective, both in terms of the kinds of support provided and in terms of where the fighting takes place. In 'faction support' PRs – which, in my coding, were typically instances in which the sponsor was attempting to ensure the continued viability of a weaker faction in its contention with the government – we see a preference for Type III sponsorship (weapons) and a focus on SOP fighting, whereas in the case of secession-focused PRs we see an almost-equal split between Types III, IV and V (direct supporting activities, e.g. base functions) sponsorship, and a predominance of SBO fighting. This poses an interesting question: why do sponsors commit more resources to struggles for control of the center (Seat of Power, Type III) than to attempts to establish local control in the periphery (Proxy Base of Operations, Types III-V)?

The data contained in the Events List are too coarse to answer this question once-and-for-all, but do suggest that we are noting an interesting set of patterns in the power-struggles between African states, indicating PW's use as a form of covert interstate war, but also showing that it serves as an ideal form of war for power contestations conceived of in more detail (e.g., as struggles involving more than the single objective of holding territory). I will take these conclusions further using qualitative techniques in Part III.

In concluding the analysis of the locations of PW, the following are worth reiterating: first, we note that for proxies as for sponsors, seizing control of the key political territories of the target state (e.g. capital city) is a frequent goal of PW. This indicates the importance of sovereignty (specifically, the territorialization of legitimate authority around concrete infrastructures like cities) in constituting the goals of PW. Second, we once again see that whether in terms of where the PW takes place or how substantially the proxy is armed/supported, the interests of sponsors provide the best explanations of observed patterns in the data. Third, we see that terrain matters in PW as in conventional war: fighters and munitions must still be moved from the sponsor to the proxy (and/or from dumps and purchase points, to the area of conflict).

Concluding Comments

The conclusions reached in this section indicate two core elements for the study of PW, i.e., the significance of the levels and nature of support that sponsors commit to their proxies, and the dynamic exchanges between states and nonstates.

PW in Africa is both a product and producer of the complex system of relationships between states and nonstates at war, and/or sponsors, proxies and targets. This can be seen in ways in which, for example, proxy wars both seek to affect and are produced by variations in the territorial distribution of target state rule; and in the way that the apparent compatibility between

proxy and sponsor aims, first discussed in Chapter 3, in fact exists as only the most obvious level of an extremely complex interaction between the objectives sought, and the responses of the target. Furthermore, and as I will further show in Part III, the roles of 'sponsor,' 'proxy' and 'target' are not clearly fixed, as belligerents cycle between these and in and out of the war. This certainly suggests a dynamic involving more than the three main parties to a PR; it also suggests a certain (possibly, continent-wide) system in balance.

PART III:

QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THREE TOKEN WARS

I have selected three wars for qualitative assessment in this part of the dissertation. These wars vary in terms of their complexity, i.e. number of proxy relationships, the changing status of participants (sponsors, proxies, and target), and the incompatibilities and vulnerabilities exploited through PW. As such, they each provide interesting test-sites for my model of PW. The three wars are the <u>Toyota Wars</u> (the simplest token), The <u>Border War</u> (more complex), and The <u>Somali Vortex</u> (most complex).

At this stage of the analysis of the features in my model of PW, I am able to use the following five <u>theoretical propositions</u> to examine the three selected proxy wars in depth:

1. The advent of a PR to signal the start of <u>focused hostilities;</u>

2. The parties involved in PW: as <u>sponsor(s)</u> (the actors who extend concrete support to other parties), <u>proxies</u> (defined by their acceptance of this support in some or other form of agreement to attack the target); and <u>target</u> (which enters the PR when its designated representatives respond to or clash with the proxies);

3. The <u>levels and nature of support</u> that sponsors commit to their proxies;

4. The aim of the PR: to <u>overcome particular constraints</u> (such as existing vulnerabilities and or sources of conflict/violence outside the sovereign boundaries of the sponsor), and <u>exploit specific opportunities</u> (in the form of places and people) by <u>militarizing them</u>; and

5. The operation of a <u>system in balance</u> that PW responds to and possibly maintains.

Components 1 and 2 were derived from an initial eyeballing of the data on the Events List and from secondary literature on the wars included. These components make up the 'WHAT' of proxy war. Component 3 was clearly indicated by the quantitative analysis, conducted in Part II, of the central question: how does PW relate to existing warring or

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disorganized fighting? Component 4 consists of a summary of the final hypothesis formulated for the work as a whole, i.e., that African states conduct covert, interstate war through intermediaries, or proxies, in spaces which provide affordances for this kind of violence. Together **3** and **4** capture the '<u>HOW</u>' of proxy war. Component 5 is a conclusion reached regarding certain patterns in the data as analyzed in Part II and, as such, makes up a finding open to further assessment, below, and in future work, in other theatres of war.

In the data on the three wars to be narrated in what follows, I will note both typical and atypical instances regarding my model of PW. I will use these to refine the model, which is presented in the final part of this dissertation, in Chapter 9. This examination is another way of falsifying the theoretical propositions or establishing an adequate theory-data fit for further and future work on wars in different sites than Africa, and on the bases of data other that those generated in and through the construction of the Events List. To repeat the meta-analytic task behind the quantitative analyses conducted in the previous section: it is with an eye on the 'progressive transformation, modification and refinement' of my ideas about proxy war that I now proceed with a qualitative analysis of three selected wars.

CHAPTER 6

THE 'TOYOTA WARS' IN CHAD, 1971-1994

Introduction

As I stated in the introduction to Part III above, the Toyota Wars are the simplest of the three token wars to be assessed here. In this chapter, I make clear what I mean by 'simple,' by way of detailing (i) the nature and number of PRs involved in the Toyota Wars, (ii) the exploitation of existing vulnerabilities which took place, (iii) the people and places employed for war, and (iv) how sponsors militarized proxies to overcome constraints such as distance, borders, and terrain.

Chad has been in a near-constant state of war over rule and resources since 1965. Between 1971 and 1994, however, this set of local conflicts also took on the character of a proxy war, as nine foreign powers (seven African, two non-African) contributed various levels of military aid to the conflict. In 1987, at the height of the fighting, the military tactics of one of the Chadian factions seized the attention and imagination of the Western media, after the *Front Armee du Nord* (FAN) used a fleet of custom-built Toyota pickup trucks to outmaneuver and outfight a much larger Libyan force. The hostilities in Chad were subsequently dubbed 'The Toyota Wars.'[263]

To explain how a multi-faith, multi-ethnic coalition of Chadian militiamen came to be riding French-supplied pickup trucks into battle against a Libyan occupation force requires an awareness of the effects of several important regional and global struggles on the civil war already in progress within Chad; furthermore, one must understand the role of specific states in connecting Chad to these regional and global struggles. Despite the length and violence of

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[263] Although the term strictly only applies to the late 1980s, I use this nomenclature to refer to the entire proxy war in Chad.

Chad's internal conflicts, it was the actions of foreign states, and the specific strategic opportunities and vulnerabilities their actions were intended to address, which constitute the real explanation of the 'Toyota Wars.'

Before detailing the various mechanisms at work in this war, I begin, by conducting an assessment of Libya's involvement in the war in terms of the typologies identified in Chapter 4. First, as regards fit:[264] the Toyota Wars involved a PR of the lagging kind. That is to say: the conflict in question predated the formation of the PR, stretching back to the colonial era (in terms of the Chad-Libya conflict over Aouzou) and the post-independence civil war (in terms of the north-south civil war). We should, therefore, think of the partnership between FROLINAT and Libya in terms of an alliance between groups who were both already at war, and hence more acutely constrained in terms of strategic and tactical objectives than would have been the case if they had first allied during peacetime. I discuss this further below.

Second, with regard to partnership: although Libya's territorial claims to Northern Chad became an issue of contention between Libya and its proxies as time wore on, the way in which this aim was to be achieved (i.e., the ceding of an area known as the Aouzou Strip to Libya by a Chadian regime) meant that for much of the war, the Libyan-FROLINAT/GUNT PR was strongly symbiotic in nature. The proxies wanted to rule Chad; the Libyans wanted the same thing. As discussed in Fit, above, this close adherence must in part be seen as the product of wartime expediency; had FROLINAT not already been engaged in a war for control of Chad when the El-Gaddafi regime forged its close ties with them after 1971, it may have been that the partnership would have been somewhat differently configured. Also, as will shortly be discussed,

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[264] The typological analysis of the Event List (including 47 states) in terms of three areas of interest: outcome (whether and how the sponsor and proxy's strategic goals were achieved), fit (how each PR related, chronologically, to the period of actual fighting in the area of conflict), and partnership (how did the strategic objectives of these two actors overlap during the period in which the PRs existed?).

the Toyota Wars are significant because of the way that Libya's proxies repeatedly turned against their sponsor, eventually leading to Libyan withdrawal from Chad.

Third, with regard to <u>outcome</u>: despite the (initial) congruence between Libya's objectives and FROLINAT/GUNT's, the outcome of the PR did not deliver these desired outcomes for either party. Libya's loss is most clear: it was forced to withdraw from Chad, and subsequently had its claim to the Aouzou Strip overturned by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). On the other hand, the dissolution of the GUNT, the wide-scale defection of GUNT fighters to Hissène Habré's FAN, and then the defeat of the FAN by forces loyal to Idris Déby meant that for all practical purposes, the political ambitions of the FROLINAT (and, later, CDR) leadership had come to naught.[265] I therefore consider the Toyota war to be a '<u>Both Lose</u>' outcome for Libya and its proxies.

These three indices show that the PW was not concurrent with the fighting exploited by the PR, that the parties to the relationship wanted the same thing from the PW, but that both sponsor and proxies failed to achieve their objectives, so that one wants to ask: why war? Or: what else is/was achieved through the PW?

<u>Main events of the Toyota Wars</u>

- Rival factions fought to rule Chad between 1966 and 1996, with pauses in 1979 and 2004
- The fighting was mostly concentrated in northern and eastern Chad, although a small number of rebel raids and airstrikes were directed into Libya from Chad in 1987
- Libya, Sudan, Zaire, Egypt, Benin and Nigeria provided military aid to one or more factions. Libya, Sudan and Cameroon also allowed rebels to operate over their borders
- An OAU peacekeeping force, headed by Nigeria, was deployed from 1981 to 1982
- The United States and France provided military aid to anti-Libyan factions
- Libya committed its own military to the conflict between 1972 and 1994. In 1987, at the peak of the fighting, this commitment ran in excess of 14 500 troops

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[265] Interestingly, however, the ascension of Déby (as a Muslim Northerner) to power can, in some senses, be read as a marginal victory for FROLINAT, albeit not in the terms it might have chosen for itself when it allied with the Libyans.

- French air units were deployed to counter the Libyan presence. These units operated from Chad as well as from French air bases in Djibouti
- Libyan forces occupied the mineral-rich Aouzou Strip from 1972
- Libya's claim to the Aouzou Strip was overturned by the ICJ in 1990, and a UN-sponsored withdrawal of the Libyan forces was completed by 1994
- Libya continued to support Idriss Déby in his bid for power
- Déby became president of Chad in 1994, and remains in power

Main Phases of the Toyota Wars

- **1951-1971:**   Libyan agitation for the return of the Aouzou Strip; Chadian independence
- **1971-1979:**   Libya occupies Aouzou, supports proxies in their war against the Chadian government
- **1980-1982:**   OAU intervention, Libyan proxies take power in Chad
- **1982-1988:**   Resumption of hostilities; Libya fights for control of Aouzou
- **1988-1994:**   Ceasefire, breakdown of the Chadian government

Actors Taking Part in the Toyota Wars

- **Sponsors:**   Libya, Sudan, Cameroon, Nigeria, Benin, Egypt, Zaire (African states) France, US (non-African states)

- **Targets:**   Tombalbaye regime of Chad (1965-1975)
  Malloum regime of Chad (1975-1978)

  Habré regime of Chad (1979, 1988-1990)

- **Proxies:**[266]   FROLINAT, Second Army/FAN, Third Army, FAP, CDR, GUNT

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[266] See Appendix C: Acronyms

Figure 6.1: Changes in the Conflict Dynamics in and around the 'Toyota Wars'[267]

Figure 6.1 represents the aggregate effect of six important events which took place during the Toyota Wars, viz., the Libyan invasion (1971) and withdrawal (1994), fighting for control over Ndjamena (79-86), the ascension of Déby to power in Chad (1994), and the two war-concluding events represented by the ICJ ruling on the Aouzou Strip (1994) and the peace accords which concretized Déby's rule (1996).

As can be seen in this diagram, two separate incompatibilities existed in Chad between 1966 and 1994: one intrastate/governmental, relating to which faction would *control* the Chadian state; and one interstate/territorial, related to which state *owned* the Aouzou Strip. The effect of the Libyan intervention in Chad was to <u>link</u> these incompatibilities together, making the range of

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[267] **Key to Figure 6.1:**

Solid horizontal black lines:	Primary visible military conflict
Dashed horizontal black lines:	Secondary visible military conflict(s)
Dashed vertical black lines:	Invasions and withdrawals
Dashed gray lines:	Off-battlefield conflicts, including diplomacy and conspiracy
Solid gray lines:	Specific off-battlefield conflicts relating to incipient peace accords
Arrow point:	Ongoing conflict
Circle point:	Concluded conflict

possible outcomes in one conflict (i.e., which faction would rule Chad) subordinate to the outcomes of the other (i.e. which state would gain control of the Aouzou Strip). Libya's withdrawal from the conflict, in the course of time, reversed this process, de-linking the conflicts and allowing them to be individually concluded (the first through violence, and the second through legal judgment).

Analyzing the dynamics of the Toyota Wars in this manner contributes to the model of PW I propose in two ways. First, it highlights the difference between 'proxy war' and simple regional power politics, in terms of the linking process described above. Although Libya meddled in Chad before 1971 and after 1994, and although the conflict in Chad also stretches off on either side of these dates, it is only *between* these two dates that the linkage (and subordination) of multiple incompatibilities, to the strategic objectives of an intervening state, took place. In other words: between 1971 and after 1994, Libyan intervention turned *two wars* into *one war*, and this is one of the ways which seem sensible for telling proxy wars apart from the simple presence of foreign backers in complex conflicts.

The second contribution of the conflict dynamic perspective represented in Figure 6.1, is in the way that it highlights the relevance of various thresholds, or break-points, not only in telling us when this conflict took place but also in making sense of sudden changes in sponsorship levels, international attention, and levels of violence. Specifically, Libyan meddling before 1971 was not broadly recognized or condemned, did not provoke OAU or foreign attempts at mediation, and indeed received only mild notice until it threatened to result in the dissolution of the Chadian state in 1981. Likewise, the departure of Libyan troops in 1994 did not signal an end to Libya's meddling in Chad or the rest of the region, but this meddling was muted in comparison to earlier levels. The persistence of meddling and conflict is indicated by

the continuation of the two arrows (each representing different incompatibilities) before and after their period of linkage. What occurred in 1971 and 1994, then, was a crossing-over of violence and intervention from 'acceptable' to 'unacceptable' levels, with these boundaries being set not by universal and unchangeable law but by expedience, the effects of uncertainty, and the state of political maneuvering in the OAU and elsewhere; that is to say, the typical geopolitics of African states. This underlines the importance of criteria other than the manifest reasons of sponsors for going to war in identifying proxy war. As discussed in Chapter 2, we are accustomed (in IR, if not overall) to treating conflicts as chronologically discrete; our use of battle-deaths concretizes this tendency. But in the case of the Toyota Wars, it may be more correct not only to talk, as Laqueur does, of a with 'no end'[268] but also of a 'war with no beginning.'

States at War

Libya was the first and most prominent meddler in Chad's civil war, although Sudan, Nigeria, Cameroon, Egypt, Gabon, Zaire, the US and France also shared various levels of commitment. To this list of sponsors I add Benin, which contributed soldiers for el-Gaddafi's 'Islamic Legion.' Of the nine sponsors, only four (Libya, Sudan, Nigeria, and Cameroon) can be said to have had a clear *local* interest in the outcome of the war, in that they shared a border with Chad. The others, as I will describe below, were all connected to the war through more far-reaching webs of alliance and policy, such as attempts to balance rivals or support allies.

Libya

Moammar el-Gaddafi's rise to power by *coup d'etat* in 1969, changed the nature of Libya's relations with Chad almost at a stroke. El-Gaddafi took up the unresolved issue of the

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[268] Walter Laqueur, *No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century* (Continuum, 2003)

Aouzou Strip with far more force than his predecessor, King Idris. This more aggressive stance can be traced back to three ideological commitments: first, el-Gaddafi's promulgation of pan-Arabism as an official ideology of the Libyan state;[269] second, his stated opposition to imperialism, including French neo-colonial practices; and third, his repeated attempts to redraw the map of Africa (broadly) and Arab Africa (specifically) through the creation of federations and unions, and later through bodies such as the OAU and AU.[270]

To deal with these in order: pan-Arabism committed the el-Gaddafi regime to the support of their co-ethnics (and co-religionists) in Chad in far stronger *ideological* terms than the Senussid 'political, military, economic and cultural' links upon which Libya's complementary *legal* claim to Aouzou rested.[271] El-Gaddafi's support for the pan-Arabic cause was clearly articulated in his *Green Book* and visible in the actions of the Libyan state in Chad and elsewhere.[272] Similarly, the Libyan state had made its opposition to 'imperialism' (variously identified as the actions of colonial, neo-colonial, or reactionary forces) quite clear by the early 1970s; by 1973, for example, it had already been implicated in supplying the IRA with weapons purchased in Germany (the 'Claudia' incident), and in hosting radical groups such as the *Rote Armee Faktion*.[273] Lastly: el-Gaddafi's attempts to craft political unions between Libya and Tunisia (the 'Arab Islamic Republic,' 1972-74), and Syria, Libya and Egypt (the 'Federation of

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[269] Ronald Bruce St John, 'The Ideology of Mu'ammar Al-Qadhdhafi: Theory and Practice', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (1983), 15 : pp 471-490

[270] Amira Ibrahim, 'Libya: A Critical Review of Tripoli's Sub-Saharan African Policies', *Institute for Security Studies Situation Report*. (23 November 2009) http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/23NOV09LIBYA.PDF

[271] Robert W. Jr. McKeon, 'The Aouzou Strip: Adjudication of Competing Territorial Claims in Africa by the International Court of Justice', *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*, 23:1 (Winter 1991), pp. 147-170

[272] Waniss A. Otman, Erling Karlberg, *The Libyan economy: economic diversification and international repositioning*,(Springer, 2010), p.53

[273] Charles A. Russell', 'Transnational Terrorism', *Air University Review* (Jan-Feb 1976; accessed online at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1976/jan-feb/russell.html)

Arab Republics,' 1969-74) indicated a revisionist attitude to the standing geopolitical dispensation of the Maghreb.[274] From this perspective, a renewal of political pressure on Libya's neighbors (Chad and its troublesome border included) made both strategic and ideological sense; and, indeed, el-Gaddafi would go on to propose a merger between Chad and Libya in 1981. By the late 1960s, then, the stage was set for a revitalized and outward-looking Libyan state to shake off the inertia of the Idris government's closing years.

Other African Sponsors

Nigeria and Cameroon were the two sponsors who made the smallest contributions, in terms of arms and support, to the Chadian proxy war. Although Nigeria did arm a Chadian faction – the FROLINAT Third Army led by Aboubakar Abderahmane – this group remained among the smallest of the Chadian proxy groups, and was militarily insignificant throughout the civil war.[275] Instead, Nigeria's main involvement in the war was as the main motivator behind the OAU mediation efforts in Chad, and the 1981-2 peacekeeping mission.

Cameroon, similarly, was not associated with any militarily significant proxy group during the war, and also did not arm or otherwise support Chadian groups. However, on two separate occasions during the conflict, fleeing rebel groups were allowed to use Cameroonian territory as a refuge: Hissène Habré and his FAN/Second Liberation Army in 1980, and the FAT (Kamogue) and GUNT (Goukouni) forces in 1981. Given that Habré in particular was able to

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[274] I. William Zartman, 'Libya: Problems for US Policy', Hearing of the House Subcommittee on Africa, Washington, Oct. 29, 1981.

[275] Huk and DeRouen, *Civil Wars of the World*, p. 238

reassemble his forces in Cameroon and then return to Chad and seize the capital, Cameroon's contribution to the conflict cannot be ignored.[276]

Sudan, then, was the only geographically contiguous sponsor (apart from Libya) to back a significant faction. Successive Sudanese governments had been arming and sheltering Muslim rebel groups in eastern and northeastern Chad since 1968; indeed, FROLINAT had been founded after a multi-party conference held in the Sudanese town of Nyala in 1966. However, Libya and Sudan's initially cordial relations began to decline after 1971; this, combined with rise of Abba Siddik's pro-Libyan faction within FROLINAT, resulted in the organization's re-orientation from being a primarily Sudanese proxy, to being a Libyan one. Sudan, in turn, transferred its support to Habré's anti-Libyan faction, and by 1981, Sudan was committed enough to Habré's success that it made ground and air units available to support the FAN's re-entry into Chad from Cameroon.[277]

Gabon, Zaire, Benin and Egypt also served as sponsors of the conflict in Chad. However, unlike the war's other African sponsors, these four states were not geographically contiguous with the territories within which their proxies were fighting; furthermore, none of them had the same kind of *specific* stake in the outcome of the Chadian conflict that the other sponsors did. More specifically: while these states contributed arms and manpower to the Chadian war, the strategic payoffs they were pursuing through this sponsorship related to non-Chadian alliances and rivalries.[278] Gabon sent weapons to the conflict to honor its alliance with France; Egypt admitted to arming Habré as a hedge against Libyan destabilization of Sudan; Benin sent troops

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[276] Reed Brody, 'The Prosecution of Hissène Habré - An "African Pinochet"', *New England Law Review*, vol. 35 (2001)

[277] Turner, *Continent Ablaze*

[278] Sam C. Nolutshungu, *Limits of anarchy: intervention and state formation in Chad*

to fight in El-Gaddafi's 'Islamic Legion' without any apparent interest in whether the Legion was fighting in Chad or Palestine at the time; and Zaire deployed 1600 troops to Chad in 1982 to support US efforts there. In the case of Zaire, these troops were even flown into the country on US military aircraft.[279]

Non-African Sponsors

The last level of sponsorship I describe here, was that exhibited by the US and France. These states all had a direct interest in the outcome of the Chadian conflict. France not only wanted a pro-French leader who would protect its interests in Chad, but also wanted to defend the sphere of influence it enjoyed over the Francophone/CAF belt.[280] The US, on the other hand, saw the Chadian conflict primarily as a way to contain and undermine the El-Gaddafi regime; as one US official put it, 'We basically jump for joy every time the Chadians ding the Libyans.'[281] This anti-Libyan attitude stemmed, in part, from el-Gaddafi's explicitly anti-American stance on the world stage, but also from tensions around US-Libyan confrontations in the Gulf of Sirte and the alleged Libyan sponsorship of transsovereign terror incidents such as the Lockerbie Bombings of 1987. Although these states were (after Libya, of course) the largest sponsors in the war, this dissertation's focus on the use of proxy wars by African states means that I will not be examining France and the US's role in the Toyota Wars in what follows.[282]

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[279] David H. Henderson, 'Conflict in Chad, 1975 to Present: A Central African Tragedy,' Seminar Paper, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Quantico, VA (2 Apr 1984), accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/HDH.htm

[280] Nolutshungu, *Idem.*

[281] 'Disputes Raiders of the Armed Toyotas,' http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,965563-2,00.html

[282] Naturally, comparative questions of this kind are interesting, and form one component of my intended postdoctoral work on proxy war.

On the most obvious level of analysis, it is interesting to note that for all of the African sponsors involved in the Toyota Wars, state-level vulnerabilities (rather than the personal goals of leaders) were a strong factor in explaining involvement. For example: Sudan, Nigeria, and Egypt can be said to have intervened in the Toyota Wars in self-defense, i.e. to balance against the threat of Libyan expansionism. Libya, Zaire and Benin, on the other hand, intervened not specifically to prevent some undesirable future for their own states, but to seize an opportunity to improve their prominence in various anti-imperialist fora composed of states (Libya and Benin), to gain access to resources for the state (Libya), and to support their state allies who were already engaged in the conflict (Zaire, Benin and Cameroon).

To say that states at war seek to confound their rivals and achieve their goals is not to say much that is new about war *as such*. Instead, my emphasis on proxy war as a (more or less covert) form of interstate warfare, is intended to emphasize why states co-opt proxies in pursuit of these two goals, given: (i) the military capabilities/incapabilities of their own armies; (ii) the willingness (or not) of their domestic constituencies, and regional or international allies to support these foreign wars; and (iii) the difficulty/ease of contravening the various norms associated with any violent pursuit of state goals *outside* that states established sovereign jurisdiction (i.e., outside its borders).

The relationship between the issue of borders (i.e. limits on jurisdiction) in PW, and the issue of *covertness* in PW, however, merits further explanation. As the case of Chad makes clear, while proxy war is often more or less concealed by the sponsor and/or proxy (e.g., through lies, dissimulation, disinformation or misinformation campaigns), the data in general (and the Toyota Wars in particular) do not bear out any idea that covertness is somehow *intrinsic* to proxy war.

Certainly, Libya made no attempt to conceal its support (in general terms) for Goukouni and Déby; and as we shall soon see in the proxy wars conducted in Somalia and Angola (Ch 7 and 8), South Africa and Ethiopia acted in a similar manner at various points in their wars. Instead, we see that to the extent that concealment occurs in PW, it does so in ways that are linked to the perceived thresholds among local, regional and international constituencies and influential bodies (e.g. OAU, UN). In other words: sponsors make their military aid more or less covert depending on <u>what they think they can get away with</u>, and the respective benefits of overt versus covert intervention.

The brief pauses in overt Libyan support for their proxies in 1972 and 1979 bear this out. In both of these, Libya was responding to the progress of mediation attempts made in various regional and global fora aimed at ending the conflict in Chad; and in both cases, while covert support continued, overt support was dialed down in order to conform to the increased levels of scrutiny directed at Chad. In the Toyota Wars we thus see the first instance of a recurrent trend in the three tokens examined here, i.e., of proxy war being a finer strategic/political tool in the hands of African states than conventional war; such that PW is used specifically because (among other things) its intensity can more readily be adjusted to respond to fluctuations in regional and international pressure, than would be the case if conventional forces were used exclusively, or indeed if PW was solely the overt use of proxies by states against their targets.

<u>Proxies at War</u>

The proxy relationship (and thus the specific <u>constraints</u> this is set up to overcome) is central to my model of PW. 'Constraints,' in this sense, refer to the way in which contextual factors associated with the PR (for example, the kinds of terrain in the area in which fighting takes place), offer specific <u>opportunities for exploitation</u>. My use of 'constraint' and 'constrain,'

both here and in what follows, applies to both the restrictive/negative sense (i.e. geopolitical conditions which make certain actions difficult or impossible) and the permissive/positive sense (i.e. conditions which make certain actions easy or possible) of these words. This two-sidedness is intended to capture the paradox at the heart of strategic decision-making; as Luttwak puts it, only in war can a 'bad road be good *precisely because it is bad* and … therefore be less strongly held or even left unguarded by the enemy.'[283]

In what follows, I explore the constraints on PW under the headings of *Distance*, *Terrain*, *Borders* and *Human Settlement*. What I mean by these terms is summarized as follows:

Table 6.1. Four Sources of Constraints

Constraints	
Physical Place	Human Space
1. Distance Definition: The proximity of the sponsor to the target and the proxy.	**3. Borders** Definition: Juridical limits on state sovereignty.
2. Terrain Definition: The physical characteristics (vegetation, rainfall, disease patterns, etc.) of the conflict area.	**4. Human Settlement** Definition: The economic, lifestyle, subsistence, and sociocultural patterns present in the conflict area.

Following this, I conclude this section by discussing the extent to which the Toyota Wars can be considered typical or atypical of PW as laid out in my model.

Distance

Distance played an inarguably important role in the Toyota Wars. For some sponsors, their proximity to the conflict made it possible for them to meddle in affairs outside their jurisdiction without lifting a finger: Cameroon, for example, was able to leverage its proximity to

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[283] Luttwak, *Strategy*, 7

southern Chad to strategic effect, by allowing Hissène Habré's forces to regroup in northern Cameroon after their expulsion from Ndjamena. Other sponsors struggled with distance, finding themselves forced to provide only the kinds of aid (e.g. weapon shipments) that could be conveyed to the area of conflict. Lastly, distance sometimes determined which proxies were chosen as partners. Nigeria, for example, formed its PR not with the most militarily significant proxy faction, but with the one that operated in the southwestern regions of the country. Distance, in other words, served to configure not only which PRs came into existence but also the kinds of support given within these.

Terrain

In the Toyota Wars, Libyan tactical doctrine was closely tailored to the wide-open spaces of northern Chad, and this reflected in their airpower-heavy PW strategy. For the bulk of the war, Libyan air units deployed from bases in Aouzou and southern Libya, were used to deliver air strikes against exposed FAN/government forces ahead of FROLINAT/GUNT advances. This combination of Libyan air support and proxy ground forces was highly effective for the first 12 years of the war, keeping opposition forces dispersed and preventing them from massing to defend the capital in 1979 and 1983.[284] Indeed, Libya's ability to add airborne firepower to FROLINAT (later, GUNT) assaults was judged a significant enough factor that French interventions in 1983 (Operation Manta) and 1986 (Operation Sparrowhawk) specifically focused on reclaiming Chadian airspace. These air defenses and no-fly zones prevented the Libyan-GUNT alliance from continuing to use the wide-open spaces of the Chadian conflict area to their advantage, which in turn led to a transfer of strategic initiative to the FAN forces and

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[284] Julian Crandall Hollick, 'Civil War in Chad, 1978-82', *The World Today* , 38:7/8 (Jul. - Aug., 1982), pp. 297-304

their subsequent victories over the Libyans in 1986 and 1987.[285] We thus see that not only did terrain configure how the Libyans embarked on their PW, but also brought about its termination after this terrain-based advantage was denied to them.

Borders

As a conflict largely based around a disputed border, it is unsurprising that the Toyota Wars provide strong support for the salience of borders in understanding the reasons behind opting for proxy war. Certainly, wars for territorial acquisition are almost (if not quite) as old as humanity itself.[286] However, two somewhat less obvious (and closely interrelated) ways in which borders contribute to proxy war in Africa are apparent from a close reading of the Toyota Wars: first, the links between borders and *regimes* rather than states, and second the importance of borders as a regional, continental and global norm. I discuss these in turn below.

First: Libya neither attempted to transform its proxy into a quasi-state during the Toyota Wars, nor was its strategy of king-making based around selectively softening some of the target state's borders to achieve an irredentist or secessionist goal. Instead, the Libyans focused on getting FROLINAT (later, GUNT, and later still, the forces of Idriss Déby) into power as the legitimate government of Chad, so that this new regime could reciprocate by <u>legally</u> ceding the Aouzou Strip to Libya, thereby adding a judicial layer to Libya's *de facto* control of the region.[287] Libya's attempt to destroy the Malloum and Habré regimes can thus be seen as an

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[285] For coverage of the air battles of this last phase of the war, see Aleksandr Serbin, 'Dangerous Flare-up', *The Current Digest of the Russian Press*, 37:39 (October 14, 1987)

[286] John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (USA: Knopf, 1993); and William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000*. (University of Chicago Press, 1982).

[287] Had the GUNT been able to stay in power longer than a year, this strategy might have worked; certainly, a letter of 'understanding' purportedly written by Chadian president Tombalbaye was part of the evidence which the Libyan delegation produced during the ICJ hearings on the fate of the Strip. In this letter, Tombalbaye formally ceded the Strip to Libya; the GUNT regime, once stabilized, could have issued a similar declaration. The letter's authenticity,

attempt to achieve a border change without formally 'seizing' territory, through effecting a regime change in Chad such that the new Chadian 'state' would be reconfigured without the Aouzou Strip in it. This is important because it shows that rather than borders being an inviolable characteristic of a state or nation, the ability of a given *regime* to cede state/national land means that borders should also be seen as characteristics of regimes, i.e. able to be traded away to aggressive neighbors given the correct combination of inducements. We will soon see similar attempts to change borders by changing regimes, in the Somali Vortex and the Border War, and of course, I return to this in the last section of this dissertation.

Second, the Toyota Wars provide a clear example of the prominent, but not always consistent, role of regional, continental and global norms in maintaining borders. We tend to treat prohibition regimes (such as *uti possidetis juris*) as if they were monolithic and always upheld; and the small number of border changes in Africa since independence appears to substantiate this. But looking closer, we see that even UPJ has been bent or ignored on occasion;[288] and most significantly, that there are kinds of border 'violation' which can drag on for decades before any consequences are in fact felt by the violators.[289] In the Toyota Wars, for example, the OAU only moved to freeze the conflict when the Chadian state seemed to be in danger of total dissolution, before this, it was apparently willing to permit the Libyans to exert *de facto* control (and even maneuver for *de jure* control) of the Aouzou Strip. We thus see that when it comes to borders, African states are fairly attached to the UPJ norm as a principle for

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however, has been questioned, especially as the Libyan delegation only ever produced a photocopy of the original document, and Tombalbaye's death in 1975 has left the fact that there ever was a secret pact over Aouzou open for debate.

[288] Wikipedia, for example, maintains an extensive list of border adjustments in Africa: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_national_border_changes_since_World_War_I#Africa

[289] E.g. South African occupation of Namibia, Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara, various border disputes.

organizing the *continent*, but also prone to contravening it (or allowing it to be contravened) in local (i.e., sub-continental) affairs – provided this contravention is limited rather than total.[290]

<u>Human Settlement</u>

The Toyota Wars also featured two constraints on sponsorship deriving from settlement patterns, respectively derived from the <u>presence</u> of particular kinds of settlement, but also its <u>absence</u>. Firstly, and most obviously, the historical settlement patterns of Chad constituted the fault line between the Sara-dominated South, and the Tebu and Zaghawa-dominated North, across which the Chadian civil war broke out in 1966. More importantly in terms of explaining the proxy war, however, is the way in which the pastoral traditions of these northern groups, their adherence to Islam, and their reliance on slave raiding to procure trade goods from the 'fields of empire'[291] connected them to Sahelian rather than sub-Sahelian patrons. This in turn established the tributary and customary links with the Libyan Senussid Orders which El-Gaddafi used as a pan-Arabist justification for its support of FROLINAT and its claim to the Aouzou Strip, and in this way the effects of settlement patterns on the eventual proxy war in Chad are clear.

On the other hand, human settlement also shaped the Toyota Wars by the ways in which it was absent from the areas of conflict. With only 10% of Chad's population living outside the far southern provinces, Libya could occupy northern Chad without needing to engage in the wide scale resettlement of affected civilians, and FROLINAT could use the largely empty terrain to evade government patrols and probes, giving it an advantage over the Chadian army. As Huk and

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[290] Boaz Atzili, comments delivered during 'Evolving Conceptions of Statehood, Sovereignty, and Recognition' panel, ISA Annual Conference, Montreal (March 2011)

[291] Reyna, *War Without End*

DeRouen put it, '[g]eography to a large extent overcame problems of fractionalization, small fighting forces, and a lack of sophisticated weaponry.'[292]

Overcoming Constraints in the Toyota Wars: Typical or Atypical?

My model of PW predicts that PRs are established for three reasons, i.e., to facilitate:

1. The exploitation of existing vulnerabilities and or sources of conflict/violence outside the sovereign boundaries of the sponsor,

2. in available places and spaces for war,

3. through the use of proxies to overcome constraints such as distance, borders, and terrain by means of militarization.

The question thus becomes, how typical or atypical are the Toyota Wars in these terms? I find that the Toyota Wars strongly cohere with my model's predictions. For example, the existence of a sparely-populated hinterland separated from its metropole by historical cleavages (ethnic, religious) is both a typical vulnerability for targets in my model, and a recurrent point of intervention. I will, however, indicate below how the Toyota Wars deviate from my model in several ways; but these only become apparent at a higher level of analysis, i.e., in examining how the constraints discussed in these sections were brought in line with sponsor strategy via the process of militarization.

The militarization[293] of people and places

While the unstable political order within Chad provided the Libyans with several opportunities to realize the territorial and regional goals already discussed in Section A., above, these opportunities had to be acted on in order to establish local factions as Libyan allies, and to

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[292] Karl R. DeRouen and Uk Heo (eds.), *Civil wars of the world: major conflicts since World War II* (ABC-CLIO, 2007), 243

[293] Militarization, i.e., meaning 'making ready for war,' from the Latin root for 'soldier.'

deploy these in a way which would produce the desired effect (i.e., regime change followed by the ceding of territory).

Libya embarked on a process of militarization within Chad by selecting local factions as proxies, providing the kinds of military support which would help them be militarily effective, assisting them with the propaganda and recruitment-related tasks which were necessary to maintain their legitimacy, and leading (or directing) them in battle. I discuss these under the headings of Arming, Agitating, and Mobilizing. I then examine the precise interface between these acts of militarization, and the geopolitical constraints discussed in Section C above, under the headings of *Denying Spaces* and *Zoning Places for Battle*. What I mean by each of these five terms is summarized, with examples, in the following table:

Table 6.2. Five Forms of Militarization

The sponsoring state militarizes…			
… people/groups, by	…arming them E.g. provision of weapons (guns, vehicles, machetes)	…agitating them E.g. use of broadcast propaganda, aid in founding rebel groups	… mobilizing them E.g. provision of trainers, advisors, leaders, liaisons
… places/spaces, by	…denying them to the enemy E.g. depopulation; use of terrain denial tactics (landmines and air defense systems); de-legitimization	… zoning them for battle E.g. declaration of certain areas as 'fronts,' objectives, or free-fire zones; identification of the enemy	

Finally, I conclude with an assessment of the ways in which the Toyota Wars are typical *and* atypical of the model of PW I propose.

(a) Arming

The Toyota Wars provide an excellent example of the importance of weapon provision in establishing a proxy group as a militarily viable partner. Although FROLINAT and FAN both

had weapons of their own, these were insufficient for the tasks which their sponsors had in mind. For FROLINAT, this meant the kinds of armament needed to take and hold government strongholds, and for FAN this meant portable anti-armor and anti-aircraft weapons strong enough to repel the Libyan forces. In both cases, the military fortunes of the proxy abruptly changed when these kinds of weapons were supplied, thereby providing an example of the way in which proxies are used to 'overcome constraints' in terms of my model above.

Thus, while it is also true that how the proxies were armed was sometimes the result of accidental processes or simply what weapons were on hand,[294] it is also clear that assessing the extent of the links between the weapon systems provided and the sponsor goal sought, is one way of distinguishing the sanctioned gray-market sale of state weapons to rebel groups from PW proper. Specifically, one might imagine that gray-market war profiteers will sell rebels any weapon system that they can lay their hands on, whereas sponsors who have a particular military goal in mind will require (or, at least, nudge) their proxies towards the acquisition of weapons which suit that goal.

(b) Agitating

Of course, it is not enough to have armed factions on the ground: these fighters must also be ideologically militarized, and provided with a rallying cause. In the case of the Toyota Wars, sponsors assisted Chadian proxies in the tasks of conscientization and propaganda production in a range of ways. For example, during the early years of FROLINAT's resistance against the Tombalbaye government, the Sudanese Islamic Charter Front[295] promoted FROLINAT's cause,

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[294] For example, different eyewitness accounts of the weapons carried by the GUNT troops concluded that this was due to the 'diversity of Tripoli's supporters.' See Sam C. Nolutshungu, *Limits of anarchy: intervention and state formation in Chad* (University of Virginia Press, 1996), p. 136

[295] The ICF was, at that point, the government-in-waiting of Sudan.

and offered cash incentives to newspapers that covered FROLINAT favorably;[296] this assisted the organization in soliciting foreign funding and positioning itself as the legitimate voice of resistance in the country. Furthermore, the very creation of FROLINAT can be seen as, to some extent, a Sudanese project – especially given that the conference at which the various rebel groups pledged to form a common front was held in Nyala, Sudan in 1967.[297] Libya, too, was prominent in shaping FROLINAT's ideology: many of the organization's early leaders (such as Abba Siddik) were radicalized while studying at Al Bayda University, in Libya, and this contributed to the strong pro-Libyan slant which would in time come to dominate FROLINAT's actions.

(c) Mobilizing

Related to the issue of agitation, above, the importance of directing the proxy in ways that served the military goals of the sponsor is also apparent from the Libyan engagement with FROLINAT from 1969. This can be seen both in the way the Libyans engineered the rise of Abba Siddik, and later Goukouni Oueddi, to primacy within FROLINAT and GUNT, and also in the ways that (after Goukouni's betrayal) the Libyans repeatedly reshuffled the upper echelons of their remaining proxy forces (the CDR) whenever the CDR leadership seemed to be displaying too much independence in terms of prosecuting its war with the FAN.[298] From this meddling it is apparent that, just as the provision of arms was not sufficient to ensure that rebels in the target state would make good proxies, neither was it sufficient to both arm and agitate them to achieve the kinds of outcomes that the Libyans had in mind, the proxy also had to be *led*, i.e. integrated

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[296] Millard Burr, Robert O. Collins, *Darfur: the long road to disaster* (Markus Wiener, 2008), p. 69

[297] The ICF's political wing, the National Congress, became the only political party in Sudan after the 1989 coup by Colonel Omar el-Bashir.

[298] Burr and Collins, *Darfur*, 182, 210, 213

into the battle plans of the sponsor. This makes the Toyota Wars a good example of the variations in sponsor strategy drawn from the data and discussed in Chapter 5, e.g. whether the proxies were directed to attack the target capital or simply to hold ground in the hinterlands; the fraught relationship between the Libyans and FROLINAT/GUNT/CDR also shows that, for some kinds of sponsor objectives, the kind of oversight required to make the proxy militarily effective (and to attend to specific vulnerabilities and opportunities as per my model) may be incompatible with the long-term stability of the PR.

(d) Denying Spaces

As already mentioned, the low population densities of the primary area of conflict in the Toyota Wars (i.e., northern Chad) had a significant effect (as constraints) in shaping the proxy war that took place. However, sponsor and proxy strategy alike played into, were constituted by, and exacerbated these constraints in ways that also shaped the war. This can be seen in the role of sponsor-supplied heavy weapons in countering Libyan aerial and armor superiority, already discussed above, and the Libyan expulsion of Tebu tribal groups into Chad in 1972 after these groups were linked to a coup attempt against El-Gaddafi. The former of these was significant both because it significantly altered the kinds of force that the Libyans could deploy into Chad, and also because the presence of a grounded Libyan air force provided the FAN forces with a series of high-value targets against which they could achieve high-profile victories. The latter, on the other hand, can also be seen as a validation of the importance of denial techniques in proxy war; here, the Libyans were not denying physical geography to an enemy through the provision of weapon technology, but rather denying human geography to its enemies by removing populations who might be mobilized as proxies for those enemies in Libya. As we shall see in the case of South Africa in Chapter 7, sponsors are often all too aware of their own

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vulnerabilities to the kinds of violence they are inflicting on the target; consequently, Libya's efforts to remove potential proxies from its own border zones can be read as an indication of the degree to which the Libyan military planners conceived of such pools of mobilizable sub-state actors as a strategic vulnerability, either to be managed or denied to the enemy.

(e) Zoning places for battle

In deciding where the Toyota Wars would be fought – in other words, in zoning particular parts of the country as areas for battle – we are confronted with this war's most significant deviation from *sponsors* as the type of actor most responsible for the shape of the eventual proxy war. In the case of Chad, most of the policies that cast the northern parts of the country into the kinds of contention which the various sponsors responded to originated not with the sponsors but with the Chadian government itself. From the moment of Chad's independence, Francois Tombalbaye's increasingly dictatorial rule (in rigged elections in 1967, he won 93% of the vote) shut out voices of domestic opposition and excluded northern politicians from the process of government; in addition, he enacted three unpopular and, ultimately, disastrous national policies which drove the country into the state of unrest and civil war which provided the structural vulnerabilities upon which the Libyan intervention relied.

Militarization in the Toyota Wars: Typical or Atypical?

As I mentioned in Section C, above, there are several ways in which the Toyota Wars are atypical as far as my model of PW. Certainly, the war also has its share of typical features: the importance of portable air-defense systems in the hands of proxies, for example, is a recurring feature in all three of the token wars examined, as is the PR-enabling effect of a hated mutual enemy (in this case, the Tombalbaye and Malloum regimes) in driving combatants (including

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potential sponsors and potential proxies) together. However, when it comes to the issues of agitation, Libya's PRs exhibit an interesting atypicality, in that multiple proxy groups went from initially working with the Libyans, to working against them, FAN and GUNT being the best examples of this. In no other war reviewed here did such prominent ideological fissures open up between sponsor and proxy – fissures so extensive that Libya ended up fighting against its erstwhile proxies by 1986.

In part, this outcome may be because the Libyan occupation solidified a previously-inchoate Chadian nationalism whose depth could not have been imagined in the contentious context of the early 1970s. However, it is also striking to note that of the three PWs examined here, the Toyota Wars involve the least active agitation of proxy rank-and-file by the sponsor. Perhaps where the Libyans went wrong, therefore, is not simply that they provoked a nationalist response but that they simply did not do enough to attend to the ideological scaffolding necessary to sustain their partnership with FROLINAT in the eyes of its members. In either case, this atypicality serves to reinforce the importance of understanding PW not only in terms of the many constitutive dynamics (e.g. constraints, places, spaces) in place at the outset of the war, but also in terms of how militarization may reconfigure these in unexpected ways which turn them into a liability (i.e., a vulnerability) for the sponsor.

Rival Theses

Below, I assess the explanatory power of three rival theses in terms of explaining the multi-actor war in Chad. These explanations constitute the baseline upon which my theory – that the Toyota Wars were a *proxy war* serving sponsors' political goals 'by other means' – must improve.

<u>The Resource Curse</u>

The reported presence of uranium deposits in Chad's Aouzou Strip in the 1970s, provides a clear starting point for the assessment of whether the 'resource curse' may have played a role in the Libyan decision to prosecute its war in Chad using proxies.[299] In favor of the 'resource curse', the salience of uranium as a strategic resource in the Cold War context cannot be excluded from any consideration of Libyan foreign policy; after all, Libya possessed a functioning 10MW reactor at Tajoura by 1978, but was reliant on foreign trade to procure the required uranium from Niger. This period also saw Libya's pursuit of nuclear weapons - again, constrained by the need to purchase plutonium and highly enriched uranium clandestinely. To develop Aouzou as a reliable source of uranium would have required either a pro-Libyan government in Ndjamena, or direct Libyan control over the Strip; and, indeed, Libyan strategy followed both of these imperatives in its partnership with Chadian proxies.[300]

However, despite the apparent link between resources and the Libyan use of proxies in Chad, the resource curse performs poorly overall in terms of explaining the Toyota Wars. First, while Libya may have chosen proxies in order to establish control over a uranium field, this cannot explain the actions of all the other states who served as sponsors in this war; Nigeria, the CAR, and Sudan, for example, showed no signs of having any interest in uranium specifically or the Aouzou Strip in general. And while Zaire's contribution to the Toyota Wars might be read as an attempt to safeguard the flow of US largesse into Mobutu's coffers, this is (once again) not the same kind of pillage-by-proxy enrichment upon which the resource curse explanation depends. Second, the ongoing nature of the Libyan claim on Aouzou, and indeed the existence Libyan (and, earlier, Ottoman) sponsorship of Chadian factions way before the advent of nuclear

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[299] Richard Cornwell, 'Chad: Fuelling the flames', *African Security Review* 8:5, 1999, pp. 76-81

[300] John K. Cooley, 'The Libyan Menace', *Foreign Policy* 42 (Spring, 1981), pp. 74-93

weapons, provides another strike against the specific status of strategic resources as an explanation of Libyan intervention. And while it is not inconceivable that Aouzou had other resources (e.g., water or pasturage) which motivated these earlier Libyan rulers to establish partnerships with Chadian groups, this cannot explain why recovering Aouzou in it entirety was seemingly such a low priority for the Idris administration and those preceding it.

To conclude on the status of the 'resource curse' as an explanation of why multiple states used proxies in the Toyota Wars, we thus see that this explains only one of these interventions (at best), or possibly none of them (at worst). Resources cannot be excluded as a factor in the outbreak of this proxy war; but neither can they be said to have played a crucial role in driving states to inaugurate PRs in their pursuit.

Weak States

The inability of central governments to extend their coercive means into (and beyond) their hinterlands, is a core element of the 'weak states' explanation for why states use proxy war. In the case of the Toyota Wars, this explanation has significant merit in explaining Chad's status as a target of PW, but significantly less in explaining the actions of Libya, among others, as sponsors.

It would be no exaggeration to say that the Toyota Wars were conceived, shaped, and concluded in the country's BET region; furthermore, struggles to control or at least pacify this region, can be seen in Chad's pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial history. It was these struggles (and their unstable outcomes) which provided willing proxies within the BET, and it was certainly the failure of successive Chadian administrations to bring the BET under direct control after 1963 (and hence, to install the requisite defenses and forward military bases in this area), that gave these proxies a safe area of operations from which to strike against government

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forces, and which made Libyan air support such an effective tool of sponsorship in support of FROLINAT. Perhaps the clearest evidence for the salience of this failure is to be found in the effects of *l'affaire Claustre*, in which the removal of French advisors and garrison forces from the BET exposed the Malloum administration as being *militarily incapable* of holding their ground against the Libyan-backed FROLINAT. In this regard, at least, the part of the 'weak states' explanation which attributes target status to a lack of military strength, seems to be validated by the data.[301]

However, there are also elements of the Toyota Wars which problematize 'weakness' as an explanation for the use of proxy war. First, the sponsors in the Toyota Wars ran the gamut from very strong (Libya) to very weak (the CAR); this, at least, suggests that we cannot complete the second half of the 'weak states' explanation, which is that lack of military capability drives states to use intermediaries such as proxies. Second, although the bulk of the Toyota Wars took place in Chad, it would be incorrect to say that Chad was the only state being targeted in this war; certainly, Sudan and Egypt's sponsorship of FAN had Libya as its target rather than Chad - and Libya, as already discussed, was far from being 'weak' in the sense that Chad was.[302] While state weakness can be seen to have significant explanatory power in terms of *how* and *where* proxy war was conducted in the Toyota Wars, it therefore fails to explain why proxy war was chosen as a strategy by the many sponsors involved in the war.

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[301] EGH Joffe, 'The international consequences of the civil war in Chad', *Review of African Political Economy* 9:25 (1982), pp. 91-104

[302] Indeed, the degree to which sponsoring states underestimated the degree of commitment which their involvement in Chad would require made 'weak' states of them all. See Michael P. Kelley, 'Weak states and captured patrons: French desire to disengage from Chad', *The Round Table* 74:29 (1985)

Cross Border Identities

As with the Border War, it is important to compare the *ostensible* role of shared identity in the Libyan intervention, to the *actual* record of the actors involved (including, but not limited to, Libya) in this proxy war.

On the one hand, Libya's support of FROLINAT (and, later CDR and GUNT) clearly drew on and perpetuated the patterns of cross-border interaction which had stretched across that region since the Senussid period. It was these along these links that the first Ottoman sponsorship of tribal groups in the BET took place, and it was also along these links that the Idris and el-Gaddafi regimes channeled their sponsorship. This indicates the presence of some kind of shared identity, even if only one that was largely configured in terms of *political* (rather than ethnic or religious) authority structures, for example involving the provision of tribute. But perhaps more importantly, it was northern Chad's cross-border links to the Islamic polities to the North (which included, but were not limited to, those involving political identity) which stood in the path of the creation of similar links to the Christian, animist, and/or colonial regimes to the South; this established the North as a site of permanent insecurity for the successive Ndjamena regime, until the accession of a Northerner to the presidency (along with an unprecedented upsurge of anti-Libyan feeling) served to internally reconfigure the Chadian state in a way which encompassed both the North and the South. In these regards, cross-border identities can be seen to have produced fertile grounds for Libya's use of proxy war at the very least, in that it guaranteed an estranged population of potential fighters in the BET, who could easily be turned against Ndjamena.

Despite all this, however, the Toyota Wars once again provide more evidence for cross-border identities being an enabling factor, than they do for identity as a causal factor. Three

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elements of the Chadian case underline this distinction. First, one may well ask whether el-Gaddafi's invocation of pan-Arab unity as a motivation for assisting FROLINAT was genuine, given his uneven treatment of the Tebu and Zaghawa tribes, and Libya's uneasy domestic relations with these groups from the 1970s. If this was indeed the case, then cross-border identities were an excuse rather than a cause; *realpolitik* wrapped in a pan-Arab flag. Second, the proliferation of factions and sponsors in the Toyota Wars - and the repeated instances of factions switching sides - indicates that even if it was identities which initially helped sponsors and proxies find each other, these identities were not stronger than the urges of military and political necessity; nor were they necessarily a prerequisite for a Chadian proxy who wished to accept, for example, Egyptian aid. Third, the role of Zaire and Benin in the Toyota Wars - in service to US and Libyan aims, respectively - indicate that even when identity matters, these identities may involve relationships entirely remote to the area of operations, rather than (necessarily) cross-border relationships between a foreign sponsor and a local proxy.

As a rival explanation for the use of proxies in the Toyota War, then, cross-border identities fare poorly. They certainly explain why the tribes of the BET were available as proxies for the Libyans; *they may* explain the Libyan intervention, depending on how seriously one takes the el-Gaddafi regime's pan-Arab justifications; but they do *not* help explain why seven other African states chose proxy war as a way of opposing, or supporting, the Libyan move. Thus, once again, while the rival hypotheses do a fair job of explaining *how* and *where* proxy war is used, they cannot satisfactorily explain *why* proxy war, specifically, was adopted.

Concluding Comments

The Toyota Wars represent the simplest of the three tokens of PW investigated in this part of the dissertation. They were simple in that a single sponsor (i.e. Libya) stood out as a

primary meddler in the conflict, because the conflict only had two real 'sides' (i.e. Libyan-backed and anti-Libyan), and lastly because the meddling was primarily unidirectional, i.e. flowing from the sponsors into the target by means of their proxies.

Despite being a relatively simple PW in term of my model, the analysis I have conducted here shows that the Toyota Wars can in no way be thought of as a simple conflict <u>overall</u>. The Toyota Wars not only brought together multiple sponsors and proxies, but did so by drawing on a vast range of vulnerabilities and sources of conflict locally, regionally and globally, for example, Cold War rivalries between Libya and the US, the French neo-imperialist agenda in North Africa, the integration of Tebu and Zaghawa political orders into the Chadian and Libyan states, historical dynamics of violence and tribute around Lake Chad, and so on.

This diversity of conflict sources, when combined with the clear presence of: (i) state objectives aimed at these conflicts; (ii) geopolitical constraints around the people and places involved in the war; and (iii) the intersection of these objectives and constraints through the process of militarization, makes the Toyota Wars difficult to study by means of exclusive notions like 'interstate' or 'interstate' war. Furthermore, as I have argued in Section 6E, above, three rival explanations for the involvement of foreign sponsors in the Chadian conflict (resource curse, state weakness, cross-border identities) do not satisfactorily explain why Libya (among others) chose to form alliances with groups inside Chad.

CHAPTER 7

THE 'BORDER WAR' IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, 1961-1988

Introduction

During the latter half of the Apartheid era (1961-1994), South Africa's military planners relied heavily on violence-capable partners for securing the country's borders, and for establishing its regional dominance vis-à-vis African nationalist regimes in the region. These two goals were explicitly linked under the heading of 'Total Strategy' in a 1975 Defense White Paper, but their interaction is, in fact, connected to a far broader pattern of regional proxy relationships, stretching from 1961 and the outbreak of anti-colonial violence in Angola, to the self-imposed dismantling of the Apartheid regime in 1994. These wars were aptly named the 'Border War' (BW) in so far as the white, minority regime in power in South Africa at the time of these wars was at pains to do their PW in the territories outside its own state borders.

As I stated in the introduction to Part III, the Border War represents a token somewhere between Chad and the Somali War, given complexities such as the number of PRs involved in the war, and changes in the status of the belligerents over time. While the constitutive dynamics[303] of the South African use of proxies on its borders will be examined in detail throughout this chapter, I wish to begin by conducting an assessment of the Border War in terms of the typologies identified in Chapter 4.[304] I do this in order to introduce three recurring elements of the BW upon which my further analysis will build, viz., (i) South Africa's limited capacity to mount a non-proxy based response to its multitudinous security challenges, (ii) the

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[303] 'Constitutive dynamics' is a term of art used to indicate not only the respective roles of the actors involved in a PR, but also how the PR change and evolve over time through PW, and through the interactions between the sponsor(s), proxies and target(s).

[304] These are done according the following: <u>outcome</u> (whether and how the sponsor and proxy's strategic goals were achieved), <u>fit</u> (how each PR related, chronologically, to the period of actual fighting in the area of conflict), and <u>partnership</u> (how did the strategic objectives of these two actors overlap during the period in which the PRs existed?).

degree to which a foundational principle of the South African state (i.e., *Apartheid*) committed it both to a regional war, and constrained the PRs which were formed in that war, and (iii) the presence of multiple underlying sources of vulnerability and opportunity for the states affected by the Border War, such that conflict in the region both predated and postdated the South African involvement.

First, with regard to fit, South Africa's relationships with its proxies predated its own direct involvement in the conflicts in Angola and Mozambique. Indeed, South Africa initially selected its proxies based on its unwillingness (and, later, inability) to contribute the kinds of military or human resources to these conflicts that a more direct involvement would have necessitated. South Africa also withdrew from the fighting before it was concluded. For South Africa, then, the Border War was thus a 'leading' PW.

With regard to partnership, while South Africa's betrayal of the Rhodesians in 1978, its cooling-off of support for RENAMO in 1984, and its abandonment of UNITA following the New York Accords in 1988 all suggest that these PRs involved 'strange bedfellows' with only barely compatible aims, a more obvious reason to classify these as 'opportunistic' PRs lies in the primacy of the *Apartheid* system in the military and political strategy of South Africa. The fact that *Apartheid*'s needs always came first when sponsor and proxy needs clashed, suggests that South Africa's relationship with its proxies is best characterized as 'opportunistic.'

Lastly, with regard to outcome, the issue of who 'won' the Border War is still hotly debated in some quarters.[305] This is because the respective sides in this debate both point to the maintenance of the conflict itself (at least until 1988) as evidence of success: in other words, from the liberation movement point of view, the Border War was a 'victory' because it lasted long enough to see the South Africans withdraw from Namibia, whereas from the South African

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[305] Glesijes *Moscow's Proxy?*, Geldenhuys, *On the Border*

point of view the Border War was a 'victory' because it lasted long enough to halt the tide of Soviet-backed expansionism into the region. In separating rhetoric from reality, however, it is important to note the eventual fall of *Apartheid*, despite the repeated (and costly) escalation of South African military involvement in defense of this policy throughout the 1980s, as evidence for the fact that South Africa <u>did not</u> achieve the strategic objectives that committed it to proxy war. As for its proxies, while RENAMO survived the war and went on to become a political opposition party, this was in some senses despite its association with South Africa, rather than because of it.[306] And while UNITA survived and even flourished after the South African departure, its eventual destruction at the hands of the Angolan government means that, like RENAMO, it cannot be said to have achieved the goal (i.e., political primacy within the target state) that led it to join forces with South Africa. From the point of view of South Africa and its proxies, then, the Border War involved a '<u>Both Lose</u>' outcome.

Again the question suggests itself: why war if the outcomes do not clearly deliver the goods for the parties involved? What <u>was</u> achieved and for whom?

<u>Main events of the Border War</u>

- South Africa fought a war of regional dominance between 1961 and 1994.
- The defense of Namibia[307] was a crucial element of the war.
- The fighting was mostly concentrated in southern Angola and Mozambique.
- South Africa provided military aid to several nonstate factions (mostly UNITA,[308] the FNLA and RENAMO); it also sponsored rogue regimes (Portugal and Rhodesia) in pursuit of joint military goals. Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Zambia all allowed South Africa's opponents to operate over their borders. Libya provided arms and training to various liberation movements in the region.

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[306] Dylan Craig, 'A Line in the Sand'

[307] Throughout this chapter, I refer to the contested territory occupied by South Africa in defiance of UN Resolution 435 as 'Namibia,' although this neologism only came into existence in 1961 and was not used by the South Africans during the Border War. Namibia was instead referred to as 'South West Africa' (after 1918) or 'German South West Africa' (between 1918 and 1884).

[308] See Appendix A: Acronyms

- Cuba, China and the Soviet Bloc provided troops to the Angolan and Mozambican governments, as well as to various liberation movements. The United States provided military aid to UNITA and the FNLA, and limited diplomatic support to South Africa.
- South Africa repeatedly committed its own troops alongside its Angolan proxies, and occupied a strip of Angolan territory from 1975 to 1988.
- South Africa relinquished its claim to Namibia in 1988.
- Funding for South African proxies ended officially in 1988.
- The UNITA movement fought on in Angola until the death of its leader in 2002.

Main Phases of the Border War

- **1961-1975:** Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa maintain 'Zambezi River Salient.'
- **1975:** Portuguese withdrawal intensifies fighting in Angola and Mozambique.
- **1979:** Rhodesian settlement leaves South Africa without regional allies.
- **1975-1988:** South Africa conducts a multi-theater war across the 'Front Line States.'
- **1984:** Nkomati and Lusaka Accords produce brief cessation of overt hostilities.
- **1988:** End of the war for Namibia.
- **1988-1994:** Dismantling of the *Apartheid* regime in South Africa.

Actors Taking Part in the Border War

- **Sponsors:**   South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Frontline States, Libya (African states); Soviet Bloc, US, China, Cuba (non-African states)

- **Targets:**   Portuguese Government of Angola and Mozambique (1961-1975)
                    Dos Santos/MPLA regime of Angola (1975-1988)

                    Machel/FRELIMO regime of Mozambique (1979, 1988-1990)

                    National Party regime of South Africa (1961-1994)

                    Regimes of the Frontline States (1975-1994)

- **Proxies:**   UNITA, FNLA, SWAPO (in Angola and Namibia), MNR/RENAMO (in Mozambique), ANC, PAC (in South Africa)

Figure 7.1: Changes in the Conflict Dynamics in and around the Border War[309]

Figure 7.1 represents the aggregate effect of six important events which took place during the Border War, viz., the South Africa's formulation of 'Total Strategy' (1966-75), the New York Peace Accords and advent of Namibian independence (1988-1990), Savimbi's resumption of armed contestation in Angola (1993-1997), and the two war-concluding events represented by the end of Apartheid (1994) and disintegration of UNITA following Savimbi's death (2002). Figure 7.1 clearly shows how two separate incompatibilities (i.e., around who should rule the Angolan and South African states), were coupled together by both combatant sides in the Border War, as well as how this coupling became an element of the mediation efforts which ended the war (i.e., which prompted event C).[310]

Analyzing the dynamics of the Border War contributes to the elaboration of my model of PW in two ways. First, as with the Toyota Wars previously examined (Chapter 6), the role of PRs in linking multiple incompatibilities together into a single war is clearly apparent. The two primary incompatibilities in this regard, at least with respect to the South African intervention,

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[309] For a key to this diagram,, see p 130

[310] Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa*

are represented in Figure 7.1. The first, regarding which liberation movement would rule Angola and Mozambique, began as a struggle against Portuguese colonial rule and hence predated direct South African involvement in (and indeed, interest in) these wars. The second involved South Africa's regionalization of its domestic security concerns (i.e., defending the oppressive policies of *Apartheid*), as well as its illegal occupation of Namibia. This conflict produced contentious regional relationships between (white) South Africa and its (black) neighbors; and this, in turn, shaped South Africa's motivation to link its own security (Conflict 2) to that of selected factions in the post-liberation struggles along its border (Conflict 1).

The second point of elaboration which I draw from the analysis above is captured by what I refer to in Figure 7.1 as Phase D, i.e. the 'War in the Cities.' During this phase of the Angolan Civil War, which took place after South Africa's withdrawal as a sponsor, UNITA used an armistice to redeploy its forces throughout key points across Angola before initiating a new round of attacks throughout the country. What this shows us is that in some cases, the effects of a sponsor's presence need not be chronologically contiguous with the presence of the sponsor itself. This, in turn, makes the Border War (and especially the case of UNITA) a good instantiation of the idea that self-sustaining dynamics (such as proxies gaining access to conflict economies, or becoming more ideologically polarized from their countrymen) can have marked effects in PWs. This brings the importance of the PR, especially in terms of the potential of sponsorship to set up self-sustaining dynamics that produce unexpected effects for some or all belligerents, to the foreground.

States at War

The Border War brought together a variety of sponsoring states in a complex web of retaliatory proxy warfare, with multiple states both sponsoring PW (as it is conceived in my

model) and being targeted in turn. Of these many crisscrossing wars, the conflict between South Africa and Angola (with UNITA and SWAPO as their respective proxies) produced the most severe and long-lasting fighting. Less severe, but similarly retaliatory, PW took place between South Africa and Mozambique (via the ANC/PAC on one side, and RENAMO on the other), Tanzania and Zambia (ANC/PAC), and Zimbabwe (ANC/PAC and "Super ZAPU"). Libya also provided sponsorship to the ANC, but was not retaliated against by South Africa. Turning to South Africa's allies: the settler regime in Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonial regime in Angola and Mozambique also served as South African proxies in their fight against a regional alliance of African nationalist liberation movements (including the ANC/PAC, FRELIMO, the MPLA, SWAPO, and others). Last, but certainly not least, the Border War involved the USA, Cuba, China and the Soviet Bloc as non-African sponsors. The role of alliances in involving states in PW was thus prominent in the Border War. I detail these alliances below.

<u>South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal</u>

In February 1960, during his visit to South Africa, British Prime Minister Harold McMillan warned an assembly of South African parliamentarians that

> '[t]he wind of change is blowing through this continent, and whether we like it or not, this growth of [African] national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact, and our national policies must take account of it.'[311]

While McMillan's predictions would eventually be borne out, it is also important to realize that at the time of his speech, South Africa had two layers of protection against this metaphorical wind. Most obvious was its minutely designed system of domestic repression, but South Africa could also count on a complex and powerful set of alliances with the Portuguese colonial regimes in Angola and Mozambique, and the British colonial regime in Rhodesia.

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[311] Harold Macmillan, 'Winds of Change speech', http://www.bbc.co.uk/archive/apartheid/7203.shtml

MacMillan's 'winds' (i.e., the forces of anti-colonial liberation) would have to overcome the entrenched settler administrations in these countries before they could directly affect South Africa; and the South African government under Vorster intended to do whatever it could to keep the Portuguese and the Rhodesians in the fight. This would include, by 1978, a range of tactics: sanctions-busting; the provision of material and logistical aid; joint operations; and the loan of army, police, and air force units to the Portuguese and Rhodesian security forces.[312]

South Africa was thus building alliances to fight the Border War long before that war in fact reached its borders. However, the tripartite alliance with Portugal and Rhodesia proved fragile. In 1974, the high costs of Portugal's three colonial wars (in Angola, Mozambique and Guinean-Bissau) combined with dire economic conditions at home to provoke a coup in Lisbon; the leftist Spinola government that emerged from this change in leadership announced that Portugal would withdraw from its African colonies within a year. This had direct military ramifications for the manpower-strapped Rhodesians, who had previously been able to count on Portuguese support in sweeping their eastern border regions for guerillas; it also deprived the South Africans of a friendly regime with which to conduct joint interdiction operations to seal the Namibian border against SWAPO infiltrators. Turning to Rhodesia, the truculence of the Smith regime had drawn heavy sanctions and negative publicity from the world community, making the Rhodesians an expensive ally for the South Africans. In 1978, under pressure from the US and seeking to preserve its own image, the Vorster administration used threats of economic boycott to push the Rhodesians to the negotiating table. In his memoirs, Smith called this 'the great betrayal.'

As its (state) alliance partners had begun to fail in their task of sealing South Africa's borders against infiltration by the ANC and PAC, the South Africans began to develop their own

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[312] Van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Angola and Mozambique*

network of interlinked anti-insurgent operations, drawing together various nonstate groups who had worked with the Rhodesians and the Portuguese (such as the MNR, which later became RENAMO, and UNITA). South African military planners closely coordinated the military operations involving these groups, drawing on a shared reserve of personnel and practices to do so.[313] In this way the South African proxy war, which once been fought by Rhodesian and Portuguese conscripts, would now be fought by disaffected Angolans and Mozambicans, as well as an assortment of mercenaries and armed refugees. In 1975, the South Africans directed their new allies in the invasion, and subsequent partial occupation, of Angola. This operation, code-named SAVANNAH, was intended to displace the pro-Soviet MPLA faction from its dominant position on the eve of Angolan independence, and replace them with a pro-Western (and, by extension, pro-South African) coalition composed of UNITA and the CIA-backed FNLA.[314] I thus use 1975 as the starting point for South Africa's <u>direct</u> involvement in the Border War, i.e., pursuing its own military objectives (rather than Rhodesia or Portugal's) through the use of proxy forces.

<u>The 'Frontline States' and Libya</u>

Aligned against South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal, were a range of independent African states, starting with Libya and Tanzania in the early 1970s. Zambia joined the anti-South African alliance shortly afterward, followed by Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe in 1975 and 1980 respectively. These states provided arms and shelter to the various Southern African

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[313] Stephen Ellis, 'The Historical Significance of South Africa's Third Force,' *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Jun., 1998), pp. 261-299

[314] Jannie Geldenhuys, *At The Front: A General's Account of South Africa's Border War* (Jonathan Ball, 2009); Philip Frankel, *Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil-military relations in South Africa* (Cambridge: CUP, 1984), p. 72; John Turner, *A Continent Ablaze: The Insurgency Wars in Africa, 1960 to the Present* (Jonathan Ball, 1998), p.102-110; and Hilton Hamann, *Days of the Generals: The untold story of South Africa's apartheid-era military generals* (RSA: Zebra Press, 2001), p.90-92

liberation movements, with each newly-independent state becoming a liberation struggle sponsor in turn; in other words, MacMillan's 'winds of change' in action. To coordinate their struggle against South Africa and its allies, many of these states joined together as the 'Frontline States' to coordinate economic and foreign policy; this grouping would eventually become the Southern African Development Community.

However, as with the PRs that originated from the South African side, what is important to note about the sponsorships conducted by African states during the Border War, is the degree to which these involved linking one conflict to another through the use of PW. More specifically, during the Border War, South Africa's opponents used their PRs with African nationalist groups to produce a 'rally around the flag effect,' to shield themselves from domestic criticism,[315] to affect the outcome of domestic power struggles, and/or to enhance their standing in continental fora such as the OAU. Thus, as was also observed in the Toyota Wars and the Somali Vortex, the use of PW involved making some the range of outcomes in some incompatibilities (e.g. domestic power struggles) subordinate to the range of outcomes in others (e.g. South Africa's war with its neighbors).

Non-African Sponsors: The US, Cuba, China, and the Soviet Bloc

Southern Africa's prominence as a theater of the Cold War is beyond dispute. Significant aid was extended from both superpower blocs to a range of factions in the Border War.[316] Furthermore, in the case of Eastern or Soviet Bloc support, different members of this Bloc (i.e. China and Cuba) strove to outdo or out-supply others (i.e. the USSR) as a response to intra-

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[315] See Ackson M. Kanduza, 'The Frontline States Against Apartheid: The Case of Zambia,' Paper Presented to an International Conference on a Decade of Freedom: Celebrating the Role of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in South Africa's Freedom Struggle, 10-13th October 2004, University of Kwazulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa. Retrieved online at <http://www.anc.org.za/un/conference/amkanduza.html>.

[316] Edmond D. Keller and Donald Rothchild (eds.), *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State sovereignty and Regional Security* (Lynne Reinner, 1996)

alliance rivalries or jockeying for position. Finally, PRs in one conflict (e.g. the US's close relationship with Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire) were instrumental in determining which actors states selected as proxies and targets in another conflict (e.g., the US backed Holden Roberto's FNLA because Roberto was Mobutu's ally and nephew; Cuba backed the MPLA in response to the US and South Africa's support for the FNLA and UNITA).

In the analysis conducted above, two aspects of the role of states in the Border War stand out; first, the role of global alliances in overcoming local differences to constitute <u>puzzling relationships</u> between 'strange bedfellows,' and second, the <u>dynamic interactions</u> between the parties to the PR. With regard to the first of these, it is no exaggeration to call South Africa's alliance with the (nominally) Maoist, nationalist UNITA group an unlikely one. However, this alliance, while perhaps puzzling *in situ*, is easily explainable in terms of South Africa's explicitly anti-communist orientation, which is in turn explainable in terms of its dependence on Western Bloc support and UNSC vetoes. In this way, cases of 'strange bedfellows' entering into a PR are explained not by referring to their shared ideologies or common objectives, but rather by the rivalries and alliances which exist within the broader state system, once again highlighting the importance of state aims in determining which PRs form, where they form, and when.

Second, and related to this, the Border War shows that the spread of fighting within a PW can <u>develop beyond its initial configuration</u> through the presence of dynamic interactions between sponsors, targets, proxies and locations. For example, in the Second Chimurenga War in Rhodesia, rivalries between China and the USSR exacerbated an ethnic divide within the liberation movements, with Soviet aid flowing to the Matabele-dominated ZAPU, while China and North Korea supported the Shona-dominated ZANU.[317] This initial state of affairs was seized as an opportunity by the South Africans, who employed a range of false-flag 'pseudo-

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[317] Turner, *Continent Ablaze*

operations'[318] to stir up fighting between ZANU and ZAPU elements.[319] By the early 1980s, rivalry between these two parties culminated in the so-called Matabeleland Massacres, or *Gukurahundi*. While blame for the *Gukurahundi* campaigns cannot be laid entirely at the feet of either of these three sponsors, their efforts to prevent the formation of a united liberation front against the Rhodesians, and (in the case of the South Africans) to specifically sow mistrust between ZANU and ZAPU, are clearly at the root of the incompatibility which produced the eventual violence.

<div align="center">Proxies at War</div>

I have shown above that one effective way to understand states' decisions to employ proxy war is to examine the constraints at which the PR is aimed. In this section, I consider *how* the use of proxies facilitates these aims. I do so in what follows, first, by examining the specific opportunities for exploitation offered by peoples and places, and second, by examining how these people and places are militarized, i.e. brought in line with the sponsor's strategy for achieving its objectives.

Distance

In the Border War, distance constrained PRs in three main ways. <u>First</u>, as already discussed in Chapter 6, nearby sponsors encountered a lower 'bar' to participating in PW than more distant ones. In this way, states like Malawi, Lesotho, Zambia and Mozambique were able

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[318] Stiff, *Silent War*

[319] Stiff, *Idem*.

to provide Level IV-V support[320] to proxy groups simply by virtue of being adjacent to the proxy's area of operations. Second, distance between prominent sponsors (such as Tanzania and Libya) and their proxies' areas of operations in South Africa necessitated the creation of elaborate 'underground railroads' by which trainees, weapons, and supplies could be moved through areas controlled or under surveillance by South Africa. Where such transit networks could not be created, proxy organizations were sometimes able to make up the slack through pure commitment. In some cases, ANC and PAC cadres would simply walk overland from their training bases in the sponsor's territory to the conflict area – even if this trip took months.[321] Third, distance – measured not between sponsor and target *per se*, but across wide areas of conflict located within the target – led to the creation of multiple fronts of battle both in Angola and Zimbabwe. These multiple fronts, in turn, produced multiple available proxies, as (for example) communities in one area joined a particular proxy group, and communities in another joined a second.

In the case of the Border War, then, distance can be seen to have played an important role in determining how many armed nonstate actors were available to serve as proxies, as well as in determining the specifics of which states would assist them and how.

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[320] Dunér's five levels are:

> **I.** Direct combat involvement (e.g. Regular invasion, Specialist functions)
> **II.** Indirect combat involvement (e.g. Irregular invasion, Shelling)
> **III.** Direct para-combat involvement (e.g. Advisory functions, Arms supply)
> **IV.** Indirect para-combat involvement (e.g. Military training, Armed blockade, Financial support)
> **V.** Direct supporting activities (e.g. Military warning, Transport, Base functions

[321] For a first-person account of the hazards of such a trip, see Ed Bernard, Mwezi Twala, *Mbokodo: Inside Mk: Mwezi Twala - A Soldier's Story* (Jonathan Ball, 1994)

<u>Terrain</u>

The importance of terrain in determining the eventual configuration of the Border War cannot be overstated. This is the case for two main reasons: <u>first,</u> the extreme variations in terrain between the scrub and desert of central Namibia (i.e., the heartland of SWAPO's liberation struggle against the South Africans), and the densely vegetated deltas of the Angolan/Namibian border. South Africa's proxy war strategy was a direct response to SWAPO's decision to move the battlefront against the South Africans to these densely-vegetated border regions; in other words, to provide the first steps towards the regionalization of the struggle for Namibia.[322] In Caprivi and the Okavango, PLAN fighters could use scrub and jungle to disperse their forces and move supplies without fear of SADF strikes, counting on the inability of the well-equipped but numerically limited South African forces to cover the entire border zone.[323]

The <u>second</u> way in which terrain impacted the Border War was in terms of the way that the occluding potential of densely vegetated terrain constituted the basis for a range of PRs and strategic alliances between belligerents who were forces (or, who sought) to share the use of these important areas. For example, during the colonial period, SWAPO's decision to move the fight for Namibia into southern Angola, led it into a loose military alliance with the various anti-Portuguese factions who also used the area; and this alliance, in turn, prompted military co-operation between the South Africans and Portuguese in the pursuit of these heterogeneous rebel formations. After Angolan independence, on the other hand, SWAPO's use of southern Angola

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[322] And this, in turn, was an explicit response to the extremely low levels of terrain-based cover in the remainder of the country.

[323] South Africa struggled, throughout the Border War, with how to enforce *Apartheid* without desegregating the armed forces, increasing the length of conscription, or sustaining so many casualties that it would affect the National Party's support vis-à-vis the white electorate. The result of these restrictions was an army for which the size of the military task always outstripped the means on hand to accomplish this; proxy war and the Romeo Mike strategy (discussed on p.172, below), were just two of the government's many responses to this ongoing problem.

committed it to an alliance with the MPLA; the MPLA protected SWAPO from the SADF, and SWAPO committed troops to the fight against UNITA.[324]

Turning from alliances between nonstates to the actions of states, terrain also affected which groups the South Africans chose as proxies. Specifically, the South African use of Kung and Ju//Wasi tribal auxiliaries as trackers throughout northern Namibia and southern Angola was a direct response to the problems of finding SWAPO groups in the rough terrain of the conflict area.[325] In conjunction with the issues discussed above, then, the salience of terrain in determining which PRs came into existence, and how proxies were used in the Border War, is clearly apparent.

Borders

Borders constrained PW strategy both in practical and discursive ways during the Border War. Practically speaking, the considerable length of those parts of the South African border which the regime was forced to consider as 'hostile,' i.e. open to infiltration, were significant. By the height of the Border War, the South Africans were attempting to interdict ANC/PAC and SWAPO infiltration from the mouth of the Kunene River to the Indian Ocean. Given the segregatory policies of Apartheid, the SADF lacked the available personnel to directly patrol this extensive border. To some extent, the South Africans attended to this challenge by creating citizen militias in sensitive border areas, as I will discuss under militarization, below. However, the bulk of their personnel deficit was made up through the use of proxies. South Africa's strategy in the Border War became one of stand-off support. After proxy forces working in conjunction with SADF advisors made contact with the SWAPO or ANC/PAC insurgents,

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[324] Turner, *Continent Ablaze*

[325] Crummey, *Banditry and Rebellion*

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'Romeo Mike' units (radio code for the *Reaksie Mag*, or 'reaction force') could be quickly deployed to the site of fighting, either by helicopter or lightly armored ground vehicles such as *Buffels*.[326] These RM units, patterned after the highly mobile Rhodesian 'fire forces,' would then fight alongside the proxies, as well as coordinating artillery and air strikes against the enemy. The SADF also made use of airborne units to resupply its proxies in Angola and Mozambique, which increased the range and mobility of these forces.

<u>Discursively</u>, the penetration of the South African border by ANC and PAC guerillas during the Border War also formed a prominent element of South Africa's justification for military action (including proxy war) throughout the Frontline States. Indeed, maintaining (i.e. defending) the border became shorthand for maintaining the state itself, such that, the judicial and ideological power of 'the border' became an overarching concept in South African domestic and regional politics, popular culture, and national ideology. By the height of the border war, it was no exaggeration to claim that, 'the border was everywhere.'[327]

<u>Human Settlement</u>

In the Border War, however, the South Africans chose, led, and directed their proxies in two main ways which reflected the human settlement of Southern Africa; specifically, South Africa's regional advantage in transport infrastructure, and to a lesser extent the legacy of the South African mining industry's migrant labor system.

To deal with these in order: from the moment of their independence, the economies of the Frontline states were tied to the South African economy by their reliance on South Africa as a

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[326] The *Buffel* (Buffalo) is a four-wheeled, mine resistant, armored personnel carrier which holds 10 soldiers.

[327] As the cover of a government-produced magazine of the time (*Paratus*) put it: *Grensdiens is Landsdiens* (Service on the Border is Service to the Country). The associated graphic for the cover was a national serviceman (i.e., white conscript soldier) squaring off a looming Soviet bear over the Namibian border.

hub for the export of primary commodities and the import of finished goods. In particular, most of the landlocked Frontline states (Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho) only had two land-based options for importing and exporting goods: via South Africa, or via Mozambique and Angola. However, over the course of the Border War, South Africa directed its proxies to destroy the rail links, road bridges and other economic infrastructure that connected the landlocked Frontline States to one another, and repeatedly mined the Angolan and Mozambican harbors, keeping safe only the routes leading to South Africa. In this way, the Frontline states remained tied to the South African transport system; they could then be subjected either to direct coercion (via rail stoppages or delays), or their economies could be held hostage against the international threats of sanctions which South Africa faced from 1976 onwards.[328] In this way, South Africa exploited, using proxies, a set of contemporary flows of goods and people to produce a strategic advantage in its relations with its neighbors.

A less critical flow that South Africa exploited in order to sponsor the war in Angola was the migrant mining labor system. This system dates back to the discovery of precious metals and minerals in the 19th century, and had produced (by the 1970s, and South Africa's assumption of a direct sponsoring role in the Border War) an enormous reservoir of ex-miners scattered across the countries of southern Africa. While working on the mines, most of these ex-miners had been taught Fanagalo, a pidgin language used to facilitate communication between multilingual shaft crews and their South African bosses. When FNLA soldiers began drifting south after Holden Roberto's failed bid for power in Angola, and were placed in holding camps administered by the SADF, the South African soldiers (many of whom had also spent time in the mines as shift supervisors or foremen) discovered that they could use Fanagalo to communicate with the

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[328] Gavin G. Maasdorp, 'Squaring up to economic dominance: regional patterns,' in Robert I. Rotberg, Henry S. Bienen, Robert Legvold and Gavin Maasdorp, *South Africa and its Neighbours: regional security and self-interest* (Lexington, 1995)

Bakongo FNLA soldiers; subsequently, when this group of military refugees was reformed as the SADF's 32 Battalion, Fanagalo served as the language of command and instruction until sufficient numbers of English speakers could be trained.[329]

<u>Overcoming Constraints in the Border War: Typical or Atypical?</u>

My model of PW predicts that PRs are established for three reasons, i.e., to facilitate:

1. The exploitation of existing vulnerabilities and or sources of conflict/violence outside the sovereign boundaries of the sponsor,

2. in available places and spaces for war,

3. through the use of proxies to overcome constraints such as distance, borders, and terrain by means of militarization

The question is, how typical or atypical is the Border War in terms of my model's depiction of the role of proxies in PW? In this regard, I find that the ways in which these constraints were confronted through proxies in the Border War <u>adequately</u> coheres with my model's predictions, with certain caveats. On the one hand, the actions of sponsors highlighted the way in which proxies could be used to fight the war in a particular way which suits the sponsor (or avoid this); on the other, the sheer number of sponsors and PRs involved in the Border War makes the use of proxies to overcome constraints somewhat atypical because of the way that multiple sponsors fought to make certain constraints more or less prominent than they might otherwise have been. For example, as seen in the Toyota Wars, the role of terrain in providing a tactical advantage to small groups fighting larger ones is clear. However, in the Border War we see that the question of which terrain will be used, or the precise ways in which

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[329] Mining hostels filled with migrant workers also served as a recruitment site for domestic proxies, which the Apartheid government then deployed to hotspots all over the country to perform various security-related tasks – including extrajudicial killings. These domestic proxies were shipped to camps in the Caprivi area of northern Namibia to receive training, once again highlighting the domestic and foreign interconnectedness of the Border Wars.

this will affect the war, was dynamic and open to contestation. Certainly, the South Africans would have preferred to fight the war for Namibia anywhere but the occluded Angolan lowlands, but this option was denied to them by SWAPO.

Similarly, in the case of settlement patterns, the Border War is both typical and atypical of my model of PW. On the one hand, the existence of local communities existing 'outside' the political order of the target proved to be a fruitful point of intervention for meddling sponsors; this is clear in the way that the Bakongo FNLA and Ovimbundu UNITA groups were mobilized against the MPLA regime which had excluded them from what they felt to be a rightful share in government. Such dynamics are typical of PW, and fall within the categories of 'existing vulnerabilities and opportunities' as well as 'available people and places.' However, the persistence of the FNLA as a South African proxy after 1975, despite operating far from their northern homeland and under direct SADF 'rule,' suggests that not all PRs need to count on such 'vulnerabilities and availabilities' to exist. In addition, the experience of 201 ('Bushman') Battalion indicates that states may on occasion form PRs with precisely the kinds of internally marginalized communities which my model predicts their opponents would have made into allies. Thus, the question of why the !Kung and Ju//Wasi communities became South African proxies instead of, say, Angolan proxies is not well explained by my model, except to say that South Africa was less 'vulnerable' to such meddling; but as we have seen above, the existence of a condition of vulnerability can be created by sponsor action as much as responded to. The import of atypicalities such as these for my model of PW will be further discussed in Chapter 9.

The militarization of people and places

Although South Africa's initial investment in UNITA and the RENAMO was limited in scale, by the late 1970s the militarization of these groups had become a fundamental element of

the South African 'total strategy.' However, despite the <u>overall</u> importance of proxy groups to South Africa's military planners, the SADF tailored their use in different theaters of conflict (primarily Angola and Mozambique, but also Zimbabwe and the homelands) to quite different vulnerabilities and available places/spaces for war; furthermore, this diversity of use can also be seen in the different ways in which the Frontline States provided sponsorship to the ANC/PAC, SWAPO, etc.

(a) Arming

While arms flows to proxies varied in level, sponsors clearly matched the levels and type of weapons provided, to the intended <u>function of the proxy within the war</u>. For example, while South Africa provided UNITA and 32 Battalion with the same kit and weapons as regular SADF troops, including anti-tank weapons with which to hold off Cuban and Angolan armored units, they outfitted RENAMO far more cheaply and in a manner which focused on light weapons and landmines.[330] This can be attributed to the South Africans' desire to have UNITA hold a strip of land in southern Angola, whereas no such buffer role was envisaged for RENAMO; I discuss these further in *Mobilization*, below. UNITA was also provided with large numbers of shoulder-launched anti-aircraft weapons by the US, in order to counter the presence of Soviet Hind helicopters among the Angolan forces; this tied into the US strategy (also seen in Afghanistan) of providing anti-Soviet forces with weapon systems which would inflict heavy material costs on the Soviets. Lastly, lacking an arsenal of its own, SWAPO's armed wing (PLAN) relied on

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[330] Much of the gear which RENAMO received from South Africa was drawn from an extensive parallel armory managed centrally by the SADF and distributed to all its proxies. This included AK-47 and AKM rifles, Soviet Bloc uniforms, and other pieces of Soviet military hardware from radio sets to vehicles. Some of these weapons had been recovered from captured ANC caches within South Africa; some had been seized from weapons stockpiles abandoned during FAPLA retreats; and others had been purchased on the black market through a range of front companies. SADF technicians and machine shops were used to remove various identifying features from this latter category of small arms before they were distributed. See Stiff, *Silent War*.

sponsor-provided anti-aircraft (emplaced machine guns) and anti-vehicle weapons (mines and RPGs) in its fight against the South Africans.

However, unlike the Toyota Wars and the Somali Vortex, the profile of proxy arming in the Border War shows that while the eventual loadout of weapons by proxies may be limited to what the sponsor is willing to provide (and hence fundamentally tied to the sponsor's military objectives for the proxy), it may also fall far short of this if high-capacity target states are able to interdict these shipments. For example, the South African government spared no expense in resisting the cross-border shipment of arms to the ANC/PAC; this is considered to be one of the reasons why the ANC/PAC were not able to start a domestic front for fighting the *Apartheid* regime, even though this would have suited the aims of the sponsors.[331] However, this kind of surveillance requires the target state to exercise significant coercive power within the area of conflict. This requirement may explain why the other sponsors and targets in two of the three three wars studied were not able to resist the influx of arms into the hands of the people/groups being militarized.

(b) Agitating

Sponsor-produced propaganda was instrumental in conferring authority to proxy forces during the Border War, thereby providing them with willing recruits and constituents. This support for propaganda ran the gamut from the extreme to the subtle. On the one hand, South Africa provided UNITA's radio station, *Voz da Resistência do Galo Negro* ('The Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel,' or VORGAN) with funding, staff and shortwave radio

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[331] As Volume 2 of South Africa's own Truth and Reconciliation Commission report acknowledges: 'it has been argued that the majority of victims of gross violations of human rights were in fact residing outside the country's borders at the time the violations were committed.' http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/execsum.htm

transmitters capable of beaming Savimbi's message throughout Angola and beyond.[332] On the opposite side of the Border, the Frontline States also provided the ANC/PAC with propaganda support, hosting liberation movement presses and assisting with the dissemination of cassette tapes and leaflets.[333] While this assistance was more muted than that provided by the South Africans, it was nonetheless seen (both at the time and in retrospect) as vital in terms of sustaining these groups' legitimacy in the eyes of their constituencies.

What is important to note in the Border Wars, however, is the salience of sponsored agitation not only in providing proxies with <u>local</u> legitimacy, but also in providing them with <u>international</u> legitimacy. While local legitimacy can indeed provide the proxy with recruits and taxes, the latter can provide entirely new sponsors, configure the proxy as a 'worthy ally' of the sponsor in the eyes of the sponsor's domestic constituency, or harness the power of the international community in other ways. For example, UNITA's international profile was a matter of considerable concern for the South African regime. Accordingly, it maintained a press center at UNITA's home base in Jamba, Angola and ensured that the organization got as much positive international press as possible; this support was instrumental in ensuring the flow of funds to UNITA from anti-Soviet backers in the northern hemisphere.[334] Within South Africa, Jonas Savimbi (the head of the UNITA) was also treated as if he were a conventional head of state, even appearing as a guest of honor at the State President's inauguration in 1984. Lastly, state-owned South African media made constant reference to the UNITA 'government' of southern

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[332] Windrich, 'Laboratory of Hate.' There is also some evidence that mobile transmitters were provided to UNITA by the US in the 'early to mid 1980s': http://www.clandestineradio.com/intel/station.php?id=10&stn=20

[333] TRC report, *Idem*.

[334] Brittain, *Death of Dignity*

Angola as 'allies,' as well as 'anti-communists' and 'patriots;'[335] these legitimating statements were used to justify continued South African involvement in southern Angola.

While the examples discussed above show how the sponsors *instrumentally* contributed to the agitation of groups for proxy war, it should be pointed out that targets also played a (sometimes *unwitting*) role in this process. For example, the FRELIMO government's rejection of tribal and traditional authority as 'obscurantism'[336] agitated former power-holders within those structures, thereby assisting the Rhodesians in constituting them as proxies. While the data thus clearly suggests an interplay between sponsor and target actions in terms of militarization, the initiative in this regard resides with the sponsor.

However, targets did *resist* this process of agitation. For example, South Africa made a policy of attacking (either through cross-border raids, or through airstrikes) ANC and PAC offices in neighboring countries throughout the 1980s,[337] and also expended considerable effort in infiltrating these remote headquarters in order to carry out espionage and targeted killings. To the extent that this served to disrupt ANC printing presses and media distribution centers, these raids also helped the South African security forces clamp down on the amount of propaganda being disseminated to the conflict areas from these locations. Counter-insurgency strategists in South Africa also leaped at the opportunity to defend key institutions in some parts of the Border War (e.g., collaborationist tribal structures in northern Namibia) against de-linking campaigns

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[335] Elaine Windrich, 'South Africa's Propaganda War,' *Africa Today*, First Quarter, 1989, pp. 51-60, and Dylan Craig, ''Total Justification': Ideological Manipulation and South Africa's Border War,' in Gary Baines and Peter Vale (eds.), *Beyond the border war. New perspectives on Southern Africa's late-Cold War conflicts* (UNISA Press, 2008). On the other side of the battle lines, a similar process of authentication resulted in SWAPO being recognized by the OAU as the legitimate representative of the Namibian people, as well as being accorded observer status by the UN.

[336] William Finnegan, *A Complicated War: The Harrowing of Mozambique* (University of California Press, 1992), p. 117

[337] Peter Stiff, *The Silent War: South African Recce Operations 1969 – 1994* (Galago Publishing, 1999)

launched by SWAPO. This played into their narrative as the region's defenders against Soviet-backed revisionism, and assisted them in agitating those communities into supporting their occupation, providing informants, or even going over entirely to the South African armed forces.

(c) Mobilizing

The Border War, as I have discussed above, involved the linkage of multiple factions contesting multiple incompatibilities across a variety of local and global environments. Sponsors mobilized (i.e., deployed and directed) proxies in ways that closely reflected not only their own objectives, but also the conditions the proxy was fighting in, and the relative strengths of the proxy and the target.

In Angola, UNITA's operations, between its integration into South African military planning and the withdrawal of the SADF from Angola in 1988, concentrated on the establishment of a UNITA-held defensive line capable of withstanding counter-attacks by the Angolan government and its Cuban allies. Through the application of enormous quantities of South African support (mostly during Operations PHOENIX and ASKARI between 1982 and 1984), this line was slowly pushed northward until it was halted by the brief Lusaka peace accords of 1984. Throughout this period South Africa worked hard to mobilize UNITA as a partner in war. This effort was necessary, because in the early phase of their interaction, UNITA forces had clashed with their South African allies on multiple occasions. Part of this contentiousness can be attributed to lingering resentment over South Africa's partnership with the Portuguese between 1961 and 1975, in which South African forces had helped the Portuguese colonial forces find and destroy UNITA units.[338] But by 1977, simple bad feelings had been replaced by more problematic clashes over tactics and objectives. On these occasions,

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[338] Willem van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Angola* (SA: Ashanti Publishing 1993)

UNITA troops would either refuse to attack well-defended targets whose destruction formed an integral part of a larger SADF operation, or they would seek out targets of their own and commit their SADF allies to dangerous or needless fights.[339] The South African response to this challenge was to integrate UNITA more firmly into their battle plans, by means of better training and closer supervision. Whereas in 1977, UNITA and SADF units had simply rendezvoused in the Angolan bush before conducting joint operations, by 1987 UNITA troops were riding into battle on the hulls of SADF tanks.[340]

In Mozambique, on the other hand, it is inarguable that RENAMO was never intended (by its creators) to rule; rather, its aim (and hence the ways in which it was mobilized by the South Africans) was simply to fight. [341] In an interview about his role in training RENAMO fighters, a former member of the Rhodesian special forces put it as follows: 'Our aim was simple … we wanted them to keep Machel and Frelimo so busy they couldn't devote time or attention to supporting [the Zimbabwean liberation movements].'[342] This continued to be RENAMO's function long after the state that created it had passed out of existence; from the SADF's point of view, RENAMO was a cost-effective and highly deniable proxy combatant with which to bedevil the Machel regime (and, given Zimbabwe's reliance on Mozambique for its sea-borne trade, the Mugabe regime as well). Finnegan makes the following point concerning this objective:

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[339] Stiff, *Silent War*

[340] John Frederick Walker, *A Certain Curve of Horn: The Hundred-Year Quest for the Giant Sable Antelope of Angola* (Grove Press, 2004), p. 197

[341] This, understandably, produced occasional clashes between ambitious RENAMO commanders and their handlers. Finnegan notes that the SADF responded to these mobilization incompatibilities by simply assassinating the troublemakers. Finnegan, *A Complicated War*, p. 79

[342] Hamann, *Days of the Generals*, p. 105

> Paolo Oliveira, the Renamo defector, whom I interviewed in Maputo, was told by a South African colonel in 1983 that Pretoria had no wish to change the government of Mozambique, but simply to "put Machel on his knees."[343]

In keeping with this objective, RENAMO's missions (i.e., the ways in which it was mobilized by the South Africans) were typically directed at economic and civilian targets (such as the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric dam, or the staff of foreign aid project sites) rather than military targets.

Beyond this, however, it is important to note that the complexity of the Border War in terms of which states and nonstates were involved, and the wide gaps in military capacity between these, produced a particularly hostile environment for those belligerents who found themselves facing far stronger opponents, or who attempted to achieve objectives for which they were not militarily suited. A good example of the latter category is the FNLA: this US-backed ethnonationalist faction from northern Namibia was all but destroyed when it moved out of its base of operations to confront Cuban forces during Operation SAVANNAH. The ANC/PAC and SWAPO were similarly outmatched in the early years of their struggle against South Africa, and would not have survived as insurgent groups had they not been able to relocate their bases of operation beyond the easy reach of the SADF.

Over time, then, the only factions remaining on the battlefields of the Border War were those whose forces had been <u>sustainably mobilized</u>: i.e., directed and deployed in ways (or locations) which both compensated for their military vulnerabilities (or leveraged their military advantages), and served the interests of the patrons who could protect them from their enemies. This issue highlights an as-yet-undiscussed element of the profile of PW in Africa: the possibility that any survey of <u>extant</u> PRs not only captures those wartime relationships that are sought or created by sponsors and proxies, but also constitutes a list of all those agents in violence who

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[343] Finnegan *A Complicated War*

have been able to survive complex wars featuring shifting combinations of belligerents. Put differently, failing to join a PR may be a suboptimal strategy for factions engaged in a complex multi-actor war. This is in line with the depiction of PW as a 'stable strategy' that I advance in Chapter 9.

(d) Denying Spaces

During the Border War, depopulation was extensively employed by RENAMO forces in pursuit of South Africa's destabilization goals. RENAMO used both force and the threat of force to remove civilians from areas of interest; it also, on occasion, settled for making civilians too fearful of reprisals for them to support the government. The result was millions of dollars in lost revenue for the Mozambican government in particular, and even more for the Frontline States more generally.[344] To some extent, the South African strategy of outfitting RENAMO 'on the cheap' played into this preference for soft over hard targets. Because they were forced to live off the land, RENAMO units sustained themselves through plunder and press-ganging; because unable to fight government forces head-on, they settled for attacking the population on which FRELIMO depended. As one Mozambican civilian later testified:

> The bandidos [bandits] like to scatter little antipersonnel mines around on paths in the villages at night, so the first person to come along in the morning stands on one … [that's] Renamo's way of telling the povo [people] that Frelimo cannot protect them.[345]

In Angola, UNITA troops under South African direction were tasked with making the Ovimbundu heartland of southern Angola as hostile as possible for functionaries of the Angolan state. These operations were often combined with strikes by South African air force units; for

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[344] Michael Cranna (ed.) *The True Cost of Conflict: Seven Recent Wars and their Effects on Society*, (New Press, 1994), pp. 81-112

[345] Finnegan, *A Complicated War*, p. 97

example, to destroy convoys of government vehicles.[346] 'Pseudo-operations,' i.e., committing acts of sabotage or murder while dressed as government soldiers[347] were also used to de-link the MPLA regime from its citizens.

(e) Zoning Places for Battle

As already discussed, the issue of where the Border War would be fought was in part decided by the nationalist liberation movements, when these moved their fight against South Africa outside its borders in order to limit the kinds of force that could be deployed against them. This turned the war against Apartheid into a 'Border War' of interdiction and infiltration, and essentially mandated the use of proxies by the South Africans to cope with the logistical and personnel challenges of fighting such a war.

However, equally important in terms of using the concept of PW to lay bare the important dynamics of a conflict such as the Border War, was the (albeit less-successful) attempt by the liberation movements to move the war back into South African territory in the 1980s. One example of this strategy occurred in 1982, when the ANC and PAC announced that their forces would begin targeting rural populations along the South African border. As one senior ANC official put it, '[These farmers] have been organised [sic] into military formations and their main task is to inform on us and to confront us when they feel strong enough to do so … we feel the time has come to clean them out.'[348] In this case, the proxy organizations' use of denial strategies (farm attacks to depopulate the border regions) provoked South African resistance (the militarization of farming communities), which in turn re-committed the proxies to the

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[346] Dick Lord, *Vlamgat : the Story of the Mirage F-1 in the South African Air Force* (Covos Day, 2001)

[347] Stiff, *Silent War*

[348] Cawthra, G, Kraak, G, and O'Sullivan, G (eds.), *War and Resistance: Southern African Reports* (Macmillan Press, 1994), p. 125

elimination of these groups *because* of their militarization. This highlights the dynamic interplay between sponsor and non-sponsor actions in the militarization of space/place in proxy war.

Militarization in the Border War: Typical or Atypical?

As with constraints, the Border War has both typical and atypical elements when compared to proxy wars as formulated generally by my model. The militarization conducted during the war was typical in that: (i) sponsor support was tailored to intended proxy function; (ii) sponsors assisted proxies in their search for legitimacy; and (iii) sponsors directed proxies to attack specific objectives depending on which vulnerabilities (in the target state) or opportunities (more generally) they wished to exploit. Furthermore, we not only see that: (iv) the processes of denying space/places to the enemy and zoning specific areas for battle were used to achieve PR objectives; but also that (v) these practices served to reconstitute the area of conflict in dynamic ways which rippled back through the associated PRs.

What is atypical about the militarization conducted in the Border War, at least when compared to a simpler token such as the Toyota Wars, is the 'tug-of-war' conducted between belligerents for control over the outcomes of militarization. Belligerents attempted to interdict one another's propaganda, interrupt one another's recruitment, and subvert or destroy each other's attempts to arm proxies. Furthermore, targets (especially South Africa) manipulated tensions within PRs were by to counter the effects of sponsor militarization. As with other elements of my model, then, my assessment of the Border War highlights the status of militarization as a dynamic, contested part of PW rather than a static one.

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Below, I assess the explanatory power of three rival theses in terms of explaining the multi-actor war along South Africa's borders between 1961 and 1988. These explanations constitute the baseline upon which my theory – that the Border War was a *proxy war* serving sponsors' political goals 'by other means' – must improve.

The Resource Curse

While resources figured prominently in how South Africa used proxies in the Border War, this relationship was a complex one, and cannot be said to have been one of the *causes* of the adoption of proxy war as a strategy in this conflict.

Certainly, both UNITA and RENAMO did illegally extract elephant ivory (in both cases) and diamonds (in the Angolan case) from their areas of operation; these resources were then exchanged for munitions on the gray market with South African support and supervision. Furthermore, to the extent that these groups guarded the walls of Apartheid, and Apartheid had at its core the defense of a segregated export-based economy, the South African regime can be said to have drawn financial benefit from its association with UNITA and RENAMO. Lastly, members of the South African military reportedly drew personal benefit from their association with these groups.

However, two factors argue against taking these features of the Border War as significant in explaining how it came to be. First, in neither case was pillage present when the proxy relationship was inaugurated (1975 and 1979 respectively); nor did it become a significant feature of the relationship soon thereafter. Second, while funds derived from pillage did pass into South African hands, these funds were not retained, but were plowed back into the coercive capital of the proxies. Given the extensive use of captured Cuban and Angolan war materiel by

the SADF itself, this re-investment can be seen as less of an attempt to profit by proxy pillage, and more as an attempt by an increasingly cash-strapped regime to fight its extensive wars more cheaply.

Accordingly, in the case of the Border War the 'resource curse' explanation of proxy war can only be accorded the status of an intervening variable. Resources were not insignificant; but the role they played had more to do with how the war was fought (or perhaps even where) than why it was fought using proxies.

<u>Weak States</u>

The 'weak states' explanation of proxy war predicts that the use of proxies will follow state weakness, with weakness acting either as a opening to being targeted (e.g. weak states are unable to suppress potential proxies in their hinterlands, leaving them open to attack) or as an opening to sponsoring PW (as weak states use intermediaries to make up for their own military deficiencies). Although the case of the Border War strongly deviates from this predicted pattern, it does so in ways which indicate the basic difficulty of satisfactorily measuring state military 'strength'.

We see this difficulty in a variety of ways. First, as regards the 'weakness' of South Africa and its enemies, it is clear that the SADF had structural weaknesses in the mid-70s which put its army at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the better-equipped Cuban forces in Angola. These weaknesses, themselves the legacy of divisions in the South African state around and after WW2 and the Vorster government's subsequent downgrading of the armed forces' budgetary priority, certainly constrained South Africa's initial forays into Angola (Operation SAVANNAH); put differently, the SADF of 1975 was certainly weaker when it joined forces with UNITA and the FNLA than it was in the 1980s, and in this sense the inauguration of the partnership happened at

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a moment of relative 'weakness' for South Africa. Furthermore, as shown in this chapter, during the Border War the SADF had the disadvantage of having to be 'everywhere at once,' guarding the entire length of the South African border against ANC, SWAPO, and PAC insurgents. This stretched the state's already-thin manpower reserves, making proxy war (coupled with the RM strategy and other tactics such as *vuiswys*). Lastly, it is inarguable that the presence of alliance-ready groups in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and elsewhere was in itself a testament to the 'weakness' of those states targeted by South Africa: had the Luanda, Maputo, and Harare regimes been able to re-assert their monopolies of violence in these regions by destroying or demilitarizing these groups, there would have been far less opportunity for the South Africans to turn these groups' areas of operations, into the sites of proxy war.

However, despite these points in favor of state weakness as an explanation of why South Africa used proxies during its Border War, there are several problems for the 'military weakness' perspective. First, South Africa's use of proxies escalated in lockstep with its growth in military strength, such that what was initially a very loose and problematic relationship between UNITA and the SADF (for example) became far stronger as the SADF's stocks of long-range artillery, airmobile forces, and air power increased. Thus, as South Africa became stronger, it also used proxy war more intensely. Second, because it was only after the failures of Operation SAVANNAH that the SADF's weaknesses (discussed above) became apparent, this weakness cannot have played into the decision to join forces with UNITA; indeed, the SADF's decision to entrust the capture of Angola's capital to 1000 soldiers backed up by light armor and almost no artillery, bespeaks a kind of overconfidence in South African military prowess, rather than the perception of inability upon which the weak-state-sponsors argument rests. Third, it is important to retain awareness of the fact that the Border Wars involved the bidirectional, or at least

reciprocal, use of proxies - by and against the South Africans. Given this, it is unconvincing to say that weakness explained why (weak) Mozambique supported the ANC and PAC against South Africa, and also why (weak) South Africa supported RENAMO in retaliation; for whatever the failings of the SADF, it cannot be considered to have been 'weak' in the same way as the FAM/FPLM. Fourth and lastly, the use (by both sides) of their own heartland regions as staging points for proxy muster and training, provides a clear counterpoint to the idea that states always enter the uncontrolled territory of their rivals to seek proxies. Indeed, in the Border Wars it was as often the overly *effective* deployment of state coercion, which produced the refugee/exile populations that sponsoring states then militarized as proxies; this was the case both in South Africa's use of 32 Battalion, and in the Frontline States' use of the ANC after the organization's infrastructure within South Africa was destroyed by police action in the early 1960s.

Given these, it would not be correct to characterize state weakness as an important factor in explaining the use of proxy forces during the Border War. As with resources, weakness was important in explaining *how* PW was used, and sometimes *where*; but not in explaining why it came about.

Cross-Border Identities

The degree to which South Africa's Apartheid system has been cast primarily as a system of *racial* domination, has simultaneously obscured and laid bare various ways in which cross-border identities played into the wars surrounding apartheid. Resolving these opposed perspectives, then, is an important preliminary task if the importance of cross-border identity in this war is to be assessed.

First, there are several ways in which cross-border identities clearly *did* matter in explaining the creation of PRs during the Border War. First, the fact that South Africa's first forays into external civil wars during the 1960s involved propping up the Portuguese and Rhodesian settler states on its border - i.e. states ruled by regimes with whom South Africa shared a European, or at least non-African identity - cannot be excluded from explaining how South Africa came to have a stake in Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe by the 1970s. Second, it is similarly clear that some would-be proxies, like ZANU and ZAPU in Zimbabwe, at least, were able to count on cross-border ethnic identities (specifically, Shona and Matabele identities) in providing willing sponsors (in Mozambique and Zambia, respectively). In this case, cross-border identities may not have generated PRs from thin air, but they certainly provided existing sponsors and proxies with a path of least resistance and maximal trust in seeking partners in war.

On the other hand, even as cross-border identities fed into proxy war in these ways, the Border War also provided ample counter-examples in which PRs took place in ways which drew on far more abstract (i.e. ideological) identities, or in which PRs were established despite clear differences in identity. Most clearly, it should be emphasized that even if 'shared settler identity' drew South Africa and its settler allies together, these were not 'transnational identities bisected by borders' in the normal sense of the phrase; had they been, Rhodesians would likely not have balked at joining the Union of South Africa in 1922, nor would the Rhodesians who fled the country to join the SADF in 1980 been effectively segregated in their own army units and barracks. Furthermore, for every ethnically coherent PR established during the Border Wars, several were established where there was no clear link of this kind, or where this link was not bisected by any single border (e.g. Tanzania's support for the ANC and PAC). Lastly, to suggest

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that the minority regime in South Africa shared an 'identity' with its black nationalist proxies strains credulity to the extreme. One might go so far as to say that anti-communism made these groups 'strange bedfellows', but even this (as far as identities go) is hard to find support for given the plasticity of (for example) Jonas Savimbi's origins as a Maoist political entrepreneur.

These features of the Border War allow one to look beyond the war's subsequent depiction as an identity-based ethnic war in which a white cross-border alliance fought a black one, to a view of it as involving a complex mix of political and ethnonationalist identities in which a range of instrumental alliances were struck between (at times very different) actors. Thus, while it is clear that identities - broadly conceived, and generally operating at the level of political-authoritative narration - *mattered* in the Border War, they did not matter in the sense of states reaching across borders to assist their endangered brethren. Of all the rival hypotheses being assessed here, then, it is role of cross-border identities which the case of the Border War most strongly refutes as an explanation for proxy war.

Concluding Comments

The assessment of state objectives, proxy utilization, constraints, and militarization that I have conducted here builds on a theme which runs throughout the Border War, i.e., the effect of a multiplicity of sponsors, proxies and targets on the overall course of the PW in question. Specifically, we see that the statement that 'the Border was everywhere' mentioned above, in fact says something not only about how pervasive the notion of a hostile border was in the *Apartheid* society, but also of the breadth and variety of 'borders,' both visible and invisible, which ran through southern Africa between 1975 and 1994. These borders included the borders between white minority rule and black nationalist rule in Africa; between the Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc globally; between tribal 'obscurantism' and post-tribal rule in Mozambique;

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between infrastructural plenty and export-oriented dependency in the Frontline States; and many others. Each border produced potential or actual incompatibilities, vulnerabilities and sources of conflict between those on one side and those on the other; furthermore, as these borders shifted in response to many dynamics (including the end of colonial rule, the current state of the Cold War, and the rise of anti-autocratic movements in Portugal (1974) and South Africa (1988-94), each shift produced new potential allies, or forced existing alliances to evolve.

Although several aspects of the Border War challenge my model of PW (or, rather, suggest lines of improvement), it is clear that conceiving of the Border War as the product of multiple competing parties in a struggle for dominance through the use of PW goes further in terms of understanding the Border War than, (i) positing a single causal link between sponsor and the use of proxies, and (ii) applying overly simplistic notions such as 'interstate' or 'intrastate' on violent struggles or rivalries.

CHAPTER 8

THE 'SOMALI VORTEX,' 1973 – PRESENT

Introduction

As I stated in the introduction to Part III, the Somali Vortex is the most complex of the three token wars to be studied here. It therefore provides the clearest test on the limits of my model of PW. That is to say, in examining the complexities of the Somali Vortex, various challenges to and confirmations of my model's predictions are encountered.

I begin my study of this complex PW in 1973, when Somali president-by-coup Siad Barre resumed the provision of military aid to Somali irredentist groups in neighboring countries, and thereby set in motion a chain of events which would drive the region into a series of wars lasting until the present day. From their origin in the interstate rivalry between Somalia and Ethiopia, these wars grew to draw in a variety of regional, continental and global sponsors as well as multiple proxies and targets. It is for this reason that I refer to the proxy wars in and around Somalia from 1973 as a 'vortex.'

While the various dynamics constituting this 'vortex' will be examined in detail throughout this chapter, it is worth noting three recurring elements of the Somali Vortex at the outset: (i) the degree to which the unstable political communities upon which the Somali, Ethiopian, and Eritrean states rested served to 'prime' these states for PW; (ii) the role of third parties in opposing or encouraging the formation of particular PRs, thereby changing the course of the PWs conducted; and (iii) the effects of the externalization of multiple external conflicts (e.g., between Ethiopia and Eritrea) into Somalia.

Initial support for my identification of these three elements as fundamental to the Somali Vortex can be found in the results of the typological analyses for the Ethiopian sponsorships in Somalia. First, with regard to fit: Ethiopia's relationships with its proxies in Somalia have

primarily been of the <u>envelope</u> type.[349] In other words, the Ethiopian meddling in Somalia both preceded and anteceded actual hostilities between proxies like the SSF/SNM, RRA, and TFG and the various belligerents which served as targets for these (the Barre regime, AIAI, and the ICU). This state of affairs underlines Ethiopia's long-term commitment to affecting the internal dispensation of Somalia through a mixture of proxy warfare and other means; however, it is also true that while the overall goals of Ethiopia during this period (mostly, self-defense) have remained coherent enough to group its many PRs together, several unique factors (e.g. the multiplicity of targets during this time already mentioned, the appearance of Eritrea as a regional rival for Ethiopia, and the advent of the global War on Terror) have played a role in constituting individual PRs.

Second, with regard to <u>partnership</u>: as with fit, above, although each of the many Ethiopian PRs established in the region has had a slightly different degree of congruence between the proxy's goals and Ethiopia's, these goals have displayed a coherent overall <u>mutualism</u>. That is to say, Ethiopia's partners in its meddling in Somalia have tended to have <u>local goals</u> which synchronized well with Ethiopia's <u>regional goals</u>. For example, while 'expediting home rule for Somaliland' was not a core goal for the Ethiopians, the result of the proxy's attainment of this goal (i.e. providing a secure buffer region against Somali border revisionism in the Ogaden) suited the Ethiopians well.

Third, with regard to <u>outcome</u>: as the only one of the three token wars which is still underway, any conclusion about whether the current dispensation represents a victory for any of the actors involved must be advanced with caution. However, from the Ethiopian point of view,

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[349] It should also be pointed out that the 'first shot' in the Somali Vortex (i.e., the Somali-backed irredentist war in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia) was inarguably fired by Somalia rather than Ethiopia. In this sense, while Ethiopia's overall commitment to proxy war in the region has been of the 'envelope' type, its first involvement (in retaliating against Somali agitation in the Ogaden) was <u>lagging</u>.

the presence of an AU-backed Somali government configured along a weak-center federal model is certainly closer to an optimal outcome (i.e. a Somalia which is regionally weak but more-or-less internally stable) than was the case a decade ago. From the perspective of Ethiopia's many proxies, the PRs have been similarly close-to-optimal. Ethiopian support has not only provided these groups with long-term military viability, but also connected them to other sponsors (e.g., the US) and given them an opportunity for a far more stable conflict termination (in terms of their various individual goals) than would have been possible without Ethiopian intervention. I therefore classify these PRs as 'Both Win' in terms of outcome.

Main Events of the Somali Vortex

- Successive Somali administrations had armed nearby irredentists since 1961.
- In 1973, Somalia backed the WSLF in a failed secession war in Ethiopia.
- Ethiopia retaliated by sponsoring Somali factions that overthrew the Barre government.
- Ethiopia, Eritrea, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the superpower blocs provided military aid to one or more Somali factions.
- A UN peacekeeping force, headed by the US, was deployed to Somalia in the early 1990s. An AU peacekeeping force was deployed in 2007.
- Al Qaeda has provided military aid and manpower to various Somali factions.
- The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has occupied parts of Somalia since 2003.
- Ethiopia occupied parts of southern Somalia in the 1990s, and the capital from 2007.

Main Phases of the Somali Vortex

- **1961-1973:** Somali agitation for 'Greater Somalia'
- **1973-1974:** War in the Ogaden
- **1974-1997:** Ethiopian destabilization of Somalia
- **1997-2003:** Ethiopian incursions into Somalia
- **2003-2007:** Re-establishment of the TFG in Mogadishu
- **2007-present:** Continued instability in Somalia

Actors Taking Part in the Somali Vortex

- **Sponsors:**   Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Libya (African states)
                   Soviet Bloc, Cuba, US, Yemen, Saudi Arabia (non-African states)

- **Targets:**   Kenyatta regime of Kenya (1963-67)
                   Selassie regime of Ethiopia (1973-74)

                   Mengistu regime of Ethiopia (1974-91)

                   Barre regime of Somalia (1976-1990)

                   Transitional National Government regime of Somalia (1990-2006)

                   Zenawi regime of Ethiopia (1999-present)

                   Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (2006-present)

                   AIAI[350] and ICU regimes in Somalia (1997-2007)

- **Proxies:**   Somali *shifta* (in Kenya), WSLF, SALF, OLF, ONLF (in Ethiopia)
                   SSF, SNM/SSDF, USC, SNF, RRA, AIAI, ICU, ARPCT (in Somalia)

Conflict Dynamics

Figure 8.1: Changes in the Conflict Dynamics in and around the Somali Vortex

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[350] See Appendix C: Acronyms

Figure 8.1 represents the aggregate effect of five important events which took place during the Somali Vortex, *viz.*, the Ogaden War (1973-76), the entry of Eritrea as an actor in the region (1990-present), the beginnings of Ethiopian intervention in Somalia (2001-present), the Eritrean response to these (2001-present), and the realignment of the Somali government-in-exile as the Transitional Federal Government (2004).

As in two previous wars, the attentions of sponsors made the outcomes over an ongoing conflict in Somalia subordinate to their desired outcomes in a larger war, i.e., the wars around the internal and regional relations of the Ethiopian and Somali states. However, unlike the previous two wars studied (i.e., the Toyota Wars and the Border War), the Somali Vortex featured (at least) three interrelated conflicts. While one of these (i.e., dynamic 3 in Figure 8.1) has been concluded for the time being, the ongoing conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea has grown from and perpetuated the other two sources of instability (i.e., dynamic 1. and 2), which have, in turn, continued to feed the Somali Vortex.

Analyzing the dynamics of the Somali Vortex in this manner contributes to my model of PW in two ways. First, and in distinction from the other two wars examined in this section of the dissertation, the Somali Vortex was not only a complex, regionalized PW like the Border War, but also the only war of the three studied in which a third-party target state (Somalia) was used as a battlefield between two other states (Ethiopia and Eritrea), resulting in the multiplicity of conflict dynamics reflected in Figure 8.1. This was in part because of the creation of Eritrea, a new state and hence a new participant in PW. This instance provides a natural experiment for using PW to explain the conduct of African states at war, i.e., an opportunity to demonstrate that PW constitutes a system, or security order, in which even a newly created state such as Eritrea can rapidly become enmeshed. Although new states no longer appear in Africa (or elsewhere)

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with the rapidity that they did during the 1960s, the prominence of 'state building' globally ensures that the question of how new regimes will adjust to the regional security orders in which they are created remains an important one.

Second, studying the Somali Vortex in terms of its multiple parallel conflict dynamics provides a useful opportunity to assess the relative importance of the Cold War in the discussion of complex multi-actor conflicts in Africa. As I have discussed in Chapter 1, our common-sense understanding of 'proxy war' is strongly linked to the term's use in reference to superpower contestation. However, in separating the multiple incompatibilities of the PWs in the region as I have done in Figure 8.1, we see that the rivalry between the superpower-backed Somali and Ethiopian states was only one of three dynamics which produced extensive PWs in the region. While this does not discount the importance of superpower sponsorship as an enabling factor at least, it shows that with respect to the question of 'why did states use proxies to fight wars in Somalia?,' we must search for a more detailed and productive answer than 'because of the Cold War.' I turn to this task in terms of the five key predictions of my model of PW, in what follows.

States at War

The three states most prominently involved in the Somali Vortex were Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. Kenya was also briefly involved as a target during the so-called 'Shifta War' in the 1960s, and later served as a sponsor by harboring the Somali TFG prior to its return to Somalia. Uganda and Rwanda have provided substantial military support (via the AU) to the TFG. Djibouti has remained diplomatically, if not militarily, connected to the conflict. Lastly, in terms of non-African interveners, the Somali Vortex has seen intervention by the United States (both directly and through the UN), the Soviet Bloc, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. These latter two states also indicate the importance of accounting for the meddling of various Islamic nonstate networks

(e.g. Al Qaeda) in this conflict. I discuss the roles of five of these sponsors (Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and the US) in what follows.

Somalia

Supporting irredentist groups abroad had been an element of Somali foreign policy ever since independence, and had been articulated by successive heads of state as an attempt to reconstitute a 'Greater Somalia' adhering to pre-colonial borders.[351] Indeed, Somali *shifta* ('bandits') with more-or-less concrete ties to Mogadishu could be found in both Ethiopia and Kenya both before and after the colonial period.[352] The existence of these links can, in large part, be attributed to the haphazard delineation of the region by the British between 1945 and 1959. During this partition, several large grazing areas used by Somali nomads (such as the Haud, in Western Somalia, and the Ogaden), and several ethnically Somali regions (such as Kenya's Northern Frontier District, or NFD) were placed outside Somali borders. From the moment of the country's independence, successive Somali regimes rejected the legitimacy of the frontier demarcations; regaining these lost territories became a central part of the rhetorical foundations of the Somali state.[353]

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[351] Emmanuel N. Amadife and James W. Warhola, 'Africa's Political Boundaries: Colonial Cartography, the OAU, and the Advisability of Ethno-National Adjustment,' *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer, 1993), pp. 533-554.

[352] '*Shifta*' is, of course, not how these raiders refer to themselves but rather the term by which predated communities referred to them; see Crummey, *Banditry and Rebellion* for an exposition of the complex identity of the *shifta*.

[353] Even the five-pointed star on the Somali flag was chosen as a reference to the five primary Somali homelands, although only three of these lay within the country's borders at the time. Somali poet Xaaji Aadan (1914-2005) described the importance of the Somali flag in the following terms:

Afriiqiyada Bari buu u yahay shamis arooryaade   "For all of East Africa, the Somali flag rises like the sun, and
Sida qamarka oogada jiruu ugu iftiimaaye   shows the way ahead like the moon. *The flag will unite what*
Ummaddii la googooyey buu ururinaayaaye   *the colonists have divided.*" [emphasis added]

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Because the Greater Somalia policy essentially encouraged civil war in neighboring countries, the Greater Somalia policy led to clashes between Somali forces, their agents, and Kenyan and Ethiopian forces, especially between 1960 and 1964[354]. The civilian government which preceded Barre had sought to mend fences with Kenya and Ethiopia; Barre ended this détente and thereby put Somalia back on a course for war.[355] This is particularly clear in regards to his support for irredentist groups in Ethiopia. During the 1970s, Somalia had been fast accumulating military strength. Barre's adoption of 'scientific socialism,' had resulted in the provision of significant military aid and advisors to Somalia by the USSR, and this aid was used to add armor, air and naval wings to the Somali National Army (SNA), significantly closing the gap in military power between the SNA and the larger Ethiopian army.[356] The Barre regime's decision to back the WSLF[357] and thereby begin the cycle of wars that became the Somali Vortex, thus occurred against a backdrop of changing power relations between Somalia and Ethiopia.

In contrast to its rising <u>regional</u> fortunes, in <u>domestic</u> terms the Somali state was extremely unstable. Somalia experienced a string of mutinies and protests during the 1980s,

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For further analysis, and the full text of the poem, see Ali H. Abdulla, 'A new Club for Somalia based on the Vision of Xaaji Aadan Af-Qallooc,' WardheerNews.com, July 05, 2009. Accessed at http://wardheernews.com/Articles_09/July/Ali_Abdulla/05_Haji_Adan_Afqallooc.html on August 04, 2010.

[354] Donald K. Petterson, 'Somalia and the United States, 1977-1983: The New Relationship' in Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman, Richard L. Sklar (eds.) *African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Berkeley, USA: University of California Press, 1985)

[355] Library of Congress: Somalia, A country study. 'Irredentism and the Changing Balance of Power,' http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+so0109). See 'Shifta war'; 'Ethiopian and Kenyan defense agreements'

[356] Turner, *A Continent Ablaze*.

[357] This support was also extended to the WSLF's ally, the Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF). See David Hamilton Shinn, Thomas P. Ofcansky, Chris Prouty, *Historical dictionary of Ethiopia*, (Scarecrow Press, 2004), p.305-307, 396

many of which were put down with deadly violence.[358] This climate of tension can in part be attributed to Barre's contentious interactions with Somalia's pervasive clan system – interactions that would, by 1989, drive the country into outright civil war[359]. By 1990, Mogadishu was an isolated city, wracked by protests and surrounded by anti-government United Somali Congress (USC) forces. On 31 December of that year, Barre fled the city, leaving Somalia without a head of state.[360] Initial attempts to restore government under a coalition government failed, and Somalia entered a phase of near-complete internal anarchy. This spelled the end of Somalia as a sponsor, but not as a target, as I will discuss below.

Ethiopia

For its part, Ethiopia entered the 1970s gripped by internal strife and anti-monarchic unrest, as well as nascent rebellions in Tigray, Ogaden and Eritrea[361]. These internal conflicts served to weaken the Ethiopian state and draw its forces into garrison roles all over the country. In addition, US military aid – the primary source of weapons for the Ethiopian army – had slowed after the international media reported incidences of human rights abuses perpetrated by the Selassie government. In 1974, these vulnerabilities were exacerbated by divisions within the Ethiopian leadership, culminating in the ouster of Emperor Selassie by a group of army officers including future head of state Haile Mengistu Miriam. It was at this moment that the Somalis and their allies chose to make their bid for the Ogaden.

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[358] Turner, *A Continent Ablaze*.

[359] Jeffrey Clark, 'Debacle in Somalia', *Foreign Affairs* 72:1: America and the World (1993/3), pp. 109-123

[360] Barre fled first to Kenya where he attempted to rally his forces, then to Nigeria after Kenyans protested against his presence in their country. He died in Lagos in 1995, of a heart attack.

[361]John Markakis, 'Nationalities and the State in Ethiopia', Third world quarterly, 11:4, Ethnicity in World Politics (Oct, 1989), pp. 118-130

Despite a string of initial losses in the Ogaden, the Ethiopians quickly gained the upper hand in their struggle with the Somali-backed rebels. Thanks to Mengistu's rise, a closer relationship between Ethiopia and the Soviet Bloc was made possible; this resulted in the provision of a Cuban expeditionary force to the Ogaden, which proved crucial in halting the Somali advance[362]. By 1977, when the Mengistu regime closed down the last US military base in the country (Kagnew Station, outside Asmara), Ethiopia's transition from US ally to Soviet ally was complete, and Soviet advisors and munitions began to arrive in the country. Various foreign initiatives aimed at mediating between the Somalis and Ethiopians failed;[363] and despite its withdrawal from the Ogaden, the Barre administration continued to proclaim its support for the WSLF and SALF. On 1 May 1978, just a few months after the last Somali unit had left Ethiopian territory, Barre made the following declaration on Radio Mogadiscio:

> The people colonized by Abyssinia will be free. Eritrea will be free, and they cannot refuse to let them be free. Western Somalia will be free, and they cannot refuse to grant it freedom. The numerous Abo will be free because this is history, and no one can prevent the sunshine from reaching us.[364]

In response to these instances of Somali agitation, the Ethiopian government began to foster and support the many anti-Barre groups that had sprung up in opposition to Barre's increasingly unpopular rule. In February 1979, a group called the Somali Democratic Action Front (SODAF) moved its headquarters to Addis Ababa, changed its name to the Somali

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[362] *Ibid.*

[363] "In Ethiopia, however, Lieutenant Legesse Asfaw, member of the PMAC responsible for military and political affairs, said in Assab on Jan. 17 that, although President Siyad Barreh desired negotiations, there could be no reconciliation with "a reactionary enemy who would have to be "repulsed and annihilated"." (Keesings, 28989)

[364] Mogadiscio Domestic Service in Somali, 0448 GMT 1 May 1978, quoted at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siad_Barre. Barre's speech was no mere public relations exercise. In January 1979, the Somali government had formally resolved to continue supporting the WSLF and SALF; indeed, support for Somali liberation groups outside the borders of the country was written into Chapter 1 of the country's draft constitution at the same set of meetings. In addition, the Somali government committed itself to the pursuit of closer ties with anti-Ethiopian Arab governments (Keesings 29706)

Salvation Front (SSF), and began operating an anti-Barre radio station beaming into Somalia (Radio Kulmis[365]). The SSF leadership was dominated by Barre's political rivals: it contained exiled members of the Barre administration (ex-Minister of Justice Osman Nur Ali), close relatives of the previous head of state (Mustafa Hadji Nuur), and members of the Majertain clan who had been held responsible for a failed coup against Barre in 1978 (Colonel Ahmed Abdullahi Yusuf). By 1981, the SSF was claiming responsibility for attacks and bombings in Somalia; it also alleged that it had received weapons shipments from Libya.[366]

The Ethiopians were also able to establish links with a second anti-Barre group, the Somali National Movement (SNM), which was led by exiled Somali diplomat Hassan Adan Wadadi. At its launch in London in April 1981, the SNM articulated a clearly revolutionary agenda for Somalia, including the removal of Barre as head of state[367]. By 1982, the SNM had entered into 'productive' talks with the Ethiopian government about establishing bases for an anti-Barre insurgency in the Ogaden; around the same time, the SSF had joined with two smaller groups to form the Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF).[368] By 1982, both Radio Halgan and the Somali government were reporting heavy fighting between the Somali army, and SDSF guerillas supported by Ethiopian troops in the north-western regions of the country;[369] Somalia also accused the Ethiopian air force of bombing several towns in Somalia during this time.[370] This pattern of Ethiopian-backed local fighting was to continue throughout the 1980s, until the

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[365] 'Kulmis' meaning 'Unity.' http://www.clandestineradio.com/intel/station.php?id=168&stn=161 .

[366] Keesings 31688

[367] Harold D. Nelson, *Somalia, a Country Study. 3rd ed* (Washington, D.C.: Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., 1982)

[368] Keesings 31688

[369] Radio Kulmis had been renamed Radio Halgan ('Struggle') after the SSF's transformation into the SDSF. http://www.clandestineradio.com/intel/station.php?id=168&stn=160

[370] Turner, *A Continent Ablaze.*

respective ends of the Barre and Mengistu regimes in the early 1990s. I will discuss how Ethiopia's involvement in Somalia changed after the fall of Barre and the appearance of Eritrea as a new regional actor in Section D, below.

Eritrea

Eritrea's entrance into the Somali Vortex was the result of its rivalry with Ethiopia. After the fall of Mengistu and the establishment of a provisional government in Ethiopia, the four main combatant factions[371] attended a series of US-sponsored peace talks in London, at which the Ethiopian representatives acknowledged the right of the Eritrean people to hold a referendum on independence. This UN-monitored referendum, held in 1993, indicated an overwhelming support for independence[372]. Eritrea became a sovereign nation on April 27, 1993.

Ethiopia and Eritrea had initially agreed to defer the final demarcation of their mutual border in the interests of speedily resolving Eritrean independence. However, by 1998 key issues had still not been settled. Indeed, the exact details concerning Ethiopian access to Eritrean ports, and growing disputes about which imported goods could be declared tax-free by the Ethiopians, had proved more complex than the authors of the 1991 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation signed by the two countries had anticipated.[373] Besides these disagreements, tensions from other sources also began to affect the Ethiopian-Eritrean relationship. There is some evidence that, from the Ethiopian side at least, the presence of a large Tigrean minority in Eritrea constituted an unresolved point in the political dispensation between the two countries.

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[371] That is, the ELF, EPLF, TPLF, and OLF.

[372] Keesings Record # 39403

[373] Alemseged Tesfai, 'The Cause of the Eritrean-Ethiopian Border Conflict,' *Dehai: Eritrea Online* (http://www.dehai.org/conflict/analysis/alemsghed1.html)

Lastly, Eritrea may have been on the lookout for a rallying effect, given domestic pressures on the Afwerki administration in early 1998.[374]

On 6 May 1998 the Eritreans elected to unilaterally adjust their border with Ethiopia by seizing the contested town of Badme[375]. Initial successes against lightly-armed Ethiopian police and militia units gave way to trench warfare and air strikes as the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) were mobilized and began to prepare a counter-offensive. Diplomatic interventions by the US, Rwanda, and the OAU failed to stop the fighting, and the Ethiopian forces counter-attacked in February 1999. A successful flanking maneuver by infantry and armored units defeated the Eritrean trench system, and by May 1999 the ENDF was six kilometers inside Eritrea. Fighting continued in fits and starts while Ethiopian and Eritrean delegations contested the terms of peace; a final ceasefire agreement was signed in May 2000[376]. By this time, Ethiopian forces occupied a quarter of Eritrea.

The fighting had lasted just over two years, but had produced an estimated 70 000 battlefield casualties as well as significant disruptions to civilian infrastructure. The competing claims which began the conflict remain unresolved and continue to generate border incidents, accusations, and exchanges of artillery and small arms fire. But beyond these obvious costs of the war lies a less obvious outcome: the displacement of Ethiopian-Eritrean rivalry into Somalia following Eritrea's inability to dominate Ethiopia conventionally. By the outbreak of war in 1999, Eritrean links with the Somalia-based Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) were plausible enough that the Ethiopians diverted up to 3000 troops to help Rahanweyn Resistance Army

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[374] Paul B. Henze, 'Eritrean Options and Ethiopia's Future' (RAND Corp, 1989). Accessed online at http://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/2009/N3021.pdf

[375] Keesings Record # 42316

[376] Keesings Record # 43557

(RRA) fighters recapture the city of Baidoa from an alliance of OLF fighters and Hussein Aideed's USC/SNA militias.[377] Aideed had already acknowledged received military aid from Eritrea and Uganda, and subsequent reports indicated similar links between Eritrea and the OLF;[378] certainly, the Afwerki government had fought alongside the OLF against Mengistu, and these old networks of comradeship formed one of the relationships which served to bind the OLF to its new Eritrean sponsors.[379]

Kenya

Like Ethiopia, Kenya was first drawn into the Somali Vortex by Siad Barre's explicit policy of expansion, and the acknowledged presence of Somali soldiers alongside the *shifta* rebels. Consequently, Kenya and Ethiopia signed a mutual defense pact in 1963-4, and renewed it in 1980 and 1987.[380] There can therefore be no doubt that the Kenyan and Ethiopian administrations took the Somali claims on their land seriously, and that the Barre regime in particular (which was in power during the 1980 and 1987 renewals) constituted a plausible continuation of this threat. However, due in part to the dispatch of a British garrison to the conflict-affected areas, there was no equivalent to the Ogaden War in northern Kenya. Instead, the Somalis renounced their claim on the NFD in 1967, and concluded a durable peace treaty with the Kenyatta regime.[381]

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[377] Keesings 43050

[378] UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 'Armed Factions And The Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict [19990515]' (UNOCHA, 1999: accessed online at http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin51499e.html); Keesings 42986; Martin Plaut 'Ethiopia's Oromo Liberation Front' *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 33, No. 109, Mainstreaming the African Environment in Development (Sep., 2006), pp. 587-593

[379] Plaut, 'Ethiopia's Oromo Liberation Front'.

[380] Keesings Record # 20716

[381] Keeings Record # 22386 B.

<u>The United States</u>

In addition to its role (along with the USSR) in underwriting the Somali-Ethiopian rivalry during the Cold War, the US spearheaded UN attempts, between 1993 and 1994, to stabilize the Somali state by the application of direct force in the form of three US-led UN peacemaking forces: UNOSOM I (1992), UNITAF (1992-1993), and UNOSOM II (1993-1995). However, the lack of buy-in by warlords such as Aideed caused these efforts to stagnate, and after a high-profile confrontation between US Rangers and militia forces in 1993 (the so-called 'Black Hawk Down' incident), first the US and later the UN withdrew from the country.[382] US interest in the region was renewed after the bombings of two American embassies in 1998, and the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001[383]. These attacks, as well as Al Qaeda's many links to African countries such as Sudan, led to the US constituting the 'failed state' of Somali as a potential security risk; and this in turn led to a search for local partners through which the US could effect a securitization of the region.

The assessment of states at war conducted above underlines both typical and atypical aspects of the Somali Vortex in terms of my model of PW. Typically, the war clearly highlights the intersection of PW and the vulnerabilities of those it targets. In the case of Somali and Ethiopia, the unstable political orders represented by the Barre and Mengistu regimes produced parallel vulnerabilities in these states into which their opponents were easily able meddle via proxies. Specifically, because both states were unstable autocracies in which the ruling classes used a range of more-or-less violent accommodations[384] to maintain primacy over fractious sub-

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[382] UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Somalia – UNOSOM I* (UN Department of Public Information, 21 March 1997, accessed online at http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm)

[383] 'Somalia-Ethiopia Conflict in Mideast's Shadow', *National Public Radio* ('News and Notes with Ed Gordon, 9:00am EST July 26 2006)

[384] This is term is drawn from Migdal's description of weak-state statecraft: see p. 15-16.

state political collectives (ethnic groups in Ethiopia, clans in Somalia), once the Somali challenge had been made in the Ogaden, neither belligerent could back down for fear of losing control of their state. In fact, one might speculate that both belligerents did lose control of their states because of the war and its aftershocks.

Less typically, the Somali Vortex makes it clear that the notion of a PR cannot be thought of as a singular, unchanging point of reference in PW. Sponsors do not forever stay sponsors, nor proxies, proxies; instead, these relationships display a considerable dynamism over time, with individual actors playing many roles both simultaneously and as time goes by. For example, Ethiopia went from being a target to being a sponsor, to being both; the EPLF went from being a proxy in the war against the Mengistu regime, to simultaneously being a sponsor and target vis-à-vis the Ethiopians and their proxies. In the specific case of the Somali Vortex, therefore, the question thus becomes: in a war with so many sponsors and proxies (as well as 2nd-, or perhaps even 3rd- and 4th-level/generation sponsors of sponsors/proxies of proxies), does it still make sense to discuss this war in terms of 'PRs' as I have conceived them? My initial response is to suggest that rather than this representing a failing of the PW model, it instead underlines the importance of further work on what it means to be a 'contender for power' in the increasingly flexible context of today's world at war. I explore this idea more fully in Chapter 9.

Proxies at War

The roles of the various and increasing numbers of proxies in this war are outlined below. As observed in my discussion of states at war in Section B, above, my interest in applying the lens of constraints to the Somali Vortex is to assess how the pronounced complexity of this war affects my model's ability to make sense of this aspect of the war. I conduct this assessment in terms of Distance, Terrain, Borders and Human Settlement, as before.

Distance

Because of the considerable size of the area of conflict associated with the Somali Vortex, distant sponsors were faced not only with the difficulty of how to ship personnel and/or material support to their proxies, but also in (some cases) how to then get this support to the areas in which their proxies were fighting. Eritrea, for example, had the airlift capacity to ship large amounts of weapons to the OPLF from 2007 onwards; but in order to take delivery the OPLF needed to be in Mogadishu, which saw enough incoming air traffic that the Eritrean shipments could be made covertly. Subsequently the weapons still had to be shipped onwards by land to Oromia (where the actual fighting was taking place).[385] In this way, distance affected not only which PRs came into existence, but also the type of support that could be provided within these PRs. Similarly, the distance between the TFG's strongholds (first, in Kenya, and then in Kismayo) and Mogadishu affected those PRs which counted the TFG as a proxy; these sponsors had to deploy force in sufficient quantities to ensure that the TFG forces could move forward from their lines and take possession of the key infrastructural points in Mogadishu. Indeed, at the time of writing the block-by-block battle for these points is still underway in Somalia.

Terrain

While the battlefields of the Somali Vortex were not characterized by the same volume and density of vegetation as was the case in the Border War, they still changed the tactical environment of the war in a variety of ways. For example, the war saw many belligerents specifically select urban terrain (rather than rough natural terrain) for much of the fighting. This intermingling of militia forces and civilians in the battles for Hargeisa (1988), Mogadishu (1990-present), Baidoa (1999) and Luuq (2001) altered the balance of battlefield power in favor of the

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[385] Plaut, 'Ethiopia's Oromo Liberation Front,'

irregular forces[386]. However, unlike the Border War and the Toyota Wars, there is no evidence that *sponsor* strategy was specifically designed (or altered) to promote, expedite, or take advantage of this feature of the conflict area. In other words, the absence of a link between the particular geopolitical constraints presented by occlusion, and Ethiopian and Eritrean sponsorship in the Somali Vortex, suggests a possible qualification to my central hypothesis that states exploit the geopolitical conditions to make specific alliances and within specific places/spaces. However, the lack of a clear link between occlusion and sponsorship in this instance might be the result of other factors not included in my model, or not yet revealed in the data. It does not rule out the applicability of *proxy war* (i.e. state exploitation of particular geopolitical conditions for war) to the Somali case, or to any other case.

Borders

The role of borders in providing the *casus belli* for Somalia that inaugurated the Somali Vortex, has already been discussed in Section B., above. In addition, we have seen that conflicts around border regulation drove Ethiopia and Eritrea to war in a way that had direct ramifications for conditions in Somalia[387]. However, borders also affected PW in more subtle ways during the Somali Vortex, i.e., by becoming a space for war, and by constituting particular vulnerability or opportunity for countries on one or either side of them. To deal with these in order: first, following the spread of the fighting between the Ethiopian state and Islamist factions into Somalia, Ethiopia (like South African during the Border Wars) was increasingly forced to fight a

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[386] Alan Vick, Aerospace operations in urban environments: exploring new concepts (Santa Monica, USA: RAND Corp, 2000), pp. 241-247; see also William Dean, 'Air Operations in Somalia, 1991-1994', accessed online at http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/cfawc/AFHWS/2011/Briefings/Dean-Air_Operations_in_Somalia_1991-1993.ppt

[387] Keesings Record # 47503

border-based war of interdiction[388]. Although Ethiopia in the 1990s had fewer personnel constraints on its exercise of military force than South Africa in the 1970s, the task of securitizing the extensive Ethiopian-Somali borders was nonetheless a considerable one. It is in this sense that the border between Ethiopia and Somalia became a space crossed by two proxy relationships; the Ethiopian relationship with Somali proxies like the RRA who could help it seal off Islamist infiltration routes into Ethiopian territory, and the Eritrean relationship with anti-Ethiopian groups operating from Somali territory.

In addition to this fairly typical role for borders in the Somali Vortex, the war also saw attempts by various actors (including Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti and the US) to certify quasi-states as legitimate through the certification of these entities in legal and moral terms. For example, Ethiopia was the first state to refer (in 2007) to its erstwhile proxies in Somaliland as a 'sovereign state;' this declaration came after Ethiopia had also expended significant effort towards getting the OAU to issue a similar recognition.[389] Similarly, Ethiopian sponsorship of the TFG from 2004 was an attempt to set Somalia's judicial borders in a very specific way, i.e. as a loose federal coalition which would be less likely to repeat Barre's experiment in pan-Somali nationalism[390].

The Somali Vortex, therefore, shows that borders have two effects on PW: exclusive (i.e., a line to be transgressed) and inclusive (i.e., a line which delineates a political entity, or sets characteristics of this entity such as its adoption of a federal model).

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[388] Jeffrey Gettleman and Mark Mazzetti, 'Somalia's Islamists and Ethiopia Gird for a war', *New York Times* (14 December 2006)

[389] Afrol News, 'Somaliland closer to recognition by Ethiopia,' 5 June 2007 <http://www.afrol.com/articles/25633>

[390] Robert Draper, 'Shattered Somalia', *National Geographic* 216:3 (September 2009), pp. 70-97

Human Settlement

In the Somali vortex, cross-border trade and agriculture patterns have provided Eritrea and Somalia with justifications for proxy war. The distribution of sympathetic populations in cities and tribal areas alike were also important in constraining Ethiopian sponsorship in the conflict, as when a tribal conference held in the heartland of the Digle and Mirifle clans in 1995, committed these groups to joining the Ethiopian forces in an assault on the ICU-held cities of Bay and Bakool. Lastly, as discussed in Section B above, references to historical flows were used to define a range of alliances and justify a range of territorial and legitimacy claims, especially by the irredentist groups backed by Somalia (from 1973) and Eritrea (from 1977). In this way, settlement patterns in the region not only provided many of the sources of conflict that produced the proxy war that followed, but also served to modify the creation and maintenance of alliances while the war was ongoing.

Overcoming Constraints in the Somali Vortex: Typical or Atypical?

My model of PW predicts that PRs are established for three reasons, i.e., to facilitate:

1. The exploitation of existing vulnerabilities and or sources of conflict/violence outside the sovereign boundaries of the sponsor,

2. in available places and spaces for war,

3. through the use of proxies to overcome constraints such as distance, borders, and terrain by means of militarization

Given that I outlined the many ways in which 1 and 2 are instantiated, the question is: how typical or atypical was the Somali Vortex in terms of my model's depiction of the role of proxies in overcoming constraints through PW? In general, I find that the Somali Vortex strongly validates my model in this regard. In this war, proxies were widely used to circumvent

constraints that would have made other forms of war extremely difficult. For example, Eritrea used proxies against the Ethiopians to compensate for their military inferiority in conventional-force terms; Somalia used proxies to legitimate its territorial ambitions in the Ogaden; and Ethiopia used PRs to shape the post-intervention Somali state (for example, withholding its support for the various regional initiatives which seemed likely to produce a strong centralized government in Mogadishu).[391] Each of these outcomes was more effectively (and perhaps, efficiently) achieved with the help of proxies, than could have been the case without them. This is in line with my model's predictions regarding the use of proxies, and as such confirms the Somali Vortex as typical of PW in this regard.

On the other hand, the degree to which Somalia's presence (as a third-party battleground for Ethiopia and Eritrea) affects my model's predictions regarding the use of proxies in PW also bears mentioning here, for in this regard the Somali Vortex displays an atypicality when compared both to my model of PW and to the other two tokens. Specifically, while both Ethiopia and Eritrea have showed themselves capable of exploiting and manipulating the geopolitical constraints of Somalia in ways which make it easier to conduct proxy war, going one step further and securitizing these areas – i.e., seeking to manipulate local constraints in ways which made it less easy for sponsors to wage proxy war – has proved to be a more difficult task. And yet, the latest phase of the Ethiopian intervention, i.e. its support of the TFG, is clearly aimed at securitizing Somalia at least to some degree[392]. How, then, are we to make sense of this apparent

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[391] Although as many as fifteen peace conferences have been held in Somalia since the fall of Barre, only six of these are now considered to have represented serious attempts to end the fighting; of these six, Ethiopia convened two. See Ken Menkhaus, Hassan Sheikh, Ali Joqombe, Pat Johnson, *A History of Mediation in Somalia since 1988*, Center for Research and Dialogue http://www.interpeace.org/pdfs/A_History_of_Mediation_in_Somalia_0609.pdf

[392] Awol K. Allo, 'Ethiopia's armed Intervention in Somalia: The Legality of Self-Defense in Response to the Threat of Terrorism', *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy* 139 (Winter, 2010)

'benevolent proxy war' – is this still a case of 'sponsors using proxies to overcome geopolitical constraints?' I think that this is indeed the case, and explain my thinking below.

This question brings my examination of PW back to a point at which the wartime use of proxies begins to resemble a related phenomenon: state-nonstate partnerships during military interventions. I discussed this on p. xx, and argued that military interventions should be distinguished from PW by virtue of their broad international legitimacy and emphasis on sovereignty creation in the target state. Following the conclusions reached in Parts II and III, I can now return to this distinction in a more informed way, to suggest that military interventions and proxy wars (at least in terms of my model of PW) rely on a more similar set of internal mechanisms than may at first appear to be the case. For example, what my model of PW explains as an attempt by Ethiopia to contest (in Somalia) the particular geopolitical constraints that the Eritreans were using to wage PW against them, might also be considered (from a military intervention point of view) to be an exercise in securitization and state-building.

Furthermore, the strange <u>dual status</u> of the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia – widely seen to be half proxy war, half peacemaking intervention – validates my assertion that PW is as fundamentally informed by the configurations of the state and war in Africa (and the international community's capacity to legitimize and delegitimize these), as are other notions like 'state failure' or 'state collapse.' Any blurring of boundaries between military intervention and proxy war in the Somali Vortex should therefore be read not as the product of an imprecision in my model's predictions about how proxies are used by sponsors, but rather as an indication of how important the presence of continent-wide (or, world-wide) systems of established order are in determining which forms of violence are permitted to states and which are not. In the case of

the Somali Vortex,[393] it seems that the international community's distaste for failed states has opened the way for sponsors such as Ethiopia, in partnership with local proxies, to conduct politics by other (violent, but sanctioned) means.

The Militarization of People and Places

Between the fall of Barre and Eritrea's entry into the war, Ethiopian involvement in Somalia had mainly been focused on maintaining close relations with the government of the breakaway province of Somaliland under Ibrahim Egal.[394] By the mid-to-late 1990s, though, Ethiopia's involvement in Somalia shifted in response to the increasingly religious character of the fighting in and around Somalia in the late 1990s, and the later appearance of Eritrean-backed Islamic groups who were the mutual enemies of both Ethiopia and the RRA. Whether the Eritrean aid to the OLF and USC/SNA was initiated as a *response* to Ethiopian meddling in Somalia, or whether it *preceded* this aid, is hard to establish. What is clear, however, is that by 2000 Somalia had become a front in the rivalry between the Tigrayan-dominated government of Ethiopia, its domestic enemies (like the OLF, who wanted self-determination for the Oromo peoples in Ethiopia), and the Eritrean government. Into this rivalry had been drawn militant Islamic groups (such as AIAI), regional coalitions (like the RRA and USC/SNA), and the ever-present Somali clans who served as a constituency and provided the military backbone for most of these groups. I discuss these variations in sponsors' use of proxies to overcome geopolitical constraints below under the same five headings previously used: Arming, Agitating, Mobilizing, Denying Spaces, and Zoning Places for Battle.

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[393] And, equally contemporarily, in the recent Libyan civil war.

[394] Ethiopia's interest in Somaliland must, in part, be understood in economic terms; since the loss of Eritrea had deprived Ethiopia of all its ports, the Zenawi government looked to Somaliland to handle large sections of Ethiopia's waterborne trade. Alexander De Waal, *Islamism and its enemies in the horn of Africa*, (Indiana University Press, 2004), p. 213

(a) Arming

The provision of weapons and military materiel within the context of PRs was a clear feature of the Somali Vortex. This was the case both in those PRs that backed the TFG and in those which opposed them. During the Ethiopian- and US-backed drive towards Mogadishu in 2006, for instance, the TFG order of battle not only included Ethiopian heavy weapons, tanks, and jet aircraft to the invasion, but could also count on US air and artillery support (in the form of AC-130 gunships and Tomahawk cruise missiles) to strike high-value targets within the ICU column. The militias in Mogadishu, on the other hand, had reportedly been instructed by Yemeni veterans of the war in Afghanistan on how to modify the already-ubiquitous RPG weapon system so that it could be fired at a steep angle to shoot down helicopters.[395] This training doubled as 'arms provision' in the sense that it provided the militias with a cheap and effective portable air defense system where they had not possessed one before.

These incidents aside, however, the Somali Vortex also displayed two variations on the usual pattern of arming in PW that I wish to underline here. First, as mentioned in Section B, above, Somalia and Ethiopia's deft manipulation of the superpowers during the 1970s left both countries in possession of considerable weapons stockpiles[396]. The continued presence of some of these weapons in fighting across the Horn years after the end of the Cold War, show that the actions of sponsors can at times outlast the sponsors (and even proxies) themselves.

A similar outcome can also be seen in the transmission and diversion of weapons shipments between different nonstate groups. In Somalia, for example, the UN estimates that around 80% of the weapons and ammunition received by the Ethiopian-backed TFG, have been

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[395] Remarks made during panel on 'Recent Trends in Foreign Fighter Source Countries and Transit Networks' at the Foreign Policy Research Initiative's Sept 2010 Conference on 'The Foreign Fighter Problem.,' Washington, DC.

[396] Draper, 'Shattered Somalia'.

diverted on from the TFG arsenals into the hands of private sector and civil society militias – thereby producing new (potential or actual) proxies.[397] In assessing what the PW lens tells us about the Somali Vortex (and vice versa), it thus seems important to note two atypical elements of the Somali Vortex, first, that belligerents who sponsor PW may not always be providing arms only to the faction they intend to provide arms to, because these arms may spread to other actors or remain present in the area of conflict; and second, that in serving as middlemen who pass sponsor-provided weapons on to others, proxies are in effect becoming 'sponsors' in turn.[398]

(b) Agitating

On the face of it, agitation played a less important role in the Somali Vortex than in the other two token wars examined in this dissertation. Certainly, Ethiopia supported two anti-Barre radio stations in order to promote the legitimacy of its Somali proxies and assist them in agitating their base: these were Radio Kulmis ('Unity'), which was operated by the SSF out of Addis Ababa, and Radio Halgan ('Struggle'), which was operated by the SDSF until the Barre-Mengistu reconciliation in 1988.[399] As mentioned previously, Somalia's state-run radio station, Radio Mogadiscu, was also used to broadcast messages of support for the various Somali-backed factions in the Ogaden. Lastly, the struggles of Islamic groups against Ethiopia in the Horn has not escaped the attentions of Al Qaeda's propaganda wing, with messages of support and

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[397] Guy Lamb, 'Stoking the Fires: The International Arms Trade in Africa', *ArmsNet Africa* (06 Feb 2006: accessed online at http://www.armsnetafrica.org/content/06-february-2009-stoking-fires-international-arms-trade-africa.) This kind of delegation of proxy armament frequently requires the presence of a cash incentive for the middlemen. This can either be provided by the sponsor (e.g. payment for shipments), by the proxy (e.g. payment via booty, illicit goods), or by some more or less unwitting third party (e.g. payment for humanitarian aid, in which arms shipments are concealed by the middleman).

[398] This connects with my intuition that further work on PW should cast a broader net around the many kinds of 'contenders for power' who use PW; in the case of the Somali Vortex, the role of arms-transferring 'sponsor-proxies' would fit this category.

[399] Clandestine Radio, 'Radio Kulmis' www.clandestineradio.com/intel/station.php?id=168&stn=161

requests for aid from Somali jihadists being relayed both locally globally.[400] However, apart

from these scattered traces, no other explicit programs of agitation have left their mark on the

historical record of the Somali Vortex.

The relative absence of sponsor-supported agitation in the Somali Vortex is doubly

puzzling given: (i) that neither of the key sponsors involved made any secret of their association

with their proxies, as I will discuss under *Mobilizing*, below; and (ii) that this form of agitation

was so prominent in the other two token wars studied. Two possibilities obtain in terms of

resolving this puzzle. First, it may be that these programs of agitation did exist, but that they

operated with sufficient discretion to have thus far escaped international scrutiny. Alternately, we

may speculate that something about the nature of the conflict in the Somali Vortex meant that it

required less in the way of agitation than other PWs; this would make the profile of agitation

found in the Somali Vortex *atypical* in terms of my model of PW. Whichever the case, further

examination of the role of ideology in sustaining the relationships between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and

their respective proxies is clearly mandated.

(c) Mobilizing

During the Somali Vortex, sponsors mobilized proxies both in terms of directing them for

battle, and in assisting them in running their day-to-day operations. The most visible of these

mobilization tactics, in terms of the latter (i.e. day-to-day operations) kind of mobilization, was

the provision by sponsors of a safe haven for proxies' head offices (i.e., their political and

administrative centers). In this manner, Anti-Somali groups coordinated their resistance against

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[400] One Somali *mujahid*, put this call as follows: 'The plan for the next stage with the permission of Allah most high is to be prepared for a major battle at any time... and also to direct a call to our brother Muslims throughout the world to share in this Jihad with us, and to help their brothers in this mission: "And if they seek your succour in the *Deen* [pious duty], it is your duty to give succour."' See 'Nida'ul Islam Interviews The spokesman for the Islamic Union of the Mujahideen of Ogadin,' retrieved from the website of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS.org) at <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/somal2.htm>.

the Barre regime from Addis Ababa; later, an Eritrean-backed coalition of anti-Ethiopian groups was established in Asmara.[401]

However, sponsors also mobilized their proxies militarily when this suited their needs. For example, while the Ethiopians had worked very loosely with the SSF and SDSF in the early days of the war against Barre, by 2006 the Ethiopian-backed TFG troops fought alongside their sponsors in the drive towards Mogadishu, while also coordinating their movements with militias from Puntland, the SRRC, the Mogadishu-based ARPCT, and troops of the Juba Valley Alliance.[402]

(d) Denying Spaces

The denial of spaces and place to the enemy was a prominent feature of the Somali Vortex. Instances of the use of this tactic fell into two categories, viz., the denial of <u>military means</u> and the denial of <u>constituency</u>. The first of these pertains to the way in which actors in PRs adjusted their military strategy to alter the military balance between them and other combatants, by making it hard for these combatants to deploy certain weapons systems (<u>military means</u>) against which the members of the PR perceived themselves to have a specific vulnerability. This has already been briefly discussed under terrain, above, but I return to the issue here in order to specifically highlight the way in which battlefield tactics both flowed from the constraints of the area of conflict (as examined in Section C, above) but also served to <u>reconfigure</u> these constraints through the militarization of space and place.

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[401] Plaut, 'Ethiopia's Oromo Liberation Front'

[402] Admittedly, a non-African sponsor (the US) committed significant electronic warfare and communication assets to this offensive, making much of this coordination possible. Nonetheless, the failure of the US-backed ARPCT offensive on Mogadishu in March of that year illustrates the importance of the Ethiopian contingent in holding together the TFG column and enabling it to displace the ICU forces from Beledweyne and Mogadishu.

This is especially visible in the tactics used by various belligerents during the Somali Vortex. During the fighting for various cities in Somalia between 1995 and 2006, for instance, militia units (i.e. the irregular forces of nonstate actors) were dispersed across urban and peri-urban zones between battles, before being mobilized (using radio or cellular communications) and rushed to the site of fighting (using weaponized pickup trucks, a.k.a. 'technicals') as needed. This style of fighting was intended to protect the militia's most valuable military assets from remote strikes by powerful interveners (such as the US-backed UN contingent in the early 1990s, and the Ethiopian-backed AU force after 2007).

Equally important to the conduct of PW in the Somali Vortex were the attempts by various belligerents to deny their opponents a <u>constituency</u> through the militarization of civilian areas from which these opponents might draw support. The Mengistu regime's restriction of food aid to Tigray and the Ogaden in the 1980s was a response to the Somali sponsorship of the WSLF and SALF[403]. In a similar vein, the Ethiopian-backed SSF began its campaign against the Somali state in 1981 by attacking police and local government officials; a similar pattern obtained during the Somali-backed Shifta War in northern Kenya between 1963 and 1967. Both of these campaigns can be read as an attempt to deny the Somali and Kenyan states (respectively) access to the civilian populations present in these areas.

(e) Zoning Places for Battle

During the Somali Vortex, sponsors displayed an atypically low ability to choose where and when the fighting associated with their PR would take place. Sometimes, this was because the fighting would take place wherever their proxy was; while the case of Ethiopia's partnership with the RRA shows that sometimes sponsors were able to identify an area they wished to zone

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[403] Keesings Record # 36260

for battle as well as a proxy in that area they could work with, this was not always the case. Eritrea, as already discussed under *Distance*, above, was forced to extend its sponsorship across significant distances, because that was where potential proxies exhibiting the specific characteristics the Eritreans were looking for (i.e., a willingness to fight the Ethiopians) were operating.[404]

A second feature of the profile of zoning in the Somali Vortex was the prominence of cities. Unlike the Border and Toyota Wars, fighting for urban centers and the infrastructural resources these commanded (e.g. ports) dominated the Somali Vortex; and also unlike these two wars, in the case of the Somali Vortex this urban zoning of the war was the not the result of the actions of sponsors, but of (eventual) proxies. Of the several anti-Ethiopian groups in Somalia that would eventually be implicated as Eritrean proxies, AIAI in particular had taken up the unificatory ideology once articulated as the quest for 'Greater Somalia.' This ideology committed it to clashes with the Ethiopian administration in the Ogaden, but it also committed AIAI to attempting to administer (i.e. rule) Somalia. While fighting the Ethiopian forces across the border in Ogaden, AIAI thus attempted to establish a series of territorial footholds of its own in Somalia, mostly centered on economically significant cities.

These attempts, while scattershot, were moderately successful: AIAI was able to gain temporary control in the coastal towns of Kisimayo and Merka, and more long-term control of the inland commercial center of Luuq. AIAI held Luuq for five years, until being expelled by an Ethiopian cross-border raid in 1996.[405] However, because these regions of Somalia were also claimed by a confederation of the Digle and Mirifle clans, these clans (and their armed representatives, the RRA) found themselves fighting AIAI and Hussein Aideed's Habr Gedr

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[404] Plaut, 'Ethiopia's Oromo Liberation Front'.

[405] Menkhaus, *Political Islam in Somalia*

Hawiye militias for control of the southwestern regions of Somalia, including the cities of Bay and Bakool.[406] This, in turn, made the RRA the most obvious candidate for Ethiopian support, given that the Ethiopians wished both to combat AIAI and keep the various Mogadishu-based factions from extending their zone of control all the way to the Ethiopian border. In this way, the PR between the RRA and the Ethiopians was established as a result of the way that AIAI had 'zoned Somalia for battle.'

Militarization in the Somali Vortex: Typical or Atypical?

While the Somali Vortex provides ample evidence for the salience of militarization in explaining conflicts through a PW lens, the data reviewed here also make clear that with regard to predicting which kinds of actors – i.e. sponsors, proxies, or targets; but also states and nonstates – have the most power to conduct militarization, the actions of proxies and nonstates should not be underestimated. Indeed, as described above, the actions of these kinds of actor were instrumental in configuring the PW that followed. This is atypical in terms of the other two tokens reviewed.

<div align="center">Rival Theses</div>

Below, I assess the explanatory power of three rival theses in terms of explaining the multi-actor war in the Horn of Africa. These explanations constitute the baseline upon which my theory – that the Somali Vortex was a *proxy war* serving sponsors' political goals 'by other means' – must improve.

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[406] Harun Hassan and Cedric Barnes, 'A Return to Clan-Politics (or Worse) in Southern Somalia?' Social Science Research Council (Mar 27, 2007: accessed online at http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/Hassan_Barnes/index1.html)

The Resource Curse

It is possible to read Somalia's post-independence clashes with Ethiopia and Kenya as a struggle for resources, with water and grazing land being the resources in question. In support of this view, it is clear that the lost resources of the Haud and the NFD were seen as important and worth regaining, if not always by the Somali government itself, then certainly to the Ogadeni clans which formed an important part of the Somali constituency; had this not been the case, then the Barre regime would not have been punished so spectacularly by the Ogadenis when it retracted the Somali claim to the Ogaden during its peace accords with Ethiopia. Beyond this, one might characterize the war between Somalia and Ethiopia as a struggle for the 'resource' of foreign aid, with each state drawing increasingly rich harvest of superpower aid from their aggressive foreign policies; however, while this may explain the short-lived war in the Ogaden, it fails to account for hostilities on either side of this, nor indeed does it take into account the speed with which the USSR withdrew its aid to Somalia after finding that it was supporting both sides of an increasingly expensive conflict. Had the promise of Soviet aid been enough of a reason for Somalia to embark on the Ogaden War, the threat of its removal should have been enough to bring about peace: and yet this was not the case.

Beyond this, however, there is little to recommend the Somali Vortex as a resource war of any kind, let alone a resource war fought by proxy. Somalia's main export industries are fruit and livestock, and there are no reports of these being plundered by the Ethiopians or Eritreans during their involvement with the country. Likewise, it is without doubt that the Ogaden adventure squandered far more, in terms of the Somali state's lost holdings of military hardware at least, than it could conceivably have brought in. Continuing in this vein; had Eritrea existed as an independent political unit opposed to Ethiopia in the mid-1970s, it might have been plausible

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to assert that Ethiopia's relations with the SSM were aimed at guaranteeing Ethiopian access to the sea. However, Ethiopia has had little difficulty gaining this kind of access via Djibouti and Kenya, so while it has certainly benefited from access to the ports located within its proxy province of Somaliland, the search for ports cannot itself be considered to be a reason for waging proxy war in Somalia.

In sum, then, the resource curse hypothesis shows little (if any) explanatory power when it comes to explaining Ethiopian and Eritrean intervention in Somalia, and Somali intervention in Ethiopia and Kenya. Clearly, resources such as pasture were important in explaining the cause, course and consequences of these wars: but it was the importance of these resources to actual or potential constituents (such as the Ogadeni), rather than to the state *per se*, which goverened their effect on the subsequent proxy war. Thus, resources must be considered to have played an enabling or intervening role in the Somali Vortex, at best, rather than a causal one.

Weak States

Different phases of the Somali Vortex drew on the weakness of the states involved, in different ways. Working back from the present, it seems clear that the weakness (indeed, the absence) of the Somali state became a spur for proxy war by Ethiopia after 1994, when the Eritrean alliance with the OPLF turned the Ethiopian-Somali border into a threat for Ethiopia. This drew the Ethiopians into a partnership with groups like the RRA, at first, and then the TFG. In addition, the inability of the Barre regime to pacify or destroy the rebellions in Somaliland after 1980, can be said to have constituted the SNM as a potential Ethiopian proxy. Similarly, it was inarguably the weaknesses associated with the unstable Selassie monarchy, and the subsequent domination of the Ethiopian state by Amhara-speakers, which provoked the Somali invasion of the Ogaden in 1973. Had the Ethiopian state not been vulnerable to the irredentist

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and secessionist claims advanced by the OLF and SALF (and indeed, the EPLF and TPLF), the Ogaden may have gone the way of the NFD - ceded by Somalia in the face of the overwhelming costs of invasion and the presence of a British garrison.

With all this said, though, the potential for state weakness to explain *why* proxies were so broadly used in the Somali Vortex is also faced with several challenges. First, Ethiopia's selective interaction with the various Somali reconstruction initiatives after 1991 shows that the Zelawi regime, at least, has had little faith that making Somalia 'strong' will necessarily end Eritrean meddling in the region. Second, while the land claims of the OLF and SALF were certainly used as a legitimation for the Somali invasion of the Ogaden, it was not Ethiopia's weakness (in absolute terms) which emboldened the Somalis, but their own increasing strength. And lastly, although the Somali Vortex is plainly a 'proxy war' both in terms of my definition and more colloquial ones, it is striking that only Eritrea has conducted its proxy war in the region in the largely-covert manner typical of this form of war. The Somali sponsorship in the Ogaden, and the Ethiopian incursions after 1997, both involved an overwhelming commitment of direct military support to the proxy. This argues against any assertion that an *absence* of coercive means on the part of the targeted state provoked the use of proxy war; if anything, it suggests that the opposite is true.

While state weakness thus plays an important enabling (or, intervening) role in explaining how and where sponsors chose to use proxy warfare in the Somali Vortex, it does not sufficiently explain the prevalence of this form of warfare in the case specified.

Cross-Border Identities

Somalia has been characterized as one of the world's most ethnically homogenous states[407]; and the powerful ethnonationalist links which this homogeneity produced, can be seen in the power and persistence of pan-Somali nationalism under a succession of post-independence Somali regimes. Furthermore, the cross-border identities which linked the Somali state proper, to ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia and Kenya, served as an explicit call to arms in the Somali invasion of the Ogaden, and in its destabilization of the NFD. In this regard, cross-border identities of the form upon which this rival hypothesis rests (i.e. that states form proxy relationships with endangered Dbrethren in neighboring states) is clearly validated by much of the Somali side of the Somali Vortex. Lastly, in the case of Eritrea's sponsorship of the OPLF, the identity of these two actors as co-combatants against the Mengistu regime was clearly salient in explaining why, of the many potential proxies which Eritrea could have chosen, it chose the OPLF as a partner. This identity - which one might term 'co-combatant identity' - represents a form of cross-border identity not yet seen in the data.

However, it is also important to note the more complex, and at times counterintuitive links between other sponsors and proxies in this conflict, before reaching a final conclusion about the explanatory power of cross-border identities. First, the salience of global religious identity, rather than local/regional ethnic identities, was a key factor in explaining Saudi, Yemeni, and Eritrean sponsorship of Somali factions. Certainly, these are cases of identities sustaining PRs, but not identities of the kind which any single border can bisect; the same is true, to an extent, of the 'co-combatant identity' identified above. Second, the importance of ethnicity and religion alike is challenged by the roster of Ethiopian proxies (such as the SNM and RRA), who shared neither of these characteristics with their sponsor. Third, the disintegration of pan-

[407]Al Castagno, 'The Republic of Somalia: Africa's most Homogeneous State', *Africa Report* 5 (1960), p. 2

Somali nationalism in the later days of the Barre regime, and its replacement with clan-based feuding, argues against any idea that Siad Barre's scientific socialism had done much more than pay lip service to the identities which nominally bound the Somali state to the political fortunes of the Somalis in the Ogaden and the NFD. Indeed, it was precisely the widespread perception that Barre's rule had involved widespread sub-national favoritism for his own clan, which led to his downfall.[408]

<u>Concluding Comments</u>

The assessment of state objectives, proxy utilization, constraints, and militarization which I have conducted in this chapter has focused on three themes which run throughout the Somali Vortex, viz., (i) the degree to which the unstable ethnic-, religion- and clan-based political communities upon which the Somali, Ethiopian, and Eritrean states rested, served to 'prime' these states for PW, (ii) the role of third parties (such as the United States and OAU) in opposing or encouraging the formation of particular PRs, and thereby changing the course of the PWs conducted, and (iii) the effects of the externalization of multiple external conflicts (e.g., between Ethiopia and Eritrea) into Somalia. These themes correlate well with the defining features in my model of PW, inasmuch as these relate directly to the ways in which sponsors respond to specific vulnerabilities and opportunities outside their own territories, by militarizing available people and places to overcome and exploit various constraints.

What is unusual about the Somali Vortex in comparison both to my model and to the other wars reviewed in Chapters 6 and 7 is the availability of Somalia as a space which is neither entirely a target nor entirely a proxy. If the Border War added a level of complexity to the understanding of proxy war which I advance here through its depiction of southern Africa as a

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[408] Turner, *A Continent Ablaze*.

complex web of retaliatory proxy wars, the Somali Vortex takes this one step further by giving an instance of a regional war in which State A attacks State B in order to attack State C. As discussed under Section C, above, this externalization of the Ethiopian-Eritrean rivalry has had the paradoxical effect of <u>lessening</u> (relative to other PWs) the extent to which sponsors and targets have contested the control of constraints in the area of conflict, because neither the sponsor nor the target in fact has much administrative access to or jurisdiction over these constraints.

The ramifications of this distinction for my model, for the study of PW in general, and for the somewhat difficult task of drawing a line between 'sanctioned proxy war' and 'military intervention' in atypical proxy wars like the Somali Vortex, all merit further discussion. I undertake this in Part IV of this dissertation; suffice it to note here that the Somali Vortex provides ample evidence that, at their most complex, proxy wars challenge my model's simplification of what constitutes an 'actor' and even a 'belligerent' (and thus, what constitutes a PR at all). More precisely, the Somali Vortex challenges those who would study it through the lens of proxy war to plausibly draw a line between those states who sponsor violence abroad, and the many nonstates, IGOs, 'sponsor-proxies,' and 'sponsors of sponsors' who do the same or enable this behavior in others.

PART IV:

'ULTIMA RATIO REGUM' – REMIX OR REDUX?

In the final section of this dissertation, I outline limits to the proffered theoretical propositions tested against the data in the previous two sections – as far as this is possible given the data at my disposal.   I will note those features that must be redefined: the PR, the parties to this, and other possible participants. Particularly worth noting about the nature of the PR, are those instances where the PR broke down. Four examples of this kind of breakdown, each stemming from a change in the PR, are as follows: (i) the falling-out between Libya and FROLINAT due to the growing unpopularity of Libyan actions in the BET region among FROLINAT members (proxy disenchantment); (ii) Kenya permitting UK troops to secure its northern frontier district against Somali agitation (vulnerabilities change); (iii) South Africa ceasing to defend the *Apartheid* system regionally (strategic/ideological compatibilities change); and (iv) Mozambique, while remaining an opponent of the Apartheid system, agreeing to curtail its sponsorship of the ANC (sponsor gives up on use of coercive violence). Note that this underlines the falsifiability of the theoretical propositions advanced.

In my analysis of the data supporting (or not) my model of PW, I will specifically seek out typical and/or atypical instantiations of the features in my model of PW, which further enhances the scientific nature of the propositions, i.e., their testability, or falsifiability of the model advanced. For example, given my definition of 'sponsor' and the accompanying conception of the role this actor/belligerent plays in PW, a typical instance will mean that the sponsor exploits proxies for their own ends, whereas an atypical instance is when proxies as agents of coercive violence, pursue only their own ambitions and fail to pursue those of the sponsor. Similarly, a typical instance will be when the sponsor provides arms and bases, while proxies provide fighters in exchange, whereas an atypical instance will be when proxies sponsor

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other proxies. Lastly, a <u>typical</u> instance will be when the target also serves as the location (places/spaces) for covert, interstate war conducted through proxies, while an <u>atypical</u> instance will be when targets retaliate and fighting is conducted within the territories of the sponsoring state. The point of this is to outline the extent to which my model is testable – even within the dataset as constructed for the purpose of describing and explaining proxy war; but as has been pointed out, for more conclusive tests of the model of proxy war advanced, we will need to examine wars in sites other than Africa, and on the bases of data other than the relationships and conflicts included in my Events List.

Africa has rarely known any kind of war <u>except</u> war using intermediaries; from the bloody 'Fields of Empire' in pre-colonial Chad,[409] to the 'divide and rule' wartime alliances of South Africa's 18th century colonial Frontier Wars, to the modern use of proxies under the cover of postcolonial civil wars. Furthermore, the sheer variety of intermediarizations conducted both in Africa and across the world (from the bands of *ghazi* warriors which formed a belt around the Islamic caliphates, to the private armies contracted to the modern Afghan state) suggests that this form of war is not unique to Africa, nor atypical of war over the ages. This prevalence and history alone makes the description and explanation of proxy war relevant to the study of relations between states, and also, as I will argue in what follows, increasingly the relations between states and nonstates actors in war and peace.

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[409] Reyna, *War without End*

CHAPTER 9

THEORIZING PROXY WAR

<u>Introduction</u>

In this, the last part of the dissertation, I discuss the proposed features of PW as outlined and assessed in Parts I, II, and III. These are obviously open to ongoing refinement, through further assessment in diverse sites of war and among different contenders for power than states. At this stage of the research program, only the hard-core of my theory is secure, i.e., that African, multi-actor wars are not simply complex civil conflicts, but primarily covert, interstate wars conducted through proxies. However, each of the characteristics of PW does indeed demand more data and finer grained analyses, as I will indicate below.

In the first part of this chapter, I consider the findings presented in Parts II and III specifically in terms of how each characteristic of PW is borne out (or not) by the data. The five features of PW are:

> 1. ADVENT: the advent of a PR signals the start of *focused hostilities*
> 2. ACTORS: the parties to this PR fall into the tripartitite division which I proposed, i.e. <u>sponsors</u> (the actors who extend concrete support to proxies so as to facilitate an attack on a potential target); <u>proxies</u> (who accept this support in some or other form of agreement); and <u>targets</u> (who enter the PR when its designated representatives respond to or clash with the proxies)
> 3. SUPPORT: the <u>levels and nature of *support*</u> which the sponsor commits to their proxies, serve as a clear signal of the commitment of the sponsor the war
> 4. CONSTRAINTS: the aim of the PR is to <u>overcome particular constraints</u> such as existing vulnerabilities and or sources of conflict/violence *outside* the sovereign boundaries of the sponsor, and specific opportunities for exploitation in the form of places and people, through the <u>militarization</u> of these
> 5. SYSTEM: the constitutive dynamics of system (interactions between sponsor(s) + proxies + target(s) keep <u>a continent-wide system</u> of PW going between states in Africa.

In addition to these five characteristics, I also assess a sixth proposed feature of PW: the degree to which the data supports my notion that African states use PW because the <u>nature</u> of PW makes it an effective tool of violent statecraft. In other words, I suggested above that PW is used because it:

- Is a flexible instrument, i.e., it can be fine-tuned to the aims of the sponsor, the capacities of the proxies, or the vulnerabilities of the target
- Can be used concurrently with other kinds of strategies (e.g., military, diplomatic).
- Is open to the deliberate modulation of the sponsor(s) of the war
- Suits local conditions where there are available people, spaces and resources for exploitation (African states using PW to do what they <u>can</u>)
- Is expedited by the presence of globalized networks (African states use PW to do what they <u>must</u>)

These aspects, which together outline the *nature* of PW, are drawn together into a sixth feature for assessment in Table 9.1 (p. 242), under the heading of 'effective tool.' Thus:

6. EFFECTIVE TOOL: the use of proxy war follows on from its *nature* as an effective tool for participating in African conflicts (flexibility, concurrency, modularizability, suitability to conditions, responsiveness to global networks).

It should be noted at the outset of this process of assessment, that the data captured by the Events List (Appendix A), and those captured by the historical narratives of the three selected wars (Chapters 6-8), are not all configured at the same level of resolution. I must thus separately assess each of the six features in terms of whether the quantitative (Part II) and qualitative (Part III) analyses provide 'confirmation', 'disconfirmation', or 'not conclusive' results regarding the status of these features of PW.

This approach has obvious scientific limitations, not least among them the difficulties of using different kinds of data. These limitations notwithstanding, the point of this chapter is to open up these six proposed characteristics for further and ongoing examination, thus, paying heed to 'a three-phase schema' of scientific development:

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> …in a continuing dialectic, science <u>identifies</u> a phenomenon (or range of phenomena), <u>constructs explanations for it</u> and <u>empirically tests</u> its explanations, leading to the identification of the <u>generative mechanisms</u> at work, which now become the phenomenon to be explained, and so on.[410]

At this stage of the program, the phenomenon under scrutiny is multi-actor wars, typified as a PW and enumerated along the six characteristics outlined above. The generative mechanism(s) at work *seem* to be the choice by African states to conduct their interstate business violently through proxies; the question of just why this is so has to await another set of data, so as to answer this causal question. I dare say, however, that knowing *what* we are studying brings us a great deal closer to asking and answering *why* this form of war occurs.

In Chapter 10, below, I consider the implications of this study for war scholarship and intervention. These are derived from the findings of this project as a whole, and constitute three main calls to action: (i) to revise terms such as 'state,' 'war,' 'sovereignty', and the actors involved in war, (ii) to recognize the centrality of proxy relationships in warfare and studies of war, and (iii) to investigate the possibility that PW's persistence is derived from a systemic balance between units of analysis (African states, in the present case).

Before concluding this introduction to the final part of this dissertation, I want to return to the status of the rival explanations against which my own developing theory must stand or fall, in order to clarify how (and to what extent) each of these fails to adequately lay bare the characteristics and generative mechanisms of the phenomenon of interest. These theory-clusters are outlined in Chapter 1, and examined empirically in Chapters 3-5. In what follows I specifically draw out (i) their short-comings relative to my theory of PW, and (ii) their possible contributions to understanding the kind of war in question.

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[410] Bhaskar, *The Possibility of Naturalism*, p. 15. Emphasis added.

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<u>Resources and PW</u>

The interplay between illegal resources and the use of proxies is a persistent feature of some of Africa's best known proxy wars. Typically, these resources are either diverted to the sponsor as outright plunder, or used to generate funds for the proxy. As an example of the latter phenomenon: during the Border War, the presence of resources in the target states (specifically, diamonds and ivory) helped the proxies generate gray-market resources (specifically, ivory) which the sponsor could use to purchase weapons on the open market, thereby arming the proxy (and itself) in a deniable manner. In this war, then, the resources to be found in the target states were far from irrelevant in producing the specific constraints within which the PR was constituted.

However, it would be an error to attribute <u>causal</u> status to the quest for resources, whether in the Border War specifically or PW in general. This is the case for two reasons. <u>First</u>: for every proxy war in which the sponsor's pursuit of target-state resources was considered to be a prominent motivator, there are one or more in which the target state had no resources to extract (e.g., the Eritrean involvement in Somalia). <u>Second</u>, as even the Border War shows, while belligerents may configure their PRs to take advantage of particular resources (or deny them to the enemy), this may be only one of several strong motivations driving the sponsor to initiate a partnership with a proxy or proxies in the first place (e.g., Rwandan involvement in the DRC). In other words, resources may play an <u>enabling</u> rather than a causal role, even when their importance to the eventual form of the PW is indisputable.

My own assessment of the role of resources in PW, then, takes a more subtle approach than is indicated by the resource curse thesis. Rather than identifying resources *themselves* as the important factor in explaining proxy wars, I focus on those the particular geopolitical spaces in

which resources and the opportunity for PW coexist; i.e., on those resources which are susceptible to covert extraction and conversion into strategically useful commodities (e.g. black market weapons) or relationships (e.g. neopatrimonial currency) for one or more of the belligerents.

In other words, my model is concerned not only with available plunder, but more specifically with those resources that the sponsor is particularly able to reach and utilize due to the specifiable conditions (e.g. available proxies) under which the war takes place, and (crucially) with the ends to which those resources are put.

Cross Border Identities and PW

The wars which I examined contained many instances of sponsors exhibiting identity-based links with their proxies. However, two clear trends in my data precluded my finding in favor of cross-border identities – i.e., bonds of loyalty spanning over arbitrarily drawn colonial boundaries – as a <u>causal</u> factor in explaining PW as a phenomenon.

<u>First</u>, many of the identities in question were derived from regional, continental, or even global identities, by means of labels such as 'Arab', 'Muslim', 'Francophone' or 'white.' These are border-spanning identities, to be sure, but they are no more specifically bisected by arbitrary <u>colonial</u> borders than they are bisected by state borders or continental limits across the world.[411]

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[411] Disaggregating 'class', 'ethnicity', 'race' and 'color' as designations for various socio-political realities is an ongoing debate within discussions about the politics of identity. I intend to flag this debate without engaging it. For further discussions of these issues, see Taylor/Gutman et al., *Multiculturalism* (Princeton University Press, 1994), and Appiah and Gutman, *Color Conscious: The Political Morality of Race* (Princeton University Press, 1996). Furthermore, it is important to realize that the varying political incorrectness of some terms, over time, means that supposedly neutral terminology (e.g. 'Sub-Saharan Africa') has been used as a direct substitute for older, now-offensive terminology ('Black Africa'); this complicates the uncritical use of *any* supposedly politically neutral terms. Neither is renaming terms in this manner done evenly across all *fora*. Comparing the French and English-language versions of the Wikipedia page for 'Sub-Saharan Africa' (http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afrique_sub-saharienne and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sub-Saharan_Africa), for example, one finds the following sentence in the former, but not the latter: '*L'Afrique sub-saharienne, aussi appelée Afrique noire car elle est principalement peuplée de Noirs...*' ('Sub-Saharan Africa, also known as Black Africa because it is predominantly populated by blacks...')

As Zartman points out, more-or-less 'artificial' borders have bisected groups for as long as there have been borders;[412] the real issue is thus not the plight of 'brothers over the border' as much as it is the existence of real interstate incompatibilities drawn together under the *mobilizing* banner of one or the other salient identity. Nor are borders the only bisections which may place proxy groups 'in' or 'out' of the sponsor's zone of common identity: we cannot, for instance, blame the Berlin Conference for placing Arabs both in northern Chad and southern Libya, when the el-Gaddafi regime's own interactions across that border involved classifying *some* tribes as sponsorable 'fellow Arabs,' but others as not. The call to identification thus seems rather often a tool in the hands of those who will use it, rather than a condition of the conflict area.

Second, it is clear that sponsors often intervene in support of groups when the identity they share is not ethnic or primordial, but contemporary and reactive; in other words (to use the vocabulary of sociology) when their shared identity is not *ascriptive* (e.g. sharing the same ethnicity) but more or less *achieved* (e.g. sharing a mutual antipathy for the target as an 'other').

South African's sponsorship of Rhodesia during the Border War is an excellent example of a PR constituted within a mix of ascriptive and achieved identity bonds. While the two nations shared an identity as 'settler states of European descent', this shared identity had not been strong enough to convince the Rhodesians to join a federation with South Africa in 1922; nor was it enough to stop the South Africans turning on their Rhodesian allies in the late 1970s. Instead, what really mattered was the two states' shared identity *in the eyes of their opponents*: in other words, it was in part because their insurgent allies were cooperating to fight what they perceived

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[412] I. William Zartman, 'Bordering on War', *Foreign Policy* 124 (May-Jun 2001), pp. 66-7

as a united front of white minority regimes, that South Africa was able to draw the Rhodesians and Portuguese into fighting on its behalf between 1961 and 1975-79.[413]

Our understanding of the role of identity in proxy war, therefore, needs to not treat identity as a <u>static</u> and <u>local</u> characteristic of the sponsor and/or target, but rather as a <u>network</u> of links which embed the sponsor, target and proxy into a system of *potentially mobilizable identities* – globally. This networked system is not only dynamic (i.e. responsive to changes and alliances on the ground), but also potentially operational on levels stretching far beyond the area of conflict. In other words, identity matters: but it matters in a far more geopolitically complex way than the cross-border identity model would lead us to believe.

<u>State Weakness and PW</u>

The consensus that African *civil wars* are produced or exacerbated by the inability of states to maintain coercive monopolies is well-substantiated, albeit that many of the predictions and explanations associated with this view remain issues for debate (for example, the relative strength and potential interactions between the 'greed' and 'grievance' motivations for those who resist the state under such circumstances). My work does not challenge 'state failure' as an important account of, among other things: why rural constituents may become disaffected with their heavy-handed governments, why dysfunctional polities and dysfunctional armed forces tend to co-occur, nor does it attempt to discredit these as contributing factors in the establishment of geopolitical conditions which are ripe for certain kinds of war;[414] instead, my data suggests that we should revise our sense of just <u>how</u> state failure plays into proxy war.

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[413] Note, for example, the reconstitution of a diverse cross-section of German-speaking people (i.e., Jewish citizens of Germany) as a homogenous body ('Jews') standing in opposition to the Aryan *volk* by Hitler and his policies.

As discussed in Chapter 1, the consensus position on the role of state weakness or failure in Africa draws on several explanatory mechanisms linking proxy war to the military capability of states. The most prominent of these explanations posits a kind of contagion or conveyor-belt effect between states' inability to maintain a coercive monopoly, and a higher incidence of proxy war involving that state.

In terms of this contagion effect, weak states invite proxy wars because their inability to restrain violent actors in their hinterlands draws in neighboring states who wish to securitize these ungoverned spaces against violent transborder actors. Alternately, the weakness of the target state may serve as a multiplier for the cross-border identity or resource curse mechanisms already confronted, in that weak states cannot resist illegal extraction schemes, and cannot protect (or are motivated to oppress) the kinds of hinterland minorities who may have powerful brethren in neighboring states. Lastly, we might imagine that the use of intermediaries is the chosen strategy of weak states whose regular forces are inefficient, untrustworthy, or unwilling to be deployed in the state's defense; this would then lead weak sponsors to turn to proxy forces instead, once again predicting a strong correlation between military weakness and involvement in PW.

Some very prominent proxy wars do, indeed, serve to highlight these mechanisms in action. For example, the Rwandan involvement with Congolese Tutsi proxy forces in the Eastern provinces of the DRC, was specifically studied (by scholars) and justified (by the Rwandans) in terms of the military weakness of the DRC state. From the Rwandan point of view, a partnership with the RCD was necessary because the Congolese national army could neither protect the Congolese Tutsi in its border provinces, nor prevent the remnants of the FDLR and *Interahamwe*

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[414] Indeed, as Anatol Lieven's magisterial account of the Russian army's failure in Chechnya shows, this phenomenon can hardly be said to only occur in Africa. For his discussion of how 'the fish rots from the head', see A. Lieven, *Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power* (Yale University Press, 1998).

from raiding across these borders into Rwanda. From the point of view of scholars and IGO monitors, on the other hand, the Rwandan forces were using the military weakness of the Congolese forces as an excuse for extracting mineral wealth from the areas administered by the RCD. Lastly, it is also true that part of the reason why Tutsi-Hutu rivalries existed in the Eastern DRC in the first place, was because of Mobutu's use of ethnic politics in the region to provide land for neopatrimonial redistribution – a move which was made necessary because the 'hollow' Zairean state lacked the coercive capacity to simply seize and redistribute land. Lastly, the Sierra Leonean use of ULIMO in Liberia,[415] and the Chadian government's relationship with the JEM militias in its conflict with Sudan, are two such examples which link proxy war to sponsor weakness.

However, my data suggests that although cases like these may be among the best-reported proxy wars, they are not typical of proxy wars in general. Instead, the wars included in the present study tend to underline the operation of more counter-intuitive gradients of power, transactions between states which have I termed 'bully', 'bystander' and 'victim' dynamics.

First: not only was no statistically significant covariance observed between state military capacity and sponsor or proxy status, but some of the continent's most *prolific* sponsors (such as Ethiopia, Sudan and South Africa) are also among its *strongest* states.

Second: comparing proxy war sponsorship to ODA levels after 1970 suggested that sponsoring states tend to be among Africa's 'success stories', i.e., those states which have received steadily increasing levels of overseas aid over time. This upward trajectory in ODA is derived from a range of sources: some of these recipient states are continental linchpins in the Global War on Terror (e.g. Sudan), others are regional hegemons and prominent members of the OAU/AU (e.g. Uganda), and others have simply demonstrated a good capacity to turn overseas

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[415] And its militarization of its *kamajor* hunting societies

aid into measurable local outcomes (e.g. Rwanda). None of these conditions match the depiction of proxy wars as primarily a practice and/or affliction of weak and failing states; instead, as with the resource curse and cross-border identity theses discussed above, they suggest that a more refined understanding of how state military capacity plays into the use of proxies in Africa.[416]

In what follows, I present the salient features of my model of PW, and show how this model provides a better account of the characteristics and instrumentality of the phenomenon of interest than the three rival theories reviewed (resource curse, failed state and cross-border identities). In addition, I show how the data gathered in this dissertation motivate a particular view on the dynamics of PW. In doing this, I clearly flag several features of my proposal that require further examination and refinement.

In Lakatosian terms,[417] the salient features which make up my model (i.e., the characteristics, nature, and instrumentality of PW) constitute an outer layer, or 'protective belt,' around the theory's core assumptions (i.e., that these wars represent a form of violent statecraft). In progressive research programs, the outer layer is constantly updated and extended by means of a 'positive heuristic,' or plan for future research, which works to include new data and describe novel phenomenon.

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[416] This finding is consistent with Atzili's examination of the interactions between border regimes and state weaknesss. In this case, state weakness appears to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for war, while strong border regimes in conjunction with weak states is both necessary and sufficient. See Atzili, 'When Good Fences make Bad Neighbors'.

[417] Imre Lakatos, 'Science and pseudoscience', in Brown et al. (eds.) *Conceptions of Inquiry: A Reader* (London: Methuen, 1981) ., pp. 114–121

Figure 9.1: Framework for Ongoing Theoretical Assessment of PW research program

In terms of my model, then, the extent to which the data reviewed here supports (and/or fails to support) my assertion of PW's characteristics, nature and instrumentality serves not only as an assessment of the model's current state, but also as a series of signposts indicating a direction which future research on this topic might profitably take. This represents the project's 'positive heuristic.' I represent this graphically in Figure 9.1, above.

<u>Salient Features of Proxy War</u>

In Table 9.1 above, I outline the extent to which the data supports for my proposed model of African war. The conclusions regarding the overall patterns in the data on the Events List were drawn from the findings presented in Chapters 3-5 (i.e., the quantitative analysis of 101 PRs across 27 conflicts), and the three token wars discussed in Chapters 6-8. Each cell in Table

9.1 corresponds to a salient feature of PW (5 characteristics, plus PW as an 'effective tool'), and is given one of four values: 'confirmed,' 'disconfirmed,' 'not conclusive,' and 'no data' (meaning that the resolution of the available data in that category affords no way of assessing that particular feature). Following this, I illustrate these findings with extracts from the data produced in Parts II and III.

Table 9.1 Testing the Features of PW against Findings

	EVENTS LIST (101 PRs across 27 conflicts)	THE TOYOTA WARS	THE BORDER WAR	THE SOMALI VORTEX
1: Advent	Not conclusive	Confirmed	Confirmed	Confirmed
2: Actors in PR	Confirmed	Confirmed	Not conclusive	Not conclusive
3: Levels and nature of support	Confirmed	Confirmed	Confirmed	Not conclusive
4: Overcoming constraints	**No data**	Confirmed	Confirmed	Confirmed
5: System in Balance	Confirmed	Confirmed	Confirmed	Confirmed
6: Effective tool	**No data**	Confirmed	Confirmed	Confirmed

Advent

The three token wars assessed strongly confirmed my idea that the start of a 'war' involving proxy relationships can be effectively measured from the moment that the PR is constituted. In the case of the Toyota Wars, Libya's intensification of its support for FROLINAT went hand-in-hand with the advent of el-Gaddafi's revisionist aims for the region; thus, Libya should be thought of as having 'gone to war' the instant that it replaced the trickle of unfocused support provided by the Idris-era government, to significant (and objective-focused) support given to a proxy that displayed the clear intention to attack the target. Similarly, in the Border

War, South Africa was inarguably attempting to work its will on the region by 1975, even though it did not stand alone against the Frontline States until the disappearance of its last ally (Rhodesia) in 1979. Finally, the Somali Vortex shows multiple instances of potential sponsors beginning their violent interactions with their neighbors by selecting local proxies to work with.

Furthermore, in all three of the token wars, it was the persistence of strong links between the sponsor and its proxies, such that these could be re-mobilized at any moment, which clearly argued in favor of the idea that these wars represented unbroken stretches of more-or-less intense proxy warfare. For example, none would argue that South Africa and Angola were at 'peace' following the Lusaka Accords of 1984, because both states kept their proxies in the field even as they withdrew their regular forces to behind the armistice lines. All of this confirms that the existence of a PR is a sensible way to mark when a sponsor is in the process of waging war.[418]

It does, however, bear mentioning that for states with pre-existing conditions of hostility, the inauguration of a PR does not play the same clear signifying role that it did in the three token wars, and more generally. In other words, in the case of proxy-utilizing states who were already at war (i.e. who engaged in PRs of the lagging and envelope kinds), it would not make sense to say that these states were 'not at war until they engaged proxies.' The large numbers of lagging and envelope wars in my dataset are the reason why I cannot consider the wars on the Events List to serve as a strong confirmation of my model in this regard; however, it certainly does not disconfirm it either. Instead, what appears to be a sensible position to take regarding the role of PR as a signal of war, is to say that a condition of war should be considered to exist the first time

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[418] This state of affairs correlates well with Hobbes' view, in *Leviathan*, that

> … *WARRE, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it is in the nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a showre or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many dayes together: So the nature of War, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary.*

(i) a PR is constituted, or (ii) open fighting breaks out between a sponsor and its proxies against a target; and should be considered to last until either breaks down or neither of these conditions obtain. In this regard, the current self-described 'state of hostilities' between Chad and Sudan serves as precisely the kind of circumstance that my model suggests should be seen as 'war;' and, unsurprisingly, this 'state of hostilities' is largely being played out through ubiquitous proxy warfare between these two states.

Actors in proxy relationship

My notion that the proxy relationship, as the fundamental structure of PW, is based on various combinations (and recombinations) of <u>sponsors</u>, <u>proxies</u> and <u>targets</u> was strongly confirmed both by the wars in the Events List, and by the simplest of the three tokens examined (i.e., the Toyota Wars). In these cases, it was clear that sponsors participate in PW by providing concrete support (Dunér's Level V or better[419]), proxies participate by accepting this support and by assisting the sponsor in attacking the target, and targets participate in the PR by contesting the actions of the sponsor and proxy by means of their own representatives, e.g. armed forces.

As I discussed in Chapter 1, I do not construct PRs in this way in order to imply that proxies lack agency, nor to imply that sponsorship is always cynical and has little to do with the proxy's (potentially legitimate) grievances. Indeed, both the typological assessments of partnership conducted in Chapter 4, and the qualitative assessments of the three tokens, produced conclusions that would argue against such views.

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[419] Once again, Dunér's five levels are:

    I. Direct combat involvement (e.g. Regular invasion, Specialist functions)
    II. Indirect combat involvement (e.g. Irregular invasion, Shelling)
    III. Direct para-combat involvement (e.g. Advisory functions, Arms supply)
    IV. Indirect para-combat involvement (e.g. Military training, Armed blockade, Financial support)
    V. Direct supporting activities (e.g. Military warning, Transport, Base functions

Nonetheless, the theory-data fit observed between my model and the issue of the actors in war is not perfect. This is most apparent in the two more complex tokens that I examined (i.e., the Border War and the Somali Vortex). In the Border War, we saw the effects of what I call nested PRs; in other words, the effect of distant sponsors (e.g., the US) working through regional sponsors (e.g., South Africa) who themselves work through yet a third kind of sponsor (e.g. Rhodesia) before a clear 'proxy' (i.e., an actor who only received and did not produce support of their own proxies) was reached. This was also observed in the Somali Vortex. Furthermore, in the cases of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somali we see two additional complications: first, the prevalence of what I call role drift: sponsors who become targets, nonstate proxies who become state sponsors, and so on; and second, the presence of networks (e.g. Al Qaeda) rather than states, as sponsors and targets in the war.

While these three elements of the latter two wars (i.e. nested PRs, role drift, and networks) challenge my model of proxy war, I do not consider them to count as disconfirming evidence regarding the central role given to PRs in my model. Primarily, this is because we still see sponsorship and the receipt of aid as the 'currency of PW,' in its most basic sense, even in the most complex of the tokens. Therefore, where it seems that my model has the most opportunity for future growth, is not in the direction of problematizing support, but rather in problematizing what constitutes an actor or a belligerent as far as these occupy any one or more of the roles designated: sponsor, proxy and target. In future work I would therefore outline this as a direction for scrutiny.

Levels of Support

My model's predictions regarding PW were that a clear link is apparent between the levels of support extended by the sponsor, and the intended military function of the proxy. This

link was first suggested by my cross-tabulation of data on sponsorship levels with (i) data on sponsor military capacity, and (ii) data on the geographical distribution of fighting in PW; more particularly, the apparent objectives of this fighting.

My prediction in this regard was strongly confirmed, both by the wars on the Events List, and by two of the three tokens (i.e., all but the Somali Vortex). In these cases, we saw repeated evidence of sponsors tailoring the kinds of support given to the proxy, to what they wanted the proxy to do, rather than necessarily what the proxy wanted to do. Sometimes, this goal-armament link was positive, in the sense of specific weapon systems being provided to achieve specific goals: the provision of portable air defense systems and vehicles in the Toyota Wars and the Border War are the clearest examples of this. In other cases, the support given was negative, in the sense of specific weapon systems being held back in order to prevent the proxy from achieving those goals which did not line up with sponsor preferences. The military limbo experienced by the RENAMO organization in Mozambique is the clearest example of this kind of link.

However, as with the other features examined thus far, certain atypicalities and incongruities were also observed between the data and my model. Specifically, in the case of the Somali Vortex we saw that some kinds of support, once provided, produce self-sustaining momentum, so that the warring and relationships went beyond the strategic designs of any of the belligerents. Weapons caches, for example, can continue to enable conflict long after the sponsor that provided them has departed; in addition, proxies can distribute their support onwards, or share sponsor-provided base areas with others. In both cases, proxies end up armed/supported – but not *only* in ways that track the objectives of their sponsors. It is therefore imperative that this be checked out against other, similarly complex PWs.

Obviously, the study of SALW proliferation in complex wars and poorly-chronicled areas of conflict is a Sisyphean challenge all of it own; it is therefore of no use to wait for authoritative accounts of weapon distribution to emerge before we can say anything about how sponsors enable the violent acts of their proxies. Furthermore, at the top and bottom ends of Dunér's scale (i.e., invasion at Level I, and the provision of bases at Level V[420]), the historical record associated with these wars is based on assertions that are at least in principle verifiable both at the time and over time.

My intuition about how to adjust my model to account for the challenges posed by the Somali Vortex, then, is to adopt a similar stance as I did in *Advent*, above: i.e., to say that proxies are armed <u>at least as well</u> as their sponsor wishes. Although we cannot thereby capture the phenomenon of proxies who are able to accumulate substantial stocks of weapons or support from outside of the PR that involves them in a particular PW, we can at least say with some certainty that sponsors will not deliberately under-support their proxies when these are working towards a goal that the sponsor wishes to see achieved. And when this kind of under-support is observed, by implication, we must concede that the sponsor's 'goal' for the proxy is not what the proxy thinks it is! Such cases clearly represent both an 'opportunistic' partnership and (possibly) a 'proxy sacrifice' in the making.

<u>Overcoming Constraints</u>

My model of PW predicted that the use of proxies by sponsors was fundamentally tied to the presence of specific constraints in the area of conflict, whether these constraints were

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[420] Dunér's five levels are:

    I. Direct combat involvement (e.g. Regular invasion, Specialist functions)
    II. Indirect combat involvement (e.g. Irregular invasion, Shelling)
    III. Direct para-combat involvement (e.g. Advisory functions, Arms supply)
    IV. Indirect para-combat involvement (e.g. Military training, Armed blockade, Financial support)
    V. Direct supporting activities (e.g. Military warning, Transport, Base functions

positive (i.e., assisted this kind of fighting) or negative (i.e., interfered with this kind of fighting) in terms of their effect. Without exception, my data strongly supports this prediction. From the simplest token examined to the most complex, PRs were tailored around the constraints of the area of conflict; this was visible not only in how and where these PRs were established, but also in ways in which the militarization of people and places was conducted. We also saw, in the two more complex token wars, how sponsor and target (or even two sponsors engaged in retaliatory PW) vie for control of, or contest, these constraints through their struggles to populate, depopulate, deny, ensure access to, or otherwise tile the balance of constraint in their favor. The postulated link between the geopolitical realities of Africa and the kinds of war to be found on the continent, therefore, appears well substantiated by my work. That is to say, they have learned to fight in these ways, and this form of war sustains the very geopolitics they responded to in the first place.

<u>System in Balance</u>

My data supports the notion that PW usage in Africa is fundamentally responsive to systemic constraints, both in terms of the patterns discovered in the quantitative data (regarding bullies and victims), and in terms of the overwhelming evidence contained in the qualitative data (regarding sponsors tailoring their use of PW to what they thought they could get away with at the regional, continental and global levels). The systemic patterns of PW revealed by my data also give clear support to the idea that for African states, PW is an effective and attractive tool. This can be seen in the discrepancy between the number of states who sponsor PRs and the number who are targeted.

However, my data also make clear that: (i) sponsors, targets and proxies exhibit <u>role drift</u>, that is, a sponsor in one PR becomes a target in another; (ii) sponsors are frequently amongst

those targeted; and (iii) sponsors and their partners engage in PW often regardless of a clear guarantee of victory. These conclusions suggest that something other than pursuing aims and ambitions through PW is at stake; specifically, that <u>systemic factors</u> collude both to make PR attractive to those who use it, and to embroil states for whom it is not attractive (or, no more attractive than other tools) in its use either as sponsors or targets. To the extent that these factors feed back on themselves, such that today's PW provokes tomorrow's, this suggests that PW in Africa, and PRs among African states and nonstates alike, are indeed elements not only of a system but of a <u>system-in-balance</u>. This in turn suggests that in studying PW, we are dealing with a <u>persistent institution of proxy war</u> use, stretching across the African continent and through fifty years of African history. This has obvious implications for intervention, as I will note in Chapter 10.

<u>Effective Tool</u>

The data on the prevalence of states at war (as sponsors, proxies and/or targets) as well as the detail gathered on the three token wars clearly suggest PW is an effective tool, otherwise, why is it so often used? Further, the data on the three token wars provide strong support for the role of unilateralism in explaining why several states with powerful armies of their own – such as South Africa, Libya, Somalia, and Ethiopia – chose to use proxies. In the Toyota Wars, we see that Libya relied on PW as an adaptable tool because it could vary the intensity of it so as to extract concessions or solicit incentive. This proved PW more effective than conventional war or indeed covert violence of another kind (SST).

Libya could 'dial down' its support for FROLINAT when Chad revoked its recognition for Israel, or when the OAU became restive over el-Gaddafi's proposed merger between the two countries, and then quickly 'dial it back up' when the OAU peacekeepers failed to keep Hissène

Habré at bay. In the Border War, we not only see South Africa using PW because of its easy modularizability, but because it provided the SADF with a fine instrument for destabilizing the Frontline States, thereby imposing on them a severe cost for their support of the ANC/PAC. Lastly, in the Somali Vortex we see PW's efficiency as a way of cheaply opening new fronts in the stalled conventional war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In none of these cases was the decision to use PW of an 'either/or' format, i.e., use it or not. Rather, PW was used to *complement* conventional war, diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, moral pressure, and the like. In this regard, my data clearly indicates the status of PW as one element of the 'admixture of different means' that, for Clausewitz, produced war from the base matter of politics.

Concluding Comments

In my discussion above, concerning my model's central features and the theory-data fit thus revealed, I have focused on how states use PW, and also how they respond to what confronts them, e.g., transnational coalitions of power, and also to what is available to them, i.e., the availability of violence-capable actors, because proxies need weapons and states need intermediaries, because they wish to go to war but cannot (or will not) use their own forces, and so on. African states thus use PW because they 'must' and because they 'can.' Beyond their obvious function of explaining why PW persists, however, the issues of 'can' and 'must' also serve as signposts to the ways in which proxy war could conceivably be removed from its prominent position in African statecraft, i.e., by individually addressing all the contextual features which proxy war draws on to operate, by addressing the core issues which make African states feel they 'must' respond to, or both.

In concluding this section, I am reminded of Michael Howard's suggestion[421] that war has retained its attractiveness as a form of foreign policy through the ages mostly because it is one of the few truly <u>unilateral</u> ways in which states can adjust their 'international relations,' and because it is thus easily relied on in conditions of uncertainty, fear, or anarchy.

<u>Constitutive Dynamics of Proxy War</u>

In Figure 9.2, below, I attempt to capture the <u>dynamics of proxy war</u>. That is to say, the way in which the participants to the PR (sponsor, proxy, target) interact – and through this interaction, constitute changes in the role-occupancies and the nature and number of PRs involved in the proxy war. These interactions between participants become, in effect, new generative loci; i.e. causal mechanisms behind the cause, course and consequences of PW. The capacity of incidents of collective violence to spread beyond their initial dimensions has been broadly studied for other kinds of war; specifying how this takes place in PW will be attended to in future work.

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[421] Michael Howard, *The Causes of Wars and other essays* (Harvard University Press, 1983)

Figure 9.2 Model of Proxy War

In Fig. 9.2 above, I depict both the interactions between the main parties to the PR, and second and perhaps further levels of establishing new and different PRs. In Figure 9.3 below, I specifically attempt to capture the ways in which these further dynamics link PWs to one another and constitute a system (i.e. as observed in the Somali Vortex).

Figure 9.3: Systemic Momentum

My proposal that multiple levels of interaction exist in the continent-wide system –
between parties in a PR, between different PRs, and between different PWs – is obviously the
most *interpretative* part of my PW model. However, this kind of multiplicity is strongly implied
in both the quantitative and qualitative data. What bears further study with different kinds of data
than I was able to use in this project is not the fact that multiple-level interactions occur (as this
is indisputable), but rather to delineate the conditions under which these emerge and draw in new
actors.

Assessing the proposed features of my proxy war model against the data delivered the
following corrections to my conception of the PR. Specifically, my data suggests that it would
not be productive to assign a permanent sponsor/proxy/target status to states, nonstates or any
particular collective in PW, i.e., to ignore the potential for the designated status of any single

actor to change over the course of a protracted PW (e.g., a sponsor can become a target). Also, these designations should not be taken to refer always to single, unitary entities, i.e., a 'sponsor' might refer to a coalition of belligerents involved in sponsorship, or to factions within a belligerent which conduct sponsorship in the belligerent's name; and so, too, for proxies and targets.

These complexities (the number of parties involved in a PR, changes in roles, and rival/competing factions emerging within a collective) are captured in the three token wars selected for qualitative analysis, i.e., The Toyota War (the simplest token, in terms of these complexities), The Border War (more complex, because of the existence of factions within belligerents, and bidirectional PRs i.e. retaliation), and The Somali Vortex (most complex, because of the existence of Somalia as (triangular) PRs). Further, finding (or not) instantiations for the proposed features of my PW model as discussed in this chapter, clearly elaborated the limits of each feature as well as the coherence of the PW model as a whole. The latter is specifically elaborated in the Constitutive Dynamics as depicted above and referred to in the next chapter as the 'ways and wayward causal chains of war.'

Proxy War and Sovereign Interstices

I began this dissertation with a working hypothesis of proxy war which included, among other things, the notion that states 'bleed over their borders,' i.e. that African states fight their PWs in an attempt to pursue politics beyond their borders. Further, I suggested that these wars were fundamentally configured by (and configurative of) the geopolitically complex spaces in which they took place. Having fleshed out my model of proxy war in the preceding four sections of this chapter, I am now able to advance a model of these complex spaces, as sovereign interstices springing up in the zones of overlap between (i) those resources and/or territorialized

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institutions upon which PW-using state depends or which it wishes to obtain, and (ii) the limits of its sanctioned (i.e. *de jure*) sovereignty.

Figure 9.4: Sovereign Conflicts and Sovereignties

Figure 9.4, above, diagrammatically represents the interactions between sovereign states (i.e., territorialized polities) over time, moving from the pre-Westphalian order (<u>configuration A</u>), to the era of the nation-state (<u>configuration B</u>), to the increasingly globalized state of the post-WW2 era (<u>configuration E</u>). Each of these sovereign forms had its own form of endemic conflict. Pre-Westphalian states, in which multiple sovereignties might apply to any particular subject, area, or group, were characterized by constant warring over competing claims to legitimacy. Indeed, 'legitimacy' itself was rarely unipolar or exclusive; a medieval warlord might hold titles granted by more than one lord, resulting in situations in which the warlord would honor his competing obligations by serving in the armies of one king while dispatching soldiers

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to that very same king's enemies. Thus, while medieval polities had extensive and intricate systems of sovereignty, these systems were not configured to be exclusive of one another, and hence violence – ongoing, brutal, and unpredictable – was a constant reality.[422]

The Peace of Westphalia, in establishing the principle of sovereign inviolability, is held to have brought an end to the massive religious wars which had dominated early Renaissance Europe. However, while this is true, in the most general terms, it must also be conceded that the precise functioning of the treaty had less to do with engendering pacifism or religious tolerance on the part of its signatories, than it did with the inauguration of a new phase of en-bordering: one which linked sovereignty to fixed territorial demarcations, thereby separating sovereign entities from another (<u>configuration B</u> in Figure 9.4), and enacting a jurisdictional ban on violent intervention in the affairs of one's neighbors.

While violence conducted by sovereigns continued after the Peace, it differed from the free-ranging violence of the religious zealots, *écorcheurs* and marcher lords[423] of the previous era; for in pinning sovereignty to physical space, the Westphalian order welded together the physic-legal footprint of the state and its militarized foreign policy, in an arrangement which would go on to last well into the modern era. The archetype of this welding-together was the 'war of national conquest' (<u>configuration C</u> in Figure 9.4), in which the patchwork territorial acquisitions and overlapping allegiances of the medieval warlords were replaced by the systematic conquest of new lands 'for the crown,' (configuration D) and later still 'for the empire,' and 'for the nation,' i.e., under the flag of the (ever-evolving) state.

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[422] For a fuller examination, see Hendrik Spruyt , *The Sovereign State and its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996) and also Winchester, *A World Lit only by Fire*

[423] *Écorcheurs* (Fr: 'skinners of dead bodies') were the bands of roaming fighters, bandits and ex-soldiers who pillaged the medieval French countryside in the 14th and 15th centuries; marcher lords were warlords who were given titles to lands outside the settled boundaries of a polity on the understanding that they would pacify these areas ('the March') on behalf of the crown.

Moving to the globalized state (configuration E), I once again draw on the work of John Agnew[424] and Saskia Sassen[425] to suggest that globalization has left the modern state 'inside-out': specifically, that while the process of late-Medieval to late Renaissance statemaking involved states gaining privileged or monopolistic access to a range of key institutions *within* their territory, and defending these from internal and external rivals, the modern state has become fundamentally dependent on extranational circuits and resources for its survival. This is no recent event; one may go so far as to say that even as the geopolitics of the burgeoning nation-state after Westphalia began to define each state's *de facto* and *de jure* borders, globalization and economic liberalism had already begun to undermine this process, leaving many of the institutions on which states depend (e.g., oil reserves), or to whose defense they are constitutionally committed (e.g., democracy promotion), at various distances *beyond* their borders.

This brings up a new kind of security problem for the post-Westphalian state: the more broadly the sources of their power are spread around the globe, the more they are forced to exceed their nominal boundaries (either in a *de facto* or a *de jure* sense) to defend their core interests; and in almost all cases, this means encroaching on institutions which other states might prefer to keep for themselves (configuration E in Figure 9.4). For peaceful states, these clashes can be addressed through various forms of multilateralism, such as treaties and inter-governmental organizations; but for states who are tempted to use violence to effect 'unilateral, but binding, political decisions',[426] the path ahead is more complex.

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[424] John Agnew, 'Sovereignty Regimes' and *Globalization and Sovereignty*.

[425] Saskia Sassen, Territory, *Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages* (Princeton University Press, 2006)

[426] John Vasquez, *The War Puzzle*, p. 36

Until 1945, such states could more-or-less legitimately use formal invasion and annexation to securitize key extranational institutions (<u>configurations C and D</u> in Figure 9.4); but following the post-World War Two ban on 'aggressive war,' states across the world have found themselves facing a *constraint* on their use of violence without any concomitant decline in the proliferation of reasons for war. This, I contend, has led them to find new strategies for force projection: drone warfare, state-sponsored terrorism, and (especially in Africa) proxy war. What all of these forms of violence have in common is an attempt, by states, to 'go' where the boundaries of sovereignty mean they cannot formally 'go' (configuration F in Figure 9.4). And, while we might make distinctions of <u>degree</u> between the US's use of contractors and tribal auxiliaries in Iraq, and Uganda's use of Sudanese rebels in the DRC,[427] both my own findings about proxy war's political character in Africa and the explicit connections drawn by US policymakers between their strategic partnerships and the broader goal of securitizing Iraq show that these two interactions have much in common as far as 'politics by other means' goes.

All this points to the existence of a new kind of militarizable space in the geopolitics not only of Africa but of the world more generally: a 'sovereign interstice' within which states operate through available intermediaries. Thus, <u>sovereign interstices are the gaps between a state's *de facto* reach and its *de jure* borders</u>. For especially weak states, these interstices may exist inside the state's recognized *de jure* boundaries; this describes the classic 'failed state,' which cannot in fact 'reach' all the way to its nominal borders. For especially strong states, on the other hand, these interstices may be regional or even global; superpowers and hegemons, arguably, throw a sovereign shadow so immense that the entire global system falls into a kind of sovereign interstice for them. However, state strength alone cannot explain the location or width

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[427] Gérard Prunier, 'Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare: Uganda, Sudan and the Congo (1986-99)', *African Affairs* 103/412 (2004), pp. 359-383

of sovereign dimensions. As my data shows, very weak states can project force abroad through intermediaries even as they struggle to maintain control of their own territory. At the same time, very strong states can take advantage of their own strong borders to open up *internal* interstices within which proxies can be trained and groomed for deployment; certainly, this is the state of affairs which characterizes the South African use of the Caprivi Strip during the Border Wars.

Furthermore, as my model of PW shows, wars conducted within sovereign interstices have yet another significant input which helps determine their extent and intensity, and that is the kinds of intermediaries which can be found inside the sovereign interstice, and the strategies by which sponsors and targets attempt to militarize these groups in their service. In Africa, intermediaries are numerous and often all too eager to receive aid from external sources; in the Global North, on the other hand, intermediaries are (for the time being) either absent or directly under the thumb of high-capacity states (as in the case of PMSCs). Nonetheless, as the forces of globalization continue to roll back the once-complete contiguity between the *de facto* and *de jure* state established by the Peace of Westphalia, the sovereign interstices of the developed world are growing in size, a broader range of mobilizable intermediaries are beginning to appear within them. One clear example of this process, is the increasing recognition of the role of diaspora populations in providing a global reservoir of radicalizable young men and women for eventual service in the war 'for the homeland' or elsewhere.[428] This shows that while the Global North has not yet become a frontline for wars conducted via sovereign interstices, this may not be the case for long.

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[428] Remarks made during panel on 'Recent Trends in Foreign Fighter Source Countries and Transit Networks' at the Foreign Policy Research Initiative's Sept 2010 Conference on 'The Foreign Fighter Problem.,' Washington, DC.

<u>Conclusion</u>

The notion of a sovereign interstice has considerable explanatory power not only for proxy wars in Africa but for wars elsewhere. However, further discussion is necessary – first, to discuss the redefinitions of what we call 'war' in Africa which this new conception makes possible; second, to determine whether this a new way of seeing war is able to bypass certain ongoing problems in the study of conflict in Africa; and third, to determine whether a vision of African war as the product of a stable *system of sovereign interstices*, produces a hitherto invisible strategy for intervening against war in Africa. I attend to these three issues in what follows.

CHAPTER 10

IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOLARSHIP AND PRACTICE

Introduction

In concluding this dissertation, I am reminded of the following report from Mark Twain, which underlines the ways and wayward causal chains of war, in general, and PW, in particular:

> [Our question to General Grant was] "<u>With whom originated the idea of the march to the sea? Was it Grant's, or was it Sherman's idea?</u>" … General Grant said: "<u>Neither of us originated the idea of Sherman's march to the sea. The enemy did it.</u>" He went on to say that the enemy … <u>necessarily originated a great many of the plans that the general on the opposite side gets the credit for; at the same time that the enemy is doing that, he is laying open other moves which the opposing general sees and takes advantage of</u>. In this case, Sherman had a plan all thought out … [he] meant to destroy the two remaining railroads in that part of the country, and that would finish up that region. But General Hood did not play the military part that he was expected to play. On the contrary, General Hood made a dive at Chattanooga. This left the march to the sea open to Sherman … [he] saw the opportunity, and he would not have been fit for his place if he had not seized it.[429]

In analyzing the central feature of my model of PW, it too often became clear that the 'Hoods,' 'Shermans' and 'Grants' of proxy war in Africa do not announce themselves clearly. That is to say, it takes a great deal of theory to find the data, and a great deal of data to instantiate a developing theory. Moreover, what each of these point mean remains open to ongoing and further examination: *aluta continua!*

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[429] Samuel Clemens, *Autobiography of Mark Twain*; emphasis added.

<u>Definitional Adjustments</u>

In what follows, I build on my previously established conclusions regarding proxy war, in order to offer revisions of three core elements in the study of conflict in Africa, i.e., what is typically meant by (i) a 'state,' (ii) 'war,' and thus (iii) 'interstate war.'

<u>Revising our definition of 'states'</u>

As I discussed in Chapter 1, theorists of the state distinguish it from other political collectives in terms of three characteristics, i.e. that 'states' necessarily feature international recognition, possess a monopoly over the legitimate use of coercive power (violence), and wield considerable social power. States are also the main providers of collective goods to their citizens. However, the only element of this definition that remains clearly a characteristic of states and states alone, is the formal <u>recognition</u> extended to states by other states and by influential bodies such as the UN. In contrast, the other elements that used to make up a state (i.e., coercive and social power, and the provision of collective goods) are increasingly dispensed by transnational and non-governmental organizations (e.g. Muslim charity organizations), non-profit organizations (NPOs), and intergovernmental organizations (e.g. the UNHCR).

This last preserve of the state is, however, a significant boon for those to whom it applies, because international recognition carries with it significant benefits. This is the case even for states in which their possession of international recognition is the <u>only</u> discernable characteristic they possess. The very different experiences of Somalia and Somaliland (until recently) provide an excellent example of this dynamic at work. For almost 20 years, Somaliland received almost no foreign aid despite having all the trappings of *de facto* sovereignty (public order, taxation, a stable citizenry with modern documentation including biometric passports). During this same period, the government-in-exile of Somalia continued to receive development aid and military

assistance from various foreign sources.[430] It therefore pays to be *recognized* as sovereign, even if conditions on the ground do not warrant this recognition in any way.[431]

Given these inalienable benefits to being a state, i.e. the 'blank sovereignty check,' it should be of little surprise to find that possession of the African state still matters even when there is so little 'state' to capture. We see this in my data in several ways. First, the prominence of regime change as a sponsor objective shows that in the absence of any ability to redraw the roster of states with whom they are forced to contend, African states have frequently settled for redrawing the list of regimes instead. Second, and as Herbst points out, we see that even for states with extreme levels of military capacity, there is often little incentive to translate this capacity into firm territorial control extending out to each and every border. Instead, the various arms of the military can be used as a kind of iterated palace guard, protecting the only thing that really matters (e.g. the conduits by which the varied benefits of sovereignty arrive, or the regime's hold on power in the face of domestic discord), while the rest of the state's internal and external security needs are met by proxies or other representatives of the 'shadow state.'[432]

All of these point towards the importance of rethinking not only what we mean by a 'state' given the evolutions discussed above, but also what we mean by sovereignty. In Chapter 1, I specifically relied on the works of Catherine Boone and John Agnew to lead our thinking away from merely mapping 'sovereignty' onto the state's 'own' territory, and within the clear reach of its exercise of legitimate authority. I therefore propose that we think of African states,

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[430] Laura Seay, Remarks delivered during 'Evolving Conceptions of Statehood, Sovereignty, and Recognition' panel, ISA Annual conference, Montreal (March 2011).

[431] Note the following from a recent account of 'Libya's fledgling alternative government': "If the Libyan rebel movement in the east is to survive, it needs international recognition soon.' And, further on, 'foreign governments have so far dithered, expressing concern and offering humanitarian aid rather than recognition.' (*The Economist*, March 12 2011), p. 54.

[432] Reno addresses the internal use of intermediaries in *Warlord Politics*; where this dissertation takes his model further is to specifically apply it to transborder (i.e. external) security policy.

in particular, as not just 'equal to or less than' their *de jure* boundaries but also (often fundamentally) 'greater than' these, in terms of their commitment to fight for and/or protect resources and institutions outside these boundaries. This may require some conceptual redrafting of what we think of as the 'map of Africa;' but the products of such a project are far more likely to make sense of where war breaks out and when than the vision of the state upon which we currently rely.[433]

Revising our definition of 'war'

In setting out this research project, I used Istvan Kende's definition of war as (i) involving regular forces, (ii) duly organized for the purpose of fighting, (iii) under circumstances in which this fighting displayed clear continuity between incidents of violence. Further, I used the standard of 'battle deaths' as inaugurated by Richardson for wars, to compile a list of relevant African wars for further study. This list not only underlined the prevalence of multi-actor wars in which both states and nonstates participated, but also suggested that the continuing role of regular forces – even in cases like *Apartheid* South Africa, which maintained a significant conventional force while also using PW – should no longer to be taken as definitive of war. My data did, however, provide adequate empirical grounds for retaining parts (ii) and (iii) of Kende's definition; that is to say, I want to propose that war continues to be defined by <u>organized fighting</u> and a <u>continuity between clashes</u>, in addition to the tally of severity that has become standard for most data sets.

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[433] I attended to precisely this idea in my 2007 paper on 'The Geopolitics of State Failure' (MPSA 2007). In this project, I used satellite imagery to redraw Africa's states as 'blocs' of more- or less-permeable (i.e., controllable) borders; I then plotted UN interventions on the map thus produced, finding that the distribution of blocs adequately predicted the contagion effects of one war vis-à-vis others. Although this was just an initial foray into the phenomenon of interest, it at least establishes the viability of spending more time (as a scholar of African war) asking the question: what is the state, and how might we best recognize it?

These criteria still, however, leave out an important aspect of modern warfare: nonstate actors. My work on PW clearly underlines the necessity to redefine 'agents of war' to include nonstate actors and 'war' as inclusive of nonstate actors. I discuss this in more detail below, but for now suffice it to point out that the breakdown of the state's monopoly over the use of legitimate violence is not restricted to collapsing states, or states in peril. For example, not only does the world's strongest state (i.e., the USA) currently employ more contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan than it does its own soldiers, there is good reason to believe that it could not do otherwise even if it wanted to;[434] and the US is not alone in this regard. Contractors of this kind run logistical systems, guard bases, train soldiers, and even perform specialist combat services such as operating strike aircraft or heavy weapon systems for states up and down the scale of military strength, from the post-Cold War US to Sierra Leone during its civil war.

At the most formal end of the spectrum, these contractors are employees of multinational companies who specialize in security provision; at the most informal end, they are simply mercenaries or bandits-for-hire. What all these actors have in common, however, is that they are all private-sector intermediaries participating in what was previously considered to be a specific preserve of states. Their presence in these wars is made possible by the breakdown of two institutions also previously dominated by states: a monopoly on skilled warriors, and a monopoly on access to society's most lethal weapons. To deal with these in order, when national armies dominated war, military service was a lifetime profession for most of its participants. Nowadays, whether through better-paying jobs in the private sector or through the incomplete disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups after conflict, ex-fighters with the necessary

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[434] Dixon, 'Achilles Doesn't Live Here Anymore'

skills to participate in war have become an accessible resource for various kinds of private organization.[435]

At the same time as states lost their monopoly on warriors, they also began to lose their monopoly on weapons. Increases in weapon lethality and portability since the mid-20th century have meant that a cheaply-outfitted group of insurgents can now contend militarily against far larger conventional forces. This means that states' advantages in terms of the *volume* of weapons which they could stockpile and deploy, counts for less on the battlefield. While weapons have become more lethal, private producers (or, resellers) of arms also began to replace states as their primary producers. Taken together, these two trends have meant that those who seek to engage in war no longer need state-run magazines, armories, depots, and munitions factories, i.e., access to the military-industrial nexus which states leveraged so effectively in Clausewitz's time; nowadays, all one needs is money or illicit goods to trade, and one can soon outfit an army.

All of these issues point towards the importance of moving away from the idea that the presence of nonstate intermediaries in war somehow means that the fighting *necessarily* has less to do with 'war' than it does, for example, with 'crime' or 'post-conflict securitization.' Instead, we should concede that the exclusion of nonstates from the battlefield was more or less a historical accident, based on a momentary advantage enjoyed by states vis-à-vis their competitors. Furthermore, as this incongruous phase draws to an end, it is our task as scholars to ensure that our theories about the phenomena we wish to make sense of (such as war) are not so inextricably linked to the fundamental assumptions of the past that they, too, enter into irrelevance.

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[435] While this phenomenon is clearly of pronounced importance in modern conflicts, it is nothing new in the broader history of war; for example, the rise of no less a striking phenomenon than the Golden Age of Piracy can be linked back to the lack of what would today be called DDR programs following the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. It is worth noting that the only ex-combatant nation which did have something resembling a DDR program at this time (the Netherlands) also produced the fewest pirates and privateers in the decades which followed.

Interstate War

My findings in this dissertation were based, as I discuss below, on the notion that the more or less standard distinction between intra- and inter-state wars is no longer justifiable in studying modern war. I discuss precisely why I think this is a problem in Section B, below, but for now, I will confine my remarks to how best to move forward from our current ideas about what makes an interstate war, to somewhat better ones.

For a war to be 'interstate' in the generally accepted sense of the term, it must feature direct clashes 'between' the <u>regular forces of two recognized sovereign states</u>. I place 'between' in quotation marks because even our casual use of the idea of wars 'between' states, places the <u>fighting on or along their extant, contested, and/or dynamic borders</u>. This common-sense notion is reinforced by our scholarly convention that for a war to be interstate, it cannot entirely take place within the sovereign territory of a single state. Thus, in this conventional view, states invade one another (or resist invasion) along battle lines that divide one state from another. Annexation or conquest alters these lines by adjusting borders, but the exclusive nature of sovereignty in interstate war remains clear.

Thus, when two very specific conditions (regular forces and borders) obtain, the war is described as interstate. When one or both of these conditions fail to obtain – i.e. the fighting is not between formal military forces, and/or is not conducted 'between' but rather 'within' a state – it is considered 'intrastate' or 'civil.'[436] When we say that Africa has very few interstate wars, then, we should really be saying that <u>African states do not send their armies over one another's borders</u>. But, as I discussed in Chapter 1, it is difficult to argue that the presence of these two

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[436] Or extrasystemic: the COW project defines these as 'wars between a state and a nonstate entity. To be classified as an extra-state war, at least one major participant in the conflict (however irregular and disorganized) should not be a member of the state system and there should be at least 1000 battle related fatalities in every year for each of the state participants.' (Meredith Reid Sarkees, 'The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997,' *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 18/1: 123-144.)

features is still as constitutive of war *as such*, as it was in Clausewitz's time. Rather, contemporary scholarship argues that states and nonstates conduct war through a variety of means and in a wide variety of places and spaces.

I thus propose that scholars of war would find it fruitful to redefine 'interstate war' not in terms of borders and geographic location, but in terms of the presence of 'agents of the state' among the ranks of the 'agents of war' in terms of their roles vis-à-vis a target. In my model, this meant studying sponsors and proxies; other projects may find alternative core elements more appropriate. Whatever the case, as discussed under *War*, above, scholars of interstate war should concede that the era in which wars of states were only fought by states, is unlikely to return in the likely (i.e. globalizing) future. A more sensible definition of interstate war, which makes room for war fought through intermediaries, is therefore both necessary and indicated.

The Three Problems for the Study of War in Africa

Douglas Lemke[437] identifies three problems in studying war in Africa: 'wrong actors,' 'missing data,' and 'bad data.' In what follows, I discuss the ways in which (i) this dissertation has, (ii) a PW focus in general could, and (iii) other work on the problem of war in Africa should proceed in order to attend to these problems and enable scholars to reach further into this ongoing area of interest and concern.

Wrong Actors

The first and most basic of the three problems which Lemke discusses, is the problem of 'wrong actors.' Specifically, he says, in studying African phenomena we do not focus our scholarship on the actors that matter; we may (for example) study formal state revenue but not

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[437] Douglas Lemke, 'African Lessons For International Relations Research,' *World Politics* 56 (October 2003)

include the revenues generated by remittance networks or transborder illicit traders; or, in the case of war, we may study only the actions of states when (for some specific kinds of war) it is nonstates which matter. With regard to the specific issue of proxy war, I would argue that most research into the problem falls prey to the 'wrong actors' problem because of the hobbling effect of the inter-/intrastate division already discussed. Given this handicap, wars featuring foreign meddling in states' internal violence 'must' be seen as civil wars (because they do not meet the conventional criteria for interstate wars), and consequently the motivations of the nonstate actors – be these greed, grievance, or some combination – 'must' take explanatory primacy.

I find this distinction problematic mostly because it has already contributed to various erroneous conclusions about war in Africa – for example, that Africa is a 'zone of [interstate] peace'[438] – and may also have given us false 'received wisdoms' about just how inviolable African borders are, or just why it is that African states manifest such high levels of 'intrastate war.' My intuition that this was an unsatisfactory state of affairs was one of the motivations for initial forays into examining covert interstate war.[439] It is for this reason that I proposed a better definition of interstate war in Section A, above. However, it bears mentioning that my attempts to lengthen the list of recognized interstate wars in Africa by showing that states (among others) do conduct war when they use proxies against their rivals, does not seek to dispute the importance of local (i.e., proxy) grievance in sustaining wars of this kind. However, I do attempt to correct what I consider to be a 'wrong actor' problem by including the sponsor and target (via my notion of a 'PR') in our examinations of a war which might otherwise have been studied only in these local terms. It is my view that the absence of any continent-wide comparative work on

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[438] Douglas Lemke, *Regions of War and Peace* (Cambridge University Press, 2002)

[439] Dylan Craig, 'Ultima Ratio Regum, Remix or Redux? State Security Policy and Proxy Wars in Self-Governing Africa,' *Strategic Insights*, vol. 9:1 (Spring/Summer 2010)

proxy warfare in Africa or elsewhere (despite its striking ubiquity) is the result of scholars'

inability to correctly target their work via concepts like the PR. In this regard, my conclusions

regarding how actors in PW respond to vulnerabilities and/or opportunities, and my answers to

the question of why (and how) sponsors seek out proxies to do their bidding, constitute a

significant improvement over alternative accounts which only studied sponsors, or only studied

proxies.[440]

<u>Missing Data</u>

Even if we are focused on the right actors, Lemke suggests, getting the *kinds of data* we

need to study their actions may be difficult. With regard to the topic of proxy war, the *covertness*

of support exchanged increases the difficulty of tracking PRs in very precise ways. For example,

it is hard to know just how much it 'pays' for the sponsor (e.g., in terms of looted goods) to

become involved with the proxy, because no-one really knows the actual goods, or the value of

all goods extracted from the area of conflict. My use of a derived variable for the 'lootability' of

targeted states, while in keeping with the work of Collier, Sambanis and others on this issue, is a

somewhat unsatisfying substitute for having actual continent-level data on criminal extraction.

This is certainly an area upon which future research should improve, perhaps by bringing these

many <u>individual</u> studies on the role of looted resources in African war studies together under a

common metric so that a clearer picture of the financial gain associated with proxy war over time

and across regions, can be established.

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[440] It is worth noting at this point that the seeds of my idea about PRs were derived from one of the most seminal works to address South Africa's proxy wars in Angola and Mozambique: *Apartheid's Contras*. By juxtaposing a local concept ('Apartheid') with a foreign one ('Contras,' i.e. the US's proxies in Nicaragua), and by referring to the violence under examination as 'contra warfare,' Minter's work showed a potentially fruitful way forward for further examinations of this kind of war; the work that I have conducted here is intended to contribute to and continue along this 'way forward.'

As I discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, until these gaps in the data are narrowed, it is possible to circumvent them by modifying one's research design. For example, I have attempted to minimize data gaps by (i) periodizing my data by decade rather than by individual year, and (ii) by making individual proxy relationships (rather than entire conflicts) the unit of analysis for much of the quantitative work done. This allows me to study the broad patterns within known proxy wars, without too much concern for invisible or undetected PRs within the same conflicts, or the effect of a PR's onset being identified by some sources as 1972 and others as 1971.

One kind of data which I have not been able to include in this project to my satisfaction, is the role played by entirely financial sponsorship in proxy war. This form of sponsorship was not covered in Dunér's 5-level model for military intervention; and indeed, one might wonder where it would fit even if the data for these illegal transfers were available. Was the US's provision of briefcases full of money to the ARPCT in Mogadishu more or less significant (i.e., higher or lower level) than its provision of airstrikes and intelligence support (Dunér's Level II) to the TFG? It is easy to say that a state which provides its proxy with non-combat advisors *and* bases (Level III) is making a more extensive commitment to the proxy than one which only provides bases (Level V), but the provision of funds is more difficult to place on this scale. The forthcoming dataset on military sponsorship produced by the UCDP[441] includes data on financial sponsorship; this will certainly be of interest to the ongoing study of proxy war, and I greatly look forward to being able to compare my core findings with those of the UCDP researchers.

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[441] Stina Högbladh and Lotte Harbom, 'External Support in Armed Conflict: Presenting a New Dataset', paper presented at ISA Annual Conference, Montreal (March 2011).

<u>Bad Data</u>

Our pursuit of the aforementioned 'missing data' should not, however, lead us blindly into the third pitfall that Lemke indentifies as facing studies of African war, i.e. 'bad data.' Lemke calls data 'bad' when it is complete, but wrong. In other words, when it is not a good reflection of the phenomena it is intended to investigate, and therefore only capable of producing spurious conclusions. In general, researchers may inadvertently produce bad data in two ways: (i) they may study the 'right things in the wrong way,' or (ii) the 'wrong things in the right way.' I discuss these, and assess the degree to which an emphasis on PW may address them, below.

Studying the 'right things in the wrong way' is the easiest bad-data hazard to avoid, because of the prevalence of methodological critique both in international relations scholarship and in the human sciences more generally. This climate of scrutiny encourages us to consider how our methods may be introducing biases into our conclusions. To use the present study as an example, despite the various methodological safeguards which I have built into my study as a guard against bias (e.g. use of mixed methods, selection of non-endogenous hypotheses), an assumption still exists on my part that the 101 PRs which I identified in this study represent the bulk of all PRs in Africa, and hence that my sample (n) approaches, and is indeed significantly identical to, the population of PRs in Africa. However, this may not be the case; because PRs are covert both by practice and by definition, there is always the possibility that new ones may be revealed, or that old ones may fall, undocumented, out of the memory of their participants. There is no easy way to address this problem, except through further work and the continued use of in-depth studies of particular wars in order to unveil previously undetectable actors and relationships. The job of researchers conducting studies such as mine is thus not to produce a

perfect dataset, but to make solid conclusions regarding what data can be asserted to be mostly reliable.

The second (and somewhat more insidious) bad-data hazard in our studies of African conflict is the hazard of 'studying the wrong things in the right way.' This has to do with the use of misguided empirical foci, i.e. measuring the *wrong indices* and thereby reaching the wrong conclusions about African war. As I have argued elsewhere,[442] the burgeoning use of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) techniques in the study of war frequently courts precisely this hazard. For example, I noted, in Chapter 1, the apparent mismatch between (i) how important military strategists say that broken terrain is for conducting insurgent warfare, and (ii) the lack of clear validation for this principle in Africa. We might be tempted to think that this anomaly is simply a measurement problem which will diminish over time, as the effectiveness of our conception of the objects to measure, thus, data-gathering and our access to GIS technology for sophisticated analysis, improves. Buhaug and Lujala, in this vein, point out that while most civil war data currently exists on the level of entire countries rather than localities, the fighting which constitutes these wars is more strongly localized. The two sets of data thus exist at incompatible levels and this precludes direct comparison; but as our capacity to study civil wars battle-by-battle (i.e. locally) increases, so will our ability to test whether rough terrain really does enable certain kinds of war.[443] Ian Brown's use of satellite imagery to study the links between desertification and the genocide in Darfur (as mentioned previously) represents one such attempt to find a technological solution to our dataset problems regarding civil war.

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[442] I discuss this in greater length in Dylan Craig, 'With Savage Pictures Fill Their Maps: Prospects and Perils in Conflict Studies' Rediscovery of Geography' (Paper presented ISA-Northeast, Baltimore MD, October 2010).

[443] Halvard Buhaug and Päivi Lujala, 'Accounting for scale: Measuring geography in quantitative studies of civil war,' *Political Geography* 24 (2005)

However, relying too heavily on GIS data to understand African war may lead scholars headfirst into the 'bad data' problem. For example, Buhaug and Rød, citing the work of Raleigh and Hegre, point out that where rebels fight and where they shelter might be two different places. In other words, even if we were to find little correlation between terrain and incidents of violence *as such*, rough terrain might still play an important role in sheltering guerillas as they move from battle to battle.[444] And, indeed, we find precisely this tactic when referring back to Mao's injunction that guerilla operations be 'centralized for strategic purposes and decentralized for tactical purposes.'[445] We would, in other words, be <u>incorrect</u> in inferring the absence of a link between rebellion and broken terrain, simply because of a low covariance between mountainous territory and localized outbreaks of violence; should we do so, we would have fallen prey to the effects of 'bad data.'

Unlike the 'studying the right things in the wrong way' bad-data hazard discussed previously, there is no easy way out of the problem of studying the 'wrong things in the right way.' However, it <u>is</u> possible to guard against this by questioning the fundamental assumptions of existing research paradigms in ways that produce new in-roads to the phenomenon of interest. In this dissertation, for example, I have <u>deliberately</u> questioned the idea that interstate and intrastate war are exclusive types, and have gone on to investigate patterns of war in Africa in ways which avoid relying on these concepts. While my conclusions do not[446] serve to 'knock

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[444] Buhaug and Rød, 'Local Determinants'

[445] Mao distinguishes between bases and zones of operation as follows: 'A guerrilla base may be defined as an area, strategically located, in which the guerrillas can carry out their duties of training, self-preservation and development. ... [there] is a difference between the terms base area and guerrilla area. An area completely surrounded by territory occupied by the enemy is a 'base area.' ... [on] the other hand, [guerrilla areas are] controlled by guerrillas only while they actually physically occupy them. Upon their departure, control reverts to ... [the] government.'

[446] Indeed, 'cannot'; and most certainly 'are not intended to'!

out' these notions, the importance of works such as mine in guarding against this more insidious kind of bad-data hazard is clear.

In concluding this discussion of how my project attends to (and is cognizant of) Lemke's three problems in African IR research, it seems fair to note that our task as scholars, in the final analysis, is not only to refine our measurement skills (through more and more sophisticated use of new tools such as GIS), but also to develop our methodological skills in ways which help us ask the right questions[447] and work with 'good' data – or, given the messiness implicit in the social facts with which we deal, at least with data that is more 'good' than it is 'bad.'

Focusing Future Intervention

In this section, I speculate on how a system-in-balance facilitates (or not) intervention. I draw this idea from an analogous concept in evolutionary biology, originally promoted by John Maynard Smith: the 'evolutionarily stable strategy' (ESS). Richard Dawkins summarizes the operation of an ESS as follows:

> A strategy is a … behavioral policy. An example of a strategy is: 'Attack opponent; if he flees pursue him; if he retaliates run away.' It is important to realize that we are not thinking of the strategy as being consciously worked out by the individual … [an] ESS is defined as a strategy which, if most members of a population adopt it, cannot be bettered by an alternative strategy … Another way of putting it is to say that the best strategy for an individual depends on what the majority of the population are doing. Since the rest of the population consists of individuals, each one trying to maximize his own success, the only strategy that persists will be one which, once evolved, cannot be bettered by any deviant individual.[448]

ESS systems thus represent the unintended, 'blind' aggregation of individual strategies in a way that goes on to constitute a durable system of incentives and punishments. The bully-victim

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[447] David Lake, remarks delivered during the opening address of ISA-Northeast (Baltimore, MD, October 2010)

[448] Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 69 – 86.

dynamic which I identified in Chapter 5 is precisely the kind of behavior which Dawkins is discussing; but for my purposes, note that these patterns also resemble the kinds of 'bellicist' theories of state-making advanced by Tilly and others.[449] Those states that fall in line with the strategy (and almost all African states have) prosper; others pay the price.

However, it is also true that accounts such as these rely on what has been called 'strong-form selection,' where deviation from the stable strategy is punished by extinction; strong-form accounts explain current forms by reasoning that alternative forms were extinguished in the fight with the 'fitter' ESS-followers, so that over time the only inhabitants left are those which have played by the 'rules.' However, as Hendrik Spruyt has pointed out, it is not necessary to have a strong-form vision of strategy selection for us to construct convincing explanations of system-level mechanisms.[450] One can simply use such a perspective to understand the role of systemic patterns as an *independent* variable in the study of war and warmaking as the *dependent* variable. Thus, for Spruyt, it is not so much a case of 'war making the state, and the state making war,' as it is a case of 'states making the interstate system, the interstate system shaping war, and interstate war determining which states then get to dominate the interstate system.' The conclusions found in my data, as reported in Parts II, III and assessed in Chapter 9, above, lead me to agree with Spruyt in this regard.

Most of the current schemes for pacifying African conflicts focus on fixing the contexts in which PW is taking place (or might take place). These include better monitoring policies to stop the flows of conflict diamonds through which many proxy wars are sustained, or better DDR programs to drain the reservoirs of mobilizable veterans from conflict-prone societies, or

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[449] Tilly, *Capital and Coercion*; also, Mancur Olson, William H. McNeill, John Keegan, *et al*.

[450] Hendrik Spruyt, Comments delivered during 'Up, Down, and Sideways: Sovereignty and Its Challengers' Panel at ISA Annual Conference (Montreal, March 2011)

civics programs for the armies of failing states aimed at turning soldiers into model citizens. In terms of my model, projects such as these are attempts to remove or lessen the effect of those constraints, vulnerabilities, and opportunities that make PW an effective tool in Africa. However, as we saw in the Border War and Somali Vortex, the goal of permanently securitizing some or other region against the meddling hands of outsiders is a daunting proposition, as even the most complete demilitarization program can still be rolled back by a determined sponsor and/or well-financed proxy. In addition, if my modeling of the 'sovereign interstice' is correct, then the geopolitical conditions which permit sponsorship-ready states and mobilizable proxies to form partnerships, are a looming global reality rather than a fading African one; and this, in turn, suggests that to attempt to pinch off African proxy war by attempting to banish the geopolitical conditions in which it takes place is to waste precious efforts on an unattainable goal. It is for this reason that I suggest a different approach, i.e., addressing PW in terms not of the contexts in which it is fought, but in terms of the desires and fears of those most able to wage it. I explain this below.

One of the reasons that war has retained its attractiveness as a form of foreign policy through the ages is because it is one of the few truly <u>unilateral</u> ways in which states can adjust their 'international relations,' and is thus easily relied on in conditions of uncertainty, fear, or anarchy. Africa gives us no shortage of examples of these kinds of conditions, or of the kinds of pressures on states that they might choose to respond to with war. Indeed, regional tensions over resource access, transnational flows, religious and political affiliations have given African states *many* things about which to fight. This proliferation of *casus belli* has, however, not been accompanied by a compensatory growth in organizations capable of effective multilateral conflict prevention. The dissolution of the OAU in 1999, as well as that organization's poor track

record in preventing any of the wars studied here, is a clear indictment of its effectiveness in providing the kinds of multilateral solutions which might assist African states in selecting negotiation or even diplomacy over violence. One might then ask: why have African multilateral institutions shown such a poor track record? My answer to this question, with specific reference to proxy war, is that multilateral institutions in Africa are concerned with the wrong kinds of intervention – i.e., they are expending all their efforts in the contextual interventions mentioned above (preventing the sale of conflict goods, providing conflict resolution training, or underwriting disarmament/demobilization/reintegration programs) and not enough in preventing states from wanting to use war at all.

The use of multilateral institutions as a guarantee against war, through some combination of norm-establishment and/or the enforcement of collective security, is a cornerstone of liberal theory in International Relations. In Africa, this vision of multilateralism – i.e. as a system which protects its members from one another, or from the depredations of nonstates – can be seen in the OAU's ostensible prohibition on border adjustments, the use of OAU and AU forces to prevent (sponsored) secession in Katanga and Biafra, and the OAU's role in condemning Libyan and South African expansionism in Chad and Namibia. Further abroad, it can be argued that the twin visions of liberalism that Michael Doyle had identified as 'liberal institutionalism' (i.e., use of multilateral institutions to defuse interstate tensions) and 'liberal identity' (i.e., the symbolic renunciation of aggressive war by states aspiring to liberal ideals) are the basis on which large IGOs like the United Nations – with its mandate to 'save succeeding generations from the scourge of war' – are built.

It may well be that the continued use of multilateralism in this way – i.e. as a shield for the weak and a guarantor of continental collective goods such as conflict mediation and resolution – will, in time, deliver substantial good (i.e., peace and prosperity) in Africa. Certainly, there are many aspects of continental initiatives, like the AU and NEPAD, which are explicitly concerned with the continent's attainment of a kind of *foedus pacificum Africanis*.[451] Furthermore, African states themselves are ardent supporters (albeit perhaps only superficially[452]) of such integrative dreams. As a continent, Africa has a remarkable density of regional and inter-governmental blocs and regional groupings, from ECOWAS to SADC to IGAD, and the average African state is a member of several of these regional groupings.[453]

However, my findings regarding the intersections of ODA and proxy war suggest an alternative (or a complement) to the 'shield for the weak' approach discussed above. Specifically, I showed in Chapter 5 that some of Africa's most prolific sponsors of PW are also its most committed participants in multilateral institutions. These strong states' interest in multilateralism is further substantiated by the cases studied in the narratives conducted in Part III. We see, for instance: (i) that South Africa initially tried to gain dominance over its neighbors *politically* (through the Zambezi River Alliance, the Bantustan system, and the abortive Constellation of States) before falling back on military means; (ii) that Libya tried to have the OAU peacekeeping force do most of the work in protecting the GUNT, only increasing their own sponsorship when the peacekeepers failed at this task and allowed Habré's FAN to seize the capital; and (iii) that Ethiopia repeatedly tried to engineer a regionalized peace deal in Somalia

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[451] Here I adjust Kant's famous phrase to refer to a 'Pacific African federation'

[452] Margaret Lee, 'Regionalism in Africa: a Part of Problem or a Part of Solution', *Polis* 9, Numéro Spécial (2002)

[453] For an ongoing study of micro- and macro-regionalism, see the United Nations University's 'Comparative Regional Integration' project at http://www.cris.unu.edu/Comparative-Regional-Integration.15.0.html

which would ensure both the buy-in of neighbors such as Kenya, <u>and</u> the kind of (weak, federal) post-peace Somali government with which the Ethiopians felt they could live.

All of this suggests a different focus for effective multilateralism in Africa: not as a shield for the weak, but as a <u>shield for the strong</u>. Kant remarked that:

> The problem of organizing a state, however hard it may seem, can be solved even for a race of devils, if only they are intelligent. The problem is: 'Given a multitude of rational beings requiring universal laws for their preservation, but each of whom is secretly inclined to exempt himself from them, to establish a constitution in such a way that, although their private intentions conflict, they check each other, with the result that their public conduct is the same as if they had no such intentions.'[454]

As odd as it may seem to propose an argument from classical liberalism as a solution to systemic war in a continent where life for so many is Hobbesian, i.e. 'nasty, brutish and short,' I believe that the strong link my data shows between state intentions and the practice of interstate war through proxies highlights a possible route for effective interdiction of these kinds of conflict. It may be more counter-intuitive than the current approach of 'building up the bullied;' but it may also be more effective.

Concluding Comments

In my future work on this topic, the first step will be to refine the features as indicated above, and the model as a whole, against other sites of violence and/or theaters of war. In this regard, it seems clear that the further empirical scrutiny of African states at war will require more than simply counting PRs, sponsors, proxies, and targets. Once these more ambitious data collection projects are completed, the further elucidation of PW will go a long way towards

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[454] Kant, *First Supplement Of The Guarantee For Perpetual Peace*

correcting the misapprehension that <u>all</u> African wars simply involve greedy rebels fighting incapable government forces in failed states.

However, a necessary step before this elucidation can happen is the creation of a finer tool for understanding what is meant by an actor in war. The Events List upon which I based my research in this dissertation of necessity treats African states as *more or less* unitary actors when it comes to proxy wars and other forms of violent foreign policy. However, because of the extent to which private interests are served by 'state' actions at war in Africa and elsewhere, a more in-depth assessment of 'who' is acting when sponsors arm proxies would likely be a productive avenue to investigate. Furthermore, even in proxy wars in which the pursuit of factional or individual interests are prominent (e.g. the Zimbabwean intervention in the DRC), the question of when such interests take a secondary role to the interests of the 'state,' in that the state causally precedes factional and individual interests should be addressed. Put differently: sometimes even faction-ridden states seem to 'act first' before their various factions decide how they are going to profit from the state's action. But, this too must be tested in other wars. Certainly, individual works on some of history's most prominent proxy wars (e.g. the contra war in Nicaragua) have taken such a route; in developing better tools for the comparative study of PW, this approach should be made more general as soon as data allows.

Lastly, in order to check this dissertation's most consistent finding: further scrutiny should be directed at my data's strong support for the notion of PW usage in Africa as a <u>system in balance</u>. As I discussed in Chapter 9, while it is clear that a self-perpetuating system of some kind is in effect, I can at this stage only speculate and infer what the constitutive dynamics of this system are. I base these inferences on both the patterns discovered in the quantitative data (regarding bullies and victims), and in terms of the overwhelming evidence contained in the

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qualitative data (regarding sponsors tailoring their use of PW to what they thought they could get away with at the regional, continental and global levels); future work should attempt to verify this finding using other kinds of data.

APPENDIX A

THE EVENTS LIST (CONDENSED)

This list reproduces the 101 PRs which constitute my Events List. The full dataset is available for download at http://bit.ly/vulQaC , or by email from the author (dcraig@american.edu)

PR ID #	Sponsor	Proxy	Target
1	Chad	AQIM	Algeria
2	Mali	AQIM	Algeria
3	Niger	AQIM	Algeria
4	Morocco	FLN	Algeria
5	Morocco	MNA	Algeria
6	Tunisia	FLN	Algeria
7	Morocco	Forces of Ait-Ahmad	Algeria
8	Congo, Dem. Rep.	FNLA	Angola
9	Congo, Dem. Rep.	UNITA	Angola
10	South Africa	Portuguese Col Gvt	Angola
11	South Africa	UNITA/FNLA	Angola
12	Zambia	UNITA	Angola
13	Cote d'Ivoire	Denard Mercenaries	Benin
14	Gabon	Denard Mercenaries	Benin
15	Morocco	Denard Mercenaries	Benin
16	Togo	Denard Mercenaries	Benin
17	Sudan	UFDR	CAR
18	Benin	Islamic Legion	Chad
19	Cameroon	FAN	Chad
20	Egypt	FAN	Chad
21	Libya	FROLINAT/FAP/GUNT	Chad
22	Libya	Idriss Deby	Chad
23	Nigeria	Third FROLINAT Army	Chad
24	Sudan	FROLINAT, FAN	Chad
25	Sudan	UFCD	Chad
26	Angola	Sassou-Ngesso	Congo-B
27	Chad	Sassou-Ngesso	Congo-B
28	Angola	DRC Govt	DRC
29	Angola	Katanga Gendarmes	DRC
30	Chad	DRC Govt	DRC
31	Egypt	Gizenga Faction	DRC
32	Morocco	Mobutu Faction	DRC
33	Namibia	DRC Govt	DRC
34	Rwanda	RCD	DRC
35	Uganda	Eastern DRC Militias	DRC
36	Zimbabwe	DRC Govt	DRC
37	Burundi	Simba Rebels	DRC

ID	Sponsor	Proxy	Target
38	Congo, Rep.	Simba Rebels	DRC
39	Mali	Simba Rebels	DRC
40	Sudan	Eritrean Islamic Jihad	Eritrea
41	Eritrea	OPLF	Ethiopia
42	Eritrea	UIC	Somalia
43	Ethiopia	Rahanweyn Res. A	Somalia
44	Ethiopia	SNM	Somalia
45	Ethiopia	TFG	Somalia
46	Somalia	WSLF, SALF	Ethiopia
47	Botswana	ANC	South Africa
48	Lesotho	ANC	South Africa
49	Mozambique	ANC	South Africa
50	Tanzania	ANC	South Africa
51	Zimbabwe	ANC	South Africa
52	Chad	ARFWS (JEM/SLM)	Sudan
53	Libya	MOJA/GSRP	Gambia
54	Togo	Voltan Irregulars	Ghana
55	Burkina Faso	Guinean Rebels	Guinea
56	Cote d'Ivoire	Guinean Rebels	Guinea
57	Ethiopia	Nasir Mutineers	Sudan
58	Libya	Nasir Mutineers	Sudan
59	Niger	Guinean Rebels	Guinea
60	Eritrea	SPLM/A / NDA	Sudan
61	Ethiopia	SPLM/A	Sudan
62	Guinea	PAIGC	Guinea-Bissau
63	Uganda	SPLM/A / NDA	Sudan
64	Burkina Faso	Gbagbo Faction	Ivory Coast
65	Libya	Sudanese mutineers	Sudan
66	Burkina Faso	Togolese Rebels	Togo
67	Ghana	Togolese Rebels	Togo
68	Somalia	Shifta Rebels	Kenya
69	Burkina Faso	NPFL	Liberia
70	Cote d'Ivoire	MODEL	Liberia
71	Cote d'Ivoire	NPFL	Liberia
72	Guinea	LURD	Liberia
73	Liberia	RUF	Sierra Leone
74	Libya	NPFL	Liberia
75	Libya	Tunisian rebels	Tunisia
76	Sierra Leone	ULIMO	Liberia
77	Libya	Ugandan Govt	Uganda
78	Mali	Moroccan rebels	Mauritania
79	Morocco	Moroccan rebels	Mauritania
80	Tanzania	Anti-Amin Forces	Uganda
81	Malawi	MNR/Renamo	Mozambique

ID	Sponsor	Proxy	Target
82	South Africa	MNR/Renamo	Mozambique
83	South Africa	Portuguese Col Gvt	Mozambique
84	Sudan	LRA/NRA	Uganda
85	Zimbabwe	MNR/Renamo	Mozambique
86	Algeria	POLISARIO	Western Sahara
87	Botswana	Caprivi Lib Army	Namibia
88	Libya	POLISARIO	Western Sahara
89	Angola	SWAPO	Namibia
90	Botswana	ZAPU	Zimbabwe
91	Libya	ZANU/ZAPU	Zimbabwe
92	Mozambique	ZANU	Zimbabwe
93	South Africa	Rhodesian PF	Zimbabwe
94	South Africa	Super ZAPU	Zimbabwe
95	Tanzania	ZANU/ZAPU	Zimbabwe
96	Zambia	SWAPO	Namibia
97	Zambia	ZAPU	Zimbabwe
98	Egypt	Nigerian Govt	Nigeria
99	Congo, Dem. Rep.	FDLR/Interahamwe	Rwanda
100	Uganda	RPF	Rwanda
101	Guinea-Bissau	Casamance	Senegal

APPENDIX B

27 PROXY WARS IN AFRICA, 1950-2010

This list groups the 101 PRs of the Events List together by individual conflict rather than PR.

PW ID #	Sponsor	Proxy	Target
1	Chad	AQIM	Algeria
1	Mali	AQIM	Algeria
1	Niger	AQIM	Algeria
2	Morocco	FLN	Algeria
2	Morocco	MNA	Algeria
2	Tunisia	FLN	Algeria
3	Morocco	Forces of Ait-Ahmad	Algeria
4	Congo, Dem. Rep.	FNLA	Angola
4	Congo, Dem. Rep.	UNITA	Angola
4	South Africa	Portuguese Col Gvt	Angola
4	South Africa	UNITA/FNLA	Angola
4	Zambia	UNITA	Angola
5	Cote d'Ivoire	Denard Mercenaries	Benin
5	Gabon	Denard Mercenaries	Benin
5	Morocco	Denard Mercenaries	Benin
5	Togo	Denard Mercenaries	Benin
6	Sudan	UFDR	CAR
7	Benin	Islamic Legion	Chad
7	Cameroon	FAN	Chad
7	Egypt	FAN	Chad
7	Libya	FROLINAT/FAP/GUNT	Chad
7	Libya	Idriss Deby	Chad
7	Nigeria	Third FROLINAT Army	Chad
7	Sudan	FROLINAT, FAN	Chad
7	Sudan	UFCD	Chad
8	Angola	Sassou-Ngesso	Congo-B
8	Chad	Sassou-Ngesso	Congo-B
9	Angola	DRC Govt	DRC
9	Angola	Katanga Gendarmes	DRC
9	Chad	DRC Govt	DRC
9	Egypt	Gizenga Faction	DRC
9	Morocco	Mobutu Faction	DRC
9	Namibia	DRC Govt	DRC
9	Rwanda	RCD	DRC
9	Uganda	Eastern DRC Militias	DRC
9	Zimbabwe	DRC Govt	DRC
10	Burundi	Simba Rebels	DRC

PW ID	Sponsor	Proxy	Target
10	Congo, Rep.	Simba Rebels	DRC
10	Mali	Simba Rebels	DRC
11	Sudan	Eritrean Islamic Jihad	Eritrea
11	Eritrea	OPLF	Ethiopia
11	Eritrea	UIC	Somalia
11	Ethiopia	Rahanweyn Res. A	Somalia
11	Ethiopia	SNM	Somalia
11	Ethiopia	TFG	Somalia
11	Somalia	WSLF, SALF	Ethiopia
11	Somalia	Shifta Rebels	Kenya
12	Botswana	ANC	South Africa
12	Lesotho	ANC	South Africa
12	Mozambique	ANC	South Africa
12	Tanzania	ANC	South Africa
12	Zimbabwe	ANC	South Africa
12	Angola	SWAPO	Namibia
12	Botswana	ZAPU	Zimbabwe
12	Libya	ZANU/ZAPU	Zimbabwe
12	Mozambique	ZANU	Zimbabwe
12	South Africa	Rhodesian PF	Zimbabwe
12	South Africa	Super ZAPU	Zimbabwe
12	Tanzania	ZANU/ZAPU	Zimbabwe
12	Zambia	SWAPO	Namibia
12	Zambia	ZAPU	Zimbabwe
12	South Africa	MNR/Renamo	Mozambique
12	South Africa	Portuguese Col Gvt	Mozambique
12	Zimbabwe	MNR/Renamo	Mozambique
12	Malawi	MNR/Renamo	Mozambique
13	Chad	ARFWS (JEM/SLM)	Sudan
14	Togo	Voltan Irregulars	Ghana
15	Burkina Faso	Guinean Rebels	Guinea
15	Cote d'Ivoire	Guinean Rebels	Guinea
15	Niger	Guinean Rebels	Guinea
16	Ethiopia	Nasir Mutineers	Sudan
16	Libya	Nasir Mutineers	Sudan
17	Eritrea	SPLM/A / NDA	Sudan
17	Ethiopia	SPLM/A	Sudan
17	Sudan	LRA/NRA	Uganda
17	Uganda	SPLM/A / NDA	Sudan
17	Libya	Sudanese mutineers	Sudan
18	Burkina Faso	Gbagbo Faction	Ivory Coast
19	Burkina Faso	Togolese Rebels	Togo
19	Ghana	Togolese Rebels	Togo
20	Burkina Faso	NPFL	Liberia

PW ID	Sponsor	Proxy	Target
20	Cote d'Ivoire	MODEL	Liberia
20	Cote d'Ivoire	NPFL	Liberia
20	Guinea	LURD	Liberia
20	Liberia	RUF	Sierra Leone
20	Libya	NPFL	Liberia
20	Sierra Leone	ULIMO	Liberia
21	Libya	Ugandan Govt	Uganda
21	Tanzania	Anti-Amin Forces	Uganda
22	Mali	Moroccan rebels	Mauritania
22	Morocco	Moroccan rebels	Mauritania
23	Algeria	POLISARIO	Western Sahara
23	Libya	POLISARIO	Western Sahara
23	Botswana	Caprivi Lib Army	Namibia
24	Guinea	PAIGC	Guinea-Bissau
25	Congo, Dem. Rep.	FDLR/Interahamwe	Rwanda
25	Uganda	RPF	Rwanda
26	Egypt	Zairean Goverment	Congo
27	Guinea-Bissau	Casamance	Senegal

APPENDIX C

ACRONYMS

Acronym	Organization	Location
AIAI	*Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya*/The Islamic Union	Somalia
ANC	African National Congresss	South Africa
AQIM	Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb; previously known as the GSPR (*Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat*/Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat)	Algeria
ARPCT	Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism	Somalia
CDR	*Conseil Démocratique Révolutionnaire*/Democratic Revolutionary Council	Chad
FAN	*Conseil de Commandement des Forces Armées du Nord*/Command Council of the Armed Forces of the North; sometimes abbreviated as CCFAN	Chad
FAP	*Forces Armées Populaires*/People's Armed Forces	Chad
FLN	*Front de Libération Nationale*/National Liberation Front)	Algeria
FNLA	*Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola*/National Front for the Liberation of Angola	Angola
FROLINAT	*Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad*/National Liberation Front of Chad	Chad
GUNT	*Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de Transition*/Transitional Government of National Unity	Chad
ICU	Islamic Courts Union	Somalia
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement	Chad
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army	Uganda
MNA	*Mouvement National Algérien*/ Algerian National Movement	Algeria
MNR	*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*/Mozambique National Resistance; see also RENAMO	Mozambique
NDA	National Democratic Alliance	Sudan
NRA	National Resistance Army; armed wing of the National Resistance Movement (NRM)	Uganda
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front	Ethiopia
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front	Ethiopia
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress	South Africa
PF	Patriotic Front	Rhodesia
POLISARIO	*Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro*/Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro)	Western Sahara
RCD	*Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie*/Congolese Rally for Democracy	Zaire / Democratic Republic of Congo
RENAMO	*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*/Mozambique National Resistance; see also RENAMO	Mozambique

Acronym	Organization	Location
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front; also known as FPR (*Front Patriotique Rwandais*)	Rwanda
RRA	Rahanweyn Resistance Army	Somalia
SALF	Somali Abo Liberation Front	Ethiopia
SNF	Somali National Front	Somalia
SNM/SSDF	Somali National Movement/Somali Salvation Democratic Front	Somalia
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army	Sudan / South Sudan
SSF	Somali Salvation Front	Somalia
Super ZAPU	See ZAPU	Rhodesia
SWAPO	South West African People's Organization	Namibia
UFCD	*Front uni pour le changement*/United Front for Democratic Change; sometimes abbreviated as FUC or FUCD)	Chad
UFDR	*Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement*/Union of Democratic Forces for Unity	Central African Republic
ULIMO	United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy	Liberia
UNITA	*União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola*/National Union for the Total Independence of Angola	Angola
USC	United Somali Congress	Somalia
WSLF	Western Somali Liberation Front	Ethiopia
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union	Rhodesia / Zimbabwe
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union	Rhodesia / Zimbabwe

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