CONVINCING THE COLOSSUS:

LATIN AMERICAN LEADERS

FACE THE UNITED STATES

By

Tom Long

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

In

International Relations

Chair: Robert Pastor

Robert A. Pastor, Ph.D.

Max Paul Friedman, Ph.D.

Boaz Atzili, Ph.D.

Dean of the School of International Service

June 13

Date

2013

American University

Washington, D.C. 20016

To Robert A. Pastor,

a mentor, intellectual inspiration, and an example of how to confront adversity with determination and good humor

CONVINCING THE COLOSSUS:

LATIN AMERICAN LEADERS

FACE THE UNITED STATES

BY

Tom Long

ABSTRACT

In recent years, analysts have argued that the United States' influence in Latin America is waning; others add that Washington is being replaced by actors from the region and beyond. However, even when Washington was at the height of its power, Latin American leaders were influential in shaping hemispheric relations, sometimes centrally—albeit in ways that have seldom been recognized. This dissertation examines Latin American foreign policy vis-à-vis the United States, asking whether and how Latin American leaders are able to influence U.S. policies that affect their interests. Building on the IR literature on small or weak states, it argues that weaker-state leaders are indeed able to exercise substantial influence in international relations, but they do so differently than great powers. Instead of employing traditional power capabilities, they must rely on a combination of opportunities, allies, and ideas. The dissertation employs multinational archival research and interviews to analyze U.S.-Latin American relations in four historical case studies—Brazil's Operação Pan-Americana in the late 1950s, the negotiation of the Panama Canal Treaties in the 1970s, the emergence of the North American Free Trade Agreement in the early 1990s, and the creation of Plan Colombia in 1998-2000—to examine how Latin American leaders define and pursue their interests when facing the world's most powerful country.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First, I would like to thank Robert Pastor, who encouraged me to wrestle with big questions and important cases. He has been extraordinarily generous with his time, energy, and encouragement. I am intellectually and personally indebted to both Dr. Pastor and Max Paul Friedman. Their work provided the inspiration for this project, and I was privileged to work with both of them over the last several years. Warm thanks to Boaz Atzili, who kindly checked on my progress every time we crossed paths. His questions and comments, from the prospectus to the final version, made this dissertation much better. Phil Brenner and Louis Goodman, while not on the committee, have been a sounding board for ideas and have been exceptionally supportive.

I am grateful for the support, financial and otherwise, that I have received while working on my dissertation and degree. The School of International Service and American University have supported me enormously during this process. Much of the overseas research for this dissertation was funded by grants from the School and from the Office of the Vice Provost for Graduate Studies and Research. I am grateful to the Tinker Foundation, which provided funding to support my travel to Panama and Argentina. During the last year, I held a fellowship at the AU Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, which allowed me to travel, research, and write. I appreciate the support of the Center's director, Eric Hershberg.

The project took me to five countries and a dozen archives. My research was greatly assisted by able archivists and officials, and I would be remiss not to thank them. Particular thanks go to Mauricio Tovar and the staff at the Archivo General de la Nación in Bogotá; the staff at the Departamento Administrativo at the Presidencia de la República de Colombia, especially Carlos Vargas and John Erick Valencia; the staffs at the Panamanian Foreign Ministry and the Fundación Omar Torrijos; Lourdes Ida Nakamura and Nayeli Montero at the Secretaría de Economía in Mexico City; and the staffs at the Itamaraty archives in Brasilia and Rio. Thanks

to Leandro Morgenfeld, professor of history at Universidad de Buenos Aires, for his hospitality, friendship, and expertise. Many of the participants in the events studied here were generous with their time, conceding interviews and introducing me to other participants. Thank you.

Finally, I want to thank my family and friends for their patience and support. My colleagues in the SIS PhD program have read and discussed myriad iterations of this project. Thanks to Ryan Briggs, Dan Dye, Sebastian Bitar, Kate Reese, Jason Rancatore, Tazreena Sajjad, Andy Hardig, and many others for intellectual support and friendship. Marta Sainz has, for five years, graciously endured my long hours, absences from the country, and piles of books. I wouldn't have gotten through this without her love and support. Above all, thanks to my mother and father for their love and encouragement during this and previous stages of my education.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1

ASYMMETRICAL INFLUENCE AND U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS

Generations of scholars have cited Thucydides' maxim, "the strong do what they will, and the weak suffer what they must," as a founding principle of International Relations.[1] The well-worn, realist phrase emphasizes constraints that leave little space for meaningful action by the leaders of "smaller states" in pursuit of their own priorities.[2] Though IR theory has clearly advanced since Thucydides, approaches to smaller states have long been dominated by a focus on how great powers and the structures of the international system constrain weak states. Recent work has argued that "vulnerabilities rather than opportunities are the most striking consequence of smallness," and that smaller states "lack real independence."[3] Many mainstream IR scholars have explained the situations of smaller states through applications or modifications of realism; meanwhile, critical scholars have applied the insights of dependency theory to foreign relations. One prominent, critical account argues that insecurity is the defining feature of the "third world" in international relations.[4] Despite their differing origins, both of these approaches offer narratives in which smaller-state agency plays little role: realism has deemed them irrelevant while dependency theory often treated their leaders as the local lackeys of foreign powers. Even

---

[1] Following common usage, I use capitalized International Relations or IR to refer to the academic discipline and lower-case international relations to refer to relations between state (or non-state) actors.

[2] In using the term "smaller states" as opposed to small or weak, I follow Godfrey Baldacchino, who argues for a relation approach that does not try to make hard divisions based on population or other measures, but instead emphasizes commonalities based on a state being considerable the smaller/weaker in a relationship.

[3] Anthony Payne and Þórhildur Hagalín, respectively, qtd. in Godfrey Baldacchino, "Thucydides or Kissinger? A Critical Review of Smaller State Diplomacy," in *The Diplomacies of Small States: Between Vulnerability and Resilience*, ed. Andrew F. Cooper and Timothy M. Shaw (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 21-22.

[4] Mohammed Ayoob, "Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism," *International Studies Review* 4, no. 3 (2003), Ozgur Cicek, "Review of a Perspective: Subaltern Realism," *The Review of International Affairs* 3, no. 3 (2004).

when scholars have explicitly addressed smaller-state "agency," these analyses have generally excluded U.S.-Latin American relations, accepting assumptions common in the literature on region, but very different from those that underlie studies of U.S. relations with Canada or small European states.[5]

A focus on power asymmetry has characterized the study of U.S.-Latin American relations, where the foreign policies of Latin American countries are often assumed to be determined by the United States. Despite their differing conclusions, both "establishment" scholars, who argue the United States is on the whole a beneficial presence, and as revisionist scholars, who argue the northern colossus has harshly pursued its own narrow interests, have tended to focus on U.S. power and decisions with comparatively little attention to the actions of Latin American leaders.[6] Perhaps this is with good reason. The United States economy is more than 2.5 times larger than that of all of Latin America and the Caribbean, and the United States exports about 60 percent more than all the countries in the region combined.[7] Despite occasional complaints from U.S. policymakers about a surge in Venezuelan military spending, the United

[5] For example, Robert Keohane saw U.S. dominance as a reason to exclude Latin America from his widely cited analysis in Robert O. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," *Foreign Policy*, no. 2 (1971). In the last decade, a more critical and constructivist body of work has emerged, largely focused on Asia as a response to Mohammed Ayoob's "subaltern realism." See Ayoob, "Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism." For responses and further theorizing, see Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," *International Organization* 58, no. 02 (2004), Cicek, "Review of a Perspective: Subaltern Realism."

[6] Max Paul Friedman, "Retiring the Puppets, Bringing Latin America Back In: Recent Scholarship on United States-Latin American Relations," *Diplomatic History* 27, no. 5 (2003), Robert A. Pastor and Tom Long, "The Cold War and Its Aftermath in the Americas: The Search for a Synthetic Interpretation of U.S. Policy," *Latin American Research Review* 45, no. 3 (2010).

[7] According to the World Bank, Latin American and the Caribbean had a combined GDP of $5.646 trillion in 2011, compared to a U.S. GDP of $14.99 trillion. U.S.exports exceeded those of Latin America and the Caribbean by $2.094 trillion to $1.328. *World Bank DataBank*, online: www.databank.worldbank.org.

States spends ten times more on its armed forces than the region as a whole.[8] Estimates of GDP ranging back to the eve of World War I indicate that the gap was even larger then, and that asymmetry has been a persistent characteristic of U.S.-Latin American relations.[9] Furthermore, U.S. power has often been exercised. The United States has intervened militarily on numerous occasions since the late 19th century in countries that border the Caribbean. Given the United States' overwhelming power capabilities and its history of interventions, the ability of Latin American leaders to influence U.S. policy would seem negligible.

This dissertation makes a different argument. So-called weak states are sometimes able to exercise significant influence both in international relations and directly on the policies of great powers. In making this argument, I draw upon an emerging body of studies of Latin American relations with the United States, largely written by a new generation of diplomatic historians exploring recently opened archives throughout the region.[10] Much of this new evidence points to

---

[8] According to the SIPRI database, the United States spent $689.6 billion on its military in 2011, compared with $67.6 billion for all of Latin American and the Caribbean (figures in constant 2010 U.S. dollars). SIPRI Military Expenditures Database, SIPRI. Online: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex.

[9] Though much debated, the most widely cited estimates come from Angus Maddison, *The World Economy*, vol. 1-2 (Academic Foundation, 2007), pp. 361, 509.

[10] Happily, there are now many examples of fine, multinational historical work on hemispheric relations. For example, James Siekmeier offers a nuanced look inside Bolivia's Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario, illustrating how internal dynamics affected relations with the United States. *The Bolivian Revolution and the United States, 1952 to the Present* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011). Max Paul Friedman used multinational archives and interviews to explore a little-known facet of World War II's impact on Latin America's German population. Max Paul Friedman, *Nazis and Good Neighbors : The United States Campaign against the Germans of Latin America in World War Ii* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Leandro Morgenfeld shows how Argentine diplomats used inter-American conferences as a forum to challenge Washington, particularly on conflictive economic relations. Leandro Morgenfeld, *Vecinos en Conflict : Argentina y los Estados Unidos en Conferencias Panamericanas* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Continente, 2010). Renata Keller used underutilized Mexican sources to question the conventional understanding of how Mexico's PRI viewed Fidel Castro's revolution. Renata Keller, "A Foreign Policy for Domestic Consumption : Mexico's Lukewarm Defense of Castro, 1959-1969," *Latin American Research Review* 47, no. 2 (2012). Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira deploys archival research from Brasil, Argentina, and the United States in a sweeping history of relations between the three countries. Moniz Bandeira, *Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos : Conflito e Integração na América do Sul : da Tríplice Aliança ao Mercosul* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2010).

weaknesses in dominant theoretical approaches and illustrates that a focus on the United States is insufficient for understanding U.S.-Latin American relations. Far from being "puppets," Latin American leaders have exhibited an independent streak—often challenging U.S. policies. I extend this insight to Latin American foreign policy to the United States, asking, how do Latin American leaders define and pursue their priorities vis-à-vis the "colossus of the North"? I argue that forms of "small state power"[11] have largely been overlooked and underestimated in both IR theory and the study of U.S.-Latin American relations. The foreign policy influence of weaker-state leaders differs from how we conceptualize the influence of great powers, and it depends heavily on opportunities, allies, and ideas.

This introductory chapter will briefly discuss the central questions and arguments of this dissertation, review their relation to the literature on U.S.-Latin American relations, and set out the contributions I intend to make to that literature and to IR theory. Finally, I conclude the chapter with a description of the structure of the dissertation.

The contributions of this dissertation are directed first at the study of U.S.-Latin America relations and second at the study of weaker powers in IR. I challenge explanations common in the literature that grant a preponderant role to U.S. power in explanations of U.S.-Latin American relations. I then pivot to the theoretical literature in International Relations, particularly on the role of small or weak states in the international system, and to Foreign Policy Analysis. I find insights to understanding U.S.-Latin American relations there, but also shortcomings. The conceptualizations of power and influence that are common to IR obscure the

---

For a useful conversation of the growth of international research and perspectives in diplomatic history more broadly, see "Diplomatic History Today : A Round Table," *American History*, no. 99, vol. 3 (2009), particularly Thomas Zeiler's "The Diplomatic History Bandwagon," which describes the push to internationalization of the field.

[11] The concept comes from Alan Chong and Matthias Maass, "Introduction: The Foreign Policy Power of Small States," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 23, no. 3 (2010).

possibility of meaningful action from medium and small states like many of those that occupy Latin America. To really understand the relationship between U.S. and Latin American leaders, we must acknowledge the agency of both sides. This requires a broader conceptualization of power and a focus on actors and their strategies. Building on these tools, I offer an analytical framework for the study of weaker-state foreign policy in the context of asymmetrical traditional power relations. That framework guides my empirical analyses in assessing goals, strategies, interactions, influence, and conditions, letting me answer the questions of how Latin American leaders seek to influence U.S. foreign policy, and whether they might succeed in doing so.

Review of the literature on U.S.-Latin American relations

Since World War II, a body of scholarship has grown around the study of U.S.-Latin American relations. A great deal of knowledge has been generated, and these texts have found homes in numerous courses. However, this literature is uneven in many ways. It is thematically oriented, and not a subfield of any one discipline. Scholars come from diplomatic history, political science, International Relations, and other fields. This diversity has created empirical richness, but has limited theoretical conversation. Explicit theoretical frameworks remain relatively rare.[12] Despite its diversity, three general "schools" can be distinguished. With debts to several previous reviews of the literature, I describe these as the establishment school, the revisionist synthesis, and the "internationalist approach."

[12] For articles that have made these points, see Gregory Weeks, "Recent Works on U.S.-Latin American Relations," *Latin American Research Review* 44, no. 1 (2009), Mariano Bertucci, "Scholarly Research on U.S.-Latin American Relations: Where Does the Field Stand? ," *Latin American Politics and Society* forthcoming (2013), Ana Margheritis, "Interamerican Relations in the Early Twenty-First Century," *Latin American Politics and Society* 52, no. 4 (2010), Jeanne A. K. Hey, "Three Building Blocks of a Theory of Latin American Foreign Policy," *Third World Quarterly* 18, no. 4 (1997).

The first grouping, to borrow Russell Crandall's term, is the "establishment" school.[13] The school has three defining characteristics. First, its explanations of U.S. policy to Latin America center on the U.S. desire to exclude extraterritorial rivals from the hemisphere. Second, establishment authors argue that the United States is, on the whole, a beneficial presence. Third, they have focused on Latin American reactions to U.S. policy, but Latin American actions have not been a central object of study.

Establishment school works are often written by individuals connected to the U.S. policymaking process. Many journalistic works also fall into this school.[14] The founding text is Samuel Flagg Bemis' diplomatic history, *The Latin American Policy of the United States*.[15] Generally, these works, as Bemis' title implies, concentrate on U.S. policy, which they see as imperfect but on the whole beneficial for the region. That is not to say that establishment authors uncritically accept U.S. policy. As Russell Crandall notes, the school has developed a partisan tone, with Democratic and Republican wings. Criticism is common, including of one's own "wing," but criticism generally is offered with the intention of drawing attention to or fixing a certain policy failure, as opposed to questioning the fundamental role of the United States in the hemisphere.[16] During the height of the 1980s debate about Central American policy, Robert A.

---

[13] Russell Crandall, *The United States and Latin America after the Cold War* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

[14] For example, see the highly readable survey by Henry Raymont, *Troubled Neighbors : The Story of U.S.-Latin American Relations, from F.D.R. To the Present* (Cambridge: Westview Press, 2005).

[15] Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States : An Historical Interpretation* (New York: Norton, 1971).

[16] This is the tone of quadrennial collections like Abraham F. Lowenthal, Theodore J. Piccone, and Laurence Whitehead, *The Obama Administration and the Americas : Agenda for Change* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2009).

Pastor described the "security thesis" as the central tenet of this school; he noted that the Republican wing was promulgating an especially aggressive version of this thesis. [17]

First advanced by Bemis, the security thesis argues that the central goal of U.S. policy in Latin America has been to prevent any extra-hemispheric power from establishing a base within the hemisphere from which it could threaten the continental United States. The Monroe Doctrine made this clear even before the United States had the power to enforce its will. After watching foreign creditors shell the harbors of debtor nations, Theodore Roosevelt's corollary articulated more extensive conditions under which the United States would intervene. The Good Neighbor Policy tried to accomplish these same goals through non-intervention and partnership, but during the Cold War, Washington at times abandoned non-interventionism to prevent the emergence of possible threats. For practitioners and scholars, the Cuban Missile Crisis represents the ultimate nightmare of the security thesis—the moment at which an existential threat arose ninety miles from U.S. shores. Pastor used the metaphor of a "whirlpool" to describe a pattern in which the United States pays little attention to its neighboring countries, only to be drawn in by crises in "an alternating cycle of fixation and inattention" that rarely leads to ideal policies.[18] The security thesis shares much with a realist vision of the world, a connection made explicit by Gregory Weeks in one of the relatively few books to try to test dominant IR theories against the sweep of U.S.-Latin American history. Weeks argues that "factors of power and security" should be central to any explanation of U.S.-Latin American relations, making realism the best guide.[19]

---

[17] Robert A. Pastor, "Review: Explaining U.S. Policy toward the Caribbean Basin: Fixed and Emerging Images," *World Politics* 38, no. 3 (1986). See a slightly different formulation in G. Pope Atkins, *Latin America in the International Political System* (Boulder (Colo.); San Francisco; London: Westview press, 1989), ch. 5.

[18] Robert A. Pastor, *Exiting the Whirlpool : U.S. Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2001), pp. 18.

[19] Gregory Bart Weeks, *U.S. And Latin American Relations* (New York: Pearson Longman, 2008).

The second main theme of the establishment school, in addition to the security thesis, is the argument, made with varying degrees of nuance, that U.S. power has benefited its neighbors. These benefits tend to fall in three categories: stability, economics and trade, and democracy. establishment authors note that in the Western Hemisphere, interstate war has been a rarity. Since the War of the Pacific in 1879-1883, territorial conquest has been minor and rare. Peaceful settlement of disputes has been the norm, with the United States playing a direct role in the arbitration of border disputes. After former colonial powers were pushed out, the region became a leader in the creation of multilateral institutions.[20]

Unlike the security thesis, which had remained relatively constant, this aspect of the establishment school has evolved, with arguments often reflecting the times in which they were written. This is clear starting with Bemis, who penned his work during the Second World War in celebration of U.S. power. In a classic work, Bryce Wood argued that U.S. policy evolved in a benevolent direction since the turn of the century, moving toward greater respect and partnership.[21] However, Wood's perspective was different in the aftermath of Lyndon B. Johnson's 1965 invasion of the Dominican Republic, which Wood criticized as the "dismantling" of FDR's legacy in the region.[22] That invasion, judged by many as rash and unnecessary, was also a turning point for Abraham Lowenthal.[23] Lowenthal later argued that U.S. policies were often undermined by a "hegemonic presumption" that it could and should do

[20] Arie Marcelo Kacowicz, *The Impact of Norms in International Society : The Latin American Experience, 1881-2001* (Notre Dame, Ind.: Univ. of Notre Dame Pr., 2005), esp. Ch. 4.

[21] Bryce Wood, *The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967).

[22] Bryce Wood, *The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985).

[23] Abraham F. Lowenthal, *The Dominican Intervention* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972).

too much in Latin America, placing him on the more critical wing of the establishment.[24] The U.S. involvement in Central American civil wars in the 1980s spurred an outpouring of scholarship on U.S.-Latin American relations—leading the "revisionist synthesis" to become the dominant perspective. Critical arguments were adamantly countered by the conservative wing of the establishment school, which argued for the necessity and ultimate righteousness of attacking leftist governments and revolutionaries during the Cold War.[25] One collection of essays from the era opens by synthesizing the two key points of security and beneficence:

> Latin America seldom impinges strongly on those who call themselves simply 'Americans' except when they see a threat to their security. But when alien and hostile movement or ideologies appear to be advancing in this hemisphere, Americans take a grave view, not only because of the potential military threat but also because of a feeling that the United States is much more responsible for the nations of this hemisphere than for those of Africa or the Near East. This is especially true of the part of Latin America nearest our shores, the Caribbean islands and the small countries of Central America.[26]

More recently, Crandall conceded that the United States has been interventionist, but he argued that these interventions helped spur democracy. Crandall served in the George W. Bush administration, and his argument reflects ongoing debates about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.[27] At least since Woodrow Wilson, the promotion of democracy has been a central element of U.S. policy, though there is much debate about both the effectiveness and sincerity of the effort. Tom Carothers gives an apt synthesis, saying "the policies were far more complex in implementation than in conception and the results were not a black-and-white assortment of

---

[24] Abraham F. Lowenthal, *Partners in Conflict, the United States and Latin America* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).

[25] Jeane Kirkpatrick, "US Security and Latin America," *Commentary* 71, no. 1 (1981).

[26] In contrast to the introduction, it should be noted that some of the essays in the book offer a more nuanced picture of the region. Robert G Wesson, ed., *Communism in Central America and the Caribbean* (Hoover Institution Press, 1982), pp. xi.

[27] Russell Crandall, *Gunboat Democracy : U.S. Interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama* (Lanham [Md.]: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006).

successes and failures."[28] Perhaps a more frequent critique in recent years—and at intervals since World War II—is that the United States *should* be doing more good in Latin America in place of its current non-policy of "neglect."[29]

The tension in the establishment school reflects old debates about the confluence of power and principle. Robert A. Pastor argues that the United States, in both its hemispheric and regional policies, has married the security thesis with an exceptional approach to world affairs—a "revolutionary vision."[30] Counter to that, Peter H. Smith argues that U.S. policy has never been particularly exceptional. Instead, it has followed the "rules of operation" of the international systems that have dominated different eras. Smith argues there have been four systems in the history of U.S.-Latin American relations: balance of power and imperialism, the bipolarity of the Cold War, the uncertainty of the post-Cold War, and finally "the antiterror war."[31] That Smith's "systems" get progressively shorter—the first lasts about 140 years while the most the most recent two cover just two decades—seems to respond more to a bias in favor of the present than to any clear analytical criteria. Disagreeing with Smith, Pastor argues that U.S. power was used to shape the international system, more than that system shaped U.S. behavior.

---

[28] For a review and assessment of those arguments and policies, see Tom H. Carothers, *In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy toward Latin America in the Reagan Years* (University of California Press, 1991), quote on pp. 11. For the original, influential argument, see Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," *Commentary*, November 1979.

[29] For example, see Peter Hakim, "Is Washington Losing Latin America?," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 1 (2006), Laurence Whitehead, "A Project for the Americas," in *The Obama Administration and the Americas : Agenda for Change*, ed. Abraham F. Lowenthal, Theodore J. Piccone, and Laurence Whitehead (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2009).

[30] Robert A. Pastor, "The United States: Divided by a Revolutionary Vision," in *A Century's Journey : How the Great Powers Shape the World*, ed. Robert A. Pastor (New York: Basic Books, 1999).

[31] Peter H. Smith, *Talons of the Eagle : Latin America, the United States, and the World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp.5-7.

Both of these central establishment claims lead to a focus on U.S. actions at the expense of Latin American actors. In the security thesis, the key concern is the U.S. perception of threats to its security. Latin America is present, but principally geographically as a space from which dangerous attacks could occur. The potentially threatening actors are by definition non-hemispheric challengers, taking advantage of Latin America's proximity to U.S. shores.[32] The second claim paints Latin Americans primarily as recipients of benefits generated by U.S. power and principle.

In establishment works, Latin Americans often have an ability to *react* to U.S. policies, but not to act on their own. For example, Bemis examined Latin American reactions (largely through press clippings) to U.S. policies like the Monroe Doctrine. More recently, Weeks writes: "leaders of Latin American countries, and groups within countries, developed a wide range of reactions to U.S. policy. Being a hegemonic power does not mean total control. Latin Americans have often struggled against U.S. dominance and at times have been successful in the effort."[33] While Weeks, reacting to the recent internationalist turn, acknowledges this aspect of Latin American agency, it is limited to reaction to the realities of U.S. power. The same is also true of various presidentially focused treatments of U.S.-Latin American relations by historians including Stephen Rabe.[34]

---

[32] This definition emerges from the Monroe Doctrine itself.

[33] Weeks, *U.S. And Latin American Relations*, pp. 4-5.

[34] Stephen G. Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America : The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), Stephen G. Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World : John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America* (Chapel Hill [u.a.: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1999), Stephen G. Rabe, "The Johnson Doctrine," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (2006).

A “revisionist synthesis” emerged during the 1980s and early 1990s, resulting in a second school.[35] This school goes well beyond the acknowledgement of imperfections or aberrations in U.S. policy to reject the fundamental concepts of U.S. policy, particularly U.S. exceptionalism. Initially, this synthesis drew upon the work of scholars like Walter LaFeber, who saw a union of U.S. business and government interests in a continuing quest to economically exploit Latin America. LaFeber argued that U.S. geography allowed it to be isolationist, but “internal developments, as interpreted by American policy makers,” led the United States to imperial behaviors.[36] In another classic work, *The Open Veins of Latin America*, Uruguayan scholar Eduardo Galeano traces how the land and people of the continent have been exploited in the production of basic commodities.[37] The conclusions of these histories coincided in many respects with the work of dependency theorists, which led Pastor to label it the “neodependency antithesis.” Perhaps even more to the point, the school was “counterconventional.”[38] In a later review, Crandall termed the school “anti-imperialist.”[39] I instead use Gilderhus’ term, “revisionist,” because it recognizes that the scholarship grew as a response to a then-dominant establishment view. As Gilderhus noted, by the early 1990s, this perspective so dominated work on U.S.-Latin American relations, that it was rare to read even thoroughly establishment works that do not recognize it. Perhaps its greatest contribution has been to demonstrate the frequent

---

[35] Mark T. Gilderhus, "An Emerging Synthesis? U.S.-Latin American Relations since the Second World War," *Diplomatic History* 16, no. 3 (1992): pp. 432.

[36] Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire; an Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963), pp. 2, Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions : The United States in Central America* (New York: Norton, 1983).

[37] Eduardo Galeano, *Open Veins of Latin America : Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973).

[38] Pastor, "Review: Explaining U.S. Policy toward the Caribbean Basin: Fixed and Emerging Images."

[39] Crandall, *The United States and Latin America after the Cold War*, ch. 1.

gap between public rhetoric and private interests in U.S. policy to Latin America, with an implicit argument that the United States has not lived up to its pronouncements.

From its economic origins, the school evolved to incorporate other critical perspectives, though the economic angle remained important. Notably, revisionists probed the prejudices of U.S. policymakers, examined U.S. cultural and economic interventions, and even argued that Latin America was a "workshop" for global American empire.[40] Starting with *Beneath the United States,* Lars Schoultz has produced some of the most influential works, with a particular focus on the pre-World War II period, by mining U.S. historical records to examine U.S. policymakers' racial biases and their influence on policy.[41] Schoultz's work on U.S. policy to Cuba illustrates how U.S. policymakers' beliefs in U.S. superiority and their disregard for Cuban nationalism spanned decades, with deleterious effects.[42] The expansion of perspectives within the revisionist synthesis has come to reflect new currents including "gender theory, ethnohistory, cultural studies, and business history to reexamine and offer fresh insights into what was once the most conventional of topics," noted Thomas O'Brien in a 2006 review.[43] O'Brien's own work seeks to broaden historical understanding beyond the domain of the state to incorporate cultural and commercial factors.[44] In a similar vein, the edited collection *Close Encounters of*

---

[40] Martha L. Cottam, *Images and Intervention : U.S. Policies in Latin America* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1994), Greg Grandin, *Empire's Workshop : Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), Michael Grow, *U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions : Pursuing Regime Change in the Cold War* (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2008).

[41] Lars Schoultz, *Beneath the United States : a History of U.S. Policy toward Latin America* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998).

[42] Lars Schoultz, *That Infernal Little Cuban Republic : The United States and the Cuban Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009).

[43] Thomas F. O'Brien, "Interventions, Conventional and Unconventional: Current Scholarship on Inter-American Relations," *Latin American Research Review* 44, no. 1 (2009).

[44] Thomas F. O'Brien, *Making the Americas : The United States and Latin America from the Age of Revolutions to the Era of Globalization* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2007).

Empire brought together a range of approaches including feminism, cultural studies, and labor history to illustrate how the subject of U.S.-Latin American relations can usefully be explored beyond the realm of government action.[45]

U.S. interventions have been perhaps the most frequent focus for revisionist scholars, so much so that O'Brien's review of recent revisionist work was entitled, "Interventions, conventional and unconventional."[46] The original revisionist literature grew out of studies reevaluating the U.S. war against Spain in 1898. Scholars have pointed to economic motivations for U.S. interventions in the hemisphere, notably Schlesinger and Kinzer's influential study of the 1954 overthrow of President Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala.[47] Scholars have continued to pursue themes of colonialism, neo-colonialism, or empire from the turn of the century to present-day policy. Greg Grandin has been the most visible, starting with his scholarly work *Last Colonial Massacre*, in which he argues that U.S. interventions in Guatemala and elsewhere were less about ending communism than about stamping out social democracy.[48] He followed with a popular polemic, *Empire's Workshop*, which argued that George W. Bush's worldwide display of unilateralism was a natural outgrowth of longstanding U.S. policies in Latin America.[49]

Grandin's work points to an area of frequent division that is useful for illustrating the difference between the establishment and revisionist approaches: the use of "empire,"

---

[45] Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine LeGrand, and Ricardo Donato Salvatore, eds., *Close Encounters of Empire : Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations* (London: Duke University Press, 1998). Some of the chapters, including those by Piero Gleijeses on Cuban policy in Africa fit more closely with the internationalist turn described below.

[46] "Interventions, Conventional and Unconventional: Current Scholarship on Inter-American Relations."

[47] Stephen C. Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit : The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1982).

[48] Greg Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre : Latin America in the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

[49] Grandin, *Empire's Workshop : Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism*.

"hegemon," and "colonial" to describe the United States and its policies. IR concepts and theory might profitably add clarity to the study of U.S.-Latin American relations in the debate on empire—a debate largely between establishment and revisionist scholars who seem to be talking past one another more than talking to one another. Rather than starting with a clear definition of what an empire is, much of this work starts with the proclamation of the United States as an empire, with little attention to previous usage of the term.[50] Traditionally, the term empire had been used to describe a relationship of near-total political control of peripheral territory by a central power. Under an empire, peripheral states have no autonomy in foreign policy and very constrained freedom, if any, to set domestic policy. For centuries, this was closely related to colonialism—official policies of settlement and economic exploitation—and physical control of territory. If that was no longer quite what is intended, it has often been unclear what definition has replaced it.

Though the opposition to Bush administration policies certainly increased scholarly and polemical attention to empire, the term was already prominent in the study of U.S.-Latin American relations, dating at least to the 1963 publication of Walter LaFeber's *The New Empire*, which built on the work of William Appleman Williams. Focused on the decades leading up to the Spanish-American War, LaFeber argues that the search for new markets and capitalist expansionism drove U.S. policy. LaFeber challenged the then-dominant view of Samuel Flagg Bemis that the turn-of-the-century imperialist fervor in Cuba, Panama, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines was an "aberration;" LaFeber saw it as the culmination of a policy driven by

[50] Alexander J. Motyl, "Is Everything Empire? Is Empire Everything?," *Comparative Politics* 38, no. 2 (2006).

commercial interests.[51] This same period has been central to many studies of U.S. empire in Latin America, with a transition to "informal empire" during the subsequent dollar diplomacy and Good Neighbor periods.

The 1998 edited volume *Close Encounters of Empire* deploys "empire" to cover an enormous range of activities, but without an overarching definition common to its contributors. The editor, Gilbert M. Joseph writes that the volume has no interest in the "attenuated debate" about whether the United States constitutes an empire: "Such arguments also ignore structures, practices, and discourses of domination and possession that run throughout U.S. history." There is no effort to separate what empire is from what it is not. One chapter describes the U.S. "informal empire…as a collective enterprise encompassing multiple *practices of engagement*."[52] Seemingly, any exercise of power is or could be imperial. Reviewing a variety of mostly historical works in 2005, Mark Gilderhus characterized U.S.-Latin American relations as being "an informal empire without colonies." However, he never specifies what he means, and his insistence on informal empire seems to be at odds with his closing statement: "No historian claiming credibility can any longer discuss the subject while leaving out the Latin Americans. The stream of influence and interaction flows both ways." The term seems to be more political tag than analytical concept.

In response to the Bush presidency, more scholars of U.S.-Latin American relations joined the imperial rush, arguing that Latin America was (and remains) the original American empire. Grandin sought to explicitly address other Bush-inspired, imperially themed books,

---

[51] LaFeber, *The New Empire; an Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898*, Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States : An Historical Interpretation*, Diane B. Kunz, "The New Empire Redux," *International Studies Review* 2, no. 1 (2000).

[52] Joseph, LeGrand, and Salvatore, eds., *Close Encounters of Empire : Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations*, pp. 71. Italics in original.

specifically those by Niall Ferguson. Despite including the word in its title, Grandin's influential *Empire's Workshop* does not define "empire" while insisting that Latin America was variously a "blueprint" for the U.S. empire, "caught in the crosswinds of U.S. empire," and "played a critical role in the reconstitution of the ideological, military, and political foundations of the American empire following the crises of the 1970s."[53] Grandin's closest approximation to a definition is: "Unlike European empires, ours was supposed to entail a concert of equal, sovereign, and democratic American republics with shared interests and values, led but not dominated by the United States."[54] One must ask, under what useful definition can an "empire" be comprised of states that are (even supposedly) equal and sovereign? Likewise, if the new definition of empire applies only to the United States, the category seems to easily collapse into tautology.

Whereas in the study of U.S.-Latin American relations there has been relatively little attention to defining empire, IR scholars have offered numerous and sometimes overlapping definitions of empire, hegemony, primacy, and unipolarity. In response to the ensuing conceptual morass, Alexander Motyl asked, "Is everything empire? Is empire everything?" Motyl's review of some of the most prominent recent works on empire, from both left and right, concludes: "Empire serves only as a convenient tag … But empire's analytical utility is close to nil." Citing work by Dominic Lieven, Motyl argues that "if the United States really is completely unlike all past empires, then the American empire cannot be an empire."[55] To be an empire, a state must engage in either direct rule through representatives or indirect rule through "native administrators," but that in any case, "peripheries do not engage in or pursue foreign relations"

---

[53] Grandin, *Empire's Workshop : Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism*.

[54] Grandin, *Empire's Workshop : Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism*, pp. 2.

[55] Motyl, "Is Everything Empire? Is Empire Everything?," pp. 243.

under an empire. Robert Pastor argues that the analytical value of "empire" applied to the United States is worse than "nil," but is misleading because it negates a legacy of U.S. policy intended to dismantle colonialist empires.[56] While Motyl's definition of empire seems clear, his equation of hegemony simply with an ability to influence the foreign affairs of other states falls back to confusion. In particular, it conflates hegemony with primacy and largely ignores the complex and varied roots of "hegemony" as a concept that has usually implied not just capabilities but certain types of relations between the hegemon and lesser powers.[57] As Ian Clark has noted, this conflation has become common in the use of hegemony to describe the United States as the state that currently holds the greatest material power capabilities.[58] What we should be talking about is "primacy." Well before the current debate on empire and hegemony, Robert Jervis offered a clear definition of primacy:

> "[P]rimacy means being much more powerful than any other state according to the usual and crude measures of power (e.g., gross national product, size of the armed forces, lack of economic, political, and geographical vulnerabilities). This in turn implies that the state has greater ability than any rival to influence a broad range of issues and a large number of states. Furthermore, a state with primacy can establish, or at least strongly influence, 'the rules of the game' by which international politics is played."[59]

As compared to empire, primacy recognizes that the leading power can influence outcomes, but certainly cannot guarantee them, and the degree to which it can influence depends greatly on the type of issue and other conditions. In the study of U.S.-Latin American relations, "empire" and "hegemon" are often used similarly, though empire is favored more by revisionist scholars and

---

[56] Pastor, "The United States: Divided by a Revolutionary Vision," pp. 233-238.

[57] Daniel H. Nexon and Thomas Wright, "What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate," *AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW* 101, no. 02 (2007): pp. 257.

[58] Ian Clark, "How Hierarchical Can International Society Be?," *International Relations* 23, no. 3 (2009).

[59] Robert Jervis, "International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?," *International Security* 17, no. 4 (1993): pp. 52-53.

hegemony by those more closely linked to the U.S. establishment. “Primacy” has not been a central concept, though it offers more clarity. Both words acknowledge one part of the reality of international politics in the Americas—the power of the United States. However, their use, often without definition, paints Latin America is a victim or an object to be acted upon. They end up obscuring more than they illuminate. For one part, the term empire tends to treat U.S. relations with the two dozen Latin American as relatively homogenous, obscuring that the history of relations with Nicaragua has little in common with relations with Brazil, as Carlos Gustavo Poggio Teixeira recently argued.[60] For another, they present an exaggerated and unvariegated notion of U.S. power, under which it would seem that the United States would be successful in getting its way more often than not. Empire and hegemony seem to deny that Latin Americans can exercise influence of their own.

An internationalist approach

Authors in both the establishment school and revisionist synthesis concentrate on U.S. power and its effects on the region, though with very different emphases and interpretations. This led Max Paul Friedman to note that despite the many foci in the literature, there was one-sidedness: “Mononational research tends to produce mononational explanations and to ignore the role of players from countries other than those whose words are examined.”[61] In a recent review article, Robert Pastor and I suggested that the previous literature on U.S.-Latin American relations had largely ignored Latin American actors for empirical and theoretical reasons. The former reason was due in large part to the scarcity of archival materials, or the difficulty of

[60] Carlos Gustavo Poggio Teixeira, *Brazil, the United States, and the South American Subsystem : Regional Politics and the Absent Empire* (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2012).

[61] Friedman, "Retiring the Puppets, Bringing Latin America Back In: Recent Scholarship on United States-Latin American Relations," pp. 625.

obtaining those. Even when those sources were available, though, they were often ignored because of a "theoretical model in which the United States was the actor and Latin America the dependent, defenseless object."[62] When Pastor called in 1986 for an "interactive perspective" that treated Latin Americans as actors, he could offer empirical examples but could cite little likeminded scholarship. When Friedman reviewed the literature in 2003, he could point to several diplomatic historians, such as Kyle Longley and Paul Coe Clark, whose work demonstrated the value of multinational research.[63]

This trend has grown into the beginnings of what I will call an "internationalist approach." It sees the mononational focus of establishment and critical work as an inadequate approach to U.S.-Latin American relations, arguing that both the United States and Latin Americans should be treated as actors— though this does not imply that their actions carry equal weight. The research gives cause for reevaluation of many events and relationships. With the opening of archives after the Cold War, historians began exploring the Latin American side of important events. For example, studies of the Cuban missile crisis had long focused on two actors, the United States and Soviet Union, but more recent studies have recognized Cuba as a protagonist whose actions had much to do with the crisis' final outcome.[64] In his study of U.S.-Nicaraguan relations, Robert Pastor not only described the actions of Nicaraguans, but the influence of the leaders of neighboring states who tried to forge peace despite belligerent U.S.

---

[62] Pastor and Long, "The Cold War and Its Aftermath in the Americas: The Search for a Synthetic Interpretation of U.S. Policy," pp. 263.

[63] Kyle Longley, *The Sparrow and the Hawk : Costa Rica and the United States During the Rise of José Figueres* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1997), Paul Coe Clark, *The United States and Somoza, 1933-1956 : a Revisionist Look* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992).

[64] Though access to Cuban archives is still limited, researchers have accessed some materials, employed Soviet archives, and conducted conferences and interviews to explore the crisis in Cuba. For example, see Michael Dobbs, *One Minute to Midnight : Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), James G. Blight and Philip Brenner, *Sad and Luminous Days : Cuba's Struggle with the Superpowers after the Missile Crisis* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002).

policies in the 1980s.[65] In a recent reevaluation of U.S.-Bolivian relations, James F. Siekmeier uses a "synthetic perspective" to demonstrate how Bolivia not only reacted to U.S. policy but actively sought to moderate Washington's response to its revolution. Centrists in the revolution then used U.S. assistance to promote their interests at the expense of leftists in their own party, the MNR. Though Siekmeier remains critical of U.S. policy in many respects, Bolivians are no longer passive recipients of it; in fact, they seek to turn it to their advantage.[66] Likewise, research in Havana by Piero Gleijeses unearthed the extent to which Fidel Castro acted on his own accord, not at the behest of Moscow, in much of Cuba's revolutionary foreign policy.[67]

Exploring works on one case helps clarify the importance of the internationalist approach. One of the most emblematic cases for scholars in the "revisionist synthesis" has been CIA involvement in the 1954 coup against Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz. Because the covert action was directed against a reformist, democratically elected government, general surveys frequently offer it as emblematic of U.S. refusal to allow for nationalist or leftist governance in Latin America.[68] The classic critical text, *Bitter Fruit*, offers an economic focus similar to that of Walter LeFeber. The book, built nearly exclusively on U.S. sources, argues that the Eisenhower administration's decision to intervene in Guatemala was driven by a desire to

---

[65] Robert A. Pastor, *Not Condemned to Repetition : The United States and Nicaragua* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2002).

[66] Siekmeier, *The Bolivian Revolution and the United States, 1952 to the Present*.

[67] Piero Gleijeses, "The View from Havana : Lessons from Cuba's African Journey, 1959-1976," in *In from the Cold : Latin America's New Encounter with the Cold War*, ed. G. M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008).

[68] These general survey typically refer to three works: Nick Cullather, *Secret History : The C.I.A.' S Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006), Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala : The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope : The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991).

help former colleagues at the United Fruit Company.[69] Whereas Schlesinger and Kinzer's critical view focuses on economic collusion between United Fruit and the government, Nick Cullather presents an establishment argument—albeit a very critical one—in *Secret History*, which focuses on the security motives and operational details of CIA involvement.[70] Neither gives much attention to the actions of Guatemalans, beyond the bizarre antics of coup leader Carlos Castillo Armas. Interestingly, Ronald Schneider's 1958 study, *Communism in Guatemala*, does employ a great deal of Guatemalan documentation to look at the growth of communism before and during the Arbenz administration. However, these documents were collected and supplied by the post-coup National Committee for Defense against Communism, and Schneider's account omits the U.S. role, which was widely and immediately suspected in Latin America by that time.[71]

Decades later, for *Shattered Hope*, an early internationalist forebear, Piero Gleijeses did seek out Guatemalan sources, including interviews with Arbenz's widow. Though his access to Guatemalan archives was limited, the new information allowed Gleijeses to come to conclusions dramatically opposed to those of *Bitter Fruit*. First, Arbenz did identify himself as a communist, and the U.S. intervention was driven by a recognition that Arbenz was deeply sympathetic to communists and that the success of his democratically elected, nationalist, and reformist government would prove an inspiration and model to others. Economic factors, and particularly the interests of United Fruit, were tangential to U.S. decisions.[72] Andrew Fraser adds to

---

[69] Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit : The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*.

[70] Cullather's study is limited by the context in which it was written, as an official CIA history. It was drafted in 1992 and originally released in 1997. Cullather, *Secret History : The C.I.A.' S Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954*.

[71] The coup appears only the epilogue of the book, which is almost entirely dedicated to the communist "takeover" of Guatemala. Ronald M. Schneider, *Communism in Guatemala, 1944-1954* (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1959).

[72] Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope : The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954.*

Cullather's account with new CIA information, but incorporates Gleijeses' conclusions. U.S. action still matters, but later evidence has shown that, in Fraser's words, "it was the actions of the Guatemalan army that made the difference."[73] This also indicates where there might be room to build on the existing literature through internationalist research. Greater access to Guatemalan archives, to the extent they exist, could help understand the decision making of the Guatemalan military, how it perceived its interests and options, and how it related to Arbenz.

While the internationalist approach has led to important improvements in the understanding of key cases, the perspective has been slower to make its way into the general histories that serve as frequent teaching tools and more often try to offer general, theoretical perspectives. To take a recent example, Mark Eric Williams' 2012 *Understanding U.S.-Latin American Relations: Theory and History* makes a conscious effort both to incorporate IR theory and "strives to avoid a pure U.S.-centric perspective."[74] The pedagogically oriented survey draws heavily on Joseph Nye's concept of soft power to outline how Latin Americans are at once attracted to U.S. culture and ideas and repulsed when U.S. actions seem to violate those principles. However, Latin Americans do not appear as actors, and the book's sources are almost exclusively from the United States. Despite its claims to the contrary, the book is almost entirely about U.S. policy to Latin America, not U.S.-Latin American relations.[75]

In a more advanced academic effort to write broad internationalist history, Hal Brands seeks to "reconstruct the history of Latin America's Cold War in a way that is both multinational

---

[73] Andrew Fraser, "Architecture of a Broken Dream: The CIA and Guatemala, 1952–54," *Intelligence and National Security* 20, no. 3 (2005).

[74] Mark Eric Williams, *Understanding U.S.-Latin American Relations : Theory and History* (New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. xxiii.

[75] Mark Eric Williams, *Understanding U.S.-Latin American Relations : Theory and History* (New York: Routledge, 2012), passim.

and multilayered." Brands rejects both "triumphalist assessments" and narratives "dominated by Right repression and U.S. complicity," arguing that U.S. involvement was one piece of overlapping global and local conflicts. While Brands shifts the focus to the central role of Latin American elites, he tends to treat their conflictive relations with the left as balanced—assigning blame equally, when in terms of people killed and disappeared, right-wing, state-sponsored violence was by far the larger of the two evils.[76] Beyond that, the book's multiarchival research shows more breadth than depth, and though it claims sources from a dozen countries, only a few Latin American leaders appear as actors in their own rights. The focus often remains the Latin American reaction to major U.S. policies like the Alliance for Progress, without asking whether Latin Americans had a role in forming them.[77] Because an internationalist work requires multinational perspectives, a truly internationalist general survey might have to wait until there is a sufficient body of well-conducted multinational studies to synthesize.

Scholars in the internationalist approach have already made major contributions by unearthing new evidence, introducing a Latin American perspective, and re-shaping our understanding of major events. However, the internationalist approach has not yet given much explicit attention to testing or building theory. It is here that a return to Pastor's call for an "interactive" focus could bear fruit. This perspective "presumes that the region is composed of actors—nations, groups, leaders—not of victims or objects."[78] Treating Latin Americans as actors means considering their interests, goals, and strategies, and how they pursue these in the

---

[76] Hal Brands, *Latin America's Cold War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010). For reviews, see W.M. Schmidli, "Tracking the Cold War in Latin America," *Reviews in American History* 40, no. 2 (2012). Daniel Sargent et al., "Online Roundtable: Hal Brands' Latin America's Cold War Hal Brands, Latin America's Cold War," *Journal of American Studies* 46, no. 01 (2012).

[77] Neither Kubitschek nor Operation Pan-America appear in the book.

[78] Pastor, "Review: Explaining U.S. Policy toward the Caribbean Basin: Fixed and Emerging Images," pp. 509.

context of asymmetry. The internationalist approach presents an opportunity both for building IR theory and for furthering a fruitful conversation between IR scholars and diplomatic historians.

This dissertation seeks to occupy a middle ground. Unlike Brands, I do not claim to cover all of the Cold War. Instead of casting my gaze at the sweep of decades of history and two dozen countries, I identify cases, defined as particular policy issues between one or more Latin American countries and the United States, which are important on their own, but also emblematic. Instead of focusing on interventions, as much of the literature has, this project seeks to recall that relationships between leaders and countries are much broader, and that on many issues Latin American actors are the principal demandeurs. To borrow a phrase from a recent rumination of the relationship between history and IR, through these cases I seek to produce "theoretically appealing *and* empirically rich accounts of events, processes and dynamics in world politics."[79] The case-based, process-focused approach adopted here allows me to engage in contextually situated theorizing, while recognizing complex causation and the importance of assessing multiple perspectives.

IR and the Americas

The revisionist synthesis was largely driven by historians, while the establishment school is largely composed of former policymakers and journalists. This has led some scholars in IR and foreign policy analysis to criticize the study of U.S.-Latin American relations as atheoretical. Others in IR have more fairly acknowledged the utility of diplomatic history for both its new evidence and new perspectives, but still press IR scholars to bring more theoretical approaches to bear to advance a dialogue between history and modern and post-modern International Relations

[79] George Lawson, "The Eternal Divide? History and International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 18, no. 2 (2012): pp. 209. Emphasis in original.

in the study of U.S.-Latin American relations.[80] Previous attempts to develop a more theoretical "school" on the topic have not advanced much. For example, a political science-driven "bureaucratic" perspective on U.S.-Latin American relations failed to gain much traction; where it did it was perhaps even more one-sided in predominately evaluating the United States.[81]

There have been a number of calls for a more theoretical explanation of U.S.-Latin American relations. In 1998, Jeanne A. K. Hey bemoaned that "Latin American foreign policy analysis still lacks a theoretical core." She identified a split between IR studies, rooted in either realism or dependency theory, and single-case explorations without explicit theory. Instead Hey suggests a turn to foreign policy, returning to James Rosenau's famous "pre-theory" structure in search of variables for analysis.[82] However, Hey and Frank Mora's own study Latin American foreign policy is structured on a levels-of-analysis approach (individual, state, system) that attempts to assess which level carries more "weight" in Latin American foreign policy.[83] However, this is a mistake of reification. Levels of analysis are analytical tools, and should not be treated as comparable independent variables. Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner makes a similar diagnosis on the state of theory, but offers a more helpful prescription. Braveboy-Wagner focuses on the smallest of the small, particularly Caribbean microstates. She notes that approaches to the foreign relations of the "Global South" in IR have offered adaptations of

---

[80] Margheritis, "Interamerican Relations in the Early Twenty-First Century," pp. 145.

[81] Abraham F. Lowenthal, "United States Policy toward Latin America: "Liberal," "Radical," and "Bureaucratic" Perspectives," *Latin American Research Review* 8, no. 3 (1973).

[82] Jeanne A. K. Hey, "Is There a Latin American Foreign Policy?," *Mershon International Studies Review* 42, no. 1 (1998). See, J.N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," *Approaches to comparative and international politics* (1966).

[83] Frank O. Mora and Jeanne A. K. Hey, *Latin American and Caribbean Foreign Policy* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), esp. ch. 1. Hey, "Three Building Blocks of a Theory of Latin American Foreign Policy."

realism,[84] dependency theory;[85] or have been part of comparative foreign policy. She argues that foreign policy analysis has largely left out the Global South, but could offer useful explanations of smaller-state behavior.[86] Braveboy-Wagner begins constructing a foreign policy theory for small states in a more recent article (discussed in Chapter 2).[87]

Where North American-based scholarship has fallen short, have Latin American scholars offered more convincing explanations? For decades, Latin American social scientists' internationally minded scholarship was heavily economic in focus, guided by the Economic Commission on Latin America and Brazil's Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros. Dependency theory grew out of these scholar-policymakers' concerns about an unequal and worsening global distribution of production. These traditions inspired a focus on international structures and U.S. intervention. Importantly for this dissertation, foreign policy scholars who drew on dependency theory often Latin American leaders as local U.S. lackeys who exploited their intermediate positions for personal gain; this critique was reinforced by a surge in authoritarianism during the late 1960s and 1970s.[88] These studies bred a concern with autonomy

---

[84] Carlos Escudé, *Foreign Policy Theory in Menem's Argentina* (Gainesville, Fla: Univ. Press of Florida, 1997), Carlos Escudé, "An Introduction to Peripheral Realism and Its Implications for the Interstate System," in *International Relations Theory and the Third World*, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).

[85] Morgenfeld, *Vecinos en Conflict : Argentina y los Estados Unidos en Conferencias Panamericanas*, Jeanne A. K. Hey, *Theories of Dependent Foreign Policy and the Case of Ecuador in the 1980s, Monographs in International Studies, No. 23* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1995).

[86] Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner and Michael T. Snarr, "Assessing Current Conceptual and Empirical Approaches," in *The Foreign Policies of the Global South : Rethinking Conceptual Frameworks*, ed. Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner (Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner, 2003).

[87] Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner, "Opportunities and Limitations of the Exercise of Foreign Policy Power by a Very Small State: The Case of Trinidad and Tobago," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 23, no. 3 (2010).

[88] The preceding paragraph draws heavily on Arlene Tickner, "El Pensamiento sobre las Relaciones Internacionales en América Latina," in *Relaciones Internacionales y Política Exterior de Colombia*, ed. Sandra Borda and Arlene B. Tickner (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Departamento de Ciencia Política-CESO, 2011), Arlene Tickner, "Latin American IR and the Primacy of *lo Práctico*," *International Studies Review* 10, no. 4 (2008).

as a central concept in the study of Latin American IR—though autonomy has been discussed as a constant quest for enlightened elites rather than an (imperfect) reality.[89] In an influential critique, Carlos Escudé argued that Latin American leaders needed to recognize a hierarchical, rather than anarchical, order in the Western Hemisphere. The quest for autonomy could undermine the quest for development, so leaders should ally themselves with the United States and derive benefits from the alliance. However, Escudé's advice failed in his own Argentina, when despite President Carlos Menem's dedication to "carnal" relations with the United States, the Bush administration denied him assistance during the 2001 peso crisis.[90]

Recently, a small number of Latin American scholars have more directly tried to connect a multinational perspective with an explicit theoretical approach. Scholars in the region have also produced a handful of books on the policy-making process in different countries, such as Rafael Valázquez Flores' work on Mexican policymaking.[91] There has been much recent work on Brazilian foreign policy in particular, as the country has taken a more active global role; however Jeffrey Cason and Timothy Power note that most of that work has addressed actual and potential Brazilian strategies, with little attention to determinants and processes of Brazilian policymaking.[92] Amado Luiz Cervo's *Historia da política exterior do Brasil* is perhaps the foundational survey of Brazilian foreign policy.[93] Cervo notes that North American authors

---

[89] Sean W. Burges, *Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009), Roberto Russell and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, "From Antagonistic Autonomy to Relational Autonomy: A Theoretical Reflection from the Southern Cone," *Latin American Politics and Society* 45, no. 1 (2003).

[90] Escudé, *Foreign Policy Theory in Menem's Argentina*.

[91] Rafael Velázquez Flores, *Factores, Bases y Fundamentos de la Política Exterior de México* (México, D.F.: Plaza y Valdés, 2005).

[92] Tom Long, "Putting the Canal on the Map: Panamanian Agenda-Setting and the 1973 Security Council Meetings," *Diplomatic History* (2013).

[93] Amado Luiz Cervo and Clodoaldo Bueno, *História da Política Exterior do Brasil* (Brasília, DF: Editora UnB, 2011).

continue to receive a privileged place in Brazilian IR, though Brazilian theorizing has grown.[94] There has also been a welcome growth in studies of Latin American foreign policies, particularly from scholars working in the region. Many of these have been primarily descriptive, while others have sought to apply theoretical approaches from IR or foreign policy analysis. Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira employs impressive multinational archival research in a tri-national study. His 2010 book focuses on detailed description of shifting relations and allegiances between the United States, Argentina, and Brazil from the 1864 War of the Triple Alliance until the middle of the first decade of the 2000s.[95] In a rare, quantitative study of the foreign policy of a Latin American country, Octavio Amorim Neto attempted to weigh competing explanations for Brazil's foreign policy orientation, using Brazilian votes in the UN General Assembly as a dependent variable.[96] Amorim Neto argues that, based on the declining coincidence of Brazil's voting with the United States, Brazilian foreign policy has become more independent. However, the decline is so steep and consistent that is almost uniformly down, with only minor upticks for regimes that seem to have been more cooperative than their predecessors. This leaves unanswered the question of whether the steady decline is perhaps better explained by other factors, like an expansion of the number of votes and the growth of the UNGA. A new study by the Brazilian Carlos Poggio Teixeira argues that IR studies of U.S.-Latin American relations have failed because they have sought to enforce uniformity where there is diversity. IR has tended to consider the whole of Latin America as one, subordinated regional system. Poggio

---

[94] Amado Luiz Cervo, "Política Exterior e Relações Internacionais do Brasil: Enfoque Paradigmático," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* vol. 46, no. no. 3 (2003).

[95] Bandeira, *Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos : Conflito e Integração na América do Sul : da Tríplice Aliança ao Mercosul*.

[96] His dependent variable looks at how often Brazil votes with the United States in the UN General Assembly. Octavio Amorim Neto, *De Dutra a Lula : a Condução e os Determinantes da Política Externa Brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro, Brasil: Elsevier : Campus, 2012).

Teixeira instead argues that South America and North/Central America need to be approached as a two distinct subsystems. In South America, he argues, the United States has been an "absent empire" largely because of Brazil's presence as a status quo-seeking, middle power.[97]

Scholarship in Latin America and the United States is increasingly exploring Latin American politics and foreign policy, but primarily examines how Latin Americans maneuver around the immutable realities of U.S. power. There is little work that asks whether Latin American leaders can influence how the United States uses its power, or how Latin American leaders might go about doing so. That is the question this dissertation now seeks to explore.

Plan for the dissertation

As indicated here, the principal focus of this project is to extend the insights of the internationalist approach to Latin American relations with the United States. I will do this by applying an "interactive" focus to U.S.-Latin American relations, building on the theory of small-state foreign policy power, and assessing what my approach adds to the interpretations evident in the dominant establishment and revisionist literatures. The specific theoretical lens and questions that I apply to each case are described in the following chapter. However, my guiding query throughout is, how do Latin American leaders define and pursue their priorities vis-à-vis the United States and to what effect? To answer that, I will pay particular attention to their foreign policy goals and strategies.

The second chapter of the dissertation delves into the IR literature on small states and argues that it can be helpfully advanced through the application of tools from foreign policy analysis. I describe a structure for the comparison of historical cases as well as the specific questions that guide each case. The next four chapters apply this focused, structured approach to

[97] Teixeira, *Brazil, the United States, and the South American Subsystem : Regional Politics and the Absent Empire*.

cases that range from the mid-1950s to the early 2000s, employing multinational research. The first case examines Operação Pan-Americana, a Brazilian-led foreign policy initiative in the late 1950s that sought to make development a hemispheric priority in order to strengthen the Western bloc. OPA was a forebear to John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. The second case takes a long view of Panamanian efforts to shift U.S. policy regarding the Panama Canal. Astute Panamanian diplomacy helped redefine the issue and place it on the U.S. agenda years before the crucial participation of Jimmy Carter. The third case applies a new lens to the Mexican decision to seek a free trade agreement with the United States in the early 1990s, showing how leaders recalculated both Mexican economic and foreign policy with dramatic effects for U.S.-Mexican relations. The fourth and final case looks at the initiation of Plan Colombia, a bilateral program that has funneled billions of dollars in counternarcotics funding to the Colombian government. The Colombian government actively sought U.S. assistance, in large part to secure its weak domestic position. In a concluding section in each chapter, I explicitly address the guiding questions, including how a multinational perspective and new evidence lead to a different understanding of the case. In the concluding chapter, I return to these questions in comparative perspective. This allows me to assess the types of strategies employed by Latin American leaders, showing how they attempted to influence U.S. policies through the use of opportunities, allies, and ideas. Finally, I synthesize the contributions of the dissertation to the study of U.S.-Latin American relations and to IR theory on smaller states.

CHAPTER 2

OPPORTUNITIES, ALLIES, AND IDEAS: AN INTERACTIVE PERSPECTIVE ON SMALL-STATE INFLUENCE

My dissertation examines four prominent cases from the last five decades of U.S.-American relations. Three of these cases—the Panama Canal treaty negotiations, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and Plan Colombia—have received significant study in diplomatic history, political science, and International Relations. The fourth, Brazil's Operação Pan Americana, has been treated as a footnote to John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. Specific interpretations have come to dominate the literature on all four events. The dominant understanding of the Panama Canal negotiations focuses on the arrival of President Jimmy Carter. One story is that the treaties represent Carter's attempt to institute a new, more just foreign policy toward the Americas and the Third World; critics of Carter and the treaties see it as an example of capitulation in an era of post-Vietnam weakness. Most of the literature treats the North American Free Trade Agreement as an expansion of U.S. principles of free trade, coming at a triumphal moment for free markets and democracy as the Soviet Union collapsed. Critics and supporters of Plan Colombia describe the initiative as a paradigmatic example of the United States' new rationale for interventionism in Latin America—either as an example of state-building that could be replicated or as overreach that trampled the peaceful intentions of the Colombian government. What all these explanations have in common is that they focus overwhelmingly on the goals, decisions, and actions of the United States. That Operação Pan-Americana has been reduced to such a minor role in the literature on the Alliance exemplifies how the near-total focus on the United States has distorted our understanding of key events.

This dissertation makes a different argument: none of these events would have come to pass as they did without the initiatives of Latin American leaders. The four case studies in the dissertation provide necessary complements to the more common explanations. The case literature is heavily based on sources from the United States, and has therefore focused on explanations and causes that originate from one side of the relationship. The accounts in this dissertation employ extensive archival work and interviews in the Latin American countries involved, in addition to U.S. sources. My argument builds on a recent trend, largely driven by a new generation of foreign relations historians, to employ Latin American sources to tell a neglected side of history. However, nearly all of this work aims to illustrate how external powers' attempts to control what was happening in Latin America, particularly during the Cold War, often fell short. Outcomes in Latin America were rarely determined by the actions of powerful outsiders; instead, powerful national elites usually played a more important role.[98] My work extends this insight to Latin American foreign policies and their effects on U.S. policy.

The four cases pose an interesting puzzle. The study of U.S.-Latin American relations is dominated by a focus on the intentions and actions of the United States. As Carlos Gustavo Poggio Teixeira recently summarized, the literature tends toward "monocausal explanations for the international relations of Latin America. … Indeed, every important event in the history of Latin America, from peace to war, from stability to instability, for good or for bad, can be attributed to actions planned in offices in Washington under the usual framework of U.S.-Latin

[98] Important works in this regard include, but are not limited to Hal Brands, *Latin America's Cold War: An International History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), G. M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser, eds., *In from the Cold : Latin America's New Encounter with the Cold War, American Encounters/Global Interactions* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), Friedman, "Retiring the Puppets, Bringing Latin America Back In: Recent Scholarship on United States-Latin American Relations, Sandra P. Borda, "The Internationalization of Domestic Conflicts: A Comparative Study of Colombia, El Salvador and Guatemala" (Ph.D., University of Minnesota, 2009), Arlene Tickner, "Intervención por Invitación: Claves de la Política Exterior Colombiana y de sus Debilidades Principales," *Colombia Internacional* 65 (2007).

American relations."[99] In IR theory, we find a similar focus on great powers. The actions of those powers and the structure of the international system itself seem to leave little room for weaker states to influence larger ones.

Given how both of these fields deploy the concepts of power and influence, we should not expect to observe effective Latin American foreign policies, especially if they conflict with the desires of the United States. In each of these cases, however, Latin American leaders took meaningful actions that influenced the course of events. They identified goals and used their foreign policies to pursue them, with differing levels of success. Power asymmetry does matter. It can constrain the choices of Latin American leaders, but it is not deterministic. Latin American leaders may have limited power capabilities, but this has not prevented them from exercising influence. Instead of assuming that the power of the United States will allow it to determine outcomes, I advance a framework that allows for a better understanding of small-state leaders' goals, strategies, and interactions with great powers. By recognizing a broader role for influence that includes agenda-setting, issue framing, persuasion, and bargaining, a richer explanation is possible. At significant moments, Latin American leaders have influenced U.S. policy by recognizing opportunities, building groups of allies, and advancing new ideas.

As many seminal works on foreign policy have shown, a shift in the level of analysis can reveal new possibilities. In this study, I focus on individuals and small leadership groups as agents, while acknowledging the influences and structures imposed by the international system. Conducting a study of just one "level" complicates the study of interactions of factors that cross levels; to avoid this problem, my cases use "fields of vision" that are centered on leaders but

[99] Teixeira, *Brazil, the United States, and the South American Subsystem : Regional Politics and the Absent Empire*.

incorporate influences from varying levels.[100] On the one hand, focusing on state-level explanations ignores the motivations of Latin American leaders. On the other, state and systemic analyses have tended to ignore how these leaders have tried to overcome their states' relative weaknesses through rarely recognized forms of influence. Therefore, I move away from state-based models of international relations, which were designed to help us conceptualize the behaviors of great powers; these models tend to minimize or ignore the impact of smaller countries, and they were not constructed to reflect small states' experiences. In doing so, it is closer to the work done by a branch of liberalism that takes "preferences seriously."[101] The shift allows me to recognize connections between domestic goals, personal political positions, and national foreign policies, crossing the foreign-domestic divide. Though that divide has been widely questioned at least since the 1970s as an unhelpful theoretical construct, it continues to exercise great sway.[102] The separation of foreign and domestic abets the assumption that the actions of Latin American leaders are determined by external forces. If foreign policy is placed exclusively in the international realm, Latin American states are defined by their position of weakness relative to the United States. My analysis places Latin American leaders at the intersection of the foreign and domestic in order to offer a more complete picture of their interests, goals, strategies, actions, and eventual successes and failures. Many times, actions taken in foreign policy by leaders—Latin American and otherwise—are done so in pursuit of

[100] The "field of vision" approach is much closer to how diplomatic historians have approached problems. See J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," *World Politics* 14, no. 1 (1961), Nicholas Onuf, "Levels," *European Journal of International Relations* 1, no. 1 (1995).

[101] Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *International Organization* 51, no. 04 (1997).

[102] Early works questioning the division of international and domestic include Bayless Manning, "The Congress, the Executive and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals," *Foreign Affairs* 55, no. 2 (1977), Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence : World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," *International Organization* 32, no. 4 (1978).

domestic objectives and to solidify a leader's standing. However, the treatment of Latin American foreign policy in the literature has largely overlooked this dynamic.

Clarifying concepts

Before discussing the literature on small states, it is important to clarify a number of concepts as they will be used in this dissertation. It has often been pointed out, with much good reason, that the term "Latin America" obscures great differences. This is undoubtedly the case. Poggio Teixeira has argued that because the term is derived from common cultural, linguistic, and historical heritage as opposed to geography or regional, systemic dynamics, it is ill-suited to the study of IR.[103] Clearly, for much of history, U.S. relations with the states around the Caribbean Sea have differed enormously with those of the Southern Cone.[104] There are tremendous differences in histories, economies, political systems, and power between the many countries of the U.S. hemisphere. As such, I am cautious about using the term "Latin America," but continue to do so because the term has been an important marker for policymakers throughout the region and in the United States. During the period studied, "Latin America" was an important ordering construct. This is not to imply identical foreign policy situations—though close geographically, the situations of Mexico and Guatemala in their relations with the United States vary tremendously. Even sub-regional divisions would obscure those differences.

Second, the terms "U.S.-Latin American relations," "inter-American relations," and "U.S. foreign policy to Latin America," have often been used interchangeably, but the differences among the three terms may be more important than the similarities. The narrowest of these terms is "U.S. foreign policy," the study of which would concern the decision-making processes within

---

[103] Teixeira, *Brazil, the United States, and the South American Subsystem : Regional Politics and the Absent Empire*.

[104] Pastor, "Review: Explaining U.S. Policy toward the Caribbean Basin: Fixed and Emerging Images."

the U.S. government regarding the development of policies regarding Latin America. If focused on the U.S. decision process, it would not require great depth of research in Latin American archives—though an understanding of a policy's consequences would be greatly improved through multinational research. The reverse would be "Brazilian foreign policy," for example. "U.S.-Latin American relations" will be used to describe relations to which the United States is always a party, coupled with one Latin American state or a grouping of Latin American states that are treated as a bloc. As such, the term refers to relations are essentially bilateral in nature, or are an aggregation of bilateral relationships. U.S-Panamanian relations (the focus of my second case), U.S.-Mexican relations (my third case), and U.S.-Mercosur relations (with the later treated as a unit) are rightfully grouped under the heading of U.S.-Latin American relations. "Inter-American relations" is the most complex. It could include relations amongst different Latin American states, and it may or may not include the United States. To use a contemporary example, both UNASUR and the Organization of American States are "inter-American" organizations, though the former excludes the United States.

Third, the concepts of power and influence have a muddled lineage in International Relations. I will not try to fully untangle that here, beyond what is necessary to clarify my own usage. Under realist IR, power has had two primary definitions. One refers to military forces—as well as economic and population resources that can be converted to military capabilities.[105] It is a measure of capabilities. The second definition of power is relational and operational. State A has power if it is able to make State B do something that State B would not otherwise do.[106] As

[105] The classic use comes from Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (1968).

[106] For an excellent survey, see David A. Baldwin, "Power in International Relations," in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse-Kappen, and Beth A. Simmons (London: SAGE Publications, 2002).

mentioned above, in U.S.-Latin American relations, both these definitions of power direct our attention to the coercive actions and capabilities of the United States. Because these uses are thoroughly engrained in IR, but without much definitional consensus, I avoid talking about the "power" of Latin American leaders and concentrate on their "influence." In doing so, I seek to avoid the coercive connotation of "power."[107] By asking if Latin American leaders can "influence" U.S. policies, I am instead asking whether U.S. actions would have been different in the absence of actions taken by Latin American leaders. Whereas narrower conceptualizations of "power" foreclose the possibility of meaningful Latin American agency, "influence" invites the study of these actions, without presupposing their (in)effectiveness. This opens a variety of mechanisms of influence to examination in the cases that follow. Likewise, this project responds to previous studies by asking what the predominant focus on the U.S. has missed, and how significant those missing elements are to understanding U.S.-Latin American relations. With these concepts in mind, I turn to a brief review of the IR literature on small states, before offering my own framework for the analysis of small-state actions.

Small-state influence

The United States is a uniquely powerful state. In U.S.-Latin American relations, this can make the United States seem like a colossus, an overwhelming power on which the leaders of comparatively weak Latin American states could have little influence. Though the mainstream of IR theory, particularly realism and security studies, long focused on great powers and their role in determining the structure of the international system, a smaller group of scholars has argued

[107] There are certainly other applications, such as structural power, soft power, or embedded in Gramscian notions of hegemony, that try to step away from this coercive connotation. However, even these seem to rely on having the ability to coerce should the structural, soft, or hegemonic power fall short.

that small states deserve serious attention.[108] Some authors have tried to adapt dominant IR theories, while others have argued that different approaches are needed to explain the foreign policies of the "global south."[109] Initially, much of the theoretically driven IR literature on small states functioned at a systemic level. The first major wave of this literature began to appear in the late 1960s, but flowered through the late 1970s and early 1980s with attention to the non-aligned movement, the United Nations, and commodity-producer organizations. Early systemic work grouped these countries under the labels of small states, weak states, middle powers, or emerging powers. A primary focus was definitional, but there has been little agreement on what constitutes a "small state." Definitions that set limits on territory, population, resources, economic production, or other criteria have not produced useful categories because of the apparent tradeoffs between these criteria. Other authors have tried to distinguish "smallness" based on self-perceptions.[110] However, that approach risks falling into a circular argument—small states tend to behave in certain ways because they see themselves as small. Robert O. Keohane suggested a division of states into the few that are "system determining," an upper-middle group that are "system influencing," the many relatively small states who are "system affecting," and the weakest who are "system-ineffectual."[111] David Mares follows this classification as he

---

[108] Here I am focusing on the IR literature regarding the international behaviors, particularly through foreign policies, of small states. Another important literature examines aspects of small states including their formation, cohesiveness, relation to international markets, etc.

[109] For example, the "peripheral realism" of Carlos Escudé tries to adapt realism, but argues that small and middle powers that are highly constrained by structures of international power that resemble hierarchy more than anarchy. Escudé, *Foreign Policy Theory in Menem's Argentina*. For a broader survey of approaches to international relations of the global south, see Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner, ed., *The Foreign Policies of the Global South : Rethinking Conceptual Frameworks* (Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner, 2003).

[110] Jeanne A. K. Hey, *Small States in World Politics : Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), pp. 2-4.

[111] Robert O. Keohane, "Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in Internatinal Politics," *International Organization* 23, no. 02 (1969).

examines the behaviors of small and middle powers in what he terms "regional hegemonies," with explicit reference to the Western Hemisphere. In these political geographies, states do not have full freedom to decide whether they will balance or bandwagon with the most powerful state in their region, he argues.[112]

It is not the goal of this chapter to settle this definitional dispute. I do not intend to apply a category of "small state" globally, given that my study is limited to Latin American-United States relations. As such, I choose to follow a relational approach. While Brazil and Panama are greatly different in terms of capabilities, in the cases studied what matters is that both were without question at the short end of an asymmetrical power relationship with the United States. As such, they were the "weaker powers" in each case, though size affected strategies. In its long struggle with the United States, Panama used its tiny size to to paint the U.S. as a bully and gain diplomatic support; conversely, Brazil used its size to argue for its inherent importance.

One way to consider influence of weaker countries is to examine junior partners within alliances—though the alliance literature has focused largely on Europe and paid far less attention to U.S.-Latin American relations. Realism has seen the role of non-great powers in alliances as unimportant. Kenneth Waltz argued that alliance leaders make decisions according to their own interests; the wishes of smaller allies did not act as a major constraint.[113] Fellow realist Stephen Walt's major concern was to determine what dynamics drove alliance formation: weak states are likely to bandwagon with likely winners, and this goal will override concerns of ideology and aid. In some circumstances, small allies might have an important influence through

[112] David R. Mares, "Middle Powers under Regional Hegemony: To Challenge or Acquiesce in Hegemonic Enforcement," *International Studies Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (1988).

[113] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979), pp. 169-170.

bargaining.[114] James Morrow argues that in asymmetric alliances, the larger partner gains freedom of action while the smaller gains protection or other benefits.[115] In a rare work specifically on Latin America and alliances, Michael Desch argued that small states are intrinsically valuable to superpowers, which compete for political favor, thus granting small states some leverage.[116] According to Jeremy Pressman, small states sometimes join alliances to restrain the behavior of their more powerful allies. Restraint is facilitated by the institutional links of the alliance itself.[117]

Other work on alliance dynamics turns to state-level dynamics. While the United States is powerful, it is hardly an impenetrable fortress. Its system includes numerous "access points" that can provide entry into policy process. These can include networks of advisors, a diffuse bureaucracy, and the Congress. However, almost all of the work on the subject has ignored or excluded Latin America. As David Mares notes in trying to carve out a place for middle powers: "For some studies, the constraints posed by the United States are perceived to be so overwhelming that Latin American countries are assumed incapable of formulating their own security definitions."[118] Those preconceptions do not appear to have been present to the same extent in studies involving smaller European allies.

---

[114] Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), esp. Ch. 2.

[115] James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," *American Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 4 (1991).

[116] Michael C. Desch, *When the Third World Matters : Latin America and United States Grand Strategy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).

[117] Jeremy Pressman, *Warring Friends : Alliance Restraint in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 3-8, 121-127.

[118] Mares, "Middle Powers under Regional Hegemony: To Challenge or Acquiesce in Hegemonic Enforcement," pp. 455.

In much-noted 1971 article, Robert O. Keohane argued: "Lesser allies have not only been able to act independently; they have also been able to use alliances to influence American policy and to alter American policy perspectives." This possibility was seemingly unique to the U.S. political system, facilitated by the U.S. "crusading spirit," a bipolar world structure, and open democratic institutions, which make the U.S. policy process uniquely susceptible to small-ally influence. Influence could occur through formal state-to-state negotiation, at the level of sub-national government agencies, or with U.S. interest groups and society.[119] He also refers to "informal penetration" of the U.S. policy-making system by smaller states. Keohane's appeal to the constituent parts of the U.S. government helpfully crosses between the literatures on alliances and U.S. foreign policy decision making.[120] However, swayed by the dominant perspective on hemispheric relations, Keohane excluded Latin America because those small nations "have lived for 150 years within an American sphere of influence."[121]

Thomas Risse-Kappen argues that the influence of smaller allies can be deeper than the ability to "restrain" suggested by Pressman or the "informal penetration" noted by Keohane and Nye. Focusing on relations between NATO democracies during the Cold War, he argues that norms about consultation and nonuse of coercion defined debates between alliance partners. Officials from NATO allies helped shape the definition of the U.S. national interest and were

[119] Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," pp. 162.

[120] Likewise, Keohane and Nye developed the concept of asymmetrical interdependence, illustrated with examples of the close cooperation between sections of the Canadian and U.S. bureaucracies. Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence : World Politics in Transition*.

[121] Keohane gives no other justification for his exclusion. In the case of South America, his claim is historically dubious, greatly overstating U.S. power before World War I and underestimating British influence. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," pp. 161.

treated as "legitimate bureaucratic players."[122] Risse-Kappen does not include Latin America in his study, but he shows that in U.S.-NATO relations, persuasion, argument, and information-sharing were important methods of influence for those with access to decision-making circles.

More recently, several scholars have argued that there is a need to re-evaluate the traditional IR perspective that "equate[s] 'smallness' with a lack of power."[123] Alan Chong and Matthias Maass argue: "The challenge lies in identifying the often particular and unconventional sources of small states' foreign policy power."[124] Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner has argued that a new approach is needed to evaluate small-state foreign policy, one which looks at power relationally and includes both capabilities and values. She notes that small states have been studied "from the perspective of dependence or vulnerability, not power." She argues for a switch from a systemic realism to a state-centric, "foreign policy power" approach in which small states can be seen as actors in their own rights. By shifting from the systemic to the state level, her work reveals that even a microstate like Trinidad and Tobago can exercise power.

> A weak power approach … aims to show that there are indeed some small states that may be not only resilient enough to deal with global economic pressures but also proactive enough to locate spaces in the international system where they might be able to successfully promote their interests. This does not mean that they are not vulnerable in many respects (as are all states to some degree or another) but that they are capable of employing strategies, both foreign and domestic, which allow them to overcome many of these handicaps.[125]

---

[122] Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among Democracies : The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy*, *Princeton Studies in International History and Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 204-209.

[123] Christopher S. Browning, "Small, Smart and Salient? Rethinking Identity in the Small States Literature," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 19, no. 4 (2006).

[124] Chong and Maass, "Introduction: The Foreign Policy Power of Small States."

[125] Braveboy-Wagner, "Opportunities and Limitations of the Exercise of Foreign Policy Power by a Very Small State: The Case of Trinidad and Tobago," pp. 410.

However, the author largely limits her focus to the economic-material—gas reserves in her illustrative case of Trinidad and Tobago—though she also notes the small nation's active use of regional organizations. Though Braveboy-Wagner describes Trinidad's "failure to influence the U.S.," in the last decade, in fact, Trinidad and Tobago has received a broad degree of latitude from the United States, having close relationships with Cuba and Venezuela without censure, while having broad access to the U.S. market and cooperation on security issues of bilateral concern. The country's leadership is frustrated by the failure to achieve a number of other goals, though these seem to reflect a broader decline in U.S. attention to the region during the period. The island nation has profitably exploited considerable autonomy in its foreign affairs. "[A] very small state, given appropriate resource or value endowments, can indeed craft a foreign policy that is proactive and influential in targeted domains," she concludes. Tiny Trinidad and Tobago's influence has exceeded the "system-ineffectual" irrelevance expected by many IR scholars, though as her study indicates, gaining salience can be a challenge for such a small state.

Weak states lack many of the tools, or capabilities, that large states employ in their exercise of power. While there is much to admire in Braveboy-Wagner's approach, to understand more fully the agency of weak states in their relations with more powerful ones, I intend to explore her contention that weak states "are capable of employing strategies, both foreign and domestic, which allow them to overcome many of these handicaps." Whereas powerful states have greater latitude for action, I argue that the ability of weak-state leaders to influence relations with large states depends on three types of strategies. First, they are more dependent on exploiting "opportunities," events or ephemeral circumstances that can be used to demand action or policy change. Secondly, weak states are more dependent on marshalling "allies" on their behalf. Here, I do not use allies in the military sense, because even a coalition of weak states is

unlikely to challenge a superpower like the United States. On the one hand, when their demands for policy change face opposition, weak-state leader will need to "internationalize" their demands and build a coalition of supportive states. They might also turn to international institutions as a source of support and a forum for coalition building. When facing an open political system like the United States, weak-state leaders might also seek internal allies, like supportive interest groups or politicians. Lastly, weak-state leaders will be more reliant on ideas to persuade or convince great powers. This has been implicitly recognized in constructivist literature that explores how Canada and Scandinavian countries have advanced new global norms, leading to policy changes restricting the use of landmines, for example. However, weaker-state leaders also advocate new ideas in more constrained situations, in which they advocate alternate "framing" or "issue definition" of problems and seek to shape agreeable options. Recent work on foreign policy change has argued that ideas and social processes should be a central focus.[126] I do not contend that these types of strategies are irrelevant to great powers. However, great powers have more options in their foreign policy toolkits. The leaders of weak-states will tend to succeed or fail depending on their ability to exploit opportunities, marshal allies, and promote ideas.

To more fully explore these strategies, the analyst needs to consider influences from across levels of analysis, and from both foreign and domestic sources. Where state-centric IR theories fall short, the tools of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) can be helpful. FPA encourages "multifactoral" and "multilevel" analyses—that is, incorporating influences from systemic, state,

[126] For example, see Steven W. Hook, "Ideas and Change in U.S. Foreign Aid: Inventing the Millennium Challenge Corporation," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 4, no. 2 (2008), David Patrick Houghton, "Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Toward a Constructivist Approach," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 3, no. 1 (2007), Mark A. Boyer, "Issue Definition and Two-Level Negotiations: An Application to the American Foreign Policy Process," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 11, no. 2 (2000).

and individual levels of analysis—on small groups of decision-makers. As Valerie Hudson argues, FPA's "actor-specific theory" provides the theoretical "grounds" for IR theory and allows for accounts of agency in a discipline that tends to focus on structures.[127] In their classic work, Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin argue that the state *is* the individuals who act in the name of the state, and that the natural reference for foreign policy analysis is to examine how those officials understand problems, make decisions, and take actions.[128] While this literature has had a "distinctly U.S. flavor," Margaret Hermann and others have advanced models that can be applied more broadly.[129] Recent work in foreign policy analysis, often referred to as poliheuristic theory, has led to an understanding of decision-making as a two-step process.[130] In this approach, decision-makers first define the situation in relation to their goals and means (sometimes called framing), often discarding certain options quickly because of perceived unacceptable costs on a given dimension.[131] The second step involves a more "rational" calculation between the costs and benefits of the remaining options. In relation to this study, influence could occur at two levels. Latin Americans could influence the manner in which U.S. leaders "frame" the region and U.S. interests. In a domestic political context, John Kingdon argued that getting an issue defined

---

[127] Valerie M. Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1, no. 1 (2005).

[128] Richard C. Snyder et al., *Foreign Policy Decision-Making Revisited* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

[129] Margaret G. Hermann, "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework," *International Studies Review* 3, no. 2 (2001).

[130] Alex Mintz, "How Do Leaders Make Decisions?," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 1 (2004), Alex Mintz, "Applied Decision Analysis: Utilizing Poliheuristic Theory to Explain and Predict Foreign Policy and National Security Decisions," *International Studies Perspectives* 6, no. 1 (2005).

[131] For works that interrogate the complex question of framing, see Alex Mintz and Steven B. Redd, "Framing Effects in International Relations," *Synthese* 135, no. 2 (2003), Houghton, "Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Toward a Constructivist Approach, William A. Boettcher, III, "The Prospects for Prospect Theory: An Empirical Evaluation of International Relations Applications of Framing and Loss Aversion," *Political Psychology* 25, no. 3 (2004), David A. Welch, *Painful Choices : a Theory of Foreign Policy Change* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005).

as a problem often represents a political victory on its own.[132] This can also be the case from the perspective of Latin American leaders seeking to position an issue with the United States. In the second stage, Latin American leaders could affect the rational decision process through the introduction of new information or via bargaining.

Unlike much FPA, my goal is not simply to explain the decisions or decision-making processes of Latin American leaders, but to assess whether Latin American leaders can be influential actors in their relationship with the United States. While these FPA tools help point to some possible mechanisms for influence, alone they are insufficient for this project because they focus on only one side of foreign policy decisions—a weakness that perhaps has hampered FPA's integration with IR theory. Latin American leaders' goals and strategies are not born outside the context of asymmetrical relations with the United States. Instead, these cases of U.S.-Latin American relations must be understood as an interactive process.[133] I seek to connect the single-country focus of FPA with the international focus of IR not by switching the level of analysis to the state or systemic level, but by examining the interactions of different countries through a focus on decision makers.

Toward an interactive FPA

How does an interactive approach allow for a better understanding of relations between weak and great powers? In this section, I advance an interaction-focused approach to analyzing cases of U.S.-Latin American relations. I use the following five analytical stages to structure the dissertation's case studies and guide the questions (discussed below) asked of each case.

---

[132] John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984), See also Robert F. Durant and Paul F. Diehl, "Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy: Lessons from the U.S. Foreign Policy Arena," *Journal of Public Policy* 9, no. 2 (1989).

[133] This echoes Pastor, *Exiting the Whirlpool*.

1. Problem understanding
2. Foreign policy goals
3. Foreign policy strategies
4. Actions and responses (i.e., dyadic interactions)
5. Outcomes

The stages offer a simplified version not solely of one side of the policy-making process, but of interactions between policymakers. In an ideal process, the stages would progress in a linear fashion: a problem must be understood before goals can be articulated; goals must be articulated before strategies to achieve them can be crafted; strategies are needed to guide actions which elicit responses; actions result in outcomes. In practice, I expect more fluidity. Events can introduce new information, which might affect how policy makers understand the problem they face. Responses from other actors could lead to expanded or curtailed goals, and so on. Therefore, these stages should be understood primarily as an analytical framework that allows for a structured examination of the actions and interactions of multiple actors, as well as the comparison across cases. That fluidity also points the important of process in each stage—process of defining goals and choosing strategies, for example—that I explore in the case narratives.

In the first step, we must try to understand how a given problem is defined by Latin American and U.S. leaders. Research in foreign policy analysis suggests that before policymakers can rationally weigh the costs and benefits of policy options, they must first come to an understanding of the problem they face. This step precedes any sort of rational choice framework, and in itself is not a purely rational matter.[134] Going beyond the single-country focus

[134] Mintz, "Applied Decision Analysis: Utilizing Poliheuristic Theory to Explain and Predict Foreign Policy and National Security Decisions."

of FPA, we also need to examine the interaction between Latin American and U.S. understandings. There are two situations in which we are likely to see low levels of problem clarity. The first regards issues that are "new" or appearing on the political agenda for the first time. Policymakers might try to understand these situations through the use of metaphors, for example, or they could argue about the correct "framing" of the issue.[135] Some constructivist scholars have suggested that a "shared reality-building process" is a central element of peaceful negotiations.[136] The second involves a breakdown in the "policy paradigm" that had been applied to a problem. Sudden moments of crisis might signal that a policy clearly has failed, and these times might allow for shifts in both the understanding of a problem and the policies that are seen as possible solutions to that problem.[137] Under either circumstance, if U.S. conceptions are malleable, this offers an opportunity for Latin American leaders to influence U.S. decisions not just through negotiating but by shaping the definition of the problem itself.[138]

Systemic realism tends to make broad assumptions about state interests.[139] Though some FPA theories also lean heavily on assumptions that foreign policy goals are rationally derived,

---

[135] Houghton, "Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Toward a Constructivist Approach, Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War : Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), Mintz and Redd, "Framing Effects in International Relations."

[136] G. Matthew Bonham, Victor M. Sergeev, and Pavel B. Parshin, "The Limited Test–Ban Agreement: Emergence of New Knowledge Structures in International Negotiation," *International Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 2 (1997). qtd. in, Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations."

[137] J. Gustavsson, "How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change?," *COOPERATION AND CONFLICT* 34, no. 1 (1999), Welch, *Painful Choices : a Theory of Foreign Policy Change*, David Skidmore, "Explaining State Responses to International Change: The Structural Sources of Foreign Policy Rigidity and Change," in *Foreign Policy Restructuring*, ed. Jerel A. Rosati, Hagan, Joe. D., and Sampson, Martin W., III (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1994).

[138] Very similar concepts to the idea of problem definition have been referred to by others as "framing" or "common knowledge." Framing also has a connotation of positioning a policy in political posturing, so I avoid it here. The "common knowledge" literature is more closely tied to negotiations.

[139] For the liberal counterpoint, see Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics."

this step follows more recent trends in cognitive FPA. Instead of beginning with this assumption, I examine the origins of Latin American foreign policy goals. In part, this is because the common assumption that interests are defined in terms of power is poorly suited to Latin American cases. Secondly, the formulation of interests is an important arena in which to observe how domestic and international factors weigh upon decision makers. By beginning with the definition of Latin American foreign policy goals, I look at how leaders understood the problems they were facing and how they strategized about their choices and constraints. The cases trace the interactions between U.S. and Latin American leaders, and finally assesses the influence that Latin American actions had in how the cases unfolded.

The first step in understanding the successes and failures of Latin American foreign policy is to establish the goals leaders are pursuing. The importance of studying the domestic origins of foreign policy goals for small states has at times been recognized.[140] My case studies begin by assessing how domestic political situations condition leaders' goals. While this might be important for gaining a richer understanding of the foreign policy of any state, traditional IR models that discuss states' interests as defined by the accumulation of power are particularly insufficient in regards to weaker states. Scholars of the "global south" have noted that realism has been an inadequate guide for these states, particularly in recent times in which territorial conquest is rare. Though weaker states may, at times, make foreign policy decisions in order to guarantee security, they cannot meaningfully do so via the accumulation of power capabilities. Braveboy-Wagner and Snarr note that scholars who have tried to apply IR theory to the global south have often found it necessary to modify those theories to introduce domestic factors.[141] If

[140] Hey, *Small States in World Politics : Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior*, pp. 75-76.

[141] Braveboy-Wagner and Snarr, "Assessing Current Conceptual and Empirical Approaches."

we “black box” domestic processes, as structural realists would have us do, we are left with unhelpful assumptions. Latin American leaders’ goals often bridge the foreign-domestic divide as leaders try to improve their political situations or solve domestic problems through their foreign policies. As described in the first stage of poliheuristic theory, these goals are not derived from purely rational or cost-benefit calculations. Defining these goals (as opposed to making assumptions about national interests) is best treated as an empirical question, meaning that we need to examine how foreign policy makers understand the problems they face.

However, because goals are not likely to be developed from domestic factors in isolation, I pivot to examine how the international environment and the U.S. policy process present both opportunities and obstacles for Latin American leaders. How do Latin American foreign policy strategies seek to exploit these opportunities and manage the constraints? Here, the context of asymmetry plays an obvious role: the obstacles may be greater and the opportunities fewer than for the leader of a more powerful country. Leaders will anticipate the constraints they face, which could limit the ambition of their goals. They are likely to push against them cautiously.

While seemingly central to the study of international relations, the study of interaction is in fact under-conceptualized. I am interested in interactions of two types. The first is more familiar, in that it could be incorporated into the modeling approaches that have dominated the study of interaction. Moving from goals and strategies to actions and responses, it is important to assess the initial U.S. response to the initiative or demand presented by Latin American leaders. This response, in addition to asymmetry, will condition the options available to Latin American leaders as the interaction unfolds. Depending on that response, Latin American leaders will have to choose what path to pursue with the United States. In the cases studied, an initial negative response from Washington did not necessarily dissuade Latin Americans from their goals, but it

did push them to alter their strategies. The dissertation's case studies demonstrate that Latin American leaders were at times able to alter the initial U.S. response through their astute management of interaction. The realization leads to a focus on how Latin American leaders achieved this influence, which occupies a significant part of the case study narratives. The second aspect of interaction is concerned with how leaders understand problems, generate solutions, and attempt to persuade one another.

Stages three and four (strategies and actions and responses) are likely to be iterative. U.S. responses will lead to changes in strategies as leaders continue to pursue goals in changing circumstances. The dynamics of interaction could lead Latin American leaders to internationalize an issue versus working through bilateral channels, seek to change the international agenda, or try to redefine their goals in language that is more salient in Washington or elsewhere. An initial positive response from U.S. leaders does not mean that Latin American leaders quickly obtained all they requested, but it did tend to keep Latin American demands in bilateral channels. Within those channels, Latin American leaders still faced the challenge of negotiating within an asymmetrical relationship. That challenge was often exacerbated by having to consider the U.S. executive and legislative branches as almost entirely different negotiating partners.[142] This stage forms the bulk of the case studies because it is here that I trace the process of intentions, actions, and interactions, using a closely constructed, chronological narrative to untangle diverse influences, while taking into account actors are likely to adjust their goals and strategies.

Finally, I offer an assessment of the effectiveness of Latin American actions in the cases studied. This assessment seeks to weigh the influences above (though in a qualitative, not

[142] Though it was not a primary focus of the study, there was general support in several cases for Peter B. Evans, Harold Karan Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds., *Double-Edged Diplomacy : International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

quantitative sense), and ascertain the effectiveness of Latin American actions, and discern the conditions under which those actions mattered. We must be cognizant that the United States might also want to change its own policy for a variety of reasons—policy failure, personnel change, changing priorities, or Congressional or public pressure. In these cases, careful process-tracing is needed to separate and weigh sometimes intertwined, competing explanations. In some cases, past U.S. policy might be seen as no longer serving U.S. interests. Here it is important to assess how those interests re-defined, and whether it is the influence of Latin American leaders or other, exogenous factors that explain that change. In these cases, do Latin American leaders have a hand in defining the new interests or providing policy options for the pursuit of those interests? If so, it can be said their actions had influence.

Methods and case selection

This dissertation asks, how do Latin American leaders, within a context of asymmetrical power relations, seek to influence U.S. policies that affect their countries and interests? I use both with-in case and cross-case analysis to examine how Latin American leaders define their interests and goals vis-à-vis the United States, how they pursue those goals, and the conditions under which they achieve or fail to achieve them. The with-in case analysis is built on process-tracing methods, applying my central research questions in four theoretically focused, historical case study narratives of U.S.-Latin American relations. By theoretically focused, I mean that each narrative was guided by my overarching question as well as by the analytical framework described in the preceding section. George and Bennett argue for process-tracing to build these narratives, to understand causal mechanisms and causal effects, and to avoid equifinality, in which multiple hypotheses are consistent with a given outcome. Process-tracing requires gathering a large body of data from different sources, to minimize the likelihood of reflecting

just one interpretation of events. The collection of this data is focused on specific events, processes, and key (as opposed to representative) actors.[143] The cross-case comparison, located in the concluding chapter, employs George and Bennett's method of "structured, focused comparison," using what they refer to as "building block" case studies.[144]

The "on the ground" methods used in my dissertation are drawn from history and historically oriented IR. I conducted archival work in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and the United States. This multinational work reflects a choice to go beyond the "mononational explanations" described by Friedman.[145] Because the cases span a range of time and countries, the locations of the documents and the conditions of the archives varied considerable. I worked in formal archival settings for the earlier cases. For more recent cases, I often worked directly in government agencies that produced and stored the documents. For cases on the Panama Canal, NAFTA, and Plan Colombia, I also conducted elite interviews, including with former cabinet secretaries, ambassadors, and presidents, and worked insights from these into my case narratives.[146] Where possible, I used documents in the interviews. Finally, I supplemented official documents with press accounts, memoirs, and scholarly work. Prior to writing, I used all of these sources to construct expansive, sourced chronologies. As described by George and Bennett, sequencing is an important step for the analysis of causal mechanisms and

---

[143] *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), Gerardo L. Munck, "Tools for Qualitative Research," in *Rethinking Social Inquiry*, ed. Henry E. Brady and David Collier (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004).

[144] George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, ch. 3, pp. 76.

[145] Friedman, "Retiring the Puppets, Bringing Latin America Back In: Recent Scholarship on United States-Latin American Relations."

[146] Oisín Tansey, "Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-Probability Sampling," in *Methoden Der Vergleichenden Politik- Und Sozialwissenschaft*, ed. Susanne Pickel, et al. (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009).

processes. This technique helped me come to an understanding of how goals, strategies, understandings, and interactions developed over time. These case chronologies guided the writing of narratives that address the key questions.

The four cases were selected because each focused on an issue with great resonance throughout Latin America at that moment. The cases all come from the post-World War II era, during which the United States was the world's leading power. During this period, U.S. attention shifted to the region mostly on a sporadic basis, as the country expended much of its energy dealing with global and distant issues, which Robert A. Pastor describes as a "whirlpool" that pulls the United States in during moments of crisis.[147] This provides an important contrast with an earlier era in which Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, and to a lesser extent the northern coast of South America were a more consistent and primary U.S. foreign policy concern. Inside those broad categories, the cases were selected to maximize variation; they cover a swath of Latin American geography, countries of different sizes, and diverse issues. The differences between the countries and time periods involved are large, important, and intentional. There are major power differentials, the foreign policy bureaucracies are not comparable, and the cases include democratic and non-democratic countries. Without this variation, the study's scope would be limited to explaining Latin American agency in a narrower geographical or thematic context. While the cases are indeed quite different, there are commonalities in the processes present within them. Crucially, in each of these cases the Latin American leaders were the demandeurs. Most of the literature on U.S.-Latin American relations presents the United States as making demands of Latin Americans, who have few options apart from compliance. This perspective has even dominated previous interpretations of these same cases. Having Latin

[147] Pastor, *Exiting the Whirlpool*.

Americans as demandeurs does not lead to uniform trajectories. A key variation between the cases regards how the United States initially responded to the Latin American demand, and the effect this had on the strategies pursued by the Latin American leaders. The cases studied include two in which the United States was initially favorable to Latin American initiatives and two in which the United States opposed or withheld support. The initial U.S. position did not determine the eventual outcome of the case, as much of the literature would lead us to believe, though it did condition the strategies pursued by Latin American leaders.

This dissertation deals with leaders and countries that seek to influence U.S. policies within relationships characterized by general cooperation. In doing so, the dissertation eschews more conflictual relationships—such as between the United States and post-revolutionary Cuba—which are important, but essentially outliers in the scope of U.S.-Latin American relations. These relationships have drawn a disproportionate amount of attention from both scholars and U.S. policymakers. The question of whether and how leaders like Cuba's Fidel Castro could influence U.S. foreign policy is a valid one. However, as indicated by the earlier discussion on junior alliance partners, there is good reason to expect different processes of influence between countries identified as generally sympathetic to one's alliance and those who explicitly seek to oppose it. In the latter situation, coercion is likely to be emphasized and consultation rare. This dissertation's choice of cases, which does not include case in which there is opposition not just to a particular U.S. policy but at a more fundamental level, is essentially a choice of scope. By focusing on the dynamics of broadly cooperative relationships, I seek to more seriously explore the options available to those Latin American leaders. Given that in most cases the costs of openly challenging the United States (during the Cold War) or the broader international system it shaped and continues to lead (during the decade after the Cold War) will

nearly always outweigh the benefits, the options for most leaders exist within a broad spectrum of cooperation. However, cooperation does not mean compliance. In a traditional imperial system, independent foreign policy would not exist from subordinated states. In the post-war international system, Latin American states are allowed their own voices, though they hardly have equal weight in international affairs and the leading power may seek to enforce limitations.

Leaders are not puppets simply because they do not seek to overturn the international order. There is a large and meaningful middle ground in which Latin American leaders can pursue their own priorities. That is, when the fundamental goals of the weaker state and the United States do not conflict, the weaker leader can maintain a great scope of independent action. At times, they can gain acquiescence or even considerable assistance from the United States for those goals. This path will make sense for many Latin American countries, which might lack many of the options open to larger alliance partners (especially in multipolar systems), such as external balancing. This is the traditional understanding of how asymmetry constrains options—in addition to making direct military action impractical. Even during the Cold War, the threat of "changing sides" would not seem to offer much leverage. The actual effect on the balance of power of a small Latin American republic switching sides would be minimal, though as with Cuba, the symbolic and strategic importance could be much larger. Regardless, the costs of taking this route are also quite high, and more so for a country geographically close the United States. The option of allying with a foreign power has essentially been removed since the end of the Cold War, though economic agreements might be available without drawing meaningful opposition from the United States, since the sector is not seen as zero-sum. At the same time, the pressure to ally with the United States, at least on most issues, has fallen dramatically, though pressure remains on issues like the U.S.-led war on drugs.

Though this dissertation is most directly situated within the study U.S.-Latin American relations, the region is a particularly apt area for the study of weaker-power influence precisely because it has been treated as so unlikely. The foreign policy literature reflects ingrained assumptions that U.S. policies form an acceptable "monocausal explanation" for what happens in the region; Latin America as a whole has largely been ignored as an actor. For example, Peter Katzenstein argues: "The overwhelming presence of the United States dwarfs all other states and has prevented the emergence of states both supportive of American purpose and power and central to the region's political affairs."[148] Based on the general synthesis of the literature, Latin America should be seen in methodological terms as a source "hard cases" to prove the possibility of small-state agency. Jack Levy colorfully refers to this logic as the "'Sinatra inference' – if I can make it there, I can make it anywhere."[149] That logic makes cases from U.S.-Latin American relations broadly illustrative. Within Latin America, the Caribbean Basin, with its history of more frequent interventions, should provide harder cases still, given that proximity and heightened U.S. interest led to more frequent exertions of U.S. power. In short, if Latin American leader provide examples of active, effective weaker-power foreign policy, it is a clear illustration that IR and foreign policy studies need to take the subject more seriously.

The dissertation will proceed through an examination of four cases, recounted as chronologically structured narratives. These narratives will pay special attention to the same central questions:

1. What has been the predominant interpretation of the case in the literature?

---

[148] Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies, Peter J. Katzenstein, *A World of Regions : Asia and Europe in the American Imperium* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005).

[149] Jack S. Levy, "Qualitative Methods and Cross-Method Dialogue in Political Science," *Comparative Political Studies* 40, no. 2 (2007): pp. 209.

2. With regard to each case, who are the most important actors in Latin America and the United States? How did each government define its interests, goals, and strategies?

3. How was the definition of Latin American interests, goals, and strategies affected by the perception of the United States or by U.S. policy? How were these goals affected by domestic political factors? How was Latin America's ability to affect the outcome shaped by the issue-area?

4. How were U.S. interests, goals, and strategies affected by domestic political factors, Latin American policy, or the asymmetry of power?

5. How would **U.S. policy** likely have been different in the absence of the Latin American effort?

6. How would the **outcomes** have been different if Latin American leaders had not vigorously pursued their interests?

7. What have U.S.-focused accounts of these cases missed, and what does a focus on interaction add to our understanding of the case and of inter-American relations?

The four in-depth cases are the Brazilian-led "Operation Pan-America" in the late 1950s, the negotiation of the Panama Canal Treaties from 1972-1978, the NAFTA negotiations in the early 1990s, and the formation of Plan Colombia from 1998-2001. The next four chapters will address these cases chronologically, applying the framework and questions described above. The final chapter will make a structured comparison across the four cases, and offer conclusions for the study of U.S.-Latin American relations and for IR theory on weaker-state foreign policy power, with a focus on the leaders' strategies.

CHAPTER 3

OPERAÇÃO PAN-AMERICANA: FIGHTING POVERTY AND FIGHTING COMMUNISM

Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek's first two meetings with Dwight D. Eisenhower had been cordial, but in the end, brought disappointing results. The two men met first over breakfast in Key West, Fla., shortly before the Brazilian's inauguration. Six months later, in July 1956, they talked on the sideline of a meeting of American heads of state in Panama City. Both times, Kubitschek pressed the American president about the need to attack poverty in Latin America, which he believed was a crucial, though largely ignored, problem for the Western world.[150] Eisenhower's responses echoed what Latin American leaders had been hearing from their U.S. counterparts since the end of the Second World War. The United States was now a global power with global responsibilities. The government's resources were spread thin, so Latin America would have to wait. However, that should not be a significant hindrance to Latin America's economic development, which would do much better to attract private investment instead of looking for government assistance.

Publicly, Kubitschek mostly praised U.S. leadership. Privately, he was frustrated with the U.S. attitude and lack of attention. He had even threatened to sit out the Panama meeting if the United States did not jumpstart a handful of development projects that had been stalled for years. In Kubitschek's mind, his ability to get development aid would play a major role not only in his own political fate but in the survival of Brazil's fragile democracy.[151] In both meetings,

---

[150] Juscelino Kubitschek, *Meu Caminho para Brasilia : A Escalada Politica*, vol. vol. 2 ([S.l.]: Bloch Editores, 1976), pp. 459-465.

[151] Developmentalism was the central tenet of Kubitschek's presidency. See Juscelino Kubitschek, *Meu Caminho para Brasília : Cinqüenta Anos em Cinco*, vol. vol. 3 (Rio de Janeiro: Bloch, 1978). For summaries in the U.S. and Brazilian literature, see, Robert J. Alexander, *Juscelino Kubitschek and the Development of Brazil, Monographs in International Studies, No. 16* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1991), Licurgo Costa,

Kubitschek warned that the desperation of poor masses in Brazil and elsewhere in Latin America created a ripe recruiting atmosphere for local communist parties. However, inside the Eisenhower administration, the vision of the communist threat in Latin America had little to do with spontaneous revolution from disenfranchised masses. Instead, brothers Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and CIA chief Allen Dulles and others were concerned largely with "subversives" who could infiltrate and undermine friendly governments.[152] Kubitschek's pleas about poverty and warnings about endogenous communism found little reception in the U.S. government from 1956 through early 1958.

On May 13, 1958, an opportunity arose that allowed Kubitschek to re-frame his calls for economic aid, while at the same time reiterating to audiences foreign and domestic his strong commitment to the Western alliance. Vice President Richard Nixon's motorcade was attacked during a visit to Caracas, drawing U.S. attention to Latin America—a region the administration had believed was generally safe from communism. The Eisenhower administration's view of Latin America's position in the global struggle was thrown into doubt. Though Nixon did not visit Brazil on that trip, Kubitschek and his aides recognized an opportunity.[153] On May 15, William P. Snow, deputy assistant secretary for inter-American affairs, highlighted growing instability, declining exports, and intensified Soviet entreaties throughout the Americas. Snow

---

Uma Nova Política para as Américas : Doutrina Kubitschek e Opa (São Paulo: Livraria Martins, 1960), Thomas E. Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964 : An Experiment in Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), ch. 5, Gustavo Biscaia da Lacerda, "Panamericanismo entre a Segurança e o Desenvolvimiento : O Operação Panamericana e a Aliança para o Progresso" (Universidade Federal do Paraná, 2004), pp. 86-91.

[152] Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, pp. 96-99, passim.

[153] Nixon had visited Brazil for Kubitschek's inauguration two years earlier. Kubitschek recounts his reaction in his memoirs, written in the 1970s. His discussion of OPA and the United States generally is more cynical than his pronouncements at that time. Kubitschek, *Meu Caminho para Brasília : Cinqüenta Anos em Cinco*, pp. 209-216. For another participant's account, which shows a more hopeful Kubitschek, see Autran Dourado, *Gaiola Aberta : Tempos de JK e Schmidt* (Rio de Janeiro: Rocco, 2000). Unfortunately, the initial meetings were informal; if documents were created, they do not appear to have been saved in the records of Itamaraty, the Memorial JK, or the National Archives.

wrote that the Caracas incident would "serve the useful purpose of dramatizing the internal Communist menace." As such, it could spur "modifications, changes in emphasis, and more effective methods of implementation" of U.S. policy.[154] Upon his return, Nixon, too, suggested a broader change in policy, saying "we must be dedicated to raising the standard of living of the masses."[155] Though the anti-Nixon demonstrations probably had much more to do with U.S. association with the recently ousted Venezuelan dictator, who had recently been allowed to move to the United States, and perhaps Nixon's own local unpopularity, than with communism,[156] Kubitschek stepped into the void to offer an explanation of that problem—and to re-cast his previous development proposals as a solution. For one part, Kubitschek and other Latin American leaders were instrumentally taking advantage of the U.S. fear of communism in order to advance their own cause of development; Though endogenous communism ranked relatively low on their list of concerns, Kubitschek, Frondizi, and Lleras Camargo also made the argument that communist sprang from poverty with an eye on their own powerful militaries, seeking to distinguish their moderate reformist efforts in the eyes of generals who, as Hal Brands has pointed out, did not need the United States to instruct them to be anti-communists.

This case is important for several reasons. First, the case occurs at the height of the early Cold War, during a period of very high bipolar tensions, in which the international environment would be expected to tightly structure Latin American leaders' choices. Second, by making Brazil a central part of the study, it allows for comparison of whether there are similar processes

---

[154] "Memorandum from the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow) to the Secretary of State," May 15, 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5,* pp. 236-238.

[155] "Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting," May 16, 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5*, pp. 238

[156] Both of these explanations were suggested in the aftermath by Tad Szulc, in "U.S. flies troops to Caribbean as mobs attack Nixon in Caracas," *New York Times*, May 14, 1958, pp. 1; "Venezuela: Anti-U.S. case history," *New York Times*, May 18, 1958, pp. E14; "Beneath the boiling-up," *New York Times,* May 25, 1958, pp. SM19.

through which Latin America's largest and smallest countries seek to influence U.S. policy. Third, the case is one of very limited near-term success, despite Brazilian leadership. Finally, development had been a central, longstanding Latin American quest.

In that quest, Kubitschek partnered with other leaders in the region. To ensure Brazil's rivalry with Argentina did not undermine the project, he sought to include President Arturo Frondizi. Later, he approached Colombian President Alberto Lleras Camargo, considered a preeminent Latin American statesman. Like Kubitschek, both men presided over democracies that had just emerged from military rule. "Operation Pan-America," an initiative to build a hemispheric consensus to combat underdevelopment as part of a Pan-American approach to communism, was a plan for foreign relations with the United States, and to confront the three leaders' domestic challenges. Their proposals were extraordinarily ambitious—an international echo of Kubitschek's campaign pledge to bring "fifty years of progress in five." In 1959, the Cuban revolution shook up hemispheric politics, creating new challenges and opportunities. Kubitschek changed Eisenhower's policy only in part; Brazilian diplomats struggled to overcome opposition from the United States and discord amongst their fellow Latin Americans. Despite these challenges, Kubitschek and his allies achieved several long-desired policy changes from the fiscally conservative Eisenhower administration. Operation Pan-America (OPA) built a foundation that would be used by its better known successor, the Alliance for Progress.

Operação Pan-Americana: A footnote in the literature

Of the four cases examined in this dissertation, this one has received the least attention in the literature.[157] In the English-language literature, OPA has been briefly mentioned in relation to

[157] The literature on the Alliance for Progress in large part reflects the revisionist versus establishment dynamic discussed in the literature review, because what each counts as the Alliance for Progress—development versus military aid for example. I am indebted to Max Paul Friedman for this clarification.

the Alliance for Progress.[158] Of surveys of U.S.-Latin American relations, Federico Gil's *Latin American-U.S. Relations* makes the strongest argument tying Kubitschek's OPA to the creation of the Inter-American Development Bank, and eventually to the Alliance for Progress.[159] Alan McPherson mentions Kubitschek only in passing, but included excerpts from an OAS document on OPA in the appendix.[160] The nature of Peter Smith's treatment is more frequent, with a brief mention of the attack on Nixon in Caracas and Kubitschek's letter, but no further exploration of the connections with the Alliance.[161] In his study of Kennedy administration policy in Latin America, Stephen Rabe says Kubitschek called for $40 billion commitment from the U.S., but does not discuss OPA. The figure is not well supported, and Rabe does not interrogate the connection between Kennedy's policies and Kubitschek's earlier proposals.[162]

There have been several important books on the Alliance, and they generally make note of Kubitschek without truly asking whether Kennedy's policy was indebted to the Brazilian. The classic evaluation is Levinson and Onis's *The Alliance that Lost its Way*, which criticized the program for falling short of many of its goals. It, too, makes only brief mention of OPA.[163] Jeffrey Taffet's recent book focuses on how the politics of the Alliance unfolded in several

---

[158] For an excellent summary on how the literature has treated OPA and the Alliance, see Christopher Darnton, "Asymmetry and Agenda-Setting in US-Latin American Relations: Rethinking the Origins of the Alliance for Progress," *Journal of Cold War Studies* vol. 14, no. no. 4 (2012): pp. 66-74.

[159] Federico Gil, *Latin American--United States Relations* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), pp. 218-220.

[160] Alan L. McPherson, *Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles : The United States and Latin America since 1945* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2006), app. 3.

[161] Smith, *Talons of the Eagle : Latin America, the United States, and the World*, pp. 136.

[162] There is no citation for the $40 billion figure, which I could not find support for. In fairness to Rabe, he deals somewhat more with OPA in his book on the Eisenhower administration. Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World : John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America*.

[163] Jerome I. Levinson and Juan de Onís, *The Alliance That Lost Its Way : A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress* (Chicago,: Quadrangle Books, 1970).

different countries, with less attention to its origins. He notes that the Nixon trip gave Latin Americans including Kubitschek "a chance to suggest ideas," but concludes that the Alliance's references to OPA were insincere.[164] As Christopher Darnton notes, assessments of the OPA-Alliance link varied between members of the Kennedy administration, with Richard Goodwin arguing the Alliance idea was essentially new while Lincoln Gordon gave the bulk of credit for intellectual authorship to Kubitschek. Perhaps most interestingly, Douglas Dillon, who had a central role in the foreign economic policies of both administrations, tied the policies of both administrations to Kubitschek's proposals.[165]

In his study on Brazilian-U.S. relations in the early Cold War, W. Michael Weis includes a chapter on Operation Pan-America, which he sees as an important step toward the emergence of a more independent Brazilian foreign policy. Building on an extensive study of the Brazilian press, interviews, and some documentation, the chapter represents one of the most complete studies of Kubitschek's foreign policy.[166] Darnton builds on Weis' work with more Brazilian documentation to argue that OPA was important for its role in agenda-setting, introducing and advancing ideas that were influential to the creation of the Alliance for Progress.[167] OPA has received some attention in studies of Brazilian politics. Robert J. Alexander's *Juscelino Kubitschek and the Development of Brazil*, is probably the most complete study of the Brazilian president in either language. It details the origins, evolution, and eventual policies of Kubitschek's brand of developmentalism. The book contains a chapter on OPA, and it is

---

[164] Jeffrey F. Taffet, *Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy : The Alliance for Progress in Latin America* (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 18.

[165] Darnton, "Asymmetry and Agenda-Setting in US-Latin American Relations."

[166] W. Michael Weis, *Cold Warriors & Coups D'etat : Brazilian-American Relations, 1945-1964* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1993), ch. 5.

[167] Darnton, "Asymmetry and Agenda-Setting in US-Latin American Relations," pp. 72-75.

particularly useful because of Alexander's interviews with participants.[168] Thomas Skidmore's classic study of Brazil's stunted experiment with democracy offers important context on OPA, but does not deal with foreign policy in much depth.[169]

There has been limited treatment of OPA in Brazilian literature, which is surprising because Brazilian scholars have produced a developed literature on foreign policy and Kubitschek is a major figure. However, when OPA is mentioned, Brazilian scholars have generally considered it an abject failure. Kubitschek himself waited more than a decade to pen his multi-volume memoirs, and his accounts of relations with the United States seem tinged with more cynicism than was evident during his presidency.[170] As Kubitschek concluded his presidency, journalist Licurgo Costa collected many of the public documents regarding Kubitschek's foreign and development policies, but his analysis is largely hagiographic.[171] Beyond the memoirs of a few participants, several Brazilian graduate theses have examined OPA, but they rely heavily on secondary documents and press accounts. In perhaps the most thorough case study to date, Alexandra de Mello e Silva draws on the personal archives of several diplomats and public collections of documents, but did not have access to the archives of Itamaraty, which have since been opened. Gustavo Biscaia da Lacerda compares Kubitschek's OPA with Kennedy's Alliance.[172] In summary, there is much empirical space to develop the case history of Operation Pan-America. Existing Brazilian and U.S. works have tended to deem OPA

---

[168] Alexander, *Juscelino Kubitschek and the Development of Brazil*.

[169] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964 : An Experiment in Democracy*.

[170] Of the four volumes, see Kubitschek, *Meu Caminho para Brasilia : A Escalada Politica*, Kubitschek, *Meu Caminho para Brasília : Cinqüenta Anos em Cinco*.

[171] Costa, *Uma Nova Política para as Américas : Doutrina Kubitschek e Opa*.

[172] Biscaia da Lacerda, "Panamericanismo entre a Segurança e o Desenvolvimiento", Alexandra de Mello e Silva, "A Política Externa do JK : Operação Pan-Americana" (Fundação Getulio Vargas, 1992).

a failure. A few authors have drawn a connection to the later Alliance, but OPA has been scarcely evaluated as a Brazilian and Latin American foreign policy initiative.

Background: Latin America and economic development aid after WWII

In the 1940s, as the United States shifted from neutrality to a war footing, the payoff of President Franklin Roosevelt's "good neighbor" policy became clear. Latin America, with the exception of Argentina, stood with the Allies and supported the United States. Brazil and Mexico participated directly in military action, while other Latin American countries offered important economic and political support, supplying oil, metals, and coffee to the U.S. war machine at controlled prices. The United States responded with $263 million in lend-lease aid, some economic assistance, and increased lending. One of the most promising projects was a Brazilian steel mill at Volta Redonda.[173] As the war came to a close, Latin American expectations began to coalesce around the idea that the United States owed assistance in return. As Robert Pastor noted: "Poorer than Europe and supportive of the U.S. effort in World War II, Latin Americans felt they deserved help and that the United States owed it to them."[174] Instead, after the war, prices of the capital goods Latin Americans desired skyrocketed, exhausting dollar surpluses that had been accumulated during the war as prices for commodity exports fell.

From the Brazilian perspective, the region slipped to the second tier of U.S. concerns. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations assumed the area would remain part of its political, economic, and ideological bloc. While there was general consensus between U.S. policymakers

[173] Peter H. Smith, *Talons of the Eagle : Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 79, Stanley E. Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War, 1945-1960: End of the Special Relationship," *The Journal of American History* 68, no. 3 (1981): pp. 600-601, W. Michael Weis, "The Twilight of Pan-Americanism: The Alliance for Progress, Neo-Colonialism, and Non-Alignment in Brazil, 1961–1964," *The International History Review* 23, no. 2 (2001).

[174] Pastor, *Exiting the Whirlpool*, pp. 206.

and those in many Latin American countries on the political and ideological components of the Cold War, this was less true in economic policy. De Mello argues that because these two administrations' foreign economic policies centered on an open, liberal trading order open to private investment, they saw Brazil's nationalist, state-led development schemes as problematic.[175] Brazilian policymakers expected greater support and leeway from Washington, not only because of the support given in the Second World War, but because an "unwritten alliance" was considered a founding tenet of Brazilian foreign policy dating to the godfather of Brazilian diplomacy, the Baron de Rio Branco.[176]

U.S. reconstruction aid to Europe spurred hopes that Latin America's support in the Second World War would be similarly rewarded. As he departed for the 1947 Rio Conference on hemispheric security, Ecuador's Foreign Minister Vicente Trujillo called for a conference "to draw up a sort of Marshall Plan for Latin America."[177] Requests for an economic conference punctuated the Rio summit. The United States appeared amenable to a separate conference the following year.[178] Closing the conference, President Truman emphasized the U.S. burden as world leader and declared that the Americas' prosperity would rely on the private sector, not a

---

[175] Alexandra de Mello e Silvia, "A Política Externa do JK : Operação Pan-Americana" (Fundação Getulio Vargas, 1992), pp. 6-7.

[176] There are several key works on the general orientation of Brazilian foreign policy. For a summary, see Amorim Neto, *De Dutra a Lula : a Condução e os Determinantes da Política Externa Brasileira*. See also Cervo, "Política Exterior e Relações Internacionais do Brasil: Enfoque Paradigmático, Mônica Hirst and Andrew Hurrell, *The United States and Brazil : a Long Road of Unmet Expectations* (New York: Routledge, 2005), Maria Regina Soares De Lima and Mônica Hirst, "Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 82, no. 1 (2006).

[177] "A 'Marshall Plan' Gains as a Rio Topic," *New York Times*, April 13, 1947, pp. 20.

[178] "The Chairman of the United States Delegation (Marshall) to the Acting Secretary of State," August 22, 1947, *FRUS, 1947, vol 8*, pp. 53-54. The Associated Press, "Argentine Urges Economic Parley of All Americas, *New York Times*, August 15, 1947; C.P. Trussell, "Aid Later Pledged," *New York Times*, August 14, 1947. Also see Stephen G. Rabe, "The Elusive Conference: United States Economic Relations with Latin America, 1945-1952," *Diplomatic History* 2, no. 3 (1978).

new Marshall Plan.[179] Some Latin Americans took a different message. Peru's foreign minister "characterized [Truman's message] as an expression of interest in the economic problems confronting the continent."[180] At the Economic Club of Detroit, OAS Secretary Lleras Camargo urged an "extraordinary experiment of cooperation." Summarizing the state of inter-American relations, he noted: "In politics, we have achieved splendid results. In economics, we have not."[181] Disappointment would continue. Frustration produced arguments that U.S. policies were intended to keep the region subordinated as a provider of raw materials.[182]

Latin America's push for economic aid became especially strident at the 1948 Ninth International Conference of American States in Bogotá.[183] Latin American delegates called for development assistance, echoing the "Marshall Plan for Latin America" theme, as well as for a specific bank for Latin American development.[184] Truman responded with a request to Congress to increase funding for the Export-Import Bank "for the financing of economic development in

---

[179] Harry S Truman, "Address before Rio de Janeiro Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security," September, 2, 1947, in *The American Presidency Project.* Available online: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12749.

[180] "The Ambassador in Peru (Cooper) to the Secretary of State," September 12, 1947, *FRUS, 1947, vol. 8, pp. 83-84.* Similar comments were noted from the Venezuelan minister: "At the next Inter-American conference, [the minister] hoped an agreement could be reached on economic cooperation which would raise the living standards of the people." "The Chargé in Venezuela (Maleady) to the Secretary of State," *FRUS*, 1947, vol. 8, pp. 87.

[181]"Discurso de Alberto Lleras ante el Economic Club de Detroit," November 3, 1947. Carpeta. 28, documento 433, BLAA. Available online: http://www.lablaa.org/blaavirtual/exhibiciones/lleras/pdf/carpeta-28/documento-433.pdf, pp. 5. Translation by author.

[182] de Mello e Silvia, "A Política Externa do JK", pp. 7-12. The arguments were influential in Brazil; Kubitschek echoes them his memoirs. Kubitschek, *Meu Caminho para Brasília : Cinqüenta Anos em Cinco*.

[183] The conference was marred by the murder of a prominent Colombian politician and the outbreak of *La Violencia*, highlighting the region's explosive social situation. Stephen J. Randall, *Colombia and the United States : Hegemony and Interdependence, The United States and the Americas* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1992), Ch. 7. "The Ambassador in Colombia (Beaulac) to the Acting Secretary of State, April 9, 1948, *FRUS, 1948, vol. 9,* pp. 39.

[184] Peruvian Foreign Minister Armando Revoredo called for unified hemispheric defense against communism and "for [a] Marshall Plan of [Latin America] including [an Inter-American] bank to offer credits to [the American Republics]." "The Ambassador in Colombia (Beaulac) to the Acting Secretary of State," Bogota, April 7, 1948. *FRUS, 1948, vol. 9,* pp. 33-34

the other American Republics."[185] Beyond that, there was little change to Truman's policies, except a modest expansion of Point IV technical assistance. Latin America grew increasingly peripheral to Truman's concerns. Though as a candidate Dwight Eisenhower criticized the previous administration for "neglect" of Latin America, once in office, the former general did not launch any major new initiatives.[186] Instead, he scaled back Export-Import Bank lending, which had been Truman's main instrument for making development loans in the region.[187] A pro-business fiscal conservative, Eisenhower slowed funding for small development projects in Brazil and elsewhere.[188] Brazilians were irked by Washington's admonitions to improve conditions for private capital and investment (particularly in the state-owned oil monopoly) in order to increase economic growth.[189] Given that Brazilian foreign policy elites had long held prioritized an informal, "special relationship" with the United States, the inability to gain special economic and military benefits stung.[190]

It was only through exceptional circumstances— the need to bargain for Latin American acquiescence to U.S. policies against Guatemala—that the Eisenhower administration finally agreed to Latin American calls for a conference dedicated to economic development. At a 1954 OAS conference in Caracas, Secretary of State Dulles was forced to trade for votes in favor of a

---

[185] Harry S Truman, "Special Message to Congress on Economic Aid to Latin America," April 8, 1948. *The American Presidency Project*. Available online: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13148.

[186] Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, pp. 29.

[187] Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, pp. 66.

[188] Levinson and de Onís, *The Alliance That Lost Its Way*, pp. 38, For an extensive history of these delays, see Rabe, "The Elusive Conference: United States Economic Relations with Latin America, 1945-1952."

[189] Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War, 1945-1960: End of the Special Relationship," pp. 603-605.

[190] Vágner Camilo Alvés, "Ilusão Desfeita: a "Aliança Especial" Brasil-Estados Unidos e o Poder Naval Brasileiro Durante e Após a Segunda Guerra Mundial," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* vol 48, no. no. 1 (2005).

resolution implicitly condemning Guatemala. He promised to reinstate some long-term lending from the Export-Import Bank and to make good on a decade-old promise for an economic conference focused on Latin America.[191] Even then, the Caracas resolution did not offer the unified condemnation of communism the administration had sought. Instead, Latin American leaders fought to turn the focus to non-intervention and to bargain for economic assistance.[192] The economic conference would finally be held at Quitandinha near Rio de Janeiro in November 1954. Raúl Prebisch at the Economic Commission on Latin America tried to set the tone with bold recommendations for state intervention and international assistance of "a minimum of 1,000 million dollars annually, and for a period of not less than ten years."[193] Those policies reflected Latin American desires, but from a U.S. perspective remained well beyond the horizon. U.S. positions at the Quitandinha were less than Latin Americans had hoped for.[194] This conference set the tone for the U.S.-Latin American relationship on economic issues during Brazil's transition back to democracy during 1955-1956.

Goals and contexts: Kubitschek, Lleras Camargo, and Frondizi

The late 1950s saw the emergence of several weak democracies from periods of military rule, including in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Peru, and Venezuela. These new democratic leaders faced immense and immediate challenges. Balance-of-payments crises loomed and military establishments lurked barely offstage. Though these leaders faced common

[191] Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, pp. 67-70.

[192] For a reevaluation of the conference employing Latin American sources, see Max Paul Friedman, "Fracas in Caracas : Latin American Diplomatic Resistance to United States Intervention in Guatemala in 1954," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 21, no. 4 (2010).

[193] "International Cooperation in a Latin American Development Policy," ed. United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (New York: United Nations, September 1954), pp. 129.

[194] Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, pp. 76. The only major exception to this policy in Latin America came in Bolivia, where the Eisenhower administration spent heavily in support of moderate democratic forces.

problems, they also dealt with domestic peculiarities that conditioned their relations with the United States and (later) their approaches to Operation Pan-America. This chapter deals primarily with the foreign policy goals and strategies of Brazilian president Juscelino Kubitschek. He was the originator of the plan and remained its primary champion until he and Eisenhower concluded their terms in early 1961. However, he was not alone. His strongest ally would become Colombian President Alberto Lleras Camargo, with the Argentine Arturo Frondizi playing an important role in the Operation's first stage. Though the case centers on Kubitschek, Brazilian foreign policy, and U.S.-Brazil relations, it also draws on Argentine and Colombian records to illustrate the roles, at times central, played by those leaders.

Kubitschek's fifty years in five

Juscelino Kubitschek, a physician, emerged onto the national political scene as the center-left governor of the interior state of Minas Gerais. He built a reputation for completing high-profile public works, often with great architectural flair. Inside the Partido Social Democrático (PSD), founded by the populist former president Getulio Vargas, Kubitschek was a moderate. Vargas was the defining figure in Brazilian politics from 1930 until he committed suicide in the bedroom of the presidential Palacio Catete in 1954. Even after his death, Vargas remained a polarizing figure, and the PSD was viewed suspiciously by conservative elites. Unlike Vargas, who had concentrated the power of the Estado Novo in his own hands, Kubitschek was committed to strengthening democratic institutions. This democratic moderation helped make him more palatable to Brazil's military, which was gradually returning control to

civilian institutions. Kubitschek, often referred to in Brazil as JK or simply "Juscelino," launched his candidacy during the term of appointed caretaker president João Café Filho.[195]

Despite years of strong growth, Brazil's economy was frequently on the edge of crisis. Vargas, Café Filho, and intervening military power brokers all pursued a fairly consistent policy of aggressive, state-led industrialization. The state compensated for limited domestic investment with deficit spending and, at times, by printing money. Inflation became a chronic problem. Brazil remained heavily dependent on a few commodities, primarily coffee, to earn the foreign exchange needed to purchase capital goods and launch industrial projects. Complicating the situation, Brazil's state-owned energy companies produced little oil or coal. The more Brazil industrialized, the more energy it needed to import, with oil often accounting for over half its imports. When coffee prices slipped, the country faced drastic balance-of-payments deficits that forced it to turn to external financing from international financial institutions, banks in New York, Paris, and London, and the U.S. government.

Despite these problems, Kubitschek set expansive development goals in his *plano de metas*. Hoping for U.S. backing of his ambitious blueprint, he offered to share the *plano* with the U.S. ambassador shortly before the election.[196] Influenced by the import substitution philosophy of the newly created think tank, the Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros, the *plano* set thirty goals and metrics for various sectors of the Brazilian economy. The intention was to cure the

---

[195] The classic work on the period is Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964 : An Experiment in Democracy*. The best English-language work specifically on Kubitschek, though it includes chapters on broader history and economic conditions, remains Alexander, *Juscelino Kubitschek and the Development of Brazil*, see also Maram Sheldon, "Juscelino Kubitschek and the Politics of Exuberance, 1956-1961," *Luso-Brazilian Review* 27, no. 1 (1990). In Portuguese, there are more works, including the president's memoirs. Juscelino Kubitschek, *Meu Caminho para Brasília*, 3 vols. (Rio de Janeiro: Bloch Editores, 1974).

[196] "Telegram from the ambassador in Brazil (Dunn) to the Department of State," October 15, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, American Republics, vol. VII, pp. 678.

troublesome balance of payments by increasing manufacturing in Brazil.[197] Though Brazil made impressive leaps in infrastructure and industry, the payments problem got worse due to debt service and growing energy imports. Inflation pushed up the costs of basic products like beans and rice, threatening to spark popular unrest. Kubitschek saw short-term deficits, often financed by printing currency, and the ensuing inflation as the cost of rapid industrialization, even referring to inflation as a necessary sacrifice by the population for a developed future.[198]

Kubitschek's primary concerns were domestic, and he wanted to use foreign policy to help spur "fifty years of progress in five." In international relations, Kubitschek saw Brazil as a natural ally of the United States, united by an historical tradition of friendship and in the defense of "Western Christian civilization," as he often said. This fit with traditional Brazilian grand strategy, which considered a close relationship with the United States to be central. In Brazilian eyes, this relationship helped balance the power of Argentina (or Chile earlier) and gave it a freer hand with its neighbors.[199] To an extent, the superpower competition of the late 1950s structured Kubitschek's choices even further, but he was more directly concerned about conservative elements of the Brazilian military, which warily eyed him and his vice-president João Goulart as Vargas' heirs. Kubitschek survived coup plots and uprisings led by conservative elements of the military, which first tried to block his inauguration and then tried to gain support for an overthrow. Though Kubitschek personally was not disposed toward deep relations with the Soviet Union, it is unlikely the military would have permitted them in any case. Still, this did not

---

[197] The construction of the new capital city was later added as a 31st goal. Suely Braga da Silva, "50 anos em 5: O plano de metas," FGV: CPDOC, online: http://cpdoc.fgv.br/producao/dossies/JK/artigos/Economia/PlanodeMetas

[198] Alexander, *Juscelino Kubitschek and the Development of Brazil*, ch. 9.

[199] A recent analysis of Brazilian foreign policy argues that the relationship was based on Brazil's position as a status quo power in South America, to which the United States could in a sense delegate responsibility. Teixeira, *Brazil, the United States, and the South American Subsystem : Regional Politics and the Absent Empire*.

translate into unqualified support of the United States. Kubitschek felt the country had been shortchanged by the Eurocentric Marshall Plan. A March 1955 U.S. intelligence estimate noted this common sentiment: "Brazilians feel that U.S. economic and financial assistance to Brazil has not been commensurate with Brazil's past services and present strategic importance to the U.S., or with Brazil's value to the U.S. as a moderating influence in Latin America and in UN affairs."[200] Kubitschek believed that external aid was both necessary for fast development and that Brazil deserved it. He tried to use his foreign policy as an instrument to obtain it.

Frondizi: Oil, austerity, and the generals

Unlike the United States and Brazil, U.S-Argentine relations had traditionally been prickly. The countries competed economically with many of the same exports, especially before World War I, and battled diplomatically over hemispheric leadership.[201] Tension was reinforced by Argentina's hesitance to support the Allies in World War II. However, after his election, Arturo Frondizi sought to build friendly relations with the world's top economic and military power. Frondizi was inaugurated in May 1958. In fact, when Nixon was attacked on the streets of Caracas, he was on a trip that had been scheduled around his attendance at Frondizi's inauguration. Nixon had been sent in part to recognize the Argentine's friendly overtures.

Like Kubitschek, Frondizi was elected president of a fragile, transitional democracy. Unlike Kubitschek, whose populist predecessor had committed suicide, Frondizi had to deal with the living specter of Juan Perón. The former leader's followers remained a major force, and attempts to ban *peronista* parties led to massive demonstrations, strikes, and occasional riots. Unions were a major piece of Kubitschek's political support in the PSD, but for Frondizi they

[200] U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on Brazil, FRUS 1955-1957, American Republics, vol. 2, pp. 660-661.

[201] Morgenfeld, *Vecinos en Conflict : Argentina y los Estados Unidos en Conferencias Panamericanas*.

contained the seed of Peronism, pushing him toward a different economic model. Where Brazil felt frustrated by U.S. economic policies, U.S.-Argentina ties had improved recently from the tension of the Perón years. The United States authorized significant loans and the transfer of military equipment, while also supporting Argentine membership in the World Bank and IMF.

Lleras Camargo: A statesmen seeks stability

Alberto Lleras Camargo assumed the presidency in late 1958 as an experienced politician and statesman. During the final stage of the Second World War, he emerged as a key Latin American voice in talks on the United Nations, strongly advocating the maintenance of separate, regional body for the Western Hemisphere. After serving as the appointed, transitional president of Colombia from 1945-1946, Lleras Camargo was elected secretary general of the recently formed Organization of American States. He returned to Colombia to become president under a newly established, democratic regime.[202] Lleras Camargo had a reputation as a moderate democrat with staunch anti-communist ideals; he could mobilize support in Latin America and with key figures in the United States including the Rockefeller family, with whom he had corresponded during decades.[203]

Whereas the political contexts of Brazil and Argentina had been defined by the faceoff between populist leaders and conservative militaries, Lleras Camargo's Liberal Party government emerged as part of a solution to the party-fueled *violencia* that had ravaged Colombia for a decade. In 1953, the military tried to end the upheaval by establishing a

[202] The democracy was somewhat limited, with a pact between the major parties to the exclusion of other political actors, with the goal of ending the widespread violence in the country.

[203] For example, see John D. Rockefeller III to Alberto Lleras. BLAA, Collección Alberto Lleras Camargo, caja X, carpeta 66, mss. 821-902/1; Exteriores to BrDel21, "Operação Pan-America. Declarações do Senhor Nelson Rockefeller," telegram exp. 8819, Nov. 21, 1958, folder 82.286, Arquivo Histórico de Itamaraty, Brasilia (AHIB). Alberto Lleras to Nelson Rockefeller, telegram, March 15, 1945, Fondo Albert Lleras Camargo, BLAA.

dictatorship under Gustavo Rojas Pinilla. To bring that bloody period to a close and return to Colombia's democratic tradition, the dominant Conservatives and Liberals agreed to a pact that returned Colombia to a limited form of democracy with guaranteed representation of both parties. This institutional pact gave Lleras Camargo the widest latitude of the three leaders. Lleras Camargo was trusted by all sides and internationally respected. He was also one of the foremost proponents of inter-American cooperation, institutions, and understanding.[204]

Having now discussed the existing case literature, the key actors and their interests (the first two questions discussed in the Chapter 2), I now turn to a chronologically structured case narrative. The narrative will focus on the interactions of U.S. and Latin American leaders, examining how that interaction affected their definitions of their interests and goals, their strategies to pursue them, and the policies they adopted (question three). I will also weigh the influence of domestic political factors on each side (question four). Finally, in the chapter conclusion, I will return to an assessment of these questions, along with questions five to seven.

Before OPA, Kubitschek tries to jumpstart Pan-American cooperation

The Eisenhower administration sought to keep Kubitschek's pre-inaugural visit informal. On the January 1956 trip, Kubitschek met the U.S. president over breakfast in Florida instead of Washington. Kubitschek made a favorable impression on the president and others and quieted lingering concerns that he might be sympathetic to Brazilian communists.[205] According to the president's brother Milton Eisenhower, Kubitschek advocated a massive, U.S.-backed

[204] For general information on Lleras, see the excellent web site and digital archives maintained by Colombia's principal library. "Alberto Lleras Camargo: Un estadista para la Colombia del siglo XX," Bilbioteca Luis Angel Arango. Available online: http://www.banrepcultural.org/blaavirtual/exhibiciones/lleras.

[205] "Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Secretary of State," January 5, 1956, *FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 6,* pp. 685

development campaign as early as this 1956 breakfast.[206] In his memoirs, Kubitschek recalls that Eisenhower asked him about "communist infiltration" in Brazil, and he responded that the real problem was low living standards and should be met with a "long program of reforms" and democracy. The only topic that really drew Eisenhower's interest was Brazilian petroleum, controlled by a state monopoly that did not allow the foreign investment the U.S. president hoped to promote.[207] The president-elect flew on to Washington for meetings with U.S. officials and at the OAS.[208] Kubitschek hoped to gain U.S. support for his *plano de metas*. Instead, the Eisenhower administration gave him U.S. and IMF plans drawn up previously to address Brazil's situation—plans for austerity, not investment—and assured that capital would flow to Brazil if Kubitschek improved conditions for foreign investors. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Dulles, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Henry Holland, and others warned of the threat from communist agents.[209] With the U.S. government unreceptive, Kubitschek "planted the seed" of his development ideas with Latin American ambassadors.[210] At Kubitschek's inauguration on February 2, 1956, his ministers presented the *plano de metas* and a request for

---

[206] "[Kubitschek] talked of a program to be called "Operation Pan America," which was the formation of a massive development fund with the United States putting up the bulk of the capital." Milton Stover Eisenhower, *The Wine Is Bitter; the United States and Latin America* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), pp. 202.

[207] Kubitschek, *Meu Caminho para Brasilia : A Escalada Politica*, 460-463.

[208] "Editorial Note," *FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 6*, pp. 684.

[209] Henry Holland, in particular, favored pressing the austerity approach on the Brazilian president-elect. "Memorandum of discussion at the 264th meeting of the National Security Council," November 3, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, American Republics, vol. 7, pp. 682-684; "Memorandum of a conversation: President-elect Kubitschek's talks with the Secretary of State," January 6, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 7.

[210] Kubitschek, *Meu Caminho para Brasilia : A Escalada Politica*, pp. 462.

$1.2 billion in assistance to the administration's emissary, Vice President Nixon. Nixon expressed little interest, announcing only a $35 million loan to expand steel production.[211]

Given the Eisenhower administration's coolness to Brazilian requests and its concerns about communism, connecting them was a natural step for Kubitschek and his ministers. During a late April 1956 visit, Vice President Goulart told Holland, "that people who are hungry and poor are receptive to communist propaganda and that the best way to fight communism is to raise living standards. I [Holland] replied that this was quite true but that there was another front on which we must be vigilant, that where we combat the clandestine espionage and subversive organization of communism."[212] Repeatedly, when Brazilian officials tried to link development to popular unrest and communism, they were rebuffed by Eisenhower administration officials who believed the threat was really Soviet scheming. In June, Holland eyed Soviet commercial overtures in South America and recommended extending aid to Brazil and Argentina, even though "judged on purely banking and economic considerations, we would be justified in declining to extend that assistance." Holland added, "The sure and certain result would be acceptance of Soviet aid with the implications indicated."[213] Even in the context of Soviet commercial overtures, the push for more assistance for Latin America petered out at higher levels of the administration, facing particular opposition from conservative Treasury Secretary George Humphrey. Humphrey was a leading advocate in the administration for low taxes, balanced budgets, and free market policies as a means to economic growth at home and abroad, and he often argued fervently for these policies in the NSC, with little concern for fostering

---

[211] "Editorial note," *FRUS 1955-1957, vol. 6,* pp. 692. Kubitschek, *Meu Caminho para Brasília : Cinqüenta Anos em Cinco*, pp. 17-18.

[212] "Memorandum of a conversation: communism in Brazil," April 30, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 7, pp. 700.

[213] "Memorandum from the assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs (Holland) to the deputy director fo the Office of South American Affairs (Belton)," FRUS, 1955-1957, American Republics, vol. 7, pp. 703-704

democracies. Like John Foster Dulles, Humphrey was one of few cabinet members with a close relationship with the president.[214] In other parts of the world, the Dulles' fears of communism trumped Humphrey's concerns about spending. Asian and European allies received hundreds of millions in loans and grants, as a frustrated Kubitschek noted to U.S. Ambassador James Dunn.[215]

Kubitschek's frustration about the chilly reception to his and Goulart's proposals led him to consider boycotting the first major Pan-American conference of his presidency in July 1956. Kubitschek said he would not attend without U.S. changes on development projects. Eventually, the U.S. administration restarted funding for projects worth $151 million that had been approved by the Mixed Brazil-U.S. Commission but stalled since 1953. Once in Panama, Kubitschek outlined development problems and argued that U.S. aid was needed to guarantee against the communist threat to Latin America. Eisenhower was polite but uncompromising. The administration's long-standing economic policy for the region was restated in NSC 5613/1 in September, which advocated "the development by private initiative of sturdy, self-reliant economies in Latin America which do not require continuing grant assistance from the United States."[216] In Latin America, only Bolivia had received significant grant assistance, and the report acknowledged that the hemisphere received a tiny portion of overall U.S economic aid.

Kubitschek's administration hoped to gain an additional source of leverage when the U.S. Department of Defense renewed requests to establish military facilities in northern Brazil. During the war, the U.S. military highly valued Brazilian bases for defending the Southern

---

[214] Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower : Soldier and President* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), pp. 290.

[215] "Telegram from the ambassador in Brazil (Dunn) to the Department of State," July 3, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, American Republics, vol. 7, pp. 703-704, pp. 710-711

[216] NSC 5613/1, qtd. in Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, pp. 92.

Atlantic. Brazil's immense geography made it strategically valuable in the Cold War, too. Defense wanted to build a guided-missile station on the distant Brazilian island of Fernando de Noronha and a naval refueling station in the state of Pernambuco. Brazil approved the latter in a December 17, 1956 agreement that included promises of $100 million in equipment for the Brazilian military, along with clauses by which Brazilian military personnel retained the right to monitor operations in Pernambuco. In discussions with U.S. officials, Kubitschek stressed—and likely exaggerated—the political risks he was taking in granting U.S. basing leases, and noted the need for economic cooperation to match the level of military cooperation. Recently arrived U.S. Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs cabled Washington after meeting Kubitschek:

> As far as Kubitschek personally [is] concerned he said that while he acknowledges and recognizes importance of continuing collaboration between Brazilian-US armed services…it is closer and more effective economic collaboration that he has primarily on his mind—that is, arrangement discussed by his mission in Washington last July and subsequently formulated in joint EXIM Bank statement but still largely waiting implementation.[217]

The blatant efforts by the Brazilians to link military and economic agreements annoyed Americans, leading Briggs to note that Kubitschek was withholding on the Fernando de Noronha station "for bargaining purposes."[218] Kubitschek exhausted much of his leverage placating his armed forces by obtaining military equipment. The president's key ally with the military was defense minister General Henrique Teixeira Lott. The minister's backing of the president, and the democratic order more generally, helped stop several small military revolts in 1955-1957. The military's support did not come cheap. In addition to equipment transfers and purchases,

[217] Briggs, Dec. 18, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 7, pp. 730.

[218] Briggs, Jan. 9, 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 7, pp. 736.

sizeable pay increases for the military forces were a factor in worsening deficits and inflation. Kubitschek later backed Lott for the presidency when his own term expired.[219]

As U.S. and Latin American diplomats prepared for an OAS economic conference in Buenos Aires, it became clear that there was division on both sides. While the Eisenhower administration continued its emphasis on private investment, Democrats in Congress increasingly criticized the president's policy for what they saw as its general inattention to Latin America and coziness with dictators. The criticisms bubbled over in the contentious confirmation hearings for Roy Rubottom, who was nominated to replace Holland as assistant secretary.[220] In Latin America, the scheduling of the conference for August 1957 sparked proclamations of optimism, but little real hope. Venezuelan president-elect Rómulo Betancourt predicted "platitudes," and not "concrete, dynamic agreements." He blamed the "demonstrated inability of the Latin American governments to agree on the same minimum, common plan to present to and argue for with the United States representatives."[221] Diplomats from Brazil, Colombia, and Uruguay tried to shape a shared agenda to press for an inter-American financial institution dedicated to development, movement toward a Latin American common market, and a payments union.[222] In the midst of a political transition, Colombian diplomats eschewed fixed positions, as did Argentines focused on serving as host and moderator. Brazilians were increasingly consumed by immediate economic problems, telling new U.S. Treasury secretary and delegation head

---

[219] National Intelligence Estimate on Brazil, Jan. 7, 1957, FRUS 1955-1957, vol. 7, pp. 738

[220] Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, pp. 100-101.

[221] Rómulo Betancourt, "Discurso del ex-presidente Rómulo Betancourt de Venezuela en la comida en su honor, Carnegie International Center, New York," January 12, 1957, *The Papers of Rómulo Betancourt, Toma XXXIV – XXXV (1957-1960)*, microfilm, roll no. 19, pp. 7, translation by author.

[222] MREC, caja 12, orden 112, transferencia 7. Gabinete del Ministro, memorandos, 1957-1958, June 25, 1957, pp. 38; MREC, caja 12, orden 112, transferencia 7. Gabinete del Ministro, memorandos, 1957-1958, August 2, 1957, pp. 46;

Robert Anderson that the country's dollar reserves had fallen to just $11 million, forcing them to raise tariffs to slow imports.[223] The United States was committed to arguing that existing financial institutions were adequate and that an inter-American bank would be redundant, trying to quell complaints with $59 million in loans from the IMF and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.[224] As Betancourt warned, the conference produced few tangible results.

The successful Sputnik launch on October 4, 1957, shook American self-confidence, and sparked worries that the poorly educated masses in Brazil would be drawn in by Soviet accomplishments. Ambassador Briggs cabled that, "Our assumption that Latin America is a safe rear area might well be re-examined." Briggs worried the Soviets would step in where Eisenhower would not and encouraged "substantial additional Government credit."[225] The ambassador's warnings did not resonate amongst Eisenhower's closest advisors. CIA Director Allen Dulles downplayed the risk of communism in Latin America in Congressional testimony in February 1958.[226] At the same time, an increasingly desperate Brazil approached the United States requesting $100 million in standby credit from the Export-Import Bank. Increased global coffee production, particularly from Africa, caused projected prices to plummet for 1958. U.S. officials gave Brazilians lectures about fiscal responsibility and explained that the Ex-Im Bank's rules did not contemplate standby credit. Other parts of the government or the Federal Reserve would not make the loans unless Brazil pledged gold collateral, of which it had little. At one

---

[223] FRUS 1955-1957, vol. 7, pp. 760

[224] "Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to Deputy Undersecretary for Economic Affairs (Dillon)," May 29, 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 6, pp. 509-510.

[225] FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 7, pp. 773

[226] Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, pp. 92.

point, U.S. officials sent Brazilians a list of all the loans Brazil had received from the U.S.—prompting a frustrated response that frequent debt payments were reminder enough.

Kubitschek and his ministers understood Ex-Im rules, but believed that Brazil's size, political importance, and longstanding cooperation with the United States meant it merited special consideration. Kubitschek warned the U.S. ambassador that he would have to consider Soviet trade offers, particularly the sale of Brazil's coffee surplus. The State Department restated its opposition to further loans, while "deploring [the] obvious tactic."[227] John Foster Dulles hoped that if the Brazilians were convinced no U.S. "bailout" was forthcoming, they would "be forced to deal seriously with IMF as [their] only alternative."[228] In April, Brazil recalled its ambassador in Washington, Ernani Amaral de Peixoto, for consultations about Soviet-Brazilian relations. Summarizing Eisenhower's policies at this point, Rabe wrote:

> Eisenhower continued to exclude Latin America from U.S. programs. He bristled whenever a Latin American official complained to him about the lack of U.S. aid, and the administration told Congress that it did not want any Development Loan Funds earmarked for the region. The administration was devoted to its free trade and investment principles and did not perceive any threat to hemispheric stability.[229]

Despite strong foundations, Brazilian-U.S. relations hit a low point in May 1958. Kubitschek's goals required changes to U.S. policy, but the Eisenhower administration had not responded favorably over more than two years. The two sides had very different understandings of development and communism as problems in Latin America. For Kubitschek, they were linked and should be a natural U.S. priority. U.S. officials, including Holland, John and Allen Dulles,

---

[227] Given low coffee consumption in the Soviet Union at the time, this seems to have been in part wishful thinking from Brazilian coffee officials. Briggs, "Telegram from Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State," February 25, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5, pp. 660; Ernani de Amaral Peixoto, "Relações Estados Unidos de América-América Latina," March 10, 1958, letter, est.51, pr.3, no.19, Washington, despachos, 1956-1958, AAHI-Rio.

[228] Dulles, "Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil," March 29, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5, pp. 669-670.

[229] Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, pp. 96.

and the president himself thought development was not a particular U.S. government concern, and that communism—to the extent it was a problem in the hemisphere—should be dealt with through security measures. Kubitschek felt Brazil merited assistance, largely based on political criteria. He saw countries in Europe and Asia getting loans and grants because they were considered politically important. Though the U.S. ambassador and a few officials favored a more flexible and generous approach to Brazil, that thinking did not carry the day. Kubitschek interpreted the Eisenhower administration's loan rejections as a denial of Brazil's importance to the Western alliance. However, he was constrained internationally and domestically from seriously pursuing Soviet help. Frustration and disappointment reigned in Brazil and elsewhere when Vice President Richard Nixon embarked on a South American trip for the inauguration of Arturo Frondizi—a trip intended to answer criticisms that Eisenhower had neglected Latin America and favored dictators. Nixon planned stops in Uruguay, Peru, and Venezuela, passing Brazil because he had visited two years prior for Kubitschek's inauguration.

Nixon in Caracas and the birth of Operation Pan-America

Nixon did not garner the warm reception that Secretary of State Dulles had assured him he would find. At Peru's University of San Marcos, Nixon met furious demonstrators. Nixon's bodyguards warned of assassination rumors floating around Caracas.[230] As his motorcade moved from the Venezuelan capital's airport to a downtown monument, some 4,000 people blocked the road, attacking the car with "heavy sticks" and "melon-sized rocks." The crowd smashed the car's windows and, in Nixon's words, covered him "with glass and something that was not

[230] The Associated Press, "Nixon's Bodyguards Given Report of Possible Attempt to Kill Him," May 14, 1958, *The Washington Post,* pp. A2

rain."[231] Some protestors seemed intent on dragging Nixon from the car, but the driver forced the damaged sedan through the crowd and out of harm's way. Shortly after the event, Nixon blamed communist organizers. He acknowledged that most of the people in the crowd were not communists, but citizens angry about U.S. complicity with the recently deposed Venezuelan dictator, who had taken luxurious residence in Miami. Nixon noted: "Communists were able to gain great support from students … What we are seeing is a terrible legacy of the dictatorship."[232] In addition to granting the deposed dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez a visa, the Eisenhower administration had decorated him with the Legion of Merit in 1954, provided military assistance, and spurred oil investments. Shortly before Nixon's visit, the United States cut Venezuela's oil quota; though the decision was driven by pressure from domestic producers, from Caracas it seemed like punishment.[233] The immediate analysis of the U.S. embassy in Caracas lacked Nixon's subtlety, saying only that "Undoubtedly the attack on the Vice President was organized by the Communists."[234] The episode so disturbed President Eisenhower that he put the military on alert to carry the vice president to safety if needed.[235]

---

[231] Tad Szulc, "U.S. Flies Troops to Caribbean as Mobs Attack Nixon in Caracas," May 14, 1958, *New York Times*, pp. 1, 9. For an official report, see "Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation," May 15, 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5*, pp. 226-227.

[232] Richard Nixon qtd. in Tad Szulc, "U.S. Flies Troops to Caribbean as Mobs Attack Nixon in Caracas," May 14, 1958, *New York Times*, pp. 9.

[233] Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, pp. 36, 39, 94. On Pérez's foreign policy approach to building support with Eisenhower, see C.A. Murgueitio Manrique, "Los Gobiernos Militares de Marcos Pérez Jiménez y Gustavo Rojas Pinilla: Nacionalismo, Anticomunismo y sus Relaciones con los Estados Unidos (1953-1957)," (2011).

[234] "Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation," May 15, 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5*, pp. 226-227.

[235] Tad Szulc, "U.S. Flies Troops to Caribbean as Mobs Attack Nixon in Caracas," *New York Times* (May 14, 1989), pp. 1

Upon his return, Nixon suggested a broader change in policy, saying "we must be dedicated to raising the standard of living of the masses."[236] This echoed the sorts of claims Kubitschek and Goulart had made in their visits to Washington in 1956. However, Nixon's view of democracy and development did not entirely coincide with Kubitschek's. In an NSC meeting on May 22, Nixon warned that Latin American democratization brought with it immense risks, empowering leaders and publics who were not willing to mount offensives against communist influence: "[N]either the democratic system nor the system of private enterprise is necessarily a safeguard against Communism." In fact, democratization was risky for U.S. interests. For countries "lacking in political maturity" leaders were likely to be "very naïve about the nature and threat of communism." Nixon emphasized: "The threat of Communism in Latin America was greater today than ever before in history."[237] After Nixon's trip, the Eisenhower administration dedicated more high-level attention to Latin America than it had for years. In a report, top administration officials recognized: "Many Latin American leaders continue to feel the area is being neglected or taken for granted by the United States" and that their share of U.S. aid was "disproportionately small."[238] Policy appeared open to revision in a way that it previously had not been. This change in emphasis was noticed in Latin America, and no leader was more ambitious in taking advantage of it than Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek.

---

[236] "Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting," May 16, 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5*, pp. 238

[237] "Memorandum of Discussion at the 366th Meeting of the National Security Council," May 22, 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5*, pp. 239-243.

[238] "Report from the Operations Coordinating Board to the National Security Council," May 21, 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5*, pp. 5.

By all indications, Kubitschek was nearly as taken aback by the attack on Nixon as were members of the Eisenhower administration.[239] The Brazilian president was initially unsure how to respond, and planned on sending an anodyne letter expressing his outrage at the attacks and expressing wishes for Nixon's safety. Augusto Frederico Schmidt, a poet who was Kubitschek's confidante, advisor, and preferred speech writer, had grander visions. He told the president: "The moment has arrived to affirm yourself as a great statesmen." Schmidt recommended a letter that expressed a desire to "recompose continental unity, which has taken a hard blow" with the Nixon incident. Though the letter should not say so, Schmidt believed the moment had arrived for the long-awaited Latin American Marshall Plan.[240]

Schmidt's idea met skepticism from influential finance minister José María Alkmin. Alkmin also saw the attack as an opportunity, but he did not want to squander it on pie-in-the-sky plans. Instead, he argued that Brazil should take advantage of the burst of attention to address coffee prices, the recent denial of loans, and stagnant negotiations with the IMF. With Kubitschek listening to their discussions, Schmidt appealed to the president's grandiosity.

> The Americans are going to be so frightened when they get this letter that they will send high officials to Brazil to figure out what is going on. Then we can more easily address our tough immediate problems. We need to think big, Alkmin. We are not just making Brazilian policy, and even less *Mineira* policy [both came from the state of Minas Gerais]. We must be statesmen.[241]

---

[239] In his memoirs, Kubitschek writes that "the attacks were not a surprise for me," because he had been observing the loss of U.S. prestige. However, the memoir's account of OPA's creation is fragmentary and contains multiple inaccuracies about Nixon's trip.

[240] Unfortunately, no official record of this meeting was found in the archives of the Memorial JK or Itamaraty. While agencies of the Brazilian government produced significant records, the same does not seem to be true of Kubitschek's closest advisers. The most complete account comes from the memoir of a participant, written much later. Dourado, *Gaiola Aberta : Tempos de JK e Schmidt*, pp. 75-76.

[241] Dourado, *Gaiola Aberta : Tempos de JK e Schmidt*, pp. 80.

Kubitschek decided that his response to Eisenhower must do more than send sympathy and that Brazil must do more than pursue short-term priorities. Following Schmidt's counsel, the president resuscitated his plans for leveraging Pan-Americanism for economic development, which had largely been cast aside after the Panama Conference of July 1956. He was conscious of the need to act quickly to take advantage of "the bonfire of indignation in Washington's political circles," as he later wrote.[242]

The first letter to Eisenhower was drafted in Kubitschek's inner circle, leaving aside the normally central foreign affairs ministry, Itamaraty, and its minister Macedo Soares.[243] The slight provoked Soares' resignation days later.[244] Kubitschek showed the draft letter to U.S. Ambassador Briggs, who noted the Brazilian attached great importance to the letter as a Pan-American initiative. Briggs wrote: "Consequently [a] rebuff or even chilly initial response could have serious consequences at this juncture."[245] The letter to Eisenhower, dated May 28, 1958, expressed "solidarity" with Nixon, while noting that "the ideal of Pan-American unity has suffered serious impairment." Kubitschek added that "something must be done" to "correct the false impression that we are not behaving in a fraternal way in the Americas."[246] The initial letter contained no concrete projects, nor did it mention "Operation Pan-America." Those proposals would evolve over the next months. Though it is difficult to establish based on available records,

---

[242] Kubitschek, *Meu Caminho para Brasília : Cinqüenta Anos em Cinco*, pp. 212.

[243] Dourado, *Gaiola Aberta : Tempos de JK e Schmidt*. Briggs, "Telegram from Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State," May 23, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5, pp. 677-679.

[244]Kubitschek, *Meu Caminho para Brasília : Cinqüenta Anos em Cinco*, pp. 212.

[245] Briggs, "Telegram from Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State," May 23, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5, pp. 678.

[246] The original two letters were published in the *Public Papers*, and are available at "Exchange of Letters between the President and President Kubitschek of Brazil," June 10, 1958, in Woolley and Peters, eds., *The American Presidency Project.* Available online: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11089.

it appears more likely that the name was chosen several days after the letter to Eisenhower, which centrally refers to "Pan American unity," "Pan American ideals," and "the right path in regard to Pan Americanism." The name did not designate Brazil as the plan's leader; instead it implied actions by and on behalf of all Americans.[247]

On June 10, Assistant Secretary Rubottom delivered Eisenhower's response to Rio de Janeiro. Like Kubitschek's initial missive, the reply was cordial but avoided concrete proposals. The U.S. president called for more intense consultations between the two governments about how to improve Pan-American solidarity—specifically about how to better implement the 1954 Declaration of Solidarity of the Tenth Inter-American Conference.[248] That declaration, which the Eisenhower administration hailed as a diplomatic triumph, arose as part of U.S. efforts to delegitimize the government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala months before a CIA-backed overthrow. Reaffirming that declaration was not what Kubitschek was hoping for; however Eisenhower's letter also suggested that Secretary Dulles visit Brazil in the near future. Though excited by the prospect of Dulles' visit, Kubitschek told Rubottom that "he [Kubitschek] had great respect for Secretary Dulles but had the feeling that the Secretary rarely if ever became interested in Latin American affairs."[249] During the ensuing conversation with Rubottom, Kubitschek downplayed bilateral U.S.-Brazilian problems, focusing on matters of hemispheric and global concern. The Brazilian offered his diagnosis of Latin America's situation, saying the attack on Nixon was a symptom of frustration with low living standards and unmet expectations.

---

[247] I could not find in the archives of Itamaraty, memoirs, or in the secondary literature an account of the genesis of the name Operação Pan-Americana.

[248] The text of the declaration is available at *The Avalon Project,* Yale Law School. Online: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam11.asp; see also *FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. 5*, doc. 65-79.

[249] Rubottom, "Draft of a memorandum of a conversation, President Kubitschek's residence," June 10, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5, pp. 679-683.

Kubitschek described to Rubottom the central tenet of what would soon become Operation Pan-America: the explicit argument that underdevelopment created communism, and that hemispheric cooperation for development was needed as a strategy to win the Cold War in Latin America.[250] Kubitschek told Rubottom: "Communists are opposed to the economic development of any underdeveloped country. They recognize that they cannot achieve their sinister design if economic development is carried out." However, Kubitschek's argument did not convince the U.S. emissary that a dramatic new approach linking development and anti-communism was needed. Kubitschek recalled: "Rubottom entirely disagreed with my point of view," blaming communist agitators instead of general discontent. Rubottom's response encouraged Kubitschek to seek the support of the Brazilian public and Latin American diplomatic corps.[251]

Adding details to the Brazilian proposal

The outlines of Kubitschek's proposal, which he now referred to as "Operação Pan-Americana" became clearer after the Rubottom visit. Kubitschek provided a more detailed outline of his thinking in a June 20, 1958 speech to Latin American diplomats. First, Kubitschek insisted that Latin Americans had not been sufficiently informed or consulted in world affairs, given that global conflict constituted a threat to the whole hemisphere. Secondly, OPA was not simply a Brazilian or bilateral initiative; it would succeed only if it became truly continental, superseding rivalries between American nations. Thirdly, it was inherently linked to the Cold War. Kubitschek said his letter to Eisenhower was "a cry of alert against the Cold War that already has presented its first symptoms in this continent." In that bipolar conflict, Kubitschek

[250] Biscaia da Lacerda, "Panamericanismo entre a Segurança e o Desenvolvimiento", pp. 147-153.

[251] For Kubitschek's recollections of the meeting with Rubottom and his thoughts on Eisenhower's response, see *Meu Caminho para Brasília : Cinqüenta Anos em Cinco*, pp. 217-222.

did not doubt that Latin America should stand with the United States as it had in the world war. Kubitschek lavished praise on the Marshall Plan, but quickly turned his focus: "There the emphasis was placed on *reconstruction*, without equal interest being given to the very serious problem of the *development* of countries with rudimentary economies." The fourth, and essential, point was that OPA was about addressing underdevelopment within the framework of the Cold War. Fighting underdevelopment was not about boosting short-term growth, Kubitschek argued, but about eradicating human suffering and creating the conditions under which people could prosper. However, when discussing what programs this would entail, Kubitschek initially suggested amplifying existing ideas instead of offering dramatic departures. His initial speech mentioned just four programs, which were in line with the philosophy of his *plano de metas*: pioneer investments, technical assistance, commodity price stabilization, and expansion of credit from international financial institutions. Addressing underdevelopment was strategic, preventative medicine against "anti-democratic" forces: "Allowing poverty to exist in this hemisphere weakens the Western cause." Kubitschek closed his speech, saying, "The union of the Americas is more than an ideal, it is imperative for our survival.[252]

Concrete proposals emerged slowly for a number of reasons. First, OPA emerged in response to the Nixon trip, and was not a fully formed policy. Kubitschek and Schmidt acted quickly to take advantage of the attention. Secondly, the Brazilians were hesitant about getting too far ahead of other Latin American countries, and they hoped to build proposals collaboratively. To do so, they first had to gain support on general ideas. Third, Kubitschek did not initially have the normal bureaucratic backing. Foreign minister Macedo Soares and the

[252] All quotes in the preceding paragraph are from Kubitschek, speech to diplomatic representatives of the American Republics in Brazil, June 20, 1958, *Operação Pan-Americana Documentario*, vol. 1, Sala de Pesquisa, Memorial JK, Brasilia, pp. 31-37. Italics in original.

diplomatic corps had been left out of the original planning. After Soares resigned, the Presidency and Itamaraty were not immediately on the same page. Diplomats largely drew on existing programs and fit them under OPA's umbrella, and then the proposals grew more detailed based on international consultation. The impending meeting with Dulles pushed Brazil to specify its goals for OPA, which had been exceedingly vague in Kubitschek's letters to Eisenhower and still quite general in the June speech. During the months after Kubitschek's speech, Itamaraty developed instructions for its diplomats on building cooperation for OPA. Those instructions, which reflected consultations with several Latin American leaders, described OPA as a way to increase private capital investment from industrialized countries, increase loans from IFIs, strengthen domestic economies and combat inflation, achieve greater price stability for basic commodities, advance the formation of a Latin American economic bloc, and enhance technical assistance programs.[253]

The clearest summary of OPA came in an *aide-memoire* circulated in early August 1958 to all the American republics. It strongly echoed the main points of the earlier memorandum and employed much of Kubitschek's original phrasing, calling OPA a long-term "reorientation of hemispheric policy." OPA was both political and economic, intended to buttress Latin America's place in the Western alliance through rapid economic development. It should be fully multilateral and "pan-American" and serve to promote democracy in addition to development. The *aide-memoire* laid out seven "basic objectives" as follows:

1. Reaffirmation of the principles of hemispheric solidarity;
2. Definition of underdevelopment as a pan-American problem;
3. Adaptation of inter-American organs and agencies, if necessary, to the requirements of fighting underdevelopment;
4. Pioneering investments in economically backwards areas of the Continent;

[253] Exteriores to Brazilian diplomatic missions in Latin America, "Operação Pan-Americana," July 29, 1958, tele. exp. 5873, CT-Telegramas, A-W Secreto, 1958, AHIB.

5. Technical assistance aimed at improved productivity
6. Measures to stabilize the prices of basic commodities;
7. Actualization and amplification of the resources on international financial institutions.[254]

In later versions—to reflect Argentine input and incorporate the U.S. perspective—points would be added on private investment and initiative. It was also pointed out that each country should be responsible for reforming its own policies to promote development.[255] With the outlines of the project becoming clearer, Brazil continued seeking Latin American backing.

Brazil seeks Latin American support

Even before Eisenhower responded to Kubitschek's first letter, Brazilian diplomats began contacting Latin American colleagues to try to shape their reaction to the letters and build support. Where the letter to Eisenhower just hinted that the crux of this Pan-American response should be to attack underdevelopment, in talks with other countries, Brazilians were more direct. After Rubottom's visit, Kubitschek sensed that Eisenhower had not yet drawn the desired conclusions from Nixon incident, and he intensified his search for Latin American unity.[256] As noted above, Kubitschek offered the first details on the plan to a gathering of Latin American diplomats. Kubitschek's speech was a call to action, and a signal to the Eisenhower administration that it was interested in something much broader than a restatement of anti-communist declarations from 1954. It also set a high bar for success, requiring substantial unity

[254] "Aide-memoire," archived on Oct. 20, 1958, revised draft, folder 82.279, AHIB.

[255] For a later modification, see "Aide-memoire," August 9, 1959, Council of the Organization of American States, Special Committee to Study the Formulation of New Measures for Economic Cooperation, *Volume L Report and Documents, First Meeting, Washington, D.C., November 17-December* 12, 1958 (Washington, D.C.: 1959), pp. 29-31. Available online: http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1958panamerica.html.

[256] Kubitschek, *Meu Caminho para Brasília : Cinqüenta Anos em Cinco*, pp. 227.

from Latin America, a policy shift from the Eisenhower administration, and a large commitment from the U.S. Congress—the Congress played little role in Brazilian strategizing.

Kubitschek personally pursed the close cooperation of Colombian President Alberto Lleras Camargo. Lleras Camargo's renown as a statesman made him a key supporter. Kubitschek wrote his counterpart: "We have to respond to the Cold War, which has already invaded the hemisphere, with the harmonious development of our economies to alleviate the sufferings, until now patiently borne, of millions of persons on this continent."[257] Lleras Camargo responded warmly, noting that while at the OAS he was often frustrated Brazil did not actively seek to lead, and he welcomed the Brazilian initiative. He echoed arguments tying Latin American poverty to the Cold War, arguing it could become a "grave danger" for the West, and he pledged Colombian support.[258] The two leaders also agreed on a shorter-term goal that fulfilled a longstanding Latin American priority: the creation of an inter-American bank for economic development.[259]

In the weeks after Kubitschek's June 20 speech to Latin American diplomats, it appeared he would gain the support he needed from Latin America. Argentine President Frondizi announced his backing of the Brazilian initiative, which was notable due to the historic rivalry between the two countries. Days later, Frondizi wrote his own letter to Eisenhower citing economic "disequilibrium" as a cause of problems and offering Argentine support for a review of

---

[257] "Carta del Presidente Kubitschek al Presidente Lleras," August 4, 1958, *Memorias de Relaciones Exteriores de Colombia, 1959*, pp. 332.

[258] "Carta del Presidente Lleras al Presidente Kubitschek," August 20, 1958, *MdeRE Colombia, 1959*, pp. 333-335; Lleras Camargo to Kubitschek, Aug. 20, 1958, letter, folder 960.3 Confidenciais asuntos gerais, AHIB.

[259] Jorge Olintho de Oliveira, "Criação de un instituto de fomento regional," Sept. 1, 1958, tele. exp. 6787, folder 960.3 Confidenciais asuntos gerais, 1958, AHIB.

international economic policies.[260] After consultations with Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and Panama, Venezuela announced support for OPA. Privately, the Venezuelan foreign minister wrote to the Brazilians: "The political cooperation of the American republics is well known ... But the same is not true of economic and cultural cooperation, and that fact dangerously weakens our system of continental organization." There were additional statements of support from the leaders of Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and a joint statement of support from Central America.[261] Brazil tried to build unity, such as with the *aide-memoire* discussed above, "with the goal of avoiding possible differences of opinion that would be exploited by the Americans to reduce the reach and size of the Brazilian initiative."[262]

While these leaders offered broad support, two smaller points of disagreement arose. The first was that many leaders preferred a foreign ministers meeting instead of a presidential summit. Brazil quickly accommodated this by saying—despite earlier indications—that a ministers' meeting would be necessary as preparation for the heads of states' gathering. Secondly, there was concern, including from influential supporters like Venezuela's Betancourt, that OPA would marginalize the OAS. Kubitschek tried to assuage these concerns, saying: "Brazil will not leave aside the mechanisms of the Organization of American States in realizing

[260] Mario Gibson Barboza to Exteriores, "Carta do presidente Frondizi ao Presidente Eisenhower," July 1, 1958, tele. rec. 5963, folder 82.281, AHIB.

[261] René de Sola, "Posición de Venezuela ante la Operación Panamericana," July 11, 1958, memorandum, folder 960.3, Pan-Americanismo, 1958-1960, AHIB; Oscar Pires do Rio to Negrão de Lima, "Posicão da Venezuela na Operação Panamericana," July 12, 1958, letter, folder 960.3, Pan-Americanismo, 1958-1960, AHIB.

[262] Fernando Lobo, "Operação Pan-Americana," Aug. 1, 1958, tele. rec. 7712, folder 960.3, Pan-Americanismo, delegações, AHIB.

the objectives of the Operation."[263] However, Kubitschek feared that moving OPA under the OAS would cost Brazil influence to the Washington-based bureaucracy and diplomatic corps.

As at other key points, Itamaraty sought Latin American input in assembling an agenda for the meeting with Dulles, trying to gain broader support.[264] The only major Latin American holdout was Mexico, which slowed Brazilian initiatives at various moments. In part, Mexican reticence seemed to be based on its rivalry with Brazil over leadership of Spanish-speaking America. More directly, though, Mexican diplomats repeatedly argued that OPA and the economic assistance it was requesting would invite greater U.S. scrutiny and intrusion into domestic affairs. Mexicans were wary that OPA would serve as a justification for U.S. intervention in Latin American economies and politics. Mexico did, in fact, have some reason for concern. Earlier U.S. economic assistance in Europe had come with some conditions regarding market access for U.S. goods and investments, even inserting the United States into labor relations—an area that PRI closely guarded. Years later, Lyndon Johnson even argued that the 1965 Dominican invasion was in keeping with the Alliance for Progress, which implied anti-communist intervention.[265] With the goal of countering U.S. interventionism, Mexico at times sided with the United States in opposition to Brazil's proposals. Mexico also highlighted the

[263] Exteriores to BrEmb Buenos Aires, "Operação Pan-Americana," July 24, 1958, tele. exp. 5937, folder 82.281, AHIB; Exteriores to BrEmbLima, "Operação Pan-Americana, July 24, 1958, tel. exp. 5940, folder 82.285, AHIB; Manuel Prado (president of Peru) and Kubitschek, public exchange of letters, July 24, 1958, folder 82.285, AHIB; Exteriores to BrEmb Bogota, "Operação Pan-Americana," July 14, 1958, tele. exp. 5102, folder 960.3 Confidenciais asuntos gerais, AHIB.

[264] Exteriores to Brazilian diplomatic missions in Latin America, "Visita do Senhor Foster Dulles ao Brasil. Operação Pan-Americana," July 29, 1958, tele. exp. 5554, folder 960.3 Confidenciais asuntos gerais, AHIB.

[265] Taffet, *Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy*.

many failed attempts to gain U.S. economic cooperation, including as recently as the prior year in Buenos Aires, to paint the Brazilian initiative as futile.[266]

In the United States, criticism of Eisenhower's Latin America policy grew. After the Nixon trip, the U.S. Senate announced a review of U.S.-Latin American policy called the Draper Committee. Prominent Democrats on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee criticized Eisenhower for being insufficiently supportive of democracy and development.[267] The president sent Secretary Dulles to Brazil to demonstrate to Kubitschek "continuing interest in the constructive proposals you have recently made,"[268] but also to address Congressional criticism.

Brazilian officials fully expected that Dulles would be more interested in discussing communism than economics, and they hoped to take advantage of that. Brazilians strategized about how to best fit OPA into the context of East-West struggle. In a position paper, officials at Itamaraty wrote: "The attenuation of the purely military aspects and the growing emphasis on economic aspects of the conflict indicates an opportunity to raise the argument that the fight against underdevelopment in Latin America constitutes a global strategy for the West."[269] When Dulles arrived to Rio de Janeiro on August 4, the meeting mostly frustrated Brazilian expectations. Dulles deferred on economic questions while arguing that U.S. history showed private initiative to be the best way to develop an economy.[270] The secretary wanted another anti-communist treaty, and he was more interested in security and police reforms, than in discussing

---

[266] Mexican Foreign Ministry to Negrão de Lima, memorandum, Sept. 1, 1958, folder 82.285, AHIB.

[267] Weis, *Cold Warriors & Coups D'etat : Brazilian-American Relations, 1945-1964*, pp. 114-115.

[268] Eisenhower to Kubitschek, letter, Aug. 2, 1958, folder 82.285, AHIB.

[269] Exteriores to BrMission at the UN, "Operação Pan-Americana," July 30, 1958, tele. exp. 6036, folder 960.3, Pan-Americanismo, delegações, AHIB.

[270] "Memorandum of a Conversation, Brazilian foreign office," August 5, 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5*, pp. 692-695

the links between poverty and unrest. Kubitschek saw Dulles as almost incapable of compromise or understanding.[271] Later the two men traveled to the enormous construction site that was Brasilia to craft the final joint declaration. At Kubitschek's strong insistence, the declaration offered statements about the importance of Pan-Americanism and the need for economic development, but offered no specific initiatives. Kubitschek succeeded in keeping references to enhanced police cooperation out of the text.[272]

Foreign ministers meeting

Mexican opposition to Brazil's proposals shaped the first major meeting on OPA. Foreign ministers from throughout the hemisphere gathered for an informal meeting in Washington in September 1958, scheduled to coincide with the annual meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. The idea came from Mexico as an alternative to a large, formal conference, and by accepting it, Itamaraty hoped to bring the Mexicans onboard with their program.[273] Brazil indicated in consultations with Latin American diplomats that it desired a stand-alone mechanism to coordinate multilateral efforts on development. Mexico demurred, and then attacked the Brazilian initiative in meetings with other diplomats.[274] The recently appointed Brazilian minister Francisco Negrão de Lima wrote Kubitschek on September 15:

> Though we have the broad support of the majority, we are meeting stiff resistance from Mexico and the United States of America, which want to trust in the mechanisms of the Organization of American States. We are studying a way to reconcile out points of view, and at our suggestion, the Colombian delegation is convening a meeting of a Latin

[271] Kubitschek, *Meu Caminho para Brasília : Cinqüenta Anos em Cinco*, pp. 227-229.

[272] Kubitschek and Dulles, "Joint communique on Pan-American matters," Aug. 6, 1958, memorandum, folder 82.280-B, AHIB.

[273] "Memorandum," July 29, 1958, folder 82.280-B, AHIB.

[274] Fernando Lobo, "Operação Pan-Americana," Sept. 11, 1958, tele. rec. 7153, folder 960.3, Pan-Americanismo, delegações, AHIB.

> America group to deal with specifics of the Operation. With the goal of avoiding the impression that we want to undermine the OAS, we will be forced to move a little in the direction of the Mexican and U.S. points of view.[275]

Kubitschek pushed back against the compromise, seeing Mexico as a threat to OPA. On the eve of the conference, he wrote Negrão de Lima urging him "do everything possible so that OPA produces something more concrete than a proliferation of anodyne meetings and the flowering of a crop of innocuous declarations of continental solidarity." Kubitschek's letter continued:

> I do not think it necessary to remind you that the meeting in Washington will be a culminating moment for OPA. The victory of the Mexican thesis would relegate OPA to be merely a formula for revising Pan-Americanism, and it would be the final blow against the de facto leadership we have exercised since the beginning of the Operation. ... I urge your Excellency to promote understanding with the U.S. delegation that demonstrates that the only hope for the creation of a powerful alliance of the states of this continent is to avoid the stagnation of our initiative as mere revisionism under the OAS framework, where it would certainly be fragmented and lost in bureaucracy.[276]

Despite Mexico's reservations, several Eisenhower administration officials were arguing that the United States needed to address at least some of Brazil's concerns, which were echoed by the majority of Latin American leaders. In the days before the informal meeting of foreign ministers, the United States released word that it would unveil initiatives on commodity prices and for a hemispheric bank. Newspaper headlines in the region called the decision a "fundamental change" or declared with relief that "the United States finally accepts the creation of an inter-American bank for economic growth."[277] The administration also gave its blessing to the pursuit of common markets in the region. However, what many in Latin America read as the

---

[275] Negrão de Lima to Kubitschek, "Operação Pan-Americana," Sept. 18, 1958, tele. rec. 7377, folder 960.3, Pan-Americanismo, delegações, AHIB.

[276] Kubitschek to Negrão de Lima, "Operação Pan-Americana," Sept. 20, 1958, tele. exp. 7218, folder 960.3, Pan-Americanismo, delegações, AHIB.

[277] "Cambio fundamental de la política de E. Unidos ante América Latina," La Plata, Sept. 25, 1958; "Estados Unidos aceptó finalmente la creación de un banco interamericano para el fomento económico," La Mañana, Sept. 27, 1958.

first of sweeping changes in U.S. policy was seen by segments of the Eisenhower administration as a way to take some wind from Operation Pan-America's sails. Inside the State Department, there was often disagreement between Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs C. Douglas Dillon, who argued for a "positive approach" and Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs Thomas Mann, who wanted to relax some aspects of economic policy but saw Operation Pan-America as a Brazilian money grab.[278] Mann was a lawyer and career Foreign Service officer, who had grown up speaking Spanish and English in Laredo, Texas, and was posted in Uruguay and Venezuela early in his career. Dillon, the scion of an international banking family, came into the government with a background in Wall Street finance. He had been prominent in Republican politics, and was a major donor to the Eisenhower campaign; out of gratitude, Eisenhower had appointed him as ambassador to France in 1953. Starting shortly after Nixon's visit and continuing into the conference, Dillon's argument gained the upper hand. Dillon announced at an OAS meeting on August 12 that the United States had dropped its objections to the creation of an inter-American bank, though details remained sketchy.[279] Representing the State Department in an August 26 meeting with new Treasury Secretary Robert B. Anderson, Dillon argued that the bank "should be as flexible as possible" in granting "control to the Latin Americans."[280] As the face of this new attitude, announced in the weeks before the ministers meeting, Dillon won great respect from Latin American representatives. Lleras Camargo thanked Eisenhower for the recent

[278] Disputes between Dillon and Mann on economic policy pre-dated the Nixon attack and are clear in a review of economic policy that took place in March and April of 1958 during which Mann largely got the upper hand.

[279] In the Buenos Aires conference in 1957, the Eisenhower administration had not gone beyond accepting the study of such an institution—though there had been advocates for the bank inside the U.S. government. Likewise, Dillon advocated U.S. involvement in a new coffee pact as early as March 31, 1958, but had gotten limited support. *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5, microfilm supplement.*

[280] "Minutes of the 269th meeting of the national advisory council on international monetary and financial problems," August 26, 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5, microfilm supplement.*

changes in position, which would help Colombian development.[281] The Colombian also congratulated Kubitschek for the "radical modification" of the U.S. position, calling it the "first symptoms of the improved state of American relations." Latin American countries must take advantage of the moment to gain "a realistic appreciation of our common needs and the dangers that affect our social, political, and economic stability," Lleras wrote.[282] While Brazil seemed to have won in achieving these points, it had also ceded on seemingly smaller ones, particularly bringing OPA under the OAS. Kubitschek's close ally Lleras Camargo shifted to support moving the process to the organization he had once headed. With the rest of the news at the meeting looking so favorable, Brazilian diplomats accepted despite Kubitschek's reservations.

However, widespread changes were not assured. In a speech shortly after the conference, Rubottom said that Latin America should not expect broader changes from the United States, dampening what had appeared to be OPA's growing effectiveness. Brazilian diplomats saw Rubottom's statement as a "grave vitiation of the spirit of our movement." The Brazilian press attacked the comments.[283] Inside the administration, a number of influential voices were even more critical. When U.S. Ambassador Briggs consulted with Eisenhower, he noted the positive effects of responding promptly and at a high level to Brazilian entreaties, but cautioned "we should not under estimate the attractiveness to Brazil and other Latin American countries of Kubitschek's thesis that under-development is the root of all evil."[284] Thomas Mann wrote in

---

[281] Lleras Camargo to Eisenhower, 1958, letter, folder 82.279, AHIB.

[282] "Alberto Lleras to Juscelino Kubitschek," Fondo Presidente de la República, Despacho Señor Presidente, trans. 6, caja 109, carpeta 30, pp. 10-12, September 13, 1958.

[283] Cyro de Freitas Valle, "Operação Pan-American. Discurso de Rubottom," Oct. 12, 1958, tele. rec. 7960, folder 960.3, Pan-Americanismo, delegações, AHIB; see also "Advertencia de Rubottom com endereço errado: O risco é tambêm para os EE.UU.," Última Hora, Oct 13, 1958, folder 82.280-B, AHIB.

[284] Briggs, Oct. 30, 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. V.*, pp. 706

January 1959 that "Brazil is attempting through Operation Pan-America to obtain the assurance of large-scale continuing financial assistance from the United States Government," which was "neither willing nor able to undertake a commitment of the sort which Brazil appears to have in mind." Mann argued that Dillon should seek to limit Brazilian expectations.[285]

There was also bureaucratic opposition to the creation of a new development bank from the Export-Import Bank, the International Cooperation Administration, and parts of Treasury. Even after President Eisenhower decided to support its creation, these same agencies sought to limit the size of the inter-American bank and the scope of its lending authority. Representatives of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Federal Reserve, and the ICA all insisted on a slow planning process with a focus on preventing overlap with existing institutions. Months after Eisenhower had approved the project, the ICA's deputy director D.A. Fitzgerald wrote that the inter-American bank "seems to have limited value."[286] Lynn Stanbaugh of the Ex-Im Bank argued against allowing the bank to make dollar-based loans, trying to make sure the organization did not compete with his own. Rubottom noted in a letter to Milton Eisenhower that "working level officials" at Treasury opposed moving ahead with the plans for the Bank. Despite his earlier remarks, Rubottom argued that the United States needed to listen to Latin American views and "had much to gain by taking a positive approach."[287] With the State Department generally taking positions closer to Latin Americans' demands, and other parts of the government adopting more conservative stances, developing a consensus position became arduous, slowing implementation of the bank to a crawl.

---

[285] Mann to Dillon, "Brazil and Operation Pan-America," January 26, 1959, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. V.*, pp. 708-710.

[286] Fitzgerald, "Proposed inter-American development banking institution," Dec. 23, 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5, microfilm supplement*, ETA-15.

[287] Rubottom to Milton Eisenhower, Nov. 19, 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5, microfilm supplement*, ETA-15.

Dillon retained a political focus, arguing that the main purpose of the institution was to improve relationships with Latin American countries.[288] Treasury Secretary Humphrey had opposed the bank for years, but he resigned in May 1957. His departure to return to business had been expected since Eisenhower's re-election, but was postponed until the illness of Humphrey's business partner at a major steel firm increased Humphrey's eagerness. His replacement, Secretary Robert Anderson, confirmed in July 1957, had his roots in the Texas oil industry, and had spent time as secretary of the Navy and assistant secretary of Defense. Anderson was more flexible on spending than Humphrey, and after at Treasury he supported the president's decision on the bank. Echoing Kubitschek's arguments, Anderson noted that "the Latin American feeling of having a special relationship with the United States had been weakened" in recent years. President Eisenhower's decision to support an "Arab Bank" made continued opposition to the longstanding Latin American request untenable.

The inter-American bank also had the strong support of Milton Eisenhower, based on his consultations with Latin Americans.[289] During July 1958, Milton Eisenhower had traveled with Roy Rubottom throughout Central America. Coming so shortly after the Caracas fiasco, there was great concern in the administration over their safety, and much attention was paid to the visit. Milton Eisenhower's report after that trip, along with the departure of Secretary Humphrey, helped speed the departure away from orthodox free-market policies to a greater acceptance of government involvement in Latin American economies. In particular, he recommended commodity stabilization and an expansion of credit, though not grants, to Central America. His

[288] "Minutes of the 271st meeting of the national advisory council on international monetary and financial problems," September, 1958.

[289] "Minutes of the 269th meeting of the national advisory council on international monetary and financial problems," August 26, 1958.

initial report, released on August 1, 1958, did not include a recommendation on a development bank.[290] However, later in August, Milton Eisenhower did strongly support the institution's creation. Several years later, Milton Eisenhower wrote the bank was "the most important recommendation [he] made in the field of credit. … Dillon Rubottom, and I saw the establishment of the Inter-American Bank as a major first step out of a dilemma." The president's brother emphasized that his support was "responding to a request the Latin-Americans had been making for two decades."[291] Milton Eisenhower lent important support within the administration for more flexible foreign economic policy in the hemisphere. His influence was strongest in shaping U.S. policy toward Bolivia, and his recommendations following his trip to Central America followed similar lines. From his reports and writings, it is clear that Milton Eisenhower provided a more sympathetic ear for center-left Latin American leaders than did Humphrey or Dulles, though he remained skeptical of Kubitschek's inflationary policies. Milton Eisenhower picked up on Latin American suggestions, and supported moderate proposals that he thought would encourage stability, democracy, and improved governance.

Back in South America, Itamaraty worked to keep OPA on its neighbors' agendas after the ministers meeting. In mid-October, Brazil circulated an aide-memoire that sought to more clearly enunciate the spirit and objectives of the initiative. The Brazilian emphasis became increasingly economic, calling for Pan-American attention to turn from political questions to the field of development "where we have advanced little." The memorandum noted that the "expansiveness of this fight against underdevelopment" would depend largely on the United

---

[290] For documents on the planning of the trip, along with a summary, see *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. V*, pp. 249-266; the original report to the president is available in Milton Eisenhower, "Dr. Eisenhower reports to President on Central American Trip," *Department of State Bulletin*, August 25, 1958, pp. 309.

[291] Eisenhower, *The Wine Is Bitter; the United States and Latin America*, pp. 229-230.

States; therefore, it was incumbent upon Latin American leaders to persuade the U.S. government.[292] More concretely, Itamaraty circulated an early proposal for the formation of a regional economic organization that would include preferential tariff schemes and eventually a common market.[293] Through his personal diplomacy, Kubitschek continually reached out to the region's presidents.[294] Despite these efforts, in the last months of 1958, the proposals from Kubitschek's letters and from September's informal meeting dropped from the presidential level. Kubitschek saw the foreign ministers' gathering as preparation for a meeting of heads of state, but the move to the OAS framework created a different path. The daily business of OPA became the concern of Latin American countries' ambassadors to the OAS and to Washington. Many Latin American countries favored this because it allowed them to use existing diplomatic resources, and the largest diplomatic staffs were in Washington. The ministers agreed to create a "Committee of 21," formed by the twenty Latin American countries and the United States.

Committee of 21

The Committee of 21 held several rounds of meetings, with the first session running from November 17 through December 12, 1958. It started optimistically, given the desire of major Latin American countries, except Mexico, to take advantage of the positive U.S. disposition on the formation of an inter-American bank. Dillon's speech during the meetings' first week drew

[292] "Aide-memoire," archived on Oct. 20, 1958, draft, folder 82.279, AHIB.

[293] "Declaracao conjunta sobre preferencia regional inter-latinoamericana," Fondo MRE, Embajada de Colombia en Brasil, trans. 8, caja 106, carpeta 104, pp. 22-24, Oct, 27, 1958.

[294] Negrão de Lima to Raul P. Barrenechea, letter, Oct. 22, 1958, folder 82.286, AHIB; Kubitschek to Frondizi, "Operação Pan-Americana. Apoio da Argentina," Nov. 5, 1958, tel. exp. 10.138, folder 82.281, AHIB; Frondizi to Kubitschek, Nov. 7, 1958, letter, folder 82.281, AHIB.

praise from the Colombian foreign minister.[295] After an early meeting, Brazilian delegate and early OPA advocate Augusto Frederico Schmidt seized upon positive words from Rubottom and Mann: "After the words of the U.S. representative this morning in the private session of the Committee of 21, I do not hesitate to say that we can consider ourselves victorious in the political battle for OPA."[296] A few days later, Schmidt noted: "I heard Mann's confession that Latin America had been treated unjustly in the loans from international organizations, and that the moment had arrived to repair those injustices. I think this statement opens possibilities for all the countries to negotiate new loans. We should not miss this opportunity."[297]

The optimism was not well founded. Though Dillon had first mentioned the policy change three months before, the administration still lacked concrete positions on what the bank should be; Treasury insisted that Dillon should refuse to discuss it during the meetings, which he and Rubottom saw as impracticable and politically unwise. Dillon continued to insist on meeting Latin American demands for loan flexibility as "absolutely necessary to meet both the urgent economic problems in Latin America and the political problem created by their increased expectations of U.S. assistance."[298] In practice, "flexibility" meant the bank would make "soft" loans repayable in local currency. Dillon's rationale was political, driven in part by how hard the Brazilian delegation pushed for it. He consistently argued for a greater initial U.S. contribution in

---

[295] "Discurso pronunciado por el ministro de relaciones exteriores, Doctor Julio César Turbay Ayala, el la Universidad de Medillín" November 24, 1958, *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores, junio de 1958 a julio de 1959*, (Bogota: Imprenta Nacional, 1959), pp. 16.

[296] Schmidt, "OPA. Comitê dos 21. Discursos dos representates dos Estados Unidos da America do Equador e do Mexico," Nov. 21, 1958, tele. rec. 9159, folder 960.3, Pan-Americanismo, delegações, AHIB.

[297] Schmidt, "OPA. Comitê dos 21," Nov. 24, 1958, tele. rec. 9186, folder 960.3, Pan-Americanismo, delegações, AHIB.

[298] Rubottom, "Inter-American development institution," Nov. 24, 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5, microfilm supplement*, ETA-11.

total dollars and percentage of funds, but Treasury continued to dither and President Eisenhower did not resolve the dispute between State and other agencies.[299] The U.S. inability to enunciate its position on the bank helped exhaust the goodwill that the announcement of the U.S. policy change had created in August and September.

Another reason for the slow progress was structural. Generally, delegations were headed below the ministerial level, and not all carried much political clout. Brazil appointed OPA's original advocate, Augusto Frederico Schmidt to head its delegation. Though Schmidt wielded considerable elegance and a close personal connection to his president, he would prove poorly suited, putting too much stock in public declarations while at times being seemingly oblivious to political machinations. His lack of diplomatic experience showed. At one point, "Schmidt affirmed, in a threatening tone or a warning to the United States, that Brazil and other Latin American countries could intensify their relations with the Soviet bloc if they did not receive substantial U.S. assistance in their fight against underdevelopment,"[300] forcing the Brazilian foreign minister to gently repudiate his delegate's statements and reiterate Brazil's backing for the United States. For one part, the statement was not congruent with OPA's stress on poverty and internal stability; on the other, such intimations could cause trouble for Kubitschek with the Brazilian military. The transparent tactic annoyed the U.S. delegation early in the process while crucial decisions on the size and scope of aid were still being made in the administration.

For Brazil, the *raison d'etre* of the Committee of 21 was to work out the details of agreements that presidents could soon complete and sign. Schmidt noted that there had been general consensus on what he called "questions of more or less—more capital, more technical

---

[299] "Minutes of the 273rd meeting of the national advisory council on international monetary and financial problems," Nov. 25, 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5, microfilm supplement*, ETA-12.

[300] Negrão de Lima, "Operação Pan-Americana," telegram, Nov. 27, 1958, folder 82.286, AHIB.

assistance, more trade, less inflation, less underdevelopment, etc., etc." However, whenever Brazil tried to attach metrics to the goals, the consensus evaporated,[301] with Mexico at times opposing openly and the United States stalling. Given the lack of progress, Kubitschek solicited supportive statements from Colombian colleagues. Relations between Colombia and Brazil, often strained on questions of coffee, had been strengthened by an agreement on production levels. Colombian Foreign Minister Julio César Turbay Ayala spoke effusively:

> President Lleras has lent decisive support to the initiative of the Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek, which aims to obtain from the United States sufficient cooperation to support Latin America in the crucial stage of overcoming its economic backwardness. Recognizing Brazil as the father of the healthy initiative of re-framing to the United States the difficulties Latin America faces, Colombia decided to support Operation Pan-America. … Today, solidarity between Colombia and Brazil are stronger than ever because the two countries, under the direction of Presidents Lleras and Kubitschek, coincide in their proposals and ideals for continental prosperity.[302]

Turbay Ayala's description of OPA as "re-framing"[303] Latin American problems is an apt one. The problems certainly were not new ones. Many of the solutions were not new either. The value of Operation Pan-America was that it put these problems in a new framework that gave them added urgency. Argentines reiterated their support, even proposing that stronger Latin American economies like Brazil and Argentina should offer "mutual aid" to Paraguay and Bolivia.[304]

As the first round came to a close, Brazilian diplomats had largely succeeded in maintaining Latin American unity, but were not able to do much to overcome U.S. indecision. On the bank in particular, the five members of the technical subcommittee (representatives of the

---

[301] Augusto Frederico Schmidt, speech in the OAS, Nov. 25, 1958, folder 82.286, AHIB.

[302] Turbay Ayala, "Discurso pronunciado por el ministro de relaciones exteriors," Nov. 24, 1958, *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores, junio de 1958 a julio de 1959*, pp. 13-25.

[303] In the original Spanish, "replantear."

[304] Paulo Nogera Bautista, "Memorandum," Nov. 28, 1958, folder 82.286, AHIB; Nogera Bautista, "Proposta argentina de criação de uma Comissão Regional de Assistência Econômica ao Paraguai e a Bolívia," Nov. 29, 1958, folder 82.286, AHIB.

U.S., Brazil, Ecuador, Cuba, and Chile) produced a draft that restated the desire to create a bank, called on all American states to participate, and said the bank would provide technical assistance.[305] After a month of work, it did not address the substantive questions of size, governance, or lending rules. Between rounds, Brazilians tried to advance proposals despite U.S. inaction, circulating a draft treaty proposal to start a Latin American common market, while continuing coffee talks.[306]

Over the Washington winter, Brazil gained several useful allies in the U.S. Congress, where Democrats had been critical of administration policy on Latin America. After the unsatisfactory close of the first "Committee of 21" round, Senators Mike Mansfield and John F. Kennedy latched onto the Brazilian initiative as a counterweight to Eisenhower's policies. Though Brazil lacked a Congressional lobbying effort, Brazilians, including Kubitschek personally, sought to reinforce these ties with messages to supportive Congressmen.[307] Kennedy's remarks in a December 15 speech in Puerto Rico were warmly received in Brazil. Kennedy was already seen as a presidential contender, and was granted extra sympathy as a Democrat—one editorial called him "the new Roosevelt"—and a Catholic.[308] Brazilian

---

[305] "Propuesta de la comisión especial para estudiar la formulación de nuevas medidas de cooperación económica," Dec. 8, 1958, folder Consejo de la OEA, AGNC, Presidencia, Despacho Señor Presidente, trans. 6, caja 187-188, carpeta 23, pp. 211-214.

[306] "Projeto de tratado de zona de livre comercio," Dec. 31, 1958, memorandum, est.14, pr.1, no.8, Bogotá, Telegramas, 1956-1959, AAHI-Rio, pp. 1-8; "Sanz de Santamaría to Alberto Lleras," Dec. 15, 1958, Fondo Presidente de la República, Despacho Señor Presidente, trans. 6, caja 109, carpeta 30, pp. 30-35.

[307] Though the Draper Committee's review of Eisenhower's policy in Latin America drew Congress' attention to the region, I found no indication that the Brazilian government sought to directly influence or lobby the U.S. Congress on its behalf. SFRC committee member Homer E. Capehart traveled to the region in 1959, but Congressional delegations do not appear to be a major factor. Milton Eisenhower's missions received more attention. Homer E. Capehart, news release, est.14, pr.1, no.8, Bogotá, Telegramas, 1956-1959, AAHI-Rio; Schmidt, "Operação Pan-Americana," Dec. 17, 1958, tele. rec. 9783, folder 960.3, Pan-Americanismo, delegações, AHIB; Kubitschek, "Operação Pan-Americana. Discurso do Senador John Kennedy," Nov. 18, 1959, tel. exp. 9318, folder 82.298, AHIB.

[308] "O apoio de Kennedy, valioso para a OPA," Dec. 18, 1958, *Diario Carioca*.

diplomats in Washington surmised: "We can be optimistic about the possibility that the new Congress will attend to a petition from the Executive for the creation of a special fund for the planned inter-American financial institution."[309] Attention remained trained on the executive.

The twin shocks of 1959

By the time delegates convened for the second round of the Committee of 21 in Buenos Aires in April, the state of inter-American relations looked quite different. Most remarkably, the dictator and earlier Eisenhower ally Fulgencio Batista had fled Havana before the triumph of Fidel Castro's revolution. The old regime's sudden collapse, and the anxiety about Castro, threw a spotlight on the administration's policies and heightened criticism from Congress. Secondly, in early 1959 Brazil once again neared an untenable balance-of-payments deficit. During the second half of 1958, Kubitschek had mostly tried to divorce OPA from specific Brazilian appeals for assistance. The dire situation forced Kubitschek to seek U.S. support for emergency relief, not just the longer-term, multilateral OPA. Kubitschek personally inquired about obtaining $300 million in new loans in late January.[310] Later that year, the CIA warned that Brazil would likely default on $2.2 billion in debt without outside assistance.[311] The two shocks created urgency for both Americans and Brazilians, but it was not clear the new priorities aligned.

In mid-January 1959, the Eisenhower administration finally presented its complete position on the design for the bank. The United States initially proposed that the bank would have $850 million of capitalization, of which about $400 million would come from the United

---

[309] BrEmbWashington to Exteriores, "Declaraões do Senador Mansfield sobre a Operação Pan-Americana," Dec. 22, 1958, letter, folder 82.282, AHIB.

[310] "Telegram from the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State," February 3, 1959, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5*, pp. 711-712.

[311] "The Financial Crisis in Brazil," National Intelligence Estimate, CIA, July 21, 1959. Available online through: www.foia.cia.gov.

States. Brazil had pressed for at least $2 billion just from the United States, and $5 billion total. The administration's plan required Latin America's initial contributions to be considerable and mostly in dollars or gold, while limiting the capacity for "soft" loans. Latin American leaders publicly criticized the proposal.[312] Privately, the administration sounded out Latin American views and got the impression that while there was some division regarding soft loans, there was a unanimous desire to increase the "callable capital" of the bank. State Department economic officer Alexander M. Rosenson reported that "the Latins seemed to have their hearts set very strongly on this matter, and refused to take 'no' for an answer." If the bank's initial capital was limited, they wanted the institution created in a way that would allow it to grow. However, representatives from Argentina, Colombia, Chile, and El Salvador told Rosenson that Brazil was a "special problem in the current negotiations."[313] Indeed, several countries worried that what they saw as Brazilian intransigence could undermine the longstanding goal of setting up the bank. The issue threatened the unity of Brazil's coalition, a top Brazilian diplomat noted:

> In a long conversation today, the Argentine ambassador told me that if Brazil takes an intransigent position in the matter of capital for the Bank, it will be entirely isolated, as the totality of Latin America wants the institution to be created as soon as possible with the hope that as it develops it will receive supplements of adequate capital.[314]

Kubitschek did not want OPA to be reduced to the bank and wanted to make sure the focus remained on underdevelopment broadly. Brazil continued to press for concrete metrics for development, starting with GDP per capita, with goals and timelines to show that OPA's collaborative effort was superior to the Soviet's. The Brazilians wanted to incorporate a specific

---

[312] Ben F. Meyer, "Decepciona a Latino America el proyecto para el banco de fomento," *United Press International*, Jan. 14, 1959, folder 82.283, AHIB.

[313] Rosenson, "Inter-American bank," Jan. 30, 1959, and Rosenson, "Inter-American bank issues," Feb. 4, 1959, in *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5, microfilm supplement*, ETA-17 and ETA-18.

[314] Sergio Corrêa da Costa, "OPA. Instituicão financeira interamericana," Jan. 20, 1959, tele. rec. 480, folder 960.3, Pan-Americanismo, delegações, AHIB.

per-capita income target of $470, to be achieved over a ten-year period. The U.S. team rejected the proposal. After a meeting with Mann, Rubottom, Randall, and Ambasador Briggs, Brazilian Ambassador Peixoto wrote: "They [the U.S. team] said they agreed fully with the Brazilian government's objective...but they disagreed not only with the practical value of fixing goals with a period of two decades to overcome underdevelopment, but also with the political advantages of comparing the economic growth with that of the principal communist countries."[315] Mann soon responded by denouncing the Brazilian position to Dillon as self-interested and no longer in line with the rest of Latin America.[316] Brazil claimed the United States was making ambitious promises, but refusing to agree to specifics.[317] At the same time, the State Department faced a transition. John Foster Dulles' illness forced him to reduce his duties in early 1959, before resigning in April after six years as secretary. Dulles was replaced by Christian Herter, who had been serving as undersecretary of state.

While rhetorical support for Operation Pan-America continued, Brazil was losing allies. In part responding to pressures from the military, Frondizi adopted a more business-friendly approach. Notably, he opened Argentina's oil industry to foreign investment—drawing a sharp distinction with Brazil on a matter that had attracted substantial U.S. attention. In a February visit to the United States, Frondizi seemed at times closer to the old Eisenhower line about reliance on

[315] Amaral Peixoto, "OPA. Posição dos Estados Unidos na cooperação financeira," Jan. 18, 1959, tel. rec. 461, folder 960.3, Confidencial, Pan-Americanismo, Operacão Pan-Americana, delegações, AHIB.

[316] "Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State (Mann) to the Under Secretary of State (Dillon)," January 26, 1959, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5*, pp. 709.

[317] João Carlos Muniz, "Operação Pan-American," Feb. 10, 1959, tele. rec. 1061, folder 960.3, Pan-Americanismo, delegações, AHIB.

private capital than to Kubitschek's state-led developmentalism.[318] Frondizi took a moderate stance, trying to take some cover in Argentina's role as host of the next round for the Committee of 21, to seek conciliation between the U.S. and Brazilian positions. In early March, the U.S. administration expanded its proposal to $1 billion in initial capital, to grow later to $1.5 billion. The arrival of Fidel Castro and a new Cuban delegation shook the Buenos Aires conference, with Cuban insistence that the U.S. should establish a $30 billion fund dedicated to hemispheric development. Castro said: "What we need, we can only obtain from the United States." Brazil's chief, Schmidt, gave Castro warm praise.[319] Uncertainty about the direction of the new Cuban regime, and the addition of a boisterous voice for even greater amounts of aid, added to the administration's desire to demonstrate its concern for Latin America. Many Latin American delegations wanted the bank to begin operations as soon as possible, so when Brazil threatened to delay further talks to pressure the Eisenhower administration, the ploy left it increasingly isolated. Shortly before the conference, Argentina's foreign ministry termed the Brazilian position "unrealistic" and largely accepted the U.S. proposal for the bank.[320] The Eisenhower administration wanted an initialed text by late March or early April, hoping to get a Congressional appropriation for the next fiscal year. The prospect of a faster start to bank-funded projects outweighed specific concessions for many governments. Isolated, and realizing that OPA's momentum was fading, Brazil retreated. All twenty-one OAS members signed the bank's

[318] The Brazilian ambassador believed the "change in orientation" was driven by Argentina's own balance of payments crisis. Ernani do Amaral Peixoto to Negrão de Lima, "Visita do presidente Frondizi aos Estados Unidos da América," Jan. 27, 1959, letter, folder 82.283, AHIB.

[319] "Castro asks for 30 billion in U.S. aid for Latins," May 3, 1959, *Washington Post*, pp. A6.

[320] Bolitreau Fragoso, "OPA. Institução financiera interamericana," March 7, 1959, tele. exp. 1692 and Luiz de Almeda, "Posição argentina no reunião dos 21 em Buenos Aires," March 24, 1959, tele. exp. 2522, folder 960.3, Confidenciais asuntos gerais, AHIB.

Articles for Agreement on April 8.[321] Remaining differences, including the location of headquarters were sorted out over the course of May, and all the OAS members passed the statutes passed on May 27.[322]

After agreement was reached on the bank, Mann pressed Brazilian delegates to close the Committee of 21, but from a Brazilian point of view, the real goals of OPA had scarcely been addressed.[323] Kubitschek knew that members of the Eisenhower administration believed OPA was about little more than Brazil's own economic problems. In late March, he had told the U.S. ambassador that "over and above these considerations … is Operation Pan-America and demand of underdeveloped people for better life. Our Communist enemies are eagerly waiting for the moment to get into the act."[324] When Mann stopped in Rio on May 11, Kubitschek tried to dispel "any impression Mann might have that Brazilians' OPA policy was intended [to] isolate US" or to address Brazil's own, short-term fiscal problem. The Eisenhower administration continued to press Brazil to take austerity measures, some of which could have caused price spikes in basic goods. Kubitschek warned Mann that overdoing reforms would lead to protests that would "do irreparable harm to U.S.-Brazil relations" during the coming 1960 presidential election.[325]

---

[321] "Editorial note," *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5, microfilm* supplement, ETA-24

[322] Venezuela strongly pushed to locate the institution in Caracas. The Eisenhower administration insisted only a Washington-based bank would win Congressional approval. Brazil, though sympathetic to Betancourt's wishes, did not fight much on his behalf after being at odds with Venezuela on other aspects of the bank. Exteriores to BrEmb Caracas, "Instituicão financeira interamericana," May 6, 1959, tel. rec. 5910, folder 960.3, Confidencial, Pan-Americanismo, Operacão Pan-Americana, delegações, AHIB; Herter to Eisenhower, "Suggested reply to President Betancourt," April 8, 1959, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5, microfilm supplement,* ETA-23.

[323] Christian Herter, circular telegram to posts in American republics," March 7, 1959, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5, microfilm* supplement, ETA-21; Sergio Correa da Costa, "Operação Pan-American. Continuadade do Comitê dos 21," April 13, 1959, confidential letter, folder 960.3 Pan-Americanismo-Delegações, AHIB.

[324] Briggs, "Telegram from the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State," March 27, 1959, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5*, pp. 715-716.

[325] Woodie Wallner, "Telegram from the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of States," May 11, 1959, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5*, pp. 721-722.

Brazilians were concerned that without the Committee of 21, OPA would dissipate. They called for a permanent organism to ensure the completion of the Operation.[326] After the conclusion of the second meeting, Itamaraty released instructions to its delegation at the OAS, instructing representatives to make sure countries followed through on the ratification and implementation of thirty-five resolutions that had been passed during the Committee of 21 meetings. The Brazilians wanted a "support group" formed within the OAS to work the subjects of the resolutions and craft more specific development projects. At the same time, they pressed a new "special fund" for the "broader implementation of Operation Pan-America."[327]

Despite what Kubitschek had told Mann, Brazil's immediate problems overwhelmed the president's focus on OPA. Kubitschek reiterated that he could not implement the reforms the IMF was insisting upon without provoking riots before a presidential election. On the evening of June 8, Kubitschek told the U.S. chargé in Brazil Woodie Wallner that Washington needed to understand that in the minds of Brazilians, there was no difference between the IMF and the U.S. government, and that the U.S. would be blamed for the IMF's refusal to extend new credit. Brazil needed a $300 million loan, so Kubitschek would have to implement the reforms, the U.S. chargé wrote, adding: "Obviously he [Kubitschek] would not wish to make a public break with the fund and the U.S."[328] Speaking at a political rally the next day, Kubitschek announced the he was doing just that—halting negotiations with the IMF because the organization's demands would impede Brazilian development. Kubitschek's appeal to sovereignty garnered the desired

[326] Sérgio Corrêa da Costa, "Operação Pan-American. Continuadade do Comitê dos 21," April 13, 1959, confidential letter, folder 960.3 Pan-Americanismo-Delegações, AHIB.

[327] Sérgio Corrêa da Costa, "Operação Pan-Americana. Programa de ação para a OEA," May 25, 1959, memorandum, folder 82.298, AHIB.

[328] Wallner, "Telegram from the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of States," June 9, 1959, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5*, pp. 723-725.

response, and the president enjoyed a burst of nationalist support. He also warned—having first consulted with and reassured the military—that ties with the Soviets would be explored as an alternate way to finance Brazilian development.[329]

Kubitschek feared domestic upheaval and challenges to the precarious democratic system. Furthermore, the IMF demands impinged on how Kubitschek saw sovereignty and autonomy in the Brazilian context. To meet the conditions, Brazil would have needed to scale back or cancel sprawling development projects, including those connected to the construction of Brasilia. Biographer Robert J. Alexander wrote:

> "President Kubitschek gave clear indication that he did not believe that because the Latin American countries needed outside financial and technical assistance to help their economic development that these countries, and Brazil in particular, should allow the donor institutions to determine national development policy. That was the nub of the issue between the Kubitschek administration and the [IMF] in 1959-1960."[330]

The decision surprised the embassy and the administration, which quickly backtracked on its early position and agreed to conversations about rescheduling Brazil's debt, though it still did not offer new money.[331] A U.S. intelligence estimate noted that Kubitschek was betting that U.S. interests in Brazil would push the administration to accommodation; in the short term, the Brazilian president could let the United States take the blame for economic problems.[332]

In mid-1959, Kubitschek had a second opportunity to grasp the Eisenhower administration's attention. Relations between the Eisenhower administration and the new Cuban government were growing increasingly tense. At the same time, a crisis was brewing between

---

[329] "Virada na política econômica," June 10, 1959, *Jornal do Brasil*, pp. 1

[330] Alexander, *Juscelino Kubitschek and the Development of Brazil*, pp. 296-297.

[331] Wallner, "Telegram from the embassy in Brazil to the Department of State," June 13, 1959, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5*, pp. 727-729.

[332] "Special National Intelligence Estimate: The financial crisis in Brazil," July 21, 1959, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5*, pp. 733-739.

Dominican autocrat Rafael Trujillo, Castro, and democratic leaders, especially Rómulo Betancourt of Venezuela. Castro and Trujillo exemplified the two ends of the spectrum that posed a threat to hemispheric stability, with revolution from the left and repression from the right.[333] The growing crisis offered the opportunity to unite Frondizi and Kubitschek around democracy instead of economics after their relation had cooled somewhat during the Buenos Aires Committee of 21 meeting. The two governments consulted in the run up to the mid-August ministerial consultation in Chile, trying to figure out how to strengthen democratic governments and isolate both Castro and Trujillo. The Argentines still hesitated to back a renewed push on development aid, however, opposing putting development questions on the agenda to avoid "interminable debates that lead to nothing in practice."[334] The Caribbean crisis dominated the Santiago meeting, and the final declarations gave only the slightest nod to economic matters while emphasizing democracy, human rights, and principles of non-intervention.[335] Concerns were growing about Castro's communist sympathies, but Brazil was not immediately able to capitalize on them to generate the same sort of response it did after the Nixon fracas.

Generally, 1959 was a frustrating year for Brazilian aspirations for Operation Pan-America. 1958 had ended with hope regarding the U.S. acceptance of a development bank, but Kubitschek could not build on the accomplishment. Brazilian goals remained largely unchanged and centered on the use of Pan-Americanism to secure external assistance for Latin America, which Kubitschek believed would help preserve a democratic order and strengthen the West.

---

[333] Regarding the growing tension between the United States and both Caribbean leaders, see Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, ch. 9.

[334] Boulitreau Fragoso, "V reunião de consulta," Aug. 6, 1959, tel. rec. 5891, est.14, pr.2, no.9, Buenos Aires, telegramas recibidas 1959, AAHI-Rio.

[335] OAS, "Quinta reunión de consulta de ministros de relaciones exteriores: Acta final," August 12-18, 1959, Santiago, Chile. Available online: http://www.oas.org/consejo/sp/rc/Actas/Acta%205.pdf.

However, Brazilian attention was consumed, particularly since June, by Brazil's balance-of-payments crisis and the inability to come to agreement with the IMF. It was more difficult for Brazil to advance a comprehensive, long-range plan for the economic development of the continent when it was on the verge of crisis. Diplomatically, Brazilians struggled to preserve Latin American unity, persuade the United States, or take advantage of the opportunity presented by the Caribbean crisis. Over the course of the year, the more generous position backed by Douglas Dillon lost ground to that promoted by Thomas Mann. Mann was in many ways arguing the easier case of continuing current policies and limiting new fiscal demands. During this period, the administration essentially delayed major action. In December, the recently appointed U.S. Ambassador to Brazil John Moors Cabot[336] reflected on his first months and found the U.S. policy to be lacking. The U.S. exaggerated Brazilian fecklessness and underestimated Kubitschek's achievements, Cabot argued. U.S. policy failed to adequately recognize Brazil's importance, and was not helping meet longer-term U.S. interests. Cabot reported:

> The cold shoulder we have given the Brazilians in their economic plight has had its inevitable repercussions on the political orientation of the Brazilian Government. One symptom of this is the trade mission which is now in Soviet Russia. … I think we must anticipate a rough going over at the Quito Conference with the Brazilians, who have so often in inter-American conferences acted as moderators, now taking the leadership in turning the heat on us. …
>
> They yearn to be considered a great power, and they feel we have treated them on a par with Honduras. Even 25 years ago we consulted with them first on practically all inter-American and on many world problems—are they less important to us now?

Cabot went on to assess how the U.S. attitude to OPA had changed, saying the United States was "refer[ing] blandly" to the Inter-American Development Bank whenever the initiative was mentioned. At the same time, the administration was willing to "foot the budget deficits" for

[336] For a fascinating, critical look at Cabot's role, see Stephen M. Streeter, "Campaigning against Latin American Nationalism: U. S. Ambassador John Moors Cabot in Brazil, 1959-1961," *The Americas* 51, no. 2 (1994).

non-Latin American nations. It should not be surprised at a lack of gratitude for U.S. loans that charged nearly market interest rates; the ambassador criticized the Ex-Im Bank for acting like "lush banking operation" instead of an "instrument of national policy."[337]

New year, new fears

In early 1960, the Eisenhower administration once again increased its attention to Latin America, especially Brazil. On December 30, 1959, Dillon mentioned the possibility of an Eisenhower visit to Brasilia, which would offer an important international nod to the new capital. Eisenhower's tour had much to do with Cuba, as the administration and Castro engaged in escalating rounds of tit-for-tat. After Castro made public accusations against the U.S. Ambassador in Havana Philip Bonsal, Bonsal was recalled to Washington. Brazil immediately sensed an opportunity, not just for OPA but more immediately to expand its sugar exports at Cuba's expense.[338] Mexico's President López Mateos made a state visit to Brazil in January, intimating that he would lower Mexican opposition to OPA.[339] While Mexican leadership was publicly supportive of Castro, in private, it was very concerned and eager to advance moderate approaches, which seemed to contribute to the new attitude.[340] At the same time, Brazil's economic picture was a bit rosier: Higher-than-expected coffee prices in the second half of 1959 had improved the balance of payments, and the IMF agreed to offer a smaller line of credit.

---

[337] "Letter from the Ambassador in Brazil (Cabot) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)," December 4, 1959, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5*, pp. 744-745.

[338] This happened in July 1960. By that time, Brazilians had been trying to quietly position themselves for six months. Moreira Salles, "Situação política mundial. Relações Estados Unidos-Cuba," Jan. 26, 1960, tele. rec. 727, vol. Washington, Telegramas Rec-Exp., 1960, AHIB.

[339] Sanz de Santamaría to Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, "Visita del Presidente López Mateos", Embajada de Colombia en Brasil, AGNC, trans. 8, caja 107, carpeta 115, January 26, 1960, ff. 60; Jorge Oliviera Maia, "Operação Pan-Americana. Reunião dos 21," Feb. 17, 1960, tele. rec. 1605, folder 960.3, Confidencial, Pan-Americanismo, Operacão Pan-Americana, delegações, AHIB.

[340] Keller, "A Foreign Policy for Domestic Consumption : Mexico's Lukewarm Defense of Castro, 1959-1969."

Kubitschek believed that Eisenhower would be much more sympathetic to the aims of Operation Pan-America if he had more direct knowledge of Latin America. When the U.S. president announced in early 1960 that he would visit South America, staying in Brazil from February 23-26, Kubitschek hoped to showcase what Brazil had accomplished.[341] Brazilian objectives during the visit were both political and economic. On the economic front, in its drafts of the joint declaration, Brazil called for a common pledge to "eradicate underdevelopment" through international cooperation.[342] In world politics, the Brazilian president and ministers continued to press for recognition that they deserved to be consulted in international matters. Itamaraty argued for "methods to improve the political contacts between Washington and the other capitals of the continent." If Latin America continued to be excluded from consultations, it could open a new divide in world affairs, Itamaraty argued: "The Brazilian government wants to call to the U.S. government's attention the danger that a worldwide North-South antagonism could occur, just as acute as the West-East antagonism that divides the world along the so-called Iron Curtain."[343] Lafer and Schmidt made similar points to Secretary Herter, who noted that "[Schmidt] told me that a greater awareness of Brazil and a better understanding of her desire to be considered a great power entitled to consultation on world problems was of paramount importance and that economic problems would take care of themselves."[344]

---

[341] Dillon first mentioned the visit to Brazilian Ambassador Moreira Salles on December 30, 1959.

[342] Exteriores to BrEmb Washington, "Visita do Presidente Eisenhower ao Brasil," Feb. 15, 1960, tele. exp. 1272, vol. Washington, Telegramas Rec-Exp., 1960, AHIB. The final declaration adopted many of these points in slightly softer language: "Joint Statement of the President and President Kubitschek of Brazil," February 23, 1960, *The American Presidency Project*. Available online: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12105.

[343] Brazilian foreign ministry to Brazilian cabinet, "Aide-memoire," Feb. 23, 1960, folder 82.287-B, AHIB.

[344] Christian Herter, "Memorandum of a conversation between Secretary of State Herter and President Kubitschek's adviser (Schmidt)," February 25, 1960, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5*, pp. 766-768.

Meanwhile, Kubitschek showed Eisenhower around the still-in-progress construction of Brasilia, and the American seemed genuinely impressed at how much had been built in two years. Kubitschek hoped the grandiosity of Brasilia would counter assumptions that Brazil's spending had disappeared into a pit of waste and corruption. During their conversations, the Brazilian president felt Eisenhower was "not sufficiently informed" about OPA, and that Eisenhower's general support had not been translated into action by the State Department. In the short term, the visit helped, as the Brazilian government re-started more favorable talks with the IMF, despite not having made the overhauls that had been demanded earlier. Kubitschek hoped the visit would pay dividends in advancing OPA during the next Committee of 21 meetings.[345]

Eisenhower's visit to Brazil was followed on April 4, 1960 by Alberto Lleras Camargo's trip to Washington. The Colombian president pressed the goals of OPA with renewed vigor, to the delight of the Brazilians. With Kubitschek's term coming to an end, Lleras Camargo was in a sense taking the mantle. Lleras Camargo had extensive meetings with Eisenhower and Secretary Herter, met with the financial leaders in Washington and New York, and gave well publicized addresses before the U.S. Congress,[346] at the OAS, before the National Press Club, and alongside Milton Eisenhower, president of Johns Hopkins University.[347] During the visit, Lleras obtained economic assistance, including for land reform, which he discussed with President Eisenhower.

---

[345] Kubitschek, *Meu Caminho para Brasília : Cinqüenta Anos em Cinco*, pp. 327-329. Rubottom, "The Brazilian foreign minister's call on the President," *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. V,* pp. 769-770.

[346] I could find no record or press mention of official meetings between Lleras an Congressional leaders during which he might have pressed the case for OPA. However, Lleras did meet with Congressional leaders including Senator William Fulbright during official dinners.

[347] The *New York Times* printed eighteen articles about Lleras' ten-day trip, including several on the front page.

Cuba cast a shadow over the visit, but Lleras Camargo used it to his benefit.[348] On April 6, Lleras Camargo addressed the U.S. Congress, where he made both political and economic arguments for supporting Latin American democracy and development. Mentioning Operation Pan-America, the Colombian argued the massive loans would be repaid, but that the interest of the United States in the proposal was "fundamentally, a political act that cannot be judged by banking standards." After describing the desperate conditions of many Latin Americans, Lleras asked the Congress "to help these people exit from the final stage of underdevelopment, before their backwardness is converted into … an historic disaster."[349] The newspaper *O Estado de São Paulo* editorialized that "it would have been difficult for Latin America to find at this moment a better spokesman before the North American government and people than the Colombian President Alberto Lleras Camargo."[350]

Lleras Camargo was even more dramatic on April 8 at Johns Hopkins, where his views coincided with those of Milton Eisenhower. Helping Latin America would be like the Marshall Plan, Lleras insisted, but easier and most likely profitable. "It would consist of giving them [Latin Americans] a push out of a transitory impasse that if prolonged could shift its destiny toward anarchy and chaos." While Colombia once accepted as natural that it should trade primary goods for manufactures, views had shifted, the president argued. Several decades earlier, Latin Americans decided to use tariff protection to industrialize and increase living standards.

---

[348] See, "Proposed program for assistance to Colombia's agrarian reform program," March 25, 1960, "Secretary's cal on President Lleras Camargo of Colombia," April 6, 1960, "Call on the President by President Lleras Camargo," April 6, 1960, in *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5, microfilm supplement,* docs. CO-25, CO-27, CO-29.

[349] Lleras Camargo, "Discurso del Presidente de Colombia ante el Congreso de los Estados Unidos," April 6, 1960, carpeta 37, documento 547, BLAA. Also see, "Colombian urges rise in aid," April 7, 1960, *New York Times,* pp. 1.

[350] A Spanish-language translation of the article was included in a cable from the Colombian consulate in Sao Paulo to the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Visita Pdte. Lleras a EE.UU.," AGN, Bogotá, fondo Ministro Relaciones Exteriores, organismos internacionales, transferencia 3, caja 1, carpeta 288, folios 49-51.

Lleras Camargo told the audience at the university: "The movement against underdevelopment became the revolutionary force most accepted by the greater part of humanity. … In Latin America, rarely has there been a feeling so unanimous, so strong, so universally shared." Despite this, Latin American countries lacked the machinery, expertise, and funds they needed. The expanding population was growing impatient with the slow rate of progress, "each of its acts of desperation will more greatly resemble communism," the Colombian added.[351]

During the preparations for a meeting of special committee on economic cooperation at Bogota in September, Brazilians felt they had regained their footing. Lleras Camargo's visit demonstrated that they could get a little help. During July and August, Kubitschek and Eisenhower renewed their exchange of friendly letters. Eisenhower offered kind words about the visit and noted that the new capital had greatly impressed him. Most intriguingly, Eisenhower hinted at a policy change that seemed it could fulfill Kubitschek's aspirations.

> "I have now concluded that, notwithstanding our past efforts, we all need to exert additional strength in our common program to meet the challenge of this new decade during which our peoples are determined to progress to a new high plane of dynamic living, socially, economically, politically, and spiritually. I wanted you to know that I will be announcing within the next few days something of the plans of the United States toward participating more effectively toward our hemisphere objectives. I hope to request authority of the Congress which will be coming back into session early next month to move ahead with this program."[352]

Eisenhower's spokesman told the *Washington Post* that the plan had been in preparation for months.[353] Rumors began to circulate among Latin American delegations at the OAS about a forthcoming "Eisenhower Plan" for Latin America. It was clear that the impetus was to isolate

---

[351] Lleras Camargo, "Discurso Pronunciado por el Presidente de Colombia en la Universidad de Johns Hopkins, Baltimore," April 8, 1960, carpeta 38, documento 549. BLAA. Translation by author.

[352] Eisenhower to Kubitschek, July 9, 1960, letter, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5*, pp. 777-778.

[353] "Ike, Herter to discuss Cuba crisis, aid plan," July 8, 1960, *Washington Post*, pp. A1.

Cuba, with the U.S. intimation coming alongside the suspension of Cuba's sugar quota. Brazil's Ambassador to the OAS Fernando Lobo noted that the moment for OPA seemed to have arrived.

> The news that the United States is preparing an economic assistance plan for Latin America, in the mould of the Marshall Plan, is having a great impact amongst the representatives to the OAS. It will be presented at the meeting of 21 in Bogota with the goal of countering the offensive of Soviet economic propaganda in the continent. In that regard, it appears Cuba will be excluded. Congratulations to your Excellency for the news, which will represent the crowning achievement of OPA. The text of the plan still has not been revealed.[354]

The enthusiasm was short lived, however. Just a day after Lobo had sent congratulations to the president, details leaked to the delegates and to the *Washington Post*. The president gave a press conference from his vacation in Newport, R.I., citing Kubitschek's "joint hemispheric concept known as Operation Pan-America," and speaking about stability, democracy, and development in language reminiscent of the Brazilian's. Answering questions from reporters, however, it became clear that the "Eisenhower Plan" would be no Marshall Plan and that private investment was still considered primary.[355] As the outlines of the plan became clearer, Brazilians were angered that Eisenhower sought the mantle of Operation Pan-America, but in their opinion disregarded its core principles and concrete proposals, such as per capita income targets, large-scale development aid, and cooperative hemispheric management. Lobo cabled back his disappointment.[356] The Brazilian chargé in Washington argued the plan was a short-term response to tensions in the Caribbean and a crass attempt to buy support: "[B]oth the local press and diplomatic channels see the American initiative as an attempt to favorably influence the

---

[354] Fernando Lobo, "OPA. Reunião dos 21, Bogotá," July 11, 1960, tele. rec. 5991, folder 960.3, Pan-Americanismo, delegações, AHIB.

[355] The statement and conversation with reporters was printed in "Ike's Latin America statement," July 12, 1960, *Washington Post*, pp. A7.

[356] Fernando Lobo to Horacio Lafer, "Questão Estados Unidos da América-Cuba," July 12, 1960, memorandum, folder 82.287-B, AHIB.

attitude of Latin Americans at the moment that they could be key in the UN and the OAS for the approval of recommendations about the situation in the Caribbean."[357] While withholding judgment until seeing the final plan, Kubitschek let it be known that he did not consider "palliative measures" to be sufficient.[358] When word spread that the planned fund was to receive a maximum of $500 million,[359] Brazil was incensed and wanted to dissociate the plan from OPA. Though historian Stephen Rabe considers the July announcement "a turning point in inter-American relations,"[360] Brazilian leaders at the time did not agree.

On July 19, Kubitschek penned a reply to Eisenhower. The Brazilian's frustration came through under a surface of diplomatic niceties. The letter stated that Brazil was not satisfied having achieved the IDB and did not want OPA be substituted with a small U.S. aid program.

> Permit me to reaffirm to Your Excellency what already has been said concerning Operation Pan America: It is not a question of an appeal to generosity, but of reason. … The fight which all of us must undertake together for the common ideals of the Americas will be valid only if we combat the causes of unrest and discontent, without seeking merely to correct and diminish their effects and consequences. We ought, therefore, to have the courage to draw the conclusions which reality presents to us. The truth is that, despite all previous efforts, not enough has been done and an adequate rate of development for the Latin American peoples has not been achieved. To wish to attribute the present unrest of these peoples to mere propaganda or agitation by extra-continental agents would be to ignore the fact that poverty and frustration of economically stagnant peoples have a much greater capability for agitation. The problem therefore consists in giving a new dimension to the work to be accomplished. …
>
> What appears to me to have been missing thus far, if Your Excellency will permit me to say it, is a truly constructive policy and the attribution of greater importance to this part of America. … To relegate to an inferior level almost 200 million men, whose rate of

---

[357] Bernardes, "Programa de assistência econômica à América Latina. Declarações do Presidente Eisenhower," July 12, 1960, tele. rec. 6119, vol. Washington, Telegramas Rec-Exp., 1960, AHIB.

[358] "JK responde a Ike: 'Meros palliatives não resolvem problemas do continente," July 13, 1960, *Última Hora*, Rio de Janeiro, pp. 6; "Kubitschek hits Ike's Latin plan," July 14, 1960, *Washington Post*, pp. A1.

[359] Murrey Marder, "Latin American aid program faces 'hard vs. soft' contest," July 16, 1960, *Washington Post*, pp. A2.

[360] Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, pp. 142.

> growth is the highest in all the world and whose integration in defense of the democracies is the surest road and inclination, is to commit an error.
>
> The offer of a new policy of strengthening the American regional family is what I have understood Your Excellency to be announcing in your noble letter. … Your Excellency has resolved to sponsor a new, fecund and vigorous action, creative of wealth. As I have already had occasion to state, it is not a plan of donations that I believe appropriate or even possible at this moment, but concrete and unpostponable measures of reciprocal interest to the country of Your Excellency and the other American nations and a more active collaboration in our development, through a new policy of public financing, in which would be observed other criteria than that of mere immediate economic profitability.[361]

Kubitschek closed by noting that the warmth and great expectations produced by Eisenhower's visit had led to disappointing results. In a second message, relayed in a conversation between the Brazilian ambassador and Secretary Herter on July 28, Kubitschek asked Eisenhower to adjust his proposal so that it fit within the lines of OPA. Under the Eisenhower Plan, the United States would make direct, bilateral loans, eschewing the Pan-American multilateralism of OPA and erasing Brazilian leadership. Herter insisted the plan fit within OPA, though he also tried to de-couple communism from development assistance.[362] The Eisenhower administration wanted Brazilian backing for anti-communist and anti-Castro declarations, but was wary about having Kubitschek connect those with his aid requests.[363] Mann criticized Schmidt for trying to take advantage of the darkening U.S.-Cuba relations to press Brazilian priorities, which included "massive" assistance under OPA, making the proposed fund multilateral, new PL-480 wheat grants, and balance-of-payments help, if needed later. "Schmidt reportedly believes that Castro

---

[361] Kubitschek to Eisenhower, July 19, 1960, letter, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5*, pp. 778-779; "Latin plan too timid, Kubitschek tells Ike," July 24, 1960, *Washington Post*, pp. A7.

[362] Walther Moreira Salles, "OPA. Plano Eisenhower," July 28, 1960, tele. rec. 6828, vol. Washington, Telegramas Rec-Exp., 1960, AHIB; Alvaro Texeira Soares, "OPA. Plano de ajuda de Eisenhower," July 28, 1960, tel. rec. 8056, folder 82.287-B, AHIB.

[363] Horacio Lafer, "VI reunião de consulta. Posição do Brasil," Aug. 13, 1960, tele. rec. 7515, vol. Washington, Telegramas Rec-Exp., 1960, AHIB.

in Cuba and a little communism in Brazil are desirable from the standpoint of Brazil's bargaining with the U.S.," Mann wrote in a memorandum to the secretary.[364] At the end of the month, Mann replaced Rubottom as assistant secretary for inter-American affairs, making him even more directly involved in U.S.-Brazilian affairs.[365]

Given the perceived paucity of the proposed fund, Brazil's delegation considered opposing it in Bogotá. Heading into the meeting, Brazilians made their disaffection known, referring to the proposal as an emergency plan that failed to address longer-term issues.[366] When a draft of the U.S. proposal circulated in late August 1960, the Brazilians intensified their criticisms. "It is oriented to the symptoms of underdevelopment instead of attacking the causes," the Brazilian foreign ministry complained.[367] A Brazilian delegate, who would later serve as ambassador in Washington, later said, "[T]here was a lot of dissatisfaction in Brazil with the rather cool reception given by Washington, under the Republican administration, to Operation Pan America. There was also some temptation of bringing things to a head and perhaps to have an open split at Bogotá."[368] Instead Brazil decided to cooperate with the subtler shift in U.S. policy, hoping it could take advantage of the warmer tone initiated in Eisenhower's visit, along with the dramatic situation in Cuba, to press for greater policy changes—even if they had to wait for a new U.S. administration. The decision to hold back and continue a cooperative approach

---

[364] "Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State," August 11, 1960, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5*, pp. 782-784.

[365] Mann was already an assistant secretary, but for economic affairs.

[366] Exteriores to BrEmb Washington, "III Reunião do Comité dos 21," Aug. 20, 1960, tele. exp. 7643, vol. Washington, Telegramas Rec-Exp., 1960, AHIB.

[367] Exteriores to BrEmb Washington, "Projecto de resolução. Programa interamericana," Aug. 30, 1960, tele. exp. 7980, vol. Washington, Telegramas Rec-Exp., 1960, AHIB.

[368] Roberto de Oliveira Campos, recorded interview by John E. Reilly, May 29-30, 1964, John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program, pp. 6

owed more to communications between Colombia and Brazil, and the desire to maintain that cooperative relationship, than to U.S. pressure. Under Lleras Camargo's counsel, Kubitschek and Schmidt decided that the Eisenhower Plan should be redefined as separate from OPA, rather than rejected entirely.[369] In Itamaraty's instructions to the Brazilian delegates, the ministry noted that because of the approaching election, Republicans could not "admit the failings of their Latin America policies." However, a Democratic administration might be more favorable to Brazilian initiatives. In the meantime, Brazilian delegates should thank the U.S. administration for its new initiative and its longstanding friendship before proceeding to attack the Eisenhower Plan for all its divergences from OPA.[370]

The meetings in Bogota, officially held under the previously moribund Committee of 21, ran from September 5-11, 1960.[371] The U.S. delegation, headed by Undersecretary Dillon, sought to ameliorate Brazilian frustrations. While the reason for the conference was specifically economic, it was permeated by U.S.-Cuban hostility. The administration was sensitive to Latin American criticism, which Democrats in Congress echoed in campaign attacks. In the October 21, 1960, presidential debate, Kennedy attacked Nixon on both Castro and economic assistance: "You yourself said, Mr. Vice President, a month ago, that if we had provided the kind of economic aid five years ago that we are now providing we might never have had Castro. Why

[369] This came through in a meeting between Schmidt and Lleras Camargo before the Bogota meetings began. Schmidt, "OPA. Comitê dos Vinte-Um. Audiência com o Presidente Lleras Camargo," Sept. 4, 1960, tel. rec. 8218, folder 82.287-B, AHIB. See also, Kubitschek's letter to Lleras. Kubitschek to Lleras Camargo, Sept. 1, 1960, BLAA, Colección Alberto Lleras Camargo, caja X, carpeta 65, mss. 821-876/1-4.

[370] Fernando Ramos, "Instruções para a delegação brasileira à III sessão da comissão," Aug. 31, 1960, tele. rec. 8249, folder 960.3, Pan-Americanismo, delegações, AHIB.

[371] For a brief account, see Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, pp. 141-145.

didn't we?"[372] Though Eisenhower did not budge on the central issues, Dillon and Mann were more willing to make smaller changes to please Brazil. Dillon requested a meeting with Brazilian representative Schmidt after the conference's open session. A host of Brazilian diplomats and ministers met the U.S team, which also included Mann. Schmidt argued that the Eisenhower Plan appeared intended to "substitute" Brazilian development proposals. Schmidt wrote: "Douglas Dillon clarified his thinking, affirming that the Eisenhower Plan was just an additional initiative in the effort for economic development in Latin America." Dillon agreed past U.S. economic aid to Latin America had been insufficient. He hoped Brazilian delegates would work with the U.S. team to integrate OPA into Eisenhower's proposal.[373]

During an extended meeting with Schmidt and Argentine delegates, Dillon incorporated references to OPA into the Eisenhower Plan, which was renamed the Social Progress Trust Fund.[374] Schmidt wrote Kubitschek: "It was a great Brazilian victory to get the Americans to recognize that up to now their aid to Latin America has been insufficient."[375] The final declaration of the Act of Bogota stressed Kubitschek's and Lleras Camargo's priorities: democratic institutions, cooperation for economic development and social progress, support for land reform, and more. All of this was to happen "within the framework of Operation Pan

---

[372] John F. Kennedy, qtd. in "Presidential Debate in New York," October 21, 1960. In *The American Presidency Project*. Available online: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29403.

[373] Frederico Schmidt, "OPA. Comitê dos 21 Bogotá," Sept. 5, 1960, tele. rec. 8249, folder 960.3, Pan-Americanismo, delegações, AHIB.

[374] Schmidt, "OPA. Comitê dos 21 Bogotá. Plano de desenvolvimento econômico," Sept. 7, 1960, tel. rec. 8312, folder 82.287-A, AHIB.

[375] Schmidt, "OPA. Comitê dos 21 em Bogotá Comissão de Financiamento." Sept. 10, 1960, tel. rec. 8452, folder 82.287-A, AHIB. For the Brazilian account of the conference, see Schmidt, "OPA. Comitê dos 21. Inauguração da Conferência em Bogotá," Sept. 6, 1960, tel. rec. 8311, folder 82.287-A; Schmidt, "OPA. Comitê dos 21 Bogotá. Discuros dos delegados do Paragui, Bolivia, Venezuela, Argentina e Peru," Sept. 8, 1960, tel. rec. 8322, folder AHIB.

America."[376] However, what superficially appeared to be Brazilian victory did not in practice fulfill Brazilian goals. The Social Progress Trust Fund would be U.S.-controlled, not multilateral as Brazil wanted, and there was no funding or clear path forward for OPA. Closing the meeting, the Cuban delegation "violently" attacked the United States and the "merely palliative" nature of its aid to Latin America.[377] Though Schmidt downplayed that criticism, it in fact echoed the very words Kubitschek had used to describe Eisenhower's original proposal.

The Act of Bogota, along with the formal creation of the Inter-American Development Bank in December, was a Pan-American swan song for both Kubitschek and Eisenhower. However, it was not quite the tune either wanted to sing. A few weeks later, on October 3, Jânio Quadros was elected the next president of Brazil, besting Kubitschek's candidate former defense minister Teixeira Lott and casting uncertainty on whether Brazil would continue to lead OPA, which Kubitschek believed was far from complete. The concerns became more pronounced as Quadros evinced little interest in OPA and far less desire than Kubitschek or previous Brazilian presidents to center his foreign policy on the notion of an "unwritten alliance."[378] From the Brazilian perspective, the U.S. was not keeping its end of the bargain. One month later, Richard Nixon's loss to John F. Kennedy set the stage for a transition in U.S. policy. During the dual transitions, Quadros would brush aside attempts from both Itamaraty and the State Department for joint planning, even backing out on a meeting with President-elect Kennedy.[379] For

---

[376] "Act of Bogota," September 13, 1960, in *The Avalon Project* (Yale Law School). Available online: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam08.asp.

[377] Schmidt, "OPA. Ata de Bogotá. Ataque do delegado cubana," February 13, 1960, tel. rec. 8576, folder 82.288, AHIB.

[378] Weis, *Cold Warriors & Coups D'etat : Brazilian-American Relations, 1945-1964*, pp. 137-139.

[379] Carlos Alfredo Bernardes, "Economia e finanças," Oct. 16, 1960, tele. rec. 10756, vol. Washington, Telegramas Rec-Exp., 1960, AHIB; Exteriores to BrEmb Washington, "Encontro de presidentes eleitos do Brasil e dos Estados Unidos," Nov. 24, 1960, tele. exp. 11026, vol. Washington, Telegramas Rec-Exp., 1960, AHIB. Carlos Alfredo

Eisenhower, Bogota was also the last major hemispheric gathering before the U.S. election during a campaign in which Latin America had become a major issue. Eisenhower pushed for a quick Congressional ratification of his Social Progress Trust Fund, which received a $500 million appropriation with strong Democratic support on September 8, 1960. It was a sweeter note compared with much of hemispheric relations during Eisenhower's tenure, but it did not rise above the cacophony of Kennedy's attacks on the administration's handling of Cuba.

Kennedy's election set the stage for a more dramatic departure in U.S.-Latin American foreign economic relations. However, the general climate for U.S.-Brazilian cooperation was less auspicious. The dispute with the IMF and U.S. officials over Brazil's balance of payments had eroded much of the "unwritten alliance." Though his economic policies were much more conservative than Kubitschek's, Quadros stressed his intention to forge a more independent foreign policy and disturbed U.S. officials with favorable public assessments of Fidel Castro. Weis writes: "By the time Kennedy and Jânio Quadros assumed office, mistrust permeated high levels of both governments." Quadros re-established relations with the Soviet Union in 1961. Though Kennedy's Alliance for Progress cited OPA as inspiration, Quadros did not seek to burnish Kubitschek's initiative. Rather, it was left to fade. For a time, Kubitschek and Lleras Camargo were invited to be special advisors to the Alliance, with the idea of giving Latin America a voice and linking the Kennedy policy to OPA. Both grew frustrated with a program they saw as too political, U.S.-controlled, and ineffective.[380] After less than a year in the presidency, Quadros abruptly resigned, and he was replaced by João Goulart. Many in the United

---

Bernardes, "Noticiário telegráfico do *New York Times* sobre a viagem do presidente eleito Janio Quadros," Nov. 22, 1960, tele. rec. 10971, vol. Washington, Telegramas Rec-Exp., 1960, AHIB; "The forthcoming Quadros administration," December 13, 1960, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5*, pp. 795-796.

[380] Alberto Lleras Camargo, "The Alliance for Progress: Aims, Distortions, Obstacles," *Foreign Affairs* 42, no. 1 (1963).

States saw Goulart as a communist sympathizer. Through the Alliance, the United States sought to control and then undermine Goulart, concludes Jeffrey Taffet. After Kennedy's death, Goulart was overthrown in a 1964 coup, which was welcomed by the Lyndon B. Johnson administration.[381] Six years after Kubitschek proposed a new era of U.S.-Brazilian cooperation, relations between the two countries hit an historic low.

The Operation and the Alliance

While Kubitschek's efforts spurred the Eisenhower administration to make some halting steps in U.S.-Latin American economic relations, including the development bank and the Social Progress Trust Fund, there is also a larger question—to which even close Kennedy advisors gave differing answers—about how much credit Operation Pan-America deserves as a cause of the Alliance for Progress. Though a thorough review of Kennedy administration archives is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is useful to consider how Kubitschek's might have inspired or failed to inspire a later policy change. Christopher Darnton's recent article, "Asymmetry and Agenda-setting in U.S.-Latin American Relations: Rethinking the Origins of the Alliance for Progress," is the most thorough exploration of potential linkages between the Operation and the Alliance. He concludes: "Latin American diplomacy, particularly on the part of Brazil, was far more consequential for the origins of the Alliance for Progress, and more broadly for the inter-American agenda, than is generally acknowledged."[382] My own research concurs with Darnton's. The principal ideas of the Alliance were contained in Operation Pan-America, and the hemispheric consensus upon which the Alliance relied was in large part built by the diplomacy

[381] For summaries of the Kennedy-Quadros relationship, see Weis, *Cold Warriors & Coups D'etat : Brazilian-American Relations, 1945-1964*, ch. 6, Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World : John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America*, pp. 63-68, Taffet, *Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy*, ch. 5.

[382] Darnton, "Asymmetry and Agenda-Setting in US-Latin American Relations."

of Kubitschek and Lleras Camargo through the OAS and the Act of Bogota. Many influential figures on the U.S. side of the Alliance for Progress had personal experience with OPA, including Douglass Dillon, who became Kennedy's secretary of Treasury, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edwin Martin, and Thomas Mann. Kennedy himself had endorsed OPA's central proposals during a December 1958 speech in San Juan, Puerto Rico, even before the Cuban Revolution's victory. In March 1961, Lincoln Gordon highlighted both OPA and longstanding requests for a "Latin American Marshall Plan" in a report to Goodwin.[383] The Alliance was explicitly under the framework of the Act of Bogota, itself an outgrowth of Kubitschek's proposals and diplomacy.

The making of major policies like the Alliance for Progress is a complex process, and there are rarely straight lines of causation, ideational or otherwise. Kubitschek's proposals were not themselves sufficient causes for the Alliance for Progress. However, his proposals had major relevance in the transition from Eisenhower to Kennedy because of their consonance with modernization theory and Kennedy's attention to Latin America because of the Cuban Revolution. Furthermore, Kubitschek and his partners had already prepared the diplomatic ground by building a near-unanimous consensus for OPA, which could be supplanted by a U.S. policy that seemed to adopt most of the same goals and to promise billions of dollars in funding. As such, not only did OPA and the ensuing Act of Bogota offer concrete proposals for hemispheric policy and highlight the security-development nexus to sympathetic U.S. policymakers, it lowered the diplomatic costs of implementing a new policy.

[383] Lincoln Gordon, "Draft memorandum from the consultant to the task force on Latin America to the President's special counsel (Goodwin)," March 6, 1961, *FRUS,1961-1963, vol. XII*, doc. 5.

Conclusion: Successes, failures, and waiting

In these brief conclusions, I will return to the guiding questions of the previous chapter. First, what has been the predominant interpretation of the case in the literature? As discussed early in this chapter, the case literature on Operation Pan-America is fairly limited. Generally, OPA has been mentioned as a curious forebear of the Alliance for Progress. In some narratives, it was an inspiration and in others a largely unconnected proposal that happened to employ similar language. This chapter is less concerned with the Alliance for Progress than with examining Operation Pan-America as a foreign policy, initiated by Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek and supported to differing degrees by other Latin American leaders. Though previous studies, particularly in Brazil, treat it as failure, this chapter shows OPA was a partial success.

Who are the most important actors? In Latin America, Kubitschek was clearly the central figure, with Alberto Lleras Camargo of Colombia coming in second. Inside Brazil, Kubitschek was able to take advantage of a strongly presidential system to direct developmental and foreign policy. The Brazilian military acted as a constraint. Kubitschek did use foreign policy to gain benefits that kept the generals on his side, but the military did not become directly involved with OPA. The initiative began with Kubitschek and his inner circle, to the extent that it provoked the resignation of the foreign minister who felt excluded; as it evolved Itamaraty played a greater role in part because Kubitschek's attention was consumed with domestic projects. Lleras Camargo was an important deputy, melding OPA with his own political objectives. The Colombian president brought important political assets as a respected statesman. Fidel Castro and his revolution were central in another respect. Cubans did engage with OPA at two inter-American conferences, but the main contribution was to unsettle the atmosphere of U.S.-Latin American relations.

In the United States, Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles were sporadically involved, and Nixon's relevance faded after his visit. The most important actors on a day-to-day basis were Undersecretary Douglas Dillon, Assistant Secretaries Roy Rubottom and Thomas Mann, and high-level officials in the Treasury Department and Export-Import Bank. The U.S. Congress also played an important role, sometimes serving as an intermediary through which Latin American criticisms were turned into Democratic political criticisms; Eisenhower and Nixon were more sensitive and attentive to the latter, as the November 1960 presidential elections neared.

How did each government define its interests, goals, and strategies? Though OPA emerged as a response to a crisis—the attack on Nixon in Caracas in May 1958—OPA sought to address Kubitschek's priorities, foreign and domestic, while tapping into longstanding Latin American demands. Kubitschek's interests included maintaining the pace of Brazilian development in the face of economic challenges, ensuring Brazilian democracy, and giving Brazil and Latin America a larger role in world affairs. Though most of Operation Pan-America's goals were not new, OPA represented a strategic innovation regarding how to pursue those goals. The goals it enunciated were extraordinary in their reach: closer hemispheric cooperation on political, security, and especially economic issues; the creation of multilateral mechanisms to tackle underdevelopment; a greater voice for Latin America in world affairs; and the growth of democratic governance in Latin America.

The Eisenhower administration's goals in Latin America were driven by security, politics, and economics. First, the administration abhorred instability in the hemisphere. Between the Guatemalan coup of 1954 and May 1958, the administration considered Latin America a safe zone in the global Cold War. As such, Kubitschek's initial proposals in 1956 received no serious consideration. The attack on Nixon and, later, the Cuban revolution overturned that view.

Secondly, the administration wanted political support from Latin America in the Cold War. Third, the Eisenhower administration wanted to promote economic growth in Latin America, but preferred not to make large fiscal commitments in that regard. This appears to stem from two factors. First, there was a philosophical belief that free enterprise was a better, long-term economic strategy, and that aid was not particularly effective in spurring growth. Secondly, the administration wanted to limit U.S. outlays. It was not puritanical in avoiding commitments to guarantee security or political support, as its approach in other regions (and Bolivia) showed; however, it was skeptical that it was needed in Latin America. The administration wanted to maintain Latin American stability and political support, preferably on the cheap.

How were these goals affected by domestic political factors? Much of the impetus for Kubitschek's goals was domestic, though concerns about Brazil's role in the hemisphere also mattered. Likewise, the constraints on Kubitschek's foreign policy were both domestic and international. Domestically, the most important factors were the role of the military and the state of the national economy.[384] He had to manage an economy on the brink of fiscal default, soaring inflation, and a military that was not always content with civilian authority. Internationally, the Cold War proved both a constraint and a bargaining chip for Kubitschek. While it limited the possibility of a large economic relationship with the Soviet Union, that relationship was unlikely for reasons that had little to do with Washington. Kubitschek was personally committed to democracy and what he saw as the defense of Western, Christian civilization. Furthermore, any serious move closer to the Soviets would have provoked a harsh reaction from economic elites and the Brazilian military (as it eventually did). Kubitschek sought to secure democratic institutions by creating industrialization and prosperity while also establishing Brazil as a South

[384] The national economy was certainly vulnerable to international shocks, too, such as the price of coffee, which Brazil had a large but incomplete influence on.

American great power. To understand the goals of OPA, both the international and domestic sources of Kubitschek's policies must be considered.

How was the definition of Latin American interests, goals, and strategies affected by the perception of the United States or by U.S. policy? While Kubitschek's goals were not heavily influenced by his perception of U.S. policy, his strategy was almost entirely designed to take advantage of what he believed were the United States' main concerns. Operation Pan-America connected the goal of development with the Cold War, though Kubitschek was more worried about the Brazilian military's response to the specter of communism than he was of communism itself. It was the former that presented a direct threat to Brazil's weak democracy. By drawing a line between underdevelopment, instability, and communism, Kubitschek hoped to raise the profile of underdevelopment in Latin America and define it in a way that made it a U.S. national security interest. Furthermore, the context of asymmetry was important, though in this case economic asymmetry was much more important than military asymmetry. Kubitschek believed that Brazil needed both foreign capital and foreign technology to achieve the progress of "fifty years in five," and at the time, the United States seemed the only viable source.

How was Latin America's ability to affect the outcome shaped by the issue-area? The central tenet of Operation Pan-America was to take an economic issue, underdevelopment, and connect it with a more salient security issue. On domestic economic issues, Brazil and its Latin American allies had considerable leeway even when the United States wanted a policy change. For example, Brazil refused repeated requests from Eisenhower himself as well as others in the administration to open its petroleum monopoly to foreign investment. The nature of OPA was quite different, though. At its essence, Kubitschek's and Lleras' arguments were requests that the U.S. government give large sums of money to Latin American countries without guaranteed

benefits. On the issue, Latin American leaders had little natural leverage. Their strategies were essentially designed to re-define the issue and to increase their bargaining power.

How were U.S. interests, goals, and strategies affected by domestic political factors, Latin American policy, or the asymmetry of power? Kubitschek's OPA was not the only influence on the Eisenhower administration's foreign economic policy. Kubitschek realized that the primary U.S. interest was maintaining stability in Latin America and to maintain its allegiance in the Cold War. However, because he used the Marshall Plan as a frequent metaphor, Kubitschek seems to have overestimated Eisenhower's willingness to spend heavily in pursuit of that goal. The administration's fiscal conservatism, embodied by Treasury Secretary George Humphrey, constrained spending. The Republican Party in Congress supported this position. After the May 1958 attack on Nixon, domestic political pressure on Eisenhower increased in the form of the Draper Commission's review of policy to Latin America. While some Democrats in Congress had already been critical of what they saw as Eisenhower's friendliness with dictators, some congressmen, including minority Senate whip Michael Mansfield and John F. Kennedy, directly noted the Brazilian plan as early as late 1958.[385] In doing so, they expanded their criticism from the issue of democracy to economic policy. Both the Cuban revolution and the November 1960 elections pushed Eisenhower to take these criticisms more seriously.

How would U.S. policy likely have been different in the absence of the Latin American effort? Even without Kubitschek's Operation Pan-America, there almost certainly would have been a reevaluation of U.S. policy to Latin America in the latter half of 1958 and through 1959 because of the anti-Nixon Caracas demonstrations and the Cuban revolution. In that case, what did Kubitschek accomplish? First, it channeled U.S. concerns. Though Caracas and Cuba drew

[385] BrEmbWashington to Exteriores, "Declaraões do Senador Mansfield sobre a Operação Pan-Americana," Dec. 22, 1958, letter, folder 82.282, AHIB; Press clipping. Kennedy. Dec. 18, 1958, folder 82.279, AHIB.

attention, they did not have any obvious connection to economic policy. A development bank was not an obvious response to rowdy demonstrators; in fact, John Foster Dulles first insisted on improved policing cooperation. Kubitschek made the argument that not only was instability linked to underdevelopment, but that both were linked to the global Cold War. Secondly, OPA brought together many Latin American leaders and helped set a common agenda. By September 1958, the insistence on a development bank became too strong to ignore, even though Brazil ultimately failed to maintain consensus on the details of its plan. Officials in the State Department, led by Dillon, referred to the near-unanimous Latin American calls to insist on the bank for political reasons, trumping the concerns of more fiscally conservative officials in other agencies. Kubitschek's OPA led directly to the creation of the Committee of 21, which allowed for much more frequent Latin American pressure on economic matters than had previously existed. OPA kept the underdevelopment-instability-communism argument on the U.S.-Latin American agenda so that various people could pick it up in response to different events, including Cuba and Kennedy's election.[386]

How would the outcomes have been different if Latin American leaders had not vigorously pursued their interests? Kubitschek was able to take advantage of the attack on Nixon in Caracas to shift the Latin American and U.S. agendas in the direction desired. For Kubitschek, this was a success in agenda setting. Notably, without a similar crisis, the president had failed to affect the U.S. or hemispheric agendas during both his pre-inaugural visit to the United States and in the Panama conference in 1956. The U.S. government had been reluctant to discuss economic issues. Following the Nixon trip in May 1958, Kubitschek got high-level U.S. attention, exchanging letters with Eisenhower, and receiving visits from Rubottom and then

[386] Darnton, "Asymmetry and Agenda-Setting in US-Latin American Relations."

Dulles in August that year. Initially, the U.S. response remained focused on communist instigation and security measures. The Brazilian argument won followers in the Eisenhower administration and across Latin America. Eventually, these arguments would be accepted by the Eisenhower administration, at least instrumentally, in the Act of Bogota on September 13, 1960.

Brazilian diplomacy was able to unite much of Latin America around general principles in June-August 1958, with the important exception of Mexico. The interpretation Kubitschek offered of instability in Latin America was neither exclusively his nor entirely novel. However, his deployment of it was astute. OPA's most visible successes came quickly, with the U.S. change to back the creation of the IDB and greater acceptance of common markets and commodity agreements. There was also a short-term increase in direct external assistance to Brazil. Brazilian leaders thought in late 1958 that these changes augured even greater shifts. It would prove much more difficult. Kubitschek clearly tried to employ a strategy of internationalization. Though the project seemed to promise significant benefits, Kubitschek struggled in 1959-1960 to maintain Latin American unity. The project required deep multilateral cooperation and institution building, and there was not a clear convergence of interests on all the details. After the agreement on the bank, many countries felt the main mission had been accomplished and were not eager to continue pressuring the United States. At the same time, Brazil's evident leadership awoke some tensions with other states in the region.

During 1959, Brazil lost control of the agenda. Its initiatives stagnated in the slow bureaucracy of the OAS, a danger Kubitsheck himself had warned his foreign minister to try to avoid. In the Committee of 21, Schmidt and other diplomats were often unable to build a Latin American position that would have given Brazil a stronger negotiating positions vis-à-vis the United States. They struggled against otherwise sympathetic partners who felt their goals were

unrealistic. Domestic constraints became more severe, and much of the energy of Kubitschek and Washington-based diplomats was consumed by trying to gain U.S. or IMF emergency loans. This fueled perceptions, clearly held by Thomas Mann, that OPA was less about hemispheric solidarity and development than about the Brazilian economy. In terms of Brazil's goal, it seemed like a lost year. However, as the year reached its end, a few reasons for optimism arose. In large part, these had to do with U.S. domestic politics, along with worsening U.S.-Cuban relations. Democrats in Congress and in the election sharpened their attacks on the Eisenhower administration's Latin America policy, particularly regarding development and democracy.

After patching up ties with Mexico and Argentina and reinforcing warm relations with Colombia's Lleras Camargo, Kubitschek was in a better position to again press OPA when the tensions in the Caribbean reached crisis proportions. These efforts increased the pressure on Eisenhower to respond to Castro with more than just security-based solutions, as he had in Guatemala in 1954. The eventual product was the "Eisenhower Plan" and the Social Progress Trust Fund. It was far short of the "Marshall Plan for Latin America" for which Kubitschek had fought, but by that time his term had nearly expired. The ideas advanced under Operation Pan-America would have to be left to other leaders, in the United States and Latin America.

Finally, what have U.S.-focused accounts of these cases missed, and what does a focus on interaction add to our understanding of the case and of inter-American relations? The U.S.-focused literature on the Alliance for Progress has examined the Alliance as a response to the Cuban revolution and as an outgrowth of modernization theory. The argument about whether there was continuity or change between the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations has largely failed to note that one of the important reasons for the continuities was that Latin American leaders were more organized in presenting their demands. It has largely missed the interplay

between Latin American and U.S. ideas that preceded the Alliance. The Alliance mirrored OPA in both the broad outlines of its stated purpose and in many of its details. This is not because the United States completely adopted Kubitschek's OPA, but because the path from idea to policy was one of frequent interaction between U.S. and Latin American leaders.

CHAPTER 4

COMPLETING THE NATION: OMAR TORRIJOS AND THE LONG QUEST FOR THE PANAMA CANAL

"Se puede jugar con la cadena, ¡pero no con el mono!"
"You can play with the chain, but not with the monkey!"
-One of Omar Torrijos' oft-repeated aphorisms

Panamanians had waited for this moment for nearly as long as there had been Panamanians. Omar Torrijos, a military man dressed in a dark civilian suit, sat next to the president of the United States in the ornate hall of the Pan American Union in Washington, D.C. The general led a country of just over two million people, one of the world's smallest in physical size and population. President Jimmy Carter, was the chief executive of the world's leading superpower, with economic and military strength that dwarfed the rest of the hemisphere. For both, the signing ceremony was a victory. However, there is little question that the Panamanian victory was the larger of the two. It was Panamanians who had fought for decades against what they considered the unjust treaty of 1903. It was Panamanians who spoke with desperate passion about the incompleteness of their nation, of partial and wounded sovereignty, and of humiliation borne of daily experience. The treaties that sat on the table in front of Carter and Torrijos would transfer control of the canal from the United States to Panama. They carried great political risks for both. For Carter, they represented the main foreign policy fight of his first year. The treaties included major reversals and concessions to U.S. positions from just a few years prior, including positions that had been tightly held by various administrations over decades of negotiation. To many Americans, the canal was an asset, built and owned by the United States, of great strategic and symbolic importance. For Torrijos the treaties had risen nearly to the level of his *raison d'être* over his nine years in power. Under these treaties, he would have to wait twenty-three

years for the complete realization of his goal. How had Torrijos and his small nation managed to rise to the top of the U.S. foreign policy agenda? Once there, how did Panama manage to influence the U.S. stance, despite the political risk the treaty entailed for the U.S. president?

In the front row of the Pan American Union sat a collection of Latin American leaders—many of whom held deep grudges against one another. Eighteen heads of state of the Western Hemisphere bore witness to the signing ceremony.[387] The Chilean General Augusto Pinochet, despised by democrats like Venezuela's Carlos Andrés Pérez, looked on as the Panamanian leader peacefully achieved, with the stroke of a pen, the principal foreign policy goal in Panama's history. Over the previous years, many of these same individuals had championed Panama's cause, chastising the United States for its inflexibility and issuing clarion calls for justice. Though they were not in the room, a host of leaders from across the globe had also lent support to Panama. It was part of the political genius of Omar Torrijos, who had seized power in a military coup and ruled without the electoral consent of his population, that he was beloved by the leading democrats in his region. He astutely managed contradictions, drawing support internally and internationally by trumpeting his nationalism and demanding justice. "Carlos Andrés Pérez said that the man he most admired in Latin American politics was Omar Torrijos," said treaty negotiator Adolfo Ahumada. "And now [Hugo] Chávez says the same thing!"[388] Torrijos was able to oppose the United States while working with it. He was able to befriend Fidel Castro, at the same time sending conservative, wealthy businessmen as his emissaries. "Torrijos was an extremely smart person," said his former foreign minister. "Street smart."[389]

---

[387] Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith : Memoirs of a President* (Toronto; New York: Bantam Books, 1982), pp. 161, Omar Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979* (Panamá: Autoridad del Canal de Panamá, 2005), pp. 634-638.

[388] Author interview with Adolfo Ahumada, September 27, 2011, Panama City. Translated from Spanish.

[389] Author interview with Nicolás González Revilla, September 20, 2011, Panama City.

This case offers a window into the actions of one of the smallest Latin American states as it pursued a goal that belonged not just to one group of leaders, but was widely embraced across Panamanian society during several decades. In that way, the case is perhaps an outlier. However, it is also a case where we would expect to see little possibility for small-state influence. Many in the United States also viewed the canal an important asset, with implications for security, prosperity, and national pride. Because of that, it offers exceptional lessons on the strategies of small-state leaders as they try to alter U.S. policies. The chapter that follows offers a brief discussion of the literature on the case and examines the background and interests of the leaders involved. The bulk of the chapter is a historical narrative that pays particular attention to how Panamanian leaders conceived of their interests and goals, formulated their strategies, and interacted with U.S. policymakers in the context of asymmetry. In the conclusion, I return to the guiding chapters outlined at the end of Chapter 2.

The Panama Canal Treaties in the literature

Much of the case literature's focus on the Torrijos-Carter Treaties[390] has been on the role of President Carter—his political calculations and the backlash engendered among the "new right" in the United States. For example, Adam Clymer studies how opposition to the treaties helped spur the creation of a conservative bloc in the Republican Party. Michael Hogan examined the rhetorical strategies of pro- and anti-treaty forces and placed them in historical context.[391] The case has also been important to scholars considering questions of inter-branch relations and the "two-level game" between domestic politics and international negotiations.

[390] Here I use the name common in Panama. In the U.S., Carter's name is usually first. The same is true of the Tack-Kissinger / Kissinger-Tack agreements, discussed below.

[391] Adam Clymer, *Drawing the Line at the Big Ditch : The Panama Canal Treaties and the Rise of the Right* (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2008), J. Michael Hogan, *The Panama Canal in American Politics : Domestic Advocacy and the Evolution of Policy* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986).

Scholars have argued that the anticipated reactions of the U.S. Senate constrained the President Carter's negotiators.[392]

While there have been several, well-regarded histories of the Panama Canal, the debate over the treaties has been treated as a minor epilogue in these.[393] The bulk of primary sources on the later periods of negotiations have only become available recently and have not been as widely studied by diplomatic historians, though there have been studies of the 1964 Flag Riots and ensuing Johnson-Robles Treaties.[394] Until recently, the most comprehensive work on the negotiations was a well-research memoir by William J. Jorden, who served on the NSC during the Nixon and Ford administrations and as ambassador to Panama during the Carter administration.[395] While Jorden's account has much to offer, it is told through his eyes. The most thoroughly researched account of the negotiations, using U.S. and Panamanian sources, is the multi-volume account assembled by Panamanian historian Omar Jaén Súarez, himself a minor player in the talks. The works are almost uncited outside of Panama.[396]

However, this chapter has a different purpose from the many IR and political science works on the subject. Its focus is on the goals and strategies of the Panamanian government, and

---

[392] Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42, no. 03 (1988), Robert A. Pastor, "The United States and Central America: Interlocking Debates," in *Double-Edged Diplomacy : International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*, ed. Peter B. Evans, Harold Karan Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), George D. Moffett, *The Limits of Victory : The Ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985).

[393] See for example, John Major, *Prize Possession : The United States and the Panama Canal, 1903-1979* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), Julie Greene, *The Canal Builders : Making America's Empire at the Panama Canal* (New York: Penguin Press, 2009). Because negotiations were ongoing when it was published, it is outside the focus of the class work David G. McCullough, *The Path between the Seas : The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870-1914* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977).

[394] Alan McPherson, "Courts of World Opinion: Trying the Panama Flag Riots of 1964," *Diplomatic History* 28, no. 1 (2004).

[395] William J. Jorden, *Panama Odyssey* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984).

[396] Omar Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones sobre el Canal de Panamá : 1964-1970* (Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, 2002), Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*.

their interaction with the United States. To apply this dissertation's main question—how do Latin American leaders influence U.S. policy?—in this case, I build a case narrative based on underutilized sources in Panama and the United States. Why did Omar Torrijos pursue new treaties as his government's top foreign policy priority? How did Torrijos pursue these goals, and what strategies did he employ? When did his tactics work and when did they fail? This chapter argues that our understanding of the Panama Canal negotiations has underplayed a significant part of the story—Panama. If we are to understand how the canal came to be on Carter's agenda, and how the issue was interpreted when he came to office, we need to understand the Panamanian government's years of struggle. Robert Pastor, both a participant in and a student of the treaty negotiations, wrote: "Panama implemented a very sophisticated strategy to achieve a nearly impossible mission … Panama's success can be understood only if one abandon's the region's stereotypes of the United States."[397] It is a story of frictions, frustrations, and failures—but finally of common ground.

Background

History cast a long shadow over the negotiations of the Panama Canal treaties. The Panamanians' key claims, along with their appeal for justice to the rest of the world, were based on their interpretation of how the Republic of Panama was born and the canal created. From the time of Spanish colonization, Panama's unique geography has been its greatest asset, as well as a curse that attracted frequent meddling. Colonial Panama was the shortest route for shipping silver from the mines of Potosí across the isthmus and to the Iberian Peninsula. As Spain declined, Great Britain and the emergent United States jousted for dominance in the northernmost province of New Granada, later to become Colombia. U.S. continental expansion

[397] Pastor, *Exiting the Whirlpool*, pp. 13.

fed the desire for more rapid transit between the coasts. This need became more obvious and profitable with the explosion of migration that followed the outbreak of the California gold rush in 1848. In 1850, construction began on a trans-isthmian railroad, a massive project that led to an influx of labor. U.S. attention spurred small interventions and the stationing of ships to ensure the train's continued operation. These "police actions" often followed riots, which Washington saw Bogota's government as incapable of preventing. That same year, the United States and Great Britain concluded the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, which guaranteed the neutrality of the isthmus. The two powers agreed to build a canal only in cooperation and planned to establish a joint protectorate over any future "canal or railway" across Central America. The bilateral treaty gave no role to Colombia or Nicaragua, the states whose territory was in question.[398]

Though interest in a canal stretched back to Spanish colonizers, the first serious attempt began in 1876. Fresh off the successful construction of the Suez Canal, the French businessman Ferdinand de Lesseps gained approval from the Colombian government to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. To some in the United States, the concession seemed to portend a new French colony—a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Instead the French company was overwhelmed by tropical disease, intense rains and landslides, and difficult terrain. Its plan for a sea-level canal underestimated the difficulty of cutting through the Continental Divide. De Lesseps' effort fell into bankruptcy. Though a new French company took over the concession, it added little work to the excavation done during the previous decade.[399]

---

[398] "The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty," *The Avalon Project* (Yale Law School). Online: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br1850.asp

[399] This summary draws on Major, *Prize Possession : The United States and the Panama Canal, 1903-1979*, pp. 1-33, McCullough, *The Path between the Seas : The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870-1914*, Michael L. Conniff, *Panama and the United States : The Forced Alliance* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2001).

Expansionists' desire for a canal, fueled by a renewed narrative of "Manifest Destiny," grew during the 1898 war with Spain. During the war, the battleship *Oregon* famously had to journey around Cape Horn to reach Cuba, nearly missing the war. The United States, having largely elbowed Britain out of the contest for influence in Central America with the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, weighed the possibilities of taking over the French route or beginning a new canal through Nicaragua. When the French company dropped its price to $40 million, President Theodore Roosevelt gained Congressional approval to acquire the concession. Weakened by a recent civil war, Colombia agreed to the Hay-Herrán Treaty, which granted the United States a hundred-year lease in exchange for a $10 million payment and a $250,000 annuity. However, the Colombian senate rejected the pact, insisting on greater compensation from both the United States and the French concessionaires. Angry at what he saw as perfidious Colombian dealing, Roosevelt began to ponder the possibility of exploiting separatist tensions.

The United States did not invent the Panamanian independence movement, which had been active nearly since the independence wars with Spain. Colombia had at times needed U.S. help in controlling some twenty revolts, starting in the 1850s. In 1903, elites there let it be known they were willing to make a deal on the canal. Philippe Bunau-Varilla, a French representative of the failed canal company, acted as a spokesman in Washington for Panamanian separatists—though his true loyalty was to the company. Bunau-Varilla interpreted a meeting with Roosevelt to mean Panama's independence had U.S. support, or at least acquiescence. Roosevelt, for his part, would not guarantee U.S. backing, but he made clear that he had no love for a Colombian government that had rejected his treaty terms. The U.S. government clearly knew another

uprising was coming.[400] After the meeting, the U.S. Navy dispatched ships to the Panamanian coast. The U.S.-controlled railway refused to transport Colombian reinforcements to Panama City, where on November 3, secessionists arrested the officials from Bogota. The Colombian detachment left Colón, and the United States recognized the new state on November 6.[401] Within fifteen days, the United States negotiated with the French representative of a new Central American republic a treaty even more favorable to the United States than the deal rejected by the Colombian senate. Under an implicit threat that Washington would withdraw its protection against Colombia, Panama ratified a pact that gave the United States a ten-mile-wide zone through the middle of the country, in perpetuity.[402]

Within a year of its ratification, Panama began to contest the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, asking for revisions due to how, and by whom, it was negotiated. In fact, once word of the lopsided Hay-Bunau-Varilla agreement reached Panama, the government sent another delegation—this one made up of Panamanians—to revise the pact. But the United States threatened to withdraw its promise of protection. The effects of asymmetry could not be any clearer. A mere reference to the U.S. guarantee of Panama's independence was enough to close the possibility of revisions.[403] Over the decades, the complaints only grew. During the decade-long construction, Panama criticized the exclusion of local workers, who were paid much less if they were hired. The U.S.-government-run construction authority instituted complex pay and

---

[400] Notes of the meeting survive through a rather tendentious route. For an explanation of the source, as well as the text of the surviving memorandum, see Thomas Schoonover, "Max Farrand's Memorandum on the U.S. Role in the Panamanian Revolution of 1903," *Diplomatic History* 12, no. 4 (1988).

[401] Major, *Prize Possession : The United States and the Panama Canal, 1903-1979,* pp. 34-42.

[402] The revolt is treated in great depth in *FRUS, 1903,* pp. 231-243. Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones sobre el Canal de Panamá : 1964-1970,* pp. 27.

[403] For the original treaty, see "Convention between the United States and the Republic of Panama for the construction of a ship canal," *FRUS, 1904,* pp. 543-552.

work divisions based on race and nationality, none of which favored the natives of the land where the great ditch was being dug.[404] President Belisario Porras called the treaty "inadequate" in 1916, and made several unsuccessful attempts to renegotiate it. The first successful revision took place in 1936 under the auspices of Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy. Partially answering Panama's longstanding complaints about sovereignty, the new treaty removed the broad right of the U.S. to intervene in Panama under a clause similar to the Cuban Platt Amendment. It did nothing to change the status of the Canal Zone. The Second World War provoked an immense build-up of the U.S. military presence in the Canal Zone, and probably represented a highpoint for the canal's strategic value to the United States.

In 1953, Panama agitated for further revisions, including an end to perpetuity, recognition of full Panamanian sovereignty, and a $5 million annuity.[405] In 1955, the Eisenhower-Remón Treaty, increased the payment to Panama to nearly $2 million per year. It also officially eliminated the gold and silver payroll system and adjusted some labor and taxation policies; in practice discrimination continued. Both the 1936 and 1955 treaties reflected revisions to the 1903 treaty—adjustments at the margins. However, resentment at the very basis of the 1903 treaty—the existence of the Canal Zone as a state within a state—continued to build. As decolonization and third-world nationalism become potent global forces, the zone began to look like an anachronism. In the late 1950s, Panamanian professionals and students launched small-scale protests; flags served as the symbolic focal point. At first, small groups planted Panamanian flags in prominent places in the zone. Panamanian leaders saw these organic expressions as something that might reshape the countries' long-term relationship. In 1959 they advocated a peaceful

[404] For a critical history of exceptional detail on living and working during the zone during the construction of the canal, see Greene, *The Canal Builders : Making America's Empire at the Panama Canal*.

[405] Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones sobre el Canal de Panamá : 1964-1970*, pp. 63-66.

"invasion" of the Canal Zone. Marchers' confrontation with U.S. police turned violent and drew Washington's attention. Eisenhower's own Defense and Canal Zone bureaucracies neglected to act on his pronouncements that there should be a visual recognition of Panamanian sovereignty. A year later, on September 21, 1960, the Panamanian flag was raised for the first time alongside the American in Shaler Triangle, near Panama City.[406]

The definitive rupture with the revisionist strategy came in 1964. Pressed by President Roberto Chiari, John F. Kennedy decided to fly the two nations' flags side by side at seventeen specified locations in the zone. Neither flag was to be flown at other official sites, including schools. In protest, a group of Balboa High School students defied the law in January 1964 by raising the U.S. flag at their school several mornings in a row. Infuriated, Panamanian students marched from their school to Balboa High, insisting on their right to fly their flag there, too. Two hundred young Panamanians collided with Balboa students, who surrounded the flag pole to prevent the Panamanians from raising their colors. U.S. police separated the sides, and eventually the angry Panamanian students marched out of the zone, where they found a receptive audience. The group grew from hundreds to thousands and turned violent, but President Chiari refused to employ the National Guard. They threw rocks and Molotov cocktails; they torched buildings. Police responded with tear gas, then carelessly with live ammunition, killing a young man who had been caught up in the crowd. Some twenty-four Panamanians were killed during the clashes and riots, and became known at the "martyrs of 1964." At least five Americans, including three soldiers hit by snipers, were killed. In the aftermath, President Chiari broke relations with the United States.[407]

---

[406] Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones sobre el Canal de Panamá : 1964-1970*.

[407] Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 32-66, Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones sobre el Canal de Panamá : 1964-1970*, ch. 4.

As the two countries slowly moved to resume relations later that year, Lyndon B. Johnson yielded to Panama's pressure. Alan McPherson argues that Panamanian leaders' anti-colonial rhetoric and use of the OAS helped try the flag riots in "courts of world opinion." The riots reinforced Panamanian nationalism and turned their struggle over the canal into a moral crusade.[408] Johnson announced the United States would open the 1903 treaties to revision, designating Robert Anderson, Eisenhower's former secretary of Treasury, as his special envoy. On December 18, 1964, Johnson announced that the United States and Panama would not revise the existing treaties, but instead would replace them with entirely new agreements.[409] The concession to Panama's demands opened nearly three years of negotiations, which culminated in the "three-in-one," Robles-Johnson Treaty of 1967. The treaty would abrogate the 1903 pact; create a joint, but U.S.-dominated canal administration and judicial system; and increase tolls to give a direct share to Panama. It granted the United States the right to construct a sea-level canal. Most importantly, though, the treaty contained an expiration date, December 31, 1999. This date did not include defense and continued to give the United States free military bases and defense rights until 2004—or with a new canal, until 2067.[410] Sensing opposition, however, neither President Marco Robles nor Johnson presented the treaty to their legislatures. Within a year, both were out of office, and the new Panamanian president Arnulfo Arias had built his campaign on attacking the proposals.

---

[408] McPherson, "Courts of World Opinion: Trying the Panama Flag Riots of 1964."

[409] Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones sobre el Canal de Panamá : 1964-1970*, pp. 180-183.

[410] Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 116-117.

1968: A new government, new goals

On October 11, 1968, a cadre of young officers in the Panamanian National Guard plotted to overthrow the newly inaugurated President Arias, a protean populist who had been elected despite "reports of widespread fraud and intimidation of voters."[411] It was Arias' third presidential victory, though he had never finished a term because of military coups against him. To preempt a third coup, Arias promised during the campaign he would not alter the Guard's hierarchy. However, within days of his election, Arias moved to purge the Guard of powerful officers, including Major Boris Martínez and Lt. Colonel Omar Torrijos. Reacting as much to save their careers as their country, the two men decided to oust Arias. Their units swept into the city and surrounded the presidential palace while Arias was out. They captured radio stations and cut off the streets. With the Guard loyal to the coup plotters, Arias fled to the Canal Zone.[412] A year later, having already wrested sole control from his fellow coup-plotter Martínez, Torrijos allowed himself a vacation to Mexico. Disgruntled and worried that Torrijos was moving too far left, three colonels decided Panama would be better off if Torrijos stayed in Mexico. One told Torrijos he was no longer welcome in Panama. Torrijos wrangled a private plane and arrived to the city of Davíd, Chiriquí, to a National Guard base controlled by his loyal ally Manuel Noriega. With Noriega, Torrijos led a group of soldiers to Panama City. There, the low-level Guard showed its loyalty to Torrijos and jailed the plotters, though the three made a daring escape to the Canal Zone. Alone in power, Torrijos blamed the Americans for both the coup and the escape. Unlike Panama's old guard, the general felt no loyalty to the Americans.

---

[411] "Arias Panama chief," *Chicago Tribune*, May 31, 1968, pp. 15.

[412] Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, Ch. 6.

Torrijos decided from the beginning to create a different relationship with the United States. He also decided that many of his goals, both domestic and regarding the return of the Panama Canal, could be better accomplished without permitting democracy. He judged that those goals justified the repression of real political organization and expression. This included banning political parties, dismissing the legislature, and tightly controlling the media. Torrijos did not approach the levels of violence of his contemporaries in Argentina or Chile, but coercion was part of his undemocratic repertoire.[413] It included the forceful exile of prominent, critical businessmen. That repertoire also included patronage and the cooptation of many figures who might have otherwise opposed him. Though many of his former friends and followers fervently believe that Torrijos was ready to step away from power and allow a democratic opening—having increased the space for free expression in 1980, allowing the return of some exiles, and holding relatively fair, though limited, legislative elections—the general's early and accidental death in a plane crash makes the question unanswerable.[414] His government was followed by the brutality of Manuel Antonio Noriega, who had earned a feared reputation as Torrijos' intelligence chief.

Divergent positions, irreconcilable goals? Assessing the case's starting point

To assess the success that Torrijos had in influencing the United States, it is important to clarify both the starting position for Panama and the government's foreign policy goals. Torrijos' government had three options regarding the 1967 treaty, wrote the foreign minister Juan Antonio

[413] According to both a 1978 report from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and a 2001 Panama Truth Commission, the most serious violations came in the first years after the coup, 1969-1972, and included selected killings of supporters of President Arias. The IACHR report The Truth Commission is available from the U.S. Institute of Peace, online: http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-panama-truth-commission-comisi-n-de-la-verdad-de-panam.

[414] Some in Panama continue to blame Noriega for Torrijos' death. Though various conspiracy theories exist, there is little evidence to support them.

Tack. It could accept them and submit them for ratification, hoping the U.S. would do the same. It could use the treaty as a starting point and try to negotiate revisions. Lastly, it could reject the treaties in their entirety, seeking to launch entirely new negotiations under a Torrijista foreign policy.[415] The first option, and to some degree the second, were politically difficult for Torrijos, whose evolving political agenda sought to unseat not just the previous administration but the entire political class. Torrijos decided early on that he would try to resolve the canal issue with finality. Torrijos and his advisers decided to renounce those treaties as a framework for negotiations with the United States, instead pushing for a blank-slate approach. In the first few years, the decision yielded no results. In fact, the United States took a much harder line than it had in 1967. This owed in part to the fact that memories of the 1967 riots had faded, but mostly to the presence of a new Republican administration. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger placed less emphasis on Latin America than their Democratic predecessors. Mark Atwood Lawrence writes: "The developing world was significant for Nixon and Kissinger only to the extent that turmoil there might complicate the pursuit of their core geopolitical agenda."[416] The administration's initial response to Panama manifested this lack of interest.

The Defense Department saw an opportunity to renege on the compromise positions that Torrijos had deemed insufficient. When negotiations were discussed in 1970, the Pentagon accepted renewed talks, but argued that "US control over canal and defense should be "non-negotiable" for "the indefinite future."[417] National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, who four

---

[415] Juan Antonio Tack, "La Lucha de Omar Torrijos por la Recuperación de la Integridad Nacional," *Revista Lotería* agosto-diciembre, no. 305-309 (1981).

[416] Mark Atwood Lawrence, "Containing Globalism : The United States and the Developing World in the 1970s," in *The Shock of the Global : The 1970s in Perspective*, ed. Niall Ferguson (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010).

[417] Packard to Kissinger, "NSSM 68 – Panama Canal," May 4, 1970, *FRUS 1969-1976,* vol E-10. Online: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d534

years later would sign onto a radically different set of principles, recommended the core of Defense's position to the president.[418] Nixon clearly stated the U.S. goals in Decision Memorandum 64: "In any new negotiations three points are to be considered nonnegotiable: a) effective US control of canal operations; b) effective US control of canal defense; and c) continuation of these controls for an extended period of time preferably open-ended."[419] This was much more conservative than Johnson's 1967 treaties. "A U.S. draft treaty offer presented in December 1971 contained a duration formula that would allow termination in fifty, eighty-five, or ninety years" depending on possible canal improvements.[420] For Panamanians, the U.S. reversion to positions common before the flag riots was a slap in the face. The U.S proposals set the stage for frustrating negotiations in 1971 and 1972, adding to Torrijos' deep suspicion of the United States.

Panama's principal goal was the immediate elimination of the Canal Zone. On this goal, the Panamanian government and population were united. On other issues, there was less internal agreement during 1970-1971. In a meeting with Nixon on October 25, 1970, Torrijos' handpicked president Demetrio Lakas was seemingly out of touch with the increasingly nationalistic positions of his own government. He told Nixon: "Panama does not want the Canal. [Lakas] regarded the United States not only as the defender of the Canal but as a 'big brother' to Panama and, indeed, to all the Americas. Panama did not want to operate the Canal either, he

---

[418] Kissinger to Nixon, June 1, 1970, *FRUS 1969-1976*, vol E-10. Online: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d535

[419] Nixon, "National Security Decision Memorandum 64," June 5, 1970. *FRUS 1969-1976*, vol E-10. Online: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d536

[420] William L. Furlong and Margaret E. Scranton, *The Dynamics of Foreign Policymaking : The President, the Congress, and the Panama Canal Treaties* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 48.

stated."[421] However, Lakas and Panama's Ambassador to the United States José Antonio de la Ossa were out of line with the Panamanian foreign ministry, while Torrijos was slow to make his position known. During 1970, Torrijos was preoccupied with his domestic situation, and the young Foreign Minister Tack was able to set an initial strategy at odds with Lakas, who welcomed a large and long-term U.S. role. When U.S. negotiators travelled to Panama City, they heard a much tougher line than Lakas', and the initial negotiations instead became just "preliminary conversations." In early 1971, the Foreign Ministry began develop more specific goals, which would gain the backing of Torrijos, whose foreign policy statements increasingly stressed independence from the United States. By March 1971, when Torrijos named new negotiators, he came down fully in support of Tack's position—even though he doubted a treaty could be achieved without bloodshed.[422] Tack's goals were for an end to the "perpetuity" clause of the original treaty, the transfer of the canal to Panamanian control, the increase of economic benefits and compensation derived from the canal, and the withdraw—or at least substantial reduction—of the U.S. military presence in the country.[423]

---

[421] Arnold Nachmanoff, "Memorandum of meeting, Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations," *FRUS, 1969-1976, vol. E-10*, doc. 539. Online: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d539. Accounts of this meeting vary substantially. William Jorden recalls it as a hastily planned coincidence that occurred when Nixon's planners needed to add a guest to a dinner. In a better documented account, Omar Jaén notes that the visit coincided with the UN General Assembly and had been requested by Panama months ahead. Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 151. Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 96-97.

[422] Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 100-118.

[423] Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack said that during the re-started negotiations: "Panama manifested that *the negotiations had been restarted with the aim of eliminating one government inside of another government, so that the so-called Canal Zone could be integrated physically and politically into the rest of the territory of the Republic of Panama, under the full jurisdiction of the Panamanian government, and that our government has a profound interest in moving in that direction*." Tack to Anderson, letter, Oct. 26, 1972. Folder negociaciones, 1972-1974, no. 545, Archivo del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Panama City, Panama, (AMREP), sec. 2, pp. 5-6. Translated from Spanish, emphasis in original. Further references to this archive will use the abbreviation AMREP, from the Spanish initials, following Jaén Suárez.

By the end of 1972, Panamanian goals were more explicit. They included: 1) an end to the "perpetuity" clause of 1903, with an end date of December 31, 1994; 2) elimination of U.S. jurisdiction in the Canal Zone and the institution of Panamanian legal and political authority there; 3) an immediate reversion of all lands and waters not needed directly for the operation or defense of the canal, 4) immediate Panamanian participation in the administration of the canal, with 85 percent of the payroll destined the Panamanian citizens; 5) the cessation of U.S. military activities not directly related to the canal, such as the School of the Americas, and stipulations and limits on U.S. military presence; 6) neutrality over the canal under a UN mandate; 6) a dramatic increase in the revenue Panama derived from the canal; 7) exclusive use of the Panamanian flag; 8) neutral arbitration of disputes; 9) Panamanian determination over the construction of a new or expanded canal, to be negotiated later.[424] Though Tack was the clear intellectual leader in defining these goals, Torrijos set the broad direction for a foreign policy that would demonstrate independence and challenge U.S. positions on the canal. The specific points listed above were gradually shaped during the first round of negotiations, during 1971 and 1972. Those talks, marked by frustrations, benefited the most strident anti-imperialists in Torrijos' circle and added to his suspicions of the U.S., a dynamic that fed tendencies toward inflexibility on both sides.

Despite decades of negotiations, the United States did not understand the fundamental nature of Panama's principal goal. For Panamanians the real problem—the issue that gnawed at their national consciousness and wrecked their sense of sovereign dignity—was the broad strip of segregated land surrounding the canal. The Canal Zone. The Zonians were a foreign population with a separate school system, grocery stores, post offices, and legal system in the

[424] "Posiciones básicas de Panamá en las principales materias," December 4, 1972. Folder negociaciones, 1972-1974, no. 545, AMREP, sec. 9, pp. 1-19.

center of the isthmus. The problem for Panamanians was the "state within a state" that did not answer to the authorities of the country in which it territorially resided. It was the domain of a governor they did not appoint or elect, and of a legal system that had as its basis the state laws of Louisiana. "Panama was born in 1903 with a contradiction between the nation and the Canal Treaty of 1903," said Ahumada "This wasn't the result of the military bases, or that the canal was managed by the United States. … The major problem was the existence of the Canal Zone. And it is difficult, if not impossible, to be an independent state with such an overwhelming presence in the middle of the national territory."[425]

Clearly, the treaties were Panama's top foreign policy priority. However, the United States was not particularly interested in the issue, and less in making major concessions. There was a great divergence between the interests of Panama—speedy and full transfer of the canal and abolition of the Canal Zone—and Nixon administration policy. Panama faced a steep climb. It would need both to gain the United States attention to get the canal on the agenda and to get the United States to alter its hard-line policy. How, then, did Panama eventually achieve its goal? I focus on a handful of key episodes. The first involves Panama's coup in setting the international agenda. During 1972 and 1973, Panama held a UN Security Council (UNSC) seat, and then maneuvered around U.S. objections to hold an UNSC meeting in Panama. Capitalizing on that attention, Panama got the United States to agree to broad principles for the negotiation of the treaties in the 1974 Tack-Kissinger agreement, including a statement the new treaties should end perpetual U.S. control. In 1975, Panama and the United States negotiated a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that regularized the U.S. military presence there and eventually muted the Pentagon's opposition to later treaties. Panama's ambitions were stalled by Nixon's political

[425] Ahumada interview. See also Rómulo Escobar Bethancourt, *Torrijos : Colonia Americana, No!* (Bogotá: C. Valencia Editores, 1981), pp. 257.

crises and then by Ford's political weakness and timidity on the subject. Finally, Panama was able to capitalize on the change of administration in Washington with the election of Jimmy Carter to achieve major goals—while deciding to give in on others to reach a deal.

1971-1973: Rejecting the past and crafting a strategy

In late 1970, Presidents Lakas and Nixon agreed to re-start conversations about the canal. These talks were plagued from the beginning, however, by Lakas' lack of understanding, Nixon's lack of interest, and chief negotiator Anderson's lack of influence. In 1971, the two sides were miles apart. Anderson insisted Panamanian demands would never pass Congress, while towing the Pentagon line of permanent control over operations and defense.[426] Torrijos asked if Anderson was willing to end the Canal Zone, and Anderson said no, he would only alter the 1967 arrangements—apparently not in the direction of Panama's wishes.[427] By July of 1971, Panama's initial hopes had collapsed into disappointment. Panamanian negotiators filled sessions, speeches, and letters with drawn-out histories that emphasized their grievances against the United States. Personal relationships that lacked rapport from the start turned venomous.[428] The Panamanian team did not realize their counterpart, Ambassador Anderson, operated from the wilderness of the Nixon administration. In addition to representing a secretary of state who played a faint second fiddle to Kissinger, Anderson was further handicapped by President Nixon's dislike for him. Years before, President Eisenhower briefly considered replacing Nixon as his running mate with Anderson. Jorden wrote: "From the time President Nixon entered the

[426] Anderson to de la Ossa, Feb. 19, 1971. Folder negociaciones, 1972-1974, no. 545, AMREP, sec. 4, pp. 1-8.

[427] Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 154.

[428] Tack to Anderson, letter, Oct. 26, 1972. Sec. 2, pp. 5. Translated from Spanish.

White House in January 1969, he never met or talked with his Panama treaty negotiator, Ambassador Anderson. Nor did Anderson ever meet face-to-face with Henry Kissinger."[429]

Those frustrating months led Torrijos to try to counterbalance U.S. pressures. With his negotiators tired and skeptical of the constant U.S. appeals to Congressional constraints, Torrijos announced that any treaty would face constraints in Panama, too. First by proclamation, then later through a revision to the constitution, Torrijos informed his foreign minister that any treaty would have to be approved by the Panamanian people in a plebiscite—and the people would not accept another treaty that maintained U.S. perpetuity.[430] Torrijos' second and most important decision was to challenge the decades-long U.S. position that the canal was to be discussed bilaterally and confidentially if Panama wanted even modest concessions. Torrijos was not interested in modest concessions, but in a dramatically different relationship. As a senior Panamanian advisor wrote: "General Torrijos had told [Anderson] that so long as Panamanian aspirations were not fully met, Panama would not sign a treaty, even if it was necessary to wait for a new generation of Americans to achieve Panamanian demands, he would continue negotiating until a new generation had taken over the country's leadership."[431]

In late 1972, Torrijos appointed a 27-year-old, personally loyal political recruit as new ambassador to the United States. Torrijos told the new envoy, Nicolas González Revilla: "'You are not being requested to go to Washington because you are an expert in either [the treaties or history],'" González Revilla recalled. Torrijos wanted the young man to take "a fresh look." Upon his return, the ambassador told Torrijos: "Our problem simply does not exist in the agenda

[429] Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 159. Sol Linowitz also wrote that Anderson "had neither access nor influence in the White House." Sol M. Linowitz, *The Making of a Public Man : a Memoir* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1985), pp. 147.

[430] Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 162.

[431] Memorandum," Jorge Illueca to JA Tack, letter. December 7, 1972, Folder no. 1118, AMREP, pp. 5. Translation from Spanish.

of U.S. problems. Not even in the State Department is it an issue."[432] Torrijos gathered his advisors, and they decided to adopt a new approach. "[Torrijos] realized that he needed to create an issue, and he did it brilliantly," González Revilla added. "He went to the third world. Non-aligned. … He started to travel a lot, within Latin America and out of Latin America."[433]

In fact, Panama had already begun taking steps toward internationalizing the canal issue, even before González Revilla's report. Panama fired the first salvos in international organizations, pushing for and obtaining Latin American support for a 1972 non-permanent UNSC seat. When the Security Council held an extraordinary meeting in Addis Ababa—the first in the developing world—Boyd equated the U.S. presence in Panama with the colonialism faced by his African colleagues. The attack caught the U.S Ambassador George H. W. Bush off guard.[434] Boyd also suggested, as an improvisation of his own accord, that a meeting be held in Panama.[435] Secretary of State William Rogers warned President Nixon: "Panama has intimated its interest in having a Council meeting there on the U.S.-Panama dispute over the Canal Zone."[436] The U.S. condemned Boyd's departure from bilateralism, with U.S. negotiator David Ward warning a Panamanian foreign policy advisor that, "The Panamanian presentation of a complaint against the United States in the Security Council had provoked adverse reactions in

---

[432] Interview with González Revilla.

[433] Torrijos made a similar point in a conversation with U.S. diplomat William Jorden. "The general said he based his strategy on a 'very simple principle.' That was: 'to resolve a problem, the first thing you have to do is *make* it a problem.' He was persuaded the only way to do that was to move the issue to the center of the world stage." Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 176. Torrijos also used similar language talking to a reporter in early 1975, saying, "The first thing was to get them to consider that it was a problem. Until very recently, they didn't even think it was a problem." Qtd. in "Panama's leader hopeful on canal," February 4, 1975, *New York Times*, pp. 7.

[434] Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 228-229.

[435] Carlos Ozores, "Omar Torrijos y sus Proyecciones en la Política Internacional," *Revista Lotería* agosto-diciembre, no. 305-309 (1981).

[436] Rogers to Nixon, "Security Council meeting in Africa," February 10, 1972, *FRUS, 1969-1976, vol. 5*, doc. 124. Online: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/d124

many circles of the U.S. government, in the executive and legislative, which in his opinion would reverse progress by at least three years."[437] Though the Panamanian representative had put himself out on a limb, Torrijos's support was just as strong as the resistance it engendered in the United States.

Boyd continued gaining support from Latin American and African governments. Meanwhile, Torrijos engaged in intensive personal diplomacy to secure the support of his democratic neighboring countries—the most influential would be Daniel Oduber in Costa Rica, Alfonso López Michelsen in Colombia, and Carlos Andrés Pérez in Venezuela.[438] In March 1972, Boyd invited UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim to visit Panama to gain a better appreciation of how the stagnated negotiations threatened peace. Boyd wrote Tack: "I told Mr. Waldheim that if the current negotiations for a new treaty failed, the Panamanian government, with the goal of winning international public support for its just cause, had the intention of appealing to the United Nations."[439] U.S. representatives tried throughout 1972 to mobilize allies to oppose a meeting in Panama, or any further meetings outside New York, employing arguments ranging from fiscal strain and organizational headaches to increased regional tensions.[440] The administration also pushed the Panamanians directly, sending William Jorden,

---

[437] Jorge Illueca, "Informe de la conversación," March 23, 1972, Folder no. 1118, AMREP. Ward's account of the meeting concurs with the basic points presented by Illueca. David Ward, "Memorandum of Conversation: Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations," March 23, 1972, Folder no. 1118, AMREP, 1-2.

[438] Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 177-178. These same three leaders were highlighted in nearly all of my interviews with Panamanian policymakers. Their support was crucial to Torrijos in dealing with the U.S. executive, and also in convincing senators concerned about the lack of democracy and political rights in Panama.

[439] Aquilino Boyd to JA Tack, March 29, 1972, letter. Folder no. 1118, AMREP, n.p.

[440] Rogers to all American Republic Posts, "Possible SC meeting in Panama," August 10, 1972, *FRUS, 1969-1976, vol. 5*, doc. 126. Online: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/d126; Armitage and Herz to Bush, "Possible Security Council meeting in Panama," October 3, 1972, *FRUS, 1969-1976, vol. 5*, doc. 131. Online: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/d131

then an NSC staffer, to try to dissuade Torrijos,[441] while Secretary Rogers warned Tack that the meetings would generate public opposition to improving relations with Panama.[442] Anderson told Boyd and foreign ministry advisor Jorge Illueca "that regardless of what happened in the Security Council or any U.N. organism, the U.S. would continue considering these problems as internal to the two countries."[443] Despite these pressures, Panama received favorable responses to its informal inquiries from most Security Council members, and by November was moving ahead with plans for a meeting in Panama City.[444]

The Panamanian strategy at the United Nations and through Torrijos' personal diplomacy had two main goals. The first was to raise the issue's profile on the international agenda, and thereby gain the attention of more important actors who set the U.S. foreign policy agenda. The second was to increase the diplomatic costs to the United States of failing to resolve the problem. On these points, the gambit was a remarkable success. Rómulo Escobar Bethancourt, a leftist university rector who spent a decade as a lead negotiator, later reflected: "The United States of America began to feel a horsefly biting its leg, and there were more horseflies coming. Panama had broken the isolation of its past and its obsequious foreign policy."[445] Now that Torrijos had the United States' attention—negative as it was—he pushed for another change to the negotiating approach between the two countries. Instead of focusing on details, Torrijos and

---

[441] William J. Jorden to Henry Kissinger, "General Torrijos and Captain Villa, *FRUS 1969-1976, vol E-10,* doc. 562. Online: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d562; Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 185-189.

[442] Rogers to Tack, "Proposed Security Council meeting in Panama," October 16, 1972, *FRUS 1969-1976, vol 5,* doc. 137. Online: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/d137

[443] "Memorandum," Jorge Illueca to JA Tack, letter. December 7, 1972, Folder no. 1118, AMREP, pp. 4-5.

[444] J.A. Tack to Kurt Waldheim, November 23, 1972. Folder Reunión del Consejo de Seguridad, 1973, AMREP, n.p.

[445] Escobar Bethancourt, *Torrijos : Colonia Americana, No!* , pp. 201-202.

Tack advocated starting with broad principles.[446] This suggestion, made as early as November 1972, would pay dividends in the wake of the contentious Security Council meeting.[447]

On January 26, 1973, with eager support from China, the Soviet Union, France, Peru, and others, the Security Council approved Panama's initiative to host a meeting.[448] The United States recognized that it had been outmaneuvered and would have at least eleven of fifteen votes against it. A vote against the meeting would appear closed-minded.[449] In the end, the U.S. put aside its opposition and voted alongside all other members to hold the meeting in Panama, hoping that it could minimize the damage. As Panama maneuvered to create the meetings, then as they approached, a host of U.S. representatives warned that hot rhetoric or grandstanding would ruin Panama's chance of any concessions. However, Panama's deft use of the meetings spurred a different U.S. reaction than threatened. The meetings would prove a pivotal moment in Panama's early struggle to change the way the United States and the world saw the canal issue, while also forcing higher-level U.S. policymakers to take the matter more seriously.

---

[446] William J. Jorden to Henry Kissinger, "General Torrijos and Captain Villa, *FRUS 1969-1976, vol E-10,* doc. 562. Online: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d562

[447] U.S. Assistant Secretary Charles Meyers said in early 1973 that agreement existed around "seven basic principles." Charles Meyer to Demetrio Lakas, n.d., 1973, Folder Negociacones 1973, no. 546, AMREP, sec. 10.

[448] "U.N. council decides to meet in Panama," *New York Times*, January 27, 1973; Chi Ping Fei to J.A. Tack, January 14, 1973, Folder Reunión del Consejo de Seguridad, no. 33, Archivo del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores; Boyd to Brin, c. January 1973. Folder Reunión del Consejo de Seguridad, tomo II, Archivo del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores.

[449] William E. Schaufele, Jr., "Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State," Dec. 27, 1973, *FRUS*, 1969-1972, vol. 5, doc. 146. Online: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/d146

1973-1974: From conflict to cooperation

In the middle of March 1973, the attention of world leaders shifted to Panama, and Panama was ready.[450] At an expense of about $100,000, the Panamanian government had installed state-of-the-art telecommunications facilities, refurbished halls and government buildings, and added security to curtail unwanted protests, especially at the University of Panama. The government had honed its message, aimed both abroad and at buttressing Torrijos' image amongst the Panamanian people. Torrijos sought the "moral backing of the world," no less.[451] The United States was less prepared, despite its fear for months that the meeting would be an anti-Yankee propaganda event. George Bush had left his position as U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations. In his place, John Scali, a former reporter and relative diplomatic novice led the U.S. delegation. While the Panamanians appealed to broad principles of justice, decolonization, and fairness, Scali insisted: "Problems with the canal will be solved by very quiet and painstaking negotiations and not by speeches in any international forum."[452]

In the Council's opening session on March 15, Panama's chief of government took the stage of the freshly remodeled National Assembly—which Torrijos had shuttered—to welcome the delegates. In an emotional speech, the general compared his country's struggles with those of everyone who suffered injustice. "Panama understands the fight of countries that suffer the humiliation of colonialism," Torrijos proclaimed. "Highest leaders of North America, it is nobler

[450] For a more complete treatment of the March 1973 UNSC meeting, see Long, "Putting the Canal on the Map: Panamanian Agenda-Setting and the 1973 Security Council Meetings."

[451] Eric Morgenthaler, "UN Security Council is Meeting in Panama amid Anti-U.S. chorus," *Wall Street Journal*, May 15, 1973, pp. 1. Quote from Richard Severo, "UN panel sits in Panama today," *New York Times*, March 15, 1973, pp. 16; Sayre to State Department, "UN Security Council in Panama – GOP preparations," March 12, 1973. RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams. NARA-AAD. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=8048&dt=2472&dl=1345. Reference to this collection of U.S. telegrams from Record Group 59, published online by the NARA, will henceforth be referenced as NARA-AAD, RG59.

[452] Qtd. in Marlise Simons, "Panama's leader hits U.S. on Canal," *Washington Post*, March 16, 1973.

to amend an injustice than to perpetuate an error."[453] Early in the week, the U.S. opposed any draft resolution on the grounds that the United Nations should not be involved in bilateral affairs. The State Department instructed the U.S. delegation to prevent the Security Council from "passing resolutions on subjects that are not properly of its concern." State did not expect any resolution could secure a majority, so elected to play defense. "For us, Panama will essentially be a damage-limiting operation," Secretary Rogers wrote Scali before the meetings.[454] Once in Panama, it became obvious that the climate was propitious to anti-U.S. resolutions. Scali publicly warned that the U.S. would veto any resolution that did not adequately consider its interests, while also saying that the U.S. had no intention of introducing its own resolution.[455] On the second day, Panama and Peru introduced a resolution that demanded the abrogation of the 1903 treaty, re-affirmed Panama's sovereignty over the Canal Zone, and called for immediate Panamanian jurisdiction. Panama showed some willingness to compromise, but the United States sought to block any text on the canal. Panama's aggressive approach, coupled with a defensive U.S. attitude, put the U.S. at a disadvantage. While Panama and Peru found cosponsors for a revised resolution,[456] the United States continued to claim that the United Nations had no place in the matter, though the second draft used more agreeable language. By the time China and Russia announced they would back the resolution, the U.S. was isolated and just beginning to

---

[453] Speech of Omar Torrijos at U.N. Security Council inaugural session, March 15, 1973. Folder Reunión del Consejo de Seguridad, no. 17, 1973, AMREP, 1-6.

[454] Rogers to Scali, "For Ambassador Scali from the Secretary," March 9, 1973, NARA-ADA, RG59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=147&dt=2472&dl=1345

[455] Francis B. Kent, "U.S. warns of UN veto on Panama issue," *Los Angeles Times*, March 17, 1983; Simons, "UN body ways Canal Zone stand," *Washington Post*, March 17, 1983, pp. 8; Sayre to State Department, "Panama SC Mtg Amb Scali Press Conf," NARA-ADA, RG59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=5529&dt=2472&dl=1345.

[456] These included Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Sudan, and Yugoslavia. "Proyecto de resolución revisado," n.d., 1973. Folder Reunión del Consejo de Seguridad, no. 17, 1973, AMREP, 1-2.

consider a counterproposal.[457] On March 19, Scali went to Foreign Minister Tack's office. The U.S. diplomat told the Panamanian that the U.S. "would prefer no resolution at all. Tack replied that he was aware that was our preference, but indicated that there would, of course, have to be a resolution." Scali pushed for a resolution with vague, general wording that only urged the continuation of negotiations, but without any statement of specific goals. Tack listened quietly and told the U.S. delegation that he would check with Torrijos.[458]

Many in Torrijos' circle had concluded that, having already isolated the United States, forcing it to veto would be a major public relations victory.[459] Despite that, the Panamanians did not stop seeking U.S. support for their resolution. The U.S. repeatedly insisted on including a phrase referring to U.S. "legitimate interests" in the canal in any resolution. Panama, knowing it had the support of nearly the full council, refused to compromise on the point. The Panamanian delegation offered Scali a third, revised resolution that incorporated some of his complaints from the previous night—something Tack emphasized. When Scali reiterated his veto threats, the issue was closed.[460] To drive home the point, Manuel Antonio Noriega, second in command of the National Guard, made an ominous call to the U.S. delegation, telling Scali that if he planned on casting a veto, "it would be best to do it from Panama's Tocumen airport." The call, Torrijos

---

[457] Kent, "China, Russia Endorse Panama's canal stand," *Los Angeles Times*, March 20, 1973, pp. 11.

[458] U.S. Delegation to State Department, "UNSC meeting – Canal resolution," March 20, 1973, NARA-AAD, RG59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=5324&dt=2472&dl=1345

[459] Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 247, Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 195.

[460] Scali to Rogers, "Ref: Panama 1491," March 14, 1973, NARA-AAD, RG59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=5321&dt=2472&dl=1345

later told the U.S. ambassador was "not sent as blackmail or threatened violence," but was just a helpful piece of close U.S.-Panamanian cooperation on security for the meeting.[461]

The U.S. offered its first counterproposal on the conference's last day.[462] It was too little, too late. Thirteen members voted to approve Panama's resolution. Great Britain abstained, on the grounds that given U.S. opposition the resolution did nothing to advance the issue. Ambassador Scali cast the third Security Council veto in U.S. history on direct orders from the White House,[463] saying that though "there is so much in it [the resolution] with which we agree," the matter was not the business of the United Nations and "the present resolution addresses the points of interest to Panama but ignores those legitimate interests important to the United States."[464] Foreign Minister Tack closed the meetings, saying, "The United States has vetoed Panama's resolution, but the world has vetoed the United States."[465]

In trying to block the Security Council meeting in Panama, and later in trying to halt Panama's resolution, the Nixon administration repeatedly warned that any such publicity would set back the negotiations for years. This was the main bargaining chip the U.S. sought to employ, and it failed spectacularly. The Panamanian historian Omar Jaén Suárez reflects: "The Nixon administration had faced a small, military-led country without a trained civil or diplomatic

---

[461] Scali to Rogers, "Panama SC meeting," March 21, 1973, NARA-AAD, RG59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=729&dt=2472&dl=1345

[462] Draft resolution submitted by the United States, March 21, 1973. Folder Consejo de Seguridad, no. 28, AMREP, section 15.

[463] Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 195-196.

[464] Speech by John Scali before the U.N. Security Council, March 21, 1973. Folder Consejo de Seguridad, no. 28, AMREP, section 15.

[465] Speech of J.A. Tack to U.N. Security Council, March 21, 1973. Folder Reunión del Consejo de Seguridad, no. 17, 1973, AMREP, 1-4.

service, without any economic or military power, and it had been beaten on difficult ground."[466] Why? The Panamanians had decided that negotiations were stalemated, though they engaged in them sporadically. The United States failed to grasp that the piecemeal concessions that had worked with previous Panamanian governments would not satisfy Torrijos. The Security Council meeting produced an immediate breakdown, but also provoked a serious reevaluation on the U.S. side. A year earlier, Kissinger had yielded to the Pentagon's reactionary negotiating positions with little thought. U.S. Ambassador to Panama Robert Sayre pushed similar positions. In the wake of the UN debacle, both took at fresh look at the costs of U.S. intransigence. On April 6, Sayre wrote to the State Department that Torrijos was a nationalist who would not accept the previous relationship. The U.S. ambassador also criticized the United States' lack of clarity over the importance of the canal, which produced inconsistent negotiating positions.[467] Instead of enforcing the threats made before the meetings, U.S. policymakers proved willing to reconsider. In part, this was because higher level officials were paying sustained attention to Panama for the first time in the wake of the meetings. The U.S. impression that they could quiet Panamanian demands with small concessions gave way to the realization that more fundamental changes would be needed to satisfy Torrijos and Tack.

While the meetings succeeded on the world stage, they also got Kissinger's attention. A month before the meeting, Kissinger had told Scali that he didn't "have any very clear views on [Panama].[468]" The spotlight of international attention forced Kissinger to clarify his own position. Jorden, Kissinger's assistant for Latin America, later reflected: "I believe that what

---

[466] Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 250.

[467] Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 252.

[468] Meeting request from John Scali, February 22, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, *Digital National Security Archive*. Henceforth, online database referred to as *DNSA*.

really made Kissinger understand he was sitting on a potential powder keg was the U.N. Security Council meeting in early 1973."[469] The meeting empowered Jorden, who was predisposed to a treaty, to advance his views in the NSC. Jorden penned text on Panama for Nixon's address to Congress, the first time the president had addressed the issue in such a prominent venue.[470]

> Another important unresolved problem concerns the Panama Canal and the surrounding Zone. U.S. operation of the Canal and our presence in Panama are governed by the terms of a treaty drafted in 1903. The world has changed radically during the 70 years this treaty has been in effect. Latin America has changed. Panama has changed. And the terms of our relationship should reflect those changes in a reasonable way. … It is time for both parties to take a fresh look at this problem and to develop a new relationship between us—one that will guarantee continued effective operation of the Canal while meeting Panama's legitimate aspirations.[471]

Panama seized upon Nixon's call for a "fresh look."[472] González Revilla met with State Department official Morey Bell before returning for consultations with Torrijos. The Panamanian inquired about replacing written exchanges with informal talks, suggesting that both sides might be more flexible that way.[473] Others were less optimistic. In response to a survey of advisors conducted by Foreign Minister Tack, Juan Antonio Stagg, an astute observer of the United States who served many years as consul in New York, noted that Nixon's growing political crisis made the possibility of successful negotiations remote.[474]

---

[469] Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 206.

[470] Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 198-199.

[471] Richard Nixon: "Fourth Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," May 3, 1973. *The American Presidency Project*. Available online: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3832.

[472] Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 277.

[473] Bell to Sayre, "Panamanian ambassador comments on USG-GOP relations and treaty negotiations," May 7, 1973, NARA-AAD, RG59.

[474] J.A. Stagg to J.A. Tack, "Respuesta al cuestionario sobre las proyecciones de la reunión del Consejo de Seguridad en las negociaciones del nuevo tratado" May 8, 1973. Folder Consejo de Seguridad, no. 27, AMREP, n.p.

Panamanian negotiators moved from their polemic criticisms of the United States to push for specific goals. Many saw longtime negotiator Robert Anderson as a problem, and by mid-April 1973, they advocated for his removal, sensing that divisions within the U.S. government had been exacerbated by the UN meetings. Due to Anderson's stubbornness and isolation from his own team, Panamanians concluded that continuing negotiations with him was useless. Morey Bell even told his Panamanian counterpart that Anderson would be replaced.[475] Summarizing conversations with Bell, a prominent advisor wrote to Tack: "Ambassador Robert B. Anderson is an unyielding exponent of the U.S. position, and while he remains at the front of the U.S. delegation, it will be very difficult to achieve any change in the U.S. position that would facilitate an understanding with Panama."[476] That Panamanians related the stalled negotiations to Anderson personally set the stage for progress upon his removal.[477]

In early May, Tack finally responded to Anderson's February letter. In twelve, frustration-laced pages, Tack criticized the U.S. propensity to make lofty statements that seemed to agree with Panamanian positions, only to back away from them later. "The experience in the negotiating table shows that the 'broad changes' proposed by the U.S. delegation are a mirage. Those changes turn to smoke when it is time to come to concrete formulas."[478] Tack tried to capitalize on Nixon's "fresh look" by appealing directly to Secretary Rogers. That month, the opportunity materialized when Rogers announced he would attend the investiture of the new Argentine president, with a stop in Brazil. Tack sought a meeting through several channels. Tack

---

[475] Manfredo to Tack, "Memorandum," April 17, 1973, Folder Negociacones 1973, no. 546, AMREP, sec. 8, pp. 1-9.

[476] De la Rosa to Tack, "Memorandum," April 23, 1973, Folder Negociacones 1973, no. 546, AMREP, sec. 8, pp. 2.

[477] J.A. Tack, "Cuestionario sobre las proyecciones de la reunión del Consejo de Seguridad en las negociaciones del nuevo tratado," April 25, 1973. Folder Consejo de Seguridad, no. 27, AMREP, n.p.

[478] Tack to Anderson, May 7, 1973, Folder Negociacones 1973, no. 546, AMREP, sec. 6, pp. 1-12.

wrote his Brazilian homologue that he was "convinced that Secretary Rogers does not receive regular briefings from his subordinates regarding the progress of negotiations with Panama."[479] Seeking to answer criticisms that Panama sought concessions while offering none, Panama for the first time proposed the end of the century for the end of U.S. control, backing off its previous position of December 1994.[480]

On May 24, 1973, at the Plaza Hotel in Buenos Aires, Tack handed Rogers a letter that included eight principles. The men also discussed the make-up of the U.S. negotiating team, with Rogers indicating, in a veiled reference to Anderson, that certain changes would be desirable.[481] Tack's eight principles, for the most part, reiterated Panama's key demands: 1) the abrogation of the 1903 treaty, 2) an end to perpetuity, 3) the complete end of U.S. jurisdiction at treaty's end, 4) elimination of the Canal Zone, 5) a fair share of economic benefits, 6) limiting U.S. activities to the maintenance, operation, and defense of the canal, 7) limitation of U.S. military activities, and 8) mutually agreed upon options for any new construction.[482]

Though Rogers discussed the proposal directly with President Nixon, the timing could hardly have been worse.[483] Both the Panama team and the Nixon administration were in upheaval. Congressional hearings on Watergate had started a week before the meeting. Tack's complaints about Anderson sped the negotiator's demise. A month after the meeting, word leaked that veteran diplomat Ellsworth Bunker was being considered as a new chief for the

---

[479] Tack to Gibson Barboza, May 10, 1973, Folder Negociacones 1973, no. 546, AMREP, sec. 5.

[480] Bell to Sayre, "Panamanian foreign minister's request for interview with secretary in Buenos Aires," May 17, 1973, NARA-AAD, RG59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=23694&dt=2472&dl=1345

[481] Ricaurte Antonio Acheen, "Puntos fundamentales de la conversación de Rogers con Tack," May 27, 1973, Folder Negociacones 1973, no. 546, AMREP, sec. 3.

[482] Tack to Rogers, May 21, 1973, Folder Negociaciones 1973, no. 546, AMREP, sec. 2, 1-7.

[483] Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 206.

delegation.[484] Bunker was just returning from a long stay in Vietnam, where he helped negotiate the war's conclusion. The energetic seventy-nine-year-old was internationally recognized and well respected in the Department of Defense. Panama told U.S. officials that Bunker would be an "excellent choice."[485] Anderson resigned a few days later, on July 2. His term had started with the negotiations for the 1967 "three-in-one" treaties, but ended in estrangement. By the time Rogers answered Tack's letter, rumors of Rogers' impending departure swirled around Washington, spurred by his criticism of the break-ins at the Watergate and against Pentagon Papers whistleblower Daniel Ellsberg. Roger's resignation, announced August 22, did little to change the decision-making locus of the administration, which rested squarely between Nixon and Kissinger.[486] Still, Rogers' reply showed a shift in the administration's tenor regarding the canal. He clearly stated that the U.S. would abrogate the 1903 treaty, something Anderson waffled on. Rogers told Tack that he "read these principles with great interest and find important elements in them that my government is prepared to accept."[487] Bunker and Kissinger were confirmed to their new positions in September and initiated a burst of progress.

After a few months of relative quiet, Torrijos continued his international grandstanding to keep the issue on the new U.S. team's agenda. The general spent September in Spain, ostensibly on vacation, but also meeting with General Francisco Franco and making announcements to the press. Torrijos visited Gibraltar, equating the British presence there with the U.S.-run Canal Zone. Torrijos' suspicion of the United States had been piqued by allegations in *Newsweek* from

---

[484] "Bunker Is Expected to Get Panama-Negotiations Post," *New York Times*, June 30, 1973, pp. 14.

[485] Bennett (USUN) to Rogers, "U.S.-Panama relations," August 1, 1973, NARA-AAD, RG59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=50915&dt=2472&dl=1345

[486] So much so that a *New York Times* column on Kissinger's nomination as secretary of state was titled simply, "Kissinger gets the title, too."

[487] Rogers to Tack, Aug. 6, 1973, Folder Negociaciones 1973, no. 546, AMREP, sec. 1, 1-2.

imprisoned Nixon crony John Dean that E. Howard Hunt and others involved in Watergate had put Torrijos on a hit list in 1972 because of his alleged involvement in drug smuggling. Though Dean's allegations were highly suspect, they angered Torrijos all the same.[488] Upping the rhetoric, Torrijos called the Canal Zone "a time bomb in the heart of Panama."[489] Torrijos went on to visit Marshal Josip Tito in Yugoslavia and Pope John VI.[490]

On November 26, new U.S. representative Bunker arrived to the tranquil island of Contadora off Panama's Pacific coast. The island would be the site of many rounds of talks. Panama's decision to host Bunker there, instead of in the city, was intended melt the frigid style that had characterized talks with Anderson. Having learned that Bunker was a boating enthusiast, the Panamanians put President Lakas' yacht at his disposal.[491] On the first evening, Tack greeted the new negotiator by recalling how they had met ten years before at the OAS, for the most part eschewing the historical diatribes often recounted by the Panamanian team.[492] Bunker told Kissinger the meeting had gone better than hoped, relaying greetings from Torrijos, who said that "for the first time he has faith and hope that all will turn out well." The two sides came to

---

[488] Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 273. The allegations again made news while the treaties were being debated. Jack Anderson, "Watergate plotters set assassination of Torrijos," December 16, 1977.

[489] Rivero to State, "Panama's 4862," September 13, 1973, NARA-AAD, RG59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=70129&dt=2472&dl=1345; Sayre to State Department, "Torrijos on Canal and conspiracy," September 21, 1973, NARA-AAD, RG59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=74073&dt=2472&dl=1345

[490] Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 276.

[491] Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 214.

[492] "Salutación: Embajador Bunker," Nov. 26, 1973, Folder Negociaciones 1973, no. 546, AMREP, sec. 11.

near-total agreement on seven of the eight principles. Bunker suggested they serve as a joint declaration between the two presidents.[493]

Bunker understood Panamanian sensitivities regarding jurisdiction and treaty duration. The U.S. should try to take advantage of the "euphoria…of long-disheartened people being extremely glad that there is at last a decent climate for forward movement."[494] After Bunker's departure on December 3, Morey Bell stayed on Contadora to continue to hammer out language on the principles with González Revilla. The two knew one another from frequent consultations in Washington. Over the next two weeks in Panama, they worked through several drafts of the eight points, which had now evolved from Tack's proposals to Rogers through Bunker's modifications to become a joint document. There were many changes in wording from Tack's letter—for example, to clarify that the 1903 treaty would be abrogated with a new treaty, not before—but the primary effect of the eight points remained the same.[495] Bell felt that the Panamanian team was being flexible, using more open phrasing on issues of jurisdictional rights during the treaty.[496] One of the main changes in the U.S. position was the recognition on various points that Panama would "grant" the U.S. rights for operation of defense of the canal, something the U.S. had often claimed it inherently possessed.[497] As both sides recognized, the eight

---

[493] President Nixon quickly signed off on Bunker's request. Bell to Sayre, "Announcement of U.S. unilateral actions," December 27, 1973, NARA-AAD, RG59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=109449&dt=2472&dl=1345

[494] December 2, 1973 – Bunker recommends adopting "joint presidential declaration on principles." Bunker to Kissinger, "Resumption of Panama-U.S. treaty negotiations," December 2, 1973. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=108252&dt=2472&dl=1345

[495] Jaén Suárez writes, "A comparison of the eight principles proposed by Tack with the U.S. proposal does not show great differences." Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 281.

[496] Bell to Bunker, "Resumption of U.S.-Panama treaty negotiations," December 4, 1973, NARA-AAD, RG59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=108581&dt=2472&dl=1345

[497] "Ocho principios," Dec. 19, 1973, Folder Negociacones 1973, no. 546, AMREP, sec. 14.

principles contained substantial ambiguity and failed to address major details such as the length of the treaty.[498] Still, perhaps for the first time, Tack and Torrijos saw a treaty as a possibility, and they sought to accommodate the United States with flexibility and patience. Panamanian interlocutors acknowledged the Congressional and political constraints Nixon faced, with Torrijos telling his ambassador, "If they want a treaty in a few months, that is good, but if they want to have it next year or even later, that's good too, and we will wait."[499]

At Bunker's urging, Kissinger planned a whirlwind visit to Panama. Torrijos met Kissinger at the airport, joining him in his motorcade through Panama City to the Palacio Justo Arosemena, where Tack and Kissinger signed the eight principles at a lively ceremony. The Panamanian crowd roared at the second principle, declaring an end to the hated "perpetuity" clause of 1903. In his speech, the secretary directed himself beyond Panama's borders to demonstrate a "new dialogue" with Latin America.[500] The eight principles, elaborated by Bunker, Tack, and their assistants, now bore the name Tack-Kissinger.[501] After the signing, Kissinger met Torrijos at the Panama City apartment of Rory González, a friend whose home often served as a getaway for the general. Torrijos wanted to break each of the eight principles into several smaller issues to allow for "successive stages of achievement" to build trust between Panamanians, Americans, and Zonians. Both leaders evinced frustration with the Zonians' ability to stymie progress. Torrijos stressed how he had worked to keep the peace in the Canal Zone, making sure there were no outbreaks of violence. He negotiated constantly, he said, and listened

---

[498] In a later NSC meeting, Kissinger referred to the principles as deliberately ambiguous "platitudes."

[499] Bell to Bunker, "U.S.-Panama treaty negotiations: report on developments," January 24, 1974, NARA-AAD, RG59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=1382&dt=2474&dl=1345

[500] David Binder, "U.S. agrees to yield sovereignty of canal to Panama," *New York Times*, February 8, 1974, pp. 2; Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 219-222.

[501] They are often given the reverse name, Kissinger-Tack, in the United States.

to student speeches for as long as six hours. Both men faced a similar problem. "There is a large group of people, however, whose mission is to see to it there is no agreement. They live off this problem," Torrijos said. This was a problem Kissinger would soon appreciate.[502]

The trip, along with Kissinger's warm reception at a ministerial in Mexico City,[503] provoked hopes for a quick treaty in Panama, even as the signing spurred loud opposition in the United States. "Tack used to say, if we have these eight points, the treaty, we will write it down in a couple of months," González Revilla reflected. "This conceptual agreement, it's got everything."[504] It would not be so easy. The day after the ceremony, a Congressional campaign began, opposing any treaty that would return the canal to Panama. Democratic Representative John Murphy alleged that the Torrijos government was unstable and linked to drug trafficking—even warning that a coup was in the offing. Senator Strom Thurmond continued his bombastic opposition, called the Tack-Kissinger principles "a pseudotreaty which will cause grave harm to United States interests." The South Carolinian told his colleagues, "There is nothing of consequence left to negotiate once we surrender our rights, even only in principle."[505] The following month, Thurmond introduced a resolution, co-sponsored by thirty-four senators, insisting that the United States maintain sovereign rights over the Canal Zone.[506]

---

[502] Memorandum of conversation between Torrijos and Kissinger, February 7, 1974, *Digital National Security Archive*.

[503] Martin to American Republics, "MFM: Discussion of agenda item 4: Panama Canal," March 6, 1974, NARA-AAD, RG59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=33949&dt=2474&dl=1345

[504] Interview with González Revilla. Shortly after the signing of Tack-Kissinger, Tack told a Danish diplomat he expected a treaty draft by September or October. Daniels to Kissinger, "Canal Treaty negotiations," March 20, 1974. NARA-AAD, RG59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=33742&dt=2474&dl=1345

[505] "A campaign starts in Congress to keep control of Panama Canal," *New York Times*, February 9, 1974, pp. 4.

[506] S.Res. 301, 93rd Congress

After the signing, the teams confronted the complex task of filling in the many details conveniently omitted to arrive at an agreement. On the Panamanian side, the negotiation of Tack-Kissinger had been handled mostly by two individuals—Tack and González Revilla. Now the rest of the foreign policy cadre, including the official negotiators, tried to grasp the meaning of the principles. These advisors, including Jorge Illueca and Juan Antonio Stagg, along with former negotiators Carlos López Guevara and Diógenes de la Rosa, met on March 5 to study the agreement. They generated a 48-page list of questions breaking down nearly every word of the agreement, and bringing in dozens of statements and documents from previous negotiations. Torrijos had said he wanted to avoid just that, but the weight of history and the ingrained tendency of the Panamanian foreign ministry to appeal to it would be hard to overcome. Whereas the meetings on Contadora were notable for their relaxed tone and lack of heated historical diatribes, the document was full of references to decades-old UN and OAS resolutions.[507] Having been left out of the process, the advisors did not hesitate to cast stones, while also insisting—against the more pragmatic advice of their own team—that the entire treaty be conducted under the framework of the United Nations.[508]

The principles advanced the talks to another stage. Whereas the principles were brief and general, the final treaty would necessarily be complex. Tack and Torrijos' strategy was to break the issue down into its constituent parts and address easier points first to build trust and increase various factions' investment in an agreement. While leadership still rested between Torrijos and Tack, the next phase of negotiations would require a larger and more specialized team. A

[507] Illueca, Stagg, De la Rosa, and López Guevara, "Cuestionario formulado por el grupo de negociadores y asesores," March 5, 1974, Folder Negociacones 1972-1974, no. 548, AMREP, i-ii, 1-47, translation from Spanish by author.

[508] Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 293.

specific agreement would also be more open to criticism, and Torrijos was concerned about attacks from the left. Those two facts led to the inclusion of a broader array of men. Some of these were selected largely for technical expertise as lawyers or engineers, while others, such as Illueca, represented vocal factions of the political left. The negotiating teams, including Bunker, reconvened on Contadora after Kissinger's departure, and the amount of work remaining eroded some of the optimism. Tensions began to surface between Tack and the young González Revilla. Tack's prestige had been bolstered by the accords, but this also made him a potential challenger.[509] To complicate matters, despite the principles, the U.S. negotiators were still working under the essentially the same guidelines as their predecessor, including a 50-year treaty, with longer options for a sea-level canal. Bunker understood the importance of duration to the Panamanians, noting it after his first trip to Contadora. Given that he had no instructions to change the termination date, Bunker avoided the issue over the course of the next year, fearing that an insistence on 50 years would scuttle the talks.[510] The inflexible instructions frustrated both sides. Years later, González Revilla felt Nixon and Kissinger had used the eight principles as a way to prolong the negotiations without making progress. He recalled:

> After the eight points, the first round of negotiations was absolutely ridiculous. The position of the US had gone back to the worst position in the last ten or fifteen years. … And at that point it was an absolute frustration from everyone in the government. Torrijos—very, extremely frustrated. Because we all thought we had it done. And Tack thought two months to develop the full treaty. We were so far away, that it was not even worth it to negotiate.

González Revilla pointed to the old guidelines as evidence nothing was being done. "What Kissinger was doing, I think, playing with the same guidelines, but with more brilliance."[511]

---

[509] Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 295.

[510] Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 277.

[511] Interview.

In fact, it appears Kissinger did want to conclude the treaties. In April, he urged Tack to make a "negotiating breakthrough" before further opposition to the treaties was able to mobilize. However, they were not his top priority, and alone he could not offer new instructions on duration.[512] For Nixon, the negotiations were never of more than marginal importance.[513] As the teams on Contadora tried to take the next steps, in Washington, the House Judiciary Committee discussed impeachment and a special prosecutor prepared a request for the White House tapes. Many senators and representatives had made their hostility to a canal treaty known. Nixon faced an ever-growing battle with the Congress, and the last thing he wanted was to open another front.

With their president and secretary of state consumed by other matters, Bell and Bunker felt the dated guidelines tied their hands in replying to many Panamanian grievances they saw as just. Both pushed for greater latitude. With progress on the main issues out of reach, the teams focused on conceptual agreements and on listing the matters that would need to be addressed under each principle. Tack and Bunker "agreed that the duration and expansion issues should be put aside until all other issues are resolved to our mutual satisfaction."[514] In March, the Panamanian team presented a 38-page list of questions. Some of the most incendiary questions had been removed from the earlier version, but it still pressed for more specific answers. What will be the date of termination? Will that date be in this century?[515] Tack strategically employed the comments from outside advisors, which allowed him to appear moderate while generating

---

[512] Bell, "Secretary's conversation with Foreign Minister Tack," April 23, 1974. NARA-AAD, RG59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=51979&dt=2474&dl=1345

[513] For example, Nixon's only mentions of Panama in his memoirs mention the country in passing while talking about travels during his vice-presidency.

[514] Bunker to Kissinger, "U.S.-Panama treaty negotiations: Report of chief negotiator-level talks," April 5, 1974, NARA-AAD, RG59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=52247&dt=2474&dl=1345

[515] "Principales materias vinculadas a los ocho principios," March 19, 1974, Folder Negociaciones 1972-1974, no. 548, AMREP, sec. 3, pp. 1-38.

pressure on Bunker and Bell by showing them that many Panamanians were less inclined to compromise. Though the teams would make significant progress on important issues, the question of duration hung over them.[516]

As late as November 1974, Bunker noted Panamanian cooperation and thought he could get a treaty by March 1975.[517] Panama eased its position on canal operations through a formula in which there would be a joint structure to run the canal. The United States would retain effective control during the treaty, but Panama would have increasing responsibilities to permit training and accommodation.[518] The teams were fruitfully progressing through major issues. To get a treaty, however, decisions needed to be made, many of them on issues dear to Congress and the Department of Defense. Panamanian frustration grew over the evasion of the question of duration, especially as they had offered some concessions. In early 1975, Bunker wrote the Pentagon, suggesting the end of the century as a termination date—Panama's position. The Pentagon answered that it could live with 25 years for operation of the canal, but it demanded forty years for defense. Bell knew it was a non-starter with Panama, and fought to change it, precipitating an interagency struggle. Having been left out of the Contadora negotiations, the Pentagon insisted on having a stronger voice.[519]

The U.S. political situation undermined progress. Bunker and Bell pressed for a presidential decision in the summer of 1974 break the impasse caused by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger's staunch opposition. At that time, Nixon was nearing a choice between

---

[516] Bell to González Revilla, "Deputies working paper," April 13, 1974, Folder Negociaciones 1972-1974, no. 548, AMREP, sec. 15, 1-8.

[517] Bunker to Kissinger, "U.S.-Panama treaty negotiations: Report of chief negotiator-level talks," April 5, 1974.

[518] Bunker to Kissinger, "U.S.-Panama treaty negotiations: Chief negotiator talks," June 30, 1974.

[519] Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 277-289.

resignation and impeachment. Wiretapping scandals threatened Kissinger, too. It is not clear whether the Nixon administration made an explicit decision to postpone a treaty, but rumors circulated in Panama that it had.[520] Regardless, Nixon had lost the political capability to lead a major effort. The *New York Times* summarized: "[N]o one who knows Mr. Nixon's thinking believes the new Canal treaty will be concluded. The reason is simply stated: Senator Thurmond and his 34 conservative colleagues represent the President's last barrier against impeachment. … So forget a new canal treaty for a while."[521]

After years of intrigue and months of daily drama between the White House and Congress, President Nixon announced on August 8 that he would resign rather than face trial on articles of impeachment. Even as the news was breaking in Washington, Kissinger sent Ambassadors Bunker and Jorden an urgent note to Tack to assure him that the resignation "will not in any way affect the negotiation" and that Kissinger intended to "press ahead" for a new treaty.[522] Nixon's departure re-opened the possibility of progress in the negotiations, but it was not clear how the new President Gerald Ford would approach the issue. Negotiations continued through August 1974, with a decision to negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

Frustrated by the pace and feeling pressure from the left, Torrijos responded by going on the offensive—shaking the monkey's chain, as he liked to put it. Torrijos had made common cause with Cuba nearly since he took power, giving the Cuban ambassador a prominent platform at the UN Security Council, for example. He had not gone so far as to really cause alarm in Washington. After months of waiting to hear a proposal on duration, Torrijos wanted to cause

---

[520] Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 296-297.

[521] David Binder, "Impeachment's effect on foreign policy is growing," August 4, 1974, *New York Times*.

[522] Kissinger to Tack, "Secretarial message," August 9, 1974, NARA-AAD, RG59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=124886&dt=2474&dl=1345

alarm. He approached democratic Latin American leaders about reinstating, en masse, diplomatic ties with Cuba.[523] Jorden noted: "Clearly, [Torrijos] looked on the opening to Cuba as a way to shake Washington out of its lethargy."[524] As with Torrijos' previous gambits, the U.S. tried to block Latin American cooperation. In this case, it had greater success, getting other countries to back down. The U.S. warned that closer ties with Cuba could ruin negotiations, but U.S. pressure steeled Torrijos' determination to demonstrate his independence. Torrijos knew the decision would placate students and other leftists, but he did not want to give Panamanian businessmen and investors the idea he might enact Cuban-style nationalizations. He knew Washington was watching closely. He deftly played to both sides. To open relations with the hemisphere's only communist state, Torrijos sent a delegation headed by Panama's best-known, free-market economist, Nicolás Ardito Barletta. Accompanying Ardito Barletta were people from across the political spectrum, from the student leader Ahumada to businessmen.[525] Tack insisted to U.S. diplomats that Castro served as a moderating influence on members of the Panamanian left who looked to the revolutionary for guidance.[526] The delegation travelled to Havana and announced diplomatic ties on August 27, 1974. The decision helped Torrijos shore up his left flank just as the slowly moving negotiations turned to the questions on which he was most open to criticism—neutrality and defense.

---

[523] Jaén Suárez questions Jorden's interpretation of the ties with Cuba being driven by Torrijos' frustration with negotiations. Instead, he emphasizes that Torrijos had slowly built ties with Cuba since 1971 and had previously considered establishing relations, pp. 306. Others, including González Revilla, made this connection, however. It seems clear that the move was made in part to help Torrijos with the left, which was clearly frustrated with the pace of the canal talks.

[524] Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 259.

[525] Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 256-260, María Mercedes de la Guardia de Corró, *Hasta la Última Gota: Gabriel Lewis Galindo* (Cali, Colombia: Cargraphics, 2009). Interviews with Ahumada and Ardito Barletta.

[526] Ahumada recounted how in 1976 Fidel Castro insisted to Torrijos that he continue negotiating despite the frustrating pace. Also see Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 306-307.

The major dispute on defense was not about the treaty, but rather what would happen upon the treaty's expiration. Panama argued it should be solely responsible for defense and believed the U.S. had agreed to this in the Tack-Kissinger principles.[527] Bell did not believe Panama was capable of defending the canal alone.[528] Through their conversations, it became apparent that the real sticking point for Panama was the massive presence of U.S. troops and bases; for the U.S., the worry was the Cold War and assuring the canal would remain open. That did not require the physical presence of U.S. troops on Panamanian soil, as González Revilla wrote Torrijos.[529] The rapport did not extend throughout the entire foreign ministry, however. Aristides Royo called the U.S. proposal "unacceptable," saying that the U.S. idea of joint defense was in fact to "turn the whole country into a military base."[530] Negotiators López Guevara and de la Rosa argued that the U.S. military presence in Panama should be regulated in the same way U.S. bases were treated around the world—citing Spain, Iceland, and Japan.[531] The argument appealed to Panamanian critics of the United States and to Torrijos' nationalism, while offering a legal justification and model that negotiators could point to in talks.

---

[527] Nicolás Gonzáléz Revilla to Morey Bell, Aug. 11, 1974. Folder Negociaciones del nuevo tratado del canal, agosto 1974, no. 550, AMREP, Section 3, pp. 1-3. Emphases in original.

[528] Bell to González Revilla, Aug. 14, 1974. Folder Negociaciones del nuevo tratado del canal, agosto 1974, no. 550, AMREP, Section 5. Emphases in original.

[529] "Comentario verbal hecho por Morey Bell," Aug. 16, 1974. Folder Negociacones del nuevo tratado del canal, agosto 1974, no. 550, AMREP, Section 5, n.p; Nicolás González Revilla to Omar Torrijos, Aug. 17, 1974. Folder Negociacones del nuevo tratado del canal, agosto 1974, no. 550, AMREP, Section 5, n.p.

[530] Aristides Royo, "Opiniones de los negociadores estadounidenses," Sept. 12, 1974. Folder Negociacones del nuevo tratado del canal, agosto 1974, no. 550, AMREP, Section 7, 1-3.

[531] López Guevara and de la Rosa to J.A. Tack, "Punto 7 de la declaración Tack-Kissinger," Sept. 17, 1974. Folder Negociacones del nuevo tratado del canal, agosto 1974, no. 550, AMREP, Section 8, n.p.

Following López Guevara's argument, Bunker's SOFA draft was based on agreements the United States had used elsewhere.[532] Given the resistance from the U.S. Department of Defense on the wider treaty, the SOFA was handled swiftly. This was more surprising given Torrijos' choice to head the SOFA negotiating team—Rómulo Escobar Bethancourt, the rector of the Universidad de Panamá and famed critic of U.S. policy. His deputy was student leader and lawyer Adolfo Ahumada. The choice played well domestically. "Torrijos concluded that, if a leftist like Rómulo could work out a SOFA with the Americans, Panama's Marxists and activist students would not likely oppose it."[533] In late January, the teams overcame some problems of wording and finished drafts that month, allowing Bunker and Tack to sign the final accords March 6.[534] "[T]he SOFA opened the doors to the rest of the negotiations," Ahumada said. "The negotiations took off when the U.S. military could breathe calmly about their presence in Panama." At the same time, Panama had started a process of reducing the fourteen military bases on the isthmus to an interim number of four. However, the SOFA also postponed the issue of duration, which would be linked to the duration of the overall treaty.[535]

The major problem confronting the U.S. team was the near-total lack of engagement of President Ford. Following an earlier request from Bunker, Kissinger sent a draft memo asking for new negotiating guidelines that accepted a treaty duration of as little as 25 years for both

---

[532] Bunker to Kissinger, "U.S.-Panama treaty negoaitions (sic): Reports of chief negotiators' session," November 7, 1974. NARA-AAD, RG59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=171119&dt=2474&dl=1345

[533] Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 268.

[534] Interview with Ahumada. Jorden to Kissinger, "Negotiation of Status of Forces Agreement," January 21, 1975, NARA-AAD, RG59; Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 328-329.

[535] Interview with Ahumada, translated from Spanish by the author.

operation and defense of the canal.[536] The Defense Department's reaction was again to demand a 50-year minimum for defense rights. Jorden criticized the proposal:

> At this point in history, to seek another 50 years of U.S. responsibility for canal defense is folly. To say this 'may be a little too much for Panama to swallow' is a considerable understatement. In fact, Panama will choke on such a proposal. … For three-quarters of all Panamanians now living, 50 years is, repeat is 'perpetuity.' General Torrijos and probably all others involved in this negotiation will almost certainly be gone before the expiration of such a period, and they are acutely aware of that fact.[537]

Despite impassioned pleas from Jorden, Bell, and Bunker, Ford offered nothing new. Kissinger pressed him, too, but Ford dodged the matter. Ford's ambivalence led to another frustrating, though not unproductive, year. Panama became more assertive, especially on the important issues of lands and waters and economic compensation. The Panamanian lands and waters team was led by the architect Edwin Fábrega, whose knowledge of Canal Zone far exceeded that of his U.S. counterparts.[538] Fábrega's assistants included the geographer Omar Jaén Suárez, a detail-minded man who would later become the preeminent Panamanian historian of the canal.

The team began from the premise that Panama would grant the United States, for a limited time, the use of territories truly necessary for the canal's operation and defense. In January 1975, Fábrega began presenting detailed proposals, including maps that questioned U.S. justifications for keeping parcels that had not been used in years. The defense of the canal required only three military bases—one in the Atlantic Coast, one in the Pacific Coast, and one in the middle, Panama insisted.[539] The initial U.S. proposal offered to return about 200,000 acres,

---

[536] Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 328-329.

[537] Bell and Jorden to Bunker, "U.S.-Panama treaty negotiations: Proposed change in presidential instructions," March 2, 1975, NARA-AAD, RG59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=45180&dt=2476&dl=1345

[538] Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 466-468.

[539] "Puntos de vista de los negociadores de la república de Panamá sobre materia concerniente al use y tierras y aguas," Jan. 21, 1975. Folder Negociacones del nuevo tratado del canal, agosto 1974, no. 554, AMREP, pp. 1-5. See also Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 333-359.

or less than 60 percent of the Canal Zone. It excluded sites Panamanians considered essential.[540] The low-key, professional team continued to bargain. As the SOFA talks came to fruition, the lands and waters table was formally seated in February. In the first meetings, the Panamanians were far more prepared to tackle specifics than were the Americans, who were hampered by poor guidelines and bureaucratic resistance.[541] The lands and waters talks were intricately linked with defense, given that much of the land was occupied by military facilities. For years, Panama had argued that SOUTHCOM, the School of the Americas, and training zones had no relation to canal defense. The bases not only violated Panama's sovereignty, but contravened the treaty of 1903.[542] Other sites the United States labeled essential had "not been used for many years" and were retained only "for contingency planning."[543] Panama's priority was to free up land around Panama City and Colón; the cities' growth had been constrained by the surrounding zone and military installations.[544] The ability to expand these cities and provide improved living conditions was an important facet of Torrijos' social and economic policy.

The negotiations went beyond a strict bargaining dynamic. They involved exchanges of ideas and persuasion, through which Panamanian leaders could influence U.S. policy despite their country's small size. In both the lands and waters and defense talks, Panama often argued

---

[540] Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 276.

[541] Meeting summary, Feb. 5, 1975. Folder Negociacones del nuevo tratado del canal, agosto 1974, no. 554, AMREP, n.p.; "Resumen de las discusiones del uso de tierras y aguas," Feb. 6, 1975. Folder Negociacones del nuevo tratado del canal, agosto 1974, no. 554, AMREP, n.p.

[542] The former negotiator Carlos López Guevara published a pamphlet making that case in legal terms in 1971. "Panamá Tiene Derecho a Denunciar la Convención del Canal Ístmico de 1903 por Violaciones a la Misma por Parte de Estados Unidos," ed. Centro de Impresión Educativa (Panamá: 1971).

[543] "Minutes of the meetings on lands and waters," Feb. 10, 1975. Folder Negociacones del nuevo tratado, no. 554, AMREP, n.p.

[544] "Minutes of the meetings on lands and waters," Feb. 7, 1975. Folder Negociacones del nuevo tratado, no. 554, AMREP, 1-3.

that "the creation of a friendly environment [is] indispensable to effective defense."[545] That is, the best way to ensure the security of the canal was to have a contented Panamanian population that took pride in it. The Panamanian negotiators wrote in a position paper: "The only true guarantee for the security of the canal is that it is surrounded by a friendly population, which protects the canal of its own desire because it feels like a participant in it and because the canal will be transferred to it at the end of the treaty."[546] This was an important Panamanian strategy to redefine the problem of the canal. It gained currency with U.S. officials who frequently interacted with the Panamanians—Jorden and Bell. In his plea to Bunker and Kissinger for more flexible instructions, Jorden repeated the argument, noting that three Panamanians on a dark night could destroy the locks and close the canal for years.[547] This argument filtered up, with Bunker telling Kissinger and Ford at a May 15 NSC meeting that a treaty would provide "more real security than we have today." Kissinger added that "failure to conclude a treaty is going to get us into a *cause célèbre*, with harassment, demonstrations, bombing of embassies."[548] In a May 22 speech, Bunker went further, mentioning the possibility of sabotage or other attacks: "We would find it difficult if not impossible to keep the canal running against all-out Panamanian opposition."[549] Panama not only negotiated, but advanced new conventional wisdom regarding how the canal's security could best be achieved.

---

[545] "Minutes of the meetings on lands and waters," Feb. 10, 1975. Folder Negociaciones del nuevo tratado, no. 554, AMREP, n.p.

[546] "Defensa," Feb. 11, 1975. Folder Negociacones del nuevo tratado, no. 554, AMREP, 1-5. Translation from Spanish by author.

[547] Bell and Jorden to Bunker, "U.S.-Panama treaty negotiations: Proposed change in presidential instructions," March 2, 1975.

[548] Minutes, part II, National Security Council meeting, May 15, 1975. Ford Presidential Library. Available online.

[549] "Bunker is fearful of Panama conflict if canal talks fail," May 23, 1975, *New York Times*, pp. 3.

Bunker returned to Contadora in March to sign the SOFA and evaluate progress on lands and waters. It was increasingly clear the U.S. chief negotiator had exhausted his authority. As Bell confided to Bunker before the March round, Panama had made concessions in the SOFA and expected U.S. flexibility in return. "The trouble is that we have nothing to take our turn with at this point."[550] Tack said it was time for a "real and visible advance regarding lands and waters and to initiate conversations about the duration of a new treaty."[551] Bunker was stuck. His requests to lower the treaty term to 25 years had gone unanswered, and he returned to Washington in mid-March to seek concessions from his own government. Torrijos sensed the stalemate and turned to his closest allies for help. The year 1974 brought with it the election of a group of democratic presidents who saw the canal's status as a matter of justice: Daniel Oduber in Costa Rica, Carlos Andrés Pérez in Venezuela, and Alfonso López Michelsen in Colombia. Two weeks after Bunker and the American team left Contadora, these three presidents joined General Torrijos on the island. While appeals to the Non-Aligned Movement and to Cuba strengthened Torrijos' image of independence, these presidents were effective advocates because of their proximity to the United States, something they explicitly acknowledged. Upon the conclusion of the meetings, they drafted a long letter to President Ford. Highlighting the "great interest for all of Latin America" in the canal dispute, the leaders criticized the U.S. position:

> The Government of Panama hopes to agree on a fixed term for the duration of the new treaty which will put an end, in unequivocal terms, to the unlimited concession over the Canal established by the Treaty of 1903 between the United States and Panama. The term should not extend beyond December 31 of 1994. The Government of the United States, on the other hand, has demanded a longer term, originally fixed at a minimum of fifty years, a time lapse not in agreement with the trends of the times.

---

[550] Bell to Bunker, "U.S.-Panama treaty negotiations: Report of developments, February 23-March 1," March 2, 1975. NARA-AAD, RG59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=45860&dt=2476&dl=1345

[551] Tack, "Exposición hecha por el ministro Tack al Embajador Bunker," March 12, 1975. Folder Negociacones del nuevo tratado, no. 554, AMREP, n.p.

> It is obvious that if the government of the United States insists in maintaining the existing situation, this position would create a serious problem of unpredictable political consequences for the Government of Panama, and may even lead to threats of public unrest and threats against the security of the Canal itself.[552]

Ford took a discourteous three months to respond with brief, platitude-filled notes to the three presidents.[553] Bunker had difficulty advancing his proposals while the Pentagon remained recalcitrant. A five-month feud continued between State and Defense, fought almost entirely about the question of treaty duration.[554] Many in the Pentagon, including Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, preferred a breakdown in treaty talks—maybe even a permanent one.

By May, Kissinger told Ford that an NSC meeting on Panama was needed. When Ford expressed his worries about Congress, Kissinger warned of "massive riots" in Panama and diplomatic beatings for the United States.[555] Kissinger recognized the political sensitivities, and suggested negotiating but pushing the signing and ratification until after the election. "If these negotiations fail, we will be beaten to death in every international forum and there will be riots all over Latin America."[556] Bunker got his chance to bring the issue to Ford in an NSC meeting on May 15. Telling Ford that a treaty was "within reach," he asked for flexibility on lands and waters and duration, starting at 50 years, but with the option to fall back to 20 years as the shortest term. Without a treaty, Bunker warned of a "confrontation" that would lead to worldwide condemnation and "hamper the operation of the waterway." Kissinger pointed out

---

[552] López Michelsen, Odúber, and Pérez to Ford, March 24, 1975. Folder Negociacones, no. 529, AMREP, n.p.

[553] Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 280.

[554] Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 278-289.

[555] Memorandum of conversation between Ford, Kissinger, and Scowcroft, May 5, 1975, DNSA.

[556] Memorandum of conversation between Ford and Kissinger, May 12, 1975, DNSA.

that even the failed 1967 treaties had offered 33 years, much better than the current terms. Ford primarily worried about the domestic political repercussions.

Defense's hard line was clear. "Flexibility" was just a giveaway, and once the U.S. sacrificed its "sovereignty," Panama would just bargain down the timeline. "When the U.S. shows strength and determination, it receives respect. When it recedes from its position, it whets appetites," Schlesinger said. Trying to gain the president's approval, Kissinger argued that with flexibility to go as low as 25 years on defense rights, the negotiators could actually get 40 or 45 years. "This is no issue to face the world on. It looks like pure colonialism," he said.[557]

Despite the debate, Ford postponed a decision. The delay frustrated Torrijos. As Kissinger pushed the issue with Ford, the Panamanians were "toughening their position" while the general prepared to "protect his political flanks should the talks break down." Torrijos and Tack increasingly believed that the State Department had lost to the Pentagon, and that Bunker, Bell, and Jorden's good intentions were hollow.[558] Fear of domestic backlash over Panama paralyzed Ford. Pressure from Congress and Defense was unabated. In June, Representative Dan Snyder attached an amendment to an appropriations bill for the State Department that prohibited any funds from being used to negotiate a canal treaty.[559] In response Torrijos cordially offered to provide the U.S. negotiators with a loan to continue their work![560] Though the Senate later struck

---

[557] Minutes of National Security Council meeting, part II, May 15, 1975. Ford Presidential Library.

[558] Jorden to Bell, "Canal negotiations: Local atmosphere cooling," May 8, 1975, NARA-AAD, RG59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=86746&dt=2476&dl=1345

[559] Graeme S. Mount and Mark Gauthier, *895 Days That Changed the World : The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford* (Montréal: Black Rose Books, 2006), pp. 172-173.

[560] Bunker to Tack, via Jorden, personal letter, June 27, 1975. NARA-AAD, RG59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=105249&dt=2476&dl=1345

the provision, its passage in the House was a clear signal regarding a treaty's popularity. Only Kissinger's insistence kept the matter on the agenda.

In mid-July, Kissinger pressed Ford to make a decision in the upcoming NSC meeting. "If we don't settle Panama, I fear we will have a Vietnam in the Western Hemisphere. Our Army will be engaged in guerrilla warfare, pilloried in international forums—all for something we will give up eventually, and on worse terms if we wait."[561] When the NSC again met to discuss Panama, it had been five months since Bunker had been on the isthmus. Ford concluded he did want a treaty if it were "something we have bargained for which will protect our rights." Still, Ford wanted to limit political costs, while avoiding violence in Panama. "We want the situation under control here and certainly not a renewal of the fighting from 1964 there where people were killed and we had a hell of a mess."[562] Ford followed Kissinger's watered-down position. A new presidential order, signed on August 18, authorized positions of not less than 40 years for defense rights and 20 for operations, though U.S. negotiators were told to seek longer periods.[563]

The "new" position was one the U.S. ambassador had told his superiors months earlier would be unacceptable in Panama. Furthermore, between the NSC meeting and the signing of the order, Torrijos flatly stated: "[I]t cannot go one day beyond the year 2000." Torrijos blamed U.S. domestic politics and questioned the appeals to Congress and the Pentagon whenever the "crucial moment" arrived. Pressure was building in Panama, too, and his ability to keep the peace around the canal was based on a sense of hope amongst the population. "I haven't lost hope, but I cannot

---

[561] Memoranda of conversations between Ford and Kissinger, July 7 and July 21, 1975. Ford Presidential Library. Available online.

[562] Minutes of National Security Council meeting, July 23, 1975. Ford Presidential Library. Available online. Kissinger discusses, and quotes widely from, the NSC meetings in *Years of Renewal* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1999), pp. 761-765.

[563] Gerald Ford, Presidential Decision Memorandum no. 302, August 8, 1975.

live just on hope."[564] Torrijos warned Jorden that he feared rioting, and that he was struggling to control the impatience of students and other activists.[565] Panama kept up its frenetic international pace, both to pressure the United States and to give Panamanian leftists something to cheer about. In addition to joining the Non-Aligned Movement, Panama won another term on the Security Council despite having occupied one of two Latin American spots two years prior.[566]

After six months, the longest breakdown since Tack-Kissinger, Ford ordered Bunker to return to Panama in September with the new instructions. Torrijos said that the sooner the ambassador could get to Panama, the better, to counter widespread pessimism.[567] Bunker's return to Contadora could not overcome the divisions on key issues. The U.S. position of seeking at least 40 years for defense, with options of a post-treaty presence and guarantees regarding new canal construction, still had a ring of perpetuity. The failure of the new guidelines had been foretold. In a statement to *La Estrella* newspaper, the frustration was clear, though toned down after Bunker and Jorden's pleas: "The Foreign Ministry feels that there has been very little progress in this stage of the negotiations."[568] The failure of the negotiations, combined with harder-line, public comments from Kissinger, provoked fierce demonstrations and an attack on the U.S. embassy, where the crowd railed not just against the *gringos*, but against Torrijos for

---

[564] Qtd. in Binder, "Panama leader says U.S. politics stall canal talks," *New York Times*, July 28, 1975, pp. 3.

[565] Jorden to Rogers and Bunker, "Talk with Torrijos," July 7, 1975, NARA-AAD, RG 59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=124700&dt=2476&dl=1345

[566] Binder, "The canal is more than a two-nation problem," November 9, 1975, *New York Times*, pp. E3; Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 381-383.

[567] Jorden to Bunker and Rogers, "Message to Torrijos," August 11, 1975, NARA-AAD, RG59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=144714&dt=2476&dl=1345; Jorden to State Department, "Canal treaty negotiations: Local atmosphere," August 14, 1975, NARA-AAD, RG59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=144701&dt=2476&dl=1345

[568] Qtd. in "Foreign ministry communique on negotiators' departure," September 18, 1975, NARA-AAD, RG 59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=165793&dt=2476&dl=1345. Also in Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 389.

talking with them.[569] Torrijos insisted that talks continue—though he was far from starry-eyed about the prospects for an accord. He often stressed the threat from the left, leaving unspoken the implication that any government that replaced him would likely lean much harder to the Soviet bloc. The challenges he faced went beyond the ideological. After solid growth, the Panamanian economy ran into deepening problems. Unemployment was high and the government faced fiscal deficits. A treaty would be a major source of legitimacy for Torrijos, but in the meantime, he sought meaningful steps such as the transfer of land that could be used for economic development, or the inclusion of more Panamanians in the operation of the canal. Even as Torrijos resigned himself that a treaty would not be done before the U.S. elections, he pressed Bunker and Jorden for concessions that would help him buttress his image. However transferring land required Congressional approval, and the Ford administration did not wish to stir the pot.[570]

Bunker returned to Contadora in November, with bleak prospects for progress. Jorden wrote: "[Bunker] knew the hard-line stand he was being asked to push reflected not military reality but domestic politics." In reality, as he saw it, was the danger to the canal was exacerbated, not prevented, by a large and continued troop presence.[571] Retired Lt. General Welborn Dolvin was added to the U.S. team in early November to help with the Pentagon and Congress.[572] Torrijos' inner circle questioned the will of the United States to come to any conclusion and criticized the electorally motivated delays. Bunker immediately dropped the offer on duration to the lowest allowable point: a December 31, 1999 expiration for U.S. operational

---

[569] Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 298-299.

[570] Jorden, Bunker, and Rogers, "Talk with Torrijos," NARA-AAD, RG59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=165774&dt=2476&dl=1345.

[571] Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 307.

[572] Bell to Jorden, "U.S.-Panama treaty negotiations: Unilateral actions," November 3, 1975. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=204496&dt=2476&dl=1345

control and 40 years for defense rights.[573] In mid-December, the Panamanian team flew to Washington, hopeful of improving on Bunker's offer. But the political climate in Washington was cooling. A once-obscure California governor challenged Ford for the Republican presidential nomination. Election season had arrived early, and the negotiations fell apart.[574]A frustrated Omar Torrijos boarded a plane to Havana.

1976: Elections: Anticipation and doubt

Torrijos' trip to meet Fidel Castro, in response to an invitation issued when relations were reestablished, included a large group involved in the negotiations: Ardito Barletta, González Revilla, Escobar Bethancourt, Ahumada, and Illueca. Economic, church, cultural, and military figures went, too, including Colonel Manuel Noriega.[575] Some 200 people joined Torrijos' entourage. Though white-and-red clad crowds hailed Torrijos' arrival, the demonstrations were largely void of anti-U.S. sentiment or references to the Panama Canal. Torrijos had gotten friendly advice from Jorden and U.S. Senator Jacob Javits about moderating his message while in Cuba—advice he evidently took by stressing to reporters that while he admired the social progress, the Cuban system would not work in Panama.[576] Further, as Ahumada related, Castro

[573] Bunker to Kissinger, Clements, and Brown, "Panama negotiations: Status report," November 26, 1975.

[574] In November, a front-page *New York Times* article called Reagan a 2-to-1 favorite to win the Florida primary, while also noting the rise of a "boyish-looking Georgian." In fact, Ford would win the Florida primary, though by a relatively narrow margin. R.W. Apple, Jr., "Reagan is termed Florida favorite," November 17, 1975, *New York Times*, pp. 1.

[575] Jorden, "Panamanian delegation accompanying Torrijos to Cuba," January 8, 1976, NARA-AAD, RG59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=275345&dt=2082&dl=1345.

[576] Binder, "Panama's leader hailed in Havana," January 11, 1976, *New York Times*, pp. 8. See also Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 310-314.

told Torrijos to be patient and to continue negotiating with the United States, and to continue to deter any aggression against the zone during the U.S. campaign.[577]

Whereas 1975 had been characterized by slow, technical progress, 1976 saw little progress at all. In early 1976, the teams had reached conceptual agreements on three of the eight Tack-Kissinger principles. Once hopeful of concluding a treaty in early 1975, Bunker resigned himself to completing the other conceptual agreements in October 1976—as a best case scenario.[578] Panamanians listened anxiously to U.S. politicians' statements that deployed the republic's name as a shibboleth. The campaign brought little courage from Ford, who delayed action for fear of criticism from Congress and candidate Ronald Reagan. In response to Reagan's attacks, Ford took tougher stances on Panama—tougher, in fact, than his own presidential guidelines. "The United States, as long as I am President, will do nothing to give up the control of the operations of the canal and will do nothing to give up the military protection of the canal," Ford told reporters.[579] In the final stretches of the primaries, Ford told a questioner: "[U]nder no circumstances will I ever do away with our right, our authority, our national defense usability of the Panama Canal. … And we will get that kind of canal right and it will be for at least 50 years."[580] The statements put U.S. diplomats and negotiators in an impossible situation. Torrijos discounted a certain amount as campaign rhetoric, but was still upset about the restatement of an old position. The news soured the public mood, and Torrijos' government neared a crisis point. Having bet heavily on the pacts to ensure his popularity, Torrijos struggled to withstand the long

---

[577] Interview with Ahumada. Jorden also makes this point.

[578] Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 519-521.

[579] Ford, "The President's news conference," March 13, 1976, *American Presidency Project*. Online: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=5703.

[580] Ford, Remarks and a question-and-answer session at the Abilene Jaycees bicentennial celebration," April 30, 1976, *American Presidency Project*. Online: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=5918.

freeze. He set 1977 as the new, public target for a treaty, adding, "Patience has its limits."[581] The negotiations went on, and Bunker made several trips to Contadora, but his presence was mostly symbolic. The White House withdrew from the issue.[582]

By June, Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter emerged as the favorite to challenge the eventual nominee of the Watergate-plagued Republican Party. During the primary campaign, Carter's position on the canal had been ambiguous, but his public statements gave little reason to hope for a significantly different policy. In response to a question early in the campaign, Carter said he would not give up control or defense rights for the canal. During a debate with Ford, he later stated: "I would never give up complete control or practical control of the Panama Canal Zone, but I would continue to negotiate with the Panamanians."[583] As his positions solidified into a speech, given in New York in June, he recognized that Panama had retained sovereignty in the 1903 treaty, while the U.S. gained "control as though we had sovereignty." The distinction, perhaps lost on many Americans, certainly was not lost in Panama. In general, though, his stated desire for "open and continued negotiations" resembled Ford's, especially earlier in 1976.[584]

The stalemated negotiations, along with personal rivalries, caught up with Panama's foreign minister, Juan Antonio Tack. Known as a fierce critic of the United States, especially prior to the Tack-Kissinger announcement, Tack was replaced less for reasons of policy than politics. Tack had lost influence to close friends of the general and representatives of leftist student movements—Nicolás González Revilla on the one hand and Rómulo Escobar

---

[581] "Panama's leader calls for new pact on canal by 1977," April 10, 1976, *New York Times*, pp. 9.

[582] Gwertzman, "GOP leaders tell Ford he's harmed as criticism of Kissinger's moves rises," May 7, 1976, *New York Times*, pp. 30.

[583] Carter, debate with Ford, October 6, 1976, in *Public Papers of the President, Gerald Ford*, 1976, pp. 2430.

[584] "Excerpts from Carter's speech and his replies," June 24, 1977, *New York Times*, pp. 22.

Bethancourt on the other. Aquilino Boyd, who spearheaded the international campaign at the United Nations, replaced Tack in the foreign ministry. Boyd never exerted the same level of influence at the negotiating table as had Tack in his hey-day.[585]

With talks frozen, Panama tried a new—and much riskier—tactic. The summer had been characterized by dead-end talks overshadowed by campaign rhetoric. U.S. negotiators received an ominous warning from Escobar Bethancourt that Torrijos had opted for direct actions. In October 1976, several bombs exploded throughout the Canal Zone, the first destroying the car of an anti-treaty Zonian.[586] The United States privately protested that the Panamanian National Guard was behind them. Torrijos, in a letter to Kissinger, vehemently denied it.[587] The authorship of the October bombings was never explicitly claimed,[588] with U.S. officials holding that the Guard, and likely Noriega, was involved, while Panama insisted otherwise. However, similar tactics appear to have been considered within bounds. Torrijos and many of his closest advisors later admitted the National Guard had a plan called *agua potable* to destroy the canal's locks if the treaties failed in the Senate.[589] Though the explosions and resulting spat threatened to derail the Panama-U.S. relationship, the United States largely backed from its assertions of

---

[585] Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 509, 557.

[586] Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 332-335, John Dinges, *Our Man in Panama : How General Noriega Used the United States and Made Millions in Drugs and Arms* (New York: Random House, 1990), pp. 83'86.

[587] Torrijos to Kissinger, Nov. 29, 1976. Folder Negociaciones, no. 529, AMREP, n.p.

[588] In an account of questionable veracity, Noreiga claims that the attacks were led by a CIA-trained team of Panamanian explosive experts. Furthermore, he recalls the plan as having been hatched by the CIA station chief and approved by the Director of Central Intelligence George H.W. Bush.Of course, Noriega penned this account from a jail cell after being arrested in an invasion ordered by then-President Bush. Jorden offers a very different account of this same meeting, arguing that the U.S. was hoping to drop the issue. Manuel Antonio Noriega and Peter Eisner, *America's Prisoner : The Memoirs of Manuel Noriega* (New York: Random House, 1997), pp. 43-48.

[589] This plan is mentioned by Escobar Bethancourt and José de Jesús Martínez. It was also confirmed in interviews. Ardito Barletta, for example, did not know about the plan at the time, but later told Torrijos it was a disastrous idea. The most detailed and credible description is Escobar Bethancourt, *Torrijos : Colonia Americana, No!*

official Panamanian involvement and let the matter drop. Meanwhile, the U.S. presidential campaign came to a close. Panama played a smaller role in the general election than during the Republican primary, but it still frequently came up with voters. Carter rode Southern support and his promise of renewal after the scandal-plagued Nixon years to unseat the unelected incumbent.

1977: Enter Carter

The election of a Democratic president, Jimmy Carter, brought hope to the Panamanian negotiating team, though Carter had spoken cautiously during the campaign. Carter and his team decided before inauguration that they would address the canal negotiations early on. Both Panamanian and U.S. participants credit Carter's political will—especially his decision to address the treaties quickly while his popularity was highest—as crucial to the treaties' eventual ratification. What is sometimes lost, however, is that Carter's team was able to conclude the treaties with several months of hard work because of the significant advances the negotiating team made during the previous years. The fact that the treaties figured so high on the Carter agenda was a testament to a long Panamanian struggle to put them there.

After his election, Carter quickly took interest in the negotiations. In mid-November meetings with Kissinger and Ford, the president-elect asked both men about the talks. Carter "hoped we would settle Panama," Ford told Kissinger. They agreed "it was very doubtful."[590] Panamanian pressure, again helped by friendly Latin American presidents, continued even in the pre-inaugural period. A host of news stories in Panama and the United States noted nervousness in the Panamanian government over Carter's intentions. Days after the election, Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez emphatically stated that the canal was an international concern

[590] Memorandum of conversation: Ford, Kissinger, and Scowcroft, November 23, 1976. FPL, available online.

and called on Carter to move quickly to address the impasse.[591] Pérez used his congratulatory letter to Carter to raise the issue, saying that Carter's responsibility was to "approve the new treaty which will put an end to a situation which identifies a great nation with colonial practices."[592] Foreign Minister Boyd traveled to Washington during the transition to press the outgoing Ford administration and to seek clarity regarding Carter's campaign statements—including in a meeting with Sol Linowitz.[593] Linowitz was a Democratic insider who served as U.S. ambassador to the OAS under Johnson. He had grown even more interested in Panama while chairing a report on Inter-American relations during the campaign. Boyd met with Kissinger on December 3 in a meeting made tense by discussion of the canal bombings. The outgoing secretary said 1977 was propitious for negotiations, that he would encourage Vance to make Panama a priority, and that "he would do all he could to keep the matter from becoming a partisan one in the United States."[594] In late December, Bunker flew once again to Contadora. No one expected the outgoing administration to make major changes, but the visit served as a symbol of continuity and kept the talks in the press.[595]

In the days before inauguration, Carter's intentions on the canal were becoming clearer—and also more favorable to Panama. A president who three years prior was "vaguely aware" of the dispute was now making the negotiations a priority. Carter described his decision as both a

---

[591] Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 569. "Venezuelan: Canal a test for Carter," November 11, 1976, *Washington Post,* pp. A23.

[592] Pérez to Carter, transmitted in Pete Vaky to State Department, "Message of congratulations from President Perez to President-elect Carter," NARA-AAD, RG59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=301725&dt=2082&dl=1345

[593] Binder, "Panama presses for commitment by Carter on canal negotiations," December 3, 1976, *New York Times,* pp. 5.

[594] Bell, "The secretary's bilateral with foreign minister Boyd," December 10, 1976, NARA-AAD, RG59. Online: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=312995&dt=2082&dl=1345.

[595] Oberdorfer, "U.S., Panama explore 21st century canal neutrality," December 25, 1976, *Washington Post*.

matter of justice and as necessary to ensure the canal's safety—using an argument similar to that advanced during years by Panama about the importance of a friendly population.[596] In private meetings, Carter told Congress that getting a new treaty would be among the first foreign policy challenges he addressed. Torrijos noted he had received optimistic signals from the incoming administration.[597] Carter's appointment of Cyrus Vance as secretary of state was seen as a positive sign. The former Kennedy administration official had emphasized late in the campaign that the next president would need to address Panama, and again stressed it after the election.[598] The actions of Panamanian leaders over the preceding years had succeeded in creating a problem for U.S. policymakers, placing it on the agenda of a U.S. president, and advancing new ideas upon which Carter seized in trying to solve the problem.

Once in office, Carter signaled the issue's importance in two ways. The first NSC meeting was on Panama, and his first presidential directive ordered a review of U.S. policy on the canal negotiations. Second, Carter appointed Linowitz as a temporary, special envoy for the negotiations. In addition to his time at the OAS, Linowitz had also chaired the Commission on United States-Latin American Relations. Its first report, published in October 1974, had called the Canal Zone an "anachronism" and recommended the conclusion of a new treaty under the Tack-Kissinger principles.[599] The second report, issued in December 1976 and aimed at the new administration, was more direct, urging "the new President to exercise prompt, vigorous, and

---

[596] Carter, *Keeping Faith : Memoirs of a President*, pp. 154-155.

[597] Juan de Onís, "Panamanian leader hopeful on new canal pact," and Gwertzman, "Carter will pursue early canal pact and Cyprus accord," January 14, 1977, *New York Times*, pp. 1;

[598] Linowitz, *The Making of a Public Man : a Memoir*, pp. 150.

[599] Sol M. Linowitz and Kalman H. Silvert, *The Americas in a Changing World : a Report of the Commission on United States-Latin American Relations* (New York: Quadrangle, 1975), pp. 31-32.

decisive leadership in negotiating an acceptable compromise."[600] Panama was aware of the Commission's work and had sought to influence Panama's place on the commission's agenda.

Panama also was reviewing its position. The foreign ministry was increasingly open to an arrangement in which the United States and Panama guaranteed the neutrality of the canal after the treaty's expiration—without the physical presence of U.S. troops. The arrangement would be enshrined in a "cooperation treaty" that would be renewed periodically.[601] Not everyone in the government was onboard with this compromise. Two weeks after the inauguration, Boyd shuttled to Washington to meet the new secretary and review the main issues in the negotiations. Boyd insisted the treaties expire by 2000. Following the NSC meeting on the subject, Vance said this was a possibility, if the U.S. retained certain defense rights beyond that date. Boyd considered this as a feasible compromise, but the idea had not yet gained Torrijos' approval. This major point between the U.S. and Panama exposed a split within Panama's government, where many insisted on a guarantee by Panama alone or through the United Nations.[602] Boyd was undercut by González Revilla when Panama's embassy stated the next week that Torrijos would support neutrality under a UN framework, but not a U.S. guarantee. Torrijos added, in declarations made live on television, that the foreign minister would no longer be a permanent member of the negotiating team.[603] Boyd, who five years prior had launched the internationalization of Panama's cause at the United Nations, quit in disgust—making the

---

[600] Commission on United States-Latin American Relations, *The United States and Latin America, Next Steps : a Second Report* (New York: Center for Inter-American Relations], 1976), pp. 5-6.

[601] "Alternativas sobre duración y garantias de la neutralidad del canal," n.d.. Folder Negociaciones 1973, no. 529, AMREP, n.p. Though the document is not dated, events mentioned place it in late 1976 or early 1977.

[602] Carter, *Keeping Faith : Memoirs of a President*, pp. 157, Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 573-575.

[603] Embassy of Panama, "Press release," February 9, 1977, AMREP.

announcement on TV without warning Torrijos. In part, the highly visible scuffle represented Rómulo Escobar Bethancourt's machinations to control the negotiations.[604]

The neutrality issue was not yet entirely clear within the U.S. government, either. General Dolvin wrote Robert Pastor, the young NSC advisor for Latin American affairs, to say that the NSC memorandum on the topic "was being interpreted by some … to include a unilateral right by the United States." Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Joint Chiefs Chair George Brown had, Dolvin believed, agreed on more ambiguous phrasing.[605] Juan Antonio Stagg, then serving as Panama's consul in New York, wrote Boyd, summing up a meeting with Pastor:

> Robert Pastor noted that the discussion of the Panama Canal issue in the National Security Council had been animated, and that not everyone was in agreement with [all the details of] the new treaty, though he didn't give details for obvious reasons. Pastor's main worry was related to the guarantees that Panama could offer the United States regarding the Canal's neutrality and safe transit of U.S. ships after the treaty's termination. A multinational accord on neutrality, or one under the auspices of the United Nations, is not considered sufficient, unless the United States obtained certain rights of unilateral action that permit it to defend said neutrality if its interests are affected.[606]

The new administration's preparations for renewed talks intensified with Linowitz's appointment as special representative. In early conversations, Linowitz declined a full-time position, because of personal business and because he refused to displace Bunker, an old friend. But on February 8, 1977, Carter designated Linowitz as "part-time co-negotiator." Though he had met the president only once, he would become Carter's conduit for information on the negotiations.[607]

---

[604] Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 577-578, Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 348-349.

[605] This became known as the Brown-Brown language. Welborn C. Dolvin to Robert Pastor, "Policy Review Committee meeting," January 31, 1977, *Declassified Document Retrieval System (DDRS)*.

[606] Stagg to Boyd, Feb. 6, 1977. Folder Negociacones, no. 531, AMREP, n.p.

[607] Linowitz, *The Making of a Public Man : a Memoir*, pp. 150-152. Jimmy Carter: "Special Representative for the Panama Canal Negotiations Designation of Sol M. Linowitz," February 8, 1977. *American Presidency Project*. Online: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7677.

The first negotiations under the Carter administration began in mid-February, again on Contadora. They started poorly. The Panamanian team was still unsettled by Boyd's departure. He had been replaced by González Revilla, who was well known and liked by many in the U.S. government, but it was unclear what role he would play in his new position. Second, the initial position presented by Bunker and Linowitz did not meet Torrijos' expectations. In particular, the presentation of U.S. defense after the treaty's expiration sounded too much like perpetuity for the general to accept. The two sides were testing one another. Did Torrijos want a treaty or a constant issue to harp on? Was Carter ready to back away the "never" he articulated in the campaign? The meetings began with delays and absences from Panama, which upset the newly appointed, business-minded Linowitz. Once the formal meetings began, the Panamanians launched a fiery denunciation of the U.S. stance. Only right before the U.S. team's departure did they receive encouraging words from Bethancourt, who hoped for a quick resumption of talks.[608] The February breakdown led Linowitz to reconsider the treaty format, and helped produced the final and successful approach. He later wrote:

> The cornerstone of the strategy would be to divide one treaty into two. The first of the two treaties—and we would insist on agreement on this treaty before we would proceed to the second—would deal solely with security questions, the authority of the United States to protect the canal from armed challenge of any kind, in partnership with Panama or, if necessary, unilaterally. We called it the "Neutrality" Treaty, because in form it was proclaimed as a way of protecting universal access to the canal. The second treaty would deal with Panamanian sovereignty in the Canal Zone, money matters, control of the company that operated the canal, the rights and privileges of American citizens working for the canal company (an immensely complicated question, and very emotional for the individuals concerned), and the logistical details of the presence of American forces on Panamanian soil. The two documents had to be separate because key elements of the first

[608] The frustrating round is described in Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 349-356, Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 579-586, Linowitz, *The Making of a Public Man : a Memoir*, pp. 155-158, Escobar Bethancourt, *Torrijos : Colonia Americana, No!* , pp. 23-26.

> would be permanent, while the second would provide a fixed cutoff date, after which the canal operation would belong to Panama.[609]

This two-treaty formula became the centerpiece of the next round of talks. Both sides reported to their leaders. Carter called the update "not very encouraging." While he refused to give way on post-treaty defense rights, he signaled a willingness to meet Panama's position on duration.[610] Carter mentioned the year 2000 to the press, an apparent slip-up after a decision to use the termination date to gain concessions on neutrality.[611] The leverage was diminished.

Given Linowitz's impatience with the laid-back style of Contadora, he pushed for the next meetings to be held in the United States. The sides met at the residence of Panama's ambassador in Washington. An exchange of letters between Carter and Torrijos had improved the disposition of both teams, seeming to convince each that the other truly wanted a treaty. Carter noted their "common interests" and called for a "balanced agreement." He told Torrijos he looked forward to meeting the leader to sign the accords.[612] The March meeting marked the inclusion of Aristides Royo. On many issues, though, the negotiators remained distant. Linowitz spoke of a treaty lasting until 2000, while Escobar Bethancourt now pressed for 1990. When the U.S. team sought to clarify questions of neutrality, Panama pushed for the transfer and lands and facilities like the railroad, the ports of Balboa and Colón, and Ancón Hill. The former university rector laid out these items, saying that "there cannot be a treaty if these don't pass to [Panama's]

---

[609] Linowitz, *The Making of a Public Man : a Memoir*, pp. 153.

[610] Jimmy Carter, *White House Diary* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), pp. 29, Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 386-387.

[611] Brzezinksi, "Weekly national security report #5," March 18, 1977, *DDRS*.

[612] Carter to Torrijos, March 9, 1977, *DDRS*.

direction and ownership."[613] At times, the talks broke down into a discussion about who had been flexible. Escobar Bethancourt invoked Carter's letter, saying the president had "proposed a new spirit for arriving at a treaty. That's the spirit that should be reflected in this meeting."[614]

After a tough morning session, the teams returned to the table. Though Escobar Bethancourt kept up a rigid line, Linowitz's new position on neutrality included significant concessions, including the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Canal Zone unless a new arrangement had been agreed to. His definition of neutrality proposed joint responsibility, without an explicit U.S. unilateral right.[615] Bunker realized that the president he now represented would take risks to see an accord through. Near the end of the meeting, the old statesman said, "We know what you consider essential. Both the canal and the zone are going to be turned over to Panama, much earlier than had been contemplated."[616] In response to a letter signed by eight Latin American presidents, Bunker and Linowitz planned trips to Colombia and Venezuela.[617] Carter stoked hopes for a treaty when he addressed the Organization of American States on April 14, saying: "I am firmly committed to negotiating in as timely a fashion as possible a new treaty which will take into account Panama's legitimate needs as a sovereign nation and our own interests and yours in the efficient operation of a neutral canal, open on a nondiscriminatory basis to all users."[618]

---

[613] The move of the negotiations from Washington also provided an improvement in recordkeeping, with embassy and State personnel on hand. "Informe de la reunión," March 13, 1977, Folder no. 47, AMREP. See especially, pp. 19..

[614] Ibid., pp.23.

[615] "Ibid., pp. 15.

[616] "Ibid., pp. 28.

[617] The visit was mentioned to the Panamanians, who were pleased with the idea, at the end of the March meeting.

[618] Jimmy Carter: "Organization of American States Address Before the Permanent Council.," April 14, 1977. *American Presidency Project*. Online: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7347.

Away from the negotiating table, González Revilla's move from the Panamanian embassy in Washington to the foreign ministry left the position of ambassador to the United States open at a crucial moment. Gabriel Lewis Galindo, Torrijos' choice for ambassador in 1977 could hardly have been more different than his choice in late 1972. Whereas González Revilla entered as a 27-year-old neophyte known for his leftist leanings and reliance on the general, Lewis Galindo was an established businessman from a wealthy family. Despite his upbringing and confessed admiration for the United States, he had supported Torrijos and was close friends with the general. Lewis Galindo could get through to Torrijos quickly, and "He could say 'no' to Torrijos, something that a lot of people could not do.".[619] Lewis Galindo was friends with U.S. Ambassador Jorden, who gave the State Department his enthusiastic recommendation.[620] On May 5, the businessman arrived to Washington, D.C. Along with his wife, Nita, he moved into the diplomatic residence, where he had lived decades before when his father served as his country's representative to the United States.[621]

Lewis Galindo's reception also differed from that accorded to González Revilla, who got the distinct impression when he arrived that the Panama Canal was not a problem anyone in Washington was trying to solve. Lewis Galindo was received the day after his arrival by Warren Christopher, acting secretary in Vance's absence. Christopher told Lewis: "I hope that we will have a new treaty before the first snowfall."[622] The State Department made arrangements for Lewis Galindo to present his credentials to the president as soon as Carter returned to the country. On May 16, Lewis Galindo entered the White House, along with his son Samuel—then

[619] Ricardo Bilonick qtd. in de la Guardia de Corró, *Hasta la Última Gota: Gabriel Lewis Galindo*, pp. 89.

[620] Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 363-364.

[621] de la Guardia de Corró, *Hasta la Última Gota: Gabriel Lewis Galindo*, pp. 87-88.

[622] Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 366.

a Georgetown University student—and his wife, Nita. Though Lewis Galindo had been advised that the meeting would be brief and limited to formalities, as he shook Jimmy Carter's hand in the Oval Office, the ambassador broached the subject of the negotiations.[623] Carter took up the conversation. He asked a staffer to take Lewis Galindo's wife and son on a tour of the White House and called in his national security advisor, recalled son Samuel Lewis. That meeting marked the beginning of a close relationship between Lewis Galindo and the president, and later with members of the president's team such as Hamilton Jordan and Robert Pastor.[624] When the ambassador called Torrijos to relate the meeting with Carter, the two men became so enthused that Torrijos' told Lewis Galindo to fly that afternoon to Torrijos' beach compound. There, he passed along the tone of Carter's message, indicating the president was willing to fight for the treaties early in his presidency when he had strong political capital. Lewis Galindo wasted no time, flying again to Washington, where made an early morning "urgent" meeting with Brzezinski. The message from the general was, in fact, quite similar to previous messages. But the urgency and the access signaled a change in the relationship.[625] Lewis Galindo would have a significant impact on the negotiations, though perhaps his greatest contributions would come during the ratification battle.

Days after Lewis Galindo's arrival, the negotiations resumed. Rather than returning to Contadora, Linowitz pushed for the meetings to be held in Washington, where he thought the teams would be more productive.[626] As the sessions opened, the same problems that dominated

---

[623] de la Guardia de Corró, *Hasta la Última Gota: Gabriel Lewis Galindo*, pp. 90-91.

[624] Samuel Lewis Navarro would go on to become Panama's vice-president, running-mate of Omar Torrijos' son, Martín. Interview with Samuel Lewis Navarro, September 15, 2011, Panama City, Panama. Translation from Spanish by author.

[625] de la Guardia de Corró, *Hasta la Última Gota: Gabriel Lewis Galindo*, pp. 92-93.

[626] Linowitz, *The Making of a Public Man : a Memoir*, pp. 160.

the March meeting rose to the surface. The United States announced on the first day, May 9, that it would accept December 31, 1999 as the conclusion of the U.S. operation and defense arrangement, and that it would not include a long-term military presence in Panama in the treaty. While the U.S. saw this as a major change, it had largely been assumed by Panama since Carter mentioned the year 2000 to the press. Panama was pleased with the date, and for the most part, Escobar Bethancourt stopped pushing to revise it to 1990 or 1995.[627]

Panama continued to insist on resolving several questions of high-profile lands that they wanted returned, like Ancón Hill, which towers above Panama City. Escobar Bethancourt wanted these solved before addressing what the U.S. considered "big" issues. "[C]onsidering reality, that is the reality of a small country negotiating with a great power, we sincerely believe that to begin our discussion on lands and waters allows us to give our government some information on the scope of the solution being worked toward and would allow us to use it as a gauge for the solution of other problems," he said.[628] That is, Ancón Hill was not just symbolic of Panamanian self-determination, but the treatment of the hill was a litmus test for how the United States would treat Panama on a range of topics. To the Panamanian team, that was the "big" issue, but it took some time for the U.S. to grasp why Panama continued to return to it. Instead they repeatedly said, to the great frustration of the Panamanian team, that they were not yet prepared to discuss the matter, which had to be dealt with by higher authorities.

The solution of Ancón is emblematic of how many questions, after years of divergence, were finally solved. Panama insisted on the return of the whole hill, while the U.S. needed parts to operate communications and other facilities. The two sides were talking past one another. If

---

[627] Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 597-599.

[628] "Memorandum of conversation: second general meeting of the negotiators, May 1977," transcript, May 10, 1977. Folder negociaciones, May 1977, no. 178, AMREP, 1-13.

the United States would give Panama the whole hill, Panama would "give you all the necessary facilities for the operation and defense of the Canal." As Royo told Linowitz and Bunker, "our aspiration and your interests are wed happily." Escobar Bethancourt explained that jurisdiction over all of Ancón was a matter of pride for the Panamanian people—something not affected by having U.S. experts work there for some years.[629] All the Panamanians coincided in this—give us the territory and we will let you use necessary lands to run the Panama Canal during the treaty period. The U.S. had failed to realize that what it saw as a marginal issue mattered deeply to Panama.[630] In fact, during the May 10 meeting that focused on the hill, the Pentagon's representative had to admit that he did not know, after months of talks, what Ancón Hill was.[631]

In response to misunderstandings regarding Linowitz's two-treaty proposal, Ambassadors Lewis Galindo and Jorden began meeting in the Panamanian's living room to assess the day's negotiations, helping work through issues that threatened to derail the May round. The Panamanian told Jorden that Torrijos was about to recall his team. In response, Bunker and Linowitz announced, to the great joy of Royo and Escobar Bethancourt, that the United States would accept Panama's spirit of cooperation and return Ancón, along with the railway and the country's principle ports, to Panamanian jurisdiction as soon as the treaty entered into force, with select facilities open to U.S. operators. When the Panamanian team left for consultations they were happy with the U.S. position on particular lands, but worried about neutrality. However, Torrijos proposed an approach that meshed with the U.S. position. Royo reminded the U.S. team that any declaration of neutrality would limit sovereignty and face tough criticism. Panamanians

[629] Ibid., pp. 2-5.

[630] Jorden gives an explanation of this "a-ha!" moment, with an emphasis on his role in it. Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 372-381.

[631] This was General Dolvin. "Memorandum of conversation: second general meeting of the negotiators, May 1977," transcript, May 10, 1977, pp. 8.

feared that a U.S.-affiliated canal could make Panama a target in the event of a superpower war. Royo proposed the following language: "The Republic of Panama and the United States are in agreement to maintain the neutrality regime established in this treaty."[632] With this understanding, the two sides were able to work toward an agreement that served as the basis on the neutrality treaty. Carter wrote: "By May 18, after much argument, the Panamanians agreed to the neutrality issue, with the understanding that our right of defense applied to external threats only, and that Panama would protect the Canal from danger from within."[633]

With neutrality solved in principle, several items remained: the new canal authority, on which there was substantive agreement; lands and waters, on which there had been much progress but with details remaining; and financial compensation, which had been postponed since 1975 by Omar Torrijos' personal decision. Torrijos was concerned that if compensation were made an early issue, the United States would try to buy its way to the agreement it wanted on other matters.[634] The two sides had exchanged papers on the economics of the canal in early 1975, but since that point, the issue had been off the table. Canal administration was sensitive to the Zonians, but also to Panama, serving as a reminder of a history of discrimination. Under the concept that Panama's practical control should grow gradually instead of being gained suddenly, a Panamanian citizen would become the subdirector of the canal authority from the treaty's initiation until 1989. Over the next ten years, a Panamanian would direct the canal, with a U.S. citizen serving as his subdirector. Similar arrangements would take place throughout canal

---

[632] "Acta de la reunión celebrada," transcript, May 18, 1977, Folder negociaciones May 1977, no. 127, AMREP, pp. 4-6.

[633] Carter, *Keeping Faith : Memoirs of a President*, pp. 157. See also, Linowitz, *The Making of a Public Man : a Memoir*, pp. 163.

[634] Interviews with Ardito Barletta, Ahumada, Royo, and González Revilla. Also, Escobar Bethancourt, *Torrijos : Colonia Americana, No!* , pp. 257.

operations, with Panamanians assuming jobs once reserved for U.S. citizens. The formula had been proposed by the Panamanian delegations, and Royo was satisfied to take the U.S. version back to Torrijos.[635] Meetings on May 24-26 were amicable as the two sides cooperated to work through language and regulations for questions like commercial activities in the Zone, the make-up of the canal's board of directors, and the canal authority's political independence.

The calm did not last. On May 29, Escobar Bethancourt met Linowitz for a Sunday lunch in Washington's Mayflower Hotel. He dropped a bomb: As payment for seven decades of nearly free use of Panama's land and waters, the chief Panamanian negotiator presented his counterpart with a demand for over $1 billion as an up-front, lump-sum payment. Panama calculated that the United States actually owed Panama more than $6 billion, but in the spirit of cooperation and out of respect for President Carter, they lowered the total. Panama also wanted a massively increased annuity payment of $300 million per year. The negotiations returned to crisis mode.[636] Escobar Bethancourt detailed all the different items for which they should be compensated—use of their geographical resource, land for military bases, the exclusion of Panamanian businesses from Zone commerce. Linowitz did not try to disagree with Panama's case. Instead he insisted that a treaty in which the United States paid Panama to take the canal would not stand a chance. Carter later wrote: "[T}he Panamanians dealt the negotiations an almost fatal blow. They demanded enormous payoffs from the United States—more than $1 billion in a lump sum and $300 million

[635] "Negociaciones del tratado del Canal de Panama," transcript, 3:07 p.m., May 23, 1977, Folder negociaciones May 1977, no. 127, AMREP, pp. 1-42.

[636]Accounts of the lunch and Escobar's proposal largely coincide. However, explanations of the origin of the proposal diverge. Jorden describes the demand as the product of a booze-fueled, late-night bull session. Jaén, as well as Panamanian interviewees, describe it as the result of more careful planning. Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 602-603, Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 392-395, Linowitz, *The Making of a Public Man : a Memoir*, pp. 164-167, Escobar Bethancourt, *Torrijos : Colonia Americana, No!* , pp. 278-279.

annually until the year 2000. This was a ridiculous request, which we never seriously considered, but it was great news to the treaty's opponents."[637]

The request should be seen in the context of the Panamanian economy, which continued to struggle. Since 1973, economic growth had been slowing progressively. Ardito Barletta says that worldwide stagflation, poorly considered social legislation in Panama, and the uncertainty over the canal generated the economic malaise. Furthermore, Torrijos' decision to exile a group of businessmen hurt confidence, leading to reduced investment. The country's foreign debt was getting less manageable.[638] Panama and Torrijos insisted on massive compensation, in part as economic stimulation. For the Senate and U.S. public, the concept would be a deal breaker. Furthermore, Carter never considered it. The United States would be turning over an asset of incredible value. Why pay for the privilege? Bunker and Linowitz accepted a main point: over the life of the canal, Panama had been drastically undercompensated. Both agreed—indeed the United States had assumed during years of talks—that Panama should derive greater benefits from canal tolls. This point had been uncontested in 1975, and broadly accepted even in the Nixon administration's 1971 policy review. On previous issues, Panama had been willing to risk the whole premise of the treaty talks to call the U.S. bluff that it could go no further in its "two-level game." Now, with a largely acceptable draft of the treaty being prepared, Panama had more to risk. Would Panama once again try to face down the United States?

At first, it appeared so. The lump-sum question hung over the negotiations. On June 3, Torrijos gathered the Panamanian Council of State to discuss the talks.[639] When the negotiators

---

[637] Carter, *Keeping Faith : Memoirs of a President*, pp. 158.

[638] Interview by author with Ardito Barletta, September 21, 2011.

[639] Frustratingly, little documentation exists explaining this period inside the Panamanian government.

returned to Washington, the stalemate continued. Two members of the Panamanian team, both close to Torrijos, had come to believe that the compensation demand would kill the treaty. The first was Lewis Galindo. The second was the leading economic advisor, Ardito Barletta, who started working on another economic proposal with U.S. negotiators, arguing that a more economically secure Panamanian population would be the best protection for the canal—extending Panama's security argument into the economic sphere.[640] In mid-June, the United States responded with an offer that combined a toll increase with substantial loans from the Export-Import Bank and the U.S. Agency for International Development. It included about $200 million generated from the interest on funds that had been paid to the Treasury Department for the original cost of construction. The sides haggled over tolls; eventually Ardito Barletta settled on 32 cents per canal ton, but added that the U.S. military should compensate Panama for the use of its land during the new treaty. Even so, Torrijos insisted on lump-sum payment. The month of June had faded with no agreement. July threatened to go the same way. Sol Linowitz's six-month appointment, and the clout he had brought to negotiations, was set to expire.

The United States turned to the same Latin American leaders who had so effectively pressed Panama's case in the past—reversing Torrijos' internationalization strategy. At the end of June, Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez made a two-day visit to Washington, meeting with Carter and both teams of negotiators.[641] Pérez and López Michelsen "thought [the demand] was a serious mistake on Torrijos' part. Their stand was decisive in finally persuading the Panamanians to revise their thinking."[642] Initially, the Panamanians were not persuaded. At

[640] Interview by author with Ardito Barletta.

[641] "Venezuelan leader praises Carter's foreign policy," *Los Angeles Times*, June 29, 1977, pp. 2.

[642] Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 415.

the beginning of July, the negotiators flew to Panama for further consultations with Torrijos. "As the weeks passed, it seemed the negotiations had reached a stalemate," Carter wrote.[643] Carter and Torrijos tried to break the deadlock in different ways. Torrijos prepared to meet with Latin American president in Bogota in early August, while Carter gathered the negotiators in the Oval Office on July 29 to seek an end to the dispute. Carter stressed to Escobar Bethancourt, Lewis Galindo, and Royo[644] that the economic payment they sought was impossible. They convinced Carter that only direct communication to Torrijos, who held Carter in high esteem, could succeed in getting the general to back away from what he saw as a just demand. Carter recalled in his memoirs: "I personally wrote a letter to Torrijos for the Panamanian negotiators to deliver, stating in effect that we were making our last offer, and that it was 'generous, fair, and appropriate.'"[645] Carter's letter highlighted the "major concessions" the U.S. had made on land-use and insisted he had given as much as he could.[646] Administration officials told the *New York Times* that a treaty would be quickly concluded if Panama "would scale down to reasonable levels" its financial demands.[647] Carter's letter was a crucial element in convincing Torrijos to scale back his demand. While Escobar Bethancourt continued pressing for billions, Ardito Barletta had hashed out an agreement that included a compromise on tolls, a package of loans, U.S. investment for public housing, and some cash.

---

[643] Carter, *Keeping Faith : Memoirs of a President*, pp. 158.

[644] The meeting participants are listed, with unfortunate mistakes and misspellings for the Panamanians, in Carter: "Digest of Other White House Announcements Week Ending Friday," July 29, 1977. *American Presidency Project*. Online: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7894.

[645] Carter, *Keeping Faith : Memoirs of a President*, pp. 158.

[646] The text of the letter was printed in Graham Hovey, "Carter draws the line in talks on canal," *New York Times*, pp. 9.

[647] Hovey, "President exhorts chief negotiators on a Panama treaty," July 30, 1977, *New York Times*, pp. 1.

President Carter inadvertently dropped another unresolved issue into the negotiations. Based on meetings with Alaska Senator Mike Gravel, who was eager to ship his state's oil riches, Carter mentioned that the United States should have an option to build a sea-level canal.[648] The idea had a long history. During the 1960s, the U.S. government studied the idea of excavating with nuclear explosions, but deemed the idea risky, unsound, and expensive. The idea of the sea-level canal, prominent in talks on the 1967 treaty, had not been a factor a decade later until the president's comments. To those who had studied the issue, creating a sea-level canal was not considered a serious possibility. However, the president's public mention of it meant that suddenly it would have to be addressed, and Panama was not willing to countenance the possibility that the treaty would grant new or extended rights to United States.

During the first week of August, Bogota hosted an ad hoc summit of regional leaders—all nominally democrats, excepting Torrijos. If Torrijos sought unfettered support from his fellow leaders, instead he heard cautious advice. After presentations from Escobar Bethancourt and Ardito Barletta, the leaders urged Panama to finalize negotiations. Torrijos decided to press for a conclusion to the treaty talks—that very day—so that the leaders could announce the success together. The chief negotiators and ambassadors of both countries gathered at the embassy, where they talked for hours while getting input from the group in Bogota—including Pérez, Oduber, López Michelsen, President José López Portillo of Mexico, and Prime Minister Michael Manley of Jamaica.[649] Finally, Torrijos accepted Barletta's curtailed economic proposal. Yesterday's issue was solved, but the sea-level canal question still loomed. Carter was willing to

---

[648] Carter: "Yazoo City, Mississippi Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at a Public Meeting.," July 21, 1977. *American Presidency Project*. Online: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7854.

[649] Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 5-15, 425-426, Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, 618-619.

back away from his off-the-cuff comments about the U.S. having a right to build a new canal and accept that the United States and Panama should agree. The White House was worried about the possibility that another country—perhaps the Soviet Union—could build a new canal. Torrijos reacted harshly to a perceived impingement on his country's sovereignty. It was unacceptable for the United States to retain an unrestricted right to build a canal elsewhere in the Americas over Panama's objections if Panama could not build a canal with a partner of its choosing. The two presidents worked the issue out, with Torrijos calling from Bogota while Carter sent telegrams from Plains, Ga., both agreeing to open-ended treaty language.

Even with the major issues laid to rest, much work remained in drafting the treaties. The U.S. team headed to Panama City with an impending deadline. Sol Linowitz's appointment would expire on August 10. The final days were tense, with Panama presenting especially tough language, testing the U.S. to get any final advantage, and then retreating to previous agreements. In the late afternoon of Linowitz's final day the two sides stepped out of the Holiday Inn where they had been working. Standing in front of a throng of reporters, Linowitz, Bunker, Escobar Bethancourt, and Royo announced that the "basic elements" of the treaties were ready.[650] After dealing with three presidents over seven years of negotiations, General Omar Torrijos had gotten much of what he started out seeking. However, without approval in the U.S. Senate and in a plebiscite in Panama, the draft treaty would mean nothing. While the very basis of the treaty was opposed by a significant group in the United States, some Panamanian groups also protested the announcement of the treaty, angry over the U.S. military presence until 2000, the residual defense rights, and the relatively modest payment.[651]

---

[650] Hovey, "U.S. and Panama reach accord to transfer canal by 2000," August 11, 1977, *New York Times*, pp. 1; Linowitz, *The Making of a Public Man : a Memoir*, pp. 173-175.

[651] "Leftists and nationalist say Panama has made too many concessions," August 11, 1977, *New York Times.*

Torrijos and Carter both strategized to gain the greatest effect from the conclusion of the treaty. They arrived at a similar idea. Latin Americans leaders had played crucial roles at many stages of the process, from their support of the UNSC meeting through the hectic telephone negotiations of August 5-6. Both men wanted to send a message that the canal treaties were not just a bilateral issue, but a hemispheric concern. Immediately after the August 10 agreement, Bunker and Linowitz went to meet Torrijos—the first time Linowitz had done so. Torrijos proposed "to invite all the Presidents of the Latin American nations to come to Panama as witnesses to the signing," a wish Lewis Galindo had already conveyed to Carter. Though he wanted to have an impressive ceremony in Panama, Torrijos sensed it could become a political punching bag for U.S. treaty opponents.[652] Carter decided to invite leaders to Washington for a signing ceremony to try to recapture momentum from treaty opponents. However the idea of a hemispheric meeting appears to have originated in Panama. The meeting was planned in Washington as a concession to Carter, but with the ceremony at the OAS, a neutral setting that allowed Torrijos to recognize the support he had enjoyed.[653] To attract the strongest attendance possible, Carter offered private meetings to any head of state who attended. Eighteen presidents and prime ministers, from Canada to Chile, accepted.[654] Preparing for so many meetings, which ranged from twenty minutes to an hour, represented a major commitment for Carter.[655]

---

[652] Linowitz, *The Making of a Public Man : a Memoir*, pp. 175.

[653] Jordan to Carter, "Panama Canal announcement checklist," August 5, 1977, available via *DDRS*. See also, *de la Guardia de Corró, Hasta la Última Gota: Gabriel Lewis Galindo, pp. 104.*

[654] Consultations with the governments had been ongoing throughout mid-August. The invitations from Carter to all thirty-three heads of state, excepting Fidel Castro, in the Western Hemisphere are available through *DDRS*.

[655] Peter Tarnoff to Brzezinski, "Proposed schedule for President Carter's bilateral meetings," August 31, 1977, *DDRS*.

Even before the final agreements, the Carter administration and the Panamanian government had been planning for a difficult fight on Capitol Hill. Carter tried to gain Republican support, talking with Ford and Kissinger on August 9. The president telegrammed every senator to ask them to wait until seeing the treaties before passing public judgment.[656] Panama contributed in three main respects. First, Panama engaged in direct lobbying. Lewis Galindo was a frequent and effective presence in Congress, meeting with nearly dozens of senators. At times he was accompanied by others such as Ardito Barletta, who estimated that he met with about fifty U.S. senators both in Washington and Panama. Lewis Galindo had almost daily contact with the Carter administration, often with the president himself, garnering high praise from Carter.[657] Secondly, Panama employed the support of other countries. In the past, backing from Latin America, the non-aligned world, and other developing countries forced the U.S. to pay attention or put pressure on U.S. positions. Panama now turned to the industrialized world's connections in Congress. As hearings took place in the Senate, Torrijos went on a tour of Europe and the Mediterranean, where he met with the British Prime Minister James Callaghan and the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, among others.[658] In a letter to Torrijos on November 2, Carter noted: "The statement by Prime Minister Begin that he will ask Senators who are friendly to Israel to vote favorably on the Canal treaties is an important one."[659] The motivation for those countries was less to help Panama than to lend a hand to a Carter

---

[656] Jordan to Carter, "Panama Canal announcement checklist," August 5, 1977; Carter, *White House Diary*, pp. 80.

[657] After ratification, Carter wrote to Lewis Galindo: "I doubt if there has been an Ambassador in the history of our country who has accomplished more for peace and the mutual interests of the United States and his own country than you have on behalf of the people of Panama during your brief service here in Washington."Carter to Lewis Galindo, June 5, 1978. On display in the Fundación Gabriel Lewis Galindo, Panama City, Panama.

[658] Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 662-663.

[659] Carter to Torrijos, November 2, 1977, available through *DDRS*.

administration priority. Prior to Carter's announcement of agreement, European countries kept their distance from Torrijos, said foreign minister González Revilla. After it, Europeans began calling Panama to offer help.[660] Thirdly, Panama hosted numerous Congressional delegations, dedicating time and resources to making its case. Most of these delegations met with Torrijos, who at times patiently weathered insults. Many senators expressed concerns about democracy and human rights. Though Panama did engage with the U.S. Congress, Torrijos was frustrated with the continuing emphasis on it. He did not appear to fully grasp the extent of the separation of powers, nor the very real limitation on Carter's ability to pressure individual senators. The time spent in the U.S. capital did convince Ambassador Lewis Galindo and even the more skeptical negotiator Escobar Bethancourt that the threat the U.S. Senate would scuttle the treaties was far greater than that of a Panamanian plebiscite.[661]

Torrijos convinced many skeptics, in and out of Congress. One such skeptic was John Wayne, an actor who encapsulated conservative American pride. After meeting Torrijos, the general and "the Duke" became friends. During the ratification debate, Wayne wrote senators and treaty opponents—including the most visible opponent of all, Ronald Reagan. The Duke told his erstwhile Hollywood friend he would "show [Reagan] point by God damn point in the Treaty where you are misinforming people … you are not as thorough in your reading of this Treaty as you say or are pretty damned obtuse when it comes to reading the English language."[662]

---

[660] Interview with González Revilla.

[661] Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 663-666, Linowitz, *The Making of a Public Man : a Memoir*, pp. 192-195, de la Guardia de Corró, *Hasta la Última Gota: Gabriel Lewis Galindo*, 207-213, Carter, *Keeping Faith : Memoirs of a President*, pp. 163-164, Pastor, *Exiting the Whirlpool*, 7-10.

[662] John Wayne to Ronald Reagan, Nov. 11, 1977. Folder Negociacones de los tratados Torrijos-Carter, no. 191, AMREP, ff. 26.

While Torrijos dedicated much of his time, somewhat reluctantly, to pleasing U.S. Senate delegations, his government mobilized a campaign across Panama to support the treaties in the referendum, scheduled for October 23, 1977. Jaén Suárez wrote: "The regime's entire public relations and propaganda apparatus was placed at the service of Torrijos-Carter treaties in a giant national campaign that also opened space to those who opposed the pact."[663] The campaign began with an assembly of local representatives, where negotiators explained the treaties to town-level officials from across the country. To promote the treaties, Torrijos opened an "Office for the Publicity of the New Treaty." This agency printed and distributed tens of thousands of copies of the Torrijos-Carter pact in advance of the referendum. It also hosted speeches that explained the advantages of the new arrangement and tried to undermine criticisms.[664] On October 23, about 800,000 Panamanians headed to the polls, with 506,805 of them, more than 67 percent, voting to approve the new treaties.[665] The only province to vote against the treaties was San Blas, home to the autonomous Kuna tribe, which has historically seen the United States as an important protector against encroachments of the Panamanian central government. The Panamanian people gave the treaties their stamp of approval less than two months after the two leaders had signed them at the OAS. The Senate would take considerably longer to do so. Its leaders refused to rush the treaty ratification, and long hearings dragged through the final months of 1977 and into 1978.

Panama's ability to influence was more limited in the Senate battle than it had been in the long struggle with the U.S. executive branch. Nowhere was this clearer than in the battle over the

---

[663] Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 660.

[664] Lucho Bejarno, Oficina de Divulgación del Nuevo Tratado, "El concepto de perpetuidad y el tratado Torrijos-Carter," Sept. 22, 1977. Folder Negociacones de 1977, no. 119, AMREP, n.p.

[665] For full results at a province level, see Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, pp. 671.

DeConcini resolution. The Carter administration, with help from Panama, had managed to round up about 60 votes by early March 1978, when Arizona Senator Dennis DeConcini added a reservation that gave the United States the right to renegotiate a military presence after 2000. More offensive to Panama, the amendment said the United States retained the right to intervene in Panama to protect the canal—violating the spirit of the Neutrality Treaty. Without this, DeConcini warned Carter, he would lose his support and that of a crucial handful of other senators. The amendment infuriated Torrijos. It violated the spirit of equality and partnership he viewed as essential. The general threatened to publicly renounce the agreements if they included the amendment. Furthermore, Torrijos and Noriega had planned a covert operation to sabotage the canal if the treaty was rejected. He considered enacting the destructive plot as a response to the amendment's passage. Carter, Lewis Galindo, and former Linowitz aide Ambler Moss convinced Torrijos to interpret the amendment in a manner less offensive to Panamanian sovereignty. On March 16, the Senate passed the amended Neutrality Treaty with sixty-eight votes. The ratification was the longest and closest treaty fight in U.S. history. In the following weeks, the Carter administration appealed to the secretary general of the OAS, the president of Venezuela, and Panamanian intermediaries to try to calm the furious Torrijos. Had Panama lost a war?, the general mused, adding: "The U.S. didn't ask this much of Japan after the Second World War." The statement of interventionism sounded alarms across Latin America, harkening back to the days of the canal's creation, but Carter promised and succeeded in neutralizing the language in the second treaty. Along with the vote of the second treaty, the Senate approved an amendment that neutralized the interventionist sting of DeConcini's reservation. Carter continued intense personal appeals in the Senate—including offers to fund a number of large pet projects—to win over wavering votes. The general backed down, essentially choosing to ignore

DeConcini's conditions. On April 18, the Senate approved the Panama Canal Treaty by the same margin, with sixty-eight votes in favor.[666]

Case conclusions

One of Latin America's smallest countries had attained its goal, gaining territorial integrity, control of the canal, and enhanced economic benefits. In exchange, it would have to wait for many of its goals, as control of the canal was handed over and the U.S. military presence was reduced gradually until 1999, which Torrijos referred to as walking "for twenty-three years with a pebble in our shoes [as] the price we have to pay for getting the dagger out of our heart."[667] The process was not quick or easy; Panamanian leaders were able to sway U.S. policy only through years of determination, spanning three U.S. presidencies. Eventually Panamanians achieved their fundamental goal through peaceful means. The process was variously marked by cooperation, conflict, and compromise. Panama challenged the United States carefully, searching for and creating opportunities to change the agenda, assembling friends through international institutions and diplomacy, and advancing new understandings about how to justly solve the problem while enhancing the canal's security. In conclusion, I return to the guiding questions for the dissertation.

First, what has been the predominant interpretation of the case in the literature? While there has been much written on the Panama Canal, most of the histories do not deal with the negotiations in depth; meanwhile works on the negotiations, written mostly by political

---

[666] The above summary is based on Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979*, 678-724, David N. Farnsworth and James W. McKenney, *U.S.-Panama Relations, 1903-1978 : a Study in Linkage Politics* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 189-224, Carter, *Keeping Faith : Memoirs of a President*, pp. 164-178, Furlong and Scranton, *The Dynamics of Foreign Policymaking : The President, the Congress, and the Panama Canal Treaties*, ch. 5, Pastor, *Exiting the Whirlpool*, chs. 3, 7.

[667] Qtd. in Pastor, *Exiting the Whirlpool*, pp. 6.

scientists, has looked at the case as an example of different phenomena in the U.S. policymaking process or in a two-level game, as noted on page 146. Panamanian actions were mostly incidental to these accounts, which make limited or no use of Panamanian sources. The exception is Jorden's memoir, for which he interviewed many key Panamanian actors, but which is still centered on his own experiences and stresses his own contribution.

Who are the most important actors in Latin America and the United States? How did each government define its interests, goals, and strategies? In Panama, Omar Torrijos was the ultimate locus of authority. His frequent speeches about the canal, his charismatic appeals to Panamanian nationalism, and his personal diplomacy put him at the center of the issue. He was the main enunciator and driver of Panama's goals and strategies. However, he was not a daily participant in the negotiations with the United States, preferring to maintain distance and independence. Torrijos derived his control from his nearly unquestioned authority over the National Guard's officer corps, which strongly supported a nationalist position on the Canal Zone. Through patronage and intimidation, Torrijos was largely able to undermine economic elites who had, in the past, argued for more conciliatory policies, including maintaining a U.S. military presence. The foreign ministry was a key player on a daily level. In the early stages of the case, Juan Antonio Tack was the most important daily interlocutor; later his influence was matched by Aquilino Boyd and Nicolas González Revilla. The men, but particularly González Revilla, relied on Torrijos for their authority. Beyond them, Panama's leftist student movement was an important influence on Torrijos, while the threat of unrest they represented was a reminder to the United States of the disastrous Flag Riots.

Torrijos defined his interests and goals in nationalistic terms. His goal was to complete Panamanian nationhood by removing what he saw as a colonial presence from the heart of the

country. For that reason, Panama's main goal was the end of the Canal Zone as an area of separate, U.S. authority. Second, Torrijos wanted to gain control of canal operations, reduce the U.S. military presence, and increase the economic benefits derived from the canal. If at all possible, Torrijos wanted to achieve these goals without bloodshed.

A number of other Latin American leaders played significant roles alongside Torrijos. In particular, democratically elected leaders including Carlos Andrés Pérez, Alfonso López Michelsen, and Daniel Oduber amplified Panama's positions in their meetings with U.S. officials and in multilateral forums. Though the archival research for this chapter did not delve into their motivations for supporting Torrijos, it appears they had several reasons for doing so. They did not seek special accommodations on using the canal, nor could Panama offer material benefits. The most central reason was to press the United States for a new approach to Latin America more generally, emphasizing human rights, democracy, and justice. The canal was a symbol of that. Though Torrijos was not a democrat, he was perceived as being a moderate progressive.

In the United States, the canal had broad bureaucratic and public resonance. Between 1970 and 1973, the Pentagon largely set U.S. policy. One effect of Panama's successful UNSC gambit was to create a bureaucratic conflict in the United States by giving the State Department a reason to solve the issue. Despite the initiatives of Henry Kissinger, neither Nixon nor Ford resolved the bureaucratic conflict. Panama's own actions, prioritizing the negotiation of a Status of Forces Agreement in 1975, helped assuage Pentagon concerns. However, it was not until Jimmy Carter's inauguration that the U.S. president became a player of importance to rival Torrijos. The U.S. Congress acted a constraint on the executive branch. Anti-treaty members' protestations ensured that Nixon would not make serious progress on the canal, and both Congress and primary elections kept Ford from taking a bolder path. During the final

negotiations under Carter, there was some reflection of Congressional concerns, though these had less to do with specific provisions that with whether the overall agreement might pass.

The U.S. definition of its interests in the canal shifted over the course of the case—while Panama's did not change significantly—because of the heterogeneous actors involved. The Defense Department preferred throughout to maintain its presence in the Canal Zone, which included the headquarters for Southern Command; air, land, sea, and submarine bases; communications stations; and training camps. Transit through the canal had declined in strategic importance since the Second World War, but remained a concern, especially for the Army. Defense's priorities weighed heavily on the U.S. position throughout the case. In 1971, the State Department did not have tightly held preferences about the canal, though it was in charge of the negotiations. It sought to limit conflict, mostly through minor concessions and the promise of more negotiations. However, the embarrassment caused by the UNSC meetings in March 1973 made the reduction of conflict a more salient focus, less for bilateral reasons than because the canal had taken on symbolic meaning beyond U.S.-Panama relations and gave the Soviets and Chinese a point on which they could criticize the United States. This latter concern seemed to be most pressing for Henry Kissinger. Nixon's and Ford's interests were largely limited to mediating this interagency dispute. President Carter also saw the canal in symbolic terms, but he hoped to make it a symbol of fairness and justice in the conduct of U.S. foreign relations. Lastly, there was a broad interest across the government in maintaining stability, though this was understood differently by different actors at different points in the case.

How was the definition of Panama's interests, goals, and strategies affected by the perception of the United States or by U.S. policy? How were these goals affected by domestic political factors? Panama's interests and goals grew out of a close and complicated history with

the United States, in which Panama experienced U.S. power as few foreign nations had. As noted on page 148, Panama's very existence owed in part to the United States. Torrijos' principle goals were not determined by the United States so much as formed in opposition to it. In large part because of this history, Torrijos was skeptical the United States would accept a real change or allow Panama greater independence. As such, Torrijos' approach consisted of testing the limits while believing that the United States would act to remove him if he went too far—a sentiment reflected in this chapter's epigraph. U.S. policy in the early 1970s refused to recognize even the concessions made in the 1967 treaty, which led Panamanians to alter their strategies from exclusively bilateral negotiations to internationalize the issue wherever possible—the UNSC, the OAS, the Non-Aligned Movement, and in a host of bilateral relationships. This strategy grew out of Panamanians' perceptions that the United States was not paying attention at a high level and that its leaders were not yet prepared to change policies.

How was Panama's ability to affect the outcome shaped by the issue area? The Panama Canal crossed issue areas, and Panama sought both to steer the discussion of the canal to issue areas where it had more leverage and to offer new interpretations of other issue areas. Panamanians preferred to discuss the canal as an issue of sovereignty and colonialism. In these issue areas, Panama had a strong case. Previous treaties had recognized that Panama retained sovereignty. The issue of sovereignty also put the canal in historical terms, where it was clear that the United States had gained rights to build and operate the canal in unfair circumstances. For Panama, this last point was connected to colonialism, which put the United States on the defensive while helping Panama make common cause with other parts of the Global South where the United States was competing for influence. For Panamanians, these were fundamental. The United States was more likely to stress security and economics in terms of the uninterrupted

functioning of the canal. In these issues, the United States could argue that its immense resources made it best able to protect the canal from attack and that the Zonians had experience running operations. Panamanians sought to re-define these issues to argue that Panamanians shared the risk of any external attack, while a small, internal attack was more likely. Even a small bomb could seriously disrupt operations. The argument made by Panamanian negotiators that the best way to protect the canal was to have a protective population that enjoyed its benefits convinced many in the United States and was cited by Bunker, Kissinger, and Carter. Panamanians had little ability to affect the outcome on another economic issue, regarding their demand for billions in compensation for benefits the United States had derived from past use of the canal. On that point, the United States could simply refuse; Panama's demands for a lump-sum payment carried little of the eloquence of its appeals to sovereignty or justice.

How were U.S. interests, goals, and strategies affected by domestic political factors, Panamanian policy, or the asymmetry of power? Perhaps the most direct effect of asymmetry is seen not in U.S. actions, but its inactions. The United States in effect refused to make decisions or act for long periods on Panama's core concerns. This inaction was, in large part, a response to domestic political conditions, namely the Watergate investigation and Ford's timidity to face the anti-treaty right before the 1976 elections. Because the treaties would require Congressional ratification, interbranch relations also affected U.S. policies.

Despite these competing factors, Panamanian leaders' actions and ideas had a significant impact on U.S. interests, goals, and strategies. In part, this occurred through Panamanians' "re-framing" of the canal issue, as discussed with regard to issue area. The shift in focus from external to internal threats was particularly important. Likewise, Panamanian actions helped assuage some of the Pentagon's concerns about transit rights, the status of U.S. forces during the

life of the treaty, and the gradual reduction of bases. Panama's success in gathering allies limited the pressure that the United States could put on Panama without seeming to confirm Torrijos' arguments about injustice and colonialism. These actions moved the U.S. government to a more conciliatory position even before Carter's inauguration, though Ford lacked political will to take on the battle with forces inside his own party.

How would U.S. policy likely have been different in the absence of the Latin American effort? Omar Torrijos' government began seriously assessing its options regarding the canal in late 1970. After deciding to reject the 1967 treaty, it vigorously pursued its main goals—the abolition of the Canal Zone and a transfer of the canal to Panamanian authority. While Panama was consistent in its pursuit of these goals, its leaders altered their strategies in response to domestic conditions, the requirements of divergent stages of negotiations, and to foreign events—especially political events in the United States. There were several significant periods during the negotiations that required new approaches.

Before there could be a chance for fruitful negotiations, Panama decided it would need to gain higher-level attention from U.S. policymakers. To do that, it radically altered the bilateral approach that had dominated U.S.-Panama relations from their inception. Panama made the canal an international issue, seeking to reframe using global narratives such as decolonization and discrimination against the Global South. Panama linked its own struggle with those of its neighbors and a host of unlikely allies across the globe. The key event was the March 1973 UNSC meeting in Panama City, though the campaign began when Panama gained the support of its neighbors to win the Latin American seat on the Security Council. All the while, Panama managed to walk a careful line of nudging the United States without provoking too harsh of a reaction. Panama called the U.S. bluff and the meetings achieved their goal of raising the stakes

of failing to address the issue, while gaining attention from a higher echelon of U.S. policymakers. Panama achieved short-term goals and created a framework for its long-term goals with the Tack-Kissinger principles.

On every item of the Tack-Kissinger principles, the U.S. stance gradually gravitated to Panama's position. This was a slow process, often stymied by political conditions in the United States. Progress on the most crucial issues, especially treaty duration, was stalled by the U.S. leaders' unwillingness or inability to make tough political decisions. At several points, U.S. political problems—feuds between State and Defense, the Watergate scandal, Ford's weakness—bogged down the negotiation. In response, Panama tried a number of strategies. First, Panama adopted a much more accommodating tone, suggesting it would take the U.S. political context into account. However, these delays created domestic challenges from the left for Torrijos. The general responded by strengthening ties with Cuba and the nonaligned movement as a show of nationalistic independence, while also hoping it would press the United States to make decisions. Panama sought to balance this by building relationships with the 1974 generation of democratically elected leaders.

Panama sought to reframe the question of the canal's security. The canal was not a military asset best protected by bases, but a geographical resource that was impossible to defend without the engagement of the Panamanian population. The understanding harkened to the violence of the flag riots, and does not seem to have been articulated cynically or purely instrumentally. Even as Panama's interpretation of the problem became the conventional wisdom for some Americans, the small country still faced a constant struggle to overcome U.S. inaction. The power of the smaller country, especially one led by a military dictator whose control was rarely in doubt after 1969, was to maintain a single-minded focus. The Panamanian leadership,

which was comprised mostly of the same men throughout, exhibited an ability to learn from U.S. responses and improve its understanding of the U.S. political process. As pointed to in some of the literature looking at asymmetrical wars through the lens of bargaining theory, a small and intensely focused country can negate some of the advantages a larger country whose power is more diffuse. In this case, that focus was at times made less effective because the canal issue entailed steep political costs for the U.S. leader. For that reason, Carter's presence remains a critical factor to understanding the outcome. Though Kissinger—and Bunker to an even greater degree—were willing to conclude a treaty, they did not have the backing of a president willing to take political risks. In that climate, Panama made incremental progress, but its leverage to initiate change was limited by U.S. domestic politics.

How would the outcomes have been different if Latin American leaders had not vigorously pursued their interests? In this case, the eventual outcome is most directly a result of the new policy. It seems unlikely that the United States would have transferred control of the canal to Panama in the absence of a sustained and vigorous Panamanian effort. The United States had long resisted greater concessions, and the canal remained a unique asset, even if it was no longer as essential to U.S. naval planning. Previous concessions had only come from Panamanian struggle, most notably in response to the Flag Riots.

Comparing the goals Omar Torrijos, as enunciated in 1972, with the final treaty, it is clear that Panama attained most of its objectives. First, the treaties eliminated "perpetuity." On the issue of duration, Panama began seeking a full transfer of the canal by 1995. After more than five years of negotiations, Panama's fallback position of 2000 was accepted—a remarkable concession from the 1972 U.S. goal of perpetual defense rights, or perhaps an extension on the order of 90 years. On the Canal Zone, Panama achieved an immediate elimination of the zone,

with de facto jurisdiction transferred over three years. Regarding lands, there was an immediate or short-term reversion of the vast majority. This included the most important sites, such as the ports, the railroad, and Ancón. Panama also achieved direct and immediate participation in the operation of the canal. Panama demanded an end to U.S. military activities not related to canal defense, naming the School of the Americas, which was moved three years after ratification. U.S. military activity was regularized under the SOFA. Panama's original demand for neutrality was largely secured in the neutrality treaty, though the U.S. refused Panama's preference for a UN mandate. Instead the neutrality guarantee was held in the OAS, where the U.S. did not have to worry about the Soviet Union or China. Regarding compensation, Panama's goals early in the 1970s were less clear. Certainly the final package did not approach the massive totals they felt they were owed. It did result in a major increase in revenue derived from tolls.

Panama insisted that it should have the right to determine where and whether a new canal was constructed. In August 1977, Torrijos and Carter agreed to broad phrasing on the issue of a sea-level canal. The final result was that Panama, after the expiration of the treaty, voted to expand the canal on its own, without U.S. participation. The nation decided via referendum to make a huge investment to build new sets of locks to accommodate much larger ships and ensure the canal's importance to world shipping for years to come. That expansion is expected to be complete in 2014, in time for the one-hundredth anniversary of the canal's opening.

What have U.S.-focused accounts of these cases missed, and what does a focus on interaction add to our understanding of the case and of inter-American relations? In this case, the policy agendas, definitions of interests, and eventual outcome were all the result of an interactive process. At times this interaction was cooperative, but it often included elements of mistrust, misperception, and conflict. This story is largely absent from the case literature. For accounts of

focused on the U.S. domestic political consequences on the negotiations, U.S.-Panamanian interaction is seemingly outside their scope. Most scholarly accounts have focused on Carter's arrival as a single, transformative moment in the negotiations. Certainly, Carter played a crucial role in closing the negotiations and making a heavy wager on ratifying the treaties. However, under Torrijos, Panama had escalated its struggle over the canal for four years prior to Carter's arrival. This consistent approach allowed Panama to build a coalition of allies who helped raise the canal's profile on the U.S. agenda while increasing costs for leaving the matter unaddressed. In large part, these actions, along with years of negotiations primed the issue for action when Carter decided to invest his political capital in doing so. Prior to that point, Panama created opportunities, namely by using its UNSC membership to hold meetings in Panama and isolate the United States. Carter's inauguration and his emphasis on setting a new tone for U.S. policy presented another opportunity that Panamanians used to conclude a treaty that included real compromises by both parties. Finally, through the force of its ideas and arguments, Panama shaped the understanding of the canal by stressing elements of sovereignty and justice. In doing so, Panama turned its own smallness into a source of strength, convincing the United States that a new approach to the canal was needed.

CHAPTER 5

A RECALCULATION OF INTERESTS: NAFTA AND MEXICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Since the Mexican Revolution, no event has had such a dramatic effect on relations between the United States and Mexico as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The pact, which has been described primarily from an economic perspective, had broad consequences for political liberalization, bilateral ties with the United States, and Mexican foreign policy. In the literature of U.S.-Latin American relations, NAFTA has often been understood as the result of expansionist U.S. trade policy at a triumphal historical moment: the agreement was a victory for the U.S. international economic agenda and emerged as the Soviet Union was collapsing. However, this interpretation largely ignores Mexico's role initiating talks. The conclusion of NAFTA fed hopes for a "free trade zone stretching from the port of Anchorage to Tierra del Fuego," in the words of President George H. W. Bush.[668] This initiative had started with Canada a few years prior. However, it received its most important boost when the United States and Mexico decided in early 1990 to pursue an agreement that would, for the first time, tightly link the world's largest economy with that of a much lower-income country. In this view, NAFTA and the liberalization of the Mexican economy is interpreted as an early step in a U.S. policy—now long stalled—of creating a hemisphere-wide free trade zone.

Despite the congruence with announced U.S. policies—President Reagan had similarly dreamed of free trade from "Yukon to Yucatan"[669]—the pact hinged not on U.S. pressure but on Mexican leaders' profound reevaluation of their own country's interests and strategies. This

[668] "Remarks announcing the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative," June 27, 1990, *Public Papers of the President*. Online: http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2041.

[669] Even in November 1988, Mexican leaders told the *New York Times* they had little interest in such an idea.

chapter refocuses the understanding of NAFTA by examining the Mexican decision and its consequences. It does not seek to give a blow-by-blow account of the complex negotiation of the treaty. Nor does it seek to parse out the social and economic consequences of NAFTA—a topic that has occupied much scholarly, journalistic, and critical attention. Rather, I focus on the calculations made by Mexican leaders during several key points prior to and during the negotiations, and I argue that their actions are a key, underestimated element to understanding the shift in bilateral ties. The most important decision was the about-face on whether Mexico wanted free trade with the United States, but this was preceded and followed by other decisions about the extensiveness of the agreement. It was also complemented by moments in which Mexico quietly handled potential irritants—including an embargo on its tuna exports, the invasion of Panama, and the kidnapping of one of its citizens to stand trial for murder in the United States—that in other times might have derailed improved relations. In effect, NAFTA happened only because the Mexican leadership dramatically re-calculated their concption of the national interest and therefore pursued a vastly different strategy. This had profound implications for the Mexican economy, but also for the U.S.-Mexico relationship.

This case is of particular interest for several reasons. First, it occurred at a time of great transition in the international system, as four decades of bipolarity came to an end. The case exhibits the effects of a changing international system on how leaders define their interests and explores how that recalculation impacts bilateral, asymmetrical relations. As such, the case offers a different process through which weaker-state leaders can profoundly influence relations. The case is also important because from the mid-1980s at least until 2000, economic liberalization in many ways replaced the older developmental paradigm represented by Operation Pan-America

as a model and as a marker of political divisions. Finally, it is a significant case because NAFTA played a major role in reshaping a traditionally difficult relationship.

Brandishing the scars of major territorial loss during the mid-1800s and U.S. interventions and machinations during the Mexico's bloody revolution and ensuing civil war, Mexico's ruling PRI had long based its foreign policy on maintaining autonomy from the United States, coupled with rhetoric about the need to defend Mexican sovereignty. However, the government of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) dramatically revised that stance while gradually discarding the rhetoric. While Salinas' economic reforms in many ways continued the trail blazed by his predecessor, Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988), his re-calculation of Mexican foreign policy had been previously almost unthinkable. It challenged one of the central tenets of the PRI legacy. While NAFTA has been discussed largely in economic terms, both for international trade and as a mechanism to "lock in" liberal reforms and the dismantling of Mexico's import-substitution apparatus, its foreign policy significance is of equal importance. The consequences of the agreement—a marked increase in interdependence—led to still-greater changes. This was just as NAFTA's architects, Mexican and American, wished. I argue that the decision to pursue an FTA was a major shift in *how* Mexican leaders sought to exercise agency and sought to influence the United States.

While this decision undoubtedly had much to do with President Carlos Salinas and his coterie of U.S.-trained economists, it is too narrow to interpret the agreement only in terms of their roles and worldviews. NAFTA was a watershed moment for Mexico, not an aberration. The recalculation of interests had started, albeit more cautiously, before Salinas' presidency. It has also proved remarkably durable, guiding Mexican economic and foreign policy through the

historic collapse of the long-ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), two *sexenios* of the PAN, and now a re-emergence of the PRI.

NAFTA reflected a realization that Mexico could best pursue its interest by engaging the U.S. in institutional arrangements instead of by rhetorical counters. Well before NAFTA, Mexico was economically dependent on exports to the United States, of both oil and light manufacturing from *maquiladoras*. However, the rules governing these exports were open to constant negotiations, in which U.S. businesses could exploit Mexico's weaker position by requesting countervailing duties on Mexican products to counteract import subsidies. With NAFTA, Mexico's leaders sought to eliminate uncertainty, convincing the United States to make commitments and to tie itself to dispute-settlement mechanisms. The shift could not have happened without Mexico's recalculation of its national interest vis-à-vis the United States. Furthermore, despite U.S. interest in expanding free trade, NAFTA would not have been concluded without Mexico's aggressiveness at key moments. To be sure, Mexican actions do not provide the entirety of the explanation. However, Mexican leaders' initiatives took advantage of a coincidence of other factors to dramatically alter the nature of the U.S.-Mexico relationship.

This chapter examines both the Mexican and international contexts for that decision. It then examines the Mexican goals during the negotiation, along with the strategies Mexico used to pursue them. In particular, I seek to explain the following key decisions. First, why did Mexico decide to open its economy, and, in a second step, tie itself much more closely to the United States? How was this decision seen in relation to Mexican foreign policy? Why did Mexico reverse its traditional stance regarding involvement in other countries' internal politics by engaging in an intense lobbying effort in the U.S. Congress? How did Mexico define what issues it was willing to include and what needed to be excluded from an agreement? Finally, how

did Mexico relate to Canada during the negotiations? Each of these questions represents a key Mexican calculation. However, before delving into those decisions, I begin with a brief examination of the most common explanations for why NAFTA was negotiated.

Economic crisis, economic imperialism: NAFTA in the literature

In the two decades since its passage, NAFTA has continued to be the subject of intense political debate in all three countries. This was highlighted when, during the U.S. Democratic presidential primary of 2008, candidates Hillary Rodham Clinton and Barack Obama sparred over who would re-open NAFTA to negotiation—sparking harsh responses in Canada and Mexico. NAFTA has also been the subject of voluminous literature, produced by academics and think-tank researchers. The vast majority of this work has disputed the impacts of NAFTA. Shortly after its negotiation, scholars and lawyers analyzed the treaty texts, while economists projected the effects.[670] Quickly, the focus turned to evaluating the agreement, dissecting its implementation, and advancing policy proposals for its improvement.[671] Many analysts saw NAFTA as a step on the way to something bigger. Politicians dreamed of a hemispheric agreement. Scholars compared the region to the European Union. Many saw hope for spurring economic development in Mexico and beyond.[672]

---

[670] For example, see Steven Globerman, Michael Walker, and Institute Fraser, eds., *Assessing NAFTA : a Trinational Analysis* (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1993), Georgina Kessel, *Lo Negociado del TLC : un Análisis Económico sobre el Impacto Sectorial del Tratado Trilateral de Libre Comercio* (México, D.F.: McGraw Hill, 1994), Robert A. Pastor, *Integration with Mexico : Options for U.S. Policy* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1993).

[671] Charles F. Doran, ed., *A New North America : Cooperation and Enhanced Interdependence* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996), Stephen J. Randall and Herman W. Konrad, eds., *NAFTA in Transition* (Calgary: Univ. of Calgary Press, 1995).

[672] Robert A. Pastor, *Toward a North American Community : Lessons from the Old World for the New* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2001), Robert A. Pastor, *The North American Idea : A Vision of a Continental Future* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

An in-depth review of these works is beyond the focus of this chapter. There are considerably fewer works that have examined the actual negotiations of NAFTA, and in these, little attention is given to Mexico's recalculation of its interests, without which the trade pact would have been impossible. Instead of reviewing the NAFTA literature more broadly, I will focus here on how studies of the negotiations and on U.S.-Mexico relations have addressed the particular question of Mexican interests and foreign policy as they pertain to NAFTA.

Several books have directly addressed the NAFTA negotiations. Frederick F. Mayer offers a detailed account as a test for frameworks of political analysis.[673] Maxwell Cameron and Brian Tomlin build on dozens of interviews and a thorough review of mostly U.S. sources to assess the importance of power asymmetry, political institutions, and negotiating positions on the process and final agreement.[674] NAFTA is also prominently discussed in several memoirs, particularly by President Carlos Salinas and envoy Hermann von Bertrab.[675] Finally, a few scholars have examined the agreement more broadly in terms of how it has affected relations between Mexico and the United States. Most prominently, Jorge I. Dominguez and Rafael Fernández de Castro argue that Salinas and Bush shifted the trajectory of bilateral relations from its historical patterns of "conflict" or "bargained negligence" to a new cooperative path.[676] Two

---

[673] Frederick W. Mayer, *Interpreting NAFTA : The Science and Art of Political Analysis* (New York, NY [u.a.]: Columbia Univ. Press, 1998).

[674] Maxwell A. Cameron and Brian W. Tomlin, *The Making of NAFTA : How the Deal Was Done* (Ithaca, Ny: Cornell University Press, 2000). In addition to Mayer and Cameron and Tomlin, a handful of other books focus on NAFTA, but I do not review them in depth here. For a detailed look at four sectors of the negotiations, see Maryse Robert, *Negotiating NAFTA Explaining the Outcome in Culture, Textiles, Autos, and Pharmaceuticals* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2000). The book suffers from a forest-for-the-trees approach that ignores much context and well as trade-offs across sectors. It gives little attention to why Mexico sought the agreement.

[675] Carlos Salinas de Gortari, *México: Un Paso Dificil a la Modernidad* (Barcelona: Plaza & Janés Editores, 2000), Hermann von Bertrab, *Negotiating NAFTA : a Mexican Envoy's Account* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997).

[676] Jorge I. Domínguez and Rafael Fernández de Castro, *The United States and Mexico : Between Partnership and Conflict* (New York: Routledge, 2001).

Mexican scholars argue that this led to a dramatically new level of interaction between Mexican foreign policy and the U.S. political system—something that would have been both unthinkable and unacceptable just a decade earlier.[677]

Frederick Mayer was personally involved in NAFTA while completing a fellowship and working with Senator Bill Bradley. Mayer approaches NAFTA from the literature on international negotiations, and posits a goal of "interpreting NAFTA" through a framework based on two dimensions, the level of analysis and the "mode of politics," such as rational choice or institutional process analysis.[678] He concludes that at varying times, varying levels and models are most useful. Because he does not specifically describe the conditions under which each should be applied, what he calls "the science and art of application" of his framework is limited. Despite the theoretical shortcomings, the book offers an empirically rich account. Mayer situates the Mexican decision to seek a trade agreement in the context of the Mexican debt crisis and the technocratic approach of Salinas and his closest ministers. Mayer concludes:

> On the domestic level the strategy was to use international negotiation to overcome domestic political opposition to economic reform, a way of accelerating Mexican market opening and of locking it in. … On the international level, the strategy was intended both as a signal to the international investment community and as a means to obtain trade concessions not otherwise obtainable from the United States.[679]

The U.S. decision, Mayer argues, was largely based on foreign policy concerns about helping Salinas and advancing an agenda of free trade. While the two concerns Mayer outlines were indeed important for Mexico, I will argue below that he misses an important third calculation about Mexican foreign policy interests.

---

[677] Rodolfo O. De la Garza and Jesús Velasco, *México y su Interacción con el Sistema Político Estadounidense* (México: CIDE, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas : M.A. Porrúa Grupo Editorial, 2000).

[678] Mayer, *Interpreting NAFTA : The Science and Art of Political Analysis*, pp. 6-7.

[679] Mayer, *Interpreting NAFTA : The Science and Art of Political Analysis*, pp. 36-40.

Cameron and Tomlin also approach NAFTA primarily from the negotiations literature. They compare predictions implicit in neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist theories, and contrast them with their own approach, which builds on Robert Putnam's "two-level game." Related to Mayer's argument that Salinas used the agreement to "lock in" reforms, Cameron and Tomlin posit that Mexican leaders can "more credibly use their vulnerability to international pressures to impose painful or costly domestic reforms, often implicitly colluding with the more powerful states against domestic constituents." Here, they take a turn back to a dependency-theory treatment of Latin American leaders as "puppets" of the United States. It is unclear why Mexican leaders would "collude" with the United States against their own people. The more important part of their argument regards how parties to the negotiation viewed "nonagreement alternatives."[680] Because Salinas perceived a high cost to failing to obtain an agreement, he was more willing to override specific domestic interests; he was more easily able to do so because of the PRI's quasi-authoritarian relationship to many of those interests (particularly labor).

Cameron and Tomlin analyze Mexico's decision to seek an agreement as part of a "prenegotiation phase." This conceptualizes a process of signaling in which parties identify a problem, search for options, decide to negotiate, and then try to set the parameters of the coming negotiation—what will be included and excluded. They argue that the economic crises of the 1980s caused Mexican policymakers to cast for solutions, including multilateral trade talks and bilateral sectoral agreements with the United States. Their summary of what they call Mexico's "commitment to negotiation" is similar to Mayer's: Salinas was driven to seek a trade agreement out of a desire to attract international investment and to "strengthen relations between the

[680] Cameron and Tomlin, *The Making of NAFTA : How the Deal Was Done*, ch. 2, esp. pp. 28-32.

Mexican government and the private sector."[681] While U.S. foreign policy concerns mattered in the Bush administration's response, Mexican foreign policy concerns are not prominent.

Interestingly, the preceding two books, along with much of the broader work on NAFTA do not originate in the literature on U.S.-Latin American relations.[682] Mayer, along with *Negotiating NAFTA* by Maryse Roberts, refers to IR theories, but primarily applies theoretical frameworks from the political economy literature on negotiations. Cameron and Tomlin conclude that asymmetry let U.S. negotiators bully Mexicans because access to the U.S. market was a much larger prize than access to Mexico's. In the end, the more important considerations had to do with other negotiating considerations and the Salinas administration's political gamble on getting a deal.[683] Perhaps for this reason, these works do not closely reflect the assumptions of the establishment school or revisionist synthesis. However, in pivoting to works that deal with NAFTA as part of the broader U.S.-Mexico relationship, as opposed to a single case study of international negotiation, the earlier categories reemerge in the literature.

In a classic Mexican work on the country's foreign policy, Mario Ojeda argued that Mexican foreign policy was determined by its place as "a weak country" so close to the United States. This meant balancing where it could, but ultimately accepting U.S. hegemony on fundamental issues.[684] This sort of ambivalence is the focus of many works on U.S.-Mexico relations, though it has been altered by NAFTA. In the epilogue to his revisionist survey of bilateral relations, Dirk Raat argues that U.S. interest in Mexico was driven by a desire for

---

[681] Cameron and Tomlin, *The Making of NAFTA : How the Deal Was Done*, pp. 56-63.

[682] However, Max Cameron has written some in that field, he approaches it largely from comparative politics.

[683] Cameron and Tomlin, *The Making of NAFTA : How the Deal Was Done*, pp. 225-236.

[684] Qtd. in Domínguez and Fernández de Castro, *The United States and Mexico : Between Partnership and Conflict*, pp. 17-18. Mario Ojeda, *Alcances y Límites de la Política Exterior de México* (México: Colegio de México, 1976).

Mexican oil, and that NAFTA should not be considered a free trade agreement, but "a financial arrangement that protects U.S. investment in Mexico." Raat paints Salinas as a second coming of Porfirio Diaz.[685] Works in the revisionist synthesis, like Raat's, have typically portrayed NAFTA as economic imperialism, and a continuation of pre-existing patterns of relations. Salinas is seen as pawn of transnational big business, with his U.S. education and a failure to match economic liberalization with political liberalization offered as evidence.

Establishment works tend to see NAFTA as part of a bigger, largely unexpected transformation in bilateral relations. Displaying elements of an internationalist turn, Domínguez and Fernández de Castro's survey of recent U.S.-Mexico relations focuses on 1990 as "the turning point" at which relations shifted from frequently conflictive to mostly cooperative. They argue that four factors explain the shift, placing the most emphasis on international changes associated with the end of the Cold War. In addition, they point to Mexico's economic crises in the 1980s, new leadership in both countries, and the availability of "a set of ideas about politics, markets, institutions, and cooperation" that the new leaders seized.[686] These works tend to emphasize different Mexican goals, too. The 1997 book *Coming Together?* argues that NAFTA was a "means to solidifying the reforms" instated by Salinas. The authors noted that guaranteed market access, as opposed solely to lower tariffs, was a major goal.[687] Sidney Weintraub, one of the original advocates for a U.S.-Mexico free trade agreement,[688] noted in a recent survey of

---

[685] W. Dirk Raat, *Mexico and the United States : Ambivalent Vistas* (Athens, Ga: University of Georgia Press, 2004), pp. 196-202.

[686] While the book does not draw heavily on archives, its authors have a strong focus on the interests and interactions of the two countries and heavily employ both the U.S. and Mexican secondary literatures. Domínguez and Fernández de Castro, *The United States and Mexico : Between Partnership and Conflict*, pp. 31-32.

[687] Barry Bosworth et al., "Coming Together? : Mexico-United States Relations" (Washington, D.C., 1997).

[688] Weintraub argued for the idea in the 1984 book, *Free Trade between Mexico and the United States?* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984).

U.S.-Mexico relations that the final agreement ended in a compromise. Citing the assessment of Mexican economist Antonio Ortiz-Mena, Weintraub notes that Mexico achieved most of its original goals. International bargaining often does not reflect broader asymmetries, and the United States viewed the agreement as part of its broader relationship with its neighbor.[689] Ortiz-Mena provides a detailed look into Mexico's strategy on limiting concessions on energy in the FTA. In the end, Mexico maintained its "red lines" while still achieving nearly all its market-access goals.[690]

The negotiation-based literature on NAFTA has attempted to incorporate the Mexican (and Canadian) perspective on the talks. Though Cameron and Tomlin did not have access to Mexican documents, they did interview numerous members of the Mexican team, largely anonymously. Before this chapter, there has not been to my knowledge a study of the NAFTA negotiations that incorporates significant Mexican documentation, which was made available to me at the Secretaría de Economía (formerly SECOFI, which led the Mexican negotiating team). Unfortunately, I was not able to obtain original documentation from the Mexican presidential level, beyond Salinas' own writing. Since Cameron and Tomlin, increased documentation from the U.S. side, including conversations between Salinas and Bush has become available. These new sources help enrich the perspective offered here, looking at how Mexican leaders recalculated the national interest, and how this led to dramatically different foreign and economic policies, along with new strategies in their relationship with the United States.

---

[689] Sidney Weintraub, *Unequal Partners : The United States and Mexico* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010), pp. 6-10.

[690] Antonio Ortiz-Mena, "Getting to No : Defending against Demands in NAFTA Energy Negotiations," in *Negotiating Trade : Developing Countries in the WTO and NAFTA*, ed. John S. Odell (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

Background

During the 1970s, Mexico's discovery of the massive Cantarell oil reserve, along with high international prices for oil, seemed to portend a bright future. Mexico used the sudden windfall to fund government programs and enhance its international role. Based on the expectation of continued high prices and earnings, the country took on debt, much of it from private banks. However, the hope was short lived. In 1981, oil prices dropped and interest rates climbed, leaving Mexico with heavy debts and a painful recession, leading a fiscal crisis. By 1982, the Mexican government announced it could no longer service its debt. On August 13, 1982, the Mexican government shuttered the country's major banks en route to nationalization. The following years brought little relief, with Mexico experiencing a 4.2 percent decline in GDP in 1982. The debt crisis forced Mexico to accept structural adjustments as part of a 1982 agreement with International Monetary Fund and the U.S. Federal Reserve, but that brought only short-lived macroeconomic stability. As a bureaucratic response, Mexico created the Secretaría de Comercio y Fomento Industrial (Secofi), which came to be dominated by liberal economists.

In 1986, another recession inflicted a 3.7 percent drop in GDP.[691] Much of Mexico's political class interpreted the dual recessions as evidence that the old PRI economic model of import substitution had reached its limit. Government subsidies to unproductive, state-controlled sectors were no longer fiscally viable. In February 1985, President de la Madrid announced a new policy in which Mexico would begin seeking foreign direct investment—something it had long sought to limit. In addition, de la Madrid said he would consider closer trade relations with the United States—though an FTA was never on the table.[692] In the face of low oil prices and

[691] World Bank database.

[692] "President de la Madrid defines Mexico's policy on foreign investment," February 1985, *Mexico Today,* pp. 1.

little access to credit markets, the government came to the conclusion that its previous economic model had failed definitively. In a major turnaround, Mexico joined the GATT in July 1986.[693] Growth remained sluggish. The economic picture was complicated by ongoing negotiations with commercial banks, the United States, and international financial institutions regarding Mexico's debt. Throughout the mid-1980s, Mexico was able to re-schedule payments, but the stopgap measures led to a greater overall debt burden. After international actors, including the United States, resisted Mexican calls for debt reduction, Mexican leaders threatened default.

New leaders in a changing world: Salinas and Bush

Without a doubt the most important player in Mexico throughout the initiation and negotiation of NAFTA was President Carlos Salinas. Salinas' powers were extensive. Though the PRI had lost some of its dominance over Mexico's political life, it remained far from the pluralistic competition of today's Mexico. The PRI dominated the compliant Mexican Congress, which had little input in trade policy and almost no input in foreign policy. The PRI also could influence media coverage and responses from special interests through its labor and business coalitions.[694] As president, Salinas stood atop this hierarchy for six years. As is often mentioned, Salinas had a Ph.D. from Harvard, and he surrounded himself with other Mexicans educated in elite, U.S. doctoral programs. These included his economy and trade minister Jaime Serra Puche and his deputy Jaime Zabludovsky; finance minister Pedro Aspe; Herminio Blanco Mendoza, who would become chief trade negotiator; and Salinas' close advisor, José María Córdoba. All

[693] Cameron and Tomlin, *The Making of NAFTA : How the Deal Was Done*, pp. 59.

[694] Weintraub notes that Salinas was able to massively saw public opinion in Mexico, and "He probably could not have achieved the turnaround in Mexican public opinion that he did had he not been an authoritarian leader." Weintraub, *Unequal Partners : The United States and Mexico*, pp. 32.

brought with them backgrounds in liberal economics and a belief in the power of freer markets to spur economic growth.

The struggling domestic economy and debt crisis was only one part of the turbulent situation that Salinas faced. His government had to tackle these problems while also dealing with doubts about Salinas' own legitimacy and ability to govern. Though the PRI remained formidable, Salinas' election had been one of the most bitterly contested in the PRI's decades of one-party rule. He had faced an opposition candidate, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the son of Mexican revolutionary hero and former President Lázaro Cárdenas. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas had defected from the PRI to create his own political movement, and many Mexicans who had previously accepted one-party rule saw Salinas' victory as marred by fraud.

The Mexican decision to seek an FTA came in the midst of historic changes in the international system as well. The world was witnessing the end of the Cold War and the speedy demise of the Soviet Union. In Europe, Germany moved toward reunification, while the continent negotiated a treaty that would create the European Union. After having directed its attention to the poorer countries of Southern Europe, the community now pivoted east. Despite global change, Mexico's preoccupations were primarily economic. That de la Madrid had chosen Salinas to be his successor confirmed the PRI's intention to continue liberal reforms. Salinas had served on de la Madrid's cabinet and was a vocal supporter of lowering tariffs, privatizing industry, and reducing state involvement in the economy. Upon taking office, Salinas appointed liberal reformers to the upper echelon of his team, including U.S.-trained economists Aspe and Serra Puche. Their major priorities were to address the debt, control inflation, and begin dismantling protectionist barriers.[695] As Cameron and Tomlin note, liberalization began well

[695] Salinas de Gortari, *México: Un Paso Dificil a la Modernidad*, pp. 9.

before Salinas decided to pursue an FTA with the United States: "Salinas accelerated initiatives to open up the Mexican economy, reducing tariffs and restrictions on imports, mainly quotas. By 1989, Mexico's average weighted tariff was 6.2 percent, and 96 percent of Mexican imports were free of quotas." In many cases, tariff reduction went well beyond what was required by Mexico's GATT accession.[696] For Salinas, economic liberalization was a means to economic growth, which was itself a means to boost the popularity of the PRI to the point it could continue to win elections, even as they became increasingly fair.

From the beginning of his term, it was clear that George Bush would have to manage the grand global changes. In the fall of his first year in office, the Berlin Wall tumbled down, setting off a quick succession of events in Europe, including the shocking collapse of the Cold War adversary Soviet Union and the speedy reunification of Germany. Given that context, it might be surprising that relations with Mexico received frequent, high-level attention in the Bush administration, especially since Bush also launched two military interventions, in Iraq and Panama. What accounts for the Bush administration's consistent interest in Mexico?

Where the U.S. graduate training of the Mexican leadership team is often mentioned, many commentators and scholars have also noted the background of influential members of the Bush administration. In an interview, Bush's Ambassador to Mexico John Negroponte noted: "The administration really cared about the relationship…it was a bunch of Texans. They understood that the relationship was important. No one had to convince them. This was a national decision, and made at a political level."[697] Negotiations with Mexico would be a high

[696] Cameron and Tomlin, *The Making of NAFTA : How the Deal Was Done*, pp. 59.

[697] Author interview with Negroponte. See also Stuart Auerbach, "Mexico comes calling for free trade," *Washington Post*, June 10, 1990, pp. H1.

priority for both the Mexican and U.S. administrations. Different from Salinas, Bush had to deal with a Congress that was both vocal and often opposed to his trade policies. Both presidents were concerned with stagnant economies; Bush also had his own reelection as a top concern. Salinas saw NAFTA as a vehicle to deliver investment and growth quickly enough to help his party's fortunes. Given the economic asymmetry, NAFTA was never going to be an economic panacea for Bush. However, Bush's base was built on his close relationship with the business sector, most of which was strongly supportive of increased trade with Mexico.

Bush and Salinas, starting together

Facing those concerns, Bush and Salinas met in Houston, both men presidents-elect, on November 22, 1988. During the campaign, Bush had intimated that he would like to extend the recently approved U.S.-Canadian free trade deal into a North American agreement. At a business luncheon in Chicago, candidate Bush said: "We need to build on our agreement with Canada by developing a new, special economic relationship with Mexico."[698] Though Bush's comments attracted little attention in the United States, Salinas' close political advisor José Maria Córdoba Montoya recalled in an interview that Bush had been the first to put the idea of free trade on the table with those comments.[699] While the bulk of the pre-inaugural meeting was centered on Mexico's debt, then more than $100 billion, Salinas recalls in his memoirs that the U.S. president mentioned free trade to them directly during that meeting: "To start, President Bush proposed the establishment of a free trade zone between Mexico and the United States. … Bush's proposal came in an unexpected moment. … He did not insist on free trade, but he had proposed the topic,

[698] "Excerpt of remarks of Vice President Bush," at the Executive's Club in Chicago, Ill., September 13, 1988, via *Federal News Service.*

[699] Author interview with José Córdoba Montoya, May 3, 2012, Mexico City, Mexico.

and I would recall that as time passed."[700] However, there is some disagreement about the nature of this proposal. Neither Negroponte nor Serra Puche was at the meeting, but neither believes Bush proposed it. James Baker, who was present, writes in his memoirs: "The subject of a free-trade agreement was not raised."[701] Córdoba Montoya was present, and referenced the proposal in an interview in the same manner as Salinas' memoirs. However, despite the disagreement about whether an FTA was mentioned, trade and debt were clearly on the agenda,

According to Mexican officials involved in the meetings, Salinas was skittish about the idea of an FTA, which he saw as a leap too far as Mexico dealt with debt and banking crises, and Bush immediately dropped it. All agree that Bush did not again mention the idea until Salinas took the initiative. In a March 8, 1990 phone call, after the Mexican government had made its momentous decision to seek a free trade agreement, Salinas would remind Bush of the proposal "of a possible free trade agreement" made in Houston. Bush simply responded, "Yes."[702] During the Houston meeting, the two presidents-elect and key advisors established positive personal rapport—they would later refer to the tone of the relationship as "the spirit of Houston. They enjoyed numerous phone calls and meetings, with Bush extending invitations for suppers at the White House and weekends at Camp David and Kennebunkport.

Salinas took office days later, on December 1, 1988. Priority no. 1 was the debt, and Salinas charged finance secretary Pedro Aspe with addressing it. Continuing discussions from the Houston meeting, Aspe insisted to U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady that additional

---

[700] Salinas de Gortari, *México: Un Paso Dificil a la Modernidad*, pp. 12.

[701] James Addison Baker and Thomas M. DeFrank, *The Politics of Diplomacy : Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989-1992* (New York: Putnam, 1995), pp. 607.

[702] "Telephone conversation with President Salinas de Gortari of Mexico," March 8, 1990, George Bush Presidential Library (GBPL). Online: http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/memcons_telcons/1990-03-08--Salinas.pdf.

rescheduling was not an option. The uncertainty of constant negotiation clouded Mexico's economic future. If Mexico did not obtain significant write-offs of its commercially held debt, it would be forced to stop servicing it.[703] These talks led to the U.S. announcement of the Brady Plan on March 19, 1989, with Mexico expressing immediate interest.[704] The plan gave Mexico a framework for its negotiations with commercial creditors, with the banks accepting either long-term, low-interest payments or markdowns in exchange for U.S. Treasury-backed bonds. By August 1989, Mexico had completed negotiations for a significant part of its debt. That autumn, Mexico turned its attention to trade. Though Mexico had quickly reduced tariffs, the Salinas government argued it had not received corresponding benefits in terms of improved market access for Mexican exports. The government's May 1989 development plan noted: "Mexico has undertaken an important process of commercial opening to increase the efficiency and competitiveness of national production. However, this opening has not been adequately reciprocated in terms of access to international markets."[705]

Though Salinas had moved aggressively to open the economy, there was not a consensus inside the Mexican government that a free trade agreement with the United States was in Mexico's interests—or that it was politically desirable. John Negroponte, at the time U.S. ambassador to Mexico, said that during 1989, talk of a free trade agreement was not seen as realistic. "My honest recollection at that time is that it was considered too hard. We'd have to

---

[703] Author interview with Pedro Aspe, 2012.

[704] President Salinas called Bush almost immediately after the plan was announced. "Telephone conversation with President Salinas," March 10, 1989, GBPL. Online: http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/memcons_telcons/1989-03-10--Salinas.pdf.

[705] "Extractos del programa nacional de modernización industrial y del comercio exterior, 1990-1994," in Carlos Arriola, ed., *Documentos Básicos* (México: SECOFI, Grupo Editorial Miguel Ángel Porrua, 1994), doc. 4.

stick to a more gradualistic approach, sector by sector. That was the prevailing wisdom."[706] Early on, Salinas was cautious, favoring incremental increases in U.S.-Mexico ties through agreements to strengthen trade and investment in limited industrial sectors, increasing quotas for Mexican exports of steel and textiles, for example.[707] The two countries also revisited the 1987 framework agreement on trade and investment, seeking to expand its scope and provide a mandate for negotiations. During his first year in government, in addition to tackling the debt, Salinas needed to fortify his political position, still weak from the contentious campaign against Cárdenas. Publicly and privately, Mexican leaders pressed the United States for larger quotas and lower tariffs on particular products, while eschewing talk of a more comprehensive agreement.[708]

Salinas made a state visit to Washington in October 1989, where he and Bush presented sectoral trade agreements and highlighted improved bilateral cooperation.[709] The Mexican president pressed for more space for Mexican exports, even mentioning the issue during the state dinner, arguing it would not only stimulate trade but be a boon to the overall bilateral relationship.[710] Clearly, trade was a central item on the agenda during the visit. Shortly after the state visit, Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher told a Senate committee he thought a U.S.-Mexico trade agreement was likely, and that the United States should pursue it incrementally, though other officials noted that Salinas had continually rejected the idea of a free trade

---

[706] Author interview with John Negroponte, via telephone, April 20, 2012.

[707] Cameron and Tomlin, *The Making of NAFTA : How the Deal Was Done*, pp. 60.

[708] "Salinas hails better U.S. ties," *The Washington Times*, October 3, 1989, pp. A6.

[709] George Bush: "Remarks at the Signing Ceremony for the Mexico-United States Environmental and Trade Agreements," October 3, 1989, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17610

[710] Adela Gooch, "Bush, Salinas hail pact to boost mutual trade," *Washington Post*, October 4, 1989, pp. A 12.

agreement.[711] Publicly, Mexican officials continued to insist that they had no plans to pursue a comprehensive agreement. Even Jaime Serra Puche, personally committed to the idea of free trade, denied that an agreement was in the offing. Shortly after the state visit, Serra Puche addressed Mexican news media to explain the new sectoral trade agreements, but when asked, said that a trade agreement between Mexico and the United States was not feasible.

> You will remember that on the topic of whether we would develop a common market between Mexico and the United States, we have said that the difference in levels of development between the two countries is still of the nature that it would not be natural to establish a free trade agreement between the two countries; but it is possible and we have to study the possibility of making sectoral agreements between the two economies.[712]

Years later, Serra noted: "I could not give the slightest hint on an FTA without creating antibodies."[713] In late 1989, Salinas was extremely concerned about the reactions of Mexican society, especially of major segments of his own political party and base, to the idea of overly close cooperation with the United States. Indeed, while he struck a cooperative tone on trade, he was less openly cooperative on other issues like counternarcotics. For example, Salinas refused to allow U.S. agents to pursue suspects across the border in "hot pursuit," citing concerns about Mexican sovereignty. Salinas wanted closer ties with the United States, but he was eager to signal the limits to that cooperation.

Sea change: Mexico proposes an FTA

Just three months after Salinas and Serra had publicly rejected a free trade agreement, they would propose a pact to U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills. That agreement would lead

---

[711] Clyde Farnsworth, "Mosbacher sees a free-trade pact with Mexico," *New York Times*, October 15, 1989, pp. D9; Karen Riley, "Free-trade pact with Mexico advocated," *The Washington Times*, October 19, 1989, pp. C1.

[712] Jaime Serra, press conference, October 10, 1989, classification 10.01.00.00, caja 1, exp. 2, Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico, D.F., [pp. 1-18].

[713] Email correspondence, May 3, 2012.

not only to much higher degrees of economic interdependence, but to an historic shift in the nature of the U.S.-Mexico relationship. What happened between October and January to provoke the recalculation of Mexican interests? First, Salinas was affected by the dramatic shifts in the international environment. A month after Salinas' return from Washington, the Berlin Wall fell. The opening of Eastern Europe seemed to portend victory for democracy and open markets—an argument Salinas made to Bush the first time he directly presented the idea of an FTA.[714] Along with the related unwinding of Central American conflicts, the global shift shook the pillars of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, which had exhibited its "revolutionary" nature through (largely symbolic) support of leftist causes abroad and nationalist, historically focused appeals for autonomy from United States.[715]

After the debt negotiations, conversation inside the Salinas' government turned toward generating economic growth. The top leadership was convinced that Mexico needed to move toward freer trade, using increased investment and stronger exports to create employment. Mexican leaders were enhancing ties with the United States, but they also hoped to balance those with links to the rest of the world. Salinas and many other Mexican officials and policy experts believed that the path to economic growth, without greater dependence on the U.S. market, led to Japan. Japan's seemingly miraculous growth through the 1970s and 1980s drew great admiration. Mexican citizens held the Japanese in higher esteem than Americans, according to polls in 1988. However, while economic ties between the two countries grew, they were never very large.[716] In September 1989, Mexico had hosted a visit from the Japanese prime minister.

---

[714] "Telephone conversation with President Salinas de Gortari of Mexico," March 8, 1990, GBL.

[715] Salinas' changed stance did not mean unquestioning support of the United States. Mexico, along with the rest of Latin America, loudly decried the U.S. invasion of Panama on December 20, 1989.

[716] Domínguez and Fernández de Castro, *The United States and Mexico : Between Partnership and Conflict*, pp. 23.

The visit ended cordially, but without any specific agreements. Mexican hopes for major Japanese investment, aid, and debt relief failed to materialize, and the perception grew that Japan was interested first in building an East Asian trading bloc, and secondly in maintaining trade with the United States. Meanwhile, the Japanese touted the visit more as a show of faith that the country would help the United States address global problems.[717]

Having failed to make inroads with Asia's major economic power, Mexico's officials met on January 8, 1990 in the *gabinete económico*, or economic cabinet—the central policy forum in the Salinas government. In that meeting, Mexican leaders again emphasized the need to promote export-led growth. Mexico needed to generate employment for a young, growing population, but it also needed to earn foreign exchange. With oil prices low, Mexico's traditional source of exchange was insufficient. The economic team had hoped for short-term gains in growth and investment after the resolution of the debt crisis, but the improvement had been slow.

Mexico had failed to attract serious attention from Japan, but Salinas was still hesitant about becoming more dependent on the United States. The Mexican team decided it would pursue investment and trade deals with Europe.[718] In late January 1990, the Mexican team, including Salinas, Serra, Córdoba Montoya, and Aspe, set off on a tour of Europe. Salinas met with Mario Soares of Portugal, Margaret Thatcher of the UK, and Helmut Kohl of Germany. All noted that attention and investment would likely turn to Eastern Europe, and that Mexico needed to focus regionally to attain growth. Kohl told Salinas that Mexico would "only be attractive as part of one of the three great blocs of international commerce."[719] As they traveled across

---

[717] Karl Shoenberger, "Japan, Mexico pledge closer economic ties," *Washington Post*, September 6, 1989, pp. C4.

[718] Salinas de Gortari, *México: Un Paso Dificil a la Modernidad*, pp. 45.

[719] Salinas de Gortari, *México: Un Paso Dificil a la Modernidad*, pp. 47-48.

Europe, and tried in Davos to position themselves among global political and business elites, Salinas came to a realization. The end of communism in Eastern Europe was not simply a victory for free markets. The sudden changes meant that the number of middle-income countries looking to attract foreign investment had suddenly exploded. In the sense of attracting international capital, the former Soviet republics were competing with Mexico. They had the advantage of being much closer geographically—and more important geopolitically—to Western Europe than Mexico. Reducing its debt problem and enacting economic reforms was not enough to put Mexico on agenda of the turbulent European continent. Serra explained: "When we went to Davos, we were not in the investment map. … [W]e realized that the opening up of Eastern Europe and so on, was really leaving us behind in terms of being able to attract foreign direct investment, which the country needed and needs badly. And also our trade flows weren't growing like they should."[720] Conversations with the Japanese forced the realization that Asia would not offer a quick economic solution for Mexico. The trip to Europe drove home the point that Mexico could not count on the old continent, either.

A watershed recalculation of interests

Mexico's decision to reverse decades of policy intended to keep the United States at arm's length came suddenly. There had been cautious steps since 1985, but the decision to propose a free trade agreement was made quickly, according to Serra, between the president and two or three ministers. As Salinas recounts the story, during the middle of a restless night in Davos, the Mexican president woke up Serra. As Serra sat on the side of the bed, Salinas told him that he had talked with Aspe and wanted to approach the U.S. trade representative in the morning with the idea of seeking a free trade agreement. Serra, as Salinas already knew,

[720] Author interview with Jaime Serra Puche, May 2, 2012, Mexico City, Mexico.

supported the idea.[721] Serra and Hills already had a meeting scheduled to finalize an agreement on textiles. The pair left that to their deputies while Serra made the unexpected gambit.

The idea of free trade with the United States had been in circulation since the mid-1980s in both political and academic circles. However, it had not gained political traction with Mexican officials at all during the de la Madrid administration and was scarcely discussed during the first year of the Salinas government.[722] Free trade with the United States was not seen as politically feasible. Furthermore, it was not clear that it was desirable. Mexico had feared that economic openness would make it vulnerable to U.S. pressures. However, even without an FTA, more than 77 percent of Mexican exports were being sold to the United States.[723] With the decision to pursue an FTA, Mexico did not give up the notion of lessening its dependence on the United States. Rather, its leaders recognized that in the status quo, Mexico was already very economically dependent. Politically, Mexico was more vulnerable when these exports relied on a mish-mash of short-term agreements. Mexican exporters depended on the generalized system of preferences, under which Mexico could export under low or zero tariffs—but only if those exports stayed under set quotas. Serra noted that some of large, export-driven industries were shutting down before the end of the year to avoid violating the GSP. Even domestic businesses were reluctant to make large investments when their market access depended on frequent quota negotiations. The Mexican team accepted many of the arguments made to them by European leaders. As part of a North American market, Mexico would be an interesting partner for trade

[721] Salinas de Gortari, *México: Un Paso Dificil a la Modernidad*, pp. 50-51.

[722] Interviews with Serra Puche and Aspe.

[723] The United States imported $27.186 billion dollars in goods from Mexico in 1989, out of a total of $35.171 billion of total Mexican exports. Foreign Trade Division of the U.S. Census Bureau and WTO Statistics Database, respectively.

and investment—a gateway to U.S. consumers. Serra and Salinas did not relinquish their goal of diversifying Mexico's economic ties. Rather, they adopted a radically new strategy.[724]

On the one hand, Salinas' core goals had not changed. His priority was to spur economic growth, which would maintain PRI popularity in the face of increasing democratization. On the other, the decision represented a major shift from the longtime Mexican goal of autonomy from the United States through the avoidance of dependence. The recalculation of interests was possible in part because the Salinas administration saw the goal of autonomy so differently, as a question of interdependence instead of dependence. Whereas dependence made Mexico more vulnerable to U.S. pressures, an understanding based on interdependence meant that Mexico could gain new leverage. This was particularly true on economic issues, where Serra Puche was eager to secure guaranteed market access. However, political advisor Córdoba Montoya indicated that he saw this interdependence as the best way to pursue Mexico's long-term political interests, too. Though Mexico's geographical proximity to the United States was going to change, the understanding of it shifted so dramatically as to require a new Mexican foreign policy. As Domínguez and Fernández de Castro argue, the shifting international landscape also weighed heavily. In 1990, Salinas mentioned privately that the world was moving to "an apparent reliance on blocs" and that Mexico would need to join or be passed by.[725]

The U.S. reaction

U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills' first response to Serra was ambivalent. She was glad that Mexico wanted to lock in reforms and lower tariffs; however, her near-term priority

[724] In fact, Mexico has remained stubbornly dependent on the U.S. market to buy its exports. In 1990, nearly 70 percent of Mexican trade was with the United States. This figure has stayed fairly steady and only declined slightly starting in about 2005.

[725] Carlos Salinas, in conversation with Robert A. Pastor, July 28, 1990. Robert A. Pastor personal papers.

was to conclude the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. Serra argued that the two sets of negotiations were "not incompatible." While Hills agreed, she was cognizant of the limited attention of high-level officials and USTR's limited resources to attack two simultaneous, complex problems. Hills told Serra she would have to consult with her president. For one part, the Mexican proposal converged with longstanding U.S. goals of opening markets to freer trade. However, the U.S. preference had long been for global trade regimes—namely the GATT—instead of regional blocs that it might be shut out from. At Canada's request, the Reagan administration had already taken a step away from the globalist position and agreed to negotiate a bilateral trade agreement. The ongoing Uruguay Round of the GATT talks was bogged down in disputes between the United States and Europe on agriculture, services, and intellectual property. However, USTR was hopeful that it could break the stalemate and achieve a number of major U.S. trade priorities in the round.

Having taken the decision to approach the United States, Mexican leaders did not wish to wait for the completion of the Uruguay Round to start bilateral talks. In part, they were conscious that making concessions or liberalizing in the GATT negotiations could lower their bargaining leverage at the bilateral level. Plus, they had a political need to quickly establish macroeconomic stability and create a positive environment to attract investment. While they saw the GATT as generally useful, it did not offer Mexico the direct and high-profile benefits of securing open access to the world's largest economy. The Mexican leadership was betting that expectations created by FTA negotiations would spur an economic boost. Wanting to prevent any delay, Mexico appealed to the highest levels of the administration and the closest confidantes of Bush. Serra talked with Secretaries Baker and Mosbacher—both from Texas. In his memoirs, Baker writes that "even while we had been negotiating the Canadian FTA we had thought about the

benefits of expanding it to a continent-wide free-trade zone." Baker held Salinas in high regard.[726] Córdoba Montoya developed a relationship with National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft. U.S. Ambassador Negroponte also provided a sympathetic ear and pathway to President Bush. Shortly after the Mexican proposal, the group of American officials gathered with Bush to discuss the possibility of negotiations with Mexico, and how this might relate to the ongoing GATT talks. If there was any serious thought of delaying trade negotiations with Mexico until after the Uruguay Round, President Bush ended it. For the United States, long-term foreign policy interests trumped multilateral trade goals.

In early 1990, when Salinas called Bush to personally propose negotiations, the Mexican president referenced the rapidly changing international environment. The two countries had been pursuing incremental negotiations on trade and investment during Salinas' first year. Salinas told Bush: "I think now that what's happening in the world and in Mexico suggests that we should speed up and broaden the scope of negotiations. So Mexico is willing to initiate a negotiation for a free trade agreement with the United States." Europe would be gaining an advantage from the cheaper labor in the opening eastern bloc, Salinas noted adding: "On the other hand, Mr. President, in Mexico I want to consolidate the new policies for a market-oriented economy." Bush responded warmly to the idea, which he had already heard from Hills and others. The two presidents agreed they would quietly explore free trade, but that they would wait until they met in June to make any public statements.[727] With the strong personal commitment of the two presidents, the administration quickly accepted the Mexican proposal.

---

[726] Baker and DeFrank, *The Politics of Diplomacy : Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989-1992,* pp. 43.

[727] "Telephone conversation with President Salinas de Gortari of Mexico," March 8, 1990, GBL.

As Serra's remark about "antibodies" indicates, the Mexicans were concerned that opposition to the negotiations would quickly mobilize—in both Mexico and the United States—if they were not able to lay sufficient groundwork. When Bush and Salinas talked in February, they agreed to go about building a base for the agreement before making it public. That secrecy lasted only a month before word leaked to the *Wall Street Journal*. The leak was followed by more infelicitous news. The Mexican doctor Humberto Álvarez Machaín, suspected of involvement in the torture and killing of U.S. Drug Enforcement agent Enrique Camarena, was forcibly kidnapped from Mexico and deposited in the United States to stand trial. The action drew condemnation from Mexico. In other times, the two events might have halted any talks. However, while the Mexican government condemned the kidnapping, it did not let the brazen act sour the overall relationship or derail the preliminary talks. Salinas set about convincing the PRI, business leaders, and the public that an FTA with the United States was now the best course for the country's future—something they had rejected in October. The Mexican cabinet set up a series of forums across the country, and Salinas made frequent trips around Mexico to speak in favor of the policy. Initially, several large unions opposed the idea. However, the PRI's control over labor groups remained tight. Nearly all of Mexican labor was under the leadership of one man, Fidel Velázquez, who had led the Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos for decades. That group was closely linked to the ruling party, so once Velázquez was brought on board, labor ceased to be an obstacle.

In an important move, in September 1990, leaders in Secofi decided to create a forum for consultation with Mexican industry, called Coordinadora de Organismos de Comercio Exterior (COECE), which was headed by influential businessman Guillermo Güemez. COECE served four main purposes. On one side, it was an important source of information for Mexican

negotiators about what specific Mexican industries needed in terms of market access and transition time to a more open economy. Secondly, the group helped get business leaders to buy into the FTA and turned many of them into advocates. Third, those same leaders had important business networks in the United States, and were able to help convince their U.S. counterparts to support NAFTA. Finally, members of COECE later traveled to negotiations, garnering the nickname of "the side room," or *el cuarto de al lado*. With Mexican labor and business both supportive, approval from the Mexican Senate to seek the agreement was a formality. The body was controlled by the PRI, and the legislature was subordinated to the presidency. The Senate concluded its brief debate and recommended on May 21, 1990 that Mexico seek a trade agreement—months before Bush presented his own notification to the U.S. Congress.

Mexico's leaders initially wanted to include Canada in the negotiations—and briefly considered requesting admission to the already signed U.S.-Canada pact instead of starting new negotiations as a quicker route.[728] Some in Secofi hoped that by making the negotiations trilateral, they could blunt domestic criticism that the pact represented a capitulation to the United States. They also hoped to learn about negotiating with the United States from the Canadian experience. In May 1990, Serra met with his Canadian counterpart John Crosbie and told him that Canada would have a seat at the table if it wished. Initially, Crosbie rebuffed the offer. The U.S.-Canada pact had been a contentious issue in the recently completed Canadian elections, and the Canadian government hoped to avoid a politically costly repeat. In addition, the Canadians had mixed feelings about helping Mexico achieve an FTA with the United States—potentially sharing their advantageous access to the U.S. market.

[728] Bush told Salinas in their March 1990 conversation that it would be better to have bilateral negotiations because of political complications in Canada. Mulroney visited Mexico City the week after the Bush-Salinas phone conversation, and Bush suggested that Salinas sound out the Canadian position.

However, just weeks after Serra's visit to Montreal, Canada suddenly changed its stance. Accepting the seriousness with which the U.S. and Mexico were pursuing an agreement, Canada decided it was too risky to remain on the sidelines, given its overwhelming reliance on trade with the United States. A Secofi memo noted: "During the last days, there has been a radical change in the position of the Canadian government regarding the FTA. After emphatically expressing its desire to remain on the sidelines, they have recently approached the Mexican government expressing a desire to engage in the negotiations."[729] Canada's about-face triggered an argument over the costs and benefits of including Canada. Serra was skeptical. Figuring that the Canadians might now want to join just to act as spoilers, Mexico opposed expanding the talks. Secofi argued: "Canada already has its agreement; therefore, the cost of failure in the FTA is much less (almost zero) than for Mexico. This means that Canada could be inflexible regarding Mexican interests."[730] Instead of opposing Canadian inclusion, Secofi argued that the U.S.-Mexico agreement should be completed first, and then the three countries could look to create a free trade area based on the two bilateral agreements.[731] As late as September 25, 1990, Bush noted to Salinas that "The Canadians came on like a ton of bricks on this thing, but late." While the U.S. would "consult" with Canada, it was willing to proceed to bilateral discussions with Mexico "if these consultations [with the Canadians] get complicated." Baker agreed that trilateral negotiations would be unduly complex. Mexico, Salinas insisted, preferred the bilateral track.

Secofi pressed USTR to move ahead with the formal notification to Congress, hoping the announcement would coincide with Salinas' trip to Washington in mid-June 1990. Formal

[729] SECOFI, "ATC," May 30, 1990, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior, n.p.

[730] Ibid.

[731] Mexico adopted this argument starting in September 1990 when Canada confirmed its interest in joining trilateral talks. SECOFI, "Canada y el ABC," January 23, 1991, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior, n.p.

notification would start a period of 60 legislative days for hearings and comment before the executive could begin talks. USTR maintained it would not be ready for that step until at least December.[732] Despite Bush's warm embrace of the idea, USTR's attention to the GATT talks and the disagreement over whether Canada would participate kept the talks from beginning as quickly as the Mexican team would have liked. When the two presidents met for a private dinner on June 10, they agreed in principle to seek an FTA and ordered Hills and Serra to study the possibility and return with recommendations.[733] USTR and Secofi had, of course, been studying the desirability of the agreement for quite some time, and the political decision to proceed had already been made. The presidents' announcement bought time for preparations and consultations, primarily at USTR's request. The White House, along with Baker, pressed USTR to speed the start of negotiations. Serra and Hills returned their recommendations in early August that an FTA would be beneficial. After receiving a formal letter from Salinas requesting trade talks, Bush notified Congress in late September that he would seek extension of his fast-track negotiating authority for both the Uruguay Round and trade talks with Mexico. Writing to Salinas, Bush emphasized both the economic and foreign relations rationales for the agreement.

> I share your conviction that such an agreement would provide an historic opportunity to expand trade and investment, thereby contributing to sustained economic growth and greater economic prosperity for our peoples. This would be an important milestone in further enhancing our relationship and meeting the new challenges and opportunities posed by the sweeping changes occurring throughout the globe.[734]

As the United States and Mexico initiated the process, the question of Canadian participation remained. In January 1991, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney appealed directly to Bush, who

---

[732] SECOFI, "Estado de las pláticas del ABC," June 4, 1990, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior, n.p.

[733] Clyde Farnsworth, "Free-trade talks seen with Mexico," *New York Times*, June 11, 1990, pp. D1.

[734] George Bush to Carlos Salinas, letter, September 25, 1990, in "Informe de los trabajos del TLC," SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior, annex 2.

preferred to accommodate Canadian wishes. With Bush now pressing for Canadian inclusion, Serra backed down. Before doing so, however, he obtained a letter signed by all three sides stating that if one party became an obstacle to the completion of the talks, the other two sides would be free to continue negotiations on a bilateral basis. Serra later said: "That is a letter that I pushed for, because for a moment I thought the Canadians were going to be party poopers. But they weren't."[735] Serra wrote his Canadian counterpart:

> "The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement will not be used a means to frustrate that objective or delay the conclusion of a North American free trade agreement responsive to the needs and aspiration of all three Parties; nor are the trilateral negotiations intended as a means to renegotiate the provisions of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement."[736]

Salinas and Bush were both personally involved in launching the negotiations, and even after they had agreed to proceed trilaterally, they shared concerns that Canadian participation could slow negotiations. The two presidents' commitment marked the initiation of negotiations and would be crucial when the talks got stuck. Bush privately told Salinas: "I want this Free Trade Agreement to be one of the major accomplishments of your and my presidencies. You've got my personal commitment to the success of the negotiation."[737]

Lobbying: Redefining non-intervention

When Mexico decided to pursue an FTA in early 1990, it did so with an economic team that boasted sterling academic credentials but very little experience in international trade negotiations. This lack of firsthand experience, a legacy of Mexico's decades of relative

[735] Author interview with Serra Puche.

[736] Serra Puche to John C. Crosbie, letter, February 5, 1991, in annex to "Seguimiento de los trabajos del TLC," February 12, 1991, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior.

[737] Bush, "Telephone conversation with President Carlos Salinas de Gortari of Mexico," February 5, 1991, GBPL. Online: http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/memcons_telcons/1991-02-05--Salinas.pdf

separation from the world economy, meant the Salinas government faced a steep learning curve. Though many key policymakers had studied in the United States, it took them several months to grasp that negotiations with the United States on trade policy would be much different than traditional foreign policy discussions—particularly concerning the degree of the U.S. Congress' involvement. Mexico had traditionally proclaimed an aversion to foreign interference in any issue that it considered domestic. The Foreign Ministry avoided close involvement in other countries' political processes, particularly with the United States. Mexico typically followed formal diplomatic channels, eschewing direct contacts with the White House. It was even less engaged with the U.S. Congress. Unlike many other countries, Mexico had not maintained a staff of lobbyists—or even a congressional liaison office in its embassy.

However, Mexico dramatically altered these behaviors in pursuit of a trade agreement. It was quickly clear that the fate of the FTA could be decided before negotiations with USTR began. In order to effectively negotiate a trade agreement with Mexico and to continue the Uruguay Round, Bush needed an extension of fast-track negotiating authority from Congress. There was little opposition to the ongoing GATT talks; however, the notion of free trade with Mexico spurred resistance from some labor and environmental groups. Mexican leaders worried that labor's Congressional allies would split fast-track approval into two votes, one for Mexico and the other for GATT. Passage of fast-track for the multilateral talks coupled with a denial for Mexico would be an intense political blow for Salinas—an approval of free trade but an explicit rejection of Salinas' gamble for closer ties to the U.S. economy.

A second factor led Mexico to adopt a dramatic, new approach regarding the U.S. Congress. Salinas tapped Secofi as the secretariat directly responsible for trade negotiations, largely sidelining the Foreign Ministry and Secretary Fernando Solana from the discussion. A

more traditional Mexican diplomat, Solana was more skeptical about the benefits of such close ties with the United States. Solana was rarely included in meetings of the economic cabinet, where key decisions about the negotiations were made. The Foreign Ministry was further marginalized from the trade talks because Salinas had named Ambassador to the United States Gustavo Petricioli, an economist and former secretary of Secofi. According to an official who worked with Petricioli during the NAFTA negotiations, on trade matters the embassy reported to Secofi and not the Foreign Ministry.[738]

Secofi recommended hiring lobbyists and legal advisors in the United States as early as June 1990, shortly after Salinas' meeting with Bush.[739] This coincided with Secofi's first analyses of U.S. fast-track procedures, recognizing it was a "fundamental piece of achieving approval of the final agreement." At the same time, Secofi was studying the U.S.-Canadian trade negotiations. At first, Secofi planned to coordinate with the Mexican embassy in Washington the hiring of a legal advisor and a lobbying firm. However, as the fast-track debate unfolded, Secofi created its own office in Washington to direct its lobbying efforts. Announced on September 5, 1990, it was led by Herman von Bertrab, a former Jesuit professor of Herminio Blanco, Mexico's chief negotiator and Serra Puche's key deputy. Von Bertrab wrote that individuals at Washington think tanks advised the Mexican team that it was customary and important for foreign countries to hire lobbyists to deal with the U.S. government. Eventually, the Washington office would hire five lobbying firms, several legal advisors, and a number of public relations consultants. Von Bertrab wrote: "If lobbyists did not exist, we would have had to invent them, for we could not

[738] Interview with Manuel Suárez-Mier, April 6, 2012, Washington, D.C.

[739] SECOFI, "ABC estrategia," June 25, 1990, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior, n.p.

participate in a game without understanding its rules."[740] One of the first people the Mexican government hired was Robert Herzstein, an influential Washington lawyer and former undersecretary in the Department of Commerce. From the outset, Herzstein advised the Mexican team that their negotiations would be not just with USTR but with 535 members of Congress. "They took that to heart," he said.[741]

Likewise, USTR's frequent and early references to Congress, both as a source of constraints on the U.S. position and in relation to the delay in initiating negotiations, helped focus Secofi's attention on the topic.[742] Mexican leaders saw maintaining a single fast-track vote as a top priority, with high political costs for failure. The main bureaucratic players who would have opposed the new strategy were not at the table, and given Mexico's closed political system, there was little room for dissent after the decision was made—though there certainly was some criticism in the Mexican press over the spending for and role of foreign lobbyists. Later, the Mexican deputy negotiator Jaime Zabludovsky noted that the slowness to initiate negotiations and of the fast-track proceedings was a disguised blessing for the Mexican team, which was eager, but in truth, too inexperienced to begin negotiations in 1990.[743] Mexico intensified its effort in February 1991. Serra and von Bertrab visited influential Democratic Representative Bill Richardson, who warned them that as things stood, they were in real danger of losing the fast-track vote. After this warning, Mexico stepped up its visits to Congress, tried to mobilize sympathetic groups from business and the Hispanic community, and planned trips to Mexico for

---

[740] von Bertrab, *Negotiating NAFTA : a Mexican Envoy's Account*, pp. 15.

[741] Author interview with Robert E. Herzstein, April 16, 2012, Washington, D.C.

[742] USTR stressed that it needed to complete consultations with Congress before sending formal notification. SECOFI, "ABC estrategia," June 25, 1990, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior, n.p.

[743] Author interview with Jaime Zabludovsky, May 14, 2012, Mexico City, Mexico.

Congressional delegations.[744] This also represented a significant change in how the Mexican government had related with its citizens in the United States. Mexico had eschewed any sort of attempts to organize emigrants for two reasons: first, it would violate its foreign policy tenet of nonintervention, and second, it was not clear how the migrants would relate to the ruling PRI.[745]

In another first, the Mexican government launched a U.S. public relations campaign. The debate on trade was peppered with uncomplimentary images of Mexico as a country of poverty, corruption, drugs, violence, and hordes of cheap unskilled laborers. Mexico approached this on two fronts. Regarding trade, the Mexican government organized a "road show" in which Mexican officials traveled across the United States to make public presentations on the benefits of the trade agreement, sometimes in conjunction with U.S. officials, including Treasury Secretary Mosbacher. More broadly, Mexico launched an effort to positively present Mexican history and culture, with museum exhibits and events in thirty-one key U.S. media markets.[746]

Fast track

The lobbying from Mexico, the Bush administration, and business allies improved the fast-track bill's prospects in Congress. Both governments sought to placate Congressional concerns on labor and environment, providing plans and assurances to influential members such as Illinois Representative Dan Rostenkowski and Missouri Senator Richard Gephardt. The fast-track process put the Mexican government in the odd position of closely cooperating with USTR and other parts of the administration—even though they would soon be across the table negotiating. One internal Secofi document advised that until fast-track authority was approved:

---

[744] von Bertrab, *Negotiating NAFTA : a Mexican Envoy's Account*, pp. 13.

[745] Alexandra Delano, *Mexico and Its Diaspora in the United States : Policies of Emigration since 1848* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), ch. 4.

[746] von Bertrab, *Negotiating NAFTA : a Mexican Envoy's Account*, pp. 25.

> The lobbying program will take particular care to closely coordinate everything with the Bush administration. In particular, all the meetings or discussions with U.S. Congress people will take place in close contact with USTR to maintain a coordinated, univocal message, and to avoid exaggerating the Mexican presence in the U.S. Congress.[747]

In early April, as Congress prepared for the vote, Salinas and Bush once again met in Houston, this time as presidents, to promote a free-trade agreement. Salinas was also there to support Mexico's PR and lobbying campaign, making a seven-city tour through the United States to press for fast-track approval. Even a few years earlier, it would have been difficult to fathom such intense Mexican participation in U.S. domestic politics.

While the focus before negotiations was primarily on the economic aspects of a potential free trade agreement, sectors of the Salinas government recognized the negotiation's importance to U.S. foreign policy. Serra says that he tried to keep the negotiations contained to economic questions, but they clearly unfolded in a political context. When negotiations were at risk—due to delays or pressures from Congress or U.S. industry—Mexico did not hesitate to frame their importance to U.S. national interests. The Mexican government knew that Mexico's stability was of paramount importance to the United States, and that the cohort of Texans in the White House clearly thought so. In preparations for the Salinas-Bush meeting, Mexico wanted to make clear the immense importance of the fast-track vote and to implicitly link the negotiations to broader changes in Mexico-U.S bilateral relations. In a briefing for the meeting, Secofi noted:

> It would be convenient to take advantage of the meeting [between Salinas and Bush] to reiterate how much is at risk in this process. The Mexican government has come to the United States in a gesture of confidence and friendship, which is not without risks. The rejection by the U.S. Congress of the Mexican initiative to negotiate an FTA would have a very negative effect on national public opinion. The great advances made in the bilateral relation would be seriously threatened by a de-authorization of the negotiation with Mexico.[748]

---

[747] "Informe de los trabajos del TLC" March 27, 1991, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior.

[748] "Informe de los trabajos del TLC" March 27, 1991, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior.

It has often been argued in the literature that before NAFTA, Mexico was extremely hesitant to accept linkages between different issues on the bilateral agenda, out of concern that this would weaken its position vis-à-vis the United States. A number of authors have argued that Mexico's more recent acceptance of linkage resulted from processes and interdependence created by NAFTA.[749] In fact, even during the earliest stages of NAFTA negotiations, Mexican officials realized the connections between enhanced trade relations and other foreign policy issues.

The Mexican team argued that it had made major, recent improvements to both environmental and labor legislation. It tried to combat critics, who noted that Mexico's legislation was OK on paper, but laxly enforced. With an eye on the negotiations, Mexico stepped up inspections and prosecutions of environmental violations and addressed problems that affected U.S. border cities. Eventually, Mexico was able to convince Gephardt, who drew much of his support for labor, to back the fast-track extension. Gephardt's approval, though only lukewarm, provided cover for a host of Democrats to support an extension of fast-track. In late May 1991, the House and Senate re-authorized Bush's fast-track authority both for a North American trade agreement and the ongoing Uruguay Round, without adding any specific environmental or labor riders.[750] More than a year after Salinas phoned Bush with the proposal, talks to form a North American free trade area could finally begin in earnest.

---

[749] For a general argument, see Miles Kahler, *Liberalization and Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia university press, 1997). On the link between NAFTA and Mexico's approach to migration, see Delano, *Mexico and Its Diaspora in the United States : Policies of Emigration since 1848*.

[750] On labor and environment, the House passed nonbinding resolutions noting the importance of the topics, but they had no legal force. Cameron and Tomlin, *The Making of NAFTA : How the Deal Was Done*, pp. 76, Salinas de Gortari, *México: Un Paso Dificil a la Modernidad*, pp. 104-105.

Negotiations: Mexico's goals and strategy

As the fast-track debate came to an end, the Mexican team—lead by Serra Puche, Zabludovsky, and Blanco—began to enunciate its opening negotiating positions while also considering how it would strategically cede ground, largely in exchange for guarantees on market access. Many in Mexico, including in supportive industries, argued that the developing country should receive special consideration. However, the guiding goal for Mexican policymakers was to secure access to the U.S. market, and it was clear that the United States and Canada would not concede an across-the-board special transition period for Mexican industry without extraordinary protections for key U.S. and Canadian goods—what the Mexican team termed "excessive compensation."[751] In fact, the Mexican team rarely worried about the agreement going too far on economic reform—though it did want to exclude labor, environment, and political matters from talks. Instead, they considered the question to be what the "minimal FTA that would be politically acceptable in Mexico."[752]

At the beginning of negotiations, the Mexican team was extremely optimistic about how quickly an agreement could be concluded. This stemmed in part from their lack of experience, but also because they were willing to use the CUSFTA as a base in many respects. In mid-June 1991, they expected an agreement could be ready by January 1992, or perhaps even earlier. The Mexican team was attentive to the U.S. electoral calendar. The fast-track debate had vividly illustrated that the negotiations could ignite a political firestorm. At that time, though, President Bush was enjoying sky-high approval ratings in the wake of the Gulf War, and it did not appear the debate over trade negotiations would pose a serious threat to him politically. As negotiations

[751] "Aranceles," draft, June 7, 1991, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior, pp. 1.

[752] "Informe GE junio 10, 1991," June 10, 1991, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior, pp. 1-58.

got under way, problems became more evident. However, the Mexican negotiators often said they believed the remaining differences could be resolved quickly, with Zabludovsky noting that for months he thought each major meeting could be the final session. Their initial optimism befuddled the Americans Jules Katz and Chip Roh. Cameron and Tomlin note: "Incredibly, on some issues the Mexicans were acting, at least in the American view, as though they were actually on the verge of a deal, when in fact the two parties remained far apart."[753]

One of Mexico's top priorities was to secure access to the United States (and Canada to a much lesser degree) for fruit and vegetable exports. On the whole, U.S. tariffs on Mexican goods were already fairly low. However, this was not the case for many agricultural products in which Mexico directly competed with U.S. growers. Tariffs were not the only issue. In some cases, Mexican produce was prohibited from entering the United States at all, or suffered from what Mexicans saw as arbitrary treatment at the border due to health and sanitary restrictions. When prices on some products fell, Mexican products could be excluded under U.S. laws meant to "safeguard" U.S. agriculture from influxes of imports. A Secofi position paper stated its goal: "Mexico will seek the immediate drawdown of tariff barriers that affect its [agricultural] exports."[754] However, as the Mexican negotiators realized, this position was inconsistent with the Mexican position on its own corn and bean growers. Those sectors were dominated by small producers who lacked the scale, technology, capital, and in many cases, the favorable environmental conditions of U.S. grains farmers. The Mexican team knew how politically and socially dangerous reforming agriculture would be, noting that more than two million Mexicans

[753] Cameron and Tomlin, *The Making of NAFTA : How the Deal Was Done*, pp. 95-96.

[754] "Aranceles," draft, June 7, 1991, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior, pp. 27.

worked in corn production.[755] Serra Puche and others in the administration believed that the Mexican countryside was in desperate need of reform and that eventually Mexican *campesinos* would have to face the realities of the global market. However, those reforms would require the PRI to roll back what many saw as the gains of the Mexican revolution. "It had a huge ideological background behind it and not much economic rationality," Serra Puche said, years later. "We had already started [eliminating] the *precios de garantia* and the *ejidos*. It was necessary for the countryside in Mexico."[756] Economic necessity did not make the process easy.

Despite those initial changes to domestic policy, Mexico was slow to make internal decisions about how to approach corn in the talks. This indecision slowed the progress of the agricultural group, where the United States was pressing for broad access. The Mexican team realized that requesting special treatment for corn would undermine its arguments for other products. Any significant action on agriculture would require the direct involvement of President Salinas. On September 4, 1991, Serra Puche made his case to Salinas in an economic cabinet meeting "that if we refused to open up to corn imports, the U.S. would refuse to open up its horticultural products." Other cabinet members noted the potential for "tremendous social upheaval" if the PRI tried to rapidly change the staid Mexican countryside. Salinas pressed the cabinet to come up with forms of social support for the countryside that could be compatible with trade liberalization and economic modernization.[757]

For manufactured goods, Mexico wanted to move beyond the GSP and frequent short-term negotiations in order to encourage investment. The United States and Canada were worried

[755] Ibid., pp. 22.

[756] Author interview with Serra Puche, May 2, 2012.

[757] Salinas de Gortari, *México: Un Paso Dificil a la Modernidad*, pp. 116.

about third-country companies using Mexico as a tariff-free export platform. However, Mexican industrialists represented in COECE tended to agree that the U.S.-Canada agreement was a good model. CUSFTA had a basic rules-of-origin content requirement that 50 percent of a product's value had to originate within the region. In most industries, a 50-percent rule would not require substantial changes in manufacturing practices. A summary of a *gabinete economic* meeting from mid-June 1991 concluded: "The establishment of integration requirements of less than 50 percent seems undesirable from the Mexican point of view, as they would not create incentives to invest in the country."[758] However, in autos, Mexico adopted a different stance. Initially, its domestic producers—dominated by U.S.-based Ford and General Motors—wanted content standards as high as 70 percent. This was even higher than the U.S.-Canada trade pact, and would especially benefit Mexican auto parts producers. Mexico had also experienced a recent boom in Japanese and Korean auto investment, which led companies like Nissan to ask for lower requirements or long transition periods.[759]

In addition to setting goals, the Mexican team sought to identify what it would not give up and what it considered to be bargaining chips. Mexico had long controlled key sectors primarily through import permits, which the Mexican team had decided as early as July 1991 would be incompatible with an agreement that gave Mexico the market access it sought. In a draft position paper on tariffs, Secofi officials noted: "In the FTA it is clear that the possibility of eliminating restrictions on our exports will largely depend on our own willingness to eliminate the system of advance permits in the sectors where there is an exporting interest for the U.S. and

[758] "Informe del GE del 17 de junio de 1991," June 17, 1991, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior, pp. 15.

[759] "Aranceles," draft, June 7, 1991, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior, pp. 19.

Canada (grains, dairy, some fruits, poultry, autos, pharmaceuticals, among others)."[760] Despite that realization, Mexican negotiators continued to argue for months that the permitting system was needed in some sectors—though they primarily hoped to trade it for other concessions.

Perhaps the most crucial area where Mexico held back in the hope of making trade-offs was in banking and financial services. The debt crisis of the early 1980s had forced the Mexican government to nationalize the banking sector. The Salinas administration did not believe it could effectively enter the world economy with a government-controlled banking sector, so Salinas directed finance minister Pedro Aspe to start privatizing financial institutions early on. The troubled banking sector made access to capital difficult and expensive for Mexican businesses. For that reason, the Mexican team was eager to reform banking. However, the newly privatized banks were seen as economically weak and politically vulnerable, given that connected individuals had bought banks without the expectation of facing foreign competition. Still, for Secofi's leaders, the promise of broader benefits and tangible U.S. concessions outweighed those concerns. The tariffs position paper continued:

> In financial services, the FTA represents an opportunity to receive important concessions in exchange for an opening that, under the right conditions, could generate substantial economic benefits, including in the short term. The cost of financial inputs, of great importance in the whole economy, could be substantially reduced as a result of the arrival of foreign institutions, without a major displacement of national ones. … The FTA with Mexico in financial services has a great value to the United States, above all as a precedent for multilateral negotiations, to the point that the absence of substantial concessions in the topic would make the treaty unacceptable for the U.S.[761]

The approaches to agriculture and financial services illustrate the central tenet of the Mexican negotiating strategy. Serra Puche, Zabludovsky, and Blanco believed that Mexico independently needed to make most of the reforms that would be considered "concessions" in negotiations. The

[760] Ibid., pp. 7.

[761] Ibid., pp. 31.

negotiations presented the advantages of receiving something in return for difficult reforms while also making them more politically palatable. A summary for the *gabinete económico* noted that the widespread possibilities offered by an FTA: "The FTA creates a unique possibility to carry out wholesale trade liberalization both of ourselves and of our primary trading partner, which will create fundamental benefits for the country."[762] Mexico's position reflected a belief that economic liberalization was worth the political costs, and that those costs could be reduced by including them as tradeoffs in the FTA.

The *gabinete económico* also discussed Mexico's "red lines" early on, saying that Mexico would not grant anything that would require changes to the constitution. Salinas announced on November 26, 1990 that the constitutional prohibitions on the energy sector would not be on the table—though there was considerable diversity of opinion within Mexico about what could be liberalized short of a constitutional revision. In Mexico, nearly all activities tied to petroleum were controlled by the state-owned Petróleos Méxicanos, or Pemex. Pemex's revenues constituted a substantial portion of the Mexican federal budget; its powerful union was a major employer and political force. Beyond that, state control of petroleum had important historical roots as a rejection of what many saw as excessive foreign control and exploitation of the Mexican economy under the long reign of President Porfirio Diaz. The nationalized oil industry was a major legacy of the PRI. Before the first official trilateral session, the Mexican negotiators maintained that there should not be a specific negotiating group for energy. Such a move would stir too much controversy within Mexico, they feared, and strengthen the hand of critics. During the pre-negotiation phase, the U.S. had accepted Mexico's position, but during the June 12, 1991 meeting, Carla Hills insisted that "respecting the Mexican constitution, there was

[762] "Informe del GE del 17 de junio de 1991," June 17, 1991, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior, pp. 13.

still room to discuss the topic in the FTA."[763] Given that energy had been a major point of debate in the U.S.-Canada deal, neither of the northern countries was ready to give Mexico a free pass. Though Mexico eventually acquiesced to having an energy group, it maintained a hard line on energy issues on which the United States pressed it—guaranteed emergency supplies; foreign investment in production, distribution or sales; and no shared-risk contracts.[764] This was by far the biggest issue Mexico wanted to exclude. Oil was perhaps the only real deal breaker for Mexico, so long as the United States guaranteed market access, agreed to restrict protectionist responses, and was bound by an adequate dispute resolution mechanism.

Mexico's concerns about the strength of dispute resolution mechanisms were tied to its new conceptualization about how to approach relations with its powerful neighbor. Whereas Mexico had long tried to exclude U.S. influence from its politics or U.S. domination of its economy, the Salinas government decided that Mexico should instead seek to bind the U.S. into institutional arrangements. Mexico's concern was not U.S. power, which was an undisputed fact, but the arbitrary use of that power. In trade issues, Mexico realized these actions were often driven by domestic politics. From the beginning of negotiations, the Mexican team took aim at U.S. anti-dumping laws or other measures that could undermine in practice the benefits it had gained in principle at the negotiating table. U.S refusal to curtail these practices probably constituted the biggest threat to the negotiations from the Mexican perspective, as Secofi officials noted in an update on the progress of talks:

> Failing to achieve significant protections from anti-dumping could not only nullify in practice the other accomplishments made in the negotiation, it would also miss an

[763] "Informe de la reunión ministerial celebrada en Toronto, Canada," June 17, 1991, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior, pp. 1-6.

[764] Mexico's conditions on petroleum were not completely defined in June 1991, but would coalesce into the "five no's," all of which were excluded from the final agreement.

> exceptional opportunity to obtain substantial agreement in the matter. Because of that, we suggest that obtaining major concessions on anti-dumping should be designated as a minimum requirement (deal-breaker) for the FTA itself. This designation would place anti-dumping in the same level of importance that the Americans grant to foreign investment and financial services in the agenda with Mexico, or intellectual property in the negotiations with Canada.[765]

USTR insisted that Congress would not accept any change, and it refused to create a group dedicated to the matter. Negotiator Jules Katz publicly insisted in early July 1991 that the U.S. would not adjust its laws. Eventually, in response to Mexican pressure, Hills and Katz agreed to have a group that included anti-dumping, along with subsidies and unfair trade practices. However, the group made little progress through 1991 due to "U.S. intransigence on discussing seriously the possibility of trilateral agreements." In response, Mexico toughened its positions in other groups, even where its industries privately said they preferred immediate liberalization.[766]

The Mexican negotiators viewed Carla Hills as tactical and patient, willing to move slowly in order to gain concessions. She and Katz were also balancing the FTA negotiations with the stop-and-go talks of the GATT Uruguay Round. Mexico clearly wanted to move quickly, as did some in the U.S. government, such as James Baker, Robert Zoellick, and Brent Scowcroft. Ideally, they would have liked to get U.S. Congressional approval well before the U.S. presidential elections.[767] USTR saw this as unlikely. To drive the point home on how far apart the sides were, the U.S. pressed for draft treaty texts that could be directly compared. After a late

---

[765] SECOFI, "Informe de los trabajos del TLC," July 22, 1991, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior, pp. 1-38.

[766] SECOFI, "Informe GE 2a reunión ministerial," August 16, 1991, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior, pp. 1-28; SECOFI, "Propuesta arancelaria," c. September 1991, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior, pp. 1-4.

[767] SECOFI, "Informe de los trabajos," October 25, 1991, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior, pp. 1-6.

October meeting in Zacatecas, the ministers declared that the stage of exchanging viewpoints was over, and they would create drafts of each treaty chapter by December 1991.[768]

As they had when USTR expressed a preference for postponing FTA talks until after the GATT round, the Mexican cabinet hoped to take advantage of a presidential meeting to gain Bush's direct intervention. Bush invited Salinas to visit Camp David in mid-December. Mexican negotiators believed the delays were largely a function of USTR's strategizing or perhaps their preference for the Uruguay Round. Secofi wrote: "Though it seems possible to conclude the negotiations during the first months of 1992 and to submit the text for Congressional approval before the elections, which demands a presidential mandate to USTR to give the FTA the necessary priority."[769] Baker also wanted to use the presidential meeting to speed the talks and pressure his own team; U.S. negotiators themselves had the sense that higher ups failed to grasp exactly how much distance separated the three parties.[770]

The two presidents came together for a friendly meeting on December 14. Bush stressed to his own officials that he and Salinas "want a NAFTA agreement and we want it as soon as possible." Bush noted that despite political pressure and criticism, "we will not move an inch back." In that meeting, Serra Puche remained optimistic that an agreement could be reached in six weeks, while Hills argued she needed an agreement that Congress would approve. Each side laid out the key remaining problems as it saw them. For Mexico, these lay in agriculture, textiles, autos, and anti-dumping. President Bush brought up energy, which Mexico was still reluctant to discuss. In particular, Bush was curious why Mexico would not allow foreign gas stations. Hills

---

[768] Cameron and Tomlin, *The Making of NAFTA : How the Deal Was Done*, pp. xii, 95-96.

[769] SECOFI, "Gabinete económico: Temas para la entrevista presidencial del 14 de diciembre de 1991," November 26, 1991, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior, pp. 1-9.

[770] Mayer, *Interpreting NAFTA : The Science and Art of Political Analysis*, pp. 130.

raised several other issues, like import permitting and foreign investment in financial services.[771] The Mexican team had privately decided they were willing to dismantle most of the advance permitting system and allow significant investment in banking. However, Mexico continued to hold these concessions back, hoping to use them to bargain on the final deal, though they promised Bush and Hills that they would try to narrow the list of exceptions.

At the end of December, the parties compiled the different texts to create a version where disagreements were in brackets. These were extensive. The bracketed text pushed the Mexican team to the realization that it needed to more clearly define its positions on energy, foreign investment, and financial services. Though much of the energy sector remained off the table, they began to expand the allowable fields of petrochemicals where foreign investment would be constitutionally acceptable. Though they continued to bar risk-sharing contracts, the Mexican team took a major decision to place procurement for energy giants Pemex and the Comisión Federal de Electricidad on the agenda.

With those concessions, Mexico hoped the negotiations would gain steam. As late as the January 14, 1992 meeting of the economic cabinet, Mexico hoped to conclude the FTA in February.[772] When Mexico reiterated its desired timeline in a January 28 meeting with Jules Katz, it drew the consternation of the veteran negotiator, who argued that there had been almost no progress in recent months. Mexico was still postponing a final decision on corn, too, which led Katz to argue that "exceptions are exceptions," and any Mexican limitations on corn would

[771] George Bush, qtd. in, "Memorandum of conversation: Meeting with President Carlos Salinas of Mexico," December 14, 1991, GBPL. Available online: http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/memcons_telcons/1991-12-14--Salinas.pdf

[772] SECOFI, "Gabinete económico: Informe de los trabajos del TLC," January 14, 1992, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior, pp. 1-36.

lead to similar U.S limits on vulnerable agricultural products.[773] Removing most of the major exemptions would require concessions from Mexico, the least open economy. While they realized that, Mexican negotiators were hesitant to be the party giving in on point after point.

To try to jumpstart talks, the three sides scheduled a plenary session in Dallas in which the heads of individual negotiating groups would bring their disagreements to the chief negotiators and ministers, who would try to settle as many of them as possible. The Mexican team exhibited new urgency, reflecting Salinas' strong desire to conclude the treaties with the clearly supportive President Bush instead of taking his chances on the U.S. elections. Because the ratification calendar required months for public comment, debate, and lobbying, the treaties would probably need to be signed by March, Serra Puche and his deputies knew. Their worry grew especially keen as Bush's approval ratings fell along with the weakening U.S. economy. Salinas directly pressured the team to make progress, and before the Dallas meetings, chief negotiator Herminio Blanco sent instructions to each of the negotiating teams instructing them to be more flexible and conclude what they could.[774] The Mexican team was also eager to show major progress—indeed, it hoped for a concluded text—to burnish as deliverables during another presidential meeting scheduled for February 27 in San Antonio.

The talks leapt ahead in the February 17-21 meetings, which the negotiators referred to as the "Dallas jamboree" for the free-wheeling style of bringing in a series of negotiating teams. Exhibiting this sense of urgency, Serra Puche and Blanco unveiled major concessions. Perhaps most significant, they agreed for the first time to remove the permitting and quota system on corn imports, replacing it with tariffs. These tariffs would then be gradually phased out during

---

[773] SECOFI, "Gabinete económico: Informe de los trabajos del TLC," January 28, 1992, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior, pp. 1-9.

[774] Cameron and Tomlin, *The Making of NAFTA : How the Deal Was Done*, pp. 107.

NAFTA's implementation. This change placed corn within the framework used in the rest of negotiations. Different products were sorted into categories labeled A, B, C, and eventually C+, designating how long the tariff phase-out would last. "A" products would be tariff free as soon as the agreement went into effect, while the C+ category would continue to enjoy some level of protection for over a decade. In financial services, the Mexican team opened its position to allow for 100 percent, U.S.-owned subsidiaries. The meeting succeeded in pushing many of the negotiating groups to remove brackets and near common texts, while also serving to highlight the areas in which significant disagreements remained. However, it fell well short of the Mexican goal of having agreements ready for Salinas and Bush's meeting.

Bush used the presidential meeting, held on the margins of a summit on counternarcotics cooperation, to restate his support for the agreement, telling Salinas "I think it's good for the country and I think it's good politics." Both presidents agreed that the agreement needed to be kept broad in order to distribute costs and benefits—that is, they could not solve disagreements by excluding those chapters from the final treaty. Salinas told Bush he thought it was possible to initial the agreements by March 12, allowing for them to be sent to the U.S. Congress before it recessed in August. The Mexican team's reading of the U.S. political situation was that support in Congress was more likely to wane than grow as November neared. Serra and Salinas pushed for a March completion. Mexico's haste was influenced by two other factors. First, the team hoped an agreement would spur interest in the Mexican economy, attracting investment quickly and leading to lower bond yields. Secondly, if the U.S. team felt political pressure to move quickly, they might compromise on some issues that were politically delicate for Salinas. In contrast, Hills pleaded for more time to expand consultations with Congress and the private sector. In addition, after months of being relatively agreeable, the Canadians were growing more

vocal on maintaining protections for products including dairy and poultry.[775] This threatened to complicate the negotiations' end game. Canada at one point threatened to pull out of talks on agriculture and textiles in favor of separate agreements. By June, frustration with the Canadians apparently boiled over into a shouting match between Jules Katz and Canadian negotiator Michael Wilson about whether Canada truly wanted to be engaged in a trilateral negotiation.[776]

After the meeting with Bush and Hills, it was clear that the agreements would not be initialed in mid-March. From the Mexican perspective, seven of the ten negotiating groups were essentially done, with Secofi reporting to the cabinet that they could be completed in a day of negotiation. Government procurement, energy, and investment remained more troublesome. After having made a number of major concessions, Mexico now felt that it was the United States' and Canada's turn to show more flexibility. Salinas' advisor Córdoba Montoya planned a trip to the White House to ask supportive members of the Bush administration to press USTR.[777]

While the list of exceptions was gradually narrowed, the U.S. began pressing for a special, C+ category that would allow for a longer tariff phase-out on brooms, glass, shoes, and ceramics. This created an odd dynamic, in which the United States was now asking Mexico for greater protections. Mexico accepted the extended category, but wanted to shorten the transition time, which U.S. negotiators initially placed at fifteen to twenty years. In a meeting in Toronto, U.S. negotiators even proposed a C++ category. In exchange for the longer transition time, Mexico gained the politically important concession of having an extraordinary phase-out of its

---

[775] Canadian reticence on these products had much to do with their importance in politically restive Quebec. "Memorandum of conversation: Breakfast meeting with Carlos Salinas, President of Mexico," February 27, 1992, GBPL. Available online: http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/memcons_telcons/1992-02-27--Salinas.pdf

[776] SECOFI, "Acuerdo: Informe de los trabajos del TLC," June 8, 1992, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior, pp. 21.

[777] SECOFI, "Acuerdo: Informe ministerial Montreal," April 10, 1992, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior, pp. 1-2.

corn tariffs, starting from very high levels, along with a quota at the initiation of the agreement. However, Blanco continued to insist that the United States reduce the number of items—particularly agricultural ones—that were in the C+ category to a maximum of ten. Mexico was prepared to increase its quota proposal on corn to 2.5 to 3 million tons during NAFTA's initial years in exchange for greater liberalization on its exports.[778]

Mexico arrived to each major meeting with the strong desire to make it the last. Secofi noted with frustration: "As was agreed in the Economic Cabinet, Mexico arrived to the meeting of chief negotiators in Toronto prepared to conclude the majority of remaining topics, leaving three of four subjects to be closed by the secretaries at the last moment. … However, the first day in Toronto, it was evident that the U.S. delegation did not share the Mexican mandate."[779] Meanwhile, Mexico's initial fears that Canada might use the safety of its own trade agreement with the United States in order to play spoiler in the trilateral talks seemed to be vindicated, and the U.S. and Mexico for the first time threatened to drop Canada from the agreement. Increasingly, Mexico began to feel that USTR's request for time for consultations was a negotiating ploy. "Everything indicates that [Katz's] strategy consists of not showing any hurry, denying the existence of dates or deadlines ... At the same time, he has increased pressure on Mexico, demanding concessions that, supposedly, had been agreed upon as excluded and denying any flexibility to Mexican interests."[780] Katz pressed Mexico, telling Blanco that it did

[778] SECOFI, "Reporte de la reunión ministerial bilateral," July 2, 1992, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior, pp. 1, 4-5.

[779] SECOFI, "Informe de los trabajos del TLC," May 25, 1992, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior, pp. 1-6.

[780] SECOFI, "Reporte de la reunión entre HBM, JK, y JW," June 15-20, 1992, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior, pp. 6.

not seem like the Mexicans were prepared to conclude the negotiations. Blanco responded that indeed they were, but that did not mean giving the United States everything it demanded.

The dynamic of negotiation began to change in July 1992, owing in large part to Bush's flagging political fortunes. Bush hoped to make a big splash with the U.S. business community at the Republican National Convention in order to gain momentum in the presidential race's final stretch. Bush and Salinas met in San Diego on July 14, attending the Major League Baseball All-Star Game together, along with their ambassadors. At the game, Bush asked Salinas for the final time about including petroleum in the FTA. U.S. Ambassador Negroponte interjected, explaining that the Mexicans were quite sincere that including oil could make the whole deal politically unpalatable in Mexico. Salinas reiterated that he had mentioned as early as 1990 that petroleum would be a "deal breaker." From there, the United States dropped broad demands on oil and worked with Mexico on more focused concessions in petrochemicals and procurement that might placate the U.S. oil industry and induce it to support the agreement in Congress. The major remaining disagreement on oil regarded whether Mexico would commit to supplying the United States in the event of another oil crisis. Salinas and Serra believed this implied a U.S. right to oil in the ground, an argument that made little sense to the Bush administration. Mexico stayed firm on keeping this out of the agreement, and eventually the U.S. accepted informal assurance that oil contracts would be honored.

With the Republican convention scheduled for August 17, the U.S. team now faced a time crunch. Bush wanted to sign the agreements before the election; however, U.S. law required a 90-day public comment period after the conclusion of talks before the president could sign—to say nothing on Congressional ratification. That meant getting an agreement in the first days of August. Mexico was feeling its own pressures, though they were more economic than political.

Meeting with Bush in San Diego, Salinas said: "The market expects that there will be an agreement, and that it will be finished and signed before the elections. We worry that if we give a number of signals to the market that this is not the case this would be very bad."[781] Both sides began to move more quickly, with Mexico moving closer to the U.S. and Canadian positions on rules of origin for the auto industry while also agreeing to dismantle parts of its complex laws governing the auto industry in Mexico.

Both Salinas and Bush were increasingly engaged in the negotiations by late summer. Bush badly wanted to sign NAFTA, and by U.S. law, the agreement had to be concluded for 90 days before he could do so. "The Americans were getting anxious. The Bush administration wanted the president to be able to sign an agreement before the presidential election in November 1992."[782] While Katz and Hills had for some time stated that the timeline would not dictate their agreements—Hills frequently insisted that the U.S. must have a "good agreement" and not a quick one—that posture weakened under intensified pressure from President Bush.

On August 2, the three teams arrived to Washington's Watergate Hotel. The Mexicans and Americans, at least, were determined to finish the FTA if at all possible. The remaining disagreements centered on government procurement and dispute resolution. Though many of the chapters were nearly resolved, the meetings became a marathon as the Canadian and Mexican teams sensed an opportunity to gain several concessions. As Cameron and Tomlin conclude: "Our analysis of the negotiations process at the Watergate makes it clear that U.S. negotiators felt the presidential pressure to get agreement, that their Mexican and Canadian counterparts

---

[781] "Memorandum of conversation: Meeting with Carlos Salinas, President of Mexico, July 14, 1992, GBPL. Available online: http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/memcons_telcons/1992-07-14--Salinas%20%5B1%5D.pdf

[782] Cameron and Tomlin, *The Making of NAFTA : How the Deal Was Done*, pp. 151.

were aware of it, and that negotiating strategies were changed accordingly." Mexico, which had been ready to give broad access to Pemex's sizable procurement budget, sought to reserve some of it for Mexican firms. Canada continued to hold firm on the cultural exemptions that it had gained in CUSFTA, though the U.S. had hoped to set a new precedent in trilateral talks that it could take to the GATT. Serra Puche had insisted on the principle that no part of the agreement should be considered concluded until the entire agreement was finished, and he tried to use that to improve Mexico's position.

The Mexicans remained concerned that weak dispute settlement mechanisms and a lack of protection from U.S. anti-dumping laws could undermine its market-access gains. Early on, Mexico had proposed using CUSFTA as the model for NAFTA's dispute resolution mechanism. That chapter of CUSFTA established bi-national panels to hear disputes, instead of directing suits to national courts. While CUSFTA was a successful model in many other parts of the agreement, its dispute-resolution mechanisms had drawn considerable criticism from the U.S. Congress, and USTR stressed that they saw the previous mechanism as temporary.[783] The topic had been contentious in the U.S.-Canada talks, and the chapter included a five-year sunset provision and was supposed to be superseded by a permanent arrangement. The Canadians saw the original FTA's panels as largely beneficial and wanted to make them permanent, at least between itself and the United States. Both Canada and Mexico wanted a strong mechanism that would curtail arbitrary, protectionist actions by the United States—in fact, it was one of the few times that the two countries teamed up. There was an additional complication from Mexico's *ley de amparo*, a constitutional provision that allowed Mexican citizens to challenge government decisions. The U.S. worried this could force trade panel decisions into Mexican courts, and it

[783] Dispute resolution was handled in Chapter XVII on the CUSFTA.

was not willing to accept their decisions. Though Mexico had insisted that it would not put constitutional reforms on the table during the negotiations—primarily to protect its energy sector—it offered major domestic legal changes to satisfy U.S. concerns. This did not resolve the issue, however, which turned on the U.S.-Canadian dispute over the mechanism through which those changes would be governed in the agreement, leading the Mexican team to privately call for a suspension of the Watergate meetings.[784] Cameron and Tomlin noted the Mexican team "did so because they did not want the gains they were making on other issues to be undone by failure on the part of the United States and Canada to reach agreement on Chapter Nineteen ['Review and dispute settlement in antidumping and countervailing duty matters']."[785]

The break in negotiations drove home the seriousness of the issue. It was the first time Mexico had moved so aggressively, and it did so at a particularly sensitive time for the Bush administration. With some reluctance, the U.S. team agreed to the Mexican proposal to extend the CUSFTA dispute-resolution mechanism, with minor adjustments regarding the implementation of legal changes in Mexico. The major framework for dispute settlement is contained in Chapter XX, though important mechanisms are included in other chapters on investment disputes (Chapter XI), and unfair trade practices, including anti-dumping and subsidies (Chapter XIX). Chapter XX created a Free Trade Commission comprised of members designated by Cabinet secretaries of the three countries to oversee NAFTA's implementation. The dispute-resolution process includes three stages: consultations, mediation through the

[784] This was referred to as a special review mechanism. Though this was eventually included, it was done so under strict Canadian conditions. On dispute-resolution mechanisms, see Cameron and Tomlin, *The Making of NAFTA : How the Deal Was Done*, pp. 47-49, 168-171, Kessel, *Lo Negociado del TLC : un Análisis Económico sobre el Impacto Sectorial del Tratado Trilateral de Libre Comercio*, Ch. 10.

[785] Cameron and Tomlin, *The Making of NAFTA : How the Deal Was Done*, pp. 171.

commission, and finally a tri-national arbitration panel, which could permit "retaliation through withdrawal of compensating benefit." [786]

The chapter on unfair trade practices had been crucial to the Mexican team from the beginning of the negotiations, when it successfully kept the question on the agenda over U.S. objections. Mexico remained skeptical of U.S. positions on anti-dumping, "snapback" tariffs to protect against import surges, and the use of non-tariff barriers. As one Mexican envoy later wrote: "From a foreign point of view, the United States enters trade agreements only when it retains the ability to carry a big stick if conditions run against its interests. Although no one had the power to take away the stick, it was at least possible to limits its arbitrary use."[787] The debate continued into the Watergate meetings, where USTR continued to appeal to Congressional constraints. As the U.S. insisted, Chapter XVIII allows each country to maintain its own anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws. However, these laws cannot be applied purely on a unilateral basis, and as Canada had insisted, the NAFTA chapter did not include a sunset provision, as the bilateral pact had. In many respects, this chapter extended the framework of the CUSFTA to include Mexico. This included mandatory consultations on any changes to domestic trade laws to prevent conflict and bi-national advisory panels in the event of conflict. Though this chapter also required substantial changes in Mexican law, these were changes that the participants saw as being necessary to improve Mexico's trade and investment climate. The Mexican negotiators noted: "The great majority of these changes were modifications that we planned to undertake anyway, but they had been postponed to have chips in the negotiations."[788]

---

[786] Gilbert R. Winham, "Dispute Settlement in the NAFTA and the FTA," in *Assessing NAFTA : a Trinational Analysis*, ed. Steven Globerman and Michael Walker (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1993), pp. 256-260.

[787] von Bertrab, *Negotiating NAFTA : a Mexican Envoy's Account*, pp. 69.

[788] SECOFI, "Informe final de la negociación del TLC," August 17, 1992, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior, pp. 32.

Agreements on the dispute resolution framework and unfair trade practices largely settled the outstanding disputes between the U.S and Mexico. However, there were outstanding issues between the United States and Canada, and the exhausted negotiators were growing bitter over sticking points in autos, textiles, and the Canadian cultural exemption. The United States, pressed by its powerful motion pictures and recording industries, wanted to do away with a special exemption that had been granted in the CUSFTA to protect Canadian cultural industries. USTR had an eye on GATT talks with the Europeans and did not want to reiterate the precedent for future agreements. Mexico saw the issue as secondary, as it did not fear U.S. media exports as deeply as the Canadians,[789] so the Mexican team was willing to allow Canada an exemption it did not get itself in order to move the deal to completion. Throughout the negotiations and for tense days at the Watergate, the U.S. and Canada went to the mat, until President Bush himself decided, in conjunction with Hills, that he was not willing to risk the agreement to break the exemption. Patience had been USTR's key weapon in extracting concessions from Mexico earlier in the negotiation, but now that the U.S. team felt presidential time pressures, both Canada and Mexico achieved priorities as they closed the deal. Finally, just after midnight on August 12, 1992, the three sides shook hands and completed the agreement.[790]

In its immediate, internal assessment of the talks, the Mexican team was extremely pleased. Most importantly, Mexico had gotten a broad agreement while maintaining its red lines on energy. Though the negotiators had abandoned the idea of using divergent levels of development as an explicit basis for negotiations, they felt Mexico had achieved a substantial advantage in the final agreement through an immediate consolidation of the generalized standard

[789] This was in part due to the language differences. Mexican negotiators also saw potential to cater to Spanish-speaking consumers in the United States.

[790] Cameron and Tomlin, *The Making of NAFTA : How the Deal Was Done*, pp. 173-174.

preferences, which allowed Mexico broader access, at lower tariff rates, to the U.S. and Canadian markets than those two countries would immediately receive to Mexico's market. Secofi's internal assessment concluded: "The consolidation of the GSP permitted a result that is highly asymmetrical in favor of Mexico."[791] Mexico gained immediate, tariff-free access to the U.S. market for 84 percent of its non-petroleum exports, while granting the same to only 43 percent of imports from the United States. Many of these immediately tariff-free imports, the Mexican negotiators argued, were on goods that Mexico needed as inputs—capital goods like factory machinery or tractors. While Mexico would open sensitive agricultural sectors, it would do so under a 15-year transitional period, slowly lifting tariffs and quotas.[792] In financial services, Mexico made some significant concessions late in the negotiations; however, internal documents show that the Salinas government was prepared to make most of these at the beginning of the negotiations, but withheld them to make tradeoffs. For Mexico, completion of the agreement greatly outweighed any particular concession. The trade agreement was meant to send a signal to the world that the Mexican economy was open for business.[793]

Side agreements: A bitter pill

The negotiations had taken much longer than the Mexicans had hoped, meaning that President Bush was not able to sign them until after the election. Instead, on October 7, 1992, Bush, Salinas, and Mulroney stood behind their chief negotiators at a table in San Antonio as

[791] SECOFI, "Informe final de la negociación del TLC," August 17, 1992, SECOFI, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior. Years later, Serra Puche noted in an interview, "The Americans and the Canadians opened much faster than we did, and so that is where we captured the asymmetry."

[792] NAFTA failed to make a dent in U.S. and Canadian agricultural subsidies, as they were unwilling to do so without corresponding changes from Europe in the GATT.

[793] Mexico was not particularly happy to have granted a handful of agricultural exceptions to the United States, particularly in orange juice and sugar, but Serra Puche said those exports were not important enough to risk the agreement.

they initialed the documents; Bush himself was not legally permitted to do so.[794] The signing ceremony did not generate the sort of political splash Bush and Salinas had hoped. By that point, it was clear that the agreement would not go to the U.S. Congress during the current term, meaning that the Mexican team would need to deal, at the least with a new Congress. With Bush's prospects sinking along with the U.S. economy, they began planning for the possibility of engaging a new administration, too. In April 1992, Salinas noted that he was hopeful about getting candidate Bill Clinton's support, in part because organized labor had not given Clinton much assistance in the Democratic primaries.[795] After months of ambiguity on NAFTA, Clinton offered a more definitive position in an October 4 speech at North Carolina State University. Clinton argued that NAFTA on its own was insufficient, but that he would support it if it were accompanied by side agreements on labor and environment, as well as domestic retraining and support for displaced American workers. Clinton hoped to have it both ways, getting the backing of the business community without losing crucial support from unions and environmental activists.[796] The Mexican team listened cautiously to Clinton's position; the Salinas team felt they had already addressed these issues during the fast-track debate. They had no interest in dealing with them again—and even less in potentially reopening a difficult negotiation when they were pleased with the final product.

On November 2, Clinton won a comfortable victory over Bush, though third-party candidate Ross Perot's vote share meant that Clinton finished well below 50 percent. The

---

[794] Though negotiations were completed August 12, the treaty texts still needed to undergo legal revision and translation, as noted in endnote 2, Cameron and Tomlin, pp. 248-289.

[795] Salinas, conversation with Robert A. Pastor, "Memorandum of conversation," April 24, 1992, Mexico City. Robert A. Pastor personal papers.

[796] George W. Grayson, *The North American Free Trade Agreement : Regional Community and the New World Order* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1995), pp. 109-136, Cameron and Tomlin, *The Making of NAFTA : How the Deal Was Done*, pp. 180-183.

Democrats retained majorities in the House and Senate. The Mexican team would now have to convince Democrats to pass an agreement negotiated with a Republican administration. After fast-track, the Mexican team had largely halted its program of lobbying for and promoting the agreement in the United States. It now needed to re-start those efforts, while also convincing skeptical officials on the Clinton transition team. In Serra Puche's eyes, the exceptions advocated in Clinton's North Carolina speech were the result of positions taken by campaign staff members, namely Mickey Kantor and individuals who had come over from Richard Gephardt's heavily union-backed primary campaign.[797]

The day after the election, Salinas called the president-elect to "urge him to move ahead with the ratification of the NAFTA, without any renegotiation of its provisions."[798] The Mexican ambassador flew to Little Rock to meet with the transition team. Later that month, Córdoba Montoya flew to Washington on a closely guarded mission to push the Clinton team to prepare for a fast ratification. The Mexican team was concerned that despite Clinton's stated support, the treaty, on which Salinas had taken a huge gamble, could stagnate. From early on, it was clear to Córdoba Montoya that Mexico would not enjoy the same sort of relationship it had with Bush. Gone was the personal chemistry between the two presidents. Clinton never viewed U.S.-Mexico relations in the same light as did Bush and his team of Texans. Whereas there had been myriad channels of communication between Mexico and the United States under Bush, communication was more limited. When word came in late December that Mickey Kantor would be named the USTR, Mexican officials feared the worst. Kantor was close to Clinton, having managed his campaign, but he had little experience with trade at a time when the U.S. trade agenda included

[797] Author interview with Serra Puche.

[798] Cameron and Tomlin, *The Making of NAFTA : How the Deal Was Done*, 182.

both NAFTA and the Uruguay Round. Kantor presented much different challenges for Mexico than Carla Hills, who though she was seen as a tough negotiator seeking the best deal for U.S. industry, believed in the benefits of free trade. Kantor was a political operator who "essentially looks at trade issues in terms of how many votes they could win in Congress or the next election," a *NewYork Times Magazine* profile noted.[799]

Salinas went to meet the president-elect personally in Texas, where Clinton restated his position that he would seek ratification along with side agreements. Despite the intense skepticism of his negotiators, Salinas agreed in principle to open negotiations on the side issues. However, Salinas also pressed Clinton and Bush to agree that Bush should sign NAFTA before leaving office, which Bush did on December 17, 1992. This was a key moment. Since NAFTA was negotiated under fast-track authority, if it was signed before June 1993, the agreement was guaranteed a floor vote in Congress within 90 days of its submission.[800] Salinas' gamble on the agreement was too great to risk letting it die, while it allowed Clinton to keep NAFTA under fast-track without adding his own signature. To try to limit the intrusiveness of any side agreements, Salinas began mentioning other "side issues" Mexico might ask to add to the talks, such as a development investment fund. Most threateningly, though, Salinas hinted that if labor and environment, which he saw as non-trade issues, were brought in, that Mexico might try to insert migration in the negotiations. Salinas knew this was a political bombshell that even Bush had refused to touch, but he meant to signal that if the U.S. crossed Mexico's red lines, Mexico was prepared to do the same. In early meetings, Mexico set out three negatives that it would not

[799] Keith Bradsher, "Mickey Kantor," *New York Times Magazine*, December 12, 1993.

[800] For a helpful summary of fast-track law, see J. F. Hornbeck and William H. Cooper, "Trade Promotion Authority and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy," in *CRS Report for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2010).

accept in the negotiation: no reopening of the completed NAFTA text, no hidden protectionist measures, and no compromising Mexican sovereignty.[801]

Questioning the new administration's commitment to NAFTA on its economic merits, Salinas and his subordinates argued quietly that delaying ratification had real consequences in Mexico. NAFTA had been a major issue in the U.S. presidential election, and Salinas did not want a drawn-out ratification debate to creep into the PRI's candidate selection and election. Mexican officials intimated that the delay could be detrimental for Mexican stability, pushing the country back toward economic stagnation, debt crisis, and political unrest. The looming prospect of instability at the southern border seemed to convince Clinton that he could not let the deal fail.[802] As Paul Krugman wrote at the time, "Mexico's government needs NAFTA, and the United States has a strong interest in helping that government."[803] While those concerns convinced Clinton he could not let NAFTA die, they did not compel his administration to tackle NAFTA with the speed the Mexicans would have liked. Though Kantor was quickly confirmed as USTR, the administration was slow to work out the specifics of its positions on the side agreements. Coming off the intensive, cabinet- and White House-level attention that the negotiations had received under Bush, the relative inattention during the first months of the Clinton administration jolted Mexico. Herman von Bertrab, who coordinated Mexico's lobbying efforts wrote: "NAFTA was certainly not one of their priorities, and to our regret they would need time to establish a negotiating position. … The Mexican team became nervous because of

[801] Mayer, *Interpreting NAFTA : The Science and Art of Political Analysis*, pp. 168-169.

[802] Cameron and Tomlin, *The Making of NAFTA : How the Deal Was Done*, pp. 182.

[803] Paul Krugman, "The Uncomfortable Truth About NAFTA: It's Foreign Policy, Stupid," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 5 (1993): pp. 18.

the delay in the further negotiations for NAFTA."[804] This concern was amplified when in Kantor's first meeting with Serra Puche and Canadian minister Wilson, Kantor was unprepared to establish the administration's opening position.[805] Years later, Serra Puche said, "The negotiations themselves with Mickey Kantor were lousy. He's not a serious person" and was "not a very good counterpart for negotiations."[806] Serra's doubts were shared by President Salinas throughout the side agreement talks.[807]

As the Clinton administration solidified its positions, Labor Secretary Robert Reich became an outspoken advocate for a labor agreement "with teeth." In practice, that meant Kantor and Reich would seek an agreement that included the possibility of trade sanctions. The administration also wanted a strong, independent secretariat. In a March 1993 meeting in Washington, Mexico and Canada immediately rejected the proposal. Frederick Mayer writes: "Kantor was convinced that the Mexicans wanted NAFTA badly enough to accept whatever the United States demanded and that Congressional approval would require side agreements strong enough to sell to Democrats like Gephardt. Strong enough meant sanctions."[808] However, Kantor was mistaken. Mexico, now often in alignment with Canada, proved a tough negotiator. A month later, when the U.S. presented written proposals on the two side agreements, Canada and Mexico rejected those, too. With the U.S. insisting on sanctions, negotiations appeared stuck, leading White House chief of staff Leon Panetta to tell the *Washington Post* that NAFTA was "dead." The comment prompted uproar from Mexico and supportive members of the U.S. Congress.

---

[804] von Bertrab, *Negotiating NAFTA : a Mexican Envoy's Account*, pp. 82.

[805] Mayer, *Interpreting NAFTA : The Science and Art of Political Analysis*, pp. 171.

[806] Author interview with Serra Puche.

[807] Salinas de Gortari, *México: Un Paso Dificil a la Modernidad*, pp. 173.

[808] Mayer, *Interpreting NAFTA : The Science and Art of Political Analysis*, pp. 183-184.

Senator John Danforth and a host of co-signers pressed Clinton to move more quickly and to avoid side agreements that would "undermine the benefits."[809] Mexico insisted that it would only accept consultations on labor and environment, but would not permit intervention in its labor unions, which were closely allied with the ruling PRI.

In June, the two sides began to soften their positions somewhat. Salinas feared that uncertainty about NAFTA was hurting the Mexican economy.[810] Mexico still opposed sanctions, but said it could accept a system that levied fines for violations, and Canada seemed to agree. Both countries identified any possibility of sanctions as thinly disguised protectionism, which they feared the U.S. might use arbitrarily. USTR shifted its emphasis from sanctions to the secretariat, which it wanted to maintain independence and apply international standards. Mexico wanted any secretariat to be allowed only to monitor to enforcement of national laws. Negotiations on environment were less contentious, with both Mexico and Canada showing more flexibility regarding the independence of trilateral environmental commissions.[811] Over the summer, a number of moderate environmental groups offered lukewarm backing for the agreement, helping ease the pressure on the Clinton administration.[812] Unions, however, remained strongly opposed, and that opposition threatened to translate to "no" votes in Congress.

By August, USTR realized that the opposition from Canada and Mexico to an agreement with strong sanctions was not going to evaporate, no matter how badly Mexico wanted NAFTA. The two parties began working on a face-saving solution that would make sure the U.S. could

---

[809] John Danforth et. al., to Bill Clinton, letter, April 28, 1993. carpeta Documentos Tratado de Libre Comercio, Control de Gestión, Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior, Secretaría de Economía de México, México, D.F.

[810] Salinas de Gortari, *México: Un Paso Dificil a la Modernidad*, pp. 171.

[811] Mayer, *Interpreting NAFTA : The Science and Art of Political Analysis*, pp. 195.

[812] Organizations including the World Wildlife Fund, Audubon Society, and Natural Resources Defense Council decided that, on balance, a more developed Mexico would pollute less.

not utilize the side agreements for backdoor protectionism, while perhaps allowing some pro-union senators to vote for the agreement. That agreement nominally included sanctions, but made their application highly unlikely. First, a weak commission would observe the application of national laws, as Mexico wished. If those were not applied, fines could be applied after a lengthy process. Only if the violating country refused to pay the fines could sanctions be assessed. Kantor was glad to have sanctions nominally included; Mexico was satisfied they would never be used. Canada seemed to be willing be go along, until newly installed Prime Minister Kim Campbell publicly announced that any eventuality of sanctions was not acceptable. Grudgingly, Mexico and the United States granted Canada an exception, knowing that those complaining in the U.S. Congress really had their eyes on Mexico. Late on August 12, 1993, the three sides agreed to the side agreements on environment and labor, exactly one year after the close of the talks at the Watergate Hotel.

Mexico's key goal in negotiating the side agreements was to be sure that they could not be used as protectionist measures. Though skeptical about the concept of the agreements, Serra Puche recognized the need to address changed U.S. political realities, and he was pleased with the outcome of the negotiations: "The side agreements, paradoxically enough, I think we made complicated enough to avoid any protectionism."[813] The agreement on environment created a trilateral council of ministers and a public advisory committee to oversee implementation of the agreement. It also established rules for the creation of arbitration panels if a member showed a "persistent patter of failure to effectively enforce an environmental law."[814] That panel could, eventually, assess fines, which would be used to improve environmental problems. Only if those

[813] Author interview with Serra Puche.

[814] Qtd. in Grayson, *The North American Free Trade Agreement : Regional Community and the New World Order*, pp. 142.

were not paid and the problem was not addressed could tariffs be used to sanction the violating country. Likewise, the labor agreement established weak, supranational organizations including an international secretariat. However, most of the responsibility in the agreement was designated to nationally controlled offices. The agreement largely limits the various institutions' powers to consultation and exchange of information. Labor issues in non-trade-related industries are excluded from consideration. An amendment to the side agreements, pressed almost singlehandedly by Congressman Lloyd Bentsen to ensure Hispanic support, created a small development bank to fund community-improvement projects on the U.S.-Mexico border.[815] While some hailed the agreements for bringing non-economic issues into a trade discussion, and thereby broadening consideration of the implications of trade, the real effect of the side agreements was limited—and mostly political. They provided Clinton the cover he felt he needed to pursue Congressional ratification.[816]

Engaging Congress: A watershed

The fast-track debate had already drawn the Mexican government further into U.S. domestic politics than it had ever gone. Trying to get NAFTA approved with a second, less enthusiastic, administration would pull Mexico in even further. NAFTA, and Mexico itself, had been major issues in the U.S. presidential campaign because of the third-party candidacy of anti-NAFTA crusader Ross Perot. Relying largely on protectionist rhetoric and buttressed by his substantial fortune, the technology entrepreneur gained nearly 19 percent of the national vote—despite quitting the race for several months over the summer. Perot highlighted the threat that

[815] The bank remained a pet project for Bentsen when he moved into the Clinton administration as Treasury secretary.

[816] On the negotiation of the side agreements, see Cameron and Tomlin, *The Making of NAFTA : How the Deal Was Done*, Ch. 9.

NAFTA would create a "giant sucking sound" as U.S. employers headed for the cheaper environment of Mexico, and he was not hesitant about painting Mexico in a negative light, highlighting poverty, desperation, corruption, and crime.[817] Even more eager to do so was far-right Republican Pat Buchanan. Both men commanded significant grassroots support and used this to mobilize mass mailings to Congress opposing the trade agreement. Perot's constant attacks had forced Clinton to clarify his own position during the campaign. For Mexico, which had not entirely overcome its aversion to engaging in the domestic politics of other countries, the intense scrutiny of the U.S. presidential campaign was uncomfortable. However, with ratification finally pending after years of discussions and negotiations on NAFTA and its side agreements, Mexico decided to double down on its lobbying strategy.

The conclusion of the side agreements required another shift. Mexico had partnered closely with USTR and President Bush during the fast-track debate to influence members of Congress. During the negotiations, USTR became an adversary, friendlier under Hills than Kantor. Now, the Mexican team needed to again coordinate closely with USTR to promote the agreement. Mexico had largely halted its lobbying activities throughout the negotiations, which cost pro-NAFTA forces momentum. Likewise, U.S. business backers, supportive of fast-track, took a wait-and-see approach. They wanted to assess NAFTA's contents before throwing their weight behind it publicly or on the Hill. NAFTA critics had taken no such break, and the forcefulness of Perot and Buchanan had sapped much U.S. public support for the agreements.

With the change of administration in the United States, Salinas replaced the well-connected Ambassador Gustavo Petricioli with Jorge Montaño. Over four years, Petricioli had

[817] The other significant part of Perot's platform was a plan to eliminate the U.S. deficit with sharp budget cuts and tax increases. Grayson, *The North American Free Trade Agreement : Regional Community and the New World Order*, pp. 113-117.

dramatically altered Mexico's diplomatic presence in the United States—including moving the embassy to a new building near the White House. He increased the size of the mission, establishing a congressional liaison office. Despite those monumental changes, Serra Puche was still concerned that traditionalists in the foreign ministry would be less effective at implementing trade policy, so Secofi had established a specific office headed by Herman von Bertrab to coordinate the efforts of Mexico's multitude of newly hired Washington lobbyists, lawyers, and public relations firms.[818] Mexico's lobby effort included some of K Street's highest priced talent, with a tab of some $30 million. The lobbyists provided access for the Mexican team and launched considerable PR efforts.[819] Salinas wrote: "In many occasions, our lobbyists guided us through the complicated paths of the U.S. legislative process. We did not have time to explore it on our own."[820] The Washington office continued to serve as a central point of contact during the ratification debate, though it was on a tight leash from Mexico City, where both Serra Puche and Salinas kept close tabs on likely vote counts in Congress.[821]

Mexico's lobbying strategy had several main components, with negotiator Herminio Blanco in residence in Washington for the debate's final chapter. On one side, Mexico utilized business contacts through COECE to help coordinate with U.S. corporate backers. Corporate coordinating organizations like USA*NAFTA helped ensure that the agreement had strong Republican backing. To court reluctant Democrats, Mexico had limited coordination with White

---

[818] On Mexico's lobbying efforts, see von Bertrab, *Negotiating NAFTA : a Mexican Envoy's Account*, Grayson, *The North American Free Trade Agreement : Regional Community and the New World Order*, Ch. 7, Todd Eisenstadt, "The Rise of the Mexico Lobby in Washington : Even Further from God and Even Closer to the United States," in *Bridging the Border : Transforming Mexico-U.S. Relations*, ed. Rodolfo O. De la Garza and Jesús Velasco (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997).

[819] Mayer, *Interpreting NAFTA : The Science and Art of Political Analysis*, pp. 236.

[820] Salinas de Gortari, *México: Un Paso Dificil a la Modernidad*, pp. 94.

[821] Author interview with Serra Puche.

House special liaison William Daley.[822] Mexico also broke new ground by attempting to organize Hispanics voters, particularly Mexican-Americans who had not been engaged in advocating U.S. foreign policy. Secofi helped coordinate small business owners into the Hispanic-American Alliance for Free Trade, which then lobbied local members. Other Hispanic-American groups also spoke in support of the agreement. Third, Mexico and its lobbyists gathered reams of information about individual members of Congress who might be undecided. They sought to identify district-level groups and businesses that might support the agreement and urged them to contact their representatives. They invited members to take part in congressional trade delegations and visit Mexico.

The Clinton administration advanced several main arguments: that NAFTA would boost U.S. exports and competitiveness, lead to greater employment, reduce illegal immigration, create an economic bridge to Latin America, and spur completion of the GATT.[823] Though various high-ranking members of the administration advanced these arguments in Congress, it largely fell to Daley and his deputy Rahm Emanuel to press individual members and round up votes. The two coordinated an extensive lobbying effort by Cabinet officials and business groups.[824] Despite these efforts, anti-NAFTA calls and letters overwhelmed supportive messages to Congress. Attacks continued from the right (Buchanan) and the left (AFL-CIO, Sierra Club, and Ralph Nader). Perot released a polemical book in August 1993, *Save your job, save our country: Why NAFTA must be stopped—Now!*, provoking a point-by-point rebuttal from the

[822] Serra Puche noted that he stayed in frequent contact with Daley.

[823] Grayson, *The North American Free Trade Agreement : Regional Community and the New World Order*, pp. 168-169.

[824] Grayson, *The North American Free Trade Agreement : Regional Community and the New World Order*, pp. 203.

administration. House Major Leader Richard Gephardt, who Mexico had hoped to convince with the side agreements, denounced the pacts and said he would oppose them.

Clinton himself had been cautious for months, but shortly before the Congressional vote, the president threw himself into the fray. The White House coordinated a series of high-profile events to support ratification. To articulate the agreement's broader importance, both Serra Puche and Clinton administration officials talked with Henry Kissinger, asking the former secretary of state to help make the foreign policy argument for NAFTA. On an even bigger stage, three former presidents joined Clinton as he signed the NAFTA side agreements. Presidents Ford, Carter, and Bush offered their support of the agreement. Vice President Gore said NAFTA "transcend[ed] ideology." Bush stressed the bipartisan nature of NAFTA, saluting members of his team including Carla Hills who were on hand. Carter stressed a wave of democratization in Latin America and said NAFTA was the "single most important factor" that would help move Mexico forward. Ford stressed the negative consequences for Mexico if NAFTA was not ratified, including spurring a wave of illegal immigration. Ford said: "If you defeat NAFTA, you have to share the responsibility for increased immigration to the United States, where they want jobs that are presently being held by Americans. It's that cold-blooded and practical. And members of the House and Senate ought to understand that."[825] Later, the administration circulated a supportive letter bearing the signatures of all living U.S. presidents. The White House set up a televised debate on NAFTA between Vice President Al Gore and critic-in-chief Ross Perot. The vice president artfully dispatched the Texan billionaire, giving NAFTA a public boost one week before the Congressional vote, neutralizing Perot's threats to turn his supporters

[825] "Remarks by President Clinton, President Bush, President Carter, President Ford, and Vice President Gore in signing of NAFTA side agreements," September 14, 1993.

and funding against those who backed NAFTA. Clinton took his time, but once the president made his move, he gave ratification his enthusiastic backing.[826]

The administration relied on important contacts in the Congress. Despite his strong dislike of Clinton, Minority Whip Newt Gingrich supported NAFTA and pressed his own party for votes. Texas Democrat Lloyd Benstsen had been an important supporter from the first, and served as a major point of contact for the Mexican team. Bensten worked to convince skeptics in his own party and from other border states of NAFTA's merits. Another important contact for Mexico, Bill Richardson, carefully counted Democratic votes. Meanwhile, Daley and Kantor made aggressive deals in Congress to address grievances and build support. From a Mexican point of view, the most frustrating were "understandings" that USTR pushed Mexico to accept. In particular, Kantor shored up the support of Floridians by offering greater protections for sugar and citrus. Serra Puche and his Secofi colleagues were angered at being asked to cede market access they had won in negotiations a year earlier. They feared that these concessions might be the beginning of a series of "urgent" requests to win votes that would nibble away at Mexican exports. In the end, a call from their ally Senator Bentsen helped convinced the Mexican team that the votes of nineteen members from Louisiana and Florida, and NAFTA's passage, might hang in the balance.[827] "Really, the final decision was, are we going to break this down because of sugar and oranges?" Serra Puche reflected. Nevertheless, these final adjustments were more sour than sweet for Mexico's negotiators.

On November 17, Salinas and Serra Puche watched live on C-Span to see the House pass the agreement 234 votes to 200. Fearing financial market backlash, Mexicans had spent months

---

[826] Grayson, *The North American Free Trade Agreement : Regional Community and the New World Order*, pp. 203-215.

[827] Salinas de Gortari, *México: Un Paso Dificil a la Modernidad*, pp. 181-183.

making economic contingency plans for how to respond if the agreement were rejected. They could now relax. The vote garnered nearly a three-quarters majority of GOP representatives and four of ten Democrats. The Senate passed NAFTA 61 to 38 on November 20. In both chambers, members from southwestern border states were key supporters. The last days of horse trading drew intense criticism from treaty opponents, who highlighted some $2 billion of concessions and earmarks made in exchange for votes. Clinton and Salinas shared congratulations in a brief phone call. In between the House and Senate votes in the United States, the Mexican Senate opened debate on NAFTA on November 18. With the overwhelming PRI majority, and the support of the business-minded PAN, the Senate passed the agreement on a 56 to 2 vote.

Why did Mexico decide to involve itself so deeply in U.S. domestic affairs? Despite the decades-long tradition of non-involvement, the answer seems fairly simple. Necessity was the mother of intervention. Once Salinas made the decision to break Mexico's and the PRI's tradition of isolation from the United States in foreign affairs, he needed his primary gambit to succeed. Salinas and Bush were on the same side of the fast-track debate, meaning their administrations would be working together. Without Congressional approval of trade promotion authority, NAFTA would not be negotiated. Mexico could stand by, as it traditionally had, while others debated the country's core interests in Washington, or it could join the debate. This was much easier for Salinas and largely U.S.-educated team to accept than it was for some PRI traditionalists. However, these traditionalists had been bureaucratically sidelined. Even before proposing NAFTA, Salinas sought improved bilateral relations and a warm personal relationship with Bush. Having taken the massive step of seeking an FTA, rejection carried political risks too great for Salinas to leave to chance. From there, Mexican leaders felt compelled to get involved in lobbying the U.S. Congress. Given the historical lack of direct political involvement—the

ambassador had to establish a congressional liaison's office—the Mexican government did not have the contacts or know-how to create its own operation in the months available. Outsourcing these duties was not risk-free. Mexico's considerable spending on lobbying and PR drew criticism in Mexico and from U.S. treaty opponents. However, Mexico needed legislative and legal expertise quickly. In addition, given USTR's frequent references to Congress, Mexican negotiators soon realized that connections of the Hill were helpful for more than passing the agreement. Mexico also gathered "intelligence" about what was happening in Congress. This allowed Mexican negotiators to make an independent decision about what concessions USTR actually needed to win important Congressional votes and which were less crucial. In this way, Mexico tried to manage the United States' "two-level game."

Conclusions: A recalculation of interests and a relationship reborn

In conclusion, I turn to the guiding questions from Chapter 2. First, what has been the predominant interpretation of the case in the literature? As discussed above, NAFTA has been discussed in several different ways. From the U.S. perspective, it has been seen as a triumph for the U.S. agenda on free trade, or more instrumentally as a way to shake up stagnant GATT talks. More critically, it is seen as akin to economic imperialism. From the Mexican perspective, NAFTA is seen mostly as a method through which President Carlos Salinas could lock in his economic reforms. However, while several scholars have noted the impact of NAFTA on later Mexican foreign policy, NAFTA itself is usually analyzed in the context of economic policy or as a case for the study of international negotiations. This chapter argues that NAFTA was also the result a profound recalculation of Mexican national interests, which affected the decision to purse an FTA, the process of negotiations, and Mexican strategy on issues such as lobbying.

Who are the most important actors in Mexico and the United States? How did each government define its interests, goals, and strategies? In Mexico, decision-making authority on NAFTA rested squarely in the Mexican presidency. Salinas and Serra Puche were able to organize business and labor interests to their advantage and the Mexican legislature was only nominally involved. The president was able to define Mexican goals: to achieve guaranteed market access, spur foreign investment, limit arbitrary protectionist measures, and keep a handful of issues off the table—primarily oil and PRI-labor relations. In the United States, there were more players with substantial influence. In the negotiations themselves, USTR was central, and its sensitivity to Congressional and business concerns kept the talks from moving as quickly as Bush and Salinas had initially hoped. However, in accepting Mexico's offer to negotiate NAFTA without waiting for GATT, USTR was overruled by Bush, with strong backing from Treasury Secretary Mosbacher and Secretary of State Baker. U.S. interests were more fragmented. Congressional interests often regarded district-level impacts or concerns for particular industries. These won out in the last-minute changes on sugar and orange juice. Bush, Baker, and Mosbacher were less attuned to these, and more concerned with foreign policy goals. They saw NAFTA as a way to promote stability and economic growth in Mexico, advance broad economic policy goals, and perhaps slowly advance democratization. When negotiations reached impasses, foreign policy goals triumphed over particular interests, even the preferences of the oil industry.

How was the definition of Mexican interests, goals, and strategies affected by the perception of the United States or by U.S. policy? How were these goals affected by domestic political factors? NAFTA represented a monumental shift of Mexican policy and a dramatic redefinition of Mexico's national interests. It reflected changing international conditions, a new perception of the United States, and domestic political and economic factors. The 1982 debt

crisis proved to Mexico's leaders that the country's previous economic model had reached its limits. This prompted a move toward liberalization and to joining the GATT, but these decisions predated any serious consideration of U.S.-Mexico free trade. In fact, while President Miguel de la Madrid decided to join the GATT, he still considered a U.S.-Mexico free trade agreement to be undesirable and politically impossible. Liberalizing the Mexican economy did not force de la Madrid to sacrifice the traditional anti-Yankee plank of PRI politics.

Salinas' recalculation of the Mexican national interest went deeper than de la Madrid's. It was broader than just economics. Salinas also responded to dramatic shifts in global politics, using NAFTA as a geopolitical and geo-economic instrument to improve relations with the United States and position Mexico in the emerging post-Cold War environment. With an eye on the Treaty of Maastricht, Salinas argued that the post-Cold War world would be defined by emerging regional blocs that were both political and economic in nature. Instead of seeking to remain largely separate in the pursuit of autonomy, Salinas argued that if Mexico were going to matter, it would need to join a bloc in order to influence through interdependence. This implied a dramatic reorientation not just of Mexico's economic policy, but of its broad approach to foreign policy. Even before he decided to seek an FTA, Salinas pursued a closer relationship with the United States. This intensified after attempts to build ties and draw investment from Europe and Japan fell short. His personal relationship with President Bush was much warmer than a Mexican president typically would have shared with a U.S. counterpart. In fact, that relationship might have represented a liability for his predecessors, who over the past decade had tried to counter U.S. policy in Central America. Some of this change seems to be attributable to a generational shift in the PRI; new leaders saw the United States in a different light based on their experiences there. The leadership also believed that just as Mexico's economic model had outlived its

usefulness, so too had the reflexive impulse to isolate Mexico from the United States. Furthermore, that policy had not stopped Mexico from becoming intensely dependent on the United States, which was by far Mexico's top trading partner, source of tourists, and destination for migrants. Decisions made unilaterally by U.S. officials on trade and a host of other issues had major consequences for Mexicans, even though they had no seat at the table. Mexico's standoffishness in Washington had stopped the U.S. government from what PRI traditionalists saw as meddling in Mexico's domestic affairs. In short, both the economic and foreign policy models that had governed Mexican policy for decades were failing to produce results.

This recalculation produced a new Mexican strategy. As an active participant in the world economy, and then in a regional free trade scheme, Mexico would have a voice in shaping rules and institutions. Given the predominance of the U.S. as an export market, the Salinas government decided that it could ill afford the uncertainty of seemingly arbitrary U.S. decisions. It would be more advantageous to lock the U.S. into clear economic arrangements, they thought. A free trade agreement would achieve this goal. The objective explains why Mexico placed such heavy emphasis on achieving clear dispute-resolution mechanisms, why it held out to make sure there were clear rules to prevent arbitrary use of anti-dumping legislation, and why it fought hard against sanctions in the side agreements. For Mexico, the top foreign economic policy priority was binding the U.S. into predictable arrangements. A free trade agreement presented other advantages. It allowed Salinas to make a number of important reforms in one blow, which otherwise would have necessitated constitutional changes that required two-thirds approval from the Senate and Cámara de Diputados. NAFTA required only ratification by the Senate, which was much friendlier to Salinas. This recalculation governed the Mexican negotiating strategy, which was marked by a cooperative attitude instead of skepticism about U.S. goals. Mexico's

decision to actively engage Congress and U.S. domestic politics was a significant departure. However, what made it even more surprising was that Mexico carried out much of its PR and lobbying campaign in close coordination with the U.S. executive. Mexico's decision to lobby was not driven by pressure from the United States. Rather, it was seen as necessary that Mexico better understand what was happening in the U.S. Congress, and that it have a way to advance its top priority there. Salinas' felt his gamble on the FTA was too big to leave Congress to chance.

How were U.S. interests, goals, and strategies affected by domestic political factors, Mexican policy, or the asymmetry of power? The U.S. interest in establishing a free-trade area with Mexico was not particularly surprising and had been mentioned in vague terms by President Reagan and Vice President Bush. However, Mexico had previously rebuffed these mentions. The key change came in Mexico's decision to propose an agreement itself, which reversed the dynamic normally associated with U.S.-Latin American economic relations. Domestic political concerns were most visible at three moments. First, during the fast-track debate, various domestic groups wanted to divide the fast-track vote on Mexico from the GATT. However, the Bush administration was less concerned about these lobbies, particularly environment and labor, and minimized their influence. Secondly, U.S. domestic politics conditioned the timeline of negotiations. It led both Bush and Salinas to make optimistic projections about how quickly talks could be completed, in order to minimize the issue's salience in the U.S. campaign. Lastly, domestic politics clearly mattered in negotiations over side agreements and in seeking ratification. Clinton was highly attuned to striking a balance between labor, environment, and business to get the agreements through Congress. As mentioned above, domestic industry demands affected particular U.S. positions, but these were less important than foreign policy goals for both Bush and Clinton. In particular, there was a belief, frequently restated outside the

negotiating table that Mexico's stability would be undermined by failed negotiations. Mexican documents clearly show that Mexico understood this U.S. concern and sought to reinforce it. Salinas and Bush discussed it directly, and it manifested itself in warnings from Gerald Ford and others that NAFTA's failure would provoke waves of millions of desperate immigrants.

Asymmetry mattered, but often not in the obvious sense. At times, Mexican negotiators felt the U.S. used the size of its market to bully them into concessions. However, Salinas also privately said, "The problem is that they [U.S. negotiators] treated us like equals, but we are not."[828] Mexican negotiators wanted asymmetry in development to be recognized, and Serra Puche argues that it was through more gradual tariff reductions. Asymmetry was an implicit focus of the negotiations—particularly on dispute resolution. In the past, asymmetry had led to U.S. decisions on economic policy with outsize effects on Mexico, made with no warning or consultation. NAFTA was a way for Mexico to reduce the economic effects of asymmetry through institutions, rules, and interdependence.

How would U.S. policy likely have been different in the absence of the Mexican effort? How would the outcomes have been different if Mexican leaders had not vigorously pursued their interests? These questions can be addressed by a comparison of U.S.-Mexican relations before and after Salinas' decision to pursue an FTA. U.S. interests in Mexico remained relatively stable, but Salinas' decision allowed for dramatic shifts in policy. Most obviously, without the proposal, there would have been no NAFTA negotiations or agreement; Mexicans had previously shunned the suggestion. Even before NAFTA, it was largely Mexican initiative that led to a changing climate for relations—though as the Camarena incident showed, this was not uniform. At the same time, the Bush administration exhibited great openness to Mexican

[828] Salinas, conversation with Robert Pastor, April 24, 1992, Mexico City. Robert A. Pastor personal papers.

proposals, particularly on trade and debt. During the negotiations, there was considerable overlap in goals between the United States and Mexico. Both Bush and Salinas had made strong, personal commitments to the success of the talks. Mexico's effort, at times bypassing USTR for consultations with Baker, Scowcroft, and Bush, helped ensure that NAFTA received equal or greater attention than the GATT talks. At the same time, Mexico made clear that it would not make large-scale transformations in its oil sector in order to secure agreement. Though the United States also had exceptions, Mexico's was almost certainly greater.

What have U.S.-focused accounts of these cases missed, and what does a focus on interaction add to our understanding of the case and of inter-American relations? The literature on NAFTA includes a greater representation of the Mexican perspective than studies of most events in U.S.-Latin American relations. However, much of this is focused on bargaining dynamics or addresses NAFTA only in broad terms. This account places NAFTA in the context of Mexican foreign policy to the United States and in an interactive perspective on bilateral relations. In doing so, it reveals how changes in the international system and in Mexican domestic politics led to a dramatic recalculation of Mexican national interests. The chapter explores that change, as well as its implications for Mexico's approach to the negotiations and foreign policy. It was obvious to Salinas—as was made clear by his close advisor Córdoba Montoya—that NAFTA would re-write the rules for U.S.-Mexican relations just as it would for the Mexican economy. Though NAFTA created only weak institutions, it multiplied mechanisms for consultations across many levels of the three governments. The broader outcome for changed bilateral relations illustrates that a Latin American government's orientation regarding the United States has equally important implications for bilateral relations as the United States. Latin American leaders do, in fact, possess the ability to change the countries' relationship while

pursuing their interests—though this is certainly easier when there is a convergence of interests. Beyond trade, Salinas showed more willingness to work with the United States on other issues, including as a mediator in the Central American conflicts. The legacy of NAFTA, unfortunately, is not that it catapulted Mexico into the first world. It is that it served to dramatically alter the way in which the United States and Mexico relate to one another, playing a major part in converting the two countries from "distant neighbors" to close partners.

CHAPTER 6

AN URGENT OPPORTUNITY: THE BIRTH OF PLAN COLOMBIA

As Andrés Pastrana prepared to take the oath of office, many of the institutions of the Colombian state were crumbling around him. The government exercised only titular control over much of the national territory. A host of armed groups—guerrillas, paramilitaries, and drug traffickers—operated nearly unchecked. Colombia's principal cities, including Bogota, had previously remained largely isolated from the decades-long conflict, but by 1998, armed fronts of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) encroached on the oases of urban safety. FARC encampments moved closer to Bogota, while bombings in the city brought the danger home. Head to head with the FARC, the Colombian army was often overmatched. It lost battles. Towns slipped out of the control of the Colombian state. The FARC were adding soldiers and amassing weapons; unlike the government troops they faced, they seemed to have little trouble obtaining sufficient resources. Colombia faced a sharp recession and approached a balance-of-payment crisis, problems that were only exacerbated by the violence. In addition to the troubling material situation, the Colombian government faced a crisis of legitimacy. A series of drug-money scandals had engulfed Pastrana's predecessor Ernesto Samper after audio tapes surfaced proving his campaign had taken millions of dollars from the kingpins of the Cali drug cartel.[829] His denials (later recanted) fell on deaf ears in Colombia and increased the ire of a hostile U.S. ambassador. The Colombian Army was seen as irreparably tainted by ties to paramilitary groups, which were guilty of massacres, forced displacements, torture, and other human rights violations on an increasing scale. The strength of the paramilitaries furthered

[829] Pastrana played a role in bringing these tapes to light, and he actively lobbied for Samper to step down.

eroded the reach and legitimacy of the central government. As a result of opposition to Samper and concern about human rights, U.S. aid had plummeted. Most of the aid that remained was funneled directly to the Policia Nacional, with the conspicuous purpose of marginalizing Samper, but with the side effect of weakening other institutions. The army's morale was disastrously low and its material conditions pitiful, with only a handful of functioning helicopters to pursue enemies across the country's mountainous jungles. Facing overwhelming challenges and lacking the tools to address them, President Pastrana surveyed his options and crafted a domestic and international strategy. That strategy, which involved intense collaboration with the United States, would lead to the creation of Plan Colombia.

Set against the background of hostility that engulfed U.S.-Colombian ties during the Samper administration, it is perhaps surprising that under Colombia's next president, the country became the third-largest recipient of U.S. aid under the auspices of the bipartisan Plan Colombia. More surprising, perhaps, is that much of that aid went to the Colombian military, which a U.S. official said in late June 1998, "doesn't pass the test with human rights groups, the US Congress, or the media."[830] The primary questions of this dissertation offer a new lens through which we can understand the origins of Plan Colombia and explain this puzzle. Though "Plan Colombia" has been used to describe a wide swath of U.S.-Colombian cooperation from the late 1990s to the present, I focus here on shorter period, from 1998 to 2001. In particular, I address the overlapping mandates of the Colombian President Andrés Pastrana and U.S. President Bill Clinton, asking, how did the Colombian government approach Clinton administration policy to Colombia? What goals did Pastrana set, what did he wish to obtain from the United States, how did he pursue those objectives, and at what cost?

[830] David Passage to Roberta Jacobson, "Consultations with SOUTHCOM," June 1, 1998, *DNSA*.

This case is set at the height of the United States' "unipolar moment," with its power unrivalled on the international stage, and is important to this dissertation in examining how that international context affects Latin American strategies. In the post-Cold War period, there has been a focus on "transnational" issues, of which drug trafficking is a paradigmatic example. This case explores how weaker countries deal with the effects of transnational issues on their relations with the United States, and on their own domestic political situations, and how that calculation affects their foreign policies. The case explores a process of influence that occurs not through a dramatic recalculation of interests or through conflict, but through a largely cooperative process—that type of case in which weaker-state leaders tend to be considered imperial lackeys.

In the face of that portrayal, the case illustrates that Pastrana's government had considerable influence in the creation and shape of Plan Colombia—though that has been obscured by interpretations that grant primary importance to the United States. That is not to claim that Plan Colombia can accurately be described as a purely Colombian proposal adopted by the Clinton administration—and much less by the U.S. Congress. However, characterizations of the plan as either an imperial design foisted upon a reluctant but desperate Colombia, or as a perversion of Pastrana's initial, more benevolent program, are far off base. Pastrana's policies changed along with circumstances in Colombia and U.S. and Colombian policymakers' perceptions of the conflict. The actors' ways of seeing the conflict—or perhaps more to the point, the armed actors participating in the conflict—mingled across borders. In the balance, however, the Colombians achieved several of their initial priorities in their foreign policy toward the United States. Those priorities included a broad vision of *responsibilidad compartida*, to use the term of the Colombian foreign minister Guillermo Fernández de Soto, that encompassed not just the drug war, but the Colombian conflict itself. Contrary to the flawed accounts of some

critics, the Colombian government clearly sought, from Pastrana's first days as president-elect, a substantial increase in U.S. military aid, accompanied by stronger social programs. Importantly, Pastrana maintained aspects of his policies that were unpopular within important sectors in the United States. Pastrana continued negotiations with the FARC during most of his presidency, until the talks had abjectly failed to produce results. To facilitate this incipient peace process, Pastrana maintained the *zona de distensión*, also called *el despeje*, a significant geographic area in which the army was forbidden from pursuing the FARC, and which served as a safe haven for conducting peace talks. Both the peace process and the *despeje* were routinely criticized in the U.S. Congress.[831] Pastrana had warm relations with Cuban President Fidel Castro, visiting him on several occasions and appealing for the Cuban's intercession with Colombian guerrilla groups.[832] Plan Colombia combined the Pastrana administration's top goals while also allowing the United States to address a potential source of regional instability.

Because of the complex and controversial nature of this case, it is important to note several things this chapter is not trying to do. It is not seeking to justify Plan Colombia in particular or the war on drugs more broadly. According to a broad range of both academic and policy students Plan Colombia did not accomplish goals set out in the U.S. war on drugs in terms of reducing drug availability or purity or increasing street prices. There is no question those goals have not been met in some forty years.[833] Nor does this chapter try to examine the Plan's effect on serious problems in Colombia—displacements, human rights violations, paramilitary links to

[831] It is worth noting that they also had many detractors in Colombia, especially in the Colombian military. The ultimate failure of these two policies has left Pastrana with a rather unpopular legacy in Colombia, where non-policymakers often expressed their opinion that he had turned the country over to the FARC.

[832] Andrés Pastrana Arango and Camilo Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego* (Bogotá: Planeta, 2005), pp. 145-155.

[833] For a recent assessment, see R. Scherlen, "The Never-Ending Drug War: Obstacles to Drug War Policy Termination," *P.S.* 45, no. 1 (2012).

the government. Its purpose is to re-examine the case in light of the guiding question of this dissertation: how did Colombian leaders pursue their goals via a change in U.S. policy?

Divergent interpretations of Plan Colombia in the literature

There are three major strands in the case literature on Plan Colombia. In the U.S. and Latin America, many critics of Plan Colombia portray the initiative as the new face of U.S. imperialism in Latin America. One volume of Colombian academic essays asks: "How can we explain that the Colombian government has accepted as its most visible policy something that is a U.S. law … precisely one of the specific, localized expressions of the new configurations of empire?"[834] Many critics link Plan Colombia to dependency theory critiques. Germán Rodas argues that the plan is a pretext for "rich countries in the framework of their neoliberal strategy … to consolidate at any cost their project in the Andean region."[835] Likewise, Jairo Estrada sees the plan as aimed "to consolidate the hegemony of the empire and its local allies."[836] In this telling, Colombian leaders are at most imperial lackeys. Others see the final Plan Colombia as a perversion of a pacific Colombian initiative. A Colombian scholar argued in 2001 that "the currently unfolding project is a transformed version of the initial idea formulated by President Pastrana."[837] Similarly, Grace Livingstone argues that the original Colombian concept of Plan Colombia was not a military initiative: "Its focus [was] on achieving peace and ending violence," adding, "The United States' redesign of Plan Colombia turned it from a peace plan into a battle

[834] Jairo Estrada Álvarez, ed., *Plan Colombia : Ensayos Críticos* (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2001), pp. 14. Translation by author.

[835] Germán Rodas Chaves, *El Plan Colombia : Análisis de una Estrategia Neoliberal* (Quito, Ecuador: Ediciones Abya-Yala, 2002), pp. 30-31. Translation by author.

[836] Estrada Álvarez, ed., *Plan Colombia : Ensayos Críticos*, pp. 14.

[837] Jaime Caycedo Turriago, "Una Guerra Social de la Globalización," in *Plan Colombia : Ensayos Críticos*, ed. Jairo Estrada Álvarez (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2001), pp. 183.

plan."[838] Other critics have focused more on the U.S. interests at play in creating the plan. For example, some argue the plan's military focus has given the U.S. defense establishment generally, and Southern Command in particular, a new raison d'etre.[839] It also provided an opportunity for Congressional largesse to the military-industrial complex, exemplified by Senator Christopher Dodd's support for sending the Colombian military Connecticut-built Blackhawk helicopters.[840] The plan's intellectual supporters have emphasized the U.S. role, largely ignoring Colombian policymakers. Arguing for the plan's expansion in 2003, Gabriel Marcella wrote, "Common wisdom prevails that little of magnitude happens in the Western Hemisphere without the leadership of the United States, especially on such a controversial, sovereignty-laden issue as fighting the scourge of narcotics at the international level."[841] Juan Gabriel Tokatlian argued that "Plan Colombia—designed in Casa de Nariño [home of Colombia's president] by the suggestion of the White House—was launched after an intense debate in Washington, a tenuous discussion in Bogota, and a worrying silence in the hemisphere."[842] Russell Crandall, citing an anonymous interview with a U.S. State Department official, writes that "The ostensibly comprehensive 'Colombian' Plan Colombia was basically a Washington creation." Crandall focuses on how Plan Colombia fit into the U.S. political context,

---

[838] Grace Livingstone, *Inside Colombia : Drugs, Democracy and War* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2004), pp. 124, 128.

[839] W. M. LeoGrande, "From the Red Menace to Radical Populism: U.S. Insecurity in Latin America," *WORLD POLICY JOURNAL* 22, no. 4 (2005), Dean A. Cook, "U.S. Southern Command: General Charles E. Wilhelm and the Shaping of U.S. Military Engagement in Colombia, 1997-2000," in *America's Viceroys : The Military and U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. Derek S. Reveron (New York; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan ; Palgrave, 2004).

[840] Crandall, *The United States and Latin America after the Cold War*, pp. 92-93.

[841] Gabriel Marcella, *The United States and Colombia : The Journey from Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003), pp. 33.

[842] Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, "Colombia, el Plan Colombia y la Región Andina: ?Implosión o Concertación?," *Nueva Sociedad* 173 (2001): pp. 137. Translation by author.

with little attention to events in Colombia.[843] These divergent explanations have one thing in common: all focus on U.S. motives for launching Plan Colombia, whether they refer to it as an invasion and a breach of Colombian sovereignty or a bold American success story.

There is another perspective from which to view the development of Plan Colombia. Rather than seeing it as a solution to a U.S.-defined problem (e.g., the absence of a post-Cold War military mission or cocaine flows), Plan Colombia can be seen through the lens of Colombian policymakers who were seeking to address the massive problems they faced in the late 1990s. From this perspective, Plan Colombia is the outcome of interactions between U.S. and Colombian policymakers. In that interaction, the U.S. occupied a dominant position in terms of military and financial resources; however, Colombia also held important cards. Marshalling evidence from archives and interviews in the United States and Colombia, I argue that the essential elements of the final version of Plan Colombia were priorities sought by the Pastrana administration starting early in his presidency—many dated to his campaign and his months as president-elect. These include large U.S. military assistance, enhanced counterdrug cooperation, alternative development programs, and political backing for the negotiations with the FARC. Pastrana's initial attempt to end the Colombian conflict did indeed stress pacific solutions such as dialogue and development; however, Pastrana and his administration saw the rebuilding of the military as a necessary complement. This chapter will describe the background in which Plan Colombia was launched before turning to the interactions between U.S. and Colombian policymakers during the crucial years in which Plan Colombia was born.

[843] Crandall, *The United States and Latin America after the Cold War*, pp. 124.

Background: A history of cooperation with points of conflict

Colombian foreign policy has traditionally centered on the United States, with a secondary focus on neighboring countries. Sometimes called the "Suarez doctrine," after Colombian president Marco Fidel Suarez, the Colombian foreign policy elite considered the U.S. to be the "north star" that oriented their country's interests.[844] Beginning in the 1960s, Colombia diversified its foreign relations and became an important regional actor, involved in the Panama Canal Treaty negotiations and the Contadora initiative. However, as Colombia's importance in the global drug trade grew, relations with the United States—along with aspects of its domestic politics—became "narcotized."[845] The U.S. market for international drugs emerged as servicemen returned from Vietnam, provoking President Richard Nixon's domestic narcotics control act in 1969. Nixon also pressured foreign governments to curb narcotics production. Initially, these policies focused on heroin and opium production. However, cocaine supplanted heroin as a drug of choice during the 1970s, drawing the Andean region, native soil of the coca leaf, into the drug trade.[846] Still, with the exception of a $95 million program in Bolivia, counternarcotics assistance to the Andean region remained minimal throughout the 1970s.[847]

[844] Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, "The Political Economy of Colombian-U.S. Narcodiplomacy: A Case Study of Colombian Foreign Policy Decision-Making, 1978-1990" (Ph.D., 1991). Randall, *Colombia and the United States : Hegemony and Interdependence*.

[845] Tokatlian, "The Political Economy of Colombian-U.S. Narcodiplomacy: A Case Study of Colombian Foreign Policy Decision-Making, 1978-1990", pp. 40-43. See also Russell Crandall, *Driven by Drugs : U.S. Policy toward Colombia* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), pp. 26-32.

[846] William L. Marcy, *The Politics of Cocaine : How U.S. Foreign Policy Has Created a Thriving Drug Industry in Central and South America* (Chicago, Ill.: Lawrence Hill Books, 2010), pp. 8-10.

[847] William L. Marcy, *The Politics of Cocaine : How U.S. Foreign Policy Has Created a Thriving Drug Industry in Central and South America* (Chicago, Ill.: Lawrence Hill Books, 2010), pp. 18.

Colombian cartels based in Cali and Medellin forced out other narcotics traffickers, notably Corsican and Sicilian mafias.[848] The massive amount of U.S. currency generated by the sale of drugs swelled the accounts of Colombian banks, which were often knowingly complicit in laundering drug profits. U.S. authorities estimated drug exports as 16 percent of Colombian gross domestic product by the late 1970s, with financial flows large enough to boost inflation.[849] By 1979, the glaring growth of the Colombian narcotics industry led Colombia's government to respond with a military campaign. The U.S. government offered $3.8 million in counternarcotics aid to the effort.[850] And while the U.S. claimed credit for the Colombians' initial success against drug trafficking organizations, President Julio César Turbay also acted because traffickers and insurgents "had reached the point of threatening democratic institutions and perhaps even its tradition of civilian government."[851] By 1981, Colombia had become the major producer and transit point for coca leaf grown in Bolivia and Peru, the major grower of marijuana, and a major player in the production of other drugs.[852] U.S. funding increased under the Reagan administration, which paired an intensive escalation of "war on drugs" rhetoric with a militaristic approach in the hemisphere. This was encapsulated in Presidential Directive 221, which stated that narcotics trafficking was a threat to the integrity of Latin American democracies, noting that

---

[848] Marcy, *The Politics of Cocaine : How U.S. Foreign Policy Has Created a Thriving Drug Industry in Central and South America*, pp. 12-14.

[849] Marcy, *The Politics of Cocaine : How U.S. Foreign Policy Has Created a Thriving Drug Industry in Central and South America*, pp. 21.

[850] Richard B. Craig, "Colombian Narcotics and United States-Colombian Relations," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 23, no. 3 (1981): pp. 255.

[851] Richard B. Craig, "Colombian Narcotics and United States-Colombian Relations," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 23, no. 3 (1981): pp. 257.

[852] Craig, "Colombian Narcotics and United States-Colombian Relations."

some insurgent groups funded themselves by involvement in the drug trade. The president called for increased involvement of the U.S. military in counternarcotics operations abroad.[853]

U.S. attention to Colombia intensified dramatically with the 1989 assassination of Luis Carlos Galán, a presidential candidate for the Liberal Party who was favorably viewed in Washington.[854] From 1989 to 1999, the U.S. granted Colombia counternarcotics aid totaling $1.1 billion, with much of this destined for the Colombian National Police.[855] This total, however, obscures significant shifts in the tenor of U.S.-Colombian relations during the decade preceding Plan Colombia. The George H. W. Bush administration largely coincided with Colombian President César Gaviria. Gaviria pushed Colombia through a violent struggle against Pablo Escobar's Medellín cartel.[856] At the same time, Gaviria attempted to address Colombia's conflicts with the guerrilla through peace dialogues. Hosted in Venezuela and Mexico, the dialogues proved largely ineffectual, and gave the FARC a respite in which to grow more militarily potent, handing the military a series of defeats.[857] Sandra Borda argues that Gaviria was the first Colombian president to exploit the U.S. concern about drugs to gain an advantage in Colombia's civil conflicts. Borda notes Colombian rhetorical strategies:

> "By conflating the illegal drug business with insurgent activities, the Colombian government was able to skillfully construct arguments to convince Washington to militarily support governmental counterinsurgent strategies. The construction of this

[853] "Narcotics and National Security," National Security Decision Directive no. 221. Available online: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-221.htm

[854] Crandall, *Driven by Drugs : U.S. Policy toward Colombia*, pp. 34.

[855] Tokatlian, "Colombia, el Plan Colombia y la Región Andina: ?Implosión o Concertación?," pp. 138.

[856] Mark Bowden, *Killing Pablo : The Hunt for the World's Greatest Outlaw* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2001), David P. Thompson, "Pablo Escobar, Drug Baron: His Surrender, Imprisonment, and Escape," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 19, no. 1 (1996).

[857] Borda, "The Internationalization of Domestic Conflicts: A Comparative Study of Colombia, El Salvador and Guatemala", pp. 55-57.

frame allowed the emergence of a common course of action between Washington's war on drugs and Colombia's concern with the growth of insurgency."[858]

While some Colombian governments benefited from increased U.S. involvement, the issue inflicted severe costs on others, particularly President Ernesto Samper, who was inaugurated in 1994. Even before his inauguration, Samper was tarnished by allegations that his presidential campaign had been directly funded by drug traffickers, corroborated by cassette recordings of major kingpins. The scandal would lead to the dismissal and resignation of top Colombian officials. Samper faced a harsh response from the U.S., along with domestic opposition, which intensified as embarrassing details about administration corruption came to light.[859] Ironically, as Crandall points out, the scandal pressured a weak Samper to comply with U.S. wishes to adopt a hard line against traffickers, as the Colombian government dismantled the Cali cartel.[860] In 1996 and 1997, the Clinton administration "decertified" Colombia under U.S. counternarcotics aid laws, signaling that the Colombian government was not cooperating in the war on drugs. Decertification triggered a cutoff of most U.S. aid programs. Remaining aid, given under a national security waiver, was channeled around the president through the head of the Colombian National Police. The Clinton administration denied a visitor's visa to Samper, causing a major embarrassment.[861]

---

[858] Borda, "The Internationalization of Domestic Conflicts: A Comparative Study of Colombia, El Salvador and Guatemala", pp. 57.

[859] Crandall, *Driven by Drugs : U.S. Policy toward Colombia*, pp. 101-106, Borda, "The Internationalization of Domestic Conflicts: A Comparative Study of Colombia, El Salvador and Guatemala", pp. 59-61.

[860] Crandall, *Driven by Drugs : U.S. Policy toward Colombia*, pp. 114-115.

[861] Cook, "U.S. Southern Command," pp. 131, Crandall, *Driven by Drugs : U.S. Policy toward Colombia*, Ch. 4.

Attempts to embarrass Samper and the aid cuts that accompanied decertification "helped weaken the Colombian state at precisely the most inopportune time."[862] The natures of the country's drug trafficking, armed groups, and decades-old conflict were rapidly changing. For the first time, in the 1990s, coca plants began to be cultivated in Colombia on a large scale. The fall of the Cali and Medellín cartels created an opening for smaller operators. Initially, the armed groups, both guerrilla and paramilitary, began to draw on drug revenue by levying taxes or offering protection to growers and traffickers. Some scholars have even argued that it was precisely the success of the U.S.-backed drug war that offered the FARC opportunities to expand.[863] By the late 1990s, while the Colombian government was starved of revenues because of a deep recession and a sharp reduction of international aid, the FARC captured hundreds of millions of dollars in funding from drugs. Three Colombian scholars summarize:

> "The participation of the FARC in the drug-trafficking economy, starting in the second half of the 1990s, caused a shift in organizational structure in their areas of influence. The period from 1996 to 1998 corresponded to the largest FARC offensive against public forces, and this demanded significant financial resources to obtain arms and new members. As a consequence, the FARC intensified its activities in the region known as the 'coca belt'."[864]

Goals and context: A new administration faces immediate crisis

The son of a president and a longtime leader of Colombia's Conservative Party, Pastrana took office with a thorough understanding of Colombian politics. However, his government faced a profound threats. Three factors created the immediate and difficult context in which Andrés Pastrana took office: the military's failures against the FARC, widespread domestic calls

[862] Crandall, *Driven by Drugs : U.S. Policy toward Colombia*, pp. 131.

[863] Mark Peceny and Michael Durnan, "The FARC's Best Friend: U.S. Antidrug Policies and the Deepening of Colombia's Civil War in the 1990s," *Latin American Politics and Society* 48, no. 2 (2006).

[864] Arlene Tickner, Diego García, and Catalina Arreaza, "Actores Violentos No Estatales y Narcotráfico en Colombia," in *Políticas Antidroga en Colombia: Éxitos, Fracasos y Extravíos*, ed. Alejandro Gaviria Uribe and Mejía Londoño (Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes, 2011).

for peace during Colombia's elections, and the intense strain on U.S.-Colombian relations during the presidency of Ernesto Samper.

The Colombian conflict, which had long been seen as a peripheral problem for the country's urban elites, came to occupy the center of national life as it threatened Colombian cities and the state itself.[865] A boom in drug production gave the FARC massive new resources against the Colombian government. In 1998, Colombia was the source of 90 percent of the cocaine entering the United States, and as much as half of this came from coca leaf cultivated in areas under FARC control.[866] It became clear that drug money was facilitating the major gains in FARC military capacity. A report by the U.S. Joint Chiefs in February 1998 noted: "Security situation in Colombia has worsened—right-wing paramilitaries and narco-guerrillas have effectively taken over large parts of the country."[867] Indeed, in the months before Pastrana took power, the Colombian military was in retreat, a point driven home when the FARC routed the army's supposedly elite unit in March 1998.[868] The combination of a U.S. president trying to appear tough on drugs and Samper's weakness proved a poisonous combination that drove relations to their nadir, while undermining the Colombian state at home and abroad.[869]

---

[865] Even in early 1998, a report noted that many commentators "argue that Colombian elites and urban residents—relatively insulated from the political violence that is rife in the countryside—are 'in denial' about the seriousness of the guerrilla problem." In "Intelligence report," Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Asian Pacific and Latin American Analysis, January 20, 1998, *DNSA*.

[866] Arlene Tickner and Carolina Cepeda, "Las Drogas Ilícitas en la Relación Colombia-Estados Unidos," in *Políticas Antidroga en Colombia: Éxitos, Fracasos y Extravíos*, ed. Alejandro Gaviria Uribe and Mejía Londoño (Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes, 2011), pp. 211-212.

[867] "OC w/ Gen Locarno, Colombia CHOD," February 12, 1998, *DNSA*.

[868] Curtis W. Kamman to Secretary of State, "The Colombian Army Pummeled at 'El Billar,'" March 27, 1998, *DNSA*.

[869] Pastrana Arango and Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego*, pp. 112.

Violence was the central theme in the 1998 presidential campaign, surpassing the failing economy and Samper's legacy of scandal. The run-off election pitted Horacio Serpa, who had been a major figure in the Liberal Samper administration, against Pastrana, a previously unsuccessful Conservative presidential candidate and former mayor of Bogotá. The early stage of the election was dominated by groups advocating for peace. The *Mandato Ciudadano por la Paz*, or the Citizens' Mandate for Peace organized demonstrations against the violence, instructing voters to deposit a white card alongside their ballot in a 1997 municipal election as a demand for peace. Though the cards were not officially counted, Pastrana and others began citing "10 million votes for peace" as a pressing popular demand to address the conflict.[870] Pastrana tried to define himself as the "peace candidate" by proposing a multipronged peace plan at the Hotel Tequendama on June 8, 1998, shortly before the second round of voting. He emphasized peace negotiations with insurgents, rural development, and political reforms. One of Pastrana's main goals was to receive international funding for development and assistance to restructure Colombian sovereign debt—what Pastrana called a "Marshall Plan" for Colombia.[871]

Pastrana's key policy objectives almost demanded improved cooperation with the United States. His principal foreign policy goals, closely linked with the domestic situation, were to restore international respectability, to obtain fiscal and development aid, and to gain international backing for peace negotiations. Pastrana also emphasized the need to attack drug trafficking as a means to sap funding from the conflict and to strengthen the Colombian military in order to improve the government's positions vis-à-vis guerrillas and traffickers. Foreign Minister

[870] Given that this would represent nearly everyone who voted, the total is dubious, though it is cited by everyone from Pastrana to UNICEF. However, it is clear that the movement had a large impact on the tenor of the second-round campaign. Pastrana Arango and Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego*, pp. 31.

[871] Pastrana Arango and Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego*, pp. 45-52.

Guillermo Fernández de Soto summarized their goals as including emergency social assistance, recovery of a monopoly on the use of force, internationalization of the peace process, and "the solution of the problem of drug plantations as an essential step to end the armed conflict."[872] Given the historically central role of the United States in Colombian foreign policy, and the preeminent U.S. role in military aid, technology, and intelligence, it seemed clear the Pastrana administration would place the United States at the center of its strategy.

While Pastrana did have a robust peace agenda, even as a candidate he did not see a negotiated solution as adequate on its own. He believed peace talks required a military strategy. In a meeting with Assistant Secretary of State Peter Romero at the U.S. embassy, Rodrigo Lloreda, a top Pastrana deputy who would later be appointed defense minister, stressed the difficulty of combining political and military realities in Colombia. The U.S. embassy in Bogota reported: "On peace, Lloreda told us Pastrana knows the guerrillas must be weakened militarily before they come to the negotiating table, but this was not a popularly acceptable campaign theme."[873] Plus, the next president's options would be limited by the weakness of state institutions. Pastrana later wrote: "It was clear then, in the middle of 1998, that the Armed Forces were not capable of mounting a large offensive against the illegal groups because they did not have the means or human and logistical resources to do so. It was a simple as that."[874] Or as his principal advisor said, when Pastrana arrived, "*No tenía con que ponerse bravo.*"—he did not have anything to get tough with.[875]

---

[872] Guillermo Fernández de Soto, *La Ilusión Posible : un Testimonio sobre la Política Exterior Colombiana* (Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, 2004), pp. 93.

[873] Eva Weingold, "Parade of Candidates 1: Bedoya and Pastrana," April 6, 1998, *DNSA*.

[874] Pastrana Arango and Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego*, pp. 85. Translation by author.

[875] Author interview with Jaime Ruiz

In addition, Colombia was in dire fiscal straits, with heavy foreign debt and an economy weakened by the violence. [876] One of Pastrana's main goals was to receive international funding for development and assistance from international financial organizations to restructure Colombian sovereign debt—a goal Pastrana encapsulated during the campaign by referring to first a "Marshall Plan" and later "Plan Colombia." In his inaugural address, Pastrana called Plan Colombia "a combination of alternative development projects that will channel the shared efforts of governments and multilateral institutions with those of Colombian society."[877] However, alternative development was all of Pastrana's plan. He later summarized his goals: "It was urgent to reform and modernize the military forces, recover our international relations, launch a plan of social investments, fight drug trafficking and seek reconciliation."[878] Pastrana had included these points in his Tequendama address, and he restated them at his inauguration on October 22, 1998. After reiterating his call for a Marshall Plan, Pastrana spoke at length about the problem of drug trafficking and its relationship to the conflict, arguing that the prolongation of fighting benefited only drug kingpins. Pastrana argued: "Colombia faced two clearly different wars," one against drug trafficking and the other against groups with social and political aims.[879]

Initial approaches

By late 1997, many in the Clinton administration seemed to realize that the harsh treatment of Samper had damaged U.S. interests in the region and diminished the institutions of

[876] Marcelo Giugale, O. Lafourcade, and Connie Luff, *Colombia : The Economic Foundation of Peace* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003), pp. 39-49.

[877] Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, "El Momento de la Paz" October 22, 1998. APA 1998, Dirección Secretaria General, caja 3, carpeta Directivos Presidenciales, Archivo Presidencia de la República, pp. 40.

[878] Pastrana Arango and Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego*, pp. 34-35.

[879] Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, "El Momento de la Paz," pp. 40.

the Colombian state. However, rapprochement with Samper appeared unworkable and politically infeasible. Before the first round of the election, Pastrana's representative Rodrigo Lloreda told U.S. officials that improving bilateral ties was a top issue, and that Pastrana realized he needed development, counternarcotics, and military aid.[880] In early May 1997, Clinton's special representative for Latin America, Thomas McLarty, visited Bogota to commemorate the founding of the Organization of American States. Though he had only a passing conversation with Samper, McLarty met with political campaigns, business groups, and civil society organizations. He had a long meeting with National Police General Rosso José Serrano, who stressed to McLarty the "increasing connection between narcotraffickers and guerrillas." Furthermore, "Serrano asserted that fighting drug trafficking in Colombia is the key to fighting the rest of Colombia's ills, from corruption to crime to the guerrillas."[881] On the same trip, McLarty met Pastrana's campaign chief Rafael Pardo and future foreign minister Guillermo Fernández de Soto, who emphasized the need for better cooperation with the United States not only on drugs, but to improve the economy and crack down on human rights violations. Neither Pardo nor McLarty thought narcotrafficker-guerrilla cooperation was as deep as Serrano argued. Pastrana's representatives emphasized the need for a national peace process and explored the possibility of U.S. involvement. Later that day, McLarty was told that "any peace process would probably involve demilitarization of parts of Colombian territory, and that the police and military need to be strengthened in order to reestablish their legitimacy in much of the country."[882]

---

[880] "Parade of Candidates," *DNSA*

[881] Kamman, "Special envoy for the Americas Thomas McLarty visits Colombia in conjunction with 50th anniversary of the OAS," May 14, 1998, *DNSA*.

[882] The name of the person who offered this key insight has been redacted from the document. Ibid., pp. 4.

Once the election results determined Pastrana to be the victor, neither the president-elect nor the U.S. awaited the end of Samper's mandate to begin making new policy. During the campaign, Pastrana had pledged to sit face-to-face with FARC leaders to seek a negotiated peace. He wasted little time. Launching an elaborate ruse, the president-elect slipped past the media and most of his own bodyguards. With a handful of staff members, he boarded a small International Red Cross plane and flew to a hamlet near the FARC stronghold of San Vicente de Caguán for a secret meeting with the legendary FARC commander Manuel Marulanda, alias "Tirofijo," and the military chief known as Mono Jojoy.[883] According to Pastrana, the meeting served as an illustration of good faith to the guerrillas and the Colombian public. Several days before his inauguration, Pastrana travelled to Washington and asked Clinton to back his Marshall Plan proposal. Accompanied by designated ministers Fernández de Soto and Lloreda and Ambassador Luis Alberto Moreno, the incoming Colombian administration also requested equipment and training for the Colombian military and help in stabilizing Colombia's fiscal situation.[884] Fernández de Soto said of the initial contacts: "President Clinton and the U.S. administration, people like Madeleine Albright, understood very well that we needed to turn the page on the relations with Colombia from Samper."[885] In a demonstration of Clinton's personal concern over the Colombian situation, the U.S. president issued an invitation, apparently improvised, for a formal state visit. That visit was speedily organized, and Pastrana returned with a larger delegation from October 26-30. During the first meeting and the state visit, the two sides

[883] The meeting is described in Pastrana Arango and Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego*, pp. 60-73.

[884] Pastrana Arango and Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego*, pp. 120-123, 187-188, Fernández de Soto, *La Ilusión Posible : un Testimonio sobre la Política Exterior Colombiana*, pp. 93-95.

[885] Interview and translation by author.

built an agenda that emphasized counternarcotics cooperation and included economics, strengthening civil and military institutions, energy, and the unfolding peace process.

Pastrana was inaugurated on August 7, 1998, days after his return from Washington. In his inaugural address, Pastrana was clear: "My top priority will be the recovery [*recuperación*] of our international relations and a frontal attack on the problem of drug-trafficking."[886] Four days later, while presenting his choice for the position of "High Commissioner for Peace," the principal contact for negotiations with the guerrillas, the president outlined his plans for the *despeje*, promised to root out ties to paramilitaries, and asked for international cooperation with the "Marshall Plan for peace in Colombia." Pastrana laid out a challenge to the guerrillas, the FARC in particular: "The Armed Forces that I command could be armed forces for peace or for war. In both cases, they need to be efficient. Paradoxically, that is the point of departure for any serious negotiations."[887] Pastrana's focus on revamping the military went beyond words. During the administration's first week in office, it began seeking fourteen Blackhawk helicopters as a first step toward addressing the army's inability to pursue guerrillas and traffickers.[888]

In the U.S. embassy in Bogota, Ambassador Curtis Kamman greeted the change of administration. Kamman had been designated early in 1998 to replace the brusque Myles Frychette, whose animosity with Samper was widely known. Kamman, a career diplomat who had been ambassador to Bolivia, worried that victories by guerrilla forces during the months before Pastrana took office had handed them momentum just as the government prepared to negotiate. Noting that Pastrana and new military leaders were "intent on embarking on a major

---

[886] Pastrana Arango and Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego*, pp. 75.

[887] Pastrana Arango and Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego*, pp. 76-77.

[888] That Colombia was allowed to buy Blackhawks was emblematic of the shifting tone of U.S.-Colombian relations since the sale of these helicopters is restricted. Interview with Jaime Ruiz.

program of internal reform and modernization," Kamman advised that the United States amplify its support beyond counternarcotics to include advocacy in international financial institutions and backing Pastrana's alternative development goals. Kamman wrote: "Effective military reform will be essential to the success of the government's strategy. In fact, one political figure close to Pastrana has told us that peace negotiations are necessary to buy time to create a more effective military force." The role for the United States in these reforms was clear.[889] In Washington, the Clinton administration was increasingly concerned about overall stability in the Andean region, with the ongoing Colombian conflict seen increasingly not just as a local matter, but a broader risk. Starting during the summer of 1998, there was considerable division within the executive branch about how, or whether, the United States should work with the Colombian army. The Department of Defense, with a sizeable influence from SOUTHCOM chief Admiral Charles Wilhelm, argued: "A modernized, more professional military could more capably support counterdrug efforts and the peace process."[890] In addition to U.S. willingness to re-set relations with Colombia, long-held beliefs amongst U.S. policymakers about the Colombian civil conflict had started to erode. Visions of the FARC and ELN as Marxist revolutionaries were being replaced with a focus on the nexus between these groups and drug trafficking. While initially many believed that the FARC role consisted of levying protection "taxes" on traffickers, in a July 1998 meeting, U.S. officials said, "We are now convinced that some factions of the FARC and ELN are heavily involved in the production of illicit drugs."[891]

---

[889] Curtis W. Kamman, "The Colombian peace process: Implications for U.S. policy," September 9, 1998, *DNSA*.

[890] Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict to Secretary of Defense, "Read-ahead for July 7, 1998 Principals Committee Meeting on Panama-Colombia," July 2, 1998, *DNSA*.

[891] "Read-ahead for July 30, 1998 meeting with U.S. embassy Bogota deputy chief mission," n.d., *DNSA*

Pastrana aimed to convince holdouts in the U.S. administration of the importance of drug trafficking in financing armed groups, in part because he wanted to involve the Colombian military in attacking both traffickers and guerrillas. Colombia would not accept a "'narcotized' peace," Pastrana said.[892] Neither the peace process nor development projects would interfere with the drug war. Pastrana personally asked Clinton for $150 million in U.S. support to create a new counternarcotics battalion, which the Colombian military command had proposed weeks before the state visit. Colombian military chief General Fernando Tapias had already laid the groundwork with U.S. officials for the proposal, which merged Colombian and U.S. interests.[893] Because it would be a newly formed, handpicked group, the battalion could avoid the human rights concerns that dogged much of the Colombian military. The battalion would operate two dozen helicopters to enable rapid strikes, focusing on narcotics, but with the aim of disrupting guerrilla financing.[894] The Pentagon was receptive to the proposal, but advised Pastrana during his visit that the request for $150 million exceeded Defense's current spending authorization.[895] Pastrana's state visit signaled Colombia's importance to U.S. interests and produced a series of important agreements. In addition to the military plans, Pastrana gained Clinton's support for the

---

[892] Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, "El Momento de la Paz" October 22, 1998. APA 1998, Dirección Secretaria General, caja 3, carpeta Directivos Presidenciales, Archivo Presidencia de la República, n.p.

[893] Dean A. Cook writes that SOUTHCOM Commander Charles Wilhelm pushed the Colombian military to take a larger role in attacking drug trafficking during Samper's final year in the presidency. Cook also says that Wilhelm met with Pastrana in September 1998 to convince the Colombian president that military pressure needed to be part of the peace process, and that it was a "hard sell." However, Pastrana and his advisors emphasized the role of the military during the presidential campaign, during the pre-inaugural visit, and immediately after his August 1998 inauguration. Wilhelm was an influential strategic voice and an advocate in the U.S. Congress for aid to Colombia, but to say he convinced the Colombians that they should involve the military against drug-trafficking ignores that Pastrana had already made that decision.

[894] "Despacho de la Viceministra de América y Soberanía Territorial," Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Memoria al Congreso Nacional, 1998-1999, (Santafé de Bogotá: Fondo Editorial Cancillería de San Carlos, 1999), pp. 278-279; Kamman, "Colombian Army counter-narcotics battalion proposed for USG assistance," October 15, 1998, *DNSA*.

[895] "Read-ahead for the October 29, meeting with Colombian President Andres Pastrana," October 28, *DNSA*.

passage of a fiscal package from the IMF that helped avert a balance-of-payments crisis with $1 billion in 1998 and another $1 billion in 1999. The deal went through shortly after the state visit, with decisive U.S. support. The visit allowed Pastrana to offer evidence to a domestic audience of international support, especially with Clinton's $280 million commitment to Pastrana's social plans.[896] In the presidents' joint appearance, Clinton called the drug fight "our joint responsibility."[897] The U.S. Congress passed supplemental counternarcotics funding of about $160 million, destined for the Colombian National Police.

The two governments agreed to set up a high-level coordinating group through which the United States could assist Colombia with counternarcotics, the peace process, and economic challenges. The inter-agency group, under the auspices of the Colombian Foreign Ministry and the State Department, would be a central site for hashing out the programs and funding that would become Plan Colombia over the following eighteen months. The Pentagon and the Colombian Ministry of National Defense formed a separate working group for defense issues. Ten days after the state visit, Assistant Secretary Romero met with Colombian officials, including Pastrana, to establish its mechanisms. Mindful of how his predecessor had lost influence to the National Police, Pastrana insisted that the relationship be conducted through the Foreign Ministry, run by his old friend Fernández de Soto. The Colombians, in this and other meetings, stressed to their American counterparts that the peace process might lead in uncertain directions, and that its immediate impact on counternarcotics was uncertain. Colombian military and civilian officials, even in discussing the peace process, stressed the ever-closer connection

---

[896] "Despacho de la Viceministra de América y Soberanía Territorial," Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Memoria al Congreso Nacional, 1998-1999, (Santafé de Bogotá: Fondo Editorial Cancillería de San Carlos, 1999), pp. 280-281.

[897] "The President's news conference with President Andrés Pastrana of Colombia," October 28, 1998, *American Presidency Project*. Online: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws?pid=55165.

between the guerrillas and drug production. Because U.S. military aid was restricted to use in counternarcotics operations, the guerrilla-narcotics nexus could lead to broader discretion in the use of U.S. assistance. Defense Minister Lloreda told his counterparts that if, after the initial 90-day truce, talks with the FARC failed, "the guerrillas need to know that the government has other options ('Plan B'), and that the normalization of relations with the United States and the international community changes the dynamics." The U.S. team met with Colombians planning alternative development projects in Putumayo under the rubric of Plan Colombia, and showed cautious enthusiasm about assisting in the peace process.[898]

Peace process

Pastrana's bold, pre-inaugural trip to meet FARC leaders was a media sensation. However, it was difficult for the administration to maintain the momentum. Upon taking office, Pastrana declared Colombian security forces would not pursue the FARC in the *zona de distensión* or *despeje,* in order to facilitate peace talks between the government and the guerrillas. Peace talks did not officially begin until January 7, 1999, nearly a month after the 90-day order for the military to abandon the *despeje*. Although the Pastrana himself again flew to the *despeje* to launch talks, FARC commander Marulanda failed to show up at the last minute, saying the meeting was unsafe. The sides struggled to establish basic trust and form a common agenda for the talks. In the rest of Colombia, the fighting between the FARC and the military continued unabated, since a ceasefire was not a condition for talks. Less than two weeks after talks began,

[898] Kamman, "Acting A/S Romero's visit to Bogota," November 13, 1998, *DNSA*; "Despacho de la Viceministra de América y Soberanía Territorial," Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Memoria al Congreso Nacional, 1998-1999, pp. 282-283.

the FARC sent an open letter accusing the government of complacency regarding attacks from paramilitaries and announced they would suspend the dialogues.[899]

Pastrana wanted to link peace negotiations with the international community, believing international involvement would lend credibility to the process while also helping it to continue beyond his four-year term.[900] Pastrana saw the United States as an essential participant, and he lobbied personally for U.S. participation. He argued that direct contact with the FARC might help the United States understand how complex Colombia's situation was—and how different from Ireland or Central America, to which U.S. officials sometimes compared it. The Clinton administration supported the peace process after Pastrana's pre-inaugural visit. Peter Romero approved an initial U.S.-FARC rendezvous, under the condition that it be held secretly in a third country. The FARC also showed interest in meeting with the United States.[901] In mid-December 1998, State Department officials met with Raul Reyes, the FARC's primary spokesman, in Costa Rica. U.S. officials stated they were there because of Pastrana's strenuous lobbying and stressed their intentions to continue counternarcotics efforts with the Colombian government.[902]

In Colombia and the United States, the talks were unpopular with many on the right. The Heritage Foundation labeled the *despeje* and peace talks a "white flag." Republicans in Congress, including Speaker Dennis Hastert, attacked the proposal and threatened to cut funding

---

[899] Manuel Marulanda et. al., "Open letter to the President of the Republic," January 18, 1999. APA 1999, Alto Comisionado para la Paz, caja 52, carpeta Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Archivo Presidencia de la República, ff. 54.

[900] This was a new facet of the Colombian conflict. Previous talks, including successful negotiations with the M-19, had been almost entirely domestic. Diego Cardona, "La Política Exterior de la Administración Pastrana (1998-2002)," in *Relaciones Internacionales y Política Exterior de Colombia*, ed. Sandra Borda and Arlene B. Tickner (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Departamento de Ciencia Política-CESO, 2011), pp. 208. Also, interviews with Fernández de Soto and Ruiz.

[901] Pastrana Arango and Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego*, pp. 130-135.

[902] Phil Chicola, "Memorandum of conversation between USG representatives and representatives of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)," n.d., *DNSA*.

should the *despeje* lead to increased coca production.[903] While many in the U.S. viewed the *despeje* with trepidation, it provoked outrage amongst Colombian military brass.[904] Commanders saw the zone as a giveaway to the FARC, who, in their eyes, would be free to use it to train, produce cocaine, and launch attacks before retreating into the zone. Resistance to the peace talks, along with worries about Pastrana's designs to reorganize the military, provoked the first major crisis of the president's tenure. The Colombian military felt it was being left out. The conflict was worsened by tensions between Defense Minister Lloreda and Peace Commissioner Victor G. Ricardo. In protest of a rumored, indefinite extension of the *despeje*, Lloreda faxed Pastrana his resignation while Pastrana was at a summit with Latin American presidents. The resignations of a host of generals followed, sparking rumors that a coup might be in the offing. Though Pastrana accepted Lloreda's resignation, he calmed the generals in a daylong meeting at a military base.

Two events scuttled Pastrana's plan for closer U.S. collaboration with the peace process. First, word of the initial meeting was leaked to *El Tiempo* in Bogota, possibly by the FARC, drawing criticism from the U.S. Congress and making involvement more politically costly. Despite that, U.S. Ambassador Kamman accepted the invitation to witness the opening of negotiations on January 7. The murder of U.S. indigenous rights activists by FARC commandoes was the final blow. On March 4, 1999, the bodies of two missing women and one man were found. Their hands were bound, and their bodies showed evidence of torture. Several days later,

---

[903] For the original report, see John P. Sweeney, "Tread cautiously in Colombia's civil war," March 26, 1999, (The Heritage Foundation). Online: http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1999/03/tread-cautiously-in-colombias-civil-war. For reactions from Colombia, see Oficina de Alto Comisionado para la Paz, "Informe semanal de coyuntura," March 26, 1999. APA 1999, Alto Comisionado para la Paz, caja 43, carpeta Informe Conyuntura, Archivo Presidencia de la República, ff. 15-11

[904] Diana Marcela Rojas Rivera and Adolfo León Atehortúa Cruz, "Ecos del Proceso de Paz y el Plan Colombia en la Prensa Norteamericana," in *El Plan Colombia y la Internacionalización del Conflicto*, ed. Universidad Nacional Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales (Bogotá: Editorial Planeta Colombiana, 2001), pp. 122-123.

the FARC admitted to the murders, saying it would discipline those responsible, but would not turn them over to law enforcement. The killings caused a sensation and called into question the goodwill of the FARC, as well as its negotiators' control over disparate "fronts."[905] Though the peace talks continued, the United States backed away from its previous contacts with the FARC and declared the group "terrorists." U.S. support for the talks was henceforth cool and cautious.

The peace talks had been frozen for months because of the FARC's threat to break negotiations over continuing paramilitary violence. In early 1999, the government offered assurances about its respect for human rights and attempts to weed out links between the army and paramilitary groups. In a show of good faith, Pastrana extended the original 90-day limit on the *despeje*, despite the activists' murders and complaints that the FARC was violating the zone's conditions. There was little visible progress until early May 1999, when the FARC and the Colombian government announced agreement on a broad 12-point agenda for negotiations. It included the end of the conflict, political reforms, human rights, agricultural and natural resource policy, juridical reforms, foreign policy, and more. The agreement followed on the heels on another meeting between Pastrana and Marulanda, held on the president's initiative to salvage negotiations. However, the sides had not agreed on a ceasefire, and the guerrillas had launched more than 300 armed acts between the opening of the talks and the conclusion of the agenda.[906] Talks collapsed again in July when the FARC refused to allow international observers into the *despeje*. An American analyst later summarized: "Throughout the first half of 1999, the FARC demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to take advantage of political space created for the

[905] Pastrana Arango and Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego*, pp. 134-135, 162-167. "Colombia rebels say own fighters killed 3," *New York Times*, March 11, 1999, pp. A10.

[906] Oficina de Alto Comisionado para la Paz, "Informe semanal de coyuntura," May 7, 1999. APA 1999, Alto Comisionado para la Paz, caja 43, carpeta Informe Conyuntura, Archivo Presidencia de la República, ff. 62-55; Pastrana Arango and Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego*, pp. 170-189.

peace process by the Pastrana administration, to recognize the significant political risks Pastrana had taken in making concessions, or to respond with reciprocal political gestures of real of symbolic importance."[907] Over the next year and a half, the two sides met frequently over this agenda, without reaching agreement on a single point.

Plan Colombia's precursors

The peace talks progressed slowly, but U.S.-Colombian cooperation intensified much more quickly. U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen traveled to the port city of Cartagena for a hemisphere-wide meeting of defense ministers, where at a breakfast meeting Pastrana and Lloreda pressed plans for the counternarcotics battalion, attack helicopters, and crop substitution and eradication. The U.S. ambassador wrote that Lloreda's "objective was to strengthen Colombia's military capability as a key tool for reinforcing the government's peace dialogue with the guerrillas." The new battalion gained strong support from Secretary Cohen.[908] As the Colombian Foreign Ministry prepared for the state visit and sought to reestablish the country's international credibility, much of the government's attention was focused on the creation of the *Plan Nacional de Desarrollo* (National Development Plan), a policy blueprint the presidency is required to present to Congress within six months of assuming office.[909] As early as December 1998, a draft of the *Plan Nacional* was circulating within the Department of National Planning. It stressed the "lack of governability" and the absence of the state, proposing "Plan Colombia" as a financing mechanism to promote investments to foster conditions for peace. The investments,

[907] Cynthia J. Arnson, ed., *The Peace Process in Colombia and U.S. Policy* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2000), pp. 7.

[908] Kamman, "Pastrana breakfast and Colombia bilateral," December 22, 1998, *DNSA*; "Despacho de la Viceministra de América y Soberanía Territorial," Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, *Memoria al Congreso Nacional, 1998-1999*, pp. 282-283.

[909] Law 152 of 1994, Chapter 4, Article 13, *Diario Oficial*, n. 41450. 19. July 1994, pp. 18.

both government and private, would target areas that were home to coca and poppy plantations and the presence of guerrillas or paramilitaries had brought economic development to a halt.[910]

Director of Planning Jaime Ruiz led the drafting of the document, entitled *Cambio para Construir la Paz* (Change to Build Peace), which in large part focuses on social and economic development. Ruiz, eager to challenge the many critics of the Pastrana administration, argued in recent interviews that all the aspects of the eventual Plan Colombia were present in the government's early plans. Initially, the elements of the larger strategy were rolled out as separate policies. Alternative development programs, described as "a Marshall Plan for Colombia" during the campaign became Plan Colombia in the *Plan de Desarrollo Nacional*. Counternarcotics, judicial reform, and military reform are all present, but not explicitly linked.[911] The *Plan Nacional* calls Plan Colombia a "strategy of alternative development and state actions for zones affected by conflict and violence."[912] The next section of the plan focuses on the staggering level of violence in Colombia. While it calls for "negotiation with armed groups as a central part" of the search for peace, the plan declares that "ultimately, the recuperation of security depends on the armed institutions of the State recovering the monopoly over arms, and the full exercise of the authority and legitimacy of the State within a strict framework of human rights."[913] While the *Plan Nacional de Desarrollo* does not include the military under the programmatic name of "Plan Colombia," it makes ample references to the need to address violence that originates from

---

[910] Departamento Nacional de Planeación, "Cambio para la construcción de la paz: Plan Colombia," December 1998. APA 1999, Alto Comisionado para la Paz, caja 43, carpeta Plan Colombia 99, Archivo Presidencia de la República, ff. 23-17.

[911] Interview with Jaime Ruiz, 2011.

[912] *Plan de Desarrollo Nacional: Cambio para construir la paz*, pp. 47. Online: http://www.dnp.gov.co/QuiénesSomos/Misiónvisiónorigen.aspx

[913] Ibid., pp. 51, see also 307-308.

drug trafficking, urban crime, and the larger conflict—initially targeting the most affected regions.[914] Large drug cultivations would be "eradicated without compensation," while small, peasant-held plots could benefit from alternative development. The *Plan* lays out a strategy for reorganizing military personnel and strengthening the military to address the conflict:

> During the past several years, the subversives have been developing a consistent strategic plan that has allowed them to grow and strengthen themselves economically and militarily, while the State has failed to confront them with a comprehensive plan. For that reason, it is imperative that we strengthen the country's defense sector … [to] confront the threat to public order.[915]

Many of the military issues targeted for improvement under the Plan would eventually be addressed with the U.S.-funded Plan Colombia—"intelligence capabilities, telecommunications, and mobility."[916] Pastrana and Ruiz's *Plan Nacional de Desarrollo* explicitly sought to "increase the offensive capability of the armed forces."[917] Given Colombia's fiscal constraints, it was clear the funding for military overhauls would have to come from outside Colombia.[918] The plan led to the creation of a high-level committee tasked with reforming the military hierarchy.[919] Key elements of the later Plan Colombia are in the *Plan Nacional de Desarrollo*, but are not yet tightly articulated. That process would come to fruition later with greater U.S. involvement.

During the first half of 1999, there were two parallel "Plans Colombia" developing inside the Colombian government. One was an interagency mechanism for social investments targeted to conflict and drug-producing regions, led by Rodrigo Guerrero under the auspices of High

---

[914] Inter alia, see pp. 305-308.

[915] Ibid., pp. 399.

[916] Given Colombian terrain, references to "mobility" essentially mean helicopters.

[917] *Plan de Desarrollo Nacional*, pp. 397-401.

[918] This point was made repeatedly in interviews with members of Pastrana's cabinet.

[919] "Decreto por el cual se crea una comisión consultiva" n.d., 1999. APA 1999, Secretaría Jurídica, caja 119, carpeta Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Archivo Presidencia de la República, n.p.

Commissioner Ricardo.[920] The other was led by a small group of advisers with personal proximity to the president, namely Jaime Ruiz, Luis Fernando Ramírez, Mauricio Cárdenas, and Guillermo Fernández de Soto, with the extensive consultation of the ambassador in Washington, Luis Alberto Moreno.[921] For Ruiz—who Pastrana called "the man chosen for the definitive design of Plan Colombia"[922]—the central goal of the plan was always to strengthen the Colombian state, and he saw the military, economic, social, and institutional components as perfectly complementary. The existence of these two tracks created bureaucratic tensions inside the Pastrana administration, spurring Guerrero's resignation as head of the coordinating entity in August 1999. In an acerbic letter to the president, Guerrero said he "understood that the integrated peace strategy had four, independent lines of action, closely coordinated under the president's authority: the political reform that was in Congress, the negotiated solution to the conflict, the *diplomacia para la paz,*[923] and Plan Colombia, a program of social and economic investment in critical conflict zones." However, he felt he had been shut out of an important part of the planning involving Fernández de Soto, Ruiz, Juan Camilo Restrepo, and Camilo Gómez and "was submitting himself to a futile waste, because he couldn't count on the interest or

[920] This is quite clear from the archives of the entity Plan Colombia and the notes from consultative-group meetings it held throughout late 1998 and 1999. See, for example, the "Comité interinstitucional," APA 1999, Plan Colombia, caja 1, carpeta Alto Comisionado para la Paz, Archivo Presidencia de la República, n.p., and other folders for that entity, located in APA 1999 in the Archivo de la Presidencia.

[921] Author interviews with Jaime Ruiz, Guillermo Fernández de Soto, and Luis Fernando Ramírez. Published sources also mention these individuals as the key Colombian figures in the development on Plan Colombia. See Pastrana Arango and Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego*, pp. 118, Marcella, *The United States and Colombia : The Journey from Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity*, pp. 39, Thomas R. Pickering, "Anatomy of Plan Colombia," *The American Interest* 2009.

[922] Pastrana Arango and Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego*, pp. 118.

[923] The phrase was used to baptize the administration's foreign policy of repairing international image and trying to involve the international community in the peace process. See Fernández de Soto, *La Ilusión Posible : un Testimonio sobre la Política Exterior Colombiana*, pp. 74-76.

support of the high-ranking government to execute Plan Colombia."[924] More than being subject to U.S. domination, Plan Colombia was the object of bureaucratic politics within the Colombian executive branch. Different agencies had picked up on aspects of Pastrana's broad strategy that were in line with their missions, and which gave them a role moving forward.

Pastrana's solutions to the Colombian conflict required U.S. and international assistance for both security and development. The ministers who were closest to Pastrana increasingly turned their attention to security. This in part reflected the availability of resources from the United States for that purpose. More than that, it reflected the stagnant peace negotiations with the FARC and a growing conviction that the revolutionary, political wing of the guerrillas had lost influence to those who controlled the purse strings. The latter group had no intention of extricating themselves from their lucrative drug-trafficking business. As Pastrana announced during his first days in office, he would build an army for peace or war.[925] By the time the U.S. package began to solidify, Colombian government officials believed the latter was more likely.

Writing a bilateral Plan Colombia

The Pastrana administration felt pressure to combine its various programs "under the same umbrella," as Ruiz explains it, to better explain its plans domestically and internationally. Much Pastrana's public rhetoric had concentrated on peace and development. In Colombia, there was criticism that the *despeje* and approach to the FARC had been naïve. Some in the United States, especially in Congress, echoed criticisms of the peace talks as soft on the FARC. Conversely, the FARC increasingly criticized U.S. military assistance as violating the spirit of

[924] Ricardo Guerrero V. to Dr. Andrés Pastrana Arango. August 3, 1999. APA 1999, Alto Comisionado para la Paz, caja 43, carpeta Plan Colombia 99, Archivo Presidencia de la República, ff. 114-112.

[925] Pastrana used this phrase many times, starting in late 1998. He was asked about the phrase at length in interview with *Semana.* See "No hay Plan B," August 23, 1999, *Semana.* Online: http://www.semana.com/especiales/no-plan/37934-3.aspx

the talks. Pastrana hoped to address these criticisms and take advantage of international funding opportunities. In an interview, Ruiz argued that Plan Colombia unified related elements:

> We knew all of these things were interrelated. That is, the idea of shared responsibility, the fight against drugs that we wanted, the strengthening of the army, and even though people did not perceive it there [in the United States], the hand extended to the guerrilla, the peace process. They were all related. They were pieces of a whole.[926]

To Ruiz it was obvious by 1999 that the United States would help strengthen the military, but that the Americans also could offer other programs for crop substitution, development, and institutional reform. "They also wanted to participate in the 'Marshall Plan,'" he noted. During June and July 1999, Pastrana and his advisors began rhetorically linking the social programs, the peace process, the counternarcotics, and the security reform into one Plan Colombia.[927]

In recognition of the changed tone of U.S.-Colombian relations, the U.S. State Department gave Colombia full certification in the war on drugs. Under Samper, the certification process had consistently been rocky, with the U.S. either "de-certifying" Colombia entirely, or allowing it a partial waiver under a national security clause. This allowed the U.S. military to share real-time battlefield intelligence with the Colombian military starting in March 1999. Once this cooperation began, the Colombian military grew more effective targeting FARC holdouts.[928] In response, the FARC launched a campaign aimed both at the government and at paramilitary groups who had captured territory from them. The number of killings spiked starting in May 1999. Violence increased further during a July 1999 FARC offensive. Paramilitaries responded with massacres aimed at anyone who might support the guerrillas. Military cooperation between

---

[926] Interview with Jaime Ruiz. Translation by author.

[927] Ibid.

[928] A former top advisor to the Gaviria administration stressed this point. Alfredo Rangel Suárez, "The Military and the Peace Process in Colombia," in *The Peace Process in Colombia and U.S. Policy*, ed. Cynthia J. Arnson (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2000), pp. 52-53.

the FARC and the ELN become more common, as they attacked police stations in small towns with the aim of pushing out the Colombian state and instituting their own governance. The strategy, some in the Colombian government believed, was aimed at gaining concessions during the negotiations and influencing upcoming elections.[929] The surge of violence increased public skepticism about the chances for negotiated peace and led Pastrana and his advisors to emphasize counternarcotics and strengthening the military.

Along with the apparent stagnation of peace negotiations, Colombia sensed an opportunity for even greater backing than had been promised in previous months. In late June 1999, the U.S. General Accounting Office produced a report that painted a stark picture of drug production in Colombia, stating that coca cultivation had increased by 50 percent over the previous two years despite fumigation. The GAO projected another 50 percent increase during the next two years.[930] The report received intense public and Congressional attention, and it refocused the Clinton administration's attention. At the same time, internal Colombian government reports concluded that the original development plans were impossible to carry out given the level of violence.[931] Between the violence and failing peace process, many advocated a new approach. High-level exchanges between the United States and Colombia intensified, with top State Department officials shuttling back and forth to Colombia.

The Colombian military came to the forefront. Newly installed Defense Minister Luis Fernando Ramírez and General Tapias flew to Washington on July 16, seeking $500 billion in

---

[929] One of the most complete records of violence is available in Oficina de Alto Comisionado para la Paz, "Informe confidencial: Dinámica del conflicto armado y las manifestaciones de violencia en el primer año de vigencia de la zona de distensión," November 18, 1999. APA 1999, Alto Comisionado para la Paz, caja 43, carpeta Informe Conyuntura II 99, Archivo Presidencia de la República, ff. 22-1.

[930] "Drug control: Narcotics threat from Colombia continues to grow," June 22, 1999, General Accounting Office.

[931] Oficina de Alto Comisionado para la Paz, "Informe semanal de coyuntura," August 13, 1999. APA 1999, Alto Comisionado para la Paz, caja 43, carpeta Informe Conyuntura, Archivo Presidencia de la República, ff. 306-300.

additional aid, primarily in the form of decommissioned UH-1H or "Huey II" helicopters that the United States would lend to a Colombian military severely lacking air support. The two met Clinton's "drug czar" Ret. Gen. Barry McCaffrey. After Ramírez presented McCaffrey with the helicopter request, the American paused and "asked [Ramírez] a question [he] was not prepared for," Ramírez said. If the U.S. were ready to assist Colombia, how much would Colombia need? The new defense minister scrambled to make mental calculations, and told the drug czar that if Colombia were going to purchase instead of borrow all the equipment it needed, it would need about a billion dollars. McCaffrey looked at his notes and told the minister that according to his numbers, Colombia needed nearly $4 billion. Ramírez said, "Well, I am saying we'd need a billion per year."

"Now you're talking!" McCaffrey exclaimed.[932] From that point forward, McCaffrey became the administration's most visible advocate for aid to Colombia—no doubt contributing to Plan Colombia's drug-focused image. Colombia was clearly on the Clinton administration's agenda, but McCaffrey anticipated a fight in Congress. He framed Colombia as an "emergency and a "near-crisis situation." He sent a letter to other administration officials advocating a massive, supplemental appropriation. After the meeting, Ramírez echoed Pastrana's line: "We are preparing modern armed forces that if peace can be achieved will guard our borders and natural resources. That is the country we dream of. But we are also preparing the armed forces

[932] Ramírez recounted the meeting during an interview, but his account squares closely with others'. Translated by author, with the exception of McCaffrey's exclamation, which was recounted in English.

for war if need be."[933] Ten days later, McCaffrey flew to Colombia, where he called for a $1 billion regional counterdrug effort, with the bulk of the money going to Colombia.[934]

Plan Colombia's backers often give U.S. assistance full credit for the later successes of the Colombian military against the guerrilla. While the equipment, training, and intelligence sharing played a part, the role of internal reforms in underappreciated. From his candidacy, Pastrana pressed for the professionalization of the military. These efforts came to fruition under Pastrana's second defense minister, Luis Fernando Ramírez, who credits improvements in three categories. First, the military added "more and better men." The army had been crippled by the high number of conscripts circling through on year-long tours, of which they spent nearly half in training. Professionalization changed that. Second, there was an improvement in equipment, much financed by the United States. In early 1999, the military had just four combat helicopters. A U.S. military intelligence report noted that the Colombian Army's 5th Brigade had just one helicopter with one machine gun. Troops employed a mishmash of weapons that complicated logistics.[935] Finally, the administration made important legal reforms. It had been almost impossible for previous administrations to remove officers with over fifteen years of service—even those grossly incompetent or suspected of rights violations. Ramírez fired 5,000 for "corruption, human rights, and ineptitude." The military initially opposed these changes. At Ramírez's request, U.S. officers sat with Colombian generals to help convince them of the need to change. Their arguments were augmented by the growing strength of the guerrillas, who had shown themselves increasingly able to make large, frontal attacks on military outposts.

---

[933] Larry Rohter and Christopher S. Wren, "U.S. official proposes $1 billion for Colombia drug war," July 17, 1999, *New York Times*, pp. A7.

[934] Bill Rodgers, "U.S.-Colombia drug war," July 29, 1999, *Voice of America*. Online: www.fas.org/irp/news/1999/07/990729-col.htm

[935] "DIA NMJIC intelligence summary," March 20, 2000, *DNSA*, pp. 9.

The breakdown in negotiations and the FARC offensive increased the Colombian government's need for a strong military while pushing many in the United States and to believe prolonged fighting was unavoidable. Some within the Peace Commission still this, arguing that a political solution with the FARC would end the guerrillas' motive for involvement with narcotics. Members of this camp continued to insist on a clear distinction between guerrillas and drug trafficking and argued that U.S. aid should be concentrated on support of the peace process.[936] But this view had lost favor within the Pastrana's inner circle. Even before the announcement of the huge Plan Colombia aid package, the U.S.-backed counternarcotics battalion began to put pressure on FARC operations. The increased military activity led the FARC to declare that the government did not truly want peace. The two sides were locked into a spiral that made a negotiated peace—a remote possibility even at the beginning of the administration—an ever-more-distant mirage.[937] This set the context in which Plan Colombia would emerge as a bilateral policy, first designed by Colombian leaders with the goal of strengthening a weak state.

[936] "Proceso de Paz," September 1, 1999. APA 1999, Alto Comisionado para la Paz, caja 53, carpeta Proceso de Paz documentos, Archivo Presidencia de la República, ff. 13-12.

[937] The Colombian government was aware of the effect the announced military aid was having on the peace process, but it also clearly needed the help to attain the basic goal of controlling the national territory. Oficina de Alto Comisionado para la Paz, "Informe semanal de coyuntura," September 24, 1999. APA 1999, Alto Comisionado para la Paz, caja 43, carpeta Informe Conyuntura, Archivo Presidencia de la República, ff. 252-236.

September 1999: A new plan emerges

Following Colombia's $500 million request and the ensuing proposal from McCaffrey, senior Clinton administration officials Thomas Pickering, Arturo Valenzuela, and Peter Romero flew to Bogota on August 9.[938] The Colombian Foreign Ministry wrote:

> "[T]hey discussed the modernization and professionalization of the military forces and the strategy the Colombian government has initiated regarding the peace process. The visit of Secretary Pickering constituted a fundamental piece to discuss the importance to Colombia of support from multilateral financial entities given the country's economic situation, to visualize multiple components of the peace process and to restate the government's compromise and initial actions in the fight against drugs."[939]

Pastrana went into the meeting with Pickering confident of Clinton's support, and the Colombian government planned to present Pickering with a one-year aid request. Pickering surprised them by saying the Clinton administration would back a three-year package, covering the rest of Pastrana's term. That assistance, Pickering said, could start that year if the Colombian government were to draft a plan quickly. Much of the planning had been done in different forms, but "what remained to be done was to reorganize the Plan in such a way that it would call together important U.S. assistance, along with aid from other countries and international organizations.[940] Pastrana chose Jaime Ruiz to begin designing a comprehensive aid request.[941]

Ruiz's favorite analogy for the situation in Colombia is not Vietnam, to which some in the U.S. forebodingly equated it, but Prohibition in the 1920s United States. Ruiz describes the Colombia's violence in sweeping terms, saying that the world—not just the United States—has

---

[938] Pickering, "Anatomy of Plan Colombia."

[939] "Subdirección de Estados Unidos y Canadá," Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, *Memoria al Congreso Nacional, 1999-2000*, pp. 353. Translation by author.

[940] Pastrana Arango and Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego*, pp. 202-203. Also see "Read-ahead for September 24, 1999 Principal's Committee meeting on Colombia," written for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, September 22, 1999, *DNSA*.

[941] Pastrana Arango and Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego*, pp. 118.

chosen a policy of prohibition. “A choice of policy is really a choice of consequences,” Ruiz says, paraphrasing U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. A host of serious consequences stem from worldwide choice to prohibit drugs, but those consequences are not distributed equally, falling heavily on the Andes and specifically on Colombia.[942] For Ruiz, it is a matter of basic fairness that the world should help Colombia address these monumental problems. The guiding light of Pastrana’s policies was to build the Colombian state’s capability to respond. “The primordial objective [of Plan Colombia] was to strengthen the state,” Ruiz stressed. Clinton understood this, Ruiz said, though many in the U.S. Congress did not. Members’ concern was having an answer for constituents who were feared drugs in their communities. Ruiz initially opposed including what he saw as meaningless cultivation-reduction targets in Plan Colombia, he compromised. Congress wanted the unrealistic goal of 100 percent reduction. Ruiz picked the middle point—a reduction of 50 percent. “Without that, it would not have passed Congress, and I needed the military, technical, and human rights assistance,” he said. Ruiz and Pastrana agreed that attacking drug trafficking needed to be part of the solution. Many in the United States, especially in Congress, saw counternarcotics as the goal of the plan, but for Colombia it was a means to disrupt the financing of the FARC and paramilitaries, allowing the state to reassert itself in territory where it had lost influence.[943]

Early drafts of Plan Colombia, under the heading “Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and Strengthening of the State,” were circulating between ministries in the Colombian government at least as early as September 12, 1999, when Defense Ministry economist Yaneth Giha Tovar sent

---

[942] Author interview with Jaime Ruiz. Also see, “El poder detrás del trono,” August 9, 1999, *Semana.*

[943] Thomas Pickering made this point independently, writing, “We understood that the drug problem and Colombia’s internal decay were intimately connected … So we were mindful in shaping the policy that support for its drug-related aspects would have to be leveraged to accomplish more than met the Hill’s eye.” Pickering, "Anatomy of Plan Colombia," pp. 71.

a copy to Andrés Soto Velasco, chief of the justice and security unit in National Planning, with the note: "I send the attached document 'Plan for peace, prosperity, and the strengthening of the state' from Plan Colombia, written in the Division."[944] The detailed, Spanish draft was already moving between departments several weeks before the English version emerged, casting doubt on claims made by Russell Crandall that the plan originated in English in the United States. Crandall writes: "[M]any U.S. officials readily admitted that it was essentially devised by the US government and that a copy in Spanish did not exist until months after a copy in English was available."[945] This claim is repeated as a symbol of U.S. domination. In fact, it is more emblematic of how evidence from Latin American sources can challenge assumptions in the study of U.S.-Latin American relations.

The early draft of the plan emphasizes "the need to strengthen and consolidate the Colombian state" through four fundamental lines of action: "restarting the economy, an anti-drug policy, juridical reform, and a strategy of social development and the peace process." The draft put into law the argument that a "mutually beneficial relation exists between the guerrilla and the drug traffickers, [and] it is of vital importance to break the links between these groups." This particular draft, originating in the police and military divisions of the National Planning Department, is nearly complete on plans to strengthen the police and military, while also enforcing stricter human rights standards.[946] There is major overlap between both the main points and the wording of the early draft and the English version from October, which Jaime Ruiz, Luis

---

[944] Yaneth Giha Tovar to Andres Soto Velasco, "Plan Colombia: Plan para la paz, la prosperidad, y el fortalecimiento del estado," September 12, 1999, ff. 332-339. Carpeta Plan Colombia, no. 2, código 124523053, Archivo DNP.

[945] Russell Crandall, *Driven by Drugs : US Policy toward Colombia* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), pp. 124.

[946] "Plan Colombia: Plan para la paz, la prosperidad, y el fortalecimiento del estado," September 12, 1999, ff. 332-339. Carpeta Plan Colombia, no. 2, código 124523053, Archivo DNP.

Fernando Ramírez, and Guillermo Fernando de Soto all insisted was written by Colombians.[947] The Plan's introduction compares Colombia's violence to Prohibition in the United States, as Ruiz frequently had done. Though Ruiz, who has a master's degree in engineering from the University of Kansas, where he met his wife, a U.S. citizen, speaks excellent English, sections of the plan contain awkward phrasing very similar in structure to the Spanish draft.[948] In a comparison of the draft and the English version, key sections are nearly identical, though the later version expands on shorter points set out in the Spanish draft.

The refutation of the idea that the Plan was penned by the U.S. government is not to suggest that it was written by Colombians in total isolation. Rather, the Plan was the result of close collaboration between the two governments, starting with Pastrana's pre-inaugural visit. It reflected many of Pastrana's original goals and priorities, adjusted to changing conditions in Colombia. It also reflected U.S. priorities, from both Clinton and Congress, about launching a visible response to public concern about drugs. Pickering wrote: "Contrary to popular belief, the United States did not design *Plan Colombia*. It was certainly discussed with us. But it reflects a realization by the Colombian government that the various strategies they had developed needed to be linked because so many, if not all, the problems were inter-related."[949] The Pastrana administration framed its priorities in language salient to U.S. policymakers and members of Congress as a pragmatic response to the weakness of the Colombian state vis-à-vis the FARC,

---

[947] In interviews, Ruiz and Fernando de Soto both said they considered insulting the readiness with which people assumed they could not write a paper in English.

[948] This was initially pointed out to me by Arlene Tickner, a top scholar at University of the Andes in Bogota. It was also noted by Ruiz himself, who said that his wife helped him with sections of the English draft. For example, the English version reads: "With the FARC, a distention area was created as a safe haven for negotiations, and has helped both parties to formulate an agenda, a process completed in May, 1999;" or "The international community can act as media for, overseer or, at a later stage, verifier of compliance with agreements made."

[949] Phillip Chicola, in *The Peace Process in Colombia and U.S. Policy*, ed. Cynthia J. Arnson (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2000).

paramilitaries, and drug traffickers, while also trying to boost a struggling economy. Colombia was the smaller, poorer country, and it was asking for billions of dollars. However, Pastrana's priorities and U.S. interests were largely compatible. As Ruiz said, "*Se juntó el pan con la hambre*—hunger and bread came together. The Defense Department noted that the United States "was actively involved in assisting the Colombians in drafting this plan."[950] But Colombia did not accept a plan written for it by the United States. Rather, Colombian policymakers actively sought resources and cooperation to address problems they had identified.

President Pastrana decided he would present Plan Colombia in his address at the United Nations General Assembly on September 20, 1999, and he planned to discuss it with Clinton in New York. In a September 16 meeting at the State Department, Colombian officials presented their plans to Secretary Albright. On September 17, Pastrana delivered a televised address laying out the plan to the Colombian people. He repeatedly spoke of drug trafficking as a driver of conflict and corruption. Strengthening the state, including the police and military, was a fundamental precondition to achieving lasting peace and reinvigorating the economy. Pastrana argued that international cooperation was needed for this, and that it was the responsibility of consuming countries to help address the problems caused by drug trafficking. The strategy required $7.5 billion over the next several years, and Colombia planned to appropriate $4 billion, much of that dedicated to enhancing social programs. Pastrana turned to the international community for the remainder, knowing that the United States was likely to commit a substantial portion.[951] After the speech, Pastrana flew to New York for the UNGA, also meeting with

[950] "Read-ahead for September 24, 1999 Principal's Committee meeting on Colombia," written for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, September 22, 1999, *DNSA*.

[951] Pastrana and Ruiz calculate that Colombia spent more than $1 billion per year on fighting drug trafficking, including the military and police. It had budgeted $900 million for new social programs under "Network of Social Support" and $800 million for "peace credits" aimed at conflict areas. Pastrana Arango and Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego*, pp. 204-209. On the requests for international support, also see Larry Rohter, "Plan to strengthen

Clinton and calling members of Congress.[952] Pastrana did not expect the U.S. to cover all $3.5 billion, but hoped Clinton's leadership would convince European countries.[953] In his UN address, Pastrana spoke about the plan in general terms and admitted the peace process had struggled in the face of continuing violence. He called for a "genuine partnership between the countries that consume and produce illegal drugs, underpinned by the principles of joint responsibility, reciprocity, and fairness."[954] Pastrana emphasized that Colombia's need for help was not limited to counternarcotics; economic and fiscal challenges further weakened the government.[955]

The English version of Plan Colombia was first publicly presented on October 6, 1999 to a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Many on the committee had been intensely lobbied by the Pastrana administration and its tenacious Ambassador Luis Alberto Moreno. Colombia persuaded many members of Congress and their staffs to visit. Senator Jesse Helms presided over the hearing, warning about the narcotic-financed power of Colombian guerrillas and the specter of narcotics "flooding American streets and school yards." Helms starkly framed the issue: "Without U.S. help, Colombia could lose this war." Lawmakers burnished their trips to Colombia as credentials, something Senator Paul Coverdell did repeatedly in supporting massive aid to Colombia. In the hearing, Republican senators expressed their support for the plan, while some Democrats such as Senator Paul Wellstone placed objections related to paramilitaries,

---

Colombia nudges U.S. for $3.5 billion," September 18, 1999, *New York Times*, pp. A6; "Subdirección de Estados Unidos y Canadá," Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Memoria al Congreso Nacional, 1999-2000, pp. 357.

[952] "Subdirección de Estados Unidos y Canadá," Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Memoria al Congreso Nacional, 1999-2000, (Santafé de Bogotá: Fondo Editorial Cancillería de San Carlos, 1999), pp. 357.

[953] "Necesitamos plata, Bill," October 18, 1999, *Semana.* Online: http://www.semana.com/nacion/necesitamos-plata-bill/39001-3.aspx

[954] "Address by Mr. Andrés Pastrana Arango," General Assembly, 54th session, September 20, 1999 (New York, Record #A/54/PV.5), pp. 8-10.

[955] Tim Golden, "Colombian leader says U.S. won't be drawn into war," September 21, 1999, *New York Times*, pp. A3.

human rights, and aerial fumigation. Senator Christopher Dodd expressed cautious support for the plan, so long as it balanced military support with other funding.[956] Because of his well-known interest in Latin America, Dodd was a particular target for Colombian persuasion.[957]

After the hearing and the administration's embrace of the Plan Colombia draft, it appeared the aid was on a fast track to approval. There was clear support in the Republican-controlled House, though the liberal wing of Clinton's own party tried to shift the funding to domestic drug treatment and prevention programs. In the Senate, it appeared Clinton might face some hurdles from Democrats, but they appeared surmountable. Pastrana left for a tour of Europe, to "clear up doubts and concerns about the Plan and its initial presentation in the United States" while also "obtaining the support of the European Union."[958] Some criticized Pastrana for trying to sell different versions of the plan to different audiences. His advisors did not expect major military aid from Europe. Fernández de Soto argued: "Europe had different strategic interests." In his address to the European parliament, Pastrana was clear that a major goal of Plan Colombia was to tackle drug trafficking and production, though he stressed that "Plan Colombia is not a military plan, like some enemies of peace would have you believe."[959] The Colombian government had a harder time in Europe in part because the FARC had been very active there diplomatically, convincing many that they were "a bunch of Robin Hoods," said Fernández de

---

[956] "Crisis in Colombia: U.S. support for peace process and anti-drug efforts," Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 6, 1999, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2000).

[957] Dodd was mentioned repeatedly in interviews with Colombian participants, and he gradually formed a personal relationship with Pastrana who he met on as many as a dozen occasions.

[958] "Visita del Señor Presidente de la República de Colombia a las instituciones de la Unión Europea," October 22, 2000. APA 1999, Dirección Secretaria General, caja 21, carpeta Despacho Señor Presidente, 2, Archivo Presidencia de la República, n.p.

[959] Andrés Pastrana, "Palabras del señor Presidente de la República, Doctor Andrés Pastrana, con ocasión de su visita al Parlamento Europeo," October 26, 1999. APA 1999, Dirección Secretaria General, caja 21, carpeta Despacho Señor Presidente, 2, Archivo Presidencia de la República, n.p.

Soto. [960] Pastrana's visit in late October 1999 helped convince many Europeans that the Colombian government was making a sincere effort in the peace process, though Europeans often disapproved of U.S. aid or felt left out of the formation of Plan Colombia.

By the time Pastrana returned to Colombia, the U.S. aid package had run into trouble in Congress. The Plan, put together hurriedly to gain emergency appropriations before the end of 1999, was caught in a quagmire of toxic executive-congressional relations. In part, this reflected lasting rancor over the Kenneth Starr investigation and Monica Lewinsky scandal. More directly, though, the branches were feuding over how to balance the budget and major legislation came to a halt. Colombia was caught in the middle. Pastrana describes the period as immensely frustrating, and Colombians tried to press Plan Colombia through the logjam. Pastrana wrote: "Facing this situation, we started an intense lobby, and I gave Ambassador Moreno instructions to visit as many members of Congress as possible; I helped to pressure as much as I could, calling Congress people or inviting them to visit the country."[961] Moreno was a gregarious presence on Capitol Hill, often noted for his small stature, boyish appearance, easy charm, and sharp intelligence. He spent hours at the Capitol, where he would board the small, underground train that carries members and staffers between the office buildings and the chambers. As he waited, he would identify members of Congress and strike up a conversation. Before the ride ended, Moreno would often have extended an invitation to Colombia or set up a meeting. Then Moreno would hop back on the train and look for another opportunity to make his pitch.[962] The Colombians pressed the executive branch, too, making frequent appeals to advocates like

[960] Interview with Fernández de Soto.

[961] Pastrana Arango and Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego*, pp. 205.

[962] This story was recounted by Minister of Defense Luis Fernando Ramírez, who accompanied Moreno on several occasions.

McCaffrey and Attorney General Janet Reno. Clinton phoned Pastrana in November, after U.S. action on Plan Colombia had stagnated for nearly two months. Pastrana was passing through dire straits. Unemployment sat near 20 percent, the peace talks appeared to have collapsed, the Colombian congress opposed him, and his popularity ratings were abysmal. He laid some blame at the feet of the U.S., telling Clinton: "It was not fair that when the Colombian government built a bridge to channel U.S. aid, Plan Colombia, we were left with only our side constructed."[963] Clinton responded to Pastrana's pleas with an address in which he spoke glowingly about the Colombian president and outlined items in the delayed foreign aid bill that would assist Colombia. However, this funding fell far short of the multi-billion-dollar package Pastrana needed to improve the situation in Colombia, not least Pastrana's political standing. That would be pushed back to the next budget cycle.[964] Later that month, Congress passed a supplemental that included an additional $165 million for Colombia, targeted to drug interdiction, the National Police, and some alternative development.[965]

The delay in U.S. aid was a major setback for Pastrana. Though his domestic agenda had been a constant struggle, until that point Pastrana's foreign policy had been fairly successful. Colombia had been able to reframe issues in a light favorable to its goals, but Pastrana and Clinton were fairly powerless when trying to get the U.S. Congress to take speedy action—even on a proposal with clear majority support. With Congressional action delayed, Colombia sought to influence the debate in Washington. Moreno continued to engage critical human rights NGOs

---

[963] Pastrana Arango and Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego*, pp. 206.

[964] Bill Clinton, "Statement on funding for Colombian counternarcotics efforts," November 10, 1999. In *American Presidency Project.* Online: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=56907.

[965] For a breakdown of U.S. spending, see Nina M. Serafino, "Colombia: U.S. Assistance and Current Legislation " (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2001)..

and skeptical members of Congress, as had since late 1998.[966] Moreno also became the point man for converting the version of Plan Colombia written by Ruiz and his team into a funding request from the U.S. Congress. In doing so, he collaborated closely with Undersecretary of State Pickering, who wrote that "support for its [Plan Colombia's] drug-related aspects would have to be leveraged to accomplish more than meets the Hill's eye."[967]

Meanwhile, the interagency debate continued. The State Department pushed for more economic and social assistance, but eventually concluded that large, upfront hardware purchases would skew the percentages heavily in favor of defense aid. Secretary Albright gave the package her OK in early January.[968] On January 11, Clinton announced his budget request for about $1.3 billion in additional funding for Colombia over the next two fiscal years. With previously appropriated money, that increased total aid to about $1.6 billion in U.S. funding for the Colombian government. Pending Congressional approval, Colombia would become the third-largest destination for U.S. aid after Israel and Egypt, a shocking turnaround from the near-total cut off just three years earlier. Citing a "compelling national interest in reducing the flow of cocaine and heroin to our shores and in promoting peace, democracy, and economic growth in the region," Clinton said the aid would allow a push into the coca-producing south of Colombia.[969] In the ensuing press conference, Clinton admitted he would have liked to include even more economic aid, but balanced "good policy and likelihood of passage in the Congress."

---

[966] Luís Alberto Moreno to Guillermo Fernández de Soto, December 16, 1999. APA 1999, Alto Comisionado para la Paz, caja 47, carpeta Embajadas 99, Archivo Presidencia de la República, ff. 130-128.

[967] Pastrana Arango and Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego*, pp. 210, Pickering, "Anatomy of Plan Colombia," pp. 71.

[968] Ann Richard, Rand Beers, and Peter Romero to Madelaine Albright, "Colombian/Andean assistance package," January 6, 2000, *DNSA*.

[969] Clinton's speech is available at "Statement announcing an assistance package for Colombia," January 11, 2000, *American President Project*. Online: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=58066.

There was criticism in the U.S. and Colombia about the plan's military nature, but Pastrana and his advisors were thrilled that the U.S. aid package met important Colombian government and military needs. "The Plan should not have been less military. It should have had even more—but also more social," Ruiz said. He blamed Europe for failing to accept its share of responsibility.[970]

The announcement offered Pastrana a crucial political boost that neither the economy nor the peace process had. The most significant accomplishment in peace talks since the conclusion of the negotiating agenda was a "Christmas truce" declared by the FARC—a small concession compared to Pastrana's extensions of the *despeje* despite the violations of the terms.[971] Even that truce was partial, and it ended on January 10 with a surge of FARC attacks on towns, highways, and oil pipelines.[972] With U.S. aid in the offing, the dynamics of the talks changed. Some hoped the threat of an efficient, U.S.-trained and equipped Colombian military might persuade the FARC to make concessions they so far had avoided.[973]

The Pastrana and Clinton administrations cooperated to assure the Plan's passage through Congress. Three days after Clinton's announcement, Albright traveled to Cartagena to demonstrate U.S. support for Pastrana.[974] There was a spike in Congressional visits, pushing the total to nearly 120 members during Pastrana's term. Pastrana made another two visits to the United States in early 2000.[975] Defense Minister Ramírez said that during late 1999 and early

---

[970] Ruiz, interview with author.

[971] "FARC declaran tregua navideña," December 20, 1999, *El Tiempo*.

[972] Kamman, "Colombia's armed actors return to work," January 21, 2000, *DNSA*.

[973] "Informe semanal de conyuntura, no. 26," January 14, 2000. APA 2000, Alto Comisionado para la Paz, caja 27, carpeta Proceso de paz con las FARC-EP, informes, Archivo Presidencia de la República, ff. 28-33.

[974] "Subdirección de Estados Unidos y Canadá," Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Memoria al Congreso Nacional, 1999-2000, (Santafé de Bogotá: Fondo Editorial Cancillería de San Carlos, 1999), pp. 354.

[975]Pastrana addressed the U.S. Conference of Mayors in January and the National Governors' Association in February. "Visits by foreign leaders of Colombia," U.S. State Department Office of the Historian. Online:

2000, so many Americans visited that he spent nearly half his time preparing for and guiding Congressional delegations. "It became 'fashionable' to visit Colombia," he said. Most of those who opposed the Plan and visited changed their opinion, Ramírez said, offering Senate Democrat Joe Biden as an example. "He listened and listened, and he became a great friend to Colombia."[976] Despite the enthusiastic support from the administration and House Speaker Dennis Hastert, the aid was subject to the normal pace of Congressional budgeting. There were battles—and lobbying—over exactly how the money should be spent. Some of this was familiar pork-barrel politics, with powerful members sparring to include military equipment built in their jurisdictions. Another group pushed to reallocate money from the Colombian military to the Colombian National Police. Some of these members had become close to General Serrano, who had become "a type of virtual ambassador" during the Samper years. Others saw the police as more insulated from human rights problems and paramilitary ties. Ramírez sought to convince these holdouts that the military and police were, in fact, working as a team and that both needed assistance. SOUTHCOM Commander Charles Wilhelm's testimony before Congress lent critical support to the Colombian military. As the Senate considered the House bill, Wilhelm accompanied Biden on a visit to Colombia, where the senator met with Pastrana.[977] Visitors included high-profile opponents like Representative Nancy Pelosi, who met with officials on February 21-22. Pelosi met with the *fiscal*, Colombia's chief prosecutor, and pressed for more funding to be directed to fight against impunity.[978]

---

http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/visits/colombia. Also see Pastrana Arango and Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego*, pp. 255-256.

[976] Author interview with Ramírez. Translation from Spanish.

[977] Kamman, "Embassy Plan Colombia meeting," April 25, 2000, *DNSA*.

[978] Kamman, "Representative Pelosi's meetings in Bogota," February 28, 2000, *DNSA*.

While it is frequently noted by critics that about two-thirds of U.S. support for Plan Colombia went to the police, military, counternarcotics, and justice, this obscures the fact that the Plan also represented an enormous increase in U.S. funding for so-called "soft" programs like alternative development, civil society, and human rights. It also takes the U.S. aid as the totality of Plan Colombia, reflecting the overwhelming focus on U.S. policy and the inattention to Colombian policy. In the eyes of Pastrana administration officials interviewed, U.S. assistance allowed for items that needed to be bought with foreign exchange, while the Colombian government could fund many social programs either with Colombian currency or through development loans from the World Bank and IMF. These loans had been granted on more generous terms and with more space for social programs than was customary, in part because of the intercession of U.S. officials. As the battle over the exact shape of Plan Colombia moved from the interagency process to the Congress, Colombia tried to loosen the conditions for the use of military aid. Traditionally, all U.S. aid had been tied to counternarcotics, often going to special battalions vetted for human rights violators. The U.S. required military aid be used for counternarcotics, not counterinsurgency, but the prevalent belief that the two were becoming harder to differentiate led the U.S. to be more accommodating in its "end-use monitoring" agreement, revised in late January. Facing a crisis, Colombia hoped to loosen strictures while arguing that it was improving respect for rights. The new attitude was reflected in the embassy's recommendation for full drug-war certification and with visits from officials including Army Secretary Louis Caldera, Pickering, and McCaffrey during late January and February.[979]

[979] For Colombian visit summaries, see "Subdirección de Estados Unidos y Canadá," Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Memoria al Congreso Nacional, 1999-2000, (Santafé de Bogotá: Fondo Editorial Cancillería de San Carlos, 1999), pp. 355. On U.S. views, see Kamman, "EUM amendment: Signed, sealed, and delivered," January 24, 2000; "Embassy recommends certification," February 8, 2000; Chiccola, "ONDCP director McCaffrey's 2/23 mtg. w. Pastrana," February 25, 2000, *DNSA.*

The debate over aid happened in the middle of an ongoing conflict and nascent peace process. Colombian officials' idea of "negotiations in the middle of conflict" made little sense to the public, but Pastrana was determined to continue the peace process, on which he had bet his diminishing political capital. The lack of a FARC ceasefire subjected the talks subject to criticism from those who thought the government was making unilateral concessions. On January 29, 2000, the FARC denounced the proposed U.S. aid package, which they believed would be "invested in the war."[980] The combination of FARC reticence to U.S. involvement and public anger regarding the post-Christmas offensive, once again put the peace process on the ropes. The government, seeking to improve its public relations with Europe as it sought development aid and trying to change the FARC's mentality, devised a plan for a joint tour of Europe. Members of the Colombian government, led by Peace Commissioner Ricardo and Pastrana confidant Camilo Gómez Alzate, joined FARC leaders in discussions and visits to seven European countries. The government said it wanted to see these countries with the FARC as models for social reform, but the timing also indicated the government's intention to demonstrate its good-faith attempt to make peace—as Pastrana wrote, "to present a more holistic vision of Colombia so the international community could understand the complexity of the conflict." FARC spokesman Raul Reyes used the tour as an opportunity to criticize the Colombian government's fumigation and imply that it was subordinated to U.S. policy. Still, the high-profile tour offered hope the peace process might yet yield benefits.[981]

---

[980] FARC communiqué, qtd. in "Informe semanal de conyuntura, no. 28," February 25, 2000. APA 2000, Alto Comisionado para la Paz, caja 27, carpeta Proceso de paz con las FARC-EP, informes, Archivo Presidencia de la República, ff. 65

[981] For a full list of participants, see Adolfo Carvajal to Guillermo Fernández de Soto, "Gira de los negociadores," February 25, 2000. APA 2000, Alto Comisionado para la Paz, caja 27, carpeta Proceso de paz con las FARC-EP, informes, Archivo Presidencia de la República, ff. 94-103; Camilo Gómez Alzate to Mauricio González Cuervo, "Informe sobre los procesos de diálogos y negociación," July 17, 2000. APA 2000, Alto Comisionado para la Paz,

Led by Ambassador Moreno, Colombian sought to stay high on Washington's agenda.[982] On March 9, the House Appropriations Committee approved an emergency supplemental bill that spread $1.4 billion in aid to Colombia over two fiscal years. After attaching conditions that the military aid must comply with the Leahy Amendment on human rights, the full House passed the aid package on March 30. The Senate trimmed the package to $1.1 billion—largely by replacing some Blackhawks with reworked Hueys— and attached more human rights funding and conditions. The Senate passed the aid in a military construction bill. In June, the final conference bill passed, totaling $1.3 billion. It included five human rights-related stipulations, along with two other conditions. Since Colombia met only one of the seven conditions, President Clinton issued national security waivers for six conditions on August 22, allowing the aid to flow. The final package, contained in Public Law 106-246, tripled the human rights program support requested by Clinton.[983]

The final funding package, while provoked and guided by the Colombian request, was a product of interagency and Congressional wrangling—the output of a complicated policy process. President Clinton issued a decision directive that was clear in its support of Colombia's objectives. Almost quoting Colombian officials, the confidential directive said: "The Administration remains convinced that the ultimate solution to Colombia's long-standing civil conflict is through a successful peace process, not a decisive military victory, and believes that counterdrug progress will contribute towards peace."[984] In implementation, the U.S. government

---

caja 27, carpeta Proceso de paz con las FARC-EP, informes, Archivo Presidencia de la República, pp. 4. See also Pastrana Arango and Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego*, pp. 221-228.

[982] "El hombre del Plan Colombia," July 24, 2000, *Semana*.

[983] Serafino, "Colombia: U.S. Assistance and Current Legislation ".

[984] Clinton, "Presidential decision directive / NSC-73," August 3, 2000, *DNSA*.

compromised with Colombian political demands: delaying aerial fumigation efforts in sensitive areas in favor of alternative development programs and protecting Pastrana's peace process. Following Ruiz's insistence, the plan would be enacted in such a way as to not jeopardize talks with the FARC. The Colombians insisted the next six months would be crucial, and that whether the talks succeeded or failed after that, they would have much greater latitude for action.[985]

However, just as Pastrana seemed poised to take advantage of "the largest assistance ever received" by Colombia, he sank into political crisis.[986] State Department polling found that just 21 percent of the Colombian population supported him.[987] Criticism mounted from several directions, but the most immediate problem was the president's disastrous relationship with the Colombian congress. Pastrana was frustrated by the legislature's slow actions on his domestic and economic agenda, some of which was linked to IMF loans. He saw the body as ridden with corruption and linked to drug money and paramilitaries.[988] On March 30, Pastrana called for a national referendum to reform the legislature followed by elections to replace its members. A leading news magazine wrote: "The parliamentarians received the recall like a declaration of war." Pastrana was forced to withdraw the referendum when the congress insisted that he, too, undergo a recall vote.[989] Because of the feud, Pastrana used the latitude granted to Colombian presidents in foreign affairs to largely exclude the legislature from Plan Colombia. Luis

---

[985] Kamman, "Interagency planning team to visit Colombia," July 28, 2000, *DNSA*; Bob Brown to McCaffrey, "Report on U.S. planning team mission to Bogota," July 31, 2000, *DNSA*.

[986] The quote is a chapter title from Pastrana's memoirs.

[987] Romero, "Colombians dissatisfied with democracy, welcome U.S. help against counternarcotics," May 2, 2000, *DNSA*.

[988] "Pastrana contraataca," May 1, 2000, *Semana*.

[989] Larry Rohter, "Political turmoil adds to Colombian president's woes," May 13, 2000, *New York Times*, pp. A3; "Póker peligroso," June 19, 2000, *Semana*

Fernando Ramírez concedes that there was insufficient debate about the final direction of Plan Colombia inside Colombia.[990] Human rights groups and other civil society members complained to the United States about the lack of consultation with the Pastrana administration.[991] The debate held on Plan Colombia within the legislature took place in April 2000, as it was already being debated in the U.S. Congress.[992]

On top of the self-made political crisis, the FARC shook up the peace process. In mid-2000, the FARC published a proposal for a cease fire. The excitement was short lived because the FARC added that the truce would exclude kidnappings. In fact, there would be a new "tax" under which the rebels would kidnap for ransom anyone worth over $1 million and target a list of people they considered corrupt. Pastrana had to reject the ceasefire offer, given that it would allow the guerrilla to continue its involvement in drug trafficking, extortion, and kidnapping, while under the FARC's conditions, the Colombian state would be prohibited from attacking these operations. The FARC increased its demands to include more territory than had already been granted and even demanded payments from the Colombian government. It was a non-starter that many interpreted as a ploy to get Pastrana to cancel negotiations and bear the blame for their failure. In late April, peace commissioner Victor G. Ricardo resigned, in part due to never-ending tension with members of the military who saw him as soft on the FARC regarding the *despeje*. In July, just a day before Clinton signed Plan Colombia into law, the unpopular Pastrana was forced to shuffle his cabinet and include more members of opposition parties.[993]

---

[990] Interview with Luis Fernando Ramírez.

[991] Higgins Porter to Grace Shelton, email message, May 23, 2000, *DNSA*.

[992] "Respuestas al cuestionario contenido el la proposición no. 245 de la plenaria del Senado de la República", n.d., n.p. Carpeta Plan Colombia, no. 4, caja 48, Archivo DNP; Manuel Antonio Salazar to Mauricio Cárdenas, April 3, 2000, n.p. Carpeta Plan Colombia, no. 4, caja 48, Archivo DNP.

[993] Pastrana Arango and Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego*, pp. 230-232.

Pastrana again looked abroad to solidify his weak domestic position. He reiterated an invitation to President Clinton for a visit to Colombia, which he had first extended during the state visit in 1998. At the time, according to Fernández de Soto, Clinton told Pastrana he would go to Colombia once he had assembled bipartisan support for Plan Colombia.[994] On January 25, 2000, Clinton told Pastrana that once the aid was approved, he would visit Colombia with leaders of both parties "to make it clear that Plan Colombia could count on the bipartisan backing, which guaranteed its sustainability and permanence."[995] On August 4, Clinton announced that he would travel to Cartagena on August 30 with Speaker Hastert and Senator Biden. The trip included Clinton's daughter, Chelsea, and Albright, Reno, and National Security Advisor Sandy Berger.[996] Clinton presaged the trip with a televised address to Colombians, in which he countered the already prevalent criticisms that the plan was a U.S. creation. He stressed the increases in development, social, and human rights funding, and U.S. support for peace talks:

> Of course, Plan Colombia will also bolster our common efforts to fight drugs and the traffickers who terrorize both our countries. But please do not misunderstand our purpose. We have no military objective. We do not believe your conflict has a military solution. We support the peace process. Our approach is both pro-peace and antidrug.[997]

The administration saw Clinton's trip as a way to boost Pastrana's flagging fortunes, since the U.S. had just made a billion-dollar bet on him. Secretary Albright wrote Clinton before the trip, saying it "present[ed] an opportunity to provide badly needed support for President Pastrana's

---

[994] Author interview with Fernández de Soto.

[995] Pastrana Arango and Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego*, pp. 256.

[996] Pastrana Arango and Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego*, pp. 258-261. Clinton, "Statement announcing upcoming visit and further assistance to Colombia," August 4, 2000, *American Presidency Project*. Online: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=1493.

[997] Clinton, "Videotaped address to the people of Colombia," August 24, 2000, *American Presidency Project*. Online: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=1410.

peace initiative," which she admitted moved at a "glacial pace."[998] Clinton's presence on Colombian soil—the first U.S. presidential visit since John F. Kennedy went to support the Alliance for Progress—was a marked contrast from relations under the previous president, Ernesto Samper. Whereas Samper was stripped of his visa to enter the United States, Pastrana gained U.S. assistance and the most prestigious delegation the United States could assemble.[999]

After the high-level political goals had been accomplished, the aid approved, and the flashy visit concluded, teams from both sides continued to work out the details of U.S. support through a host of implementation agreements. Pastrana and his key lieutenants, starting with Jaime Ruiz, were intensely and personally involved in the formation of these agreements.[1000] Colombia drafted an "interagency action plan" to coordinate U.S. aid. Pastrana named Gonzalo de Francisco as the point man for organizing Colombia's strategy for the south of the country, which had been targeted since the earliest Colombian drafts as the first area for Plan Colombia. Implementation agreements covered topics like counternarcotics and the strategy for increasing military and state presence in Putumayo as well as agreements between U.S. AID and Colombian agencies to carry out development projects. Proposals were broad in the early stages, offering goals like "reduce the participation of the targeted population in illicit cultivation…generating favorable conditions for the peace process in Colombia."[1001] Eventually, the proposals were

---

[998] Albright to Clinton, "Your trip to Cartagena, Colombia," August 25, 2000, *DNSA*. On the trip, also see "Subdirección Estados Unidos y Canadá," Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Memoria al Congreso Nacional, 1999-2000, (Santafé de Bogotá: Fondo Editorial Cancillería de San Carlos, 1999), pp. 364; Clifford Kraus, "Clinton to herald a new era of ties on Colombia trip," August 29, 2000, *New York Times*.

[999] For a contemporary Colombian interpretation of the visit, see "El espaldarazo," September 4, 2000, *Semana*.

[1000] Romero to Albright, "Expanded meeting with President Pastrana," August 30, 2000, *DNSA*.

[1001] "Convenio interinstitucional para fortalecer la capacidad del Ministerio de Defensa Nacional de Colombia en apoyo al program bilateral sobre control de naróticos," August 14, 2000, caja 11, carpeta 3, doc. 34, Archivo Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Unidad de Gestión Central, CAN, Bogotá (henceforth AMDN).

concretized in manuals, glossaries of terms, and strategic plans. By October 2000, a U.S. interagency "ExCom" had "accepted the Colombian government's plan for implementing Plan Colombia as a valid basis for the USG to proceed with its own support planning."[1002]

By the first quarter of 2001, bilateral defense groups had worked out arrangements for the modernization of aircraft in the Colombian Air Force, the training of hundreds of pilots, the weapons systems to be added to re-worked Huey helicopters, and more.[1003] To meet the human rights conditions of the aid, the United States supported the creation of mobile human rights investigative teams and training units to "strengthen and institutionalize a culture of respect for human rights."[1004] Albright and Romero had been consistent in pressing for these sorts of teams, something the Pastrana administration was receptive to, though it struggled to get compliance from the military. Entrenched officers saw proliferating human rights policies as threatening. State Department officials like Harold Koh pressed the Pastrana administration to be more engaged with human rights NGOs, to get their buy-in for at least some portions of Plan Colombia.[1005] The State Department fretted that Pastrana was failing to build public support for the program, and that his unpopularity would undermine it. At the time, it appeared that failed presidential candidate Horacio Serpa had a strong chance of capturing the presidency—a possibility the United States did not welcome.[1006] The continuation of U.S. support seemed

---

[1002] James Mack, "Colombia initiative ExCom," October 6, 2000, *DNSA*.

[1003] Eventually these details were contained in appendices to the agreement. See, mainly, Appendix 5. Many of these drafts and internal communications regarding the accords are held in Caja 11 at the Archivo Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Unidad de Gestión Central, CAN, Bogotá.

[1004] "Memorando de constancia," 4-5 June 2001, caja 11, carpeta 7, docs 87, 35, AMDN.

[1005] Romero suggested to Albright that she bring this up in several meetings with both Pastrana and Fernández de Soto. See two August 28, 2000 briefing memoranda from Romero to Albright, *DNSA*; Peter Higgins to Harold Koh, "Your meeting with Plan Colombia southern coordinator Gonzalo de Francisco, September 20, 2000, *DNSA*.

[1006] Romero to Albright, "Expanded meeting with President Pastrana," August 30, 2000, *DNSA*.

assured, given its bipartisan support, even as Clinton's presidency entered its final months. More worrying was Pastrana's inability to translate the support of the international community into domestic political success.

While many aspects of this policy and of the closer bilateral cooperation endured, Pastrana's peace process would not. The Pastrana administration became more vocal about its intention to cut illegal armed groups off from drug revenues. Discussions between the FARC and the new peace commissioner grew tense. In late 2000, the FARC again suspended the talks over complaints of paramilitary violence and to protest the increased U.S. role in counternarcotics. Instead of backing away from the peace talks, Pastrana doubled down, extending the *despeje*, though for a briefer period. He made two more visits to meet Marulanda in early 2001. In the second, Pastrana and Marulanda signed the "Agreement of Los Pozos," which, despite the administration's attempts to brandish it as a significant advance, contained few concrete measures.[1007] There was temporary improvement in the mood of talks. In June 2001, the two sides agreed to the release of hundreds of captured soldiers and police.[1008] However, the new George W. Bush administration saw the peace talks in a less favorable light than had Clinton, despite Pastrana's otherwise successful attempts to build a personal relationship. This was enhanced after September 11, 2001, though the change in U.S. policy after the attacks mattered less than the FARC's continued and absolute refusal to provide significant concessions. It was no longer politically tenable in Colombia for Pastrana to continue extending the *despeje* to prolong a process that was almost universally seen as a failure. Finally, Pastrana called an end to the talks and the *despeje*. The final issue on which the FARC refused to resolve was a seemingly

[1007] The agreement is contained in Appendix 4 of Pastrana Arango and Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego*.

[1008] Pastrana Arango and Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego*, ch. 34, appendix 36.

preliminary one—a timetable for reducing the intensity of the conflict and trying to protect the civilian population. Pastrana administration officials decided the FARC had no real interest in separating itself from drug trafficking. In Ruiz's formulation, the political elements of the FARC had lost influence to those who filled the coffers.[1009] Pastrana ordered Commissioner Ricardo to give the FARC stark proposals so they, not the president, would break off the talks. The FARC would not leave the negotiating table, nor would they give ground. When the FARC hijacked an airplane and kidnapped a Colombian senator during a commercial flight, it was the final outrage Pastrana would tolerate. He later wrote: "There were no more alternatives. … I had bet with my whole soul on a process to reach peace, but the FARC, deaf and blind to the pain of their countrymen, preferred to bet on war."[1010] Pastrana ordered the Colombian military, a far more efficient force than had retreated from the zone nearly three years prior, to re-enter the *despeje*. Employing enhanced intelligence capabilities, Colombian pilots launched a two-day campaign against FARC locations inside the area.

Case conclusions

From its roots with Pastrana, Plan Colombia grew into a signature, and highly controversial, U.S. policy. Under Pastrana's successor President Álvaro Uribe and President Bush, the rhetoric of the plan shifted to align with the post-September 11 "war on terrorism." The Colombian military, brandishing U.S. equipment and training, launched a much more effective assault on the FARC. Later investigations have unearthed links between Uribe's administration and allies in Congress with paramilitary groups. However, these events, and the

[1009] Ruiz, interview with author.

[1010] Pastrana Arango and Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego*, pp. 474.

major changes in the strength of the Colombian government are far removed from the situation Pastrana faced when he took office in 1998.

In these brief conclusions, I return to the guiding questions outlined in Chapter 2. First, what has been the predominant interpretation of the case in the literature? As discussed on page 322, there are three predominant views of Plan Colombia in the case literature, which largely overlap with the "revisionist synthesis" and partisan wings of the establishment school. The first argues that Plan Colombia is a new expression of post-Cold War, U.S. imperialism meant to entrench U.S. hegemony through political and economic means. The second sees U.S. policies as a perversion of Pastrana's initially peaceful initiatives. A third, security-oriented triumphal view paints Plan Colombia as a model of successful U.S. state building to be emulated elsewhere. A handful of Colombia-based scholars, finally, have hinted at an "international turn" understanding of what Arlene Ticker calls "intervention by invitation."[1011]

Who were the most important actors in Colombia and the United States? How did each government define its interests, goals, and strategies? In Colombia, Pastrana was able to effectively fashion foreign policy out of the executive branch, sidelining Colombia's congress. His right hand in doing so was Jaime Ruiz, who acted as a "super minister" to coordinate other agencies. Foreign minister Fernández de Soto was close to Pastrana and helped him advance his agenda with Colombia's allies. However, other agencies were not as fully on board. Because of his predecessor, Pastrana had to deal with a National Police command that was accustomed to acting on its own, even bypassing the president to work with the United States. The military was skeptical of Pastrana's peace negotiations as well as his plans to reform the officer corps. Pastrana was largely able to bring them around because Plan Colombia offered substantial

[1011] Tickner, "Intervención por Invitación."

benefits, and because the two sides agreed on their fundamental and urgent interest in strengthening the Colombian state. This guided Colombian policy and implied many second-order goals: stabilizing the economy, building state presence in rural Colombia, restoring territorial control, and reducing violence. In a different sense, the FARC were a constant player. Though the group interacted directly with U.S. policymakers only fleetingly, they sought to influence U.S.-Colombian relations through statements and actions. The failure of negotiations seemed to demonstrate their interests were incompatible with Pastrana's.

In the United States, Colombia benefited from frequent, high-level attention. Pastrana did not need to do much to get on the U.S agenda—concern about cocaine and stability largely achieved that, but his actions set a new tone. Pastrana had substantive pre-inaugural meetings with Clinton and a state visit in the first months of his term. The Colombian government invited and coordinated frequent visits of high-level officials and members of Congress, another clear expression of U.S. interest. This culminated in visits from the secretary of state and the president in 2000. Clinton's attention was important, though he was not the most significant player. Against what many critics imply, the Pentagon was not either (though its importance increased during implementation). Rather, the most crucial U.S. actors were General Barry McCaffrey and Under Secretary Thomas Pickering. McCaffrey was central for his role in helping Colombians adapt their proposal to emphasize counternarcotics as a middle step to undermining the FARC in a way that was more politically salient in the United States. Pickering was crucial in frequent consultations with Colombians during the second half of 1999 in converting their Plan Colombia into a specific funding request. McCaffrey's office wanted drug-supply reduction, and like many in the Pastrana administration, he saw that as inextricably linked with the Colombian conflict. Pickering was invested in Colombia's stability, and he stressed the risk that instability there

could spread across the Andes. Both placed a high value on helping Pastrana. Drugs and stability formed the two main U.S. interests in Colombia.

How was the definition of Colombian interests, goals, and strategies affected by the perception of the United States or by U.S. policy? How were these goals affected by domestic political factors? How was Colombia's ability to affect the outcome shaped by the issue-area? More than in any previous case, during the creation of Plan Colombia there was close intermingling between Colombian and American officials that affected how they defined their strategies and goals. For Colombians, the main goal was strengthening the state; for Americans, this was also crucial, though was perhaps seen as a means to reduce instability or drug trafficking instead of an end on its own. This main Colombian interest was driven by domestic conditions, principally the crisis Pastrana inherited, in which the FARC had gained considerable territory, the Colombian military was ineffective, the economy was suffering, and average Colombians were calling for respite. However, the strategies that Colombians pursed were closely related to perceptions of U.S. policy and the context of asymmetry. Colombia's position was greatly affected by the fact that it was a weak government making a large request for aid. On the one hand, the weakness made its situation a crisis for U.S. policymakers; on the other, its needs were great and its leverage limited. However Pastrana's insistence on sticking with the peace talks and the *despeje* demonstrate that the strategy was not determined by the United States. The belief inside the Pastrana administration was that to weaken the FARC it needed to cut into the group's financing, and that financing was increasingly linked to cocaine production and trade. In 1998, the government was militarily unable to execute this strategy, but they knew it squared with U.S. interests. Even before Plan Colombia, this led to cooperative initiatives like the formation of an elite counternarcotics battalion, largely equipped and funded by the United States. That served as

a model for later cooperation, in which Colombia re-framed its priorities in terms more amenable to U.S. actors. In doing so, it shifted the "issue area" from the unpopular question of involvement in the Colombian conflict to drug supply reduction, where there was more agreement.

How were U.S. interests, goals, and strategies affected by domestic political factors, Latin American policy, or the asymmetry of power? Of the two U.S. interests, drugs and stability, the first has typically been understood as a domestically driven, "intermestic" issue while the second is seen as a traditional U.S. foreign policy concern, particularly in Latin America. While the administration, especially Clinton himself, was more concerned with stability, much of its public language reflected the drug issue. As much of the literature on Congress and foreign policy would suggest, the domestic concern about Colombian cocaine in U.S. "schoolyards," in Jesse Helms formulation, drew the greatest attention in Congress. Domestic politics invaded in a second way, when a stalemate about unrelated issues delayed Congressional consideration of Plan Colombia for several months. Power asymmetry was clearly a major factor in structuring the issue. The massive demand of the U.S. (and European) market created forces that the weak government of smaller Colombia was poorly equipped to handle. This structure meant that the Colombian government's main partners for addressing the consequences of drug trafficking on its internal conflict were the drug-consuming countries themselves. Looking for aid, military or otherwise, Colombian leaders needed to look to more powerful partners. Because of that, Colombia was strategic in how it presented the problem. It employed the rhetoric of the U.S. war on drugs and worked within its confines by accepting limitations military aid. However, it did not lose sight of its primary goal of strengthening the Colombian state and weakening the FARC. Colombian leaders did not seek to alter the twin U.S.

concerns of drugs and instability; instead they pursued a strategy of adapting their interests in order to help shape U.S. policies to pursue their own goals.

How would U.S. policy likely have been different in the absence of the Colombian effort? Put differently, if the United States had foisted its own policy on Colombia, as many critics assume, would that policy have been different than Plan Colombia? This question is perhaps more difficult to unravel in the case of Plan Colombia than in the other three cases because of how closely U.S. and Colombian officials interacted, even before Pastrana was inaugurated. As noted above, Pastrana did not have to win a place on the U.S. agenda, nor was counternarcotics assistance something novel in U.S.-Colombian relations. However, the change in aid and in the relationship was dramatic compared to the previous administration. No significant new policy could be made with Samper at the helm. The U.S. government did not wish to work with him, and it was doubtful that he could have enacted major reforms. Instead, the U.S. began working with Pastrana as president-elect. There was a fairly low degree of policy divergence between the Pastrana and Clinton administrations, and the process of policy formation was largely cooperative. Pastrana's pursuit of aid made the Clinton team feel as if it had a capable partner in Colombia after the disastrous Samper years.

However, there are several aspects of the case where the effects of Colombia's efforts are more evident. Pastrana's policies on continued peace talks and the *despeje* are difficult to explain if one considers only U.S. interests; it is unlikely they would have formed part of U.S.-dominated policy. Likewise, the changed emphasis in U.S. aid from the Colombian National Police to the military altered previous U.S. policies. However, many aspects might have looked similar, as they were designed to meld Colombian and U.S. priorities—an emphasis on drug-based financing versus on overall attack on the FARC (which also financed itself through extortion and

kidnapping), for example. Likewise, Colombian policymakers talked about co-responsibility, but did not make a point of assigning blame to the United States for its drug demand. All of these aspects reflect Colombia's weak position and its need to compromise to get U.S. assistance.

How would the outcomes have been different if Colombian leaders had not vigorously pursued their interests? Because Colombian leaders were pursuing the integrity of the state against serious, perhaps existential challenges, the outcome could have been far different. Regardless of what exactly U.S. policy would have been, the outcome required intense cooperation from Colombian leaders. That is not to say the government would have necessarily been overthrown; indeed, the U.S. government had worked with the Colombian National Police to avoid that worst-case scenario even with little cooperation from Samper. However, the expanded war against the FARC that began in 2001, which led to a stronger government presence in much of the country, required the commitment of Colombian leaders even more than it required U.S. involvement.

What have U.S.-focused accounts of these cases missed, and what does a focus on interaction add to our understanding of the case and of inter-American relations? U.S.-focused accounts have sought to explain why the United States created Plan Colombia, with explanations ranging from imperial designs to pork-barrel politics. Several authors have asserted, mistakenly, that the Plan was written in U.S. Department of State. These accounts have missed an essential aspect of the Plan's origin: The Pastrana administration actively pursued it and sought to shape it so that it helped achieve Colombian goals. At the same time, other accounts have tended to downplay Pastrana's peace process and misunderstand its role in later developments. The process, and the FARC's demands in its final stages, largely delegitimized the group as a potential political actor in the eyes of the Colombian public, and with many in the U.S. and

Europe who still viewed the group through a Cold War, revolutionary lens. At the same time, Pastrana's actions in seeking to rebuild the Colombian military and Colombia's ties to the United States bequeathed his successor drastically different capabilities. As Pastrana himself later noted, in 1998, Colombians who were exhausted by violence voted for a peaceful, negotiated attempt to end the conflict. Four years later, exhausted by the failed peace process, Colombian voted for Álvaro Uribe, who promised he would lead the assault on the FARC and initiate a period of "democratic security."

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

The cases of Operation Pan-America, the Panama Canal negotiations, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and Plan Colombia illustrate that Latin American leaders can, through certain strategies and under certain conditions, influence U.S. foreign policies despite their positions as weaker partners in asymmetrical relationships. As the cases demonstrate, Latin American leaders have often attempted to advance their domestic interests in their policy with the United States. In these cases, they at least partially succeeded by affecting the U.S. policy agenda and the way in which the United States defined and pursued its interests in the region.

This concluding chapter will summarize the dissertation's contributions to two different fields. Using a cross-case comparison focused on the guiding questions from Chapter 2, I synthesize what this new perspective adds to the study of U.S.-Latin American relations that "establishment" and "revisionist" accounts omit or obscure. As argued in the introduction, the dissertation advances the "internationalist" approach to the study of U.S.-Latin American relations by offering a serious analysis of Latin American foreign policy. Previous internationalist scholars have argued that Latin American actors were not U.S. or Soviet "puppets," and were often able to maneuver around U.S. policy while non-Latin American actors struggled to control events in the region. This dissertation builds on that point and demonstrates how Latin American leaders not only influenced events in their own region, but were at times able to influence U.S. behavior. Secondly, the dissertation uses this evidence to advance theory on weaker-state foreign policy. In particular, I develop an argument that small states are able to exercise a greater degree of influence in international affairs than most IR theory indicates, but that their ability to do so largely relies on three factors—opportunities, allies, and ideas.

Cross-case lessons

By design, the four cases studied here vary tremendously. The countries involved range from tiny Panama to Brazil, South America's giant. The cases stretch across 45 years, encompassing periods of great bipolar tension, relative détente, and emerging and consolidated unipolarity. Demonstrating that Latin American leaders meaningfully influenced hemispheric relations in such diverse cases provides convincing evidence that these processes of influence should be at work more broadly. The cases are individually enlightening regarding the possibilities, limits, and means of influence. However, through comparison we can examine the impact of different conditions and ask whether similar processes of influence are present. This section applies the same guiding questions, described in Chapter 2 and addressed in the concluding section of each chapter, to each case.

Who are the most important actors in Latin America and the United States? How did each government define its interests, goals, and strategies? Latin American foreign policy is a highly presidential affair in all the cases. When Kubitschek developed OPA, the Brazilian Congress was an afterthought. Omar Torrijos had shuttered the Panamanian legislature and invented his own mechanism, a national referendum, to give the treaties legitimacy. The Mexican Senate held a vote on NAFTA, but the president's party, the then-dominant PRI, did not voice any serious objections. In the most recent case, Plan Colombia, President Pastrana was involved in such a row with his legislature that he tried to have all its members recalled, but legislators still had next to no involvement in the country's principal foreign policy endeavor. There were certainly other actors involved; the military was important in three of the four cases. However, executives were the most important Latin American actors in all four cases by a substantial margin.

The U.S. Congress was a much more salient force in every case than the legislature of the Latin American country—reflecting both asymmetry and the difference in governing institutions.

NAFTA and the Panama Canal Treaties required U.S. Congressional ratification, with the latter requiring a supermajority in the Senate; OPA and Plan Colombia required substantial appropriations. Still, Congress' role did not exceed the U.S. executive's, in part because Congress' most important actions tended to come later in the cases, allowing the president to set the terms.[1012] The much greater capabilities of the U.S. government also played a role. Latin American foreign policymaking usually centered on the president and a handful of close advisors. U.S. decisions often, but did not always, rose to the president, who delegated the execution of policy to the bureaucracy. Authority was spread much more broadly, with various actors sometimes offering different and competing approaches.

Regarding the definition of interests in the United States and Latin America, it is notable the extent to which domestic and foreign factors intermingled on both sides of the relationship. Jeanne Hey has argued that domestic factors are likely to be more pressing for small, less developed countries.[1013] Certainly, domestic factors were important for Latin American leaders, with themes of economic development recurring in OPA, NAFTA, and Plan Colombia, and sovereignty and national dignity prominent in the Panama Canal case. Basic domestic political factors such as the continuance of the governing political regime mattered for the Latin American definition of interests in all four cases, too: Kubitschek believed that democracy needed to deliver growth in order to survive; Torrijos' popularity and power were linked to his nationalism and quest for the canal; Salinas hoped NAFTA would improve the Mexican

[1012] James Lindsay has noted, correctly, that the executive often anticipates Congressional concerns. However, the executive still retained an important first-mover advantage. For a discussion of executive anticipation of Congressional actions, see James M. Lindsay, "Congress and Foreign Policy: Why the Hill Matters," *Political Science Quarterly* 107, no. 4 (1992).

[1013] Hey, *Small States in World Politics : Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior*, pp. 189.

economy and enable the PRI to win fair elections; and Pastrana wanted to regain control of much of national territory.

U.S. policymakers did not face that level of domestic influence in defining their interests and priorities. The U.S. concern about instability in the region is one of the primary continuities throughout the cases—starting with OPA, Latin American leaders tried to use this U.S. interest to their own advantage. However, while this interest does offer continuity in U.S. policy, the promotion of stability was understood in different ways, which Latin American actors sought to influence in all four cases. In OPA, Kubitschek stressed the connection between underdevelopment, instability, and communism. Torrijos argued that a stable and happy Panamanian population would guarantee the canal's safety. Salinas and Serra told U.S. officials that if NAFTA were rejected, it would undermine the government and send waves of migrants to the border. Pastrana and U.S. policymakers often stressed the effect that Colombian instability had on the export of cocaine to the United States and warned of spillover effects.

How was Latin America's definition of its interests, goals, and strategies affected by U.S. policy? How were these goals affected by domestic political factors? Latin American interests were primarily determined by domestic factors, with international factors, such as the goal of restraining U.S. power, in a secondary role. With the exception of the Panama Canal case, Latin American leaders invited a greater U.S. role in certain respects, though they often hoped to channel or contain U.S. power, as did Mexico's leaders when they prioritized binding the United States to NAFTA institutions and dispute resolution mechanisms. However, if Latin America's interests were rooted in domestic considerations, its goals and strategies were deeply affected by U.S. policy and the perception of U.S. power.

How was Latin America's ability to affect the outcome shaped by the issue-area? As noted with regard to Panama, issue area was both important and somewhat malleable. For example, the core tenet of Operation Pan-America was that an economic issue (development) was in fact a security issue (anti-communism) that weighed on the global balance of power. This dynamic of re-framing issues through a process of "securitization" has been discussed by scholars in the Copenhagen School.[1014] Perhaps the more important factor had to do with *where* the issue took place. As might be expected, Latin American leaders were able to exercise more influence on issues and events that took place in Latin America. When those issues moved into the U.S. policymaking and especially legislative process, gaining influence was more difficult for Latin American leaders. That said, the cases exhibit a degree of learning across cases by Latin American policymakers regarding the U.S. policy process and about Congress in particular. Although OPA's success depended in large part on Congressional appropriations, Brazil had no strategy for dealing with Congress. Torrijos and the Panamanian negotiators did not actively monitor Congress until the final stages, and then at the behest of Carter administration officials and Panama's astute Ambassador Gabriel Lewis. For Mexico, NAFTA was the beginning of a major break in its approach to the U.S. legislative branch. By the time of Plan Colombia, the Colombian government was cognizant of how it would need to approach Congress from the beginning of Plan Colombia planning. This process of adaptation seems to be a promising area for future study.

How were U.S. interests, goals, and strategies affected by domestic political factors, Latin American policy, or the asymmetry of power? As noted above, the most continuous U.S. interest was in promoting stability in the hemisphere; this broad interest is directly connected to

[1014] Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ed., *On Security, New Directions in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

the context of asymmetry. While any country would be concerned about the stability of its neighbors, the U.S. concern was global (though its concern regarding Mexico is particularly acute). Other U.S. interests and goals were affected by domestic political factors, such as the concern about drugs in Plan Colombia. U.S. strategy and timing of U.S. actions was also often affected by domestic politics. For example, Eisenhower's Social Development Trust Fund was timed to address criticism aimed at Richard Nixon's presidential campaign. George Bush pressed to conclude NAFTA in time to announce it at the GOP nominating convention and put his rival on the defensive. Latin American leaders tried to shape the U.S. foreign policy agenda in order to gain greater levels of attention for their concerns. On the one hand, this could be done through cooperative, bilateral channels like presidential diplomacy, letters, and visits. On the other, it could mean more internationalized, confrontational approaches like Panama's 1973 UNSC meetings or Kubitschek's coalition of leaders who demanded economic concessions as a price for political cooperation in the Act of Bogota.

How would U.S. policy likely have been different in the absence of the Latin American effort? In all the cases, Latin American leaders had at least some influence on U.S. policy. This was perhaps smallest in OPA, at least when focusing on the Eisenhower administration, though even there Brazilian and Latin American efforts did pay off with the creation of the Inter-American Development Bank. Absent Latin American pressure, the Eisenhower administration had little reason to drop its longstanding opposition, but compared to the goals of OPA, it was a relatively minor concession. The U.S. policy in the early 1970s of maintaining control of the canal in perpetuity required a much greater shift, a change that would be incomprehensible without Panama's effort and its success in making the canal an issue with global resonance. Realists would struggle to explain U.S. actions. The Mexican proposal of NAFTA coincided

with U.S. interests in many respects and represents a very different path. The most crucial aspect of the case was Mexico's recalculation of its own interests, after which the negotiations could proceed on largely cooperative grounds—a sharp break from the past decades of U.S.-Mexico relations. The emergence of Plan Colombia was made possible in part by a change of administration in Colombia, after which the Clinton administration was eager to change its policies to help Pastrana. Previous U.S. policies focused almost entirely on fumigation and interdiction of illicit drugs by helping the Colombian National Police. Pastrana's ability to re-frame the Colombian conflict led to changed policies. Fumigation and interdiction continued, with Pastrana's and later Uribe's blessings, but they were complemented by efforts to rebuild the Colombian army into a force that could defeat the FARC, and supplemented by alternative development efforts and major increases in human rights and judicial reform funding. At the same time, Pastrana obtained Clinton's publicly stated support for the peace negotiations and the *despeje*, both of which elicited right-wing opposition in the United States. Taken together, these cases confirm that Latin American leaders have substantial room to maneuver around U.S. policies to pursue their own priorities in domestic and foreign policy. They also demonstrate that Latin American leaders have actively sought to shape how U.S. policymakers define and pursue their interests—a type of influence much different from that present in realism or even neoliberal approaches to bargaining. Below, I will discuss the types of strategies that these leaders used across the cases.

How would outcomes have been different if Latin American leaders had not vigorously pursued their interests? Changing U.S. policy in the preferred direction does not always lead to the desired outcome. Surely, the Inter-American Development Bank and ensuing Alliance for Progress did not spark the level of economic development and poverty reduction that Kubitschek

and many of his Latin American counterparts sought. In other cases, the change in U.S. policy did lead to more propitious outcomes for Latin American leaders. The Panama Canal Treaties were executed as they were signed, with many aspects of the transfer and military withdrawal proceeding ahead of schedule—though the invasion to remove and arrest Manuel Noriega shows that U.S. intervention remained a concern for Panamanian leaders. NAFTA accelerated a long process of political opening in Mexico, but failed to spur enough immediate economic growth to salvage the PRI's slipping popularity. The 1994 financial crisis inflicted intense economic pain on the Mexican population and further undermined the incumbent party's legitimacy. The PRI lost power in 2000 before returning in 2012, boasting that NAFTA had in fact led to significant macroeconomic growth and huge growth in trade and investment. Even with the PRI out of power, the governing PAN actively promoted trade with North America and beyond as the key to Mexican development. While NAFTA transformed bilateral relations, NAFTA did not lift Mexico to the first world as some of its promoters promised. Undocumented migration soared; drug-trafficking and violence grew. Plan Colombia succeeded in strengthening the Colombian state and weakening the FARC, though not as quickly as Pastrana hoped. The peace negotiations failed, and Pastrana's promise that he would build "an army for peace or for war," took on a more ominous tone during a decade-long fight to reduce the FARC's influence and territory.

This section addressed many of the guiding questions to compare across the cases. In the next section, I will situate the dissertation's contributions within the study of U.S.-Latin American relations.

Conclusions for U.S.-Latin American relations

What does the U.S.-focused literature on U.S.-Latin American relations miss, and how does a focus on interaction add to our understanding? As discussed in Chapter 1, the literature on

U.S.-Latin American relations can be broadly divided into three camps: an "establishment" school, a "revisionist synthesis," and a more recent "internationalist" approach. The establishment school is characterized by a focus on the "security thesis" as the central explanation for U.S. policy and the argument that the United States has been, on the whole, a beneficial presence in the hemisphere. Under the security thesis, the primary concern of U.S. policymakers has been to make sure no external rival could use Latin America as a base from which to threaten the United States. U.S. and Latin American interests are not necessarily harmonious, but nor are they incompatible. The "revisionist synthesis" emerged as a critique of the early establishment school, in which "the distinguishing feature of U.S. relations with Latin America has been the prevalence of conflict and exploitation." The United States, according to this view, is an imperial presence, and its relations with its southern neighbors are heavily influenced by the need for cheap raw materials and exploitable markets.[1015]

The models coincide in their focus on the actions of the United States as a sufficient explanation for hemispheric relations. Under the security thesis, Latin American territory might be important as a base for external powers, but Latin American actors are not treated as independent of the United States or its potential extra-hemispheric rival. What matters is the U.S. perception of and responses to potential extra-hemispheric threats. This interpretation coincides with the core tenets of realism, under which we should expect the United States, as an aspiring or de facto regional hegemon, to expand its influence to prevent the rise of peer competitors.[1016] U.S. power is beneficial because of the stability it provides (akin to hegemonic stability theory), through the benefits of trade, or because of its example and promotion of democratic governance.

[1015] Gilderhus, "An Emerging Synthesis? U.S.-Latin American Relations since the Second World War," pp. 431.

[1016] The version par excellence of this thesis comes from John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001).

Revisionist authors also offer U.S. actions as an adequate explanation for U.S.-Latin American relations, exploring interventions as a primary example of the United States' imperial urges. The perspective has expanded to include factors such as U.S. prejudices as explanations for exploitative U.S. policies. Where establishment authors have, implicitly or explicitly, argued that the United States is different from other great powers—that is, exceptional in a positive or benign fashion—revisionists hold up evidence of U.S. actions to demonstrate that the country has followed its own interests with little regard for professed principles. To make these claims, neither side has generally needed to offer much evidence from Latin America, as the key debate has been about U.S. policy to the region—not, in fact, about U.S.-Latin American relations.

Instead of trying to resolve this debate, the internationalist approach asks different questions and tries to answer them by using additional evidence. Ideally, this work should be interactive in its focus and multinational in its research. First, this perspective sees asymmetry as the context for U.S.-Latin American relations, but not as a determinant of those relations. Secondly, not only are the outcomes of events the product of an interactive process, in many cases, the importance of that interaction extends to the definition of interests and the formulation of foreign policy. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the process by which goals are defined. Third, internationalist research must weigh both foreign and domestic factors in order to trace their influence on the policymaking process. Fourth, just as the United States can exercise influence on Latin America through its power, Latin American leaders can influence both the course of events and, at times, U.S. policy. However, the internationalist researcher must be open to means of influence beyond traditionally defined power resources. This approach has guided this dissertation. In summary, what has it unearthed about U.S.-Latin American relations that the

U.S.-centric approaches have not? To answer that question, I will now return by examining the four cases through the lens of the establishment, revisionist, and internationalist approaches.

Three approaches to four cases

The first, and least studied, case is Operation Pan-America. It has largely been treated, especially in the English-language literature, in connection with the Alliance for Progress. This act of subsuming a major Brazilian and regional foreign policy initiative into a U.S. program is symptomatic of how various approaches have usually dealt with Latin American actors. Both Republican and Democratic "establishment" authors, many of whom were members of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations have offered brief discussions of OPA. Milton Eisenhower, for example, referred to OPA as evidence of continuity between the economic policy enacted late in his brother's administration and the Alliance, which was unfolding as he wrote *The Wine is Bitter*. This view was in part substantiated by Stephen Rabe's book on the Eisenhower administration, which noted that though Eisenhower's policies fell far short of Kubitschek's aspirations, the United States was responding to them. Kennedy administration officials have been divided to the extent they credit Kubitschek, ranging from claims that Kennedy's Alliance was a direct response to Kubitschek's call, to those who say the similarities are just coincidence. Richard Goodwin's and Arthur M. Schlesinger's memoirs minimize the Latin American contribution, despite evidence that he was in close contact with Latin Americans before the Alliance proposal; on the other hand, Lincoln Gordon and Douglass Dillon have given central credit to OPA and Eisenhower policies.[1017]

[1017] Richard N. Goodwin, *Remembering America : a Voice from the Sixties* (New York: Harper & Row, 1989), Lincoln Gordon, *A New Deal for Latin America: The Alliance for Progress* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963). For a summary of this debate, see Darnton, "Asymmetry and Agenda-Setting in US-Latin American Relations," pp. 72-74, Roberto Porzecanski, "Alliance for Progress or Alizana para el Progreso : A Reassessment of the Latin American Contribution to the Alliance for Progress" (M.A. thesis, Tufts University, 2005). Ted Sorenson's

Scholar Mark Eric Williams points to "Latin American states and statesmen that offered a vision of hemispheric development, encouraged their northern neighbor to buy into it, and adeptly took advantage of the OAS machinery and Cold War climate to press their case" as "important precursors to the Alliance for Progress."[1018] However, more typical are Abraham F. Lowenthal's and Peter H. Smith's treatments, which coincide with many Kennedy administration accounts by noting Kubitschek but giving full causal credit to the U.S. decision regarding how to respond to the Cuban Revolution.[1019] Critiques of the Alliance have tended to focus more directly on parsing the motives and effects of U.S. aid programs. Levinson and de Onís looked at weaknesses in conception, bureaucracy, and implementation, with a critical eye toward the transition between Kennedy and Johnson. While establishment authors diverge on whether they credit OPA, none has made it a significant subject of study. If one were to synthesize an establishment view of OPA, it could reasonably be summed up as a footnote and perhaps a minor influence on a generally beneficial turn in U.S. policy to Latin America that would come from Kennedy's Alliance for Progress.

Amongst revisionists, OPA has gotten even less attention. Michael Latham examined the Alliance's roots in modernization theory, arguing that it was undermined by the Western-centric biases embedded in that theory's teleology. Latham briefly mention's Kubitschek and OPA, and notes that the late Eisenhower administration "added economic growth and the reduction of popular misery" to its anti-communist arsenal. However, contra Kubitschek, the United States retained interventionist and military measures as its central tools, thus undermining its own

---

memoir *Counselor* makes only brief mention of the Alliance for Progress and none of Kubitschek. Theodore C. Sorensen, *Counselor : a Life at the Edge of History* (New York, NY: Harper, 2008).

[1018] Williams, *Understanding U.S.-Latin American Relations : Theory and History*, 199-201.

[1019] Lowenthal, *Partners in Conflict, the United States and Latin America*, pp. 29-30, Smith, *Talons of the Eagle*, pp. 150-151.

economic initiatives.[1020] Schoultz argues: "Eager for a toe-to-toe contest with Castro and his Soviet supporters, Kennedy New Frontiersmen picked up the banner of Latin America's poor," before turning his focus to U.S. support for counterinsurgency training throughout the hemisphere.[1021] In a revisionist synthesis, OPA is scarcely present, but appears only to the extent that Latin American aspirations were rejected in favor of policies driven by the expansion of U.S. power through the hemisphere in prosecution of the Cold War.

What does an internationalist approach add to our understanding of Operation Pan-America? My study is perhaps the third study of OPA that could fall under this label. Michael Weis situates OPA within U.S.-Brazilian relations in the early Cold War. Christopher Darnton recently examined the link between OPA and the Alliance in terms of agenda-setting theory.[1022] All three of these studies, including mine, draw on archives from the United States and Itamaraty, and they converge in several respects that are significantly different from the establishment and revisionist accounts. In relation to U.S. policy, internationalist accounts have treated OPA as a necessary, but not sufficient cause of the changes in U.S. policy under Eisenhower and Kennedy. However, an internationalist approach also treats OPA as a Brazilian foreign policy, not just as a precursor to the Alliance. OPA grew out of domestic demands in Latin American societies, which were deeply linked with the democratic opening of the mid- to late-1950s. OPA was a dual strategy oriented to foreign and domestic policies. The degree of Latin American cooperation reflected the (short-lived) democratization of the region, as leaders in similar domestic political positions often found their interests converging. This helped

---

[1020] Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology : American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), pp. 77.

[1021] Schoultz, *Beneath the United States : a History of U.S. Policy toward Latin America*, pp. 356-358.

[1022] Weis, *Cold Warriors & Coups D'etat : Brazilian-American Relations, 1945-1964*, Darnton, "Asymmetry and Agenda-Setting in US-Latin American Relations."

Kubitschek, Frondizi, and Lleras more effectively pressure the United States on economic issues in the wake of the Nixon visit than during previous Latin American attempts.

In addition to offering a serious analysis of Latin American foreign policies in a case that has been mostly treated by establishment and revisionist authors as a footnote to U.S. initiatives, the internationalist approach argues for a different understanding of U.S.-Latin American relations in the case. It sees several levels of interaction between U.S. and Latin American policymakers. Building on Weis' and Darnton's work, I am especially attentive to the formation of preferences and priorities on both sides of the relationship. The Latin American priority of gaining development aid had a domestic genesis, while Brazilian-led strategy of linking development and anti-communism was conditioned by the opportunities presented by the international system, U.S. policies, and the context of asymmetry. The proposal of OPA responded directly to a number of opportunities, starting with the attack on Nixon; it was then reshaped given the renewed interest generated by the Caribbean crisis and worsening U.S.-Cuban relations. During the fifteen years since the Second World War, various U.S. administrations showed little interest in Latin American development, refusing to consider proposals for a development bank and even going to significant lengths to avoid an economically focused summit. OPA sought to reshape U.S. priorities by redefining Latin American underdevelopment in security terms. This was not entirely new, but the Brazilian effort took this idea, assembled a group of allies behind it, and made it politically salient. The internationalist approach makes clear that without Latin American prodding, the Eisenhower administration would have little reason to consider reversing its opposition to a development bank or establishing the Social Progress Trust Fund. These policies were direct responses to Latin American diplomatic initiatives. A range of establishment and revisionist scholars note that during the last two years of

his administration, Eisenhower laid the groundwork for the Alliance for Progress. This groundwork came from an administration, which unlike Kennedy's, was not dominated by modernization-theory thinking. The argument that the Alliance grew out of modernization theory alone also fails to note that similar theories were already prominent in Latin America, particularly in the indigenous Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros, which shaped Kubitschek's thinking about economic development. An astute—albeit partially successful—push from several Latin American leaders caused Eisenhower to change policies that later became the Alliance's groundwork. Likewise, the case shows that the simple existence of the Latin American demand was not sufficient. Various leaders had vocalized the demand for a development bank during many years, but it was not until OPA that the proposal gained organized Latin American support (allies) and took advantage of opportunities to gain traction with U.S. policymakers. This indicates that Latin American foreign policy strategies are an important area of research if we are to understand U.S.-Latin American relations—and even to understand the formation of U.S. policy.

The case of the Panama Canal Treaties is of particular interest because numerous factors indicate that Panama should have had little success in getting the United States to change policy. It would be difficult to imagine a greater power differential than the U.S.-Panama relationship at that time, which stretched far beyond the difference in size. Historically, Panamanian independence in many respects depended on U.S. policy. Even during the negotiations, thousands of U.S. soldiers occupied dozens of bases, and the United States controlled the country's primary strategic and economic asset. Despite these factors, Panama crafted a remarkably independent foreign policy that turned its smallness to its rhetorical and political

advantage. However, this is not the primary understanding of the Panama Canal Treaties offered in the establishment and revisionist literatures.

There is a clear partisan split in the establishment literature on the Panama Canal Treaties, which centers on Jimmy Carter's role and the connection between opposition to the treaties and the rise of the "new right," and to Ronald Reagan's political career in particular. However, as a whole the establishment has been concerned with parsing the meaning of the treaties for understanding the U.S. role in the world in the post-Vietnam era. A recent realist survey of U.S.-Latin American relations claims that the treaties intentionally "undermined regional solidarity" that threatened to challenge the United States—an interpretation that would likely seem bogus to Panamanians who so carefully crafted that very solidarity in support of their cause.[1023] Another group of studies uses the treaties as a case of U.S. executive-Congressional relations, and the two-level game between presidentially appointed negotiators and the U.S. Congress, but these pay little attention to Panamanians.

Revisionist survey texts have paid the treaties little attention, even though the tale of the canal's construction was a central component in early revisionist work. Alan McPherson summarizes the treaty in a page, noting that Panamanians "cleverly framed their demand … in anticolonial terms" and that Carter paid a great cost for the treaties' passage.[1024] Greg Grandin's *Empire's Workshop* mentions it only in regard to Reagan's rise. The most careful revisionist study was written by Walter LaFeber, who both examined Omar Torrijos' political context and recognizes the importance of pre-1977 interactions. However, LaFeber sees U.S. motivations as economic, believing the canal issue represented a "small, if formidable, obstacle to be cleared on

[1023] Williams, *Understanding U.S.-Latin American Relations : Theory and History*, pp. 237.

[1024] McPherson, *Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles : The United States and Latin America since 1945*.

the way to the ultimate goal of developing a workable economic relationship with Latin America. … If the Canal problem was solved, Latin America could again act as the laboratory for United States policies in the developing nations." LaFeber eventually concluded that the final pact was a "triumph" that the United States forced upon Panama—a conclusion that does not seem to follow from his preceding analysis of Torrijos' situation and goals.[1025] If one focuses solely on U.S. policy, with a proclivity to highlight examples of U.S. greed and aggression, the Panama Canal Treaties are an incongruous example.

The internationalist approach to the case shows that Panamanian actions are necessary to understanding how the negotiations unfolded. There is an even stronger case to be made that the Panama Canal Treaties would not have occurred if Panama had not aggressively and persistently sought the end of the Canal Zone and the transfer of control. It was Panamanian leaders who made the matter internationally salient and diplomatically costly for the United States, which led the State Department to take an accommodative position starting in 1974. Because Panama convinced other countries, including nearly all of Latin America, to vocally adopt its cause, the canal was highlighted by the Linowitz Commission and others, which primed the issue for Carter. At the same time, much groundwork had been laid during the Nixon and Ford administrations—despite the lack of personal commitment from either of those presidents. This was made clear by the Carter administration's early affirmation of the Tack-Kissinger agreement on principles as a framework for continuing negotiations. Without Panamanian efforts during the five years preceding Carter's inauguration, the Panama Canal would not have been either significant or ready for Carter to select as a major early initiative. In many cases, Carter's arrival has been treated as both necessary and sufficient for the approval of the treaties. However, the

[1025] Walter Lafeber, *The Panama Canal : The Crisis in Historical Perspective* (New York; Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1989), pp. 151-152, 158-162.

internationalist approach demonstrates that Panama's foreign policy and U.S. political will were both necessary conditions for the treaties, and that Carter's arrival alone is not a sufficient explanation.

Because the establishment and revisionist literatures have marginalized the Panamanian side, they have missed theoretically relevant aspects of the case. For example, the case sheds particular light on the ways in which small-state leaders can use international institutions in pursuit of their goals, as well as the role small states can play in affecting the political agendas of larger ones. The March 1973 UNSC meetings emerge as a key moment, as do summits with democratically elected leaders. Second, there is a lack of emphasis on and understanding of Panamanian goals in the case, which leads LaFeber to treat Panama as the loser in the treaties. Panamanian negotiators never asked for an immediate handover of the canal, because they believed a transition was needed to ensure smooth continued operation of a national resource. The earliest Panama had demanded was a 1995 transfer. However, the Panamanian leadership did want an immediate abolition of the Canal Zone, which they achieved in de jure terms immediately and gained de facto with a three-year phase-out of separate Zonian facilities. Panamanian goals remained relatively stable over a five-year period, though its strategies changed drastically in response to changing U.S. leadership, shifting international events, and internal politics.

NAFTA presents a very different case, especially regarding Latin American preferences. Whereas Panamanian leadership pursued stable preferences, the central focus of an internationalist case study of NAFTA is how Mexican leaders dramatically shifted priorities and how that change affected Mexico-U.S. relations. Establishment and revisionist accounts would tend to offer U.S. policies as the explanation for Mexico's changed position. Most case studies of

the NAFTA negotiations have either come from the establishment literature or from literature on international negotiations or bargaining. An exception is Domínguez and Fernández de Castro's work, which situates NAFTA at the center of U.S.-Mexican relations. They focus primarily on the "important spillovers" that NAFTA produced in relations between the two countries through altering perceptions, deepening institutionalization, and intensifying intergovernmental contacts.[1026] This study, along with careful examinations of the negotiations themselves by Cameron and Tomlin and Frederick Mayer have done more to account for the motivations of the Salinas government, emphasizing the desire to "lock in" liberalizing economic reforms.

Revisionist authors have tended to paint NAFTA in a very different light. Though it is not a primary focus for them, revisionist surveys have painted a different picture, using NAFTA as an exhibit in a larger critique of neoliberal or "Washington Consensus" policies of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Greg Grandin blames NAFTA for a host of Mexican economic and social problems, including increasing "the cost of meeting basic nutritional requirements." McPherson erroneously calls the agreement a U.S. "brainchild," ignoring the Mexican and Canadian roles in advocating first CUSFTA and then NAFTA. He writes that after the Canada-U.S. pact, "Major import-export firms then doled out large contributions to U.S. members of Congress so that they would bring Mexico into the fold of NAFTA." He places full agency in U.S. hands.[1027] Revisionist authors have paid more attention to links between the supposed effects of NAFTA—the 1994 peso crisis and the Zapatista uprising—than to its initiation and negotiation.

This dissertation's study of NAFTA supported many of the conclusions drawn by Domínguez and Fernández de Castro, Cameron and Tomlin, and Mayer. As these authors

---

[1026] Domínguez and Fernández de Castro, *The United States and Mexico : Between Partnership and Conflict*.

[1027] McPherson, *Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles : The United States and Latin America since 1945*, pp. 113-114.

emphasize, achieving and institutionalizing liberal economic reforms was a central concern for Mexican policymakers. The effects were drastic for the U.S.-Mexican relationship, even if NAFTA spurred only incomplete reform of the Mexican economy and far less economic growth than many hoped. Going beyond these excellent works, I have explored the roots and short-term implications for bilateral relations of the Mexican decision to seek a trade agreement with the United States. I find that both domestic and international factors weighed heavily on Mexican leaders' recalculation of national interests. It was not simply a desire to lock in reforms, but a belief that the world was in the midst of a profound transformation. This in large part drove a desire to alter relations with the United States through a new Mexican foreign policy, one presaged on restraining the U.S. and gaining influence through interdependence instead of pressing for autonomy through opposition to a wide range of U.S. actions that could be labeled interventionist. The cases of OPA and the Panama Canal show that, through certain strategies, Latin American leaders have been able to take an initial negative response and change it. NAFTA shows how, without U.S. pressure, a Latin American government opted for a radically new approach and took the lead in redefining its relationship with the United States.

The case of Plan Colombia represents the shift in U.S.-Latin American relations in the post-Cold War era, in which drug trafficking has become a major point of both cooperation and contestation. The establishment literature has tended to be supportive of U.S. actions, though with a partisan split focused on the distribution of aid between military, human rights, and development projects. The general consensus is that U.S. policy was "driven by drugs," in Russell Crandall's phrase.[1028] Establishment writers, often in military or policy think tanks, have emphasized the later successes of the Colombian Army and have held up Colombia as an

[1028] Crandall, *Driven by Drugs : US Policy toward Colombia*.

example of how the United States can successfully engage in state-building projects or confront drug-trafficking organizations or insurgents across the globe.[1029] The assessments of Plan Colombia tend to diverge more extensively when concerned with the later period after the transitions from Colombian President Andrés Pastrana to Álvaro Uribe and from U.S. President Bill Clinton to George W. Bush. However, the key explanation of Plan Colombia centers on the U.S. response to a surge in cocaine production and exports from Colombia, with an assumption that U.S. policymakers were the near-exclusive architects of that response.

Revisionist authors have offered a very different interpretation. The most critical scholars have argued that Plan Colombia represents no less than the new face of U.S. imperialism. Plan Colombia, Germán Rodas argues, is aimed at drugs only on the surface, while its true purpose was to open a military front against Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez.[1030] James Petras connects it to the Central American civil wars of the 1980s, and also described Plan Colombia as a U.S. counterattack against left governments in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Cuba, "which can contribute to undermining the mystique surrounding the invincibility of U.S. hegemony."[1031] Grace Livingstone argues that the U.S. government subverted Pastrana's original, peaceful plan and converted it into a "battle plan."[1032] Villar and Cottle echo this analysis (and many of the same quotations), writing: "Clinton militarized the nation and financed the counterinsurgency

---

[1029] Marcella, *The United States and Colombia : The Journey from Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity*, Jason Campbell, Michael E. O'Hanlon, and Jeremy Shapiro, "Assessing Counterinsurgency and Stabilization Missions," (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2009), Paul Wolfowitz and Michael E. O'Hanlon, "Plan Afghanistan," *Foreign Policy*, October 28, 2011 2011.

[1030] Rodas Chaves, *El Plan Colombia : Análisis de una Estrategia Neoliberal*. See also, Estrada Álvarez, ed., *Plan Colombia : Ensayos Críticos*.

[1031] James Petras, "Geopolitics of Plan Colombia," *Economic and Political Weekly* 35, no. 52/53 (2000).

[1032] Livingstone, *Inside Colombia : Drugs, Democracy and War*.

with the political support of George Soros's organization, Human Rights Watch."[1033] In making the claim, though, they do not account for evidence that Pastrana had been seeking large escalations in material military assistance and enhanced cooperation through training and intelligence sharing even during his pre-inaugural period.

To an extent that establishment authors have not recognized and revisionists have explicitly rejected, the final Plan Colombia was the product of cooperation between U.S. and Colombian leaders—not a replacement of a Colombian plan with a U.S. plan. In this cooperative process, Colombian leaders explicitly pursued their own interests, recognizing and using the U.S. focus on drugs but not kowtowing to it, despite the precariousness of their own positions. Colombian priorities were primarily born out of their domestic weakness—the military was being challenged for control of Colombian territory and the economy was in dire condition. In addition, the country had been largely isolated internationally as the preceding President Ernesto Samper was consumed by drug-money scandals. Under those circumstances, Pastrana's priority was to strengthen the military and civil capabilities of the weak Colombian state as quickly as possible, which implied gaining assistance from the international community. That said, Plan Colombia does not represent the simple fulfillment of Colombian priorities. Rather the internationalist approach shows that those priorities were conditioned by an asymmetrical international environment, clearly seen in the structure of the transnational drug market and by the distribution of resources. Because of that context, Colombian foreign policy strategies were directed at obtaining resources from the United States and, to a lesser extent, Europe, based on a justification of "shared responsibility" for the consequences of drug trafficking. Many in the Clinton administration realized that attacking drug trafficking was a means to the Colombian

[1033] Oliver Villar and Drew Cottle, *Cocaine, Death Squads, and the War on Terror : U.S. Imperialism and Class Struggle in Colombia* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2011), ch. 6.

government's goal of strengthening the state, not its primary concern. However, the Clinton and Pastrana administrations emphasized that portion in their public arguments as an instrumental tactic to boost support in the U.S. Congress for greater appropriations. The two governments acted strategically and in tandem because of the perception that their interests coincided.

The internationalist approach presents a richer, more complex understanding of U.S.-Latin American relations, in which there are many significant actors instead of one. However, the shift is more than a tradeoff between richness and parsimony because it throws into question the central theses of the establishment and revisionist authors. Revisionists who have treated Latin America as a victim of U.S. aggression must grapple with a situation in which power explains only part of the story. Caricatures of Latin American leaders as imperial lackeys do not hold up to scrutiny when those leaders shift between conflict and cooperation as they pursue their own interests. Kubitschek and Torrijos were nobody's puppets; though cooperative in tone, Lleras Camargo and Pastrana both put Colombian interests first as they dealt with the United States. Establishment authors, even those who limit themselves to explaining just U.S. policymaking through a "bureaucratic" approach, must take Latin American actors more seriously as a possible source of influence on the policymaking process. My approach does not overturn the key establishment school claim, the security thesis, however, it does demand an exploration of how Latin Americans sought to affect U.S. perceptions of threats and shape responses to them. Above all the demonstrated influence of Latin American leaders means that studying U.S. policy is not a sufficient proxy for understanding U.S.-Latin American relations.

Weaker-state foreign policy strategies

This dissertation also aims to contribute to the understanding of weaker states' foreign policies, particularly in asymmetrical relationships, by building on the early work of Robert O.

Keohane and the recent work of Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner. Latin American leaders influenced U.S. policies and the outcome of these four cases in U.S.-Latin American relations. In that sense, they not only exercised "agency" but also, in Braveboy-Wagner's formulation, small-state "foreign policy power." However, where her analysis limits this power to a narrow range of issues and partners, this dissertation argues that, at times, the influence can be significant even when that partner is the United States. The cases studied here indicate that while the leaders of the weaker states in asymmetrical relationships can exercise influence, they do so differently than traditional conceptualizations of power. I categorize the strategies utilized by these states' leaders under three groups: opportunities, allies, and ideas.

First, leaders of the weaker state will need to take advantage of opportunities to change U.S. policy. Here, I use "opportunity" to mean a temporally bound window for action. Often, these opportunities will come because of unexpected events that cast doubt on the efficacy of a particular U.S. policy or unsettle the policy agenda. Cognitive studies in FPA, going back to Jervis' classic work on misperception,[1034] had noted that policymakers tend to fit new information into pre-existing "schema," but that momentous events are more likely to upset these patterns of understanding—which relates to the influence of ideas, discussed below. Opportunities could also restructure political coalitions to facilitate actions. Without political actions, however, events and crises are not opportunities. Taking advantage of them will often require the astute use of allies and ideas.

Second, the ability to exercise influence on U.S. policy will often depend on the ability to win international and domestic allies. In situations where the U.S. government rebuffs or ignores that initial small-state demand, international allies will play a more significant role. Successfully

[1034] Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," *World Politics* 20, no. 3 (1968).

internationalizing an issue can accomplish several goals. First, it will increase the salience of an issue on the U.S. policy agenda. Allied countries can raise an issue in bilateral diplomacy, lend support in international institutions, and give a greater sense of legitimacy. Weaker states can also use international institutions as a megaphone for their concerns and as a forum for winning allies. Secondly, internationalization can raise the costs of refusing of deal with an issue. With other countries paying sympathetic attention, this refusal can make the United States appear to be an ungenerous alliance leader. Particularly supportive allies could create linkages between the issue and other U.S. interests where their cooperation is desired. In other cases, particularly those where the initial U.S. response is generally favorable, the small-state leader will benefit greatly from allies in the United States—in the bureaucracy, Congress, and interest groups.

While the leaders of weaker states, by definition, lack the economic and military capabilities associated with power, they remain able to influence U.S. policy through various ideational means, as some liberal and constructivist IR scholars have noted in their work on middle powers including Canada and the Scandinavian countries. Much of this work has focused on the promotion and diffusion of global norms. However, these leaders can also have a more focused influence on particular policy decisions as opposed to the diffuse process of norm cascades.[1035] In these more focused cases, the following processes of ideational influence are particularly significant: information exchange; cognitive framing; rhetorical framing; and policy options. First, information exchange and consultation is an important aspect of largely cooperative relationships, and has been discussed by authors studying alliance dynamics (though

[1035] The classic work is Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998).

not including Latin America).[1036] The leader of a weaker state can be seen as an expert who can offer insights into events in their own country or region. In certain situations, consultation can affect how policymakers understand, or cognitively frame, a problem. The literature on bargaining has referred to this process as the creation of "common knowledge"—an agreement on the nature of the issues being addressed—as fundamental to the success of negotiations.[1037] As poliheuristic FPA indicates, the way in which a problem is framed affects what actors see as possible or desirable solutions. There is also a more intentional type of framing, in which actors rhetorically advance a particular understanding of a problem in order to make it more politically salient or to favor certain options. In this case, the "framing" does not extend to the cognitive level of how the weaker states' leaders understand a problem, but refers to how they publicly discuss a problem in order to gain support for their proposed solutions. The rhetorical framing may, but does not necessarily, coincide with the policymakers' own cognitive framing. Instead, what matters is the political effect. Finally, the leaders of weaker states might be in a position to present or advocate for policies that are being considered. As in the exchange of information, the leaders of weaker states might be seen as sources of expertise when suggesting policy solutions, though clearly self-interested recommendations could certainly undermine this.

In summary, while the leaders of weaker states in asymmetrical relationships lack military and economic power, they are able to exercise influence through a number of other, more discreet channels. These three categories of strategies are not exclusive to weaker-state

---

[1036] See Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among Democracies : The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy*, Pressman, *Warring Friends : Alliance Restraint in International Politics*.

[1037] Pepper D. Culpepper, "The Politics of Common Knowledge: Ideas and Institutional Change in Wage Bargaining," *International Organization* 62, no. 1 (2008), Bonham, Sergeev, and Parshin, "The Limited Test–Ban Agreement: Emergence of New Knowledge Structures in International Negotiation."

leaders. However, their comparative lack of material capabilities is likely to make them more dependent on opportunities, allies, and ideas to gain influence.

Summary

This dissertation has presented four case narratives, based on multinational research, that focus on the interactions between U.S. and Latin American leaders. It has been motivated by the central question, how do Latin American leaders try to influence U.S. policies, and can they succeed in doing so? The answers to those questions indicate the value of this focus for improving our understanding of U.S.-Latin American relations and the role of non-great powers in international relations. Understanding the interactions of great powers and weaker states, in the Western Hemisphere and beyond, requires an exploration of both sides. Assuming that the leaders of weaker states simply "do what they must" ignores how they actively shape agendas, re-frame problems, advance options, and achieve influence to advance their own priorities. Research into the perspectives of multiple states can lead to richer interpretations not only of frequently studied cases but of foreign relations more broadly.

REFERENCES

Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," **International Organization**, Vol. 58, No. 02 (2004), pp. 239-275.

Robert J. Alexander, *Juscelino Kubitschek and the Development of Brazil* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1991).

Vágner Camilo Alvés, "Ilusão Desfeita: a "Aliança Especial" Brasil-Estados Unidos e o Poder Naval Brasileiro Durante e Após a Segunda Guerra Mundial," **Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional**, Vol. vol 48, No. no. 1 (2005), pp. pp. 151-177.

Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower : Soldier and President* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990).

Octavio Amorim Neto, *De Dutra a Lula : a Condução e os Determinantes da Política Externa Brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro, Brasil: Elsevier : Campus, 2012).

Cynthia J. Arnson, ed., *The Peace Process in Colombia and U.S. Policy* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2000).

Carlos Arriola, ed., *Documentos Básicos* (México: SECOFI, Grupo Editorial Miguel Ángel Porrua, 1994).

G. Pope Atkins, *Latin America in the International Political System* (Boulder (Colo.); San Francisco; London: Westview press, 1989).

Mohammed Ayoob, "Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism," **International Studies Review**, Vol. 4, No. 3 (2003), pp. 27-48.

James Addison Baker, and Thomas M. DeFrank, *The Politics of Diplomacy : Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989-1992* (New York: Putnam, 1995).

Godfrey Baldacchino, "Thucydides or Kissinger? A Critical Review of Smaller State Diplomacy," in Andrew F. Cooper and Timothy M. Shaw, eds., *The Diplomacies of Small States: Between Vulnerability and Resilience* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) pp. pp. 21-40.

David A. Baldwin, "Power in International Relations," in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse-Kappen and Beth A. Simmons, eds., *Handbook of International Relations* (London: SAGE Publications, 2002).

Moniz Bandeira, *Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos : Conflito e Integração na América do Sul : da Tríplice Aliança ao Mercosul* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2010).

Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States : An Historical Interpretation* (New York: Norton, 1971).

Mariano Bertucci, "Scholarly Research on U.S.-Latin American Relations: Where Does the Field Stand? ," **Latin American Politics and Society**, Vol. forthcoming (2013).

Gustavo Biscaia da Lacerda, "Panamericanismo entre a Segurança e o Desenvolvimiento : O Operação Panamericana e a Aliança para o Progresso"Universidade Federal do Paraná, 2004).

James G. Blight, and Philip Brenner, *Sad and Luminous Days : Cuba's Struggle with the Superpowers after the Missile Crisis* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002).

William A. Boettcher, III, "The Prospects for Prospect Theory: An Empirical Evaluation of International Relations Applications of Framing and Loss Aversion," **Political Psychology**, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2004), pp. 331-362.

G. Matthew Bonham, Victor M. Sergeev, and Pavel B. Parshin, "The Limited Test–Ban Agreement: Emergence of New Knowledge Structures in International Negotiation," **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol. 41, No. 2 (1997), pp. 215-240.

Sandra P. Borda, "The Internationalization of Domestic Conflicts: A Comparative Study of Colombia, El Salvador and Guatemala" (Ph.D., University of Minnesota, 2009), p. n/a.

Barry Bosworth, Susan Margaret Collins, Nora Lustig, and Institution Brookings, "Coming Together? : Mexico-United States Relations," Washington, D.C., 1997.

Mark Bowden, *Killing Pablo : The Hunt for the World's Greatest Outlaw* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2001).

Mark A. Boyer, "Issue Definition and Two-Level Negotiations: An Application to the American Foreign Policy Process," **Diplomacy & Statecraft**, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2000), pp. 185-212.

Hal Brands, *Latin America's Cold War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010).

———, *Latin America's Cold War: An International History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).

Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner, "Opportunities and Limitations of the Exercise of Foreign Policy Power by a Very Small State: The Case of Trinidad and Tobago," **Cambridge Review of International Affairs**, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2010), pp. 407-427.

Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner, ed., *The Foreign Policies of the Global South : Rethinking Conceptual Frameworks* (Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner, 2003).

Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner, and Michael T. Snarr, "Assessing Current Conceptual and Empirical Approaches," in Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner, ed., *The Foreign Policies of the Global South : Rethinking Conceptual Frameworks* (Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner, 2003) pp. pp. 13-30.

Christopher S. Browning, "Small, Smart and Salient? Rethinking Identity in the Small States Literature," **Cambridge Review of International Affairs**, Vol. 19, No. 4 (2006), pp. 669-684.

Sean W. Burges, *Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009).

Maxwell A. Cameron, and Brian W. Tomlin, *The Making of NAFTA : How the Deal Was Done* (Ithaca, Ny: Cornell University Press, 2000).

Jason Campbell, Michael E. O'Hanlon, and Jeremy Shapiro, *Assessing Counterinsurgency and Stabilization Missions*, 2009 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution).

Diego Cardona, "La Política Exterior de la Administración Pastrana (1998-2002)," in Sandra Borda and Arlene B. Tickner, eds., *Relaciones Internacionales y Política Exterior de Colombia* (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Departamento de Ciencia Política-CESO, 2011) pp. 195-225.

Tom H. Carothers, *In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy toward Latin America in the Reagan Years*University of California Press, 1991).

Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith : Memoirs of a President* (Toronto; New York: Bantam Books, 1982).

———, *White House Diary* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010).

Jaime Caycedo Turriago, "Una Guerra Social de la Globalización," in Jairo Estrada Álvarez, ed., *Plan Colombia : Ensayos Críticos* (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2001) pp. 179-214.

Amado Luiz Cervo, "Política Exterior e Relações Internacionais do Brasil: Enfoque Paradigmático," **Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional**, Vol. vol. 46, No. no. 3 (2003), pp. pp. 5-25.

Amado Luiz Cervo, and Clodoaldo Bueno, *História da Política Exterior do Brasil* (Brasília, DF: Editora UnB, 2011).

Phillip Chicola, in Cynthia J. Arnson, ed., *The Peace Process in Colombia and U.S. Policy* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2000).

Alan Chong, and Matthias Maass, "Introduction: The Foreign Policy Power of Small States," **Cambridge Review of International Affairs**, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2010), pp. 381-382.

Ozgur Cicek, "Review of a Perspective: Subaltern Realism," **The Review of International Affairs**, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2004), pp. 495-501.

Ian Clark, "How Hierarchical Can International Society Be?," **International Relations**, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2009), pp. 464-480.

Paul Coe Clark, *The United States and Somoza, 1933-1956 : a Revisionist Look* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992).

Adam Clymer, *Drawing the Line at the Big Ditch : The Panama Canal Treaties and the Rise of the Right* (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2008).

Michael L. Conniff, *Panama and the United States : The Forced Alliance* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2001).

Dean A. Cook, "U.S. Southern Command: General Charles E. Wilhelm and the Shaping of U.S. Military Engagement in Colombia, 1997-2000," in Derek S. Reveron, ed., *America's Viceroys : The Military and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan ; Palgrave, 2004) pp. 127-162.

Licurgo Costa, *Uma Nova Política para as Américas : Doutrina Kubitschek e Opa* (São Paulo: Livraria Martins, 1960).

Martha L. Cottam, *Images and Intervention : U.S. Policies in Latin America* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1994).

Richard B. Craig, "Colombian Narcotics and United States-Colombian Relations," **Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs**, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1981), pp. 243-270.

Russell Crandall, *Driven by Drugs : U.S. Policy toward Colombia* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).

———, *Driven by Drugs : US Policy toward Colombia* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008).

———, *Gunboat Democracy : U.S. Interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama* (Lanham [Md.]: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006).

———, *The United States and Latin America after the Cold War* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

Nick Cullather, *Secret History : The C.I.A.' S Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006).

Pepper D. Culpepper, "The Politics of Common Knowledge: Ideas and Institutional Change in Wage Bargaining," **International Organization**, Vol. 62, No. 1 (2008), pp. 1-33.

Christopher Darnton, "Asymmetry and Agenda-Setting in US-Latin American Relations: Rethinking the Origins of the Alliance for Progress," **Journal of Cold War Studies**, Vol. vol. 14, No. no. 4 (2012), pp. pp. 55-92.

Rodolfo O. De la Garza, and Jesús Velasco, *México y su Interacción con el Sistema Político Estadounidense* (México: CIDE, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas : M.A. Porrúa Grupo Editorial, 2000).

María Mercedes de la Guardia de Corró, *Hasta la Última Gota: Gabriel Lewis Galindo* (Cali, Colombia: Cargraphics, 2009).

Alexandra de Mello e Silva, "A Política Externa do JK : Operação Pan-Americana"Fundação Getulio Vargas, 1992), p. pp. 60.

Alexandra de Mello e Silvia, "A Política Externa do JK : Operação Pan-Americana"Fundação Getulio Vargas, 1992), p. pp. 60.

Alexandra Delano, *Mexico and Its Diaspora in the United States : Policies of Emigration since 1848* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

Michael C. Desch, *When the Third World Matters : Latin America and United States Grand Strategy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).

John Dinges, *Our Man in Panama : How General Noriega Used the United States and Made Millions in Drugs and Arms* (New York: Random House, 1990).

Michael Dobbs, *One Minute to Midnight : Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008).

Jorge I. Domínguez, and Rafael Fernández de Castro, *The United States and Mexico : Between Partnership and Conflict* (New York: Routledge, 2001).

Charles F. Doran, ed., *A New North America : Cooperation and Enhanced Interdependence* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996).

Autran Dourado, *Gaiola Aberta : Tempos de JK e Schmidt* (Rio de Janeiro: Rocco, 2000).

Robert F. Durant, and Paul F. Diehl, "Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy: Lessons from the U.S. Foreign Policy Arena," **Journal of Public Policy**, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1989), pp. 179-205.

Milton Stover Eisenhower, *The Wine Is Bitter; the United States and Latin America* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963).

Todd Eisenstadt, "The Rise of the Mexico Lobby in Washington : Even Further from God and Even Closer to the United States," in Rodolfo O. De la Garza and Jesús Velasco, eds., *Bridging the Border : Transforming Mexico-U.S. Relations* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997) p. pp. 89.

Rómulo Escobar Bethancourt, *Torrijos : Colonia Americana, No!* (Bogotá: C. Valencia Editores, 1981).

Carlos Escudé, *Foreign Policy Theory in Menem's Argentina* (Gainesville, Fla: Univ. Press of Florida, 1997).

———, "An Introduction to Peripheral Realism and Its Implications for the Interstate System," in Stephanie G. Neuman, ed., *International Relations Theory and the Third World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).

Jairo Estrada Álvarez, ed., *Plan Colombia : Ensayos Críticos* (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2001).

Peter B. Evans, Harold Karan Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds., *Double-Edged Diplomacy : International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

David N. Farnsworth, and James W. McKenney, *U.S.-Panama Relations, 1903-1978 : a Study in Linkage Politics* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983).

Guillermo Fernández de Soto, *La Ilusión Posible : un Testimonio sobre la Política Exterior Colombiana* (Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, 2004).

Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," **International Organization**, Vol. 52, No. 4 (1998), pp. 887-917.

Andrew Fraser, "Architecture of a Broken Dream: The CIA and Guatemala, 1952–54," **Intelligence and National Security**, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2005), pp. 486-508.

Max Paul Friedman, "Fracas in Caracas : Latin American Diplomatic Resistance to United States Intervention in Guatemala in 1954," **Diplomacy & Statecraft**, Vol. 21, No. 4 (2010), pp. 669-689.

———, *Nazis and Good Neighbors : The United States Campaign against the Germans of Latin America in World War Ii* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

———, "Retiring the Puppets, Bringing Latin America Back In: Recent Scholarship on United States-Latin American Relations," **Diplomatic History**, Vol. 27, No. 5 (2003), pp. 621-636.

William L. Furlong, and Margaret E. Scranton, *The Dynamics of Foreign Policymaking : The President, the Congress, and the Panama Canal Treaties* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984).

Eduardo Galeano, *Open Veins of Latin America : Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973).

Alexander L. George, and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005).

Federico Gil, *Latin American--United States Relations* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971).

Mark T. Gilderhus, "An Emerging Synthesis? U.S.-Latin American Relations since the Second World War," **Diplomatic History**, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1992), pp. 429-452.

Marcelo Giugale, O. Lafourcade, and Connie Luff, *Colombia : The Economic Foundation of Peace* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003).

Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope : The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991).

———, "The View from Havana : Lessons from Cuba's African Journey, 1959-1976," in G. M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser, eds., *In from the Cold : Latin America's New Encounter with the Cold War* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008).

Steven Globerman, Michael Walker, and Institute Fraser, eds., *Assessing NAFTA : a Trinational Analysis* (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1993).

Richard N. Goodwin, *Remembering America : a Voice from the Sixties* (New York: Harper & Row, 1989).

Lincoln Gordon, *A New Deal for Latin America: The Alliance for Progress* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963).

Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," **International Organization**, Vol. 32, No. 4 (1978), pp. 881-912.

Greg Grandin, *Empire's Workshop : Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006).

———, *The Last Colonial Massacre : Latin America in the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

George W. Grayson, *The North American Free Trade Agreement : Regional Community and the New World Order* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1995).

Julie Greene, *The Canal Builders : Making America's Empire at the Panama Canal* (New York: Penguin Press, 2009).

Michael Grow, *U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions : Pursuing Regime Change in the Cold War* (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2008).

J. Gustavsson, "How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change?," **COOPERATION AND CONFLICT**, Vol. 34, No. 1 (1999), pp. 73-96.

Peter Hakim, "Is Washington Losing Latin America?," **Foreign Affairs**, Vol. 85, No. 1 (2006), pp. 39-53.

Margaret G. Hermann, "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework," **International Studies Review**, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2001), pp. 47-81.

Jeanne A. K. Hey, "Is There a Latin American Foreign Policy?," **Mershon International Studies Review**, Vol. 42, No. 1 (1998), pp. 106-116.

———, *Small States in World Politics : Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).

———, *Theories of Dependent Foreign Policy and the Case of Ecuador in the 1980s* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1995).

———, "Three Building Blocks of a Theory of Latin American Foreign Policy," **Third World Quarterly**, Vol. 18, No. 4 (1997), pp. 631-657.

Stanley E. Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War, 1945-1960: End of the Special Relationship," **The Journal of American History**, Vol. 68, No. 3 (1981), pp. 599-624.

Mônica Hirst, and Andrew Hurrell, *The United States and Brazil : a Long Road of Unmet Expectations* (New York: Routledge, 2005).

J. Michael Hogan, *The Panama Canal in American Politics : Domestic Advocacy and the Evolution of Policy* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986).

Steven W. Hook, "Ideas and Change in U.S. Foreign Aid: Inventing the Millennium Challenge Corporation," **Foreign Policy Analysis**, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2008), pp. 147-167.

J. F. Hornbeck, and William H. Cooper, "Trade Promotion Authority and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy," *CRS Report for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2010).

David Patrick Houghton, "Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Toward a Constructivist Approach," **Foreign Policy Analysis**, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2007), pp. 24-45.

Valerie M. Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations," **Foreign Policy Analysis**, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2005), pp. 1-30.

Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala : The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982).

"International Cooperation in a Latin American Development Policy," in United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, ed. (New York: United Nations, September 1954).

Omar Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones de los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979* (Panamá: Autoridad del Canal de Panamá, 2005).

———, *Las Negociaciones sobre el Canal de Panamá : 1964-1970* (Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, 2002).

Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," **World Politics**, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1968), pp. 454-479.

———, "International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?," **International Security**, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1993), pp. 52-67.

William J. Jorden, *Panama Odyssey* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984).

G. M. Joseph, and Daniela Spenser, eds., *In from the Cold : Latin America's New Encounter with the Cold War* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008).

Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine LeGrand, and Ricardo Donato Salvatore, eds., *Close Encounters of Empire : Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations* (London: Duke University Press, 1998).

Arie Marcelo Kacowicz, *The Impact of Norms in International Society : The Latin American Experience, 1881-2001* (Notre Dame, Ind.: Univ. of Notre Dame Pr., 2005).

Miles Kahler, *Liberalization and Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia university press, 1997).

Peter J. Katzenstein, *A World of Regions : Asia and Europe in the American Imperium* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005).

Renata Keller, "A Foreign Policy for Domestic Consumption : Mexico's Lukewarm Defense of Castro, 1959-1969," **Latin American Research Review**, Vol. 47, No. 2 (2012), pp. 100-119.

Robert O. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," **Foreign Policy**, No. 2 (1971), pp. 161-182.

———, "Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in Internatinal Politics," **International Organization**, Vol. 23, No. 02 (1969), pp. 291-310.

Robert O. Keohane, and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence : World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).

Georgina Kessel, *Lo Negociado del TLC : un Análisis Económico sobre el Impacto Sectorial del Tratado Trilateral de Libre Comercio* (México, D.F.: McGraw Hill, 1994).

Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War : Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).

John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984).

Jeane Kirkpatrick, "US Security and Latin America," **Commentary**, Vol. 71, No. 1 (1981), pp. 29-40.

Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," **Commentary**, November 1979, 34-45.

Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1999).

Paul Krugman, "The Uncomfortable Truth About NAFTA: It's Foreign Policy, Stupid," **Foreign Affairs**, Vol. 72, No. 5 (1993), pp. 13-19.

Juscelino Kubitschek, *Meu Caminho para Brasília* (Rio de Janeiro: Bloch Editores, 1974).

———, *Meu Caminho para Brasilia : A Escalada Politica* ([S.l.]: Bloch Editores, 1976).

———, *Meu Caminho para Brasília : Cinqüenta Anos em Cinco* (Rio de Janeiro: Bloch, 1978).

Diane B. Kunz, "The New Empire Redux," **International Studies Review**, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2000), pp. 136-138.

Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions : The United States in Central America* (New York: Norton, 1983).

———, *The New Empire; an Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963).

———, *The Panama Canal : The Crisis in Historical Perspective* (New York; Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1989).

Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology : American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

Mark Atwood Lawrence, "Containing Globalism : The United States and the Developing World in the 1970s," in Niall Ferguson, ed., *The Shock of the Global : The 1970s in Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010) pp. pp. 205-219.

George Lawson, "The Eternal Divide? History and International Relations," **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2012), pp. 203-226.

W. M. LeoGrande, "From the Red Menace to Radical Populism: U.S. Insecurity in Latin America," **WORLD POLICY JOURNAL**, Vol. 22, No. 4 (2005), pp. 25-35.

Jerome I. Levinson, and Juan de Onís, *The Alliance That Lost Its Way : A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress* (Chicago,: Quadrangle Books, 1970).

Jack S. Levy, "Qualitative Methods and Cross-Method Dialogue in Political Science," **Comparative Political Studies**, Vol. 40, No. 2 (2007), pp. 196-214.

Maria Regina Soares De Lima, and Mônica Hirst, "Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities," **International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)**, Vol. 82, No. 1 (2006), pp. 21-40.

James M. Lindsay, "Congress and Foreign Policy: Why the Hill Matters," **Political Science Quarterly**, Vol. 107, No. 4 (1992), pp. 607-628.

Sol M. Linowitz, *The Making of a Public Man : a Memoir* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1985).

Sol M. Linowitz, and Kalman H. Silvert, *The Americas in a Changing World : a Report of the Commission on United States-Latin American Relations* (New York: Quadrangle, 1975).

Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ed., *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

Grace Livingstone, *Inside Colombia : Drugs, Democracy and War* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2004).

Alberto Lleras Camargo, "The Alliance for Progress: Aims, Distortions, Obstacles," **Foreign Affairs**, Vol. 42, No. 1 (1963), pp. 25-37.

Tom Long, "Putting the Canal on the Map: Panamanian Agenda-Setting and the 1973 Security Council Meetings," **Diplomatic History** (2013).

Kyle Longley, *The Sparrow and the Hawk : Costa Rica and the United States During the Rise of José Figueres* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1997).

Carlos Alfredo López Guevara, "Panamá Tiene Derecho a Denunciar la Convención del Canal Ístmico de 1903 por Violaciones a la Misma por Parte de Estados Unidos," in Centro de Impresión Educativa, ed. (Panamá: 1971).

Abraham F. Lowenthal, *The Dominican Intervention* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972).

———, *Partners in Conflict, the United States and Latin America* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).

———, "United States Policy toward Latin America: "Liberal," "Radical," and "Bureaucratic" Perspectives," **Latin American Research Review**, Vol. 8, No. 3 (1973), pp. 3-25.

Abraham F. Lowenthal, Theodore J. Piccone, and Laurence Whitehead, *The Obama Administration and the Americas : Agenda for Change* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2009).

Angus Maddison, *The World Economy*Academic Foundation, 2007).

John Major, *Prize Possession : The United States and the Panama Canal, 1903-1979* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

Bayless Manning, "The Congress, the Executive and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals," **Foreign Affairs**, Vol. 55, No. 2 (1977), pp. 306-324.

Gabriel Marcella, *The United States and Colombia : The Journey from Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003).

William L. Marcy, *The Politics of Cocaine : How U.S. Foreign Policy Has Created a Thriving Drug Industry in Central and South America* (Chicago, Ill.: Lawrence Hill Books, 2010).

David R. Mares, "Middle Powers under Regional Hegemony: To Challenge or Acquiesce in Hegemonic Enforcement," **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol. 32, No. 4 (1988), pp. 453-471.

Ana Margheritis, "Interamerican Relations in the Early Twenty-First Century," **Latin American Politics and Society**, Vol. 52, No. 4 (2010), pp. 137-146.

Frederick W. Mayer, *Interpreting NAFTA : The Science and Art of Political Analysis* (New York, NY [u.a.]: Columbia Univ. Press, 1998).

David G. McCullough, *The Path between the Seas : The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870-1914* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977).

Alan McPherson, "Courts of World Opinion: Trying the Panama Flag Riots of 1964," **Diplomatic History**, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2004), pp. 83-112.

Alan L. McPherson, *Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles : The United States and Latin America since 1945* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2006).

John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001).

Alex Mintz, "Applied Decision Analysis: Utilizing Poliheuristic Theory to Explain and Predict Foreign Policy and National Security Decisions," **International Studies Perspectives**, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2005), pp. 94-98.

———, "How Do Leaders Make Decisions?," **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol. 48, No. 1 (2004), pp. 3-13.

Alex Mintz, and Steven B. Redd, "Framing Effects in International Relations," **Synthese**, Vol. 135, No. 2 (2003), pp. 193-213.

George D. Moffett, *The Limits of Victory : The Ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985).

Frank O. Mora, and Jeanne A. K. Hey, *Latin American and Caribbean Foreign Policy* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).

Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," **International Organization**, Vol. 51, No. 04 (1997), pp. 513-553.

Leandro Morgenfeld, *Vecinos en Conflict : Argentina y los Estados Unidos en Conferencias Panamericanas* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Continente, 2010).

Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*1968).

James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," **American Journal of Political Science**, Vol. 35, No. 4 (1991), pp. 904-933.

Alexander J. Motyl, "Is Everything Empire? Is Empire Everything?," **Comparative Politics**, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2006), pp. 229-249.

Graeme S. Mount, and Mark Gauthier, *895 Days That Changed the World : The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford* (Montréal: Black Rose Books, 2006).

Gerardo L. Munck, "Tools for Qualitative Research," in Henry E. Brady and David Collier, eds., *Rethinking Social Inquiry* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004) pp. 105-122.

C.A. Murgueitio Manrique, "Los Gobiernos Militares de Marcos Pérez Jiménez y Gustavo Rojas Pinilla: Nacionalismo, Anticomunismo y sus Relaciones con los Estados Unidos (1953-1957)," (2011).

Daniel H. Nexon, and Thomas Wright, "What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate," **AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW**, Vol. 101, No. 02 (2007), pp. 253-271.

Manuel Antonio Noriega, and Peter Eisner, *America's Prisoner : The Memoirs of Manuel Noriega* (New York: Random House, 1997).

Thomas F. O'Brien, "Interventions, Conventional and Unconventional: Current Scholarship on Inter-American Relations," **Latin American Research Review**, Vol. 44, No. 1 (2009), pp. 257-265.

———, *Making the Americas : The United States and Latin America from the Age of Revolutions to the Era of Globalization* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2007).

Mario Ojeda, *Alcances y Límites de la Política Exterior de México* (México: Colegio de México, 1976).

Nicholas Onuf, "Levels," **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1995), pp. 35-58.

Antonio Ortiz-Mena, "Getting to No : Defending against Demands in NAFTA Energy Negotiations," in John S. Odell, ed., *Negotiating Trade : Developing Countries in the WTO and NAFTA* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

Carlos Ozores, "Omar Torrijos y sus Proyecciones en la Política Internacional," **Revista Lotería**, Vol. agosto-diciembre, No. 305-309 (1981).

Robert A. Pastor, *Exiting the Whirlpool : U.S. Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2001).

———, *Integration with Mexico : Options for U.S. Policy* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1993).

———, *The North American Idea : A Vision of a Continental Future* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

———, *Not Condemned to Repetition : The United States and Nicaragua* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2002).

———, "Review: Explaining U.S. Policy toward the Caribbean Basin: Fixed and Emerging Images," **World Politics**, Vol. 38, No. 3 (1986), pp. 483-515.

———, *Toward a North American Community : Lessons from the Old World for the New* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2001).

———, "The United States and Central America: Interlocking Debates," in Peter B. Evans, Harold Karan Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam, eds., *Double-Edged Diplomacy : International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

———, "The United States: Divided by a Revolutionary Vision," in Robert A. Pastor, ed., *A Century's Journey : How the Great Powers Shape the World* (New York: Basic Books, 1999) pp. pp. 141-238.

Robert A. Pastor, and Tom Long, "The Cold War and Its Aftermath in the Americas: The Search for a Synthetic Interpretation of U.S. Policy," **Latin American Research Review**, Vol. 45, No. 3 (2010), pp. 261-273.

Andrés Pastrana Arango, and Camilo Gómez, *La Palabra Bajo Fuego* (Bogotá: Planeta, 2005).

Mark Peceny, and Michael Durnan, "The FARC's Best Friend: U.S. Antidrug Policies and the Deepening of Colombia's Civil War in the 1990s," **Latin American Politics and Society**, Vol. 48, No. 2 (2006), pp. 95-116.

James Petras, "Geopolitics of Plan Colombia," **Economic and Political Weekly**, Vol. 35, No. 52/53 (2000), pp. 4617-4623.

Thomas R. Pickering, "Anatomy of Plan Colombia," **The American Interest** 2009, 71.

Roberto Porzecanski, "Alliance for Progress or Alizana para el Progreso : A Reassessment of the Latin American Contribution to the Alliance for Progress" (M.A. thesis, Tufts University, 2005), p. 39.

Jeremy Pressman, *Warring Friends : Alliance Restraint in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).

Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," **International Organization**, Vol. 42, No. 03 (1988), pp. 427-460.

W. Dirk Raat, *Mexico and the United States : Ambivalent Vistas* (Athens, Ga: University of Georgia Press, 2004).

Stephen G. Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America : The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988).

———, "The Elusive Conference: United States Economic Relations with Latin America, 1945-1952," **Diplomatic History**, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1978), pp. 279-294.

———, "The Johnson Doctrine," **Presidential Studies Quarterly**, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2006), pp. 48-58.

———, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World : John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America* (Chapel Hill [u.a.: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1999).

Stephen J. Randall, *Colombia and the United States : Hegemony and Interdependence* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1992).

Stephen J. Randall, and Herman W. Konrad, eds., *NAFTA in Transition* (Calgary: Univ. of Calgary Press, 1995).

Alfredo Rangel Suárez, "The Military and the Peace Process in Colombia," in Cynthia J. Arnson, ed., *The Peace Process in Colombia and U.S. Policy* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2000).

Henry Raymont, *Troubled Neighbors : The Story of U.S.-Latin American Relations, from F.D.R. To the Present* (Cambridge: Westview Press, 2005).

Commission on United States-Latin American Relations, *The United States and Latin America, Next Steps : a Second Report* (New York: Center for Inter-American Relations], 1976).

Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among Democracies : The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).

Maryse Robert, *Negotiating NAFTA Explaining the Outcome in Culture, Textiles, Autos, and Pharmaceuticals* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2000).

Germán Rodas Chaves, *El Plan Colombia : Análisis de una Estrategia Neoliberal* (Quito, Ecuador: Ediciones Abya-Yala, 2002).

Diana Marcela Rojas Rivera, and Adolfo León Atehortúa Cruz, "Ecos del Proceso de Paz y el Plan Colombia en la Prensa Norteamericana," in Universidad Nacional Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales, ed., *El Plan Colombia y la Internacionalización del Conflicto* (Bogotá: Editorial Planeta Colombiana, 2001).

J.N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," **Approaches to comparative and international politics** (1966), pp. 27-92.

Roberto Russell, and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, "From Antagonistic Autonomy to Relational Autonomy: A Theoretical Reflection from the Southern Cone," **Latin American Politics and Society**, Vol. 45, No. 1 (2003), pp. 1-24.

Carlos Salinas de Gortari, *México: Un Paso Dificil a la Modernidad* (Barcelona: Plaza & Janés Editores, 2000).

Daniel Sargent, Jonathan Haslam, Max Paul Friedman, and Hal Brands, "Online Roundtable: Hal Brands' Latin America's Cold War Hal Brands, Latin America's Cold War," **Journal of American Studies**, Vol. 46, No. 01 (2012).

R. Scherlen, "The Never-Ending Drug War: Obstacles to Drug War Policy Termination," **P.S.**, Vol. 45, No. 1 (2012), pp. 67-73.

Stephen C. Schlesinger, and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit : The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1982).

W.M. Schmidli, "Tracking the Cold War in Latin America," **Reviews in American History**, Vol. 40, No. 2 (2012), pp. 332-338.

Ronald M. Schneider, *Communism in Guatemala, 1944-1954* (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1959).

Thomas Schoonover, "Max Farrand's Memorandum on the U.S. Role in the Panamanian Revolution of 1903," **Diplomatic History**, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1988), pp. 501-506.

Lars Schoultz, *Beneath the United States : a History of U.S. Policy toward Latin America* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998).

———, *That Infernal Little Cuban Republic : The United States and the Cuban Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009).

Nina M. Serafino, *Colombia: U.S. Assistance and Current Legislation* 2001 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service).

Maram Sheldon, "Juscelino Kubitschek and the Politics of Exuberance, 1956-1961," **Luso-Brazilian Review**, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1990), pp. 31-45.

James F. Siekmeier, *The Bolivian Revolution and the United States, 1952 to the Present* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011).

J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," **World Politics**, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1961), pp. 77-92.

David Skidmore, "Explaining State Responses to International Change: The Structural Sources of Foreign Policy Rigidity and Change," in Jerel A. Rosati, Hagan, Joe. D., and Sampson, Martin W., III, ed., *Foreign Policy Restructuring* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1994) pp. 43-64.

Thomas E. Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964 : An Experiment in Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

Peter H. Smith, *Talons of the Eagle : Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

———, *Talons of the Eagle : Latin America, the United States, and the World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, Burton M. Sapin, Valerie M. Hudson, Derek H. Chollet, and James M. Goldgeier, *Foreign Policy Decision-Making Revisited* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

Theodore C. Sorensen, *Counselor : a Life at the Edge of History* (New York, NY: Harper, 2008).

Stephen M. Streeter, "Campaigning against Latin American Nationalism: U. S. Ambassador John Moors Cabot in Brazil, 1959-1961," **The Americas**, Vol. 51, No. 2 (1994), pp. 193-218.

Juan Antonio Tack, "La Lucha de Omar Torrijos por la Recuperación de la Integridad Nacional," **Revista Lotería**, Vol. agosto-diciembre, No. 305-309 (1981).

Jeffrey F. Taffet, *Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy : The Alliance for Progress in Latin America* (New York: Routledge, 2007).

Oisín Tansey, "Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-Probability Sampling," in Susanne Pickel, Gert Pickel, Hans-Joachim Lauth and Detlef Jahn, eds., *Methoden Der Vergleichenden Politik- Und Sozialwissenschaft*VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009) pp. 481-496.

Carlos Gustavo Poggio Teixeira, *Brazil, the United States, and the South American Subsystem : Regional Politics and the Absent Empire* (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2012).

David P. Thompson, "Pablo Escobar, Drug Baron: His Surrender, Imprisonment, and Escape," **Studies in Conflict & Terrorism**, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1996), pp. 55-91.

Arlene Tickner, "El Pensamiento sobre las Relaciones Internacionales en América Latina," in Sandra Borda and Arlene B. Tickner, eds., *Relaciones Internacionales y Política Exterior de Colombia* (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Departamento de Ciencia Política-CESO, 2011) pp. pp. 551-573.

———, "Intervención por Invitación: Claves de la Política Exterior Colombiana y de sus Debilidades Principales," **Colombia Internacional**, Vol. 65 (2007), pp. 90-111.

———, "Latin American IR and the Primacy of *lo Práctico*," **International Studies Review**, Vol. 10, No. 4 (2008), pp. 735-748.

Arlene Tickner, and Carolina Cepeda, "Las Drogas Ilícitas en la Relación Colombia-Estados Unidos," in Alejandro Gaviria Uribe and Mejía Londoño, eds., *Políticas Antidroga en*

Colombia: Éxitos, Fracasos y Extravíos (Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes, 2011) pp. 205-234.

Arlene Tickner, Diego García, and Catalina Arreaza, "Actores Violentos No Estatales y Narcotráfico en Colombia," in Alejandro Gaviria Uribe and Mejía Londoño, eds., *Políticas Antidroga en Colombia: Éxitos, Fracasos y Extravíos* (Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes, 2011) pp. 413-445.

Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, "Colombia, el Plan Colombia y la Región Andina: ?Implosión o Concertación?," **Nueva Sociedad**, Vol. 173 (2001), pp. 126-143.

———, "The Political Economy of Colombian-U.S. Narcodiplomacy: A Case Study of Colombian Foreign Policy Decision-Making, 1978-1990" (Ph.D., 1991), p. n/a.

Rafael Velázquez Flores, *Factores, Bases y Fundamentos de la Política Exterior de México* (México, D.F.: Plaza y Valdés, 2005).

Oliver Villar, and Drew Cottle, *Cocaine, Death Squads, and the War on Terror : U.S. Imperialism and Class Struggle in Colombia* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2011).

Hermann von Bertrab, *Negotiating NAFTA : a Mexican Envoy's Account* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997).

Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979).

Gregory Weeks, "Recent Works on U.S.-Latin American Relations," **Latin American Research Review**, Vol. 44, No. 1 (2009), pp. 247-256.

Gregory Bart Weeks, *U.S. And Latin American Relations* (New York: Pearson Longman, 2008).

Sidney Weintraub, *Free Trade between Mexico and the United States?* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984).

———, *Unequal Partners : The United States and Mexico* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010).

W. Michael Weis, *Cold Warriors & Coups D'etat : Brazilian-American Relations, 1945-1964* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1993).

———, "The Twilight of Pan-Americanism: The Alliance for Progress, Neo-Colonialism, and Non-Alignment in Brazil, 1961–1964," **The International History Review**, Vol. 23, No. 2 (2001), pp. 322-344.

David A. Welch, *Painful Choices : a Theory of Foreign Policy Change* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005).

Robert G Wesson, ed., *Communism in Central America and the Caribbean*Hoover Institution Press, 1982).

Laurence Whitehead, "A Project for the Americas," in Abraham F. Lowenthal, Theodore J. Piccone and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *The Obama Administration and the Americas : Agenda for Change* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2009) pp. 203-224.

Mark Eric Williams, *Understanding U.S.-Latin American Relations : Theory and History* (New York: Routledge, 2012).

Gilbert R. Winham, "Dispute Settlement in the NAFTA and the FTA," in Steven Globerman and Michael Walker, eds., *Assessing NAFTA : a Trinational Analysis* (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1993) pp. pp. 271-293.

Paul Wolfowitz, and Michael E. O'Hanlon, "Plan Afghanistan," **Foreign Policy**, October 28, 2011 2011.

Bryce Wood, *The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985).

———, *The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967).