

**Putting the Canal on the Map:
Panamanian Agenda-setting and the 1973 Security Council Meetings**

Abstract

In the early 1970s, Panama's negotiations with the United States over the status of the Panama Canal had come to a frustrating standstill. The military government of Omar Torrijos had rejected the unratified treaties tabled by Marco Robles and Lyndon B. Johnson, only to find itself facing much less generous positions from the Nixon administration. Realizing that the issue of the canal was being ignored in Washington, the Panamanian government launched a new strategy of internationalizing the previously bilateral issue. To do so, it created and exploited an unusual, high-profile forum: extraordinary meetings of the U.N. Security Council in March 1973. In those meetings, Panama deftly isolated the United States in order to raise the issue's profile and amplify the costs of leaving the matter unsettled. By using underutilized Panamanian sources, this article looks at how that meeting occurred, the burst of progress that followed, and how this early stage shaped the environment for the final negotiations under Jimmy Carter several years later.

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*"The United States has vetoed Panama's resolution, but the world has vetoed the United States."*¹

-Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack, March 1973

In the middle of March 1973, ambassadors from the fifteen members of the United Nations Security Council gathered in Panama City for an extraordinary meeting. Representatives from many more Latin American countries traveled to the isthmus, too, to represent their concerns before the world body. Panama was ready. At an expense of about \$100,000, the Panamanian government had installed state-of-the-art telecommunications facilities, refurbished halls and government buildings, and added layers of security to curtail any unwanted protests. The government had honed its message, aimed both abroad and at buttressing Torrijos' image amongst the Panamanian people. Torrijos sought the "moral backing of the world," no less.² The United States was perhaps less prepared, despite its months of attempts to avoid the Panama meeting for fear it would be an effective, anti-Yankee propaganda event. George Bush had left his position as U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations. In his place, John Scali, a relative diplomatic novice led the U.S. delegation. While the Panamanians appealed to broad principles of justice, decolonization, and fairness, the United States calmly insisted that, "Problems with the canal will be solved by very quiet and painstaking negotiations and not by speeches in any international forum."³

Before the meetings, the Nixon administration had leveled threats against Panama that the meetings and any bombastic rhetoric would scuttle the talks. If Panama wanted even modest

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concessions, it would get them only if it respected U.S. conditions that any talks would be strictly bilateral and strictly confidential. Panama's military leader General Omar Torrijos was not interested in modest concessions, but in a dramatically different relationship. "General Torrijos had told [lead U.S. negotiator Robert B. Anderson] that so long as Panamanian aspirations were not fully met, Panama would not sign a treaty, even if it was necessary to wait for a new generation of Americans to achieve Panamanian demands, he would continue negotiating until a new generation had taken over the country's leadership."⁴ That frustration led Torrijos to try to counterbalance U.S. pressures by challenging the old position on confidentiality and bilateralism and maneuvering for a showdown on his home turf.

The negotiations over the Panama Canal Treaties have been a frequent and important case study in diplomatic history, political science, and international relations. The episode has been considered a crucial episode in the formation of the "new right" and a proxy for a wider debate over the U.S. role in the world.⁵ In international relations, the talks were a prominent example of how negotiators can employ legislative constraints as part of a "two-level game" to narrow acceptable outcomes.⁶ In presidential studies, some supporters of President Jimmy Carter have offered the negotiations as a symbol of his determination and sense of justice, just as opponents cast the issue as capitulation.⁷

However, the literature on the Panama Canal negotiations focuses on the actions of the United States and the consequences for U.S. political actors.⁸ There has been little attention to the interaction between the United States and Panama and less to the Panamanian government's strategies—with the exception of colorful anecdotes about Panama's quotable leader, Omar Torrijos.⁹ Case narratives on the treaties typically focus on the arrival of Jimmy Carter, whose determination led to the conclusion of the treaties, but this largely ignores how the Panama Canal

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became a top issue on Carter's foreign policy agenda. It also understates the significant work that had been done prior to Carter's arrival on political, military, technical, and economic issues. The framework for negotiations had been developed not by the justice-minded Carter but by the realpolitik-minded Henry Kissinger. By exploring an early part of the Panamanian strategy, this article begins to remedy the one-sidedness of earlier studies, while addressing an empirical gap by incorporating Panamanian primary sources. Despite the large amount written on the Panama Canal Treaties, Panamanian sources have played only a minor role.¹⁰ In the research that led to this article, the author had wide access to the archives of Panama's foreign ministry, as well as to other underutilized Panamanian sources in the National Library of Panama.

The article focuses on how and why Panama advocated for and then exploited UNSC meetings in Panama City. It argues that those meetings spurred advances in negotiations that took place in the months after those meetings, leading up to the Tack-Kissinger agreement on principles—despite U.S. warnings that the meetings would scuttle ongoing talks. The 1973 forum was momentous in its own right. It was just the second time the council had met outside its New York headquarters, and provide an example of how the United Nations can create leverage for small states.¹¹ Panama's deft tactics forced the United States first to accept the extraordinary meeting against its wishes and then to employ its veto—for just the third time—to reject a nearly unanimous resolution. However, the meeting holds a broader significance in the history of the treaty negotiations. The story of how the Panama Canal Treaties came to be is not just a story of Jimmy Carter. It is also a story of Panamanian persistence and shrewd strategizing. The 1973 UNSC meeting embodied that determination just as it signaled an abrupt departure from Panama's previous approach to canal negotiations.

Divergent goals, irreconcilable positions?

At the beginning of the 1970s, the United States showed little interest in changing the status of the Canal. For decades, the United States had placated Panamanian complaints—punctuated by outbreaks of violence—with minor adjustments or increases in compensation. After Torrijos came to power in a 1968 coup, his government rejected the “three-in-one” treaties negotiated by his predecessors in 1967. Ratifying that treaty, or using it as the basis for new negotiations would have been politically difficult for Torrijos, whose evolving political agenda sought to unseat not just the previous administration but the entire political class.¹² Torrijos decided early on that he would try to resolve the canal issue with finality, and he did not see the 1967 pact as sufficient. Torrijos and his advisers decided to renounce those treaties as a framework for negotiations, instead pushing for a blank-slate approach.

In the first few years, Torrijos’ decision yielded no results. In fact, the Nixon administration took a much harder line than Lyndon Johnson had in 1967. Parts of the U.S. Defense establishment viewed the change in Panama’s government as an opportunity to renege on the positions Torrijos had deemed insufficient. In 1970, the Pentagon accepted renewed talks, but argued that “US control over canal and defense should be “non-negotiable” for “the indefinite future.”¹³ National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, who four years later would sign onto a radically different set of principles, recommended the core of Defense’s position to the president.¹⁴ Nixon clearly set out U.S. goals: “In any new negotiations three points are to be considered nonnegotiable: a) effective US control of canal operations; b) effective US control of canal defense; and c) continuation of these controls for an extended period of time preferably open-ended.”¹⁵ For Panamanians seeking a solution to longstanding grievances, the U.S. reversion was a slap in the face.

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The Torrijos government's goals remained essentially the same from 1970 to the ratification of the treaties in 1978. The principal goal was the immediate elimination of the Canal Zone. On this goal, the Panamanian government and population were united. Other goals included an end to the "perpetuity" clause of the original treaty, the transfer of the Canal to Panamanian control, the increase of economic benefits and compensation derived from the Canal, and the withdraw—or at least substantial reduction—of the U.S. military presence in the country. Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack said during the re-started negotiations:

*Panama manifested that the negotiations had been restarted with the aim of eliminating one government inside of another government, so that the so-called Canal Zone could be integrated physically and politically into the rest of the territory of the Republic of Panama, under the full jurisdiction of the Panamanian government.*¹⁶

Though Torrijos' principle aims were concretized in 1971, many of the more specific goals regarding questions like the treaty's lifespan lacked definition or shifted over the subsequent years. By the end of 1972, Panamanian goals were more explicit. They included: 1) an end to the "perpetuity" clause of 1903, with an end date of December 31, 1994; 2) elimination of U.S. jurisdiction in the Canal Zone and the institution of Panamanian legal and political authority there; 3) an immediate reversion of all lands and waters not needed directly for the operation or defense of the canal, 4) immediate Panamanian participation in the administration of the canal, with 85 percent of the payroll destined the Panamanian citizens; 5) the cessation of U.S. military activities not directly related to the canal, such as the School of the Americas, and stipulations and limits on U.S. military presence; 6) neutrality over the canal under a UN mandate; 6) a dramatic increase in the revenue Panama derived from the canal; 7) exclusive use of the Panamanian flag; 8) neutral arbitration of disputes; 9) Panamanian determination over the construction of a new or expanded canal, to be negotiated later.¹⁷

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Despite decades of negotiations, supplementary treaties, and agreements, Panama was convinced the United States did not understand the fundamental nature of its principal goal. For Panamanians the real problem—the issue that gnawed at their national consciousness and wrecked their sense of sovereign dignity—was the broad strip of segregated land surrounding the Canal. The Canal Zone. The Zonians. The foreign population, school system, grocery stores, post offices, and legal system that occupied a swatch of land in the center of the isthmus. The problem for Panamanians was the “state within a state” that did not answer to the authorities of the country in which it existed. It was the domain of a governor they did not appoint or elect, and of a legal system that had as its basis the laws of the state of Louisiana. “Panama was born in 1903 with a contradiction between the nation and the Canal Treaty of 1903. This wasn’t the result of the military bases, or that the Canal was managed by the United States,” treaty negotiator Adolfo Ahumada said. “The major problem was the existence of the Canal Zone. It is difficult, if not impossible, to be an independent state with such an overwhelming presence in the middle of the national territory.”¹⁸

1972-1973: Rejecting the past and crafting a strategy

In early 1971, talks had been renewed, but it was clear the two sides were miles apart. Anderson insisted Panamanian demands would never pass Congress, while towing the new Pentagon line of permanent control over operations and defense.¹⁹ In April, Torrijos asked if Anderson was willing to end the Canal Zone, and Anderson said no, he would only alter the 1967 arrangements—and apparently not in the direction of Panama’s wishes.²⁰ By June and July of 1971, Panama’s initial hopes had collapsed into disappointment. Foreign Minister Tack wrote that, “[I]t became obvious that the Panamanian positions from January 1971 were not acceptable to the United States, and that the U.S. basic points of the position from December 1970 were not

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acceptable to Panama.²¹ What the Panamanian team perhaps did not realize was that their counterpart, Ambassador Anderson, was operating from the wilderness of the Nixon administration, unable to overcome the president's personal dislike of him or the weak bureaucratic position of Secretary William P. Rogers compared to Kissinger. Neither Nixon nor Kissinger ever met with the ambassador. "There was a chasm between the White House and the Panama talks that never was bridged during the Anderson years."²²

In late 1972, Torrijos appointed a new ambassador to the United States, filling a position that had been open for six months with a 27-year-old political recruit who evinced strong personal loyalty. Torrijos told his new ambassador, González Revilla, "You are not being requested to go to Washington because you are an expert in either [the treaties or history]." Instead, Torrijos wanted the young man to "take a look, a fresh look."

"Then I came back and my report to Torrijos was, 'Have you ever solved a problem that you don't have?'" González Revilla said. "And he said, 'Wait, what are you talking about, what do you mean'?"

"I mean, have you ever solved a problem you don't have?" he remembered telling Torrijos. "Our problem simply does not exist in the agenda of U.S. problems. Not even in the State Department is it an issue. Later I found out that the policy, the guidelines, the White House guidelines to the State Department about Panama, was to review the treaties every four years whenever the government changed, and give them two or three dots, and commas. It's a face-lifting, not a negotiation."

Torrijos gathered his advisors, and they decided to adopt a new approach. "So then he realized that he needed to create an issue, and he did it brilliantly," González Revilla added. "He

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went to the third world. Non-aligned. ... He started to travel a lot. Within Latin America and out of Latin America. Latin America, principally with the democratic governments."²³

Panama had already begun taking tentative steps toward internationalizing the Canal issue, even before González Revilla's report from Washington. Panama fired the first salvos of its new strategy in international organizations, pushing for and obtaining Latin American support for a UN Security Council term starting in 1972. When the Security Council held an extraordinary meeting in Addis Ababa—the first held in the developing world—Panama's Ambassador Aquilino Boyd used the forum to equate the U.S. presence in Panama with colonial and racial oppression. The attack caught the U.S. representative, George H. W. Bush, off guard.²⁴ Secretary of State Rogers warned President Nixon "that Panama has intimated its interest in having a Council meeting there on the U.S.-Panama dispute over the Canal Zone."²⁵ The U.S. condemned Boyd's departure from bilateralism, with U.S. negotiator David Ward warning a Panamanian foreign policy advisor that, "The Panamanian presentation of a complaint against the United States in the Security Council had provoked adverse reactions in many circles of the U.S. government, in the executive and legislative, which is his opinion would reverse progress by at least three years."²⁶ Boyd's suggestion was apparently improvised on his own initiative.²⁷ Though the Panamanian representative had put himself out on a limb, the support the idea garnered from Torrijos was just as strong as the resistance it engendered in the United States.

Boyd continued gaining support from Latin American and African governments. Meanwhile, Torrijos engaged in intensive personal diplomacy to secure the support of his democratic neighboring countries—the most influential would come to be Daniel Oduber in Costa Rica, Alfonso López Michelsen in Colombia, and Carlos Andrés Pérez in Venezuela.²⁸ In March 1972, Boyd invited UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim to visit Panama to gain a better

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appreciation of how the stagnated negotiations threatened peace. "I told Mr. Waldheim that if the current negotiations for a new treaty failed, the Panamanian government, with the goal of winning international public support for its just cause, had the intention of appealing to the United Nations."²⁹ U.S. representatives at the UN tried to mobilize allies to oppose further meetings outside New York, employing arguments ranging from fiscal strain and organizational headaches to increased regional tensions.³⁰ Attempts to dissuade other members from approving the Panama meeting continued throughout 1972.³¹ The administration also pushed the Panamanians directly, sending NSC staffer William Jorden to dissuade Torrijos,³² while Rogers warned Tack that the meetings would generate public opposition to improving relations with Panama.³³ U.S. lead negotiator Anderson told both Boyd and foreign ministry advisor Jorge Illueca "that regardless of what happened in the Security Council or any U.N. organism, the U.S. would continue considering these problems as internal to the two countries."³⁴

Despite these pressures, Panama received a favorable response to its informal inquiries from most Security Council members, and by November was moving ahead with plans for a meeting in Panama City.³⁵ Meanwhile, the December round of negotiations approached complete collapse. There was little common ground between the positions advanced by both sides, and the talks were further complicated by internal struggles within both the U.S. and Panamanian governments that led to little support for the negotiating teams. Frustrated at the bargaining table, the multilateral component of Panama's approach took on ever-greater importance.

The Panamanian strategy at the United Nations and through Torrijos' personal diplomacy had two main goals. The first was to raise the issue's profile on the international agenda, and thereby gain the attention of more important actors who set the U.S. foreign policy agenda. The second was to increase the diplomatic costs to the United States of failing to resolve the problem.

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On these points, the gambit was a remarkable success. Rómulo Escobar Bethancourt, a leftist university rector who spent a decade as a negotiator, reflected: "Torrijos traveled throughout the Americas, central, north, and south, reinforcing his connections with leaders in every corner of the continent. The United States of America began to feel a horsefly biting its leg, and there were more horseflies coming. Panama had broken the isolation of its past and its obsequious foreign policy."³⁶ Now that Torrijos had the United States' attention—negative as it was—he pushed for another change to the negotiating approach between the two countries. Instead of focusing on details, Torrijos (no lover of details himself, by all accounts) and Foreign Minister Tack advocated starting with broad principles.³⁷ This suggestion, made as early as November 1972, would pay dividends in the wake of the contentious Security Council meeting.

On January 26, 1973, with eager support from China, the Soviet Union, France, Peru, and others, the Security Council approved Panama's initiative to host a meeting.³⁸ The United States recognized that it had been outmaneuvered and would have at least eleven of fifteen votes against it. A vote against the meeting would appear closed-minded.³⁹ In the end, the U.S. put aside its opposition and voted to hold the meeting in Panama, hoping that it could modify the Panamanian position and minimize the damage.

1973-1974: From conflict to cooperation

In the Council's opening session on March 15, Panama's chief of government took the stage of the freshly remodeled National Assembly—which Torrijos had shuttered—to welcome the delegates. Representatives expecting a brief and courteous welcome would have been taken aback. Instead, the general compared his country's struggles with those of everyone who suffered injustice. "Panama understands the fight of countries that suffer the humiliation of

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colonialism," Torrijos proclaimed. "Highest leaders of North America, it is nobler to amend an injustice than to perpetuate an error."⁴⁰

Early in the week, the U.S. opposed several draft resolutions on the grounds that the United Nations should not be involved in bilateral affairs. State Department instructions to the U.S. delegation fixated on the desire to prevent the Security Council from "passing resolutions on subjects that are not properly of its concern." State did not expect any statement would be able to secure a majority in the council, so instead elected to play defense. "For us, Panama will essentially be a damage-limiting operation," Secretary Rogers wrote Scali before the meetings. "No possible glory can come to us (or the UN) from it."⁴¹ Once in Panama, it was quickly obvious that the climate was more propitious to anti-U.S. resolutions than the Americans had anticipated. Scali publicly threatened that the U.S. would veto any resolution that did not adequately consider its interests, while also saying that the U.S. had no intention of introducing its own resolution.⁴²

On the second day, Panama and Peru introduced a resolution that demanded the abrogation of the 1903 treaty,⁴³ re-affirmed Panama's sovereignty over the Canal Zone, and called for immediate Panamanian jurisdiction. Panama initially showed some willingness to work to the United States—if the U.S. was willing to support a resolution that was not too watered down. That window closed as the United States initially sought to block any text at all on the canal. As had happened with the decision to hold the meeting in Panama, U.S. efforts to convince other members failed. The United States became increasingly isolated, with only Great Britain in its corner. Panama's aggressive approach, coupled with a defensive U.S. attitude, once again put the U.S. at a disadvantage. While Panama and Peru lined up cosponsors for a revised

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resolution, including Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Sudan, and Yugoslavia for its resolution,⁴⁴ the United States continued to claim that the United Nations had no place in the matter—even though the second draft included significantly softer language. By the time the China and Russia announced they would back the revised resolution, the U.S. was isolated and just beginning to consider a counterproposal.⁴⁵

On March 19, Scali went to Foreign Minister Tack's office. The new U.S. diplomat told the Panamanian that the U.S. "would prefer no resolution at all. Tack replied that he was aware that was our preference, but indicated that there would, of course, have to be a resolution." Scali then pushed a resolution with vague, general wording that only urged the continuation of negotiations, but without any statement of specific goals. Tack listened quietly, then told the U.S. delegation that he would check with Torrijos.⁴⁶

The Panamanians thought there was "about an 80 or 90 percent chance that [Scali] was going to veto."⁴⁷ According to Jorden, Panama decided during the meetings that it preferred a U.S. veto to U.S. approval. "Torrijos told me later that, after consulting with University Rector Escobar and other advisers, he decided Panama's cause might be better served if the United States opposed the resolution. That, they concluded might attract even more world attention than the unanimous approval of a more balanced statement."⁴⁸ Many in Torrijos' circle of foreign policy advisors had also concluded that, having already isolated the United States, forcing it to veto would be a major public relations victory.⁴⁹ While it is likely that Torrijos did realize that a veto would serve Panama's interest, the Panamanians did not give up on getting U.S. support—if that support were for Panama's resolution. But the U.S. repeatedly insisted on including a phrase referring to U.S. "legitimate interests" in the canal in any resolution. Panama, knowing it had the

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support of nearly the full council, refused to compromise on the point. The Panamanian delegation did offer Scali a third, revised resolution that incorporated some of his complaints from the previous night—something Tack emphasized. When Scali reiterated his veto threats, the issue was likely closed.⁵⁰ To drive home the point, Manuel Antonio Noriega, second in command of the National Guard, made an ominous call to the U.S. delegation, telling Scali that if he planned on casting a veto, "it would be best to do it from Panama's Tocumen airport." The call, Torrijos told the U.S. ambassador was "not sent as blackmail or threatened violence," but was just a helpful piece of close U.S.-Panamanian cooperation on security for the meeting. At the same time, Torrijos "almost pleaded" Scali to find compromise wording on a resolution that would benefit both sides.⁵¹

The U.S. offered its first counterproposal on the conference's last day, well after Boyd and Tack had managed to unite the rest of the council members behind the Panama-Peru proposal.⁵² The U.S. text was too little, too late. Finally, the council voted on the resolution. Thirteen countries voted in favor. Great Britain abstained, on the grounds that given U.S. opposition the resolution did nothing to advance the issue. Ambassador Scali cast the third Security Council veto in U.S. history on direct orders from the White House,⁵³ saying that though "there is so much in it [the resolution] with which we agree," the matter was not the business of the United Nations and "the present resolution addresses the points of interest to Panama but ignores those legitimate interests important to the United States."⁵⁴ While leaving the meeting, Scali told the press that "Just as I thought we were on the brink of agreement, the Panamanians, for reasons best known to them, reversed their field."⁵⁵ Foreign Minister Tack closed the week of meetings, saying, "The United States has vetoed Panama's resolution, but the world has vetoed the United States."⁵⁶

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The United States went on the defensive, trying to explain its veto to the world. Torrijos used the successful meeting to shore up his domestic support. He held consultations with student groups and travelled across the countryside, presenting the trips as consultations to see what Panama's next steps should be. Inside the Panamanian foreign ministry, Tack savored his victory. He received telegrams from members of the council, expressing appreciation for Panamanian hospitality, and "deep satisfaction" with the result. The Indian ambassador wrote, "I should like to think that the results were on the whole satisfactory not only to the people of Panama, but also the Latin American countries as a whole."⁵⁷

In trying to block the Security Council meeting in Panama, and later in trying to halt Panama's resolution, the Nixon administration repeatedly warned that any such publicity would set back the negotiations for years. This ominous warning was the main bargaining chip the U.S. sought to employ, and it failed spectacularly. The Panamanian historian Jaén Suárez reflects, "The Nixon administration had faced a small, military-led country without a trained civil or diplomatic service, without any economic or military power, and it had been beaten on difficult ground."⁵⁸ Why? The Panamanians had decided that they negotiations were stalemated, even though they continued to engage in them sporadically. The United States had failed to grasp that the approach that had succeeded in reducing tensions with previous Panamanian governments—piecemeal concessions—would not satisfy Torrijos. The Security Council meeting did produce an immediate breakdown, but this breakdown served not to delay negotiations for years, but to provoke a serious reevaluation on the U.S. side. Just a year earlier, Henry Kissinger had yielded to the Pentagon's reactionary negotiating positions with seemingly little thought. U.S. Ambassador Sayre had pushed similar positions. In the wake of the UN debacle, both took a fresh look at the costs and benefits of U.S. intransigence. On April 6, Sayre wrote to the State

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Department that Torrijos was a nationalist who would not accept the previous relationship. The U.S. ambassador also criticized the United States' lack of clarity over the importance of the canal, which produced inconsistent negotiating positions.⁵⁹

Panamanian negotiators moved from their polemic criticisms of the United States to push for specific goals. Many saw longtime treaty negotiator Robert Anderson as a problem, and by mid-April 1973, they began to push for his removal. In so doing, they began to pick up on divisions within the U.S. government, schisms that had been exacerbated by the U.N. meetings. Due to Anderson's stubbornness and his increasingly obvious isolation from his own team and his superiors, Panamanians concluded that continuing negotiations with him was useless in the aftermath of the Security Council meetings. State Department representative Morey Bell went so far as to tell his Panamanian counterpart that Anderson would be replaced.⁶⁰ A prominent advisor wrote to Tack:

Ambassador Robert B. Anderson is an unyielding exponent of the U.S. position, and while he remains at the front of the U.S. delegation, it will be very difficult to achieve any change in the U.S. position that would facilitate an understanding with Panama. This opinion is shared by some within the U.S. government, like Morey Bell, who told Manfredo that for Ambassador Anderson, the strict maintenance of the U.S. position had become a point of honor; that he had become inflexible and that a change of that position would require Anderson's exit as chief of delegation.⁶¹

That Panamanians related years of stalled negotiations to the Anderson personally set the stage for progress upon his removal.

While the meetings succeeded on the world stage, they also got the attention of an audience of one. Henry Kissinger, the preeminent voice in the Nixon administration's foreign policy, took note of the Panama Canal issue in a way that he previously had not. A month before

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the meeting, Kissinger had told Scali that he didn't "have any very clear views on [Panama]."⁶²

The spotlight of international attention forced Kissinger to clarify his own position.⁶³ The meeting also empowered Jorden, who was predisposed to a treaty, to advance his views in the NSC. Jorden penned text on Panama for Nixon's annual address to Congress on foreign policy, marking the first time the president had directly addressed the issue in such a prominent venue.⁶⁴

Another important unresolved problem concerns the Panama Canal and the surrounding Zone. ... For the past nine years, efforts to work out a new treaty acceptable to both parties have failed. That failure has put considerable strain on our relations with Panama. It is time for both parties to take a fresh look at this problem and to develop a new relationship between us--one that will guarantee continued effective operation of the Canal while meeting Panama's legitimate aspirations.⁶⁵

Panama seized upon Nixon's call for a "fresh look."⁶⁶ The Panamanian ambassador in Washington, González Revilla, met with Morey Bell before traveling for consultations with Torrijos. The Panamanian inquired about the possibility of informal talks instead of written exchanges, suggesting that both sides might be more flexible that way.⁶⁷ Others were less optimistic. In response to Tack's survey, Juan Antonio Stagg, an astute observer of the United States who served many years as consul in New York, noted that the political crisis faced by the Nixon administration made the possibility of successful negotiations increasingly remote.⁶⁸

Following up on suggestions from his advisors, Tack looked for an opportunity to sideline Anderson and advance the negotiations by going over his head. In early May, the foreign minister finally responded to Anderson's February letter. In a twelve-page letter laced with frustration, Tack criticized what he saw as the U.S. propensity to make lofty statements that seemed to agree with Panamanian positions, only to back away from them later. "The experience in the negotiating table shows that the 'broad changes' proposed by the U.S. delegation are a

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mirage. Those changes turn to smoke when it is time to come to concrete formulas."⁶⁹ Much of Tack's anger, however, focused on Anderson, who was perceived as ineffectual and out of touch. Tack tried to capitalize on Nixon's "fresh look" by seeking to appeal directly to Secretary of State Rogers.

That month, the opportunity materialized when Rogers announced he would attend the investiture of the new Argentine president, taking advantage of the trip to visit Brazil, too. The foreign minister correctly surmised that the upper echelon of the Nixon administration had not been involved in the negotiations; Tack wrote his Brazilian homologue that he was "convinced that Secretary Rogers does not receive regular briefings from his subordinates regarding the progress of negotiations with Panama."⁷⁰ Panama appealed to Brazil to intercede on its behalf, while also requesting a meeting through Sayre at the U.S. embassy in Panama. Seeking to answer criticisms that Panama sought concessions while offering none, Panama for the first time proposed the end of the century for the end of U.S. control, backing off its previous position of December 1994. Tack asked that face-to-face negotiations be restarted.⁷¹

Tack decided that the previous approach of focusing on details and trying to negotiate up to the bigger issues was doomed. Instead, he argued for shifting the negotiations to broad principles that could later be used to orientate the discussions on details. On May 24, 1973, at the historic Plaza Hotel in central Buenos Aires, Tack delivered to Rogers a letter that included eight principles. The men also discussed the make-up of the U.S. negotiating team, with Rogers indicating in a veiled reference to Anderson that certain changes would be desirable.⁷² In his letter, Tack noted that the U.S. seemed to be uncertain on what he considered the central issue of the negotiations—whether the Canal operated on sovereign, Panamanian territory. Tack's eight

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principles, for the most part, reiterated Panama's key demands: 1) the abrogation of the 1903 treaty, 2) an end to perpetuity, 3) the complete end of U.S. jurisdiction at treaty's end, 4) elimination of the Canal Zone, 5) a fair share of economic benefits, 6) limiting U.S. activities to the maintenance, operation, and defense of the Canal, 7) limitation of U.S. military activities, and 8) mutually agreed upon options for any new construction.⁷³

Though Rogers did discuss the proposal directly with President Nixon, the timing could hardly have been worse.⁷⁴ Both the Panamanian team and the Nixon administration were in upheaval. Congressional hearings on Watergate had started a week before the meeting. Nixon's attention was clearly elsewhere. However, Tack's portrayal of Anderson appeared to speed the negotiator's demise. A month after the meeting, word leaked into the press that the veteran diplomat Ellsworth Bunker was being considered as a new chief for the delegation.⁷⁵ Bunker was just returning from a long stay in Vietnam, where he had worked to negotiate the war's conclusion. The energetic seventy-nine-year-old was internationally recognized and well respected in the Department of Defense. If the newspaper reports on Bunker were intended as a trial balloon, they worked. Panama noted the rumors and told U.S. officials that he would be an "excellent choice."⁷⁶ Anderson resigned a few days later, on July 2. His term had started with the negotiations for the 1967 "three-in-one" treaties, but ended with his estrangement from his own team and from his negotiating partners.

State Department shakeups dominated the summer, and it took nearly two months until Secretary of State Rogers answered Tack's letter. Even as he sent the letter, rumors of his impending departure were swirling around Washington, as the secretary became ever-more vocal in criticizing the "White House plumbers" break-ins at the Watergate and against Pentagon

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Papers whistleblower Daniel Ellsberg. Rogers's resignation, announced August 22, did little to change the decision-making dynamic in the administration, which had for some time rested squarely between Nixon and Kissinger.⁷⁷ Still, Rogers' reply showed a shift in the administration's tenor regarding the Canal. He clearly stated that the U.S. would abrogate the 1903 treaty, something Anderson at times waffled on. Though he was no longer in a position to make firm commitments, Rogers told Tack that he "read these principles with great interest and find important elements in them that my government is prepared to accept."⁷⁸

September 1973 brought with it a new U.S. team, with both Bunker and Kissinger confirmed to their new positions, and started a burst of progress. The two men enjoyed a level of confidence that Anderson and Rogers never had with Nixon. Panama still was not the central issue for Kissinger, but it was at least on his radar. He gave Bunker wide latitude with the Panamanians and support with the Pentagon. "[Bunker's] experience in Vietnam and his reading of the Panama record told him the Defense Department would be a key factor in any solution. If military men were convinced a settlement was possible that did not weaken their ability to protect the canal, a treaty would be conceivable. If they felt it would jeopardize that task, chances for an accord were near zero."⁷⁹ Bunker began his appointment by consulting widely within the U.S. government and working to establish his own administration's position before meeting with the Panamanian team.

After a few months of relative quiet, Torrijos continued his international grandstanding with an eye to keeping the issue on the agendas on the new U.S. team. The general spent September in Spain, ostensibly on vacation, but also busily meeting with Spanish dictator General Francisco Franco and making announcements to the press. Torrijos visited Gibraltar,

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ingratiating himself to his Spanish hosts by equating the British presence there with the U.S.-run Canal Zone. Torrijos' constant suspicion of the United States had been piqued by allegations from imprisoned Nixon crony John Dean, published in *Newsweek*, that the United States had planned to assassinate him in 1972.⁸⁰ Upping the rhetoric, Torrijos called the Canal Zone "a time bomb in the heart of Panama."⁸¹ Torrijos went on to visit Marshal Josip Tito in Yugoslavia and Pope John VI.⁸²

The upcoming United Nations General Assembly, scheduled just days after Kissinger's confirmation, set another deadline for U.S. policymakers, who were certain the canal issue would be raised there. Kissinger sought to prevent an embarrassment like the one suffered in March. He adopted an accommodating tone in a bilateral meeting with the Panamanian delegation in New York, while also pushing Panama to dial down its public rhetoric. Kissinger told Tack on October 5 that he was aware of the principles the foreign minister had proposed to Rogers, and emphasized that Bunker had been appointed because of Kissinger's faith in him.⁸³ The second prong of Kissinger's strategy to minimize the Panama issue at the UNGA was to make a warm, though general, proposal to Latin America as a whole for a "new dialogue."⁸⁴ The approach largely avoided fireworks, and Kissinger got positive reviews from many in Latin America.

The parties agreed that negotiations between the new teams would start in November. In the interregnum, Bunker worked the Pentagon and Foggy Bottom to come up with an acceptable response to the Tack's eight principles. Bunker continued to meet resistance from the military, in particular from the Army.⁸⁵ In preparation for the resumption of negotiations, Secretary of the Army Calloway took a four-day trip to Panama, where he met with Torrijos, Lakas, and Tack. He had a long conversation with Carlos López Guevara, a negotiator with a close relationship

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with Torrijos. Calloway was surprised by the depth of Panama's feelings regarding military bases, especially the headquarters of the U.S. Southern Command. Though he continued to emphasize his opposition to moving the base, he did state that he hoped to conclude a new treaty.⁸⁶ While the Pentagon continued to put up a bureaucratic battle, Bunker was at least weakening their resistance.

On November 26, the new U.S. representative arrived to the tranquil island of Contadora, part of the Pearl Islands archipelago off Panama's Pacific Coast. Contadora, which was being developed as a resort by Torrijos' confidant, businessman Gabriel Lewis Galindo, would be the site of many rounds of talks. Panama's decision to host Bunker there, instead of in the city, was intended to create a decisive break from the frigid negotiating style that had characterized talks with Anderson. Having learned that Bunker was a boating enthusiast, the Panamanians put President Lakas' yacht at his disposal.⁸⁷ On the first evening, Tack greeted the new negotiator by recalling how they had met ten years before at the OAS, and for the most part eschewing the historiography often recounted by the Panamanian team.⁸⁸ Bunker greeted the tone of the meetings, telling Kissinger that they had gone better than hoped. He relayed greetings from Torrijos, who said that 'for the first time he has faith and hope that all will turn out well.' The two sides had been able to come to near-total agreement on seven of the eight principles, Bunker said, which he suggested could serve as a joint declaration between the two presidents. At length, Bunker commented on the rapport he had developed with Torrijos during chats and a helicopter tour of Panama.⁸⁹

Bunker offered an astute analysis of the Panamanians' position, more clearly understanding the sensitivities regarding jurisdiction and treaty duration. He referenced the need

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to take Panama's national pride into account, and to try to take advantage of the "euphoria...of long-disheartened people being extremely glad that there is at last a decent climate for forward movement."⁹⁰ After Bunker's departure on December 3, State Department officer Morey Bell stayed behind on Contadora to continue to hammer out language on the principles with Ambassador González Revilla. The two men knew one another from Washington, where they had frequent consultations. Over the next two weeks in Panama, they worked through several drafts of the eight points, which had now moved from Tack's proposals to Rogers through Bunker's modifications to become a real joint document. While there were many changes in wording from Tack's letter—for example, to clarify that the 1903 treaty would be abrogated by the conclusion of a new treaty, not as a prerequisite—the subjects and primary effects of the eight points remained the same.⁹¹ Bell felt that the Panamanian team was being flexible on wording, using more open phrasing on issues of jurisdictional rights during the treaty.⁹² One of the main changes in the U.S. position was the recognition on various points that Panama would "grant" the U.S. rights for operation of defense of the Canal, something the U.S. had often claimed to have a right to.⁹³ As both sides recognized, the eight principles contained substantial ambiguity and failed to address major details such as the length of the treaty, beyond an allusion to the end of perpetuity.⁹⁴ The first seven principles initialed by Bell and González Revilla held up to the scrutiny of Bunker and Tack when the two returned in early January. Bunker initialed the principles with Tack before returning to Washington.

In the capital, Bunker set about convincing Kissinger to travel to Panama to sign the accords himself. Kissinger initially had little interest in doing so, seeing a signature from the negotiators as being sufficient given the principles' lack of finality. Bunker, however, appealed to Kissinger's sense of importance, noting that the ceremony would be widely viewed as a major

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step across Latin America, and that the secretary's presence would amplify the effect.⁹⁵ By mid-January, word leaked out that the U.S. and Panama had agreed on a statement of principles and that Kissinger would travel to Panama to sign them. The news of progress on the treaties after years of stagnation began to shake treaty opponents from their slumber. At the same time, the Panamanians showed great appreciation for the progress they had seen since Bunker's arrival, and stated a new level of flexibility and patience. For the first time, Panamanian interlocutors acknowledged the Congressional and political constraints faced by the Nixon administration, with Torrijos telling his ambassador, "If they want a treaty in a few months, that is good, but if they want to have it next year or even later, that's good too, and we will wait."⁹⁶

Kissinger planned a whirlwind visit to Panama for the signing, along with meetings with Tack and Torrijos. The general met Kissinger at the airport, joining him in his motorcade through Panama City to the site of the ceremony. The two foreign ministers signed the eight principles at a lively ceremony at the Palacio Justo Arosemena, the home of the erstwhile national assembly, which had also hosted the UN Security Council meetings. The Panamanian crowd roared at the reading of the second principle, declaring an end to the hated "perpetuity" clause of 1903. In his speech, the secretary directed himself beyond the borders of Panama to stress the importance of the principles as an example of the "new dialogue" he had proposed with Latin America.⁹⁷ The eight principles, elaborated by Bunker, Tack, and their assistants, now bore the name Tack-Kissinger.

After the signing, Kissinger met Torrijos at the Panama City apartment of Rory González, a close personal friend to Torrijos whose home often served as a getaway for the general. The two powerful men chatted comfortably. Torrijos noted that he didn't expect

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Kissinger to have all the answers to the problem with Panama, nor did he expect miracles. "I have told the Panamanian people," Torrijos told Kissinger in a strange aside, "that the man who wrought miracles left this earth some 2,000 years ago." Torrijos wanted to break each of the eight principles into several smaller issues to allow for "successive stages of achievement," starting with easier matters to build trust between Panamanians, Americans, and Zonians. Of the latter, Kissinger said, "I think it is very important for them to get used to living in Panama and abiding by Panamanian rules,"—an exceptional concession if he indeed meant it. Both leaders evinced frustration with the residents of the Zone and their ability to stymie progress. Torrijos stressed how much he had worked to keep the peace in Panama with respect to the Canal Zone, making sure there had been no outbreaks of violence during his tenure. He constantly met with students and other protest groups. He negotiated constantly, he said, and listened to their speeches for as long as six hours. Both men faced a similar problem. "There is a large group of people, however, whose mission is to see to it there is no agreement. They live off this problem," Torrijos said. Of course, this was a problem Kissinger would begin to appreciate, as the agreement drew a sharp backlash from Congress.

Conclusion

The Tack-Kissinger agreement would not immediately lead to a new treaty. However, the principles did constitute the framework under which the final treaties were negotiated in 1977, and they deserve to be treated as more than a footnote. So, too, does the UNSC meeting in March 1973, which made that agreement possible. Panama deftly created and then exploited that forum to isolate the United States, raising the profile of the canal issue on the U.S. policy and international agendas, while also raising the costs of not coming to an agreement. This can clearly be seen in Kissinger's about-face and his recognition that failing to address the Panama

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Canal's status incurred significant diplomatic costs to the United States across Latin America.

Before the UNSC meeting, Kissinger expressed nearly no interest in Panama and passively accepted Defense Department positions. Afterwards, he took important steps that bred substantial advances—replacing the chief negotiator, altering guidelines, pressing Defense, putting Panama in the State of the Union address, and going to Panama to sign the accords. That the Tack-Kissinger accords did not lead to faster progress resulted more from very unusual political conditions in the United States—namely Nixon's scandals and resignation and the extreme weakness of the unelected Gerald Ford, which led to a primary challenge from the anti-treaty Ronald Reagan. However, using the UNSC meetings as a model, Panama continued to press its cause internationally whenever it began to slip off the U.S. agenda. This astute diplomacy by one of the world's smallest countries ratcheted up the pressure on the United States and helped keep the canal on the agenda. It was this work, beginning in late 1972, that made Panama an issue that Carter so boldly hoped to solve to inaugurate a new style of foreign policy and an era of improved relations with Latin America.

Endnotes

¹ Speech of J.A. Tack to U.N. Security Council, March 21, 1973. Folder Reunión del Consejo de Seguridad, no. 17, 1973, Archivo del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Panamá, Panama City, Panama (henceforth AMREP), 1-4.

² Eric Morgenthau, "UN Security Council is meeting in Panama amid anti-U.S. chorus," *Wall Street Journal*, May 15, 1973, pp. 1. Quote from Richard Severo, "UN panel sits in Panama today," *New York Times*, March 15, 1973, pp. 16; Sayre to State Department, "UN Security Council in Panama – GOP preparations," March 12, 1973. RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams. NARA-AAD. Online:

<http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=8048&dt=2472&dl=1345>. Reference to this collection of U.S.

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³ Qtd. in Marlise Simons, "Panama's leader hits U.S. on Canal," *Washington Post*, March 16, 1973.

⁴ Memorandum, Jorge Illueca to JA Tack. December 7, 1972, Folder no. 1118, AMREP, pp. 5. Translation from Spanish.

⁵ Adam Clymer, *Drawing the Line at the Big Ditch : The Panama Canal Treaties and the Rise of the Right* (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2008); James Michael Hogan, "The "Great Debate" over Panama: An Analysis of Controversy over the Carter-Torrijos Treaties of 1977" (Ph.D., 1983); George D. Moffett, *The Limits of Victory : The Ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985); Natasha Zaretsky, "Restraint or Retreat? The Debate over the Panama Canal Treaties and U.S. Nationalism after Vietnam*," *Diplomatic History* 35, no. 3 (2011).

⁶ Robert A. Pastor, "The United States and Central America: Interlocking Debates," in *Double-Edged Diplomacy : International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*, ed. Peter B. Evans, Harold Karan Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42, no. 03 (1988).

⁷ Robert A. Pastor, *The Carter Administration and Latin America : A Test of Principle* (Atlanta, Ga.: Carter Center of Emory University, 1992); Craig Allen Smith, "Leadership, Orientation, and Rhetorical Vision: Jimmy Carter, the 'New Right,' and the Panama Canal," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 16, no. 2 (1986); Robert A. Strong, "Jimmy Carter and the Panama Canal Treaties," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 21, no. 2 (1991).

⁸ The same could be said for most studies of Panama-U.S. relations generally. From the building on the canal to U.S. invasion to overthrow Manuel Noriega, the United States has had as strong a role in Panama's history as in any other Latin American country. For a survey of U.S.-Panama relations, see Michael L. Conniff, *Panama and the United States : The Forced Alliance* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2001).

⁹ Most attention given to Panama's actions comes in works written by participants. See William J. Jorden, *Panama Odyssey* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984); Robert A. Pastor, *Exiting the Whirlpool : U.S. Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2001).

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¹⁰ The only history to extensively employ both Panamanian and U.S. sources is written by treaty participant *cum* historian Omar Jaén Suárez, *Las Negociaciones De Los Tratados Torrijos-Carter : 1970-1979* (Panamá: Autoridad del Canal de Panamá, 2005). Unfortunately, this text has been scarcely cited and is not widely available in the United States.

¹¹ This point is made in a different context by Matthew James Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution : Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

¹² Juan Antonio Tack, "La Lucha De Omar Torrijos Por La Recuperación De La Integridad Nacional," *Revista Lotería* agosto-diciembre, no. 305-309 (1981).

¹³ Packard to Kissinger, "NSSM 68 – Panama Canal," May 4, 1970, *FRUS 1969-1976*, vol E-10. Online:

<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d534>

¹⁴ Kissinger to Nixon, June 1, 1970, *FRUS 1969-1976*, vol E-10. Online:

<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d535>

¹⁵ Nixon, "National Security Decision Memorandum 64," June 5, 1970. *FRUS 1969-1976*, vol E-10. Online:

<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d536>

¹⁶ Tack to Anderson, letter, Oct. 26, 1972. Folder negociaciones, 1972-1974, no. 545, AMREP, sec. 2, pp. 5-6.

Translated from Spanish, emphasis in original.

¹⁷ "Posiciones básicas de Panamá en las principales materias," December 4, 1972. Folder negociaciones, 1972-1974, no. 545, AMREP, sec. 9, pp. 1-19.

¹⁸ Author interview with Adolfo Ahumada, September 27, 2011, Panama City, Panama.

¹⁹ Anderson to de la Ossa, Feb. 19, 1971. Folder negociaciones, 1972-1974, no. 545, AMREP, sec. 4, pp. 1-8.

²⁰ Jorden, pp. 154.

²¹ Tack to Anderson, letter, Oct. 26, 1972. Sec. 2, pp. 5. Translated from Spanish.

²² Jorden, pp. 159. Sol Linowitz also wrote that Anderson "had neither access nor influence in the White House."

Sol M. Linowitz, *The Making of a Public Man : A Memoir* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1985), pp. 147.

²³ Author interview with Nicolas González Revilla, September 20, 2011, Panama City, Panama. This is corroborated by William Jorden's account in which he notes that after the signing of Tack-Kissinger, U.S. negotiators returned to

the table under the constraint of three-year-old instructions. "The general said he based his strategy on a 'very simple principle.' That was: 'to resolve a problem, the first thing you have to do is *make* it a problem.' He was persuaded the only way to do that was to move the issue to the center of the world stage." Jorden, pp. 241.

Torrijos also used similar language talking to a reporter in early 1975, saying, "The first thing was to get them to consider that it was a problem. Until very recently, they didn't even think it was a problem." Qtd. in "Panama's leader hopeful on canal," February 4, 1975, *New York Times*, pp. 7.

²⁴ Jaén Suárez, pp. 228-229.

²⁵ Rogers to Nixon, "Security Council meeting in Africa," February 10, 1972, *FRUS, 1969-1976*, vol. 5, doc. 124.

Online: <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/d124>

²⁶ Jorge Illueca, "Informe de la conversación," March 23, 1972, Folder no. 1118, AMREP, n.p. Ward's account of the meeting is much briefer and less passionate, but concurs with the basic points presented by Illueca. David Ward, "Memorandum of Conversation: Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations," March 23, 1972, Folder no. 1118, AMREP, 1-2.

²⁷ Carlos Ozores, "Omar Torrijos Y Sus Proyecciones En La Política Internacional," *Revista Lotería* agosto-diciembre, no. 305-309 (1981).

²⁸ Jorden, pp. 177-178. These same three leaders were highlighted in nearly all of my interviews with Panamanian policymakers. Their support throughout the 1970s was crucial to Torrijos in his dealing with the U.S. executive, and also in convincing senators concerned about the lack of democracy and political rights in Panama.

²⁹ Aquilino Boyd to JA Tack, March 29, 1972, letter. Folder no. 1118, AMREP, n.p.

³⁰ Rogers to all American Republic Posts, "Possible SC meeting in Panama," August 10, 1972, *FRUS, 1969-1976*, vol. 5, doc. 126. Online: <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/d126>

³¹ Armitage and Herz to Bush, "Possible Security Council meeting in Panama," October 3, 1972, *FRUS, 1969-1976*, vol. 5, doc. 131. Online: <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/d131>

³² William J. Jorden to Henry Kissinger, "General Torrijos and Captain Villa," *FRUS 1969-1976*, vol E-10, doc. 562. Online: <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d562>; Jorden, pp. 185-189.

³³ Rogers to Tack, "Proposed Security Council meeting in Panama," October 16, 1972, *FRUS 1969-1976, vol 5*, doc.

137. Online: <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/d137>

³⁴ "Memorandum," Jorge Illueca to JA Tack, letter. December 7, 1972, Folder no. 1118, AMREP, pp. 4-5.

³⁵ J.A. Tack to Kurt Waldheim, November 23, 1972. Folder Reunión del Consejo de Seguridad, 1973, AMREP, n.p.

³⁶ Rómulo Escobar Bethancourt, *Torrijos : Colonia Americana, No!* (Bogotá: C. Valencia Editores, 1981), pp. 201-202.

³⁷ William J. Jorden to Henry Kissinger, "General Torrijos and Captain Villa, *FRUS 1969-1976, vol E-10*, doc. 562.

Online: <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d562>

³⁸ "U.N. council decides to meet in Panama," *The New York Times*, January 27, 1973; Chi Ping Fei to J.A. Tack, January 14, 1973, Folder Reunión del Consejo de Seguridad, no. 33, AMREP; Boyd to Brin, c. January 1973. Folder Reunión del Consejo de Seguridad, tomo II, Archivo del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores.

³⁹ <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/d146>

⁴⁰ Speech of Omar Torrijos at U.N. Security Council inaugural session, March 15, 1973. Folder Reunión del Consejo de Seguridad, no. 17, 1973, AMREP, 1-6.

⁴¹ Rogers to Scali, "For Ambassador Scali from the Secretary," March 9, 1973, NARA-ADA, RG59. Online:

<http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=147&dt=2472&dl=1345>

⁴² Francis B. Kent, "U.S. warns of UN veto on Panama issue," *Los Angeles Times*, March 17, 1983; Simons, "UN body ways Canal Zone stand," *Washington Post*, March 17, 1983, pp. 8; Sayre to State Department, "Panama SC Mtg Amb Scali Press Conf," NARA-ADA, RG59. Online:

<http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=5529&dt=2472&dl=1345>.

⁴³ This condition, though sometimes treated as a concession by the U.S. team, had actually been accepted by President Lyndon B. Johnson after the flag riots.

⁴⁴ "Proyecto de resolución revisado," n.d., 1973. Folder Reunión del Consejo de Seguridad, no. 17, 1973, AMREP, 1-2.

⁴⁵ Kent, "China, Russia Endorse Panama's canal stand," *Los Angeles Times*, March 20, 1973, pp. 11.

⁴⁶ U.S. Delegation to State Department, "UNSC meeting – Canal resolution," March 20, 1973, NARA-AAD, RG59.

Online: <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=5324&dt=2472&dl=1345>

⁴⁷ Interview with González Revilla.

⁴⁸ Jorden, pp. 195.

⁴⁹ Jaén Suárez, pp. 247.

⁵⁰ Scali to Rogers, "Ref: Panama 1491," March 14, 1973, NARA-AAD, RG59. Online:

<http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=5321&dt=2472&dl=1345>

⁵¹ Scali to Rogers, "Panama SC meeting," March 21, 1973, NARA-AAD, RG59. Online:

<http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=729&dt=2472&dl=1345>

⁵² Draft resolution submitted by the United States, March 21, 1973. Folder Consejo de Seguridad, no. 28, AMREP, section 15.

⁵³ Jorden, pp. 195-196.

⁵⁴ Speech by John Scali before the U.N. Security Council, March 21, 1973. Folder Consejo de Seguridad, no. 28, AMREP, section 15.

⁵⁵ John Scali, Press conference held after the last session of the United Nations Security Council, March 21, 1973. Folder Consejo de Seguridad, no. 28, AMREP, section 15.

⁵⁶ Speech of J.A. Tack to U.N. Security Council, March 21, 1973. Folder Reunión del Consejo de Seguridad, no. 17, 1973, AMREP, 1-4.

⁵⁷ L. Mojsov to J.A. Tack, March 31, 1973. Folder Reunión del Consejo de Seguridad, 1973, AMREP, n.p.; S. Sen to J.A. Tack, March 31, 1973. Folder Reunión del Consejo de Seguridad, 1973, AMREP, n.p.

⁵⁸ Jaén Suárez, pp. 250.

⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 252.

⁶⁰ Manfredo to Tack, "Memorandum," April 17, 1973, Folder Negociaciones 1973, no. 546, AMREP, sec. 8, pp. 1-9.

⁶¹ De la Rosa to Tack, "Memorandum," April 23, 1973, Folder Negociaciones 1973, no. 546, AMREP, sec. 8, pp. 2.

⁶² Meeting request from John Scali, February 22, 1973, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, *Digital National Security Archive*. Henceforth, online database referred to as DNSA.

⁶³ Jorden, pp. 206.

⁶⁴ Ibid., pp. 198-199.

⁶⁵ Richard Nixon: "Fourth Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," May 3, 1973. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
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⁶⁶ Jaén Suárez, pp. 277.

⁶⁷ Bell to Sayre, "Panamanian ambassador comments on USG-GOP relations and treaty negotiations," May 7, 1973, NARA-AAD, RG59.

⁶⁸ J.A. Stagg to J.A. Tack, "Respuesta al cuestionario sobre las proyecciones de la reunión del Consejo de Seguridad en las negociaciones del nuevo tratado" May 8, 1973. Folder Consejo de Seguridad, no. 27, AMREP, n.p.

⁶⁹ Tack to Anderson, May 7, 1973, Folder Negociaciones 1973, no. 546, AMREP, sec. 6, pp. 1-12.

⁷⁰ Tack to Gibson Barboza, May 10, 1973, Folder Negociaciones 1973, no. 546, AMREP, sec. 5.

⁷¹ Bell to Sayre, "Panamanian foreign minister's request for interview with secretary in Buenos Aires," May 17, 1973, NARA-AAD, RG59. Online: <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=23694&dt=2472&dl=1345>

⁷² Ricaurte Antonio Acheen, "Puntos fundamentales de la conversación de Rogers con Tack," May 27, 1973, Folder Negociaciones 1973, no. 546, AMREP, sec. 3.

⁷³ Tack to Rogers, May 21, 1973, Folder Negociaciones 1973, no. 546, AMREP, sec. 2, 1-7.

⁷⁴ Jorden, pp. 206.

⁷⁵ "Bunker Is Expected to Get Panama-Negotiations Post," *New York Times* 1973.

⁷⁶ Bennett (USUN) to Rogers, "U.S.-Panama relations," August 1, 1973, NARA-AAD, RG59. Online:
<http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=50915&dt=2472&dl=1345>

⁷⁷ So much so that a *New York Times* column on Kissinger's nomination as secretary of state was titled simply, "Kissinger gets the title, too."

⁷⁸ Rogers to Tack, Aug. 6, 1973, Folder Negociaciones 1973, no. 546, AMREP, sec. 1, 1-2. Rogers did, however, maintain a level of ambiguity regarding the issue of jurisdiction and sovereignty that Tack found very frustrating.

⁷⁹ Jorden, pp. 209.

This is a pre-peer-reviewed versions of Tom Long, "Putting the Canal on the Map: Panamanian Agenda-setting and the 1973 Security Council Meetings," *Diplomatic History*, (forthcoming)

⁸⁰ Jaén Suárez, pp. 273.

⁸¹ Rivero to State, "Panama's 4862," September 13, 1973, NARA-AAD, RG59. Online:

<http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=70129&dt=2472&dl=1345>; Sayre to State Department, "Torrijos on Canal and conspiracy," September 21, 1973, NARA-AAD, RG59. Online:

<http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=74073&dt=2472&dl=1345>

⁸² Jaén Suárez, pp. 276.

⁸³ Bell and Pickering to Sayre, "Secretary's bilateral with Panama Fonmin Tack," October 9, 1973, NARA-AAD, RG59.

Online: <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=77648&dt=2472&dl=1345>

⁸⁴ Bernard Gwertzman, "Kissinger calls on Latins to join 'new dialogue'", *The New York Times*, October 6, 1973, pp.1.

⁸⁵ Jaén Suárez, pp. 279; Jorden, pp. 212.

⁸⁶ Callaway to Bunker, "Secretary of army's conversation with Panamanian treaty negotiator," November 12, 1973,

NARA-AAD, RG59. Online: <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=93202&dt=2472&dl=1345>

⁸⁷ Jorden, pp. 214.

⁸⁸ "Salutación: Embajador Bunker," Nov. 26, 1973, Folder Negociaciones 1973, no. 546, AMREP, sec. 11.

⁸⁹ President Nixon quickly signed off on Bunker's request. Bell to Sayre, "Announcement of U.S. unilateral actions,"

December 27, 1973, NARA-AAD, RG59. Online:

<http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=109449&dt=2472&dl=1345>

⁹⁰ December 2, 1973 – Bunker recommends adopting "joint presidential declaration on principles."

Bunker to Kissinger, "Resumption of Panama-U.S. treaty negotiations," December 2, 1973. Online:

<http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=108252&dt=2472&dl=1345>

⁹¹ Jaén Suárez coincides with this assessment, saying that "A comparison of the eight principles proposed by Tack with the U.S. proposal does not show great differences." Jaén Suárez, pp. 281.

⁹² Bell to Bunker, "Resumption of U.S.-Panama treaty negotiations," December 4, 1973, NARA-AAD, RG59. Online:

<http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=108581&dt=2472&dl=1345>

⁹³ "Ocho principios," Dec. 19, 1973, Folder Negociaciones 1973, no. 546, AMREP, sec. 14.

⁹⁴ In a later NSC meeting, Kissinger referred to the principles as deliberately ambiguous "platitudes."

⁹⁵ Jorden, pp. 216-217.

⁹⁶ Bell to Bunker, "U.S.-Panama treaty negotiations: report on developments," January 24, 1974, NARA-AAD, RG59.

Online: <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=1382&dt=2474&dl=1345>

⁹⁷ David Binder, "U.S. agrees to yield sovereignty of canal to Panama," *New York Times*, February 8, 1974, pp. 2;

Jorden, pp. 219-222.