

**U.S. NORMS IN
EDUCATION AND DIPLOMACY**

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
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ABSTRACT

This paper identifies habits that contribute to American national identity, as demonstrated in the interactions of U.S. diplomats abroad. I examine the foundations of curriculum in U.S. education—and how national identity is reproduced within this domestic institution. Our American identity is the amalgamation of our individual habits which are rooted in our ideas, norms, and values of what is important and worthy of pursuit, what is proper and what is correct. These ideas form a discourse in American identity today, as they did in the time of John Dewey—father of modern education in the United States—and Alexis de Tocqueville—a sociologist, cultural anthropologist, and political commentator—who both have much to say on the relationship of formal education to national identity and politics. These particularly American cultural habits are elucidated in diplomatic action because diplomats are constantly in situations that highlight contrasts between cultures.

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CHAPTER 1

AN INTRODUCTION: BUILDING A FRAMEWORK

Introduction

Sitting in a cross cultural communication class, I listened to a classmate detail her experiences teaching students from nations around the world in a singular classroom. She described one group of students which spoke frequently during the class discussion, another group that was silent in class discussions, but wrote phenomenally, and other groups who were clearly socialized in school systems different from their fellow classmates. In my next class that same day, a presentation was given on U.S.-Chinese relations. I began to wonder: if differences among students socialized in different education systems were that evident in the classroom setting, how did these socialized cultural habits mesh in international relations between two diplomats formed by different systems? The seedlings for this research endeavor were planted.

In conducting diplomacy with the Russians between 1976 and 1984 from desks in Moscow and Washington DC, Foreign Service Officer Raymond Smith discusses this very issue, for him a frustration, in his memoir, *Negotiating with the Soviets*.¹ Why was he frustrated? He and his American colleagues were attempting to communicate with people possessing an entirely different worldview. Smith discusses how they walked away time and again from negotiations without resolution because they did not take key cultural differences into account. The Foreign Service represents some of the best and brightest the United States has to offer—given the selectivity, extensive application process, and number of people who apply. However, even this crowd of officers did not step back long enough to analyze what would make

¹ Smith, Raymond. *Negotiating with the Soviets*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1989.

diplomacy more effective—they continued trying to employ a type of diplomacy that embodied norms foreign to or rejected in Russian culture.

As Smith puts it, “if we are going to effectively negotiate with the Soviets we need to try to see the world through their eyes.”² Seeing the world through their eyes acknowledges pivotal differences in perspectives—and, as with many nations, these perspectives are made up of cultural habits. The ways in which we act and react to political, social, or conflict situations are a direct result of our values and beliefs about the world. Smith notes that “our historical experiences have produced some fundamentally different values and expectations.” I would add to historical experiences that our institutional socialization—such as the socialization received in formal education—play a fundamental role in both reproducing and shaping these values and expectations.

My argument is in a similar vein as Smith’s in acknowledging the importance of culture and national identity in diplomatic relations. Smith’s approach stresses the importance of learning about one’s counterpart. My focus, however, is in tracing the domestic habits that make up a cohesive “American” identity from where it is first reproduced for the next generation in schools to maturation in fully-formed citizens, with a focus on the diplomatic corps. National identity, then, is paramount to the success of politics and negotiation in both theory and practice—and can even be a strategy for diffusing future conflict. Awareness of our own American habits and how they are reproduced can help us conduct diplomatic relations beyond just our bilateral relationship with Russia.

Raymond Smith focuses on what for him is the heart of the matter in difficulties communicating with the Soviets: understanding the pervasive Marxist ideology in Russia. While I do agree with Smith, I find that analysis a bit unsatisfactory, as well as unhelpful for foreign relations more broadly. The heart of the question in this situation is:

² Smith. iv.

- 1) What identity is normalized and legitimate domestically?
- 2) How is that identity reproduced?
- 3) To what extent does that identity exert influence over actors in the context of diplomatic culture and foreign relations?

Ted Hopf's theory of societal constructivism provides the lens through which to view this relationship between knowledge of habits (making up our national identity) and power.

Smith correctly identifies culture as an overwhelmingly influential factor in foreign relations, but has missed that the point is not the political consequences of Marxism, but the values and beliefs that underlie it. These habits were inculcated in classrooms and reinforced in other domestic social institutions. If Marxism is deemed a threat to the human rights of those under Marxist leaders or a threat to our own national interests, then the place to understand current situations and shape future outcomes is in the schools. The emphasis of my research will be tracing four habits that contribute to a distinctly American identity, as identified in case studies and American political theory and as reproduced in U.S. secondary schools.

Research Question

The continuity of habit between curriculum in American secondary schools to a matured national identity has yet to be considered, but U.S. diplomacy makes a prime case study for observation. The habits of American life (our values reflected as actions) are planted via education and the matured roots are evident in full-fledged citizenship; these cultural habits are elucidated in diplomatic action because the profession requires constant interaction with other cultures. The values that underlie these habits in American life form a set of ideas on what is important and worthy of pursuit, what is proper and what is correct. These ideas form a discourse on American identity today, just as they did in the days of John Dewey—father of

modern education in the United States—and, even earlier, in the days of Alexis de Tocqueville—a French observer who wore the hats of a sociologist, a cultural anthropologist, a political commentator, and many more as he wrote on democracy.

It is from their arguments that I derive the basis of mine: 1) that national identity matters in theory *and* in practice and 2) that identity is reproduced in education, creating a particular set of habits which is traceable through our diplomatic leadership. The reason for focusing my trajectory of national identity through diplomats is namely due to a basic tenet of cross cultural-communications: you learn most about your own identity when it contrasts or conflicts with others' cultural practices—indeed habits and values—that differ. In tracing national identity from education to profession (and, in theory, matured (firmly socialized) citizens), I aim to increase understanding of the role national identity plays in how we interact with others. I hope to motivate readers to pursue further research on diffusing conflict via education, a key social institution that shapes our beliefs and values, forming our habits. These all-important habits make up our political and social actions—i.e., what it means to be an American citizen or have “American” values.

I will examine the reproduction of national identity through secondary education through two case studies in U.S. diplomacy: 21st century United States-Chinese relations and late 20th century United States-Russian relations. In examining how U.S. ambassadors engaged in diplomacy through discourse analysis of previously recorded and in-person interviews, I consider what habits found in our education are reproduced. To achieve greater understanding, I draw in conversation on character- and nation-building education—specifically through cultural norms emphasized in literature education; curriculum debates; American political theory discussing the ties between democracy and education; and evidence of that culture throughout diplomats' interviews.

Structure

Chapter 1 is a general introduction, stating my research question, outlining the structure for analysis, and defining my terms, as well as placing myself within the scholarly field. This chapter sets up the forthcoming arguments. The second chapter elaborates on my case study selection and contains excerpts from my interviews with U.S. diplomats and analysis. I also identify and isolate four particular habits in my interviews that contribute to our “American” identity. Chapter 3 focuses on the role of education in democracy, particularly through the eyes of Alexis de Tocqueville, John Dewey, and more modern scholars. Chapter 4 explains why I have selected secondary education and goes in to detail on the curriculum debates in U.S. education which unsurprisingly mirror (or are rather a product of) the culture wars of contemporary American culture—but also exemplify the four habits mentioned in Chapter 2. Chapter 5 concludes my argument by looking at the desired qualities of a Foreign Service officer and the Department of State selection process—cultural habits are traced through what it means to be a “top” candidate and the American identity these chosen officers are supposed to embody and reproduce for others. The chapter concludes explicitly summing up the linkages between the *techné* of Chapter 2, the theory of Chapter 3, and the education observations in Chapter 4.

What is a habit?

What makes a habit? In daily use, habits always seem to be good or bad and the object of endless quests to develop more “good habits” or break the bad ones. But cultural habits are to be thought of in a unique way—these habits are the culmination of societal values and beliefs on being and existence. Habits are the actions that are a direct (even if not a conscious) result of these underlying assumptions about reality. Cultural habits can be formed, be challenged,

evolve, and adapt—but this process is more like a river eroding a bank over time and less similar to giving up nail-biting or smoking.

Tocqueville uses the term “habit” to address the desired American character. A set of habits shapes what it means to be a good democratic citizen and these habits are indeed normalized, reproduced, and learned. These habits relate directly to what it means to be a citizen of a particular regime and what the identity of a nation is. For example, individuals in a free society are encouraged to learn and empowered when they have knowledge and mastery over the habits required to be self-governing and to live in relative peace and stability with their neighbors.

Ted Hopf discusses the place of national identity in his work on constructivism in international relations theory. For him, national identity is made up of history, politics, daily interactions, social life, and much more. These are the mundane habits of everyday life that make up our American identity. It is the greater social structure which gives these habits their significance. In other words, these set of habits are recognized behaviors that inspire expected reactions and communicated commonly understood messages. Researching such “requires thousands of pages of reading, months of interviews and archival research, and a host of less conventional activities, such as riding public transportation, standing in lines, and going to bars and cafés to participate in local practices.”³ Fortunately, as the researcher, I have spent a lifetime riding public transportation, going to bars, standing in line, and much more in the United States.

³ Hopf, Ted. “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory.” *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer, 1998), 171-200. The MIT Press. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539267> Accessed 11/07/2013.

Literature Review

While there is not much work on diplomatic norms in connection to the habits socialized in the education system, there are bodies of scholarly work on norm reproduction in education, diplomatic behavior, cross-cultural communication, American education, and lastly, American political theory which stresses the relationship between education and citizen formation. Thus, my literature review will touch on the prominent discourses within international relations, American political theory, and education. I use existing theories and data from various sources, to provide a new understanding of the role our domestic culture plays in international relations.

Diplomatic memoirs, such as Raymond Smith's, provide material ripe for analysis. I also consulted *Negotiating with the Russians*, a collection of essays published by the World Peace Foundation and spanning Lend-Lease to post war negotiations on atomic energy.⁴ The book opens with a very critical question of whether or not it is (or was) even possible to negotiate with the USSR.⁵ This question goes to the heart of my research, as understanding the role of national identity creating contrast in these negotiations can be crucial to diffusing conflict or furthering American interests in the world. These are texts full of practical and on-the-ground experience on how government, policy, and diplomacy operate—they provide fertile ground for analyzing social institutions and interactions. While these texts provide great raw data, many of them lack a theoretical component.

My research will first look at education in the U.S. In order to tie education to the political sphere, I draw on the vast body of literature in American political theory on democracy and education. Alexis de Tocqueville in *Democracy in America* concludes that “in the United States

⁴ Dennett, Raymond and Joseph E. Johnson. *Negotiating with the Russians*. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1951.

⁵ Dennett. ix.

the instruction of the people serves to powerfully maintain a democratic republic.”⁶ He also notes that in the United States “the sum of men’s education is directed toward politics.”⁷ If one must learn how to be a good citizen within a democracy, it seems to follow that one must learn to be a citizen of any other type of regime as well. The characteristics of “good citizenship” that are socialized in individuals would also extend to help shape their behavior in international contexts, just as it does arguably in domestic contexts.

John Dewey, whose thoughts have defined much of the present-day U.S. education system, wrote prolifically on the topic of education—including a book entitled *Democracy and Education* where he advocates fostering and maintaining a democracy as the overarching goal of education.⁸ The relationship between education and democracy has been addressed within the fields and from the perspectives of both American politics and education—the connection between the two is well-established. Dewey’s ideas that guide educational philosophy today include the notion that teachers should not teach values, but should develop character and train children how to act within social institutions. I argue, as above, that these habits are actually indicators of values—that inherent to identity are our beliefs and attitudes about the world.

The literature from cross cultural communications is also relevant. The premise of my argument relies on the concept of unconscious culture, as articulated by Edward T. Hall, being relevant and influential in diplomatic negotiations.⁹ To illustrate unconscious culture, Hall uses two ice bergs—each representing a culture—with only the tips visible above the water. The submerged portion of each iceberg represents the part of culture of which we are typically

⁶ de Tocqueville, Alexis. *Democracy in America*. Transl. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. 291.

⁷ Tocqueville. 291-292.

⁸ Dewey, John. *Democracy And Education : An Introduction To The Philosophy Of Education*. Waiheke Island: The Floating Press, 2009. eBook Collection (EBSCOhost). Web. 19 July 2013.

⁹ Weaver, Gary. “Contrasting and Comparing Cultures”. *Culture, Communication and Conflict*. ed. Gary R. Weaver. Rev. 2nd ed., Boston: Pearson, 2000. 72.

unaware, even of behavior and norms within our own culture. As scholar Gary Weaver phrases it, “We are usually unaware of our own culture until we leave it and interact with those who are culturally different. This interaction and conflict raises aspects of our own culture to our conscious awareness.”¹⁰ The conflict Weaver mentions is visually demonstrated in the iceberg analogy when the two icebergs collide underwater—the parts of our culture of which we are unaware are different and often in conflict. These unconscious differences are exactly what I wish to address within the education system and within diplomatic behavior.

I have chosen to focus my study on China and Russia, because of the U.S.’s tendency to define its own cultural identity and foreign policy in contrast to these “others.” Edward Said’s famous “Orientalism” articulates the concept of “othering” through the prime example of the Orientalism discourse. Othering is a learned process which helps us define ourselves and our policies by distinguishing practices that differ from our way of doing things—in other words, constructing a self/other dichotomy that often overstates differences between groups to empower one and subordinate the other.¹¹ The discourse of “the other” is important here insofar as if there were not a “self” and “other” engaged in diplomacy, there would be no conflict or inability to communicate. The “other” provides meaningfulness to the “self” identity and provides a point from which to make distinctions. However, methods to ameliorating the self/other construct involve two paths—one is the approach of specializing in the “other” and the second approach is learning about oneself.

This self/other construct helps to trace a distinct “American” identity—which will be the focus of this paper. In the study of cross cultural communication, the emphasis is always placed on achieving a greater understanding of self. In this case, a great understanding of American identity as reproduced in schools and evidenced in diplomacy can help us analyze what our

¹⁰ Weaver. 73.

¹¹ Said, Edward W. “Orientalism.” *The Georgia Review*. Vol 31, No 1 (Spring 1977). 162-206. University of Georgia. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41397448> Accessed 4/8/13.

identity is and what we want it to be. We may also be able to diffuse future conflict through the education system by looking out how we reproduce culture in the classroom. Such cultural analysis has practical applications in allowing us more fruitful negotiations, not just with Russia and China, but all countries we encounter with differing education systems. How do we get other nations on board with our priorities? How can we better advance our interests and understand our counterpart nation's interests and priorities? Awareness of our own culture could lead us to be more fluent in other cultures.

There is also an extensive literature on citizenship education—how to approach it and what habits to transmit to the next generation. More importantly, what societal habits can we teach that do not discriminate or violate individual habits, but still up hold the very institutions that compose this nation? Education in this respect plays a critical role in shaping the identity—or normative virtues adopted by a particular society. Chapter 4 focuses further on curriculum debates—including a discussion on civics—and how these curriculum choices are important precisely because they reinforce habits for public and private life. Alexis de Tocqueville focuses on the importance of education in the American democratic system, insisting that one must be educated for democracy.

My research question seeks to fill a gap in the current scholarship with ramifications that could potentially be just as practical as they are academic. I will discuss the behaviors exhibited in diplomatic negotiations, as recounted by the diplomats themselves, and then operating under American democratic theory and constructivist positioning, I will then trace “American” culture from its genesis in the school system to its maturation. I will use the tools Marianne Jørgensen and Louise Phillips discuss in their demonstration of discursive psychology to analyze the text transcripts of my interviews and of Foreign Service oral histories.¹² This method allows me to explore, more abstractly, how this discourse constitutes an identity and, more concretely, how

¹² Jørgensen, Marianne and Louise Phillips. *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*. 104.

these interactions point to social action by way of democracy and participation in public and private life.¹³

For more on how I understand constructivism, reference constructivist scholar Ted Hopf's *Reconstructing the Cold War: The Early Years, 1945-1958* where he discusses societal constructivism as a solution to provide meaning to systemic constructivism or structural realism.¹⁴ According to Hopf, "The concept that does most of the work for constructivism is social identity: how you understand yourself in relationship to others. And this societal identity is constructed through one's daily interactions not just with other people, but also with ideas, landscapes, art, music, television, cinema, etc."¹⁵ Many experiences of the diplomats highlight not only how important ideas were, but how the states, by marginalizing these creative and intellectual groups, also recognized the influence (and sometimes perils) of the intelligentsia.

Hopf contrasts this concept with the more traditional understanding of constructivism (systemic)—which suggests that "these identities are mostly formed during interaction between states—between the United States and the Soviet Union, for example."¹⁶ Societal constructivism encompasses how these "identities are also generated at home, in domestic societies."¹⁷ The gap in the scholarship, highlighted by Hopf, is a failure to account for domestic actors that shape identity. I argue that education as an institution is one of the most highly influential domestic societal actors. Conversely in the very particularistic work on norm creation and dissemination, Hopf has also noted as missing "is what Jeffrey Checkel has called the 'cultural

¹³ Jørgensen. 105.

¹⁴ Hopf, Ted. *Reconstructing the Cold War: The Early Years, 1945-1958*. Oxford University Press, New York: 2012

¹⁵ Hopf. *Reconstructing the Cold War*. 6-7.

¹⁶ Hopf. *Reconstructing the Cold War*. 7.

¹⁷ Hopf. *Reconstructing the Cold War*. 7.

match' between an international norm and domestic understandings of self."¹⁸ Societal constructivism seeks the middle path between a systemic understanding and a norm by norm study of international relations.

Or put in Hopf's words:

Societal constructivism hypothesizes that the identities that are being generated in society as a whole inform elite understandings of national identity. These understandings of what the Soviet Union is, for example, are what informs a political elite's understanding of other states. There is an interaction, a mutually constitutive relationship, between what an elite understands about her own country and what she understands about some particular other. These understandings establish an identity relationship between the two states. And this relationship implies policy choices toward that country, from the broadest distinction between enmity and amity, to more specific policies such as political support or military aid.¹⁹

Hopf explained that, "identities are necessary, in international politics and domestic society alike, in order to ensure at least some minimal level of predictability and order."²⁰ Through conducting interviews with and pouring over memoirs of U.S. diplomats, I have identified some habits common to our "American" identity. I am grounding my larger argument pragmatically with two case studies to distinguish which of these traits are likely "American" and are present in relationships with various countries from those traits that are unique to the specific context be it time, geographic location, or in relation to a specific "other". My theory of the Foreign Service Officer qua American democratic citizen—that is my concept that domestic habit formation/identity is present and relevant to interactions on the international state—is examined in two different periods and places—but not that dissimilar of contexts.

¹⁸ Hopf. *Reconstructing the Cold War*. 12.

¹⁹ Hopf. *Reconstructing the Cold War*. 19.

²⁰ Hopf. *The Promise of Constructivism*. 174.

According to Hopf's theory, societal constructivism "argues that how the Soviet Union understood itself at home explains how it related to other states abroad. By Soviet Union, [he does] not mean just Soviet elites, though of course they matter in the last instance. No, it is mass public understandings of what it means to be Soviet, to be socialist, that animates societal constructivism."²¹ This description of societal constructivism is key to my framework—first, laying out examples of American identity as present in conversations with diplomats and then, providing an analysis at the domestic level of the theoretical foundations of American identity and identity formation via education. Perhaps the biggest tension in my framework is the use of both societal constructivism and passing references to Said's concept of "othering." Said's concept works well with societal constructivism's more broad analysis of relationships and identities, as opposed to a norm by norm analysis, but it also with Hopf's description of constructivist thought as a whole. Constructivism looks at identity and "identities perform three necessary functions in a society: they tell you and others who you are and they tell you who others are."²² The practice of "othering" is precisely that—drawing lines that tell you who you are and who they tell you who others are. It is from understanding our own identity as and nation and perceiving the identity of another nation that we act in a predictable manner according to a set of determined interests and that our "others" act in a predictable manner. (All of this is similar to "following a script" in the field of sociology).

Insofar as they describe different parts of a similar phenomenon, they work well together, but Hopf and Said then go in different directions. "Othering" is about drawing a line in the sand—"this" is what we are not (whatever "this" may be); it is your understanding of your identity through your understanding or creation of an "other." You (the nation in question) are the ultimate arbiter of identity. In societal constructivism however, Hopf focuses one on how our

²¹ Hopf. *Reconstructing the Cold War*. 4

²² Hopf. *The Promise of Constructivism*. 175.

national identity is reproduced in daily social practice (what I will refer to as “habits”) on a domestic level and distinguish importantly “that the producer of the identity is not in control of what it ultimately means to others; the intersubjective structure is the final arbiter of meaning.” In other words, Hopf’s theory is not self-centric—unlike Said, a nation does not define or create a self or other, but Hopf’s theory is dependent not only how we create “others” or how we construct our own identity through habitual action, but also on how we perceive ourselves domestically and how our own national identity are perceived by others.

Methodology

In reviewing the literature, I have attempted to engage my ideas in conversation with scholars of varied backgrounds. My attempts to identify habits common to U.S. education and U.S. diplomacy and trace the connections between them draws on qualitative research methods and discourse analysis—looking at poststructuralists such as Ernesto LaClau and Chantal Mouffe. They make interesting bedfellows with the ideas of Alexis de Tocqueville and the American Founding Fathers. Lastly, one can hardly discuss education in the United States without looking to the Father of Modern American Education, John Dewey, whose theories are still reproduced today in one of the country’s most respected schools of education, The Teachers College at Columbia University. This unlikely team of scholars contributes to identifying the role culture plays in the United States. My epistemological orientation was influenced by in-depth study of American and Classical political philosophy at the undergraduate level and then by exposure to sociology, post-structuralism, and mainstream political “science.” It was here that these ideas muddled in my brain and hopefully come out coherently in this paper.

I draw more broadly from poststructuralist discourse, as well as from constructivism with in the international relations field. “The relationship between identity and foreign policy is at the center of poststructuralism’s research agenda,” and thus, poststructuralism fits my research question as it seeks to identify an identity formed through education and evidenced in public discourse, in the realm of U.S. diplomacy. Within poststructuralist discourse, my analyses draw on Laclau and Mouffe’s concepts concerning identity and conflict analysis. Notions of identity and conflict run strong in the diplomatic memoirs as self/other constructs are formed, “Marxist” and “Communist” ideologies are “othered”, and diplomats experience frustrations when realities differ from their own expectations. Through the interviews, I focus on American identity as displayed in diplomatic interactions —the insights of which could be pertinent to relations with many or some “others”, not just a specific “other”.

Method

The constructivist and poststructuralist theories are key to my research as it focuses on the transmission of normalized habits. Discourse analysis as my method fits well with the data I intend to use and my goal of ascertaining the influences of culture in diplomacy as it is transmitted in U.S. education. Poststructuralism lends itself well to discourse analysis in its emphasis on the importance of language and language giving meaning to actors and events—particularly the language we use in our curriculum debates and in our literature canon.

As Lene Hansen says referencing Michel Foucault, “Language’s structured yet” changing “nature brings to the fore the importance of political agency and the political production and reproduction of discourses and the identities constructed within them.”²³ In other words, to study a set of normative habits (which collectively can form identity) looking at the text

²³ Hansen, Lene. *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*. New York: Routledge, 2006.

of the documents themselves will lend insight to tracing the “American” identity, created in U.S. education and helps shape how diplomats behave in negotiation. Other theories such as realism and liberalism do not adequately address questions and relationships of identity, knowledge, and power or they do not focus on the level of analysis I am using (social institutions as opposed to international liberal institutions or purely states).

After examining U.S. education norms and societal norms, I will trace these norms through to U.S. actors’ practice of international politics. Norms in international politics will of course be traced through interviews with diplomats—to learn through their experiences more about the internal discourse, operations, and perception of “self” within American diplomacy. To collect my data for discourse analysis, I narrowed my case studies into two the time periods for the two case studies—United States-Russian relations in the late 20th and Sino-American relations in the early 21st centuries. To discuss education, I draw on sources that focus on major curriculum debates such as trial transcripts and educators’ explanations for selection of the top ten most widely read novels in U.S. secondary education—that allows me consider the specific socialization of citizens and in particular, these diplomats. This data set is by no means exhaustive, nor could it be. I then look at American habits as identified by the Foreign Service itself. For this section, I looked at the selection and application processes for Foreign Service Officers.

For the last set of data collected, I combined oral histories and in-person interviews with diplomats who participated in negotiations either in Russia or China during the time period at which I am looking. For interviews, I started with a few contacts of current and former Department of State employees and snow-balled my list of contacts from those initial connections. The interviews are also not exhaustive to the point of representing every diplomatic experience, negotiation, or viewpoint, but once again sufficient for my purposes. I have employed discourse analysis to examine American education and diplomatic habits. Given

the timeframe for my case studies of United States-Russian relations in the second half of the 20th century and Sino-United States relations in the 21st century, I focus research on the U.S. education system to those years—but include a few years earlier to account for diplomats emerging or practicing at the time of Bretton Woods and the end of the war.

As for choosing discourse analysis over comparative case studies to analyze my data, comparing cases would exceed the limits of this particular research project, as one would need to undergo a similar, but separate research project for each country's education and diplomacy to address the same issues in such depth—this might be fruitful, but would be a different study entirely. The type of discourse analysis I use, conversation analysis in discursive psychology, draws upon methods of endomethodology. It would also be possible to make comparisons with U.S. diplomatic (and educational) habits in U.S. relations with other countries (i.e., United States-Iranian relations or United States-French relations, etc.). But at some point the expansion of data would create redundancy without yielding results that were significantly different and would be at the cost of a more in-depth analysis—as my premise more broadly is that by studying ourselves we can apply our knowledge of self to diplomatic relations and with other countries. This particular study only examines the connections within the specified case, however, and will not make categorical or definitive recommendations as to other nations' education systems.

Discourse analysis will fulfill the previously stated objectives: analyzing diplomatic behavior in two case studies of U.S.-Soviet relations post World War II through the end of the Cold War and of Sino-American relations in the 21st century; examining literature on education, education and democracy, constructivism, and cross cultural communications; analyzing curriculum debates; and looking at the Foreign Service selection process. Curriculum debates hone in on prevailing philosophies in U.S. education—with emphasis on what the major influences should be and how it should be structured. These steps will allow us to trace the

role of American culture as produced in the classroom and as an evidently influential force in negotiations and relations between U.S. diplomats and their foreign counterparts.

Would negotiations be more fruitful if we better understood what assumptions and style of communication we bring to the table? With the focus in industrial organizational psychology on understanding one's own personality and work style, there is a large literature on how to best collaborate and work in teams with others—largely based upon self-knowledge of strengths, weaknesses, and interests. On a domestic (or company-specific) level, this self-knowledge can lead to more productive and harmonious teams in the workplace, according to IO psychology. I argue that this notion also applies on an international level, regarding awareness of one's own national culture at the negotiating table.

Case Studies

To answer the posed question of “How does national identity manifest itself starting from U.S. education through to U.S. diplomatic negotiating behavior?”, the textual analysis will focus on data narrowed to two particular U.S. relationships: 1) U.S.-Soviet relations from 1940 to 1991—framed by two major events, World War II through the end of the Cold War and 2) Sino-U.S. relations in the 21st century. By anchoring my research in these two examples, I can draw on diplomatic accounts from this time period and interviews with former diplomats stationed in these areas. I have chosen these two cases because one provides a historical example and one lends credence to this theory as still relevant today. Russia and China both have unique relationships with the “West” and the U.S. in particular. As Anne-Marie Brady says in her book on Chinese foreign diplomacy, “much of the structures and approaches of China's [diplomatic

matters] system were initially copies from the Russians.”²⁴ These two cases in particular will allow me to draw not only on past and present examples, but draw comparisons between the United States’ constructions of the “other” in both cases.

The data for the case studies will be derived from the sources identified above, diplomat oral histories relevant to U.S.-Russian relations in the second half of the 20th century and current United States-Chinese relations, prominent discourses in American political theory and education, State Department documents, and the works of constructivist and poststructural theorists. I will look at the habits that form culture prominent in the education system look to see which of those learned habits are institutionalized in national discourse. I also will draw on narrative resources, interviewing a former ambassador who is current professor at American University and working with a PhD student who has collected a fair amount of data on diplomatic behavior and diplomatic history for his dissertation on a separate topic.

²⁴ Brady, Anne-Marie. *Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People's Republic*. Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.: Lanham, MD, 2003. xii.

CHAPTER 2

CASE STUDIES: INTERVIEWS WITH DIPLOMATS

Case Selection

The first case study is U.S.-Soviet relations through the Cold War. This case study will receive the most attention for two reasons that I will discuss in a moment. The second case study is focused on U.S.-Chinese relations in the 21st century. The examination of data in this case study is drawn from interviews and builds upon my insights from the previous case study—putting the application of theory in the context of a present situation and relationship. Diplomatic practices are isolated below for a more detailed discussion of where these practices originate and how they exemplify a coherent American identity.

The reasons for a more substantial treatment of Russia are twofold: first, the ambassadors that agreed to my requests for in-person or over the phone recorded interviews were all diplomats that served in the Soviet Union and second, I had a limited amount of time to conduct this research—I may have been able to contact more diplomats and conduct more interviews with a less strict time constraint. I think the primary reason also for U.S. ambassadors' openness to discuss their experiences in Russia comes from the distance provided by time and circumstances from the Cold War era. We are still in the midst of our 21st century relationship with China and as such, it remains a much more sensitive issue. It also may be the case with such a recent case study that having a preapproved written account of one's experiences in China is currently less risky than off-the-cuff remarks. But I will not speculate further than to say, I am unsurprised that it was easier to obtain firsthand accounts in the Soviet case study.

These two cases exemplify the United States defining its own identity—a distinctly American identity—and priorities around an “other.” In the Cold War era, the international landscape was a tense bi-polar stage on the brink of a war that never really occurred, outside of warring ideologies. China provides us a modern day example of an ideological foe and a rising competing power, in a world that is seeing a steady decline in American influence. This decline in influence is not to suggest that the United States is necessarily losing its place as a superpower, but rather that it is losing its place as *the* superpower and it is becoming instead a superpower among many, or at least multiple, powers. But, as mentioned previously with the work of Gary Weaver and Edward Said, it is often in defining what we are not that we further entrench an American identity and particular (democratic) habits that mark us as distinct.

In Chapter 1, I cited Ted Hopf, as the guide for my constructivist approach in applying principles of domestic democratic education which shape an American identity to international relations. The John Gerard Ruggie’s article, *Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution*, — which serves as a sort of introduction for a series of proceeding essays—is also operative to my account of the democratic citizen—in his distinction of a particular “American-ness” when it comes to multilateralism.²⁵

Data Selection-Russia

Russia, or more properly the Soviet Union, makes a compelling case for my argument. First, the latter half of the 20th century involved defining “American-ness”, our national identity, in contrast to the USSR.²⁶ Russia during the Cold War is the perfect example of Edward Said’s concept of “othering”—through this relationship, our nation more explicitly defined what it means

²⁵ Ruggie, John. “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution.” *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. 31.

²⁶ Note: Despite the official USSR name, the country continued to reproduce its Russian identity and therefore, I have used Soviet and Russian or USSR and Russia somewhat interchangeably.

to be American and what is not American. But Hopf's notion of how these identities are arbitrated in our interactions and by the perception of identities is also important because my analysis is derived from not what a state government wanted us to think about who we were or who the Russians were, but as these identities are arbitrated by interactions and perceptions. I am analyzing text which comes from transcribed in-person interviews with former ambassadors and political officers stationed in Moscow during the Cold War. I conducted and transcribed these interviews myself. I have cleaned up these texts slightly so that they would read more easily, while still maintaining the integrity of what the ambassadors said and how they said it. In this way, the ambassadors can speak for themselves and I was able to analyze what was present, not what I would have liked for them to say or how it would have been beneficial to construct it to warrant my claims.

I interviewed three ambassadors. As a young man not yet finished with college, Ambassador Roger Kirk served in Moscow as an embassy clerk from 1949-1950, prior to formally entering the Foreign Service—in what he called the very lowest position in the embassy. He returned to the Moscow embassy as a political consular from 1963-1965.²⁷ My second interview was with Ambassador Jack Matlock, who was in Moscow during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1961 as Vice Consul and Third Secretary in the Political Section. He later returned as Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM)—second in command—in 1975 and as Ambassador during the end of the Cold War in 1987. In the interim, Amb. Matlock was Soviet Affairs Director in Washington DC, was the charge d'affaires (acting ambassador), and played Gorbachev in key mock summits to prepare President Reagan to meet Gorbachev in person.^{28 29} Lastly, I interviewed Melvyn Levitsky, who was involved with Russian affairs from 1972-1978 as a

²⁷ Roger Kirk Oral History. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. <http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Kirk,%20Roger%20.toc.pdf> Accessed 4/6/13.

²⁸ Jack Matlock website. <http://jackmatlock.com/about/> Accessed 4/6/13.

²⁹ Jack Matlock Wikipedia page. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jack_F._Matlock,_Jr.#Moscow:_as_Third_Secretary Accessed 4/6/13. Note: Jack Matlock's personal website directs visitors to the Wikipedia page directly. Amb. Matlock also told me in person and via email to look up his Wikipedia page for further information.

Political Officer in Moscow and as the Officer-in-Charge of the Bilateral Relations Section for the Office of Soviet Union Affairs.³⁰ While these ambassadors only represent three view points, they represent viewpoints throughout the Cold War, with service to Moscow ranging from the early 1960s to the conclusion of the Cold War in the late 1980s. Given the short period of time for my research, the busy schedules of former ambassadors, and most importantly, the nature of discourse analysis, three interviews are sufficient for my research—an initial probe into the relationship of education and national identity as evidenced in diplomacy.

Data Selection –China

Society has clearly undergone many changes in the last century—particularly in international cooperation, trade, and access to information in a globalized era. It may be difficult to see the parallels between ambassadors in Soviet affairs socialized 50 or more years prior and their present-day colleagues stationed in China. The selection process for Foreign Service Officers—which I detail in Chapter 5—has varied over the years, too. Despite commonalities in ideology between the Soviets and the Chinese and the means in which the Department of State handles representation in countries with political doctrines counter to our own, it may be difficult to see any resemblance. I argue that despite the differing levels of technology, the degree of access to information, and a shift toward multilateralism, these diplomats are really more similar than different.

How can this be? The 20th century U.S. diplomats and the 21st century U.S. diplomats were socialized with the same domestic habits in the United States—habits that shape the individual capable of democracy. From where did this preparation come? In part, their American identity was shaped by their formal education. These diplomats—though educated a generation

³⁰ Melvyn Levitsky CV. University of Michigan website.
http://sitemaker.umich.edu/ambassador.levitsky.fordschool/files/levitsky_cv.pdf Accessed 4/6/13.

or more apart—read the same canon of books in high school, even though they went on to major in different subjects at different universities, which I will speak more to in Chapter 4. The dedication to the tenets articulated in the Declaration of Independence and the habits required to safeguard these “American” principles in the mundane—such as voting in local elections and participating actively in civil society—have not changed. Importantly, these principles which govern my more full account of the Soviet case study are still relevant in a different time period (today) and place. An individual socialized with American democratic habits still acts qua democratic citizen, specifically qua *American* democratic citizen, when on the international stage. China merely provides a present day example to reinforce that these domestic character traits, despite being influenced by, are not exclusive to our relationship with the Soviet Union or to that specific time period. Our relationship with China has impacted our American identity in its own right as well.

To select data for analysis in my case study of 21st century U.S.-Chinese Relations, I scoured the Library of Congress and the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training collection of Foreign Service Oral Histories. My criterion for selection was diplomats that had served in China from 1999 and onward. Unfortunately, Ambassadors Joseph Prueher and James Sasser have not yet recorded oral histories or they are not yet available. Likewise, Ambassador Jon M. Huntsman, Jr. has not updated his oral history since he served as Ambassador to China.

My conversation analysis focuses on identifying habits that make up American-ness as acquired in the domestic sphere in each of these diplomats’ oral histories. Building on my case study of the Soviet Union, I suggest—by including this more current case—that the principles found to be true about American identity are still relevant and impactful today. As this case is very current and relevant to U.S. foreign policy, members of the Department of State were hesitant to talk to me on the record and, whereas many Cold War documents have been

declassified, the China file is ongoing and remains somewhat sensitive information. In addition, many diplomats serving in the 21st century are less likely to have retired than those that were active in the 1960s-1980s. These oral histories were selected as second best raw material, but nonetheless sufficient for my purposes of conversation analysis.

I looked at the oral histories of David Kramer, G. Eugene Martin, Michael A. Boorstein, and Edward Kloth, all diplomats who dealt with China in the 21st century—though here I have only presented text from Amb. Martin below because his thoughts were most pertinent without being redundant to my in-person interviews. Secretary Kramer served as the Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. While much of his career focuses on Russia, he was highly involved with China in regards to human rights around 2008. G. Eugene Martin did two assignments in Hong Kong, one in Taiwan, and served as a Chinese language instructor in the 1960s and 1970s— my China case study below focuses on his Oral History. In the 1980s, he continued to work with the Chinese in the Bureau of East Asian Affairs, the office of the Deputy of Secretary of State, Bureau of Legislative Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Political Affairs-China.

From 1992-1996, Martin was Consul General and finally, DCM at the Beijing embassy in 1999-2000. Boorstein also had experience in Moscow with the Soviets before teaching Chinese and serving as an administrative counselor in Beijing in 1990s and directing the building of the American embassy in Beijing from 1999-2002. Kloth served in Japan and Korea prior to his 2000-2001 appointment to the East Asia Bureau, where he worked with Sino-American relations. The text analyzed in this case study looked at diplomats with lifetime careers dedicated to this area of the world and those with only one or two assignments in China. The timeframe spans from the time immediately preceding the turn of the millennium to the first decade of the new millennium.

Analysis

After analyzing my two case studies using conversation analysis, I have come to two conclusions. Most of the diplomats discuss the “other” in terms of becoming acquainted with culture, and the ways in which these diplomats become acquainted with culture is through studying literature and history. Also in becoming acquainted with the “other”, they highlighted habits that make up American identity simple by describing their experiences and expectations encountering the foreign through an American lens—i.e., expectations of a free press or freedom of expression. The learning and gaining awareness of differences in the contrast to the familiar exemplifies Gary Weaver’s iceberg analogy. In order to make my argument more coherent and easier to follow, I will organize my analysis by argument and then by case study, so that the reader may clearly see: 1) what the argument is and 2) how it is supported by analyzed text from both case studies. This approach is as opposed to treating one case study thoroughly and then the second case study. While such organization would suffice, it is less ideal for drawing connections between case studies and therefore does not allow the same argument to be presented as strongly. I have also labeled the quotes from my interviews and the oral histories with the parenthetical citation of (diplomat’s last name, case study country) for easy identification.

Across both case studies, I identified a few habits that seem indicative of a distinctly American identity formed by the domestic sphere. These habits are derived from assumptions and frames put forth by the diplomats themselves in a variety of ways throughout their interviews. For me, this list is merely the tip of the iceberg, insofar as a list of American habits—by no means is it comprehensive, but cursory and sufficient in nature.

Table 2.1 American Habits

1. Faith in the Public Square
2. Equal Access/Open Society
3. Individual Agency
4. Freedom of Expression

In subsequent chapters, I will offer an explanation for the acquisition and reproduction of these habits—as well as discuss their role more broadly in the United States and within the specific context of the diplomatic corps.

Faith in the Public Square

Faith in the public square is an interesting habit because religion can either reinforce temporal authority or subvert it. That is to say, if the divine law reinforces national law, then religion can be useful to society insofar as it helps temper the spirits of citizens interiorly without needing state-sponsored retribution from a police or military force to maintain control. However, if the divine law does not reinforce the national or civil law, the two systems will compete or live in a state of tenuousness. The mismatch of divine law and national law can lead people to have greater respect for another authority or allegiance to an outside system—which can certainly be problematic for a political leader.

Faith also has a tenuous relationship with freedom, particularly in the United States which was founded on ideals from the Enlightenment and has a distinct Puritan legacy. Despite tensions in the United States between freedom and religion, we have a fairly religious overture to our national identity, courtesy of our founding. Alexis de Tocqueville identifies this tension and explains how freedom and religion can work together in the American project in *Democracy in America*. While in some political ideologies religion is neither encouraged, nor recognized by the

state, the American democracy has incorporated religious principles and served as a place of asylum from religious persecution since its inception. Religion as part of our identity can be both self-contradictory and inherent—but it has given rise to a language of political theology in America. Whether or not our leaders are personally religious, they appeal to religion in public speeches and ceremonies. American politicians are essentially required to be fluent in the language of political religion, as they call to mind our religious heritage and participate in the discourse of American religion in public life.

While this background wanders a bit from my central question and purpose, I think it is important to understand the role of religion that most Americans are familiar with and used to seeing. Such that when they experience religion and religious communities in other cultures, they interpret it through these experiences and in the course of this larger narrative on religion and public life in America. In Melvin Levitsky's assignment in the 1970s, the Soviet Union was pushing back among an increased religious fervor among individuals and encouraging adoption of an atheism more in line with Marxist thought. Given how the Jewish community used the Sabbath, the synagogue, and the network of the Jewish community to pass information and documentation on emigrating, it is understandable why the Soviet leaders were increasingly concerned about religion. Jews made up part of the intelligentsia, as well—which at the time was heavily restricted from expression via writing, painting, or any number of other creative avenues of expression. At this time, religion in the public square—far from being a second language required of all politicians—was subversive to the regime.

Amb. Levitsky discusses the role of the Jewish community in as he encountered serving in internal affairs:

Then I developed my own [contacts] among the Soviet Jewish so called refuseniks, those that had been refused exit from the Soviet Union. And among a bunch of painters, musicians, jazz musicians and rock musicians who were not allowed to play their music,

although they had their official—most of them had official jobs as well but they would go around and try to sell their paintings, play their music, sometimes in basements, little halls, etc. and that community in general—that sort of marginal communities to get a sense of what was going on. Well, particularly with Soviet Jewry which I spent a lot of time on the since they were marginalized in a pretty extreme way. In other words, if they applied to leave, even if they had an important government job, they were fired immediately and then they had a hard time getting any other meaningful job. They always had a pretty good pipeline, not just in the area of Soviet Jewry, but other areas as well. So, that provided some insights into domestic politics beyond what you could read in the officially controlled newspapers. (Levitsky, USSR)

In order to gather information from these communities, the Ambassador said in another part of his interview that he went to the synagogue, where many Jews would stand outside Saturday services and exchange information. He interacted with these marginalized communities to gather insights that the official newspapers omitted. Importantly, we see how the official state narrative is not necessarily comprehensive or accurate and also how important these creative and religious minorities are in shaping the domestic political landscape—so much so that the state marginalized these communities' experiences and prevented their views and work from being published.

I will return to a discussion on marginalized communities' restricted ability to produce art and music—as well as the marginalization of the Jewish community—as this observation begins from an American expectation that that would be and should be allowed. While not always universally upheld in practice throughout American history, freedom of expression is safeguarded as a constitutional right and not a merely a privilege. Had this contrast not been present between the American ideal and the Russian reality, it is likely that the marginalization of religious and creative communities would not have struck the ambassador as anything out of the ordinary.

Equal Access/Open Society

What I'm saying is the problem was much more of different ideologies (Interviewer: right) than it was necessarily that Russian culture was all that different from ours. Now granted that, it helps enormously to understand Russian culture. And my greatest asset as a diplomat was that my specialty was Russian literature and culture and that I could talk to people including the officials about their own culture with respect and insight and so on which conveys to them that this is not a person who is hostile, who's trying to do you in, this is a person who's potential friend, even though we have different philosophies and we're coming from different directions. So knowing the other culture is vitally important for human communication, but in negotiation what you have to do is (chuckle) use your knowledge of the other culture to try to convince your own government to adopt policies which will not be needlessly offensive (chuckle) on the other side. (Matlock, USSR)

There are two main points I want to tease out of this passage. The first is the concept that Ambassador Matlock believes that diplomats have some agency in convincing their government how to act. This agency and the sense of empowerment convey not only an ability to sway opinion, but a comfort-ability or confidence in freely expressing one's opinion to those in power. Even if such a practice may be difficult to achieve or rare in practice, the concept is at the very least expressed as accessible to him and the statement was delivered with some humor—as opposed to the whispers of the Russian woman who attended a play with Ambassador Roger Kirk (see his account of the story below). The framework for trying to convince your own government of anything is one of an open society—a government by the people that is more bottom up than top down—in other words, democratic.

The second point I want to explore is his differentiation between ideology and culture is an interesting one—and a distinction that fades away within the context of this research. Amb. Matlock appears to be operating under the assumption that art, literature, and other “artifacts” are what compose the essence of culture. My conception of culture is less tangible, but very visible—the values that govern action within a society. Such values are not the values of

individuals per se, but the socialized values which inform our habits. These habits are the practice of what we prioritize and how a society or individual conducts themselves, both in the private and the public spheres. These very habits are the product of what Amb. Matlock terms “ideology.”

Thus, ideology plays a significant role in shaping actions. Amb. Matlock says explicitly that his “greatest asset as a diplomat” was his intensive specialization in Russian literature and culture. This specific knowledge of the Russian regime (way of life)—habits—is what allows the Ambassador to connect personally with Russian citizens. The comprehensive knowledge provided to him through literature is what allows him to move beyond what one might learn in a Russian (or American) civics class and beyond what one might believe ideologically to relate and work with the Russian people and navigate the Russian system.

Ambassador Jack Matlock emphasizes the importance of his literary background. Amb. Kirk also affirms the importance of literature in his career as a diplomat. Neither specifically mention American literature—but the concept that societal truths about Russian identity are accessible through study of their national literature leads to self-reflection on our own canon—a topic addressed at length in Chapter 4, examining the origins and reproduction of our national identity. Amb. Matlock’s academic background was in Russian literature, citing it above as strength because of what it signifies. More than just power and politics, a knowledge of literature is, in the ambassador’s view, a means of saying that he knows and cares about Russian habits and the values and norms that shape those habits. He talks about the sort of negotiating currency that it provides him both with his Russian counterparts—and perhaps more importantly, with his American superiors. Amb. Matlock says it all when he says that the Americans and the Russians have different philosophies, and he knows that because he knows what their habits are, what their national identity is.

After a brief aside to clarify terms and to allude to a later exploration of acquisition and habit reproduction, I want to reinforce this expectation of openness and accessibility in American identity. Amb. Matlock returns to this norm when he speaks of access to high-powered individuals, as well as what Amb. Levitsky tells us are the marginalized communities.

In Gorbachev's time, we began to have access to all range of people. For a long time we, we were more or less confined to dealing with officials in the Foreign Ministry or the Foreign Trade Ministry, so far as officials were concerned. You could sometimes meet to writers and theater people and, or talk to ordinary people when you were traveling, you know, in fairly superficial way. But it was only with Gorbachev and from about 1987 on that we began to have I would say very intensive contact across the board including with members of the Politburro and the politicians. (Matlock, USSR)

In this quote of Amb. Matlock, we see an emphasis on accessibility of those in power—but also those that were thought of as dissenters or marginalized—access to (at least some) public opinion beyond the official narrative. The concept that a citizen should have access to the leadership and that weight is giving to dissent and minority or public opinions is in its very nature democratic. The diction “confined” evokes a rather negative image of imprisonment—without access, FSOs are “confined.” As politicians and party members become more accessible, encounters become less “superficial” and more “intensive.”

Ambassador Eugene Martin discusses accessibility from another point of view. He discusses freedom to travel abroad, not for those in power or in government service, but for the public.

Q: In our exchange programs, were we trying to break away from getting the princelings to the United States and trying to reach down for equal opportunity and diversity? Could we do that, or was it too controlled by the Chinese?

A: It is controlled. My experience in Guangzhou was that a lot of the people that we wanted to send to the States could not get permission to go. The usual excuse was that they're too busy; or that their offices needed them, they couldn't let them go; etc. They weren't politically correct. The answer was often “We will decide who you can send to the States,” and their candidate would

usually be the office director, the bureau chief, or the Party cadre who wanted a trip to the States, and were happy to take our largesse and go to the States. These were not the people we wanted. We've had some success in breaking out of this limited universe of people. We seek out academics, students, business people, people from the provincial centers rather than from the capital. This is somewhat successful, but it's still limited in terms of the scope of the people that we could get and we could reach. (Martin, China)

Martin, in discussing the exchanges programs to the U.S., mentions the level of control that the Chinese government has. This quote demonstrates two things. First, in questioning the governmental control, the interviewer asserts that there is again the expectation that it should be more open. Second, in this expectation of openness, we also see two distinctly American habits—the striving for diversity or the striving for representation throughout professions, ages, ethnicities and the ideal of equality of opportunity. These two habits are innately democratic as they attempt to equalize and empower people across the board. Again, if the interviewer and diplomats experiences were not in contrast to this control, I do not think it would have occurred to them to pose the questions—why was it not open to all or what gives someone the ability to be sent?

An integral part of American identity is its exceptionalism and its desire to spread its “American-ness” throughout. We treat countries more favorably when they adopt policies in our interest or adapt their society to be more like ours. This strain of thought is the basis to some extent for the Democratic Peace Theory—the more other nations are like us, the less war there will be in the world. Amb. Martin’s comments affirm this perspective—prevalent even among the Chinese—to the extent that becoming more like us is progress or “modernizing.” (This concept of course is the benefit or at least the consequence of American hegemony—we define what success, modernization, or progress is).

Individual Agency

Q: What were you seeing in terms of changes in Chinese society in the three years you were away?

A: They had become much more open. The access to the Internet and the access to information from any number of international sources was much greater. The other thing I would mention is that I was in Guangzhou before, and I came back and went to Beijing. Beijing is very much of a capital city. Guangzhou is perhaps like San Francisco, whereas Beijing is Washington, and bureaucratic, and is more formal and official than Guangzhou. The Cantonese people tend to be less interested in politics and more interested in business, money, and getting ahead. It is a very different environment and impacts the embassy's perspective and also how the embassy and the Chinese officialdom interact. However, generally my impression in those three years was that China was continuing to develop and open up rapidly. There's a lot more of what I call personal space for people. It's not individual rights, but individual space perhaps is a better term. People talk more freely. They didn't feel as confined or as restricted in what they said. Taxi drivers, of course, like anyplace else in the world, were great interlocutors, and they were willing to talk about just about anything, and what a bunch of bums were running the country, and so forth. Shopkeepers would complain about the situation, people on the street that you'd meet, even the academics that you met in official receptions, delegations and conferences were much more open about criticisms of how China was changing. Many of them were still cautious in terms of criticizing the leadership directly or criticizing the system, but they were always trying to make the point that we are moving, we are progressing, but we need to continue to make reforms and changes, particularly on the economics side. The problem is that economic reforms have gone about as far as they can go without becoming politically sensitive. (Martin, China)

In this passage, Martin also identifies some of the habits that make up the American norm of openness and accessibility—access to information (as well as the accountability and transparency that comes with that) and free speech—as in the ability criticize leadership. Both of these habits are cornerstones to American democracy. Constantly individual citizens, civil society groups, and media publicize information and criticize politicians to keep them accountable for their actions as representatives of the American people. The flow of public opinion and criticism is normal to the point of inundation here, but elsewhere—as seen in the

USSR excerpts above and in the commentary on China—such access to information is nearly the opposite of our super saturation.

Americans use this free-flowing information as checks and balances on power and see these habits of openness and accessibility as rights. The framing of this emergence of space as similar to our “rights”, as Amb. Martin does above, is what makes them comprehensible to us, though they are in a foreign context—that is to say that Martin likens the emergence of these phenomena to something like rights. They essentially create a space for the individual within a societal context. In a nation like the United States that is focused on the individual, the language of rights is long socialized and habituated in everyday practice. In more some communal societies, the concept of space for the individual and the framework of individual rights is something that takes negotiating within their own social structures. The recognition of a focus on the collective as different is an acknowledgment of an American focus on the individual as normative. The American notion and habit of individual agency discussed above is a natural consequence of our individual-based thought.

Freedom of Expression: Press and Speech

Amb. Roger Kirk served in the Soviet Union and subsequently returned on a trip. They attended a play with the Russian couple who had been assigned to them during the Kirks' previous tenure there.

In '91 of course, things changed and we went back to Moscow my wife and I on a trip and I contacted him. And he said, “Yeah, let's, let's meet, let's get together.” And we went, he took us to a play. And the play was by Bulgacov and the central point of it was there was that there was this dog changed into a man and became head of the local communist party and he was fine until a cat came by and then he got all agitated (chuckle). And that play had been shown... Bulgacov was a very famous Russian writer as you may know early 20th century. That play had been performed once in Stalin's time. When he made-Someone told him about it and he

had everybody in theater fired. From the director through the hat check girl. But I thought things have really changed—this man is taking me to that play. And his wife very quietly, because they took over, they took over a petit bourgeois house, they did that to my house, my parents' house. (Kirk, USSR)

Here, Amb. Kirk repeats multiple times that the context—i.e., the history and the culture—are extremely important to do work in the Foreign Service successfully. The context of a country is made up of the habits that govern values in practice—how their cultural values are enacted bears on how they communicate, negotiate, and administrate, because it determines their policy agenda. The very means through which Amb. Kirk suggests one acquire this knowledge is through language—that is the reproduction of these habits in writing and speaking—or as he says, reading and language. The advice to go to plays actually combines both reading and language, as the plays themselves are literature and their performance is the experience. Plays, like books are also instructive insofar as they reproduce knowledge and, often, identity. Importantly, political change was reflected in the literature—the play on stage. The intimate connection between literature and politics is evident in Stalin's reaction to the initial run of the play.

In this last passage, change in regime—openness, habits, and more—were demonstrated in this one event where the Ambassador and his wife were taken to this play by a Russian couple. The mere fact that this play was once forbidden and now allowed to be staged—and that in this play were very sensitive ideas and criticisms to the government—showed a transformation. As Amb. Levitsky says below, part of the significance of these actions, habits, and their instantiation in literature is the reception and response they receive—from both the government and the people. If looking at language through literature and discourse is a highly effective means of learning about Russian identity, it is also presumably a means of looking at and learning what our own habits are that make up our national identity. In this

particular relationship, Hall's analogy of the ice berg rings true. In this specific relationship between the ambassador and his Russian friends, the particular differences between Russian and American culture are highlighted and a distinct American identity becomes clear.

The ambassador's use of *this* man is taking me to *that* play, signifies a major change in what the Russian government allowed. The Russian woman reacting to the play also felt comfortable speaking about a past era, even if only quietly. Amb. Kirk's knowledge of the play and command of the history is what gives the story significance. The contrast here is what makes the situation so unusual. Had I, the interviewer, grown up in a more closed society, I may or may not have picked up on the contrast the ambassador was highlighting. Also, the whisper in this anecdote contrasts well with Amb. Matlock's earlier open jest about his efforts to convince his own government of an opinion. Openness to not only other cultures, but ideas, is part of the American identity. Generally a country free from censorship, we read a story as such and understand the political implications. The movements in the United States toward censorship have generally been led by political and religious forces, countered by advocates of freedom who have for the most part won out.

Despite exceptions in the McCarthy era and the annual banned book list (a relic of our stringent Puritanical heritage, I can only assume), Americans are free to disagree within the bounds of the law and write about that disagreement. The significance comes with the reaction to the book, play, pamphlet, etc. by the general public. If it subverts the regime, does it do so dangerously, or is it just an opinion? Amb. Kirk's emphasis on "*this* man is taking *me* to *that* play" also reveals a distinction in thought and identity between what is Russian and "American-ness" and more importantly, what that play signifies about the changes in Russian habits—in this case the Russian identity, according to this particular account, seems to be "progressing" toward Amb. Kirk's perception of American habits of what is right and what is good for a society.

Education and Socialization

In concluding this chapter, Ambassador Eugene Martin makes an important observation about national identity when it comes to encountering the foreign—namely, that just because upper class Chinese students often study or travel abroad, their domestic socialization is actually strengthened by these experiences, not changed. I find this observation to be interesting when compared to Foreign Service officers who are educated in the United States and then take on assignments abroad. While many Foreign Service officers choose tracks other than cultural diplomacy, they are all—to some extent—instantiations of American national identity and American interests. Each encounter they have will help shape someone's impression of what it means to be American.

In Amb. Martin's words:

They certainly know much more about the world than their parents or their peers who never left China know, because they've studied overseas, they've traveled overseas, they're much more aware of China's weaknesses and China's lack of development. They're also, I think, much more nationalistic. Even though they've lived overseas and learned about the United States and other countries, that doesn't necessarily mean they're friendlier to the United States or that they're particularly more democratic. What they see, or what their reaction is, is that China needs to strengthen itself more to be able to compete on an equal basis with the rest of the world, not necessarily on military terms. (Martin, China)

I find this to be fascinating because here Martin suggests that education acquired through travel does not un-socialize Chinese citizens necessarily. Awareness of others' cultural habits does not necessarily change our habits, but in some cases actually entrenches our habits. This connection demonstrates the power of the socialization process and formal education, as opposed to experiences gained later in life or less formally—and it also extends (as mentioned above) to the idea that diplomats retain their socialized American identity (if

educated domestically), even as they live elsewhere. Martin also suggests that there is a positive relationship between being friendlier to the United States and becoming more democratic. From this passage, an aspect of “American-ness” is reinforcing its own habits globally by showing more favor towards nations that have become increasingly “American,” via adoption of American cultural habits.

From American Identity to American Literature

These habits which make up a national identity are recorded and reproduced in plays and other literature—and then passed on to future generations. This phenomenon evidenced in Ambassador Melvyn Levitsky was first assignment as publications procurement officer. His job was to travel to the Moscow bookstores and try to find books according to whatever guidelines various U.S. government agencies—including military branches—requested.

So there was, Since the Soviets put out an annual plan before each year which listed what kind—what the names of the books they were going to publish. There were some agencies that had specific requests and then others had general areas that they were interested in. And, so we would go to, daily we would go around to the Moscow bookstores and then we would go out to the various places, we travel out to the various places in the Soviet Union to buy books at bookstores and the other republics and in the provinces. (Levitsky, USSR)

The emphasis here placed by the U.S. government on Russian publications was important. It was not only ambassadors that saw publications as vital tool to conduct diplomacy. The state, too, thought they could glean political information from what was to be published. Also, the notion of publishing a set list of all of the books to be released that year is in contrast to the vast amounts of books and other publications put to press in the United States.

But what was really interesting was the ability to go out and talk to people—spent most of the time on the street in Moscow. Spent time in, when you went on trips to, in going to restaurants, talking

to people, I was always, besides going to the bookstores, go to the grocery store, go to the markets—see what availability of the food was, particularly in the winter time. And then when we, I came back, I would always write what was then called an airgram which was sent in a diplomatic pouch, a kind of long report and analysis on what it looked like in places like [*list of Russian city names*], the Baltic Republics—all of them, where we could go even though we didn't recognize the forcible incorporation of the Baltics into the Soviet Union and through the caucuses, so we went to the [*more city names listed*] a couple of time. And each time coming back, these reports, which were based on context and then on some analysis on the availability of goods on the Soviet Union, were clearly quite well prized by the community that followed Soviet affairs and the community in Washington. (Levitsky, USSR)

A major portion of his responsibilities was gathering information and analyzing it into something useful for not only the Department of State, but for all of the other departments for which he was gathering publications, including military branches and other government bureaus. In addition to combing bookstores, Amb. Levitsky routinely visited other stores and made specific note of the paucity of food and material goods—which interested the American government. In a capitalist society such as the United States, most middle class Americans (the largest social class for much of American history—and the one for which American society is known for giving rise to) are not familiar with the unavailability of goods or information—including severely limited access to books and news and empty food shelves in grocery stores. Unique to the American identity is security of materials and of thought (which is not to say there are not Americans that experience poverty or hunger, but the general American mentality and identity is one of “haves”, attaining a basic standard of living that is substantially higher than most of the world).

Despite being a relatively closed society, Russians gathered their own information via literature besides what was officially available to them. The closed nature of society however

gave way to some underground publishing. Interestingly, once again, Levitsky mentions how the creativity and expression were suppressed via marginalization of artists, writers, and musicians.

The Russians because, this extends back in to Czarist times, but also in a period where they had limited information besides the official press, they read everything they could get their hands on. They asked us for magazines and sometimes we would give them to them. Or books, there was a book program where we would get out, we have here at the embassy big packages of books. Some of it published works that were originally *samizdat* which is self-publishing—never published officially in the Soviet Union. So for example, all of Solzhenitsyn's things, so they were published in the United States and we would give them copies of those uh books when we got them. There's nothing particularly subversive about it, but they couldn't read them there because they couldn't get a hold of them. Solzhenitsyn was only allowed to publish one book which was *A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* and it was a prison camp story. It was done during the Khrushchev so-called thaw, when things had opened up somewhat for artists, singers, pro-lits, and writers. It was interesting to see how much they read, how much they were able to find out and understand and get information about—through—by hook and by crook. That is they couldn't get in their own official press or buy any books that were—or buy many books that were of interest to them although they read their stuff, too. They would go to the theatre sometimes. There was one theatre that was noted for sort of going into margins that was a little bit close to what would have been prohibited. (Levitsky USSR)

From Russian refuseniks to Bulgacov's play and *samizdat* or Chinese freedom of travel, many of these diplomats have already implicitly made the connection between national identity and habitual practice. To become fluent in Russian culture, the ambassadors studied language and literature. The Soviets restricted access to subversive publications and the United States found value in what was or was not being published in the Soviet Union. In China, despite international exposure, nationals that go abroad tend to maintain their Chinese socialization and strengthen their national identity, as compared to older generations which traveled less.

Drawing from the assumptions and frameworks from which these ambassadors perceive their foreign experiences, I have identified related, but isolatable American habits: faith in the public square; expectation of equal access/open society; perception of individual agency; and entitled freedom of expression in press and speech. Through these relationships with the Soviet Union and China we see the emersion of our expectation of how things should be or how we are used to them being contrasted with how things are elsewhere.

CHAPTER 3

THEORY: EDUCATING THE CITIZEN FOR DEMOCRACY

Educating for Democracy

*"Educate and inform the whole mass of the people. Enable them to see that it is their interest to preserve peace and order, and they will preserve them. And it requires no very high degree of education to convince them of this. They are the only sure reliance for the preservation of our liberty."*³¹

--Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 1787

*"Socialization and governance reinforce each other as democratic purposes. The politics of education, or the way schools are governed, determines how students are socialized, for it is in this arena that decisions are made about what should be taught and who is entitled to educational benefits. That same politics is also an object of students' learning because it demonstrates the rules of political access and participation, the methods by which conflicts are resolved, and the weight given to different political interests. How students are socialized, in turn, determines the future viability of education politics."*³²

--McDonnell, 2000

These quotes are both great launching points shifting our attention from diplomatic actions and impressions that paint a portrait of American identity and toward a discussion on the domestic educating that produces a distinctly American identity. The first quote represents a view from the American Founding era on the purposes of education and why it is inherently connected to maintaining a free society. The second quote adequately describes the relationship between the specific socialization of formal education (schools) and politics; this process is cyclical or co-constitutive. This paper only looks at one slice of the cycle, the individual that is socialized in American culture—in other words, imbued with American identity. While the book the McDonnell quote comes from argues for a refocus on democratic

³¹ Jefferson, Thomas. *Thomas Jefferson letter to James Madison*. Paris, December 20, 1787. Ed. H.A. Washington. New York : H.W. Derby, 1861. www.yamaquchy.com/library/jefferson/madison1.html Accessed 4/8/13.

³² McDonnell, Lorraine M. "Defining Democratic Purposes." *Rediscovering the Democratic Purposes of Education*. Ed. Lorraine M. McDonnell, P. Michael Timpane and Roger W. Benjamin. Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2000. 4.

habits in education (implying that current education has strayed from this), I would still argue that the type of education and how we provide it are continuing to socialize generations in habits of “access and participation, the methods by which conflicts are resolved, and the weight given to different political interests”—democratic or otherwise, all of which make up our distinctly American identity. That is to say that even if current education has strayed from a specific set of habits, it is in fact still imparting a set of habits—desired or not—that socialize young citizens and create and cohesive national identity. These American habits acquired through the socialization of education are succinctly stated in and prized by the Foreign Service recruitment process—a connection to be addressed in the final chapter in more detail.

The number of books and articles which focus on citizenship education is seemingly infinite. From Plato scholars focused on what regime creates just citizens to Augustinian ideas on the earthly city and American Founding ideas on the democratic citizen, the literature is vast and varied on what makes a good citizen and what type of education will produce that character. This determination requires answers to fundamental questions, such as:

1. What is the ultimate goal of the society?
2. What is necessary for citizens to do or how should they behave to work toward that end?
3. How does society most effectively socialize citizen behaviors toward those ends?

The answers to these questions are instantiated in the daily habits which create the domestic culture, reproduced in education.

However, this chapter could not possibly dive into all of those questions here individually, as they fall outside the scope of my research question, aside from providing the essential framework for our query. Looking at American identity and American identity in contrast to Russian or Chinese identity indeed presupposes certain answers to the above questions. So while I will not be evaluating the questions and answers per se, I am looking at the consequence of how these questions have been answered in the American context. My

focus on the education and socialization of citizens begins with Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* as a foundation. Tocqueville provides firsthand observations and insights on U.S. principles during our infancy as a nation. In the midst of our nation-building and creation of a unique identity, he thoroughly examines the connections between politics, education, and religion—and implicitly through all of that (though sometimes explicitly), the role of power woven through society's major institutions. In addition to looking at Tocqueville to better understand the education that produces an American identity, I looked at John Dewey, the founding father of modern education in America, to consider the philosophies that guide U.S. education today. Dewey believes that "any education given by a group tends to socialize its members, but the quality and value of the socialization depends upon the habits and aims of the group."³³ This connection between education and habituation is one that Tocqueville explores, as well.

The focus of this chapter is to delve into a model of citizen—the American democratic citizen. This identity socialized to a specific set of cultural habits is exactly what Tocqueville sought to produce through the means of education and in which John Dewey and other modern educators and scholars find value, even necessity. The cultivation of American habits was seen as vital to the future of the nation. The hope of creating an ideal citizen—one that supported and defended the regime—was also the goal of the Soviet and Chinese governments in their efforts to limit publications. The original purpose of public education in the United States was exactly that, to prepare citizens for to live and preserve our democracy—inculcating in them a set of habits which both allowed the individual to participate fully in self-government and to maintain self-government for future generations.³⁴ Dewey defined education as "the acquisition of those habits that effect an adjustment of an individual and his environment."³⁵ Thus, the democratic citizen is clearly a particular type of citizen, educated for a purpose. This view of education

³³ Dewey. *Democracy and Education*. 144.

³⁴ McDonnell. 1.

³⁵ Dewey. *Democracy and Education*. 83.

expresses a very particular ontological perspective—namely that “education is...an active and constructive process.”³⁶

In *Democracy and Education*, Dewey explains the importance of education in democracy:

The superficial explanation is that a government resting upon popular suffrage cannot be successful unless those who elect and who obey their governors are educated. Since a democratic society repudiates the principle of external authority, it must find a substitute in voluntary disposition and interest; these can be created only by education. But there is a deeper explanation. A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept men from perceiving the full import of their activity. These more numerous and more varied points of contact denote a greater diversity of stimuli to which an individual has to respond; they consequently put a premium on variation in his action.³⁷

Individuals in society act according to habits that are both informed and given meaning by experiencing a shared space—in this case, a shared American identity and a particularly American democratic social structure. John Dewey reiterates this connectedness in *Democracy and Education* by concluding that “our net result thus far is that social environment forms the mental and emotional disposition of behavior in individuals by engaging them in activities that arouse and strengthen certain impulses that have certain purposes and entail certain consequences.”³⁸ These impulses which have purposes and consequences are made meaningful through our shared identity—a common social environment that creates a shared understanding of acceptable mental and emotional behavior.

³⁶ Dewey. *Democracy and Education*. 70.

³⁷ Dewey. *Democracy and Education*. 151.

³⁸ Dewey. *Democracy and Education*. 32.

As Dewey says, democracy is not just a regime, but a mode of living which must be learned. Tocqueville makes a similar point, if not explicitly, in his argument for the role of civil society and religion in democracy—these elements are outside the law, but critical to our functioning as a cohesive society and living together peacefully. Later, Abraham Lincoln places a similar importance on a devotion to the ideals in the Declaration of Independence which transcend codified law. An individual socialized with these particular habits will do a lot more than merely obey the law, but be actively dedicated to preserving and enacting these principles of democratic society.

Tocqueville and Dewey on Education

With a mind cultivated to “preserve” freedom and self-government, democratic citizens are taught a set of habits that allows them to uphold these values and reproduce a specific cultural identity. As Tocqueville argues (he might prefer the term “observed”), education in democracy is key to “[securing] the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity,” as promised in the preamble to the U.S. Constitution. Though Tocqueville believes this education could occur both formally and informally—emphasizing the informal—“those who worked to spread public schooling ‘stressed civic and moral values that they claimed could only be maintained through public education. The nation could fulfill its destiny only if each rising generation learned those values together in a common institution.’”³⁹ A cohesive identity provides a shared stake in the venture which is required for the maintenance of a republic. Education is fundamental in reproducing this identity—an idea which Tocqueville proposes and to which John Dewey, the Father of Modern Education, and other scholars have since contributed; progressive educators continue to emphasize the importance of “civic education as

³⁹ McDonnell. 2.

the keystone of democracy, and they argued that it required a well-developed public sphere where civic discourse among a broad spectrum of the population was actively encouraged.”⁴⁰

Both Tocqueville and Dewey write on the importance of imbuing certain habits which serve higher purposes—in this case creating an identity that preserves the democratic state. What habits of citizens are necessary to secure such a regime? In Tocqueville’s own words, “One cannot doubt that in the United States the instruction of the people serves powerfully to maintain a democratic republic. It will be so, I think, everywhere that the instruction that enlightens the mind is not separated from the education that regulates its mores.”⁴¹ Here, Tocqueville identifies explicitly and simply the higher goal of education—regulating mores, habits of the heart and mind.⁴² It should be noted that Robert N. Bellah et al. in *Habits of the Heart* actually make a different argument concerning Tocqueville.⁴³ They emphasize Tocqueville’s warning against Americans becoming too individualistic and posit what the consequences are for civil society. In contrast, I argue that there is still a strong, unified American identity and a firm set of habits that characterize what it means to be an American citizen—including the habit of individual agency discussed in Chapter 2. Tocqueville asserts the need for a strong civil society and Dewey elaborates on just how formative education is in that acculturation process. It is precisely *because* education plays such a critical role in this cultural habituation process, we should be especially attentive to what *is* being taught and whether it detracts from the American identity we wish to reproduce (that can either result in maintaining our way of life or transforming it entirely).

⁴⁰ McDonnell. 3.

⁴¹ Tocqueville. 291.

⁴² Tocqueville. 275.

⁴³ Bellah, Robert N., Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton. *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life*. University of California Press, Berkeley: 1996.

In contrast, Dewey stresses the importance of acquiring the following habits: language, manners, good tastes and esthetics appreciation, and “to say that the deeper standards of judgments of value are framed by the situations into which a person habitually enters is not so much to mention a fourth point, as it is to point out a fusion of those already mentioned.”⁴⁴

Dewey focuses less on character-building in education—but he clearly views schools as responsible for imparting certain cultural habits.⁴⁵ Despite believing that education should not attempt to instill specific values, he still sees education as the primary social institution universal to all U.S. citizens in their formative years and he understands the close and unique relationship between democracy and education.

“By various agencies, unintentional and designed, a society transforms uninitiated and seemingly alien beings into robust trustees of its own resources and ideals. Education is thus a fostering, a nurturing, a cultivating, process,” in Dewey’s view.⁴⁶ Likewise, Tocqueville acknowledges “with the exception of the family, education is the only major social institution in which all Americans participate over a sustained period and that also focuses on the values and skills necessary to maintain a civil society.”⁴⁷ As to the role of the family, Lorraine Smith Pangle and Thomas L. Pangle’s essay in *Rediscovering the Democratic Purposes of Education* also acknowledges that while “much or most of moral education is a matter not of intellectual discovery or rational conviction but of habituation, emotional attachment, and cultivation of the heart, for the Founders, that by far the most important part of education takes place in family life

⁴⁴ Dewey. *Democracy and Education*. 35.

⁴⁵ Dewey, John. “The School and Society.” *Dewey on Education*. ed. Martin S. Dworkin. New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University. 1967. 33-49.40.

⁴⁶ Dewey. *Democracy and Education*. 21.

⁴⁷ McDonnell. 10.

rather than in school life. Still schooling is an essential supplement to and completion of the more basic and decisive formative influence of the home.”⁴⁸

Habits

Dewey further illustrates his view of the role of education with an analogy:

But the important thing for education is the exercise or practice of the faculties of the mind till they become thoroughly established habitudes. The analogy constantly employed is that of a billiard player or gymnast, who by repeated use of certain muscles in a uniform way at last secures automatic skill. Even the faculty of thinking was to be formed into a trained habit by repeated exercises in making and combining simple distinctions, for which, Locke thought, mathematics affords unrivaled opportunity.⁴⁹

Even the very definition of education, Dewey points out, denotes “a process of leading or brining up.”⁵⁰ Dewey says education, like the Founders argued, is a “shaping, forming, molding activity-- that is, a shaping into the standard form of social activity” or unified identity, bearing a specific outcome in mind.⁵¹ There is then “no great difficulty in seeing how [education] shapes the external habits of action.”⁵² It is precisely this reasoning and the focus on habits of the mind and heart from Tocqueville that led me to focus on analyzing habits, rather than attitudes, values, ideals, beliefs, or perspectives. In essence, all of these words are related and at times interchangeable—but the use of the word and focus on “habits” has a distinctly practicable sense. Habits are these values, virtues, ideas, and norms enacted within social institutions,

⁴⁸ Pangle, Lorraine Smith and Thomas L. Pangle. “What the American Founders Have to Teach Us About Schooling for Democratic Citizenship.” *Rediscovering the Democratic Purposes of Education*. Ed. Lorraine M. McDonnell, P. Michael Timpane and Roger W. Benjamin. Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2000. 25.

⁴⁹ Dewey. *Democracy and Education*. 108.

⁵⁰ Dewey. *Democracy and Education*. 21.

⁵¹ Dewey. *Democracy and Education*. 21-22.

⁵² Dewey. *Democracy and Education*. 25.

discourse, and everyday interaction; habits translate the abstract principles into the quotidian actions that, in turn, cumulatively give shape to the abstract principles.

Tocqueville argues that people can actually be “induced to act justly.”⁵³ While Tocqueville observes during in an era of American infancy, American political scholar Brian Danoff takes this question further in his analysis to the American Civil War era, under Lincoln. “As we have seen in case of the draft, Lincoln believed that during a great crisis, people can legitimately be forced to act justly—that is, they should be compelled to sacrifice their private interest for the common good. But Lincoln knew that although this principle was valid in times of great crisis, in normal times a free polity cannot rely on this principle of force and still remain a free polity.” This incompatibility of force and freedom led Tocqueville to the concept of harmonious self-interest and common good. Similarly, “part of Lincoln’s answer is that democratic leaders must *persuade* the citizenry that it is in their own self-interest to do what is right”—not merely dictate it (emphasis added).⁵⁴

In short, not just this French observer believed that education of self-interest *and* morality was crucial, but an American president nearly 100 years later maintained this belief and acted upon it.⁵⁵ Even the “antifederalists...would agree that as a last resort, force needs to be used to compel the wicked to obey just laws,” and thus, habituating self-interest properly conceived would have been a means to accomplish this goal consistent with this conviction. The Antifederalists, consistent with Tocqueville, “believed that free government should be primarily based not on the external control of the sword, but rather on the internal control that is the result of education.”⁵⁶ Here I think it is important to distinguish education as a means transmitting

⁵³ Danoff, Brian. *Educating Democracy: Alexis de Tocqueville and Leadership in America*. State University of New York Press, Albany: 2010. 71.

⁵⁴ Danoff. 71.

⁵⁵ Danoff. 88.

⁵⁶ Danoff. 49.

habits from indoctrination. Merely experiencing the social institution of education with the same basic expectation of knowledge resulting creates a shared identity and common background for all Americans in the United States. What differs from indoctrination is the freedom to reject these habits—to not vote, to not be active in civil society, or to not uphold common values like inclusivity or to not support equal political rights, for example.

Brian Danoff engages the idea of moral education on yet another level, by citing Lincoln warning citizens in his famous Lincoln-Douglas debates that it was possible for “the youth [to] be corrupted by ideas that are opposed to the spirit of the regime.”⁵⁷ This warning echoes the charges brought against Socrates for corrupting the youth—both charges are implicitly constructivist and furthermore, fortify the argument that ideas reproduced in education (even, especially, in early education) *do*, in fact, have profound effect on our later habits as adult citizens and actors in politics, business, and social life. And, that the culture these habits make up, wrongly formed, can be a threat to the regime. Tocqueville and Lincoln both stress the importance of ideas in forming a common cultural ethic—fashioning the set of norms that govern politics or could influence existing norms governing politics.

Distinctly “American” Culture

For Tocqueville, this American identity is composed of “two perfectly distinct elements that else have often made war with each other, but which, in America, they have succeeded in incorporating somehow into one another and combining marvelously,” the spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom.⁵⁸ Lincoln upholds Tocqueville’s idea of American identity to an extent, but replaces the spirit of religion with the transcendent principles of the Declaration of

⁵⁷ Danoff. 90.

⁵⁸ Tocqueville. 43.

Independence.⁵⁹ The concept of “transcendent” invokes what has developed in to the language of American political theology—where faith is still rhetorically present in our politics. Whether or not these are the same norms we find in American culture socialized in U.S. education today will be taken up in the following chapter on the norms reproduced in U.S. education. For Tocqueville, there was no question in his observations that “by the prescriptions relative to public education that, from the beginning, one sees revealed in the full light of day the original character of American civilization.”⁶⁰

Education plays a key role in cementing a unified identity; an identity in which residents of Maine and residents of Hawaii both feel a part of, despite their differences in location, history, climate, and local culture and despite having likely never met.⁶¹ In a statement that Benedict Anderson would approve of, Tocqueville reinforces the concept that “the Union is an ideal nation that exists so to speak only in minds, and whose extent and bounds intelligence alone discovers.”⁶² Anderson makes a similar argument today—that the nation is an “imagined political community” because “even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”⁶³ Education is the common source of the knowledge (intelligence) and habits that create this unified idea of what it means to be a U.S. citizen. The critical step to creation and maintenance of a cohesive identity is the institution of a set of habits to be practiced by the people. Tocqueville observes that the American democracy is such that it “can only be suitable for a people long habituated to directing its affairs by itself, and in which political science has

⁵⁹ Danoff. 89.

⁶⁰ Tocqueville. 41.

⁶¹ McDonnell. 3.

⁶² Tocqueville. 155.

⁶³ Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities*. Verso. London: 2006. 6.

descended to the last ranks of society.”⁶⁴ The operative word here is “habituated,” as discussed above.

Tocqueville discusses this concept of habit in further detail with his concept of the role of mores. He says to this end:

I consider mores to be one of the greatest general causes to which the maintenance of a democratic republic in the United States can be attributed. I understand here the expression moeurs in the sense the ancients attached to the word mores: not only do I apply it to mores properly so-called, which one could call habits of the heart, but to the different notions that men possess, to the sum of ideas of which the habits of the mind are formed. I therefore comprehend under this word the whole moral and intellectual state of a people.⁶⁵

In fact, the very nature of “sovereignty of states depends on memories, on habits, on local prejudices, on the selfishness of province and family; in a word, on all the things that render the instinct for one’s native country so powerful in the heart of man.”⁶⁶ Tocqueville’s observations of democracy lead him to conclude that laws on their own are not nearly enough to sustain a democracy—that one must have habits that contribute to an identity which maintains and advocates for democracy. This notion goes back to his concept of the American identity as composed by the spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom. These spirits produce a character beneficial to the operation society that is extrajudicial, but does not need to be codified, so long as it fosters democratic habits in the people. Such habits help to form a cohesive national identity, an accountability to fellow citizens and the regime (if only psychologically), and a responsibility to the nation (e.g. the famous line from John F. Kennedy, Jr.’s inaugural address, “Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country.” This mindset

⁶⁴ Tocqueville. 156.

⁶⁵ Tocqueville. 274-5.

⁶⁶ Tocqueville. 158.

is one that is habituated). These habits also help citizens to live cohesively and in a stable environment with a relatively similar moral ethic and ideas about how society should work—in other words fluency in a larger, unified culture. To codify identity would stray from democracy and border on dictatorial insofar as the tyranny of the majority may take hold (though Tocqueville notes the breaking of un-codified social norms can indeed be worse than legal punishment).

For Tocqueville, it was necessary that a democratic character or more specifically “American” identity be created through habituation. “Tocqueville believed that something like virtue was necessary if a republic was to thrive, and he believed that through education, people’s virtuous qualities could be brought out,” Danoff notes. Danoff also quotes Tocqueville’s commentary on France, reiterating that “nations, like private people, need to acquire education before they know how to behave.”⁶⁷ The same here would be true for any regime, Soviet, Chinese or otherwise—that it is through education we acquire the knowledge of how to behave and accumulate the social currency (habits) necessary to function within that system. Tocqueville makes this habituation argument universally, then, that education is essential for learning the habits that govern how individuals operate and interact in society domestically—but also when it comes to behavior as a nation. Danoff brings in the point of view of the Anti-federalists as confirmation of the consensus surrounding this process of socialization: “Charles Turner wrote that, ‘It is EDUCATION which almost entirely forms the character, the freedom or slavery, the happiness or misery of the world.’”⁶⁸ In Danoff’s analysis on Tocqueville, he identifies one important distinction in democracy compared to other regimes—namely the difference between rule by force and rule by persuasion.⁶⁹ This point echoes Lincoln’s sentiments that one must be persuaded and not forced into something like conscription.

⁶⁷ Danoff. 60.

⁶⁸ Danoff. 49.

⁶⁹ Danoff. 49.

Tocqueville's version of this idea is aligning self-interest with those interests of the American project.

What specific habits does Tocqueville identify? The first habit would be a firm singular system of mores, backed by brimstone Puritan Christianity—for which the punishment for breaching such norms or the mutually-assumed social contract was not merely fines or prison, but eternal damnation. Secondly, the citizens must have command of a common knowledge—particularly a comprehensive account of and affinity for one's rights and how the American regime operates, but also of social and cultural norms. Tocqueville says that while it would be extremely difficult to find a superior scholar in the ranks of American students, it would be equally hard to find someone uneducated.⁷⁰ In other words, the American project sacrifices the outstanding education of the few to instill a basic education in the many. Other habits recognized by the Founders necessary to “the survival of America's political institutions” were the “citizens' ability to participate in public life and to exhibit civic virtues such as mutual respect and prudent judgment.”⁷¹

American political institutions are unique from their European counterparts in that Americans carry the habits acquired in public life into the private sphere and not, as the Europeans do, take habits from private life and apply them to the public life.⁷² In addition to carrying these habits from the public life of self-government into the private realm, American citizen “carry the habits of trade into politics.”⁷³⁷⁴ Tocqueville cites some of the habits that spill over into other these other sectors: order, common mores, and the pursuit of practical arts over theoretical knowledge. Such a government requires the socialization not of strong individuals,

⁷⁰ Tocqueville. 51.

⁷¹ McDonnell. 2.

⁷² Tocqueville. 292.

⁷³ Tocqueville. 1292.

⁷⁴ Tocqueville. 273.

but of strong local communities—to counter the danger of extreme individualization discussed in the McDonnell book. The almost ironic part of this mission is that great men (the Founding Fathers) set up a system which is unlikely to produce future generations of geniuses, but will produce a much more educated populus on the whole. The result tends to be a striving for equal access that sometimes morphs into a pursuit of equal results—regardless, this ideal is evident in the last chapter’s discussion of American identity as demonstrated in the diplomats’ expectations of equal access to information. This conundrum of sacrificing the great for the good is similar to the one Sparta finds itself in with the great Constitution writer, Lycurgus. He is a great leader who sets in motion a society which though stable and providing for a greater number, does not allow for (or is somewhat hostile to) the breeding of future greatness. Strong individuals can be more creative or critical thinkers, which does not necessarily lead to the maintenance of a republican regime.

Though Tocqueville astutely points out the importance of common interests and shared bonds in a successful federal system, this point is often seen as outdated because of the diverse makeup of the American citizenry.⁷⁵ Today, education reform battles between the focus of existing as a public good and a path for individual achievement and means to economic mobility. This conundrum is the conundrum of the American citizen on a local level—negotiating a truce between the common good and self-interest. Inherent to Dewey’s view of progressive education is the notion that education should strive “to take part in correcting unfair privilege and unfair deprivation, not to perpetuate them.”⁷⁶ In this particular view of democratic education, “it is natural that the significance of an education which should have as a result ability to make one’s

⁷⁵ Tocqueville. 158.

⁷⁶ Dewey. *Democracy and Education*. 207.

way economically in the world, and to manage economic resources usefully instead of for mere display and luxury, should receive emphasis.”⁷⁷

McDonnell, Timpane, and Benjamin argue that in this technical training and aim of global competitiveness, fostering a democratic culture in education can get lost amidst other priorities for education. In focusing on democratic education and the singular culture therein, Tocqueville (and McDonnell et al.) seems to call for an antiquated homogeneous approach to forming a civilization.⁷⁸ While it might seem ripe for rehashing Samuel Huntington’s (in)famous Clash of Civilizations in today’s age, is actually compatible with the current American landscape and our heritage as a nation of immigrants. “The question [of whether the U.S. has passed a threshold of diversity that makes a shared civic identity impossible] has been tested most recently in state and local debates over what should be included in social studies and language arts curricula.”⁷⁹ These debates will be considered in the following chapter, but curriculum debates and other civil society factions do not preclude a unified American culture or particular set of democratic habits that are based on more than on the whiteness of one’s skin or some shared Puritan heritage.⁸⁰

Insofar as the United States is a melting pot or salad bowl (whichever you fancy) dedicated to a singular project or homogeneous set of principles, the United States is unlike many nations united by common religion, ethnicity, or culture (even shared heritage). Therefore these common goals in the American project do not call for a homogenous culture per se, as it might initially appear, but rather present day calls for a continued need of habituation for the assured continuation of republican government and democratic values. And thus, all citizens, regardless of heritage, ethnicity, or religion, have benefited from and, in fact, need

⁷⁷ Dewey. *Democracy and Education*. 206.

⁷⁸ Tocqueville. 158.

⁷⁹ McDonnell. 7.

⁸⁰ Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993; 72, 3. Global. 22.

homogeneous socialization to create citizens suited for this project.⁸¹ The very nature of our “civic education assumes that despite diverse religious beliefs, ethnic cultures, and political views, the vast majority of citizens subscribe to a set of common values that allow them to trust each other in their public lives” (Note: I read civics here not as a set class, but rather as a set of habits which result in a specific civic identity).⁸²

Dewey elaborates on this diversity specifying that perhaps more than any other one cause, [different groups with different customs] forced the demand for an educational institution which shall provide something like a homogeneous and balanced environment for the young.⁸³ For Dewey, American diversity requires not only a commitment to homogenous principles, but that the only path to this unity in politics is through education—“the intermingling in the school of youth of different races, differing religions, and unlike customs creates for all a new and broader environment.”⁸⁴ The habits then derived from these ideals are ones of broadening one’s horizon and ability to assimilate, both of which have been key for new immigrants coming into the United States and successfully adopting the national identity. Often times it seems that most of the immigrants I know have embraced this American identity and specific habits with much more enthusiasm than cradle Americans.

⁸¹ Tocqueville. 158.

⁸² McDonnell. 7.

⁸³ Dewey. *Democracy and Education*. 41.

⁸⁴ Dewey. *Democracy and Education*. 41.

CHAPTER 4

EDUCATION TODAY: CURRICULUM AND CULTURAL HABITS

Introduction

The purpose of focusing on education for this thesis question I think is evident, at least after Chapter 3 and the role that formal education plays in habit acquisition and a shared national identity. However, my decision to focus on literature education and the evolution debate over civics, history, or other social study might be of some debate or at least of interest—as might be my decision to focus on secondary education over that of the university or even primary school. First in looking at literature, I am choosing to look at broader cultural habits instilled by education particularly to the uses of the democratic regime. What sort of broader cultural norms are we reproducing in American classrooms and why?

Civics is a conscious reproduction of fairly forthright habits; the purpose in teaching civics is self-evident. The study of literature, however, is an implicit instrument for introducing, discussing, and internalizing societal habits; and, as mentioned by multiple diplomats that I interviewed, crucial to full understanding national identity. In addition, the Founders viewed “the study of English” as “intimately associated with the study of history,” and, thus, as intimately tied to citizenship and American culture.⁸⁵ Why is it that, in a country without a national curriculum (or even anything resembling one prior to the Common Core), an overwhelming majority of high schools assign the same core set of literature texts? What is inherently valuable about reading *Macbeth* or *Catcher in the Rye*? In addition to my theoretical reasoning, Chapter 2 details former ambassadors’ emphasis on the importance of literature in learning a new culture and in gaining insights into their assignments—which was unprompted by me.

⁸⁵ Pangle. McDonnell, Timpane, and Benjamin. 31.

Secondary Schools

To address the second question, ‘why secondary schools?’ is to address human development and formation. The common canon for general education at the college level (if such a core is required) is vastly varied by the number of courses, area/department of each requirement, and specific courses allowable and available to fulfill it. In addition, it is difficult to track the heritage of the general education requirements at the university levels—with competing narratives as to how the Great Books curriculum gave way to a broader liberal arts general education which eventually gave way to a semi-controlled general education requirement. In contrast, state regulations for high school graduation are fairly comparable—even if the exact curriculum is not. 40 out of 50 states require four years of English to graduate high school and, furthermore, 47 states and the District of Columbia have adopted language arts standards “that reflect the knowledge and skills colleges and employers demand of high school graduates.”⁸⁶ While in some states as few as 27% of students graduated college (within six years at a public university), the national average for completing high school within four years is at an all-time high of 78%.⁸⁷⁸⁸ Thus, I would argue that an overlapping, though not identical, literature curriculum which most Americans receive is a better place for analysis than a university.

Why was the secondary level chosen over primary school where children are first exposed to so many institutional norms? The primary education process is less of a reproduction of values and habits in formal curriculum than it is habits transmitted through figurative osmosis—experiential living and observation, over what I am focusing on, formalized

⁸⁶ “What courses do students need to complete to graduate from high school?” Data First. <http://www.data-first.org/data/what-courses-do-our-students-need-to-complete-in-order-to-graduate-from-high-school/> Accessed 3/26/13.

⁸⁷ Lynn O’Shaughnessy. “20 states with the best and worst college grad rates.” *CBS Money Watch* blog. August 13, 2012. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505145_162-57491259/20-states-with-the-best-and-worst-college-grad-rates/ 3/26/13.

⁸⁸ Lyndsey Layton “National public high school graduation rate at a four-decade high.” *Washington Post* Education Blog. January 22, 2013. http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-22/local/36472838_1_graduation-rate-dropout-rate-asian-students Accessed 3/26/13.

schooling and curriculum. In addition, high school is truly the introduction of critical thinking skills. High school students presumably have the basic tools of language acquired in earlier education to begin the process of articulating their own ideas verbally and in writing. Primary schools focus more on mechanics of education—how to read, how to write, add, or read a map than secondary schools. With those mechanics, a student can then begin to question, evaluate, consider, and argue for or against a particular position. At the high school level, students read an article and begin to support or refute it. Students begin to learn why we need basic math skills and may even be introduced to economics. Students can begin to look at a map and beyond reading the key, question how it was drawn and for what purpose.

In primary schools, habituation undoubtedly happens to some extent, but my interest lies more in the types of habits acquired at the secondary level. Of note, primary schools do not have a comparable body of curriculum similar to the 7th-12th grade literature cannon. Furthermore, on a practical level, I do not have the time here to do justice to both primary and secondary schools, so I have focused on secondary education. Middle and high school students are older (approximately children aged 12-18) and have a greater sense of rationality at that point, making them prime for such formation. High school is fertile ground for developing one's own opinion and critical thinking skills as noted above. As such, this time period is crucial in the reproduction of ideas and values—habits of the mind and heart. In addition, it is the literary canon in particular which has remained essentially the same for both of eras covered in my case studies. The 7th-12th grade literature canon has remained relatively consistent for multiple generations—creating that common context and national identity to which both Dewey and Tocqueville refer. And, as I mentioned, I do not have enough data to make the same assertion that primary schools offer a homogenous enough curriculum to draw similar conclusions.

Democratic Model and Literature

McDonnell points out that the democratic purposes of education remain today, despite being less explicit and less primary. “Large majorities of parents and the public believe that it is essential for schools to teach habits of good citizenship.”⁸⁹ If we trace this reproduction of habits through formal education, a particular type of citizen is socialized to act in a certain way in matters of trade, public life (government or civil society at-large), and private life (within the context of the family and on the individual relational level). These same modes of living that are a result of democratic education influence the democratic woman or man who chooses to enter the Foreign Service—to the same extent as any other profession—despite the training and education provided by the Foreign Service itself and the influence it exerts on its officers (to be taken up further in Chapter 5—Foreign Service Selection and Training).

Tocqueville actually speaks to the very phenomenon I am documenting—namely, that the principle characteristics in a nation’s literature are principally subordinate to a state’s social system and political constitution.⁹⁰ “The relations,” Tocqueville elaborates, “existing between the social and political state of a people and the genius of its writers are always very numerous; he who knows the one is never completely ignorant of the other.”⁹¹ It is this very notion that inspired me to look at normative habits of citizens as they are transmitted through literature education. The most recent changes advocated in the literature canon are movements towards a more multicultural literature canon are a perfect example. While the canon remains largely unchanged, Dewey’s idea that exposure to others’ experiences will bring about the intermingling of races, religions, and customs for the purposes of unifying students and promoting habits of openness has gained some traction. As the level of diversity in American increases, so does the

⁸⁹ McDonnell. 3.

⁹⁰ Tocqueville. 449.

⁹¹ Tocqueville. 449.

necessity for us to be dedicated to the American thesis—the proposition that all men are created equal and have a freedom to prosper. In another example of habits and education, Tocqueville observes the instantiation of this relationship in the contemporary American literature’s portrayal of women: “In America all books, not excepting novels, assume women chaste, and no one tells of gallant adventures in them. The great regularity of American mores is doubtless due in part to the country, race, and religion.”⁹²

Tocqueville’s discussion of womanly virtue in literature returns to this concept of regularity of specific national mores, which he mentions by name multiple times throughout *Democracy in America*. These learned mores or “habits of the mind,” as he referred to them in his first volume, are vital to shaping actions of individuals and ultimately the outcome (success or failure, as it may be) of American democracy. In U.S. education we see battle after battle in local school communities and the national forum over what should be taught in terms of content in schools and how it should be taught. Such debates go to the roots of the purpose and function of charter, magnet, career-focused, private, parochial, home, and many more schools. The very reason parents or students who are able to choose a school outside of their local district do is that they prioritize different values from the state and have a different vision of what education should be or how it should be delivered. The importance of education—its unique formative characteristic and role in the acquisition of habits—is evident in its major presence in every political election—national or local, regardless of what other social versus defense arguments are the soup du jour.

⁹² Tocqueville. 586.

Curriculum Debates

The most recent debates in public school curriculum are debates far from new; they have raged in some form for the last 60 or so years—but the factions of the education system are often representative of the political system and conflicts in national identity. As Marshall, Mitchell, and Wirt say in their work on education,

In spite of overarching national cultural agreements, conflicts arise from subgroups, subcultures, and partisan interests with different values. Conflicts have occurred, for example, over the appropriate curriculum. Many states agree on the value of teaching American civics, but not on whether it is the student's duty to accept uncritically what the government does or to question the government's use of power (Litt, 1965; Morgan, 1977). Similarly the current conflict over teaching evolution versus creationism is rooted in value differences; and, of course, states have different cultural values. ...Policy-makers' choices, more often than not, will both reflect as well as shape the values of the culture.⁹³

The debates are many, but I want to look at the following: the inclusion of minority literature (allowing the voices of colonized, queer, non-western, developing nations, African-American, female, etc. as mentioned above in reference to Dewey), the presence of civic values (and not only their presence, but what they are and how they can be taught), and the representation of various historical narratives. A parent or a teacher's ability to question the status quo and raise debate when it comes to the dominant narratives is evidence that the "American" identity discussed in Chapter 2 is woven throughout domestic culture. These citizens entitled to information about what is being taught and why, feel empowered to question authority if they disagree, and often express their satisfaction or dissatisfaction. In other words, these "American" habits of assuming societal openness and accessibility to those in power, possessing individual agency, and expressing those opinions are three of the four habits identified in Chapter 2. The question of faith in the public square is also addressed, as the

⁹³ Marshall, Catherine, Douglas Mitchell, and Frederick Wirt. *Culture and Education Policy in the American States*. The Falmer Press, Bristol, PA: 1989.. 12-13.

resulting curriculums make statements about belief. Though I do not delve into debates on creationism and evolution here, such contentious debates contest whether the language of political theology from our heritage has a place in a society shaped by scientific reason from the Enlightenment and an increasingly multicultural population with diverse religious beliefs.

As noted by Marshall et al. in the quote above, the inclusion or exclusion in and of itself signals a value judgment which is reproduced to the next generation. For example, inclusion asserts that there is something inherently valuable about diversity, openness, or acceptance (or perhaps, less ambitiously, tolerance). Exclusion may signal underlying belief in a singular absolute truth or a strong predominant value (like *our* cultural heritage or *our* religious tradition). Presentation, of course, plays a role as well; if the works are included, are they presented favorably or not and vice versa, is a work excluded because of time, irrelevancy, redundancy, or because of the ideas or perspective therein?

These curriculum debates persist despite dedication to a singular project and, as mentioned in Chapter 3, put the question of habits required for a singular democratic character to the test; has our diverse nature (characteristic of our very Founding) led us past the point of being able to agree on these values? In part the culprit is conflicting values, though that is not the whole story. A further layer of complexity is added when it is not directly conflicting values, but agreed upon values that different groups either assign different priorities to or instantiate the same value in a different manner (this idea is actually one Kwame Appiah presents in his discussion of global ethics from his book *Cosmopolitanism*, the idea can just as readily apply to a diverse nation, as a diverse world).⁹⁴

Whether or not the root of these differences is conflicting values, priorities, or conceptions of values, Marshall et al.'s conclusion holds true: "Policy-makers' choices, more

⁹⁴ Appiah, Kwame Anthony. *Cosmopolitanism*. W.W. Norton & Company, New York:2006.

often than not, will both reflect as well as shape the values of the culture.”⁹⁵ As both a *product* of the socialization of education and the curriculum and a *producer* (in terms of policy, organization, and leadership for public education), the leader is a key part of the cyclical relationship between education, culture, and government. My focus on the socialization of the individual in education fits well here with the basic concept that the U.S. political leader (working either domestically or abroad), like all other citizens, will act in a manner that reflects the habits of his culture and upbringing.

The curriculum debate brings to light the question of what habits are we (U.S. society) encouraging in the classroom—the first public social institution to which we nearly all belong. The division of opinion reflects the multiplicity of factions discussed in Federalist 10 (at least in the political context—and nearly every perspective in the political context has an opinion and agenda for education), which can rupture and ultimately break a society. These habits go to our very identity as Americans, simultaneously inheriting and hoping to bequeath to the next generation our democracy. The first controversy I want to look at is the teaching of evolution and creationism. The controversy goes to the very heart of the matter of worldview—religious or otherwise—on the origins and purpose of human life, as well as what happens after death.

Civics Education: Coercion or Persuasion?

The civics education debate speaks directly to the heart of what values are taught—and from those values what habits are reproduced and further entrenched or newly acquired. The question of the role and composition of civics curriculum in schools is central, undeniably to the formation of the democratic citizen—it is, if you will, the formalized, explicit education of citizenship. Teaching the different platforms of the political parties, how Congress works, and

⁹⁵ Marshall, et al. 12-13.

the roots of the federal system all empower the individual to act as autonomously and exercise their rights. In fact, knowledge of democracy often translates into agency in democracy. The concept of rule of the people not only as a political arrangement but as a right is one that is seen in Chapter 2 when the ambassadors note or perceive a lack of individual agency. Tocqueville noted that though the American man may be relatively inarticulate, ask him about his government and his rights and he will begin to wax on poetic.⁹⁶ This knowledge actually makes for self-government, because knowledge of the system makes it an accessible system. How does one change the system or have influence as an individual? They learn in civics class about the importance of voting and what would make them an eligible candidate for office. They might learn to contact their senators and representatives or how to take part in a campaign or primary. Individual agency is universal and uncontroversial within the American identity and American civics classrooms—from the idea of the American dream (that prosperity is up to the individual and his/her work ethic) to voting in elections or staging a protest.

These elements in the particular are critical habits of a democratic citizen. But the United States is a very diverse place, with citizens hailing from all over the world. These people come from nations and ethnic groups that define citizenship and what it means to be a good citizen very differently. Civics is by its very nature particularistic and nationally-focused—an interesting concept to promote amidst an era (at least the last two decades) of globalization and of promulgating universal human rights which attempt to minimize national differences or even to make them irrelevant. In recent years, civics has been such a controversial topic that Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote an op-ed advocating for a reemphasis on civics curriculum and its vital role in our individual roles as American democratic citizens.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ Tocqueville. 291-292.

⁹⁷ O'Connor, Sandra Day. "Not by Math Alone." *Washington Post*. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/24/AR2006032401621.html> 3/26/13 Accessed 3/15/13.

Also, to what extent is patriotism and a uniform set of habits for citizens a form or coercion? To this point, I am again reminded of the idea of rule by force and rule by persuasion, highlighted by Brian Danoff in his commentary on democratic education under Woodrow Wilson. According to Woodrow Wilson, “The democratic leader should strive to persuade and educate, but not dominate.”⁹⁸ Wilson himself subscribed to a view of rule by persuasion or reason and ideas over force; evidence of this philosophy is seen with the failed League of Nations—though Wilson championed it, when he failed to persuade Americans, he did not force it. The lingering question remains: is habit formation via public persuasion coercive? With even deeper emphasis in psychology (from jury selection to negotiation to voting behavior) and a more expansive definition of force (i.e., as encompassing more than the physical), it sometimes seems as though today’s society views persuasion as coercion.

Though some regimes rely on rule by fear, democracies ensure the maintenance of the regime and adherence to our laws by extra-martial means—persuasion and habit, among them. Do people follow most laws and social norms out of habit? Part of the reason law is slow to change is that law must be publicly known and promulgated, as well as widely respected. What use is a law that no one takes seriously? If everyone disobeyed a law or several, it would be impossible to enforce. People often also assume a law as right (as in correct or moral), especially if well-established—but, if it changed often, would citizens think more critically instead of acting habitually? Would they be less likely to follow it because it might change again in the near future or if something was once acceptable, it might be again? The reason that people breaking the law makes the evening news is not in fact because it is so common, but because it is rather an extraordinary event (whereas, conversely, someone who takes the subway to work in New York City is not news, because it is so very ordinary).

⁹⁸ Danoff. 123.

These habits of civics however are contested precisely because many are rooted in religious teaching or have been used historically to the advantage of corruption or evil—think of Hitler’s use of nationalism in Nazi Germany or the English empire’s use of exceptionalism as justification for colonization. One could say that civics, properly conceived, is beneficial to democracy (or for that matter any regime in which it is designed to secure), but also to democratic citizens. While it can be abused by officials in power, another popular argument is that civics discourages critical thinking and questioning of the regime and habits it perpetuates. This argument posits that students of civics are sheep-like in their acceptance of power structures, identity, and class standing—teaching them to accept and even advocate for the status quo without a critical examination of its implications. This argument is complex in that the promotion of critical thinking and not fostering democratic habits can, in fact, be a direct threat to any regime, even a democratic regime. But an important distinction is needed: civics makes the case for American democracy via persuasion, not via forced indoctrination.

Even if a democratic and free society were the “right” way to structure and govern the society, there would be dissidents as in any regime with differences of opinion and values. To not teach civic values and democratic habits has consequently led to the phenomena in society of the U.S. government taking responsibility for more and of civil society taking responsibility for less (including citizens being less likely to be involved/engaged in any sort of organization, government included—see Robert Putnam’s *Bowling Alone* which elaborates on the waning participation in civil society). Outside of curriculum, but in the classroom, civic habits like the Pledge of Allegiance have come under fire for the phrase “under God” (as instituting religion) and for coercing allegiance itself.⁹⁹ Court cases ruling that the pledge cannot be required and that prayer should be removed from schools have tangible consequences for a democratic nation; the citizen’s habits are altered of how and when (and should) patriotism/loyalty and

⁹⁹ “10 Important Court Cases That Forever Changed Education.” Online Colleges. August 15, 2010. <http://www.onlinecolleges.net/2010/08/15/10-important-court-cases-that-forever-changed-education/> Accessed 3/26/13.

religion be expressed publicly or regularly. The question that follows is: Is it then appropriate for a citizen to vote and act on these ideals, if they are discouraged from pursuing them in public?

Historical Narratives

The final curriculum debate I want to address before diving into a discussion on the literature education in the United States is the representation of various historical narratives. This point actually plays into the later debate over literature curriculum. It is often joked that anymore it is just politically incorrect to *be* a white male, regardless of whether you are racist, sexist, homophobic, or any number of discriminatory labels. I have also heard since sixth grade that the victors write the history books. Revolutionary War? The Americans wrote the story. The Civil War? By its very name you know the North won (i.e., it is not commonly referred to as the War of Northern Aggression...outside the south that is). The question then comes to mind what values and habits are reproduced on each side of this curriculum debate. To teach one narrative insists that there is a material reality and verifiable facts—the truth—to be told. To acknowledge the existence of multiple narratives actually poses a formidable obstacle to learning what actually took place and what the consequences and lessons to be had are, but it acknowledges that the losers of history or the bystanders have perspectives and outcomes, too.

The consequence, however, of the multiple narratives approach should not be taken lightly—though it is the current fashion to favor wider diversity of perspective. In Plato's Republic, he discusses the Myth of the Metals or the Noble Lie. Similarly, if there are certain goals and values you wish to habituate, there is merit in finding these heroic or desirable qualities in the giants on whose backs we build and maintain the American project. That is to say, there is something useful at looking at all the idealistic qualities of the Founding Fathers,

putting their virtues on a pedestal to be admired, revered, and, most importantly, mimicked by future generations.

And, there is a cost to revealing their faults in the promotion of alternate, competing narratives which rightly (or wrongly) may put their unblemished reputations in peril. The underlying point of this debate and of the other curriculum debates is that the values we choose to pursue culturally and reproduce in education have very real implications for our habits as democratic citizens and, by consequence, for our democracy both domestically and globally. It is for this reason, Dewey in *Democracy and Education* notes that “as a society becomes more enlightened, it realizes that it is responsible not to transmit and conserve the whole of its existing achievements, but only such as make for a better future society. The school is its chief agency for the accomplishment of this end.”¹⁰⁰ That is to say that we use formal education as the primary means of transmitting not a comprehensive account of our nation and its history, but only reproducing that knowledge which contributes to our continued endurance and success. Schools in fact have a duty, not only to simplify social structures and subjects, but to purify it, removing “so far as possible, the unworthy features of the existing environment from influence upon mental habitudes” -- “weeding out what is undesirable.”¹⁰¹

Literature Education

Last, but most importantly, I will address literature education. This aspect of education is probably the most applicable to my research question because this mode of habits transmission is found in all cultures with written languages. In other words, reading the national literature of another nation challenges assumptions and habits previously thought to be standard or

¹⁰⁰ Dewey. *Democracy and Education*. 39.

¹⁰¹ Dewey. *Democracy and Education*. 39.

universal. Intentionally or otherwise, an author captures the spirit of a nation, a culture—their identity and individual habits—when he/she writes fiction. They capture which habits make a hero and which habits create a villain. A moral code is often established, whether the protagonist follows or deviates from it. There is a common understanding between author and reader of what habits make up goodness and of what is culturally accepted or what is rebellious.

It, then, is no wonder that an analysis of the literature prized in classrooms tells us something about the greater culture and national identity. Surprisingly, a national study on U.S. literature curriculum has not been conducted since Arthur N. Applebee's 1989 study on literature taught in 7th-12th grade in the public schools almost 25 years ago. However, by looking at Applebee's thorough study and comparing it with more recent, similar but local surveys and lists of college preparatory reading, I found that they correspond closely, suggesting that the required reading lists for high school students has not change substantially.¹⁰² Similar to Jeremy Hoffman's 2001 findings with the Applebee study "[showing] that not much had changed in the nearly twenty-five years since the last major study of its kind in the spring of 1963"—that is to say that "the Western canon that had dominated secondary classrooms in 1963 still dominated in 1988"—remained mostly true for his 2001.¹⁰³

As Hoffman, who conducted an updated, smaller-scale study similar to Applebee's, notes that many authors have multiple works making the list, "only three women appear on the list...and there are no minority authors."¹⁰⁴ Despite curriculum arguments which favor diversifying the canon—the authors, the cultures, etc. represented, the nearly 50 year unchanged that has been documented comes as surprising. As Hoffman puts it, "the sweeping changes that took place in America's cultural landscape between 1963 and 1988 weren't

¹⁰² Applebee, Arthur N. *A Study of High School Literature Anthologies*.
<http://www.albany.edu/cela/reports/applebee/applebeestudy/main.html> Accessed 2/15/13.

¹⁰³ Jeremy Hoffman. "The Western Canon in Today's High Schools." *Minnesota English Journal*.
<http://www.mcte.org/journal/mej07/9Hoffman.pdf> Accessed 2/15/13. 141.

¹⁰⁴ Hoffman. 143.

enough to effect change in the canon.”¹⁰⁵ Hoffman’s observation makes you question what the relationship is between culture and literature. Why *these* books in the last 50 years? And, if the society changed so drastically in those decades, but the literature did not, does that not call into question their relationship? The same books can certainly be interpreted differently through the ages, but a book can also have implications about identity and culture without having specific policy implications.

While I am not attempting to prove causation or do more than suggest a cyclical relationship between education, culture, and government, the unchanging cannon shows that the U.S. democratic citizen does have a certain type of unified education going back at least a few generations—that reproduces (and thus further entrenches) the same habits of the mind and heart that making up our American identity.

The following list shows the most frequently read books that appeared on all lists, along with the percentage of schools recorded in Applebee’s 1989 study and in the 2001 Minnesota English Journal study.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ Hoffman, 141.

¹⁰⁶ Hoffman. 142.

Table 4.1 U.S. Literature Canon

<u>Title (Author)</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>2001</u>
<i>Romeo and Juliet</i> (Shakespeare)	90	79
<i>Macbeth</i> (Shakespeare)	81	(top 15)*
<i>Huckleberry Finn</i> (Twain)	78	55
<i>To Kill a Mockingbird</i> (Lee)	74	83
<i>Julius Caesar</i> (Shakespeare)	71	(top 15)
<i>The Pearl</i> (Steinbeck)	64	(top 27)
<i>The Scarlet Letter</i> (Hawthorne)	62	42
<i>Of Mice and Men</i> (Steinbeck)	60	62
<i>Lord of the Flies</i> (Golding)	56	52
<i>Diary of a Young Girl</i> (Frank)	56	(top 27)
<i>Hamlet</i> (Shakespeare)	56	55
<i>The Great Gatsby</i> (Fitzgerald)	54	76
<i>The Crucible</i> (Miller)	47	62
<i>Night</i> (Wiesel)	<i>unlisted</i>	52
<i>Odyssey</i> (Homer)	29	42

*Note: The Hoffman survey lists all of these as occurring within the 27 books which appear in 30% or more of schools in the study. He does not provide the specific percentage of schools. *Night* by Elie Wiesel is the only book that does not appear on both lists. The remaining titles not only overlap, but have maintained their prevalence.

If these books really do not mirror the cultural changes we seen over the last half of a decade, then what is the reasoning behind their continued use? *To Kill a Mockingbird* has clear implications for race relations, what justice is and how it should be enacted—but even if this book does not cause every 9th grade student to rethink racial relations or justice, the book does serve as exposure to a narrative (albeit fictional) of the racial tensions inherent to our American past. Fiction allows authors to explore real, controversial, or current themes without directly assaulting current leadership or national heritage. It allows authors to challenge the status quo,

assumptions, expectations, and more without coming off as aggressive. A foundational understanding of for example Shakespeare is not meant to make us British, but to look at the nature of human relationships and boundaries found in society.

In a Michigan literature canon analysis for 9th grade (a list which looks unsurprisingly like the one above), an experienced teacher points to reasons these selections are made. Some of the practical reasons are attempting to avoid overlap with previous literature classes and familiarizing students with vocabulary for standardized exams and college admittance tests. However, he highlights a particular reproduction of values also, inherent in the canon, that “the Curriculum attempts to teach a cultural literacy – that of upper-middle class White America.”¹⁰⁷ He also cites major questions that the literature attempts to target at this grade level—particularly the question of identity. The teacher also mentions that broadening students’ horizon, a multicultural approach, and expanding cultural awareness are values that he aspires to provide to students in his classes. These habits are in line with a Dewey-modeled education.

Curriculum debates are a bit of a tangent from the central question, but are critical to what makes up American identity because of what is implicit in the argument for educating for democracy. These students, though children today, will one day be the bearers of self-government in the voting booth and the educators in and outside of the classroom. For it is “in directing the activities of the young, [that] society determines its own future in determining that of the young. Since the young at a given time will at some later date compose the society of that period, the latter's nature will largely turn upon the direction children's activities were given at an

¹⁰⁷ Canon Analysis. <https://sites.google.com/site/english9syllabus/home/mde-curriculum-canon-analysis> Accessed 2/15/13. (This site is a Google site created by a student site was created as an assignment for a graduate level English class at Western Michigan University.)

earlier period.”¹⁰⁸ In other words, what we choose to teach today will directly influence who we are tomorrow—domestically and on the international stage.

Despite these contentions over curriculum, there *is* a fairly large consensus among parents of what baseline habits should be reproduced in education. In actuality, “large majorities of white, African-American, and traditional Christian parents agree that schools should teach mutual respect for others regardless of their racial or ethnic background or their sexual identity, that students should learn that living in integrated neighborhoods is good, and that they should be taught about the black struggle for civil rights.”¹⁰⁹ These desired goals for education encompass the habits identified in interviews with the diplomats—namely, equal access and an open society and both possessing freedom of expression and respect for others’ free expression. Similarly, inherent to learning about the black struggle for civil rights, civil rights leaders exemplify individual agency in speaking out against and defying commonly upheld norms of discrimination. While “white, African-American, and traditional Christians” do not represent the entire spectrum of opinion by any means (notably leaving out non-Christians, Hispanics, Asians, and other groups of which compose significant populations), these groups are diverse and do represent a spectrum of opinion—even if it is incomplete. The ideas these parents mutually agree to are presented as such in the confines of the classroom—ideas, but by mere exposure to these ideas, students are likely to exert real influence institutions as future political leaders, CEOs, educators, parents, and even diplomats.

¹⁰⁸ Dewey. *Democracy and Education*. 74.

¹⁰⁹ McDonnell. 7.

CHAPTER 5

THE FOREIGN SERVICE: SELECTION AND TRAINING

Introduction to the Foreign Service

Having looked at the case studies, the theory of American democratic education, and U.S. curriculum, I am now going to tie these together. I have chosen to do so by looking at the Foreign Service Officer selection process for the expressed reason that this process itself is a paramount example and concise articulation of American identity. The job of the Foreign Service is, in part, to promote U.S. interests abroad and represent American culture. Thus, the selection process is orchestrated to select those individuals that best represent what we are trying to reproduce internationally as “American identity.”

When linking education to the Foreign Service, we must acknowledge that while our Foreign Service may be more democratically educated than most of the world (i.e., they do not come from national diplomatic academies), many officers had access to elite schools, if not in high school, then for university. In addition to premier education, I have to account for norms acquired through organizational selection, training, and culture—that is habits acquired informally or outside of formal 7th-12th grade education. However in my interviews with diplomats despite ample discussion of the importance of understanding national culture and identity, Ambassador Roger Kirk commented that I would find surprisingly little when it came to cultural training. And though he caveated his statement saying that it probably has improved since he went through training, he was not confident that there was adequate cultural training outside of language preparation even today. Another diplomat I interviewed, Ambassador Jack Matlock had received six weeks of training total before his first assignment—including his intensive

language training. The final ambassador I spoke with, Melvyn Levitsky, received by far the most training, with ten months of intensive Russian language training.

Since I am looking at habits reproduced in secondary literature education, I think it is important to begin by noting two things. First, all three experiences above give me reason to believe organizational training had little effect in terms of a separate socialization process for entrenching national identity: that the Department of State training does not significantly influence one's cultural norms and orientation. Secondly, the Foreign Service Officer Test (FSOT), the first step to qualify for service, requires cultural knowledge outside of civics—presupposing a certain cultivation and knowledge of a common American identity.¹¹⁰ Awareness of American cultural norms is a pre-requisite for service. The official State Department exam guide lists this component by name:

United States Society and Culture. This knowledge area encompasses an understanding of major events, institutions, and movements in national history, including political and economic history, as well as national customs and culture, social issues and trends, and the influence of U.S. society and culture on foreign policy and foreign affairs.¹¹¹

The FSOT “draws upon a candidate’s writing skills, general background, experience and education, and measures knowledge of English expression and other subjects basic to the functions of Foreign Service Officers.”¹¹² The Department of State specifies that the exam tests general background and knowledge acquired in education. Since the FSOT is open to all citizens, the inclusion of “United States Society and Culture” demonstrates that there is an

¹¹⁰ Note: There is a body of literature that focuses on global nomads—which would include the children of Foreign Service Officers. But these studies refer to those people who are socialized as children in multiple countries. Just as attending an American university can have little influence on a global nomad’s sense of identity (or lack of belonging to a specific place), employment in the Foreign Service seems to do little to change the socialized habits of its officers. See Chapter 5 for more detail.

¹¹¹ Guide to the Foreign Service Officer Selection Process. U.S. Department of State. http://careers.state.gov/uploads/f7/33/f7332b47ed70772afdb35003f8735a66/3-0_FSO_RegGuide_Nov152012.pdf Accessed 3/14/2013. 28.

¹¹² *Guide to FSO Selection*. 15.

existing set body of cultural habits with which the average citizen should be familiar. In considering what Tocqueville sees to be the defining norm of American identity, equality of conditions, he describes this norm as “[extending] its influence well beyond political mores and laws, and...it gains no less dominion over civil society than over government: it creates opinions, gives birth to sentiments, suggests usages, and modifies everything it does not produce.”¹¹³ In other words, not only are American citizens familiar with this body of cultural habits, such habits actively shape their opinions, reactions, and actions in and outside of politics. For Dewey, the importance and results of sharing a common space; democracy breeds a “conjoint communicated experience”—from where a culture and the habits therein are derived.¹¹⁴

The U.S. Foreign Service is fairly unique in that there are no specific education requirements. A candidate is not required to have a college degree, much less from a specific institution. That being said, practically speaking, many officers—anecdotally—note an unsurprising prevalence of Ivy League alums. The fact that the U.S. education system inculcates a set of habits in an individual is all the more notable in the absence of a centralized curriculum, a singular required school system, or, in the case of diplomats, an elite diplomatic academy with a particular *raison d’être*.

Foreign Service Selection Process

Below I have illustrated the steps it takes to become a Foreign Service Officer. The process begins with the applicant choosing a specialization in one of the established career tracks: consular, economic, management, political, and public diplomacy. He or she then

¹¹³ Tocqueville. 3.

¹¹⁴ Dewey. *Democracy and Education*. 151.

registers for and takes the Foreign Service Officer Exam, which tests knowledge from all career tracks and includes questions of broader American culture via multiple choice and essay questions. For those test-takers who score high enough, they are invited to submit a series of essays demonstrating their experiences that exemplify the 13 dimensions of being a Foreign Service Officer.


The 13 dimensions are the public statement of precisely the set of “habits”—as Tocqueville would say—of which the Department of State wants to see evidence in their prospective employees. These habits are concisely what the Department of State wishes to reproduce as American identity abroad; the department’s employees of every rank are each selected to be ambassadors of American identity and promote our habits abroad. As conduits of the body American habits that form a singular American identity, employees communicate this identity both formally and informally—similar to the way these habits would be passed down to the next generation, both formally and informally. The Department of State even has cultural affairs bureaus for the expressed purpose of showcasing American identity and conducting diplomacy through expression of that identity. These required essays are personal narratives, scored along with the candidate’s detailed resume. Qualifying applicants advance to the next stage, the oral assessment. The oral assessment is a day-long event in which applicants are interviewed by a panel and observed as they participate in a crisis simulation that tests their problem-solving skills, ability to work in a team, and aptitude for negotiation.

Applicants that reach the oral assessment may be dismissed at any part of the day, or be asked to stay and still not have a high enough score to qualify for the next phase. These candidates must pass medical and security clearances before finally securing their places on “The Register,” an official list of eligible candidates for DOS hiring. The applicants that have reached the Register can be assumed to have adequately demonstrated the 13 dimensions—

essentially habits—of a Foreign Service Officer. These “habits” are expected to be present in applicants prior to any in-organization training provided by the Foreign Service Institute.

Because this process is open to all citizens—regardless of educational background—and Foreign Service Officers *are* selected from all backgrounds, this set of 13 habits required by DOS is essentially one that is not just exclusive to elite secondary academies and institutions of higher learning. Where this very specific set of habits came from if it was not the training from the Foreign Service Institute itself? These regular joes—no minimum education or specified school—are to have this singular set of habits and were for the most part socialized in the same culture. With 78% of all Americans graduating from high school and significantly less graduating from university, what other social institution has such a universal reach? (One may also think of primary school. See my thoughts regarding this in Chapter 4). For Dewey, it is precisely in formal education that we acquire these habits.

Chart 5.1: The Foreign Service Selection Process¹¹⁵



Set of Habits Necessary for Foreign Service

As noted above, the Department of State actually posts a list of desired habits for in its applicants, called the “Foreign Service Officer Qualifications - 13 DIMENSIONS.”¹¹⁶ To look at

¹¹⁵ Foreign Service Officer Selection Process. http://careers.state.gov/specialist/selection-process#.UUI_glejtXI Accessed 3/14/2013.

these dimensions more carefully and determine if these habits are also those encouraged in secondary literature education, I will address them each either individually or in small groups. These 13 dimensions succinctly articulate habits of openness, individual agency, and freedom of expression. Despite not listing faith in the public square within any of the 13 points, it should be noted that a core objective of American foreign policy is to secure religious freedom around the world—to which the Department of State has dedicated a full-time ambassador.

Table 5.1 13 Dimensions of a Foreign Service Officer

Composure	Oral Communication
Cultural Adaptability	Planning and Organizing
Experience and Motivation	Quantitative Analysis
Information Integration and Analysis	Resourcefulness
Initiative and Leadership	Working With Others
Judgment Objectivity and Integrity	Written Communication

The first habit necessary for Foreign Service is one that applies to all the others—though all the attributes are interrelated. Experience and motivation is one of the 13 Dimensions, which requires the “[demonstration of] knowledge, skills or other attributes gained from previous experience of relevance to the Foreign Service” and the ability “to articulate appropriate motivation for joining the Foreign Service.”¹¹⁷ These habits are the cornerstone of all the others, as the applicant must demonstrate previous experience that incorporates all of the following habits and how these experiences shape the desire and reasons for a candidate to apply. For Amb. Matlock interviewed in Chapter 2, part of his preparation was previous study of Russian literature.

¹¹⁶ *Foreign Service Officer Qualifications - 13 DIMENSIONS*. careers.state.gov/index/download-center4/3.0.0_fso_13_dimensions.pdf. Accessed 3/14/2013.

¹¹⁷ FSO Qualifications.

One of the habits necessary for Foreign Service is composure—the ability “to stay calm, poised, and effective in stressful or difficult situations; to think on one's feet, adjusting quickly to changing situations [and] to maintain self-control.”¹¹⁸ A second habit required of FSO is cultural adaptability, working and communicating “effectively and harmoniously with persons of other cultures, value systems, political beliefs, and economic circumstances; to recognize and respect differences in new and different cultural environments.”¹¹⁹ These lines detailing effective cooperation with persons of different backgrounds is very similar to *Dewey's Democracy and Education* quote on political unity through education and “intermingling” citizens of various national origins, races, etc. Part of Amb. Levitsky's ability to obtain information as a procurement officer was through conversing with locals, as was his involvement with marginalized communities. This concept of working well with persons of different cultures, also applies to a more general habit of being able to work with others. Candidates should demonstrate in their application habits that foster “constructive, cooperative, and harmonious” work environment—allowing each not only to lead (see below), but contribute to a team and build up the team.¹²⁰ For Tocqueville, these skills are important in the building up of civil society. A society needs political leaders, but just as much needs citizens to participate in the education system, the religious institutions, and other organizations that produce a robust civil society.

Information and analysis; planning and organizing; and resourcefulness are all necessary habits which officers must possess. These abilities to absorb and synthesize information, as well as the ability to prioritize and act effectively with a given set of objectives and limited resources are crucial to success in the field. This challenge of meeting objectives with limited resources and unforeseen or inalterable obstacles requires the “creative alternatives

¹¹⁸ FSO Qualifications.

¹¹⁹ FSO Qualifications.

¹²⁰ FSO Qualifications.

or solutions to resolve problems.”¹²¹ The habit of resourcefulness is also connected to composure and cultural adaptability, as it, too, requires “flexibility in response to unanticipated circumstances.”¹²²

The second to last group of habits desired by DOS are habits of initiative and leadership, judgment, and objectivity and integrity. I have grouped these habits together because these habits are crucial to good leadership and building relationships with foreign counterparts—personally and professionally—in the field. Initiative and leadership allow one to see work that needs to be done and take responsibility for it to the point of seeing it through to completion, as well as the ability to persuade others to a given opinion or action. Judgment is a habit that allows one to discern whom to trust, when to act, and to evaluate the context adeptly of any given situation. Judgment also relates to one’s ability to analyze information and prioritize accordingly.

Objectivity and integrity are habits that ensure first that one can be trusted with confidential information and is above participating in corruption, but these habits also ensure that as a FSO one would make relationships with foreigners that do not compromise the essence of his and the Department of State’s work. These habits are vital to Tocqueville’s view of a healthy democracy. To that point, democracy requires the ability of the citizen to take initiative in leading their township and school system, to know who to trust to represent their interests in the legislature, and to judge the constitutionality of a law or the innocence of an individual. Integrity and objectivity are also modes of operation when it comes to reproducing an identity or sharing a common space, individuals have an expectation for how those around them will act. This statement does not presume that expected actions are necessarily objective or

¹²¹ FSO Qualifications.

¹²² FSO Qualifications.

have integrity, but the actions of an individual or a nation that possesses objectivity and integrity are predictable.

The last section of habits I wish to address (and these groupings are how I found significance in them, not how they are listed) is oral communication, quantitative analysis, and written communication. I group these together because they most literally translate into habits derived from formal school subjects—that of English (Literature) and math. Oral and written communications are merely two mediums of expressing oneself concisely, in a manner that is “grammatically correct, organized, precise, and persuasive.”¹²³ Communication must also convey accurate meaning and use the appropriate style to engage the target audience. In the communications profession today, it is often said: there is what you thought you said, what you actually said, and what your audience thought you said.

Quantitative analysis is the ability to not only identify and collect data, but to glean its significance—recognizing possible patterns or trends. Again in the case of the procurement officer position, Amb. Levitsky was tasked with analyzing data and reporting back via airgram to various federal departments. The ideal candidate for the Foreign Service also has a mastery of basic math skills. These quantitative and communications skills become habits when these theoretical principles are applied in the same way to specific situations—i.e., we are often socialized to know when and how to speak to specific audiences. This dimension is a skill in the abstract, but a habit in practice (habituation). The cross-cultural communications field is created around the premise that each culture has different habits of communication—from facial expression and posture, to tone and diction. And, thus, awareness of the cultural habits of your audience if you are the communicator or of the communicator if you are the audience is critical to effective communication.

¹²³ FSO Qualifications.

Upon review, these 13 Dimensions (or habits, essentially) required for Foreign Service look remarkably similar to the habits required of a democratic citizen, as conceived by Tocqueville, Dewey, and other scholars on American education—in other words, it is important to not only know your identity and the identity of others, but to be able to articulate that identity and reproduce it. Democracy requires a basic level of education—one would presume a basic understanding of math and an ability to communicate effectively. These skills are necessary in civil society for effective participation in groups and social institutions, as well as for voting on a myriad of issues, following debate in the public sphere, and running for office, even at the local level. Staying informed on the issues in the public sphere and active in civil society requires the integration of information and judgment to act on a given impulse or opinion (or not act, as the case may be). The ability to freely access information and to participate in democracy by voting, holding office, or holding membership in civic organizations are both part of the American identity discussed in Chapter 2.

Working with others and cultural adaptability are essential to a successful democracy—one has to be able to live with neighbors in a free society who chose to pursue happiness differently or who have a background unfamiliar to his/her own. Individuals in democracy must not only tolerate individuals who are culturally different, but also learn to work as a team with them to accomplish legislation and meet basic needs and public goods (e.g. education, roads, local and federal government). Composure is essential here, too—in that every time we have a difference of opinion in democracy there is no threat of revolution or upheaval which provides for safety and stability in a society of factions. These habits are equally important at the international level, when American citizens in their role as diplomat must work with foreign counterparts to glean information and work toward resolutions or on joint endeavors.

It is evident how the remaining habits flow from the habits explained—that planning and organizing, as well as resourcefulness are required when individuals have competing

interests—regarding, for example, of what school curriculum should consist. Initiative and leadership are key to an active civil society. This habit applies not only to those running or holding elected office, but to citizens that need to take up roles leading the Kiwanis, organizing the bowling league, or conducting drives for new voters. In education, parents that take initiative are crucial to parent-teacher associations, coaching teams, tutoring, fundraising, and many other aspects which make their children and the school as an institution successful. The very concept of taking initiative or holding a leadership role is one that implies individual agency, a habit discussed in Chapter 2—one’s ability to actually act and influence. In addition to agency, there is a level of openness—for participation—in society at all levels, not just among the elite or ruling class. Amb. Matlock’s candor about persuading your own government is the product of societal openness and ability to influence.

Lastly, important aspects to civil society in democracy are judgment, objectivity, and integrity. I save these for last because these are perhaps—not the most important—but what holds the rest of these habits together. For a robust civil society, one needs to be able to use prudential judgment both in the private and public sphere—that is prudential judgment is a necessary habit in the democratic citizen. For Tocqueville, this set of guidelines urging right action outside of law and reinforcing obedience to the law was religion. For Lincoln, greater emphasis was placed on our common dedication to the higher ideals of the Declaration of Independence that outweighed any individual desire to act in discord with laws set forth or the set of habits necessary to make democracy work outside of law.

The democratic citizen (including the Foreign Service Officer qua democratic citizen) must also act with objectivity and integrity—again both in the public and private sphere. Because in democracy the power is placed with the people, individual citizens must be able to trust other citizens with whom they live and to whom they entrust their fates. The very nature of a free society, and its ability to survive, rest not in the law, but in the ability of citizens to conduct

themselves according to a certain set of un-codified principles, Tocqueville's mores. Another way to look at these 13 habits is to consider what the American democracy would be like in the event these habits were absent from its citizens. How does a democracy work in the absence of teamwork or initiative? What about a democracy with citizens who are unable to synthesize information—how would one stay informed and vote? Similarly, how does American diplomacy function without these habits? The purpose of our diplomatic corps, aside from conflict resolution, is promotion of our interests and identity abroad (which, in some cases, may also be a form of conflict resolution).

The very reason, Tocqueville says, citizens are interested in and informed on their government is because they play a direct role in governing. The consequence of this direct role is that the outcome of society and of the individual are intrinsically linked, that the individual habituates himself to the freedoms, the spirit, the order, and the structure of—in Tocqueville's conception—the township. The American identity is one of synthesis—of history, authority, locale, and infrastructure—and it is this identity in which we invest future generations to take initiative and to self-govern. Through the intertwining of individual and common goods, the individual is able to “[assemble] clear and practical ideas on the nature of his duties, as well as the extent of his rights.”¹²⁴

Training Provided by the Foreign Service

The training provided to officers that have been selected and hired is conducted by the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) which “is the Federal Government's primary training institution for officers and support personnel of the U.S. foreign affairs community, preparing American diplomats and other professionals to advance U.S. foreign affairs interests overseas and in

¹²⁴ Tocqueville. 65.

Washington.”¹²⁵ FSI provides over 600 classes that range from professional development for each career track to one of their 70 language courses to area studies.¹²⁶ The five branches of the FSI consist of: the School of Language Studies, the School of Applied Information Technology, the School of Leadership and Management, the School of Professional and Area Studies, and the Transition Center.¹²⁷

While the length of training could last anywhere from one day to two years, many of the courses are day-long sessions for two weeks straight on the current course schedule.¹²⁸ Former director of the Foreign Service Institute, Amb. Jack Matlock discussed the difficulty during his tenure of finding qualified professors from universities to teach area studies courses, which he believes gives the best comprehensive account of what is going on within a country or region. Area studies involves an interdisciplinary approach to studying religious dynamics, ethnic groups, geography, availability and control over natural resources and trade, history, culture, education system, and more. Amb. Matlock’s difficulty was finding professors who could provide this holistic account instead of knowledge of just one subject.

Many of the courses offered today focus on technical skills in their email service and other software of choice, technical writing skills, diplomatic phone communication style, and career track specific procedures—e.g. how to assist victims of crime or recognizing forged documentation. While there is a large focus on *techné* habits—none of these, sans the area courses, would seem to really challenge any pre-programmed cultural information on “Americanness” any more than job training for a more domestic organization that requires skills acquisition and procedural learning for new hires.

¹²⁵ Foreign Service Institute. U.S. Department of State website. <http://www.state.gov/m/fsi/> Accessed 4/1/13.

¹²⁶ FSI.

¹²⁷ FSI.

¹²⁸ *Foreign Service Institute Course Catalogue* 2012-2014. http://fsitraining.state.gov/catalog/2012_Course%20Schedule_Tuitions.pdf Accessed 4/1/13.

Ambassador Matlock, in his interview, stressed the importance above all of knowing American culture and being able to navigate your own government and superiors—particularly when it comes to negotiation and communication with foreign counterparts and then coming back to your superiors to work out a compromise or response. Essential to American identity is this concept of accessibility of those in power and the openness of society. The four habits I identified as part of a comprehensive “American” identity as discussed in Chapter 2 necessarily are aspects of our national identity as articulated in the 13 habits which make a good Foreign Service Officer.

Hailing from all parts of the country, of varied background, different genders, and levels of education, all successful FSO candidates have acquired this common American identity prior to entering the Foreign Service. Primary and secondary schools may be one of the few things Foreign Service Officers have in common when it comes to socialization—as the DOS makes a concerted effort at diversifying their staff and truly representing America. With a shrinking civics education in the second half of the 20th century, secondary literature education may be one of the few common curricular experiences shared by the majority of officers. These diplomats qua American democratic citizens bring to the table a socialization unique from other nations—primarily acquired through the social institution of education.

Conclusion

Through diplomatic interviews, American political theory, and review of the U.S. education system, I have looked at the importance of cultural habits and national identity in diplomatic relations. Though often overlooked by theorists in favor of material power or international institutions, national identity permeates international affairs and often dictates outcomes of relationships between nations—fruitful when the differences are understood or

even appreciated—or detrimental when ignored or unrecognized. Using Ted Hopf's theory of societal constructivism, I considered the relationship between knowledge of habits (making up our national identity) and power. Formal education socializes students with habits that reinforce the ideals of the regime.

Even after an examination of the relationship between knowledge, power, and resulting identity, I am left with only some answers and many more questions.

- 1) What identity is normalized and legitimate domestically?
- 2) How is that identity reproduced?
- 3) To what extent does that identity exert influence over actors in the context of diplomatic culture and foreign relations?

Because of the nature of the United States—as a democracy with a unifying bond that is a set of ideals, rather than a physical or involuntary characteristic—citizens are socialized in a particular way which prepares them to self-govern and to maintain the democracy, even though citizens represent many religions, ethnicities, and individual experiences. The habits called for to achieve these gargantuan tasks are captured and reproduced in the national literature—which is many U.S. students gain exposure to in high school. The values that underlie these habits in American life are found in this very cannon and help to form a set of ideas, as I mentioned in the introduction, on what is important and worthy of pursuit, what is proper and what is correct. What I hope to leave you with is some notion that national identity matters in both the theory and practice of international relationships and that identity is reproduced in education, creating a particular set of habits which is traceable through our diplomatic leadership.

My research, though theoretical, is grounded with the *techne* of real-world diplomats and their experiences in both the Soviet Union and China. These two case studies serve as just two

examples of applications for this concept. I traced four of the habits identified in those interviews that contribute to the American democratic citizen through political theory of the American Founding and of U.S. education to actual curriculum. I concluded with the qualifications expected of a Foreign Service Officer applicant, a succinct list of habits that reflect our national identity of the American democratic citizen. Perhaps in tracing this cycle of identity production and reproduction, a future study can suggest a model for citizen formation by looking to curriculum changes that might affect, in part, the resulting identity. Another suggestion for further research is a more in-depth examination of specific literature texts and the political context from which they were produced. Lastly, it would also be compelling to understand which other domestic institutions influence identity and to what extent. I hope my research motivates readers to also pursue further research on diffusing conflict via education, a key social institution that shapes our beliefs and values, forming our habits.

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