

Wir Sind Nicht Deutsch!

How anti-German communists won favor in post-Munich Czechoslovakia

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Spring 2013

University Honors

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Abstract

With the benefit of 20-20 hindsight, countries in the ex-Soviet Bloc claim they never desired to join the Soviet Union. In Eastern Europe, a new trend exists that blames the 'inactive' Western countries that balked in the face of illegitimate Soviet coups surrounding the year 1948. In Czechoslovakia, however, the line between legitimate and illegitimate was largely muddled as the communists rose to power in a "bloodless" and seemingly authentic manner. So how did it happen if the modern rhetoric is that the Bloc didn't want to be annexed? Did the Czechs mean to "hand over" their country? Did the West know what was happening? What was in the West's power to do?

Though many scholars today focus on detailing the precise facts of the coup and examining why the West didn't intervene, my research will explore a unique and overlooked angle involving the Czech transition: the role of the "German question." Through archival research I seek to examine communist propaganda within Czechoslovakia at the time, which galvanized the tense and very strong anti-German sentiment in the country and leveraged it against the Western powers. I intend to answer the question: *to what extent was the US aware of this psychological pressure and did they do anything to counter its effects?* Contrary to this modern trend, at the time the majority of Czechoslovaks not only welcomed the Soviets but were susceptible to an ongoing propaganda infiltration that played upon their worst fears: another German attack.

Just years after the end of World War II, the Soviet Union began to steadily subvert the countries it had liberated from Nazi rule. The ensuing fifty years would see Soviet control stifle the autonomous growth and national expression of its units. Because occupation was so unpleasant for the Eastern European states, retrospective perspectives tend to be colored with disdain. Fueled by vivid memories of the difficulties they had endured, ex-Bloc countries claim that the 1947-48 communist takeovers were universally illegitimate. While this may have been undeniably true for some states, the reality is often more nuanced. In many cases, the Soviet Union was initially *welcomed*, usually as a glorified liberator and brother nation.

One such state was Czechoslovakia, where the line between legitimate and illegitimate was muddled. In 1948, the communists rose to power in a “bloodless” and seemingly authentic manner within Czechoslovakia’s established democratic system. This reality contradicts the modern rhetoric that the only way Communists could have come to power was via state subversion, terror, etc.—anything but by the people’s will. So how is it possible that a country chose East over West?

This paper explores a unique and overlooked angle involving the Czech transition from war to Soviet Satellite: the role of the “German question.” The Czechoslovak situation is unique from that of other Bloc neighbors because it had a democracy that served as a platform for the communists to gain public support. With anti-German sentiment at its peak following the war, this emotion was fueled and directed via effective propaganda campaigns aimed at steering public support toward the communists. The divisive issue at hand as Czechoslovakia decided whether to align herself more strongly with the East or the West? Who was doing more to suppress Germany.

I undertook to answer the following questions by examining the speeches and correspondences of leading Czechoslovak officials, 1947 public opinion polls, and articles printed in the communist daily *Rude Pravo*: How effective was communist propaganda in not only galvanizing support for the Soviet Union but also undermining sympathies with the West? To what extent was the US aware of this all-encompassing fear of the Germans? Did the US attempt to alleviate this psychological pressure or at least fully understand the danger of ignoring its effects? I found that a recurrent theme amongst the propaganda was a declaration of Soviet solidarity with the Czechs towards countering a resurgent Germany. Additionally, *Rude Pravo* and communist officials systematically undermined their Great Power compatriots by presenting the Americans and other Western entities as oblivious or antithetical to this goal. Furthermore, evidence suggests that the West's efforts to counter these attacks were limited and insufficient, or came too late to make a difference. When the US made it a policy objective by 1947 to rebuild and re-arm Western Germany, it was not difficult for the communists to galvanize the tense and pervasive anti-German sentiment and leverage it against the Western powers.

Historiography

The predominant western rhetoric tends to view the Czechoslovak story as one of absolute tragedy and victimhood. Though Soviet occupation would be devastating, suppressing Czechoslovak autonomy and self-affirmation, at the time the Czechoslovak people had, of course, no prescience of the reality that would soon befall them. In the early days of Soviet involvement in the country, the Czechoslovak position was one of optimism and fraternity.

Yet, disdain for the Soviet occupation discolors the reality of the earlier days of the communist takeover. This view resounds through most of the literature on the time period, and usually that of Czechoslovak expats such as Josef Korbel. Korbel writes in his book *The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia* a heart-wrenching tale of how the Czechs had been duped by insincere Communists who manipulated not just their feelings toward the Germans but toward such cultural elements as religion as well.¹ While communist occupation was indeed tragic, what is missing from the aforementioned accounts is an impartial and telling portrayal of the compelling nature of communism at the time, and on that note, why the Czechs would have considered it a viable—and even preferable—alternative to the West.

Top-down approaches that view events primarily as the results of Great Power dynamics also dominate literature on the Czechoslovak coup. This perspective tends to minimize the Czechoslovak role; as if they were a medium for Great Power tactics instead of an entity capable of autonomy. Walter Ullman's book, *The United States in Prague 1945-1948*, suffers from this problem. He mentions the German issue in a brief section of his book, but only explores the events surrounding the Great Power decision at Potsdam to sanction the early transfer of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia to occupied Germany and Austria.² He does not explore the topic further, as if the transfer had settled the matter completely. The danger of this top-down, Great-Powers-focused approach is that it misses the dynamics that are keystone in a democratically-functioning society. Unless the countries outside of the “big three” are insentient, it is worthwhile not

¹ Korbel, Josef. *The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia 1938-1948: The failure of coexistence*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1959

² Ullman, Walter. *The United States in Prague, 1945-1948*. East European Quarterly, Boulder. New York: Columbia University Press. 1978

only to focus on events within the country itself but also explore more strata of society in a historical analysis.

Radomir Luza and Ladislav Cabada, authors of “Czechoslovakia between Democracy and Communism, 1945-1948”³ and “From Munich to the Renewal of Czechoslovakia”⁴ respectively, each narrow their scopes from the larger powers to party dynamics within Czechoslovakia. Their perspectives are still top-down as they focus on the reconfiguration of the political structure at the time—which is indeed valuable—however, they fail to explain how the Czechoslovak people, unaware of these mechanisms, could be so attracted to the communist party. Their accounts fail to answer a critical question: What motivated the Czechoslovaks to feel a stronger proclivity toward the Soviets than toward the West?

Regardless of whether one accepts the view of the Czechoslovak people as victims, their strong historical and geopolitical ties to the West foment blame, either because the West let an ally succumb to an evil aggressor, or because it didn’t put in a sufficient effort to begin with. Why didn’t the West intervene? The most common, albeit superficial response is that Europe had already been divided into “spheres of influence,” and Czechoslovakia was consigned to the East. The fact of the matter is that Prague’s fate hadn’t already been decided. Czechoslovakia had not been drawn into Eastern territory or discussed at Yalta or during the famous Churchill-Stalin napkin agreement when the “spheres of influence” were technically outlined. In fact, the Americans and Soviets had

³ Luza, Radomir. “Czechoslovakia between Democracy and Communism.” In *History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1948*. Ed. Mamatey, Victor S. and Luza, Radomir. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973). P, 387-415

⁴ Cabada, Ladislav. “From Munich to the Renewal of Czechoslovakia.” *Czechoslovakia and The Czech Republic in World Politics*. Ed. Cabada, Ladislav and Waisova, Sarka. (Lexington Books. 2011) p. 45-50

negotiated a troop withdrawal to leave Czechoslovakia independent. Furthermore, the United States had played an instrumental role in Czechoslovakia's independence years after World War I, when it not only granted the country freedom and autonomy from Austria-Hungary but helped to establish a free and fair democracy. Not only was Czechoslovakia therefore considered a close friend, but also the US was already developing programs to incentivize countries to choose the West over the East, capitalism over communism. The US had the means and the reason to at least consider a meager effort in winning Czechoslovakia.

Thus, if Czechoslovakia was truly a 'wild card' directly after its liberation in 1945, why did the US decide that building up Western Germany as a defense against Soviet expansion was a better idea than making a difference in a country where they still could, a country that could serve as a wedge into the Soviet Bloc no less? Furthermore, as the Soviet Union legitimized its occupancy of Eastern Europe as creating a buffer zone against a resurgent Germany, why was it paradoxically the West's objective to rebuild Germany, a fact that not only would push Czechoslovakia toward the communists, but legitimize the Soviet Union's occupation in Europe as a whole?

Historian Igor Lukes blames the insufficient American response on the lack of intel coming out of the American embassy in Prague. Through extensive research into the personal papers of then-Ambassador Lawrence Steinhardt, Lukes paints a convincing portrait of an ambassador who spent too much time vacationing and did not know enough about his post country.⁵ In particular, Lukes condemns Steinhardt's reports of jubilant festivals and feeling of national pride resounding through Czechoslovakia; nowhere is the

⁵ Lukes, Igor. *On the Edge of the Cold War*. Oxford University Press. 2012

“communist menace” to be seen. What he was observing—the upsurge in nationalism and the groupthink that accompanies it—was an important clue, not entirely a symptom of ignorant frivolity as Lukes sees it. The same wave of nationalistic euphoria that drew Steinhardt to these festivals was washing over the rest of the country as well. It would ultimately lead to the irrevocable decision to side with the Soviets.

Germans in Czechoslovakia following World War II

As the Second World War was drawing to an end, the Eastern and Western fronts were closing in toward each other; in Czechoslovakia, this meeting point would be a line that roughly ran through Plzen, a town to the East of Prague. This stopping point had been negotiated beforehand; thus, although the Americans had arrived early and could have kept moving in to liberate Prague, they honored their agreement with the Soviets who would liberate Prague themselves shortly thereafter. In the meantime, the Czechs were left wondering why the Americans had stood idly by during those few days before the Soviets arrived.⁶ The situation was reminiscent of the tragedy in which the Soviets waited across the river from Warsaw for the Nazis to ransack the city before moving in. This event, and the speculation that surrounded it, would be both the beginning of Western skepticism amongst the Czechs as they decided which side would be better ally in sympathizing with Czech concerns against the Germans. The debate surrounding this topic would last until the West lost any conceivable chance of making a difference in swaying public opinion—that point was the “communist coup” on February 25, 1948.

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⁶ 16-52916-1 “Department of State Incoming Telegram, No. 61, Received January 22, 1948. From Praha, to Secretary of State.”

The country was ecstatic when the Soviets liberated Prague in May of 1945; the Czechoslovak people, supported by the Soviets, eagerly set about purging the country of its German (and Hungarian fascist) entities.

To underline the nature of the anti-German sentiment in this time period, it would be valuable to have a brief context of how these emotions embodied themselves between 1946-1948. In Czechoslovakia, which had a large German population living in its Sudeten, Transcarpathian, and Reich territories, the post war German treatment and expulsion was particularly horrifying. The Czech liberation gave rise to a strong nationalist movement, fueled by their kinship with their Soviet liberators who were also Slavs. No one was immune from the effects of this widespread nationalist hysteria; not even the westward-looking president, Beneš, whose first order of business upon returning from exile in 1945 was to expel Germans and Hungarians from Czechoslovakia. He claimed that if he did not purge the country of its fascist minorities, civil war would inevitably ensue, adding: “If the Germans come back... it will be to annihilate Czechoslovakia.”⁷ Accordingly, over 3 million ethnic Germans were expelled through 1946.⁸ Many of the German refugees flooded into Austria and the American sector of the occupied Western Germany. Those Germans who were deported had their citizenships revoked and their valuable possessions confiscated before entering the out-bound trains. These were the lucky ones, however, as many would be imprisoned in forced labor camps, forgotten for decades thereafter. These labor camps began to fill with Germans who were literally replacing the Jews for whom the camps had originally been built and

⁷ 860F.00/5-393. Telegraph “To Secretary of State from AmEmbassy Praha May 23, 1947.”

⁸ Heimann, Mary. *Czechoslovakia: The State that Failed*. London: Yale University Press. 2009 p.156

facing similar punishment, including undernourishment via inadequate rations. In fact, in some places before expulsion Germans were even required to wear a white armband, schools were closed, they were unable to switch residences, visit places of public amusement, and they could only shop at designated hours.⁹ In a sick twist of irony, the Germans were administered a strong dose of their own medicine.

While the Germans suffered a swift and rocky expulsion, there were undeniable benefits for the remaining Czech and Slovak citizens in their wake. Besides helping themselves to the possessions taken from deported Germans, land was confiscated and redistributed to the most nationalistic Czech peasants. Approximately 1,460,000 persons deemed to be ethnically suitable Slavs were moved in to claim the vacant properties.¹⁰ Additionally, the removal of the Germans (as well as the Hungarians, who had been uprooted from the Southern Slovak border regions and traded for equal amounts of Slovaks from Hungary) had a practical dimension too. An ethnically homogenous state was more stable insofar as it eliminated any ‘fifth columns’ that could be manipulated by outside powers.

A large ‘witch-hunt’ occurred as nationalist Czechoslovaks, spurred on by their politicians, sought to rid themselves of any German, no matter what their alliances to the original Nazi regime had been. Germans were labeled broadly as “fascists,” “traitors,” “collaborationists,” and “foreign oppressors.” 97% of those brought to court were found guilty. To make matters worse, Beneš had passed a law that insisted death sentences be carried out within two to three hours of the sentence, which effectively crushed the

⁹ Heimann, *Czechoslovakia: The State that Failed*. 157-158

¹⁰ Heimann, *Czechoslovakia: The State that Failed*. 154

opportunity for appeals.¹¹ This rate was much lower in Slovakia, which was not in a position to blame Fascism on a rival ethnic group as it had been a fascist satellite during the Second World War.

The divide between Czechs and Slovak ‘fascists’ would also strain the relations between the two parts of the Czechoslovak whole for years to come. Because the Communists found such an eager audience in the Czech area of the country, oppositional parties were shifting their focus to the areas they could still win support: Slovakia.¹² Yet, this was no deterrent for the Communists, who undermined Slovak credibility by essentially deeming their opinion irrelevant since Slovakia had been a fascist hub during World War II.¹³ Clearly, an ex fascist region could not empathize with the greater Czech goals of a crippled Germany and Slovakia was essentially marginalized.

The on-the-ground reality in 1947-48 Czechoslovakia doesn’t directly explain the appeal of communism but rather the appeal of anything anti-German—which is exactly what the Soviets offered. In 1947, Benes defined Czechoslovakia’s position as one “concretely” between the East and West: “As to the relations toward Germany and our security, we are and will be going with the Russians and with the Soviet Union, always and without stipulation. As for our cultural life, we are Europeans, we are not with the West or only with the East.”¹⁴ Benes, leader of the Czechoslovak party of National Socialists, would distinctively attempt to maintain Czechoslovakia’s position as one of autonomy bridging East and West. Though he naively expected to maintain power in this

¹¹ Heimann, *Czechoslovakia: The State that Failed*. 159

¹² 860F.00/5-2947. “Subject: Growing Tension in Czech-Slovak Relations, From Ambassador Steinhardt to the Honorable Secretary of State, May 29, 1947.”

¹³ 860F.00/5-2947. “Subject: Growing Tension in Czech-Slovak Relations, From Ambassador Steinhardt to the Honorable Secretary of State, May 29, 1947.”

¹⁴ Airgram no. A312, May 9, 1947. Embassy Praha. (Steinhardt)

position, his party and those others that had joined the National Socialists in a bloc against the communists would be greatly hurt by the West's decision to re-arm Germany that same year. Ambassador Steinhardt warned the US that:

All Czech political thinking is conditioned by the belief that the ultimate reemergence of Germany as a strong and aggressive power is not only possible but probably. This belief accounts for the unswerving loyalty with which even such moderate leaders as President Benes cling to the Soviet alliance. The belief is of course strengthened by existing disagreements among the Great Powers over the character of the German settlement. A corollary advantage which the Soviet Union reaps from delaying a definitive German settlement, is therefore, that Czechoslovakia, in common with other countries in this part of Europe, are (sic) given an additional reason for prolonging their political and military dependence on the Soviet Union.¹⁵

Across Czechoslovakia, pro-West and anti-Communist parties struggled to reconcile the concrete actions happening next door with their people's fear of a resurgent Germany.

When US Chargé d'Affairs John H. Bruin traveled throughout Czechoslovakia in August 1947 to touch base with Western-leaning political figures, he was repeatedly pressed to change the American position on re-arming Western Germany. In one such meeting, Slovak politician Frastacky and his colleagues would turn the subject back to the American activity in Germany:

[They] evinced great perplexity and perturbation over American policy of reviving German economy. They were quite evidently afraid the American policy would go to far and that Germany would emerge as a great power. I did my best to assure them on this score...As the interview proceeded they expressed great concern over the revival of German industry, particularly the recent American policy of sponsoring an increase of coal and steel output of the Ruhr. They were quite evidently suspicious and distrustful of American policy and claimed that this policy would lead to catastrophe.¹⁶

¹⁵ 860F.00/5-393. Telegraph "To Secretary of State from AmEmbassy Praha May 23, 1947." NARA

¹⁶ "Memorandum to the Ambassador Charles W. Yost from George F. Bogardus, Subject: Tour of Slovakia" Enclosure to 2922, August 1, 1947. AmEmbassy Praha

The concrete Western actions in Germany had the effect of driving the nation into the “clutches” of the communists; this was only reinforced when Benes asked for a shipment of grain to offset a bad harvest that same fall which was denied by the West (and filled by the Soviet Union) when they claimed that the communists were gaining too much support and that Benes was too critical of Western decisions in Germany. Back at home in Czechoslovakia, Benes would be perceived as impotent against a backwards West and his platform was undermined.

Communist support surged in 1947 as Western support plummeted. Public opinion polls revealed that 81-98% of Czechoslovaks did not believe Germany could ever become a democratic and peace-loving country and would instead seek to start a new war.¹⁷ At the end of the Paris peace conference, a poll revealed that of those who had changed their minds about the Western Powers following the conclusion, 79% had a more negative perspective.¹⁸ Churchill’s popularity suffered a 92.5% decline in those who changed their mind about him after his antagonism toward the Soviets and subsequent decision to support efforts to rebuild Germany in an attempt to provide a safety net against Soviet expansion into Western Europe.¹⁹ The Czechs looked desperately for support in the now even more likely event that Germany would return.

They found it in alignment with neighboring countries, such as Poland. In April of 1947, the Czechoslovaks and Poles had drafted the Polish-Czech Friendship treaty which provided that, “in the event one of the parties should become involved in conflict with Germany, the other party ‘shall, forthwith, without any negotiations or any questions,

¹⁷ 860F.00/6-447. “Subject: Recent Surveys of Czechoslovak Opinion” To the Honorable Secretary of State from Ambassador Steinhardt of Prague. June 4, 1947.

¹⁸ *What’s your opinion? A year’s survey of public opinion in Czechoslovakia*. Compiled by Ing. Dr. Cenek Adamec, Dr. Bohus Pospisil, Milan Tesar. (Prague: Orbis June 1947) p. 18. NARA.

¹⁹ *What’s your opinion? A year’s survey of public opinion in Czechoslovakia*. 19

bring assistance embracing all the ways and means at her disposal.’’²⁰ Rude Pravo hailed the victory of the treaty, underscored Soviet empathy and support with the Polish and Czech anti-German cause, and lambasted the West for being antithetical to this goal:

The Conference showed the deep contrast between the Soviet Union and its chief partners of the World War II. The cause of this contrast lies in the efforts to prevent the Soviet Union and the liberated nations to enjoy the fruits of victory over Fascism and in the fact that some people in the West are not interested in a consistent extermination of German and Japanese imperialism.²¹

Rude Pravo and the Communist Party’s words were immensely effective in appealing to the anti-German furor I described above. By playing the West’s actions to their benefit and drawing a contrast between the two parties, it was easy to galvanize support for the communists.

By January 1948, US Chargé d’Affairs Bruins began to consider doing something to attempt to reverse anti-American and anti-Western sentiment in Czechoslovakia:

I am convinced there are three things we could do which would materially consolidate pro-Western sentiment and that we should do all of them without delay: (1) negotiate a commercial agreement, (2) negotiate a cultural convention; (3) publish American documents in Czechoslovakia on true story of liberation of Praha.²²

These suggestions came too late considering that the situation had been brewing since 1945. No action would be taken on the first two points, but as for the third, US Ambassador Steinhardt would request to declassify the documents pertaining to the Great Power agreement to stop at the Plzen line. This request, received on January 22, 1948,

²⁰ 860F.00/7-957 Airgram. “Remarks by Foreign Minister Modzelewski Regarding the Polish-Czech Friendship Treaty.” April 18, 1947. NARA

²¹ 860F.00/6-1147 Telegram. “Clement Gottwald at the session of the Communist Party Central Committee” Rude Pravo—June 6, 1947. NARA

²² 860F.00B/1-2848: Telegram. “The Chargé in Czechoslovakia (Bruins) to the Secretary of State.” Praha, January 28, 1948. FRUS Eastern Europe, 1948.

would take a month to run through declassification procedures in both America and Great Britain, finally being released just five days before the coup on February 25, 1948.²³

Conclusion

The more technical aspects of the “communist subversion” took root in the spillover from this chaos. By 1948, the communists pervaded all levels of government and society. They had used a combination of fear and incentives in the wake of the Germans to systematically occupy a political majority in Czechoslovakia. This furor came to a head just a few days before the “coup” when on February 21st, Communist Prime Minister Gottwald condemned any remaining non-Communist government workers as an “anti-populist, anti-democratic, anti-socialist bloc threatening to push Czechoslovakia *toward a new Munich*.”²⁴ The appeal to anti-German fear was effective: the accusation necessarily included the president himself, a National Socialist. Thus, President Beneš was inundated with appeals from factory workers to push forward ministerial resignations, positions that would be replaced with Communists. Though he attempted to hold out, a few days later on the 24th a massive crowd comprising a sixth of the Czechoslovak population participated in a strike organized by the Communist party and trade organizations. Beneš succumbed under this pressure and swore in the ministers. This act sealed the communist takeover; additionally, Beneš’ approval had the effect of legitimizing turnover to the Soviets.

If events occurred the way the modern Western rhetoric describes them, the Soviet coup in Czechoslovakia would most likely not have been bloodless and would have fallen into the same category as that of Poland’s 1947 fraudulent election. The fact

²³ 711.66F/2-1348. “Outgoing Telegram from Secretary of State (Marshall) to AmEmbassy London, February 20, 1948.” NARA.

²⁴ Heiman, *Czechoslovakia: The State that Failed*. 173

of the matter is that in the period between the end of the Second World War and the eventual coup in 1948, the Communists enjoyed significant support from the Czechoslovak people themselves.

Milan Kundera, one of the most famous Czech novelists from the communist period, was originally an avid member of the Czech Communist Party until he was expelled shortly after the coup. He writes indirectly about his experience in *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting*, describing the early Czechoslovak feeling toward the Soviet Communists as one of optimism, hope, and enthusiasm:

In 1939, the German army entered Bohemia, and the Czech state ceased to exist. In 1945, the Russian army entered Bohemia, and the country once again was called an independent republic. The people were enthusiastic about the Russia that had driven out the Germans, and seeing in the Czech Communist Party its faithful arm, they became sympathetic to it. So the Communists took power in February 1948 with neither bloodshed nor violence, but greeted by the cheers of half the nation... [The Communists] had an imposing program. A plan for an entirely new world where everyone would find a place. The opponents had no great dream, only some tiresome and threadbare principles, with which they tried to patch the torn trousers of the established order. So its no surprise that the enthusiasts, the spirited ones, easily won out over the halfhearted and the cautious, and rapidly set about to realize their dream: the idyll of justice for all.²⁵

As Kundera and the rest of Czechoslovakia would soon discover, the Soviet vision was not at all what they had expected. The strong emotions reverberating throughout the country clouded their judgment and it would appear that Czech popular support swung toward the party with the strongest anti-German line. The relevancy of such a history brings up important questions, most primarily surrounding the idea that events could have gone majorly differently if the West had not decided to rebuild Western Germany, in doing so alienating the ex-Nazi-occupied countries and emboldening the Soviet Union that had declared at Yalta that it would stay in Eastern Europe in so far as it desired a

²⁵ Kundera, Milan. *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting*. Harper Perennial, 1996. P 10-11

buffer zone between it and a resurgent Germany. In this regard, it also adds to the general discussion about how and why communism could have been appealing at this time period though it may be so universally detested today. Finally, we are faced with an intriguing comparison of Soviet and American tactics and which was the more appealing and why—in this case, the Soviets were able to address a very real and vivid sentiment to the Czechoslovak masses. It was a sentiment that the West handled clumsily, and to their detriment.

Bibliography

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Cabada, Ladislav. "From Munich to the Renewal of Czechoslovakia." *Czechoslovakia and The Czech Republic in World Politics*. Ed. Cabada, Ladislav and Waisova, Sarka. (Lexington Books. 2011) p. 45-50

A brief and dry summary of the events between 1938-1948.

Heimann, Mary. *Czechoslovakia: The State that Failed*. London: Yale University Press. 2009

The German author takes it upon herself to present the shocking reality of what it was like to be German following WWII in a very helpful chapter. The rest of the book presents a cynical perspective of the history of Czechoslovakia from the beginning of its formation after World War I to its end in 1993.

Korbel, Josef. *The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia 1938-1948: The failure of coexistence*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1959

A timeline beginning at the end of the war and tracing the "communist subversion" up to the 1948 coup. Very sympathetic to Benes, this overly flowery book is academic in mentioning facts for further exploration but is too biased to be considered a serious source.

Lukes, Igor. *On the Edge of the Cold War*. Oxford University Press. 2012

Focuses on Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt's insufficient correspondence of events on the ground during the steady communist takeover. This book contributes to a picture of what might have plagued US intel of the Czechoslovak situation.

Luza, Radomir. "Czechoslovakia between Democracy and Communism." In *History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1948*. Ed. Mamatey, Victor S. and Luza, Radomir. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973). P, 387-415

A general summary of events that is not specific about the German situation. This fact in itself might help provide a means for measuring the actual effect of German fear

"People's Democracy Triumphs in Central and Southeast European Countries. Growing Cooperation Among Socialist States." *Soviet Foreign Policy 1945-1980*. Volume II. Ed. Gromyko A.A., Ponomarev B. N. Translated from Russian by David Skvirsky. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981. P. 51-61

The translated Soviet version of events reveals an interesting anti-west, pro-USSR rhetoric that might be similar to that the Czechs would have read about "Western imperialists." A good point to begin to explore the nature of propaganda.

Rosser, Richard F. *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*. Prentice Hall. 1969. 147-152

Describes very generally the Soviet “plan of action” in acquiring the Visegrad states as a buffer zone and the systematic communist subversion therein, from the Soviet side.

Schmidt, Dana Adams. *Anatomy of a Satellite*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1952

Schmidt does a good job of examining the structure of the communist apparatus in Czechoslovakia, in the buildup before the coup and after its completion. Useful guide for understanding the way that information was disseminated and power therefore acquired.

Taborsky, Edward. “President Edward Benes and the Czechoslovak Crises of 1938 and 1948.” In *Czechoslovakia: Crossroads and Crises, 1918-1988*. Ed. Stone, Norman and Strouhal, Eduard. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989) P.120-143

Taborsky is considered the prominent expert on Czechoslovak President Benes. Unlike Josef Korbel’s book, which is too overtly biased, Taborsky sticks to the facts and his portrait of the President reflects the pressures from the people, the West, and the Soviet Union and how these ultimately might have led to his takeover.

Ullman, Walter. *The United States in Prague, 1945-1948*. East European Quarterly, Boulder. New York: Columbia University Press. 1978

Ullman provides a general history using primarily archival documents surrounding this time period, relying on much the same sources as Igor Lukes but lacking a thesis. It is a useful overview within which I can place my own, more specific, investigation.

Primary Sources

Kundera, Milan. *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting*. Harper Perennial, 1996. P 10-11

A novel that contains Kundera’s personal interjections on his memoirs of the Soviet takeover and occupation of Prague. Useful example to show the people’s early perspectives of Soviet occupation, as well as how it would develop as the occupation wore on.

FRUS Czechoslovakia 1947, 1948 and archival findings in Department of State files, NARA. The specific documents were used in the text of the essay:

- 16-52916-1 “Department of State Incoming Telegram, No. 61, Received January 22, 1948. From Praha, to Secretary of State.”
- 860F.00/5-393. Telegraph “To Secretary of State from AmEmbassy Praha May 23, 1947.”

- 860F.00/5-2947. "Subject: Growing Tension in Czech-Slovak Relations, From Ambassador Steinhardt to the Honorable Secretary of State, May 29, 1947."
- Airgram no. A312, May 9, 1947. Embassy Praha. (Steinhardt)
- 860F.00/5-393. Telegraph "To Secretary of State from AmEmbassy Praha May 23, 1947." NARA
- "Memorandum to the Ambassador Charles W. Yost from George F. Bogardus, Subject: Tour of Slovakia" Enclosure to 2922, August 1, 1947. AmEmbassy Praha
- 860F.00/6-447. "Subject: Recent Surveys of Czechoslovak Opinion" To the Honorable Secretary of State from Ambassador Steinhardt of Prague. June 4, 1947.
- *What's your opinion? A year's survey of public opinion in Czechoslovakia.* Compiled by Ing. Dr. Cenek Adamec, Dr. Bohus Pospisil, Milan Tesar. (Prague: Orbis June 1947) p. 18. NARA.
- 860F.00/7-957 Airgram. "Remarks by Foreign Minister Modzelewski Regarding the Polish-Czech Friendship Treaty." April 18, 1947. NARA
- 860F.00/6-1147 Telegram. "Clement Gottwald at the session of the Communist Party Central Committee" Rude Pravo—June 6, 1947. NARA
- 860F.00B/1-2848: Telegram. "The Chargé in Czechoslovakia (Bruins) to the Secretary of State." Praha, January 28, 1948. FRUS Eastern Europe, 1948.
- 711.66F/2-1348. "Outgoing Telegram from Secretary of State (Marshall) to AmEmbassy London, February 20, 1948." NARA.

The following documents were useful in guiding my general understanding of the events in 1947:

- 760C.60F11/3-347: Telegram: "Charge in Cz. (Bruins) to Secretary of State." Praha, March 3, 1947
- 860F.00/4-347: Telegram: "Ambassador in Cz. (Steinhardt) to Secretary of State." Praha, April 3, 1947
- 860F.00/5-847: Telegram: "Ambassador in Cz. (Steinhardt) to Secretary of State." Praha, May 8, 1947
- 560.AL/7-547: Telegram "Sec of State to Embassy in France." Washington, July 9, 1947
- 740.0011 EW (Peace)/7-1047: "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Riddleberger)." Washington, July 10, 1947
- 860F.00/7-1547: Telegram: "Ambassador in Cz. (Steinhardt) to Secretary of State." Praha, July 19, 1947
- 711.60F/7-2247: Telegram. "Ambassador in Cz. (Steinhardt) to Secretary of State." Praha, July 22, 1947
- 860F.00/8-1347: Telegram. "The Charge in Cz. (Yost) to the Sec. of State." Praha, August 13, 1947
- 860F.00/9-947: Telegram. "The Charge in Cz. (Yost) to the Sec. of State." Praha, September 9, 1947
- 860F.00/9-1547: Telegram. "The Charge in Cz. (Yost) to the Sec. of State." Praha, September 15, 1947
- 860F.00/9-2947: Telegram. "Ambassador in Cz. (Steinhardt) to Secretary of

State." Praha, September 29, 1947

- 860F.00/9-3047: Telegram. "Ambassador in Cz. (Steinhardt) to Secretary of State." Praha, September 30, 1947
- 711.60F/10-2947 "Memorandum of Conversation by the Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Beam)." Washington, October 29, 1947
- 860F.51/11-1447 "Memorandum of Conversation by the Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Beam)." Washington, November 14, 1947
- 860F.00/11-2047: Telegram. "Ambassador in Cz. (Steinhardt) to Secretary of State." Praha, November 20, 1947
- 740.00113 EW/11-2047: Telegram. "Ambassador in Cz. (Steinhardt) to Secretary of State." Praha, September 20, 1947
- 860F.00/11-2047: Telegram November 20, Praha (mentioned in footnotes)
- 860F.6131/12-547: Telegram, "The Charge in Cz. (Bruins) to the Sec. of State." Praha, December 5, 1947
- 860F.6131/12-347: Telegram, December 3, Praha (mentioned in footnotes)
- 860F.6131/12-2427: Telegram, December 24, Praha (mentioned in footnotes)
- 860F.00B/12-2247: Telegram, "The Charge in Cz. (Bruins) to the Sec. of State." Praha, December 22, 1947