Conflict versus Collaboration:

Insurgents, Drones, and the Flawed Strategic Mindset of the United States Defense Institution

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ABSTRACT

After the conduction of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, officials of the United States Department of Defense declared that there would be "no going back" to the narrow-minded strategic approach that guided the institution in the Cold War era. However, analysis of the technology-centered "revolution" occurring within the Defense Department demonstrates that the transformation has so far been one of tactic, not strategy. This paper utilizes Nobel Prize recipient Thomas Schelling's models of conflict behavior to parse the strategic differences between conventional war and insurgency. A comparison of the essential elements of insurgency with those of conventional warfare demonstrates that the relationships between players in these two conflicts are fundamentally converse and therefore demand very different strategies. Review of classical insurgency and counterinsurgency literature supports an understanding of insurgency as a 'people's war' and is strategically lending to Schelling's model of bargaining games. In contrast, the American defense institution's reliance upon technology, as fomented by intradepartmental analyses of the American military victories against the Soviet Union and Iraq, demonstrates that the Defense Department is primed solely for pure conflict. Current United States drone policy is evaluated by examining key indicators of popular support and recruitment of Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Yemen. This illustrative case study demonstrates that the use of drone strikes as the primary U.S. Defense tactic against transnational insurgency is counterintuitive to the critical bargaining game played between insurgents and the local population. The United States' reliance on drones is therefore concluded to be no more than a symptom of the Defense Department's inability to think outside of the strategy of pure conflict, which places the American military at a disadvantage in the global campaign to lessen terrorism.

In *The Strategy of Conflict* (1960), Nobel Prize recipient Thomas Schelling pioneers the use of game theory in evaluating conflict behavior. Upon identifying three distinct types of 'games' played by opponents and parsing their intrinsic characteristics, Schelling concludes that a rational strategy in any game situation depends essentially on the definition of the relationship between players. Written originally within the context of the Cold War and the development of nuclear weapons, Schelling's book sheds light on the ways in which inherent power or skill does not always translate into tangible advantage in situations of conflict. His revolutionary analysis is just as relevant today as it was to the Cold War strategists of the mid-twentieth century. When considering the changing nature of warfare in this century, the criticality of understanding the game of insurgency cannot be overstated. A comparison of the essential elements of insurgency with those of conventional warfare demonstrates that the relationships between players in these two conflicts are fundamentally converse and therefore demand very different strategies. Furthermore, an analysis of both the structure of the United States Department of Defense and its current technology-centered strategic mindset, as fomented by intradepartmental analyses of the American 'victories' against the Soviet Union and Iraq, demonstrates that the American military is primed solely for pure conflict. The Obama administration's current strategy for combating transnational insurgent militancy—targeted killing by way of unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones—reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the 'game' played between the United States and emerging insurgent threats. In order for the US defense institution to properly address threats of terror and insurgent militancy in the coming century, it must first address the stark contrast between insurgent strategic culture and that of the global hegemon.

A. Games of Pure Conflict

Schelling begins *The Strategy of Conflict* with an analysis of 'games of pure conflict', where the preferences of two players are perfectly correlated inversely. Action in this situation is zero-sum, where a gain by one player means a loss by the opponent. Schelling notes that by his time of writing, a vast amount of game theory literature had already yielded many insights into the strategy of pure conflict. Success in these games could be determined by mathematical calculations of both relative strength and probability. Starting resources which would provide clear advantage (intelligence, relevant skill, and the like) should necessarily be weighed by opposing sides. Strategy, in the case of pure conflict, is typified by "pursuit and evasion", whereas "threats and promises are of no consequence in the accepted theory of zero-sum games."[1]

The theoretical notion of conventional war, where states develop and train standing armies to meet in a designated field of war, historically lended to the strategy of pure conflict. The great Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz defines war in the first chapter of *On War* as "nothing but a duel on an extensive scale".[2] His extended analogy perfectly encapsulates the essence of zero-sum game strategy. If the adversaries of war are likened to "two wrestlers", "striv[ing] by physical force to compel the other to submit to his will", victory by one side is fully contingent upon skill.[3] The nature of the perceived end of war—which Clausewitz famously defines as political—does not change the means by which that end is reached. Violence, Clausewitz contends, is the compulsory instrument of war, and

"disarmament becomes therefore the immediate *object* of hostilities in theory".[4] It is only after disabling the enemy that the victor is able to impose his political will.

It is important to note that while Clausewitz depicts war in the abstract as a zero-sum game played between two skilled opponents, he recognizes its "modification in the reality".[5] In particular, he notes three prerequisite conditions which must be met in order for war to progress in pure conflict: first, conflict must arise suddenly and in complete isolation from the previous history of combatant states; second, it must be limited to a single solution (or outcome); and third, the solution must be perfect, complete, and bring about a political situation which will be free from future conflicts between the two parties. These principles reflect the logical basis of game theorizing as it derives from mathematics. Decisions are isolated from outside influences, information is rationally analyzed through cost-benefit analysis, and choices are final and exact. Recognizing the absolute improbability that war will ever resemble this equation in its entirety, *On War* proceeds as a strategy for navigating the *reality* of war, defined by friction, polarity, and oftentimes, an imperfect conclusion. However, systems of defense designed around conventional war—such as that of the United States—are often structured to address the objective, theoretical model of war rather than its complex modification in the reality.

B. Games of Pure Collaboration

The second type of game situation Schelling identifies is 'pure collaboration'. Players in games of pure collaboration, having identical preferences, win or lose together. He challenges

the assumption that the study of these kinds of interactions is trivial—a rational course of action, in this case, is obvious to both players—by noting potential coordination problems. The most critical element of the pure collaboration game is the communication structure, which dictates the capacity for players to actively anticipate and compliment each other's actions. Oftentimes, barriers to communication necessitate behavior that is suggestive, such as the concerted effort of two people crossing paths on a sidewalk to walk to their right in order to avoid collision.

Schelling stresses that the pure collaboration game is a game of strategy—as opposed to skill—because "it is a behavior situation in which each player's best choice of action depends upon the action he expects the other to take, which he knows depends, in turn, on the other's expectations of his own."[6] The interdependence of expectations, as Schelling calls this phenomenon, distinguishes pure collaboration from pure conflict: in the first, players are motivated to make their actions predictable to the other, whereas in the second, tipping off your opponent is definitively ill-advised. In games of pure collaboration, mutual understanding forms the center of strategy, whereas games of pure conflict necessitate an objective evaluation of skills, resources, and probabilities. Most importantly, the reasoning of players in games of pure collaboration becomes disconnected from the objective situation, which has the effect of marginalizing the importance of individual strength or inherent skill. Schelling observes that "one is not, in tacit coordination, trying to guess what the other will do in an objective situation; one is trying to guess what the other will guess one's self to guess the other to guess, and so on ad infinitum."[7] In pure coordination, therefore, it is not a matter of guessing what the "average person" would do, but recognizing and anticipating the choice of your opponent, who

may be guided by an entirely different set of rational inclinations and constraints. Oftentimes, as Schelling notes, the stable influence of institutions, traditions, or leadership shape serve to shape the 'rules' that govern a conflict.[8] In this sense, Schelling is not opposing the principles of rationality—that actors have ordered, consistent, and transitive preferences which they seek to maximize—but merely arguing that the *context* within which individual preferences are formed has a great impact on the character of the preferences themselves, as well as how they are perceived to be best maximized. Within a game between two players, therefore, understanding the opponent player and the context within which that player operates is critically important.

C. Bargaining Games

The third and perhaps most important game type is 'mixed-motive' or bargaining. These games are characterized by a combination of conflict and coordination and are interactions "in which, though the element of conflict provides the dramatic interest, mutual dependence is part of the logical structure and demands some kind of collaboration or mutual accommodation—tacit, if not explicit—even if only in the avoidance of mutual disaster."[9] It was Schelling's fascination with the potential application of game theory to bargaining situations which sparked his interest in writing *The Strategy of Conflict,* beginning with his observation of nuclear proliferation by states in the mid-twentieth century. Although the world continued to witness conventional, interstate war, the strategic context of these conflicts was suddenly and entirely transformed by the possibility of mutually assured destruction. War, in this situation, required some element of collaboration in order to protect the future of the human race;

'winning', under these conditions, potentiated that everyone could lose. In essence, nuclear weapons made state-on-state warfare non-zero-sum and transformed the power of lethal weaponry into an element that was no longer of inherent advantage.

The key recognition made by Schelling is that bargaining games adopt their critical elements from games of pure collaboration, not pure conflict. He contends that because the actions of bargaining players are also guided by the interdependence of expectations, it is not always an advantage to possess knowledge or skill so long as your opponent better understands your position and anticipates your reasoning. Schelling clarifies this point by stating that "mixed-motive refers not, of course, to an individual's lack of clarity about his own preferences but rather the ambivalence of his relation to the other player—the mixture of mutual dependence and conflict, of partnership and competition."[10] While the bargaining game is non-zero-sum, preferences diverge significantly enough that success on behalf of one player is possible. The key to winning a bargaining game lies not in the character of conflict but in mutual dependence: the player who is best able to exploit the character of mutual dependence for unilateral gain will be successful. Like the bargaining game—which contributes this character of mutual dependence—reasoning between players becomes disconnected from the objective situation and so a deep understanding of the *context* within which the opponent operates is essential. Knowing the enemy, in the case of bargaining games, is the primary determinant of success.

Insurgency, at its core, is a bargaining game. Its strategic context is defined by both competition with the state and coordination with the population in which it is embedded. While there exists an obvious element of conflict in an insurgent campaign—typically directed

towards the existing governmental structure—an insurgency exists within and is colored by the realm of politics. Contrary to the Clausewitzian notion of politics as end, the mutual dependence of an insurgent on the populace necessitates politics as *means* in an insurrection. Bargaining, therefore, is at the strategic center of an insurgent campaign.

One of Mao Tse-Tung's generals stated that revolutionary war is "20% military and 80% political".[11] The insurgent, in Mao's eyes, is a political actor. In his highly influential book *On Guerrilla Warfare*, Mao states that "there is no reason to consider guerrilla warfare separately from national policy," and characterizes the guerrilla war of resistance against Japan as "the one pure expression of anti-Japanese policy".[12] Insurgents are motivated to pursue war—using guerrilla tactics, or otherwise—in order to "destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics".[13] In the case of an insurgency, obtaining this goal is not as simple as disarming the opponent and imposing the insurgent's political will. As Bard O'Neill observes, "most insurgent leaders know they risk destruction by confronting government forces in direct conventional engagements."[14] Engagement of those who form the foundation of a polity—the mass of the people—therefore forms the strategic center of an insurgency.

O'Neill acknowledges that the need for popular support is given critical recognition in the written and spoken commentaries of countless insurgent leaders over the course of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.[15] He quotes Mao, stating that "the richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people."[16] The Communist Party of China leader not only recognizes that popular political grievances—as channeled into an emotive framework for action—form the basis for an insurgent movement but asserts that guerrilla warfare "can

neither exist nor flourish if it separates from [the people's] sympathies and co-operation."[17] In

On Guerrilla Warfare, he likens insurgents to fish, and the people to the water in which the fish

swim.[18] His sentiments reflect the inability of an insurgency to thrive outside of its native

element: the population from which the movement derives its resources, recruitment, and

political will.

Bernard Fall suggests that the evidence amassed on guerrilla battlefields over the last

three decades points to civilian support as the essential determinant of insurgent success.[19]

Lieutenant Colonel David Galula recognizes the critical relationship between insurgents and the

local population in his highly influential book of counterinsurgency strategy, *Counterinsurgency*

Warfare: Theory and Practice. Galula postures that "war is not a chess game but a vast social

phenomenon with an infinitely greater and ever-expanding number of variables, some of which

exude analysis."[20] Civilian mobilization in support of an insurgency may be identified as one of

these variables, requiring not only a deep understanding of the social context but also an

acknowledgment of the mutual dependence between the insurgents and the population.

Galula's statements further support the characterization of insurgency as a game requiring

collaboration, rather than one of pure conflict. Schelling postures that "if *chess* is the standard

example of a zero-sum game, *charades* may typify the game of pure coordination; if *pursuit*

epitomizes the zero-sum game, *rendezvous* may do the same for the coordination game."[21] The

strategy of pure collaboration, therefore, is key to waging insurgent warfare in that it dictates

the game between insurgents and the population that supports them.

Galula analogizes the fight between insurgent and counterinsurgent to "a fight between

a fly and lion", in which "the fly cannot deliver a knockout blow and the lion cannot fly."[22] The

lion may swing fiercely at the fly with the occasional lethal affect, but there will always emerge more flies to contribute to the lion's exhaustion and frustration. This insight is of direct relevance to the evaluation of the 'game' between insurgents, the civilian population, and counterinsurgents. When practiced exclusively, counterinsurgent operations employing targeted force—the epitomic strategy of pure conflict—"have at best no more effect than a fly swatter. Some guerrillas are bound to be caught, but new recruits will replace them as fast as they are lost."[23] An effective counterinsurgent strategy must, as Schelling articulates, exploit the character of mutual dependence that exists between insurgents and the mass of the people. If we were to translate this wisdom into Galula's terminology, an ideal counterinsurgent strategy would require draining the swamp from which the flies breed. Applied to Mao's analogy, the mutual dependence of the fish on water makes the *water* a primary target.

II. The United States Defense Institution and Technology

A. Structure and Strategic Mindset: the Cold War to the Gulf War

The United States Department of Defense, as it exists today, reflects over four decades of changing security climate. Much of the structure, however, harkens back to American Cold War strategy. As combined with the perceived victory of technology in the Gulf War, the strategic mindset that emerged from Cold War thinking has penetrated the US Defense system and has continued to define American military operations in the twenty-first century. This

mindset, when scrutinized under the auspices of Schelling's models, markedly resembles the strategic thinking of pure conflict.

In 1998, former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski published a major work entitled *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*. The book is an elaborate manifestation of the strategic mindset which guided American defense policy makers in the critical period of the Cold War, from 1979-1985.[24] Brzezinski, who served under the Carter administration, witnessed the phase of deterioration which led the United States, under newly elected President Ronald Reagan, to abandon détente in favor of a more direct, confrontational approach towards the Soviet Union. During the 1970s, Brzezinski had been instrumental in propounding the idea that the Soviet system was incapable of evolving beyond the industrial phase into the "technetronic" age.[25] His model of conflict with the USSR, therefore, shifted emphasis onto the material and intellectual advantages afforded to the American defense system. In *The Grand Chessboard,* Brzezinski envisions the continuing competition between the US and former USSR as a chess game, where the player who most effectively uses strategy to command and control the course of interactions will emerge victor. The characterization of the 'game' between the two powers in this way represents the nearly two decades of pure conflict thinking that underlay the Cold War.

As a result of this pure conflict strategic mindset, the United States Department of Defense was developed in the late twentieth century around a state of constant technological innovation. Colonel T. X. Hammes describes the process by which American defense systems "were designed to find, identify, and track large, conventional forces, so that they could not surprise us."[26] The Soviet Union formed the archetypal conventional enemy: territorially-bound

and subject to defeat by an overwhelming demonstration of military power. In reaction, a strategy of proliferation ensued within the defense community, as stocks of weapons and intelligence were expanded and the United States prepared for the inevitable clash of two superpowers.

In analyzing the influence of the strategy of pure conflict on US defense institution, it is important to recognize the tactical difference between the technologies developed for use in interstate battle and nuclear weaponry. As previously noted, the development of the nuclear bomb transformed the strategic context of state-on-state warfare by necessitating some degree of collaboration between opponents. If pure conflict was allowed to progress without an element of coordination, both sides could risk nuclear holocaust. The proliferation of other technologies, including weapons of force and informational processing platforms, more aptly served the existing strategic framework of the Defense Department because they enabled increases in speed and power but could perceivably be used in battle without endangering the ultimate success of the United States. Radar, precision targeting, and guided missiles could be developed and utilized with the perception of pure strategic advantage, and would come to do so in the post-modern period.

Hammes chronicles that after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Department of Defense struggled to redefine its mission and reformulate a force structure in reflection of the new international system. He notes that "instead of studying the human and organization factors that led to the downfall of the Soviet Union, many analysts pointed to the USSR's inability to develop, produce, and finance the high-tech weapons systems necessary to keep up with the United States in our bipolar competition."[27] These sentiments confirmed Brzezinski's

predictions, and only further fomented the faith in technological innovation that had emerged prior to the Cold War. It was thought that American advantage in future conflicts would continue to be predicated on technical skill and the power of force. By placing technology at the center of American military strategy, the United States military was effectively able to deny the importance of ideological or organizational capacity in favor of what appeared to be more tangible assets.

In the early to mid-1980s, Colonel Huba Wass de Czege set out to revise the Army's field manual on operations. He postured that the 1976 edition formulated by General DePuy "was too static for the fast-moving modern battlefield" and conducted a significant review of the classics of military strategy—including Clausewitz and Sun Tzu—in order to redesign the Army's tactical plan of action.[28] He noted an important consistency between the classic theorists which had been missed by DePuy: each "stressed the importance of surprise, shock, and maneuver on the battlefield."[29] In order to capitalize on the advanced weaponry being developed in the Defense Department, Wass de Czege created a new framework for operations that would translate the use of these technologies into clear tactical advantage—exactly what their developers had intended them for. The publication of Wass de Czege's manual, titled *AirLand Battle,* molded combat operations in favor of the opponent which could fight faster, stronger, and more skillfully, with the aid of technology, embodying the enduring strategic mindset of pure conflict.

The ideas of *AirLand Battle* would come to define American combat operations in the First Gulf War. Within a month of arriving in Bagdad, US troops toppled the Iraqi regime, prompting President Bush and other defense policy officials to declare major victory.[30] Hammes

chronicles that after witnessing the stunning success of advanced weaponry in the Gulf, the Department of Defense took to the development of more and more high-tech instruments of war.[31] The enduring strategic mindset of pure conflict, in this case, fomented the illusion that these technologies played to the strength of the US military and were the primary mechanism by which the United States could maintain its military hegemony.

There is a paradigm at the center of the Department of Defense's current strategic mindset which has grave implications for its ability to adapt to the intra- and non-state wars being fought in this century. Fred Kaplan notes that by the time US troops entered Afghanistan in 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had embraced the technical revolution happening in the DOD, "not out of infatuation with high tech but because it fit his thinking about geostrategy in the post-Cold War era".[32] Kaplan contends that while the US military—an institution defined by tradition and bureaucratic inertia–has had the tendency to revert back to Cold War thinking, there would be "no going back" after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.[33] The current counterinsurgency strategy adopted by the Obama administration, however, is predicated on the use of unmanned robots and centered on the 'surgical' tactic of targeted killing.[34] This policy is entirely counterintuitive to the understanding of insurgency as a people's war, and may in fact encourage more terrorism than it prevents. The United States' reliance on drones is no more than a symptom of the Defense institution's inability to think outside of the strategy of pure conflict.

B. Case Study of Current Strategy: Drones in Pakistan and Yemen

On January 5, 2012, President Barack Obama held a press conference in the newsroom of the Pentagon to present the new strategic guidance for the Defense Department. The eight-page document presented on behalf of the administration referred to the need to "directly strike the most dangerous groups and individuals" who pose threats to American security; namely, those members of the growing network of global jihad who participate in terror attacks against the United States.[35]

While the United States Government generally recognizes Al Qaeda as primarily a terrorist organization, an analysis of the origins and utility of terrorism lends to the definition of terror as a *tactic,* not a strategy in itself. O'Neill defines terrorism as one of three forms of warfare associated with insurgent conflicts—along with guerrilla war and conventional war—and contends that "to understand most terrorism, we must first understand insurgency."[36] Terrorism, as a tactic used by insurgents in order to achieve political objectives, is arguably used within the same strategic context as other insurgent tactics. Al Qaeda, as an organization that utilizes terror tactics, is not solely defined by them: in essence, it is a transnational insurgent group which forms a part of the global Islamist movement. Consistent with O'Neill's definition of insurgency, it aims to "destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics"—namely, the group conceptualizes its struggle "as an effort ultimately to change the international order by creating a global caliphate (Islamic state)."[37] Its insurrection is, correspondingly, worldwide.

Unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, were first tactically used against Al Qaeda under President George W. Bush. The Bush administration conducted one strike in Yemen in 2002, a host of strikes in Pakistan between 2004 and 2007, and then embarked on a more sustained

campaign of strikes in 2008. During his term, Bush authorized a total of 48 strikes in Pakistan.[38] The drone program has since been dramatically expanded under the Obama administration, in reflection of the President's new strategic guidance for the Defense Department. Between 2009 and 2012, the Obama administration carried out at least 239 covert drone strikes, predominately in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan and in Yemen.[39] Peter Bergen estimates the acceleration of the program under Obama as increasing from an average of one strike every 40 days to one every 4 days by mid-2011.[40]

From a strategic perspective, drone strikes are ineffectual at best—and counterproductive at worse—in the game against insurgents. Returning to the wisdom of Galula, the targeting of individuals within a movement by way of advanced technology does nothing to address the source of recruitment for the insurgency and merely has the effect of a 'fly swatter'. Proponents of the drone campaign cite the importance of leadership in garnering support for an insurgency and emphasize the effectiveness of drone strikes in eliminating key players in an insurgent movement. This observation is in fact consistent with Schelling's emphasis of leadership as an effective facilitator of coordination. However, there are reasons to believe that the drone program as it currently operates plays to the strategic benefit of insurgents by fomenting anti-American sentiments and facilitating insurgent recruitment.

There are fundamental inconsistencies between the logic of targeted killing and the bargaining game being played by insurgents. As previously discussed, insurgents operate within a strategic context of both competition with the state, or political entity, and partnership, with the population. As the writings of countless insurgent leaders and counterinsurgent experts attest, it is the partnership with the people that forms the center of an insurgency and critically

determines an insurgent movement's chances for success. The drone program, which is aimed at eliminating individual insurgents, falls prey to the same fundamental externality that less technologically-advanced uses of force does: collateral damage. The British Bureau of Investigative Journalism states that of the 344 drone strikes conducted in Pakistan between 2004 and 2012 which killed between 2,562 and 3,325 people, between 474 and 881 victims were civilians.[41] Another statistic offered by the New America Foundation, which places the total killed by drone strikes in Pakistan at somewhere between 1,873 and 3,171 people, determines that between 282 and 459 of these were civilians.[42] While these statistics certainly do not begin to approach those indicated during counterinsurgent combat operations—the International Red Cross reports that in the second half of the 20th century, an average of 10 civilians died per one soldier in armed conflict—they are still cause for strategic concern.[43]

According to a 2009 Gallup poll, only nine percent of Pakistanis support the drone program, whereas more than half think it kills mostly civilians.[44] A 2011 Pew Research Center poll states that 97% of Pakistanis think American drone strikes are "bad," and 73% have an unfavorable view of the United States.[45] If the political goal of the Al Qaeda insurgency is to undermine the international system as it exists under the US superpower and the primary mechanism by which this is achieved is to foment public discontent with American leadership and encourage insurgent recruitment, it appears as though the drone program is working to Al Qaeda's advantage. Prominent Yemeni youth activist Ibrahim Mothana notes that there is a positive correlation between drone strikes and burgeoning numbers of Al Qaeda in Yemen. He notes that "in 2009, A.Q.A.P. had only a few hundred members and controlled no territory; today it has, along with Ansar al-Sharia, at least 1,000 members and controls substantial

amounts of territory."[46] These observations point to the need for a fundamental reevaluation of the strategic advantages—or, as seems the case, disadvantages—of the current United States counterinsurgency strategy centered on drone warfare.

III. Conclusions

Just over a decade after the First Gulf War confirmed his belief in the utility of high technology, Donald Rumsfeld summated his concerns regarding the then-waging 'Global War on Terrorism' in a single question: "Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?"[47] Current evaluations of the United States drone campaign, as a clear manifestation of the enduring strategic mindset of pure conflict instilled in the Defense Department, suggests that the answer to this question is no. Although the logic of Schelling's models demonstrates that the successful player in a bargaining game is the one who exploits the mutual dependence between players for unilateral gain, the current design of American counterinsurgency strategy only serves to enhance the character of mutual dependence between insurgents and the population which supports them. Until defense policy makers effectively addresses the incongruent strategic contexts of the United States defense institution and its insurgent opponents, the insurgents will continue to prevail.

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[3] Ibid., paras. 2, 3.
[4] Ibid., para. 3.

[5] Ibid., para 6.

[6] Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict,* 86.

[7] Ibid., 93.

[8] Ibid., 91.

[9] Ibid., 83.

[10] Ibid., 89.

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[14] Ibid., loc. 1294.

[15] Ibid., loc 1301.

[16] Ibid., loc. 1294.

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[28] Kaplan, *The Insurgents,* 57.

[29] Kaplan, *The Insurgents,* Kindle Edition, loc. 1080.

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[31] Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone,* Kindle Edition, loc. 274.

[32] Ibid., Kindle Edition, loc. 1098.

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[34] Ibid., 353.

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