

Humanitarian Intervention Isolated Impact or Broader Deterrent?

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Abstract: The concentrated costs and widely distributed benefits of humanitarian intervention have long been a challenge in convincing the international community to militarily intervene in humanitarian crises. Over the past 20 years, interventions have been conducted on a selective basis, typically when the potential costs are very low. This study examines whether or not such selective interventions cause a deterrent effect, restraining other states from engaging in human rights abuses.

This study uses quantitative and qualitative approaches to examine the relationship between humanitarian intervention and deterrence. This dual approach allows broad analysis of a large number of cases as well as focused, detail-oriented analysis. Discovery of a deterrent effect could materially change the cost-benefit calculus of humanitarian intervention and would support an expansion of the current, de facto system of selective intervention.

The quantitative and qualitative approaches taken find little evidence of a deterrent effect. This suggests that humanitarian interventions have little effect beyond the immediate geographic space in which they are conducted.

Introduction

Military intervention in the name of protecting core human rights has become an increasingly accepted phenomenon over the past two decades. However, as a result of practical political considerations, humanitarian interventions have not been applied in a universal, coherent manner. Rather, states have intervened when national interests were at stake and when the anticipated costs of intervention were low.

Scholars of humanitarian intervention do not disagree with this approach, noting that it is not necessarily possible for the international community to intervene in all situations of egregious human rights abuse. As Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun state in their work entitled *The Responsibility to Protect*: “The reality that interventions may not be plausibly mounted in every justifiable case is no reason for them not to be mounted in any case” (Evans 105). This type of selective intervention is the de facto system currently used by the international community. Interventions are launched where and when they are politically appealing and have limited potential costs.

The international community’s intervention in Somalia and failure to intervene in Rwanda are classic cases of selective intervention. More recently, the intervention in Libya and failure to intervene in Cote d’Ivoire, Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, etc. illustrates the same principle. What remains to be examined is the broader effect of selective intervention.

It may seem hypocritical to intervene in one humanitarian crisis and then not intervene in a similar situation in a neighboring country. However, if selective intervention builds respect for core humanitarian rights over time, it may be a politically practical means to achieve the desired end. Yet, through what mechanism could *selective* intervention create the desired *universal* respect for core human rights?

There are many potential answers to this question. One potential mechanism through which selective intervention could have a universal effect is through military deterrence.

Military deterrence has had a demonstrable restraining effect on the behavior of nations in other policy areas (George). There is no reason to believe that it could not have a similar effect regarding respect for core human rights. In such a case, selective intervention would act as a signal to other, would-be human rights abusers, showing them that they are also vulnerable to international intervention. This would deter them from committing abuses, thereby increasing respect for human rights.

This study will search for the presence of a deterrent effect resulting from selective humanitarian interventions. Showing that selective intervention creates a deterrent effect would alter the cost-benefit equation of launching an intervention. The costs would remain the same, but the improvement in human rights would be more widespread. The existence of a deterrent effect would therefore help to justify the current, de facto policy of selective intervention and possibly warrant its expansion.

Structure

The focus of deterrence is the attacking state. Actions are taken by a state or community of states to deter a potential attacker. In humanitarian interventions, the attacker is being deterred from abusing core human rights by the international community’s historical propensity to militarily intervene in such situations. In this first round of deterrence, a deterrence failure results in abuse of human rights.

A second round of deterrence may occur if there is a deterrence failure in the first round. Once abuse begins, the international community may choose to militarily intervene to stop the abuse. However, here, the international community is the attacker – the party on which deterrence is focused. In this second round, an abusive state might be able to deter the international community from intervening by, for example, threatening to inflict high casualties. This study is focused on the first round of deterrence in humanitarian intervention: do humanitarian interventions create a deterrent effect, reducing human rights abuses? The second round of deterrence will only be discussed briefly towards the end of the study.

This study will begin with an overview of important elements from the deterrence and humanitarian literatures, followed by a broad quantitative assessment of deterrence in humanitarian intervention. A qualitative case study approach will then take a more focused view of humanitarian intervention. The combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches is designed to provide a thorough examination at both broad and focused levels of analysis. As will be detailed below, it is the hypothesis of this study that humanitarian intervention does not cause a deterrent effect. Therefore, in both the quantitative and qualitative approaches, cases will be chosen that offer the best chance of demonstrating a deterrent effect associated with humanitarian intervention.

Humanitarian Intervention: Definition and Evolution

Many definitions of humanitarian intervention were reviewed in preparing this study, but the most versatile was a definition found in *Waging Humanitarian War: The Ethics, Law, and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention* by Eric A. Heinz. According to Heinz, Humanitarian intervention is “the transboundary use of military force for the purpose of protecting people whose government is egregiously abusing them, either directly or by aiding and permitting extreme mistreatment” (Heinz 2). This definition keys in on the primary difference that distinguishes humanitarian intervention from other operations, such as peacekeeping, delivering humanitarian aid, and imposing sanctions. These may all be methods of enforcing adherence to international humanitarian norms, but, as the Heinz definition suggests, humanitarian intervention is distinct from other operations because it centers on the use of military force.

Philosophically, humanitarian intervention can trace its roots to the Renaissance, when European thinkers developed doctrines justifying foreign intervention. Philosopher theologians, such as Vitoria and Grotius, developed moral justifications for European intervention in Africa, Asia, and the Americas. In his work “Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention,” Parekh Bhikhu traces aspects of this line of thinking forward to the theories that justify present day humanitarian intervention (Parekh).

The concept of “Just War” has also had an important philosophical influence on the development of humanitarian intervention. This concept originated in the fifth century with Saint Augustine of Hippo. Just War originally centered on theological questions about when a Christian can justly use force and how that force can be legitimately deployed. Generally, the tradition can be summarized as follows: Just War can only be engaged in by a legitimate authority that must have a just cause and just motives; all other alternatives to war must first be exhausted; resorting to war should do more good than harm; and non-combatants must be given protection. The Just War tradition was later rekindled by Saint Thomas Aquinas and has since been adopted, in a more secular form, as part of the intellectual foundation for international humanitarian intervention (Fixdal).

The precedents for contemporary humanitarian intervention can be traced back to the end of WWII when the United Nations (UN) was formed. As the world's sole international governing body, the UN became the venue in which international issues were addressed, including humanitarian issues (Bosco). The 1948 Genocide Convention, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Nuremburg trials were among the early building blocks that became the foundation of humanitarianism. The genocide convention and the universal declaration of human rights anchored the role of the UN as the lead international forum for dealing with humanitarian issues. This leadership has continued to the present day with the UN acting as the primary legitimizing body for humanitarian interventions.

At the time of its creation, the UN was poorly equipped to forcefully impose international humanitarian norms. The UN was built on the statist paradigm as well as the principles of universal human rights. These two ideas contradict each other. Under the statist paradigm, states have sole sovereignty over their territory. As Mary Kaldor notes: "Intervention is taken to mean an infringement of sovereignty and, in its strong version, a military infringement" (Kaldor 124). The enforcement of universal human rights requires the international community to violate states' sovereignty by intervening when human rights are not respected. This contradiction is one of the largest challenges facing those who advocate humanitarian intervention.

In spite of the rapid developments made in the field of human rights during the post-war period, growth in humanitarianism was suspended for over forty years, thanks to the Cold War standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union. With the five major post-war powers all wielding veto power in the UN Security Council, and the world divided into eastern and western spheres of influence, legitimate intervention to protect core human rights was not possible.

This standoff ended as the dichotomous Cold War world order crumbled in the early 1990s. Without the superpower standoff obstructing action, the UN became more active. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then Secretary General of the UN, marked the occasion by launching the Agenda for Peace initiative. Boutros-Ghali laid out his view of the UN's role in a post-Cold War world emphasizing that, free of Cold War divisions, there was an opportunity for the UN to fulfill its promise to uphold human rights, secure justice, and ensure international peace (An Agenda for Peace).

With its new-found freedom of action, the UN approved international interventions in Bosnia and Somalia in 1992. These interventions were justified on humanitarian grounds signaling the emergence of the contemporary humanitarian intervention. Over the ensuing decade, additional humanitarian interventions were conducted in Africa, Eastern Asia, and the Middle East.

A Concept Built on a Contradiction

Humanitarian intervention's reliance on force exposes a fundamental contradiction embedded in its very foundation. Human rights are based on the belief that all humans are entitled to a set of basic rights. Chief among these is the right to life (United Nations). The contradiction occurs when the international community expresses a willingness to use military force and take the lives of some in the interest of protecting the human rights of others.

Advocates have dealt with this contradiction by limiting the circumstances where humanitarian interventions should be launched. As Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun note in their 2002 Foreign Affairs article on the Responsibility to Protect, humanitarian interventions

should only be launched if abuses are so striking that the death and destruction caused in an intervention is outweighed by the potential death and destruction that would occur without an intervention. Only in crises where core human rights are being abused on a grievous scale, such as genocide or ethnic cleansing, warrant international military intervention (Evans).

In the face of such wholesale destruction, advocates typically describe intervention as a moral necessity. In fact, a large portion of the literature regarding humanitarian interventions can be described as moral and ethical arguments (Lango, Jamieson, Bellamy, Udombana). These can be broadly summarized by an argument put forward by Samantha Power in her work on genocide entitled *A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*. Power argues that those who have the ability to stop massive suffering have a moral duty to act. Doing nothing in the face of massive violence amounts to tacit support for the perpetrators (Power).

Thanks to the work of Power and other scholars, sovereignty is being re-conceptualized as a privilege rather than an inherent right. As expressed in a 2001 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty report entitled “the Responsibility to Protect,” all governments have a responsibility to protect the wellbeing of their people (Report of the International...). If a government is unable or unwilling to protect its population, or is actively abusing its population, the “responsibility to protect” passes to the international community. At this point, the state has forfeited its traditional sovereignty, and it is the moral duty of the international community to intervene (Evans). The international community officially adopted the Responsibility to Protect doctrine in 2005 when it was written into paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document (2005 World Summit).

The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine provides a framework for justified interventions. However, humanitarian interventions do not always conform to this altruistic framework. Humanitarian interventions are conducted by states, and states fundamentally act in their own self-interest. In the words of Fixdal and Smith “Humanitarian intervention is never purely humanitarian” (Fixdal 284). Even supporters of the principle of ending humanitarian abuse through the international community recognize that “states often use the language of humanitarianism, even when they act out of self-interest” (Parekh 54). In the view of Bhikhu Parekh, this is a symptom of the fundamental incompatibility of Westphalian statism and the doctrine of humanitarian intervention (Parekh).

Today’s de facto policy of selective intervention is plagued by the contradictions in humanitarianism. These range from issues at the UN, to the prevailing deference to state sovereignty and national interest. However, if selective intervention accomplishes the desired universal increase in respect for human rights, why not embrace and expand this current de facto doctrine? The discovery of a deterrent effect generated by humanitarian interventions would suggest that they are having an impact on respect for human rights beyond the geographic area of intervention.

Deterrence: Conceptual Foundation

Fundamentally, as Robert J. Art describes, deterrence is simply “the threat of retaliation” whose “purpose is to prevent something undesirable from happening” (Art 165). There are a wide variety of deterrence definitions that vary based on the level of conflict being considered and the types of parties involved. Scholars do not, for example, consider strategic nuclear deterrence to be the same as conventional arms deterrence. This type of nuance is especially

important when examining humanitarian interventions, as payoff structures behave differently in these cases than in conventional state-on-state wars.

Early discussions of deterrence centered on deductive reasoning regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Many of the broad conceptual principles hashed out in this early literature are relevant to all discussions of deterrence, including the discussions of the potential deterrent effects associated with humanitarian intervention.

Assuming perfect symmetry of information and unitary, rational actors, deterrence can be modeled as a series of potential payoffs that will be realized if particular decisions are made. Acquisitions of new military technology, changes in strategic posture, and military planning all influence the payoffs of particular actions (Ellsberg).

In his 1961 work entitled “The Crude Analysis of Strategic Choices,” Daniel Ellsberg uses such assumptions to outline a basic game theory approach to deterrence. Ellsberg contends that states attempt to deter one another by altering the payoff structures of their opponents. In Ellsberg’s simplified model, the United States and the Soviet Union spent the Cold War faced with an ever-present choice: to launch a nuclear first strike or wait. Both countries attempted to decrease the payoffs of a first strike by creating a durable second strike capability that would survive an attack. Nuclear armed submarines, missile silos, and land-mobile ICBMs are examples of this effort. By decreasing the utility of taking a particular action and increasing the relative utility of not taking that action, a state increases the likelihood that deterrence will hold (Ellsberg).

As many authors have pointed out, the assumptions on which early deterrence models are based rarely exist in the real world. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke as well as Robert Jervis note that deductive models of deterrence assume that both parties are unitary actors, there is no information asymmetry, and both parties are behaving in a rational, utility maximizing manner (George, Jervis “Rational Deterrence”). In his 1971 work entitled “The Essence of Decision,” Graham Allison called into question the validity of such assumptions (Allison). In spite of their somewhat unrealistic assumptions, early game theory models provide a unique, albeit simplified, window into the ways in which states seek to alter the payout structures of their adversaries.

A simple game theory model of humanitarian intervention would behave much in the same way as in the previous nuclear deterrence example. However, instead of altering utilities by increasing nuclear second strike capability, the international community demonstrates its willingness to forcefully protect core human rights. The abusing state could alter payoff structures by arming itself or threatening other responses to intervention.

Signaling

Unlike the perfect information symmetry assumed by early deductive models, information is, in reality, asymmetric. As is discussed in “The Calculus of Deterrence” by Bruce M. Russett, the capability to retaliate in a nuclear exchange, conventional war, or humanitarian crisis is not, in and of itself, significant enough to create deterrence. Rather, a state must convey a credible threat to use such a capability. “Deterrence fails when the attacker decides that the defender’s threat is not likely to be fulfilled” (Russett 98). Alexander George and Richard Smoke elaborate on the importance of credibility and signaling in their 1974 book *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*. George and Smoke review nearly a dozen case studies in an attempt to find the drivers of successful deterrence and deterrence failure. One of

the themes that they uncovered in deterrence failure is a poor understanding of the strength of an adversary's commitments. When a state sends mixed signals, aggressor states are often tempted to probe and test the strength of commitments with the intent of further exploiting weakness in deterrent threats (George).

Detering an aggressor from attacking an allied state, violating valued principles, or abusing a civilian population requires a credible commitment to defend those interests. A credible commitment consists of capability and perceived intentions (Russett). Even if a state is deeply committed to using its capabilities to protect human rights, it must adequately signal its willingness to do so. Misunderstandings regarding commitment often lead to deterrence failure (George).

In the case of humanitarian intervention, signaling occurs in international fora, such as the United Nations. More importantly, it occurs when the international community demonstrates its resolve by militarily intervening to stop abuses of human rights. This shows that there is power behind the rhetoric at the UN, NATO, and other international organizations.

Threat of Punishment vs. Promise of Denial

In addition to examining the importance of signaling and game theory in deterrence, scholars have sought a more nuanced understanding of how deterrence behaves in differing situations. In his 1983 work, "Conventional Deterrence," John J. Mearsheimer distinguishes between deterrence based on punishment and deterrence based on denial. Deterrence based on punishment consists of a threat to retaliate for unacceptable behavior by destroying an unacceptably large part of the opposing state's infrastructure and civilian population. Deterrence based on denial amounts to convincing the opposing state that its objectives will be difficult or impossible to achieve on the battlefield and, therefore, not worth pursuing militarily (Mearsheimer).

The nature of the deterrent threat (punishment or denial) can have an important impact on the power of deterrence. Depending on the context, the capability to inflict punishment-based deterrence may be somewhat more powerful, as it directly affects the opposing power's civilian population. Civilians are, through economic and political means, the ultimate source of a state's power. As Thomas C. Schelling observes, power to compel the opponent to take an action (or refrain from taking an action) results from a state's ability to threaten the source of an opponent's political power – its civilian population. The opponent's military is simply the shield behind which the civilian population hides (Schelling).

From Schelling's perspective on political violence, the ability to counter an opposing military (deterrence by denial) would be a somewhat less powerful deterrent. Having the power to prevent the opposing military from obtaining its objectives may prevent an attack as Mearsheimer suggests, but the ability to circumvent that shield and directly target the civilian population is likely to generate a stronger deterrent.

However, this generalization does not apply equally to all cases. Authoritarian states with little concern for their people's wellbeing will be more difficult to persuade with deterrence based on punishment. Also, depending on the objectives involved, it may be counterproductive to overtly threaten the opposing civilian population. This would certainly be the case with the international community attempting to deter human rights abuse. Therefore, Humanitarian interventions fall squarely into the category of deterrence based on denial. If the objective of state-led violence can be broadly characterized as perpetuating and preserving the state's power,

humanitarian interventions act as a tool to deny those ambitions thereby discouraging human rights abuses.

In addition to differentiating between deterrence based on punishment and deterrence based on denial, Mearsheimer offers a more comprehensive view of the cost-benefit calculus that goes into deterrence based on denial. Scholars, such as Daniel Ellsberg, focus on payoffs facing each actor. Mearsheimer steps back from these payoffs recognizing that they are driven by the strategic capabilities of the attacking state. These capabilities directly inform the attacker's cost-benefit calculation (i.e. potential payoff) by defining the boundaries of what is likely to be achieved and at what cost (Mearsheimer).

Mearsheimer begins by dividing offensive military strategy into three broad categories: attrition, limited aims, and blitzkrieg. Blitzkrieg is the fastest and least costly of the strategies, while attrition is the slowest and most costly. Mearsheimer goes on to argue that the power of deterrence is directly related to which of these three strategies are available to the attacking state. He cites several case studies in support of his argument. These demonstrate that deterrence is more likely to fail when the attacker believes it is capable of launching an effective blitzkrieg (Mearsheimer). Expressed in the terms of Daniel Ellsberg, blitzkrieg provides the attacker with the highest utility at the least cost, increasing the likelihood of a deterrence failure.

In cases of humanitarian abuse, the abusing state is the attacker and the international community is the defender attempting to deter abuse. The defender (international community) and the target of abuse (civilians) are separate. Thus, the abusing regime would only face military resistance if the international community, which is notoriously slow, opted to intervene. The speed with which the regime could act would, therefore, be critical. If a rapid strategy for abuse, such as a speedy crackdown, were available to the attacking regime, the expected costs would be low and deterrence would, according to Mearsheimer, be likely to fail.

Deterrence: Unconventional Actors

Scholars have also examined the manner in which deterrence varies depending on the types of parties involved. As Ivan Arreguín-Toft observes, deterrence theory works best when both parties deploy their power in similar ways. Small states may be able to effectively deter large ones by threatening an asymmetric war where the large state's superior killing power is often more of a liability than an asset (Arreguín-Toft). Overuse of this killing power may actually help the opposing regime rally the people to its cause (Adler).

Small states have won a larger percentage of conflicts with large states in recent decades suggesting that large states may not have sufficient stamina to wage asymmetric wars. With superior killing power offering few benefits, asymmetric wars force large powers to engage in, what amounts to, a drawn-out attrition strategy (Arreguín-Toft). As Mearsheimer observes, the slower and more costly an attacking state's strategic options are, the more likely deterrence is to hold (Mearsheimer).

This leaves large powers in a difficult position. Defending their interests is likely to result in long costly wars that ultimately diminish deterrent power, but appeasing the opposition also diminishes deterrent power. Emmanuel Adler refers to this dilemma as a "deterrence trap" (Adler).

Dealing with rogue states also creates problems for deterrence. Arguments have been made that deterrence behaves in a fundamentally different way for tyrannical, rogue regimes based on their inherently dangerous and irrational nature. Jervis points out that rogue states,

themselves, may play to this argument since appearing to act in an irrational manner increases their own deterrent power. This is a reiteration of Schelling's "rationality of irrationality" theory (Jervis "Deterrence, Rogue..."). Perhaps the seeming irrationality of tyrannical rogue states is not a cause for alarm, but simply an attempt to increase its deterrent power on the international stage.

Many rogue states are also abusers of core human rights. In addition, many abusers of human rights are smaller states in the global south. Understanding how these actors use and respond to deterrence will be an important aspect of the international community's efforts to prevent abuses.

This overview of a select portion of the body of deterrence literature offers a window into areas of scholarship that are important to the international community's active protection of core human rights. This study hopes to build on the existing nuance within the deterrence literature by examining deterrence as it pertains to humanitarian interventions.

Quantitative Analysis

Research Question and Hypotheses

Do selective humanitarian interventions create a deterrent effect? Deterrence will be measured by looking for increases in respect for core human rights, i.e. abusive powers being dissuaded from abusing their populations following humanitarian interventions.

Hypothesis 1) Selective intervention sends mixed signals to abusive nations and a lack of commitment by the international community reduces the effectiveness of this deterrent signal. Therefore, this study hypothesizes that there will be no evidence of an increase in respect for core human rights as a result of selective humanitarian intervention.

Hypothesis 2) It takes time for governments to process signals and change behavior. It will be more likely that a deterrent effect will be observed in the years following an intervention than in the year of intervention itself.

Hypothesis 3) The deterrent signal is likely to be stronger in countries with geographic and cultural proximity to the intervention. Over cultural and political distance, signals are likely to be diluted. Therefore, this study expects any evidence of a deterrent signal to create a stronger effect locally than globally.

Hypothesis 4) The larger the intervening coalition, and the more force used, the stronger the deterrent signal will be and, by extension, the greater the observed increase in respect for core human rights.

Framing

The topic of deterrence and human rights is vast, as is the quantity of available data. Before selecting and examining data on this topic, the parameters of this study must be defined. These include the time period studied and the specific human rights examined.

The contemporary humanitarian intervention wasn't born until the early 1990s. Human rights became an international issue after World War II, when protections for human rights were written into the UN charter. At that point, the UN Security Council was paralyzed by the Cold War standoff between East and West. With both sides wielding veto power, the international community had few opportunities to intervene to protect humanitarian norms. This changed with the end of the Cold War and, by 1992, the international community had launched humanitarian interventions in both Somalia and Bosnia. Data will be considered beginning with these first post-Cold War interventions and extending to the present.

Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, there have been many interventions. However, this study will only consider those that involved the use of legitimate military force. In this study, the use of military force is treated as a signaling mechanism, warning surrounding countries not to abuse human rights, and thereby possibly creating a deterrent effect. This limits the selected cases to those most likely to show a deterrent effect. Interventions to deliver food aid, observe ceasefires, or aid in reconstruction would create different signals and are far less likely to create a deterrent effect.

The search for a deterrent effect is focused on changes in observed respect for core human rights, rather than examining all human rights. Internationally recognized human rights range from the universal right to education to the right to life. Naturally, the international community is less likely to incur the costs of intervention to protect property rights or education rights. The behavior of abusing nations is, therefore, most likely to be altered by deterrence when abuses involve human rights that the international community has demonstrated a willingness to forcefully protect. In this study, these rights will be termed "core human rights." They principally revolve around the right to life and security of person.

In summary, this study will examine whether or not humanitarian interventions in the post-Cold War period have caused a deterrent effect resulting in lower abuses of core human rights. Framing the study in this way offers a focused window through which to view the cases where deterrence is most likely to have had an effect.

Case Selection

As previously mentioned, only forceful interventions are being considered for this study. In selecting cases, emphasis was placed on the international legitimacy of the use of force, particularly UN authorization under chapter VII of the charter. A chapter VII mandate validates the humanitarian justification for intervention and also sends a stronger signal to would-be human rights abusers.

The goal in case selection was, again, to focus on the cases most likely to show a deterrent effect of humanitarian intervention. For this reason, cases were not considered where the intervening nations had questionable motivations or where no military force was used.

The following list of cases is not meant to be 100% inclusive, but to provide the most clear-cut examples of militarized humanitarian intervention that hold the most promise for demonstrating a deterrent effect. This creates a selection bias. However, this is a bias towards demonstrating a deterrent effect, which is the opposite of the study's hypothesis. In our view, selecting the most likely cases for demonstrating a deterrent effect makes the study more rigorous.

Cases:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Intervening Entity</u>
Somalia	1992-1993	United Nations
Bosnia	1992-1995	NATO, United Nations
Kosovo	1998-1999	NATO
East Timor	1999-2000	International Force for East Timor (Australia, New Zealand)
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Eastern DRC)	2002-Present	United Nations (MONUC, MONUSCO)
Sudan	2005-Present	United Nations
Liberia	2003-Present	United Nations (UNMIL)
Sierra Leone	1999-2005	United Nations (UNAMSIL)

Method

For the quantitative analysis section of this study, several statistical approaches were taken. Such approaches enable the study to examine a broad swath of cases without becoming bogged down in the details of each case. The first statistical approach used was a Pearson's Chi-Squared test for association. This was followed with a regression test.

Data from two different sources was used in these tests: The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset and the Political Terror Scale (PTS) dataset (See Appendix, Section 1 for elaboration). This diversification is important as it helps to control for technical issues with the underlying data. Both datasets contain various ordinal variables that measure respect for core human rights by examining the prevalence of abuses. These variables were treated as dependent variables. Intervention was treated as the independent variable.

Of the two tests conducted, the Chi-Squared test is the more basic. The advantage of the Chi-Squared test is that it is capable of handling a dummy variable. However, the results of this test are non-directional, so they will not show whether intervention is associated with a rise or fall in respect for core human rights. The Chi-Squared test will simply show whether there is any relationship between intervention and human rights.

For the Chi-Squared test, intervention was coded into several dummy variables. The first of these gave a "yes" code to intervention in the year that the intervention occurred. The remaining intervention variables gave a "yes" code for the one, two, and five years following the intervention, which tests hypothesis two. The data was then organized into geographic sets in order to test hypothesis three: one set for the whole world, and one for each region in which interventions occurred (See Appendix, Section 2 for details on geographic groupings). By lagging the intervention variable and organizing the data based on geographic region, the test controls for a time-lagged effect and geographically specific factors not accounted for in the data.

A regression test was used to get a better sense of the direction and strength of any relationship. The regression test was also used to test hypothesis number four, which is better suited to a regression than a Chi-Squared test. In order to conduct this test, the intervention variable was reworked to include the strength of each intervention. A scale was developed from 0-4.5 with 0 indicating no intervention and 4.5 indicating an intervention by a large coalition using a large amount of force (See Appendix, Section 3). Intervention strength was used as the independent variable and the same human rights data sets were used as the dependent variable.

In some regions, an intervention of only one particular strength was conducted. This created a problem because a regression is only appropriate when there are a range of values in

both the independent and dependent variable. Therefore, unlike the Chi-Squared tests, regressions were not conducted in individual regional groupings. Rather, the regions were coded for intervention individually, but combined together into one, whole world, dataset. This was regressed against each of the CIRI and PTS dependent variables.

The specific regression used was an ordered logit regression, which is capable of handling a discrete, hierarchical dependent variable. Both the CIRI and PTS are constructed as discrete variables. It must be noted that this type of test makes several assumptions. First, the ordered logit regression assumes that each country-year is an independent data point and therefore does not control for possible correlations across the dependent variable. This could artificially inflate or deflate any potential relationship. Also, the ordered logit regression assumes proportional odds, that the relationship between the independent variable and any two levels of the dependent variable are equal. For example, within the dependent variable, the difference between a score of 0 and a score of 1 is treated with the same magnitude as a change from a 1 to a 2. It remains unclear whether the data sets used fully meet these assumptions.

Results

Hypothesis 1)

Out of a total of the sixty Chi-Squared tests conducted, there were five statistically significant associations between intervention and respect for core human rights at the 95% confidence level. This is approximately the number of associations that one would expect as a result of chance alone at the 95% confidence level (See Appendix, Section 4 for full data summary).

The ordered logit regression test showed statistically significant correlation in three of the twelve regressions that were run. There were an additional two tests that showed correlation that was nearly statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. However, there are several inconsistencies in these results that call their validity into question.

First, out of the five significant and nearly significant results, four were found in the less sensitive CIRI dataset (See Imperfections in the Datasets below), while only one significant correlation was found in the PTS data. Second, if there was a true relationship between intervention and respect for human rights, one would expect to see continued correlations in the trailing intervention variables. This is not the case in either the CIRI or PTS results. Lastly, the correlation coefficients are low (below 0.12) in all cases.

Based on the low number of results demonstrating positive association as well as the low number and inconsistencies of results demonstrating correlation, it is difficult to conclude that there is any broad relationship between humanitarian intervention and respect for human rights. By extension, it becomes difficult to conclude that humanitarian intervention has a deterrent effect.

Hypothesis 2)

The highest concentration of statistically significant associations were found two years trailing humanitarian interventions. However, as shown in the data below, only two positive results were found two years after intervention. Only one positive result was found for the year of intervention, trailing one year, and trailing five years. With so few associations found, it

becomes difficult to confidently conclude that there is any association between intervention and respect for human rights regardless of timing.

Number of Results Showing Statistically Significant Association ($p \leq 0.05$)

Data Sets	Year of Intervention	Trailing 1 Year	Trailing 2 Years	Trailing 5 Years
CIRI Physical Rights Integrity Index	0	1	0	0
Political Terror Scale (Amnesty Data)	1	0	2	0
Political Terror Scale (State Dept. Data)	0	0	0	1
Total Number of Statistically Significant Results ($p \leq 0.05$)	1	1	2	1
Total Number of Tests Conducted	15	15	15	15
Total With Significant Association	6.67%	6.67%	13.33%	6.67%

Hypothesis 3)

This study anticipated that there would be stronger evidence of association between intervention and respect for human rights in countries with geographic and cultural proximity to the intervention. However, the data seem to suggest that, if there is a relationship between intervention and respect for human rights, the opposite is true. Three out of 12 Chi-Squared tests revealed association at the world level, but only 2 out of 48 tests conducted at the regional level showed association. Yet, as mentioned in previous sections, the small number of results with positive associations leaves significant doubt as to whether any relationship exists at all.

Number of Results Showing Statistically Significant Association ($p \leq 0.05$)

Data Sets	World	Sub-Saharan Africa	Middle East and North Africa	Eastern Asia	Europe
CIRI Physical Rights Integrity Index	0	1	0	0	0
Political Terror Scale (Amnesty Data)	2	0	0	0	1
Political Terror Scale (State Dept. Data)	1	0	0	0	0
Total Number of Statistically Significant Results ($p \leq 0.05$)	3	1	0	0	1
Total Number of Tests Conducted	12	12	12	12	12
Total With Significant Association	25%	8.33%	0%	0%	8.33%

Hypothesis 4)

Five out of twelve ordered logit regression tests show statistically significant, or nearly significant, correlation at the 95% confidence level. All four significant and nearly significant CIRI results have positive correlation coefficients, which represents a positive relationship between the strength of a humanitarian intervention and any ensuing rise in respect for human rights. The PTS data is set up differently and therefore a negative correlation would signify an increase in respect for human rights following an intervention. Indeed, the one statistically significant correlation found in the PTS data has a negative correlation. These results seem to suggest that the larger and more powerful an intervention, the greater any ensuing increase in respect for human rights in the surrounding region.

However, all of the coefficients in the statistically significant results are less than 0.12 indicating that any relationship is relatively weak. In addition, four of the five significant and nearly significant results occur in the less sensitive CIRI dataset (See Imperfections in the Datasets below). If there were truly a robust relationship between the strength of intervention and levels of respect for human rights, one would expect to see that relationship clearly illustrated in the PTS data, which it is not. Strength of intervention and respect for humanitarian intervention appear to be positively correlated, but it remains unclear whether a relationship really exists or there are problems with the data.

Results Showing Statistically Significant Correlations ($p \leq 0.07$)

	Year of Intervention	1 Year Trailing	2 Years Trailing	5 Years Trailing	Total
CIRI Physical Rights Integrity Index	1	1	1	1	4
Political Terror Scale (Amnesty Data)	0	0	0	0	0
Political Terror Scale (State Dept. Data)	0	1	0	0	1
Total Number of Statistically Significant Results ($p \leq 0.07$)	1	2	1	1	5

Imperfections in the Datasets

The first round of Chi-Squared tests were conducted using the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Physical Rights Integrity Index. The Physical Rights Integrity Index is a compilation of four other CIRI variables that measure respect for core human rights: extra-judicial killings, political imprisonment, politically-motivated disappearances, and torture.

One potential drawback to these CIRI variables is their lack of sensitivity to large numbers of humanitarian abuses. The coding guidelines instruct coders to designate all countries committing 50 or more abuses with the same label, signaling the highest level of human rights abuse. This could potentially mask a deterrent effect existing in the most abusive countries by glazing over large declines in abuse if the total number of abuses remains above 50 cases per year. It could also skew regression results since identical changes in the variable signify larger human rights abuses as the code approaches 0. However, the shortcomings in the CIRI data were filled by including the more robust Political Terror Scale data. The CIRI data were also included in the study because it is specifically catered to human rights abuse, while the PTS is broader, measuring all political terror.

Conclusions

The results of this quantitative analysis show that it is unlikely that humanitarian interventions have a deterrent effect. Only five out of sixty Chi-Squared tests showed statistically significant association at the $p \leq 0.05$ level. In addition, there was no discernible pattern on how those results were distributed over time. However, there did appear to be a pattern regarding geographic distribution, as most of the positive results that were observed were at the world level. The low amounts of association detected relative to the number of tests conducted make it unlikely that humanitarian intervention has a significant deterrent effect. The regression test showed a positive relationship between the strength of humanitarian intervention and respect for human rights, but inconsistencies in the results and a conflict with the simpler, more robust Chi-Squared tests render these results inconclusive. However, given the low correlation coefficients

observed, it can confidently be said that any deterrent relationship that might exist between humanitarian intervention and respect for human rights is weak.

This study will now turn to a qualitative case study to search for further evidence of deterrence generated by humanitarian interventions.

Qualitative Case Study

Introduction

This section is designed to complement the statistical analysis discussed above by looking into a single case in greater detail. Going through a single case in detail will create an opportunity to uncover factors influencing deterrence that a large n statistical examination would gloss over. In choosing a case for this section, one was deliberately selected that offered the best prospects for finding a post humanitarian intervention deterrent effect.

The 2011 intervention in Libya is one such case. In early 2011, the uprisings across the Middle East spread to Libya. Colonel Muammar Gaddafi launched a brutal crackdown that threatened thousands of citizens. This crackdown was particularly harsh in the east of the country around Benghazi. European Union countries, such as France and Britain, clamored for action to prevent a blood bath. This eventually resulted in a NATO-led military intervention that prevented the severe human rights abuses that many feared and ultimately removed Gaddafi from power.

When compared to the humanitarian interventions previously discussed in the quantitative analysis section, the Libya intervention is unique for several reasons. First, a large amount of force was utilized. Second, the Libya intervention resulted in the removal of the government in power, which is unusual for a humanitarian intervention. Third, unlike interventions in East Timor, Somalia, Liberia, etc., the Libya intervention occurred during a period of regional upheaval, ripe with opportunities for abuse of core human rights. This presented an opportunity for the intervention to immediately deter further abuses. These reasons, the strength and swiftness of the intervention combined with concurrent regional upheaval, make Libya a unique, “most likely case” for demonstrating a deterrent effect of humanitarian interventions.

It must be noted that since only one year has elapsed between the beginning of the intervention and the time of this writing, data was not yet available to include in the quantitative study. However, in the view of this study, this potential shortcoming is outweighed by the unique nature of the Libya case described above.

As the protests in Libya morphed into a rebellion in early 2011, Britain and France stood against Muammar Gaddafi’s crackdown. The United States joined their European counterparts and, with the backing of the Arab League, the UN passed Security Council resolution 1973 authorizing member states to take all necessary measures to protect Libyan civilians (Elliott). With American and European involvement, NATO was chosen to lead the Libya intervention. Within two days of the passage of resolution 1973, airstrikes on Gaddafi’s forces began (Timeline...).

By this time, the Tunisian President, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, and the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had been toppled. Protests were breaking out in Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria. During and also after the NATO intervention, there were large abuses of core human rights in

these three countries. These abuses continue well after the one-year anniversary of the beginning of the Libya intervention.

In Yemen, President Ali Abdullah Saleh attempted to cling to power in a violent and ultimately futile crackdown that resulted in over 2,000 deaths, tens of thousands of injuries and many disappearances (Al-Haj). In Bahrain, the ruling Sunni Al-Khalifa family violently repressed protests launched by that country's Shi'a majority. Troops were called in to assist from other Gulf Cooperation Council countries including Saudi Arabia. Alleged human rights abuses in Bahrain ranged from beatings to killings and disappearances (Amnesty International...). By far, the bloodiest repression occurred in Syria.

Like the other Arab Spring revolutions, protests in Syria began peacefully, but escalated following abuse by the Assad regime. In April 2011, the month after airstrikes began in Libya, the monthly death toll in Syria increased from 121 per month to 698 per month. These high casualty rates continued in Syria as the Libya operation continued. When NATO announced the successful end of the Libya intervention, the monthly death toll in Syria again rose from 656 in October 2011 to 829 in November 2011. December, January and February all saw death tolls above 1,000 (The Rising...).

If there is a deterrent effect caused by humanitarian intervention, one might expect the Syrian regime to launch a crackdown while NATO was otherwise occupied in Libya. However, one would then expect the regime to pull back out of fear of a similar intervention as NATO forces ended operations in Libya and became available. This clearly did not occur in Syria.

In spite of the international community's willingness to intervene in Libya to protect core human rights, the months following the intervention witnessed governments in Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria continuing abuse of their populations or even beginning new abuses. This does not necessarily mean that the intervention did not have any deterrent effect. The observed abuses may have been even more egregious had the international community not acted in Libya. However, the presence of such widespread abuses does suggest that any deterrent effect associated with the Libya intervention was extremely weak or nonexistent.

In the Libya intervention, the international community clearly and publically stated its willingness to intervene in the name of protecting civilians from human rights abuses. Substantial force was used, ultimately resulting in the fall of the ruling regime. Why did so blatant a signal fail to deter governments in the surrounding countries from abusing their civilians? The Libya case offers several insights which may help to explain the failure to observe a deterrent effect of humanitarian intervention in both the quantitative and qualitative portions of this study.

In his classic article on the functions of force, Robert J. Art describes deterrence as a threat of retaliation to be initiated if an opponent does something unacceptable (Art). What, then, shielded the governments of Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria from the coercive force of the threat made by the international community when it intervened in Libya? After examining the context and events of 2011, three likely explanations stand out:

- 1) Powerful allies shielded the abusing countries from the threat.
- 2) The military abilities of the abusing countries were such that they would make it difficult for the international community to follow through on their threats. This would offer a type of counter-acting deterrence.
- 3) The international community's threat to intervene to protect core human rights was not credible.

1) An interesting commonality between Yemen, Bahrain and Syria is their alliance to one of the permanent five members of the Security Council. Both Yemen and Bahrain are allies of the United States. The United States' fifth fleet is based in Bahrain and Bahrain's support was important in getting Arab states to agree to the Libya intervention. This made it difficult for the United States to turn around and advocate intervention in Bahrain (Quinn).

Yemen has been a key ally with the United States in the War on Terror, especially in recent years with the emergence of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which is based in eastern Yemen. The United States has launched numerous airstrikes against these militants, sometimes in cooperation with the military efforts of the Saleh government (Mazzetti). This put the United States in the difficult position of choosing between condemning its ally or towing a weaker line on human rights than it had in Libya (Al-Haj). In both cases, the U.S. chose not to offer the same response as it did towards its enemy, Libya.

The Assad government in Syria is closely allied to Russia. Russia has a naval base in Tartus, Syria, which provides important support for its Mediterranean presence. The Assad regime is also a large purchaser of Russian-made weaponry. Since human rights abuses began in Syria, Russia has repeatedly blocked measures to condemn or sanction the Syrian government in the United Nations. Rather, Russia has continually provided public support for the Assad regime (Radia).

The alliances of Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria to some of the world's largest powers stand in stark contrast to Libya's status as an international pariah. In spite of giving up weapons of mass destruction programs and offering compensation for the Lockerbie bombing victims, Libya had not secured the backing of any of the world's major powers. Perhaps the alliances of Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria made their governments feel confident that the international community would not be willing to intervene in their countries as it had been in Libya.

2) Another possible reason for deterrence failure is that the abusing nations might have the ability to militarily foil an international intervention. As demonstrated in Somalia and Bosnia, humanitarian interventions are characterized by casualty aversion. It follows that if the subject of a possible international intervention can credibly threaten to inflict an unacceptable level of casualties, they may be able to deter an intervention (Arreguín-Toft). By threatening to inflict unacceptable casualties, a state may shield itself from the international community's implicit threat to intervene to protect core human rights, leaving it free to conduct abuses.

Casualty aversion leads the intervening nations to favor standoff military force, such as air and naval power. The Libya intervention shows how air and naval forces can still achieve the desired effect. However, if an abusing country has the means to attack naval vessels and shoot down aircraft, it may be able to threaten to inflict unacceptable casualties as discussed above. In contrast to Libya, which had not updated its military since the end of the Cold War, Syria had been actively acquiring modern weaponry from Russia for several years prior to the 2011 unrest. This effort included multiple types of contemporary anti-ship missiles, Buk-class surface-to-air missiles, and Pantsyr low-level air-defense systems. Many of these systems are relatively new and have never been faced in combat (SIPRI: Syria...). These armaments, combined with Syria's sizable surface-to-surface missile force, may have been powerful enough that the Assad regime believed they could deter an attack by the international community.

This explanation is less applicable to Yemen and Bahrain whose militaries are smaller and less capable. However, even in these cases, Bahrain is known to have imported modern anti-ship missiles including Exocet and Harpoon missiles, which could inflict significant damage to intervening nations' ships (SIPRI: Bahrain...). Scholars, such as Ivan Arreguín-Toft, have argued that powerful states or groups of states can be deterred by small states that can credibly counter the means of attack and threaten to inflict unacceptable casualties. Military capability, therefore, could potentially be one of the reasons that the Libya intervention failed to deter countries, such as Syria, from abusing the core human rights of their citizens.

3) As Bruce M. Russett notes in "The Calculus of Deterrence," threats must be credible to create a deterrent effect (Russett). Poor credibility is one of the most significant drawbacks to the doctrine of selective intervention. By intervening only at opportune moments in pariah countries with poor military capabilities, such as Libya, the international community sends mixed signals. In addition, when interventions are launched, there is a historic tendency to limit the level of commitment and withdraw when casualties are incurred. Examples of this tendency include Somalia (US withdrawal), Rwanda (Belgian withdrawal), and Sudan (under-commitment). For abusing nations, chances are that the international community won't intervene, and even if it does act, its action typically does not result in regime change. The intervention in Libya may not have been a credible threat, preventing a deterrent effect from developing.

Out of all of the cases reviewed for this study, the Libyan case offers one of the best opportunities to observe a deterrent effect associated with humanitarian intervention. Yet even after the Libya intervention, more severe abuses occurred in Syria. Abuses also continued in Bahrain and Yemen. Given the weak or non-existent deterrence observed in the Libya case, one must examine why the international community failed to deter further abuses. Powerful allies, abusers' military ability, and a failure of signaling by the international community provide potential explanations. However, these explanations remain somewhat speculative and additional study will be required as more information becomes available.

Conclusion

Intervention in the name of protecting core human rights is becoming increasingly accepted among the international community. However, as previously described, interventions are still conducted on an ad hoc basis, which this study terms selective intervention. We began by asking through what mechanism could selective intervention create improvement in the respect for core human rights. Military deterrence is one such mechanism. However, it was argued, using both quantitative and qualitative analytical techniques, that selective humanitarian interventions do not create a deterrent effect and have little impact on wider respect for core human rights.

The data in the quantitative examination was chosen to include interventions that would be most likely to show a deterrent effect. Also, Geographic and timing factors were controlled for. However, the quantitative analysis offered little evidence of a relationship between humanitarian intervention and respect for core human rights.

In the qualitative approach, the 2011 case of humanitarian intervention in Libya was used since it was judged to be a "most likely case" for demonstrating a deterrent effect. However, given the level of ensuing humanitarian abuse in surrounding countries, any related deterrent

effect appears to have been extremely weak, if it even existed at all. This corroborates the findings of the quantitative analysis.

As an extension, specific factors were discussed in the Libya case which may have limited any potential deterrent effect. These factors included the importance of large powerful allies, military capabilities of the abusing nation, and poor signaling by the international community. These factors also may be applicable to the cases discussed in the qualitative analysis. However, additional, more rigorous study is needed to determine the exact nature of factors that may limit the deterrent effect of humanitarian interventions.

Given the results of this study, it is unlikely that humanitarian interventions create any material deterrent effect. Without a notable effect beyond the borders of the subject country, policymakers must ask whether the costs of selective intervention are justified by its results. Indeed, selective interventions alleviate immediate human rights abuses, but without a deterrent effect, the benefits are limited to a specific area at a specific instant in time.

Discovery of a deterrent effect would have significantly altered the cost-benefit equation making it more palatable for the international community to expand selective interventions. Without a wider impact on human rights, policy makers must continue to evaluate whether intervening is worthwhile at all. After all, without deterrence, what mechanism exists to prevent the next regime from conducting the same abuses of the past? What mechanism exists to prevent neighboring countries from committing the same abuses? Is the doctrine of selective intervention really anything more than a high-stakes, international game of whack-a-mole?

While there is little evidence that humanitarian interventions currently have material deterrent power, steps can be taken to create such a power without fundamentally altering the de facto system of selective intervention. The key steps in creating deterrent power lie in eliminating factors that shield abusing states from deterrence. As previously discussed, several of these factors can be observed in the Libya case. As this case reveals, improving deterrent power requires the international community to reduce the influence of large power relationships, restrict sales of sophisticated arms to abusive states, and improve signaling.

Without a deterrent effect, the costs of humanitarian intervention, both in lives and in treasure, are not creating the maximum potential benefit. Regardless of opinion on state sovereignty and the merits of international governance, when the international community does act to enforce human rights law, it should get the highest possible benefit for the costs incurred. Before engaging in additional selective interventions, steps should be taken to maximize their deterrent effect.

Appendix

Section 1

Multiple data sets were considered, in searching for an appropriate measure of human rights that could be used for the dependent variable. In the end, The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset and the Political Terror Scale (PTS) were selected. Both of these data sets focus on core human rights such as the right to life, security of person, freedom from arbitrary arrest, etc.

The specific CIRI data used is called the Physical Rights Integrity Index. It is a compilation of four individual measures: extra-judicial killings, political imprisonment, torture, and politically motivated disappearances. This enables a researcher to look beyond the numerical value coded in the index and gain a deeper understanding of the crimes behind that value. The PTS data set includes two variables for political terror, one coded from United States Department of State reports and the other coded from Amnesty International reports. Unlike the CIRI data, the PTS data do not have individual component variables that break down the reasons for each individual score. Each data set has its strong points and weak points, many of which balance each other out. Therefore, both data sets were used.

Section 2

The composition of regional groupings were decided based on UN coding adjusted to match the geographic, cultural, religious, and linguistic similarities found in the four regions used in this study (Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East, Eastern Asia, Europe). For example, the UN codes Cyprus as being in Asia, but as an EU member, more logically belongs in Europe.

Section 3

Intervention Strength	Participation of one of the P5 Security Council Members	Size of the Coalition	Amount of Force Used
0	No	Non-Existent	Non-Existent
1	No	Small	Small
1.5	Yes	Small	Small
2	No	Large	Small
2.5	Yes	Large	Small
3	No	Small	Large
3.5	Yes	Small	Large
4	No	Large	Large
4.5	Yes	Large	Large

Section 4

CIRI Physical Rights Integrity Index

	Year of Intervention		1 Year Trailing		2 Years Trailing		5 Years Trailing	
	P value	Chi-sq	P value	Chi-sq	P value	Chi-sq	P value	Chi-sq
Whole World	0.887	3.655	0.476	7.576	0.252	10.187	0.240	10.376
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.732	5.238	0.010	20.075	0.620	6.244	0.696	5.564
Middle East and North Africa	0.376	8.609	0.202	11.002	0.766	4.926	0.627	6.182
Eastern Asia	0.941	2.884	0.727	5.280	0.568	6.715	0.498	7.360
Europe	0.132	12.456	0.465	7.679	0.342	9.005	0.357	8.827

Political Terror Scale (Amnesty International Data)

	Year of Intervention		1 Year Trailing		2 Years Trailing		5 Years Trailing	
	P value	Chi-sq	P value	Chi-sq	P value	Chi-sq	P value	Chi-sq
Whole World	0.017	12.053	0.131	7.086	0.041	9.968	0.166	6.474
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.981	0.420	0.923	0.913	0.696	2.216	0.488	3.434
Middle East and North Africa	0.455	3.656	0.988	0.330	0.267	5.207	0.144	6.849
Eastern Asia	0.396	4.072	0.976	0.472	0.291	4.968	0.439	3.766
Europe	0.616	2.661	0.148	6.785	0.043	9.827	0.298	4.897

Political Terror Scale (US State Department Data)

	Year of Intervention		1 Year Trailing		2 Years Trailing		5 Years Trailing	
	P value	Chi-sq	P value	Chi-sq	P value	Chi-sq	P value	Chi-sq
Whole World	0.190	7.443	0.117	8.819	0.415	5.004	0.000	33.314
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.395	4.083	0.485	3.452	0.897	1.085	0.255	5.327
Middle East and North Africa	0.622	2.625	0.808	1.604	0.872	1.239	0.455	3.655
Eastern Asia	0.504	3.330	0.521	3.226	0.913	0.978	0.486	3.449
Europe	0.181	7.586	0.146	8.183	0.117	8.808	0.568	3.874

Section 5

CIRI Physical Rights Integrity Index

	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P Value	95% Conf. Interval	
Year of Intervention	.0999949	.032982	3.03	0.002	.0353513	.1646384
1 Year Trailing	.063946	.0331028	1.93	0.053	-.0009342	.1288262
2 Years Trailing	.1184424	.0319289	3.71	0.000	.0558628	.181022
5 Years Trailing	.0582923	.0320361	1.82	0.069	-.0044973	.1210818

Political Terror Scale (Amnesty International Data)

	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P Value	95% Conf. Interval	
Year of Intervention	-.0496708	.0362515	-1.37	0.171	-.1207225	.0213808
1 Year Trailing	-.032523	.0373409	-0.87	0.384	-.1057099	.0406638
2 Years Trailing	.0576818	.03748	1.54	0.124	-.0157775	.1311412
5 Years Trailing	-.0208484	.0355944	-0.59	0.558	-.0906121	.0489152

Political Terror Scale (US State Department Data)

	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P Value	95% Conf. Interval	
Year of Intervention	-.0385704	.0326862	-1.18	0.238	-.1026342	.0254935
1 Year Trailing	-.0970814	.0337955	-2.87	0.004	-.1633193	-.0308435
2 Years Trailing	-.0451183	.0322774	-1.40	0.162	-.1083808	.0181443
5 Years Trailing	-.0276858	.0319579	-0.87	0.386	-.0903222	.0349506

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