

Isla de Pascua or Rapa Nui?

Easter Island and the Prospects for Independence

Kevin M. Gatter Espinosa

Professor Brian Norris

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Abstract

Easter Island, the most remote inhabited island in the world, has long captured the world's imagination for its mysterious *moai* statues and the dramatic collapse of its ancient society. Chile annexed Easter Island in 1888, and almost immediately, the Island's indigenous Rapanui people formed an independence movement to reestablish the Polynesian kingdom of Rapa Nui. The movement became more vocal following Easter Island's exclusion from the post-World War II wave of decolonization. This Capstone employs comparative analysis of the independence movements of Easter Island, the Basque Country of Spain, and South Sudan to determine the likelihood that Easter Island will achieve independence from Chile. Mutual economic dependence between Easter Island and Chile, the lack of official external support for the independence movement, and continued migration of Chileans from the mainland to Easter Island suggest that Easter Island will remain Chile's *Isla de Pascua* for quite some time.

Introduction

On September 9, 1888, a crowd of curious Rapanui gathered around the flagpole outside the wooden Catholic church of Hanga Roa, the only village on Easter Island (then known as Rapa Nui). Under the bright Polynesian sun, Chilean naval officer Policarpo Toro delivered a speech in a strange language and then proceeded to hoist the flag of the Republic of Chile, much to the astonishment of the onlookers. An indignant Rapanui elder protested that if the Chilean colors were to be displayed, the Rapanui flag should fly alongside the Chilean one. Seeking to avoid conflict, Toro raised the orange and white *Te Ravo Reimiro* alongside the standard of his country. Toro proceeded to present the King of Easter Island, Atamu te Kena, with a document written half in Spanish and half in a mix of Tahitian and Rapanui. According to the Spanish version of the treaty, Atamu te Kena agreed to cede the “full and entire sovereignty” of Easter Island “forever and without reservation” to the Republic of Chile.¹ However, the Tahitian-Rapanui version of the treaty led the King to believe that his signature merely designated Chile as a “friend of the land.”² Perhaps sensing the turmoil that was to come, the defiant Atamu te Kena yanked out a fistful of grass and brandished it at Toro, exclaiming, “This is for your animals!” He then grabbed a handful of dirt, put it in the pocket of his jacket, and cried, “But this is for us!”

More than a century later, Chilean-controlled Easter Island has witnessed big changes. The Island is now known to the rest of the world as Easter Island (Spanish: *Isla de Pascua*)

¹ Steven Roger Fischer. *Island at the End of the World: The Turbulent History of Easter Island*. (London: Reaktion Books, 2005), 142.

² Ibid.

because it was “discovered” by Dutch admiral Jacob Roggeveen on Easter Sunday in 1722,³ with its Polynesian name of Rapa Nui being used only internally among the indigenous Rapanui inhabitants.⁴ Spanish has replaced the Rapanui tongue as the dominant language, whereas Roman Catholicism has replaced traditional beliefs.⁵ The Rapanui, a Polynesian people who once believed that they were the only human beings in the universe,⁶ have witnessed the arrival of tourists who journey to the most remote inhabited island in the world⁷ to see the renowned *moai* statues and enjoy the white sand beach at Anakena. Cars chug down the dusty streets of Hanga Roa, while modern-style homes have replaced traditional Rapanui cave dwellings. A sizeable population of non-Rapanui ancestry also calls this island home, and Chilean faces appear among Polynesian ones. Out of a population of approximately five thousand, about 25 percent of Easter Islanders come from mainland Chile, while the remaining 75 percent belong to the Rapanui ethnic group.⁸

While Easter Island may appear superficially to have modernized, the Island is still grappling with the legacy of Chilean colonization and oppression. Following annexation to Chile, the once-proud Rapanui people of Easter Island were reduced to living in a tiny corner of

³ Thor Heyerdahl. *Easter Island: The Mystery Solved*. (New York: Random House, 1989), 18.

⁴ To avoid confusion with the term “Rapanui” (the name for the indigenous Polynesian inhabitants of Easter Island), Easter Island will be referred to by its name in the English language and not its indigenous name “Rapa Nui.” It should be noted, however, that the Rapanui prefer to refer to their island as “Rapa Nui” and not as “Easter Island” or “Isla de Pascua.”

⁵ Grant McCall. *Rapanui: Tradition and Survival on Easter Island*. (Honolulu, HI: The University Press of Hawaii, 1981), 58.

⁶ Peggy Mann. *Easter Island: Land of Mysteries*. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976), 94.

⁷ Thor Heyerdahl. *Aku-Aku*. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1958), 15.

⁸ “Censo 2002: Síntesis de Resultados.” Comisión Nacional del XVII Censo de Población y VI de Vivienda. March 2003.

their isolated island, which was converted into a giant sheep ranch. Now, 123 years following annexation, a sizeable sector of the population of Easter Island is dissatisfied with Chilean rule. An independence movement has emerged among the Rapanui population that seeks to establish Easter Island as an independent nation-state. Many pro-independence activists dream of reestablishing the Polynesian kingdom that existed on the island when it was still called Rapa Nui.

The question that will be examined in this paper is: How likely is it that the Easter Island independence movement will be successful? This paper will employ a comparative analysis of the independence movements of Easter Island, the Basque Country,⁹ and South Sudan to determine the likelihood that Easter Island's independence movement will succeed in making Easter Island an independent nation-state. Three factors will be used to compare these independence movements: economic integration between territory and metropolis,¹⁰ official external support for the independence movement, and migration of ethnic groups from the metropolis to each territory.

Based on these comparisons, it seems unlikely that the Easter Island independence movement will succeed in its objective. Mutual economic dependency between Chile and Easter Island is a stumbling block to independence. Furthermore, the independence movement lacks official support from other nation-states. Additionally, the presence of a mainland Chilean community on Easter Island and an intense Chileanization campaign launched by the

⁹ In this paper, "Basque Country" refers to the provinces of Basque heritage that are currently part of the Kingdom of Spain and referred to as *País Vasco* in Spanish. The Basque provinces of France are not included in this paper.

¹⁰ "Territory" in this paper will refer to areas in which an independence movement has developed, in contrast to the "metropolis."

government in Santiago have created serious challenges to Easter Island's independence movement. Overall, the case of Easter Island's independence movement more closely resembles that of the Basque independence movement, which was unable to achieve independence for the Basque Country, than that of South Sudan.

The cases of the Basque and South Sudanese independence movements were selected because they each exemplify the two different outcomes of an independence movement: success and failure. The Basque independence movement has been unsuccessful in achieving Basque secession from Spain, whereas South Sudan gained independence in July 2011 and is the world's newest country.¹¹ Both the South Sudanese and Basque independence movements represent populations that are ethnically different from the dominant population of the metropolis. This is also the case of Easter Island. Additionally, Easter Island, the Basque Country, and South Sudan have small populations relative to their metropolises. Easter Island has a population of five thousand, a figure which represents 0.03 percent of Chile's total population.¹² The population of the Basque Country is approximately 2.1 million, which composes 4.9 percent of Spain's total population.¹³ The population of South Sudan is estimated to be eight million inhabitants, a figure equivalent to 20 percent of Sudan's pre-secession population.¹⁴

This paper will examine both external and internal factors that affect the success of

¹¹ "Their day in the sun." *The Economist*. July 9, 2011.

¹² Robert T. Buckman. *Latin America 2008*. (Harpers Ferry: Stryker-Post Publications, 2008), 304.

¹³ "IV Inkesta Soziolinguistikoa." Gobierno Vasco, Servicio Central de Publicaciones del Gobierno Vasco. 2008.

¹⁴ "Discontent over Sudan census." *AFP*. May 21, 2009.

independence movements. Regarding economic relations between a territory and a metropolis, if there is greater economic dependency and integration between both economies, it is less likely that the territory will secede (and that the metropolis will be open to independence). For instance, the Basque Country, whose economy is highly integrated with that of Spain, failed to achieve independence, whereas South Sudan, whose economy functioned largely independently of Sudan's, was able to secede. Additionally, external support for independence from other states is important to the success of an independence movement as territories generally are militarily weaker than the metropolis and lack political clout in international organizations such as the United Nations. Lack of official external support is a major detriment to prospects for independence. Furthermore, the presence of ethnic communities from the metropolis can undermine local support for independence, which is detrimental to independence movements.

This paper will open with an examination of the role of the independence movement in the history of Easter Island under Chilean rule, and then discuss Chile's position towards Easter Island's independence movement. The paper then analyzes some of the most significant grievances of the Easter Island independence movement before examining the role of economic integration between territory and metropolis, external support for independence movements, and migration of ethnic groups from the metropolis to the territory in either favoring or discouraging independence. The conclusion will discuss which of these factors is most relevant in determining the likelihood that Easter Island's independence movement will be successful in accomplishing its objective.

Easter Island under Chilean Rule: Emergence of an Independence Movement

An independence movement has existed on Easter Island ever since the Island was

annexed to Chile in 1888. Shortly after annexation, the Chilean government leased out the entire island to a sheep ranching company, and the Rapanui population was confined to the village of Hanga Roa.¹⁵ This action convinced the Rapanui that the Chilean Government was not at all concerned with the welfare of the indigenous inhabitants, and the Rapanui independence movement was born.¹⁶ Many Rapanui had hoped that Chile would respect their culture and political structures following annexation. However, in 1898, the Chilean authorities on Easter Island prohibited the public display of the Rapanui flag.¹⁷ The following year, the last Rapanui 'ariki (king) died during a visit to Valparaíso: historians now believe that he was deliberately poisoned by Chilean officials.¹⁸ Such repression angered the Rapanui, who revolted against Chilean rule in 1902.¹⁹ The rebellion was quickly put down by Chilean soldiers and caused the Chilean Government to issue a *reglamento* (edict) that severely restricted the autonomy of the Rapanui.²⁰ One of the most draconian provisions of this *reglamento* forbade the Rapanui from leaving Easter Island without official permission.²¹

The Rapanui launched an unsuccessful rebellion in 1914.²² This rebellion had important consequences for Easter Island. For the first time, the attention of many Chileans was drawn to

¹⁵ Alfred Métraux. *Easter Island: A Stone Age Civilization of the Pacific*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), 19.

¹⁶ Fischer 2005, 146.

¹⁷ Ibid, 152.

¹⁸ Ibid, 153.

¹⁹ Ibid, 155.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Métraux 1957, 21.

²² Fischer 2005, 166.

the plight of the inhabitants of Easter Island, and there was significant public outcry in Chile over the lack of rights for the Rapanui.²³ Chilean periodicals and rights groups published reports of abuses committed by the Chilean authorities in Easter Island, which included corralling all the Rapanui into the village of Hanga Roa and failing to support local attempts at agriculture.²⁴ Following Chilean demands that the Rapanui be given political rights and representation, Chile designated Easter Island a *subdelegación* (county) of the Valparaíso Region in 1916.²⁵ While this development may have satisfied mainland Chileans, it represented a major setback for the Easter Island independence movement because this action showed that the Chilean Government had rejected autonomy and was seeking to bring Easter Island closer to the rest of the Republic.

Despite being granted some legal protection, the Rapanui continued to be oppressed in their homeland. As Easter Island was leased out to sheep ranchers, the Island was used as pasture for sheep. The Rapanui were restricted to the town of Hanga Roa and required a special pass to be able to venture beyond the village limits.²⁶ Punishments for trying to escape Hanga Roa or Easter Island were strict and included banishment to the Chilean mainland.²⁷ In the mid-1930s, the Chilean Government installed a Spanish-language primary school on Easter Island and required that all Rapanui children be enrolled.²⁸ Pupils were forbidden from speaking the Rapanui language and were punished by being beaten or having their heads shaved in public if

²³ Ibid, 164.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid, 166.

²⁶ John Douglas Porteous. *The Modernization of Easter Island*. (Victoria: University of Victoria, 1981), 121.

²⁷ Edwin N. Ferdon, Jr. "Easter Island Exchange Systems." *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*. 14 (1958): 150.

²⁸ Fischer 2005, 189.

they did not speak Spanish.²⁹ Discontent with Chilean rule led to high levels of tension between the Rapanui and their Chilean overlords. Repression only seemed to grow worse in 1953, when Easter Island passed to the jurisdiction of the Chilean Navy.³⁰

Following the global wave of decolonization after World War II, the Chilean Government felt compelled to take action to improve the civil rights of the Rapanui. Failure to do so would surely have attracted international condemnation, so Santiago was keen to take steps to prevent this. Regional developments also played an important role in shifting Chilean policy. Despite their geographic isolation, the Pacific islands soon witnessed their share of political unrest. While Easter Island was largely spared violence, the neighboring island of Tahiti erupted in strikes, riots, and anti-French violence due to heavy-handed French rule.³¹ Contact between Tahiti and Easter Island made the Rapanui more self-aware and eager to clamor for their rights.

Fearing unrest, the Chilean authorities lifted the restriction on leaving Easter Island in the 1950s.³² Some Rapanui, seeking better economic opportunities, left Easter Island for mainland Chile and Tahiti, but many ultimately returned.³³ Rapanui who left Easter Island for Chile saw firsthand the rights that citizens in independent republics enjoy.³⁴ Upon their return to Easter Island, these Rapanui agitated for self-determination. Revolutionary fervor swept Easter Island in the mid-1960s. Social changes in Chile led many Rapanui to believe that a solution to their

²⁹ Ibid, 210.

³⁰ Ibid, 202.

³¹ Porteous 1981, 170.

³² Fischer 2005, 192.

³³ McCall 1981, 136.

³⁴ Fischer 2005, 209.

colonial dilemma would soon be had. Rapanui hopes for self-determination intensified in 1964: the reform-minded Christian Democrats came to power in Chilean presidential elections, and Eduardo Frei Montalva embarked on an ambitious campaign of social transformation.³⁵ Following Frei's election, Rapanui leaders sent an open letter to the President which contained Rapanui grievances and demands. Among the items listed included "unpaid labor, travel restrictions, confinement to Hanga Roa, suppression of the Rapanui language...and arbitrary naval decisions which could not be appealed."³⁶ The leaders concluded their letter by expressing hope that "colonialism" in Easter Island would soon end.³⁷ Frei, in an attempt to placate the enraged Rapanui, responded that Easter Island would hold municipal elections in 1965.

The 1965 elections, however, unsettled Chilean officials. The Rapanui elected Alfonso Rapu, a schoolteacher who was a major figure in the Easter Island independence movement, as *alcalde* (mayor) of Hanga Roa.³⁸ In response to this, the military governor declared the elections invalid.³⁹ As tensions grew and violence erupted, Frei declared that Chile would respect the result of the elections.⁴⁰ Frei felt compelled to confirm the results of the election because he feared that if the Chilean Government in Santiago did not respect the will of the Rapanui voters, "international attention might be drawn to Easter Island's embarrassing neo-colonial situation,"

³⁵ Ibid, 211.

³⁶ Porteous 1981, 171.

³⁷ Ibid, 171.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Fischer 2005, 214.

argues Steven Roger Fischer.⁴¹

With Rapu's election, it seemed that the Rapanui were one step closer to achieving independence from Chile. The Chilean Government, however, had other plans. Still fearing that international attention would be drawn to the colonial situation of Easter Island, Chile took steps to integrate the Rapanui closer to the mainland. As John Douglas Porteous observes:

During the late 1960s the mainland government was concerned to expunge the island's former 'colonial' status, to upgrade the conditions of life of a people who were both locationally and socioeconomically marginal to Chile, and to achieve 'the incorporation of the islander into the mainstream of national life.' Accordingly, an elaborate plan for the improvement of utilities, social services, communications, transport, and housing was announced, with the deliberate intention of effecting rapid 'transformation and modernization.' Infrastructural improvements were motivated on the one hand by the need to provide basic standards for a nascent tourist industry, and on the other by feelings of guilt regarding Chile's neglect of the island during the previous eighty years.⁴²

Along with these plans, an influx of mainland Chileans arrived on the Island in 1965, comprising about 25 percent of the population.⁴³ Construction of an international airport at Mataverí linked Easter Island with both Tahiti and mainland Chile.⁴⁴ Medical facilities were upgraded, and radiotelephone, telegraph, and postal services substantially improved.⁴⁵ The Easter Island Act of 1965 gave the Rapanui full voting rights, social security, and socialized medicine.⁴⁶ The culmination of integration occurred in 1966, when Easter Island officially became a province of

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Porteous 1981, 175-176.

⁴³ Ibid, 178.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 172.

⁴⁵ Ibid, 178.

⁴⁶ Mann 1976, 187.

the Valparaíso Region.⁴⁷ The Rapanui were granted full Chilean citizenship in that same year.⁴⁸ Despite these developments, conflict continued in 1967, when the Rapanui protested that development projects “disregarded traditional island values and that consultation with the Rapanui had been, at best, perfunctory.”⁴⁹

Direct integration to the rest of the Republic prompted a massive influx of mainland Chileans to Easter Island. Starting in 1965, the Frei government offered Chileans who moved to Easter Island a two hundred percent increase in salary (later reduced to fifty percent),⁵⁰ which enticed many mainlanders to relocate to the tiny island. By 1970, approximately 25 percent of the population of Easter Island, out of a population of one thousand, was comprised of mainland Chileans.⁵¹ With these inhabitants came an intense Chileanization campaign, and Easter Island was bombarded with Spanish-language radio, television, courts, government offices, and education.

Daily life on Easter Island did not change significantly following the 1973 military coup against Salvador Allende. In fact, for the Rapanui, life on Easter Island got better following the coup. In 1974, Augusto Pinochet Ugarte became the first Chilean head of state to visit Easter Island. Streets were paved and tourism began to increase under Pinochet’s rule. Repression on Easter Island was not as strong as in mainland Chile, mainly because most Rapanui were not pro-Allende. In 1984, Sergio Rapu became the first ethnic Rapanui to be named as governor of

⁴⁷ Fischer 2005, 215.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Porteous 1981, 229.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 230.

⁵¹ Ibid, 219.

Easter Island, and he was succeeded by another Rapanui, Jacobo Hey Paoa, in 1990.⁵²

Following the restoration of democracy in 1990, the Chilean Government took some steps to protect the rights and culture of the Rapanui and other indigenous groups in Chile. In 1993, the *Ley Indígena* was passed, which gave legal recognition to six distinct indigenous groups, including the Rapanui.⁵³ The *Ley Indígena* called for the establishment of a fund that would “assist development and living conditions of these groups.”⁵⁴ Additionally, the government pledged to respect native lands, traditions, and languages.⁵⁵ In 1995, Chile’s Senate Commission on Indigenous Peoples approved a law that would prevent non-Rapanui from acquiring land on Easter Island.⁵⁶ While many Rapanui independence leaders applauded this gesture, they noted that Chile had not returned tribal lands that had been seized from the Rapanui upon annexation. This led to anti-Chilean violence and protests in 2000.⁵⁷

Easter Island independence activists, who are overwhelmingly Rapanui in ethnicity, continue to exert pressure on Chile to allow the territory to exercise its right to self-determination. A small victory was achieved in 2007, when Chile granted Easter Island the status of *territorio especial* (“special territory”) and gave the Island an autonomous charter.⁵⁸ However, as of present writing, the charter has yet to be put into effect, and Easter Island remains governed as a

⁵² Fischer 2005, 221-227.

⁵³ Ley N° 19.253. Ley Indígena. Ministerio de Planificación y Coordinación. October 5, 1993.

⁵⁴ Fischer 2005, 240-241.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 244.

⁵⁷ Ibid, 250.

⁵⁸ Reforma constitucional que establece los territorios especiales de Isla de Pascua y Archipiélago Juan Fernández. Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile. July 30, 2007.

province of the Valparaíso Region.⁵⁹

Chile's Stance on Easter Island: National Pride and Strategic Interests

For its part, Chile is reluctant to grant independence to Easter Island. In 1952, President Gabriel González Videla triumphantly declared, "The Isla de Pascua [Easter Island] is, and will eternally be, Chilean."⁶⁰ Santiago views Easter Island as an integral part of the Chilean state and thus considers independence an unacceptable option. In order to understand this position, it is first necessary to explore the reasons that motivated Chile to annex Easter Island.

Chile annexed Easter Island in 1888.⁶¹ Previously, Easter Island had not been colonized by any other nation-state. In 1770, the Spanish explorer Don Felipe González de Ahedo landed at Easter Island and claimed the Island for Spain,⁶² but Spain did not make any attempts at colonization and effectively abandoned its claims.⁶³ Following González de Ahedo's departure, the Rapanui lived isolated from the rest of the world, receiving only occasional visits from European explorers, such as James Cook in 1774.⁶⁴

The nineteenth century was an era of territorial expansion throughout the world. The United States expanded its borders at the expense of Mexico, Spain, Russia, Great Britain, and

⁵⁹ Gobierno Regional de Valparaíso. Gobierno Regional de Valparaíso. November 13, 2011.

⁶⁰ Fischer 2005, 197.

⁶¹ Beverly Haun. *Inventing "Easter Island."* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 10.

⁶² John dos Passos. *Easter Island: Land of Enigmas*. (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1971), 24.

⁶³ McCall 1981, 48.

⁶⁴ Heyerdahl 1989, 57.

France, and annexed the independent kingdom of Hawaii in 1893.⁶⁵ In 1885, the major European powers held the Berlin Conference, in which they agreed to regulate European colonization of Africa.⁶⁶ An international race to claim overseas colonies had begun.

Chile gained independence from Spain in 1818 following a war of independence that lasted for eight years.⁶⁷ Through the strong leadership of statesman Diego Portales,⁶⁸ Chile was spared much of the violence and instability that plagued South American nations post-independence. Chile was able to achieve a high “degree of political stability which permitted the rapid development of agriculture, mining, industry, and commerce.”⁶⁹ From the outset, Chile was a strong military power, defeating the Peru-Bolivian Confederation in the War of the Confederation from 1836 to 1839⁷⁰ and Spain in the Chincha Islands War from 1864 to 1866.⁷¹ Perhaps the most significant event in Chilean history in the nineteenth century was the War of the Pacific (1879-1883). Chile defeated the combined forces of Bolivia and Peru and “increased its territory by one third, landlocking Bolivia in the process, and gained a world monopoly on sodium nitrates.”⁷² The victory led Chileans to dream of establishing an empire and becoming a

⁶⁵ John Heffner. “Between Assimilation and Revolt: A Third Option for Hawaii as a Model for Minorities World-Wide.” *Texas International Law Journal* 37 (2002): 621.

⁶⁶ John D. Hargreaves. “The Berlin West Africa Conference: A Timely Centenary.” *History Today* 34 (1984): 16.

⁶⁷ Benjamín Vicuña MacKenna. *La guerra a muerte: memoria sobre las últimas campañas de la Independencia de Chile*. (Santiago: Imprenta Nacional, 1868), 562.

⁶⁸ Harold Blakemore. “Chile From the War of the Pacific to the World Depression, 1880-1930” in *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, edited by Leslie Bethell, 498-535. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

⁶⁹ Porteous 1981, 24-26.

⁷⁰ Arturo Valenzuela. “Chile: Origins, Consolidation, and Breakdown of a Democratic Regime,” in *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America*, edited by Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, 162. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1989.

⁷¹ Buckman 2008, 308.

⁷² Erika Beckman. “The Creolization of Imperial Reason: Chilean State Racism in the War of the Pacific.” *Journal*

“world power.”⁷³ The War of the Pacific initiated a period of Chilean territorial expansion that took place on three fronts. The first occurred in the present-day Chilean provinces of Tarapacá and Arica in the north,⁷⁴ while the second was directed against the Mapuche people in southern Chile.⁷⁵ With this expansion, Chileans developed an image of themselves as a Latin American country that could compete with the strongest, most developed nation-states of Europe.⁷⁶

The third theater of Chilean expansionism was the Pacific Ocean. Due to Chile’s relative geographic isolation (separated from its neighbors by the vast Atacama Desert in the north and the Andes Mountains in the east), Chile set its sights westward. Chile possessed a strong navy,⁷⁷ which made expansion into the Pacific Ocean a logical conclusion. Extending Chilean power into the Pacific islands was viewed as necessary because of economic and military reasons.⁷⁸ From an economic standpoint, a Pacific Empire would enhance Chile’s position in the global economy. Prior to the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914,⁷⁹ the port of Valparaíso in central Chile occupied an important place in international shipping.⁸⁰ The Chilean Government believed that possessing Pacific islands would cement Chile’s privileged position in international shipping

of Latin American Cultural Studies 18 (2009): 73.

⁷³ Ibid, pp. 74.

⁷⁴ William E. Skuban. *Lines in the Sand: Nationalism and Identity on the Peruvian-Chilean Frontier*. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2007), 13.

⁷⁵ Juan Pablo Fassnidge. “Pacificación de la Araucanía”, una mirada histórica de un conflicto actual. (Santiago: Universidad Alberto Hurtado, 2009), 2.

⁷⁶ Fischer 2005, 136.

⁷⁷ Porteous 1981, 27.

⁷⁸ Fischer 2005, 136-137.

⁷⁹ Edward Tenner. “Digging Across Panama.” *Humanities* 32 (2011): 28.

⁸⁰ Porteous 1981, 27.

and lead to economic growth. Controlling Pacific islands would also bring military advantages, as Chilean presence in the Pacific islands could serve as a check on the regional presence of the major powers, namely France, Great Britain, and the United States.⁸¹ If Chile seized territory, it could prevent these countries from becoming too powerful in the Pacific.⁸²

By the mid-nineteenth century, the majority of the Pacific Islands had already been colonized by the European powers. One island that had escaped colonization, however, was Easter Island. Chile viewed Easter Island's geographic location in the South Pacific as very strategic due to the fact that the island lies between South America and Australia, which was a major market for Chilean goods.⁸³ Easter Island also lies between Australia and North America, and could serve as an important fueling stop for trading vessels.⁸⁴ Chileans believed that Easter Island could be turned into a plantation economy that would produce fruits and other agricultural products that required a tropical climate and thus could not be grown in temperate mainland Chile.⁸⁵ Additionally, Chile feared that France and Great Britain had their sights on the Island, a fear which was further heightened when France took control of Tahiti.⁸⁶ Geographically, Easter Island is the nearest Pacific island to mainland South America, which was another reason that made annexation attractive to Santiago.⁸⁷ Finally, it is important to not overlook the prestige that

⁸¹ Ibid, 29.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Dan Bendrups. "Navegando, Navegando: Easter Island Fusion and Cultural Performance." *The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology* 10 (2009): 117.

⁸⁴ Porteous 1981, 29.

⁸⁵ Ibid, 28.

⁸⁶ Fischer 2005, 125-126.

⁸⁷ McCall 1981, 63.

possessing a colony would bring to Chile. In the nineteenth century, countries that owned colonies were considered major world powers. Therefore, possession of a colony such as Easter Island would raise Chile's international prestige and make Chile the only South American nation to possess a colony,⁸⁸ which was viewed as a characteristic of modern, developed nation-states.

Easter Island continues to be strategically important for Chile. Possessing Easter Island has allowed Chile to establish a foothold in the Asia-Pacific region. Chilean interest in Easter Island increased under the military government of Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990), as tensions with neighboring countries made Chile feel the need to portray itself as a militarily strong and modernized nation-state.⁸⁹ The establishment of a Chilean naval base on the Island has enabled Chile to assert its military might far from the South American mainland. With the opening of the Panama Canal, Easter Island no longer plays an important role in international shipping, yet Chile can use Easter Island as a base from which to strengthen relations with Asian countries and Australia. This could bring Chile into closer contact with growing Asian economies. The main economic advantage that Easter Island offers Chile is revenue obtained from the Island's tourist industry, which is an important contribution to Chile's economy.

Chile is currently on the brink of becoming South America's first developed nation, which is a source of pride for many Chileans. The country was admitted to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2010, becoming the organization's first South American member.⁹⁰ This, along with Chile's history, has led many Chileans to view

⁸⁸ Fischer 2005, 138.

⁸⁹ Porteous 1981, 234.

⁹⁰ "List of OECD Member Countries – Ratification of the Convention on the OECD." *OECD*. November 13, 2011. <<http://www.oecd.org/pages.html>>

themselves as a distinct country that has progressed far beyond any of its neighbors. Chile, to date, remains the only South American country to possess territory outside of South America proper, which further differentiates Chile from its neighbors. Possessing Easter Island is a source of pride that places Chile in the category of powerful nations whose territory extends beyond the continent in which they are located, as is the case of Great Britain, the United States, France, and other countries. The fact that Easter Island is so well-known internationally has also been another source of Chilean pride in possessing the Island. Easter Island has been named a UNESCO World Heritage Site⁹¹ and has attracted outside curiosity for centuries. Easter Island's *moai* were also in the running for the New Seven Wonders of the World contest.⁹² The Chilean Government proudly portrays Easter Island as a national symbol of Chile in tourism campaigns. The popularity and prestige of Easter Island in the international community are another factor that explains Chile's reluctance to allow Easter Island to become independent.

The Easter Island Independence Movement: Grievances and Demands

The establishment of Easter Island as an independent nation-state is the ultimate objective of the Easter Island independence movement. The independence movement's political body is the Rapa Nui Parliament (Spanish: *Parlamento Rapa Nui*),⁹³ headed by Rapanui tribal leaders. While the *alcalde* (mayor) of Easter Island is elected, tribal leaders obtain their positions based on kinship. Commonly cited grievances of the independence movement include Chile's seizure of tribal lands, unrestricted migration of Chileans to Easter Island, and Chileanization policies.

⁹¹ Luis Mizón. "Easter Island's Last Secret." *UNESCO Courier* 50 (1997).

⁹² "Líder pascuense furioso porque le dieron a la isla un triunfo moral." *Las Últimas Noticias*. July 10, 2007.

⁹³ Angélica Baeza Palavecino. "Miembro del parlamento Rapa Nui: 'La isla se tiene que independizar de Chile.'" *La Tercera*. August 3, 2010.

Many Rapanui independence activists question the legality of the 1888 treaty that annexed Easter Island, which is currently the subject of a lawsuit against Chile.

Land disputes between the Government of Chile and the Rapanui continue to simmer. One of the most recent manifestations of discontent occurred in December 2010, when several pro-independence activists occupied buildings in Hanga Roa that they claimed had been “stolen” from their ancestors.⁹⁴ When the protestors refused to abandon the buildings, Chilean police fired pellet guns and wounded between seventeen and thirty people.⁹⁵ Maka Atan, a Rapanui lawyer associated with the Easter Island independence movement, stated that police had been “shooting to kill.”⁹⁶ Two months later, a group of Rapanui occupied a luxury hotel in Hanga Roa, arguing that the land on which the hotel had been built was stolen by the Chilean Government.⁹⁷ The protestors were evicted by Chilean police, but the dispute continues.⁹⁸ Easter Island’s independence leaders insist that an independent Easter Island could force Chile to respect Rapanui sovereignty and return the tribal lands to their rightful owners. Independence, in the view of many, would pressure Chile to abandon its claims to traditional Rapanui land.

Pro-independence Rapanui activists have also called for restrictions on migration from the Chilean mainland to Easter Island.⁹⁹ Independence leaders fear that a larger population of Chileans on Easter Island will damage Easter Island’s Polynesian identity. The influx of

⁹⁴ “Easter Island land dispute clashes leave dozens injured.” *BBC News*. December 4, 2010.

⁹⁵ *Ibid*.

⁹⁶ *Ibid*.

⁹⁷ “Police evict Rapa Nui clan from Easter Island hotel.” *BBC News*. February 6, 2011.

⁹⁸ *Ibid*.

⁹⁹ Angélica Baeza Palavecino. “Tomas en Isla de Pascua: Un conflicto con historia.” *La Tercera*. August 3, 2010.

Chileans is closely linked to the introduction of Chilean institutions to Easter Island and also to the tourist trade. Thanks to an increase in tourism, hundreds of mainland Chileans have moved to Easter Island to work in the lucrative tourism industry.¹⁰⁰ This has strongly influenced Easter Island's demography. For instance, as recently as 1952, the majority of the population of Easter Island was of indigenous Rapanui descent, with few Chilean inhabitants.¹⁰¹ However, since 1966, the Chilean population of the Island has grown to comprise approximately 25 percent of the population.¹⁰² Growing numbers of Chileans on the Island and high rates of intermarriage between Chileans and Rapanui greatly concern pro-independence activists, who fear the Rapanui bloodline will die out. In October 2009, Easter Island held a referendum on restricting migration from Chile, with 90 percent of the Rapanui voting in favor of restricting Chilean migration.¹⁰³ The Chilean Congress, however, needs to approve changing the constitution in order to put this restrictive law into effect, which seems unlikely. The Chilean Government cannot restrict migration of its citizens from the mainland to Easter Island because legally, Easter Island is as much a part of Chile as Santiago or Valparaíso. Therefore, restricting Chilean migration would be viewed as unconstitutional. This has led pro-independence activists to call for independence from Chile, as an independent Easter Island would be in a better position to make its own laws restricting immigration. Additionally, the Easter Island independence movement wants to restrict the annual flow of tourists, which is blamed for having caused environmental degradation

¹⁰⁰ Gideon Long. "Easter Island to curb immigrants." *BBC News*. October 25, 2009.

¹⁰¹ Porteous 1981, 219.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

and pollution on the Island.¹⁰⁴

Closely linked to this influx of Chileans are Chileanization policies that have also angered pro-independence Rapanui activists. Ever since annexation by Chile, the Island's Polynesian identity has been eroded and replaced with more Latin American elements. Intermarriage between Rapanui and Chileans is growing common, which contributes to a diluted Rapanui bloodline and a weakened sense of Rapanui identity among children of mixed descent. Few youngsters speak Rapanui as their mother tongue, and Spanish, the language of professional advancement, has become the dominant language on the Island and is spoken in the schools, shops, and government offices.¹⁰⁵ The education system on Easter Island is the same as its counterpart on mainland Chile,¹⁰⁶ and no considerations are made for Easter Island's Polynesian heritage. These policies were meant to bring Easter Island closer to the rest of the Republic of Chile and to ease the transition for Chilean families that moved to Easter Island from the mainland. The Easter Island independence movement, however, views these measures as disrespectful and inattentive to the needs of the Rapanui. In an independent Easter Island, it is argued, the Island's original traditions and language can be protected and will not be threatened by dominant Chilean culture. Therefore, independence is viewed as a form of cultural preservation that appeals to many Rapanui who see their culture and identity as being threatened by Chilean influences.

Factors Affecting the Success of Independence Movements: Economic Integration,

¹⁰⁴ "Rapa Nui déjà vu." *The Economist*. 10 October 2009.

¹⁰⁵ Fischer 2005, 218.

¹⁰⁶ "Los dominios del rey." *La Tercera*. October 17, 2011.

External Support, and Ethnic Migration

A large number of dependent territories and colonies still exist despite the post-World War II wave of decolonization. Many ethnic groups continue to live as minorities in other nation-states, as is the case of the Rapanui. As Ernest Gellner points out, there are potentially eight thousand ethno-linguistic groups in the world, yet there are only about two hundred nation-states,¹⁰⁷ which implies that not every ethno-linguistic group is able to be an independent nation-state. In order to determine which independence movements will succeed and which will fail, this paper will examine three characteristics of dependent territories: the degree of economic integration between the metropolis and the territory, official external support for independence, and migration of ethnic groups from the metropolis to the dependent territory. These factors will be analyzed for the cases of Easter Island, the Basque Country, and South Sudan to determine why the independence movement in South Sudan succeeded and why the Basque independence movement failed. The case of Easter Island will be compared to these two cases to determine the likelihood of the Easter Island independence movement achieving its objective.

Economic Integration Between Metropolis and Territory: Easter Island, the Basque Country, and South Sudan

A territory's economic relationship with its metropolis is an important factor that can either encourage or discourage independence. A high degree of integration between the two economies leads to interdependence and complicates the prospects that 1) the territory will move towards independence and 2) the metropolis will be open to secession. From the point of view of the metropolis, secession leads to the loss of part of the economy, which can be devastating for

¹⁰⁷ Ernest Gellner. *Nations and Nationalism*. (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1983), 44.

the metropolis. The territory, for its part, may become more reluctant to declare independence so as not to lose the economic benefits that union with the metropolis confers. However, if there is no strong economic relationship between the territory and the metropolis, there will be much stronger pro-independence sentiment, which is favorable to the success of an independence movement. Economic integration, it can be said, favors continued political integration.

The cases of Easter Island, the Basque Country, and South Sudan support this theory. Easter Island's lack of natural resources has led to economic dependence on Chile, while Chile's economy benefits from the revenue that Easter Island's tourist industry generates. Similarly, the Basque Country and Spain have a strongly interdependent relationship. Spain depends on the Basque Country's industry and manufacturing, whereas the Basque Country has access to markets in Spain and the rest of the European Union. These two cases contrast sharply with that of South Sudan, which had a lower level of economic integration with Sudan. This may have been a contributing factor that helped South Sudan obtain its independence, and could explain why the Basque Country has not achieved independence. The similarities between Easter Island and the Basque Country on this issue suggest that the high level of economic interdependence between Chile and Easter Island discourages Easter Island's independence.

One of the most potent challenges that the Easter Island independence movement has to face is the economic situation of the Island. Even with economic aid from Chile, Easter Island has a much lower level of economic development than the rest of Chile. The Island's lack of a viable economy has pushed Easter Island into an intimate relationship with Chile. As long as these economic problems and high level of integration between Chile and Easter Island remain, they will continue to be a major deterrent to Easter Island's independence.

Easter Island may be one of the least economically viable places on Earth. Most ominously, even basic economic activities are executed with difficulty on Easter Island. For instance, agriculture on Easter Island is severely limited. Despite having a subtropical climate,¹⁰⁸ Easter Island is not conducive to agriculture. The Island's soils are not evenly distributed and are "often shallow and stony,"¹⁰⁹ and have almost no mineral content.¹¹⁰ Grass is the only vegetation on most of Easter Island's surface.¹¹¹ Obtaining freshwater is very complicated due to the fact that Easter Island is volcanic in origin.¹¹² When it rains, water is absorbed by the volcanic rock and disappears rapidly from the surface.¹¹³ Further complicating the water supply, there are no rivers on Easter Island.¹¹⁴ The only reservoirs of freshwater are the craters of the Island's three extinct volcanoes, yet the crater of the Rano Kau volcano is so full of peat grass that freshwater is limited.¹¹⁵ Thus, Easter Island is wholly dependent upon Chile for basic necessities. Virtually all food is imported from Chile by ship or airplane.¹¹⁶ This includes such basic staples as bread and chicken.¹¹⁷ During much of the twentieth century, food was brought to

¹⁰⁸ Haun 2008, 6.

¹⁰⁹ Alfred Métraux. *Ethnology of Easter Island*. (Honolulu: Bernice P. Bishop Museum, 1971), 10.

¹¹⁰ Porteous 1981, 101.

¹¹¹ Métraux 1971, 12.

¹¹² Haun 2008, 6.

¹¹³ Métraux 1971, 10.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*, 11.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid*, 7.

¹¹⁶ "Rapa Nui déjà vu." *The Economist*. 10 October 2009.

¹¹⁷ Porteous 1981, 226.

Easter Island only once a year by a vessel of the Chilean Navy.¹¹⁸

Infrastructure on Easter Island is severely lacking. Easter Island currently does not have a functioning sewage system.¹¹⁹ Diesel-powered generators provide electricity and power cuts are frequent.¹²⁰ The only town on Easter Island is Hanga Roa,¹²¹ home to approximately 75 percent of the Island's inhabitants (according to the 2002 census).¹²² While the roads in Hanga Roa have been upgraded, they are not surfaced, which leaves the roads muddy after a heavy rainfall.¹²³ Educational and health establishments are limited.¹²⁴ There are no establishments of higher education on Easter Island, so students who wish to pursue a university education must journey to Chile to study in one of the universities located on the mainland.¹²⁵

Easter Island's economy is almost wholly dependent upon the tourist industry. Tourists come to see the renowned *moai* statues and experience the Island's Polynesian culture,¹²⁶ and are also attracted by Easter Island's moniker as the most remote inhabited island on Earth.¹²⁷ In the mid-1990s, approximately fourteen thousand tourists visited the Island annually, and this number

¹¹⁸ Ibid, 164.

¹¹⁹ "Rapa Nui déjà vu." *The Economist*. 10 October 2009.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Peter Beighton. "Easter Island People." *The Geographical Journal* 132 (1966): 347.

¹²² "Censo 2002: Síntesis de Resultados." Comisión Nacional del XVII Censo de Población y VI de Vivienda. March 2003, 24.

¹²³ Porteous 1981, 178.

¹²⁴ Fischer 2005, 226.

¹²⁵ McCall 1981, 79.

¹²⁶ "Rapa Nui Déjà Vu." *The Economist*. 10 October 2009.

¹²⁷ Victor Strauss Frank. "A Trip to Easter Island: A Speck on the Ocean." *Journal of the Franklin Institute* 162 (1906): 179.

jumped to seventy thousand in the years between 2000 and 2010.¹²⁸ Tourism, unfortunately, has had a negative impact on the Island's natural environment,¹²⁹ and several Rapanui leaders would like to restrict visitors to only five thousand a year.¹³⁰ However, tourism is also restricted by Easter Island's remote location, which limits the number of tourists who can enter the Island each year.

Because Easter Island is so dependent on Chilean aid, some Rapanui do not support the independence movement. Alberto Hotus, a member of Chile's Partido por la Democracia (PPD), is head of the Consejo de Ancianos on Easter Island.¹³¹ He is a leading voice against independence for Easter Island, arguing that union with Chile has stimulated the Island's economic development, which would surely be lost if Easter Island became independent.¹³² Rapanui opposition to independence often comes from the older inhabitants of the Island, who can remember the times when Easter Island was severely economically undeveloped.¹³³ The lack of natural resources and basic necessities on Easter Island and the fact that Chile provides the Island with almost everything that it needs have made many Easter Islanders reluctant to support independence. Some believe that severing links with Santiago will lead to a loss of aid, and Easter Island will face economic collapse. The reasoning is the following: if Easter Island is having these economic difficulties despite Chilean aid, how will Easter Island support itself if it becomes an independent nation-state and ceases to receive constant Chilean assistance?

¹²⁸ "Rapa Nui Déjà Vu." *The Economist*. 10 October 2009.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ "Los dominios del rey." *La Tercera*. October 17, 2011.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

Chile also benefits economically from its Pacific outpost. The Chilean Government stands to gain from the revenue that the lucrative tourism industry produces. For example, it is estimated that tourists who visited Easter Island in 2010 to see the solar eclipse brought in more than one billion dollars,¹³⁴ which is important for Chilean economic growth. The tourism industry on Easter Island has also created job opportunities for both Rapanui and mainland Chileans alike.¹³⁵ Additionally, Chile can use Easter Island as a base from which to engage in economic activities such as fishing. Due to “growing acceptability of a 200-mile economic limit for territorial waters,” Chile has been keen to use Easter Island as a base for economic adventures in the Pacific region.¹³⁶ Therefore, Easter Island is profitable for Chile. This situation of mutual benefits is a factor that will likely hinder the Easter Island independence movement’s quest to secede from Chile.

In a sharp contrast to Easter Island, the Basque Country has historically been one of the most industrialized regions in Spain and is an important manufacturing center in the Iberian Peninsula.¹³⁷ The region has recovered well from its economic crisis of 1975-1985, when unemployment rose and quality of life indices fell.¹³⁸ By 1990, two-thirds of Spain’s integrated steel plants were located on the Basque coast, along with one-third of Spain’s shipyards.¹³⁹

¹³⁴ “Isla de Pascua espera ingresos sobre US\$1.100 millones por eclipse de sol.” *Terra*. May 16, 2010.

¹³⁵ “Rapa Nui déjà vu.” *The Economist*. October 10, 2009.

¹³⁶ Porteous 1981, 234.

¹³⁷ Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh. *A Rebellious People: Basques, Protest, and Politics*. (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 21.

¹³⁸ “Introduction.” *Business Revitalization*. Spri. November 16, 2011, 1.

¹³⁹ Zirakzadeh 1991, 21.

More than half of Spanish steel production occurs in the Basque region.¹⁴⁰ The Basque Country is considered “an economically advanced area of Spain” in comparison to regions such as Andalusia and Extremadura.¹⁴¹ Indeed, the Basque Country has one of the highest per capita disposable incomes in all of Spain.¹⁴² The region is one of the most economically viable regions in Spain and in the European Union as a whole.

Basque economic growth is crucial to the economy of Spain. The Basque Country’s factories and manufacturing plants are among the most productive on the entire Iberian Peninsula. The region continues to be a major destination for economic migrants in Spain, and its economy consistently performs significantly better than those of many regions of Spain, such as Castilla-La Mancha and Andalusia.¹⁴³ Because of this high level of Spanish dependence and the integration of the Basque and Spanish economies, Spain opposes Basque secession. If the Basque Country became independent, Spain would lose an important industrial and manufacturing base. This, in turn, would harm the Spanish economy, which is already among the weaker economies of the European Union. While it may be an exaggeration to claim that Basque independence would jeopardize Spanish economic survival, it should nonetheless be noted that the Basque economy is a vital contributor to Spain’s national economy. The Basques also benefit from union with Spain, as Basque products are able to reach all member-states of the European Union without the application of tariffs or quotas. This has discouraged the Basques from secession and continues to be a major challenge to the Basque independence movement.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid, 17.

¹⁴³ Goio Etxebarria and Mikel Gómez Uranga. “Panorama of the Basque Country and its Competence for Self-Government.” *European Planning Studies* 8 (2000): 529.

South Sudan, prior to independence, represented a much different case than both Chile-Easter Island and Spain-Basque Country. Because of the largely independent economic development of the northern and southern regions of Sudan, independence for South Sudan has not adversely affected the economy of Sudan. The northern part of Sudan developed an economy that operated rather independently of the economy of the southern regions of the country. For instance, the area around Khartoum was able to develop a light industrial base.¹⁴⁴ Sudan also possesses some oil reserves and small-scale agriculture is practiced in some regions of the country.¹⁴⁵ Furthermore, Sudan was able to rely on its northern oil reserves without having to extract petroleum from oil fields in the south.

South Sudan, however, remained severely underdeveloped as a part of Sudan. South Sudan became the “forgotten” region of Sudan that did not receive much financial aid or attention from Sudan, and it contributed little to Khartoum. This lack of development has afflicted newly independent South Sudan. The country has appallingly low levels of public health infrastructure such as sanitation and hospitals.¹⁴⁶ It is estimated that 85 percent of South Sudanese are illiterate and have never attended school.¹⁴⁷ There have been chronic shortages of clean drinking water.¹⁴⁸ The Government of South Sudan spends a disproportionate amount of its capital on buying weapons and furnishing an army, but spends almost nothing on constructing

¹⁴⁴ Graham Bateman and Victoria Egan. *The Encyclopedia of World Geography*. (Oxford: Andromeda Oxford Limited, 1993), 148.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Nima Elbagir and Faith Karimi. “South Sudanese celebrate the birth of their nation.” *CNN*. July 9, 2011.

¹⁴⁷ “Independence Beckons.” *The Economist*. January 8, 2011.

¹⁴⁸ Sam Seibert. *Newsweek*. “Riding High.” July 18, 2011.

schools, hospitals, roads, etc.¹⁴⁹ Much of South Sudanese economic activity consists of subsistence farming,¹⁵⁰ which has been unaffected by independence from Sudan. On a more positive note, 80 percent of the former Sudan's oil reserves are located in what is now South Sudan, yet these went untapped while South Sudan was part of Sudan.¹⁵¹ However, while South Sudan possesses the oil, Sudan possesses the pipeline necessary to export the oil.¹⁵²

Because South Sudan did not receive economic aid from Khartoum, nor did it contribute much to the Sudanese economy, there was a low level of economic integration between the two economies. This was conducive to South Sudanese independence. The South Sudanese reasoned that because Sudan would not attend to their needs, they had nothing to lose by declaring independence. Additionally, the South Sudanese Government felt that as an independent entity, it could better attract foreign investment and foment economic development, because as an independent nation-state it could design its own laws concerning foreign investment and would not have to obey laws passed in Khartoum. The Sudanese, for their part, were not overly concerned with South Sudanese secession because the region contributed little to Sudan's economy.

Sudan continues to rely on its other economic activities, such as light industry and agriculture, for economic survival. Additionally, Sudan has been able to ensure that it will

¹⁴⁹ "The promise and peril of independence." *The Economist*. June 13, 2009.

¹⁵⁰ Belgis Attia Gebreel and Elsamawal Khalil Makki. "The Role of Women in Jubraka Farming and Household Food Security in Kadogli (South Kordofan State, Sudan)." *Ahfad Journal* 1 (2009): 40.

¹⁵¹ Danna Harman. "As South Sudan prepares for independence, old hurts linger." *Christian Science Monitor*. January 24, 2011.

¹⁵² William Armstrong. "Sudan's Pyrrhic Independence." *The New York Amsterdam News*. July 21-July 27, 2011.

continue to maintain a share in South Sudan's oil reserves through control of the oil pipeline that the South Sudanese need in order to export their petroleum. While South Sudan lacks basic infrastructure and will depend on Sudan to be able to export its oil,¹⁵³ it is hoped that investment projects will allow South Sudan to harness the capacity of its numerous natural resources and spur economic development. Countries such as Israel¹⁵⁴ and China¹⁵⁵ have expressed interest in becoming economic and strategic partners of South Sudan, and it is expected that they will be the source of much needed foreign investment. Indeed, several corporations have already undertaken investment projects in South Sudan, such as the China National Petroleum Corporation and the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation of India.¹⁵⁶ This economic aid has targeted the country's natural resources that had not been utilized under Sudanese rule.

The differing economic experiences of Easter Island, the Basque Country, and South Sudan reveal that a high degree of economic integration between the metropolis and its territory discourages independence, which is the case of both Easter Island and the Basque Country. Easter Island receives a lot of financial aid from Chile but contributes strongly to the mainland in the form of tourism revenue and the geographical advantages it provides for economic expansion in the Pacific. Chile would be reluctant to allow Easter Island to become independent due to the revenue generated by Easter Island's lucrative tourism industry that would no longer be sent to

¹⁵³ "After the Divorce." *The Economist*. August 13, 2011.

¹⁵⁴ Daniel R. DePetrìs. "A new friend for Israel in...South Sudan." *Christian Science Monitor*. September 14, 2011.

¹⁵⁵ Boswell and Perry 2011.

¹⁵⁶ Vincent Trivett. "Oil-Rich South Sudan Has Hours to Choose Between North Sudan, China, and the U.S." *Business Insider*. July 8, 2011.

Chilean coffers and the possibility to exploit Easter Island's location in order to establish stronger economic relations with the Asia-Pacific region. For their part, the Rapanui depend on Chilean aid to import basic necessities such as food and provide services such as healthcare and education. Meanwhile, the Basque Country is an important economic center of Spain and is a major contributor to the Spanish national economy. The high level of industrialization and economic growth that the Basque Country contributes to the economy is a reason why the Spanish Government is opposed to Basque independence. Furthermore, economic advantages of union with Spain and the European Union are an important factor that has dissuaded many Basques from supporting independence.

The case of South Sudan contrasts with those of Easter Island and the Basque Country. South Sudan did not have a strong economic relationship with Sudan and was an economic backwater under Sudanese rule. South Sudan's resources, namely oil and gems, were not exploited by the Sudanese Government. Khartoum largely ignored South Sudan's economy and focused instead on its military conflict with South Sudanese groups. The fact that the economic systems of Sudan and South Sudan functioned for the most part independently of one another facilitated independence, as independence was not economically disruptive to either country.

As much as pro-independence activists in Easter Island may wish to sever links with Chile, the fact remains that Chile's and Easter Island's economies are strongly interdependent. This interdependence is a factor that will likely frustrate the ambitions of the Easter Island independence movement much as it has done to the Basque independence movement.

External Support for Independence Movements: Easter Island, the Basque Country, and South Sudan

External support is another factor that can determine the success and trajectory of independence movements. Outside support for independence is frequently crucial to the success of an independence movement. For instance, the United States, China, and many other countries supported South Sudan's independence movement. This support can legitimize the independence struggle of a territory that is seeking independence, and countries can provide military and economic aid to territories and colonies if pro-independence conflict becomes violent. For example, a crucial factor for the success of the U.S. War of Independence was support that France provided to the colonial troops, who were at a military disadvantage when compared to the superior British forces. Given that many territories that seek independence are usually weaker economically and militarily vis-à-vis their metropolises and generally lack international clout, outside support is often vital to the success, and even survival, of independence movements. An independence movement that has a powerful external ally will be more likely to make its struggle known to the global community and could arouse the sympathies of other nation-states. However, support for independence movements is often determined by international norms and geopolitical concerns.

Currently, Easter Island's independence movement does not have the official support of external nation-state actors, yet it has attracted unofficial support from private individuals and non-governmental organizations. Sources of support for Easter Island's independence can be broken down between private individuals and non-governmental entities. Similarly, the Basque movement does not have the official support of other nation-states, but human rights violations associated with the Basque independence movement have aroused the attention of various non-state actors. Conversely, South Sudan enjoyed widespread official international support for its independence, which may have been a decisive factor in allowing that country to gain its

independence. This external support for South Sudanese independence was a factor that helped South Sudan become independent, whereas the Basque Country, which did not have external aid, failed to become independent. On this issue, Easter Island more closely resembles the case of the Basque Country, which suggests that the territory's independence movement will be unsuccessful in its mission.

The Easter Island independence movement does not have a strong external ally in the quest for independence. At present, no nation-state has expressed the opinion that Easter Island ought to become independent from Chile. Easter Island is rarely a topic of importance in bilateral relations between Chile and other nation-states, and due to the small population and remote location of the territory, it passes largely unnoticed in international dealings with Chile.

Despite the fact that no national government has officially expressed support for Easter Island's independence movement, private individuals and non-governmental organizations have established close links with the movement. An individual who has established close links with Easter Island's independence movement is Congressman Eni E.H. Faleomavaega of American Samoa. Faleomavaega, currently a member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the House Committee on Natural Resources, traveled to Easter Island during the congressional recess of 2011 to assess relations between the Chilean Government and the Rapanui clans.¹⁵⁷ Faleomavaega traveled to Chile and Easter Island in his capacity as Ranking Member of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific and as a Member of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere.¹⁵⁸ Faleomavaega decided to travel to Easter

¹⁵⁷ "US Congressman to assess Easter Island conflict between Rapa Nui natives and Chile." *MercoPress*, March 24, 2011.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

Island following Chilean police's violent suppression of a Rapanui protest in December 2011 and forced evictions of Rapanui from traditional lands (these lands were then leased out to private companies).¹⁵⁹ In February 2011, Faleomavaega co-authored, with Hawaii Senator Daniel Akaka, a letter to Chilean President Sebastián Piñera Echeñique to express "concerns about the current situation unfolding in Easter Island."¹⁶⁰ During his visit to Chile, Faleomavaega met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Planification, Undersecretary for Regional Development, and Special Advisor for Indian Affairs, while in Easter Island Faleomavaega met with the Governor of Easter Island and with leaders of the Rapa Nui Parliament,¹⁶¹ the main pro-independence group on the Island.¹⁶² Faleomavaega encouraged U.S. President Barack Obama to "support the indigenous rights" of the Rapanui people and to discuss this issue during his state visit to Chile in March of 2011.¹⁶³ President Obama did not discuss the rights of the Rapanui people during his visit to Santiago.

Chilean lawyer Osvaldo Gálvez is working with leaders from the Rapa Nui Parliament to submit a lawsuit against Chile, with the objective of nullifying the annexation treaty of 1888 and obtaining an indemnization of 175 billion Chilean pesos (approximately \$355 million) for the residents of Easter Island who lost their land and animals.¹⁶⁴ The lawsuit will be submitted in August 2012 to a court in the city of Valparaíso, and if the lawsuit is successful, Chile will be

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² *Saving the Rapanui*. Journeyman Pictures. November 2004.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ "Los dominios del rey." *La Tercera*, October 17, 2011.

forced to withdraw from Rapanui territory.¹⁶⁵ If Gálvez does not prevail in court, he will work with the U.S. Indian Law Resource Center to take the lawsuit to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States.¹⁶⁶ Other individuals who have spoken out in favor of the sovereignty movement include James Anaya, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and Hawaii Senator Daniel Akaka.¹⁶⁷

One example of a non-governmental organization that has taken a stand in solidarity with the Easter Island independence movement is the Indian Law Resource Center, a non-governmental organization based in Helena, Montana. The Indian Law Resource Center's mission is to provide "legal assistance to indigenous peoples of the Americas" to protect their political, economic, and social rights.¹⁶⁸ Notably, this organization advocated for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 1994.¹⁶⁹ As previously stated, the Indian Law Resource Center has stated that it will take Gálvez's lawsuit against Chile to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States if the Valparaíso court rejects the lawsuit.¹⁷⁰ Additionally, the Center is examining other legal means to protect the Rapanui people.¹⁷¹ The Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) is another non-

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Joss Douglas and Samantha Nadler. Difficult Times for Chile's Easter Island. Council on Hemispheric Affairs. 14 March 2011, 1.

¹⁶⁸ "About the Center." Indian Law Resource Center. <<http://www.indianlaw.org/content/about-center>>. (accessed October 29, 2011).

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ "Los dominios del rey." *La Tercera*, October 17, 2011.

¹⁷¹ "Rapa Nui struggle to maintain lands and protect culture." Indian Law Resource Center. <<http://www.indianlaw.org/content/rapa-nui-struggle-reclaim-lands-and-protect-culture>> (accessed October 29, 2011).

governmental organization that has expressed its interest in the Easter Island independence movement. COHA was established in 1975 to advise U.S. policymakers on relations with Latin America.¹⁷² COHA has called on the Chilean Government to return tribal lands to the Rapanui, “address historic injustices,” and grant Easter Island its right to sovereignty.¹⁷³ The Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs has also condemned violence against the Rapanui and has advocated that the Chilean Government find a permanent solution to Easter Island’s problems.¹⁷⁴

It is important to remember that no nation-state has publicly supported the Easter Island independence movement. Even in the case of Congressman Faleomavaega, who made an official visit to Easter Island, there has been no official U.S. government support for the independence of Easter Island. Groups such as the Indian Law Resource Center are working with Easter Island’s independence movement but do not have the official support of the countries in which these groups are based. While these groups can exert pressure on national governments, they do not design policy nor do they formulate responses to international problems. Therefore, their support is not as strong as official support from national governments would be.

The Basques confront a situation similar to that of the Rapanui. The Basque independence movement does not have the support of any national governments. This could be due in large part to the violent actions of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). ETA was founded in 1959 by young nationalists who were frustrated with the passivity of the Partido Nacionalista

¹⁷² “About COHA.” Council on Hemispheric Affairs. <<http://www.coha.org/about-coha/>> (accessed on October 29, 2011).

¹⁷³ Douglas and Nadler 2011, 1.

¹⁷⁴ “UBCIC Condemns Chilean Government’s Attack on Unarmed Rapanui.” Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs. December 4, 2011.

Vasco (PNV) towards the dictatorship of Francisco Franco.¹⁷⁵ Initially a political group that was focused on the preservation of the Basque language,¹⁷⁶ the group soon sprouted a militant wing that launched its first terrorist attacks in 1959.¹⁷⁷ The attacks continued intermittently until ETA announced in October 2011 that it would end its armed struggle.¹⁷⁸ ETA's violent activities could be a factor that dissuaded national governments from supporting Basque independence, as these governments did not want to be identified as supporting a "terrorist" organization.

Many non-state actors similarly do not endorse Basque independence and routinely condemn violence perpetrated by ETA, yet denounce human rights violations that are related to the cause of Basque independence. The United Nations Human Rights Commission has condemned the violent treatment and torture of Basque political prisoners in both France and Spain,¹⁷⁹ but has not called for self-determination of the Basque Country. Torture was especially prevalent in Spanish prisons under the government of Francisco Franco,¹⁸⁰ but has continued even after the restoration of democracy.¹⁸¹ Amnesty International is an example of a non-governmental organization that has condemned the abuse and torture of Basques incarcerated for political motives,¹⁸² but it has yet to call on Spain to allow the Basque Country to exercise its right to self-determination. Other human rights organizations have criticized Spain for human

¹⁷⁵ Paddy Woodworth. *The Basque Country*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 174.

¹⁷⁶ Luis Núñez Astrain. *The Basques: Their Struggle for Independence*. (Txalaparta: Welsh Academic Press, 1995), 33.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid*, 32.

¹⁷⁸ David Román. "Basque Separatists Vow Again to End Violence." *The Wall Street Journal*. October 21, 2011.

¹⁷⁹ Núñez Astráin 1995, 91.

¹⁸⁰ Sullivan 1998, 92.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid*, 92.

¹⁸² Núñez Astráin 1995, 95.

rights violations against independence activists, but have not called for Basque independence.

The case of South Sudan differs radically from those of Easter Island and the Basque Country. South Sudan's independence movement enjoyed widespread official support from other nation-states and supranational actors, including the United States,¹⁸³ the European Union,¹⁸⁴ Israel,¹⁸⁵ South Africa,¹⁸⁶ and China.¹⁸⁷ The United States played a major role in helping Sudan reach the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005,¹⁸⁸ which stipulated that a referendum on South Sudanese independence be held in 2011.¹⁸⁹ President Barack Obama immediately congratulated South Sudan upon independence.¹⁹⁰ The United States also played an important role in pushing Sudan to allow South Sudan to hold its independence referendum. Additionally, the United States established a large diplomatic presence in South Sudan prior to and following the country's declaration of independence.¹⁹¹ The United States also promised to lift some economic sanctions on Sudan and forgive Sudan's international debt if Sudan did not

¹⁸³ Boswell and Perry 2011.

¹⁸⁴ Giedre Steikunaite. "A New Country in Africa?" *New Internationalist*. January/February 2011.

¹⁸⁵ DePetrìs, 2011.

¹⁸⁶ Boswell and Perry 2011.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Luke A. Patey and Harry Verhoeven. "Sudan's Islamists and the Post-Oil Era: Washington's Role After Southern Secession." *Middle East Policy* 8 (2011): 133.

¹⁸⁹ Luka Biong Deng. "The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Will It Be Sustained?" *Civil Wars* 7 (2005): 248.

¹⁹⁰ Maggie Fick. "Obama congratulates South Sudan on independence vote, but what about Abyei?" *Christian Science Monitor*. January 16, 2011.

¹⁹¹ "Independence Beckons." *The Economist*. January 8, 2011.

prevent South Sudanese independence.¹⁹² Congressman John Kerry stated that if Sudan did not interfere with South Sudanese independence, Sudan would be removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.¹⁹³ In this case, the promise of normalizing relations with the United States¹⁹⁴ was a major factor that pushed Sudan to allow South Sudan to hold its referendum on independence. In short, because the Sudanese conflicts were so bloody and well known, other countries had few qualms about taking an active role in promoting South Sudanese independence.

What are some factors that incite nation-states to support certain independence movements but not others? In order to understand the position of the international community towards independence movements, it is necessary to take into account international norms concerning sovereignty and secession. One norm that makes countries reluctant to support independence movements is the territorial integrity norm, defined by Mark W. Zacher as “the growing respect for the proscription that force should not be used to alter instate boundaries.”¹⁹⁵ This norm, predominant since the end of World War II,¹⁹⁶ holds that “state borders should not be changed.”¹⁹⁷ It also implies “great antipathy towards the threat or use of force for the traditional purposes of national aggrandizement.”¹⁹⁸ The territorial integrity norm could be a major stumbling block for the Easter Island independence movement, as it is unclear whether the

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Boswell and Perry 2011.

¹⁹⁴ “After the Divorce.” *The Economist*. August 13, 2011.

¹⁹⁵ Mark W. Zacher. “The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force.” *International Organization*. 55 (2001): 215.

¹⁹⁶ Boaz Atzili. “When Good Fences Makes Bad Neighbors: Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict.” *International Security*. 31 (2006-2007): 139.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid, pp. 142.

¹⁹⁸ Alan James. *Sovereign Statehood*. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 210.

international community would permit or even be receptive to altering Chile's borders.

Additionally, the 1960 United Nations Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples "made it clear that it was existing colonies, and not ethnic groups, that were eligible for independence."¹⁹⁹ The United Nations Special Committee on Principles of International Law stated that while the United Nations promotes self-determination, it does not authorize or encourage "any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States..."²⁰⁰ Thus, the Rapanui, as an ethnic group and not a "colony," would not be eligible for independence in the view of the United Nations. As Ernest Gellner points out, there are potentially 8,000 ethno-linguistic groups in the world, yet there are only about 200 nation-states,²⁰¹ which implies that not every ethno-linguistic group is able to be an independent nation-state. The Easter Island independence movement, therefore, needs to overcome these challenges set by international norms in order to present a strong, legitimate case for independence that is not based solely upon ethnic or linguistic identity. However, this could prove difficult, as support for independence comes primarily from the Rapanui and not from the Chileans: ethnicity marks divisions on the stance on independence. The same is true of the Basque Country, where Basques are the primary supporters of independence, while Spaniards oppose Basque secession. In the case of South Sudan, however, there were many ethnic groups supporting independence, so independence was not perceived as favoring one particular ethnic group over others. Therefore, it is important to

¹⁹⁹ Zacher 2001, 221.

²⁰⁰ Jorri Duursma. *Fragmentation and the International Relations of Micro-States*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 20.

²⁰¹ Gellner 1983, 44.

keep in mind that international norms often condition official external support for independence movements.

In addition to international norms that are not conducive to independence, geopolitical considerations and special interests play a role in dissuading countries from supporting independence movements. In Easter Island's case, commercial and diplomatic interests in Chile are a factor that leads countries to abstain from supporting Easter Island's independence.

For instance, the United States has not expressed official support for the Easter Island independence movement. One of the reasons is undoubtedly geopolitics. Chile has traditionally been one of the strongest allies of the United States in South America, an alliance whose relevance has grown due to the emergence of left-wing, anti-United States governments throughout the region. The United States cannot risk losing one of the few allies that it still has in Latin America. Additionally, Chile is a close economic partner of the United States. The two countries signed a free trade agreement in 2003.²⁰² It is likely that these economic relations would sour if the United States supported independence for Easter Island. Other countries, such as Spain and Russia, would be reluctant to support Easter Island's independence movement because these nation-states have active secessionist movements operating within their territory. These countries would not be receptive to supporting independence for Easter Island for fear that it would encourage their own ethnic minorities (Basques and Catalans in Spain, Chechens and other groups in the Russian Federation) to declare independence. It was less risky for countries

²⁰² George W. Bush "Proclamation – To Adjust the Rules of Origin Under the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement and the United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement." *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*. 43 (2007): 1638.

to support the independence of South Sudan because of the poor international prestige of Sudan's government: in fact, opposing South Sudan's independence would likely have raised the ire of members of the international community. Therefore, it is important not to overlook the role that geopolitical considerations play in conditioning official support for independence movements.

Without outside support, it is highly unlikely that Easter Island will be able to achieve independence because it is such a miniscule island with a small population of only five thousand inhabitants. Chile has superior military might and political clout. However, if a coalition of other nation-states were to support Easter Island independence, serious pressure could be exerted on Chile to allow Easter Island to become an independent country. This was the case of South Sudan, yet the Easter Island independence movement lacks the support of national governments. This lack of outside support is another factor that complicates independence for Easter Island in the near future.

On the issue of external support for independence, the Easter Island case more closely resembles that of the Basque Country than that of South Sudan. Neither independence movement has been able to attract outside support. This may be due to differing reasons: whereas in the case of the Basque Country ETA's terrorist activities may have dissuaded countries from supporting independence, Easter Island's small size and population could be reasons for not supporting independence. The South Sudanese independence movement differs sharply from its Easter Island and Basque counterparts because it had the external support of powerful countries such as the United States and China. This could be due to the negative international image of Sudan and the low political costs of supporting South Sudanese independence. Of course, international norms and geopolitical considerations play an important

role in tempering international support for independence movements.

Migration from Metropolis to Territory: Easter Island, the Basque Country, and South Sudan

A third factor that has an important role in determining the success of independence movements is the migration of ethnic groups from the metropolis to the dependent territory. If the population of the dependent territory is relatively homogeneous and composed of groups that are not present in the metropolis, it is more likely that there will be a stronger sense of national identity and cohesion, which is a factor that strengthens independence movements. However, if the territory's population is heterogeneous and is home to groups from the metropolis, there will likely be more division among the different groups, which is detrimental to independence movements. A group from the metropolis living in the territory would likely feel a strong attachment to the metropolis and would be less receptive to the idea of separating from the metropolis. These groups would likely oppose independence, especially if they arrived in the territory in the service of the government or armed forces of the metropolis. The arrival of outside groups and intermarriage between members of indigenous groups and groups from the metropolis can contribute to a weakened sense of national identity in those dependent territories whose cultural identity is different from that of the metropolis. For instance, the immigration of Americans to Hawaii in the late nineteenth century, and the subsequent marginalization of Native Hawaiians, was a factor that cemented U.S. control of the Republic of Hawaii and ultimately facilitated statehood in 1959.²⁰³ The presence of these ethnic divisions is problematic for independence movements because they cannot claim to represent the whole population of the

²⁰³ Haunani-Kay Trask. "Native social capital: The case of Hawaiian sovereignty and Ka Lahui Hawaii." *Policy Sciences* 33 (2000): 375.

territory, which raises issues of legitimacy. This is even more relevant in light of the 1960 United Nations Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which states that ethnic groups are not eligible for independence. If an independence movement represents the views of one ethnic group in a territory but not the views of other groups, it is less likely that the independence movement will attract external support.

Ethnic migration is yet another factor that makes independence for Easter Island seem unlikely. Easter Island is home to two major communities, the indigenous Rapanui of Polynesian descent, and Chileans who have migrated to the Island from mainland Chile. In Easter Island there are sharp ethnic divisions which handicap the independence movement. The Basque Country is similar to Easter Island in that it has witnessed an influx of outsiders who are allied with the metropolis (Spain), and their political and cultural influence has contributed to a weakening of pro-independence support and distinct identity. While South Sudan is a more ethnically diverse entity than either Easter Island or the Basque Country, it is composed of groups of African descent that bear the collective history of oppression by the Arab government of Sudan. However, a key difference in the case of South Sudan is that it is not home to groups from the metropolis, unlike the cases of Easter Island and the Basque Country. This contributed to the success and cohesion of South Sudan's independence movement and adversely affected the Basque independence movement, and so it is likely that ethnic divisions regarding independence will seriously challenge the Easter Island independence movement.

Ever since annexation in 1888, Chileans have migrated from the mainland to Easter Island. Out of a population of approximately four thousand inhabitants, the 2002 census revealed that 60 percent (about 2,400 inhabitants) were of Rapanui ancestry, whereas the

remaining 40 percent were Chileans from mainland Chile (comprising about 1,600 inhabitants).²⁰⁴ A 2009 estimate of the demographics of Easter Island placed the percentage of Rapanui as 75 percent of approximately five thousand inhabitants, a figure which includes people of mixed Rapanui and Chilean ancestry.²⁰⁵ The remaining 25 percent is composed of mainland Chileans.²⁰⁶ A small number of Rapanui live outside of Easter Island, concentrated mainly in Chile and Tahiti.²⁰⁷

The influx of Chileans has worried many Rapanui leaders, who fear that the migrants are eroding traditional Rapanui culture and are receiving favorable treatment from the government in Santiago. The majority of Chileans who settle in Easter Island are government employees.²⁰⁸ Chile actively promoted Chilean migration to Easter Island by offering its citizens a 200 percent salary increase for working on the Island,²⁰⁹ and relocation to Easter Island accelerated during the 1960s.²¹⁰ The influx of Chileans was accompanied by an intense Chileanization campaign²¹¹ which was intensified following the Easter Island Act in 1965.²¹² In order to make Easter Island more amenable to Chilean migrants, and to facilitate the territory's integration into the Republic of Chile proper, the Chilean Government felt compelled to Chileanize the territory to promote

²⁰⁴ "Censo 2002: Síntesis de Resultados." Comisión Nacional del XVII Censo de Población y VI de Vivienda. March 2003.

²⁰⁵ *Saving the Rapanui*. Journeyman Pictures. November 2004.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁷ McCall 1981, 136.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 65.

²⁰⁹ Mann 1976, 187-188.

²¹⁰ Porteous 1981, 159.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, 151.

²¹² *Ibid.*, 187.

national cohesion and to provide migrants with the comforts of home.

The Rapanui language has been one of the primary targets of the Chileanization campaign. In the 1930s, the Chilean Government launched an aggressive program of intensive primary school instruction in Spanish.²¹³ Spanish is the sole official language of Easter Island due to the fact that Easter Island is considered a *departamento* of the Valparaíso Region (V Región, as it is known administratively).²¹⁴ All official business on the Island is conducted in Spanish,²¹⁵ and Rapanui has been relegated to a language spoken privately among the indigenous inhabitants. Miki Makihara has observed that there has been “[l]anguage shift from Rapanui” to Spanish on Easter Island.²¹⁶ In 1977, Rapanui was the predominant language of 75 percent of primary school students, but this number had fallen to only 25 percent a decade later.²¹⁷ In the late 1990s, only about 20 percent of Rapanui primary school students had a strong grasp of the Rapanui language.²¹⁸ Figure 1 shows the percentage of primary school-age Rapanui children who spoke either Rapanui or Spanish as their dominant language between 1980 and 2000.

Figure 1. Percentage of Primary School Rapanui Students Speaking Either Rapanui or Spanish as their Dominant Language.

²¹³ Ibid, 151.


²¹⁴ Ibid, 188.

²¹⁵ *Saving the Rapanui*. Journeyman Pictures. November 2004.

²¹⁶ Miki Makihara. “Rapa Nui Ways of Speaking Spanish: Language Shift and Socialization on Easter Island.” *Language in Society* 34 (2005): 727.

²¹⁷ Ibid, 728.

²¹⁸ Ibid.



Source: Miki Makihara. "Rapa Nui Ways of Speaking Spanish: Language Shift and Socialization on Easter Island." *Language in Society* 34 (2005): 728.

Whereas Rapanui was once the dominant spoken language on the Island, the arrival of Chilean migrants and the persistence of official assimilationist campaigns has led to the dominance of the Spanish language on Easter Island. Steven Roger Fischer asserts:

"To be Chilean" at last meant, of course, a weakening of the indigenous inheritance. And nowhere was this more apparent than in the use of the Rapanui language. Until the mid-1960s Rapanui had still been the island's dominant tongue. But Chilean civil administration promoted assimilation...And so Spanish soon became necessary in nearly every public act. All Rapanui now used Spanish not only with the *continentales* but increasingly among themselves. With this, the Rapanui language changed, too, becoming more influenced by Spanish. Many Rapanui parents no longer spoke Rapanui at all to their children, believing that Spanish would better their chances in life.²¹⁹

While Rapanui leaders are taking action to revive the traditional language, the presence of a large Chilean, Spanish-speaking population that has the official support of the government in Santiago and the intermarriage of Chileans with Rapanui has seriously jeopardized the existence of the Rapanui language.²²⁰ It is feared that one day, the Rapanui language will disappear entirely.²²¹

²¹⁹ Fischer 2005, 218.

²²⁰ *Saving the Rapanui*. Journeyman Pictures. November 2004.

Another source of tension between the Rapanui and the Chilean community on Easter Island relating to the Chileanization campaign is education. With the arrival of Chileans, Easter Island's education system (which was hitherto largely nonexistent)²²² was modeled on the Chilean system. Educational materials reflected a thoroughly Chilean cosmovision,²²³ and there were no adaptations of the material to the Rapanui context. Easter Island's education system does not provide instruction in the Rapanui language,²²⁴ which has threatened the language and contributed to its disuse among young Rapanui. In both Chile and Easter Island, schools portray the Chileans as the "saviors" of the Rapanui people.²²⁵ The education system's inability to adapt to the local context has infuriated Rapanui political leaders, yet its consistency with mainland schooling has the support of Easter Island's Chilean community.

Tensions between the two groups, despite intermarriage, remain strong. The Rapanui resent the Chileans because on average, this group has higher living standards than do the Rapanui despite having arrived later to Easter Island.²²⁶ Many mainland Chileans who live on Easter Island view the Rapanui with suspicion, and do not trust their ability to govern the Island either as an autonomous entity or an independent nation-state. There is geographic segregation according to ethnicity on Easter Island, with most Rapanui living in the town of Hanga Roa, whereas Chileans live in and around the naval base in Mataverí.²²⁷ Stereotyping and lack of

²²¹ Métraux 1971, 33.

²²² Thor Heyerdahl. *Easter Island: The Mystery Solved*. (New York: Random House, 1989), 253.

²²³ "Los dominios del rey." *La Tercera*. October 17, 2011.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ McCall 1981, 154.

²²⁶ Porteous 1981, 229.

²²⁷ Fischer 2005, 202.

mutual understanding plague both the Rapanui and Chilean communities of Easter Island. While the Rapanui consider the Chileans to be arrogant and overbearing, a commonly held Chilean view of the Rapanui is that the Polynesians are “primitive Indians” incapable of effective governance.²²⁸ The memory of pro-independence revolts on Easter Island are still fresh in many Chileans’ minds, and several have expressed fear that the Rapanui are hoarding weapons in secret caves to massacre the Chileans residing in Easter Island.²²⁹ Resident Chileans also oppose returning tribal lands to the Rapanui.²³⁰ Because of this, virtually all Chileans living in Easter Island are staunchly opposed to independence for fear of living in a Rapanui-governed republic.

The fact that many Rapanui, particularly the youth, can no longer speak the traditional language is a major dent to Rapanui nationalism, which in turn retards the independence movement. Saturating the Rapanui environment with Chilean media, education, and politics is designed to bring Easter Island closer to Chile, and as younger generations grow up with these Chilean influences, it is more likely that they will feel less enticed to separate from Chile. Inter-marriage is another important element that has created a more Chileanized Rapanui stock. Furthermore, inter-marriage dilutes the Rapanui bloodline, which is another encroachment upon Rapanui identity and sense of uniqueness from the rest of Chile.

The arrival of mainland Chileans to Easter Island has sharply impacted the Island’s demography. Whereas in the 1960s less than one-tenth of Easter Island’s population was of non-Rapanui heritage,²³¹ in the early years of the twenty-first century that percentage (excluding

²²⁸ McCall 1981, 178.


²²⁹ Ibid, 177.

²³⁰ Fischer 2005, 262.

²³¹ Porteous 1981, 157.

those of mixed Rapanui and Chilean ancestry) has more than quadrupled. Easter Islanders self-identify as Rapanui based largely on having Rapanui ancestors. Figure 2 shows trends in the percentage of the population of Easter Island that self-identifies as Rapanui since 1960.

Figure 2. Rapanui as Percentage of Easter Island Population



Source: Simon Roger Fischer.
*Island at the End of the World:
 The Turbulent History of Easter
 Island.* London: Reaktion
 Books, 2005.

The Rapanui and Chileans have differing political stances on independence: support for independence comes from the Rapanui community (though it is important to point out that not all Rapanui are pro-independence), whereas resident Chileans favor Easter Island remaining a part of Chile. Easter Island's Chileans, while forming a minority group, have a disproportionate amount of power on the Island and most importantly, hold political sway in Santiago. The fact that the inhabitants of Easter Island are divided along ethnic lines regarding independence complicates the independence movement's mission, as it cannot claim to represent the people of Easter Island if a powerful sector of the populace opposes independence. The Chileans on Easter Island form a sizeable group that could oppose secession if the Rapanui declare independence.

Like Easter Island, the Basque Country has also witnessed an influx of outsiders and is home to a bicultural population. This migration was influenced by intense industrialization and economic growth in the Basque Country that was unparalleled in any part of the Iberian Peninsula.²³² This economic growth continued into the twentieth century. Waves of migrants from other parts of Spain began in the 1890s,²³³ shortly after the rapid economic growth and industrialization of the Basque region. These newcomers were Spanish-speakers who generally belonged to the lower classes.²³⁴ These migrants transformed Basque society, which was worrisome to Basque nationalists. Many areas in which the Basque language was dominant soon became Spanish-speaking districts,²³⁵ and many ethnic Basques were becoming “culturally Spanish.”²³⁶ This linguistic phenomenon continued in such a manner that by the 1990s, only 23.1 percent of the population of the Basque Country could speak fluent Basque.²³⁷ By the 1950s, half of the population of the Basque Country was of non-Basque ancestry (mainly with ancestry from other regions of Spain),²³⁸ a clear demographic shift from the Basque Country’s homogeneity fifty years earlier.

This influx of Spanish-speaking migrants had significant consequences for Basque nationalism. Perceiving that Basque culture and identity were under attack, nationalist sentiment in the Basque Country grew. As John Sullivan observes, “[u]ntil the 1890s the social

²³² John Sullivan. *ETA and Basque Nationalism*. (London: Routledge, 1988), 1.

²³³ Sullivan 1988, 1.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Ibid, 38.

²³⁷ Núñez Astrain 1995, 13.

²³⁸ Ibid.

distinctiveness of the four Basque provinces had produced no nationalist consciousness.”²³⁹ It was with the arrival of non-Basque outsiders that Basque nationalism grew. Prior to the arrival of migrants, the Basque Country had been one of Spain’s most homogeneous regions.²⁴⁰ However, with the arrival of outsiders, the Basques felt the need to preserve their identity. Sabino Arana, the “father” of Basque nationalism,²⁴¹ argued that the Spanish were “racially inferior” to the Basques²⁴² and advocated discrimination against Spaniards living in the Basque Country.²⁴³ The arrival of Spanish migrants was one of the most recurring Basque grievances held against Madrid, as the Spanish government was viewed as complicit in promoting this migration.²⁴⁴

Throughout much of the twentieth century, Basque and Spanish inhabitants of the Basque Country held differing political views concerning the status of the Basque provinces. As late as the mid-1990s it could be said that a majority of Basques supported self-determination and eventual independence, and support for nationalist parties was high.²⁴⁵ Spaniards living in the Basque Country, however, were overwhelmingly opposed to Basque nationalism and independence.²⁴⁶ The large population of Spaniards living in the Basque region would likely have prevented pro-independence voters from obtaining victory had a plebiscite on independence

²³⁹ Sullivan 1988, 1.

²⁴⁰ Woodworth 2008, 24.

²⁴¹ Núñez Astrain 1995, 26.

²⁴² Sullivan 1988, 2.

²⁴³ Woodworth 2008, 33.

²⁴⁴ Sullivan 1998, 38.

²⁴⁵ Núñez Astrain 1995, xii.

²⁴⁶ Sullivan 1988, 43.

been held, and would have opposed any measure granting a higher degree of autonomy to the Basque Country.

In recent years, support for independence among the Basques has fluctuated between only 20 to 30 percent of the electorate, reaching a low of 21 percent in favor in 2001 and recording only 22 percent approval in 2008.²⁴⁷ 30 percent of respondents surveyed said that they opposed independence, while a further 32 percent stated that they would examine the circumstances in order to make their decision.²⁴⁸ Reasons given for this decrease in pro-independence support include concerns over the economy and housing shortages.²⁴⁹ Meanwhile, 65 percent of Spaniards living in the Basque Country stated that they are opposed to holding a referendum that would offer Basque voters the chance to become independent from Spain.²⁵⁰ On a national level, 68 percent of respondents stated that they believed that independence for any region of Spain should not be permitted.²⁵¹ Clearly, while it is undeniable that support for independence among Basques has decreased, those who continue to support Basque independence are mainly Basques, whereas the majority of Spaniards living in the Basque Country are opposed to secession. This, in the Basque case, has proven to be a stumbling block for the independence movement, as a sizeable percentage of the local population is opposed to independence. This seriously undermines the Basque independence movement and problematizes independence leaders' attempts to move forward in the quest to obtain independence from Spain.

²⁴⁷ "El apoyo a la independencia de Euskadi llega a los niveles más bajos en siete años." ADN.es. July 12, 2008.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ "Los españoles ven más independentistas a los catalanes que a los vascos." Público.es. November 10, 2009.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

South Sudan has a much more complicated demography than either Easter Island or the Basque Country. Metropolitan groups did not migrate to South Sudan. It is estimated that the country is home to more than sixty different ethnic groups.²⁵² A common view of the conflict in Sudan is that it pitted the Arab-speaking Muslim north against the black Christian and animist south.²⁵³ While this description may be an oversimplification,²⁵⁴ it nonetheless bears some truth. The ethnic groups of South Sudan shared a common history of abuse by the north and conflict with the Sudanese government. These conflicts led to longstanding mistrust between the northern and southern regions of the country.²⁵⁵ Following independence from Egypt and Great Britain in 1956, the southern regions were ruled from faraway Khartoum.²⁵⁶ This led to civil war between 1955 and 1972, and afterwards, an intense Islamicization and Arabization campaign in the south.²⁵⁷ These campaigns were viewed as an assault on the cultural identity and political rights of these southern ethnic groups, which contributed to discontent and pro-secession sentiment in the south. Francis Mading Deng observes that over the past sixty years, there has been a renewed “sense of pride in African identity” among the South Sudanese.²⁵⁸

²⁵² “Distribution of Ethnic Groups in South Sudan.” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.” December 24, 2009.

²⁵³ Boswell and Perry 2011.

²⁵⁴ Francis Mading Deng. *Sudan at the Brink: Self-Determination and National Unity*. (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), 8.

²⁵⁵ “The promise and peril of independence.” *The Economist*. June 13, 2009.

²⁵⁶ Ariel Zirulnick. “Timeline: South Sudan’s Long Path to Independence.” *Christian Science Monitor*. July 8, 2011.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Deng 2010, 9.

The largest ethnic groups in South Sudan are the Dinka and the Nuer.²⁵⁹ These groups are of African descent, in contrast to the Arab groups that reside in the north.²⁶⁰ While precise statistics on the ethnic composition of South Sudan are as yet unavailable, South Sudan is overwhelmingly composed of black African groups that were the targets of northern militias during the Sudanese civil wars.²⁶¹ South Sudan, thus, is composed almost exclusively of groups that were marginalized and mistreated by the government in Khartoum, which led to extremely strong support for independence from Sudan.

In summary, a major difference between South Sudan and the cases of Easter Island and the Basque Country is that there is not a sizeable population of inhabitants from the “metropolis” living in South Sudan. In the Basque Country and Easter Island there are groups that have been repressed by the metropolis, as was the experience in South Sudan, yet there is also a large presence of groups from the metropolis. If the ethnic groups in a territory share a common history of suffering repression, it is more likely that they will unite against the aggressor and move towards independence (as in the case of South Sudan). Conversely, if a society is divided between groups that have been subjugated by the metropolis and groups of settlers from the metropolis, there will not be a unified front on either independence or unification with the metropolis, and a change in political status is harder to achieve (Basque Country and Easter Island).

²⁵⁹ “Their day in the sun.” *The Economist*. July 9, 2011.

²⁶⁰ Jeffrey Gettleman. “After Years of Struggle, South Sudan Becomes a New Nation.” *New York Times*. July 9, 2011.

²⁶¹ Jeffrey Haynes. “Religion, Ethnicity and Civil War in Africa: The Cases of Uganda and Sudan.” *The Round Table* 96 (2007): 312.

An influx of outsiders has important ramifications for the politics and culture of a territory. In the case of the Basque Country, usage of the Basque language was significantly reduced with the influx of Spanish speakers. The same held true for Easter Island: whereas Rapanui was commonly spoken on the Island as late as the 1960s, it has since been displaced by the Spanish language. This undoubtedly angers the indigenous population, be they Basques or Rapanui, and can prove detrimental to the notion of an identity distinct from that of the metropolis. This can be damaging to support for independence among younger generations, who grow up speaking the language of the metropolis and being immersed in that culture. Additionally, it is likely that inhabitants of the metropolis who relocate to the territory will prefer to remain part of the metropolis and thus be more hostile to independence. This political phenomenon has been observed in both the Basque Country and Easter Island.

While there is a smaller percentage of Chileans living in Easter Island than there are Spaniards in the Basque Country, the Chileans nonetheless exert a strong influence on the Island's politics. The majority of these Chileans arrived in Easter Island as government employees, and as such, can count on the support of this entity. Additionally, they are closely linked to the Armed Forces, which can serve as a deterrent for the Easter Island independence movement.

In terms of ethnicity, the case of Easter Island is more similar to that of the Basque Country than that of South Sudan. In both Easter Island and the Basque Country, there has been an influx of inhabitants from the metropolis who speak a language other than the indigenous tongue. In both territories there has been a deterioration of the traditional language and national identity, as well as intermarriage between members of indigenous groups and migrants from the

metropolis. South Sudan has not seen an influx of Arab Muslim inhabitants from Sudan, so there was no group from the metropolis with which the independence movement had to contend. The Easter Island and Basque independence movements, however, have problems obtaining external support for independence because they are supported overwhelmingly by members of a particular ethnic group, which contradicts the United Nations Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

Conclusion

In short, an analysis of economic integration between Easter Island and Chile, the lack of external support for the independence movement, and continued migration from Chile suggest that it is unlikely that Easter Island's independence movement will be successful in its objective. There is a high degree of integration between the economies of Easter Island and Chile. Additionally, Easter Island provides Chile with economic benefits in the form of tourism, jobs, and as a base for economic activity in the Pacific region. The independence movement, while having the support of many private individuals and non-governmental organizations, does not have the support of other nation-states. Furthermore, the rise of a Chilean community on Easter Island has been accompanied by an intense program of Chileanization that has contributed to the deterioration of key elements of Rapanui national identity.

A comparison of the cases of the independence movements of Easter Island, the Basque Country, and South Sudan reveals that the case of Easter Island's independence movement more closely resembles the Basque independence movement than the South Sudanese independence movement. The independence movements of both Easter Island and the Basque Country do not have the support of other nation-states, whereas South Sudanese independence was widely

supported by the international community, including by countries such as the United States and China. Furthermore, in both Easter Island and the Basque Country there are many inhabitants who originally came from the metropolis (Chileans in the case of Easter Island, Spaniards in the case of the Basque Country) who are virulently opposed to independence. This is problematic for both independence movements, as these movements represent the interests of a particular ethnic group, and independence on the basis of ethnicity is not permitted by the United Nations. On the issue of integration of the economies of the territory and the metropolis, the case of Easter Island, a territory with few natural resources that is extremely dependent on Chilean aid, is similar to the case of the Basque Country, whose economy is a major contributor to Spain's national economy. Easter Island receives economic aid from Chile while contributing to Chile revenue earned by the Island's tourism industry. This mutual relationship is repeated in the Basque Country, as Spain depends on the contributions of the Basque economy, and the Basques can sell their products to willing markets in Spain and the European Union. However, South Sudan's economy operated largely independently of Sudan's economy, which helped to facilitate the transition to independence. Due to its abundant natural resources, South Sudan could better attract foreign investment to stimulate its economy, which was a more attractive alternative than remaining economically stagnated as a part of Sudan. A combination of these factors will likely work against the Easter Island independence movement. It will be interesting to see how pro-independence activists respond to these challenges, and whether or not the local Chilean population can be won over to the cause of independence.

In terms of which factor bears the most relevance in determining the success of Easter Island's independence movement, a thorough examination indicates that official external support for independence is probably the most significant factor. This support is necessary both during

and after the independence struggle, when the new nation-state seeks international legitimacy. If a territory becomes independent but does not have any allies, its survival as an independent nation-state will be difficult. Due to its small population vis-à-vis that of mainland Chile (approximately five thousand versus seventeen million), Easter Island's independence movement will need outside help in order to gain recognition and legitimacy. Additionally, Chile, compared to Easter Island, is militarily superior, so if armed conflict breaks out, Easter Island will need support from other nation-states. Because this external support is currently nonexistent, it seems unlikely that the Easter Island independence movement will be successful.

While migration of ethnic groups from the metropolis to the dependent territory is undoubtedly an important factor that can hinder the success of independence movements, it is possible that a territory could become independent despite the opposition of groups from the metropolis living in the territory. For example, in the case of an armed struggle, if metropolitan groups comprise a minority of the population, it is quite possible that they will be overwhelmed by numerically superior indigenous groups. It is also possible that over time, the descendants of the original migrants from the metropolis may identify more strongly with the dependent territory than with the metropolis. This, in turn, can be conducive to the success of an independence movement. This was largely the case during independence struggles in both the United States and Latin America, where the development of a distinct "American" identity was a factor that facilitated independence. In Easter Island, intermarriage between Chileans and Rapanui has led many individuals of mixed-ethnicity to develop a distinct "Easter Island" (neither Rapanui nor Chilean) identity. It is possible that in future generations, these individuals will perceive themselves as sufficiently "different" from mainland Chileans and agitate for greater autonomy or even independence. From this one can conclude that while independence

may currently seem unlikely for Easter Island, it is possible that in several years it may become a more realistic possibility.

Economic integration between the metropolis and the territory can be a stumbling block for independence. However, it is still possible for two countries to maintain a close economic relationship while still respecting each other's political sovereignty. Contemporary examples of close integration of national economies abound. Several micro-states have special economic arrangements with larger states for economic survival, such as Monaco and France. If Easter Island becomes independent, it will likely maintain a high degree of economic integration with Chile simply because Chile is geographically the closest country. If the Easter Island independence movement can impress this point in the minds of voters, it may be more successful in its quest for independence.

The case of Easter Island bears increasing relevance following the post-World War II era of decolonization. While several colonies and territories gained independence in that wave of decolonization, many, such as Easter Island, remained attached to their metropolis. Political considerations and economic reality may frame the debate in terms of autonomy rather than independence. Indeed, Easter Island has its own autonomy movement that seeks to remain a territory of Chile while preserving the traditional heritage and identity of the Rapanui. It is likely that if independence proves unfeasible, the independence movement will be incorporated into the autonomy movement and will push for greater protection of Rapanui political and cultural rights. If this occurs, a future area of research could be a study of the fate of protected areas that have been officially set aside for indigenous populations. Comparative cases can include American Indian reservations in the United States, the Swedish-speaking Åland Islands of Finland, and

indigenous groups in Darién, Panama. Ethno-linguistic composition of these entities can be studied to determine whether government protection has ended up benefitting or harming the political rights and culture of indigenous groups.

For its part, Chile has already granted autonomy to Easter Island, but it is unlikely that Chile will grant independence to the Island. Even autonomy has proven to be a difficult pill for the Chilean Government to swallow, as evidenced by the Government's failure to put the autonomous charter into action. The national pride that possessing Easter Island invokes is a powerful factor that has made Chile reluctant to grant independence to its Polynesian outpost. Of course, geopolitical, economic, and strategic concerns play an important role as well, but for many Chileans, seeing the Chilean flag flying over this volcanic island located two thousand miles into the Pacific Ocean is a sign that Chile is a modern, advanced nation-state.

As in many territories and colonies that have sought or are seeking independence, such as Greenland, Puerto Rico, Chechnya, Québec, and others, independence remains a divisive and sensitive issue. Pro-independence discourse is often laced with a heavy emotional content that raises passions on both sides of the issue. Whatever political changes may happen to Easter Island in the future, it must be the Easter Islanders themselves who decide whether they will remain Chile's *Isla de Pascua* or seek to reestablish the Polynesian kingdom of *Rapa Nui*.

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