Religion & Identity in Europe: How the Growth of Islam Affects European Identity and How Nations Address the Issue

By Michael Adamsky

Fall 2011
Honors Capstone
Professor Karin Johnston

Introduction

National identities in the European Union are called into question more by religion than by any other factor. Economic and social issues may create cleavages within society, but these divisions are relatively shallow compared the problems that can arise from religious differences within a country. The religious question in recent years has become even more problematic, as more and more Muslims are moving into countries across the EU. Europe has long been seen as something of a "Christian club"[1], and so many countries are being forced to reexamine what makes their people German or French or British.

There are numerous ways to attempt to answer this question. All three of the case study countries below have strengthened their immigration and citizenship laws. These attempts can best be understood as a way to keep the country's national identity intact and unchanging. These countries (and especially France) have also attempted to eliminate the religious question entirely by secularizing all aspects of society. Finally, the case study countries have taken a more direct approach in targeting Muslim communities, who are seen as the agents of national identity changes, in a negative fashion. When examining national identity in Europe, where religious groups are again coming into conflict, one must ask how nations are addressing the age-old question: what makes us, us? This paper will examine the strategies employed by the three case-study countries in dealing with religion domestically.

---

[1] BBC. "Turkey Entry 'Would Destroy EU'." *BBC News*. BBC, 8 Nov. 2002. Web. 15 Oct. 2011. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2420697.stm>.

Three Case Studies: Germany, France, and Britain

Germany is indicative of the idea of Europe being a Christian club: it was originally united in the early 10th century as part of the Holy Roman Empire[2] and today is 68% Christian [that number may seem low compared to France's roughly 90% Christian population, but it's important to keep in mind that 28.3% of Germans identify as "nonaffiliated or other"]. This largely Christian population, coupled with the fact that 91.5% of Germans are ethnically German, seems to indicate that Germany would lack the religious problems found elsewhere on the continent. However, newly emerging religious demographics are challenging the typical German identity. [3]

Germany recently experienced an influx of Turkish immigrants to the country. These immigrants brought Turkish language, culture, and Islam across the border. Turks now make up 2.4% of the population. The influx, however, has had a greater impact on religion, as 3.7% of the German population identifies as Muslim. Although the numbers of Muslims in Germany is still relatively small, the demographic change is much greater. Even before the recent boom in Muslim immigration, previous immigrants to Germany (including Greeks, Italians, Spaniards, Poles, and Russians) brought some form of Christianity with them. For

---

[2] Fulbrook, Mary. *A Concise History of Germany*. Cambridge [England: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Print.
[3] "Germany." *The World Factbook*. Central Intelligence Agency, 15 Nov. 2011. Web. 15 Nov. 2011. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html>.

the first time in centuries, Germany is finding it harder and harder to assume its

typical Christian identity.[4]

France, like Germany, is demographically an exemplary member of the

Christian club, with between 85% and 90% of the population identifying as

Christian [there is discrepancy because religion is not typically included as a part of

French censuses]. Unlike Germany, France's population is not ethnically French.

This is largely not a problem, as most French citizens identify themselves as

Frenchmen.[5] The idea of "le citoyen," that all French citizens are citizens regardless

of their belief structure, has long separated religion and politics in France.

Like, Germany, however, this sense of French national identity is being called

into question by a large influx of immigrants. One of the largest minorities in France

are Muslims, who make up between 5% and 10% of the population.[6] As this

minority has grown, it has also become more vocal. French Muslims have also

casted doubt on what exactly it means to be a Frenchman. Suddenly, the

"traditionally French" (the Christian French) are beginning to question the idea of le

citoyen and what that means for their national identity.

Britain also has a rich history as a member of Europe's Christian club.

Originally a Catholic state, the entire country was essentially converted when King

---

[4] Ibid

[5] Oppenheimer, David B. "Why France Needs to Collect Data on Racial Identity - In a French Way." *Hastings International and Comparative Law Review* 31.2 (2008): n. pag. *Social Science Research Network*. Web. 16 Oct. 2011.

[6] "France." *The World Factbook*. Central Intelligence Agency, 15 Nov. 2011. Web. 15 Nov. 2011. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/fr.html>.

Henry VIII created the Anglican Church and placed himself at its head. Today,

71.6% of the country considers itself Christian. Like Germany, Britain has a

relatively small Muslim minority (only roughly 2.7%).[7] However, Britain's Muslim

minority has long been in the spotlight, whether it be for racial or religious reasons.

Between Germany, France, and Britain, it's safe to say that Britain has a

history of being the least religiously tolerant of the three nations. Religious groups

have often fled the country in search of freer places to worship. It should come as

no surprise, then, that when a demographic of people that is both religiously and

ethnically different begins to form, Britons might not be so welcoming. Especially

after the London terror attacks of 2005, Britain's Muslim population has received a

great deal of media attention and many Britons harbor animosity toward the

demographic.[8]

Three Different Channels

In addition to understanding the countries being examined, it is also

important to understand the different channels through which this paper will

examine them.   The constitution channel examines how a country's basic governing

documents (or, in Britain's case, underlying laws) handle the issue of religion.

Similarly, the legal channel focuses on how countries use more modern laws (either

the enforcement of old ones or the creation of new ones) to handle religion. In some

[7] Ibid
[8] Haaretz. "U.K. Troubled by Increasingly Violent Anti-Islam Protests." *Haaretz.com*. N.p., 12 Sept. 2009. Web. 16 Oct. 2011. <www.haaretz.com/news/u-k-troubled-by-increasingly-violent-anti-islam-protests-1.8030>.

Adamsky   6

cases, this can mean altering citizenship rules and requirements. In others, it can

mean protecting religious minorities. In changing and enforcing various legal

statutes, a country can effectively control how and where citizens practice their

religion and whether said religion is recognized by the state. These legal tools give

nations an array of versatile options for dealing with religion domestically.

Using legal means is not the only way to create a uniform and stable sense of

national identity. The ideas of secularization and inclusion are tied most directly to

the more social aspects of religion. They focus on an adaptive national identity

constructed around the will of the people: that is, society determines how religion

should be handled domestically, and the government supports these desires. These

solutions are far more proactive than legal reactions, because they challenge entire

nations to determine exactly how accepting (or not accepting) they want to be of

religious groups that aren't in the majority. Among the three case studies, one can

find strong examples of both strategies.

Finally, there is the security channel, which examines how these nations have

seen the issue of religion as a security problem and how they have dealt with it

accordingly. Especially in today's post-9/11 society, immigrants and those who

belong to minority religious groups are often seen as potential threats, and it's

important to analyze how this perceived threat has influenced each country's policy

toward dealing with religion in general. Intimidation is a strong and nuanced term.

It implies that one party is knowingly targeting another in attempt to force the

second party's hand one way or another. In the context of changing national

identities due to an influx of Muslim immigrants, states have often used intimidation to protect what they see as their traditional national identity. Intimidation is the basest form of identity protectionism, but it is one that all three of the case studies have undertaken.

The chart below details how each of the three case study countries has dealt with religion through each of the three channels. In any cell labeled "N/A," there was no information found on the subject:

	How Countries Deal with Religion Domestically by Field		
	Constitution/legal	Social	Security
Germany	There is a state religion in Germany, but other faiths can apply to receive tax money	N/A	Germans worry that immigrants may be taking jobs and exploiting social welfare
France	France has freedom *from* religion, as contrasted to other states' freedom *of* religion	Public is largely secular and disapproves of religious relics in public. As such, most (especially the hijab) have been banned	N/A
Great Britain	Anglicanism is "state" religion, primarily due to the crown's heading of the church. However, lack of true religious history means there is little personal connection to the faith	Great deal of pressure applied by both the government and the people to force compliance with social norms in Protestant Britain	Britain has largely recognized that it can prevent radicalization by promoting the interests of its large Muslim population

Germany

Germany's Nationality Act outlines the steps an individual must take to become a German citizen. Most recently updated in 2007 to account for EU policies, the Act is a fairly simple guide that doesn't seem to establish any identity-ensuring measures, except for one. In Section 10, there are two clauses (1.4 and 1.6) that appear to structure German national identity at an individual level. Clause 1.4 states that an individual can only be naturalized if he or she "gives up or loses his or her previous citizenship."[9] The clause has significant implications for immigrants to Germany: you must cut political ties with your home country. By forcing applicants to give up their previous citizenship, they lose any loyalty they may have had there. This molds national identity among immigrants (especially among ethnically, culturally, and religiously different Turks) by forcing them to eschew their Turkish past: they cannot be German and Turkish, only German.

While clause 1.4 was only a mild attempt at preserving national identity (after all, Turks could become German citizens without giving up their cultural or religious backgrounds), clause 1.6 went a bit farther. This clause allows for citizenship once an individual "possess an adequate knowledge of German."[10] This means two things: immigrants must speak the same language as all other Germans and they must spend enough time steeped in German culture to learn the language. Erasing much of the language barrier between native Germans and immigrants

---

[9] "Nationality Act." *German Law Archive*. N.p., n.d. Web. 16 Oct. 2011. <http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/>.
[10] Ibid

helps unify the populace by erasing the key differences between the two groups.

Exposing immigrants to German cultural norms has a similar effect: the idea is that

the more welcomed and comfortable these groups feel in their new culture, the less

likely they are to remain faithful to their old culture. The issue of social divisions,

then, takes on less of a "Germans and Turks" focus and instead becomes more

focused on "Christian Germans and Muslim Germans."

Germany's Basic Law was passed in 1949, largely as a reaction to the policies

of the recently destroyed Third Reich.[11][12] The German Basic Law essentially acts as

the country's constitution and combines rights and duties in an effort to better

protect the rights of all individuals in Germany (including social, political, and

economic rights). Article 4 of this document focuses largely on the issue of religious

freedoms. Specifically, the document says the following: "Freedom of faith and of

conscience, and freedom to profess a religious or philosophical creed, shall be

inviolable. The undisturbed practice of religion shall be guaranteed."[13] The law has

also been read frequently by the Constitutional Court in ways that are

accommodating for people of faith. As Edward Eberle says,

> This dynamic has resulted in…excusing them [religious individuals]
>
> from the constraints of the general law…The Court's motivation…is to

[11] Eberle, Edward J. "Free Exercise of Religion in Germany and the United States." *Tulane Law Review* 78.4 (2006): *HeinOnline*. Web. 12 Nov. 2011, 1024.
[12] Ibid, 1039
[13] "Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany." *German Law Archive*. N.p., n.d. Web. 16 Oct. 2011. <http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/>.

relieve a person from the dilemma of trying to obey claims of

conscience that conflict with claims of law.[14]

The article, as codified by the Basic Law and interpreted by the

Constitutional Court, is important and unique for a few reasons. For one, it's the

first guarantee of religious freedom of its kind in German history.[15] It's also

important because it can be seen as an effort on the part of the German government

to change the discourse on the German national identity. Article 4 does this by

attempting to dispel the belief that Germany is a part of the Christian club. The idea

is that if all religions are free to do as they choose, there is no one "German" religion,

as endorsed by the state (this is similar to the idea of secularization in France, which

is discussed below). Whereas Germany's citizenship laws may attempt a sort of

cultural conversion of immigrants, Article 4 of the Basic Law requires no such

change.

Some may question whether this religious freedom applies to Muslims in

Germany, or just to Catholics and Christians. In the early 2000s, the Constitutional

Court actually ruled on a case meant to decide whether an Afghani-born woman

who had acquired German citizenship could "be denied a teaching position in the

public schools because of her religious conviction to wear a head scarf while

performing her duties."[16] The ruling in the case, which was known as *Islamic

Teacher's Head Scarf*, was that she could not be denied the position. The Court

---

[14] Eberle, 1039
[15] Ibid, 1039
[16] Ibid, 1063

justified its ruling by saying that "religiously compelled dress, such as the wearing of

a head scarf, was a matter of personal free exercise of religion which government,

therefore, could not use as a basis to deny qualification…"[17] The one possible caveat

in Article 4 of Germany's Basic Law is that these laws only apply to citizens.

Therefore, it might be argued that the article does little in the way of including

religious minorities, as they are first subjected to the standards of German

citizenship laws.

The waves of immigrants that have moved into Germany in the past few

decades have been alarming to many. Many felt that as Turkish citizens arrived as

part of West Germany's Labor Recruitment Agreement with Turkey, the influx of

workers would be temporary. The workers were to be shipped in by train,

employed for a few years, and shipped home when the work could be taken over by

Germans. German companies recruited heavily from the poorest areas of Turkey so

that even the unskilled jobs in assembly would seem attractive to the migrant

Turkish workers. The German government was thrilled to see the workers boosting

"tax revenues and social security contributions and [making] a 'substantial

contribution to increasing production levels.'"[18] However, because the recruitment

was only meant to be temporary, the government had no plan to integrate its new

---

[17] Ibid
[18] Bartsch, Matthias, Andrea Brandt, and Daniel Steinvorth. "Turkish Immigration to Germany: A Sorry History of Self-Deception and Wasted Opportunities." *Spiegel Online*. Der Spiegel, 9 July 2010. Web. 15 Oct. 2011. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,716067-2,00.html>.

workers. According to immigration expert Rauf Ceylan: "Germany has only had an intensive integration policy for about 10 years."[19]

Recently, however, tensions over the poorly integrated Turkish immigrants (statistically less integrated, more poorly educated, more underemployed, and more underpaid than other immigrants) have begun to come to a head, as many feel threatened by their continued stay in Germany. In the 1980s, there was a push by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) to send all of the immigrants back to Turkey and to "demand that what is left of Germany be reserved mainly for the Germans."[20] These views continued through the 1990s, before being largely pushed aside in the early 2000s. Now, integration is the more accepted solution.

Integration would solve two questions regarding Turkish Muslims in Germany. One the one hand, it would allow them to be a more cohesive part of German culture. They could become better educated, better employed, and better paid, and they might also be able to seek the benefits of German citizenship. On the other, better Turkish integration may eliminate what German citizens see as another possible threat to their livelihood: terrorism. Germany fought alongside the U.S. in its War on Terror and was directly responsible for the capture of some of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay. Many Germans worry that the Turkish Muslim population may be a source of homegrown terrorism.[21] However, by better integrating its domestic Turkish Muslim population, Germany can hope to make

---

[19] Ibid
[20] Ibid
[21] Kurnaz, Murat. *Five years of my life: an innocent man in Guantanamo*. New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Print.

them feel more German than Turkish. Such a shift in identity would likely draw

many already-moderate Muslims away from any temptation towards radicalism.[22]

France

France has long been a bastion of secular society. French citizens after the

Revolution were not to be determined by their religious beliefs, political views, or

economic status: citizens were citizens. France is unique in granting its people

freedom *from* religion, rather than the freedom *of* religion. In part, this has meant

an extreme stance on secularization, as religious differences have wreaked havoc on

European nations in the past. France's views on this issue came to a head with the

1905 law separating church and state. The law "guarantees the free exercise of

religion…The Republic does not recognize, remunerate or subsidize any religion."

Among other restrictions, the law makes it forbidden for any individual to "erect or

to put up a religious sign or symbol on public buildings or in any public place…"[23]

The French government also does not record religious information on censuses.[24]

In recent years, however, as more and more Muslim immigrants have begun

entering the country, French secularization efforts are coming under fire. There are

two major problems with secularization: it is not ideal for all parties, and it can

cause problems by robbing the government of important demographical

---

[22] Bartsch et al.
[23] "Law Separating Church and State (1905): Excerpts." *Concordat Watch*. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Oct. 2011. <http://www.concordatwatch.eu/showkb.php?org_id=867&kb_header_id=849&order=kb_rank%20ASC&kb_id=1525>.
[24] Bowen, John R. "Does French Islam Have Borders? Dilemmas of Domestication in a Global Religious Field." *American Anthropologist* 106.1 (2004): Print, 45.

information. Muslims in France have tended to be less likely to accept

secularization's efforts to keep religion quiet in the public sphere. On the one hand,

this trend happens by accident: thousands of Muslim immigrants moving into a

traditionally Catholic nation are bound to gain media attention. On the other,

however, there is the idea of *Islam de France* [Islam of France] versus *Islam en*

France [Islam in France]. In an effort to more successfully acclimate themselves to

their new country, many French Muslims are attempting to blend both the French

identity and Muslim values as a way of "signaling one's allegiance both to the French

Republic and to Islam."[25] The issue raises religious questions into the public view,

and so many non-Muslim French people try to ignore Islam's role in the

assimilation.

Secularization has also left the government in the dark in regards to

important demographical information. Because religious information is not

collected as a part of French censuses, the French government has no official tally of

Muslims in the country. Estimates put the total around four to five million, over half

of whom are foreign nationals.[26] Ordinarily, this wouldn't be a problem, except that

most of these immigrants are removed from the cultural mainstream of France. The

original Muslim immigrants after WWII were only expected to remain in France a

short time, but as economic situations worsened in the 1970s, many of them

remained behind. As such, most French Muslims continue to live in isolated housing

---

[25] Ibid, 44
[26] Ibid, 45

projects.[27] It is for this reason that inclusion, as opposed to secularization, may have been a more beneficial policy for France.

In France, there have been numerous incidences of acts of intimidation by the state against Muslim immigrants. One of the most infamous examples was the 2004 banning of the hijab in public schools. The hijab is the traditional Muslim headdress for a woman that "covers hair and neck, leaving the face tightly framed."[28] Although the law officially banned all conspicuous signs of religion in school (including yarmulkes and crucifixes), many saw it as a direct attack on Muslims. Proponents of the bill overplayed the meaning of the hijabs, referring to them as "veils" in an obvious attempt to make them sound oppressive and unwelcome in French society.[29] Despite heavy opposition, the law was passed, and the effects were immediate and far-reaching.

Forty-eight girls and three Sikh boys were suspended in the law's first year. The law also began impacting other sectors of society, essentially escaping the elementary and secondary public schools it was meant to govern. As Judith Ezekiel describes,

> A Paris meter reader was suspended for wearing a headscarf under
> her hat. Authorities prohibited a fashion show of beveiled women.
> Schools have forbidden beveiled mothers from volunteering in

---

[27] Ibid, 44
[28] Ezekiel, Judith. "French Dressing: Race, Gender, and the Hijab Story." *Feminist Studies* 32.2 (2006): *JSTOR*. Web. 12 Nov. 2011, 256.
[29] Ibid

libraries and for school outings. A university cafeteria refused to serve a beveiled girl. A municipal official stopped a bride's aunt from signing as a witness when she refused to remove her hijab 'for identification.'[30][31]

Although it's possible that these biases are only found among the people, and have no impact on the state's decision-making, Ezekiel believes that the restriction exposes French sentiments on the country's national identity. She goes on to explain that "at the core of [French political culture] lies...the universalist, secular, republican France. The hijab has been constructed as a dire threat to this identity, and the ban as a bulwark against Islamic fundamentalism..."[32] With this law, the French state turned to intimidation where they felt that no other strategy would succeed.

Britain

Like Germany, Britain has a state-recognized religion. However, the history of the Anglican Church differs greatly from the history of the Catholic Church or other Protestant churches in Germany and France. Henry VIII's separation from Rome was less a matter of religious differences (as in Martin Luther's case) and was more a matter of political differences. Because Great Britain's national religion is tied directly to the monarch, Henry's conversion meant the kingdom's conversion. As such, there is much less personal connection between Britons and Anglicanism

---

[30] Ibid
[31] Ibid, 257
[32] Ibid

than there is between Germans and Christianity or the French and secularism.

There is still, however, a strong sense of nationalism that shapes many British

sentiments towards foreigners, many of whom happen to practice other religions.[33]

When it comes to shaping societal norms in relation to religion, Britain has a

track record of using intimidation. This word implies that one party is knowingly

targeting another in attempt to force the second party's hand one way or another.

In the context of religion in Great Britain, intimidation has arisen both from the state

level and among the native populace as a response to a flood of immigrants, many of

them Muslim. Intimidation is brutal form of identity protectionism, but it is one that

has frequently been used to shape domestic religious discourse in Britain. Although

some of this intimidation has been caused by government action, violence against

Muslims in Britain is due in large part to the actions of citizens and citizen groups.

Examples of both cases are described below.

In an official capacity, British officials seem to be profiling all Muslims as

potential terrorist threats. In recent years, there has been an upswing in arrests

based not on evidence, but on "associations." Mike Cole offers up the following

example:

> Thus, the trustees of mosques fall under suspicion if they have been
>
> fundraising for international causes, such as humanitarian relief for
>
> Palestinian refugees in the occupied territories, on the spurious

[33] "The History of the Church of England." *The Church of England*. The Church of England, n.d. Web. 23 Oct. 2011. <http://www.churchofengland.org/about-us/history.aspx>.

ground that 'even though the emergency relief was not destined for

terrorist organizations, some of it may have ended up in their

hands.'[34]

Cole also points out that the UK Terrorism Act of 2000 has essentially made it a

crime to even learn about political and radical Islam: possessing books on the

subject is an offense and even looking up information on the topics online can earn

an individual time in jail. Finally, Cole discusses Britain's subscription to Europe-

wide policies that "make it possible to deprive citizenship of those with dual

nationality who display symptoms of 'unacceptable behavior' such as the

glorification of terrorism."[35] While such behavior may be repulsive, the steps taken

by the British government are often oppressive, especially because they single-out

the Muslim minority.

The British population, however, has often taken an even more hard-line

approach in dealing with religious minority groups, especially Muslims. Most

recently, the English Defence League (EDL), a far-right group with extreme anti-

Muslim sentiments, has been responsible for the violence. The group formed in

2009 after a radical Muslim group, Al Muhajiroun, demonstrated "against the war in

Afghanistan as the Royal Anglican Regiment marched through the town after a tour

---

[34] Cole, Mike. "A Plethora of ''Suitable Enemies'': British Racism at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 32.9 (2009): *Taylor & Francis Online*. Web. 23 Oct. 2011, 1681.
[35] Ibid

of duty."[36] After their formation, the group carried out a firebombing attack on a

mosque in Luton, London. Since then, the group has been linked to numerous

violent crimes against Muslim groups, including spray painting, attacking, and

burning mosques,[37] and even going so far as to threaten the lives of reporters who

have covered their attacks.[38] One EDL organizer is reported as having posted to an

EDL website: "They burn our poppies, we burn their mosques."[39]

Like Germany, Britain has also chosen to take a more integrative approach.

Efforts at creating a more multicultural Britain began in earnest after the London

terrorist attacks in 2005. Although domestic security efforts were significantly

strengthened, the British government also worked with representatives of the

British Muslim community to create "a commission to advise on how, consistent

with their own religion and culture, there is better integration of those parts of the

community inadequately integrated."[40] The British government was working with

and for British Muslims to create a more unified society, and all in a time when anti-

Muslim sentiments were at a fever pitch in Britain.

---

[36] BBC. "Is Far-Right Extremism a Threat?." *BBC News*. BBC, 22 Sept. 2009. Web. 23 Oct. 2011. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8266933.stm>.

[37] BBC. "Stoke-on-Trent Mosque Fire Suspects Charged with Arson." *BBC News*. BBC, 25 Mar. 2011. Web. 23 Oct. 2011. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-stoke-staffordshire-12856596>.

[38] "Death Threats for Journalists Covering Far Right Demos." *Newsroom*. National Union of Journalists, 2 Nov. 2009. Web. 5 Nov. 2011. <http://www.nuj.org.uk/innerPagenuj.html?docid=1406>.

[39] "Norway Massacre: We Need to Remain Vigilant About the Far-Right in the UK." *The Daily Mirror*. The Daily Mirror, 25 July 2011. Web. 12 Nov. 2011. <www.mirror.co.uk/news/top-stories/2011/07/25/we-need-to-remain-vigilant-about-the-far-right-in-the-uk-115875-23295131/>.

[40] Brighton, Shane. "British Muslims, Multiculturalism and UK Foreign Policy: 'Integration' and 'Cohesion' in and Beyond the State." *International Affairs* 83.1 (2007): Print, 1.

And the effort was not simply for show: within a year, the Home Office had created the Commission on Integration and Cohesion; in the time between the attacks and the formation of the CIC, they created seven working groups collectively known as Preventing Islam Together (PET). The working groups worked on some of the most important issues in blending the two distinct identities: "Muslim youth; education; women's issues; regional, local, and community projects; the training of imams and the role of mosques; community security and police relations; and, finally, tackling extremism and radicalization."[41] But why was the government so willing to work with a community that was highly suspect in Britain at the time?

Much of this stems from the British government's belief that "insufficient integration" was the cause of the terrorists' actions. The Blair government saw the gap between mainstream British society and British Muslims as a source of disenfranchisement.[42] As such, PET was designed in part to reach out to the Muslim community as something of a diplomatic mission to "counter the ideological and theological underpinnings of the terrorist narrative"[43] and "empower voices of mainstream Islam."[44]

Conclusion

---

[41] Ibid

[42] Ibid, 2

[43] "EIWG Work Fact Sheet." *International Priorities*. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 5 Feb. 2008. Web. 12 Nov. 2011.
<http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front%3Fpagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1153388310360>.

[44] Brighton, 4

National identity is called into question in Europe more frequently by religion than by any other social cleavage. Islam is an especially touchy subject because it is so different from Western religions and because it is often seen as a threat to the Western way of life. There are myriad ways that countries can choose to handle as delicate a matter as religion, but it's important for each country to decide which way is best to deal with its particular issues. In Germany, there are constitutional and legal protections for those practicing other religions, especially Islam. Despite problems between German citizens and Turkish Muslim immigrants in the past, the country is moving towards amelioration and a common identity through integration.

In France, there is extremely secularism, as French citizens expect freedom from all religion. This policy has often led to problems between the French state and French Muslims, who tend to be more vocal and less private about their religion than other French citizens. Identity cleavages caused by religion are still very deep in France. Finally, the British have often turned to intimidation, both by the government and by the populace, to preserve what they see as their traditional identity. One step forward, however, has been the government's willingness to meet the demands of Muslims in Britain to prevent radicalism, which it sees as a threat not only to British identity, but to the British people as well. With the Muslim population in Europe expected to continue growing, it will be interesting to see how these countries continue to respond to the question of national identity. Will the criteria for being German or French or British still be the same in 2021 as it is in 2011?

Works Cited

Bartsch, Matthias, Andrea Brandt, and Daniel Steinvorth. "Turkish Immigration to

Germany: A Sorry History of Self-Deception and Wasted Opportunities."

Spiegel Online. Der Spiegel, 9 July 2010. Web. 15 Oct. 2011.

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,716067-2,00.html>.

"Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany." *German Law Archive*. N.p., n.d.

Web. 16 Oct. 2011. <http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/>.

BBC. "Is Far-Right Extremism a Threat?." *BBC News*. BBC, 22 Sept. 2009. Web. 23

Oct. 2011. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8266933.stm>.

BBC. "Stoke-on-Trent Mosque Fire Suspects Charged with Arson." *BBC News*. BBC,

25 Mar. 2011. Web. 23 Oct. 2011. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-

stoke-staffordshire-12856596>.

BBC. "Turkey Entry 'Would Destroy EU'." *BBC News*. BBC, 8 Nov. 2002. Web. 15 Oct.

2011. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2420697.stm>.

Bowen, John R. "Does French Islam Have Borders? Dilemmas of Domestication in a

Global Religious Field." *American Anthropologist* 106.1 (2004): 43-55. Print.

Brighton, Shane. "British Muslims, Multiculturalism and UK Foreign Policy:

'Integration' and 'Cohesion' in and Beyond the State." *International Affairs*

83.1 (2007): 1-17. Print.

Cole, Mike. "A Plethora of ''Suitable Enemies'': British Racism at the Dawn of the

　　　　Twenty-First Century." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 32.9 (2009): 1671-1685.

　　　　Taylor & Francis Online. Web. 23 Oct. 2011.

"Death Threats for Journalists Covering Far Right Demos." *Newsroom*. National

　　　　Union of Journalists, 2 Nov. 2009. Web. 5 Nov. 2011.

　　　　<http://www.nuj.org.uk/innerPagenuj.html?docid=1406>.

Eberle, Edward J. "Free Exercise of Religion in Germany and the United States."

　　　　Tulane Law Review 78.4 (2006): 1023-1088. *HeinOnline*. Web. 12 Nov. 2011.

"EIWG Work Fact Sheet." *International Priorities*. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 5

　　　　Feb. 2008. Web. 12 Nov. 2011.

　　　　<http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/www.fco.gov.u

　　　　k/servlet/Front%3Fpagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&

　　　　cid=1153388310360>.

Ezekiel, Judith. "French Dressing: Race, Gender, and the Hijab Story." *Feminist

　　　　Studies* 32.2 (2006): 256-278. *JSTOR*. Web. 12 Nov. 2011.

"France." *The World Factbook*. Central Intelligence Agency, 15 Nov. 2011. Web. 15

　　　　Nov. 2011. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-

　　　　factbook/geos/fr.html>.

Fulbrook, Mary. *A Concise History of Germany*. Cambridge [England: Cambridge

　　　　University Press, 1990. Print.

"Germany." *The World Factbook*. Central Intelligence Agency, 15 Nov. 2011. Web. 15

    Nov. 2011. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-

    factbook/geos/gm.html>.

Haaretz. "U.K. Troubled by Increasingly Violent Anti-Islam Protests." *Haaretz.com*.

    N.p., 12 Sept. 2009. Web. 16 Oct. 2011. <www.haaretz.com/news/u-k-

    troubled-by-increasingly-violent-anti-islam-protests-1.8030>.

Kurnaz, Murat. *Five years of my life: an innocent man in Guantanamo*. New York, N.Y.:

    Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Print.

"Law Separating Church and State (1905): Excerpts." *Concordat Watch*. N.p., n.d.

    Web. 22 Oct. 2011.

    <http://www.concordatwatch.eu/showkb.php?org_id=867&kb_header_id=8

    49&order=kb_rank%20ASC&kb_id=1525>.

"Nationality Act." *German Law Archive*. N.p., n.d. Web. 16 Oct. 2011.

    <http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/>.

"Norway Massacre: We Need to Remain Vigilant About the Far-Right in the UK." *The

    Daily Mirror*. The Daily Mirror, 25 July 2011. Web. 12 Nov. 2011.

    <www.mirror.co.uk/news/top-stories/2011/07/25/we-need-to-remain-

    vigilant-about-the-far-right-in-the-uk-115875-23295131/>.

Oppenheimer, David B. "Why France Needs to Collect Data on Racial Identity - In a

    French Way." *Hastings International and Comparative Law Review* 31.2

    (2008): n. pag. *Social Science Research Network*. Web. 16 Oct. 2011.

"The History of the Church of England." *The Church of England.* The Church of

    England, n.d. Web. 23 Oct. 2011. <http://www.churchofengland.org/about-

    us/history.aspx>.