

NATO: Looking Beyond Libya



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I. INTRODUCTION

NATO has reached a fork in the road. Over twenty years have passed since the end of the Cold War, and those decades have seen remarkable changes in the organization. However, the summer of 2011 marked an unprecedented and chilling warning from the United States to Europe. NATO has always been a physical representation of the treasured relationship between the United States and its European counterparts. But on 10 June 2011, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates bade Europeans to take caution and acknowledge the “real possibility for a dim, if not dismal future for the transatlantic alliance.”¹ Although he said that this future is not inevitable and that European allies “have it well within their means to...produce a very different

¹ “Transcript of Defense Secretary Gates’s Speech of NATO’s Future.” *Washington Wire*. 10 June 2011.
<http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/06/10/transcript-of-defense-secretary-gatess-speech-on-natos-future/>.
Accessed 7 December 2011.

future,” he outlined serious problems with the alliance that must be fixed in order to salvage NATO and move forward.²

Secretary Gates’ speech occurred right in the middle of the Libyan mission, inviting high scrutiny to the modest mission spanning March – October 2011. The Libyan mission, known as Operation Unified Protector, was an UN-mandated operation focused on civilian protection. In many ways, it was unlike any mission that NATO has ever done; it veers from the mold of previous missions. Although the Libyan mission ended in success, it is not clear what the future of NATO will be. For many, it seems that the multitude of problems discovered or emphasized during Operation Unified Protector point towards the “dim, if not dismal future” that Secretary Gates predicted back in June. Others see Libya as an enormous success and step forward for the alliance. By examining the Libyan operation and experts’ reactions to its outcome with past NATO-future theories and previous missions in mind, I think that it is possible to understand the direction which NATO will take in the next few years. Based on the current domestic situation in many member states and growing issues in the NATO structure, I believe that NATO will be stepping back from the mission field in the immediate future. It seems that a more global NATO continues to be the goal of missions, but that effect might be created with NATO partnerships instead of global NATO forces taking on missions. NATO’s relationships with other regional military powers, such as Australia and South Korea, in Afghanistan should be expanded beyond the scope of the ISAF mission and cultivated for the future.

² “Transcript of Defense Secretary Gates’s Speech of NATO’s Future.” *Washington Wire*.

Libya represents a shift from constant engagement in long-term missions towards short-term missions with clear goals and an established conclusion. The brief timeline, absence of ground troops and lack of post-conflict involvement of the Libyan mission represent a distinct shift from the previous missions of the Balkans and Afghanistan. Overall, the Libyan mission shows that the combination of a revised global NATO goal and mission type is the immediate future of NATO. The success of the Libyan mission guaranteed the continuance of the organization and boosted its international credibility, but the struggles that NATO experienced in search of success will limit immediate and large-scale involvement in the future.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

As NATO attempts to adapt to the changing structure of international politics and the globalization of security threats, a number of major debates surround it. There are many individuals, states, and other organizations that favor NATO's continuation in the modern post-communist world, but there are also many others who believe that the elimination of the existential communist threat requires the deconstruction of NATO as well. In these two camps, there are a number of splinter groups that offer different theories for debate. NATO proponents disagree on its new purpose and whether the organization should remain focused on Northern

Atlantic collective security or expand into a more globalized security organization. Furthermore, even those who disagree with NATO's existence have unique reasons for their beliefs. A thorough analysis of these scholarly works is vital to jumpstart my specific research in regards to the effects of the Libyan crisis on NATO's future. Without knowing the background of NATO, there is no way to understand where it can go in the future. Many believe that the Libyan mission will serve as an indicator for NATO and whether it will continue its global mission expansion or retreat towards its previous collective defense roots.

According to Robert E. Hunter, NATO is on its way to becoming a permanently integral part of European politics and security – certainly not fading into obscurity. In *Maximizing NATO: A Relevant Alliance Knows How to Reach*, he argues that “no other alliance in history has recreated itself for times as different as the Cold War and today's challenge to construct a Europe ‘whole and free.’ From the start of the 1990s, when NATO seemed to have outlived its usefulness, it has emerged indispensable once more to Europe's long-term security.”³ NATO has been forced to restructure itself for a new century, new objectives, and new members, and Hunter details this evolution throughout the early 1990s. Because of the seemingly successful evolution of NATO, Hunter believes that “the virtues of collective defense have been validated” and that the theory of collective defense can be considered viable.⁴ Although *Maximizing NATO: A Relevant Alliance Knows How to Reach* hails the “recent renaissance” of NATO, it acknowledges that more restructuring is necessary for the continued success of the organization.⁵

³Robert E. Hunter, *Maximizing NATO: A Relevant Alliance Knows How to Reach* (Foreign Affairs 78.3, 1999), 190.

⁴ Hunter, *Maximizing NATO*, 190.

⁵ Hunter, *Maximizing NATO*, 190.

Hunter outlines a number of different steps that NATO should take in order to continue its growth and influence in the European sphere. Among these suggestions is the creation of a relationship between the European Union (EU) and NATO – vital to the progress of a more secure and free European continent. As an EU-NATO relationship forms, the European allies “can and will assume more of the common security burden.”⁶ More responsibility from the European allies will remove some of the pressure from the United States, which has borne the majority of the costs of NATO since its inception in 1949. This suggestion speaks to the Libya mission, which was faced with a capabilities gap and a lack of resources to supply the alliance. More cooperation with the EU would create a better common understanding of where security resources go and facilitate a standardization of defense practices – especially after the EU created the External Action Service, which focuses on foreign affairs and security policy.

Hunter’s argument is based on a logical progression of actions taken by NATO to reform itself for the 21st century. Ultimately, he arrives at the conclusion that NATO has successfully reoriented itself to address new security issues throughout the European continent, as well as to monitor the rebirth of Russia. With the demise of communism, regional and cultural issues have emerged that require an alliance to solve. So far, there have been few incidents that have called for outright NATO involvement, but those that have, such as the Balkans, demonstrate a prepared and efficient new NATO. Despite being written over a decade ago, *Maximizing NATO: A Relevant Alliance Knows How to Reach* still logically outlines the evolution of NATO to address new security issues in the modern post-communist European continent. However, my

⁶ Hunter, *Maximizing NATO*, 191.

research is trying to understand if the theory of a relevant NATO can be achieved by expanding NATO into a globalized security organization – and if NATO even wants to follow that path anymore. Hunter provides a solid background for NATO presence in the twenty-first-century, but fails to push NATO beyond the European continent. His argument does not account for the changes that have occurred in the alliance since involvement in Afghanistan, and therefore, his highly optimistic opinion of NATO's future is slightly outdated.

James Goldgeier is another scholar who argues for the continuance of NATO, but in a global capacity. In February 2010, Goldgeier published a special report for the Council on Foreign Relations, titled *The Future of NATO*, which detailed necessary steps for NATO to continue to remain active. Goldgeier stresses that the most important step to remain relevant is for NATO to “expand its traditional understanding of collective defense to confront the twenty-first-century threats of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to both states and nonstate actors, and cyberwarfare.”⁷ Specifically, this revision of collective defense requires a new understanding of the sphere of influence that NATO operates within. Originally, NATO was focused on the European continent and built the alliance against a traditional “Article V threat,” but as terrorism introduces new global security threats, Goldgeier argues that “acting as an expeditionary alliance is not secondary to Article V; in certain cases today, it is the essence of Article V.”⁸ In answer to those that protest globalization for fear that it will cause NATO to

⁷ James M. Goldgeier, *The Future of NATO* (Council on Foreign Relations: CSR 51, 2010), 4.

⁸ Goldgeier, *The Future of NATO*, 7.

move away from its original Article V promise, Goldgeier counters that these new threats are actually a new breed of Article V threats that are simply not conventional “armed attacks.”⁹

Goldgeier discusses specific relationships he believes will strengthen NATO for the future. These include its relationships with the EU, Russia, and non-NATO democracies around the world. Furthering these relationships also addresses his final point – the development of more appropriate capabilities. NATO is currently incapable of responding to many of these new twenty-first-century threats; Goldgeier’s answer is higher levels of cooperation with organizations such as the EU and developing “not just military but nonmilitary capacities to deal with future contingencies.”¹⁰ Finally, Goldgeier repeatedly stresses the importance of NATO to both the United States and Europe, and the need to keep the United States engaged in the alliance. With the emergence of these modern threats, the majority of the United States’ foreign policy focus has turned away from Europe and “if NATO fails to accept a growing global role, then the United States will lose interest in investing in the alliance’s future.”¹¹ According to Goldgeier, “potential U.S. disinterest is the greatest danger facing NATO going forward” in a world where the legitimacy that the NATO alliance provides it has become more important than ever, and “European [understanding of] the new threat environment” is vital to retaining that interest.¹²

In conjunction with *The Future of NATO*, Goldgeier also co-authored a paper with Ivo Daalder, called *Global NATO*, that takes the argument for the globalization of NATO a step

⁹ Goldgeier, *The Future of NATO*, 7.

¹⁰ Goldgeier, *The Future of NATO*, 15.

¹¹ Goldgeier, *The Future of NATO*, 4.

¹² Goldgeier, *The Future of NATO*, 20.

further to argue for NATO to “open its membership to any democratic state in the world that is willing and able to contribute to the fulfillment of NATO’s new responsibilities.”¹³ Beyond mere relationships with non-NATO democracies, *Global NATO* argues that Article 10, which restricts membership to European countries, and Article 6, which limits NATO geographically, of the North Atlantic Treaty should change. They argue that NATO has clearly expanded beyond its original geographic limits, but continues to refuse to acknowledge or act on valuable partnerships beyond Europe. These partners, stretching from Australia to Brazil to Japan, have “greatly contribute[d] to NATO’s efforts by providing additional military forces or logistical support to respond to global threats and needs.”¹⁴ Daalder and Goldgeier make the important point that although the alliance has made steps towards strengthening its relationship with these countries, it has still not been able to see them as allies instead of simply partners. And for the authors, the distinction is very clear. While partners have “dialogue,” allies are able to have full “interoperability” – which has been NATO’s strength over the years.¹⁵ The report discusses the logistics of expanding the organization, from military hierarchy to the continuance of consensus voting.¹⁶

Ultimately, Daalder and Goldgeier state that “global threats cannot be tackled by a regional organization,” and that with the increased globalization of modern-day threats, “it would be foolish not to welcome into the alliance other countries that can make the same commitments and help confront new global challenges.”¹⁷ The future of NATO must be global in every sense.

¹³ Ivo Daalder and James M. Goldgeier, *Global NATO* (Foreign Affairs: Sept/Oct 2006), 106.

¹⁴ Daalder and Goldgeier, *Global NATO*, 109.

¹⁵ Daalder and Goldgeier, *Global NATO*, 110.

¹⁶ Daalder and Goldgeier, *Global NATO*, 111.

¹⁷ Daalder and Goldgeier, *Global NATO*, 113.

This argument is very appropriate as the Libyan mission closes. It speaks to one opinion on what the future of the alliance should be – a global one without reservations. Libya has been touted as a success, so does that mean that NATO should continue to act globally? The success of the mission could be argued in favor of this view, but this view fails to account for the implausibility of revising the treaty and the increasing mission-weariness that NATO members are experiencing.

Another author arguing there is a new NATO for the future is Rebecca R. Moore. However, instead of focusing on the military or geographic evolution of the alliance, she posits that NATO missions have evolved from primarily military to political. For Moore, the most important post-Cold War change that NATO underwent was a shift from pure arms power towards the construction of “a new security order in Europe – an order grounded on the liberal democratic values...– and encompassing territory outside NATO’s traditional sphere of collective defense.”¹⁸ The book describes how NATO began a “mission in Europe whole and free [that] reflected an evolving concept of security underpinned by a considerable faith in the pacifying effect of shared democratic institutions and values.”¹⁹ Now, more than it ever had been during the Cold War, the link between security and Western democratic values was nurtured and taught. And that association of security and democracy has grown stronger as modern threats have moved outside of the European arena – like Libya. The Libyan revolution was based on democratic ideals and the overthrow of an oppressive dictator, and NATO felt obligated to help

¹⁸ Rebecca R. Moore, *NATO’s New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World* (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007), 1.

¹⁹ Moore, *NATO’s New Mission*, 2.

protect the citizens that rebelled. Values certainly play a role in the actions of NATO, but are they becoming the main dictator of the NATO mission field?

Moore uses her book to explore the “essentially values-based conception of security” that NATO fostered in Europe, and whether these values can “extend beyond Europe into Central Asia and the Greater Middle East – two regions in which NATO now seeks to ‘project stability.’”²⁰ She believes that with a “new political mission in a more global context,” NATO can bring Western influences into other parts of the world.²¹ For all of her discussion of political evolution, Moore makes it clear that her analysis is based on the assumption that any military and political evolutions are inseparable.²² However, the alliance “was predicated on a commitment to European integration and shared values” first and foremost – military capabilities alone are not enough.²³ Although Moore acknowledges the possibilities for NATO to become global, her analysis maintains that the most important facts are the continued existence of NATO in any form and that the alliance continues to base its future policies on its original shared democratic values.

Departing from the overwhelming support of NATO expansion, *The United States and NATO: The Way Ahead* by Wesley K. Clark supports NATO with provisions. For Clark, NATO is a relevant organization but it has not fully completed its adjustment to a post-communist world. Like Hunter, Clark argues that “it is inevitable and proper that both NATO and the

²⁰ Moore, *NATO's New Mission*, 6-7.

²¹ Moore, *NATO's New Mission*, 141.

²² Moore, *NATO's New Mission*, 143.

²³ Moore, *NATO's New Mission*, 143.

NATO-US relationship continue to evolve over time.’’²⁴ However, Clark expresses doubts about the ability of NATO to fully meet the threats of the twenty-first-century, and therefore, doubts the ability of the alliance to survive. His outline of new security threats – intra-failed state and regional conflicts, local instabilities and insurgencies, and the rapid proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – are certainly daunting for the current capabilities of NATO.²⁵ He writes from a U.S. military perspective, which is a much different approach than most scholars on the subject. Therefore, his reticence towards full trust in the alliance is more alarming than most, since the U.S. military is arguably the most important component of NATO. Clark also opines that national interests hold NATO back in some ways and prevent it from being completely efficient. While he supports the continuance of NATO, and even its expansion, Clark’s analysis is laced with concern about the ability of NATO to actually operate in light of modern threats. He is significantly less optimistic about NATO’s capacity to change than the previous scholars have been. His analysis of the future of NATO holds some credence in light of the Libyan mission – there were certainly domestic political considerations that influenced the mission – but it does not appear that NATO was incapable of dealing with new threats such as local instability and uprisings. The Libyan mission met its objectives, so it would seem that if NATO is unprepared for the twenty-first century, it is not based on an inability to adapt to new security threats.

In direct opposition to proponents of NATO expansion, Kenneth N. Waltz presents a solid argument against the NATO alliance’s continued existence. *Structural Realism after the*

²⁴ Wesley K. Clark, *The United States and NATO: The Way Ahead* (Parameters 29.4, 2000), 14.

²⁵ Clark, *The United States and NATO: The Way Ahead*, 4-5.

Cold War claims that “the strange case of NATO’s (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s) outliving its purpose shows why realists believe that international institutions are shaped and limited by the states that found and sustain them and have little independent effect.”²⁶ And even though NATO has continued to expand and adapt in the twenty-first-century, Waltz remains undeterred. For Waltz, NATO merely emphasizes the “subordination of international institutions to national purposes” and provides a prime example to demonstrate the failure of international institutions as a whole.²⁷

Waltz argues that the democratic peace theory cannot exist, interdependence is a weak excuse for cooperation, and international institutions have a very limited role in global politics. He believes that the reason NATO still exists in a post-communist world is because once an organization is created it is hard to get rid of. NATO’s proponents continue to cast around for new goals in order to keep the organization in existence but it is not a necessary organization. Waltz uses logic to paint the most extreme picture possible, and draws on dramatic rhetoric to turn the audience against such a “moribund institution” as NATO.²⁸ However, despite his harsh language, he puts together a well-researched argument that references major theorists, such as Kant and Morgenthau, and seamlessly weaves together a theory flushed with evidence. To argue his opposition, Waltz presents issues of European division, the isolation of Russia, and increases in fiscal and militaristic burdens. For Waltz, the continuance of NATO is a farce that liberals and institutionalists refuse to let go of, and its crutch should be removed permanently. While I disagree with the fundamental argument that Waltz makes about NATO, the Libya mission

²⁶ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Structural Realism after the Cold War* (International Affairs 25.1, 2000), 18.

²⁷ Waltz, *Structural Realism after the Cold War*, 18.

²⁸ Waltz, *Structural Realism after the Cold War*, 20.

certainly exposed European divisions as well as fiscal and militaristic burdens; in his argument to disband the organization, Waltz does accurately identify serious issues that will affect the future of NATO.

My research will operate under many of the same arguments of the NATO expansionist theories. I agree with the progression of NATO development that Hunter lays out, but agree with James Goldgeier that the alliance would benefit more as a global security network based on partnerships in the future. I also see the logic in Moore's argument of NATO's political evolution and the importance of shared democratic values. I believe that her argument is increasingly relevant as NATO expands its sphere of influence, because modern-day threats are increasingly oriented between Eastern and Western values. Consequently, it will be more imperative than ever to make sure all NATO members are committed to and focused on their shared democratic values. Finally, while I think that Waltz's argument is incorrect, I do understand many of the concerns that he raises about European division, Russian isolation, and increases in fiscal and militaristic burdens. Especially in light of the European financial crisis and the 2008 Georgian war, these types of traditional concerns will not completely disappear in light of more modern threats. My research will examine, in light of these established NATO theories, the future of NATO at the close of the Libyan mission; a future which appears to be pointing towards a reduction in global presence and a revision of mission types based on the indicators from Libya.

III. METHODOLOGY

In the first section, I will look at the history of NATO mission expansion. In order to understand the specifics of the Libyan mission and the potential future of NATO, it is important to know the path that it has already travelled. I will examine two examples of NATO mission expansion, the Balkans and Afghanistan, and address NATO enlargement. The information will be gathered through books, scholarly articles, and online research – mainly focusing on secondary sources. The overview will provide a brief explanation of NATO enlargement, information on the two cases of mission expansion, and include a short comparison to the recent Libyan mission. In the second section, I will provide an overview of the Libyan mission itself. It

will outline the cause of the Libyan crisis and detail how NATO became involved. It will also include a brief explanation of NATO actions in Libya, how the mission ended, and potential plans for the future of the country. In order to analyze the mission, it is vital to understand exactly what happened. The purpose of my research is to use the Libyan mission as a potential indicator of the future of NATO, and therefore, the Libyan mission must be understood. For this section, I have relied primarily on secondary sources, including news articles, but have also used a significant number of primary sources from the United Nations and NATO.

Finally, the last section will focus on reactions to Libya and a subsequent analysis of the future of NATO. My research involved conducting interviews and analyzing secondary sources. The compilation of all of these levels of analysis will help construct a picture of NATO's post-Libya future. As a relatively new topic, there is a significant amount of information that is still missing from the scholarship. The mission just ended less than two months ago, and since my research is based on reactions to the Libyan mission, there is a lack of extensive publications on the subject. Likewise, full statistics reports and other facts have not been released to the public, so there are many figures that are still unavailable. The research addresses the salient points but there are certainly details that remain missing at this time.

IV. BACKGROUND OF NATO MISSION EXPANSION

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has only actively participated in missions since the early 1990s. Prior to that, it served as a deterrent in the Cold War; it was meant to be intimidating but not active. However, the fall of communism was synonymously the removal of NATO's raison d'être, and the 1990s saw NATO conduct a structural shift from communist deterrent to active nation-building. The two most important examples of this evolution are the NATO missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Each shows a progressively further reaching alliance, both geographically and in mission purpose, and the evolution that these missions demonstrate has reached a culmination in Libya.

The Balkans crisis of the 1990s was the first time that NATO forces ever actively engaged in combat. NATO's renaissance into an active military organization began on 28 February 1994 when the alliance shot down four warplanes that violated the no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina.²⁹ Following the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, and specifically the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in December 1995, the United Nations handed over their United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mission to NATO under the new title of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR). Its mandate was to deploy to Bosnia and Herzegovina, "for a period of approximately one year, a force to assist in implementation of the territorial and other militarily related provisions of the agreement."³⁰ The newly-mandated IFOR mission was, in effect, supposed to push the Dayton Peace Agreement and help reconstruct the country under an enforced peace. The IFOR mission was the alliance's first foray into active enforcement, and it filled a niche that was previously unrepresented. UNPROFOR had tried to "create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis," but as a UN peacekeeping force, it had a very limited mandate on its ability to act in the region.³¹ UNPROFOR's ineffectiveness as an active military presence was epitomized by the Srebrenica massacre in early July 1995, when UN peacekeeping troops were unable to stop the massacre of over 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys in a purported safe zone.³² The massacre symbolized

²⁹ "NATO and the Balkans: The case for greater integration." *NATO Review*. Summer 2007. <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue2/english/art3.html>. Accessed 6 December 2011.

³⁰ "The General Framework Agreement: Annex 1A." Office of the High Representative. 14 December 1995. www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=368. Accessed 6 December 2011.

³¹ "Former Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR." United Nations Department of Public Information. 31 August 1996. www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof_p.htm. Accessed 6 December 2011.

³² "The Fall of Srebrenica and the Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping." Human Rights Watch. 1 October 1995. www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,HRW,,BIH,3ae6a7d48,0.html. Accessed 6 December 2011.

the United Nations' military shortcomings, and opened the door for a military-based organization to step in. NATO offered its services to the United Nations, and IFOR operated for a year in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The operation was a technical success, but the country was still incapable of self-government and operation. So on 12 December 1996, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 1088, which authorized the new Stabilization Force (SFOR) to implement the peace that IFOR had established.³³ The SFOR mission operated in Bosnia and Herzegovina until 2004, and in hindsight, has been treated as an overwhelming success for NATO due to the completion of its mandate and the lack of continuing violence in the region; internally, the mission is viewed as a success due to the unanimous participation that members provided. The Balkans operations “contributed greatly to reshaping [NATO’s] post-Cold War identity,” and directed the alliance towards developing additional capabilities in areas such as crisis-management.³⁴ By 2004, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was deemed significantly less volatile and the military capabilities of SFOR were no longer necessary. In order to continue to help assist the country in creating a functional democratic government, the European Union launched EUFOR ALTHEA as the UN-sanctioned legal successor to SFOR and it has remained in operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2004.³⁵

³³ “History of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” NATO. www.nato.int/sfor/docu/d981116a.htm. Accessed 6 December 2011.

³⁴ “NATO in the Balkans: Briefing.” NATO. February 2005. www.nato.int/docu/briefing/balkans/balkans-e.pdf. Accessed 6 December 2011.

³⁵ “EUFOR Fact Sheet.” EUFOR. www.euforbih.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15&Itemid=134. Accessed 6 December 2011.

At the same time that NATO was preparing to end its mission in the Balkans, it assumed command of another mission even further from home. On 11 August 2003, NATO took control of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan under the authorization of the United Nations.³⁶ The ISAF mission statement states that

ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.³⁷

In cooperation with the Afghan government, NATO ISAF forces are simultaneously fighting a war and rebuilding the nation. However, the increased responsibilities and geographic distance from the European continent have shown the first cracks in the potential success of global NATO missions.

In contrast to the IFOR/SFOR missions in the Balkans, there has not been the same overwhelming support from NATO member states for ISAF. While each member state has contributed due to requirements by the North Atlantic Treaty, contributions and their importance to the mission range based on how supportive the member state is of NATO presence in Afghanistan. For example, the United States is the largest troop contributor, with upwards of

³⁶ "History." NATO: ISAF. www.isaf.nato.int/history/html. Accessed 6 December 2011.

³⁷ "Mission." NATO: ISAF. www.isaf.nato.int/mission/html. Accessed 6 December 2011.

90,000 troops committed to the ISAF mission.³⁸ On the other hand, Poland is only contributing 2,580 troops and significantly smaller funds to the mission.³⁹ These funding and troop commitment gaps outline a growing rift within NATO. By 2007, Defense Secretary Robert Gates was openly critical of the United States' NATO allies and their failure to provide operational security troops to Afghanistan. He said that he was “not satisfied that an alliance whose members have over 2 million soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen cannot find the modest additional resources that have been committed for Afghanistan.”⁴⁰ The war has continued to be unpopular and, for many, seems to demonstrate the limits of NATO and its willingness to shoulder long-term operations outside of Europe.

By 2010, both American and European domestic constituencies had grown war-weary. For Europe, the ISAF mission was seen as an unpopular mission that the Americans had forced them into, while Americans were struggling to support two independent wars. Likewise, the costs for the mission were gaining more attention as austerity measures swept across the transatlantic sphere. In November, NATO leaders “signed an agreement with the Afghan government to transfer primary security responsibility from the alliance to Kabul by 2014” at the NATO Lisbon summit.⁴¹ However, this would not mean a complete removal of NATO ISAF troops from the region. Rather, they would be removed from combat roles by 2014, but would

³⁸ “Troop numbers and contributions.” NATO: ISAF. www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.php. Accessed 6 December 2011.

³⁹ “Troop numbers and contributions.” NATO: ISAF.

⁴⁰ “Defense Secretary Robert Gates Criticizes NATO Allies on Afghanistan Effort.” Fox News. 22 October 2007. www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,303956,00.html. Accessed 7 December 2011.

⁴¹ Christi Parsons and Paul Richter. “NATO sets 2014 target for Afghan pullout.” Los Angeles Times. 21 November 2010. www.articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/21/world/la-fgw-nato-afghanistan-20101121. Accessed 7 December 2011.

remain in a supportive role to Afghan security forces due to the continued instability of the region. The original intention of the pullout announcement at the highly publicized summit was to “reassure their war-weary constituents that there was an end in sight to the conflict,” but contemporaneous caveats such as the continued support presence in Afghanistan diminished any goodwill effect that the announcement could have garnered.⁴² The ISAF mission is still operational, but its nine-year history represents a step forward for NATO mission expansion and its accompanying issues.

The NATO mission in Libya has similarities to the Balkans and Afghanistan missions, but represents a deviation from the full-force mission expansionism of the past. Libya still continues the new NATO policy of global missions, but with a slight recession from Afghanistan. While Afghanistan was far removed and had no direct relationship or influence on European affairs, Libya is seen as a neighbor sharing the Mediterranean. With easy access to the European continent, it is considered a more backyard threat than the global mission of Afghanistan. Another key difference is that both prior missions were long-term with extensive ground troop presence and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. In contrast, the focus of Libya has been a quick mission with no ground troops and no NATO post-conflict commitment.

In conjunction with this progressive mission expansion, NATO membership has also grown exponentially since the 1990s. From its creation in 1949 until the end of the Cold War, only four nations joined the original twelve members of NATO. In contrast, post-Cold War NATO membership has almost doubled. In 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were

⁴² Parsons and Richter. “NATO sets 2014 target for Afghan pullout.”

the first former Soviet bloc nations to join the alliance.⁴³ Seven Northern and Eastern European countries became members in 2004 during the fifth round of NATO enlargement.⁴⁴ The most recent enlargement was the accession of Croatia and Albania in 2009, bringing the current number of NATO members to twenty-eight.⁴⁵ These growth spurts have been helpful in building capabilities for NATO missions, but have also proved to limit the missions that NATO conducts.

Many of the newer countries have stronger reservations about the use of force and international action, which limit the scope of NATO missions. In the North Atlantic Council, the consensus-based decision-making body of NATO, increased membership means increased conflict. The organization still attempts to operate under strong consensus, so when members join that have different ideas about the orientation of the alliance, it impacts the effectiveness of the alliance. In addition to reservations from the new members of NATO, older member states are experiencing enlargement fatigue. Accession requires a great effort from members as well: including new staff into an already-established system and standardizing the new members' capabilities to ensure full operability within the NATO structure. Consequently, the rapid enlargement of the past decade has caused some strain. Libya represents a mission without full consensus, and some parties attribute part of the issue to enlargement. New members have different ideas on the role of NATO, lack capabilities to contribute to missions like Libya and stress the consensus-based decision process of NATO. These key differences – mission expansion, and to some extent, membership enlargement – have set up the debate that Libya

⁴³ "Timeline: Nato." BBC News. 9 August 2011. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1543000.stm. Accessed 13 December 2011.

⁴⁴ "NATO Enlargement: Enhancing security and extending stability through NATO enlargement." NATO. April 2004. www.nato.int/docu/enlargement/html_en/enlargement01.html. Accessed 13 December 2011.

⁴⁵ "NATO enlargement." NATO. 4 May 2011. www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm. Accessed 13 December 2011.

represents a change in NATO and that the future direction of NATO can be derived from the results of the mission.

V. OVERVIEW OF THE LIBYAN MISSION

At the end of 2010, a wave of revolutionary uprisings erupted in Tunisia and Egypt. By the start of the new year, the effects of the newly christened “Arab Spring” were beginning to be seen in many other Middle Eastern countries – including Libya. On 15 February 2011, protests against the arrest of a Libyan human rights activist, Fethi Tarbel, in Benghazi spiraled into massive political protests of the oppressive Gaddafi regime that quickly spread throughout the country.⁴⁶ The political protests rapidly dissolved into full-blown rebellion, and began to move

⁴⁶ William Edwards. “Libya Hit by Arab Revolution Against Dictatorship and Corruption.” Al-Jazeera. 16 February 2011.

across the northern shore of Libya, overpowering Gaddafi forces in Benghazi and Misrata.⁴⁷ By the end of February, the United Nations (UN) had imposed sanctions against the Gaddafi regime due to its forceful repression of the Libyan people.

On 26 February 2011, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1970, which obligated all UN Member States to “freeze without delay all funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the [Gaddafi regime].”⁴⁸ The resolution also banned the Gaddafi family or administration from leaving Libya and imposed an arms embargo on the country.⁴⁹ The crisis was closely monitored by the UN and surrounding nations as it escalated through the end of February and into March. However, as Gaddafi launched his counteroffensive with renewed vigor and violence, the UN announced the authorization of a no-fly zone over Libya, tightened sanctions on the Gaddafi regime and issued a call to Member States, “acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.”⁵⁰ UN Resolution 1973 officially sanctioned the use of force against the Gaddafi regime. Ten of the UN Security Council’s fifteen

<http://www.aljazeeraah.info/News/2011/February/16%20n/Libya%20Hit%20by%20Arab%20Revolution%20Against%20Dictatorship%20and%20Corruption.htm>. Accessed 7 December 2011.

⁴⁷ “Timeline: Libya’s civil war.” The Guardian. 19 November 2011.

www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/19/timeline-libya-civil-war. Accessed 7 December 2011.

⁴⁸ “Security Council imposes sanctions on Libyan authorities in bid to stem violent repression.” United Nations News Centre. 26 February 2011. www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37633. Accessed 7 December 2011.

⁴⁹ “Security Council imposes sanctions on Libyan authorities in bid to stem violent repression.” United Nations News Centre.

⁵⁰ “Security Council approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, authorizing ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians, by vote of 10 in favour with 5 abstentions.” United Nations Department of Public Information. 17 March 2011. www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm. Accessed 7 December 2011.

members voted for the resolution, which was co-sponsored by the United States, Great Britain, France and Lebanon. Brazil, Russia, India, China and Germany abstained from the vote.⁵¹ All of the abstentions were based on the prioritization of peaceful conflict resolution, but Chinese and Russian representatives further elaborated their concerns that “many questions had not been answered in regard to provision of the resolution, including...the limits of the engagement.”⁵²

UN Resolution 1973 provides the basis for NATO involvement in the Libyan crisis. The inclusion of “regional organizations” in the resolution ensured that a NATO coalition would be legal and welcome to intervene in Libya.⁵³ Likewise, the resolution confirmed that NATO would be acting with the support of the Arab League.⁵⁴ It was evident from the beginning that no country was willing to act alone in response to UN Resolution 1973, and the only organization that possessed the capabilities or the command structure to effectively impose the UN’s no-fly zone over Libya was NATO. Consequently, NATO took command of international military operations in Libya on 31 March 2011.⁵⁵

The NATO mission in Libya, known as Operation Unified Protector, had two parts: the implementation of the arms embargo and the protection of civilians. For the first, NATO ships and aircraft patrolled the entrances to Libyan waters. The second, and more high-profile, aspect

⁵¹ “UN authorises use of force against Gaddafi.” EurActiv. 22 March 2011. www.euractiv.com/global-europe/un-authorises-use-force-gaddafi-news-503225. Accessed 7 December 2011.

⁵² “Security Council approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, authorizing ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians, by vote of 10 in favour with 5 abstentions.” United Nations Department of Public Information.

⁵³ “Security Council approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, authorizing ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians, by vote of 10 in favour with 5 abstentions.” United Nations Department of Public Information.

⁵⁴ “Security Council approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, authorizing ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians, by vote of 10 in favour with 5 abstentions.” United Nations Department of Public Information.

⁵⁵ “Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR Protection of Civilians and Civilian-Populated Areas.” NATO. June 2011. http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_06/20110608_Factsheet-UP_Protection_Civilians.pdf. Accessed 7 December 2011.

of Operation Unified Protector involved intelligence gathering and “NATO air and maritime assets [that could]...then engage military targets on the ground, at sea or in the air.”⁵⁶ It is important to note that ground troops were never involved in Operation Unified Protector. Even as it calls for Member States to take action against the Gaddafi regime, UN Resolution 1973 explicitly excludes “a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.”⁵⁷ As a result, the majority of the operation was focused around the air strikes that NATO conducted between March and October 2011.

During Operation Unified Protector, over 26,500 sorties were conducted and over 5,900 military targets were destroyed.⁵⁸ However, these air strikes were shouldered by only a portion of the alliance combined with some volunteer nations from the Arab League. Key NATO members such as Germany and Poland abstained from joining the operation, choosing instead to offer support from Europe or to take on more responsibilities in NATO’s Afghanistan operations. The participants in the Operation Unified Protector air strikes included sixteen countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Canada, France, Denmark, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Jordan, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. The military capabilities involved included “fighter aircraft, surveillance and

⁵⁶ “NATO operations and missions.” NATO. 18 October 2011. www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_62060.htm. Accessed 7 December 2011.

⁵⁷ “Security Council approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, authorizing ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians, by vote of 10 in favour with 5 abstentions.” United Nations Department of Public Information.

⁵⁸ “Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR Final Mission Stats.” NATO. 2 November 2011. http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_11/20111108_111107-factsheet_up_factsfigures_en.pdf. Accessed 7 December 2011.

reconnaissance aircraft, air-to-air refuellers, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and attack helicopters” and there were over 8,000 troops assigned to Operation Unified Protector.⁵⁹

After months of air strikes, Gaddafi was killed on 20 October 2011, during his capture in Sirte, Libya. He was hit in the crossfire and was dead upon arrival to the Misrata hospital.⁶⁰ Just eleven days later, on 31 October 2011, Operation Unified Protector ended and was able to dissolve almost immediately due to the absence of ground troops involved in the mission.⁶¹ Less than eight months after it had begun, the alliance ceased its actions in Libya and NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen promptly declared the Libyan mission to be “one of the most successful in NATO history.”⁶² Libya is now being led by a provisional government, called the National Transitional Council, which has already experienced a fracturing of the rebel forces into individual rebel militias in light of the removal of the Gaddafi regime. The Transitional National Council named Abdel Rahim el-Keeb as prime minister and has pledged to work quickly towards establishing elections and the creation of a national constitution.⁶³ NATO has offered its support in reforming Libyan defense and security, but has clearly stated that the United Nations should be in charge of international support for Libyan reconstruction efforts.⁶⁴ Before Operation Unified Protector even concluded, the United Nations passed Resolution 2009

⁵⁹ “Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR protection of Civilians and Civilian-Populated Areas & Enforcement of the No-Fly Zone.” NATO. October 2011. www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_10/20111005_111005-factsheet_protection_civilians.pdf. Accessed 7 December 2011.

⁶⁰ Moni Basu and Matt Smith. “Gadhafi killed in crossfire after capture, Libyan PM says.” CNN. 20 October 2011. www.articles.cnn.com/2011-10-20/africa/world_africa_libya-war_1_libyan-people-moammar-gadhafi-gadhafi-aide?_s=PM:AFRICA. Accessed 7 December 2011.

⁶¹ “Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR Final Mission Stats.” NATO.

⁶² “Nato chief Rasmussen ‘proud’ as Libya mission ends.” BBC News. 31 October 2011. www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15516795. Accessed 7 December 2011.

⁶³ “Libya – Revolution and Aftermath (2011).” The New York Times. 22 November 2011. www.topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/libya/index.html. Accessed 7 December 2011.

⁶⁴ “Nato chief Rasmussen ‘proud’ as Libya mission ends.” BBC News.

to establish a United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), on 16 September 2011. The purpose of UN Security Council Resolution 2009 was, in part, to reaffirm that “the United Nations should lead the effort of the international community in supporting the Libyan-led transition and rebuilding process aimed at establishing a democratic, independent and united Libya.”⁶⁵ It is clear that although NATO was the only organization capable of conducting and concluding Operation Unified Protector, there is an understanding that the United Nations is more appropriately equipped to continue the nation-building process with Libya, effectively removing NATO from further responsibilities.

⁶⁵ “Resolution 2009 (2011).” United Nations Security Council. 16 September 2011. <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/502/44/PDF/N1150244.pdf?OpenElement>. Accessed 7 December 2011.

VI. REACTIONS TO LIBYA: SUCCESSES & PROBLEMS

Because the completion of the Libyan mission occurred less than two months ago, there are very few detailed scholarly works published yet. In order to analyze leading views and reactions to the Libyan mission, I focused on interviewing officials and scholars as well as using speeches and news articles that were published concerning the results of the Libyan mission and post-Libya NATO. Specifically, I focused on gathering reactions from sources that have very distinct perspectives of the Libyan mission, and consequently, very individual reactions. These speeches, articles and interviews all focus on the post-mission period, and explore the future of NATO beyond the Libya mission end on 31 October 2011.

First, I interviewed the current NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, Jamie Shea. When asked if he thought that Operation Unified Protector was a success, Shea was quick to point out that the mission “was a success in as much as the mission is over, the objectives were met,” but any long-term success would have to be examined at a later date when the examination was more removed from the mission timeline.⁶⁶ He also posited that success be measured by the fact that “NATO held together” and there was minimal collateral damage to Libyan civilians and their property.⁶⁷ Compared to Kosovo – which was littered with high-profile collateral damage such as the bombing of the Chinese embassy and the Serbian Ministry of Defense headquarters in Belgrade – the NATO air strikes in Libya were fairly accurate, caused minimal collateral damage and did not garner the ill-will that previous NATO air strikes had generated. Shea explained that “even the UN acknowledged openly that the degree of destruction of property and buildings affected by NATO was very small,” and that previously unobtainable positive press could be viewed as its own form of success.⁶⁸

However, Shea was very clear that although the objectives of the mission were met, there “are some worrying signs emerging from Libya.”⁶⁹ For him, the most important of these issues were the disparity between American and European contributions to the mission and the lack of unanimity in NATO mission participation. The disparity between American and European contributions to NATO has become a growing concern because the “the American contribution was major, and without it, the Europeans would not have been able to succeed in the mission.”⁷⁰

⁶⁶ Jamie Shea. Interview. 17 November 2011.

⁶⁷ Shea. Interview. 17 November 2011.

⁶⁸ Shea. Interview. 17 November 2011.

⁶⁹ Shea. Interview. 17 November 2011.

⁷⁰ Shea. Interview. 17 November 2011.

Sixty-five percent of all NATO defense budget spending is American, and this figure highlights “the fact that NATO continues to be, in fact more, reliant upon the United States” and this “is not good for people in Washington who would like to see more European burden-sharing.”⁷¹ The disparity between American and European spending is a growing problem – literally. Last reports stated that while the U.S. spends “4.7% of our GDP on defense, which is almost twice the percentage France spends and more than three times what Germany pays in,” only five out of twenty-eight member nations were adhering to the NATO requirement that 2% of GDP be directed to defense spending with the numbers only expected to grow farther apart.⁷²

The other worrying sign is that there is no longer a goal of unanimous participation within the North Atlantic Council. According to Shea, “only eight NATO countries participated in the air strikes” and the vast majority elected to separate themselves from parts, or the entirety of, the operation.⁷³ The overwhelming lack of NATO member participation has led some to say that “Libya was a sort of ‘coalition of the willing’ inside a NATO command structure.”⁷⁴ Consequently, the worry is that “Libya shows that in the future, countries are going to consider NATO missions to be optional or are going to feel that they have an “opt-out” clause,” the idea of optional participation in NATO missions undermines alliance solidarity and eliminates valuable capabilities.⁷⁵

⁷¹ Shea. Interview. 17 November 2011.

⁷² Ted C. Fishman. “Column: Why the U.S. is stuck with NATO’s bill.” USA Today. 22 June 2011. www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/2011-06-21-US-stuck-with-NATO-bill_n.htm. Accessed 8 December 2011.

⁷³ Shea. Interview. 17 November 2011.

⁷⁴ Shea. Interview. 17 November 2011.

⁷⁵ Shea. Interview. 17 November 2011.

In response to discussions of a globalized NATO and speculation on whether Libya demonstrates a progression towards an internationally-focused NATO, Shea argued that the “NATO footprint could actually be getting smaller in the future.”⁷⁶ With Libya at an end, the only current mission is in Afghanistan and those NATO troops will be withdrawing from the country in 2014; or at the very least, NATO will reduce the troop numbers and purpose to a small training contingent and there are no other missions on the horizon.⁷⁷ However, the second important consideration is that NATO will not operate without UN approval, and the results of Libya have made future UN approval much harder to obtain. Although the Russians and the Chinese did not veto the Libyan mandate, they have vowed to take action if any other such legislation reaches a vote. Shea explained that they believe that NATO “abused the mandate” based on the regime change that the NATO air strikes helped bring about.⁷⁸ For the countries that abstained, it was important to make the point that there must be limits to the involvement of international entities in domestic affairs and while they condemned the violence, they were also leery of the potential damage that could be wrought by being given the authority to use “all necessary measures” to reach objectives.⁷⁹ Although previous administrations have moved forward internationally without UN approval, the Obama administration has made it abundantly clear that they intend to work within international frameworks and will “want a resolution as a mandate for action.”⁸⁰ But even if UN approval is gained, declining European defense budgets

⁷⁶ Shea. Interview. 17 November 2011.

⁷⁷ James Kirkup. “Lisbon: nato leaders endorse Afghanistan 2014 withdrawal date.” The Telegraph. 20 November 2011. www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8148560/Lisbon-Nato-leaders-endorse-Afghanistan-2014-withdrawal-date.html. Accessed 8 December 2011.

⁷⁸ Shea. Interview. 17 November 2011.

⁷⁹ “Security Council approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, authorizing ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians, by vote of 10 in favour with 5 abstentions.” United Nations Department of Public Information.

⁸⁰ Shea. Interview. 17 November 2011.

are beginning to become more problematic for NATO and its members. Due to widespread budget cuts, the Europeans had a difficult time even supporting the modest Libyan operation, which suggests that “you could actually have a NATO which is more focused on European issues in the future than on global issues...a NATO with a more modest role.”⁸¹ The austerity measures that have swept through Europe have hit defense budgets hard, and NATO will be the first to feel it. Since members already struggle to reach their financial contribution requirements, these austerity measures are likely to rein in NATO action even more.

Finally, Shea raises the point that the most problematic rift in the NATO alliance is not based on American/European burden-sharing dilemmas, but is actually the conflict between the Europeans themselves to define the use of force. Since there is no common culture on the use of force in Europe, two cultures have evolved: one that is prepared to use force at all costs, and another that does not see the value in using force over peacekeeping or humanitarian actions. According to Shea,

the interesting thing...here is not so much views across the Atlantic but an increasing gap between Europeans themselves in terms of capabilities, transformation of their defense forces, willingness to use force. I mean, many Europeans were very surprised that Germany abstained...it wasn't sort of seen as breaking ranks with Washington, [rather] the German decision was breaking ranks with Paris and London, its two major European Union and NATO allies.⁸²

⁸¹ Shea. Interview. 17 November 2011.

⁸² Shea. Interview. 17 November 2011.

This rift between Europeans is even more troubling because it speaks to the difficulties that will emerge during the NATO Chicago summit next May. If the Europeans cannot come together on a common culture of force, it will be much more difficult to convince the Americans that they are still invested in the alliance. Shea believes that the Americans will be entering the Chicago summit looking at the alliance “not just as a moral alliance but as an economic transaction,” and he does not think that the Europeans can convince the Americans of the validity or sincerity of the new “smart defense” system of multinational capability sharing if they still cannot agree when to use it.⁸³ Overall, Deputy Assistant Secretary General Shea was satisfied with the immediate outcome of Operation Unified Protector and is convinced that the mission shows the staying power of the alliance, but remains concerned about the direction that the future of NATO will take due to the issues that Libya raised.

I wanted to compare two separate NATO opinions in my analysis, so I examined a recent speech that Ivo Daalder, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, made at the Atlantic Council on 7 November 2011. He asserts that NATO was the “one multinational alliance capable of carrying out such a complex mission” and that twenty-first century NATO was uniquely suited to respond to the Libyan crisis.⁸⁴ Daalder has a slightly different view of burden-sharing than Shea, in that he did not seem to focus as much on the discrepancies between American and European capabilities and involvement. In fact, he explained that “our allies and partners did step up and they did so in spades” and that “all of NATO took part in this operation...some allies did not

⁸³ Shea. Interview. 17 November 2011.

⁸⁴ “An Irreplaceable Alliance: 11/7/11 – Transcript.” Atlantic Council. 7 November 2011. www.acus.org/event/irreplaceable-alliance-impact-libya-mission-nato/transcript. Accessed 8 December 2011.

participate directly, but even those who didn't were helpful in particular ways.”⁸⁵ Daalder does not dwell on concerns of European reliance on the United States; rather, he cites them as an understandable part of being the leader of the pack – even if it is leadership from behind. Likewise, he does not seem to identify massive rifts between individual European countries in the Libya crisis.

The issues that Daalder identifies are a lack of sufficient munitions stock-piles (preventing the NATO allies from quick, large-scale action) and a critical shortage of “intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets.”⁸⁶ However, his only conclusions are that these issues must be addressed at the Chicago summit in May. Daalder’s overall view of the NATO mission in Libya is simultaneously one of “American leadership that mobilized the international community to action” and of “the Atlantic alliance pulling together and everyone bearing the fair share of their security burden.”⁸⁷ In regards to the Chicago summit, Daalder believes that one of the most important issues will be the Smart Defense Initiative that focuses on building multinational capabilities, but unlike Shea, he believes that the issue is obtaining funding in light of austerity measures rather than any confusion based on cultures of force. In contrast to Shea, Ambassador Daalder is quite convinced that Operation Unified Protector was an overwhelming success and sees the benefits as greatly outweighing any potential issues. He believes that there is a future for a global NATO, but in a supportive capacity – not necessarily taking on defense and security reform as a permanent new career.

⁸⁵ “An Irreplaceable Alliance: 11/7/11 – Transcript.” Atlantic Council.

⁸⁶ “An Irreplaceable Alliance: 11/7/11 – Transcript.” Atlantic Council.

⁸⁷ “An Irreplaceable Alliance: 11/7/11 – Transcript.” Atlantic Council.

The NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, published an article on 29 June 2011, approximately halfway through Operation Unified Protector, that addressed his potential concerns for NATO after the Libyan mission. He, like Daalder, was concerned with the effects of austerity measures on the future of NATO. Specifically, he believes that the “fundamental challenge facing Europe and the alliance as a whole” is “how to avoid having the economic crisis degenerate into a security crisis.”⁸⁸ The Secretary General states that NATO continues to be relevant in the changing security climate, its members contribute several types of vital capabilities and the failures are not military but political. In order to continue to stay active, Rasmussen recommends “strengthening European defense, enhancing the transatlantic relationship, and engaging with emerging powers on common challenges.”⁸⁹ For Rasmussen, Libya represents a successful mission that could have gone bad. Emerging powers chose to not stand in the way of the mission, European defense was able to handle the relatively modest operation and the new leadership-from-behind plan by the Obama administration appears to be working well for both sides of the Atlantic. However, not every case will be like Libya – especially as defense budgets continue to drop. While the United States and emerging powers are raising their defense budgets, “defense spending by the European NATO countries has fallen by almost 20 percent” since the end of the Cold War.⁹⁰ These spending gaps are a growing weakness of NATO, and could lead to the derailment of future missions and a loss of international credibility.

⁸⁸ Anders Fogh Rasmussen. “NATO After Libya: The Atlantic Alliance in Austere Times.” NATO. 29 June 2011. www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-CB663C5A-7DABB56B/natolive/opinions_75836.htm. Accessed 8 December 2011.

⁸⁹ Rasmussen. “NATO After Libya: The Atlantic Alliance in Austere Times.”

⁹⁰ Rasmussen. “NATO After Libya: The Atlantic Alliance in Austere Times.”

In an effort to find reactions to the Libyan mission outside of the NATO structure, I interviewed Professor Rebecca R. Moore from Concordia College. Interestingly enough, she had very different views than those within the NATO structure. She admits that there was certainly short-term success in Libya, but remains unsure about the lasting impact of the mission. For Moore, the importance of Libya emphasizes the necessity of global partnerships in order for NATO to continue to operate outside of Europe. She states that “it’s fair to say that the allies are more than a little war weary in Afghanistan,” and that the best way to maintain their global reach without exhausting their resources is to reach out to other countries through partnership programs.⁹¹ Specifically, the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept emphasizes the necessity of a global partnership network and has an entire section dedicated to partnerships and the concept that

the promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organizations around the globe. These partnerships make a concrete and valued contribution to the success of NATO’s fundamental tasks. Dialogue and cooperation with partners can make a concrete contribution to enhancing international security, to defending the values on which our Alliance is based, [and] to NATO’s operations...⁹²

Essentially, NATO acknowledges that the first steps towards globalization are cooperation and coordination with other countries and is making an effort to work towards bettering those relationships.

⁹¹ Rebecca R. Moore. Interview. 23 November 2011.

⁹² “Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Active Engagement, Modern Defence.” NATO. 2010. www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf. Accessed 8 December 2011.

Also, Moore agrees with Deputy Assistant Secretary General Shea in her reaction to the Libyan mission – the most troublesome gap is within the Europeans themselves. However, in regards to U.S.-European relations, Libya “did highlight the capabilities gap that exists between the United States and Europe.”⁹³ Moore believes that the future of NATO lies with global partners and through a resolution to the capabilities gap. She believes that although the capabilities gap has existed for years, “one might hope though that this experience coupled with the Obama administration’s shift of resources to Asia will offer some incentive to address the issue.”⁹⁴ As Obama seeks to become increasingly more invested in cultivating economic ties in Asia, he has turned away from the Europeans.⁹⁵ Moore believes that this behavioral shift may serve as the wake-up call that Europe needs to alter their capabilities behavior. The future of NATO is positive, but not overwhelmingly so because of the conflicts within the European ranks. In order to pursue a global presence after Libya, NATO must cultivate its global partnerships.

Finally, I examined an article that Kurt Volker wrote on 23 August 2011 after the Libyan rebels removed Gaddafi from power. Kurt Volker is currently an academic, working as the Managing Director and Senior Fellow of the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University, but he previously served as the U.S. Ambassador to NATO. His article, titled *Don’t Call It a Comeback*, ran in Foreign Policy magazine and issued a scathing review of current practices at NATO. The article could not be clearer in its emphasis that NATO marginally

⁹³ Moore. Interview. 23 November 2011.

⁹⁴ Moore. Interview. 23 November 2011.

⁹⁵ Erin Lindsay. “President Obama at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).” The White House Blog. 13 November 2011. www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/11/13/president-obama-asia-pacific-economic-cooperation-apec. Accessed 8 December 2011.

succeeded in Libya in spite of itself. Regarding Operation Unified Protector, Volker states that “it is more accurate to say it is a success *despite* deep-rooted problems that **still remain unaddressed** within the alliance.”⁹⁶ For Volker, the Libyan mission could represent the final breaths of the alliance if its serious problems are not fixed. The article outlines four different problem categories: mission, leadership, execution and solidarity.⁹⁷ The mission problem is essentially a lack of serious military purpose. For months, NATO studiously avoided any indication of “regime change” in Libya out of fear of overstepping the UN mandate. However, Volker argues that it was obvious even in the beginning of the crisis that “there was no way to protect civilians so long as Qaddafi remained in power.”⁹⁸ Consequently, the first months of the mission were only a partially credible, halfway attempt at action by a military organization muzzled by some of its members. This fear of the mandate gave the UN Security Council unprecedented and unnecessary control over NATO, and essentially allowed “Russia and China to use the U.N. Security Council to set the limits on NATO action in Libya.”⁹⁹

Secondly, Volker argues that there is a leadership problem within the NATO command structure. While some, such as Ambassador Daalder, see the United States’ new ‘lead-from-behind’ mentality as a positive change for the alliance, Volker states that the abrupt leadership pullback from the United States was a mistake that made Europeans question the American commitment to the alliance and raised doubts in Washington about why Americans were still committed. His suggestion is that the United States needs to find “something in between

⁹⁶ Kurt Volker. “Don’t Call It a Comeback.” *Foreign Policy*. 23 August 2011.

www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/23/dont_call_it_a_comeback. Accessed 8 December 2011.

⁹⁷ Volker. “Don’t Call It a Comeback.”

⁹⁸ Volker. “Don’t Call It a Comeback.”

⁹⁹ Volker. “Don’t Call It a Comeback.”

unilateralism and “handing over” the reins to others” and needs to “feel comfortable leading together with others,” citing Kosovo and the Gulf War as good examples.¹⁰⁰ An approach of leadership together would reaffirm the American commitment to NATO allies, but at the same time, would calm domestic critics by acknowledging that NATO is important while decreasing the overall cost burden of the United States. The future of NATO depends on American reevaluation and reaffirmation of the costs and importance of leadership.

Another problem that Volker identified in the Libyan mission is an execution problem – synonymous to the capabilities argument that many others have made. Libya showed that the United States far surpasses all other allies in its capabilities, and that the “majority of European allies now lack the capabilities to take on even a basic military mission such as a no-fly zone without the United States.”¹⁰¹ And instead of attempting to narrow the capabilities gap, most European nations are slashing their defense budgets due to new waves of austerity measures. An analysis of the Libyan mission raised serious doubts of “whether, given budget trajectories, [Europeans] could afford to do again a few years from now what it is doing in Libya today.”¹⁰² It is a problem that will only grow exponentially in the future, and raises questions of the future of NATO if it is a military organization without any means. And finally, Volker points to another commonly discussed problem: solidarity. Volker targets Afghanistan as the true beginning of solidarity erosion in the alliance, when allies only joined the war after putting “caveats on the use of their forces.”¹⁰³ However, he believes that if Afghanistan demonstrates chinks in solidarity,

¹⁰⁰ Volker, “Don’t Call It a Comeback.”

¹⁰¹ Volker, “Don’t Call It a Comeback.”

¹⁰² Volker, “Don’t Call It a Comeback.”

¹⁰³ Volker, “Don’t Call It a Comeback.”

“in the case of Libya it went out the window.”¹⁰⁴ In Libya, even the United States starting putting caveats on its involvement, legitimizing the acceptability of minimal (or restricted) mission participation. For Volker, these problems do not necessarily foreshadow an end to NATO in the near future, but he does think that “if we think of Libya as a NATO success story, we will never get to the bottom of the major problems still plaguing the alliance” and that NATO will not be ready and able to act the next time that it is needed.

After analyzing the individual reactions, it seemed that while each individual had their own opinion of the Libyan mission and NATO’s future, they all identified common problems that emerged from the Libya mission. These problems, such as the capabilities gap, divisions within Europe, and questionable solidarity within the alliance are enormous obstacles that NATO must overcome if it has any hope of continuing its current path. But based on the Libyan operation, I have to question whether the path of mission expansion and globalization is still what NATO is striving towards. Quite frankly, it seems that the shortened mission timeframe and lack of post-conflict involvement, among other things, point to a regression in NATO activity in the future. I agree with Jamie Shea’s prediction that the NATO footprint seems to be lifting – not going away, but certainly lightening for the immediate future. Libya was a success for NATO, but a short-term success does not necessarily lead to a sequel. Because of the problems that NATO discovered during the Libya mission, coupled with the financial and economic troubles that have hit on both sides of the Atlantic, a continuation of the global mission field does not seem to be in NATO’s immediate future. Rather, I think that there is a weariness that can only be healed by time and future missions could be more globally partnered rather than

¹⁰⁴ Volker, “Don’t Call It a Comeback.”

globally NATO. If NATO actively attempts to cultivate the partnerships that it gained in Afghanistan and Libya, it could continue to act globally without pushing the limits of the alliance any further. The NATO summit in Chicago next May will be the true test of the future of NATO; many of the current crises that NATO faces will be addressed at the summit, and the alliance's reaction will be telling for its future intentions domestically and globally. It is important to acknowledge that the glass is half full – Libya was a success – but the glass is still only at half.

VII. CONCLUSION

The NATO evolution from Cold War deterrent to the preemptive military organization active in the world was an impressive one. It spanned two decades and included missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Each mission has been considered a success (so far), but there have been lessons learned. However, the Libyan mission deviated drastically from previous NATO missions. It was shorter, had no post-conflict commitment, was not unanimously supported and only had the capabilities support of some NATO allies. All of the issues that were swept under the rug in previous missions became media headlines in Libya. Everyone became aware of the significant capabilities gap that exists between the United States and its European counterparts. However, it is clear that this gap will only grow larger if the current trend continues and

European defense budgets are slashed to make way for austerity measures. Likewise, it was highly publicized that the NATO mission was actually only a partial-NATO mission. Important allies such as Germany and Poland refused to participate in the Libyan mission, and Germany even went as far as abstaining in the UN Security Council vote for a Libyan resolution. Such disparate views on force in Europe point to future problems. If such resistance greeted the Libyan operation, how will there be consensus in the future? NATO has always acted under consensus, but if that can no longer be reached, it is questionable if NATO will continue to act as it did in the past. Libya brought these issues and more to the forefront, and now the question is where does NATO go from here? Once again, two decades later, the question remains: what is the future of NATO?

From looking at the history of NATO mission expansion, an overview of the Libyan mission and expert reactions to the outcome of the mission, a direction becomes clear. It is not a solid answer, because the situation is still too fresh for concrete analysis. The majority of information is still not published on the mission and there is no benefit of hindsight. Therefore, a general direction is as close as this analysis can get. But that direction represents a significant change for NATO in the next few years. Previously, the focus was on long-term nation-building and reconstruction efforts; but the domestic financial and political strain that most members face, coupled with the problems that reach to the core of the NATO alliance, suggest that its new direction seems to be towards shorter timeframes, minimal commitment and minimal costs. There is no indication that the push for mission expansion and the goal of NATO acting as a global military organization have changed, but instead of diving headfirst into more big missions

across the world, it seems more likely that NATO will focus primarily on fixing the problems within the alliance and act globally through its partnerships. This degree of separation will save money, domestic goodwill, and allow NATO to cultivate and improve its partnerships and act globally without being the only actor. The issues will be discussed at the NATO Chicago summit next May; specifically, the idea of a Smart Defense Initiative that would promote multinational defense spending in order to mitigate overall individual member costs without sacrificing more capabilities. In conclusion, Operation Unified Protector was a success without the victory lap. NATO can be proud of meeting its mission objectives but there is little else to celebrate from the Libyan mission – the mission is complete but the alliance has slipped, and the future of NATO will be a push to keep the alliance balanced and off the edge of the cliff.

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