

Capstone – Leader Personality and Performance in Latin America

Shay Durac

Advisors: Ruth Lane and Kimberly Cowell-Meyers

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## Abstract

Latin America has a penchant for electing leaders who overstep their constitutional authority, with or without the consent of the governed. Many studies have examined this phenomenon, but the scholarship rarely investigates the differences between these leaders that govern their success or failure. This study investigates the effect leader personality has on leadership style, and the means he uses to consolidate governmental authority in the executive. Through a biographical personality analysis, leaders' personality types are determined, and methods of authority consolidation are analyzed to see if personality can explain for differences. These elements of power consolidation can be seen to reflect the leaders' personality types in a routine and predictable way, demonstrating that the phenomenon is not unified but also affected by the leaders themselves.

## Introduction

The leaders of Latin America are known for their vibrancy, and have a way of staying in the headlines throughout the region and the world, for better or for worse. Perhaps here more than anywhere else in the world are countries known by the face that leads them, and it is hard to find a student of International Politics that does not have an opinion on Chávez, Castro, or Evo Morales. Much attention has been paid to how these leaders captivate their audiences, though common wisdom often sees the Latin American public as being particularly susceptible to authoritarian, strong-man style leaders even in democratic systems, or has sought to explain the phenomenon of Latin American democracy taking these authoritarian leaders as given. What attention is given to the specific actions of these leaders generally focuses on how they respond

to public opinion, rarely considering the biographical details of the leaders as having any important impact on their leadership style.

However, much more attention has been given in Western democracies to the influence of personality in leadership style. This relationship has been explored since the 1950s, and even earlier with the application of early Freudian personality studies to leaders. Though much of Freudian psychotherapy has been rejected by the scientific community, the deeper idea of personality influencing behavior is still well known and respected. Further, the study of behavior in leaders can often describe why a leader succeeds or fails in developing a cult of personality.

The application of these studies of personality and behavior can help to explain the complex phenomenon of cults of personality and strongman-style leaders in Latin America, and to dissect this phenomenon to discover whether it is truly as unified as has been routinely asserted. Research has begun to explain why the population of a Latin American country is susceptible to and willing to accept *caudillismo*, or the cult-of-personality, authoritarian style of governance made famous by Latin American dictators and current democratic leaders. We must, however, also understand what drives the actions a leader takes that distinguishes him from other leaders also considered *caudillos*, and the specific personality of the leader has much to do with how they do so.

This study will attempt to analyze the individual actions of three leaders often described as *caudillos*, Juan Perón, Hugo Chávez and Alberto Fujimori. By comparing the way these leaders go about similar issues and comparing these approaches to the personalities of the leaders themselves, we can ascertain whether leader personality has a pronounced effect on the actions

of these leaders, or if the phenomenon of *caudillismo* is in fact as unitary as some analysts have maintained.

### Research Questions

This paper focuses on how the personality of a leader and their behavior as a leader impact the support they entertain from the population of their country. It will examine both how different personalities make different leaders act differently, and also how different elements of personality cause different courses of action within a single leader. Specifically, I will compare how different leaders approach similar political topics such as land reform, electoral reform and terrorism and insurgencies, and the media, as they are important to many Latin American leaders. I will compare these different courses of action to the personality differences between the leaders as defined by biographical studies of each leader. This biographical study will also serve to highlight the different elements of a leader's personality and how they interact in his pursuit of specific policies and his public performance in general. My hypothesis is that a categorization of leader personality types will allow prediction of courses of action on policy goals, both within a single policy area and in their holistic approach to leadership in general.

### Literature Review

Current literature on the leaders of Latin America has two distinct foci. The first and most common focus is the study of how leaders respond to the desires of the population. Many of these studies focus specifically on certain policies, and trace the events or political whims of the leader who inspire them (Burt 2006, Kelly 2003). Others accept cults of personality and *caudillismo* as a tacit element of Latin American politics, and use that as a starting point to analyze politicians (Jones and Micozzi 2008, Close 2004) and the public's response to them

(Corrales 2008), framing this relationship as stemming from the concept of *caudillismo* rather than a specific control of the relationship by the politicians. The second focus is on the leaders themselves, though it tends to be biographical to the extent that it excludes in-depth comparison to other cases. These studies often emphasize the leader's upbringing and other personal factors as being important in how they govern the country (Jones 2007), which begs a more comprehensive analysis of this factor across multiple cases.

The merits of connecting personality to leadership style are well known, even if the literature is generally rather dated. Both the current dynamic of personality, especially the way one conducts himself in day-to-day situations (Goffman 1959) and more comprehensive histories of what constructs one's personality (Lasswell 1960) have received substantial attention in the literature. This, in conjunction with the importance many biographical works give personality, provides ample reason to see personality as an important inspiration of leadership style, and in Latin America of the nature of a cult of personality that emerges around a certain leader. Therefore, it is surprising to see an almost complete absence of any study across multiple leaders in the region that takes personality into account. This paper endeavors to fill that gap and demonstrate a measurable relationship between the two concepts of personality and leadership style.

For the purposes of this paper, and in general consensus with current literature, I will define *caudillismo* as having two distinct meanings. First, it refers to the style of leadership entertained by more authoritarian leaders in Latin America, principally in dictatorships but also in democracies where the public elects leaders who circumvent the normal constraints of the democratic system. Second, it refers to the general phenomenon surrounding these leaders, and the praise given them by the public that seems undeserved from an observer from a country with

stronger democratic principles. This distinction is important, though the term is used to refer to both concepts interchangeably throughout the literature, and in this paper, lacking a better term for one or the other, its dual meaning will have to suffice.

Most sources see *caudillismo* as being an inherently Latin American phenomenon, and many sources that try to connect Latin American leaders within a single framework see *caudillismo* as being a starting point to view how they relate to their community. Jones and Micozzi (2008) draw upon the idea of *caudillismo* as an ideology well known, if not supported, by the majority of Latin Americans. In the specific case of Argentina, Néstor Kirchner governed not long after the fall of Galtieri, who had been the last major President under the military junta that had ruled for almost 15 years. While democracy had existed in Argentina before, *caudillismo* had taken its toll on the Argentine people, as it had in much of Latin America. For this reason, Néstor Kirchner was, like his predecessors, able to manipulate the democratic system in a way that a president of the United States would never be able to. His authoritarian economic and political measures were seen as acceptable by the population, in large part because they had recently experienced a dictatorship that took authoritarianism far beyond what Kirchner did. Jones and Micozzi (2008) compare Néstor's authoritarian stances, which by the end of his term had engendered some opposition in the populace, with Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner's more conciliatory rhetoric. They argue that her more open stance was enough to make up for the authoritarian manner of Néstor, without a need for change in policy. The ups and downs of Fernandez's presidency, thereby, should indicate whether open government or policy is more important in the way populations view their leaders. This reflects the tenet that *caudillismo* and the style of government of leaders is distinct from the policies they advocate, at least to the extent that the leader can control them, which may not necessarily be the case. It instead applies

to how the leader goes about achieving a policy; almost any policy can be advocated using conciliatory or authoritarian rhetoric, and authoritarian leaders can pursue different policies from the same bent.

Burt (2006) considers Fujimori's Peru, focusing mostly on fear in politics, an element which Fujimori was clearly able to control. Peru had also experienced dictatorship in the late 1970s, and Fujimori was known for his authoritarian stances which, while eventually landing him in prison, at the time did not seem to hurt, and perhaps even helped his popularity. Fujimori capitalized on the country's fear of leftist guerilla groups such as Sendero Luminoso, and gained fervent support by cracking down on them while solidifying his hold on the country by restricting opposition movements in the name of national security. Burt sees Fujimori as being driven by similar ideals that drove the military dictators that came before him. He saw the impotence of the democratic organs of government, and through actions such as his *autogolpe* in which he shut down Congress, he further concentrated the political power of Peru within the presidency.

This points out a fundamental characteristic of most Latin American democracies; they are, as Kelly states (2003), delegative democracies, in that the leaders are able to consolidate power to a great extent. Unlike "Western" democracies such as those of North America or Europe, which depend not only on federal government but also local and social elements to reinforce the democratic idea, delegative democracies like those of Latin America see the Presidency as the only accountable organ, and institutions like courts or legislators are at the best unnecessary. At worst, they represent obstacles to the country's development, and Fujimori's *autogolpe* was, in Kelly's eyes, not only an opportunity for the president to reinforce his power, but also a quasi-populist move that earned him the respect of the country, at least for a short

while. Kelly further investigates a series of “interventions,” or important moments in the presidency of Fujimori. They range from events under his control, such as the *autogolpe*, to events that simply happened under his leadership, such as the capture of the leader of Sendero Luminoso. Further, Kelly analyzes their impacts using statistical analysis, both in the short and long run, on Fujimori’s popularity. The interchange between causal and non-causal events in his presidency is an important distinction, but the analysis does not go so far as to analyze the causes for his behavior, which indicates a major gap in much of the current statistical literature.

Jones’ (2007) biography of Hugo Chávez emphasizes particular elements of Chávez’s life experiences that have inspired, and help explain, the way that Chávez acts. Jones’ analysis focuses on the ups and downs of Chávez’s approval ratings, and the causes for these fluctuations as well as the steps Chávez has undertaken to boost his popularity. While including an element of the policies Chávez endeavored to portray as populist, much of the book focuses on Chávez’s personal self-promotion, and though it often views Chávez through the eyes of the Venezuelan people, it also returns to his history to describe the past he so regularly refers to in his public performance. However, it rarely goes so far as to see how this history inspires his action, simply exploring the parts of the history highlighted by Chávez in his interactions with the public. That is the main connection between each of these sources; while they present both an analysis of the leader in question, and examine how the public sees the leader, there is a general neglect of analysis from the viewpoint of the leader. The existing scholarship does not the way leaders present their national policies in a way that takes into account both holistic explorations of how leaders gather general support and the biographical aspects of the leaders that create distinct “cults of personality” around them.



The literature around leader personality and style is generally older, but still has currency in terms of its ability to describe leader behavior from the perspective of the leader himself, rather than the situation in which he is placed. Seeing the leader as a person rather than the face of an institution is the major flaw with current literature that this paper is intended to correct. Goffman's (1959) work on the study of leaders is focused on the concept of seeing a leader as a person performing an act. He looks broadly at what constitutes leader behavior, and draws a distinction between the idea that drives the leader and the way in which the leader conveys this idea to his audience. The focus of his work is on the "performance" that conveys a deeper idea, and the various accoutrements that are necessary to convey the idea successfully. Especial emphasis is given to such ideas as setting, manner, and the dichotomy between honest belief in the role one is playing, and cynicism, as to the deception inherent in any politician's presentation. It is easy to see how these elements factor into Latin American cults of personality; Jones' Chávez is a man who has a picture of a future toward which his country should work, yet who believes that he must be the one who brings that future to life (Jones 2007). As such, he entertains an elaborate performance daily that involves everything about his appearance down to how he dresses and speaks on his TV show, and also incorporates the ways he must act in order to convince the public of his ways. These are the key elements of Goffman's work, and they demonstrate his connection between personality and desired leadership style and the way that they are executed in everyday life.

Much of the cult of personality of leaders like Hugo Chávez comes from the biographical nature of the character. Chávez prides himself on being born in a mud hut, and this represents not only a part of his performance à la Goffman, but also an inherent characteristic of his life that has had impact on his personality, and thus on his undertakings in politics (Jones 2007, Goffman

1959). Lasswell (1960) focuses specifically on the ways in which an individual's upbringing and personality factor into their political decisions. While otherwise examining extreme cases of leaders who became insane and were institutionalized in his work, the most extensive analysis Lasswell provides is of a completely sane though clearly troubled individual who was at the forefront of his particular political movement, though he does not reveal the individual's name as he was a patient. While Lasswell clings in large part to Freudian analyses of individuals, with specific focus on their sexual lives, this is not his only contribution to the analysis of leaders (thankfully, as it has little bearing on the cases at hand, or in modern psychoanalysis).

Lasswell's main contribution in light of this investigation is his relation of personality to leadership style; a leader from a poor background is likely to have a different set of individual preferences and goals from a leader from a high social standing. This is exemplified in the ways in which a leader compensates for characteristics he inherently likes or dislikes. Whether this dislike comes from repressed sexual urges, as Lasswell seems to believe, or from something entirely different, as is more likely the case, the study still demonstrates a truth that is generally overlooked by much of the current literature. As such, a biographical analysis of a leader is necessary not only to analyze his individual cult of personality, but also to see what he believes is necessary for the country, and how he will undertake to portray this necessity as being in the best interests of the population at large.

Suedfeld, Conway and Eichhorn (2001) examine personality through a lens that combines the biographical analysis of leaders, as advanced by Lasswell (1960), with a quantitative investigation of specific elements of leader personality present (or absent) in a series of Canadian Prime Ministers. Leaders were evaluated on two sets of criteria, the first being how complex they viewed crisis situations and the world in general, and the second being what images they

utilized in their public personas. The first criterion was measured through an analysis of how willing the leader was to accept and acknowledge multiple approaches to a problem, and further, how successful the leader was in constructing an integrated position to support their decision. More conciliatory styles were seen as being more complex, while authoritarian, one-dimensional pursuits were seen as simpler. The second criterion evokes comparison to Goffman's definition of performance, in which certain images are given particular weight for the responses they evoke. The authors see the three main types of image as being power, affiliation, and achievement. Power is referenced by leaders who emphasize the ability and capability of the government in resolving a problem, affiliation refers to the sense of belonging to a group advocated by the leader of a party, and achievement emphasizes the ability of the population to advance and overcome difficulties. These three images are used in different quantities by different leaders, and their preferred images often reflect both a different level of complexity in their decision making, and a different level of connection to the population. The authors successfully combine the theory on personality and leader behavior with a real-life case, though it is, as is often the case, a Western democracy under the microscope. Further, the focus of their personality study is generally restricted to the leader's time in office, and their personality is not studied holistically but rather in narrow bands that, while important, do not cover the spectrum of traits seen to be important by theorists.

An example of biographical analysis is seen in Close's study (2004), which deals with the transition of Nicaragua from dictatorial *caudillismo* to electoral *caudillismo*. This transition mirrors in large part Kelly's delegative democracy, in that electoral *caudillismo* is an element and a consequence of the presidentially focused democracies in Latin America. Close sees this electoral *caudillismo* as coming from both the desire of the populations for a leader who will

honestly show accomplishments during his tenure, and from the ability of a leader to take advantage of the system as it has not been deeply entrenched in the minds of the people. Close characterizes Alemán and Ortega as examples of the kind of leader who can present himself at one moment to the population as a populist, yet at the next coordinate backroom deals with opposition parties to cement his power. This speaks both to Goffman's cynicism in the performance one plays, and also Lasswell's inspirations for the way a leader does business (Goffman 1959, Lasswell 1960).

A final element of this dichotomy between caudillismo and democracy is the long-term nature of most presidents' cults of personalities. Corrales (2008) examines the fact that certain leaders are capable of coming back to the forefront of politics after leaves of absence; one need only look at the current list of Latin American presidents to see this is true. Several, including Ortega of Nicaragua and Alan García of Peru, were presidents at some earlier point in their country's history. This fact speaks both to the nature of the population, as is the focus of Corrales' work, and the personalities and characteristics of the leaders, which while not being a focus of Corrales is a logical extension of his investigation. This second element seems to indicate that Latin American leaders, unlike their North American and European counterparts, do not see their career as functionally over upon leaving the presidency; their popularity lives on, and as such there is no reason for their political career to die. This demonstrates a perhaps inherent characteristic of the kind of person inclined to become a Latin American president, along the lines of Lasswell (1960). It also analyzes the way these leaders present themselves as eternally fighting for the good of the country, while perhaps only yearning to be back in power, which echoes Goffman's conception of the "presentation of self" (1959). Each of these factors is an important element of a biographical study of Latin American leaders, though a deeper

investigation is needed to connect the personality-centered and theoretical literature to the actual cases.

In conclusion, the literature on Latin American leaders shows strong direction and focus in its exploration of how populations react to their leaders, but does not explore the causes as to why the leaders act the way they do to the extent that such an important body of literature should. This gap is the main weakness in current scholarship that this paper intends to correct.

### Conceptual Framework

The concepts behind this study are personality and leader behavior. For the purposes of this study, the personality of a leader will be categorized according to the Myers-Briggs framework. While this framework is not universally accepted, it allows for a more quantifiable differentiation difficult to achieve through more general descriptive frameworks. Other frameworks may help to better characterize the effect specific elements of personality on leader actions. Thus, they may also be referenced to expand upon the relationship.

### Study Design

I will examine three specific cases in this study. I have chosen these cases because they offer a variety of both political ideology and personality types. They include current and past leaders, and those whose cults of personalities are still strong as well as those whose followings have deteriorated. They also reflect three different This variety will better allow me to control for external variables as well as draw more prescient comparisons between the leaders.

The first case is that of Alberto Fujimori in Peru. He exemplifies a leader whose following collapsed by the end of his term, and is now generally seen as a *caudillo* who

overstepped his authority and was taken to task for it. His extreme authoritarianism and willingness to go beyond the limitations of the democratic system reflect an extreme example in the course of Latin American politics, but the fact that he dealt with some of the same issues as other leaders indicates that a study of his personality can offer much to contrast with other Latin American leaders.

The second case is that of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. He is one of the most recognizable leaders in Latin America, and his style of leadership is so foreign to most of the Western world that he has begun to exemplify the Latin American style of leadership to much of society. This is not an entirely valid interpretation of his position, but he has greatly inspired many similarly-minded leaders in the region and as such he represents an important example that must be included in any overall study of the leaders of the region. Further, his personality is very distinctive and observable in many of his actions, both day-to-day and in terms of larger policy goals.

The final case is Juan Perón of Argentina. His cult of personality lasted for longer than his presidency, and remained ingrained in Argentine culture long enough after he was deposed for him to be able to return to the presidency, albeit briefly, eighteen years after he was deposed. He dealt with a different set of issues than either of the two later leaders, though he helped define the populist tradition in his dealings with these issues. He will provide a contrast to the neopopulists Fujimori and Chávez. Further, his support has continued to this day within a certain element of Argentine society, and can thereby demonstrate how a single leader can affect a country for much longer than his tenure in office.

In this study I will view the personality and performance of the leader as the major independent variable. I will measure this according to the current literature on personality, specifically focusing on elements of the leader's biographical history that are reflected in his current behavior. I will categorize the leaders based on the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator system, using biographical details from their life before election to the presidency to identify their type, and then projecting predictions of their behavior in office based on this type. Analysis of the leader's political ideology will also be included in these hypotheses, as it will be necessary to predict a leaders' goals; however, it will not be used to predict a leader's approach to these goals, as this is the prerogative of the personality study.

The main dependent variable will be the performance a leader gives, and specifically how that relates to the pursuit of policy. I will analyze this based on a series of four policy areas, each of which is related to the populist nature of these leaders. The first, land reform and workers' rights, has been a hot issue of the left and working class in Latin America since the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. The second, reelection and constitutional election reform, has been a hallmark of the *caudillismo* phenomenon, as the individually focused style of democracy has led single leaders to refuse to give up their authority in many cases. The third area, terrorism and domestic insurrections, has been part of what sets *caudillos* apart from more traditional, Western, democratic leaders, and from themselves. Some *caudillos* received their training in these revolutionary organizations, while others form their policy around opposing them, though on the whole they have an altogether different approach to the phenomenon of domestic terrorism than presidents of the United States or European countries. The final area, the media, has also distinguished some *caudillos* from others; some leaders have been very successful in manipulating the media to distribute their message, while others have had more confrontational

relationships with the traditional media. Overall, these four areas represent a variety of elements of most Latin American leaders' agendas.

For the sake of the reader, what follows is a short overview of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator system, including the general criteria on which the subjects in the study are judged. While this is by no means an exhaustive description of the system, it provides an introduction for those who have little or no experience with its use.

The framework advanced within the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator system divides the realm of personality into four separate categories, each of which being governed by two polar opposites. The test itself allows for a scale between the two extremes, though it insists that even people very close to the middle of the scale generally trend significantly more to one pole than the other. The four categories, or pairs of "preferences," are introversion/extraversion, sensing/intuition, thinking/feeling, and perceiving/judging. Each pair is completely separate from each other pair, and as such the terms used take on different and more specific meanings than they are afforded in everyday parlance. Thus, the simple comment that someone is "introverted" or "extraverted" is not enough to guarantee that this is their proper designation within the Myers-Briggs system. Instead, their behavior must be viewed through the rules governing that pair of preferences to make sure the correct definition of introversion or extraversion is being applied. This same logic holds true for all of the preference pairings.

The first pairing, introversion and extraversion (I/E), describes where an individual's energy is focused. According to Myers-Briggs, introverts focus their energy inwards, whereas an extravert's energy is focused toward the outside world. This goes beyond the typical definition of extraversion, in that an introvert can be sociable while still focusing more attention inward,



just as an extravert can enjoy solitude while still depending on the outside world for affirmation and balance.

One can predict that a more extraverted leader will approach matters in a more collaborative way, while an introverted leader will be more likely to come to his own conclusions and act on those alone, being less dependent on advice. With regard to land reform, an extravert will be more responsive to the people from whom he draws his support, while an introvert will stick to his own plan, perhaps thinking he knows better than his constituents. An extravert will likely be more willing to engage in negotiations with guerrilla groups than an introvert who will not be able or willing to understand their perspective. In the way leaders pursue extension of their tenure in office, extraverts will likely attempt to do so as a mass undertaking with the support of the population, while introverts will be more willing to bypass institutional or democratic measures to do so. Finally, and more obviously, an extraverted leader will likely spend considerable effort in outreach to the press, seeing them as an extension of his message, while an introvert will likely see them more as an annoyance that wants too much information and may try to avoid the media's eye.

The second pairing, sensing and intuiting (S/N), describe the manner in which an individual gathers information from his surroundings. A sensing person depends more on sensory perceptions, preferring explicit facts and routine, methodical interpretations of the world around him. This is in opposition to an intuiting person, who sees information in the way that it fits into preexisting patterns and is more likely to stress this pre-existing framework over cold material facts. Further, an intuitive preference is generally indicative of a more open, creative approach to tasks that appreciates ingenuity, while a preference for sensing generally relies on a traditional, step-by-step approach.

We can expect a sensing leader to approach leadership in a more routine, one-size-fits-all way, using a similar approach to multiple issues. An intuiting leader, on the other hand, will likely have a better conception of how various issues interact and play out, and as such will be more likely to create a spontaneous plan to fit a new issue. A sensing leader will likely follow existing paradigms for land tenure, going about it in ways that have been done before, while an intuiting leader will be more able to create a new framework that will work better for his country's individual situation. With regard to terrorism or coup attempts, a sensing leader will probably have a plan in place beforehand and will follow it to the letter while an intuiting leader will be better prepared to act in response to the peculiarities of the specific situation, though he might suffer by not having all of his plans in place early enough. A sensing leader will probably establish his path to maintain control early in his term, while an intuiting one will use the confusion at the end of his term to prepare a more spontaneous plan. Finally, a sensing leader will likely use the media in its traditional form, while an intuiting leader will find new methods to reach out to his population through the media.

The third pairing, thinking and feeling (T/F), refer to a person's decision-making process. A thinking person takes an analytical, logical approach to decisions, to the point that a person who tends to this extreme can come off as cold and uncaring, in whose decisions emotions are given only the weight logic allows. On the other hand, a feeling person puts more weight on emotions, both of themselves and others, and a more figurative value system not necessarily based on raw logic.

We can assume that a thinking leader will be swayed less by intangibles such as public opinion or media analysis than a feeling leader. On the issue of land reform, a thinking leader will be more self-assured of the efficacy of his plan and will be more likely to stick to it

expecting long-term benefits even if there is opposition in the short term, while a feeling leader will be more willing to change the details of his plan to fit public opinion. A thinking leader will approach terrorism and coups in a logical, methodical way being able to see specific aims, while a feeling leader may be more amenable to negotiation of major points to come to a positive end of the situation. A thinking leader will be more willing to use less popular methods to gain reelection such as authoritarian constitutional changes or reinterpretation while a feeling leader will more likely rely solely on his public appeal to revise the constitution. Finally, a thinking leader will more likely see the media as a tool, while a feeling leader will see it more as a connection to the population, and their approaches to the media will follow this paradigm.

The final pairing, judging and perceiving (J/P), describe an individual's overall worldview. A judging preference generally implies a desire to have control over all elements of a given situation, and thus must fill their time with activities to feel as though they are making the most of it. Further, judging people are generally conservative and dedicated to a specific operating framework, needing organization and steady, methodical work. On the other hand, those with perceiving preferences are more easygoing and do not need direct control over their situations. This often leads to procrastination or working in bursts, though close deadlines often serve as inspiration for perceiving people, rather than a source of panic, as they do for judging people.

A judging leader is more likely to take a more openly authoritarian stance toward any issue than a perceiving leader, who, being more comfortable with having less control over a situation, will allow more dissent. On the issue of land reform, a judging individual will likely demand close government control over the reform process, while a perceiving individual will be more willing to put the project at least somewhat under independent control. A judging

individual's response to terrorism or coups will likely be harsh and unyielding, while a perceiving individual may approach these issues with more openness. A judging individual will likely be more authoritarian in his pursuit of extra terms, possibly being willing to do so without constitutional approval, while a perceiving individual will be more willing to use popular referenda. Finally, a judging individual will be more likely to restrict the media than a perceiving individual, who will likely interfere less in their operations.

Each of the pairings is further divided into five subscales, which describe specific elements of each pairing. Thus, the pairings do not demand uniformity, and people can exhibit one preference or another in completely different ways, and to completely different degrees. Further, the subscales can indicate elements of one's personality that one can concentrate on if one is unhappy with his or her current state of being, so as to fit more in line with his or her overall personality preference system.

### **Personality Study – Alberto Fujimori**

Alberto Fujimori's personality drew in large part from the value system imparted upon him by his parents, both of whom were originally Japanese immigrants to Peru in the decades before the Second World War. He grew up in a relatively poor Japanese district of Lima, though his family moved around multiple times when he was very young. His early life was split between studying at a local school, where he learned Spanish for the first time, and working with his family at his parents' flower store. In both pursuits he was very methodical even from an early age, and was seen as a perfectionist by his parents. (Kimura 26) He was seen as antisocial by his peers in school, partially a result of his less-than-impressive Spanish grammar. (Kimura 31) However, the local Japanese children also did not accept him entirely as his parents were

more interested in becoming part of the local Peruvian society, and as such his family was shunned by the more traditional Japanese families. These experiences in childhood dictated his future idea in which he held no particularly strong loyalties to either the Japanese community or the Peruvian elites. (Kimura 29)

Fujimori spent little time socializing in school or even through college, and was known as a bookworm to his classmates, though they highly respected his mental faculties and he was often seen as likely to do well. (Kimura 31) His focus was always on himself, and he went to great lengths to expand his education, traveling to the United States to study at the University of Wisconsin. (Kimura 48) As his career continued, he used this focus to help guide his decisions without bending to public will, both in his tenure as the Peruvian Agricultural University and as President. This suggests that he fits most in line as an Introvert per the Myers-Briggs system.

Fujimori's position on the Sensing/Intuitive scale is less well-defined. While he was seen as methodical while growing up, he was also open to new ideas, and was less conservative about social conventions than his peers. (Kimura 29) His experiences with his wife, Susana, attest to this. He married her despite the misgivings of her parents, who would have preferred a wealthier suitor for their daughter, as they were rich, established members of the Peruvian Japanese community. (Kimura 46) As their marriage fell apart, Fujimori, while not giving in politically to his wife's demands, he allowed her to make such demands in the public spotlight, which clearly violated social norms, though at the same time making him look more mature in the eyes of many of his supporters. (Kimura 54)

Fujimori generally scores highly on the Intuitive end of the five subscales of the trait. He takes original approaches to problems, eschewing tradition as the situation demands. He

provides imaginative answers to problems, as evidenced by his appeal to previously disenfranchised voters during his first election campaign. (Kimura 87) His tenure in the Peruvian university system attests to his scholarly nature, and he often saw events as being part of a framework rather than separate instances. (Kimura 67) As such, it makes more sense to call Fujimori Intuitive than Sensing, though he is by no means an extreme case.

Fujimori was seen as coldly logical throughout his life, most specifically in relation to his wife Susana's romanticism. (Kimura 46) He rarely showed emotions to his family with the exception of the requisite respect demanded by his culture. He had deeply ingrained principles through which he viewed his surroundings, but did not take criticism kindly. (Kimura 54) His "no-comments" policy on his domestic situation demonstrated his logical approach even to his relationships, and for this reason his wife publicly called him out for his coldness. The discussion of where Fujimori lies on the Thinking/Feeling spectrum is not about whether or not Fujimori falls on the Thinking side, but rather how far he lies in that direction. There is substantial evidence, both in Fujimori's personal history, and more so in his approach to political crises, to suggest that he is the archetypal case of an extremely Thinking person, to the point that he completely neglects the Feeling side of the spectrum.

Myers and McCaulley state that Judging individuals are concerned most with "making decisions, seeking closure, planning operations or organizing activities," (1985, in Bayne p. 39) and this seems to properly describe Fujimori's approach to any situation. His focus through school was on results, and he often created elaborate plans for his studies principally to have a goal to aim toward. (Kimura 27) In addition, immediately after his marriage to Susana his university was destroyed in a natural disaster, and he spent his honeymoon working to build a force to rebuild the campus instead of actually honeymooning. (Kimura 48) His dedication to an

organized, methodical approach to his actions, while not relying on a traditional, conservative structure, demonstrates his Judging nature. His future actions as president demonstrated this preference quite clearly, during which he organized his campaign and presidency quickly yet deeply in a way that allowed for surprising success despite opposition from both major established Peruvian political parties.

Alberto Fujimori can thereby, based on the aforementioned evidence, be described as an individual fitting best into the INTJ description. Myers and Briggs describe INTJs as follows:

“Usually have original minds and great drive for their own ideas and purposes. In fields that appeal to them, they have a fine power to organize a job and carry it through with or without help. Skeptical, critical, independent, determined, sometimes stubborn. Must learn to yield less important points in order to win the most important.”

Considering that Fujimori’s mother often described her son, both in youth and adulthood, as “mokusu,” a Japanese word meaning “stubborn and uncompromising,” it appears that this description is a good fit.

We can predict from this type that a leader like Fujimori would take a rather unilateral stance toward problems facing the nation, and that he would likely use orderly, bureaucratic means to implement his policies. With regard to the idea of land reform, my hypothesis is that Fujimori would consider this problem to be a “less important point” given his political orientation (right of center), and would likely abandon it to focus on a more important issue, namely presidential succession. Fujimori would likely attempt a change to the succession system through a methodical, organizational structure rather than personal appeals to the public.

Terrorism as a whole would likely be seen as something that must be negotiated with harshly, with little reason to suggest successful negotiations with a group with such radically different views. Responses to domestic crises would likely be planned from the beginning, with new information unlikely to cause Fujimori to radically change his plan, instead simply being factored in logically as part of a greater scheme. Finally, we can assume that Fujimori's dealings with the media would be less than constructive, as his introversion, coupled with his independence and stubbornness would likely clash with the media's investigative style.

### **Policy Study – Alberto Fujimori**

Fujimori acted little in the realm of agrarian reform considering his previous position as a professor of agriculture and president of the Agricultural University of Peru. He never made concrete land reform proposals despite his rhetoric of appealing to the impoverished people of Peru, who had suffered as much under the Spanish colonial land tenure system as people of other Latin American countries that were contemporaneously pushing for land reform. He largely managed to keep demands for land reform out of the public sphere, and discriminated institutionally against the political parties that used land reform as part of their platforms. (Kimura 100) He did, however, often use agrarian terms for economic policies in an attempt to appease poor Indian and mestizo peasants. For example, his overarching economic policy of his first term was often referred to as "clearing the field" for economic expansion by cutting public spending. (Kimura 128) Further, the limited or nonexistent benefits of most of his economic policies forced Fujimori to repeatedly explain that his policies would not defeat poverty overnight, which, though it did not represent a substantial departure from previous economic policies toward the poor, did represent a significant difference in terms of how the President



addressed the previously-ignored indigenous community, and as such kept them on board at least until the middle of his second term as President.

Fujimori's attempt to change the country's presidential succession system was unique in comparison to any other attempt in Latin America. When he was first elected, the Peruvian Constitution prohibited any President from being reelected, and as such Fujimori needed a Constitutional Convention to propose any amendments to allow him to be reelected. However, he chose to advance this policy not through an appeal to the populace, but rather as an additional part of his so-called "autogolpe," or self-coup, during which he dismissed the legislature and ruled by decree for a period of around six months. (Kimura 93, Conaghan 31-2) During this period, he proposed the rewriting of large segments of the Peruvian Constitution to consolidate more power within the executive branch. Among his proposed changes was the establishment of reelection, either unlimited or at least for one additional term. (Conaghan 46-7) When opposition parties began showing their hostility toward this amendment, Fujimori and his Cambio 90 party created a series of procedural obstacles to other parties' participation in the Convention, including a requirement for 100,000 signatures within about a month and a half for a party to be registered for elections, and the invitation of thousands of people to participate in the Convention coupled with the prohibition of party affiliation in the convention to dilute any party other than Fujimori's Cambio 90 from having any tangible influence in the drawing up of the new Constitution. (Kimura 94)

As such, it is hardly a surprise to see that the question was not whether or not Fujimori was allowed to run again, but whether he would be able to run again indefinitely. Eventually, the decision was made to only allow him one additional term, as the party members of Cambio 90 were split. (Kimura 103) However, this did not stop Fujimori from running for and being elected

to a third term. This time, he used the Supreme Court that he had earlier stripped of opposition members and filled with sympathetic justices to rule that his second term was, under the new Constitution, his first legal term, and as such he was entitled to run for one additional term. (Conaghan 49) Thus, unlike leaders like Chávez who appeal to the populace for confirmation when they desire extended term limits, Fujimori used a series of bureaucratic, procedural motions according to a previously-designed framework to achieve the same results without consulting the people. As such, the public response was substantially different, as they did not individually authorize his Constitutional changes. During the first term limit extension, public support was mixed though slightly in favor, as Fujimori still retained much of his early popularity from the “autogolpe” and his role in the capture of Sendero Luminoso leaders. However, the second, judicially mandated extension was viewed substantially less positively both within and outside of Peru. Despite this, Fujimori managed to win the election, with the help of his monopoly on the press and political fear machine. (Conaghan 108)

Fujimori saw terrorism as a phenomenon to be dealt with using whatever means was available, including domestic surveillance, indefinite detention, paid informants and torture. (Kimura 91) Fujimori claimed that his authoritarian stance toward terrorism could legitimately include infringements upon civil rights, claiming that this was necessary to maintain an aggressive approach which, he claimed, would stamp out terrorism more efficiently than engagement. (Kimura 102) Fujimori justified these claims by stating that the Peruvian people were willing to compromise their rights if it would help eliminate Sendero Luminoso’s presence. In this regard he was not entirely incorrect, as Sendero’s presence in some areas was more troubling than any government infringement. However, this surveillance system stayed in place

long after the threat of Sendero had largely subsided, and was regularly used against the people of Peru. (Conaghan 117)

Many considerable successes on the terrorism front came to pass during Fujimori's tenure as president, though whether he could be attributed for the majority of them was another question entirely. Abimael Guzman was captured during his presidency, and going along with his policy of refusing dialogue with terrorists, Fujimori refused to negotiate with Guzman for his or other prisoners release in exchange for a ceasefire or demilitarization. (Kimura 99) This affirms previous suppositions that Fujimori would likely take a unilateral stance toward terrorism, refusing to negotiate terms, instead going about the process individually and methodically.

In a specific domestic crisis related to terrorism, Fujimori clearly demonstrated his methodical and carefully calculated nature. The Japanese Embassy in Peru was attacked by Tupac Amaru guerrillas during a major reception, and several ambassadors and high ranking diplomats were held hostage for a total of 126 days. (Kimura 131) At the beginning of the crisis, intermediaries successfully negotiated the release of most of the children, women, and elderly, including Fujimori's mother who was among the crowd unbeknownst to the hostage-takers, as there was no way the guerrillas could monitor that number of people. After the first wave of hostages was released, the rebels demanded the release of a number of their comrades in exchange for allowing the hostages to go free. At first, Fujimori completely refused to negotiate with them at all and began planning for a rescue operation, but was quickly dissuaded by the government of Japan when it became obvious that the guerrillas would not hesitate to kill the hostages, including a large number of high-level Japanese diplomats and the country's ambassador. (Kimura 140) Instead, Fujimori refused to negotiate a compromise with the hostage takers. Amnesty for prisoners was quickly taken off the table, and Fujimori instead guaranteed

safe passage out of the country, which was quickly rejected by the guerrillas. This negotiation went on for a period of months, neither side budging, while the government attempted to starve out the rebels. (Conaghan 173)

In a telling episode of Fujimori's relationship with the press, he condemned and expelled from the country a Japanese reporter who snuck onto the embassy grounds to film a press conference for the guerrilla leader, Nestor Cerpa. (Kimura 141) In the weeks leading up to this point, the rebels, feeling abandoned and cut off from the outside world, began giving way and suggesting that improved prison conditions and safe travel out of the country were sufficient reward for giving up the hostages. However after this press conference the rebels felt as though their position had improved, and as such went back to their original demand for release of prisoners. (Kimura 145)

However, unbeknownst to them, Fujimori's attempt to engage them was simply a stalling technique, as he had an entirely different plan already in the works. In the last days of the crisis, Fujimori even went so far as to suggest that he would release some prisoners, and that negotiations could determine which ones would be released. However, before these negotiations could take place, the secret tunnels that were being drilled into the embassy compound were used to quickly storm the compound, and the exhausted guerrillas could not put up much of a fight. All of the guerillas were killed, along with three police officers and one hostage who died of a heart attack during the offensive. (Kimura 155) This plan had been in the works since the early days of the crisis, demonstrating Fujimori's cold, logical and methodical nature, in which people's lives were seen as simply another element in a greater equation. (Kimura author) asks if the situation would have been different if his mother had been kept hostage; I would

hypothesize that it would not have mattered, as Fujimori had nearly fanatical certainty in the success of his policy.

Finally, Fujimori's attitude toward the press was similar to that which was predicted. He generally kept a low profile except for his frequent, politically calculated trips to poor areas to interact face-to-face with the indigenous peasantry, during which government press photographers took many opportune photographs that helped him immensely in the polls. (Kimura 69) However, even during the gravest of political crises, he often hid in the Presidential Palace and waited for the din to die down before appearing in public. (Kimura 171) When his wife went on a hunger strike in protest toward his decision to run for reelection, he ignored her and allowed her to be hospitalized rather than acknowledge her opinion. (Kimura 59) Further, during the subsequent divorce proceedings, he only issued vague proclamations that the health of the First Couple's relationship was not interfering with the administration of the State. (Kimura 62) Later in his presidency when admittedly false questions came up about the veracity of his birth certificate, and whether he was perhaps born in Japan, he ignored the story and stayed in the Palace for days, instead allowing his allies in Congress to forbid discussion of the issue and rule that he was elected legitimately. (Kimura 170-2)

Each of these important elements of Fujimori's presidency reflected his personality type in clearly predictable ways from which generalizations could effectively be drawn as to how he would act in similar situations. Though this is not always the case with all leaders, the fact that Fujimori fit so strongly into his personality type may have something to do with the general consistency behind his policies across the board.

### **Personality Study – Hugo Chávez**

Hugo Chávez personality is readily apparent in his nearly constant speeches to the Venezuelan people and to the world at large. This personality also shone through his early actions during his tenure in the military and his coup attempt, as well as later during his campaign for the presidency. While parts of Chávez's demeanor as president may be an act with a specific political rationale, his earlier assertions of his personality serve as the cases that may be observed to accurately investigate whether his true personality is visible in his actions as president.

From an early age, Chávez was a gregarious person who had a keen ability to interact well with others. His first job as a young child was to sell the spider-shaped candies his grandmother made to other poor denizens of the impoverished village in which he grew up. He did so willingly and successfully, building a regular clientele based on his effervescent people skills. (Jones 47) As a child, Chávez spent much time playing baseball with friends, and he later became an accomplished pitcher and batter, which played a significant role in his admission to the Cadet Training Academy, his springboard into the military echelon. In baseball, and more so in the military, Chávez was a natural leader, and from early in his military career he showed himself as capable of organizing people. (Jones 67) He drew affirmation from like-minded individuals who shared his disappointment with the government and the structure of the military, and quickly began formulating long-term plans to change both institutions. For this, and other readily apparent reasons, it seems safe to judge Chávez to be an Extrovert according to the Myers-Briggs framework.

Chávez regularly turned to the heroes of Latin American independence for inspiration toward his endeavors. He idolized Simón Bolívar, the liberator of much of South America, and read his biography almost religiously through his education as a cadet. He also spent

considerable time reading the stories of local heroes, including Ezequiel Zamora, and Pedro Pérez Delgado, who was a distant relative of Chávez. (Jones 59) Chávez did not see these revolutionaries as a tie to the past, or to the conservative bloc of politicians that regularly invoked their memories. He instead condemned these politicians, who he saw as simply paying lip service to the memory of the leaders without actually following their goals. As such, Chávez put special emphasis upon the symbolic, an element of an Intuitive nature.

Further, Chávez was very interested in broadening his studies, and referenced many of the great philosophers of the left in his attempt to organize a coup, and again in his campaign for the presidency. He also saw his career in the military as part of a larger plan; from his early days he began sowing seeds of doubt in fellow cadets who he felt had the same concerns he did. (Jones 79) While these doubts were meant originally to do nothing but unite him with other similarly-minded people in a sense of purpose, and any action taken together would be far down the road, it showed Chávez's foresight, as many of these cadets would go on to hold high-level military positions and would serve him well in the future.

Finally, Chávez felt all but conventional loyalties to the state institutions, and was clearly open to more idiosyncratic methods. During his military days, this preference often led him into trouble, such as when he was disciplined for deserting his unit to play baseball. (Jones 56) However, his substantial charisma often let him get away unscathed from such predicaments.

For these reasons, I believe it would be legitimate to place Chávez on the Intuitive side of the Sensory/Intuitive spectrum, farther than Fujimori but not entirely an extreme case.

Chávez has always put his value system ahead of any concept of principles, as is evidenced by his deference to the ideals of leaders such as Bolívar instead of the ideals

supposedly instilled in him by the military. As a child, he was always warm and caring towards his family, especially his grandmother Rosa, who bore a substantial part of the burden of raising him and his brother Adán. (Jones 33) He was very romantic and idealistic in his correspondence with his fiancée, Nancy Colmenares, and put great emphasis on keeping harmony with the people with whom he worked and lived in the military, trying to resolve petty differences among his followers in planning for the coup. (Jones 68) His personality in early life could easily be seen as “agreeable” to an outside observer, and for this reason I find it convincing to label Chávez as Feeling according to the Myers-Briggs Typology.

As previously mentioned, Chávez was a master of setting up elaborate plans long before they became immediately useful. His presidential election was rooted in his failed coup attempt some six and a half years earlier, and this coup was rooted in a group of likeminded military cadets formed fifteen years prior during Chávez’s early days in the military. (Jones 102) These attributes would suggest that Chávez would lean towards the Judging end of the Judging/Perceiving spectrum.

However, Chávez was also generally casual about some elements of his plans before their execution, and could be very flexible in his interpersonal dealings, qualities that would suggest he would fall on the perceiving end of the spectrum. I would suggest that these secondary elements represent his cultivation of perception in line with his Extraverted and Feeling nature, and that Chávez nonetheless belongs on the Judging side of the spectrum, though clearly not as far in that direction as Fujimori.

Chávez’s Myers-Briggs personality type would thus be ENFJ, which Myers describes as:



“Responsive and Responsible. Generally feel real concern for what others think or want and try to handle things with due regard for the other person’s feelings. Can present a proposal or lead a group discussion with ease and tact. Sociable, popular, sympathetic. Responsive to praise and criticism.”

While future analysts could question the last sentence of this description, on the whole it does seem to describe Chávez well, though it focuses substantially on the Feeling aspect of his personality, which is not certain to be the dominant element. With this typology, one can draw hypotheses about his actions within the four dimensions investigated by this study.

Chávez would likely be sympathetic to the problem of land reform, not simply because he, as he is so fond of repeating, was “born in a mud hut.” His sympathy toward poor farmers, coming from the Feeling element of his personality, could lead him to establish a detailed, long-term plan to review the land tenure system. His penchant for unconventional approaches and his anti-traditional stance also suggest that he would not be beholden to the current system, and would thereby afford it no special consideration, instead being willing to start from scratch.

Attempts to change the presidential succession system would almost certainly be couched in appeals to the population, as validation for his actions would need to come from someone beyond Chávez’s intimate circle. If Chávez is legitimately “responsive to praise and criticism,” he would almost certainly need to test these factors through public opinion polling before making a substantial change to the country’s political system, even if he personally feels that this is the best choice for the country.

Domestic crises would likely have detailed plans, though these plans may be more open to interpretation and adjustment than under a strictly Judging leader such as Fujimori. Terrorism

would be treated as a manifestation of greater ills, especially due to Chávez's reliance on abstract concepts to form judgments about the world, feeling more comfortable making comparisons to other historic cases than simply seeing events as they are. As such, one can expect Chávez to be more willing to negotiate with "terrorists" at home, and to be less quick to condemn terrorism abroad unquestioningly, instead seeking to remedy the root causes of terrorism through less divisive and violent means.

Finally, one could assume that Chávez would play willingly into the designs of the press, as his extraverted nature and developed sense of feelings would endear him to the public, using the press as an effective instrument to spread his message. His openness to praise and criticism, as per Myers' predictions, should suggest that he would be unlikely to censor press activity, instead not only allowing for unfavorable depictions but also using them to improve his *modus operandi* in the eyes of the public.

### **Policy Study – Hugo Chávez**

Improving the lives of the Venezuelan poor was one of Chávez's main missions in his first election campaign, and immediately following his election he gave an inaugural address, in which he asked how 80% of the Venezuelan population could live in poverty given the fact that Venezuela had so many natural riches.(Jones 227) He also quickly came out in condemnation of the then-current Constitution, which was the basis of the outgoing political system which Chávez blamed for structuralizing the gross inequalities of income that existed in Venezuela. Along with many more political reforms, Chávez would attempt to lay the groundwork for further changes in the new Constitution, which would be written and implemented in the early part of his first term.(Jones 256)

Chávez began his land reform plan in 2001, the first attempt in forty years to make any remedy to the gross imbalance of landholdings. 60% of the country's land was owned by less than 2% of the population, and a large amount of it was fallow. (Jones 306) In addition, Venezuela was South America's only net importer of food. Chávez thereby proposed a land reform package with the objective of making the country self-sufficient agriculturally by breaking down unused latifundios, and cracking down on landowners who took the titles to their land through corruption or graft.

His policies were targeted solely at large plantations, and specifically at those that left large tracts idle, though the first target was unused government-owned land. In the first four years of the plan, 2.2 million hectares of land were distributed, all of it state-owned, despite claims from the old establishment that private property was being seized.(Jones 308) This policy was seen as fair-minded by independent analysts, and by any means was less far-reaching than many similarly-timed plans. However, it was violently decried by the opposition, and in large part led to the coming minor revolts, which in turn paved the way for the coup that would take place later in his term. Despite the violence that erupted, Chávez refused to back down from his plan, and instead criticized the forces in society working to undermine it through assassinations and violent rhetoric, and for this reason he succeeded in a limited but nonetheless substantial reform.

Later attempts at land reform went farther, as Chávez had survived a coup and was able to use his political capital more openly. In 2005, Chávez began his pursuit of "21<sup>st</sup> Century Socialism," which, possibly to silence U.S. opposition, he compared to a "Venezuelan New Deal"(Jones 451). This policy included a more aggressive land reform policy, one which applied to private holdings as well as state-owned land, and one of his first targets was the massive,

mostly unused estate of a British aristocrat who was accused of receiving ownership of the land illegally, and whose land had subsequently been settled by dozens of squatters who farmed the unused land. Soon after, Chávez targeted a huge estate that included much fallow land, as well as a nature preserve which housed several endangered species and was a popular destination for foreign tourists.(Jones 438) These actions earned the condemnation of the right wing, business interests, and environmentalists, but were celebrated by Venezuela's working class, clearly demonstrating Chávez's populist streak in this area.

Chávez considered revising the country's constitution to be one of the first priorities of his presidency, and while the constitutional changes largely revolved around attempts to fight poverty and extend opportunities to the nation's poor, it was no secret from the start that Chávez was not happy with the presidential succession laws in their current form. As such, from the first day of his presidency during which he swore on "this moribund constitution" that he would "push forward the democratic transformations that are necessary" Chávez demonstrated his derision for the old system and declared that the Venezuelan people should, with his help draft a new constitution that would allow him to run for office for more than a single term, as he was originally permitted. (Jones 226)

The old institutions of Congress and the Supreme Court were slow to join in his campaign to change the constitution, and as such Chávez called for a Constitutional Assembly, whose members would be voted on in a separate election soon after Chávez's inauguration. His control of the process guaranteed that *Chavistas*, or Chávez supporters, won 125 of the Assembly's 131 seats.(Jones 240) The assembly thereby became little more than an extension of the president's power, as few assembly members questioned Chávez's edicts, instead crafting the Constitution almost entirely according to the President's orders. (Jones 245)

As the Assembly drew up plans for the new constitution, the old Congress and Judiciary became more entrenched in their positions, and refused to acknowledge the Assembly's right to discard them or change them significantly. Chávez responded hotheadedly, decrying the opposition and issuing an executive order giving the Assembly the power to dismiss judges, and authority over the Congress to incorporate laws under the new constitution that took precedence over Congress-passed laws, restricting the Congress's authority to procedural measures such as rubber-stamping the president's budget, and allowing the president to leave the country for international engagements. (Jones 242) In return, Congress attempted to impede Chávez in every way they could, refusing to allow Chávez to leave the country for international summits until concessions were made by the Assembly. Chávez was infuriated and began threatening to shut down the Congress and the Judiciary until the new constitution was implemented, but this plan was short-sighted and impractical. Eventually, he stood down, and though the Assembly dismissed some judges immediately, they left most of the reforms for after the new constitution had been drawn up and implemented. Chávez escaped condemnation for his brash methods because just as he was proposing these authoritarian measures, a scandal broke in which two federal judges threw out clearly valid corruption charges against members of the old government, and were condemned from all sides for their brash disregard for the rule of law and public opinion.(Jones 246) The judges were suspended by the Constitutional Assembly, and the entire debacle granted even more support to Chávez's Assembly than it already had. Chávez was thereby able to continue pursuing his new constitution, and his opponents were left silenced.

This new constitution included radical changes to the office of the presidency. The term of the president was extended from five years to six, and immediate reelection was permitted. In an attempt to demonstrate accountability, the constitution provided for a mandatory recall

referendum midway through the president's term, with binding results. (Jones 255) This recall mechanism was touted by Chávez as evidence that he was making reform democratically, as the Venezuelan people had a constitutionally established way of removing him from office if he overstepped his bounds. However, this was not enough to win over his opposition, and certain elements in the military began plotting his overthrow, partially due to fears that Chávez would in fact win a recall election despite slowly falling public support. This coup attempt was largely unsuccessful; though the upper echelon of the military was largely opposed to Chávez, these commanders had little direct control over troops and were quickly outnumbered by troops loyal to Chávez.

After the failed coup attempt, Chávez returned to his previous methods, and even restored some of the participants in the coup to their previous offices, a choice that would come back to haunt him when these opposition leaders simply turned around and worked against him in their new capacities. Chávez went on to win the 2003 recall referendum and 2006 presidential elections handily. His popular support from the lower classes seemed to have no bounds, as almost all of his constitutional referenda going forward passed, including a later referendum allowing him unlimited reelection. (Jones 446)

Venezuela's problem with domestic terrorism was less serious than other neighboring countries, and as such Chávez had more leeway to effect broader civil rights laws without the fear of retribution by terrorist groups. However, this turned around to hurt him during the coup attempt; by refusing to silence his opposition, he allowed them to plan and execute a coup using the guarantees of liberty of press and protest as guises to hide the true nature of the plan, and then to use the media to portray the opposition as much larger than it was, and better in control of the country than it actually ever became during the attempted coup. (Jones 373)

Chávez's actions during the coup reflect his personality clearly, in the dealings he had with those who captured and kidnapped him for two days. He accepted the situation he was in quickly, and was able to act quickly in a way that both guaranteed his safety and eventually helped him regain power after the *golpistas* proved their weakness. Chávez managed this by cultivating a relationship with the lower-level soldiers under the command of the military leaders who launched the coup. By doing so, and by giving them information they did not receive from official media sources or their superiors, they began to doubt their leaders' descriptions of the day's events. (Jones 338) The lower-level soldiers also served as a communications network, through which Chávez's message was able to spread quickly and undermine the coherence of message desired by the *golpistas*.(Jones 340)

Chávez's response mechanism in this situation was likely not planned as deeply as most of his other undertakings, though it does demonstrate his ability to create plans that went beyond their immediate objective; Chávez guaranteed that these soldiers would not allow him to be spirited off to execution without advanced warning, which would allow him to defuse the situation, and furthermore, he was able to find a way to demonstrate to at least a certain portion of the Venezuelan public that he had not resigned or fled the country, as the *golpistas* claimed. (Jones 338)

Chávez's dealings with the coup against him were the only real interactions he had with domestic insurgencies, though he had a different approach to global terrorism. Although he, like the rest of Latin America, condemned the September 11 terrorist attacks, he routinely condemned the United States' assertion that its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were intended to fight terrorism, instead accusing the world's biggest superpower of engaging in wars for oil and world hegemony. His speeches to the UN often reflected his extravagance in argument, as he

made the claim that the podium smelled of sulfur after President Bush spoke, in effect calling Bush the Antichrist. Later, Chávez would go on to defend enemies of the United States such as Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, with whom he cultivated a relationship around "finish[ing] off the US empire." (Jones 444) Chávez also recently made the news by condemning the multinational effort to remove Libya's Muammar Gaddafi from power, accusing the United States of acting as the world's policeman with the support of NATO. (Jones needsource) Several minor diplomatic crises also occurred in South America when Chávez was accused by Colombian President Álvaro Uribe of harboring FARC guerrillas, and both countries' ambassadors were briefly recalled. (Jones needsource) Chávez demonstrated through the entire timeframe both a desire to lead, either symbolically or more meaningfully, a loose alliance of countries opposed to the United States' global influence, and his brash manner, typical of many Venezuelans (Jones 262), may have been both an appeal to his people and part of a greater plan to win attention for his approach, despite the often negative portrayals by mainstream media outlets in Venezuela and the United States. As such, Chávez's Judging and Extraverted characteristics, as well as his intuitive nature, can all be seen in his approach to these objectives.

Chávez began his interactions with the media as predicted by his personality. Upon his election, he tried to reconstruct his relationship with the established media, which was in large part run by upper-class Venezuelans with ties to the old order. As such, he was not enthusiastically welcomed by them, and the press soon became one of Chávez's major impediments, as, with the exception of his government-controlled TV programs, none of the nation's main media outlets portrayed him in a favorable light. (Jones 237) Chávez was regularly incensed by what he saw as an unfair portrayal in the press. However, despite his complaints he made no attempt to restrict the press's ability to operate freely, and early



comparisons to Castro held little water because of Chávez's commitment to constitutional guarantees of liberties of speech and press. As such, Chávez's confrontational stance toward the press was limited, as he refused to take an authoritarian position which would go against his commitment to the democratic process. (Jones 240)

Despite his commitment to civil liberties with regard to press freedom, Chávez and the press have had a constant and bitter relationship throughout his presidency. The press routinely accuses Chávez of creating a dictatorship, whether in response to a specific program or simply as a commentary on his presidency. However, the most telling episode of his presidency with regard to the press took place during the coup attempt against Chávez in 2002.

The coup against Chávez took place on April 11, 2002. It began with a strike and march which were directed by corporate interests bent on unseating Chávez. The march was redirected to converge on the Presidential Palace in an attempt to demonstrate the size of the opposition movement. However, during this march, several protesters on both sides were killed by snipers, who were later found to have no connection to Chávez. At the time, though, the media used footage they took later of Chávez supporters returning fire when they were being shot at by unknown assailants, and paired it up with the footage of anti-Chávez protesters being shot at by snipers. Despite the fact that there was no connection between the *chavistas* who were firing pistols at the same snipers who shot anti-Chávez demonstrators earlier, and the fact that the two video clips were shot hours apart and in completely different locations, the media maintained that it was clear and convincing footage of Chávez supporters killing anti-Chávez protestors, and the news station that assembled the clip was even given a prestigious news award for their reporting before the footage was found to be manipulated. (Jones 328)

Throughout the coup, Chávez was hindered in keeping his position because he had no reliable and supportive ally in the media that would allow him to state his message, and was instead subject to more confusion when various outlets began repeating that he had resigned or fled the country when neither had happened. His inability to get in touch with the nation prolonged the coup substantially, as it was nearly impossible to organize any pro-Chávez demonstration when the country's only media outlets portrayed the coup as having completed its objectives and that he had abandoned the country and his principles. (Jones 355) Even after the tide of the coup turned, and Chávez supporters began to overrun the *golpistas*, or perpetrators of the coup, Chávez was still unable to communicate through the press, and as such he considered resigning and fleeing the country if the constitution was respected and his vice president was allowed to take office. His abandonment of his preconceived plans, and inability to act in this time of crisis due to his lack of press coverage, demonstrate his judging character, and his willingness to abandon his office in exchange for respecting the constitution he helped implement showed the feeling side of his personality, as he put more emphasis on the way in which he resigned than in choosing whether to resign.

Chávez's difficulty in dealing with the press, and more combative style than predicted, seem to have a lot to do with the fact that the opposition controlled the media to the point that it was no longer an unbiased force, instead one pursuing a specific agenda and using its unique position in Venezuela's civil society to pursue it to the exclusion of Chávez's desires. After the coup, partly in fear of a repeat attempt, Chávez refused to crack down on press freedoms, and the press did not change their operations. (Jones 377) Instead, soon after the coup oil companies, with their executives largely comprised of ex-*golpistas*, began a strike, again with the support of the media. This strike quickly crippled Venezuela's economy, as without petroleum to refine,

Venezuela had very little to trade with the world, and was also unable to maintain its infrastructure to move food around the country. The media touted this as evidence of Chávez's inability to maintain control over his country, and even his ex-wife came out in criticism of his refusal to step down. Despite this, Chávez began what became after the coup attempt his normal protocol toward the press, ignoring their rhetoric while he tried to solve the problem in hopes that the Venezuelan people would respect his response to the crisis and not put undue faith in the media reports that routinely condemned him. (Jones 421)

Chávez's interactions with the press became more heavy-handed in his second term in office, as he began to restrict the press's operations more openly. He refused to renew the operating license of RCTV, the most outspoken opposition TV station, despite cries of authoritarianism. However, he let most other media outlets as they were despite their opposition stances, and never made any concrete attempts to unseat executives who were especially vocal in their opposition to him. (Jones 447)

Overall, Chávez's interaction with the media was not quite as expected; while he attempted to use government-sponsored television such as *¡Alo Presidente!*, his marathon talk show in which he exercised free reign to speak at length to the Venezuelan people, in a populist manner, he engaged with the mainstream media more as an opposition force than as a means to broadcast his message. As such, the predictions must be revised, since they assumed that he would be able to control the media better than he was. It is still possible to see his personality through these dealings, as he was very extraverted when given the opportunity on TV, often engaging in discussions of various matters simply for the sake of conversation, instead of simply repeating his political messages as did leaders such as Castro. His long-term plans on how to

deal with opposition media outlets demonstrated his perceiving and judging nature, and his constant appeals to the emotions rather than the logic of his people show his feeling character.

### **Personality Study – Juan Perón**

Rowan Bayne, in her analysis of the Myers-Briggs Personality Type Indicators, makes specific reference to a special category of introverts that can do well in social situations but still focus their overall worldview around themselves rather than the people with whom they associate. Perón fits very well in this category; while he was known for his charm and ability to inspire others to action, he admitted himself that he was more comfortable outside of the spotlight, and was described by a journalist upon his death that “he loved his dogs and was loved by a great part of his country.” (Page 6) From an early age, he demonstrated that he was more comfortable with a single confidante than a group of friends, though his confidante would change several times throughout his life as individuals fell in and out of his favor. (Page 21) Though Perón would later be in the spotlight almost constantly, his early life reflected more of a desire to blend into the background, and up until his selection as Vice President, which put into motion the events that would catapult him to the presidency, he was always the chief advisor to someone in power rather than the person in power himself. (Page 59) Further, he was slow to form close bonds with others, almost never referring to people in the second person, instead using the proper third person form that connotes both respect and distance. (Page 24) However, as demonstrated by his regular speeches to adoring crowds, Perón often seemed more in his element in conversation rather than in writing, and as such it is difficult to support the assertion that he is a polar example of an introvert; instead, it is more likely that, though he falls on that side of the spectrum, his social and extraverted side is more developed than in the majority of

introverts. As such, I will cautiously categorize him as a Myers-Briggs introvert who is nonetheless capable in social situations.

Perón demonstrated throughout both his adolescence and his military career prior to ascending to the presidency a strong work ethic that often manifested itself in his slow, plodding method of achieving his goals. He was, from an early age, “capable of long hours of intense work,” and his first distinction in the armed forces was the translation of a repetitive and didactic German manual of exercises for soldiers. (Page 24) He also took especial interest in pedagogy, often taking initiative to teach close friends or confidantes a variety of skills for the simple sake of teaching. (Page 33) His speaking style endeared him greatly to the Argentine lower classes, as it was always straightforward, sensible, and practical to the point that he was often criticized by the oligarchy for being unable to converse in their idiomatic and high-minded way of speech. (Page 32, 130) His realistic interpretation of the events in which he found himself allowed him to keep his head low and gain the support of a large part of society, rather than rushing into an ill-fated attempt to rush the course of history, something that was often an option to him though he always remained cool-headed and kept his focus on the long-term plan. (Page 49) For these reasons, I find it safe to place Perón firmly on the Sensing side of the Sensing/Intuitive spectrum.

Despite his difficulty in finding intimacy with others, Perón was always able to appear convivial and charismatic, and in his adolescence he spent considerable time learning the customs of the Argentine field hands who worked on nearby estates when his family lived in Patagonia, and again spent time associating with lower-class workers in Buenos Aires when he attended a boarding school there. (Page 20, 22) He was often dedicated to preserving harmony, both within his family, and later within the ranks of the military companies with which he was assigned. (Page 18, 59) His Catholic religious faith, though doubted by some, clearly instilled a

strong value system from which he would very rarely depart, and though during his presidency he would fight many political battles with the church, his family instilled in him a value system that would often dictate his action. (Page 18) However, Perón was far from trusting, and often favored justice over Christian mercy and sympathy. (Page 46, 49) This conflicting description would seem to place Perón squarely in the middle of the Thinking/Feeling paradigm. However, analysis of a specific crisis, the death of Evita, demonstrates Perón's personality clearly in the most extreme of circumstances. Prior to her death, when it was clear that she was not going to recover from her illness, Perón often suggested to her that she follow various homeopathic and folk remedies despite their clear inefficacy and instructions by her doctors to the contrary. As the situation grew more grim, Perón was unable to accept the logical facts of his wife's illness, and instead turned to various miracle workers in hope that something could reverse that which was clearly irreversible. Upon Evita's death, Perón became inconsolable, demonstrating his clear and undying devotion to her, and the loss of his confidante drove him to make several political decisions that were clearly illogical, including attempting to take on his wife's various roles in feminist organizations that were both below his station as President of Argentina and contrary to his own political beliefs. (Page 257-261) Though much of this could be expected from any mourning husband, the fact that this crisis drove a sitting president to such actions demonstrates a lack of a logical approach rarely seen in a person of such a position, and I believe is enough evidence to place Perón on the Feeling side of the spectrum.

The aspect of Perón's personality that fits most clearly on one side of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator system is his Judging nature. As previously mentioned, Perón was seen from an early age as being industrious, and his participation in the military was in large part based on a desire to be part of such a clearly organized and hierarchical structure. (Page 22) Though he was

capable of acting spontaneously and ingeniously, this was not his preferred *modus operandi*. (Page 24) Further, as evidenced by his slow, plodding progression through the ranks of the military, Perón was capable of putting plans into place long before they reached fruition, and his difficult assignments in Europe and Northern Argentina demonstrated his ability to use routines as a tool to help provide purpose to his life. (Page 29, 31)

As such, I categorize Perón as an ISFJ, which is described by Myers-Briggs as:

“Quiet, friendly, responsible and conscientious. Work[s] devotedly to meet obligations. Lend[s] stability to any project or group. Thorough, painstaking, accurate. Their interests are usually not technical. Can be patient with necessary details. Loyal, considerate, perceptive, concerned with how other people feel.”

This description fits Perón quite well; it provides justification for both his ability to shine in the spotlight and his preference for his own company, and accurately portrays both his strengths and weaknesses in relation to his service in the military. Based on this description, we can predict that Perón would approach land reform, and other issues regarding the impoverished masses more relevant in his time period, with a methodical, long-term plan, and he would likely desire close control over the entire plan. He would also likely devote substantial effort into accommodating the specific concerns of the Argentine people into these plans, though in the end he would likely make the decision based on his own interpretation of the situation.

In his approach to election and reelection, Perón would likely establish himself as a candidate over a long period, and would invest substantial energy in planning a reelection campaign. Further, he would likely put effort into consolidating his position in the political

system, and his response to opposition would likely be respectful yet strong-handed, as he would likely desire absolute control over the electoral process, and, if possible, solid reason to believe in his success before he committed himself fully.

In response to domestic threats and insurgencies, Perón would likely have elaborate plans for any contingency, preferring to adapt these to the circumstance rather than creating an ad hoc response based solely on the crisis at hand. He would likely also deal harshly with these crises, in an effort to maintain stability in the country. He would also likely try to maintain connections throughout society to ensure that he would have advance warning of any threats to this stability.

Finally, with regard to his approach to the press, Perón would likely desire the same accuracy in depicting his actions as he demanded of himself. As such, we can assume that he would not put substantial emphasis in freedom of the press, as he would likely react harshly towards what he saw as unfair portrayals. He would likely perform well in interviews and the like, though he may seem out of his element. He would also probably try to use the press as a method to connect with the populace rather than through simple mass appeal.

### **Policy Study – Juan Perón**

Perón's first foray into improving the lot of the impoverished Argentine lower classes took place while he was still a mid-ranked military officer in 1943. He had recently helped to found the GOU, a secret organization within the army that did not take a side in the ongoing dispute over which army general would lead the coup over then-president Castillo, but existed to solidify strong positions for its members in the army leadership so that they would come out ahead no matter who won the internecine struggle. Perón used Castillo's appointment of Robustiano Patrón Costas as his heir apparent to ensure his position as the planner of the



movement, as well as increase the public opinion of the secret organization's goals, specifically the defeat, either electorally or in a coup, of Patrón Costas. Perón did this by emphasizing Patrón Costas's reputation when he worked as a sugar magnate of transporting workers in cattle cars, trafficking Bolivian Indians as virtual slaves, and maintaining his laborers in servitude through extortion and forced loans, ensuring that they would never be able to release themselves from their indentures. (Page 47)

Perón learned from his experiences in Mussolini's Italy that even a military leader could not ensure success in governance without the support of the majority of the country, including the lower classes. (Page 66) He soon thereafter catapulted himself into the public spotlight with a speech in which he declared that the Argentine economy would only truly find stability through a tripartite negotiation system in which employers, workers, and the state each had equal standing and could convey their concerns and have them respected. (Page 69)

After his election, Perón made it clear that one of his first priorities as president was establishing the country's economic independence. (Page 168) In line with his prior ideological position, Perón insisted that for this to work, the lower-class workers must be able to find strong and effective representation in the form of unions. (Page 177) However, he was not happy with these organizations being completely outside his influence; the country's major union at the time, the CGT, did not defend him during the events that guaranteed his popular appeal during a brief period of falling out of favor of the military junta that governed immediately before his election. Instead, the CGT stood by the sidelines and did not intervene on his side, despite his overtures to them and their shared reverence for the lower classes. (Page 134) As such, Perón decided that he needed to have closer regulatory authority over the representation unions afforded the working classes, and declared that the government would only negotiate with unions specifically

recognized by an advisory body presided over by Perón. (Page 181) He maintained this chain of command throughout his presidency, guaranteeing that the negotiators on organized labor's side would be sympathetic and malleable, as if they were not they would lose their position of power.

Even as fractures were beginning to form in the government, and rumors were surging of coup plots, Perón still had the support of the workers, and was able to successfully manipulate organized labor to his benefit. When a railway strike emerged in 1949, Perón politicized the conflict, accusing the striking unions of being communists, and as such was able to draft the striking workers into the army and subject them to military discipline while maintaining popular support for his actions. (Page 231) Later, during his attempt to regain power in the 1970s, Perón once again turned primarily to the working classes to regain his support, even flirting with taking the peronist movement on a leftward turn, going so far as to open negotiations with Havana and organizing plans vaguely similar to several implemented during the Cuban Revolution. (Page 381) This was a remarkably pragmatic approach considering his past wholesale condemnation of communism.

Perón's approach to election and reelection changed as his significance to the Argentine people evolved between his years in the military and his tenure as president. However, his approach contained several key similarities that can be seen to reflect Perón's deeper vision and conception of the office. In the immediate aftermath of the coup, Perón wanted to make it clear that his group, the GOU, had been instrumental in the former president Castillo's ouster, and as such he circulated documents through the armed forces in which he maintained that the GOU was the sole catalyst for the revolution, and that he himself had been instrumental to the coup's success. (Page 55) Perón also began courting the established political parties in an attempt to

sow seeds of legitimacy that he could cultivate over the following years before reaping the rewards in triumphant fashion in the 1946 presidential elections. (Page 57)

Later in the post-coup period, Perón began aspiring to higher office within the government, and used his connections to the newly installed President Farrell to usurp the position of War Minister despite the fact that the majority of the military leadership did not support his candidacy. (Page 60-1) After the aforementioned period of appealing to Argentina's *descamisados*, as the working classes were referred to, Perón reveled in the demonstrations of October 17, 1945, which intended to secure Perón's release, as he had recently been stripped of the Vice Presidency and arrested. The demonstrations were allowed to continue, and their magnitude, along with the newly-freed Perón's refusal to address them without eliciting some political benefit from President Farrell, forced the sitting president to instate a new cabinet filled with Perón loyalists and call for elections, which Perón, with his now obvious public support, was almost guaranteed to win. (Page 133)

In short, Perón successfully and astutely created a long-term plan, in which he would slowly rise in the military hierarchy while making inroads into both the political and labor organizations of the Argentine society. This legitimacy and support from the public became the springboard he used to repair the military career that had been damaged by his thirst for power, and bypass the hierarchy to become elected president the first time in 1946.

In 1948, Perón began attempts to rewrite the Argentine Constitution. One of the foremost reforms advocated by the peronists was the removal of Article 77, which prohibited direct reelection. Though Perón himself spoke out against repealing this article, it was clear to most around him that he was only saying this to have a plausible defense against charges of

authoritarianism. (Page 200) Soon afterward, the Radical and Communist parties spoke out against the calling of a Constitutional Convention, as Perón and his supporters in the legislature had given the convention nearly universal power to do anything from simply change Article 77 to scrap the Constitution wholesale and write a new one from scratch. (Page 201) The Radicals asserted that Perón was trying to create a fascist, authoritarian state, and inscribe these changes into the Magna Carta of the country. (Page 203) However, despite this, the convention went forward as expected, and, among other reforms, removed the prohibition on reelection. (Page 206)

Later on in his term, Perón continued denying his desire to run for reelection, though it was clear that he did not reject it entirely, instead doing so out of a desire to maintain a sense of accountability. When the CGT, the nation's major union conglomerate, called on him to run for reelection, he declined superficially, but the organization put forth a memorandum calling on Perón to be reelected nonetheless. (Page 231) In August of 1951, the peronists in Congress called on Perón to run for reelection, and at this point he finally gave in, admitting for the first time that he would run. (Page 241) The rest of the reelection campaign went forward with an air of inevitability, and despite some accusations of electoral fraud by the Radical Party, Perón was reelected, with almost double the votes of the second-place finisher, Balbín of the Radical Party. Immediately before the election, Perón claimed, in part due to Evita's tireless dedication to his cause, and also because the election of 1951 was the first one in which women were given the vote, that "The first election I won with the men; this one I shall win with the women." (Page 254)

Thus ended a saga which, despite Perón's insistence to the contrary, had been in the works since the president began contemplating revising the country's constitution. Perón knew

he could win, long before he had even admitted his desire to run for a second term. Despite the turmoil that was to follow during his second term, his reelection campaign was remarkably successful and demonstrated careful planning over a long period, even if Perón was less likely to be up front about these plans with the nation's voters.

Perón's approach to factionalism in the military and insurrectionary elements evolved quickly over his presidency. He came to office promising reconciliation and renounced vengeance for any injustices he had suffered in his inaugural address. (Page 156) This policy remained in place through much of his first term; while minor insurrections occurred, they were usually without any hope of success, and their leaders were punished relatively lightly. However, by the beginning of his second term, Perón began using the military as more of a crutch to support his presidency. (Page 251)

By his second term, insurrections became a more regular occurrence, and Perón began taking a more retaliatory stance towards them. After word began to spread of a plan, created by the oligarchy and socialists, to depose the president, Perón decided extreme action needed to be taken. He convened a demonstration in front of the Casa Rosada, and complained about the oligarchs. As the demonstration began, a bomb exploded, killing several demonstrators. The remaining demonstrators demanded that Perón punish those responsible; Perón suggested that they carry out the punishment for him, accusing the same oligarchs and socialists of planting the explosives. The now-incensed demonstrators unfolded upon Buenos Aires, vandalizing the Socialist Headquarters and destroying countless precious works of art in the upscale Jockey Club, a tragic act of cultural vandalism. (Page 271-272)

As the floor began to fall out from underneath Perón, he began taking more conciliatory steps to try to preserve his authority over the nation. A naval coup attempt failed in its objective of bombing the Casa Rosada, and instead bombed the Plaza de Mayo, which was crowded with people attending a memorial service for a deceased general, killing over 350. (Page 307-308) Perón responded only by imprisoning the leaders of the coup, and pushing for reconciliation with the Catholic Church, which had been blamed for engendering discontent among the armed forces since the beginning of Perón's second term. (Page 312) However, this did not prove particularly effective; the opposition interpreted Perón's conciliatory overtures as a sign of weakness, and it was not long before General Lonardi and his supporters would succeed in deposing Perón. (Page 317)

Perón's approach to major instances of dissent was often unexpectedly conciliatory given the gravity of offenses committed by insurrectionists. This demonstrated both a desire for stability and an ability to operate outside the authoritarian framework of revenge for wrongs against the leader. However, Perón's populism can be seen clearly in some of his responses to threats, and just as he could be statesmanlike, he could turn a blind eye to culture and decency and allow his supporters to destroy the offices and residences of his enemies. Perón's response to rebellion thus has a bipolar nature, as he could be both openly conciliatory and condemnatory, sometimes within the duration of a single event.

As with most candidates who come from outside the establishment to run for political office, Perón had to deal with a media that was largely unsupportive of him at first. During the period of military rule before his election as president, Perón was largely ignored by the press, and when he was forced out of his position as Vice President and arrested, only *La Epoca* gave his story any credence, with other media outlets portraying the event as beneficial to Argentina's

stability. (Page 125) Later, during the 17<sup>th</sup> of October protests, Eduardo Colom, *La Epoca*'s editor, played a part in forcing General Avalos's hand in releasing Perón by repeating Avalos's promise that Perón was free to the crowd which demanded to see Perón. As Avalos could not be seen to have lied outright to the massive crowds surrounding the Casa Rosada, he was forced to give in to Colom and the crowd's wishes and release Perón. Perón would not forget *La Epoca*'s defense in this time of need. (Page 130)

*La Epoca* would continue to support him through his presidency. During his attempt to consolidate organized labor under his direct control, *La Epoca* published an exaggerated story accusing enemies of Perón in the CGT of conspiring with Spruille Braden, the US Ambassador to Argentina, to organize the labor movement against Perón. (Page 180) This story helped direct public opinion against Gay, Romualdi, and other anti-peronist leaders of the CGT, who were quickly forced out, allowing Perón to solidify his control over the organization.

Later in his first term, Perón, with the help of Evita, began a concerted effort to create a press monopoly favorable to him while damaging the reputations and circulations of established daily papers like *La Prensa* and *La Nación*. A holdings firm named Alea began, in 1947, to buy up media outlets, and by the end of its purchasing phase owned all of the country's major papers with the exception of the two aforementioned dailies and *Clarín*, a popular afternoon paper. The newspapers affiliated with Alea quickly became little more than loudspeakers for Perón's party line. (Page 211-212)

Perón began his assault on the independent media with an attempt to run *La Prensa*'s credibility into the ground. Through a constant stream of accusations of undue foreign influence and anti-nationalism, Perón and his allies lambasted the newspaper, and ill-advised vocal support

from Braden and other high-level American dignitaries only served to solidify these accusations in the mind of Perón's supporters. Soon thereafter, Perón supporters took to the streets and vandalized *La Prensa*'s office, killing a worker. After this, the legislature launched an investigation which resulted in accusations that *La Prensa* had not paid import duties and thereby expropriated the paper, turning it over to the CGT and leaving *La Nación* as the only daily not controlled by peronists. (Page 213-214)

Perón later used *La Epoca* and the now-peronist controlled *La Prensa* to discredit political opponents, even when they represented substantial parts of the population. When Catholic protestors, who were displeased with Perón's repeal of laws enforcing the Church's social prescriptions, burned a cloth that appeared vaguely similar to the Argentine Flag's colors, the two newspapers published stories accusing "traitors to the Fatherland" of setting fire to the emblem of the country. (Page 304) Despite the fact that the group had not, in fact, burned an Argentine flag, the accusations stuck, and Perón removed the church leaders who had pushed forth the protestors, Archbishops Tato and Nova. The Vatican responded by excommunicating "those responsible for removing Archbishop Tato of his position." (Page 304-5) This in turn began another firestorm of nationalistic hyperbole in the press. (Page 305)

It can be seen that Perón used the press first and foremost as a mouthpiece for government propaganda, and tolerated little dissent from non-peronist media outlets. He also took great interest in solidifying control over as much of the press as he could so that he could ensure close oversight on what the media published.

## **Results**



Fujimori demonstrated his personality largely as expected in his response to land reform and workers' issues. Though he claimed he wished to improve the lives of poor Peruvian workers, and often used his rapport with them to create publicity stunts, he made no clear attempt to fix the system that had subjugated them for most of the course of history. He instead couched his programs to improve the overall economy of the country which, as a byproduct, deepened poverty, as a necessary "clearing the field" before meaningful reform could be accomplished. This reform never came, though the populist rhetoric he attached to his economic reform policies allowed him to evade heavy criticism until late in his term.

Fujimori approached reelection largely as predicted. His approach only had limited connection to the public at large; instead, almost all of the change Fujimori accomplished was through manipulation of existing institutions and individual decree. The *autogolpe* demonstrated Fujimori's desire to have direct control over the running of the country, as well as the desire for uncontested control over the revisions to the constitution. He had nearly perfect control over the constitutional convention, as the only element of the new constitution that he was not afforded was the allowance for unlimited terms. Even after this, Fujimori still managed to get another term by manipulating the Supreme Court into interpreting the course of history in a way beneficial to him, though hardly one based on sound legal reasoning.

President Fujimori's approach to terrorism was harsh, as expected. He formed a large part of his platform on providing stability to the country as a whole, and the admittedly lucky capture of several Sendero Luminoso guerrillas provided him with a boost in popularity that was long-lasting and important. He demonstrated that he clearly favored stability over civil liberties, and implemented a vast spy network to solidify his control over the population, allowing him to react swiftly and strongly against possible threats. During the Japanese Embassy hostage crisis,

Fujimori pretended to negotiate with the terrorists, but he never had any inclination to accede to their demands, instead doing so to delay conflict until he was certain of the success of his plan. The eventual course of action, storming the embassy and killing the militants, demonstrated Fujimori's intransigence in dealing with opposition forces and heavy-handed approach to dangerous situations, as well as his need for individual, absolute control over the situation and its evolution.

Finally, Fujimori was, as expected, wary of the media, and hardly its darling. While he could use it for publicity purposes, such as his frequent pictures in garish traditional Indian headdresses, he had more trouble using it to conduct a meaningful discourse with the population. He preferred to ignore negative depictions in the media than to acknowledge them and respond, and often holed himself up in the Presidential Palace until accusations diminished and he regained control of the dialogue.

Chávez was, as expected, supportive of land reform. He started with a characteristic desire to maintain support from as much of society as possible, especially considering the tenuousness of his position early in his presidency. However, as time progressed and he became more comfortable with his mandate, as well as less concerned with winning over the opposition, he began more expansive land reform packages that included private expropriation, in effect turning the ages-old land tenure system on its head.

Chávez based his reelection desires on a constant public dialogue; rather than going through the system directly, he would first hold referenda to gauge public support for his measures, and would often consult with the public, directly or indirectly, before turning to constitutional assemblies or the legislature to revise the reelection rules. He did, however, also

demand closer control over the final outcome once the public had given him a modicum of support. His aspirations for continuous power reflected his judging and perceiving nature, as he implemented long-term plans from the very beginning to allow him to keep power while appearing democratic, and he based these attempts on his carefully-measured analysis of public opinion.

Chávez had little dealings with domestic terrorists, apart from his response to the coup attempt that, in the long haul, helped solidify his control over the presidency. He reacted to the coup with a desire for reconciliation, imprisoning the leaders but allowing most of the participants to return to their offices. His dealings with international terrorism demonstrated both his sympathy with the aims of many revolutionary groups and a desire for publicity for his opposition to the United States. His partnerships with *bêtes noires* of the United States, such as Ahmadinejad and Gaddafi, served both of these purposes; he could both form a loose coalition of support among non-aligned countries as well as guarantee a measure of publicity, both negative and positive.

Chávez's dealings with the press were substantially different from what was predicted, though this may in large part have been due to his political orientation and opposition to the oligarchy which controlled the vast majority of the country's media outlets. However, he did act with some conciliatory goals, as he refused to curtail press freedom in any meaningful way. While he complained about the press's treatment of him, he did not force them to treat him differently, and it was not until recently that he began to restrict the licenses of particularly anti-Chávez television and radio stations. However, his inability to coexist well with the existing media establishment meant that he had substantial trouble communicating with the population

during the coup attempt, which, though not resulting in success for the coup plotters, certainly prolonged their failure.

Perón approached workers rights almost exactly as predicted. He used labor rights as part of a long-term platform that both advanced him in the military hierarchy and solidified public support into his tenure as president. His courtship of the working class proved effective when they returned to save him during the October 17<sup>th</sup> demonstrations. Once he was in office, he demanded consolidated control over unions. The workers would prove to be Perón's greatest ally, supporting him for much longer than his presidency lasted.

Perón had a long-term approach to both election and reelection. Unlike some of the military leaders that preceded him, Perón wanted to be respected both in the military and by the public. He gained this public support through appealing to both the workers and the established political parties. He also maintained distance from the actions of the constitutional assembly when it came to the rules governing reelection, thereby succeeding, at least in theory, of disproving accusations of authoritarianism. However, it was clear that Perón did desire the chance for reelection, and though he only announced his candidacy for reelection three months before the election, his victory was all but assured, as his campaign had been in the works since the beginning of his first term.

Perón's approach to domestic threats was not always consistent; he was at first conciliatory, then combative, then conciliatory again as his presidency waxed and waned. This demonstrated two conflicting goals of Perón in respect to these threats. First, he wanted to maintain stability in the country. Second, he wanted to hold his enemies accountable while uniting his supporters. During his early presidency, he pursued stability by not deposing half of

the military that had just put him into office. Later, after Radicals and members of the old oligarchy began attacking his supporters, he unleashed the *descamisados* upon various political targets. However, when he began to lose his footing, his focus returned to stability, and he once again pursued reconciliation with his opponents so as to try to hold on to his position. Thus, we can see that two different elements of his personality won out a different times during his presidency.

Perón had a very controlling relationship with the press. He did not profess any specific commitment to press freedom, and instead used public appeals to destroy one of his media rivals, and consolidated ownership of most of the media under his control. Throughout his presidency, and even before, he used *La Epoca*, a sympathetic daily he later acquired, to trumpet his message, and rumors, to the population, and this conduit served his purposes in various ways over his tenure. He was also quite proficient in his public appeals, despite his preference for solitude and his own company, and could summon a sympathetic crowd in the Plaza de Mayo at a moment's notice, even as his presidency began to crumble.

The predictions for extraversion and introversion were largely correct in relation to land reform. Fujimori, an introvert, used his pro-worker stances almost solely as a publicity move, and Perón, also an introvert, used his support from workers more as a means to an end rather than the end in itself, while Chávez was dedicated to actually accomplishing land reform to benefit workers, using polls to gauge support and responding to criticism.

Introversion and Extraversion also correctly predicted leaders' responses to terrorism and coups. Chávez, the only extravert, was willing to negotiate with his kidnappers during the coup, a strength that may have saved his life, and he has been an outspoken advocate for negotiating

with terrorists, sometimes excessively so. Fujimori only negotiated with terrorists during the Japanese Embassy hostage crisis, and even then only to prepare to storm the compound, and Perón was willing to forgive his adversaries but rarely to negotiate in times of crisis.

Introversion and extraversion also predicted well for approach to reelection. Chávez was dependent on polling and public appeals for his term extensions, while Fujimori sought reelection through the courts and Perón stayed out of the spotlight and let his supporters demand his reelection with little prompting.

Finally, introversion and extraversion were somewhat less successful in predicting approach to media. Fujimori largely avoided it, as predicted, but Perón was more capable in using it as a tool, especially considering the popularity of his wife Evita. Also, Chávez had great trouble in using media effectively during crisis situations, though the fact that the media was in the hands of the oligarchy he was despised by did not help him.

Sensing and intuiting predicted decently for land reform; Chávez was willing to establish a new paradigm, as was expected for an intuiting individual, and Perón, while supporting change, was rarely the one trailblazing the cause of the workers. Fujimori, despite his lack of interest in land reform, did approach the economy as part of a new, much larger paradigm, as would be expected from an intuiting individual.

Sensing and intuiting did not predict well for response to terrorism or coups. Chávez, an introvert was capable of a rapid response tailored to the situation as expected, but Fujimori, also an introvert was dependent on a more long-term plan that had been in place. Further, Perón, expected as a sensing individual to have a plan in place, was instead very inconsistent in his

dealings with terrorism, tailoring his plan to the situation to such an extent that his plan was often dangerously haphazard.

Sensing and intuiting were inconclusive in predicting approach to reelection. Perón, a sensing individual, did have a long-term plan to maintain control, despite the fact that he did not reveal this plan to the population until late in his term. However, Chávez, an intuiting individual, also had a long-term plan, using popular referenda long before his term expired to extend his ability to be reelected, and used polling for his policies throughout his term to tailor his plan for reelection. Fujimori, an intuiting individual, went about reelection somewhat as predicted, using the Supreme Court late in his second term to grant him a third term, but had been planning to continue in office regardless.

Finally, sensing and intuiting predicted relatively well for use of the media. Perón appealed to the traditional media and in this was widely successful, as predicted by his sensing nature. Fujimori used the media, when he chose to do so, as a tool for publicity stunts to boost support among the population, and Chávez, when he had success in his dealings with the media, used it to give long speeches to the segments of the population in which he was most popular.

Thinking and feeling predicted well for approach to land reform. Fujimori was clearly convinced that his economic policies, regardless of their immediate impact on the poor, would help the country in the long run, and as such he had no impetus to change them, as predicted by his thinking nature. Perón and Chávez, both feeling individuals, were more prone to changing their plans to fit public opinion, though they both pursued workers' rights quite passionately, albeit with different final aims.

Thinking and feeling also predicted well for response to terrorism. Fujimori, a thinking individual, was coldly logical in his approach to the Japanese Embassy hostage crisis, being more willing to risk the lives of those involved than to negotiate, thinking that the former option was better despite the possible loss of life. Feeling individuals Chávez and Perón both pardoned and negotiated with their enemies, a skill that saved Chávez's life, but helped destabilize Perón's presidency in the long term.

Thinking and feeling predicted well for pursuit of reelection, with Fujimori, a thinking individual, being willing to use less popular methods such as quasi-legal control over the Supreme Court's rulings to gain reelection, while Perón and Chávez, both feeling individuals, being substantially more dependent on public support to guarantee their reelection.

Finally, thinking and feeling also successfully predicted the leaders' use of the media. Fujimori saw it specifically as a tool to help his popularity with the masses, using his participation in tribal ceremonies as a publicity stunt. Chávez and Perón both used the media as a connection to the people when they could, with Chávez using his show *¡Álo Presidente!* as a forum in which he could speak directly to the population, and Perón seeing the media as the best way to spread his message to his supporters, through which he could summon a demonstration at a moment's notice.

There were no perceiving leaders examined in this study, and as such any predictions made based on the leaders' judging nature must be taken with a grain of salt. However, the fact that judging individuals were predicted to take a more authoritarian stance may have something to do with the fact that all three of the *caudillos* studied, who varied in each of the other three dimensions, were all judging individuals. As such, the leaders' authoritarianism can be seen to



represent their judging nature. Since the three leaders were authoritarian in virtually all of their endeavors, demanding control over land tenure, directing their pursuit of reelection themselves or at least strongly directing their supporters, wanting control over dissent, and being willing to restrict the media, their judging natures were present in their actions as well.

## Conclusions

We can see from the results of this survey that personality does have predictive power in analyzing elements of leader action. Within the four elements of leader action studied, three reflected strong predictive power in each of the three leader cases, and the fourth succeeded in two out of three. Further, two of the aspects of personality were correct in predicting response to all of the elements of action studied, while a third predicted all but one and the fourth predicted two, an overall success rate of over 75%. A summary of these results is reflected in the following charts.

Leader \ Policy Area	Land Reform	Terrorism/Coups	Reelection	Media
Alberto Fujimori	√	√	√	√
Hugo Chávez	√	√	√	x
Juan Perón	√	√	√	√

Table 1 – Leaders and Policy Area Predictability

Policy Area Trait Pair	Land Reform	Terrorism/Coups	Reelection	Media
Extravert/Introvert	√	√	√	x
Sensing/Intuitive	√	x	x	√
Thinking/Feeling	√	√	√	√
Judging/Perceiving	√	√	√	√

Table 2 – Personality Subtypes and Policy Area Predictability

Further, leader personality has been seen to be consistent before and after ascending to the presidency. This indicates that this sort of survey could likely be used in a predictive manner with at least some reliability in the results. Obviously, while the course of history in any leader's presidency cannot be predicted, their approach has been demonstrated to be more predictable, with some degree of certainty.

This study would benefit from studies of more cases throughout Latin America, as there is no shortage of *caudillo*-style leaders whose personalities are worthy of study. Also, more variance of personality type would provide for a better sample, as the three leaders studied shared several similar characteristics, specifically the fact that all three were judging individuals. The results for the judging/perceiving aspect of personality would require confirmation by a study including a perceiving leader before they could be taken as certain, though this study may require selection of a leader outside of the *caudillo* paradigm.

This study has demonstrated, as well, that *caudillismo* is not a unitary phenomenon, and that different leaders that fit the description may nonetheless approach the same issues in completely different ways. Even the concept of popular support, which has formed the basis of

most definitions of *caudillismo*, can be approached differently by different leaders; Fujimori saw it almost as a commodity to be utilized, whereas Chávez clearly appealed to it almost constantly, and Perón often used it as his own personal army.

Overall, this study has been successful in its aims of correcting the absence of leader analysis within the literature studying *caudillismo*, though, as previously mentioned, it could be expanded further by a deeper or broader study.

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