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Integrating What? Role of Identity in European Horizontal Integration Process

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ABSTRACT

The successive waves of enlargement of the European Union (EU) extended the landscape of EU well beyond the geographic borders of the continent. Especially during the "Big Bang" expansion of 2004, two questions re-surfaced in the European Studies literature: What is the "absorption capacity" of the Union, and what does that mean for the EU's European identity? As a process largely driven by exchange of signals between the candidate state and the Union, EU membership is a process by which a state can be recognized as European. In light of the prospective membership of Turkey, this capstone provides a conceptual exploration of ways in which the European identity was, and has been portrayed during the previous phases of enlargement.

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I dedicate this Capstone to my parents.

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Chapter 1

<u>**Introduction**</u>

"We should [be careful] not [to] draw new thick lines with thick ink on the European map, as we

have just got rid of the Iron Curtain."

~ Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner for Enlargement[1]

"We are uniting people, not forming coalitions of states."

~ Jean Monnet[2]

" Nations are not eternal. They began, so they will come to an end. A European confederation

will probably replace them."

~ Ernest Rennan, 1882[3]

The "big bang" enlargement of the European Union (EU / Union) in May 2004 and the

successive wave of enlargement in 2007 pushed the borders of EU beyond its landlocked borders

of the continent. Europe today includes Mediterranean islands such as Malta and Cyprus. As a

Union of 27 member states, "enlargement" or "EU membership" has proven to be a successful

foreign policy tool of EU for many years. Enlargement has always been considered a sensitive

subject and the accession of former Soviet Union members into EU brought upon a distinction

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[1] "Certain Ideas On Europe: Olli Rehn on Enlargement" The Economist
<http://audiovideo.economist.com/?fr_story=2b080d7103834b9eee1748b78898b16899ff9df2&rf=bm>.
[2] Marilynn B. Brewer, *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU* (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 40.
[3] Quoted in Oliver Zimmer, *Nationalism in Europe, 1890-1940 (Studies in European History)* (Basingstoke,
Hampshire.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 1.

between the "New Europe," and the "Old Europe." The Eastern states were referred to as the "New Europeans," as if they were new converts to a religion, and it would take time for them to prove their "devotion," or loyalty to this community.[4] Although this might come as a striking distinction, similar efforts were made to differentiate between *old* nations and *new* nations in the past. Due to the origins of the concept, Karl W. Deutsch (along with Carl J. Friedrich & William J. Foltz) suggested that we can distinguish between the *old* nations of West (i.e. France and Britain) and the nations that sprang up in the post-colonial world.[5] Using such differentiated language preserves the history of the continent and delivers it to present, implying that once all lands belonged to the "old nations," before the colonialism was over. The asymmetric relation in the language slowly died out, but the life of a state among others still matters for the Europeans, and this is reflected with their emphasis on a particular kind of Europeanness that states present in their interactions. A key moment for such portrayals is during the enlargement period.

The issue of enlargement is very much politicized in relation to potential membership of Turkey. Role of identity politics has only recently found its way into the greater integration debate, with the membership of former Communist bloc countries. Traditionally, the discussion of EU's widening, focused largely on the institutional convergence and neglected the role of culture and identity in theories associated with such behavior. With the Constructivist turn in the study of International Relations (IR), there is a necessity to study European enlargement and horizontal integration with emphasis on ideational variables, beyond the study of economic variables.

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[4] Scott MacMillan, "What 'New Europe'?" Slate, <http://www.slate.com/id/2078876/>.
[5] Oliver Zimmer, 4.

Soon after the world vs. Andrew Moravcsik debate on the main drivers of the European integration, scholars have been less reluctant to open the "black-box" of states, to study what they call "state preferences." Yet, what did integration even mean for these scholars? Lack of a proper effort to unpack the contents of integration caused a number of problems to surface, where scholars ended up "talking past each other."[6] Consequently, many scholars decided to adopt Bela Belassa's definition of economic integration, ruling out the fact that the European Union is more than a venue for inter-state economic cooperation.[7] When we talk about "integration" in context of European Union, we are actually referring to cohesion, and unification of policies. Over time it was discovered that the term "integration" was a placeholder for 3 inter-related but separate areas: *Sectoral* integration *(Broadening), Vertical* integration *(Deepening), Horizontal* integration *(Widening).*[8] The indictors were also differentiated between Political Integration (PI), and Economic Integration (EI).

Such a discovery did not mean much to scholars. The problems associated with variable operationalization, only a few scholars chose to look deeper into the Political Integration of the Union. The research agendas put forth by Europeanists have called for studies on enlargement and *horizontal* integration. Jean Monnet, one of the primary pioneers of European integration process had envisioned a kind of Europe that entailed uniting *people*, not forming coalitions amongst states.[9] Bringing people together was a signal for interaction amongst individuals, not political elites. However, the integration acts were interpreted differently. The unification of the

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[6] Joseph S. Nye, "Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement." *International Organization,* Vol.22, No.4 (Autumn 1968).

[7]"Whereas cooperation includes actions aimed at lessening discrimination, the process of economic integration comprises measures that entail the suppression of some form of discrimination" Bela Belassa, *The Theory of Economic Integration,* George Allen and Unwin, London, 1969, 1.

[8] William E. Paterson, Neill Nugent and Michelle P. Egan, eds., *Research Agendas in EU Studies: Stalking the Elephant (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics)* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 37.

[9] *"We are uniting people, not forming coalitions of states."*

Coal and Steel industries, and efforts in generating Common Agricultural Policy led many scholars to consider the European integration as equivalent to economic integration. However, the narratives of the European Commissioners often made references to a "European Community," and existence of such a community was, and has been ambiguous. Who are these Europeans? What are the frontiers of such an identity? Given our historic experience with associating national identity with state boundaries, European Union's vague geographic borders, and ever changing frontiers renders a longitudinal study on rhetoric an exceptional study of contested meanings of European identity throughout a period of 30 years. Low levels of theorizing on the horizontal integration of the union could illustrate if the European Union would be able to hold its leverage over candidate states with the promise of membership, or would it lose it as a foreign policy tool in the future. The issue is crucial for policy-makers in planning for the future of the Union, but it also has implications on the *meaning* of being European.

The successive waves of enlargement brought about the Absorption Capacity debates in the European Circles. The new debate of Absorption Capacity is more than an institutional effectiveness debate, but a Geographic Absorption Capacity debate, where the discussion is more focused on the dilution of the European identity, instead of dilution of its activities. A similar experience has been shown through NATO expansion process, for which some scholars announced "if NATO does not expand, it could well dissolve."[10] Yet, NATO is a military alliance, and it never aimed at integrating their military power. Does expanding terrain of European Union diminishing the definition of being European? Could enlargement really endanger the future of this "ever closer union?"

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10 Peter Duignan, *NATO: It's Past, Present, and Future* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2000), 77.

This capstone aims to contribute to the current literature on the theories of the Union's enlargement and horizontal integration literature and by exploring the meaning of European Geographic Absorption Capacity and the European identity alike. By studying the supply of enlargement, I contend to understand if the meaning of being European has been weaning throughout the integration process, and for this I propose three ideal-type definitions of being European and I study the accession process during successive enlargement processes. With the assistance of "rhetorical commonplaces" deployed and the legal framework of applications, I propose a scheme of different European identities that were assigned to the European Union in its 40 year history of enlargement. I conclude this research with an assessment of what my findings would reflect on current prospective candidates Turkey, Ukraine and Republic of Macedonia.

Overview of the European Union Enlargement Process

Mark Leonard suggests that Europe's vision "to not have a vision" is the provider of its main

strength.[11] The beginning of the European Union is traced back to an idea, which has been

deliberately considered as the premise of an economic alliance: Integrating the coal and steel

industries. It was the belief that uniting two essential raw materials to wage war amongst

European states, countries will not be able to fight each other anymore. The idea was

simultaneously announced and depicted as steps toward a "European Federation."[12] On 9 May

1950 with the Schuman Declaration, talks to establish the European Coal and Steel Community

(ECSC), and the Six signed the ECSC in 1951. The Six signed the Treaties of Rome establishing

the European Economic Community (EEC) and the EurAtom in 1957. Four years later, ECC

received its first round of new member applications.

Under EU's own rules, enlargement is part of EU's existence.[13] Ever since the first wave of

applications to join the European Economic Community, EU attracted many states' application

into the Union. The very first series of applicants were Norway, Ireland, Denmark, and UK. Just

like many other European projects, enlargement began with series of failures. The accession

talks with these states were terminated by the French President De Gaulle, due to his fear of UK

and the US relations and as a threat to his ideal of Grandeur. Following this failed attempt, UK

re-applied, and De Gaulle vetoed the British application one more time in 1967 announcing "UK

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[11] "EU Enlargement," European Stability Initiative, <http://www.esiweb.org/enlargement/?cat=56#awp::?cat=56>.
[12] Winston Churchill: Pioneers of European Integration, referring to "a kind of United States of Europe." 19
September 1946.
[13] Tony Judt *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York: Penguin (Non-Classics), 2006), 720.

as not fit to join the European enterprise."[14] The membership negotiations continued following

the departure of De Gaulle from his office in 1968.[15] Following De Gaulle's departure, first wave

of enlargement process was completed in 1973 when Ireland, Denmark and UK joined the

European Community, thus completing the first wave of enlargement. Number of EU member

states increased to 12 with the accession of Portugal and Spain in 1986, despite French domestic

opposition.[16] There is approximately forty years' of history in European enlargement, and very

limited research on this kind of horizontal integration.

Enlargement is a process by which member states exercise *leverage* over applicant states, by

requiring to adopt various regulations and regimes of the EU. The process refers to expansion of

the Schengen zone, and expansion of the Euro currency-area, as well as the expansion of the

European Union borders.[17] For the purposes of this paper, definition of enlargement will be

limited to geographic expansion of European Union's borders. Until now, there have been 6

successful waves of enlargement that increased the number of EU member states from six to

Twenty-seven. The process does not end with a mere application, or state's willingness to join

the Union. When the European Council receives the application, it asks the European

Commission for its "Opinion." This opinion is discussed by the Council members and

unanimously approves a candidate for negotiation. After the Commission negotiates under the

supervision of the Council, a vote is carried out in the Council on the accession of a new member

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[14] Fraser Cameron, ed., *The Future of Europe: Integration and Enlargement* (London: Routledge, 2004), 3.
[15] As Moravcsik famously referred to as "De Gaulle between grain and Grandeur." As per titled an article on topic.
[16] Francois Mitterand told the Nouvel Observateur that "*One needs to be careful not to turn the common market into a free trade zone. Neither Greece nor Spain are in a position to join the Community.*" Document accessed via Euro Navigator Online Archives.
[17] William E. Paterson et al., 37.

followed by ratification in all of the member states.[18] This process was approved in 1993 at the

Copenhagen European Council that the Union where member states agreed to offer membership

for those who wanted it.[19] The criteria that was put forth for states included the following:[20]

1. *Stable democracy,*

2. *Respect for human rights, and protection of minorities,*

3. *The rule of law,*

4. *A competitive market economy, and*

5. *"Ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union."*

Additionally, the Article 49 of the Treaty of European Union also sets out additional requirements for application:

> Any European State, which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1), may apply to become a member of the Union. It shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of the European Parliament, which shall act by an absolute majority of its component members. The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is founded, which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the Applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

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[18] John Pinder and Simon Usherwood, *The European Union: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions)*, 2 ed. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, USA, 2008), 128.
[19] Ibid. 131.
[20] Ibid.

Membership to the EU is continent on the member state recognizing another as European, before allowing admission into the Union. So, even if state X calls itself European, this will not be sufficient ground for membership. In international relations, self-recognition does not entitle a state to participate into an International Organization, let alone the international system itself. It is through recognition by an "other" (or, as in this very example: "others") that renders any state a legitimate actor, ready to participate in inter-state relations. Thus the international system is an exclusive club of recognized nation-states. With a similar logic, "exit" from the international system could be through taking away the "badge" of recognition by other states. Then, the life of a state among states is dependent on the mutual exchange of recognition amongst members of the international system. The relevance of this mutual exchange of recognition is crucial when it comes to membership to the European Union.

Act of recognition does not just happen; to recognize something, one must know *where* and *what* to look for. The Union's horizontal integration process relies on a similar kind of a process in recognizing a state as an equal partner to the Union. The membership criteria mainly rely on a body of law, also referred to as the *Acquis Communitaire* –as if there is only <u>one</u> *Acquis.* It could be argued that there are many varieties of *Acquis*, which deals with different facets of becoming an EU member state: Accession Acquis, Institutional Acquis, EEA Acquis, Policies Acquis etc. Adoption of this collection of legal provisions, a state can *learn* how to become European.[21] In addition to the provisions outlined in the *Communitaire,* the Copenhagen Criteria

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[21] This process will be referred to as Europeanization, to highlight the process of socialization through which a state goes through in order to adapt to its new social role as an EU member state. This should not be considered as equivalent, or synonymous with the wide use of word "Europeanization," which refers to domestic and institutional reform, but not necessarily to the process of adopting the rules.

as set forth by the European Union also sets some guidelines on as to what European states are

looking for in prospective members to the Union.

The adoption of the *Acquis communitaire,* or as Phillipe Schmitter calls it, "the sum of total

obligations that have accumulated since the founding of [the European Coal and Steel

Community] and are embedded in innumerable treaties and protocols" by the candidate state is

the most important feature to recognize.[22] Although *Acquis* is the utmost important component of

accession, it does not mean that it is enough for membership. To illustrate this further, former

German Chancellor Günther Verheugen considered Russian membership as "definitely a non-

issue."[23] Despite the efforts of Michael Gorbachev to be part of the "Common European Home"

idea, Russia was never recognized as European and the situation would be the same today years

after Cold War.

With each successive enlargement, meaning of Europe also broadened to cover a greater

landscape. The meaning of Europe, and the geographic borders of it have also been expanding

with each successive wave of enlargement. 21st century Europe surely moved well into South

and to the East, and yet bounded all poles as one Europe.

Enlargement of the Union has traditionally been studied in context of a widening-deepening

debate, which studied the sustainability of institutional setup of the Union in relation to the pace

of enlargement. However there is more to horizontal integration than studying the institutional

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[22] Quoted Stephen J. Silvia and Aaron Beers Sampson, "Acquis Communautaire and European Exceptionalism: A Genealogy," *ACES Working Paper* (July 2003): 1

[23] Robin Oakley, "No 'big Bang' EU Enlargement," CNN, <http://articles.cnn.com/2001-01-27/world/davos.eu_1_enlargement-gunter-verheugen-eu-members-turkey?_s=PM:WORLD>

functions capabilities. Horizontal integration in European context has generally been studied through four different ways: 1) Applicant state's enlargement politics, 2) Member-state enlargement politics, 3) EU enlargement politics, 4) Impact of enlargement on the Union.[24] Given its rich research agenda, EU enlargement promises to be one of the most prominent areas of European Studies. Frank Schimmelfennig suggests that

> [T]he more an external state identifies with the international community that the EU represents and the more it shares the values and norms that define the purpose and the policies of the EU, the stronger the institutional ties it seeks with the EU and the more the member states are willing to pursue horizontal institutionalization with this state. [25]

Table 1: Waves of Enlargement:

Year:	New Members:
1973	UK, Ireland, Denmark
1981	Greece
1986	Spain, Portugal
1995	Sweden, Finland, Austria
2004	Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta.
2007	Bulgaria, Romania

As it can be seen from the table above, 2004 witnessed the largest accession of new members

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[24] Michelle Cini and Angela Bourne, eds., *Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 98.
[25] Ibid. 105.

into the Union. After the anticipated admission of Croatia into the Union in 2013, it has been

assumed that the Union will slow down accession, or even pause enlargement for a period to

ensure the absorption of its newest members within the community. Because after each phase of

enlargement of the Union, what follows is the "Enlargement fatigue." Despite the overwhelming

evidence that EU enlargement makes all parties involved better off, EU Citizens blame high

unemployment and many other policy failures on EU enlargement.[26] Especially with respect to

the Eastern enlargement, during which the states were given restrictions on labor movement to

avoid the potential "Polish Plumber" Problem.[27] The other issue that was continually raised

during the membership negotiations was the issue of "Absorption capacity," which next section

contends to highlight.

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[26] "The Ins and Outs," The Economist, <http://www.economist.com/node/8808134?story_id=E1_RRDRTPQ> and
Alison Smale and Dan Bilefsky, "Fighting EU 'enlargement Fatigue'," New York Times,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/19/world/europe/19iht-eu.2005285.html>.

[27] The Polish Plumber Problem: The fear of low-skilled labor movement within the European Union territories from
Eastern and Central European states to the Western European states, taking European jobs.

<u>Geographic Absorption Capacity: More than a Widening-Deepening Debate</u>

"Had I known the price of enlargement would be the gross dilution of NATO, I might have urged

other means to achieve the objective."

~ Henry Kissinger[28]

Although the above quip was made in reference to NATO, the "absorption capacity" arguments

in EU framework reflect same kind of an anxiety. Talking about an "absorption capacity" in

context of European Union is funny. Not only because it gives the Union "sponge" like features,

but it also implicitly infers that there is an end point to the integration process once the

absorption capacity is reached. The phrase "absorption capacity" entered the European Union

vocabulary, and the official texts with one sentence that was added at the end of the Concluding

chapter of the 1993 Copenhagen Summit, where it was written:

> The Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum
>
> of European integration, is an important consideration in the general interest of
>
> both the Union and the candidate countries.[29]

Following this appearance, "absorption capacity" disappeared from the political discourse for a

long period of time, until it re-appeared in 2005 –a year after the "big-bang" enlargement of

2004. Phrase appeared in the Enlargement Strategy Paper by the European Commission, where it

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[28] Henry Kissinger, ""the Dilution of NATO," *Washington Post*, June 8, 1997.
[29] Michael Emerson, Senem Aydin, Julia De Clerck-Sachsse and Gergana Noutcheva, "Just What Is This
'absorption Capacity' of the European Union?" *CEPS Policy Brief* (2006) <www.ceps.eu/ceps/download/1219>.

said:

> *The capacity to act, and decide according to a fair balance within institutions;*
>
> *respect budgetary limits and implement common policies that function well and*
>
> *achieve their objectives.*[30]

As it can be understood from the excerpt above, Commission's definition of "absorption capacity" is synonymous with effective functioning of the European Commission. This variety of absorption capacity is more focused on maintaining a certain number of Commissioners *vis-à-vis* the number of member of states. Since the number of EU Commissioners is in proportion with the number of member states, overcrowding could lead to adversely affecting the workings of this institution.

A year after the issuance of the European Strategy Paper as per requested by the European Parliament (EP), EP held a meeting where the Members of the European Parliament (MEP) adopted a resolution, which incorporated "*geographic enlargement*" as part of the "fundamental understanding the concept of absorption capacity."[31] Incorporating a geographic feature to the "absorption capacity," implicitly limits the further expansion of the Union. It needs to be noted that the decision was not unanimous and contra opinions were also expressed, among whom was Olli Rehn, who at the time was serving as the Commissioner for Enlargement, who argued that "we must avoid making enlargement hostage to a theological debate about the final borders of Europe."[32] As a counterpoint, Doris Pack, MEP of the European Peoples' Party (EPP, and also

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[30] Michael Emerson, Senem Aydin, Julia De Clerck-Sachsse and Gergana Noutcheva, "Just What Is This 'absorption Capacity' of the European Union?" *CEPS Policy Brief* (2006): 3 <www.ceps.eu/ceps/download/1219>.
[31] Ibid 4.
[32] Ibid.6.

known as the Christian Democrats) – European Democrats (ED) announced that the European

Union borders were reached with the accession of Bulgaria, Romania and the Western Balkans.[33]

The kind of absorption capacity Doris Pack expressed is a deliberate effort in leaving Turkey out

of the European Union.

The Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006 – 2007 document prepared by the

European Commission for the European Parliament proposes a switch in rhetoric from

geographic absorption capacity to "integration capacity of the Union."[34] According to the

document, this is a more appropriate word to describe the economic and political constraints of

enlargement. In reference to the "Geographic Absorption Capacity question raised by the

Parliament, Commission suggested the following definition of European identity:

> The term 'European' combines geographical, historical and cultural elements
>
> which all contribute to European identity. The shared experience of ideas, values,
>
> and historical interaction cannot be condensed into a simple timeless formula and
>
> is subject to review by each succeeding generation.

Document further reads, "The European Union is defined first and foremost by its values."[35]

With respect to the legal basis of European membership, document submits that legal basis

European Enlargement is protected by the Article 49 of the Treaty of European Union *"Any*

European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) may apply to become a

member of the Union." The document emphasizes that the treaty provision does not mean that all

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[33] "For me the boundaries of the EU are reached with the accession of Bulgaria, Romania and the Western Balkans".
[34] "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006 – 2007: Including Annexed Special Report On the EU's Capacity to Integrate New Members," European Commission, <ec.europa.eu/enlargement/.../2006/.../com_649_strategy_paper_en.pdf> (19)
[35] Ibid.

European states that which apply will become EU members. But those who get admitted are those who uphold the European values.

The term "absorption capacity," has been called as not only "flawed," but also "dishonest," and "short-sighted" concept.[36] From the outset of the Union, there was no envisioning of *Finale Politique* for the EU. Using phrases such as "absorption capacity" give false image as to the final destination and feel of the Union. Necessary technical provisions were made in re-adjusting the number of Commissioners and the number of votes in the European parliament which ensured the effective workings of the European institutions in light of European enlargement. In a strategy adopted in 2000, number of European Commissioners was limited with 27 members irrespective of the number of member states, and the number of seats in the European Parliament were agreed to get re-distributed. Since the Commission is capable of providing flexibility in re-structuring its workings. As Frank Vibert submits, the change in the rhetoric of the European Union should be considered in context of the completion of the "big-bang" enlargement and the pending membership of Turkey into the Union. According to Vibert, the phrase has come to be used by two separate groups of people: "those who wish to oppose further enlargement (particularly Turkish enlargement), and those who wish to fight for new powers for the EU under a banner different from that of the "constitution"[37].

As the KOK Report highlights, even without enlargement there is need for institutional changes that need to be made in EU to bring citizens closer to EU, even without any future phases of European enlargement (to diminish the impact of "democratic deficit").

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[36] Frank Vibert, ""absorption Capacity: " the Wrong European Debate," Open Democracy, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-europe_constitution/wrong_debate_3666.jsp>, 3.
[37] Ibid. 2.

In his book, *Postwar*, Tony Judt also touches on the boundaries of the European identity in relation to the Eastern enlargement question, and suggests that the European identity does not confer upon an *absolute* geography, but rather function on a *relative* geography:

> Europe, then, is not so much about *absolute* geography—where a country or a people actually are – as *relative* geography: where they sit in relation to others. At the end of the twentieth century, writers and politicians in places like Moldova, Ukraine or Armenia asserted their "Europeanness" not on historical or geographical grounds (which might or might not be plausible) but precisely as a defense *against* history and geography alike. [38]

In context of the European Enlargement Process the question with the geographic absorption will be here to stay given the impatience of Turkish leaders with the slow pace of accession talks and with only 1/33 chapters of *Acquis* closed, there will be a long time before Turkey gets fully admitted, and the debate on the boundaries of where Europe ends and where the Other begins is likely to preoccupy the political discourse. Since the European integration literature long neglected the role of identity and topic of widening, I provide a review of the scholarly debates on European integration, and enlargement.

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[38] Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (New York: Penguin (Non-Classics), 2006), 753.

Chapter 2

Theories of European Integration

Theories on European integration process have long been negligent of the role played by " state

identity" and other ideational variables. The Constructivist turn in IR Theory challenged many

assumptions of traditional theories on the drivers of the European integration process.

Neorealists have always been in dismissal of international institutions such as the EU.[39] To

explain the persistence of international organizations such as EU, and their respective expansion,

Neorealists explain the phenomenon as a product of states' rational calculation of costs and

benefits, and defend that states only join organizations when their relative gains outweigh their

relative losses. In a somewhat similar manner, IR Liberal Theorists vastly rely on Robert

Keohane's Functional Regional Theory (*After Hegemony*, 1984), according to which, absence of

a hegemon could motivate inter-state cooperation and persistence of institutions. However, the

European integration process has sustained over time in and in spite of a hegemon. John

Mearshimer, looking at the process of EU integration as a byproduct of Cold War predicted that

the European integration would end once the Cold War concluded.[40] EU, by design is more than

a mere platform for cooperation, so "regime theories" are constrained in their explanations for

"integration" is by no means compatible in definition with cooperation. Most of the subsequent

theories on integration have their roots embedded in these two theories, and therefore show

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[39] Mark A. Pollack. "*International Relations Theory and European Integration.*"Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 39, No. 2. (221-244), 222.

[40] William E. Paterson, Neill Nugent and Michelle P. Egan, eds., *Research Agendas in EU Studies: Stalking the Elephant (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics)* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 398.

parallel signs of weakness. Integration debate witnessed the infamous Functionalist v. Intergovernmentalist debate, which aimed to explain the drivers behind the European integration process from two distinct viewpoints.

According to the Neofunctionalist approach, integration process is an elite-driven process. As a theory that looks strictly into "political integration," it predicts that the integration in sector X would "spill over" into area Y. The theory emphasizes the role of delegating decision-making powers to central, supranational institutions, which in turn would increase the degree of integration among countries. As Ernst Haas describes it,

> *[Integration is] the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.*[41]

Furthermore, Haas argues that the European integration model could be applied "in all sections of the world, in all ages, irrespective of the specific power initially given to the central authority."[42] Yet, the indicators Haas chooses in his definition (namely: shifting of loyalties, moving political activities toward a new center and possession of jurisdiction by new institutions) are all aggregate measures, and need to be *disaggregated* to their component parts in order to flash out causal inference in the approach. The problem with Haas' indicators were also observed by Joseph Nye, who challenged Haas' approach with a simple question: What if

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[41] Haas, E.B. (1958) *The Uniting of Europe.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.
[42] Ibid.

increase in these three variables does not vary at the same rate (or not vary at all)?[43]

Neofunctionalism downplayed the role of national interests and nationalism, and was after being

the theory to dispatch a "United States of Europe." Soon after the failure of the talks on the

Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), Intergovernmentalism emerged as the successor to the

throne of Neofunctionalism. Theory was also denounced by Haas himself, announcing

Neofunctionalism as "obsolete." Recent trends in "differentiated integration," throughout the EU

region where some states (such as Denmark) choose to opt out of implementing common policies

on various policy areas (i.e. European Blue Card system for collective immigration policy or

European Security and Defense Policy) can be considered as further evidences on the role of

national preferences in EU. European horizontal integration under the Neofunctionalist

perspective could be considered as driven by the collective interest of the Union as a whole, the

most vivid counter-example to this point would be the fact that the European Commission,

although the executive branch of the Union is not in charge of accepting new member states. On

the contrary the decision is made by the European Council; a platform on which national

interests matter.

Intergovernmentalism emerged to challenge the idealist worldview of Neofunctionalists. With its

roots in Neorealism, Intergovernmentalist lesson is that "nation-state is still here."[44] Stanley

Hoffman argues that the nation-states are still the primary players on the international level, and

that "anything beyond the nation-state is less." Liberal Intergovernmentalism, on the contrary,

opposes the idea of "high" or "low" politics, and submits that "state preferences" guide the

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[43] Nye, J. "Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement." *International Organization,* Vol.22, No.4 (Autumn 1968), 858.
[44] Hoffman, Stanley (1966) "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe." *Daedalus,* Vol 95, No. 3, 862-915) 863

course of integration. According to Andrew Moravcsik, Liberal Intergovernmentalism adopts a

two-level analysis where state-society dynamics guide states' decisions in the international

level.[45] Enlargement, for Moravcsik is an outcome of the inter-governmental bargaining process

where "a state's bargaining power is inversely proportional to the relative value" it places on the

Enlargement.[46] From this approach, it is clear to understand that what is considered as "low" or

"high" politics can change over time for states. The Intergovernmentalist turn in political

integration theory induced various attempts to incorporate domestic level of analysis to the

international level. One of such attempts is the Postfunctional approach, which asserts that the

political integration in the European context is a process driven by public opinion and by the

domestic politics of member states.[47] The Postfunctional approach, just like Liberal

Intergovernmentalist theories are after observable measures, by using opinion polls and surveys.

In a much similar way with the domestic spillover, Liberal Intergovernmentalism also aims to

explain European enlargement as a product of "geographic spillover," where inclusion of more

state partners would lead to more intergovernmental bargaining of borders.[48]

Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholtz (1998) provide the most viable alternative explanation

on political integration with their Modern Neofunctional (also known as Transactionalist)

approach to political integration. Transactionalists argue that the establishment of supranational

institutions is a consequence of increased cross-border transactions. Wayne and Sandholtz

contend that by studying the rate of transaction in various sectors, one can assess the speed of

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[45] Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International
Relations," *International Organization* 51:4 (1997): 544.
[46] Andrew Moravcsik The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht,
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press (1998), 62.
[47]Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks. "A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration:." B.J.Pol.S. , 2008 39 : 1–23.

[48] William E. Paterson, Neill Nugent and Michelle P. Egan, eds., *Research Agendas in EU Studies: Stalking the
Elephant (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics)* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 46.

integration in corresponding policy areas and understand that the political integration is a *market driven* process: when there is demand, there is supply of integration measures. According to authors, "increasing levels of cross-border transactions and communications by societal actors will increase the perceived need for European-level rules, coordination and regulation."[49] In contrast to liberal intergovernmentalism, Transactionalist approach sets primacy of economics in its arguments. Some scholars criticize Transactionalist approach for being extremely Euro-centric.[50] However, the theory in a European context allows for a causal explanation between social integration of mass publics (i.e. by measuring tourism within the region etc.) and political integration. An alternative explanation of political integration is put forth by the New Institutionalist approach, which is ultimately a rational choice approach to political integration process. With respect to the EU enlargement process, rationalist approaches suggest that the EU would continue expanding its membership until the marginal benefits exceed the marginal costs both for the applicant states and the member states.[51]

Unlike Neofunctionalism and Intergovernmentalism, Social Constructivism is not an IR Theory, but instead a general social theory, or rather an approach that studies the role of ideational variables.[52] Social Constructivist explanation of integration submits that once the institutions are put in place, they are capable of influencing inter-state behavior *vis-à-vis* intersubjectivity process, where actors "learn" and re-shape their positions in relation to actors.[53] What "learning"

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[49]Wayne Sandholtz, and Alec Stone Sweet, eds. *European Integration and Supranational Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA, 1998. 11-12.

[50] Webber, Douglas and Bertrand Fort, eds., *Regional Integration* in East *Asia* and. *Europe*: *Convergence or Divergence?* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 293.

[51] Michelle Cini and Angela Bourne, eds., Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 106.

[52] Erik Jorgensen and Antje Wiener, eds., *the Social Construction of Europe* (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications Ltd, 2001), 31, Ft. 16.

[53] Wendt, Alexander "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," *International Organization* 46:2 (1992): 391—425.

means is a process through which actors can interact in broad institutional contexts (norms and discursive contexts).[54] Additionally these institutions can also facilitate environments suitable for "norm diffusion," as per suggested by Martha Finnenmore and Kathryn Sikkinik[55] Since it is difficult to track down ideational variables, Finnenmore proposes a "norm life-cycle" approach to explain how norms emerge and get advocated by norm entrepreneurs, causing norm cascades. Norm diffusion would be the diffusion of the European norms. As per suggested by Checkel, and Hooghe European Commission can be considered a norm entrepreneur in promoting a kind of European idea by which absolute Europeanness of a state grows less important.

Karl Deutsch in the 1960s argued that the integration process had halted, and a decade later Ernst Haas wrote of the obsolescence of the European integration.[56] The 1980s proved these scholars wrong, for EU advanced beyond what these scholars expected. The waves of European enlargement have outlived the ideas of these Constructivist researchers. Current agendas in the field have been focusing on the collective identities and the community of values and norms. Under this approach EU members would be ready to admit candidate states, which identify themselves with the European identity. Michael J. Shapiro submits that foreign policy is about making an "other."[57] So, while EU is enlarging, it is enlarging in relation to an "other" (East, West, North, Central Europe etc), and the outside group is kept outside of the boundaries of the "in" group.

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[54] Erik Jorgensen and Antje Wiener, eds. *The Social Construction of Europe* (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications Ltd, 2001), 53.
[55] Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52:4 (1998): 887—918.
[56] William E. Paterson, Neill Nugent and Michelle P. Egan, eds., *Research Agendas in EU Studies: Stalking the Elephant (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics)* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 398.
[57] Iver B. Neumann, *Uses of the Other: The East in European Identity Formation (Borderlines)* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 23.

In Constructivist account, European enlargement would continue until it covers the states that

share its collective identity, values and norms.[58] Once the cultural borders of Europe are reached,

the enlargement would stop. This idea is also resonant in Karl Deutsch's "we-feeling" hypothesis

on collective identity formation in security communities. However, this is not to say that by

becoming members of the European Union, states become less of their national identity, and

more "European." Europessimists consider existence of a "European people" a farce, because

they consider that there is no common European history, or common myth on which a European

identity could be built.[59] A common Europeanness could only exist in relation to another, and

"other" could be the Soviet Union, the Turks or even Laissez-Faire Capitalism. From a Social

Constructivist perspective, EU's horizontal integration process is a way in which states can

modify and re-establish what constitutes being European.

According to Sjursen, European horizontal integration is a reflection of Europe's "kin-ship based

duty" to those states in the peripheries. As a pact of "liberal democracies" European Union infer

upon certain kinds of obligations which bring moral obligations to states in the Eastern

Europeans that threatened the identity of the EU in the case of non-enlargement. In a similar line

of logic, Lasas provide that the "collective guilt" of the EU for "having betrayed the CEECs

before and after the Second World War."[60] Both of these approaches envision two separate final

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[58] Michelle Cini and Angela Bourne, eds., *Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 108.

[59] Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez, eds., "Social Constructivism and European Integration," in *European Integration Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA, 2004), 166.

[60] William E. Paterson, Neill Nugent and Michelle P. Egan, eds., *Research Agendas in EU Studies: Stalking the Elephant (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics)* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 49.

borders of EU. According to Sjursen Turkey is not eligible for "kin-ship" duty of the states, and

according to Lasas, Ukraine and Georgia cannot benefit from "collective guilt."[61]

Although these respective approaches are all very helpful in understanding the enlargement

process, they operate on a specific kind of European identity that they consider as given. In order

to understand whether enlargement could endanger the European identity, one needs to assess if

there is a European identity that could be evaluated. If the supply of enlargement is dependent on

the identities of states, then one could study how much socialization a state needs to go through

in order to attain the specific kind of European identity that's at play at the time of integration.

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[61] William E. Paterson, Neill Nugent and Michelle P. Egan, eds., *Research Agendas in EU Studies: Stalking the Elephant (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics)* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 49.

Table 2: Theoretical approaches for enlargement[62]

	Realism	**Liberal Intergovernmentalism**	**Supranational Institutionalism**	**Constructivism**
Applicant/ Member State Politics	Anticipated effect of enlargement on a state's: - Autonomy, - Security, - Relative influence in EU.	Anticipated effect of enlargement on a state's welfare (depending on domestic economic structure)	Anticipated effect of enlargement on: - EU's collective interests -Competences and budgets on individual institutions	Extent of applicant's identification with the EU and its constitutive norms
EU Macro Politics	Preferences of most powerful member states.	Relative bargaining power and side-payments	- Agenda-setting and entrepreneurship by institutional actors (Commission) - Presence and strength of transnational interest groups in favor of enlargement	Extent of shared collective identity and constitutive norms between EU and applicants
EU Substantive politics	As above	As above - formal decision-making rules	As above - formal decision-making rules	Ideas and policy paradigms underpinning particular policy areas
Impact on new members	N.A.	Empowerment of domestic actors, domestic adoption costs	N.A.	Socialization and persuasion; legitimacy of EU rules and norms

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[62] Michelle Cini and Angela Bourne, eds., Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 102

Chapter 4

Constructing A Conceptual Framework

It is a common held belief among Christian Democrats that Turkey is not European, given its Muslim population. Christianity is not a *priori* for EU membership, as per announced by various EU leaders, however, there seems to be an assumption on what EU membership entails. Under Social Constructivism European enlargement can be explained through identity constructions as well as normative obligations, as expressed above.[63] I therefore outline three ideal types of European identity, which could reflect the contested nature of the European identity. Below I outline three ideal-types that I propose in assessing the "Europeanness" of states that were admitted during each wave of enlargement. I identified three ideal types of European identity for the purposes of this research.

I use these ideal-types as per suggested by Max Weber. By studying the deviation of a state from the ideal-type one could assess which meaning of European identity were deployed during any given phase of enlargement. It should be noted that the models I propose are over-simplified typology of what I consider as constitutive of the European identity. To borrow from Patrick Thaddeus Jackson,

> *…instead of a representation or a depiction, [typology] is a deliberate over*
>
> *simplification of a complex empirical actuality for the purpose of highlighting*
>
> *certain themes or aspects that are never as clear in the actual world as they are*

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[63] William E. Paterson, Neill Nugent and Michelle P. Egan, eds., *Research Agendas in EU Studies: Stalking the Elephant (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics)* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 49.

in the ideal typical depiction of it.[64]

The purpose of these ideal-types is to organize my arguments, so they serve a functional role for the scope of this paper. There are numerous definitions of European identity, and I do not contend to limit the universe of definitions in my three categories. The philosophical problems that might arise out of these ideal-types are acknowledged, and as per Wittgenstein wrote, "Philosophical problems arise when language *goes on holiday.*"[65] The issue is no different with the varieties of Europeanness we refer to.

The aim of these typologies is to provide an understanding of what kinds of Europe is being discussed by the European politicians. All three ideal-types set the boundaries of an "in" group and an "out" group, and in accordance with all three definitions, being European means something similar but different from other meanings. With the current borders of the Union, the meaning of Europe has become synonymous with being a member of the EU. While all EU member states are European, not all those who are outside of it are. By proposing these ideal types, I aim to differentiate between two kinds of Europeanness, that many scholars treat as one. Thus, while some of the ideal-types below include references to legal provisions in becoming a European member state, some do not. I study each ideal-type and its application in turn throughout all waves of enlargement.

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[64] Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics (New International Relations)* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2010), 37.
[65] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1969), 19e.

A. *Family Resemblance*:

In his book, Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein proposed *family resemblance* as a method of organizing information. The basic assumption here is that none of the members of a family look exactly the same, but each member carries a resemblance with the others. In the process of horizontal integration, EU member states would look for a family resemblance with the candidate state. This presupposes that the EU member states accept to have a common encoded trait that renders them related. It is these shared traits that render the condition of being "European" meaningful. According to Wittgenstein, the meaning of a word is its use in the language.[66] Wittgenstein's formulation would require the meaning of any given word to be derived by pointing at the word's bearer. The common features of those who bear the "European" etiquette then should show us overlapping features amongst the members of the European family. The meaning of "European" is open ended despite the efforts of limiting it to a mere Christian Club experience. Although there are some rules that govern who could apply to the Union, the bounds of the European identity are not regulated. In Wittgensteinian perspective, Europeanness could be considered an "unregulated game," unconstrained by rules.[67] This is a stark assumption, for many associates being European with being part of the West --or the Western Civilization. A kind of family resemblance that implies a certain geographic and cultural features, and yet that is broadly defined and overly simplified.

According to Wittgenstein, naming could be considered as a baptism of an object.[68] Of course, in case of identities, calling some body "European" is not enough to render it as such. However,

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[66] Ibid. 21e
[67] Ibid. 32.
[68] Ibid. 19e.

calling some state European in a specific context could have the same impact. Thus, as suggested by Weber, by pointing at the bearer of such a name (or, adjective), one could understand the meaning of the term.[69]

In his article, "*How to Think About Civilizations?"* Patrick Jackson suggests two ways of considering what constitutes a civilization. While Samuel P. Huntington adopts an essentialist approach in dividing the world into various civilizations by looking at attributes, whereas Jackson studies the *processes* that go into constructing civilizations. In this respect, family resemblance would be considered as an essentialist approach, where one would look at the carriers of Western attributes. Looking at those who call themselves Western reveals a tendency to associate heritage with that of Ancient Greece, Roman and Christian civilizations.[70] The Treaty of Rome articulates a union of European states based on shared common values, however this cannot be reduced to mere Christianity as attempted by Helmut Kohl.[71]

Samuel P. Huntington considers the civilizations as the "highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of identity people have.[72] For European enlargement, the assumption would be the existence of a European civilization, to which all those who are European are members of. The assessment of belonging would be the examination of material attributes of a state: ""blood, language, religion, [and] way of life."[73] The assumption here is that the common sense works the same way and the "religion of Europe" is nothing but Christianity. However, the case with

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[69] Ludwig Wittgenstein, 21e.

[70] Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 171.

[71] Please see the quote at page 45.

[72] Quoted in Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, ed., "How To Think About Civilizations," in *Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon. Routledge, 2009), 176-227.

[73] Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, ed., "How to Think About Civilizations," in *Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon. Routledge, 2009), 182.

religion and kin-ship is different: Assuming Christianity as the religion of the Western Civilization would infer European states to continuously maintain "non-Christian" selves out of their civilization borders. The attribute-ontology adopted by Huntington reflects

> [O]bjects as collection of properties are held together at their core by some bare and propertyless [sic] substantial existence, a dispositional "being-that" around which the object's different qualities are arranged."[74]

Alternatively, Jackson proposes a process-ontology in study of civilizations, which differs from attribute-ontology:

> The alternative to an attribute-ontology would be a *process-ontology*. Such a scientific ontology would not regard objects as collections of properties, but would instead analytically embed the existence of objects in an unfolding set of transactional mechanisms and relations that have the effect of reproducing the object from moment to moment.[75]

The underlying assumption here is that a community is not constituted by its physical resources and products but rather via its practices and interactions. Through a process-ontology driven study, production and re-production of the civilization boundaries could be examined. In case of European Enlargement process, a process-ontological study could highlight the changes in the definition of European identity with each wave of enlargement. With this approach enlargement moves beyond the material attributes, and opens new possibilities and ne meanings for what it means to be European. Hence, the family resemblances from one phase of enlargement to next would differ. So would the ideal-type family resemblance in defining European identity. The ideational variables and structures co-constitute, and co-determine each other.

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[74] Ibid. 181.
[75] Ibid.183

B. *The Lowest Common Denominator*:[76] [77]

The Lowest Common Denominator (LCD) could also be referred to as the "Minimum definition" of being European. I identify lowest common denominator requirements as:

1. Respect for Human Rights,

2. Democracy promotion,

3. European state.

I set the parameters of LCD within the bounds of the 1975 Helsinki Accords, which was the first all European treaty to highlight the importance of Human Rights, and in many respects shifted the lowest common denominator of the European identity to rely on the rights of the individuals instead of ideologies or religion. Following this kind of logic, being a signature of the Helsinki Accord of 1975, would entitle any state respecting human rights as European.[78] The values expressed in this document, are the minimal expressions of European values to which all states were invited to sign. The main set of Articles related to the protection of human rights and minorities were included in the Third Basket, and specifically under Article VII, where the states accepted to: *"respect […] human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief."* Signing of this Accord, and states' promise to protect the rights of the individuals in a Treaty signing setting is considered as a "Speech Act," through which the promise becomes an act of recognition.[79]

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[76] " A Very Special Relationship." European Stability Initiative. <*www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_118.pdf*>.
[77] In his categorization of populist radical right parties, Cas Mudde proposes five approaches, which promise to avoid the problem of circularity. Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 14-5.
[78] At the time of signing Helsinki Accords, Ukraine was still part of Soviet Union.
[79] Erik Jorgensen and Antje Wiener, eds., *the Social Construction of Europe* (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications Ltd, 2001), 127.

These rights were later codified in the European Charter for Fundamental Rights, to which all European Union states are signatories. In order to maintain this ideal-type as "minimum" as possible, I will be deploying the Helsinki standards instead of the EU Charter. Since Europe can be defined in terms of its values, then the minimum definition would be bounded with respect to human rights and promotion of democracy.

As a pact of liberal democracies, being European entails being a working liberal democracy with free elections and pluralist features. As the Union considers itself as a democracy promoter, it feels under obligation to supply enlargement because there is a moral obligation that comes with the Union's identity.[80]

As for being a European state; although this may sound straightforward, what constitutes a state European could be contested. The definition of the land mass that we have referred to as Europe has transformed throughout centuries and current implicit borders of Europe might not be the same in the future. Historically, Europe used to mean the Western coast of the continent in as so much that when Mozart headed *west* from Vienna to Prague, he described himself as "crossing an *oriental* border."[81] Germany used to be considered part of Central Europe, before it came to be considered as part of the West with the accession of a number of Eastern and Central European states into the Union. Although continent's borders are fuzzy, Morocco or Israel would not be considered as European states. In fact Morocco's membership application was turned down on the geographic basis. Although Netenyahu has been mentioning Israel's intention of

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[80] William E. Paterson, Neill Nugent and Michelle P. Egan, eds., *Research Agendas in EU Studies: Stalking the Elephant (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics)* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 49.
[81] Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York: Penguin (Non-Classics), 2006), 752.

applying for European Union membership, its Middle Eastern locale hinders its chances from

such a possibility.

C. *The Highest Common Denominator*

This is the "Maximum Definition," of being European, which focuses on the largest number of

characteristics a candidate state would need to share with the European Union "family." This

ideal-type covers all of the categorization types defined above.[82] So a European state would need

to be recognized as part of the "family" (i.e. the West, Europe, Western Civilization etc.),

adhering to the minimal amount of shared values.[83] This definition would also include the

prerequisite legislation that needs to be adopted by states in compliance with the Article 49 of the

Treaty of the European Union, and the Copenhagen Criteria. Under these criteria the more "like"

unit a candidate member is, less likely it is to endanger loss of European identity.

Figure 1: Summary of Ideal-Typical Definitions of European Identity

Family Resemblance	Lowest Common Denominator (LCD)	Greatest Common Denominator (GCD)
• Attribute-ontology • Process-ontology	• Human Rights • Democracy Promotion	• LCD + Family Resemblance • Adoption of *Acquis Communitaire*

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[82] Ibid.

[83] Irrespective of the ontology adopted, family resemblance is considered in the broad meaning.

Ideal Types in Action

1ˢᵗ Wave of Enlargement: UK, Denmark and Ireland - 1973

It took UK two attempts before it was admitted to EEC in 1973 along with Denmark and Ireland.

With lack of fixed criteria for enlargement, these states are the very first set of states that did not

go through a through process of Europeanization. Given the timing of the admission, Helsinki

Accords were not signed at the time of the accession of these states, and there was no mention of

human rights or democracy promotion in the accession into the Free-trade area. Of all the newly-

admitted states, UK was considered the most interesting because for some Britons 22 January

1972, the day when UK's accession was signed, as a day of mourning.[84]

From the beginning of the European project, UK always aimed at staying along with the

European states but not "amongst" them. An illustration of UK's positioning with respect to

Europe could be illustrated by the following words of Winston Churchill on 11 May 1953 at

House of Commons:

> Where do we stand? We are not members of the European Defense Community,
>
> nor do we intend to be merged in a Federal European system. We feel we have a
>
> special relation to both. This can be expressed by prepositions, by the preposition
>
> "with" but not "of" – we are with them, but not of them. We have our own
>
> Commonwealth and Empire.[85]

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[84] "A Great Day." Le Monde (23-24 January, 1972). Accessed Through: <http://www.ena.lu/>
[85] Erik Jorgensen and Antje Wiener, eds., in *The Social Construction of Europe* (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications Ltd, 2001), 112.

The attitudes were no different during and after the accession into the Union. Even after more than 20 years after its membership into the Union, Britain is regarded as "of" rather than "in" Europe, and is considered an "awkward partner," and "semi-detached" from Europe.[86]

All states that were acceded along UK have historically been the most Euroskeptic states, and also the drivers of differential integration within the social and security policy sectors of the Union. However, at the time of their admission, by virtue of having Western model of governments and democracies, UK, Denmark and Ireland were considered Western enough by the Union. Although many newspapers announced the admission of these new states as the changing face of the Common Market, some went further, announcing UK's membership as a change in the face of the West, and the world map alike.[87] The "speech act" of joining the EEC could in fact be treated as a change in the British and the EU identity alike. The act of joining the European Community could be interpreted as an act of becoming European – a process by which newly admitted states come to be regarded as "European." As the members of the West, these states also were becoming European, and part of the "European" family. Membership to a common market is obviously not the same as participating in a political union, however, the meaning of the act coincides with a certain kind of a European ethos that was advocated by the founding fathers of Europe.

Given the timing of the admission, the Lowest Common Denominator approach does not apply to this wave of admission, nor does the Greatest Common Denominator definition of Europe. The ideal-type that was in action in this phase of enlargement falls only in the scope of the

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[86] "Statement by the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs at the Council (Luxembourg, 1 April 1974)."Accessed Through: <http://www.ena.lu/ >.
[87] "A Great Day." Le Monde (23-24 January, 1972). Accessed Through: <http://www.ena.lu/>

family resemblance, due to the material features of these states in having liberal market economies and working democracies.

2nd & 3rd *Waves of Enlargement: Southern Expansion - 1981 & 1986*

"Spain is the problem, Europe is the solution."

~ *Ortega* y Gasset[88]

Tony Judt refers to the period between 1973 and 1986 as a period of "sequence of irregular big bangs."[89] In 1977 Francois Mitterrand, a soon to-be-president of France, announced, "Neither Greece nor Spain are in a position to join the Community. Accession is neither in their interest nor is it in our interest. Interim steps are desirable."[90] However, his thoughts were not widely shared. Keeping the Southern states out might have hindered these already weak democracies. The Commission's report on Greece made references to its economic backwardness, its ongoing conflict with Turkey, and the danger of successive 'enlargements' that follow each other too rapidly for the Community to absorb.[91] It took Greece a total of six years after its application, and it took Spain and Portugal 10 years. Although these states had to adhere to a relatively stricter membership rules than UK, Denmark or Ireland, they were shown flexibility in their adoption of the *Acquis*, even after they were admitted.

The material attributes of these admitted states to the European identity were weak. They had no effective governments, and most importantly, they were relatively *poor* states. Through the

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[88] Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (New York: Penguin (Non-Classics), 2006), page nr.
[89] Ibid. 526
[90] "Beyond Enlargement Fatigue," ESI, www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_74.pdf. (2)
[91] Ibid.

Integrated Mediterranean Programs, European Union tried to prepare these states economically

to adapt the Common Market. Regional subsidies that were offered to Spain and Portugal in

1986 were not offered to Greece in 1981 and this had caused Greek Prime Minister Andreas

Papandreou to threaten the Union with "getting out of the Union![92] The crisis was averted and by

1986, Europe had expanded to cover the Southern Europe.

This wave of enlargement could be considered as deploying the Lowest Common Denominator

definition of Europe, through the aid of subsidies and as an act of democracy promotion. All

three states were signatories to the Helsinki Accords. In a similar manner, with reference to the

Greek accession, there were references to meta-civilizational narratives to the European history,

and the material attributes of these societies. Both ideal types of European identity were

deployed, giving rise to the use of Maximum Definition of Europe.

4th Wave of Enlargement: Austria, Sweden, Finland - 1995

In contrast to previous accessions, admission of Finland, Sweden and Austria was fast and less

costly than the previous waves of enlargement. As the neutral states during Cold War, Austria,

Finland and Sweden have all applied to European Union membership in the aftermath of the

Cold War.[93] Switzerland and Norway were also among those who submitted their membership

application to the EEC, however, following referendums they could not become members of the

Community. Among those who successfully completed the accession process, Sweden displayed

least enthusiasm by public approval of the membership with only a 52.3 per cent vote in a

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[92] Tony Judt, 528.
[93] Austria applied for membership in 1989, Finland in 1992, Sweden in 1993.

national referendum.[94] Quiet transition of these states into the European Union, was

complemented with stark deepening in the union in the aftermath of the accession. The

institutional arrangements were made such as to assign four votes for Austria and Sweden, and

three votes for Finland.

At the Welcome speech he delivered, Egon Klepsch, President of the European Parliament,

highlighted the meaning of this very enlargement for the Union as an at through which the

European commitment to the parliamentary democracy would be strengthen. He announced that

> As a result of the enlargement to include Norway, Austria, Finland and Sweden,
>
> the geography of the Union will be transformed. The Union's area will grow by
>
> 50% and extend beyond the Arctic Circle. For the first time we will have a
>
> common border with Russia. This fact alone indicates that the enlarged Union
>
> will have new responsibilities in external affairs.[95]

Consciousness of what lies behind the border for the European Union. The external affairs

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[94] Tony Judt, 717.

[95] "Address by the President of the European Parliament Dr Egon Klepsch on the occasion of the official signing of the Treaty on the accession of Norway, Austria, Finland and Sweden to the European Union (Corfu, 24 June 1994)." Accessed Through: <http://www.ena.lu/ >.

5th & 6th *Waves of Enlargement: Big Bang Enlargement - 2004-2007*

"Our aim must be [to] build an ecumenical bridge…from the monasteries and cathedrals of Kiev

and Moscow"

~ Helmut Kohl, German Chancellor 1995[96]

When the EU started to offer membership to new democracies in June 1993, it did not specify when and with whom the actual accession negotiations would start. It was assumed that the Eastern Enlargement would "cripple down" the existing Union, and "derail the introduction of a single European currency.[97] However, the European institutions put in place a number of initiatives that ensured the CEECs were transitioning smoothly from Communist governments to pluralist democracies. Some of these initiatives were PHARE Democracy Program, established to promote human rights and delivered aid packages for countries such as Poland and Hungary. The establishment of the program was costly: PHARE supported projects in 11 CEECs, with approximately 5.42 billion Euros. The question with these states was: Did they even belong in Europe?

Hobsbawm called the Central European States as the *Mitteleuropa,* which he says is the "belonging to politics rather than geography, to the realm of political programs rather than to reality… more often than not geography is the continuation of politics by other means."[98] In the aftermath of the Cold War, Germany moved from Central Europe, to the "West" but, same was

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[96] Sedat Laciner. *Turkey-European Union Relations and the Cultural Dimension*. (London: Centre for Legal and Political Studies, 1997), 36.
[97] "Beyond Enlargement Fatigue," ESI, www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_74.pdf.
[98] Quoted in Iver B. Neumann, *Uses of the Other: The East in European Identity Formation (Borderlines)* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 147.

not true for the other states such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania or Poland. These states remained

"Central" and "Eastern" European. As Iver B. Neumann highlights, just by their mere existence,

the "East" contributed to the European identity formation.[99] During this phase of enlargement,

there were many references to the Christendom of these Eastern states, and in many ways this

very feature became a commonality by which Eastern states identified themselves. During the

accession talks, an Estonian politician announced: Why should Estonia leave one Union to enter

another? The answer was simple: No one other than Estonia was forcing this membership to EU.

From EU's perspective, membership of Central Eastern European states can be considered as

expansion of the Union to include the "Other" as part of the "Self." This was particularly

distressing for Jacques Chirac, who argued in favor of setting new institutional rules which

would allow founding members to have more votes than the newcomers, "who were likely to

bring in more problems."[100] The institutional changes as per requested by the French did follow,

but not in the way Chirac imagined them. The Treaty of Nice put in place a ceiling in the number

of European Commissioners (27), and a ceiling for the Members of the Parliament (700).

Yes, Eastern European states were not Russia, but they most definitely had a Soviet history, and

membership to Warsaw Pact. Being a buffer state between Russia and a powerful Europe Eastern

Europeans were aware of the threat they were under:

> We cannot become a truly European nation until we separate ourselves from
>
> Europe, since our Europeanness does not mean submergence, but that we become

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[99] Iver B. Neumann, *Uses of the Other: The East in European Identity Formation (Borderlines)* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 207

[100] "So That's All Agreed, Then," The Economist. Dec 14th 2000, <http://www.economist.com/node/451295?story_id=E1_QVTNJV>

a part of it, indeed a very particular part not interchangeable with any other.[101]

Separating Eastern Europe from Europe was not possible for the region was landlocked in place, however, membership in the Union provided an alternative route in which Eastern states were not "submerged," but rather supported to reach their inner "European."

The CEEC Enlargement could be considered as an exercise of the Greatest Common Denominator Ideal Type, which set the prerequisites of being a European both in terms of carrying family resemblance but also in terms of Lowest Common Denominator in support of democracy and human rights.

Table 3: Summary of Ideal-Types of European Identity Deployed During Enlargement

Wave of Enlargement	Adopted Definition of Europeanness
1st Wave: 1973	Family Resemblance
2nd and 3rd Waves: 1981 & 1986	Minimum Definition
4th Wave: 1995	Maximum Definition
5th and 6th Waves: 2004 & 2007	Maximum Definition

Soon after the Big Bang Enlargement, political parties across Europe started to blame European enlargement for their slow growing economies and high unemployment. Followed by the rejection of new European Constitution in the referenda in the Netherlands and in France, Europeans were frustrated to be part of the European Union. The period was a busy time for the European Commission to convince people that enlargement of the Union had benefits for

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[101] Ibid 159.

Europeans as a whole, and that enlargement could not be blamed for failures in national economies. The disgruntle over the 5th and the 6th waves of Enlargement could be traced back to the time of Central and Eastern European States' application into the Union.

As outlined above, the successive waves of enlargement have not contributed to the waning of the European identity. If anything, the definition of what constitutes European identity has grew in context, and in ingredient. The previous waves of enlargement say nothing about waning of the European identity. If anything, the previous waves of enlargement illustrate that the ideal-type of Europeanness is moving in the direction of a more structured definition, which is more complex and "more detailed" than the previous phases of enlargement. The trend promises to continue and exercised on the future candidate states.

Future Enlargement of EU

The future of enlargement posits a crucial question: Where does Europe end? Since the *Final*

Politique of the Union is not codified anywhere, Commission and the Council has been acting as

though there will eventually be final frontiers of Europe, beyond which would be the terrain of

European Neighborhood Policy, or a potential Mediterranean Union. While these are all

speculations on the future of Europe, history of the continent is likely to play an influential role

in the future agenda-setting and membership negotiations.

Historically, as Iver B. Neumann points out, Europe ended where Turks began. In an interview in

1999 with the EU Magazine, Commissioner for Enlargement, Günther Verheugen was asked this

very question, and he gave the following response:

> When people ask me how I would define Europe, I find it very difficult to say.
>
> First of all, how do you give a geographical definition? How do you say where
>
> Europe ends? Defining Europe in cultural terms, by saying that Europe is where
>
> the values of the old Europe apply, does not make things any easier, either. I
>
> would prefer to say that the European Union is a political project that also needs
>
> to have certain geographical limits, simply because, otherwise, our political and
>
> material capabilities will be overstretched. This is something we need to
>
> recognize... I am one of those people who think that there is no final answer for

the European project, either in terms of its political geography or of the substance

of integration.[102]

As the previous waves enlargement depict, there is a trend in deployment of a maximum

definition of Europe for the new applicants, and the admission is only guaranteed after a rigorous

Europeanization process. Although the future of the Union is not likely to see another "big bang"

enlargement, current candidates and prospective candidates have many political challenges that

they are likely to bring to the Union. Preparations for Croatia's admission are almost ready,

given that its border dispute with Slovenia is almost solved. In contrast, seventeen-year-old

dispute between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia over the state's name has not been

solved, and Ukraine's geo-strategic location might affect the EU-Russia relations (as was the

case with Europe's energy dependency on Russia). Of all of the current candidates, it is Turkey's

candidacy that attracted the most attention in respect to waning of European identity. As with the

"big-bang" enlargement, Turkey's accession would be a further Eastward widening of Europe,

and "Europe" would morph its meaning.

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[102] Interview with Günter Verheugen, European Commissioner for Enlargement.
Source: Im Interview: Günter Verheugen: „Die EU ist ein politisches Projekt, das eine räumliche Begrenzung haben muss", in EUmagazin. 4/2003, 35. Jahrgang, pp. 19-21. Accessed via European Navigator: <http://www.ena.lu/>.

Case Study: Turkey

Orhan Pamuk, in his memoir *Istanbul* describes the city as "an unlucky hostage caught between two worlds that offered no choice but to be Muslim or Christian."[103] The dilemma is the same for Turkey as a whole. While the Kemalist ideology directs Turkey into Europe, for Europe (historically) "Europe" began where Turk stopped:

> The presence of Turk in Europe is incidental. They remain at the end of five hundred years as much strangers as they were at the beginning. European ideals and words, just like "nation," "government," "law," "sovereign," "subject" do not apply to them.[104]

Turkey's potential membership has also become a popular issue around which many populist radical right parties rally. While these parties historically advocated for the expansion of EU to include Eastern European states, these parties adopted a wide held consensus on excluding Turkey.[105] The argument? Turkey has no "common ethnological and cultural denominator, and moreover contains extreme Islamic elements."[106] One of the most common slogans in Italy was "Turkey for the Turks, Europe for the Europeans."[107] The slogans have their place in history. The

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[103] Orhan Pamuk, *Istanbul: Memories and the City* (New York, NY: Vintage, 2006), 172.
[104] Iver B. Neumann, *Uses of the Other: The East in European Identity Formation (Borderlines)* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 160.
[105] Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 170.
[106] Ibid.
[107] Ibid.

historic representations of the Turks in Europe has been associated with evil, as synonymous

with barbarian:

> The Turk was seen as a pernicious force sent by God to scourge Christendom for
>
> its sins. To fend off this evil, all that was required was for Christians to repent,
>
> unite and take up the defense of the faith.[108]

Ruling aside the fact that Europeans are not as religious as they used to be, the imagery

suggested in above passage sets the Turk not only as the enemy of the Europeans, but also is a

threat against which all Christians must react.

With an approximate population of 78 million, Turkey is the largest o all candidate states waiting

on EU membership. The human rights violations, the famous *Midnight Express* controversy that

highlighted status of Turkish Prisons and its relations with Islamic states have long been frowned

upon, so far as leading some senior European Commissioners such as Austrian Franz Fischler to

openly express his doubts about democracy in Turkey.[109] As a member-state, Turkey's

population would make it the second largest member of the Union after Germany, and this would

also reflect upon the number of votes it gets in the European Parliament.[110]

While a strong democratic republic, 98% of Turkish population is Muslim and for Christian

Democrats this is the main obstacle between Turkey and Turkey's membership to the European

Union. Soon after its independence, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (the founder and the first president

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[108] Iver B. Neumann, 45.
[109] Tony Judt, 767.
[110] The higher the population of a member state, the higher the number of representatives it gets in the European Parliament. The number of votes a state gets is also allocated by the population of the country ("How Does EU Work?"). Therefore, had Turkey been an EU member, it would be the second largest state with regard to representation in the European Parliament, with 87 parliamentarians and 10 votes in the European Council (Oymen 28).

of the Republic of Turkey), announced that Turkey's goal must be to become a member of the

"contemporary civilization."[111] To pursue this goal, Turkey submitted its membership

application to the European Community in April 1987. At the time of application, Altunisik

points out that the European response was "negative in tone without any words of

encouragement."[112] In fact, the membership application stayed unaddressed for many years, until

2005 when the accession negotiations officially began. The excuse shown by Brussels was: "time

[is] not yet ripe."[113]

Another practical problem would be that the frontiers of European Union would move into the

Asia Minor, and border Georgia, Iran, and Armenia. Günther Verhugen, the EU Commissioner

for enlargement also announced that the he did not expect Turkey to become a member "before

2015," and that was in 1999.[114] There are talks about 2023 for full membership, but given the

pace of the accession negotiations, this might not be a realistic timeline either.

An attribute-ontological family resemblance definition of Europe would keep Turkey out of

European Union, for the material features of Turkey, or the Turkish society are different from

others. Even though DNA tests on the cross-section of Turkish population does not find Turks

any different from other *Mediterraneans*, the perception of Turks has not changed over the

years.[115] While the Commission's reported political issues were pushed aside in case of Greece,

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[111] Sedat Laciner. *Turkey-European Union Relations and the Cultural Dimension*. (London: Centre for Legal and Political Studies, 1997), 4.

[112] Meliha Altunisik and Özlem Tür, *Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change (The Contemporary Middle East)* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005), 119.

[113] Peter Coffey, *The Future Of Europe: Revisited* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar Pub, 2004), 91.

[114] Tony Judt, .768.

[115] A. Arnaiz-Villena et al., "Hla Alleles and Haplotypes in the Turkish Population: Relatedness to Kurds, Armenians and Other Mediterraneans," *Tissue Antigens* 57, no. 4 (April 2001): 308-17, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1034/j.1399-0039.2001.057004308.x/abstract>.

Turkey's political challenges are continuously mentioned and are put as obstacles in front of

Turkey's membership.[116]

As the 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th Waves of expansion illustrate, EU has been actively exercising its role

as a Human Rights advocate and Democracy promoter. It has continuously extended a helping

hand to new democracies of Europe, and assisted transitioning into liberal market economies

through various aid initiatives. With this kind of a track-record in pursuing stability on the

European soil, it is a surprise that Europe did not admit Turkey any earlier. With a history of

military coups, and human rights violations, Turkey would have been the ideal EU member that

could have been admitted with Romania, or even with Greece and Spain. Although Turkey's

membership application has been sitting since 1987, Turkey might have been considered too far

out from the Common European home to be a threat to European stability.

With the expanded borders of the European Union, Turkey has a chance that it did not before to

be admitted into the Union. The process-ontology oriented study of European identity as

illustrated with the Eastern enlargement, allows for future membership of Turkey. If only Turkey

was recovering from a dictator as a new democracy, it might have been considered a more

attractive candidate for the Union membership. There is no need for pessimism, for the history of

European Union illustrates that the definition of "European" is ever changing and becoming

more focused on the Europeanization process. Once Turkey's accession negotiations conclude,

there will be a place for it in Europe.

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[116] The Economist covered Turkey- EU relations in its October 2010 issue calling Cyprus an "Immovable Object" in the way of Turkey's accession talks

Chapter 5

Conclusion

An article by Lars-Erik Cederman starts with a twist on what Massimo d'Azeglio once said: "We have made Europe, now we have to make Europeans." What Cederman neglected in his argument is that Europe has not been *made.* If the vision of the Founding Fathers is embraced, and if Europe stays true to its promise, one would never know if the Europe has been made or not. By making references to European Absorption Capacity, or Geographic absorption capacity, Europe is waging a false debate. Enlargement process is not likely to endanger the European identity, for "Europeanness" is context-dependent and Europe has moved in the direction of increasing standards and requirements for candidate states, and adopted a Greater Common Denominator definition of Europe through which states socialized into being European enough to be a member. In an Op-ed piece he wrote in the Financial Times, Mark Mazower of the University of London argued that the Europe's borders and the European identity need to be adapted to the century we are living in:

> Just as the enlargement of the Union consigns the old "European Europe" of the
>
> original six to scrap heap of the past, so it raises the question of where Europe's
>
> limits should now be set. …The cold war is over and notions of an essentially
>
> Christian Europe need to be left behind, too, if the EU is to replicate the success
>
> in the next 50 years that it enjoyed in the last. [117]

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[117] Financial Times, 12 December 2002. As referenced in Fraser Cameron, ed., *The Future of Europe: Integration and Enlargement* (London: Routledge, 2004), 99.

This capstone shed some light on the ideal-types of European identity that were at play during various enlargement waves for EU. Shifts in these ideal-types illustrate a conscious effort in setting boundaries of EU's identity to specify who is "in" and who is "out." As Mark Leonard said: *Europe doesn't change countries by threatening to invade them: its biggest threat is having nothing to do with them at all."[118]* Although this could be considered as EU arrogance, it is no lie that European Union membership comes with many perks. Additionally, participating in the European family of states also provides a higher level of prestige and power for states in dealing with worldly matters. It also needs to be noted that EU also has much to gain from enlargement. Using phrases like "Absorption Capacity," might discourage future candidates from applying, or might lead European Parliament and the Commission to set new barriers to enlargement.[119] As for the European identity; the physical boundaries of the continent are as fuzzy as the definition of the term "European."

Although there is no such thing as a European nation, there are things that could be drawn from nationalism literature. One prominent scholar in this respect is Kedourine- who sees nation as an outcome of a nationalism process resulting from the interactions between politics and ideas.[120] Neumann quotes Mouffe, who is also in support of the fuzzy definition of identities:

> We would go further and argue that not only are there no "natural" or "original"
>
> identities, since every identity is the result of a continuing process, but that this
>
> process itself must be seen as one of permanent hybridization and *nomadization.*

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[118] "EU Enlargement," European Stability Initiative, <http://www.esiweb.org/enlargement/?cat=56#awp::?cat=56>.
[119]Frank Vibert, ""absorption Capacity: " the Wrong European Debate," Open Democracy, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-europe_constitution/wrong_debate_3666.jsp>, 3.
[120] Oliver Zimmer, *Nationalism in Europe, 1890-1940 (Studies in European History)* (Basingstoke, Hampshire. Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 6.

> Identity is, in effect, the result of a multitude of interactions that take place inside
>
> a space whose outlines a re not clearly defined.[121]

If the European identity is considered as a process resulting from the interaction between politics and different ideas of Europe, then efforts to construct a *Finalite Politique* for the Union would not hinder the changing face of European identity. The demographics would attest to the change, so would the changing relations between EU member states, candidates and other neighboring states. Although the current state of the Union could best be described as "uncertain," this should not be considered as a disadvantage. "Lack of a vision"[122] delivered the most successful political organization in the 21st century, so why should lack of clear boundaries or lack of clear meaning of European identify be considered threatening? If any new ideal type of Europe is to be constructed, it needs to be contextualized through interactions instead of various material attributes of states.

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[121] Mouffe quoted in Iver B. Neumann, *Uses of the Other: The East in European Identity Formation (Borderlines)* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 210 (emphasis added).
[122] I borrow Mark Leonard's argument I introduced earlier.

Appendix A: Chronology of Enlargement Events[123]

1. The aspirant members demonstrate their willingness to join the EU.

2. The Union recognizes their desire and launches assistance programs.

3. The European Council rules on enlargement and formulates the criteria.

4. The aspirant members submit applications to the Council and conduct national reforms in accordance with the criteria formulated by the Council.

5. The Council accepts or rejects the application (unanimously) and asks the Commission to issue an Opinion on the application.

6. The Commission issues an Opinion on the application, accompanied by a summary report and recommends starting negotiations.

7. The European Council reacts to the Commission's assessment and asks for yearly reports and summary papers.

8. The start of negotiations. The Commission proposes and the Council unanimously adopts the common positions to be taken by the Union in the negotiations.

9. The Council regularly issues Accession Partnerships drafted by the Commission, the candidate countries has to alter national reforms accordingly.

10. Conclusion of negotiations between the Member States meeting in Council and the applicant country. (Theoretically suspension of negotiations is possible in case the country seizes to satisfy the Copenhagen political criteria).

11. Assent of the European Parliament.

12. Unanimous Act by the Council.

13. Signing of the Accession Treaty by governments of the Member States and of the candidate Country.

14. Ratification of the Treaty in the candidate countries and in the Member States.

15. Entry into force of the Accession Treaty.

16. The accession is completed when all the transitional periods are over.

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[123] Dimitry Kochenov, "EU Enlargement Law Treaty – Custom Concubinage?: History and Recent Developments," European Integration online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 9 (2005) No 6, <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2005-006.htm#2.1.1>.

Appendix B: Chronology of the most recent enlargement process

	Application	Accession
Turkey	*14.4.87*	
Cyprus	4.7.90	1.5.04
Malta	16.7.90	1.5.04
Hungary	31.3.94	1.5.04
Poland	5.4.94	1.5.04
Romania	22.6.95	1.1.07
Slovakia	27.6.95	1.5.04
Latvia	13.10.95	1.5.04
Estonia	24.11.95	1.5.04
Lithuania	8.12.95	1.5.04
Bulgaria	14.12.95	1.5.04
Czech Republic	17.1.96	1.1.07
Slovenia	10.6.96	1.5.04
Croatia	*21.2.03*	

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        the European Union (Corfu, 24 June 1994)." Accessed Through: <http://www.ena.lu/ >

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