

Wandel durch Austausch:

The Importance of Exchange Diplomacy in German Foreign Policy

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Germany continues to engage in robust exchange diplomacy in comparison to nations of similar stature. The majority of these programs are administered by the German Academic Exchange Service. The amount of programs available to foreign students and professionals as well as German citizens, independent of the ERASMUS program, suggests that Germany places high value in the effectiveness of exchange diplomacy. This capstone uses textual analysis to explore Germany's continued investment of large amounts of resources in educational exchange programs, taking into account the historical role that exchange diplomacy played in the normalization of Franco-German relations during the post-World War II era. Due to the positive historical precedent of exchange diplomacy as a tool to recast Franco-German relations, Germany seeks to use exchange diplomacy to help German universities regain their past status at the top of global academia and promote German language learning abroad.

In today's information age governments continually strive to connect with foreign publics and non-state actors in order to build, maintain and reinforce a positive image abroad. While there are many tools available to accomplish this goal such as international broadcasting, social media, cultural programs, etc., one particular tool is often overlooked; educational exchange. While most developed nations continue to operate exchange programs, no nation invests as heavily in exchange as Germany. What is the rationale behind this investment? Among the global higher education community, Germany is seen as a place of abundant opportunity for university students, particularly post-graduate students; a destination that is financially feasible for students due to the vast array of scholarships funded by both German state and federal governments. The establishment and administration of these programs and scholarships are left to independent organizations, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) in particular. This paper explores the significance of the DAAD as a German foreign policy instrument and the relevance of public diplomacy and soft power to contemporary German foreign policy thinking.

The DAAD is the largest funding organization in the world that supports the international exchange of students and scholars. The organization primarily serves as an independent private sector partner to the German Foreign Ministry (AA). The International Institute of Education (IIE) performs a similar function in relation to the U.S. Department of State. Additionally, the DAAD serves as a mediator between various partners and communities as well as a self-governing organization of Germany's higher education institutions.¹ In 2009, operating on a budget of just under €350 million, the DAAD distributed funding to more than 65,000 individuals participating in over 250 programs.² Unlike other nations of comparable economic size, such as the United States, the German government continues to provide funding for the DAAD's exchange programs at a steadily increasing rate over the past few years.

The DAAD's most important partner is the AA from which it receives most of its funding. The organization serves as a primary means through which the AA can project an image of Germany as an education and research hub that is the preferred destination for the best in all fields. Of the AA's eight partner organizations, the DAAD operates by far the largest budget, one that has increased by nearly 60% between 2000 and 2009.³ As described by the AA, the DAAD's work plays an integral role in achieving many of the goals that the AA set forth for Germany's foreign cultural and educational policy (AKBP). The AA provides more than half of the funding for the AKBP in conjunction with the Ministry for Education and Research and the Interior Ministry, among others.⁴

¹ Dr. Christiane Bode and Nadine Pils, eds. *Annual Report 2009 Summary*, trans. James M. Croft (Bonn: Brandt, GmbH, 2010), 12.

² Bode and Pils, *Annual Report*, 17.

³ Bode and Pils, *Annual Report*, 17.

⁴ Auswärtiges Amt, "Culture and intercultural dialogue," accessed April 16, 2011, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/KulturDialog/ZieleUndPartner/ZielePartner.html>.

The AA sees the AKBK as “a mainstay of German foreign policy...which helps to establish trust in Germany and helps lay a broad foundation for stable international relations.”⁵ The mutually beneficial relationship between the AA and the DAAD plays an important role in Germany’s overall public diplomacy efforts, as the German government continues to eagerly pursue a foreign policy largely reliant on soft power, particularly as the country looks to build a more prominent international profile. How does the German government, particularly the AA, justify this increasing monetary commitment to the DAAD when determining the success of exchange programs can often only be undertaken in the long-term and difficult to assess overall?⁶ In this paper I will seek to answer this question through a textual analysis of the presentation of DAAD’s exchange programs in the AA’s own documents, the DAAD’s program materials, and the German news media.

Based on my analysis, I identify three main factors contributing to the salience of higher education exchange programs in the German conception of public diplomacy and the significance of the DAAD as a tool of German foreign policy. My analysis explores the following claims; the Franco-German rapprochement immediately following WWII created a strong precedent for exchange programs as a credible and successful foreign policy tool, the AA seeks to use robust educational exchange to rehabilitate the standing of German universities as institutions at the forefront of academic scholarship, and the AA looks to use exchange programs to boost German language learning around the globe.

I begin with a review of the literature in both foreign policy studies as well as public diplomacy studies. This comparison demonstrates why the field of foreign policy analysis does

⁵ Bode and Pils, *Annual Report*, 4.

⁶ Christopher Ross, “Public Diplomacy Comes of Age,” *The Washington Quarterly* 25(2002): 80.

not offer an adequate theoretical framework to examine the central question. By contrast, public diplomacy studies, particularly work on soft power, provides an alternative justificatory framework for German foreign policy post-WWII. I then discuss the three separate illustrative arguments for the significance of educational exchange and the DAAD as the main administrator of these numerous programs. I conclude with the implications of this evidence of exchange diplomacy as central tenant of German foreign policy. The German government's strong consistent support for exchange programs and the DAAD demonstrates how theories of exchange diplomacy and the value of soft power have emerged into the forefront of an otherwise traditional set of foreign policy institutions.

Literature Review

The importance of public diplomacy in general has largely been overlooked in previous studies of German foreign policy, as scholars have instead focused on foreign policy positions that have affected strategic and security policy, or economic policy. Such work has relied on more traditional perceptions of the power of states and their options in leveraging power to influence other states and, more recently, non-state actors. An overview of the literature in this particular field illustrates how traditional theoretical frameworks are no longer ideal in explaining the prevalence of non-traditional foreign policy tools such as educational exchange within German foreign policy. By contrast, public diplomacy scholarship presents a more applicable theoretical framework in soft power.

Foreign Policy Scholarship

In academic work on German foreign policy, scholars perceive Germany's policies as important only in light of Germany's actions within the many international organizations that it

is a member of, such as NATO or the European Union.⁷ Even the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent reunification of West and East Germany are studied from the perspective of what a unified Germany could mean for Europe. Most scholars who have looked at German foreign policy outside of these institutions have chosen to focus on foreign policy within the context of either a larger era such as the Cold War⁸ or individual international conflicts,⁹ such as the Bosnian conflict.

For example, in his compilation of articles on German foreign policy after reunification which explores both theory and practice, the case studies presented by Rittberger all examine German policy within a multilateral institution rather than the country's individual policy. Even when analyzing the discourse around German foreign policy immediately post-reunification, the competing viewpoints summarized within this work all disagree on how much hard power German would gain and how much of that power it would assert. This focus seems to ignore the reality of the country's decades-long reluctance to depend only upon such efforts. While Germany does use hard power, it does so reluctantly and believes that the use of hard power in many situations can actually exacerbate instability. Therefore some scholars who still view German foreign policy actions within traditional terms perceive German foreign policy as based on its commitment to diplomacy and the rule of law, instead of simply in terms of hard power.¹⁰ The specter of war looms large over these conjectures as well, driving scholars to busy

⁷ These scholars include Rainer Baumann, Christoph Bluth, Henning Boekle, Scott Erb, Corinna Freund, Jeffrey S. Lantis, Helga Haftendorn, Martin Koopmann, Stephen F. Szabo, Samuel F. Wells Jr., and Henning Tewes.

⁸ These scholars include Christopher Bluth and Scott Erb,

⁹ These scholars include Helga Haftendorn and Jeffrey S. Lantis.

¹⁰ Regina Karp, "The New German Foreign Policy Consensus," *The Washington Quarterly* 29(2005): 68-69.

themselves with visions of a Germany that is confident enough to unilaterally decide to use military force in certain circumstances.¹¹

As Peters put it, even for those policy makers who do not believe Germany should pursue such an assertive foreign policy, the nation state remains the most important if not only actor¹² and scant mention is made of the non-state actors that Germany seems to be targeting with its AKBP. Within the academic discussion on Germany's foreign policy, four theoretical frameworks, neo-realism, utilitarian liberalism, constructivism and Germany as a Civilian Power, are used to explain the foreign policy decisions taken after the fall of the Berlin Wall, recognizing that prior to that event Germany was functioning within the Cold War framework. In examining each of these theoretical frameworks it becomes clear that each theory is ill-suited to address the main research question.

A majority of scholarship on German foreign policy is traditionally based on a neo-realist framework for international relations as relates specifically to Germany. This conception of neo-realism does not have an explicit theory of foreign policy, but one of international politics that holds that interactions amongst states can be explained by the distribution of power within the international system at that time. In treatments of German foreign policy that draw upon neo-realist positions, the relative power of the state in relation to the international system's distribution of power is the main consideration.¹³ In establishing this relationship between foreign policy and Germany's power position, neo-realist theory rests on the assumption that states as rational actors take decisions based on a cost-benefit analysis. If Germany does not

¹¹ Dirk Peters, "The debate about a new German foreign policy after unification," in *German foreign policy since unification: Theories and case studies*, ed. Volker Rittberger (New York: Manchester University Press, 2001): 18-19.

¹² Peters, "The debate about a new German foreign policy," 20.

¹³ Rainer Baumann, and Wolfgang Wagner, "Neorealist foreign policy theory," in *German foreign policy since unification: Theories and case studies*, ed. Volker Rittberger (New York: Manchester University Press, 2001):37.

follow this logic then the decision taken will have negative consequences perhaps even the disappearance of the state itself, therefore Germany rarely acts outside the constraints of the international system.¹⁴

Within neo-realist theory, anarchy plays an integral role since it creates the necessity for the state's two fundamental foreign policy interests; an interest in gaining as much power as is possible, and an interest in ensuring the state's own security. Since the international system as per the neo-rationalist theory is anarchic in nature, Germany can only pursue specific aims if it has achieved its own security. That same system makes it impossible to have complete security therefore Germany are constantly looking to increase their own security. As every state's aim is the same, there will always be a scarcity of security and so this interest will play a central role in defining Germany's foreign policy.¹⁵

As the state's security increases it looks to increase its influence as well. In order to have influence, states must possess power.¹⁶ Power is defined within this framework as "control over resources when determining the power position of a state,"¹⁷ but can come to mean a state's control over other actors or outcomes when used to describe state behavior. It should not be confused with influence, which is the amount of control a state has over the international environment within which it operates. States engage in influencing the behavior of other states in order to achieve its goals. In this theory, because all states look to create favorable conditions for

¹⁴ Baumann and Wagner, "Neorealist foreign policy," 38-39.

¹⁵ Baumann and Wagner, "Neorealist foreign policy," 39.

¹⁶ Baumann and Wagner, "Neorealist foreign policy," 41.

¹⁷ Baumann and Wagner, "Neorealist foreign policy," 40.

their purposes, the state is constantly looking to increase its influence, as defined above.¹⁸

Therefore in order to gain influence, states must acquire and leverage power.

The neo-realist explanation for the foreign policy behavior of Germany depends on the state's power position which is constructed from the polarity of the international system as well as the economic and military capabilities of the state in comparison to other states.¹⁹ Germany's power is based on its capabilities and so this power can be derived from many areas of policy.

The precise number of capabilities varies amongst scholars, but they are most often examples of hard power.²⁰ Soft power, as described by Nye cannot be employed within this framework, as it includes categories such as ideas and ideologies which neo-realists do not consider valid.

Although there are various capabilities, Germany's military and economic strength are seen as the core capabilities and measures of power.

Given these variables, neo-realist foreign policy theory puts forth two types of power politics to gain influence. Autonomy-seeking policy looks to keep the state from becoming further dependent on another state. Such policy can include the state's withdrawal from bilateral or multilateral agreements, any attempt to win back powers from international or supranational institutions, or a general refusal to cooperate, among others.²¹ While autonomy-seeking policy seeks to minimize outside influence of Germany's environment, influence-seeking policy seeks to create opportunities for a state to do just that to another state. These policies are most often carried out within international institutions, as they are important even for smaller states since a formalized decision making process within these institutions ensures that no one state can have

¹⁸ Baumann and Wagner, "Neorealist foreign policy," 41.

¹⁹ Baumann and Wagner, "Neorealist foreign policy," 42.

²⁰ Baumann and Wagner, "Neorealist foreign policy," 43.

²¹ Baumann and Wagner, "Neorealist foreign policy," 46.

complete control. Outside of international institutions, influence-seeking policy can also be used within bilateral relations.²²

Neo-realist theory provides a framework within which a large portion of scholarship on German foreign policy is viewed. The tenants of neo-realist theory explain the near-complete focus of scholarship on Germany's foreign policy as it relates to Germany's position within international or supranational organizations. The fundamental role of power within this framework is evidenced by case studies that examine German foreign policy within times of heightened security concerns, such as the 2003 Iraq War or more often the Balkan crisis of the early 1990s.²³ As previously pointed out, neo-realist theory cannot be of any use to the study of German exchange diplomacy besides establishing the state as a rational actor. While the state may be a rational actor, the types of variables that can be considered state preferences within neo-realist theory do not include those that inform theories of soft power,²⁴ which informs the practice of public diplomacy.

Unlike neo-realism, utilitarian liberalism, the second theory that has been used to analyze German foreign policy, does not see states as solitary actors who are acting upon a national interest. Instead, states are seen to form their foreign policy behavior based on their domestic interests.²⁵ On the most basic level, in this theory, individual states are always the main actors. Even if they form collectives, the individual state remains the primary actor. Each actor seeks to maximize his or her utility by making decisions that help them achieve their goals in the manner

²² Baumann and Wagner, "Neorealist foreign policy," 47.

²³ Such case studies have been conducted by Scott Erb, Helga Haftendorn, and Jeffrey S. Lantis.

²⁴ Baumann and Wagner, "Neorealist foreign policy," 44.

²⁵ Corinna Freund and Volker Rittberger, "Utilitarian-liberal foreign policy theory," in *German foreign policy since unification: Theories and case studies*, ed. Volker Rittberger (New York: Manchester University Press, 2001): 68.

that incurs the least cost. Although this particular form of decision making can be seen as the individual acting as a rational actor, rationality and utility are slightly different.²⁶

Rationality, in utilitarian-liberal foreign policy theory, suggests that an actor will always choose the option that maximizes his or her utility from the many objectively available alternatives presented. These alternatives are not constrained by certain variables such as uncertainty, or lack of information that the actor may have to face in choosing them. Utility, while related to rationality, refers to the actor's policy making power, which can lead to an analysis of the actor's interests and preferences. An interest often defines an actor's orientation in regards to maximizing his or her utility, and a preference then refers to a more specific policy leaning that is then derived from that initial interest.²⁷ For example, if an actor's interest is in simply surviving, then perhaps their foreign policy preference will be to enter into defense pacts in order to ensure protection in the case of any threat to his or her survival.

When specifically looking at foreign policy, there are two different approaches that fall under utilitarian-liberalism, structural-based and agency-based approaches. While the structural-based approach refers aptly to domestic structures,²⁸ the agency-based approach sees domestic interests as most important. The agency-based approach is preferred in looking at foreign policy as it allows for a more longitudinal view. This is not to say that the agency-based approach neglects domestic structures, rather it sees domestic structures as intervening variables in relation to domestic interests which are seen as independent variables in shaping foreign policy behavior.

²⁶ Freund and Rittberger, "Utilitarian-liberal foreign policy," 69.

²⁷ Freund and Rittberger, "Utilitarian-liberal foreign policy," 70.

²⁸ Freund and Rittberger, "Utilitarian-liberal foreign policy," 71.

In this way, domestic structures create an environment within which certain domestic actors are more successful in pushing forth their policy preferences than others.²⁹

When using this utilitarian-liberal point of view, there are then two conditions under which German foreign policy can undergo changes; when strong domestic actors change their preferences or when the composition of domestic actors within a policy network changes, thereby changing the goals of that network's actions.³⁰ It may be true that Germany's foreign policy changed after WWII due to a change in the composition of domestic actors leading to an emphasis on exchanges as a means of rehabilitating relations, at least with France. The main problem of this theory in answering the central question of this paper is the main assumption that the interests that shape a state's foreign policy are always utility-maximizing. While such an assumption may be understandable for foreign policy policies regarding bilateral trade agreements, military actions, etc., it is not suited to public diplomacy efforts, particularly exchange diplomacy programs. Exchange programs do not yield results in a short period of time, particularly student exchanges, nor are any positive developments through participation in these programs guaranteed. If the German government were truly approaching its foreign policy within this framework, they would be acting counter intuitively by allocating such large amounts of funds to organizations such as the DAAD to be used for exchange programs. There is little evidence that these exchange programs are the most cost-effective option available for the AA in achieving their foreign policy.

The last of the three overarching foreign policy theories is constructivist foreign policy. Constructivist foreign policy theory places social norms at the center of any explanation of

²⁹ Freund and Rittberger, "Utilitarian-liberal foreign policy," 72.

³⁰ Freund and Rittberger, "Utilitarian-liberal foreign policy," 99.

foreign policy, is better suited than realist or even liberal theories of foreign policy to analyze the importance of exchange diplomacy and the DAAD in relation to the foreign policy goals of the AA. Constructivist theory emphasizes the independent influence that values, ideas and norms can play in justifying certain interests.³¹ The social norms help actors make decision based on the appropriateness of the action rather than the consequences that may follow that action.³² Depending on the commonality and specificity of a particular social norm, its strength can vary.³³

Constructivism as used to examine Germany foreign policy falls short in answering this paper's central question due to its reliance on international institutions. This framework views social institutions on the international level as integral to distinguishing international society from the neorealist concept of an anarchical international system. These international institutions are in fact simply sets of interrelated norms, such as sovereignty, which constitute behavioral roles.³⁴ So for scholars working within this framework, an explanation of German foreign policy would be concentrated on German membership in international institutions. German membership and constant participation in these international institutions does indicate a certain set of norms and ideas that anchor German foreign policy. But the nature of the programs run by the DAAD and the larger AA initiatives suggest an increased emphasis on global interconnectedness that exceeds these norms. For example, a large portion of the DAAD's work on behalf of the AA is not situated within the framework of multilateral exchanges within an international institution,

³¹ Henning Boekle and Wolfgang Wagner, "Constructivist foreign policy theory," in *German foreign policy since unification: Theories and case studies*, ed. Volker Rittberger (New York: Manchester University Press, 2001): 106.

³² Boekle and Wagner, "Constructivist foreign policy," 105.

³³ Boekle and Wagner, "Constructivist foreign policy," 109.

³⁴ Boekle and Wagner, "Constructivist foreign policy," 119.

although the DAAD does administer Germany's portion of the ERASMUS program which originated and continues to be overseen by the European Union.

Germany as a Civilian Power, used by a handful of scholars, is the traditional framework perhaps best suited to analyze the AA's decision to focus heavily on AKBP. During the beginning stages of reunification, the specter of a more powerful Germany prompted a flurry of theories and conjectures on what this would mean for German foreign policy. Many scholars, especially realists, had assumed that Germany, more powerful through reunification, would reclaim a central position in Europe and turn away from its past low-profile multilateral foreign policy approach in favor of a unilateral approach that would perhaps even seek to reassert German hegemony in Europe.³⁵ History of course tells us that this was the case and so civilian power was put forth as an explanation for this lack of fundamental change.

The concept of the Civilian Power role first appeared in Hanns Maull's work in the early 1990s, as an explanation for why German foreign policy had displayed "modified continuity,"³⁶ beginning in 1989 throughout the formal process of German reunification, despite significant changes both domestic and international. The construct assumes that Germany is an actor with bounded rationality. The basic assumption of this concept is that because of the interdependence between states as well as states and foreign societies, foreign policymakers have been unable to unilaterally achieve both "power and plenty."³⁷ Therefore, states, through institutionalization, division of labor, or liberalization to lower transaction costs, benefit from this interdependence.

³⁵ Volker Rittberger, *German foreign policy since unification: Theories and case studies* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2001):1.

³⁶ Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns W. Maull, *Germany as a Civilian Power? The foreign policy of the Berlin Republic*, (New York: Manchester University Press, 2001): 3.

³⁷ Harnisch and Maull, *Germany as a Civilian Power*, 3.

States that engage in these activities are seen to be a civilizing force in international relations.³⁸

In such a role, Civilian Powers seek to replace politics based on power with politics based on legitimacy.³⁹ A Civilian Power seeks to eliminate violence from international relations, thereby eschewing military force in favor of collective action, and most importantly in regards to the current research question, the employment of non-military foreign policy tools⁴⁰ whenever possible.

This is made easier by the fact that the establishment of a Civilian Power must be preceded by the establishment of democratization of domestic politics; in other words, all Civilian Powers must be democracies.⁴¹ Maull and other scholars who discuss Civilian Power are quick to state that this does not mean that these states are pacifist in nature, rather that they will deploy forces only when action is multilaterally agreed upon and confined to either defense against an aggressive use of force, peace-making, deterrence or effective peacekeeping.⁴² They need not be pacifist because as long as military power is used to support the normative commitments of managed interdependence, it still can be seen as civilian.

While the concept of the Civilian Power does continue the academic focus on power in the more traditional sense in foreign policy studies, its acknowledgement of the interdependent network of states and non-state actors as the foundation for foreign policy decisions and motives is crucial. Such a foundation is clearly seen in the discourse on German foreign policy today, in fact, it merits little dissension amongst policy makers. Historically, Tewes argues, Germany was unable to be a civilian power before 1945, not because its foreign policy was purely military

³⁸ Harnisch and Maull, *Germany as a Civilian Power*, 3.

³⁹ Harnisch and Maull, *Germany as a Civilian Power*, 4.

⁴⁰ Henning Tewes, *Germany, Civilian Power and the New Power: Enlarging Nato and the European Union* (London: Palgrave, 2002): 11.

⁴¹ Tewes, *Germany, Civilian Power and the New Power*, 35.

⁴² Tewes, *Germany, Civilian Power and the New Power*, 12.

based, but because its domestic politics were not civilianized.⁴³ During the reign of Wilhelm II, German foreign policy slowly moved from treating any non-military endeavors as commercial interests to treating these same projects as key to German imperialism. Between the late 19th century and the First World War, German government projects, even economic, were transformed into political aims that were “imbued with a missionary sense of nationalism (pg. 34),” and therefore foreign policy was far from being civilian.⁴⁴

Even the Weimer Republic, although a democratic government, was not a Civilian Power as the Republic’s fledgling democracy was destabilized due to heavy reparations levied in the Versailles treaty that ravaged its economy. That is not to say the Weimar Republic did not have its successes in edging closer to becoming a Civilian Power; it got quite close through its foreign policy achievements such as the Treaty of Locarno and its participation in the League of Nations, signaling an acknowledgement that institutions and interdependence could pave the way for peace. Of course the forces of revisionism and resurgent nationalism were also growing at the time,⁴⁵ and eventually this renewed emphasis on power overpowered the roots of Civilian Power that had sprouted.⁴⁶ The Germans continued to see their national identity as defined by blood ties, territory and the quest for national grandeur rather than the values that gave the Republic its constitution.⁴⁷

This failure of democracy and liberalism in domestic politics prevented a Civilian Power foreign policy, a situation that obviously did not improve until the end of WWII.⁴⁸ After 1945 however the Federal Republic gained a functioning democracy, not because its liberators were

⁴³ Tewes, *Germany, Civilian Power and the New Power*, 33.

⁴⁴ Tewes, *Germany, Civilian Power and the New Power*, 34.

⁴⁵ Tewes, *Germany, Civilian Power and the New Power*, 35.

⁴⁶ Tewes, *Germany, Civilian Power and the New Power*, 36.

⁴⁷ Tewes, *Germany, Civilian Power and the New Power*, 37.

⁴⁸ Tewes, *Germany, Civilian Power and the New Power*, 37.

Western democracies, but rather because they instilled the factors necessary for a lasting democratization. Most importantly, state-society relations were democratized by the adoption of the Basic Law (the Federal Republic's constitution) which helped establish the foundations for German Civilian Power. The Basic Law was formed to guard against the powers of the state and granted basic rights on each individual citizen and it became the cornerstone of West German political culture, unlike the constitution of the Weimar Republic. Within thirty years of its adoption, the democratic values set forth in the Basic Law had become the common point of identity for Germans⁴⁹ instead of the previous identity founded upon culture and blood, thereby cementing the necessary features necessary for a Civilian Power foreign policy.

The theory of Civilian Power importantly suggests that German acknowledgement of the interdependence of today's world explains why Germany is a Civilian Power. Unfortunately, scholars that use this theoretical framework continue to restrict their analysis of German foreign policy to the country's actions in relation to other state actors or the actions of German leaders in relation to their foreign counterparts. In chronicling the bilateral diplomacy between Germany and its smaller Eastern neighbors, Tewes focuses on the actions of German Chancellor Kohl, other government ministers, ambassadors and their counterparts. This focus suggests that one-on-one meetings single-handedly ensured that German bilateral relations with Hungary, Poland, etc. remained on good footing after 1989.⁵⁰ The actions of the state in relation to non-state actors, which are numerous in Germany's current exchange diplomacy efforts, are sadly missing.

Additionally, even within this framework, security concerns continue to be seen as the driving force of most foreign policy actions. While talking about Civilian Power and human

⁴⁹ Tewes, *Germany, Civilian Power and the New Power*, 38.

⁵⁰ Tewes, *Germany, Civilian Power and the New Power*, 53-55.

rights, Pfeil asserts that the AA's human rights policy in 1995 highlighted the need to promote democracy and "good governance." But rather than stemming from a desire to spread a democratic structure similar to Germany's own, which according to the Civilian Power theory is what Germany's foreign policy should be about, Pfeil attributes this goal to security concerns, suggesting that the AA felt that by establishing internal democracies elsewhere, it was achieving external peace for itself.⁵¹ Furthermore, any mention of Germany's successes regarding human rights in the international arena are within the framework of international bodies such as the UN Commission on Human Rights.⁵² It seems clear that the current scholarship on German foreign policy and the theoretical frameworks within which they have been conducted are not applicable to the question at hand. The theoretical perspectives related to public diplomacy offer a more useful set of tools to understand the rising salience of exchange programs and the DAAD in relation to German's foreign policy objectives.

Public Diplomacy Scholarship

The field of public diplomacy (PD) has experienced a revival over the past decade with ample amounts of scholarship conducted into all facets of the field and more practitioners are realizing the value of this scholarship.⁵³ Most importantly in discussing the importance of exchange programs, public diplomacy scholarship has proposed the crucial theoretical concept of soft power. Initially proposed by Joseph Nye, soft power represents one of three ways in which any state used to affect other actors to obtain the state's objectives.⁵⁴ While a state may use

⁵¹ Florian Pfeil, "Civilian Power and human rights: the case of Germany," in *German foreign policy since unification: Theories and case studies*, ed. Volker Rittberger (New York: Manchester University Press, 2001): 90.

⁵² Pfeil, "Civilian Power and human rights," 91.

⁵³ Bruce Gregory, "Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616(2008): 275.

⁵⁴ Joseph S Nye Jr., "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616(2008): 94.

‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’ to influence others’ actions, soft power specifically uses attraction and “the ability to shape the preferences of others.”⁵⁵ Nye importantly differentiates between simple influence and the use of soft power, as influence can be gotten through hard power means. Soft power is the “ability to entice and attract,”⁵⁶ and this attractiveness can arise from a nation’s values, culture and policies.⁵⁷

Exchange diplomacy is made to either enhance or work as an agent of a nation’s soft power. The admittance of foreign citizens, who are important non-state actors in today’s high-tech world, is done in the hopes that these foreigners will be attracted to and enticed by the host nation. As the analysis shows, exchange programs can often be designed to achieve specific policies.⁵⁸ With the introduction of soft power into the lexicon public diplomacy has now become inextricably linked with the exercise of soft power. Advocates for the increasing importance of public diplomacy view soft power as a tool that carries fewer risks than many hard power tools,⁵⁹ an especially important consideration for the German government. This view of soft power as a less risky, yet just as potent way in which a state can achieve its foreign policy objectives provides a foundation upon which the German AA’s employment of exchange diplomacy can be rationalized.

Scholarship in the field of PD has largely focused on American efforts. Work that has looked at a more diversified set of states often presents a more general overview of these states’ efforts. Additionally, when discussing the theoretical bases for PD, the body of work largely

⁵⁵ Nye, “Public Diplomacy,” 95.

⁵⁶ Nye, “Public Diplomacy,” 95.

⁵⁷ Eytan Gilboa, “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy,” *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616(2008): 61.

⁵⁸ Nicholas J. Cull, *Public Diplomacy: Lessons From the Past* (Los Angeles: Figueroa Press, 2009): 20.

⁵⁹ Brian Hocking, “Rethinking the ‘New’ Public Diplomacy,” in *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations* ed. Jan Melissen (London: Palgrave, 2006): 33.

treats exchange diplomacy as a variety of cultural diplomacy, often times interchangeable with the term cultural relations. Cultural relations are usually viewed as an important part of historical PD efforts that have little relevance for current and future PD projects. Much of the recent scholarship on PD has focused on what is sometimes referred to as diplomacy 2.0, particularly the use of technological advances such as social media to augment and restructure the PD efforts of national governments. With the introduction of soft power into the lexicon by Joseph Nye, PD has now become inextricably linked with the exercise of soft power.

Nye sees public diplomacy as a means of utilizing and promoting a nation's soft power in order to reach a specific outcome.⁶⁰ Nye traces the advent of public diplomacy, although it was not known by that name, to the late 1800s after the Franco-Prussian War and explains the rapid evolution of American PD efforts through both World Wars and the post-War period then reaching the well known Cold War PD efforts that he believes helped bring about the fall of Soviet Russia.⁶¹ Nye contests that PD is today more important than it has ever been, citing the ability of publics to access information through non-traditional channels which leave state governments little room to sway public opinion through controlled means. Hence today the real challenge is not informing other publics but rather holding their attention (p.99).⁶² While Nye has identified various methods and types of PD largely accepted by other scholars he does not address the use of educational exchange as a PD effort to promote the sponsoring nation. Additionally, Nye earlier focused solely on American PD efforts and seemed to define soft power from the perspective of American foreign policy goals, but has recently revised his

⁶⁰ Nye, "Public Diplomacy," 94.

⁶¹ Nye, "Public Diplomacy," 98-99.

⁶² Nye, "Public Diplomacy," 99.

understanding of soft power and turned his attention to smart power, which deals with balancing both hard and soft power.⁶³

PD scholarship also focuses on communication channels and their effect on how PD is conducted. Gilboa focuses on previous scholarship examining the relevance and application of public relations and communications knowledge to PD practitioners and scholars in providing an overview of PD theory.⁶⁴ This is illustrated by his distinction between PD and media diplomacy.⁶⁵ Unlike Nye, he does not believe one single term such as soft power is adequate to encompass the various manifestation of public diplomacy today.⁶⁶ He contends that this addition of disciplines to the study of PD has come about as international relations and communications have grown more intertwined over the years, beginning in 1992 with Signitzer and Combs' linking of PR and PD. These new definitions of PD allow for the addition of non-state actors and reflect the increasing interdependence between all actors.⁶⁷

Gilboa acknowledges early on that there are large weaknesses in the current available scholarship on PD; observing that most current scholarship focuses on historical accounts of the United State's past PD efforts during the Cold War.⁶⁸ Still, he does not make more than a cursory mention of educational diplomacy in the context of addressing the various PD models introduced by scholars.⁶⁹ Gilboa asserts that PD efforts aimed at long-term results are indicative of traditional public diplomacy which is no longer optimal within the current information age framework. In doing so, Gilboa rejects the importance of exchange diplomacy in favor of

⁶³ Gilboa, "Searching," 62.

⁶⁴ Gilboa, "Searching," 73.

⁶⁵ Gilboa, "Searching," 58.

⁶⁶ Gilboa, "Searching," 56.

⁶⁷ Gilboa, "Searching," 57.

⁶⁸ Gilboa, "Searching," 56.

⁶⁹ Gilboa, "Searching," 66.

advocacy, cyber public diplomacy, and international broadcasting.⁷⁰ If this is the view gleaned from a general overview of PD scholarship then clearly such scholarship has little relevance to this analysis.

Unlike Gilboa, Melissen does see the relevance of these traditional forms of PD, but identifies them within the framework of a New Public Diplomacy which he feels is more closely connected to a PR approach.⁷¹ While he does not mention exchange diplomacy specifically, Melissen suggests that cultural relations, which he specifies as art and culture, now encompasses information activities which previously were solely responsible for communicating a country's journalism, research, thinking and national debate thereby exposing foreign publics to a country's beliefs and values.⁷² He believes that New Public Diplomacy places renewed value on establishing relations between non-governmental actors, a definition that could perhaps include exchange diplomacy. But he also makes the valid point that for practitioners of cultural relations their involvement with primarily non-governmental actors may be the precise reason why their work cannot be PD. PD usually refers to a government's attempt to inform foreign publics of its views and policies to create a favorable response.⁷³

This would suggest that exchange diplomacy cannot be considered a form of cultural relations even though organizations such as the Goethe Institute engage in activities that could be defined as New Public Diplomacy or cultural relations. The separation of both fields is considered necessary as any hint of government involvement in cultural relations efforts would hinder the trust such efforts establish between non-governmental actors and foreign publics.

⁷⁰ Gilboa, "Searching," 72.

⁷¹ Jan Melissen, *Wielding Soft Power: The New Public Diplomacy* (Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2005): 24.

⁷² Melissen, *Wielding Soft Power*, 25.

⁷³ Melissen, *Wielding Soft Power*, 26.

Melissen counters this claim, echoing Gilboa's assertion that in today's international information era PD practitioners no longer operate in a state-centric framework. Therefore their work will increasingly overlap with government efforts unless cultural relations practitioners assume a more limited role.⁷⁴

Nicholas Cull's "Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past," explicitly addresses exchange diplomacy, albeit as one of many PD tools. The paper outlines the definition of various terms within PD, its evolution and core concepts, and historical PD successes and failures among other topics. Unlike most other scholars in this field, particularly Nye, Cull believes that PD need not always be about immediately influencing others. He introduces the concept of listening as a function of PD, arguing that sometimes PD efforts can simply consist of a state's attempt to listen to a foreign public and change its actions accordingly. Therefore, Cull's definition of PD is broader than those mentioned in both Nye and Gilboa in that it uses "manage" rather than influence and asserts that all PD efforts are programs of engagement.⁷⁵

Cull describes exchange diplomacy as, "an actor's attempt to manage the international environment by sending its citizens overseas and reciprocally accepting citizens from overseas for a period of study and/or acculturation."⁷⁶ He makes a distinction between cultural diplomacy and exchange diplomacy stating that while exchange diplomacy is focused on mutuality and two-way communication within an exchange setting, cultural diplomacy primarily serves to project and sell a national culture. Cull denotes the Franco-German exchanges of the immediate post-War period as an example of successful exchange diplomacy, noting that the transformative

⁷⁴ Melissen, *Wielding Soft Power*, 26-27.

⁷⁵ Cull, *Public Diplomacy*, 12.

⁷⁶ Cull, *Public Diplomacy*, 20.

power of exchange diplomacy was all the more important in this case as the two nations had been in a state of near constant conflict for over 500 years.⁷⁷

In describing the evolution of the various exchange programs between France and Germany, Cull highlights the initiative shown by municipal and state authorities in establishing exchanges and institutes before the large scale participation at the federal level. He points to the shared threat of Soviet Russia, the overwhelming devastation experienced by both countries immediately after WWII, the French desire to export their language and the German desire to combat propaganda from the East as all driving factors in the establishment of extensive Franco-German exchange programs.⁷⁸ Cull identifies the institutional inertia acquired by exchange programs, particularly when they target future leaders as central to the success of these programs. In picking this particular example to showcase the effect of exchange diplomacy Cull does ask whether such thorough programs can only grow and have the support of the government after a history-altering event such as WWII.⁷⁹

By selecting exchange diplomacy as an entity separate but equal in relation to cultural diplomacy Cull, unlike most others in the field, recognizes the importance that some countries place on exchange diplomacy. However Cull continues the trend of only observing exchange diplomacy in a historical context in choosing the historical example of the Franco-German rapprochement. The majority view of PD theory either disregards cultural diplomacy, and by extension exchange diplomacy, or presents it as being of decreasing importance in the face of technological and informational advances that make PR and branding more relevant. Like Cull's paper, most works that do explore exchange diplomacy programs do so in a historical context.

⁷⁷ Cull, *Public Diplomacy*, 36.

⁷⁸ Cull, *Public Diplomacy*, 38-39.

⁷⁹ Cull, *Public Diplomacy*, 39.

Puckhaber, Bu, Vogel, and Naumann have all conducted such historical studies of educational exchange programs. Apart from Naumann's work, all of these authors examine American exchange programs with Puckhaber's article addressing German student exchange programs to the United States in the immediate post-war period. Puckhaber's article primarily studies the American government's motivations for bringing German high school students over to America and how they sought to frame and sell the program to the American public through the popular press. She focuses on policymakers' beliefs that the reason why Germany had failed to sustain a democracy was due to the prevalence of anti-democratic educational ideas. They believed that since reform could only come from within the best they could do was to expose Germans to democratic values.⁸⁰

The exchange programs targeted students considered to be future leaders in order to present them with ideas and methods contrary to those that they had become accustomed to during Nazi leadership.⁸¹ While the government itself had little interest in the actual running of the program they did get involved in selecting the right candidates, excluding students who had previously been part of anti-democratic or communist organizations.⁸² These exchanges were seen as community efforts as many community organizations such as churches and higher education institutes often sponsored the students.⁸³ While the programs ran under the auspices of the federal government, funding was privately raised for each individual student. Officials touted the so-called success of these programs in pushing democratic reform in then West Germany even though the problems encountered in reorienting German students upon their return home as

⁸⁰ Annette Puckhaber, "German Student Exchange Programs in the United States, 1946-1952," *German Historical Institute Bulletin* 30(2002): 124.

⁸¹ Puckhaber, "German Student Exchange Programs," 125.

⁸² Puckhaber, "German Student Exchange Programs," 124.

⁸³ Puckhaber, "German Student Exchange Programs," 126.

well as complaints from Americans who were wary of having former enemies live in their country suggest otherwise.⁸⁴

In his article on educational exchange and cultural diplomacy during the Cold War Bu, like Puckhaber, believes that the Soviet threat was a reason behind the establishment of educational exchange programs,⁸⁵ although unlike Puckhaber Bu does not cite any other reasons. This may be because Bu's paper is looking at the broader view of all American cultural diplomacy efforts during that time and so the need to expose students to democratic ideas so that they could build democratic institutions may have been specific to West Germany at the time. This security concern does not suggest a neo-realist justification for the creation of exchange programs as that particular concern is a product of that particular era that is not applicable today as the flow of information around the world has significantly changed. Bu specifically notes that education exchange programs at the time covered so many different activities that the term became synonymous with all cultural relations.⁸⁶ The United States was particularly active with international intercultural involvement at the time due to its efforts to exert its leadership on the global stage evidenced by its main role in the founding of the United Nations and the passing of Fulbright Act and the Smith-Mundt Act.⁸⁷ Bu also suggests that the support and advocacy of President Eisenhower on behalf of such exchange programs propelled the rapid growth of these programs.⁸⁸

Bu delves into the funding and institutional structure of organizations such as the Institute of International Education who became private partners to the State Department in running these

⁸⁴ Puckhaber, "German Student Exchange Programs," 136-137.

⁸⁵ Liping Bu, "Educational Exchange and Cultural Diplomacy in the Cold War," *Journal of American Studies* 33(1999): 394.

⁸⁶ Bu, "Educational Exchange," 393.

⁸⁷ Bu, "Educational Exchange," 394-395.

⁸⁸ Bu, "Educational Exchange," 396.

exchange programs. The IIE served as a contractor to the State Department to administer government sponsored exchange programs,⁸⁹ a function which it continues to perform today. While the IIE was funded through government contracts, the State Department was unable to keep up with the flow of students as it outgrew national facilities⁹⁰ and so the Ford Foundation, a private entity, stepped in to provide financial support which amounted to a little over half of the institution's entire budget.⁹¹ In addition to this funding, the Ford Foundation contracted IIE to run their exchange programs as well allowing IIE to integrate these programs into exchanges funded and created by the State Department.⁹² While Bu's work deals with American exchange programs, by describing the evolution and framework of IIE he provides a possible comparison for the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) whose role in German exchange diplomacy will be specifically examined in this paper.

Vogel's paper on the creation of the Fulbright Program under which Germany continues to accept a large number of higher education students and teaching assistants does not provide any insights into German exchange programs and the political motivations behind them. Like the other works mentioned, Vogel's work is only concerned with the American side of the program although it does shed some light on the changes in funding of the program over time. While the United States originally unilaterally funded the Fulbright exchanges after the passage of the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961, the State Department renegotiated its existing agreements and settled on a funding plan where the German counterpart funds more than half of the program's

⁸⁹ Bu, "Educational Exchange," 399.

⁹⁰ Bu, "Educational Exchange," 400.

⁹¹ Bu, "Educational Exchange," 402.

⁹² Bu, "Educational Exchange," 403.

cost.⁹³ This particular paper was written back in 1987 so the budgeting figures have most likely increased since then but the funding agreements most likely still stand, as the State Department often has a harder time getting Congressional approval for funding such programs than the German Foreign Ministry.

Cindy Naumann offers a different perspective by looking at British exchange programs in the post-war period and the motivations behind these programs while continuing the historical trend. Unlike the American programs that were first suggested after WWII, Naumann notes that Anglo-German exchange had been common practice prior to the twentieth century particularly at the university level where the German approach to higher education became the basis for post-graduate study in the United Kingdom.⁹⁴ Naumann believes that the main difference between Anglo-German exchange in the twentieth century and previous times was that after WWI the interest for such exchanges was based in efforts to promote international understanding between European countries rather than the previous focus on academic and intellectual purposes.⁹⁵

Naumann's work is also very pertinent to my research into the role of the DAAD today as it summarizes the changing role of the DAAD from its creation in 1925 through the Nazi period. In examining the memoranda and other documents from both British and German officials, she finds that the British government, as early as 1940, was discussing exchange programs as a way to re-educate the German populace after WWII.⁹⁶ They realized however that they could not directly determine the future of German education as the German people were already upset that so much of their future was being determined without their input after WWII. Officials felt that

⁹³ Ralph H. Vogel, "The Making of the Fulbright Program," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 491(1987): 19.

⁹⁴ Cindy Naumann, "The Rebirth of Educational Exchange: Anglo-German university level youth exchange programmes after the Second World War," *Research in Comparative and International Education*, 2(2007): 355.

⁹⁵ Naumann, "The Rebirth of Educational Exchange," 356.

⁹⁶ Naumann, "The Rebirth of Educational Exchange," 358.

the only way to ensure that the Germans understood that others had confidence in them was to build personal relationships. To help foster these relationships, the German Educational Reconstruction (GER) organization was created and it quickly expanded its focus to include informing the English about Germans and vice versa, acting as a facilitator of exchange programs.⁹⁷ As the British saw universities as Germany's main way of building relationships with the rest of the world, most exchange programs that were set up were targeted at university students and faculty.⁹⁸

In addressing the funding of these programs, Naumann observes that due to the British government's lack of funds when it was involved in a rebuilding effort back home as well, for a time private groups helped the individual students until, as was the case with the Fulbright Program, the German government took over most of the monetary and organizational responsibility of running these programs.⁹⁹ This shift in management allowed the exchanges to facilitate a more bilateral relationship as opposed to the unilateral relationship that existed at the onset of these programs. While Naumann's article importantly offers another viewpoint outside of the American one in regards to post-war exchange programs it does not shed much light on the German players involved in facilitating these exchanges. Furthermore, Naumann's focus is on the British institutions and organizations that were tasked with building and initially managing these programs.

Outside of these two narratives of the role of cultural diplomacy in American PD efforts and the study of historical exchange programs very little scholarship is to be found on German exchange programs from a PD viewpoint. There is work that approaches this topic from an

⁹⁷ Naumann, "The Rebirth of Educational Exchange," 359-360.

⁹⁸ Naumann, "The Rebirth of Educational Exchange," 362.

⁹⁹ Naumann, "The Rebirth of Educational Exchange," 365.

higher education background such as Herman Neumeister's article on how education in the Federal Republic of Germany after WWII was designed to foster international understanding by decree of the individual state constitutions that were written in that time.¹⁰⁰ Neumeister's article does address the topic of exchanges although not student exchanges. As the director of the Educational Interchange Service (PAD) at the time of the article's publishing, Neumeister focuses on the teacher exchange programs run by his organization in cooperation with the state governments where teachers serve as cultural ambassadors to both their pupils abroad and their pupils back home.¹⁰¹

While his article does not illuminate the inner workings of the PAD or its relationship to the Foreign Ministry and other institutions involved in German exchange programs, Neumeister's assertion of the enshrinement of the belief in education as a tool for international understanding in state constitutions may provide a justification for Germany's continued commitment to exchange diplomacy. Even though this article was written over three decades ago and the programs offered by PAD and other exchange administrators in German may have changed, the state constitutions have most likely not changed.

As is evident in this review of the current literature, there is scant scholarship on German exchange diplomacy which given that the overwhelming amount of all PD scholarship focuses on the United States is not surprising. Additionally, those sources that do directly analyze German exchange programs are sadly out of date and are therefore of little help as the German government has continued to expand its PD efforts since the Cold War period. Most contemporary works on the topic look at the administration of these individual exchange

¹⁰⁰ Hermann Neumeister, "Education for International Understanding in the Federal Republic of Germany," *The Phi Delta Kappan*, 51(1970): 259.

¹⁰¹ Neumeister, "Education for International Understanding," 262.

programs rather than examining what role these programs and more importantly the institutions that administer them such as the DAAD occupy in the larger German PD effort.

Methods

Given the paucity of scholarship directly addressing contemporary German exchange diplomacy, my analysis is largely based on a document analysis of the DAAD's annual reports, primary sources from the AA's own public materials and statements of official policy. The primary sources taken from the DAAD's present budgetary information, chart the evolution of the organization over the last sixty years, and most importantly, reflect the AA's main aims in regards exchange diplomacy as a main tenant of its foreign policy. This emphasis on exchange diplomacy within the primary documents implies the presence of a certain worldview within the AA that values the actions of non-state actors and individuals in building important and lasting relationships. Additionally, secondary sources such as news articles from leading German newspapers and magazines do serve to reinforce the new foreign policy priorities of the AA that is reflected in the use of exchange diplomacy. These materials have been analyzed to locate an emergent reasoning framework for German foreign policy anchored just as strongly in exchange diplomacy as in the traditional areas of engagement in international organizations, or the further cultivation of bilateral relations.

In analyzing the historical precedent set by the Franco-German rapprochement, my historical analysis has been based off of past scholarly research as well as the very text of the Elysée Treaty with particular emphasis paid to any mention of the creation of exchange programs and their subsequent sustained growth. In addressing the other main thrusts of this paper's main argument, I have chosen to use primary sources from both the DAAD and the AA in the textual

analysis with limited use of secondary sources like newspaper and magazine articles. This limited use of secondary sources, particularly the lack of opinion pieces, is partly due to the nature of the German press, in that journalistic coverage of the DAAD is often limited to traditional reporting and interviews within the university section. While these secondary sources succinctly summarize and positively portray the AA's efforts in conjunction with the DAAD they do not offer much insight into the AA's general perception of exchange diplomacy.

Analysis

Initially founded in 1925, the DAAD was subject to increasing politicization in the lead up to and during the Nazi Era and formally shut down in 1948. The organization was revived in 1950, based out of Bonn, and began work to provide scholarships for both foreign students coming to German and German students going abroad and to facilitate student exchanges. Both of these responsibilities continue to make up the bulk of the organization's work today. The DAAD's work has continually grown in scope over the last sixty years, matching the organization's budget which has steadily grown from an initial DM 7,000 back in 1950.¹⁰²

Why does the German government, specifically the AA, continue to give the DAAD increasing monetary support despite the recent economic crisis? Upon close analysis of both the predominant theory-based logic that appears to underscore policy decisions as well as the discourse within the AA and the German media surrounding educational exchange this paper proposes three likely factors contributing to the significance of the DAAD as a component of Germany's foreign policy repertoire, and the salience of exchange programs in German conceptions of public diplomacy. The paper explores the following claims:

¹⁰² Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst (DAAD), "History," accessed April 13, 2011, <http://www.daad.de/portrait/wer-wir-sind/geschichte/08945.en.html>.

First, the past historical success of the Franco-German exchanges during the post-WWII era has established a positive precedent for exchange as a tool that can transform Germany's image with foreign audiences. This particular policy of people-to-people exchange created a positive regard for the practice that allowed the AA to place AKBP at the center of German foreign policy, thereby rationalizing its continuous support for organizations such as the DAAD.

Second, a strong AKBP supported by the DAAD and others has allowed Germany to rebuild the image of its universities as ideal institutions where young researchers and scientists help Germany stay competitive in the international competition to produce the next great minds in the future. Once the blueprint upon which American and British universities modeled their own structure and practices, German universities did not escape the effects of the Nazi era,¹⁰³ and subsequently lost their prestige and position at the forefront of academic study. The past continues to weigh heavily on Germany and so the rehabilitation of the image of German universities is seen as vital to the rebuilding of Germany's image on the world stage.

Lastly, the German government seeks to use academic exchange in tandem with other initiatives to promote German language learning. In other words, exchange programs help boost the profile of German as a foreign language and by extension help restore Germany's importance on the world stage. With the initiation of the "German- Language of Ideas," campaign in 2010, which aims to position German as a challenger to English in science research and publication,¹⁰⁴ all three motivations converge in an effort run by the DAAD that aptly demonstrates the importance of exchange diplomacy within the AKBP and by extension, German foreign policy.

¹⁰³ Paul R. Neureiter, "Hitlerism and the German Universities," *The Journal of Higher Education*, 70(1999): 2-3.

¹⁰⁴ Auswärtiges Amt, "Deutsch – Sprache der Ideen," accessed April 16, 2011, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/KulturDialog/Initiativen/DSDI/Uebersicht_node.html.

The three justifications argued in this paper reflect the salience of particular ideas that sustain the discourse of foreign policy and more broadly, strategic thinking on what is perceived to be required for German engagement in international relations given the unique historical constraints the country faces. The paper explores these three claims in depth through historical and document analysis of the DAAD program, journalistic coverage of various AA initiatives and the DAADs participation in these initiatives and official publications that offer justification and explanation for German foreign policy imperatives and reveal the particular significance of public diplomacy as a motivating strategy.

Historical Precedent

In policy making, it is often true that sometimes things remain constant simply because there is nothing to prove that a change in policy would yield better results; politics can often be a risk-averse line of work. In light of historical precedent, the current plethora of exchange programs funded by the AA seems less unusual than might otherwise be perceived. In examining past German public diplomacy efforts it is possible to pinpoint a time frame within which exchange diplomacy came to almost suddenly occupy a prominent role in German foreign policy; the advent of the Franco-German rapprochement after the end of WWII. This particular thawing of relations is seen as a perfect example of the power of exchange diplomacy when practiced properly.¹⁰⁵

Although the Franco-German relationship prior to this new era of cooperation between the two nations is often described as being one of the most volatile rivalries until 1945,¹⁰⁶ the two nations did participate in cultural exchange prior to this period. After WWI, both countries began

¹⁰⁵ Cull, "Public Diplomacy," 36.

¹⁰⁶ Cull, "Public Diplomacy," 36.

to harmonize interests and attitudes using both existing and new networks of acquaintances on a nongovernmental level. Due to these efforts, a large amount of cultural exchange happened during the interwar period.¹⁰⁷ Unlike the Franco-German exchanges that took place in the post-war period, these exchanges happened within an international rather than bilateral setting. As these exchanges were initiated by non-governmental organizations instead of national governments, they were unable to have an immediate impact on intergovernmental relations. These programs were still important, however, in that they were able to influence future leaders,¹⁰⁸ a role that most exchanges seek to play even today. Unfortunately most of the international endeavors during this period were short-lived¹⁰⁹ and had little lasting impact outside of setting a precedent for future attempts to return to this path after WWII.

In 1945, after the horrors of WWII began to draw to an end, politicians and leaders in both France and Germany realized that reconciliation between their countries was vital for ensuring that the then fragile peace would last. The pioneer of exchanges between the two countries was the *Bureau International de Liaison et de Documentation* (BILD), an initiative to promote Franco-German understanding founded by a French Jesuit priest. The initial exchanges featured school children. Around the same time municipal leaders were using exchange as a way to build relationships with their counterparts across the border through a system of agreements, beginning in 1950, that linked similar French and German towns¹¹⁰; somewhat similar to the current Sister Cities programs.

¹⁰⁷ Guido Müller, "France and Germany after the Great War: Businessmen, Intellectuals and Artists in Nongovernmental European Networks," in *Culture and International History* ed. Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003): 98.

¹⁰⁸ Müller, "France and Germany," 105.

¹⁰⁹ Müller, "France and Germany," 98.

¹¹⁰ Cull, "Public Diplomacy," 37.

Within the framework of these agreements, civic and student exchanges flourished, their success prompting the national governments of both nations to act. These early programs were seen as instrumental in building the “human infrastructure of the political relationship,¹¹¹” and helped create “a certain awareness of a common destiny.¹¹²” When discussing the Franco-German reconciliation immediately after WWII, scholars often regard the signing of the Franco-German Cooperation Treaty in 1963, as the end of the Franco-German rapprochement.¹¹³ Treaty signatories believed that the Treaty, “solemnly sealed Franco-German reconciliation,” and that “the enmity between the two peoples.....belonged to the past.¹¹⁴” Instead, the reconciliation carries on today and the longevity of this relationship through exchange and other soft power mechanisms helps reinforce the benefits of exchange as a PD tool.

The Elysée Treaty created an intergovernmental bond between Germany and France. The Treaty prominently featured exchange as a way to establish important relationships between German officials and their French counterparts, even though this was not the only issue addressed. The Treaty itself consisted of two main parts; the first outlined the general parameters of the Franco-German relationship and the second, contained three main parts, the most important of which established the requirement that both governments consult each other before all important decisions dealing with any area of foreign policy, particularly issues that were of interest to both nations.¹¹⁵ Within this second portion of the Treaty there are many explicit references to exchanges of personnel. For example, within section (B) of the second part

¹¹¹ Alfred Grosser, qtd. in Ulrich Krotz, “Parapublic Underpinnings of International Relations: The Franco-German Construction of a Europeanization of a Particular Kind,” *European Journal of International Relations*, 13(2007):388.

¹¹² Jacques Delors and Karl Lamers, qtd. in Ulrich Krotz, “Parapublic Underpinnings of International Relations: The Franco-German Construction of a Europeanization of a Particular Kind,” *European Journal of International Relations*, 13(2007):388.

¹¹³ Ulrich Krotz, *Structure as Process: The Regularized Intergovernmentalism of Franco-German Bilateralism*, (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2002): 4.

¹¹⁴ Krotz, *Structure*, 4.

¹¹⁵ Krotz, *Structure*, 4.

of the Treaty, an exchange of personnel from the armed forces of both countries is established.¹¹⁶ The Treaty established the practice of exchanges between diplomatic personnel, a practice which grew in importance throughout the decades following the Treaty's implementation.¹¹⁷

Section (C) of the second part of the Treaty directly addressed youth affairs and once again established youth exchange as a means to improve Franco-German cooperation.¹¹⁸ In his work on Franco-German relations, Krotz singles out educational and youth exchanges as one of the three main pillars of the parapublic underpinnings of this partnership. These programs have involved over seven million participants since 1963.¹¹⁹ As Nick Cull points out, many of Germany's leaders who came of age during the formative years of the exchange programs between the two countries understood the need for continued cooperation between the two countries.¹²⁰ Robert Picht's analysis of Franco-German high school exchange highlights the DAAD's role in providing institutional support in implementing programs, as outlined in the Treaty as early as 1963.¹²¹ These exchanges helped create a strong friendship between the two nations, particularly at the secondary school level, which continues today. The DAAD still fosters this specific relationship by developing various programs that specifically focus on the German-French relationship and look to maximize impact by focusing on specific groups such as teachers of Roman and Germanic languages.¹²²

¹¹⁶ Alistair McConnachie, "The Treaty of Elysée....The Real Heart of Europe," accessed April 16, 2011, <http://www.sovereignty.org.uk/features/eucon/elysee.html>.

¹¹⁷ Krotz, *Structure*, 6.

¹¹⁸ McConnachie, "The Treaty."

¹¹⁹ Krotz, "Parapublic Underpinnings," 387.

¹²⁰ Cull, "Public Diplomacy," 38.

¹²¹ Robert Picht, "Deutsch-Französischer Hochschulaustausch: Stand und Perspektiven," *Aktuelle Frankreich Analysen*, 11(1998): 3.

¹²² Picht, "Deutsch-Französischer Hochschulaustausch," 7.

More pertinent to the central question of this analysis, however, is the snowball effect created by the establishment of these programs¹²³ even though they were not completely state-funded and run at the time. Those students who participated in the first Franco-German exchange programs helped establish state-funded programs when they entered public life, beginning in 1963. The generation that participated in these programs went on to commit to further agreements in 1988 and afterwards,¹²⁴ successfully maintaining the close Franco-German bilateral relationship that began in the late 1940s.

The ENA program, founded in 1966, is a strong example of this phenomenon. In this program, select German post-graduate students are enrolled in an elite French university to study public administration in order to observe the mechanics of the French state from within. Many of the 300 alumni of this program have gone on to occupy crucial positions within the Franco-German relationship, even within the German Chancellery.¹²⁵ The positive precedent of the youth exchange programs begun during the Franco-German rapprochement served to legitimize exchange diplomacy as a staple of future German foreign policy. The AA looks to replicate this strengthening of bilateral ties through exchange with all of its partners; a goal reflected in the DAAD's first key objective:

*Promoting outstanding young students and academics from abroad in order to win over future leaders in education, science and research, culture, industry and commerce, politics, and the media as partners and friends of Germany.*¹²⁶

¹²³ Cull, "Public Diplomacy," 39.

¹²⁴ Cull, "Public Diplomacy," 39.

¹²⁵ Picht, "Deutsch-Französischer Hochschulaustausch," 7.

¹²⁶ Dr. Christiane Bode and Nadine Pils, eds. *Annual Report 2009 Summary*, trans. James M. Croft (Bonn: Brandt, GmbH, 2010), 18.

The success of exchange programs specifically focused on the Franco-German bilateral relationship also serves to legitimate the DAAD's expanding roster of programs.¹²⁷ In increasing the scope of its activities, the DAAD is able to attract increased funding from the AA.¹²⁸ For example, in 1986 the DAAD, in conjunction with the French government, began an exchange program focused on fostering research initiatives that included participants of both nationalities in areas of natural science, life science, environmental science and engineering. By 1996, this program supported over 200 research projects. Based upon this success, the DAAD used this program as a model for creating similar programs with other European nations.¹²⁹ The variety and longevity of these programs created and administered by the DAAD are seen as instrumental in helping produce a generation of young Europeans who see Franco-German cooperation as natural.¹³⁰ Most importantly, the decision to embark on exchange programs with the French in particular signified an acceptance of exchange diplomacy that laid the groundwork for its continued importance through today.

Internationalization of German Higher Education

In addition to enhancing positive bilateral relations between Germany and its various foreign partners, the DAAD's exchange programs are also seen as a way to reestablish "Germany as a centre of learning and research in all its magnitude and diversity."¹³¹ This need to work on the internationalization of German universities was acknowledged by the AA more than ten years ago, as evidenced by the establishment of the annual publication of "Wissenschaft

¹²⁷ Bode and Pils, *Annual Report*, 37.

¹²⁸ Bode and Pils, *Annual Report*, 17.

¹²⁹ Picht, "Deutsch-Französischer Hochschulaustausch," 7.

¹³⁰ Picht, "Deutsch-Französischer Hochschulaustausch," 8.

¹³¹ Auswärtiges Amt, "Research and academic relations initiative – instruments," accessed April 16, 2011, <http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/KulturDialog/Initiativen/Aussenwissenschaftsinitiative2009/Massnahmen.html>.

weltoffen,” by the DAAD and the College Information Exchange GmbH (HIS). The publication is an annual data report on the international nature of academic study and research in Germany.¹³² At that time, even though the percentage of foreign students at German universities in Germany was on par with other industrialized countries, the majority of these students came from other European countries.¹³³ Since that time, the AA has understood that internationalization, defined as the process of making Germany and its universities more internationally well-known research and academic destinations,¹³⁴ was dependent on increasing the overall number of foreign students as well as increasing diversity within those students.

The internationalization of German universities through exchange programs is also a way to rehabilitate the global standing of these institutions which has been slow to recover since the country’s turbulent times early in the 20th century. German universities, particularly after the liberal reforms of Alexander von Humboldt, were seen as the blueprint for American universities during the 19th century (Huddleston, pg. 43),¹³⁵ but today the position has reversed. The AA seeks to use exchange programs at the university level, primarily focusing on the science and research, “to attract and keep the best minds.....the elites of tomorrow¹³⁶” at German universities. This view is reinforced by the third objective outlined by the DAAD:

¹³² “Über Wissenschaft Weltoffen,” *Wissenschaft Weltoffen 2010*, accessed April 16, 2011, <http://www.wissenschaft-weltoffen.de/about>.

¹³³ Sabine Hieber, “Internationalization of German Higher Education,” *Millenium*, 11(1998): 1.

¹³⁴ Auswärtiges Amt, “Ziele und Aufgaben der Außwärtigen Kulturpolitik,” accessed April 16, 2011, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/KulturDialog/ZieleUndPartner/ZielePartner_node.html.

¹³⁵ John Huddleston, “German Universities and Adult Education,” *British Journal of Educational Studies*, 18(1970): 42.

¹³⁶ Auswärtiges Amt, “Research and Academic initiative – instruments.”

*Promoting the international standing and appeal of German institutions of higher education and thereby preserving or re-establishing Germany's reputation as a top place for studying for young academics and researchers from all over the world.*¹³⁷

German universities, unlike their British or American counterparts, were initially connected to the State out of necessity, but with the rise in prominence of academic research, they became increasingly independent. This independence was even enshrined in the Weimar Constitution, but German academia's passivity towards the political events of the turbulent inter-war and Nazi era caused German universities to lose prestige and start to lag behind their English-speaking counterparts. This is not to say that professors were wholly responsible. Over three fourths of the student bodies of German universities during these years possibly supported the Nazi party and owed their allegiance to party leaders who operated outside the university system.¹³⁸ The overwhelming nature of this support, characterized by large book burnings, caught foreign academics off guard and diminished the popularity of formerly well-respected institutions such as the University of Berlin. The independence of these universities was compromised, alarming foreign academics.¹³⁹

As these institutions worked to recover from the deeply negative consequences of the Nazi era after the end of WWII, they first had to focus on rebuilding their standing domestically. By the time they had made progress in this area, the German model had been outstripped by the Anglo-American model¹⁴⁰ in the new globalized field of higher education. Today more than ever, universities are central to the knowledge-based societies that are required to remain

¹³⁷ Bode and Pils, *Annual Report*, 18.

¹³⁸ Neureiter, "Hitlerism," 510.

¹³⁹ Neureiter, "Hitlerism," 511.

¹⁴⁰ Rosalind Pritchard, "Trends in the Restructuring of German Universities," *Comparative Education Review*, 50(2006): 91.

globally competitive by conducting research that enables innovation and training individuals to work in knowledge- or service-based industries.¹⁴¹ Student mobility has grown along with the globalization of higher education, and Germany belongs to a group of six countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, that has experienced an increase in the overall number of incoming students.¹⁴²

The AA believes that “exchange programmes and school partnerships promote cross-border mobility,¹⁴³” aiding the internationalization of German universities. To further aid in this process, the AA has also developed plans to establish “German Houses of Research and Innovation,” that will house external sites of German universities abroad in collaboration with research organizations such as the Max Planck Foundation, and German companies. These houses, begun in 2009, are meant to “showcase Germany as a centre of learning and research in all its magnitude and diversity.¹⁴⁴”

Fachzentren, similar to the “German Houses of Research and Innovation” but housed on the campuses of foreign universities, have already been established at universities around Africa to provide graduate and doctoral programs to foreign students. By creating these *Fachzentren*, Germany is looking to give its universities access to international cooperation,¹⁴⁵ crucial in achieving the internationalization of German higher education. The German government hopes

¹⁴¹ Phillip G. Altbach and Ulrich Teichler, “Internationalization and Exchanges in a Globalized University,” *Journal of Studies in International Education*, 5(2001): 5.

¹⁴² Altbach and Teichler, “Internationalization,” 7.

¹⁴³ Auswärtiges Amt, “International exchange in the schools sector,” accessed April 16, 2011, <http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/KulturDialog/SchulenJugendSport/InternationalerSchulaaustausch.html>.

¹⁴⁴ Auswärtiges Amt, “Research and academic relations initiative – instruments.”

¹⁴⁵ Auswärtiges Amt, “Fachzentren in Afrika: Top-Ausbildung für die Entscheider von morgen,” accessed April 16, 2011, http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/KulturDialog/Initiativen/Aussenwissenschaftsinitiative2009/Bildungspartnerschaften/Maerz11/Fachzentren_in_Afrika.html.

that by enacting visa and immigration policy changes which make studying in Germany easier for foreign students. This goal of ‘quality through internationality’ is echoed in the many scholarships and international programs offered by the DAAD which are all aimed at making Germany “attractive for the best in the world.”¹⁴⁶ Exchange agencies like the DAAD have been one of the main actors working to capitalize on the increased mobility of both students and staff during the last few decades. And in that role, these agencies have come to set priorities for the exchange activities of universities and even national governments.¹⁴⁷

The AA’s focus on presenting German universities as research institutions above all else, is aptly represented in the term “Wissenschaftsstandort,” or research campus as a way to describe the goal of these academic exchanges. The term is echoed in media coverage of the push to draw more post-graduate and doctoral students to Germany.¹⁴⁸ In order to establish Germany as a center for quality research, the AA’s Research and Academic Relations Initiative also supports the exchange of researchers and scientists. Programs that bring foreign scientists to Germany to teach or research helps establish the image of Germany as a country with superior facilities and research opportunities. Additionally, these programs allow the best in their fields to come and teach or research in Germany.¹⁴⁹ Programs that take German scientists abroad to teach or

¹⁴⁶ Sascha Zoske and Sebastian Balzter, “Eingeschrieben, abgeschrieben,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 2, 2010, accessed April 16, 2011, <http://www.faz.net/s/Rub1A09F6EF89FE4FD19B3755342A3F509A/Doc~E71983550490B4448A26D11149CFE6710~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html>.

¹⁴⁷ Altbach and Teichler, “Internationalization,” 8.

¹⁴⁸ Tilmann Warnecke, “Doktoranden zieht es nach Deutschland,” *Zeit Online*, July 20, 2010, accessed April 16, 2011, <http://www.zeit.de/wissen/2010-07/doktoranden-deutschland>.

¹⁴⁹ Auswärtiges Amt, “Wissenschaft und Hochschulen,” accessed April 16, 2011, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/KulturDialog/Wissenschaft/HochWissFor_node.html.

research help the AA raise German universities' profile by giving foreign students a glimpse into German academic practices.¹⁵⁰

Along with funding scholarships exchange programs for scientists are the “core of the foreign culture and education policy in the area of higher education and the sciences,¹⁵¹” for the AA. Consistently increasing the size and scope of these programs increases the number of participants who are then able to help Germany retain its ability to perform well in the international competition for the best minds.¹⁵² As with most exchange initiatives supported by the AA, of the over 25 different organizations that funded scientists, the DAAD supported the vast majority of the foreign participants and the largest number of domestic participants in 2010.¹⁵³

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¹⁵⁰ Auswärtiges Amt, “Deutsche Lektoren im Ausland: Botschafter der deutschen Sprache und des Hochschulstandorts Deutschland,” accessed April 16, 2011, http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/KulturDialog/Initiativen/Aussenwissenschaftsinitiative2009/Bildungspartnerschaften/September/Bildungspartnerschaften-September_node.html.

¹⁵¹ Auswärtiges Amt, “Wissenschaft und Hochschulen.”

¹⁵² Auswärtiges Amt, “Wissenschaft und Hochschulen.”

¹⁵³ Förderorganisationen, Gefördertengruppen, Fachrichtungen,” *Wissenschaft Weltoffen 2010*, accessed April 16, 2011, <http://www.wissenschaft-weltoffen.de/daten/7/1>.

¹⁵⁴ Warnecke, “Doktoranden zieht es nach Deutschland.”

teach or research in Germany.¹⁵⁵ Programs that take German scientists abroad to teach or research help raise the profile of German universities by giving foreign students a glimpse into German academic practices.¹⁵⁶

Strengthening German Language Learning Worldwide

Hand in hand with this internationalization and rehabilitation of German universities is the use of exchange programs to boost German language learning worldwide. The AA believes that promoting the German language is instrumental in establishing long-term bonds with future leaders in all fields, and strengthens the standard of business, science and research in Germany.¹⁵⁷ The most recent initiative by the AA in this direction is the “German: Language of Ideas,” campaign launched by the AA in 2009. The campaign is meant to help increase interest in the German language, especially amongst young people, and open doors to German science, economics, and culture. The campaign also aims to build support for the study of German-as-a-foreign-language from key figures in the fields of politics, education, business and media. As in the field of higher education, German has been overtaken by English as the main language of science and academia, and only 14.5 million people learn German worldwide.¹⁵⁸ This is yet again a reversal of past historical trends, and the AA hopes to counter this trend through exchange diplomacy, all the while understanding that universities increasingly must teach in English to remain competitive with other institutions.¹⁵⁹ The DAAD plays an important role in

¹⁵⁵ Auswärtiges Amt, “Wissenschaft und Hochschulen.”

¹⁵⁶ Auswärtiges Amt, “Deutsche Lektoren im Ausland.”

¹⁵⁷ Auswärtiges Amt, “Deutsch – Sprache der Ideen.”

¹⁵⁸ Auswärtiges Amt, “Deutsch – Sprache der Ideen.”

¹⁵⁹ “Sprechen Sie Deutsch? Nein? No problem...,” *The Independent* March 10, 2011, accessed April 16, 2011, <http://www.independent.co.uk/student/postgraduate/quotssprechen-sie-deutsch-nein-no-problemquot-2237988.html>.

funding exchange programs and individual scholarships to promote the German language, as evidenced by the organization's fourth institutional objective:

*Promoting German studies and the German language, including German literature and regional studies, at select foreign universities so as to strengthen German as an important academic and scientific language and as a lingua franca, and helping to disseminate knowledge about German current affairs.*¹⁶⁰

When providing funding for foreign students to come study in German universities, the AA looks for students who are interested in German language or have previously taken German studies.¹⁶¹ Specific exchange programs have been created by the DAAD to target students at the top of their class at foreign German language schools in the hopes that with this possibility of receiving financial support, these students will continue their study of German. Similarly, the DAAD has also recently begun the Promotion of German-as-a-Foreign-Language Courses in support of German Universities Abroad program that is dedicated to helping the establishment of German-as-a-Foreign Language courses abroad in cooperation with German universities.¹⁶²

An emerging trend in the AA's promotion of these programs has been to highlight the life-changing impact that learning German can have for students in developing or war-torn countries, particularly Iraq and Afghanistan. An article from the *Spiegel* in 2009 succinctly sums up this causality in its tagline, "Whoever learns German in Afghanistan can hope for a better life."¹⁶³ The article profiles Khalil Ahmad Sarbas, an Afghan student studying German studies in

¹⁶⁰ Bode and Pils, *Annual Report*, 20.

¹⁶¹ Auswärtiges Amt, "Scholarship programmes: opportunities for the best students," accessed April 16, 2011, <http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/KulturDialog/Initiativen/Aussenwissenschaftsinitiative2009/Bildungspartnerschaften/Mai/Stipendien-JunZhu.html>.

¹⁶² Bode and Pils, *Annual Report*, 36.

¹⁶³ Katrin Elger, "Es fühlt sich so nach Freiheit an," *Spiegel Online*, April 20, 2009, accessed April 16, 2011, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/unispiegel/d-65099622.html>.

Jena, Germany with funding from the DAAD. The contrast between his uncertain life in Kabul, full of soldiers and a meager income, and his life in Germany, where he has free time to read Kafka, is heavily drawn. The main point is that by learning German, Khalil has changing his life for the better and that, as hoped by the AA, he wants to go back home after completing his studies and teach German to students in Kabul.¹⁶⁴ This idea that learning German can lead to a better life advantageously supports the growth of German universities, by placing university study in Germany as the bridge between the means, German language skills, and the goal, a more secure and stable future.¹⁶⁵

In addition to programs that help foreign students study German studies in Germany, the DAAD does have programs that help German teachers and lecturers teach abroad. These teachers are seen as “ambassadors of the German language,¹⁶⁶” and German culture. Such programs sent 493 German teachers to 110 different countries in 2009, and operated a budget of over €20 million. The programs have long been a staple of the DAAD’s work and were founded as early as 1953.¹⁶⁷ As with most programs that promote the German language these programs also inadvertently promote university study in Germany by presenting students in 110 countries with the experience of what university life in Germany would be like. Some of these programs even contain a travel component that allows these German teachers to travel with their students to Germany for one or two weeks in order to give students a firsthand experience. The AA and the DAAD hope that the teachers will help cultivate students’ interest in Germany leading them to study at German universities in the future. The teachers also introduce the students to the DAAD

¹⁶⁴ Elger, “Es fühlt sich so nach Freiheit an.”

¹⁶⁵ Auswärtiges Amt, “Bildung für eine bessere Zukunft,” accessed April 16, 2011, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/KulturDialog/Initiativen/Aussenwissenschaftsinitiative2009/Bildungspartnerschaften/Januar11/Bildungspartnerschaften_node.html.

¹⁶⁶ Auswärtiges Amt, “Deutsche Lektoren im Ausland.”

¹⁶⁷ Auswärtiges Amt, “Deutsche Lektoren im Ausland.”

and the various exchange programs and scholarships that the organization funds in the hope that these students will participate in these programs.¹⁶⁸

Conclusion

The AA's decision to continually increase the amount of funds available to the DAAD, despite the recent economic crisis, shows a strong confidence in the importance and success of exchange diplomacy as a foreign policy tool. Upon close analysis of both the theoretical shifts in German foreign policy thinking as well as the discourse within the AA and the German media surrounding educational exchange there seem to be three main reasons why this is so. First, the past historical success of the Franco-German exchanges during the post-WWII era has established a positive precedent for exchange as a tool that can transform Germany's image with foreign audiences. This particular policy of people-to-people exchange created a positive regard for the practice that allowed the AA to place AKBP at the center of German foreign policy, thereby rationalizing its continuous support for organizations such as the DAAD.

Second, a strong AKBP supported by the DAAD and others has allowed Germany to rebuild the image of its universities as ideal institutions where young researchers and scientists help Germany stay competitive in the international competition to produce the next great minds in the future. Once the blueprint upon which American and British universities modeled their own structure and practices, German universities did not escape the effects of the Nazi era,¹⁶⁹ and subsequently lost their prestige and position at the forefront of academic study. The past continues to weigh heavily on Germany and so the rehabilitation of the image of German universities is seen as vital to the rebuilding of Germany's image on the world stage.

¹⁶⁸ Auswärtiges Amt, "Deutsche Lektoren im Ausland."

¹⁶⁹ Neureiter, "Hitlerism," 2-3.

Lastly, the German government seeks to use academic exchange in tandem with other initiatives to promote German language learning; in other words, boost the profile of German as a foreign language and once again by extension help restore Germany's importance on the world stage. With the initiation of the "German- Language of Ideas," campaign in 2009, which aims to position German as a challenger to English in science research and publication,¹⁷⁰ all three motivations combine in an effort run by the DAAD that aptly demonstrates the importance of exchange diplomacy within the AKBP and by extension, German foreign policy.

All of the programs and initiatives that I discovered in looking at the collaboration between the DAAD and the AA are examples of Germany's public diplomacy because they seek to allow Germany to engage with a foreign public,¹⁷¹ in this case with individual foreign citizens rather than other states. The post-WWII move to manage the international environment by using exchange programs and scholarships to attract foreign publics suggests that the AA has prioritized policies that rely on a more nuanced view of power. Foreign policy studies therefore should duly expand to include the study of German public diplomacy efforts. The inclusion of the study of public diplomacy is uniquely important for scholarship on Germany as no other nation of comparable economic strength and size has so clearly placed public diplomacy efforts at the center of foreign policy. In a more general sense perhaps the AA's actions signal a trend that will become increasingly common as access to information and the continued rise of non-state actors continues. If this is the case, then scholars need to adopt and create alternative frameworks for foreign policy study.

¹⁷⁰ Auswärtiges Amt, "Deutsch – Sprache der Ideen."

¹⁷¹ Cull, "Public Diplomacy," 12.

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