

US Base Politics in Asia- Pacific: Japan & the Philippines

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This paper analyzes the comparative base politics of Japan and the Philippines, two nations regarded as vital American allies from the Cold War to today. United States military facilities in each nation remained popular with the American military and the national host governments. Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War renewed the determination of local activists, nationalists, and politicians to resist military bases in Okinawa and the Philippines. In both nations, the different outcome of base negotiations can best be understood by an analysis of the security, political, and economic dimensions of base politics. In the case of Okinawa, American bases will continue to remain a key factor in the US-Japan security alliance that assures stability in Northeast Asia. However, the case of the Philippines demonstrates an example where the political, security, and economic factors contributed to the United States' withdrawal in 1992. Key factors that led to the bases' closure included the strength of Philippine nationalism, the damage caused by the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, frustration over the issue of financial compensation between the United States and the Philippines, and improvements in regional stability fostered by the development of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

I. Introduction

The purpose of this research paper is to examine the bilateral security alliance between two of the United States principal allies in the Asia-Pacific region, the Philippines and Japan, with a specific focus on the presence of American military bases on the sovereign territory of each nation. At the end of the Cold War, significant opposition movements existed within both the Philippines and Japan, particularly in Okinawa. In the Philippines, the Aquino government remained at odds with the anti-base movement given Aquino's personal desire for the US military presence to continue, albeit on renegotiated terms. Nevertheless, the United States withdrew following the Senate's refusal to ratify a new agreement between the Aquino government and American negotiators. Japan also has a persistent opposition movement in Okinawa. In spite of frequent complaints by local political citizens and politicians, the Liberal Democratic Party remained committed to ensuring favorable base access to American military forces. In Japan, the inertia of base politics is so strong that even the Democratic Party of Japan--a party whose then-leader Yukio Hatoyama expressed opposition to American bases in Okinawa--has continued the status quo. The purpose of this research paper is to develop a comparative understanding of the two respective outcomes. After examining base politics within each nation based on the security, economic, and political concerns of both the United States and its host nation, I conclude that the United States remains in Okinawa because the security, economic, and political climate within Northeast Asia necessitates an extended United States military presence. In particular, the threat of North Korea requires it. Meanwhile, in the Philippines, the United States' need for large naval and air facilities has been nullified by the conclusion of the Vietnam War in 1975, the absence of an external military threat like the Soviet Union after 1989, the continued success of the regional grouping known as ASEAN after its founding in 1967.

II. Theoretical Foundation

The theories of realism/neorealism, liberalism/neoliberalism, and constructivism help to explain the evolution of international relations in Asia. Accordingly, it is important to briefly define the basics of each theory in order to grasp its potential explanatory power for base politics between two nation states. The rest of this section will outline the main points of view for each of the three dominant international relations theories and discuss how scholars have applied them to explain the Asia-Pacific regional sub-system, including Northeast and Southeast Asia. The former consists of Japan, the Korean Peninsula, China, Taiwan, and the Russian Far East. The latter describes the major nations of maritime and mainland Southeast Asia including the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, and Myanmar.

Since the beginning of the Cold War, scholars have regarded realism as one of the most significant theoretical foundations for international relations. Realism focuses on state actors as the primary unit of analysis. States, realists assume, are unitary and rational actors. In an anarchic international system, realists predict that states will act to maximize their power in order to ensure survival. Kenneth Waltz believes that the structure of the international system can predict war and peace based on the distribution of power between states (2001:160). In the Cold War, the bipolar system between the United States and the Soviet Union divided the world into two-established blocs, the United States-led bloc versus the Soviet bloc. Waltz believed war to be unlikely so long as the relative power gap between the two blocs remained close and stable (2001: 670). While this line of reasoning was accepted during the Cold War, its rapid, unforeseen conclusion in the period from 1989 to 1991 caused realist scholars to redefine the theory to fit the new security climate. Stephen Walt argues that states act based on their evaluation of the threat posed by other states rather than the distribution of power. According to Walt, states

determine what constitutes a threat based on others' aggregate size, geographic proximity, perceived capabilities, and perceived intentions (1987: 264). During the Cold War in Asia, balance of threat theory explains the development of the American-centric "hub-and-spokes" system. Although the United States emerged as the largest power, Asian states including Japan and the Philippines perceived that the US did not have aggressive intentions, leading to the formation of a security alliance against the Soviet Union, China, and client states like North Vietnam or North Korea. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, scholars questioned whether the "hub and spokes" system remained relevant in a world no longer plagued by superpower competition. At the same time, an economically developing China committed to a stable international environment strengthened this argument.

Liberalism/neoliberalism disagrees with the zero-sum approach to world politics described by realists. Instead, liberalism argues that states can achieve positive-sum gains through cooperation, multilateralism, and interdependence through the free flow of trade (Moravcsik 1992: 17). This line of reasoning views international organizations as significant actors built to achieve mutual gains for its members. International organizations help to limit distrust, moderate (or raise the costs of) aggressive state behavior, and encourage internationally recognized norms and behavior (Moravcsik 1992: 30). Neoliberalism, in particular, places significant emphasis on the gains states receive from the free flow of trade, commerce, and labour. Mutual interdependence gives states a strong incentive to avoid war and cooperate on transnational threats in order to ensure the stability of the international system. In a post-Cold War international climate, scholars recognized the potential for liberalism/neoliberalism to explain the changing dynamics in Asia. China's rise as an economic tiger increased the interdependence of both Northeast and Southeast Asia. Without the USSR providing support to

Vietnam or North Korea, it was assumed that the two former client states must open up to the world or face the possibility of collapse. In Southeast Asia, the continued success of ASEAN, including the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement of 1992, encouraged confidence in a new regional foundation based around mutual interdependence and stability based around common norms to be discussed further in the next paragraph (Soesastro 2008: 32). Meanwhile, the Northeast Asian experience with interdependence is different. While trade between Japan and China increased after the Cold War, the regional security situation is still complicated between the two nations based on historical experiences, disputed claims to islands in the China Sea, and the role of the United States (Green 2003: 22).

The constructivist perspective holds that power politics can be reshaped by common norms that alter state preferences. Accordingly, they regard security studies as a social construction. Matt McDonald writes that a constructivist security analysis must “emphasize the importance of a range of social, cultural and historical factors that encourage particular forms of meaning to be given to different actors and their intentions” (cited in Heng 2009: 7). The constructivist critique of traditional international relations theory must then be seen as broadening the security discourse beyond the distribution of power and the pursuit of material interests suggested by realism or liberalism. Amitiv Acharya makes the case that norms, socialization, and identity consist of the three most important explanatory tools for the creation of security communities.. According to Acharya, the process of socializing various legal-rational and socio-cultural norms has led to the development of “the ASEAN Way” (Acharya 2009: 4,454). Pek Koon Heng suggests that, “The ASEAN Way represents a 'culture specific' and sociological approach to conflict management in Southeast Asia.” (2009: 1)

In Northeast Asia, conflict management is complicated by the historical mistrust between Japan, China, and South Korea. Japan's treatment of Chinese and Koreans during World War II is the primary cause, particularly in China. Visits by Japanese officials to the Yasakuni Shrine cause protests from China. The inability for both sides to reconcile historical difference remains one serious obstacle to a closer political relationship between the major powers of Northeast Asia. The constructivist perspective argues that persistent mistrust can be mitigated through historical reconciliation and the emergence of common norms.

The three mainstream international relations theories form a useful framework for analyzing the relations of both Northeast and Southeast Asia. Like any model, each theory possesses its own usefulness and constraints to varying degrees based on the real-life scenarios. Realism best describes the security-political environment of Northeast Asia. While there is a high degree of economic interdependence between the major powers of China, Japan, and South Korea, Northeast Asia is at risk of war at two fault lines: the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits. North Korea remains the biggest threat to instability. In the last year, North Korea threatened war with South Korea two times, launching military strikes on a South Korean naval ship and fishing village. An authoritarian Communist regime, North Korea retains diplomatic ties and receives economic support from China. The United States, Japan, and South Korea oppose North Korea's nuclear weapons program as a grave threat to regional peace. In addition, the political issue caused by China's rise has the potential to create another security dilemma between South Korea, Japan, and the United States and the Communist Party-dominated government. China's military growth causes its neighbors to respond through increased military spending or stronger political cooperation with the United States. In 2007, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe desired to make the revision of Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution a lynchpin of his

foreign policy (*Reuters* May 18, 2007). Though rejected by the public and political establishment, Abe's position demonstrated the level of seriousness that Japan's political leaders attribute to the security dilemmas of the region. After a Chinese vessel collided into a Japanese Coast Guard ship near the Senkaku Islands on September 7 2010, Japanese-Chinese relations suffered another significant setback. After a diplomatic standoff between China and Japan, the United States announced on September 23 that the US-Japan security treaty covered the Senkaku Islands. Japanese officials warmly received the American gesture. The incidence stiffened Japan's resolve to maintain the US security treaties and fulfill its treaty obligations.

In Southeast Asia, the constructivist framework holds the strongest explanatory power for security studies. With the conclusion of the Vietnam Wars, war ceased to be the issue that plagued the region's security, political, and economic development. As Acharya notes, the development of ASEAN in 1967 was in part a response for the challenges to regional stability caused by the American war. The resulting "ASEAN way" of respect for sovereignty, non-interference, consensus, and peaceful co-existence developed from a desire to remove the battle of the Cold War from Southeast Asia. Most importantly, realism's state-centric framework cannot adequately conceptualize the non-traditional threats in Southeast Asia, including drug trafficking, terrorism, environmental degradation, and uncontrolled migration flows. The limitations of realism do not mean that it lacks any analytic value in Southeast Asia. In fact, realism explains the continued presence of bilateral security treaties between the United States and the Philippines. Nevertheless, security studies in Southeast Asia require the pairing of both realism and constructivism.

III. Methodology

I've selected to compare the major base issues related to the United States military facilities found within Japan and the Philippines, two of America's key allies in the Asia-Pacific region. A thorough analysis of base politics should reveal the key similarities and differences that help to establish American military bases in the territory of another sovereign nation and serve to explain the outcome of the successive base negotiations following a facilities' initial establishment. In regard to real-life outcomes, the cases of Japan and the Philippines show that local resistance can either lead to withdrawal by the base nation, concessions by the basing nation to the hosts' demands on issues like extraterritorial rights, or the continuation of the status quo based on several key qualitative factors. Extraterritorial rights granted to the military personnel were an extremely controversial issue in both the Philippines and Japan. At the end of World War II, the military base agreement between the Philippines granted American servicemen complete immunity from local laws. In Okinawa, American soldiers enjoyed the same privilege since the island was under American occupation.

Those three dimensions include the security interests pertaining to the military bases, the economic costs and benefits of the bases, and the political climate that the two states negotiate.

At the beginning of a military base's lifespan, security is the most significant factor because survival is the primary goal of all states living in an anarchic international system. Relevant to the security dimension, both states perceive vital national interests at risk without the presence of military bases within the host nation. In the case of Japan and the Philippines, the United States bases guaranteed a US reaction in any act of aggression towards the smaller host. As time passes, the topic of security may become less visible in the public debate on base politics, particularly when local actors focus attention on the economic and political factors of bases. However, security remains a key determinant of base politics for the national political elite

and the military of both nations. Beyond considerations of survival, a states' national political leadership and military is likely to consider the security dimensions related to military bases from a broader regional dimension. For instance, military bases may contribute to regional stability if they deter third party state actors from hostile actions, ensure access to vital shipping and trade routes, and allow the host-nation to commit more resources to development.

The economic dimension is important to military base negotiations because all involved actors--state and non-state--respond to the economic incentives set in place by base negotiations. Who bears the cost of military basing is an important factor that determines the positions of basing and host nation. As pointed out, this question differs based on the consensus reached by basing and host nation. Calder's framework (2007: 128) used to distinguish "compensation" and "bazaar" politics is appropriate for Japanese and Philippines base negotiations. Economic factors are also important because they are likely to have a direct impact on the local communities living near military bases. For instance, military bases may be an important source for jobs and local investment in business and real estate. Foreign troops consist of a large market for entertainment and leisure services. In both cases, the effect may not be positive if it contributes to the growth of the sex trade and other illicit services.

The final key dimension is the political environment that drives base negotiations. The political dimensions may involve the widest range of actors, including state and non-state actors such as grassroots activists and NGOs. One important thing to consider is how important is the military base for both the basing and host-nation. However, particularly in the host nation, that question may be answered by a plethora of competing voices with divergent perspectives and interests. For instance, the theme of nationalism is likely to be prominent among opposition parties, especially in a nation with a history of colonialism like the Philippines. A look at the

political dynamics requires one to consider not one but all of the key reasons that concerned actors may oppose or support overseas bases. For instance, some environmental groups have resisted US bases in Okinawa on the grounds that bases affect the indigenous du-gong, a rare sea mammal (Calder 2007: 169). A critical task in my methodology is to identify the actors involved and outline their positions.

A thorough analysis of the security, economic, and political dimensions related to base negotiations should contribute to a comprehensive understanding about what determines the outcome of base politics. The security-economic-political framework is best suited for base politics because it considers the dual-level game of elite and local politics played throughout negotiations without entirely removing the security considerations that are essential to the purposes of bases. As such, the security-economic-political framework may explain the entire of lifetime of a military base dating from the construction stage to the closure.

Bearing the security-economic-political framework in mind, my research will draw on a variety of primary and secondary sources. Primary data includes documents by government actors including but not limited to heads-of-state, the ministry of foreign affairs, and local bureaucrats. The platform of political opposition parties and statements by their leaders is another important resource for base politics. Since base politics cannot be removed from its local context, writing by citizens affected by bases and data including opinion polling is another important source for the understanding of base politics. The secondary sources include scholarly books articles written about base relations pertaining to Japan and the Philippines. Since negotiations between the United States and Japan remain unresolved and subject to change, I may also seek out news articles from respected news outlets that provide the immediate information and analysis needed to take an informed perspective on base negotiations.

IV. Literature Review

Much of the recent scholarly research on base politics has focused on the United States global network of military facilities spread throughout the globe in the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and even the Horn of Africa. Comparative studies on base politics in Japan and the Philippines are considered in a global context that removes the regional security dimensions from the equation. While in the post-Cold War era, more and more scholars regard base politics as the complex interplay between domestic and international forces, the current discussion devotes a sizable time explaining domestic forces that affect the outcome of negotiations between the host nation and foreign military. Though the effort to establish generalized patterns to base politics is commendable, a comprehensive analysis of base politics cannot neglect the importance of regional security.

This literature review shall be organized in the following three sections: (1) an examination of base politics, centered around the lessons drawn by previous scholars; (2) discussion of the literature completed on Japan related to its alliance with the United States and the evolution of basing issues in Okinawa and the mainland; (3) discussion of the literature completed on the Philippines related to its relationship with the United States and the base issues at Subic Naval Facility and Clark Airfield. In both sections with a specific-country focus, my discussion is organized by the chronological date of its publication. It is hoped that this will help the reader see how the attitudes of the main actors in base politics has evolved over time.

In a unipolar international structure, the study of base politics has developed from its original focus centered on superpower competition to one that focuses on primarily on the United States' large network of overseas military facilities. Without the monolithic and easily discernible treat of the Soviet Union, leading scholars have turned to broader institutional factors

within the domestic politics of the host nation as well as traditional security issues to explain why the United States military continues to maintain a global presence around the world. The emergence of domestic host-nation factors as a key variable in base-negotiations is one recent trend in the discipline. Within the past three years, Kent. E. Calder and Alexander Cooley both published two separate books that conceptualize base politics through different perspectives, yet both authors agree on the importance of broader domestic institutional changes within the host nation (Calder 2007; Cooley 2008). Consequently, each author's contribution has widened the complexity of the study of base politics and their work shall be considered in greater detail.

Kent Calder observes that American military bases are known for their “strategic importance” and “political vulnerability.” In the post-Cold War era, the disjunction between the importance and vulnerability of American military bases causes Calder to describe American military bases as “embattled garrisons” (2007: 2-9). Calder defines base politics as the interaction between the basing and host nation on the status and operations of local military facilities within the host nation, identifying four defining traits within base politics. The first is the dual nature of base politics. Base agreements are established at the international level in an agreement between two sovereign states. However, base agreements are implemented at the domestic and local level, where individuals enjoy the benefits and bear the costs of basing agreements. Alexander Cooley uses a similar analytical framework to Calder. Cooley writes that base negotiations are driven by the game of “two-level” politics (2008: 10). One level is the bilateral security alliance between the two state actors and the second level is the domestic political climate that involves political parties, the military, national and local government bureaucracies, NGOs, and grassroots activists.

Writing on the significance of American military bases, Calder devotes an entire chapter to the historical legacy of US involvement in World War II and the ensuing buildup of a global network of military installations during the Cold War. The United States military buildup in East Asia happened in two main stages. With the exception of the annexation of the Philippines and Hawaii, the first wave of bases started in World War II as a product of the Allies “island hopping” strategy. This is the period where the United States gained access to Okinawa following its victory over Imperial Japan. While by 1945, 45 percent of American forces lay in the Pacific (2007: 45), Calder notes that in the immediate aftermath of World War II the United States sought to reduce its overseas presence. However, Calder is quick to point out that Douglas MacArthur saw Okinawa as an exception, where a permanent US military presence in the Ryukyus would help to restrain Japan’s post-war ambitions and maintain American influence in the Western Pacific. Nevertheless, Calder concedes that nothing changed American policy on military bases in Asia quite like the Korean War. According to Calder, the brutal invasion by Kim Il Sung’s forces--supported by the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)--solidified in Washington the legitimacy of the worldview proposed by State Department Policy Planning Director Paul Nitze in National Security Council Memorandum-68. In drafting NSC-68, the United States sought a forward deployed military presence throughout the world and linked its security to the credibility and strength of its alliance with key allies. In Asia, the primary effect of this new policy was to enact the “San Francisco Treaty System,” where Calder writes, the United States saw an economically strong Japan as vital to national security. As a quid pro quo, Japan received favorable trade deals in return for American bases on the mainland in the US-occupied Ryukus. During the war, America’s share of Okinawa grew to 40,000 acres--an area equal to 13% of the island’s entire land mass (Calder 2007: 25).

On the meaning of American bases, Cooley differs from Calder by focusing less on their historical legacy than on several key themes. However, in the first theme, Cooley also acknowledges the importance of American power projection. However, Cooley's focus is directed more towards contemporary bases used for rapid deployment from Central Asia and the Middle East to hot spots in the War on Terror. Cooley sees forward deployment as a key for American forces to react to events anywhere at a rapid speed. In addition, bases play important roles related to logistical planning and the collection of intelligence. Cooley observes that the US possesses 766 overseas military installations (2008: 5), yet he notes that the 2007 Global Defense Posture Review advocates a drawing down of Cold War bases in Asia (2008: 6). The second important theme is that bases are important diplomatic symbols. According to Cooley, military bases can either serve as a symbol of assurance to American allies towards its security commitments or be a reminder to the host-nation that it has sacrificed some of its sovereignty to US military power. His observation that American bases can serve as a wider symbol of the state of US bilateral relations, particularly in the host nation, is particularly poignant according to some observers of US-Philippine relations during the Marcos-era and in contemporary US-Japanese relations. In recognition that base negotiations can become divisive and contentious, Cooley writes that the last significant meaning of base negotiations is that they can demonstrate the restraints of US power (2008: 8). According to Cooley, the conventional wisdom that the United States can use its military power at will is often negated by the real outcome of base negotiations. The list of countries resisting US military bases includes states with a considerable differential of power such as Uzbekistan. As my later discussion will show, even traditional allies such as the Philippines are not exempt from this phenomenon.

In analyzing the “dual nature of base politics,” both Cooley and Calder divide host-nations according to the internal nature of the host-nation and its political-economic structure. For instance, Calder writes that there are “Four Paradigms” that describe host-nations and affect their behavior in base negotiations (2007: 127). The two paradigms related to my case study are centered on Japan and the Philippines, which Calder describes respectively as “Compensation” and “Bazaar” base relations. “Compensation” politics is typical in democracies with long-established bureaucratic institutions and market economies (2007: 127). According to Calder, one critical aspect of “compensation politics” is the accommodation of the host-national government to demands from both the basing nation and the complaints from local citizens. Japan fits the example of “compensation” base negotiations because its national government incurs a significant portion of the actual costs for basing American forces. At the same time, the national government provides a large sum of money and resources to local communities adversely affected by American bases, particularly in Okinawa prefecture. Calder regards “compensation” politics as fundamentally stable because host governments distribute enough financial benefits to quell local discontent to a level that is low enough not to demand changes from the military base status quo. Meanwhile, Calder characterizes the Philippines as representative of “bazaar” politics. Base negotiations, like a market bazaar, involve involves two actors haggling over the price of rental payments. In “bazaar” politics, the host nation derives significant domestic benefits from payments by the base nation (Calder 2007: 140). During the Marcos-era, the central government distributed US funds to political allies including the military and other political elite. Calder describes “bazaar” politics as fundamentally unstable because the two actors possess divergent incentives. The basing nation seeks to maintain its facilities as the

lowest cost possible while the host nation seeks to extract as much resources as possible, typically for its own political benefit.

Cooley's descriptive model of base politics downplays the political-economic forces between the base and host nation. Instead, Cooley's derives his analysis based on the domestic and institutional changes within the base host. With regards to Japan and the Philippines, the two base hosts are divided by the stability, strength and longevity of their domestic institutions. Japan is classified as a "consolidated democracy." Japan has a stable constitution that has endured its legitimacy for more than half of a century. For most of that time, the Liberal Democratic Party administered the nation's government. With political stability and limited opposition, the LDP built what became the world's second largest economy. These institutional and structural forces shaped Japan as a reliable host for United States military forces. By virtue of its classification as a "democratizing state," Cooley describes the Philippines as a less reliable base host (2008: 16-17). Democratizing states can be a less reliable base host for several reasons. Democratizing states often lack the political legitimacy needed to manage relations. The absence of legitimacy decreases the credibility of the national host government as a negotiating partner. In addition, democratizing states often emerge from authoritarian rule or neo-colonialist rule. Democratizing nations are highly sensitive to issues of national sovereignty, particular when a host nation faces a strong nationalist opposition. At the time of closing of Subic Bay and Clark, Cooley's framework using the Philippines as a democratizing nation describes US-Philippines base negotiations with greater accuracy than Calder. This is because, at the time the Philippine Senate refused to ratify the base treaty, the government was run by democratic government ruled by the 1989 Constitution. Additionally, the most contentious stage of "rent" negotiations ended

following the eruption of Mount Pinatubo, which buried Clark Airfield under several feet of volcanic ash.

Both Cooley and Calder's models provide useful explanations for the domestic political forces that unquestionably shape base politics. For that, the literature on base politics has been enriched by the predictive power of each author's conjecture on outcomes. However, these conjectures are framed largely in domestic political terms. They provide inadequate attention to the security dimensions and fail to give adequate consideration of how security concerns may affect the preferences of both basing nation and base host. In addition, each author could give more attention to the possibility that external security interests and political developments may affect the perceptions and opinion of host national governments, political parties, and even average citizens. I propose to build a model for base politics that builds upon their contribution without removing the security factors that are bound to impact its outcome. An analysis of base politics is incomplete if it does not acknowledge that the international system continues to shape the perceptions and preferences of the key actors, namely the host and base nation.

VII. Japan -- Reluctantly Realist

One of the most remarkable changes of the last century has been Japan's transition from a belligerent nationalist power, to a war-torn nation devastated by two atomic bombings, to an economic powerhouse with a government that renounces war. Japan's remarkable ability to reinvent itself has had a profound impact on international relations and the United States. It has been more than a half century since most Americans regarded Japan as a security threat. Within that time, Japan became the most significant American ally in East Asia. During the Cold War, successive US presidents considered a stable and economically strong Japan critical to the entire stability of the region. While the threat of invasion by the Soviet Union once feared in the US

and Japan has subsided, Japan continues to face serious threats to its security. The threats result from the unresolved geopolitical issues of Northeast Asia, including the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits (Oros and Tatsumi 2010: 2). Yet, Japan's security challenges do not end there, with other important threats like nonproliferation, territorial disputes over islands in Japan's north and south, and access to the South China sea shipping routes vital to world trade (Ibid: 2). On top of all of these concerns, there remains the politically sensitive issue of China's rise usurping Japan as the biggest regional power.

Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are most notably described within the context of the institutional restraints caused the pacifist clause enshrined in Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution. However, significant evidence demonstrates that the government commits a substantial amount of resources directly into its security. The SDF formed in 1954 at the urging of the United States, who feared that a strict interpretation of Article nine left Japan vulnerable to Soviet influence..According to Military Balance 2009, Japan ranks roughly as the seventh largest military spender in the world (2). As a global leader in high-technology, Japan's military also possesses one of the world's most formidable technological capabilities. Combining SDF expenditures with the amount of money that Japan commits US forces (discussed in the economics section), one could argue correctly that Japan contributes a sizable amount of its national resources to its own protection. Nevertheless, Japan's security capabilities remain publicly downplayed in Tokyo because of Article Nine's firm renunciation of war. Implemented in 1947, Japan's commitment to non-aggression has been normalized by Japanese fears of "re-militarization," a renewed emphasis on economic development, and a cautious policy of recognizing the minimum need for self-defense.

In 1957, the government published the Basic Policy for National Defense, whose four points state as follows: (1) to affirm commitment to the United Nations, (2) to stabilize the livelihood of the people and promote, (3) to establish efficient defense *within the limits required for self-defense [italics added]*, (4) to deal with external threats based on the United States-Japan Security alliance. The Basic Policy for National Defense is consistent with the Japanese Cold War-era policy famously described as the “Yoshida Doctrine.” Named after two-time postwar Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, Japanese foreign policy focused on building the country as an economic power while protecting the homeland with self-defense forces and US military support. US security assurances are outlined in numerous treaties. For example, in the 1960 Japan-United States Security Treaty, the US regards any attack on Japan as “dangerous to its own peace and safety” and declares military forces ready to “act to meet the common danger” in Article Five.. To provide for security, Article Six grants “the United States the use by its land, air, and sea forces of facilities and areas in Japan.” (Oros and Tatsumi 2010: 164-166)

The US military bases in Japan represent the quid pro quo for the United States’ guarantee of security. Nevertheless, Japanese calls to reduce and end the US military presence in Okinawa Prefecture remain the biggest challenge to the sixty-year alliance. The issue has frustrated US and Japanese negotiators since the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was formed in 1996 to resolve base issues. Negotiations led to changes in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) after the rape of a 14 year girl by three Marines. The SOFA, which governs the legal rights of US forces in Japan, was revised to allow for harsher punishment for Marines guilty of crimes committed off-base. In 2006, the US and Japanese government agreed to a relocation plan to move 8,000 Marines to Guam and replace the Futenma facility from its current location in the center of Ginowan City to the rural, less populated location of Camp Schwab. The

agreement stipulated that Japan will cover 60% of the US \$10 billion costs. Though the agreement was stalled by Prime Minister Hatoyama in 2008, it remains in force today. However, the ultimate implementation remains unclear. (Chanlett-Avery 2011: 7-8)

Security dimensions of US bases in Okinawa

On September 7, 1945, the Japanese Defense Task Force of the Southwestern Islands signed a surrender document with the United States (Ota 1999: 13-14). That the United States gained Okinawa through conquest seemed to impact the belief among military leaders on the island. Distrustful of a re-militarized Japan, General Douglas MacArthur foresaw US bases as an important guarantor against Japan's re-militarization. The Supreme Command for Allied Powers (SCAP) occupied Japan under the formal auspices of the Allies, but the United States distinguished the Ryuku islands as a territory under American administration. This was accorded by a SCAP directive in January 1946 setting a dividing line for Japan proper at the 30 degree N (Watanabe 1970: 20). From this moment onward, Okinawa remained in the United States' political control until its reversion in 1972. After Mao's Chinese Communist Party defeated the Kuomintang in 1949, American policy towards Okinawan military bases hardened. Congress appropriated \$50 million for the construction of permanent military installations on the island to be built as early as 1950 (Ibid 22). In the surrender terms of the San Francisco Treaty signed in 1951, the United States and Japan accepted that military bases in Okinawa would remain under American administration. After the Korean War, US holdings of the island grew to 40,000 acres (Calder 2007: 24). One lesson that American strategic planners attained from Korea was to regard Okinawan military bases as the bedrock of US Cold War policy in Asia. So long as the threat from the Soviet Union existed, mainstream Japanese acceptance of US bases in Okinawa

remained stable. However, Japanese expectations were likely to change after the end of the Soviet threat.

At the end of the Cold War, an influential group of Ivy League scholars and the high-brass within the Pentagon proposed that American policy in Asia should change very little. Led by Harvard professor Joseph S. Nye, the Department of Defense published the United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region in 1995. The report observed, unlike Europe, in East Asia there has been no sort of reconciliation process between China and Japan comparable to Germany and France. Without the institutional links of the European Union or NATO, the Nye report argued that the security of a region depends on forwardly-deployed US forces to balance regional tension between China, Japan, North Korea, and South Korea. The report estimated the need for 100,000 military personnel in the region. The 100,000 figure caused controversy to opponents of the US military bases, yet Nye has always insisted that this figure is flexible contingent on changes at the ground level. (Smith 1999; Johnson 1999; Nye 2001)

In 2008, there were 47,200 American service members stationed in Japan. This breakdown includes 17,400 in the Navy, 15,000 in the Marine Corps, 12,300 in the Air Force, and 2,500 in the Army. 11,700 naval personnel live aboard vessels of the 7th fleet in Yokota. Okinawa hosts the largest contingent of American service members than any other prefecture with 23,140 marines and airmen as late as 2006. Though the small island prefecture consists of only about 0.6% percent of the entire land mass of Japan, Okinawa regularly hosts around 80% of the American forces stationed in Japan. The disproportionate burden that Okinawan residents experience causes frustration with the United States and the Tokyo government to be discussed later in the political section. (Yoshida 2008: 127-128)

By virtue of Okinawa's geography, the American bases are strategically important to both US and Japanese security. Okinawa is 390 miles from Taipei, the capital city of the Republic of Taiwan and 830 miles away from Seoul (Watanabe 1970: 5). The United States Pacific Command states that its current objective for Northeast Asia is to prevent conflict in the Korean Peninsula (United States Pacific Command: April 2009). While the trilateral cooperation with Japan and South Korea and multilateral dialogue is one pillar of US policy in Korea, US policy regards military deterrence as a crucial element to its strategy. Within this context, Okinawa has been an irreplaceable node in a forward deployment strategy that deters regional war, because it allows American forces to respond in the early, decisive stages conflict. An Army report dated in 2003 suggests:

...it takes 2 hours to fly to the Korean peninsula from Okinawa, as compared with about 5 hours from Guam, 11 hours from Hawaii, and 16 hours from the continental United States. Similarly, it takes about 1-½ days to make the trip from Okinawa by ship to South Korea, as compared with about 5 days from Guam, 12 days from Hawaii, and 17 days from the continental United States. (Wilhelm 2003: 12)

The logistical capabilities served by Okinawan bases are the second reason it serves as critical to US strategy beyond sheer geography. Okinawan bases served as a logistical hub for operations in Korea and a staging area for the Vietnam War, Desert Storm/Shield, and operations in East Timor (Ibid: 3-4). The operational capabilities provided at Kadena Air Force Base, Naha Military Port, and White Beach Naval Facility make it an expensive and difficult endeavor to move.

For Japan as well, the strategic importance of Okinawa is strong. Harvard scholar Joseph Nye notes that Japan, like the United States possesses an interest in seeing Taiwan's democracy survive. Though 400 miles away from the mainland, Okinawa is located relatively close to the vital shipping lanes of the South China Sea and the Senkaku Islands. 70% of Japanese oil tankers

pass through the South China Sea (Rowan 2005: 431). A nation with few natural resources, Japan has an understandably strong strategic interest for ensuring that shipping lanes remain free and safe. Any disruption could cause severe distress Japanese citizens and economic losses for Japanese firms.

The second reason why the Japanese may prefer the United States in Okinawa relates to Sino-Japanese tensions over territorial claims over the Senkaku Islands. Both Japan and China regard the islands located northeast of Taiwan as their sovereign territory. To many observers, including some Japanese, the dispute represents a symbol of China's aggressive intentions towards its neighbors (Hearst 2011). The Chinese demonstrated aggression by crashing a Chinese vessel into a Japanese coast guard ship. This followed by the demand in China for an official apology from Japan. After Japan detained the ship's captain, Chinese officials responded by arresting Japanese nationals in China. After a tense several weeks in September 2010, the outcome demonstrated the resilience of the US-Japan treaty. Tensions cooled after China and Japan met for informal talks at a meeting in Hanoi with defense ministers from ASEAN (*Japan Times* October 12, 2010). However, Japan gained significant leverage after Secretary Clinton had announced to Foreign Minister Seigi Maehara that the US-Japan treaty covered the Senkaku islands on September 23, 2010 (Ibid 2010). The concept of deterrence, firmly enshrined by the US-Japan treaty, worked. The success of deterrence has important ramifications for the American bases in Okinawa, since they are justified on the same grounds. Accordingly, the Democratic Party of Japan's calls for a "more equal" US-Japan alliance ended after the dispute and strengthened the importance of US bases in Okinawa. (Mulgan 2010)

Confrontation with China has caused an important shift in the strategic thinking of Japanese military planners. In December, the government announced a buildup of forces in the

nation's south. Japanese strategy appeared to be turning away from its focus on repelling a land invasion in the north to one directed towards securing the sea and air lanes of the south. The plan included adding submarines, helicopter-carrying ships described to resemble aircraft carriers, and high-tech aircraft (*New York Times* February 28, 2011). While the tragedy following the March 2011 earthquake may disrupt some of this planning, Japanese officials hold no illusions about the difference between deterrence through Japan's Self-Defense Forces and the United States. At least on the mainland, the lessons related to the Okinawan bases are clear. Former Foreign Minister Yukio Okimoto recently told a British newspaper:

"The only deterrence we have with China is the United States because what China fears most is the deterioration of its relationship with the US. What the US said was that should there be any conflict between Japan and China, they would fulfill their obligations under the treaty. That was a big political statement and now we are realising that Japan's security threat system works."
(*Guardian* March 7, 2011)

At the very least, Okimoto's remarks and the positions outlined in the 2006 relocation agreement demonstrate that the United States and the national government in Tokyo share some understanding of the challenges and solutions to security in Asia. More importantly, the position of the ruling Democratic Party of Japan has evolved in the United States' favor. Ultimately, Yukio Hatoyama realized that he could not offer an adequate vision for Japan's security without the United States. Hatoyama resigned in 2010 after reneging from the promise to remove the Okinawa bases. Under the stewardship of Naoto Kan, Japan has promised closer cooperation with the United States based on the security benefits. This suggests that if the political and economic dimensions can be resolved, there is a strong likelihood that United States will keep its facilities in Okinawa.

Political Dimension

In the case of Okinawa, base politics is a three-player game. The 2006 agreement between Washington and Tokyo alike demonstrates the two countries share enough security

interests to find room for a compromise. However, a permanent political solution may require reconciling the third actor: the Okinawan prefecture government and its constituents. A common and critical theme to the story of Okinawa's military bases is the relationship between the Okinawan people and the central government in Tokyo. A complete understanding of today's political dimension requires discussion of the history of Okinawa. The 2006 Futenma relocation agreement suggests that Okinawans will live with an American military presence as long as the burden drops in urban areas such as Ginowan City. The dissatisfaction of many Okinawans reveals this assumption to be misguided. This section will outline Okinawa's broader history in order to place today's political climate in its proper context.

The first important theme is the relationship between Japan and Okinawa. Public opinion polls demonstrate that there is indeed a consensus existing between Japanese and Okinawan people regarding national identity. A conducted in 1967 by the *Asahi Shimbun*, one of Japan's leading newspapers of the time, showed that roughly 85 percent of Japanese and Okinawans favored Okinawa's return to Japan. Reversion was also justified by persistent opposition against the American occupation well before the transfer of sovereignty in 1972. Okinawa and Japan share a national identity that has developed over a long and painful period of time. The isolation from Japan's national development during its nation-building stage before World War II and afterwards before Reversion caused a psychological difference between Okinawans and the *naichijin* (Japanese mainlanders). The Ryuku Islands officially became a polity of Meiji Japan in 1879 after years of reign by rulers that paid tribute to Japanese and Chinese influence. After the Sino-Japanese war, the government accelerated its assimilation of Okinawa into "mainstream" Japan. This did not prevent Okinawa from lagging behind in most aspects of modernization. For example, the number of Okinawan students attending government institutions in 1932 ranked 1.8

per 10,000 persons while the national average was 10.8. That Okinawan economic and social development lagged behind the rest of Japan before World War II explains one reason why Okinawan political leaders remained quiet about the American occupation in its first years. Even today, Okinawa remains one of the poorest prefectures in Japan. The belief that the central government ignores Okinawa is a source of resentment that extended to political life after World War II. After the Association for the Promotion of the Return of Okinawa to Japan collected petition with 199,000 signatures and the support of Okinawan politicians, Japan accepted the US terms of American administration for an unspecified period of time. In the eyes of Okinawans, this demonstrated that Tokyo remained willing to place diplomatic relations with the US over Okinawan wishes. (Watanabe 1970: 3, 9-13)

The second theme critical to understanding Okinawa today is the theme of anti-militarism. Okinawa was the first battle fought on Japanese territory and the first to include civilians participating in combat. The Japanese military conscripted about 25,000 civilians in a war of attrition against an overwhelmingly larger and better equipped American force. Okinawans bore a terrible price in the battle. US Army records suggest 142,058 civilians perished including a total of 11,483 children. While the Allied fire-bombing campaign and the atomic bombing caused thousands of casualties on the mainland, Okinawa's experience is painfully different. The Japanese military is reported to have murdered civilians considered hindering the military campaign in Okinawa. The bitter scars of war remain a long-lasting symbol in the Okinawan psyche relevant to base politics. During the American War in Vietnam, slogans for reversion included "No war, for peace" and "Return to the Peace Constitution." Today opposition against American military bases is articulated by Okinawans in terms of peace, non-violence, and anti-militarism. (Ota 1999: 25, 33-36)

The perception of indifference and anti-militarism are themes that make Okinawan political demands against US bases deeper than their face value. To be sure, the typical pragmatic opposition to bases based on social disruption, cultural insensitivity, and quality life are important. The Futenma airbase makes up 25% of the total area of Ginowan City¹. Situated within the center of the city, residents live with the noise pollution and the constant threat of an accident, such as when a helicopter collided with a university adjacent to Futenma in 2004 (*Stars and Stripes* August 2004). Even with no civilians harmed, neighborhood boards passed resolutions calling for a ban on helicopter flights (Ibid). However, the last two decades of negotiations demonstrate that the political animosity against military bases cannot be quelled by their removal to another less populated location within Okinawa--something the United States and Japan have tried to do three times.

Following the highly publicized rape of a school girl in 1995, public opposition in Okinawa grew to an unprecedented level. 85,000 protesters gathered in Ginowan City (Millard 1999: 97). The protest movement was led by a coalition of local politicians and activists. The Okinawa Women Act against Military Violence (OWAMV) emerged as one of the significant nongovernmental organizations. The OWAMV organizes protests, letter-writing campaigns, and distributes information about Okinawa. Among its platform, OWAMV opposes relocation, demands changes to the SOFA related to the prosecution of crimes committed by American soldiers, and seeks to provide support for women that sexually service US troops (Women for Genuine Security: www.genuinesecurity.org). Its influence is transnational. The OMAMV hosted two international conferences in 1997 and 2000 and is partnered with other like-minded NGO in Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines, and South Korea (Ibid).

¹Information obtained at lecture on the US-Japanese Alliance by William Brooks, delivered at American University, on March 3, 2011.

The role of local politicians is also important. In 1996, then-Governor Masahide Ota led an anti-base referendum that passed with 89 percent approval (*CNN World* September 1994). In addition, Ota refused to sign an agreement on US forces--prompting a legal battle that ended in the Supreme Court. Tokyo ruled against Ota and the Governor lost reelection to a candidate aligned with the LDP in 1998. Ota is not the only Governor to assert leadership on the base issue. In 2001, Governor Inamine visited Washington to lobby both the Japanese government and the United States on implementation of a plan to relocate Futenma airbase (Military Base Affairs Division: 2001). Inamine spoke with Ambassador Yanai, Paul Wolfowitz of the Department of Defense, and Admiral Dennis Blair of the Pacific Command (Ibid). The role of the local politicians and government helps to shape public opinion in Okinawa and the mainland. The power of the opposition movement is more than a mere symbol. The size and intensity of protests caused the formation of SACO and revisions to the SOFA.

National opposition to the American bases in Okinawa also bears an important role on the base politics. Opposition may not be as intense or mainstream as within Okinawa, yet it has existed since the beginning of the US-Japan alliance. The left-wing Japanese Socialist Party opposed the United States-Japan Security Treaty in its 1951 platform and demanded the return of Okinawa (Watanabe 1970: 114). In 1960, JSP opposition failed to block the US-Japan Security Treaty in the Diet. The official slogan of the Communists and Socialists remained the "abrogation of the U.S. Japan Security Treaty and the immediate, unconditional, and complete return of Okinawa (Ibid 133). In 1960, the JSP threatened to block the renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty in the Diet return in 1995. In contemporary politics, the Democratic Party of Japan is the party with the largest following critical of the Okinawan status quo. In order to form a government, the DPJ welcomed the anti-base Social Democratic Party in 2008. Their presence

in the DPJ is one reason that Prime Minister Hatoyama announced the delay of the 2006 agreement. Hatoyama needed the SDP's support to pass the government budget. (*New York Times* December 9, 2009)

Economic Dimension of Base Negotiations

The economic dimension of the ongoing base negotiations in Okinawa involves two categories, the economic costs required to maintain the actual base facilities and their impact on the local development within Okinawa. The question of who bears the costs of maintaining the US facilities bases has become an important component in the negotiations between the United States and the Government of Japan (GOJ). Since the late seventies, the GOJ has spent billions to support and maintain American facilities in Okinawa and the mainland (Calder: 2007, 196). From the United States perspective, the host nation support (HNS) support provided by Japan is a strong incentive for keeping the bases in Japan. American negotiators frequently insist that the GOJ bear the costs of any relocation agreement. Meanwhile, the GOJ must respond to the economic demands of the Japanese people and the local populations affected by US bases.

The Pentagon regards Japan's cost-sharing role as one of its most significant obligations to the US-Japan alliance. Japan's host nation support is the most generous of any US ally. The Special Measures Agreement and Force Improvement Program provide the formal, institutional framework for costs shared by the GOJ. In 2001, Japan paid \$4.6 billion to maintain US facilities, covering 75 percent of the total US basing costs. Under the terms of the SMA, Japan allocated \$ 7.8 billion over five years for US bases. Japan pays virtually all of the costs of Japanese labor employed at the US base and a portion of the public utilities used on the military bases. Japan also bears the cost required to transfer US training activities to other locations in Japan. The Force Improvement Plan includes funding for quality-of-life projects related to

housing, community support, and recreation. The GOJ also approved some funds for hangar improvements. In total, the FIP spent \$600 million on the construction, restoration, and upgrading of military facilities in 2001. The absolute total of Japan's recent commitments averages around \$5 billion per year. In the SMA announced in 2011, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the GOJ would maintain the overall HNS level at the current levels for fiscal years 2011 to 2015. (U.S. Department of Defense: 2003; Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan: 2011)

The opportunity costs of any relocation drive the US position on bases. The Pentagon often boasts that it is cheaper to base US military facilities in Japan than in alternatives in Hawaii, Guam, or California. Under the 2006 agreement to close Futenma and open a new airbase at Henoko, the Koizumi-led government agreed to pay a total of \$26 billion for its implementation (*New York Times* December 8, 2009). When the deal stalled under the DPJ government, Hatoyama told reporters one reason would be to reapportion some of the funds committed to US funds to pay the national debt (Ibid). This position has not satisfied the Pentagon. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has publicly criticized Japanese officials on the issue of financial compensation. The American position insists that Japan should pay the costs of removing the bases from Okinawa.

The second economic dimension is how the bases affect the local economy of Okinawa. Statisticians from the Okinawa Prefecture acknowledge the important role that the military bases play in the local economy. Total base revenue is defined to include all salary paid to Japanese base employees, rental fees for land used by the U.S. military paid to the local landowners and money spent by SOFA status people in the local economy. At the time of reversion, base revenue accounted for 15% of the total expenditures in Okinawa (Ibid). In the last decades, the

Okinawan economy has grown enough to reduce base revenue substantially as a percentage of total revenue. In Japan, Okinawa is a popular tourist location known for its sunny climate. Revenue from tourism totaled around 5000 million yen in 1999. (Military Base Affairs Division: 2000)

In spite of this base relations continue to serve an important role in the Okinawan economy through the compensation program the GOJ finances to Okinawan landowners. Government aid consists of the largest source of income in Okinawa--ahead of tourism and military related revenue. For example, in Fiscal Year 2005, Tokyo earmarked \$600 million for the development of Okinawa. In 2006, it added another 10 percent to the total, reaching 8.2 billion yen or around US \$100 million. Land-lease rental payments to local landowners make one of the largest expenditures in Okinawa, where 67 percent of the land used for military facilities is privately owned. In 2003, 32,000 landowners received over 7.4 billion yen--or US \$90 million--in rental income for their properties. Since the eighties, military lease payments have steadily risen despite falling land prices. As a result, Okinawan landowners share a significant economic interest in preserving the bases--despite the political dimension. The Okinawa Federation of Landowners of Land Used for Military Purposes is one of the influential associations that represent the interest of landowners. Numbered 28,000 strong, it lobbied against the 1996 referendum supported by then Governor Ota. (Calder 2008: 171-173)

In addition to landowners, persons employed on the bases are another group with a stake in base politics. In Okinawa, bases employ over 8,000 workers. The Japanese government pays the entirety of the base salaries to a total of around \$500 million. Many base employees are members of trade unions such as the All Japan Security Forces Labor Union. These unions, while typically left-leaning and allied with the Japanese Socialist Party, possess an incentive for

stability in base relations. The impact of this interest serves to moderate opposition to the bases and the GOJ, since many workers rely on the GOJ to pay their salary. Japanese firms are the last group with an economic interest in Okinawan military bases. The US military pays over \$500 million in annual contracts to Okinawan firms. Local construction companies receive 80 percent of the contracts related to US military facilities, which totaled 80 billion yen in 2005. Their influence in Okinawa is significant because their size is disproportionately large compared to the rest of Japan. In Okinawa, construction firms consist of about 8 percent of the prefecture's total output, a full two percent larger than the national average.

The economic dimensions of base politics contribute to the continuation of American bases in Okinawa. Okinawans are compensated directly by the Government of Japan and by the revenue produced by base activity. The importance of actors like Okinawan landowners is significant because it increases the local stake for the preservation of the status quo. In effect, compensation politics ensures that opposition against the bases can be moderated in Okinawa by the structural dimensions of the island's economy.

Outcomes

In 1996, United States and the Japanese government convened the Special Action Committee on Okinawa to address the burden shared by the Okinawan. The original agreement accepted that 11 facilities totaling approximately 5,002 hectares of land would be returned. Futenma Air Station, which people of Okinawa strongly requested the return of, would be removed to a coastal heliport near the northern city of Nago (Military Base Affairs Division 2004:12). In addition, the US promised to address issues related to noise pollution and social disruption. President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto promised to complete

the implementation of the agreement within seven years. Since then, little action has been completed.

Under the Bush Administration, high-level meetings scrapped the Clinton-era proposal for a new one. Bush and Koizumi negotiators agreed to a new formula, where Futenma facilities would be moved to Camp Schwab near Nago. 8,000 Marines and their families were to move to new facilities in Guam. In addition, the plan proposed moving Futenma's KC-130s to Kanoya base in Southern Kyushu. Negotiations between the foreign and defense ministries appeared successful when the governments reached the 2006 agreement. However, the proposed construction of v-shaped offshore runway created protests from local groups in Nago, including environmental activists. Amidst this climate, local politicians passed resolutions condemning the plan. As a candidate, DPJ leaders Hatoyama publicly suggested bases should be moved outside of Okinawa, raising expectations for their permanent removal.

As Prime Minister, Hatoyama received strong pressure from Washington to stick to the proposed plan. In a 2009 meeting with Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, Defense Secretary Robert Gates outlined the US position as the "only viable option." By May of 2010, Hatoyama had caved in and announced the plan's reinstatement. The Joint Statement agreed "to locate the replacement facility at the Camp Schwab Henoko-saki area and adjacent waters, with the runway portion(s) of the facility to be 1,800 meters long, inclusive of overruns, exclusive of seawalls" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: May 2010). Representing a concession to the United States, Japan conceded that "relocation depended on tangible progress toward the completion of the replacement facility." (Ibid)

As a result of this outcome, Hatoyama announced his resignation. Hatoyama's successor, Naoto Kan, has avoided the political mistakes of his predecessor. Kan has spent his time

repairing ties to Washington. "I believe the Japan-U.S. alliance is the foundation of Japan's foreign policy and shall be maintained and strengthened regardless of the change in power," Kan told reporters in 2011. The implications of this statement suggest that the ultimate outcome related for US bases appear the status quo. Kan told the Japanese public, "As long as the presence of U.S. bases in Okinawa is necessary for the security of all of Japan, it is necessary to make ceaseless efforts to share the pain and burden of the prefecture with all the people in the country." Kan added. "I promise to strengthen efforts through various opportunities to seek the understanding and cooperation of those living outside Okinawa regarding the burden of hosting U.S. bases." (*Japan Times* January 21, 2011)

Ultimately, base relations between the United States and Japan are likely to remain stable within the next several years. The security climate in Northeast Asia, particularly after the Senkaku confrontation, reinvigorated the US-Japanese relationship. Even the Democratic Party of Japan leadership, once skeptical of the need for US bases, has changed its position by vying for friendlier ties with the United States. The Kan administration's acceptance of relocation is a sign that the imperatives of security have changed the political climate, particularly at the national level. However, the disjunction between the national perspective and the feelings of Okinawans that live with the bases is unlikely to wane. From the Okinawan view, dissatisfaction with the bases will continue even with reductions in the size of American forces and facilities. Resistance against the US bases is a product of socio-historic forces as much as it a quality-of-life issue. Nevertheless, the economic dimensions, including the compensation that Okinawans receive from GOJ and US payments, will guarantee that there will always be limits to the political opposition. There is too much money at stake and too many Okinawans that reap the

economic benefits of bases. As a result, the United States' military bases in Okinawa will stay for the time being.

VIII. The Philippines

The outcome of negotiations between the United States and the Philippines on the military facilities located at Clark Airfield Base and Subic Bay reflected two dual-level changes, the new security architecture in Southeast Asia after the end of the Vietnam Wars and the nationalist and anti-colonial demands of domestic actors. Even though President Corazon Aquino preferred the US military to stay in the Philippines, she was unable to maintain a coalition strong or wide enough to get an agreement approved by the Philippine Senate in 1991 (Kraft 1993: 3). After months of difficult negotiating, the Senate's decision represented a huge disappointment to US negotiators. Combined with the destruction caused by the eruption of Mt Pinatubo, the economic and diplomatic costs no longer justified the American investment. In a stable regional subsystem, the forwardly deployed military presence at Clark and Subic became viewed as a privilege rather than a necessity. Overtime, all three dimensions--security, political, and economic--favored the removal of the US bases in the Philippines.

Security Dimension--US & Philippine Perspectives

The two main facilities of Clark Airfield and Subic Naval Station served as two strategic nodes in United States policy in Southeast Asia. The peacetime presence of the United States military in Southeast Asia was consistent with the broader aims of American forward deployment in East Asia, to guarantee access to the trading routes and natural resources needed to support a capitalist, interdependent world order and to ensure a stable global strategic balance between the United States and Soviet-bloc (Bowen Jr. 1988: 111). To this extent, security planners viewed the deployment of American forces as ways to support specific goals: to

reassure allies, including the Philippines, of the United States capabilities and willingness to defend against external threats and to ensure prompt action from the United States when it determined the need for military intervention. All of the nations within the Asia-Pacific shared an interest in maintaining the freedom of maritime navigation in the main trade routes in the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific. American naval bases were regarded as vital to this goal.

The construction of Clark Airfield and Subic Naval Station followed the acquisition of the Philippines at the end of the Spanish-American War. In 1903, the US Army created Fort Stotsenburg (Sorenson 2007: 164). The facility was renamed Clark in 1919 and converted into an airfield. Japanese forces conquered Clark in 1942 (Ibid). The United States did not regain control of the facility until 1945. Originally built by the Spanish, Subic Naval Station was renovated to include a shipyard, naval air station, and supply depot. At the beginning of the Cold War, the United States regarded both Philippines bases as critical to the United States' position in the Western Pacific. Shortly after the Philippines' independence, the two governments agreed that the US would enjoy continued American access and control over the Philippine bases.

Two documents formed the legal component of bilateral defense relations, the Military Basing Agreement and the Mutual Defense Treaty. In the original Military Basing Agreement signed by both parties in 1947, the United States obtained the exclusive right to military facilities for 99 years. The original terms also provided the Americans' right to import goods duty-free and allowed the United States to retain exclusive jurisdiction over any US personnel accused of a crime off base. Signed on August 30, 1951, the Mutual Defense Treaty outlined the security obligations required of each signatory in a formal United States-Philippine security alliance. The MDT stipulates that the two parties agreed, "to act to meet... common dangers in accordance with their constitutional processes." The treaty could be invoked by either party if subjected to an

armed attack. The meaning and significance of this clause was interpreted by many Filipinos as a blanket guarantee of United States. Another additional document worthy of discussion includes the Mutual Assistance Agreement signed on March 17, 1947. Under the terms of the MAA, the United States provided the Philippines Armed Forces with equipment, materials, and service. US military assistance became a cornerstone of the United States-Philippine relationship during the Cold War. (Kraft 1993: 4-5)

The significance of the Philippine bases grew with the increasing American involvement in the land wars in Southeast Asia, including Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. During the Vietnam War, Clark supported the military and logistical operations of the Air Force. Similarly, the United States upgraded the capabilities of Subic Naval Station to support the Navy's wartime operations. If the Vietnam War heightened the strategic value of the Philippines bases, the United States' withdrawal in the seventies caused the beginning of a reassessment of their importance. One U.S. Senate report from 1977 wrote, "The value Clark Airfield in the future... is questionable unless the United States intends to maintain the capability to mount and support major military operations on the Southeast Asian mainland." (Sorenson 2007: 165)

Even with the negative perceptions of American military involvement in Southeast Asia, the sheer size of the military of the Philippines' facilities guaranteed their importance to the strategic planning. At the end of the Cold War, Clark Air Force Base remained the only major tactical installation in Southeast Asia. With 15,000 military personnel and civilians living on the base, Clark was the third largest Air Force base in Asia (Sorenson 2007: 164). Clark headquartered the Thirteenth Air Force, including two fighter wings, the 3rd Combat Support Group, the 3rd Security Police Group, and the 31st Aerospace Rescue and Recover Station (Ibid: 165). At nearby Crow Valley Weapons Range, the 44,000 acre facility supported live tactical

training. Overall, Clark Airfield had the capacity to support the airlift of personnel and material through the Western Pacific. Meanwhile, the Subic Naval Facility hosted a naval station, air station, and repair facility in addition to being a hub for communications (Bowen Jr. 1988: 110). It had the capabilities to support several carrier battle groups and the logistics needed for fuel, ammunition, and repair (Ibid). The United States regarded the four major benefits of the Philippine bases at the end of the Cold War to be: to offset the Soviet presence in Southeast Asia, threaten Soviet communication lines from Southeast Asia to the Russian Far East, support ground warfare in the defense of allies, and to defend the air and shipping routes critical to regional stability. In particular, the United States saw the Philippine bases in relation to the broader strategy of containment, particularly with the Soviet presence at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. However, bilateral discussions for the Soviet withdrawal from Cam Ranh began to take place as early as 1988. The collapse of the Soviet Union undercut two major benefits for the base. In addition, the historical legacy of Vietnam severely diminished the likelihood of American involvement in a Southeast Asian land war. The protection of the sea and shipping lanes of Southeast Asia remained the only major security concern after the end of the Cold War.

In spite of the longstanding commitments articulated by the Mutual Defense Treaty, the Philippine perspective on security remained skeptical of whether the broader regional goals warranted the American presence within the Philippines. Many Philippine analysts no longer regarded the threat of invasion by an external force as the primary threat to its security. This sentiment is a product of the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN). The member states looked to the organization to provide regional stability and conflict resolution. The norms centered on the respect for sovereignty, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and non-

interference raised these hopes. Regional confidence inspired the belief that the Philippines could remain secure without the presence of American military bases.

Political Dimensions

By the early nineties, the political climate of US-Philippine base negotiations experienced the strong themes of nationalism, sovereignty, and democratization in the Philippines. *Kalayaan* meaning freedom and independence is the word that best captures this spirit. *Kalayaan* originated during the Philippine war for independence against the Spanish and the United States. It was revived to express frustration at the extraterritoriality rights' of the United States. The first Military Base Agreement granted Americans complete immunity from Philippine laws, even for crimes committed off-base. The agreements were revised several times to provide the Philippines with a more equal footing. Nationalism in the Philippines took on a profoundly anti-colonial favor. (Kraft 1993: 5)

Within the Philippines, the renewal of the Military Base Agreement pitted President Corazon Aquino against an influential, assertive group of Philippine Senators. Aquino enjoyed the advantage of widespread popularity and the support of a majority Filipinos on the base issue. Nevertheless, Aquino was unable to use her considerable advantages to renew a ten-year agreement with the United States. Anti-Marcos sentiment expressed in Philippine nationalism and opposition to "neo-colonialism" plus the changes to the Philippine Constitution in 1987 nullified Aquino's domestic position. One could argue that Aquino's position could not overcome the historic tide of nationalist impulses, a tide that swept her very own democratic movement into office.

The discussion of the political dimension must first begin with a look at the Philippines. The nation gained its independence in 1946. Two decades of fragile democratic rule ended with

the rise of Ferdinand Marcos. Elected in 1965, Marcos enjoyed 21 years of rule as the head of the Philippine. The length of Marcos reign owes in part to the invocation of a state of emergency on September 13, 1972. This announcement was followed by the arrest and detainment of thousands of political opponents. Despite committing human rights abuses, the United States supported Marcos to guarantee base access. US military assistance rose from \$18.5 million in 1972 to \$45.3 million the following year. American strategic interests outweighed concerns for democracy so much that even President Jimmy Carter granted Marcos \$500 million in security assistance. Marcos downfall began with his own brutality against political opponents, namely the assassination of ex-senator Benigno Aquino Jr. on August 21, 1983. Aquino's murder set off a chain of events that propelled the opposition to power. (Abinales and Amoroso 2005: 205-206, 209-211, 221)

What had previously been a fractured opposition united behind Corazon (Cory) Aquino, widow of Benigno. Aquino defeated Marcos in an election in February 1986 (Ibid 224). Aquino's campaign enjoyed support from a broad swath of Philippine society from moderate and elite opponents of Marcos, the Catholic Church, and left-wing activists. Her movement was associated with the term "People Power," an expression for national improvement led by ordinary people. A core component included staunch nationalism and anti-colonialism. However the role of Philippine nationalists cannot be understated. Resentment towards reliance on the United States inflamed nationalists. The remarks of Claro M. Rector, the famous nationalist Senator from the fifties, remained relevant: "A dependent nation cannot expect respect from other nations" (*Manila Bulletin* 2010). The anti-colonial passions of the nationalists had a profound effect on the 1987 Constitution ratified by President Aquino.

The 1987 Constitution would have two major implications for the Military Base Agreements. Section Eight of Article II of the Constitution stipulates that the Philippines will follow a “policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory” (Kraft 2005: 7-8). A strict interpretation of this clause caused tension with American negotiators, since the position of the military has always been to support the maximum degree of operational flexibility. More importantly, Section 25 of Article XVIII states that no foreign military bases, troops, or facilities can be allowed in the Philippines unless “under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, if Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of votes cast by people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized by a treaty by the other contracting state” (Ibid 8). By all practical means, the Constitution of 1987 provided the Philippine Senate with the last word on the issue of American military bases. As base negotiations ensued, the implications of this provision became enormous.

Cory Aquino entered her term as president with the vague promise to “keep her options open” in regards to the MBA. On October 1988, the two nations agreed on terms for the continued operation of the bases through September 1991. The United States agreed to increase payments to \$481 million a year for 1990 and 1991, a significant increase from the previous years’ package of \$181 million. One factor driving Aquino’s support of the 1988 agreement was the problem of foreign debt. In 1986, the Philippines international debt was estimated at \$27.2 billion (Abinales and Amoroso 2005: 233). The Americans allowed the Philippines to use the aid package to repay a significant amount of debt (*New York Times* October 17, 1988). Other members of Aquino’s cabinet, including Foreign Minister Raul Mangaplas, demanded that Aquino press harder for up to \$1.3 billion in aid. With some of her cabinet dissatisfied, the 1988

agreement was bound to set the stage for the next round of negotiations to extend the bases for ten years after 1992.

Bilateral negotiations launched on September 18, 1990 with the Philippine American Cooperation Talks (PACT) in Manila. The Philippines requested another increase its compensation package to total \$825 million per year. In addition, the Philippine negotiators asked that financial payment from the United States be regarded as “rent” rather than aid. This arrangement was unacceptable to the United States’ because it would compromise Congress’ exclusive right to appropriate funds. In the US view, the precedence of Congress’ role had been set in 1978 after Senator Daniel K. Inouye visited Marcos. Inouye sent the message that Congress could not appropriate the sum demanded by Marcos, who proceeded to back down (De Bobes 1990: 86). Regardless how the aid was classified, the Aquino and her negotiators felt confident in their ability to extract large financial concessions from the United States, raising public expectations to high levels.

The eruption of Mount Pinatubo in June 1991 played a significant role in the final outcome between negotiations. The eruption covered nearby Clark Airfield under several feet of ash. Within a month, the United States announced that it would withdraw from the 89-year old facility. The Americans did not believe that the costs of repairing Clark to be justifiable. The announcement gave the Philippines’ negotiators one less bargaining chip, since it was already well-known that the US planned to vacate one of its Philippines’ facilities. The final treaty signed on August 27, 1991 guaranteed US forces at Subic for ten years. The terms offered the Philippines \$393 million in compensation for 1992 and \$203 million annually for the duration of the agreement.

The battle for ratification in the Philippine Senate took place amid dashed hopes for a better monetary package in the Philippines. Even though, some opinion polls showed that 80 percent of Filipinos supported the continuation of US bases, resistance in the Senate mounted before the ratification vote, scheduled for September 12, 1991. On September 8, 1991, a majority in the twenty-three member body announced opposition against the treaty. Aquino responded with a public announcement on local television that “it would be ill-advised, even foolish” to reject the agreement. The stakes rose on September 9th, when Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney announced, “If they’re not prepared to ratify the treaty and extend the agreement, then we will in fact depart” (*New York Times* September 9, 1991). On September 10, Aquino led public pro-base rallies in Manila. News reports estimated between 100,000 and 200,000 participants in the pro-base rallies. Nevertheless, the Senate voted against the treaty by a 12-11 margin on September 12, 1991. (*New York Times*: November 7, 1992)

All senatorial opposition contained the expression of nationalism; however the reasons for rejection of the treaty varied from outright hostility towards the US bases to anger at the inadequate compensation terms. Senator Agapito Aquino, the brother-in-law of Cory and brother of Benigno, declared in his speech on the Senate floor, “It is a vote for a truly sovereign and independent Philippine nation... a vote to end a political adolescence tied to the purse strings of America-a crippling dependence” (*New York Times* November 7, 1992). In his speech in front of colleagues, Senate President Jovinto Solanga echoed, “It does not strike me as a treaty of friendship, it is a treaty of surrender; it is not a treaty of cooperation, it is a treaty of capitulation; it is not a treaty of security, it is a treaty of greater insecurity.” In the end, the spirit of *kalian* prevailed. Philippine nationalism sought to reassert the nation’s independence and territorial integrity. After decades of imposed rule by the Spanish, United States, and Marcos, hostility

towards any infringement on the sovereign rights of the Philippines overwhelmed the political climate. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Marcos regime suggested that it was possible for the Philippines to reassert itself.

Economic Dimensions

Given the weak position of the Philippine economy at the time, the closure of Clark Airfield and Subic Naval Facility dealt the country an additional blow to its economic development. In the late 1980s, Cory Aquino inherited a national economy plagued with inefficiencies due to the cronyism of Marcos, whose family held a monopoly on most of the key industries. Facing capital flight and the withdrawal of short-term loans, the economy happened to “contract by more than 15% in two consecutive years (1984-1986).” Social indicators revealed growing poverty, including that two-thirds of families consumed less than the daily recommended minimum caloric intake. Worsening the Aquino’s ability to meet these challenges, the Philippines faced an international debt crisis, totaled at \$27.2 billion in 1986. The economic realities of the Philippines became the foremost domestic political issue for Cory Aquino to resolve and this undoubtedly affected her position on the military bases. (Abinales and Amaroso 2005: 213, 231-233)

The economic benefits of the Military Base Agreement threatened to make the US withdrawal difficult for the Philippines to absorb. Clark and Subic directly employed around 45,000 Philippine nationals, making the US the second largest national employer (Greene 1988: 52). In addition, the surrounding areas benefited from the service industries--ranging from restaurants, bars, even prostitution--demanded by US base officials. American military bases purchased agriculture from the surrounding areas well. One estimate suggested that the economic contribution totaled to \$1 billion annually (Niksch quoted in Kraft 1993: 10). This figure

“included payments to workers and contractors hired to do work inside the US facilities, payments for utilities and housing for personnel, and spending by permanent or transient US personnel on their own account.”. Finally, there was the economic and financial assistance that the US provided as a quid pro quo for the military bases. American payments declined with the withdrawal of the bases. After the Senate’s rejection of the new MBA, US assistance fell from the originally requested \$550 million to \$220 million (Kraft 1993: 10-11).

The United States’ costs in the base transactions remained disproportionately high until their eventual closure. As mentioned, the US paid the Philippines major payments in aid and assistance. Throughout the lifetime of Clark and Subic, American payments steadily rose. Military assistance jumped from \$18.5 million in 1972 to \$45.3 million in 1973. The Carter Administration spent \$500 million in assistance (Abinales and Amoroso 2005: 209-211). In 1983, President Reagan agreed to up five-year payments to \$900 million (Calder 2007: 73). In October 1988, the US agreed to pay a total of \$962 million in military and economic aid for 1990 and 1991 (*New York Times* October 17, 1988). The surging costs associated with maintaining the Philippines base began to frustrate American negotiators. After the announcement of the US withdrawal, Richard Armitage, then an American negotiator in Manila, told reporters, “We wanted an agreement, but not at any price” (*New York Times* January 5, 1992). In the end, the United States felt that the value of the bases justified their high price.

The United States departure contributed to the loss of 79,500 jobs in the Philippines. The Philippine government was then tasked with the challenge of revitalizing local areas hurt by the US departure. The government focused on the creation Subic Bay Maritime Industrial Complex (SBMIC), since much of the value of Clark was lost by the eruption. The estimated conversion costs totaled \$36 million, pressing the government’s precarious finances even deeper (Kraft

1993: 11-12). Meanwhile, the United States faced the cost of moving the function of each facility to new locations. Ultimately, the replacement facilities for Subic came from Guam, Japan, and Singapore. Though the Navy once estimated the relocation costs to total around \$3 billion, Admiral Charles R. Larson, head of American forces in the Pacific, suggested to reporters that the costs would be less since many of the functions could be spread to other sites (*New York Times* January 5, 1992).

The economic dimension clearly affected the political dynamics between supporters and opponents of the American bases. In the Philippines, the economic situation encouraged support for the successful conclusion of base negotiations. Conversely, the United States' viewed the economic demands of the Philippine negotiators as a disincentive to remaining at Clark and Subic.

Outcomes

Cory Aquino countered the Senates' rejection by proposing a national referendum to reaffirm the MBA treaty. Aquino's position was weakened by the United States' announcement to withdraw without Senate confirmation and domestic resistance. The media and the Justice Department questioned the constitutionality of the national referendum (Cooley 2008: 82). By the end of 1991, it became clear that the United States would end its 90-year long military presence in the Philippines. On November 24, 1992, the United States lowered the flag at Subic Naval Facility, completing the complete withdrawal of American bases in the Philippines.

The end of the American military bases in the Philippines did not lead to the deterioration of the security climate in Southeast Asia for several reasons. First, the United States and the Philippines continued bilateral security cooperation. Before the United States withdrew, it signed an agreement with President Fidel Ramos to maintain exercises, exchanges of information,

training, logistical cooperation and coordination (*New York Times* November 7, 1992). Terms of the agreement included American access to its former military facilities. In addition, the United States successfully replaced the naval functions of Subic with replacement facilities in Singapore. President Bush announced the agreement to move the logistic operations of the Seventh Fleet to Singapore in 1992 (*New York Times* January 4, 1992). Today, Singapore hosts 110 sailors and provides the resupply of food, ordnance, fuel, and ship repairs from the West Pacific to the Indian Ocean (Calder 2007: 61). Finally, the regional political and security consensus in Southeast Asia facilitated an environment where the United States could move freely. The quick agreement signed with Singapore signaled that the consensus still existed for the United States' military presence. In 1994, the development of the ASEAN Regional Forum also reduced the likelihood of inter-state conflict through confidence building, dialogue, and consensus.

IX. Conclusion

My examination of the base politics in the Philippines and Japan demonstrates that the lifespan of overseas American military bases is determined by a variety of security, political, and economic forces. The three dimensions are subject to change based on a combination of the international forces and the domestic politics that take place within both the host and the base nation. The complexity of this process makes it difficult to forecast. However, the examples of Japan and the Philippines provide a set of similarities and differences that can be explained and generalized.

The two case studies are related to the period of American expansion and hegemony in Asia-Pacific at the end of World War II. Though the Philippines case study is also the unique product of colonial forces beginning at the end of the Spanish-American war, the facilities in

both the Philippines and Japan were founded to support US forward deployment in Northeast and Southeast Asia. The “hub-and-spokes” system protected American interests against the threat from the Soviet Union and the CCP dominated China and provided for the security of both the Philippines and Japan. In this sense, the United States, Japan, and the Philippines enjoyed benefits from the American bases. In both cases, the political dimension was complicated by the disjunction between the national and local sentiments towards the bases. Both the Aquino-led government and the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan politically supported the military bases. However, local nationalists opposed the military bases as an infringement of sovereignty and anti-imperialist grounds. As a result, both the United States and the host governments have attempted to manage tensions through several rounds of negotiation.

In the case of Okinawa, the United States and the GOJ have worked together to produce an environment where the military bases are likely to stay. This outcome is a sign that the three dimensions of base politics favor the status quo. In Northeast Asia, the threat from North Korea and Chinese emergence mean that the US and Japanese interests will continue to coincide. The 2010 standoff between Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands near Okinawa has reinvigorated the alliance. The security threat has pushed the political dimension since the military bases are easier to politically justify. Even the left-leaning DPJ has sided in favor of the Okinawa bases and the 2006 relocation plan. In addition, the economic dimension favors the bases continuation. The GOJ’s payments to Okinawans have co-opted at least some support on the islands. The United States is also reluctant to leave since the HNS support provided by the GOJ is so generous.

In the Philippines the outcome to base negotiations is very different from the Japanese example because the political, security, and economic dimensions are reversed. Even though the

eruption of Mt. Pinatubo was an influential event that undoubtedly affected the base negotiations, its role only exacerbated a situation that was trending against the bases' renewal. First, the security environment in Southeast Asia was remarkably different from Northeast Asia. The end of the Cold War reduced the threat of regional war. However, the development of norms based on sovereignty, non-interference, and consensus in Southeast Asia created regional confidence in ASEAN, an organization formed for conflict resolution. While the United States' security presence remains important, it can be effectively supplemented by Southeast Asian regionalism and cooperation.

The Philippines' outcome was also significantly different because of the political and economic dimensions. The strength of the ideals represented by *kaliyaan* and Philippine nationalism cannot be compared to the situation in Okinawa. It is the legacy of hundreds of years of occupation by Spain and the United States followed by resentment and outrage at the US-supported Marcos regime. The end of Marcos' rule ushered in an era where hundreds of years of resentment inspired anti-base restrictions in the 1987 Constitution as well as opposition from nationalists within the Philippine Senate. The absence of any real security threat made it more politically justifiable for base opponents to resist the US bases on nationalist grounds. Finally, the economic dimensions produced tensions between the United States and the Philippines, particularly over the size and nature of American financial assistance to the host-nation. American negotiators expected the price of American bases in the Philippines to rise to levels well beyond their security value. The instability of financial compensation caused Americans to consider where US forces could be redeployed in Southeast Asia from the Philippines well before the closure of Subic and Clark.

As a result of the different political, security, and economic dimensions found within the examples of Japan and the Philippines, the United States' remains in Japan and does not possess permanent military facilities in the Philippines. The rise and fall of the American facilities in East Asia is likely to continue to follow this pattern. Where the security, political, and economic realities demand it, American personnel are likely to be deployed overseas, in nations with very different cultures, customs, and languages. As long as the United States remains the world's largest military spender, it will be expected to bear a large and diverse presence overseas to guarantee the security of the United States, its allies, and to safeguard the routes that facilitate global trade.

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