

A U.S. Presidential Elections Board Game and Applied Literature Review

The purpose of my Capstone has broadly been to devise a fun and interactive means to teach Americans from all walks of life about, and engage them in our politics. To do this, I first performed original research to determine whether educational board games, as a type of role-play or simulation, positively influence learning outcomes. I concluded that they do. Second, I wrote an applied literature review on campaign effects and voting behavior in U.S. Presidential elections to understand how the most high profile campaigns influence electoral outcomes. Finally, I used this analysis to craft and construct a preliminary board game that pits players against each other in a simplified, yet accurate and accessible simulation of a Presidential campaign. Through its very nature as a game, I hope that my Capstone can, to some degree, educate the unaware and engage the uninterested in our political process.

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What Moves the Numbers?
An Applied Literature Review for *The Democracy Game*

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“For nearly a quarter of a century the press has reported on who is winning and losing. What is different about today’s news is a far deeper and troubling phenomenon. The strategic game is embedded in virtually every aspect of election news, dominating and driving it. The game sets the context, even when issues are the subject of analysis.” – Thomas Patterson (*Out of Order* 1993, 69)

“Remember, the point of running a campaign is to move numbers.” – Glen Bolger (*Campaigns and Elections American Style* 2010, 91)

The Origin and Structure of this Paper

This Capstone stemmed from two of my strongest interests: American politics and playing games. Though each occupies a different part of my life—and the “real” world—I find both fun, entertaining, and important. So when I started thinking about a project, it was perhaps inevitable that I would try to marry these disparate interests. No less vital to me, however, was creating something that would be of greater use to someone other than myself, the narrow vein of academia that might be interested in it, and the family and friends of mine who I would force to read it. It was with these two goals in mind that *The Democracy Game: A U.S. Presidential Elections Board Game* was born. Through it, I knew that I could combine and learn more about politics and gaming, and share with others the thrill I get from both. I certainly have accomplished the former, and I hope future players of the game will deem my efforts a success, too.

Crafting and constructing the game was immediately and highly challenging, for several tough questions needed answering. First of all, how precisely would be the best way to go about “thrilling” others? Surely the very nature of a game would keep players engaged for a time, but it would be impossible to maintain this appeal indefinitely without cultivating their own interest in politics and/or strategic decision-making. Thus the goal became educating others in the functions and process of presidential campaigns, and so empowering them to become engaged in politics, real and simulated.

But how to do that? To answer this question, I conducted original research to determine, among other things, whether and how simulations and games could improve quantitative learning outcomes. Explored more fully in *The Games of Presidential Studies: Measuring Student Learning Achievement Using Simulations*, I found that they

foster classroom enthusiasm and civic engagement, create a sense of control over one's learning, require higher understanding of course material, help students retain knowledge longer, and encourage critical thinking skills, like creativity... [and] develop students' emotional capacities and enhance emotional skills like empathy. (Korn 2010, 2)

From my experiment, I concluded that games "can make a real impact on student learning outcomes" (6).

It is this line of inquiry that has lead to this paper, which aims to devise a set rules for *The Democracy Game* that are based on what campaigns actually do to win elections, yet accessible to all comers. In so doing, I also seek to answer two additional questions: Do campaigns implicitly treat elections as games to be won? If they do, how do they go about winning, and do voters understand what they are doing and why? After all, we Americans consider the right to vote among our most fundamental rights as free citizens because it "is preservative of other basic civil and political rights" (*Reynolds v. Sims* 1964). Speaking to this belief, we go to the polls more often than most other democracies. Every four years, we decide who will lead our republic and by extension shape our times, guide our futures, and change our world. For reasons of personal and public interest, it seems that knowing campaigns' affects on our individual and collective exercise of that right is highly important.

Before beginning this project, I thought that simple and satisfying answers to these questions would be easily available, if not regularly consulted by many people. Wrong. It took months of digging to find the subfield of political science, called "campaign effects," that deals with just this topic. As it turns out, the scholarship has only recently begun to rally around an empirical, and frankly, preliminary consensus around the effectiveness campaigns. Meanwhile, campaigns themselves have only recently become more open about what they do and why they

do it. The predictable result is that, few people, let alone ordinary Americans, have anywhere near a remotely firm grasp on campaigns' effects on us. Thus the purpose of this paper is to simultaneously evaluate the wealth of literature about what has become known about campaign effects for the general reader, and to apply those findings as rules for *The Democracy Game*.

To do that, this paper is divided into four parts. In the first, I discuss the evolution of the campaign effects literature from its inception in the 1950s to the present. Specifically, I focus on the historical relevance and enduring prevalence of the presidential "minimal effects" model, which maintains that mass preferences are set well before elections begin and that "campaigns and the mass media can only influence [them] at the margin" (Alvarez 1997, 16). I also discuss the modern incarnation of this model, the presidential forecasting model, which as the name implies is used to predict electoral outcomes months in advance based on measures of these mass preferences.

The second part is by far the most content-heavy. Here, I explore the two schools of thought within the contemporary campaign effects literature, which holds that campaigns have measurable, sometimes substantial effects on electoral outcomes, and seeks to identify them: campaign practitioners and campaign academics. Though the former lends only qualitative data on the nature of campaigns and their effects, it would be a mistake to omit from a comprehensive review the anecdotal and experiential information that these experts bring from the field. Furthermore, they are necessary complements to the academics' quantitative data, which would be piece-meal and devoid of practical context without it. The academic literature provides this increasingly quantitative data on various campaign effects. From here, I aim to reconcile the differences between the two schools of thought, and introduce the specific campaign effects the

academic literature has already identified. Where appropriate, the implications for *The Democracy Game*'s design are also discussed.

In the third part, I move from the campaign effects literature to other related data essential to understanding the context of modern campaign dynamics. These include the role of campaign strategy, the 2008 primary election, and the timeline of the campaign. This part is critical for applying the identified campaign effects to a workable game framework.

Fourth and finally, I situate *The Democracy Game* in the context of the literature discussed in the first three parts. This part begins with my general game design methodology, develops the blueprint for the precise game rules and materials, and concludes by answering anticipated criticisms of the game design.

Appendices A, B, and C contain a draft of *The Democracy Game*'s rules, the preliminary game board, and a sample playing card template, respectively. In Appendix D is a reformatted copy of the cited *The Games of Presidential Studies: Measuring Student Learning Achievement Using Simulations*.

The History of Presidential Campaign Effects

"Minimal Effects:" 1944 to Today

Campaign effects literature can be traced as far back as 1944, to Columbia University researchers Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet's *The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign*. Through a panel study involving 3,000 residents of Erie County, Ohio from May to November of 1940, the team planned to

measure the changes in preferences which the Columbia researches thought would occur during the electoral season and then match those changes in preferences with campaign events and information... But instead of documenting any changes in preferences, the

Columbia team found an amazing stability of preferences in the 1940 election. (Alvarez 1997, 16)

In their own words, Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) observed that

What the political campaign did, so to speak, was not to form new opinions but to raise old opinions over the thresholds of awareness and decision. Political campaigns are important primarily because they activate latent predispositions. (74)

Put another way, the Columbia team in their study uncovered the first evidence that campaigns persuade few people.

In their 1954 follow-up to *The People's Choice, Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign*, the Columbia team “examine[d] the political opinions, attitudes, and candidate preferences of residents of Elmira, New York, during the 1948 presidential election campaign” (Shaw 2006, 19). Yet again, they reached a wholly unexpected conclusion, but one that even those with a passing interest in political science now take for granted. Expanding on their findings in their first book, they found that voters behave in two ways:

First, with no clear directives from stimuli outside themselves, people are likely to fall back on directive forces within themselves. This means that voters are likely to fall back on early allegiances, experiences, values, and norms—for example, those associated with being raised as a member of the working class or a minority group. Second, voters are likely to be especially vulnerable to less relevant influences than direct political stimuli. If voters cannot test the appropriateness of their decisions by reference to political consequences, then they are especially likely to be influenced by other, nonpolitical facts—for example, what trusted people around them are doing. As a result, old interests and traditions of class and minority blocs are brought to bear upon the determination of

today's vote. In this process the principal agencies are not Machiavellian manipulators, as is commonly supposed when bloc votes are delivered at the polls, but the ordinary family, friends, co-workers, and fellow organization members with whom we are all surrounded. In short, the influences to which voters are most susceptible are opinions of trusted people expressed to one another. (Berelson et al. 1954, 115)

In other words, “voters tend to get their preferences from contact with ‘opinion leaders’ within their social group,” not from campaigns (Shaw 2006, 19).

As Alvarez (1997) puts it,

The importance of the Columbia research cannot be underemphasized [for two reasons]. First, this research was methodologically innovative, especially regarding the development of the panel study. Second, it established the subsequent research agenda with their conclusion that political campaigns had only marginal conversion (or persuasion) effects. (18)

Following Columbia research and other extant data—including the publication of the seminal volume *The American Voter* (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960)—however, the campaign effects literature grew dormant as most political scientists thought the matter settled (Brady 2006, 5). In fairness to scholars of the time, even modern studies on minimal effects continue corroborate the Columbia and Campbell et al. findings. Notably, Finkel (1993) examined the three presidential elections in the 1980s and concluded that “the ‘minimal effects’ model is confirmed *only* if by minimal effects we mean campaign period conversions away from both preferences and political predispositions” (18). (To his credit, Finkel (1993) also found that “much scholarly work on the minimal effects model has centered on the stability of state vote

intentions only, and neglected the critical role of predispositions and political activation that was outlined in [*The People's Choice and Voting*].)

Through all of this, it is important to note that none of these studies necessarily precluded the possibility of campaign effects. Rather, in searching for *persuasion* effects, these studies found none. Thus it would appear that the “minimal effects” thesis took root because scholars of the time at which this landmark research was first conducted, being unable to identify significant persuasion campaign effects, initially theorized that their absence indicated *no* campaign effects at all. Nevertheless, the book remained closed for a number of years.

By the late 1980s, however, the book began to open again. There were three primary reasons for this. First and most important, was the development of a new perspective in the field of political communication that also lent itself to studying campaign effects. This perspective was led largely by Iyengar and Kinder in *News that Matters: Television and American Opinion* (1987). The two found that

Television news clearly and decisively influences the priorities that people attach to various national problems, and the considerations they take into account as they evaluate political leaders or choose between candidates for public office... As a general matter, the power of television news—and mass communication in general—appears to rest not on persuasion but on commanding the public's attention (agenda-setting) and defining criteria underlying the public's judgments (priming). (117)

In other words, Iyengar and Kinder realized that the media and campaigns can and do influence vote choice by telling the public what topics to think about, and how to think about them.

Campaigns, of course, endeavor (via the media) to get voters to think about issues most favorable to them in the way most favorable to them. Alvarez (1997) again summarizes

It is difficult to change the minds of voters, and neither political campaigns nor the mass media are well suited for that task. However, perceptions are less malleable and are more subject to change... Most of these works, from the Columbia research [on]... argue that political campaigns and the mass media can and do influence voter perception and misperception and therefore, indirectly influence preferences as well. (21)

The second major reason was the 1988 election, in which many political scientists felt “that George H.W. Bush outmaneuvered Michael Dukakis for the presidency, largely by waging a trivial and negative campaign” (Shaw 2006, 2). This fueled discontent with the status quo within the discipline, and as such, scholars began to reopen their studies of campaign effects.

Third, and no less important, was the growing availability of data with which to perform experiments and analyses. Campaigns were only forced to maintain data with the passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act and its amendments in the early 1970s. At the same time, numerous clearinghouses began to compile and disseminate data, campaigns became more willing to share resources, and presidential libraries started to open their records to outsiders.

Presidential Forecasting Models (include the core elements of predetermination)

Today, the last remaining vestige of the minimal effects model is the forecasting model, which, as the name implies, seeks to identify the likely winner in presidential contests in advance. Wlezien (2001) aptly summarizes the theory behind modern presidential election forecasting. Political scientists rely, “on a ‘referendum’ model of sorts, in which voters—those in the middle—vote either to stay the course or to change based on the performance of the incumbent administration” (25). “Election outcomes are typically modeled as a function of partisan identification, the state of the economy, and assessments of the incumbent party or administration” (Hillygus and Jackman 2003, 584). These fundamentals help, and usually

succeed, in predicting election outcomes. Still, it is “an inexact science” (Wlezien and Erikson 2004, 747).

“In addition to studies of preference shifts, some have suggested that presidential election campaign effects can be understood as the difference between political science presidential election forecasting models and the actual vote” (Bartels 1993). A less than practical assertion, it nonetheless makes clear the distinction between the political context forecasting models apply and the effects campaigns can have in spite of those factors.

Indeed, Shaw (2006) notes that forecasting models have become increasingly bound to campaign performance:

What is interesting is that the forecasting models do not specifically posit that presidential voting behavior is unaffected by campaigns. Most of them, for example, offer presidential job approval as a predictor of the vote, noting that approval rates could clearly be affected by the campaign. Moreover, a few models rely on past vote totals to predict the upcoming race, leaving open the possibility that past campaigns might affect current elections. Even forecasters with no endogenous (or lagged endogenous) variables in their models often admit that campaigns are necessary to educate voters about the external reality upon which their predictions are based. (22)

Forecasting models are certainly no less valid or useful as they have been, but it is likely that scholars will continue to use them to understand the political climate moving into elections. At the very least, they can be useful (and entertaining) tools for this purpose.

Wlezien (2001) says it best:

All that forecasting models can offer well in advance of an election is some sense of the advantage or disadvantage candidates have as the campaign begins. They offer a starting

point of sorts, not the final resting place. Campaigns matter. They always have and they always will. (30)

Transition to Contemporary Literature

Shaw (2006) and others maintain that the classic minimal effects literature does not preclude the possibility of campaign effects. Because the contemporary campaign effects is so deeply rooted in the models that came before it, many researchers do not consider even the strictest constructions of the campaign effects models as

necessarily at odds with one another. Some have suggested that the fundamental variables simply determine how the campaign will play out, thus rendering the outcomes predictable... Presidential candidates will run optimal campaigns, but subject to the constraints of existing social and economic conditions. For instance, running a successful campaign is much easier when presidential approval and [economic] prosperity are on your side. (Hillygus and Jackman 2003, 584)

Shaw (2006) articulates perhaps the best understanding of the contemporary minimal effects hypothesis, deeming it “subtle and challenging” (24). In presidential elections, he writes,

macrofactors, such as the state of the economy and presidential approval, are thought to determine the distribution of aggregate preferences. Meanwhile, microfactors, such as party identification and sociodemographic characteristics, are thought to determine the nature of individual preferences. Furthermore, the minimal effects scholarship does not contend that no one is persuaded by the presidential campaign but rather that the net effect is typically incidental to the election outcome. (24 – 25)

In the end, Shaw (2006) concludes that the minimal effects hypothesis has more to say about the normative, rather than quantitative, importance of presidential elections in the United States:

Most scholars writing from this point of view seem to believe that campaigns *are* important. First, they see presidential campaigns as important political institutions. They serve as exemplars for citizen responsibility and control over political power in the United States. Second, and more pragmatically, they believe campaigns mobilize support for the two major-party candidates... [that] might *not* occur without prompting by the parties... Third, they acknowledge that campaigns can produce slightly asymmetrical mobilization or persuasion and might thus tip a close election. Still, scholars who emphasize noncampaign factors hold that differential mobilization or persuasion effects between the parties tend to be minimal, which severely limits the chance that campaigns will determine who wins the presidency.

The Contemporary Campaign Effects Literature

Campaign Practitioners and General Effects

As the foregoing literature has established, campaign effects are real and many. Nonetheless, there remain two distinct schools of thought on the topic that vary sharply in their perspective on modern campaigns today: campaign practitioners, and campaign academics. The first, is that of campaign practitioners, the professionals, party leaders, and consultants who run, work on, and in many cases, live and breathe campaigns. Campaign practitioners were among the first to disagree with the minimal effects hypothesis (if they ever agreed with it at all). Working in campaigns, they understood that while parties and polls, strategies and tactics may balance out in the long-term, that is rarely the case in the short-term. They take an anecdotal, qualitative view that relies on decades of their own and others' work in the field, and so offers important insights that research cannot, case studies, and cutting edge ideas with which academic

literature struggles to keep up. (The classic example of the latter is the effect of the Internet in campaigns, something the literature even now barely addresses).

The flip side, however, is that they rarely offer any data in making their point. Certainly many academics fall prey to this failing, but the problem is much more pervasive and widespread on the practitioner side because the nature of their profession precludes many tools to gather data. The principal tool that they do have, polling, is almost entirely contextual: It depends not only on the individual race being polled, but the time during the race at which the poll is taken. Consequently, practitioners are able to speak very specifically about the characteristics of individual races, but only broadly about campaigns in general and in the manner informed by those individual experiences. For our purposes, it is also important to note that this problem is compounded even further in presidential races, where campaigns not nationwide, but in 50 states and the District of Columbia. This forces practitioners to speak even more generally, as campaigns take different action in different states. Put cynically, campaign practitioners' theory of campaign effects could be summed as, "Trust us, this works, we've been there." Their arguments often avoid measurement and simply "*infers* certain campaign or media effects" (Alvarez 1997, 22). That does not mean, however, that it should be discounted. Not only is real-world experience a practical necessary in the campaign world, but the qualitative data is even sometimes buttressed with empirical studies, surveys, and other evidence.

Still, the greatest challenge in assessing the current state of the qualitative literature lies in identifying those reliable, expert sources whose advice can be counted upon, and separating them from the masses of punditry. Quality qualitative data is hard to come by. People are at the heart of this data, not numbers; yet, as is the case on the quantitative side, we might seek to find the right ones. In *Campaigns and Elections American Style*, Thurber and Nelson (2010) do just

that. They and the authors cited in their volume utilize the outcomes of the 2008 election to gather and present the most current, well-informed qualitative literature on running effective campaigns, and thus on campaign effects. “The basic thesis of [the] book is that election campaigns influence voter behavior” (Thurber 2010, 30). A summary of their collective findings follows.

Winston (2010) speaks to the importance of a candidate’s positions in the context of the times, writing that it is ultimately, “it is a candidate’s positions, not money, not consultants, and not campaign managers that will make or break a campaign” (50). Bolger (2010) details what he calls, “the four key elements to a winning campaign:” candidate quality, a focused message, enough money, and a strong grassroots operation (62 -64).

Steinhorn (2010) writes about the importance of creating an identifiable campaign brand: “Despite all the attention paid to campaign advertising, the truth is that television ads alone will not win an election. But an effective branding campaign—one that turns every media tool into an advertising vehicle—will” (141). He also describes the complexity and success of the Obama campaign’s online operations, declaring “History has shown that connecting with people is far more powerful than persuading them, and it would be hard to imagine future campaigns not trying to replicate the Obama model” (151).

Speaking to campaigns’ relationship with the media, Lynch (2010) writes that, Positive news coverage is crucial to successful campaigns since news reports have more credibility than paid advertising, even amid skepticism toward the press and the use of direct online communication... Most campaign professionals believe that coverage by the news media is far more important than paid advertising, although millions of dollars are

spent on ads. Candidates need to be covered in order to become known, to frame the debate, to control the agenda, and to raise money. (160, 167)

They do this in a variety of ways, from publicly announcing their candidacy, to writing books, to seeking out key (and celebrity) endorsements, and with minimal success, stunts like Obama's bowling and McCain's use of "Joe the Plumber."

Hernnson (2010) notes that the goals of campaign fieldwork are "to identify, communicate with, and mobilize campaign supporters" (194). This is typically done through "voter identification, registration, targeting, literature drops, and get-out-the-vote drives" that, in the best campaigns, are fully integrated into the rest of the campaign's organizations and activities (193, 194). On a related note, Rosenblatt (2010) describes the networking tools available to campaigns: grassroots organizing, social networking, blogs, fundraising, and more.

With "Campaigns Matter," Nelson (2010) concludes the book by with an analysis of some of the strategic decisions that changed the outcome of the 2008 Democratic primary campaign. Among the most important was this:

First, the Clinton campaign, like many political commentators, assumed that Senator Clinton was the front-runner and that the nomination would be decided on Super Tuesday... The Obama campaign, on the other hand, planned for a long, drawn out competition, and put staff in states to organize far in advance of the state primaries and caucuses. As a result, when the nomination was not wrapped up on [Super Tuesday], the Obama campaign was much better positioned, both organizationally and financially, for the long nomination contest that followed.

As even the minimal effects hypothesis concedes, without campaigns going toe-to-toe on all these initiatives, one campaign would gain an advantage greater than the political context would ordinarily permit, and thus tip the outcome of the election.

Campaign Academics and Specific Effects

Campaign academics, those who study campaigns, bring this assertion to a new level by finding precisely how, and how much, these efforts move the electorate. As the Columbia team proved, campaigns can lead to small persuasion effects (Berelson et al. 1954). Likewise, we know from Iyengar and Kinder (1987) that campaigns compete to set the agenda to issues most favorable to their candidates, and to prime voters to feel certain ways about these issues.

In one of the first works on contemporary campaign effect, Popkin (1991) studied the effects that the massive amount of information during presidential campaigns on the electorate. Ultimately, he found that “when a (contested) campaign focuses on an issue it leads to *less* voter misperception, not more” (40). Consequently, campaigns can affect vote choice. In another important work (entitled *Do Campaigns Matter?*) Holbrook (1996), found for the first time that some campaign events, especially the party nominating conventions, can have a substantial effect on voters’ preferences in spite of the national political context. However, he also found that most other campaign events only have minor, transitory effects that diminish in result over time, either due to the efforts of the opposing campaign or general memory decay (157).

A decade later, Shaw (2006) was able to put the minimal effects hypothesis in perspective to the contemporary research. He wrote,

There are at least four reasons why presidential elections are expected to be relatively impervious to campaign effects. First, federal election law imposes spending limits on the candidates’ campaigns in exchange for public funding... Second, the proliferation of

polling and focus group technologies makes it unlikely that either campaign will achieve an advantage with respect to strategic information... [Third,] both candidates bring an equal amount of expertise to the table in a given election. Fourth and finally, we assume presidential campaigns often produce tit-for-tat resource allocation patterns. (23, 24)

But, as campaign professionals like those featured in *Campaigns and Elections American Style* understand is that there are always variations, if not outright exceptions to these and other standards of presidential campaigning, perhaps not over decades, but certainly within the same cycle. In fact, 2008 is a fine example: On the one hand, Obama had an unprecedented online operation, and forewent public financing to operate that first billion-dollar campaign. By contrast, Clinton and McCain not only lacked these assets, but also the fundamental strategy to utilize and harness them.

Indeed, the fact that campaigns do not work equally in every state has also been repeatedly proven. Lau, Andersen, and Redlawsk (2008), for example, assert that political campaigns are important because they educate voters on the issues important to them in the upcoming election and teach them how to “vote correctly;” that is, to vote for the candidate who best represents “their own values and interests” (406). Nevertheless, they note that this education is not equally distributed nationwide because “the incentives created by the Electoral College mean that presidential candidates do not campaign equally in every state” (398). Indeed, Lau et al. find that this variation results in “an increased probability of a correct vote of about 12% in battleground states where both candidates are blanketing the airwaves with ads, compared to states that the candidates are largely ignoring” (405).

The key, then, is not to look so much at voting behavior in general, but specifically what actions presidential and other campaigns take that provoke different behaviors in the polity. In

the past there was no question, only this statement: “Campaigns have only minimal effects on electoral outcomes. Today, the question has become, “How far do campaign effects reach?” While campaigns persuade and mobilize voters on an individual level, for our purposes, it is most necessary to understand how the collection of these individual interactions affect the race in the aggregate. That is where our discussion now turns.

Two important works merit the greatest discussion, especially for our purposes: Shaw’s “A Study of Presidential Campaign Event Effects from 1952 to 1992” (1999), and Gerber and Green’s “The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment” (2000). In the first, by examining “the strategic planning memoranda of the Bush and Clinton campaigns from 1992... [as well as] dozens of events from the 1992 [race,]” Shaw captures and “identifies four... [broad] categories of presidential campaign events: *messages, party activities, mistakes, and outside occurrences*” and “eleven additional subcategories” (390). From there, he determines what kind of impact each has, and how long that impact endures, classifying each into the following four models of effects:

Minimal effects [which]... do not disturb the trial heat margin between the presidential candidates... *Spike effects* [which]... produce an abrupt but transient change in the trial heat margin between the presidential candidates... *Step effects* [which]... produce an abrupt but durable change in the margin between the presidential candidates. [And] *Wave effects* [which] produce a gradual change in the margin between the presidential candidates. (404)

The ultimate result is a study that focuses not on minute campaign effects or long-term campaign strategy, but instead reveals compelling insights on the aggregate national campaign effects of a wide variety of major short-term tactical campaign events that are still in use today.

In the second landmark study, in which the residents of New Haven, Connecticut were divided into control and treatment groups and provided nonpartisan messages about voting via personal canvassing, direct mail, and telephone calls, Gerber and Green found that, in one model, “personal contact raises the probability of turnout by 8.7 percentage points... [and] the effects of voter contact do not vary significantly across messages” (658). In other model, they found that,

“Face-to-face contact raises turnout by 9.8 percentage points, and direct mail raises turnout by .6 percentage points for each mailing [at least up to the first three]. One of the most surprising results to emerge... is the ineffectiveness of telephone appeals [from professional phone banks]... We find no indication whatsoever that telephone appeals raise turnout... [in fact] telephone calls would seem to have diminished turnout slightly.

Furthermore, they attributed the overall decline in voter turnout over the past several decades to a corresponding “decline in face-to-face political activity” (661). This, and subsequent field studies, indicate that field campaigns can have not only an impact on voters, but play an important role in our system of government.

In *Unconventional Wisdom: Facts and Myths About American Voters*, Kaufmann, Petrocik, and Shaw (2008) superbly synthesize and categorize the present state of quantitative contemporary campaign effects research. For our purposes, it is best to start here, and delve into greater detail as necessary. The following is a chart excerpted from their book that summarizes the main findings of the quantitative campaign effects research on tactics today over the past 15 years (167 – 170). The entire chart is replicated in its entirety (dating to the ‘80s and incorporating forecasting models) and used in construction of the game cards in Appendix C:

<i>Type/ Tactic</i>	<i>Source</i>	<i>Level</i>	<i>Campaign Effect</i>
<i>Aggregate Effects</i>	Berelson et al. (1954)	Presidential	+5% - 8% change in margin
	Markus (1988)	Presidential	+2% change in margin
	Finkel (1993)	Presidential	+2% change in margin
	Bartels (1993b)	Presidential	+0% - 2% change in margin
	Campbell (2000)	Presidential	+2% change in margin
	Holbrook (1996)	Presidential	+10% change in margin
<i>TV Advertising</i>	Gerber (1988)	Senate	Incumbent spending advantage increases support by 6%
	Shaw (1999b, 2006)	Presidential	+1% - 3% change in margin
	Goldstein and Freedman (2002a, 2002b)	Presidential	Significant change in turnout
<i>Negative v. Positive TV Ads</i>	Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) Lau et al. (1999) Finkel and Geer (1998) Lau and Pomper (2004) Freedman and Goldstein (1999) Wattenberg and Brians (1999)	Statewide/ Mayoral/	+3% increase in turnout after seeing advocacy ad; -3% decrease in turnout after seeing negative ad
		Presidential	No effect on turnout
		Meta	No effect on turnout
		Presidential	No effect on turnout
		Senate	Negative ads stimulate turnout
		Presidential	Negative ads stimulate turnout
		Presidential	Negative ads stimulate turnout
	Clinton and Lapinski (2004) Geer and Lau (2006)	Presidential Presidential	Negative ads stimulate short-term turnout Negative ads stimulate turnout
<i>Radio Advertising</i>	Overby and Barth (2003)	Statewide	Significant effect on political information
	Geer and Geer (2003)		Attack ads are more memorable than advocacy ads
	Panagopoulos and Green (2006)	Mayoral	+1% - 6% in turnout per 90 GRPs
<i>Direct Mail</i>	Gerber and Green (APSR, 2000)	City Council	+1% increase in turnout
<i>Telephone Calls</i>	Gerber and Green (APSR, 2000)	City Council	-5% decrease in turnout
<i>Door-to-Door Contacting</i>	Gerber and Green (APSR, 2000)	City Council	+9% increase in turnout
<i>Debates</i>	Holbrook (1996)	Presidential	+3% change in margin
	Shaw (1999)	Presidential	+2% change in margin
	Hillygus and Jackman (2001)	Presidential	+1% change in margin
	Johnston, Jamieson, and Hagen (2004)	Presidential	+2% change in margin
<i>Nominating Conventions</i>	Campbell (2000)	Presidential	+7% change in margin
	Holbrook (1996)	Presidential	+4% change in margin
	Shaw (1999)	Presidential	+7% change in margin
	Hillygus and Jackman (2001)	Presidential	+8% change in margin
	Johnston, Jamieson, and Hagen (2004)	Presidential	+7% change in margin
<i>Candidate Appearances</i>	Shaw (1999, 2007)	Presidential	+0% - 2% change in margin
	Holbrook and McClurg (2005)	Presidential	Conditional effects on partisan composition
	Holbrook (2002)	Presidential	Significant change in margin

The most glaring absence from this list is unquestionable Internet campaign effects—specifically what effect campaign websites, social media campaigns, other advocacy or organization websites, and similar tools have on voters. New and unprecedented the field is, there have been only a handful of notable studies yet conducted specifically on these tactics (see Drezner and Farrell 2007; Lupia and Philpot 2005). One study in particular found that

the Internet and online election news appear to provide an important source of information, potentially mobilizing new voters to participate in [presidential] elections... [while admitting that] it is clear we are at a crossroads in terms of understanding the impact of the new information technology on American democracy” (Tolbert and McNeal 2003, 183).

We can expect that the proliferation of mass web fund-raising, social networking, and the like will soon direct scholars to examine web campaign effects as well.

An interesting note on social networking: Besides campaigns’ ever-increasing use of major as well as lesser known social networking websites for spreading and targeting their messages, raising funds, and recruiting volunteers, Gerber, Green, and Larimer (2008) recently found that “social pressure” can have an incredible effect on turnout. While their control group voted at a rate of 29.7%, “showing households their own voting records” increased turnout to 34.5%,

a 4.9 percentage-point increase over the control group. Even more dramatic is the effect of showing households both their own voting records and the voting records of their neighbors. Turnout in this experimental group is 37.8%, which implies a remarkable 8.1 percentage-point treatment effect. (38)

If this social pressure creeps its way into social networking, it could have a tremendous impact on both the cost and level of turnout across the nation and in diverse groups.

The next most remarkable findings in my quixotic quest for literature is the dearth of research on *financial* campaign effects. Common sense dictates—and consultants, practitioners, and voters are all quick to point out—that money is the “lifeblood” of American politics (Kaufmann et al. 2008, 195), but also that the best-financed candidate does not always win. Surely every campaign effect can be considered financial inasmuch as vast sums are required to pay for any given campaign initiative. But this is hardly a reason for the brownout on campaign fundraising and expenditure dynamics at the presidential level, how it affects the aggregate vote and vice versa. Only a handful of studies address this. As Adkins and Dowdle (2002) point out,

Generally, few scholars devote significant attention specifically to fundraising, which is one of the more critical aspects of presidential nomination [and, of course, general election] campaigns... this may reflect either an assumption that fundraising success travel in tandem or that the dynamics of fundraising present severe methodological obstacles to credible analysis. (259)

The ones that follow are the most prominent or interesting. Consequently they inform our (sparse) conceptual understanding of financial campaign effects and the same element in *The Democracy Game*.

In examining the 2000 election, Box-Steffensmeier, Darmofal, and Farrell (2005) discerned that while “expenditures by [only] the Bush campaign influenced the expected vote, while the expected vote did not influence either Gore or Bush expenditures” (17). They then concluded that in general elections, “The expected vote instead impacted campaign expenditures indirectly, by influencing media coverage which, in turn, impacted expenditure” (20 – 21). Said

another way, campaigns do not respond directly to the polls per se, but to the news that those polls engender; furthermore, campaign funds spent wisely can move poll numbers.

On the other hand, campaigns do respond very directly to the polls in their fundraising appeals. The problem is that few studies have examined how exactly they systematically go about doing that. Rather,

campaigns make decisions about how to try to collect money by estimating how to get the greatest return for the least commitment of resources (e.g., money, candidate time, staff time.) Ultimately, the composition of each candidate's financial constituency is a function of the candidate's resources and the campaign's decisions about how to take advantage of them. (Brown, Powell, and Wilcox 1995, 50)

Adkins and Dowdle (2002) divide

the independent variables affecting early fundraising into two categories: (1) candidate performance and (2) organizational aspects of the candidate's campaign. Measures of candidate performance include initial national poll results, changes in viability generated during the exhibition season, and length of candidacy in the campaign. Organizational aspects of the campaign are measured by the candidate's electoral constituency size, the amount of money spent by the campaign on fundraising, and whether candidates choose to self-finance their campaign.

For the game, these are all non-factors: All would require some activity on behalf of the candidates or campaigns before the start of the game's timeline. Thus as far as candidate performance measurements go, the most that can be done is to peg the performance of fundraising cards to the voter points each candidate has on the board during the Invisible Money Primary Phase of the Election Cycle, on any major changes in those points due to Campaign

Events, and on the percentage of delegates won in a primary. Though not wholly realistic, it would still have the added benefit of forcing the candidates to lay the groundwork for both the primary and general campaigns. (Organizationally, only two elements are non-factors: the first and the third. The amount of money spent by the campaign on fundraising can, in fact, be incorporated into the game with relative ease.) (The dependent variable is “pre-primary fundraising.”)

Aside from its implications for *The Democracy Game*, what should be clear is that this subject deserves further study and should get it.

The Fundamentals of Modern Campaign Dynamics

With a firm understanding of the contemporary campaign effects literature, we are very near the task of applying it to *The Democracy Game*. Before we make that leap, however, we must first discuss the basic ways in which modern presidential campaigns operate to understand the basic form and structure that the game must take. There are three components to this: the electoral votes and party delegates allotted to each state based on its population and partisanship; the general strategies that all presidential campaigns follow and goals they set; and election cycle timeline, what happens when.

State Partisanship, Party Delegates, and Electoral Votes

Presidential elections are fought, lost, and won on a state-by-state basis, so it is best to start there. Each state has partisan predispositions strongly influence votes on the individual level and in the aggregate. The measure of such predispositions I have selected, the Cook Partisan Voting Index (CPVI), is one of the most well respected measures of state and congressional district partisanship in the field. By comparing the average of the “major-party Presidential voting results” from the immediate past two elections, the CPVI measures how each state and

district “performed compared to the nation as a whole” (The Cook Political Report 2009a) According to The Cook Political Report’s website, “The index is an attempt to find an objective measurement of each congressional district that allows comparisons between states and districts [across state lines], thereby making it relevant in both mid-term and presidential election years.” (2009a.)

If ever there were a measure for partisanship designed for the construction of a board game, this is it. Because the CPVI relies on the *difference* between a state vote and the national vote and not simply on the *outcome* of a given election, it provides an objective figure for each state that is not dependent on any single election. In other words, the numbers will work regardless of how each state has voted or will vote in the future. Moreover, these data do not provide either party an advantage in *The Democracy Game*, making it more fair and viable. Democratic-leaning states, as it happens, hold 269 electoral votes, one short of the number needed for victory. The Republicans are not at all far behind, with 260 electoral votes, the remaining nine belonging to Colorado, the only state found to be in accordance with the national outcome. The CPVI for each state can be found in Appendix B on both the preliminary game board and in a separate chart (The Cook Political Report 2009b).

The remaining data required much less time and thought to gather. Finding states’ electoral votes, for instance, took literally no time at all. I should add though, that I selected states’ votes from this past decade in my effort to keep the game and all of its relevant data as current as possible. While the distribution of votes will be changing in time for the 2012 election, there is no reason to expect a change sufficient to upset the balance or relevance of the game.

Finding the data on each party’s delegates took some more effort, but once I came across *The New York Times’s* online 2008 Election Guide, it proved an invaluable source. I did,

however, choose to amend the data slightly. Recall that in 2008, Democrats deprived Michigan and Florida of half of their delegates for violating the set primary election calendar. The Republicans did the same then, and to South Carolina, New Hampshire, and Wyoming. The penalty was a fluke in the nomination process, and I feel that letting stand would damage the general applicability of the game. All the delegates have been restored. Consequently, the number of delegates required to win each party's nomination is slightly different in the game than it was in 2008, though given the fluid and transitory nature of each party's nominating process, I don't think this presents any noteworthy inconsistencies. (The number of electoral votes needed, of course, remains fixed at 270.) Nor do the Democratic figures consider the role or influence of superdelegates. That was enough of a mess in real life, and I felt no particular need to subject *The Democracy Game* to it. A count of electoral votes and my Democratic and Republican delegate figures are also on the game board and available in the chart in Appendix B (Federal Election Commission 2003; *The New York Times* 2008a; and *The New York Times* 2008a).

Presidential Campaign Strategy

It is also critical to understand the underlying strategy that presidential campaigns adopt in order to win the White House. According to Shaw (1996), by the general election,

Campaigns do not consider all states equally important... resource priorities are substantially influenced by the electoral votes commanded by the states. [Furthermore], the presence of a well-financed, active opposition in the race; the dynamics of the campaign; and a host of goals beyond simply winning a majority in the Electoral College all create an enormous amount of "noise" in determining the optimal allocation of resources in and across the states... Both political science and the news media also have

it right when they assume that the presidential campaigns are rational actors seeking to maximize the probability that they will win an Electoral College majority... It leads one to (correctly) presume that candidates seek to identify those states most at risk *and* most critical to amassing 270 electoral votes when they decide where to campaign. (51 – 52)

This information is largely common sense, but must be confirmed and categorized, as Shaw aptly does.

Following up on this research, Ridout, Rottinghaus, and Hosey (2009) offer some of the first empirical evidence that primary and caucus rules “tend to structure how candidates spend their money and time... [that] a state’s delegate allocation-method matters for how candidates distribute their resources” (792). They also found that

How much money the candidate has... the behavior of other candidates... [and] a state’s place in the nomination calendar [also] influences candidate [resource allocation] behavior. The earlier the nomination event, the more attention it will receive, and as the number of same-day nomination events increases, attention to a state will decrease. (793)

Though we have already sufficiently reviewed aggregate campaign effects, it is important to understand precisely how campaigns work to influence the vote of the individual voter. We already know of the work of Iyengar and Kinder (1987). While most studies have focused on aggregate campaign effects, Peterson (2009), in one of the more recent studies on the subject, focused on “the individual-level differences in how people use and adapt to campaign information” (447). His findings “suggest that the campaign altered how voters made their decisions and that this change stemmed from the changes in uncertainty about the candidates” (455). They do this by agenda-setting and priming certain issues, but they must also do this in response to the various events that necessarily occur throughout and as a part of campaigns. He

also signaled how far the literature has come from minimal effects: “The role of political scientists,” he wrote, “is to uncover the systematic patterns in campaigns that stir the minds and hearts of voters” (457).

Modern Election Cycle Timeline

Finally, we must understand the presidential election cycle, the order of what happens when, to be able to build a game based on reality. Based on the extant literature, I have identified six phases that campaigns and the electorate travel through on their journey to the next election.

The first is known as the “invisible primary.” Quite simply, it is the time characterized by “the campaigning that takes place during the long period leading up to the voting in Iowa and New Hampshire. During this period, candidates vie to become the perceived front-runner in the race,” and so secure the most funds, the best endorsements, and the agenda most favorable to them before a single vote is cast (Corrado and Gouvêa 2004, 79). The single most significant campaign events during this phase are the candidates’ announcements.

Over the past few election cycles, the “invisible primary” has grown longer and more visible. For the 2008 election, it began immediately following the 2006 mid-term elections, at least, for the media and the few Americans interested at so early a date (Wlezien and Erikson 2002, 970). For the candidates, it was likely months or years earlier. Many have humorously noted how the video Hillary Clinton posted online in mid-January 2007 announcing her candidacy featured trees in full green bloom in the background; others said that John Edwards hardly stopped campaigning for president following his and Kerry’s defeat in 2004. For our purposes, however, calling it the day after the mid-term elections is more than sufficient and will set each player on a level-playing field.

The second is one that everyone knows, the primary campaign. It officially begins on the date of the first primary or caucus (Iowa) and ends on the date of the last (in 2008, Montana and South Dakota for the Democrats, and Nebraska for the Republicans). The most important primaries or caucuses tend to be the earliest: Iowa, New Hampshire, and Super Tuesday, the date when hundreds of delegates are up for grabs. Of course, primary campaigns usually end much sooner than the date of the final primary, once one candidate generates enough momentum to gain an insurmountable lead in the delegate count and becomes the presumptive nominee.

The third phase is not narrowly defined, as it is more a time of organizational development within the campaigns more than anything else. I have termed it the summer campaign. The campaigns begin to trade barbs with increasing intensity to be sure, but the vast majority of their energy is focused on preparing for the fall when the voters are paying attention. That means honing their messages, building a strong field operation, fundraising, planning for the conventions, and healing any intra-party wounds from the primaries. The most significant campaign event that occurs during this time is the announcement of the presumptive nominees' running mates.

The fourth and fifth phases are defined exclusively by their events: the party conventions. For parties, it is the time to formally select their nominee and standard-bearer. For voters, it is the time to begin paying attention to the race in earnest. And for campaigns, it is nearly a week of dominating the news cycle, spreading their message, and, according to most contemporary scholars, affecting voters (Holbrook (1996); Shaw (1999); Kaufmann et al. (2006)). Typically the party in the White House has the option to choose the date of their convention second. In 2004 and 2008, the Republicans had control of the White House, and so that will be reflected in *The Democracy Game*.

The conventions launch the final phase of the cycle, the general campaign, where the candidates battle relentlessly until (and through) Election Day, with the debates being the most significant events.

The Democracy Game in Context

Game Design Methodology and Key Elements

The most popular and accessible games based loosely on elements of reality are so because they are easy to “get” but remain complicated enough to be challenging. It is a delicate balance between simplicity and complexity, strategy, skill and luck that must be achieved. After carefully studying their rules, I would submit that the key to achieving this balance is funneling all elements of the game into a single, fundamental “mechanism” that can be used to attain a single goal. This can be most clearly grasped through example, and the two best that immediately leap to mind are *Monopoly* and *Risk*. (Never mind the amalgam between the two that uses the money earned in the former to finance the wars of the latter.)

For all its seeming complexity, *Monopoly* has only three principal game elements: First, players travel around the game board and purchase property, which earns them game money when other players land on their property. Second, players build houses and hotels on their properties to increase their income. And third, players’ journeys around the board earn (or lose) them money by chance as they land on other players’ properties and other spaces, and draw chance cards (“Strategy Guide – Rules” 2010). That’s it. These elements may seem complex and disparate, but they are united by a singular purpose, which is to make money change hands and so purchase (or sell) property.

Everything else that occurs in the game are simply permutations of this fundamental dynamic, subject to players' strategy and skill in choosing to buy or build on their property; and luck in moving around the board.

In *Risk*, the goal is to conquer all of the territory on a map and so dominate the world through war. Likewise, there are only three principal game elements: First, and most important, players use soldiers to conquer the several countries and continents on the game board. Second, players receive *Risk* Cards, which can be traded in for additional soldiers when certain requirements are met. Third, the number of soldiers that players may add to the board on their turn increases as the game continues and the "war" escalates ("Risk Board Game" 2009). Again, that's all there is, and again, each of these elements is used to do only one thing: to earn additional soldiers, which are then used to conquer additional territory.

The rest of the game is simply a combination of strategy and skill based on the placement of soldiers and the battles in which players choose to engage, both of which must needs be defined by the game board; and luck based on the roll of the die in battles, the order of *Risk* Cards received, and the random placement of soldiers on the field at the outset.

Seeing how well this dynamic works, I have sought to make it the foundation of *The Democracy Game*, a task that has not been without some difficulty. But I'm getting ahead of myself. The easiest way to identify this dynamic in presidential campaigns is to work backwards from the endgame. Just as the goals of *Monopoly* and *Risk* are to purchase all property and conquer the planet, respectively, we already know that the goal of any presidential campaign is to win 270 votes in the Electoral College. It goes without saying, then, that this should be the players' goal in *The Democracy Game*. However, this can only be accomplished by winning a plurality of the popular vote in a sufficient number of state elections as to reach 270 Electors. As

such, winning these state elections must instead be considered the game's singular goal. This broad framework has thus far been relatively easy to develop.

From here though, the questions become much more complicated: What determines the outcome of state elections? Votes. Fine, so that—or something representative of a vast number of votes on a game board—must be the fundamental mechanism into which all elements of the game “funnel.” What remains is the most difficult question of all: What affects those votes, and makes them what they are such that only one candidate prevails? In other words, what is that the players, acting as campaigns, can do to affect the vote? This is where the survey of the campaign effects literature and other data is applicable.

First, we must determine which models or schools of thought within the campaign effects literature to apply to *The Democracy Game*. In light of the foregoing pages, this decision is not difficult: The most up-to-date literature maintains that campaigns have effects, so that it what we will use. (Not to mention that there would not be much of a game to be played if the campaigns truly had only minimal effects.) Still, we must also take stock of the forecasting models' preconditions because they are adept at identifying the political climate of the election, something contemporary campaign effects literature consistently maintains is very important. Within the contemporary effects literature, the academic, quantitative data is particularly valuable for determining the effects that various campaign tactics will have on the game board. However, given the rapid pace with which campaigns change, it is imperative to rely on the qualitative data to fill the many gaps that remain on the quantitative side.

That decided, we now must condense the applicable literature into the three elements that will affect the state votes on the board. These must be carefully selected, so as to preserve the integrity of presidential campaigns while reducing them to a level appropriate for this game.

Since the quantitative data will be at core of the game's design, it is best to draw from this pool first. Fortunately, Thurber (2010) identifies the "three fundamental elements of campaigning: strategy, organization, and message" (5). These are those that must be preserved.

The first, strategy, is about using the campaign's scarce resources in the most effective manner. In *The Democracy Game*, I believe this can best be incorporated through an element of campaign finance. Not only is it a critical part of modern campaigns, but requiring players to raise money and spend it on developing their organization and getting their message out will require them to think strategically about how best to allocate their resources with available funds.

The second, organization, means having a disciplined, competent team capable implement the campaign's strategy through the use of appropriate tactics. In this situation, however, it is impossible to simulate a campaign organization because of the omniscience with which each player has control of his or her campaign. To maintain this element, I think it best to apply it to the field campaign. Such an effort requires a great deal of staff and competence, and is aptly suited to this element. Plus, the literature provides perhaps the most conclusive data on field campaign effects, and it deserves to be utilized.

The final element, message, is about effectively communicating with voters about what they want to hear. There are two major factors limiting the use of messaging in *The Democracy Game*. First, messages depend on issues, and this is not a game about issues, nor can I plan for or expect players to know about a wide array of issue areas. Second, messages depend on the political climate, and though I would like to affect the political climate at the outset, doing so during the course of the game would consistently give one player an unfair advantage. Though this may be the case in reality, it should not be in a game meant for fun and learning. What I can do, what I will do, is peg message to the tactics that are available to any campaign's disposal.

Rather than focusing on the effectiveness of the message, the message component will focus on the tactics with which players' get it out, constrained by the funds they choose to spend on it.

Though slightly more complex than the *Monopoly* or *Risk* examples due to the interplay between the financial and other elements, this dynamic effectively preserves the key elements of campaigning and distills them for the game's use. From here, we can apply the remaining data on the states and campaign timeline to set the framework within which these elements will operate.

The Democracy Game *Framework*

Were this a review of all the processes of presidential campaigns, it would likely require a rather substantial binding, or its own wiki. Presidential campaigns are hundred billion dollar operations, with millions of participants, are years in the making. This is a couple-hundred dollar board game, uninterested in politics, and only months in the making. It will be designed for the average American, and should revolve around his her primary electoral concerns.

Anticipated Game Design Criticisms

Given the numerous subjective decisions that I have made regarding the design of *The Democracy Game*, I expect to hear at least some criticism. With so much at work and so many elements in play in presidential campaigns, it is the sad but inevitable reality of this project that several worthy campaign elements were left on the cutting room floor, so to speak. To preempt what can be preempted, and to justify the omission of admittedly important elements of presidential campaigns, I would like to take the time to address some of these points now.

I have omitted Superdelegates in the Democratic Primary. If it were any other year, this probably would not merit any discussion, but coming on the heels of the 2008 Democratic Primary in which they are worth mention. Though decisive in the 2008 contest, the general understanding is that they will flock to whoever wins a majority of the delegates. Therefore,

omitting them from the game would only have a minimal impact on the game's accuracy, whereas their presence would cause immediate and enduring confusion.

While central to an understanding of real political campaigning at all levels, I have ultimately found it best to avoid individual-level data in the game design because they focus on the intricate and detail-oriented process of winning individual voters on a person-by-person, precinct-by-precinct basis. As I have previously said, I do not want to put my players too deep in the weeds. (I did not want to put myself too deep in the weeds either, but I am sure that I am too far gone at this point. But better that I should than my players; it remains a worthy sacrifice.) Rather, it is my belief that they will get the most benefit by being the most engaged, and the way they can become most engaged is in the aggregate on a state-by-state basis.

Sadly, this also requires the exclusion of many subtle and important aspects of modern campaigning, notably targeting and coalition building. However, the game has been constructed so that players, as rational campaign actors, can learn to maximize the capabilities of the strong tactics available to them, not to discern what the highest quality voter contacts entail. Better it be provided for them and experienced in the aggregate. (And of course, this speaks nothing of the complexity of identifying and the wild variety of means of mobilizing individual voters.) Thus, the omission of this complex task, though regrettable, was highly necessary.

Probably the most difficult decision was the omission of candidate characteristics from *The Democracy Game*. For a very long while, I had hoped to let players create or choose a candidate whose qualities would have a measurable impact on the campaign. Various cards might have new or different effects, etc. But in my planning, I soon realized this plan was untenable. In *Monopoly*, it doesn't matter whether you play as the hat, wheelbarrow, car, or any other token. In *Risk*, it doesn't matter what color army you are. And in *The Democracy Game*,

for the same sake of simplicity in its design, it cannot matter who your candidate is or what his characteristics are. To make it so would introduce another layer of complexity to a game that already cannot afford it. Rather than having a positive effect on the game, I feel such a move would be more akin to the use of Class or Race Cards in card games like *Magic: The Gathering* or *Munchkin*, thus compounding the games' primary elements, not clarifying them. I have also come to believe that excluding the candidate from the game, and putting the player in the drivers seat as exclusively as the campaign manager, will drive further establish the point that campaigns are fundamentally games, and that its not always the best candidate who wins.

Furthermore, the literature is divided on the importance of the candidate himself. The “minimal effects” and forecasting literature places greater importance on party than on candidate, and the contemporary effects literature agrees. Most notably, Menefee-Libey (2000) observes that,

For the weeks and months of campaigning that lead up to election day [sic], on the important dimensions of representation and deliberation, contemporary American politics is *campaign centered*... *In most contemporary contests for national and statewide office, professionalized campaign organizations—not the parties, and not the candidates themselves—coordinate and mediate the most important aspects of our electoral politics.*

(5, 25)

I would imagine that the American people do not feel this way, but it is true. Certainly candidates are a part of their campaigns—some more, some less than others—but they are also largely a product of and defined by them; consequently, even mediocre candidates will get by. In fact, many scholars suggest that that is precisely what happened with the 2000 presidential election. I am comfortable enough with that being the case here. If the goal is to understand how

a generic campaign is run I cannot say I am satisfied with its exclusion from the game, and perhaps it is something that will make an appearance in some future edition, but for now, it is a trade-off I am willing to accept.

The aforesaid elements of presidential campaigns that have been excluded, and the others I have not mentioned, were done so both for simplicity's sake, and to ensure that *The Democracy Game* would be generally applicable to all presidential campaigns. This is a tall order given that the issues, candidates, voter preferences, and a whole host of factors vary between—even during!—election cycles. As the research I have cited makes plain, the 2008 election cycle was like none before it. Since similar accounts have been afforded to every other election of the modern era, it seems safe to say that the 2012, 2016, and all subsequent presidential elections will bear only some resemblance to the ones that came before them. That's to say nothing of the difference *between* campaigns of the same cycle. "The mind reels" (Vonnegut 1963, 29). Thus for any game of this nature and ambition to conform to reality and prove successful in its purpose, it must appear—I hesitate to use this word—generic. It must also be easily adaptable to changing times and data. Thus, for this as well as reasons noted above, I have sought to distill the campaign to its basest elements.

As I alluded to earlier, I have used the vast amount of qualitative data at my disposal in the game design under only two circumstances. The first is to fill the gaps in our conceptual understanding of campaigns that the present quantitative data do not (as yet) provide. The reason for this is obvious. The second is to add nuance to the numbers, to give the game a personality. Both, I found, have been necessary to make the game as complete and accessible a depiction of presidential campaigns while maintaining its simplicity, and well as to give it color and life.

Ultimately, I have designed the game according to my discretion, subject to my research, experience, intuition, and above all, respect for and trust in the players. I have, however, endeavored to do it logically and creatively so as to distill the reality of the presidential campaign process to an enlightening game that is accessible to all those who wish to play it. I hope my efforts have been successful.

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
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Draft Official Rules

The object of *The Democracy Game* is to win a sufficient number of state elections on Election Day to win a majority (270) of the votes in the Electoral College and thus get your candidate elected President of the United States.

PLAYERS

The game is designed for two to six players, ages 10 and up.

EQUIPMENT

Game Board

The game board is a map of the United States color coded by the 2009 Cook Partisan Voting Index (CPVI), which indicates how strongly each state leans toward one of the two major parties compared to the national average. The CPVI, number of electoral votes, and number of delegates in the Democratic and Republican primaries are listed on or near each state. The outer edge of the game board is the election cycle used for keeping track of the stage of play, and it is divided into 52 “weeks.” Depending on the stage of the cycle the game, most cards in play will have different attributes based on the multiplier. The board is designed for political accuracy.

Cycle Token

For standard play, the cycle token is moved one space around the election cycle after each player has completed his or her turn that round to indicate the stage of the cycle in play. For a longer game, the cycle token may be moved after every two rounds. For a faster game, it may be moved two spaces for every round.

Vote Tokens

Six sets of tokens, one set for each player. Placed on any of state of each player’s discretion during his or her turn when earned from playing any tactic or field card. The net number of tokens on a state, plus (or minus) the CPVI, indicate the players’ standing in each states’ polls, and is the contest’s outcome on Election Day.

Event Cards

The deck has W event cards. Each has a distinct campaign, political, or issue event indicated on it to which players must respond in the round during which it is drawn. Players must follow all instructions on each event card. If a 1 through 3 is rolled, 1 event card is turned over. If a 4 or 5

is rolled, 2 event cards are turned over. If a 6 is rolled, 3 event cards are turned over. The deck is shuffled and placed face down in preparation for the game.

Tactical Cards

Each deck has the same X tactical cards. Each has a distinct messaging tactic from which players or their opponents may earn or lose vote tokens. Play of each card is subject to the restrictions on each card and requires the indicated number of finance cards. Each player receives the same deck of tactical cards in preparation for the game.

Field Cards

Each deck has the same Z field cards. Each has a distinct field tactic from which players may earn vote tokens and influence the vote on Election Day. Play of each card is subject to the restrictions on each card and requires the indicated number of finance cards. Each player receives the same deck of field cards in preparation for the game.

Dice

There are 6 dice, two blue, two red, and two white. They are used when certain spaces on the election cycle, all types of cards, and election ties call for them.

SUMMARY OF PLAY

The Democracy Game is modeled after the U.S. Presidential Election. First, players select a political party and develop a campaign strategy. Next, as the election cycle moves toward Election Day, they “fundraise” to pay for tactical and field cards, which are used to respond to event cards and earn vote tokens. Finally, players place vote tokens on the game board, trying to win their party’s primary, and then the general election. The instructions below explain the rules of the game in further detail.

GAME PLAY: BASICS

Preparation

Place the board on a sizable table. Shuffle the Event Cards and place them face down on its allotted space on the board. Each player receives a Tactical Deck and a Field Deck. Place the cycle token on “Week 0,” Election Day.

Party Selection and Turn Order

Each player rolls a die at the outset of the game. The player with the highest number selects his party first, and goes first on each week. *No matter what happens during game play, the turn order remains the same.* The other players select their party going clockwise, and take their turn in clockwise order each week. No more than three players may select either party.

If the members of one party outnumber the other, then each player of the smaller party receives a financial, tactical, and field multiplier on each turn to make up the difference. For example, if there are 3 Republicans and 1 Democrat, the Democrat would get a multiplier of 3. If there are 3 Democrats and 2 Republicans, each Republican would get a 1.5 multiplier.

Election Cycle Phases

The election cycle has six phases: the Invisible Primary, Primary Campaign, Summer Campaign, Democratic Convention, Republican Convention, and General Election. There are numerous events within each cycle. Each phase and event has an effect on game play (see “Multipliers” below). Each space on the cycle is considered one week.

Vote Tokens

Throughout the game, players earn vote tokens and place them as they see fit on the game board. In the primaries, the CPVI numbers have no affect, and the players compete against others in their own party to win each state’s delegates.

In the general election, the CPVI numbers indicate a party advantage in that state, and vote tokens are worth 0.2 poll points. For example, Pennsylvania has a CPVI of D+2, meaning that without any vote tokens, it would go for Democrats on election day by 2 poll points. However, with no Democrat vote tokens and 12 Republican vote tokens, it would be R+0.4 and go Republican on Election Day.

Event Cards

Unless any special cycle events are occurring which specify otherwise, at least 1 event card is drawn at the beginning of each week. If a 1 through 3 is rolled, 1 event card is turned over. If a 4 or 5 is rolled, 2 event cards are turned over. If a 6 is rolled, 3 event cards are turned over. Event cards may affect the financial, tactical multiplier, or provide financial or tactical bonuses or losses.

Finance Points

Finance points are used to pay for tactical and field cards. They may also be used to purchase vote tokens directly at X tokens per point. Players who choose the standard private financing option receive 4 Finance Points at the beginning of each week, subject to event card, cycle phase, and cycle event financial multipliers.

Tactical Cards

Tactical cards are the main mechanism by which players earn vote tokens to place on the board. Any number of tactical cards may be played at any time, subject to the restrictions on each card.

Field Cards

Field cards are the secondary mechanism by which players earn vote tokens to place on the board. Any number of field cards may be played at any time, subject to the restrictions on each card. They are only subject to multipliers on the days and in the states where elections are being held. They are also used for breaking ties.

Tapping

Most tactical and field cards require an initial cost to put the card in play from the player’s deck, and then costs on each turn to receive the vote tokens. Unless specified otherwise on the card, players who do not wish to play a certain card for a turn, or cannot afford to pay for it for a turn, may “tap” the card by turning it sideways. It has no affect until it is untapped, which can be done at the beginning of the player’s turn.

Multipliers

The financial, tactical, and field multipliers respectively determines how many financial points player who have opted for private financing can raise on each turn, and how many vote tokens their tactical and field cards will earn on that turn. Multipliers appear on all event cards, for election cycle phases, and on certain weeks.

If more than one multiplier appears, either from multiple event cards or a combination of event cards and phase and event multipliers, then the multipliers are multiplied together to find the multiplier for that turn. For example, if the first event card has a tactical multiplier of .5, the second event card has a tactical multiplier of 2, the phase multiplier is 1, and the cycle event has a multiplier of 2, then the overall tactical multiplier would be 2. If those numbers were financial multipliers, players would be able to raise double their regular allotment of 4 financial points, or 8 financial points.

For the complete list of the phase and cycle event multipliers, see the attached “Game Board Base Multipliers.”

GAME PLAY: PRIMARY CONTESTS

The length of the Primary campaign and times of the various state elections are indicated on the election cycle. During the Primary campaign, players compete against other players of the same party for delegates to the national convention. The Democrats have a total of 4,312 delegates and require 2,157 to win their party’s nomination, and the Republicans have 2,528 delegates and require 1,265 to win the nomination.

Delegates in the Democratic Primaries are awarded proportionally, rounded to the nearest full delegate. Delegates in the Republican Primaries are awarded by simple plurality vote.

If only 2 players are playing, they may have several options:

1. Skip to the Primary Campaign phase on the election cycle entirely;
2. Play through the Invisible Primary and Primary Campaign preparing for the General Election.
3. Play as candidates of the same party, vying to win their parties nomination, and then as opposing candidates in the General Election.
4. Play as candidates of the same party, vying to win the nomination, and then as an independent candidate in the General Election.

GAME PLAY: GENERAL ELECTION

The length of the General campaign and times of the major party events—the conventions and debates—are indicated on the election cycle. During the General campaign, players of the same party compete as a team against the opposing party team.

GAME PLAY: ELECTION CYCLE EVENTS

Exploratory Committee

Each player must “form” a presidential exploratory committee on week 2. Forming the committee provides a financial multiplier of 2.

FEC Report Deadlines

There are 4 FEC Report Deadlines on the game cycle, when the campaigns “rally” their base to demonstrate their financial strength. Each provides a financial multiplier of 2 to all players, and any financial multipliers of 1 or less on the event cards drawn have no effect.

Pre-Announcement

Each player may choose to “pre-announce” his or her candidacy at the beginning of any turn between weeks 3 and 16, *before any event cards are drawn*. Pre-announcing provides a financial multiplier of 2. Players cannot pre-announce after announcing their candidacy. More than one candidate may pre-announce on the same week.

Announcement

Each player must “announce” his or her candidacy at the beginning of any turn between weeks 3 and 17, *before any event cards are drawn*. Announcing provides a financial multiplier of 2, and a tactical multiplier of 2. Players do not have to pre-announce in order to announce their candidacy. More than one candidate may announce on the same week.

Primary Elections

More than one primary usually takes place on the same week. For the full list, see the “Primaries List.” Delegates in each state’s Democratic primary are awarded proportionally, rounded to the nearest whole number. Delegates in each state’s Republican primary are awarded to the winner of a plurality of votes. Players may place vote tokens in any state they wish during the primary cycle in preparation for upcoming primaries or the general election. First place, and sometimes second place, in each week’s primaries may provide a Financial and Tactical multiplier. For the complete list, see the “Multiplier List.”

Primary Concession

Primary candidates may concede the race and withdraw their candidacy at any time between weeks 19 and 36, the weeks following Iowa and the final primary. More than one candidate may concede on the same week. When candidates concede, they must remove half of their vote tokens from the board. Candidates who concede have three options:

1. Continue to play and assist their party’s candidate in winning the general election;
2. Continue to play and run as an independent candidate; or
3. Leave the game.

Unless all players come to an agreement at the beginning of the game, no player who concedes is bound to any of these options.

Party Nominee

A player may declare him or herself his or her party’s presumptive nominee once:

1. His or her last primary opponent concedes;
2. All party players agree that one candidate has amassed enough votes for his or her nomination to be considered inevitable; or

3. He or she amasses the number of delegates required to be the party's nominee. Once the party's presumptive nominee is declared, no additional primaries occur (for the purposes of the game) and none of their multipliers take effect. The declaration of a party's nominee provides a financial multiplier of 3 and a tactical multiplier of 2 to the nominee only. Any financial multipliers of 1 or less on the event cards drawn have no effect.

All players continue to play as usual, except that the victor of each party's nominating contest controls where all remaining party members' vote tokens are placed. He or she may not relinquish this authority. As such, the party operates as a "team" for the remainder of the game. Team members are encouraged to confer with one another at any time to discuss campaign strategy and tactics.

Vice President

Each party's nominee must "select" his or her vice presidential candidate at the beginning of any turn between weeks 36 and 40, *before any event cards are drawn*. If there are other members of the nominee's party remaining, he or she must select one of them. Selecting provides a financial multiplier of 2 and a tactical multiplier of 2 to both the nominee and his selection. More than one candidate may select on the same week.

If the nominee is the only member of his party remaining, he or she does not need to identify a selection. However, he or she receives a financial multiplier of 4 and a tactical multiplier of 4 the week of his or her selection.

Democratic Convention

The Democratic National Convention provides all members of the Democratic Party with a financial multiplier of 3 and a tactical multiplier of 3. It also provides all members of the Republican Party a financial multiplier of 2.

Republican Convention

The Republican National Convention provides all members of the Republican Party with a financial multiplier of 3 and a tactical multiplier of 3. It also provides all members of the Democratic Party a financial multiplier of 2.

Presidential and Vice Presidential Debates

There are 3 presidential debates and 1 vice presidential debate in the General Campaign phase of the Election Cycle, when the candidates vie to demonstrate their superiority on a host of issues, foreign and domestic. Candidates without a vice president will participate in the vice presidential debate themselves.

At the beginning of any round of debate, before event cards are drawn, the players participating in the debate must decide how many "rounds" of debate they will have. They must decide whether to play:

1. "Best of" a certain number of rounds (for example, best 2 out of 3); or
2. "First to" a certain number of round victories (for example, the first to reach 5).

Debates will be conducted through a series of die rolls. One round occurs when each player rolls 3 dice at the same time. To decide the outcome of the round, compare the highest die each player

has rolled, the next-highest die each player has rolled, and the lowest die each player has rolled. Players win the round when he or she wins 2 of the 3 pairs.

Ties are awarded to neither side. If no player wins 2 of the 3 dice pairs, the dice must be recast and the round repeated. Debates end once the rules upon which the players agreed at the outset are fulfilled. The “winner” is awarded a financial multiplier of 3, and the “loser” is awarded a financial multiplier of 2.

Election Day

This is the final week on the cycle when cards may be played, when the election occurs and campaigns work to get out the vote (GOTV). It provides a field multiplier of 3 to all players. (No event cards affect field multipliers.) At the end of this round, all vote tokens are counted, and the player with a plurality of the vote tokens in a state wins that state’s electoral votes.

General Concession

The player who wins 270 or more electoral votes wins the game. The losing general election candidates must concede the race after all of the votes are tallied on Election Day. When a candidate concedes, his opponent wins the game.

GAME PLAY: ADVANCED

“Public” Financing

There are two methods of financing the campaign: private and public. Players who choose the standard private financing option receive 4 Finance Points at the beginning of each week, subject to event card, cycle phase, and cycle event financial multipliers. Players who accept public financing receive 175 Finance Points at the start of the game for use until his or her party’s convention, and then another 125 Finance Points for use from his or her party’s convention onward, *and no more*. Additionally, with the exception of a multiplier applied due to a party being outnumbered, financial multipliers *have no effect*.

Independent/ Third Party Candidates

Any number of players may choose to play as an Independent or Third Party Candidate. If they do so, they do not participate in major party primaries, conventions, or debates and so receives no multipliers for those events. Additionally, without any party advantage according to the CPVI, players must overcome the Democratic or Republican advantage in each state in which they compete. Independent or Third Party Candidates may choose either private or public financing.

TIES

Ties in a Democratic Primary

Because the Democratic Primaries award delegates proportionally, any players who tie would receive the same percentage of delegates. If the players must divide an odd number of delegates, the player with the greatest number of vote tokens earned from field cards in that state wins the odd delegate. If the tied candidates each earned the same number of vote tokens from field cards, the candidates flip a coin to determine the winner of the odd delegate.

Ties in a Republican Primary

In case of a tie in a Republican Primary, the player with the greatest number of vote tokens earned from field cards in that state would win the state's delegates. If the tied candidates each earned the same number of vote tokens from field cards, the candidates flip a coin to determine the winner.

Insufficient Delegates to Win Party's Nomination

If no player reaches 2,157 delegates in the Democratic Primary or 1,265 in the Republican Primary, the player who has won a plurality of states wins.

Insufficient Votes to Win Majority of Electoral College

If no player reaches 270 electoral votes, the player who has won a plurality of states wins.

ROUNDING

Multipliers, delegates, electoral votes, and vote tokens are all rounded to the nearest whole number.

WINNING THE GAME

The player who won his party's Primary election and the General election by winning enough states to receive 270 Electoral Votes is the ultimate winner. The party that won the General election is the winning team.

Game Board Base Multipliers

Phases and Events	Space Num.	Time Applicable	Restrictions	Financial¹	Tactical²	Field³
<i>Invisible Primary</i>	1 - 18	All cycle	None	1	1	1
Exploratory Comm.	2	Space only	None	2	1	1
FEC Report Deadline (1)	15	Space only	None	2	1	1
Pre-Announcement	3 - 16	Any one space	Before announcement	2	1	1
Announcement	3 - 16	Any one space	None	2	2	1
<i>Primary Campaign</i>	19 - 35	All cycle	None	1	2	1
Iowa	19	Space only	None	1	1	2
New Hampshire	20	Space only	Iowa first place	2	2	3
			Iowa second place	2	1	3
			All others	1	1	3
Michigan	21	Space only	New Hampshire first place	3	2	3
			All others	1	1	3
Florida	22	Space only	Michigan first place	1	2	2
			All others	1	1	2
Super Tuesday	24	Space only	Florida first place	1	2	3
			All others	1	1	3
		Space only	Super Tuesday first place			
Potomac Primary	25		place	3	2	2
			Super Tuesday second place	1	2	2
			All others	1	1	2
FEC Report Deadline (2)	26	Space only	None	2	1	1
		Space only	Potomac Primary first place	1	2	2
Texas	27		All others	1	1	2
Pennsylvania	31	Space only	Texas first place	1	2	2
			All others	1	1	2
North Carolina	33	Space only	Pennsylvania first place	1	2	2
			All others	1	1	2
		Space only	North Carolina first place	1	2	2
South Dakota	35		All others	1	1	2
<i>Summer Campaign</i>	36 - 41	All cycle	None	1	1	1
Party Nominee	25 - 36	Any one space	Nominee only	3	2	1
Vice President	36 - 40	Any one space	Nominee and VP only	2	2	1
FEC Report Deadline (3)	41	Space only	None	2	1	1
<i>Dem. Convention</i>	42	All cycle	All Dems	3	3	1
			All GOP	2	1	1
<i>GOP Convention</i>	43	All cycle	All Dems	2	1	1
			All GOP	3	3	1
<i>General Campaign</i>	44 - 52	All cycle	None	2	2	1
First Debate	45	Space only	Winner	3	1	1
			Loser	2	1	1
VP Debate	47	Space only	Winner	3	1	1
			Loser	2	1	1
Second Debate	48	Space only	Winner	3	1	1


				Loser	2	1	1
FEC Report Deadline							
(4)	49	Space only		None	2	1	1
Third Debate	50	Space only		Winner	3	1	1
				Loser	2	1	1
Election Day	52	Space only		None	1	1	3

When there is more than one multiplier per week, the two multipliers are multiplied together. For example, the finance multiplier for week 49 would be *General Campaign* x FEC Report Deadline (4), $2 \times 2 = 4$.

¹ Finance multiplier applies to all funds raised that week.

² Tactical multiplier only applies to tactical cards played that week.

³ Field multiplier only applies to field cards in play in states holding an election that week.



State Game Board Data, Based on Election 2008

State ¹	Abbreviation	CPVI	Electoral Votes	Total Dem. Delegates	Total GOP Delegates
Alabama	AL	R+13	9	60	48
Alaska	AK	R+13	3	18	29
Arizona	AZ	R+6	10	67	53
Arkansas	AR	R+9	6	47	34
California	CA	D+7	55	441	173
Colorado	CO	EVEN	9	71	46
Connecticut	CT	D+7	7	60	30
Delaware	DE	D+7	3	23	18
District of Columbia	DC	D+41	3	37	19
Florida ^{2,3}	FL	R+2	27	211	114
Georgia	GA	R+7	15	103	72
Hawaii	HI	D+12	4	29	20
Idaho	ID	R+17	4	23	32
Illinois	IL	D+8	21	185	70
Indiana	IN	R+6	11	85	57
Iowa	IA	D+1	7	57	40
Kansas	KS	R+12	6	41	39
Kentucky	KY	R+10	8	60	45
Louisiana	LA	R+10	9	66	47
Maine	ME	D+5	4	34	21
Maryland	MD	D+9	10	99	37
Massachusetts	MA	D+12	12	121	43
Michigan ^{2,3}	MI	D+4	17	157	60
Minnesota	MN	D+2	10	88	41
Mississippi	MS	R+10	6	40	39
Missouri	MO	R+3	11	88	58
Montana	MT	R+7	3	24	25
Nebraska	NE	R+13	5	31	33
Nevada	NV	D+1	5	33	34
New Hampshire ³	NH	D+2	4	30	24
New Jersey	NJ	D+4	15	127	52
New Mexico	NM	D+2	5	38	32
New York	NY	D+10	31	281	101
North Carolina	NC	R+4	15	134	69
North Dakota	ND	R+10	3	21	26
Ohio	OH	R+1	20	161	88
Oklahoma	OK	R+17	7	47	41
Oregon	OR	D+4	7	65	30
Pennsylvania	PA	D+2	21	188	74
Rhode Island	RI	D+11	4	32	20
South Carolina ³	SC	R+8	8	54	48
South Dakota	SD	R+9	3	23	27
Tennessee	TN	R+9	11	85	55
Texas	TX	R+10	34	228	140
Utah	UT	R+20	5	29	36
Vermont	VT	D+13	3	23	17
Virginia	VA	R+2	13	101	63
Washington	WA	D+5	11	97	80
West Virginia	WV	R+8	5	39	60

Wisconsin	WI	D+2	10	92	40
Wyoming ³	WY	R+20	3	18	28
TOTAL			538	4312	2528
MAJORITY (50% + 1)			270	2157	1265
Election 2008			270	2026	1191

¹ The Territories, Democrats Abroad, and independent Superdelegates have been excluded.

² The Democratic National Committee had penalized Florida and Michigan for moving their nominating contests too early. They had been deprived of half their delegates. Here, they have been restored to the full count.

³ The Republican National Committee had penalized Florida, Michigan, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Wyoming for moving their nominating contests too early as well. They had also been deprived of half their delegates, but here have been restored.

(Federal Election Commission 2003)

(The Cook Political Report 2009)

(*The New York Times* 2008a)

(*The New York Times* 2008b)

Primary and Caucus Calendar 2008: Democratic Nominating Contests¹

Month	Week ²	Date Range	State ³	Delegates ⁴
January	1	12/30 - 1/5	Iowa	57
	2	1/6 - 1/12	New Hampshire	30
	3	1/13 - 1/19	Michigan	157
			Nevada	33
	4	1/20 - 1/26	South Carolina	54
	5	1/27 - 2/2	Florida	211
TOTAL				542
February	6	2/3 - 2/9	Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah	2064
			Louisiana, Nebraska, Washington	194
	7	2/10 - 2/16	Maine, District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia	271
	8	2/17 - 2/23	Hawaii, Wisconsin	121
	9	2/24 - 3/1		
TOTAL				2650
March	10	3/2 - 3/8	Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, Wyoming	462
	11	3/9 - 3/15	Mississippi	40
	12	3/16 - 3/22		
	13	3/23 - 3/29		
	14	3/30 - 4/5		
TOTAL				502
April	15	4/6 - 4/12		
	16	4/13 - 4/19		
	17	4/20 - 4/26	Pennsylvania	188
	18	4/27 - 5/3		
TOTAL				188
May	19	5/4 - 5/10	Indiana, North Carolina	219
	20	5/11 - 5/17	West Virginia	39
	21	5/18 - 5/24	Kentucky, Oregon	125
	22	5/25 - 5/31		
TOTAL				383
June	23	6/1 - 6/7	Montana, South Dakota	47
	24	6/8 - 6/14		
	25	6/15 - 6/21		
	26	6/22 - 6/28		
	27	6/29 - 7/5		
TOTAL				47
GRAND TOTAL				4312

¹ Though both the Democratic and Republican calendars were similar, I based the game's cycle on the Democratic calendar because it ends a month earlier, the contests are more compressed, and I am more familiar with it having closely followed the contested 2008 Democratic Primary.

² Only 15 weeks have contests. Separate rows indicate contests on different days during that week.

³ Excluding Territories and Democrats Abroad.

⁴ Again, the Delegates from Florida and Michigan have been restored.
(*The New York Times* 2008a)

Primary and Caucus Calendar 2008: Republican Nominating Contests

Month	Week ¹	Date Range	States ²	Delegates ³
January	1	12/30 - 1/5	Iowa	40
			Wyoming	28
	2	1/6 - 1/12	New Hampshire	24
	3	1/13 - 1/19	Michigan	60
			Nevada, South Carolina	82
	4	1/20 - 1/26		
	5	1/27 - 2/2	Florida	114
			Maine	21
TOTAL				369
February	6	2/3 - 2/9	Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia	1081
			Kansas, Louisiana, Washington	126
	7	2/10 - 2/16	District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia	119
	8	2/17 - 2/23	Wisconsin, Washington	80
	9	2/24 - 3/1		
TOTAL				1406
March	10	3/2 - 3/8	Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont	265
	11	3/9 - 3/15	Mississippi	39
	12	3/16 - 3/22		
	13	3/23 - 3/29		
	14	3/30 - 4/5		
TOTAL				304
April	15	4/6 - 4/12		
	16	4/13 - 4/19		
	17	4/20 - 4/26	Pennsylvania	74
	18	4/27 - 5/3		
TOTAL				74
May	19	5/4 - 5/10	Indiana, North Carolina	126
	20	5/11 - 5/17	West Virginia	30
			Hawaii	20
	21	5/18 - 5/24	Kentucky, Oregon	75
	22	5/25 - 5/31	Idaho	32
TOTAL				283
June	23	6/1 - 6/7	New Mexico, South Dakota	59
	24	6/8 - 6/14		
	25	6/15 - 6/21		
	26	6/22 - 6/28		
	27	6/29 - 7/5		
TOTAL				59
July	28	7/6 - 7/12	Nebraska	33
TOTAL				33
GRAND TOTAL				2528

¹ Only 16 weeks have contests. Separate rows indicate contests on different days during that week.² Excluding Territories.³ Again, Delegates from Florida, Michigan, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Wyoming have been restored. (*The New York Times* 2008b)

Actual Election Cycle, 2008

Phase	Events	Date Range	Real Weeks	Game Weeks	Game/Real	Notes
<i>Invisible Primary</i>	Day after 2006 Midterms - Day before 2008 Iowa Caucuses	11/8/06 - 1/2/08	60	19	1/3	Begins months or years prior, but only starts in earnest after midterms
	Formation of Exploratory Committee					Not always necessary; sometimes coincides with Formation of Exploratory Committee
	Pre-Announcement Announcement					
<i>Primary Campaign</i>	Iowa Caucuses - Final	1/3/08				
	Democratic Primaries (Montana, South Dakota)	- 6/3/08	22	17	3/4	Compressed to elections "weeks" rather than days for game purposes
	See Dem and GOP Calendars					
<i>Summer Campaign</i>		6/4/08				
	Day after Final Primaries - Dem Convention VP Announcement	- 8/24/08	12	6	1/2	
<i>Democratic Convention</i>		8/25/08				
	Dem Convention	- 8/31/08	1	1	1/1	
<i>Republican Convention</i>		9/1/08				9/1/08 was Labor Day, typically when Americans begin to pay attention to the election
	GOP Convention	- 9/7/08	1	1	1/1	
<i>General Campaign</i>	Day after GOP Convention - General Election	9/8/08 - 11/4/08	8	8	1/1	
	First Debate					9/26/08
	VP Debate					10/2/08
	Second Debate					10/7/08
	Third Debate					10/15/08
	GOTV					11/4/08
TOTAL			104	52	1/2	

Modified Election Cycle (Draft) for The Democracy Game

Space	Cycle Phase	Special	Dem Delegates	GOP Delegates
0	Election Day	Start		
1	Invisible Primary	Formation of Presidential Exploratory Committee		
2	Invisible Primary			
3	Invisible Primary			
4	Invisible Primary			
5	Invisible Primary			
6	Invisible Primary			
7	Invisible Primary			
8	Invisible Primary			
9	Invisible Primary			
10	Invisible Primary			
11	Invisible Primary			
12	Invisible Primary			
13	Invisible Primary			
14	Invisible Primary			
15	Invisible Primary	Quarterly FEC Report Deadline		
16	Invisible Primary	Last Day to Pre-Announce Candidacy		
17	Invisible Primary	Last Day to Announce Candidacy		
18	Invisible Primary			
19	Primary Campaign	Iowa	57	40
20	Primary Campaign	New Hampshire	30	24
21	Primary Campaign	Michigan, Nevada	190	94
22	Primary Campaign	Florida, South Carolina	265	162
23	Primary Campaign	Super Tuesday: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, Washington		
24	Primary Campaign		2258	1289
25	Primary Campaign			
26	Primary Campaign			
25	Primary Campaign	Potomac Primary: District of Columbia, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Virginia, Wisconsin	392	200
26	Primary Campaign	Quarterly FEC Report Deadline		
27	Primary Campaign	Mississippi, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, Wyoming	502	332
28	Primary Campaign			
29	Primary Campaign			
30	Primary Campaign			
31	Primary Campaign	Pennsylvania	188	74
32	Primary Campaign			
33	Primary Campaign	Indiana, Kentucky, North Carolina, Oregon, West Virginia	383	261
34	Primary Campaign			
35	Primary Campaign	Montana, South Dakota	47	52

36	Summer Campaign	Last Day to Declare Presumptive Nominee
37	Summer Campaign	
38	Summer Campaign	
39	Summer Campaign	
40	Summer Campaign	Last Day to Announce VP
41	Summer Campaign	Quarterly FEC Report Deadline
42	Democratic Convention	
43	Republican Convention	
44	General Campaign	
45	General Campaign	First Debate
46	General Campaign	
47	General Campaign	VP Debate
48	General Campaign	Second Debate
49	General Campaign	Pre-General FEC Filing Deadline
50	General Campaign	Third Debate
51	General Campaign	
52	Election Day	GOTV

Kaufmann, Petrocik, and Shaw 2008, 167 – 170

Type/ Tactic	Source	Campaign Level	Campaign Effect
Aggregate Effects	Berelson et al. (1954) Markus (1988) Finkel (1993) Bartels (1993b) Campbell (2000) Holbrook (1996)	Presidential Presidential Presidential Presidential Presidential Presidential	+5% - 8% change in margin +2% change in margin +2% change in margin +0% - 2% change in margin +2% change in margin +10% change in margin
Presidential Forecast Models	Campbell (2004) Abramowitz (2004) Norpoth (2004) Wlezien and Erikson (2004) Lewis-Beck and Tien (2004) Holbrook (2004) Lockerbie (2004)	Presidential Presidential Presidential Presidential Presidential Presidential Presidential	+/-2% average deviation from prediction +/-2% average deviation from prediction +/-4% average deviation from prediction +/-2% average deviation from prediction +/-3% average deviation from prediction +/-6% average deviation from prediction +/-6% average deviation from prediction
Television Advertising	Gerber (1988) Shaw (1999b, 2006) Goldstein and Freedman (2002a, 2002b)	Senate Presidential Presidential	Incumbent spending advantage increases support by 6% +1% - 3% change in margin Significant change in turnout
Neg v. Pos TV Ads	Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) Lau et al. (1999) Finkel and Geer (1998) Lau and Pomper (2004) Freedman and Goldstein (1999) Wattenberg and Brians (1999) Clinton and Lapinski (2004) Geer and Lau (2006)	Governor/ Senate/ Mayoral/ Presidential Meta Presidential Senate Presidential Presidential Presidential	+3% increase in turnout after seeing advocacy ad; -3% decrease in turnout after seeing negative ad No effect on turnout No effect on turnout Negative ads stimulate turnout Negative ads stimulate turnout Negative ads stimulate turnout Negative ads stimulate short-term turnout Negative ads stimulate turnout
Radio Advertising	Overby and Barth (2003) Geer and Geer (2003) Panagopoulos and Green (2006) McCleneghan (1987)	Statewide Mayoral Mayoral	Significant effect on political information Attack ads are more memorable than advocacy ads +1% - 6% in turnout per 90 GRPs +10% change in margin Significant effect on margin
Direct Mail	Miller, Bositis, and Baer (1981) Gerber and Green (APSR, 2000)	Primary City Council	+19% increase in turnout +1% increase in turnout
Telephone	Adams and Smith (1980)	City Council	+9% increase in turnout

Calls	Miller, Bositis, and Baer (1981) Gerber and Green (APSR, 2000)	Primary City Council	+15% increase in turnout -5% decrease in turnout
Door-to-Door Contacting	Miller, Bositis, and Baer (1981) Gerber and Green (APSR, 2000)	Primary City Council	+21% increase in turnout +9% increase in turnout
Debates	Holbrook (1996) Shaw (1999) Hillygus and Jackman (2001) Johnston, Jamieson, and Hagen (2004)	Presidential Presidential Presidential Presidential	+3% change in margin +2% change in margin +1% change in margin +2% change in margin
Nominating Conventions	Campbell (2000) Holbrook (1996) Shaw (1999) Hillygus and Jackman (2001) Johnston, Jamieson, and Hagen (2004)	Presidential Presidential Presidential Presidential Presidential	+7% change in margin +4% change in margin +7% change in margin +8% change in margin +7% change in margin
Candidate Appearances	Shaw (1999, 2007) Holbrook and McClurg (2005) Holbrook (2002)	Presidential Presidential Presidential	+0% - 2% change in margin Conditional effects on partisan composition Significant change in margin

The Games of Presidential Studies:
Measuring Student Learning Achievement Using Simulations

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Simulations and other elements of an active pedagogy have recently become more popular in political science classrooms. More important, these methods have been qualitatively proven to better engage students in their education. However, there is much the literature does not address, such as actual quantitative data measuring the efficacy of simulations in improving learning outcomes, and the viability of short, simple games—microsims—rather than longer role plays for this purpose. Therefore, I designed a microsim to teach participants about campaign financing in the 2008 Presidential election and compared their learning outcomes to those of a group that had been given a lecture on the same topic. From the data, I concluded that microsims could yield better learning outcomes than traditional teaching methods under certain circumstances.

Introduction

Amongst political scientists, there has been a marked shift over the past several years from prioritizing specialized classroom learning outcomes that emphasize political research methods, empirical analysis, and modeling towards more basic ones that ensure students understand the fundamental workings of their government, teach them to take action in their communities, and empower them to be good, responsible citizens for the part of their lives that they do not spend in the political science classroom (Buehler and Schneider, 2009). The goal, of course, is to create a more politically aware polity that can bring about a better democracy, and a better world, for us all. It follows that the bulk of this effort has been concentrated on government and civics classes at the high school and college level, where students' minds are malleable and capable, but also where they are less likely to be engaged in the process of learning.

For more than seven decades (Dewey, 1938), teachers of all stripes have increasingly sought the best means of engaging their students in their own education to achieve better learning outcomes. Now more than ever, given the importance of this ambitious initiative, political scientists have an obligation to continue this work. We must learn how to best to connect with our students to show them the importance of this material. We must learn how to

best convey new, and sometimes highly complex or nuanced ideas, so that students can easily and enjoyably assimilate them, and so that our colleagues can more easily absorb the techniques we learn and advocate. And because political science is a dynamic discipline grounded in rapid, real world changes, we must go one step beyond, by learning how to teach students the critical, analytic, and strategic skills that will enable them to remain engaged in and attuned to politics, policy, and the workings of their government well into the future.

In recent years, simulations, role plays, and other elements of active pedagogy have become more popular in political science classrooms, and more important, been proven effective in accomplishing these ends. This is a journey on which the discipline has only recently embarked, and there are a great deal many more discussions that must be had. It is with that goal in mind that this ongoing, exploratory study has been conducted.

Simulations and Role Plays in the Classroom

Both the effectiveness of simulations and role plays in teaching and methods by which to create them are well documented and need little additional explanation here (for example, see Dorn, 1989, Smith and Boyer, 1996, and Frederking, 2005). Suffice it to say, political science simulations have come to be viewed as a critical tool for teaching students, engaging them in their education, and providing a deeper understanding of and investment in the workings of government because they distill the complexity of many political processes—running for office, the policy cycle, and the Supreme Court case selection and deliberation, to name but a few.

Wheeler (2006, 338), while beginning a “clearinghouse for collecting and disseminating [role plays] and simulations,” summarizes a great deal of research demonstrating that they foster classroom enthusiasm and civic engagement, create a sense of control over one’s learning, require higher understanding of course material, help students retain knowledge longer, and

encourage critical thinking skills, like creativity. Baylouny (2009) also demonstrates that simulations and role plays even have the ability to develop students' emotional capacities and enhance emotional skills like empathy.

Yet despite a wealth of anecdotal and student self-rated evidence speaking to this effect, there is much that the literature does not address. As late as 2005, Frederking recognized a notable absence of quantitative data measuring the true effectiveness of simulations in learning. Further reflecting the lack of hard data and the novelty of this form of teaching, the literature does not address the efficacy of using simulations over or instead of traditional passive methods like lectures as vehicles to deliver new information or ideas, rather than reinforcing ideas already learned through these passive methods. Additionally, few simulations cited in the literature make use of short, simple games—to borrow a term from Jansiewicz (2007), microsimulations, or microsims—as opposed to longer scenarios or role plays, macrosims, as a teaching and learning tool. Even when they are examined, they are hardly done so separately from longer, more in-depth simulations. Finally, there are few studies that use simulations to teach material that is only tangentially related to the phenomenon that the microsim exhibits, and thus test the effect of a particular microsim independently of the material on which it is being played.

Research Question

Given this literature, my research question asks whether microsims of campaign and other political phenomena have the potential to be used not only as a means of engaging students, reinforcing already learned concepts, and providing an illuminating experience, but also to effectively present to students new ideas and information on their own.

Again, it is important to note that this is only an exploratory study. According to Babbie (2007, 88), “exploratory studies are most typically done for three purposes: (1) to satisfy the

researcher's curiosity and desire for understanding, (2) to test the feasibility of undertaking a more extensive study, and (3) to develop the methods to be employed in any subsequent study." I undertook this study for two reasons. The first was to learn more about simulations and role plays in preparation for an honors capstone project in which I intend to design one based on the U.S. Presidential election. The second was to prepare myself for my upcoming stint as teacher in Las Vegas through Teach for America. However, recognizing the limitations of being a student while trying to conduct an externally valid experiment of this nature, I hope that my work will inspire others in their studies and, at the very least, kick-start new discussions that are well worth having.

Research Design

I designed and conducted an experiment to gather original data on the efficacy of running simulations to teach political science.

I recruited students in the following manner: Students majoring in a variety of disciplines, including political science, were asked to opt-in to the study. These individuals were recruited from the rolls of two Introduction to Political Research classes taught in the Fall of 2009 at American University, through an electronic promotions campaign that involved the AU Career Center School of Public Affairs listserv, the Department of Government listserv, the daily e-mail events roundup Today@AU, a Facebook event, and outreach via personal contact. They were each asked to attend one of four sessions around late November and early December 2009 so as to accommodate the schedules of all of the participants. Additionally, the students were enticed to participate in this experiment by being given the opportunity to enter a drawing for a \$50 gift card to the retailer of their choice. To date, 21 students have chosen to participate.

At the outset of each session, students were asked to fill out a basic information survey that included questions on their level of interest in politics and their personal opinions of teaching methods they had previously encountered.

Control Group: Lecture Track

The ten participants in the control group were given an initial survey and 16-question pre-test on presidential campaign fundraising and finance. They then listened to a 40-minute scripted lecture on presidential campaign fundraising in the 2004 and 2008 elections based principally on Hasen (2008) that contained the answers to the questions in the pre-test. Upon completion of the lecture, participants were then given a new evaluation and a replica of the pre-test as the post-test to determine how much learning had taken place. Students were also asked to fill out another post-test, referred to as the long-test, one week following the experiment to determine how much knowledge had been retained.

Experimental Group 1: Microsim Track

The experimental group, on the other hand, consisted of 11 participants. They too received the same initial survey and 16-question pre-test on presidential campaign fundraising and finance as the control group. However, they heard only a five-minute excerpt of the scripted lecture to prime them to play *The Money Race*. After the game, they participated in a five-minute debriefing period to discuss the lessons learned, and took a similar evaluation as the control group and an identical post-test. Again, students were also asked to fill out the long-test, one week following the experiment.

Experimental Group 2: Lecture Track, and Microsim

In order to gather as much data from my small group of participants as possible and to allow the control group to play *The Money Race*, I also asked the control group to play the

microsim, and take a replica post-test again to assess the combined effect of both the lecture and microsim on learning.

The Money Race

I designed The Money Race such that it would require participants to apply their learned knowledge, or if they were in the experimental group, to explore new knowledge. The game was also designed to introduce students on a basic level to importance of a robust fundraising operation in campaigns by allowing them to experience the difficult strategic decision-making process that campaigns face when determining what states, coalitions, and other groups to target with their scarce funds. See Appendix 1 for the game board and cards.

Rules of *The Money Race*:

1. There are two players: one representing the Democratic ticket, the other, the Republican.
2. Each already has 200 electoral votes on the map, and like an ordinary presidential election, one must reach 270 to win.
3. To do that, one player draws a presidential fundraising trivia card and reads it to the other
4. If the other player gets it correct, he or she may put the number of tokens (in this case, pennies for one side and nickels for the other) state on the card on the map wherever he chooses; if the other player gets it wrong, he receives one token to place wherever he chooses.
5. The game continues this way until all cards are drawn.
6. Each token is worth +1 for that player's party, and whoever has the highest number in a region wins it.
7. If the players tie in a region, no one wins it.
8. If no one reaches 270 votes, the game is a draw.

Hypothesis

Hypothesis:

- H₀: Microsims are neither more nor less effective at delivering new ideas and information than traditional lectures.
- H_A: Microsims can be more or less effective at delivering new ideas and information than traditional lectures.

Confounding Issues

As I have mentioned, this research was chiefly intended as an exploratory study to satisfy my personal curiosity and provide insights on microsim to design to other researchers. This is particularly important to note because there are numerous constraints on the experiment that might prohibit it from being externally valid. Many of these constraints stem from my status as a student and lack of a pool of students on which to experiment. For instance, it was very difficult to recruit even the 21 students who have so far participated. Additionally, there is a possibility that students might perform better not because of either the lecture or microsim, but because they gained familiarity with a test they were repeatedly asked in a short period of time. Finally, as a student, there was little I could do to compel the participants to submit their responses to the long-test, and not all participants chose to do so.

Findings

All scores are out of 16 possible points. See Appendix 2 for bar graphs.

Control Group: Lecture Track

Experimental Group 2: Lecture Track, and Microsim¹

	Pre-Test	Post-Test	Gains	Post-Microsim	Microsim Gains	Long-Test	Long Gains
A	0	6	6	8	8	6	6
B	1	5	4	13	12	8	7
C	1	10	9	13	12	16	15
D	1	13	12	15	14	10	9
E	2	13	11	13	11		
F	2	10	8	13	11	10	8
G	3	12	9	13	10		
H	5	13	8	13	8		
I	7	14	7	14	7	14	7
J	7	14	7				
MEAN	2.9	11	8.1	12.78	9.88	10.67	7.77

¹ One can argue that the pre-test score for Experimental Group 2 is, in fact, the post-test score for the control group, not the pre-test for the control group. If this were the case, the combined gains of the lecture and microsim would still be great, but the gains of merely the lecture on top of the microsim would be marginal, and rather low.

Experimental Group 1: Microsim Track

	Pre-Test	Post-Test	Gains	Long-Test	Long Gains
K	0	5	5		
L	0	13	13	6	6
M	0	13	13	10	10
N	0	13	13	11	11
O	0	10	10	7	7
P	1	10	9		
Q	1	13	12	11	10
R	1	5	4		
S	3	15	12	12	9
T	3	9	6	8	5
U	4	13	9	10	6
MEAN	1.18	10.82	9.64	9.38	8.19

Difference of Means

	Pre-Test	Post-Test	Gains	Long-Test	Long Gains
Control Group: Lecture Track	2.9	11	8.1	10.67	7.77
Experimental Group 1: Microsim Track	1.18	10.82	9.64	9.38	8.19
Experimental Group 2: Lecture Track, and Microsim	2.9	12.78	9.88	10.67	7.77

Conclusions

As it turned out, participants in the Control Group, when subjected to a difference of means test, learned less than their counterparts in the experimental group. Thus, we can reject H_0 because, at least internally, the microsim proved to be more effective at presenting new information than the lecture. However, it is also worth noting that the most learning took place when the long lecture was supplemented with the microsim in Experimental Group 2. Thus, both the lecture and microsim combined is the most effective means of delivering wholly new ideas and concepts. According to the long-test, though, the microsim alone was most beneficial in ensuring that students retained information. In any case, microsims are not only something fun to do, but they can make a real impact on student learning outcomes.


Suggestions for Further Research

Between the conclusions we can draw and the confounding issues, there are many available avenues for future research. For example, it would be useful to conduct a similar study with a larger n to test the same hypothesis. As a part of that same study, it is highly important to test the long-term retention of information learned through each of these methods to assess their effectiveness.

Other, less critical issues to explore include: the effect that participant interest or appreciation for politics has on learning, if any; distilling the elements of microsims that make them so appealing for incorporation into standard lecture pedagogy, if possible; improving current simulation how-to's and implementing simulation clearinghouses for easier access; and, determining methods to spread this kind of active learning pedagogy that students clearly prefer throughout the curriculum.


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
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Appendix 1: *The Money Race*
Game Board

Game Cards (with Answers in Bold)

<p>These people believe that unequal distribution of wealth should play less of a role in determining presidential election outcomes and policies of the president once elected:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Democrats Libertarians Egalitarians Socialists <p>2</p>	<p>Wealthy campaign donors and spenders are often referred to as:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Hot Money Big Money Soft Money Hard Money <p>2</p>	<p>The McCain-Feingold law is also known as:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Federal Election Campaign Act The Bush Doctrine The Public Financing Law Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act <p>4</p>	<p>In 2008, individuals were allowed to give presidential candidates in the primary and general campaign seasons up to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> \$2300 \$2000 \$1000 There are no limits. <p>3</p>
<p>Individuals who gather contributions from many other people within an organization or community on behalf of a campaign to gain influence and prestige are called:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Handlers Bundlers Hsu-bies Raisers <p>2</p>	<p>McCain opted into the public financing system for the 2008 general election. He was limited to spending:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> \$42 million \$84 million Funds equal to the amount he raised. \$100 million <p>4</p>	<p>Limited, trackable, and reported funds that are given directly to candidates are known as:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Real Money Legal Money Campaign Contributions Hard Money <p>2</p>	<p>Often unlimited funds that are given to political parties and other political organizations are called:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Dirty Money Illegal Money Soft Money Cold Money <p>2</p>
<p>These organizations rose to prominence in the 2004 presidential election as a means of aiding, and attacking, the presidential candidates:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> National Committees Exploratory Committees 501c4 Groups 527 Groups <p>2</p>	<p>This 2008 presidential candidate loaned himself/herself the most: \$42.3 million through January 2008. Who was it?:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> John Edwards John McCain Mitt Romney Hillary Clinton <p>2</p>	<p>In the last quarter of 2007, nearly half (47%) of Barack Obama's donors gave in amounts of this much or less:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> \$2300 \$200 \$100 \$25 <p>3</p>	<p>Obama reported receiving contributions from this many people in February 2008:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 million The same as Hillary. 3 million 500,000 <p>3</p>
<p>As the 2008 Democratic Primary race tightened in January, what percent of Hillary's donors rose to become small donors?:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 16% 25% 35% 50% <p>4</p>	<p>The small donor trend has boosted the campaigns of many long-shot presidential candidates. One of these was:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Joe Biden Mike Huckabee Tom Tancredo Dennis Kucinich <p>3</p>	<p>This kind of political speech has allowed voters and candidates alike to create and exchange political messages via the Internet:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Lazy Speech iSpeech Cheap Speech Close Speech <p>2</p>	<p>Together, all of the presidential candidates raised in 2007 for the 2008 primaries more than double what was raised in 2003 for the 2004 primaries. They raised:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> \$700 million \$552 million \$453 million \$325 million <p>4</p>

Appendix 2: Findings Bar Graphs*Control Group: Lecture Track**Experimental Group 2: Lecture Track, and Microsim*

Experimental Group 1: Microsim Track

Difference of Means