

Indicators and Warnings for Internal Terrorism in Western Europe

General University Honors Capstone

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Introduction

With terrorism on the rise today and the high profile it now has, many studies have been done on the causes and methods of prevention. Another important area of study closely connected is how to predict future attacks. Prevention is much more difficult if there is no advance warning. Prevention benefits from a study of the causes, so that we can see how to solve the underlying issue of terrorism, but in the short term, prediction of when and where attacks will occur is probably the most important element to improve national security. So my aim was to take a look at possible indicators leading up to attacks. The specific discipline used by the intelligence field to address this question is called warnings intelligence. The main method used is an indicators and warnings matrix, which is a list of observable steps that indicate that an attack might be going to happen. Since terrorism and the groups that use it as a tactic are so diverse, it is important to narrow the type of terrorism in my study to increase the accuracy of my I & W matrix. To that end, I have chosen to focus on internal terrorism in Western Europe, specifically those carried out by right wing or nationalist groups. Much of the research on terrorism has gone into international terrorism, thanks to high profile attacks like 9/11 in the US and the Madrid and London attacks of 2004 and 2005. However, it is also important to look at domestic terrorism, which has a longstanding tradition of costing many lives, though many of the individual attacks are smaller. The study will examine the similarities and differences between attacks by the two different types of ideologies, and develop a list of indicators and warnings for attacks of both types that will hopefully provide a basis for future study on predicting domestic terrorism, particularly in Western Europe.

Literature Review

Mill's Methods

Mill's Methods are a type of logical reasoning, originally developed to discover and prove causal relations. John Stuart Mill laid out the principles in his 1843 book, *System of Logic*. Two in particular are Mill's Method of Agreement and Mill's Method of Difference. According to Mill, the Method of Agreement specified that "If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree, is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon"(Mill 1843, 454). The Method of Difference indicated that "If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon"(Mill 1843, 455).

However, modern work by many authors, including Stanley Lieberman and Jukka Savolainen, shows that it is impossible to prove causal relations based on the method. The two go on to disagree, with Lieberman arguing that the method is further limited by its inability to deal with probabilistic cases and small samples (1991). Savolainen indicates that is not accurate and that Mill's Methods are very useful for eliminating possible causes in a large variety of different cases and sample sizes (1994). Paul Holland gives a more general explanation when he determines that Mill's Methods accurately note that the effect of a cause is relative to another cause, of any type (1986). So while the methods will not determine causal factors for indicators, they will be able to eliminate some and leave others that have the highest amount of correlation.

Indicators and Warnings

I&W is the short form for indicators and warnings, which is an intelligence tool often used to try and predict coming events. It is the basis for the indications intelligence, developed particularly during the Cold war to predict where conflict might happen. Cynthia Grabo is one of the major scholars in the field and has written a number of articles and books on the subject (1972, 2002). She outlines the differences between warnings intelligence and current intelligence, and describes the need for indicator lists. She defines indicators as steps or clues that lead to the predicted action. She explains that the philosophy for them was that every country would take certain steps while preparing for war and the lists can be distributed to the whole intelligence community. The indicators on the list should be developed from logic, historical precedent, specific practices of the country in question, and lessons learned from observing the country engage in conflict previously. She also mentions that it is important to note that not all indicators on the list will be seen before conflict, particularly the more political or economic ones. Another author who discusses uses intelligence to predict conflict is Sean O'Brien, who uses a dataset and formula to predict country instability (2002). He attempts to forecast the occurrence of instability and also the intensity. The method of analysis used is fuzzy analysis of statistical evidence, or FASE, which lets him predict using a number of variables, much like indicators.

Diane Ramsey and Mark Boerner discuss the use of indicator lists during the Cold War against the Soviets, and their use in strategic planning (1972). They also develop a generic list of indicators, and examine which ones appear to most reliably predict conflict. Jack Davis provides an analysis of tactical versus strategic warning, how tactical is almost immediate while strategic goes into increases in the likelihood of danger (2002). Keith Clark ties into that with his work on the importance of warning, and how easy it is to miss some things despite best efforts to the

contrary (1965). He suggests that exact likelihood and imminence may be the most difficult to pinpoint. Herbert Rothenberg gives a case example of the use of indicators through the development of weapons systems, listing indicators such as research and development stages (1972). He also includes the thought that the development of new weapons can be an indicator for conflict. Euan Davis talks about how indicators are patterns of events that develop into warning, sometimes without providing any kind of time scale (1972). The events are often found in current intelligence, but must be drawn from other areas as well, often stretching further back in time. He cautions that it is important to resist the temptation to warn too often, because it will soon lose effectiveness. He concludes with the fact that indicator lists are most commonly used to predict imminent military activity. That applies for most of the work done on indicators and warnings, especially during the Cold War, when the focus was on how to predict conflicts by state actors. Now the same method is being adapted to apply to actions by non-state actors as well, which is how my work uses it.

European Terrorism

Terrorism has long been an issue in Europe, probably longer in some ways than the U.S. Gerd Langguth discusses terrorism during the 1970's, and defines it as "a type of combat of political extremism rigidly aimed at achieving political objectives targeted on changing society by violence" (1994, 38). He believes that terrorism at the time in Europe fell for the most part into three categories; Marxist groups who support communism, ethnic terrorists who fight for nationalist reasons, and terrorist organizations from the Middle East. He emphasizes that cooperation between terrorist groups in Europe was growing at that time. Bruce Hoffman looks at the rise in terrorism among right-wing groups at the beginning of the 1980's (1994). He argues that it was partly the result of the lack of attention paid to the right versus the left. In

order to achieve the same amount of attention as the left-wing groups, the right wing became more violent. This describes a dangerous relationship in terrorism, that of the escalation of violence in response to the actions of others. This has been a long standing principle in conflict, but the application of it to terrorism is unpleasant if perhaps inevitable.

Another element is ethnic terrorism, as Langguth mentions and Raphael Zariski expand on (1994). Ethnic groups are often neither left nor right, though they are still extremists in their goals and means of achieving them. They are most often nationalist and in favor of separation or secession. He does point out that many ethnic minorities are not extremist, and of those that are it is usually only a very small segment of the population. He also discusses the differences between groups, showing that they can be very different even if they have similar goals.

TWEED Dataset

The TWEED dataset will be the basis for my analysis in this paper. The full name is the Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data, and it covers approximately fifty years of terrorist attacks carried out in Western Europe, from 1950 through 2004 (2006). It only includes internal terrorism, which is when those committing the acts are native to the country in which the acts take place. That means that no international terrorism, or incidences of foreign individuals acting in a country that is not their own, are shown in the data set. Jan Oskar Engene, who developed the data set, had found that while there was a significant amount of information already gathered for international terrorism, internal terrorism had been somewhat neglected. Despite that, data on international terrorism was being used to describe the use of terrorism to affect an internal political situation. So TWEED helps address the research gap and provides a more accurate basis for studies of internal terrorism such as mine. The data in the set was compiled from Keesings's Record of World Events which is a record developed mostly from

news coverage and chosen due to the combination of continuous and accurate reporting for the time period and regional area. Fifty two different variables are included, most of which focus on the facts of the attacks, such as who, when, where, and the consequences. They range from the date and place of attack, name of the organization, killings and injuries, type of violence, government reaction, and ideological profile.

For the purposes of this data set and my work, terrorism is defined broadly as an act that inflicts personal injury or material injury that impacts people in a personal way, carried out for the purpose of either getting attention or conveying demands to people, beyond just those immediately affected. A more operational definition is also given, that is that the following acts constitute terrorism if carried out purposely by an agent. These acts include bombings, explosions, arson, fires, rocket attacks, killings, attempted killings, abductions, kidnaps, shootings, sieges, violent attacks, and other violent actions. Western Europe is also defined as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. Northern Ireland is counted as part of the UK, and overseas territories are not included (Oskar 2006).

Analysis of Statistics

Countries

Out of the 11,245 attacks recorded between 1950 and 2004, 816 were carried out by left wing extremist groups. That is approximately 7.3% of total attacks. 7,921 were attributed to nationalist/ethnic groups, which is about 70.4%. Approximately 15 left wing attacks are committed per year throughout the 18 countries of Western Europe, so less than one attack per country per year. For nationalist terrorism, there are an average of 144 attacks committed a year,

making it about 8 per country per year. Going beyond that average, there are a number of countries who have had a lot more attacks than others. This can be partly explained by size, because the smaller countries have less people to form terrorist groups and attack the country. In a similar fashion, it also may partly account for why there are so many more nationalist attacks than left wing attacks, if we consider that some of the larger countries might be more prone to terrorism from nationalist groups than from left wing groups. However, that should not be interpreted as a complete explanation, because there are many other factors at work in why some countries have more trouble with terrorism than others. Since that is the case, the specific statistics for each country become important. Austria has had 32 attacks, so .3% of the total number of 11,245. Belgium has had 103, or .9%, Denmark 6 and .1% of the total, Ireland 127 making 1.1%. The other countries with less activity are Luxembourg, .0% with 1 attack, Netherlands .4% with 44 attacks, Norway .0% again with 3 attacks, Switzerland at .5% with 56 attacks, and finally Sweden, which had .1% of the total with 9 attacks. The countries slightly above the average of 144 per year are Greece at 294, 2.6%, Italy with 776, 6.9%, Portugal with 237, 2.1%, and Germany, where 519 attacks (4.6%) were carried out.

Finally, there are three whose totals of terrorist attacks far exceed the average; France, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The top three come in at 3,362 attacks (29.9%), 1,143 (10.2%), and 4,533 (40.3%) respectively. There are so many more instances in these countries that they have a much larger influence than any of the others on the statistics. It is also interesting that they are three of the most powerful and oldest countries in Western Europe. Iceland and Finland will not be included in any of the statistics because no attacks occurred in either country during the entire time period of study. So while the number of countries is still considered 18, the zeros of those two countries have been removed. It is also important to note that the attacks recorded

in Germany are only for the Western part until the end of the Cold War. The following table shows also that not only do different countries have different levels of activity; they have unequal representation of the different types of terrorist organizations.

Group's ideological character	Country	Frequency	Total	Percent
Left wing extremist	Belgium	41	103	40%
	Denmark	1	6	17%
	France	75	3362	2%
	Greece	133	294	45%
	Italy	123	776	16%
	Luxembourg	1	1	100%
	Netherlands	4	44	9%
	Portugal	179	237	76%
	Spain	85	1143	7%
	United Kingdom	27	4533	.5%
	Switzerland	4	56	7%
	Sweden	1	9	11%
	(West) Germany	140	519	27%
	Austria	2	32	6%
	Total	816	11245	7.3%
Ethnic/nationalist	Belgium	9	103	9%
	France	2654	3362	79%
	Ireland	26	127	20%
	Italy	288	776	37%
	Netherlands	10	44	23%
	Portugal	5	237	2%
	Spain	706	1143	62%
	United Kingdom	4190	4533	92%
	Switzerland	15	56	27%
	(West) Germany	17	519	3%
	Austria	1	32	3%
	Total	7921	11245	70.4%

Starting with left wing terrorism, it can be seen that many countries have a much higher number of attacks than the average. These include Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, and

Germany. Luxembourg's high percent can be somewhat discounted, because it is produced from only one attack total in the country. Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden also have percents higher than the average, though only slightly. Austria, Spain, Switzerland, France, and the UK all are below the average, with the last two being the furthest down. This indicates that left wing terrorism is much more of a threat in at least Belgium, Greece, Portugal and Germany, than it is in France and the UK, where it is practically non-existent. Ireland and Norway have no attacks of this nature. For nationalist terrorism, the pattern is mostly reversed. France and the United Kingdom are the only two that have percents above the average, though Spain is not too far off. The lowest numbers of attacks occur in Belgium, Portugal, Germany, and Austria, three of which had the highest percentages of left wing attacks. Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Greece, and Luxembourg were all excluded because they had no attacks from nationalist groups, which completes the list of those who had the highest number of left wing attacks. So the countries are somewhat split into two groups, with France, the UK, and Spain on the nationalist side and the others either closely divided or more left wing.

Date

The dates of attacks provide a means to look at attacks in terms of whether they are increasing in frequency over time, tapering off, or going through cycles. The exact middle of the time period is 1977, so depending on where the statistics fall for the two groups, it will be possible to suggest general increases or decreases. Left wing terrorism hit a mean of 1981, but also a median of 1984. Since both of those years are after 1977, though not by much, it seems clear that the frequency is fairly evenly balanced over time but slightly higher in the second half of the time period. The difference between the two dates, and the fact that the mode is also 1984, indicates that there was a major peak in attacks that year, about 22% of all left wing attacks. A

more detailed look by year shows that attack rates were quite low until 1970, when they increased dramatically before reaching the peak in 1984. After that, it tapered down slowly until 1990, when it then went back to about the same rate as before 1970. So this data shows one surge of activity that lasted for approximately two decades.

Nationalist terrorism is slightly more evenly distributed on either side of the time period, since the mean for those types of attacks is 1980. However, the median and mode are both 1981, so the gap between the average and the highest peak are closer together. In a similar fashion to left wing terrorism, the rate of attacks was comparatively low until about 1970, though it was still much higher than that for leftist groups. Then there was a cycle of high activity until around 1985, with the peak in 1981, when a little over 13% of the total attacks took place. After that, a lower level of activity resumed until again rising around 2001, which may be the beginning of another high activity cycle that was not completed by the end of this data. If so, we may be in a high activity phase right now, part of a cycle that will continue to repeat itself approximately every 15 years. Both types of attacks have a range of 54 years, indicating that they have been occurring over the entire time period of the data set, and possibly starting even earlier.

Deaths and Injuries

An important statistic for terrorist attacks is calculating the damage. This will be the main criteria for selecting cases for the development of the Indicators and Warnings matrix. For this study, I am defining the damage done by terrorist attacks as personal injury. That is primarily people injured or killed, though in the case of neither, property damage that caused personal injury in some form was included in the dataset and explains all the instances with no physical casualties. The chart below records the data for left wing and nationalist groups, including the sample size, or number of attacks. Other statistics explain the average number of

people, the most common number of people, the range of people, and the total number of people in both categories.

Group's ideological character		Number of people killed	Number of people injured
Left wing extremist	Number of Attacks	816	816
	Mean	.27	.73
	Mode	0	0
	Range	9	61
	Sum	222	594
Ethnic/nationalist	Number of Attacks	7921	7921
	Mean	.28	.88
	Mode	0	0
	Range	38	220
	Sum	2200	6941

The total number of people killed or injured in left wing attacks is 816. That means that an average of 1 person was killed or injured per attack. To break that down further, 222 people were killed total for all attacks, with an average of .27 of a person. Also, the highest number of people killed in a single attack is 9, and 80% of attacks had no deaths which dropped to 15% at one death. For injuries, 594 people total were injured, and the highest number in a single attack was 61. Overall, 87% of attacks had no injuries and at 1 injury, it immediately dropped down to 7% of attacks. So both categories only have 15 to 20% of attacks with an actual casualty.

In nationalist attacks, a total of 9,141 people were either killed or injured. That is an average of 1.15 persons per attack, with .28 killed and .88 injured. Obviously, the killing of .28 people is not possible, but the calculation in itself gives an idea of how often 1 person would be killed to no people killed if total deaths were equally spread out among attacks. The highest death toll for an attack was 38 people, and 84% of attacks had no deaths. The injuries reached a

peak of 220 in one instance, and 91% of attacks had no injuries. For both the percentage dropped dramatically when the number rose above zero, similar to left wing terrorism.

Type of Attack

The final statistics for a description of the two different types of groups is how they carry out the attacks. Many groups have a preferred method that they will use over their entire existence, and knowing what it is helps us prepare to prevent it. The following table includes the frequency of use for a selection of different categories of attacks. Also included are attacks that ended in failure, or the method was unreported.

Group's ideological character	Type of Attack	Frequency	Percent
Left wing extremist	Letter Bomb	9	1.1
	Car Bomb	17	2.1
	Fire Bomb	16	2.0
	Other Bomb	478	58.6
	Rocket/Grenade	9	1.1
	Armed Attack	181	22.2
	Arson	20	2.5
	Kidnapping	22	2.7
	Other	17	2.1
	Failed	16	2.0
	Unknown	31	3.8
	Total	816	100.0
Ethnic/nationalist	Letter Bomb	61	.8
	Car Bomb	169	2.1
	Fire Bomb	1225	15.5
	Other Bomb	3022	38.2
	Rocket/Grenade	21	.3
	Armed Attack	1390	17.5
	Arson	42	.5
	Kidnapping	50	.6
	Other	27	.3
	Failed	107	1.4
	Unknown	1807	22.8

Total	7921	100.0
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For both types of terrorist organization, the preferred method appears to be some kind of bomb, other than letter, car or fire. In addition, the second most popular for both is an armed attack. This makes sense in light of the goal of terrorism, to commit large and violent crimes to draw attention. Both other types of bombs and armed attacks are much less expensive and complex in resources as something like a rocket attack, and they have a much higher possible casualty number. In addition, unlike kidnapping or arson, they are not also common in the larger world of crime for motives other than death and destruction. Nationalist groups also have a reasonably high percentage of fire bomb use, and a larger number of attacks with unlisted methods, probably from very small attacks. The low percentage of failed attacks is reasonable when one considers that the majority of failures would occur early enough in the planning or execution that they would go unreported.

Left Wing Case Studies

In order to develop a better picture of left wing attacks, I have selected four separate attacks which I will describe in as much detail as is available. The selection of cases was made based on how much personal injury was inflicted for the most part. The first three cases are wholly based on that, coming from among the instances with the highest number of people killed or injured. The last case is selected first for it being a more recent attack, occurring after 1990, and then for being the highest number of people killed or injured among the recent attacks. This is to prevent a string of very similar attacks all carried out around the same time period being the only basis of analysis.

The first attack was May 26th, 1979, in Spain. The group behind it is known in Spain as GRAPO, or The First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Groups in English. GRAPO was

formed in 1975 initially as the military wing of Communist Party of Spain-Reconstituted, though it later split off. It's an urban group with the aim of replacing the Spanish state with a Marxist government, and it also opposes NATO and the US. The organization is very small, with only around 25 members at any given time, and during the height of activity, a good number of the members were in jail. In this attack, the target was a public café in central Madrid called Bar California 47, often frequented by police and right wing extremists, particularly those belonging to the fascist New Force Party, which had an office nearby. Several bombs were placed in the café, possibly right before detonating, though when police went in they managed to defuse one that hadn't gone off. One witness claims he saw a young man enter the restroom with a package and then leave at a run, so may be when they were placed. According to police, both bombs were found in two different restrooms. Also, an anonymous caller phoned the café shortly before the explosion to report that a bomb was going to go off. In total, 9 people were killed and 61 were injured, all of them civilians. Immediately after the attack, no one was claiming it, though police have since concluded that it was most likely GRAPO.

There were several possible reasons for this attack, the first of which was the killing of Juan Carlos Delgado de Codes, an unarmed leader of the group, who was shot in the streets by a policeman April 20, 1979. His death prompted a major upsurge in violence from the end of April through May. The other possible cause was a response to demonstrations by the right calling for a military dictatorship. Only the day before, ETA claimed responsibility for an attack that killed three military officers, and their funerals the next morning prompted the demonstrations. So the café bombing that same evening was possibly a strike out against them; however, it also led to more demonstrations outside the café after the attack. The attack fit into a

weekend of lots of terrorist activities and deaths, with other attacks, some claimed by ETA, also taking place.

The second attack has also been attributed to GRAPO, though some claimed it was actually carried out by ETA. This attack took place just over a year later on July 22nd 1980, in the region of Logrono, Spain, near the Basque Provinces. The target was a busload of paramilitary civil guards that was driving through the area on their way to target practice at a nearby firing range. Remote controlled bombs were planted next to a bridge, and 3 went off as the bus paused while crossing the bridge. At least 100 pounds of explosives were used, and the bus was almost entirely destroyed. Seven more bombs were later found that had not exploded as they were supposed to. In total, one Civil Guard lieutenant was killed, and 32 others in the bus were injured. Just moments before, two other buses carrying more Civil Guard officers had crossed the bridge in the same convoy, and they may have been the intended targets for the bombs that failed to detonate.

This attack took place amid a number of outside circumstances. First, there was a series of attacks carried out by ETA right around the same time, making this incident part of a larger wave of violence. This fact, along with its location near the Basque Provinces, prompted officials to look at ETA for this attack as well, but GRAPO claimed it instead. During this time, GRAPO was under a lot of pressure from the police, and ongoing clashes had seen many of the active members of the organization locked up. So GRAPO was relatively weak and struggling for a continued existence. The person who called to claim the attack clearly indicates that was the motive for the attack, by stating that it was done to show the police they had not succeeded in eliminating the group yet.

The third attack is from a different country and group than the previous two. April 24th, 1975, an RAF group took over the West German embassy in Stockholm, Sweden. Three people were killed and 30 were injured in the attack. RAF stands for Red Army Faction, a left wing group from Germany that aimed to lead an urban guerilla war against imperialism. It rose up in the late 1960's, and carried out its first terrorist action in 1970. The group targets representatives of the German state and also the US military, with every attack carefully planned and executed. They have had cycles of activity, based on arrests of the leadership, but so far have always resurfaced. In 1972, the group engaged in a major series of bombing attacks against a variety of targets in Germany, leading to the arrest of most of the group that same year. They did not carry out another attack until 1975. The siege of the West German embassy was done with the goal of negotiating for the release of 26 political prisoners, mostly members of RAF. It was based on the successful exchange of a kidnapped hostage for six prisoners earlier the same year. A team of six RAF members calling themselves the Holger Meins Commandos shot their way into the Embassy and took 12 diplomats hostage, including the German Ambassador to Sweden. They then planted explosives in the embassy as insurance against a police raid and barricaded themselves on the upper floors. When the Swedish police refused to withdraw from the lower part of the Embassy, the terrorists shot the military attaché.

Unfortunately for the group, the West German government had decided they couldn't give in to terrorists a second time, so they refused the prisoner exchange. The terrorists then said they would shoot one hostage for every hour they had to wait for the government to agree, and started with the economic attaché. The Swedish police, given approval by the Germans, prepared to enter the building, but before they could, the explosives went off accidentally because of a short in the fuse. The blast killed one terrorist and injured many of the others in the

embassy, destroying part of the building. The terrorists, who were injured and confused, surrendered to the police. They were later deported back to Germany and prosecuted. The siege lasted just about 12 hours, ending around midnight after the explosion.

This attack is very different from those of GRAPO, which had no short term goal like the release of prisoners. It was also much higher profile because the number of embassies seizures over history is relatively low compared to typical bombings. In addition, it took place in another country, possibly for a number of reasons including the group's relative weakness at the time, less security obstacles, or a desire to be further away from Germany when committing such a crime. Whatever the case, this could almost be classified as a failed attack, because they did not achieve their primary objective, but they did cause personal injury and draw attention to the issue, so their larger aim was met.

The final attack is a more recent example of left wing terrorism, though with a slightly lower casualty count. September 19th, 1994, a group called the Revolutionary Popular Struggle carried out a car bomb attack in Greece. One person was killed and 11 others were injured. The group was formed in 1973 and has expressed the goals of defeating fascism and imperialism as well as fighting U.S. interference in Greece. The group is relatively unknown, though the Greek government suspects it is linked to the more famous 17 November organization. In the first decade of its existence, almost all of the group's targets were American. Later on, the target expanded more, as is seen in this particular attack.

In this case, the target was the Greek police in an attack on a police bus that was driving through the Perissos quarter of Athens, in the northwest of the city. The bus drove the same route every day to pick up employees on their way into work in the morning. The homemade bomb was placed close to an old security building right next to the bus stop, and the explosion

killed one senior police officer. It was detonated with the use of a remote control device located about 30 to 40 meters away on an old railroad track while the bus was stopped to pick up more people. Of the 11 others who were injured, 10 of them were also police officers and one was a civilian. This was the first attack by this group that resulted in any deaths. This was a major change from their methods, as they had previously targeted things like unoccupied cars. The group claimed the attack in a letter to the local newspaper. Their reasoning was somewhat vague, stating that the attack was in response to the government's rejection of an offer made the year before to maintain a cease fire until 1995 in return for the release of certain unnamed prisoners who had been jailed for their 'anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist policies'. Since the group did not have any known members in prison at the time, it was unclear who they were talking about. Their letter also warned that they would continue to target policemen and civilian employees. So in this instance it appears they were acting on a threat, to show the government that they should be taken seriously.

Nationalist Case Studies

As with left wing terrorism, for nationalist/ethnic terrorism I have selected four cases to study. The same selection criteria of maximum casualties were used, also with the addition of one more recent, but less damaging attack. The four attacks took place in 1972, 1987, 1998, and 2001, with the last being selected as a post 2000 attack with relatively large casualties. All four attacks are carried out by two different groups, IRA sub-groups and ETA, who have been two of the most active nationalist groups over the years.

The first attack occurred on March 4th, 1972. The group that was blamed for the event was the Provisional IRA, a splinter group from the Irish Republican Army. They are a paramilitary group with the goal of separating Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom and

uniting it with the Republic of Ireland. The split occurred in 1969 over a difference in ideologies and how they should respond to violence against them. They had at least 200-400 extremely active members, and they set out to cause maximum loss of life since the very beginning of their existence. Their targets were the British Army, Ulster security forces, Loyalist politicians and prison or judicial officials, with the majority of attacks taking place in Northern Ireland. The group was very well supplied and supported by locals and Libya.

On the 4th of March, PIRA carried out a bomb attack at the Abercorn Restaurant in Belfast that killed two and injured 136 others. The explosion happened at 4:30pm on a Saturday, when the restaurant, upstairs bar, and street outside were crowded with shoppers, mostly women and children. About one minute before the bomb went off, a warning call was made to the Post Office headquarters that there might be a bomb somewhere in the Castle Place area, which is a large shopping area of the city that includes the restaurant where the bomb exploded. However, the call was both too vague and far too late in coming to evacuate the restaurant, possibly on purpose, which makes it in reality a no warning attack. The call was traced back to a pub popular with PIRA members, confirming for government officials their belief that PIRA was involved. The group always denied responsibility however, instead blaming their Unionist opponents. However, PIRA had previously warned that entertainment venues might be a target, and the Abercorn was a popular bar that admitted off-duty soldiers. It fits into a number of similar bombings around the same time period, possibly all in retaliation for Bloody Sunday. The bomb was placed in a shopping bag under a table in the bar, and the explosion collapsed the ceiling onto the victims. This was managed despite increased security in the area to protect shoppers.

The second attack was also by a branch of the IRA, though in this case the Real IRA, or RIRA. RIRA split from the Provisional IRA in 1997 following a disagreement over whether to accept the Good Friday Agreement, which RIRA rejected. RIRA's aims were the same as the Provisional IRA's had been, to continue the fight to separate from Britain. They refused to even consider discussions with the British government, and vowed to continue their terrorism until the British left. This particular attack is in fact the one they are most remembered for. August 15th, 1998, a car bomb exploded in the town of Omagh, a market center for surrounding areas in County Tyrone, Northern Ireland. The bomb went off at around 3pm in a major shopping area of the town, killing 29 people and injuring another 220. It happened to be a Saturday, always a busy shopping day, and a street festival going on at the time drew additional people to the area.

Approximately 40 minutes prior to the explosion, a Belfast TV station received a call warning that there was a bomb set to go off on the main street of Omagh. Police immediately began evacuating the area, but when the bomb went off, they discovered the warning was incorrect and they had evacuated people to a location closer to the bomb. The car, a Vauxhall Cavalier, carrying the 500 lb bomb was originally stolen across the border in Ireland several days before the attack, and then equipped with the bomb. It was then driven into town and abandoned by two men around 40 minutes before the attack, though not at the agreed upon location. The plans had called for it to be left behind the courthouse, where it probably would have had little chance of causing casualties. However, the driver was young and inexperienced, and supposedly panicked when he realized he couldn't reach the courthouse because of the road closures due to the street festival. By the time he informed his superiors in Belfast of the change, the warning had already gone out and it was too late. After the attack, the government connected a blast that had occurred on a remote hillside near the border nine days earlier with the Omagh bombing,

concluding that it had most likely been a practice run, not a general test of explosives like originally thought. While initially denying their involvement, RIRA eventually admitted responsibility and apologized for what they claimed was a horrible mistake, an argument made slightly more believable, though not excusable, by the fact that a number of previous bombings were successfully evacuated. It is believed the attack was a response to the Good Friday Agreement. Recently, it was revealed that both high level Irish police and MI5 had some warning from informers in the RIRA that the attack would take place, but chose not to act on the information for fear of losing their sources.

The next two cases are both attacks in Spain by the group ETA, which stands for Basque Fatherland and Liberty in the Basque dialect. The group is based in the Basque provinces of both Spain and France. Formed in 1959, it is also one of the oldest terrorist groups in Western Europe that is still active. Their main goal is to establish an independent Basque nation by attacking government and economic targets, primarily in Spain. They also carry out assassinations of Spanish government officials, members of the military and security forces, as well as moderate Basques. Despite the best efforts of the government to destroy the group, it has always bounced back from setbacks, partly thanks to the broad base of support it has from Basques.

The first attack of the two was a car bombing on June 19th, 1987. 21 people were killed and 30 were injured in the explosion in the parking garage of the Hipercor department store in central Barcelona. The specific targeting of civilians was a departure from their previous attacks, suggesting that the group was changing tactics after seeing no results from their former strategy. The attack happened at 4:15 pm on Friday, half an hour after a warning was given to police and a local newspaper indicating that there was a bomb in the store itself. Shortly before the blast,

police and security officers started searching the store, which was not evacuated because police interpreted the calls as false alarms. However, the warning was slightly inaccurate and the attack came in the form of a car bomb outside the store. The car was parked on the first level of the underground garage, and when it exploded the ceiling collapsed and it started a fire that sent smoke throughout the garage and store. In fact, most of the victims died from smoke inhalation, not injuries from the blast. The 200 kg bomb was hidden inside the trunk of the car, and set to detonate on a timer. The attack was possibly prompted by the June 10th elections, where a member of the party associated with the Basque movement was elected. ETA claimed the attack, but also called it a mistake, saying that future attacks would be more appropriately located. The members who carried out the attack stated they were acting on orders from ETA leadership and that they visited a number of different possible sites before deciding on the location and building the bomb. The attack provoked massive anti-terrorism protests worldwide.

The final attack is the most recent selection, also carried out by ETA. This attack was also a car bombing, this time in the city of Madrid on November 6th, 2001, though not initially admitted to. No one was killed, but the explosion resulted in 95 people being injured and massive damage to surrounding buildings. The bomb went off at 9:08am Tuesday in an office and residential area on the northeastern edge of Madrid, during the morning rush hour. That area is one of the busiest areas in the city during that time and the bomb was located close to the headquarters of IBM and the offices of a Spanish bank. Two suspects were apprehended shortly after the explosion, driving away from the area wearing wigs and carrying guns and false identity papers. Once ETA had claimed the attacks, they stated that the target had been a top government official. In fact, Juan Junquera, the secretary general of the scientific department, was close to the blast, and suffered minor injuries, so it is suspected he was the intended target. Investigators

looking at the bomb concluded that the bomb was powerful enough to have killed a large number of people if the timing had been more accurate. The attack happened during a supposed cease fire by the group and a week after a series of arrests of members of an organization that had been linked to ETA, which was probably the motivation for the attack.

Similarities, Differences and I & W

Left Wing Extremism

The following table uses Mill's Methods to determine similarities and differences.

Characteristics of groups and attacks	Attack 1: Bar California 47 Bomb	Attack 2: Police Bus Spain	Attack 3: German Embassy	Attack 4: Police Bus Greece	Common to all Attacks
Small urban group approx. 25 members	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Group opposes US presence	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Reason for attack: arrest or death of a group member	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No*
Reason for attack: response to an action by an opposition group	Yes	No	No	No	No
Reason for attack: to prove group is dangerous	No	No	No	Yes	No
Target: restaurants or bars	Yes	No	No	No	No
Target: Government buildings or officials/military	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No*
Target: Car or bus	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Target: Civilians	Yes	No	No	No	No
Group has short term goal for particular attack	No	No	Yes	No	No
Gives a warning before attack	Yes	No	No	No	No
Uses explosives	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Uses multiple bombs	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No*
Bombs are remote controlled	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No*

Uses guns	No	No	Yes	No	No
A terrorist is seen at the scene of the attack during or right before	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Attacks results in high numbers of deaths/injuries	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No*
Attack is claimed by group	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No*

Through this table, it is clear that there are very few similarities that hold true for all attacks. In fact, two of the three similarities are actually characteristics of the group, not the attack at all. If those two are discounted, then the only one left is the use of explosives in the attack. When compared to the total percentage of attacks that were bombs, over 62% of the total, this makes sense. Especially when the fact that explosives are used in some cases that are defined more as an armed attack, like in the case of the West German embassy siege. However, since this is just a selection of cases, it is likely that there are some that do not use explosives at all. In light of the inability to guarantee that one characteristic actually does apply to all cases, it is more reasonable to look for a majority, that is 3 out of 4 sharing the same trait. Those characteristics are noted with an asterisk after the No in the final column. With those characteristics added to the listed of those held in common, there are a total of seven, still not counting the first two. The additional six that are somewhat typical are: the reason for the attack was the arrest or death of a group member, the government is the target in some manner, the attack uses multiple bombs and some malfunction, the bombs are detonated by remote control not set to a certain time, a large number of people are killed or injured, and the group claims the attack. All the other characteristics are only true for one or two attacks, making them much less likely to show up in others.

From this, it is possible to conclude that any sign of explosives or an attack against an American target is an indicator for a leftist terrorist attack, and any of the other six are possible

indicators that should be included on a list, but not necessarily used to rule out the prediction of an attack. It should also be considered that since the organizations are fairly small and often have some of their members in jail, there is a limit to how many resources are available for an attack. All the above similar characteristics are implemented into the following Indicators and Warnings matrix with possible indicators for each characteristic, the time period before the attack it might be seen in, and level of certainty which each predicts an attack. The list is by no means exhaustive, as a much larger sample of case studies would have provided additional insight. However, it provides a basis for predicting attacks up to 3 months out. The scale of likelihood goes from possible as the lowest, then somewhat likely, likely, and finally extremely likely as the highest.

I& W Matrix for Leftist Attacks

Characteristic of attacks by leftist groups	Indicator of characteristic	Time prior to attack	Prediction - Likelihood of attack
Target U.S.	Any significant change in U.S. presence/interference in country	5 - 15 days	Somewhat likely against U.S. target
Target U.S.	A planned visit by a high level American official	Days until visit	Likely against U.S. visitor
Target U.S.	Demands or requests made by U.S.	5 - 15 days	Possible against U.S. target
Urban group	Change in climate of city	3 - 5 days	Possible in restive city
Explosives	Orders of material used to create bombs	15 - 30 days	Likely
Explosives	Thefts of explosive material	15 - 90 days	Extremely likely
Explosives	Activity by those known to have bomb making skills	10 - 20 days	Possible
Explosives	Test explosions	8 - 15 days	Likely
Explosives	Larger than normal orders of electronics used in remote detonators	20 - 30 days	Possible

Arrest/Murder of Member of group	Members of group arrested	2 - 60 days	Likely against government target
Arrest/Murder of Member of group	Members of group killed by police	1 - 30 days	Likely against government target
Arrest/Murder of Member of group	Leader of group arrested or killed	1 - 60 days	Extremely likely against government target
Target Government	Elections not favorable to their cause	3 - 15 days	Possible against government target
Target Government	New laws targeting group	3 - 15 days	Somewhat likely against government target
Target Government	Government statements or other actions against group	1 - 10 days	Somewhat likely against government target
Claiming Attacks	Group has claimed other attacks recently as part of a series	2 - 45 days	Possible
Terrorist at Scene of Attack	Suspicious activity somewhere in city	5 - 10 days	Possible
Terrorist at Scene of Attack	Unusual interest in areas of the city/ logical targets	5 - 10 days	Somewhat Likely

Nationalist Terrorism

The table below uses Mill's Methods again to look at similarities and differences between nationalist attacks.

Characteristics of groups and attacks	Attack 1: Abercorn bombing PIRA	Attack 2: RIRA Omagh bombing	Attack 3: Hipercor bombing ETA	Attack 4: Madrid car bomb ETA	Common to all Attacks
Group is military wing of political party with at least 200 members	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Reason for attack: arrest or death of a group member	No	No	No	Yes	No
Reason for attack: response to an action by an opposition group	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Reason for attack: to prove group is dangerous	No	No	Yes	No	No
Target: restaurants or bars	Yes	No	No	No	No

Target: Government buildings or officials/ military	No	No	No	Yes	No
Target: Car or bus	No	No	No	Yes	No
Target: Civilians	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Target: A shopping area	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No*
Busiest time for location of attack	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gives a warning before attack	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No*
The warning was inadequate	Yes	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes
Uses explosives	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Used one large bomb over 200kg	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Some kind of test run was used to perfect attack	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
A terrorist is seen at the scene of the attack during or right before	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No*
High numbers of deaths/injuries	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Main victims were women and children	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Attack is claimed by group	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No*

The asterisk again denotes that the majority of attacks had that characteristic in common, which is three out of four cases. These attacks had more in common with each other, possibly because there were only two majorly different groups involved, instead of three. There were 8 characteristics that all attacks had. The first relates to the group itself, detailing that the groups had both developed as the military wing of a political party and were fairly large. Four others describe the target and result of the attacks, which were focused on civilians and happened at the busiest time for the area, resulting in a high death or injury count made up mostly of women and children. The next two describe the methods used, in every case one powerful bomb that was at least 200 kg. Finally, the last shows that in every case that a warning was given, which was all

but one, the warning was inaccurate or vague, preventing civilians from being evacuated in time. Three characteristics found in the majority of attacks were that the target was some kind of shopping area, the terrorist was seen at the scene of the attack shortly before the explosion, and that the attacks were claimed by the appropriate terrorist group. The main differences between the attacks were the exact location of the attacks outside of being major gathering places for civilians, and the motives for the attacks.

For predicting nationalist attacks, just as with leftist attacks, any sign of bomb building should be viewed with great concern. Unlike leftist attacks, however, where the target can be predicted to be either representative of the local government or the U.S., a nationalist attack would most likely happen where it could do the most damage in terms of civilian life. The lesser level of regard for human life may be because nationalist groups seeking a separate nation see even ordinary citizens who are not part of their ethnicity as the enemy. Another important factor is that a warning is often given, but due to their frequent inaccuracy, extra precautions should be taken. This means always evacuating and moving people beyond the minimum distance. Just as for leftist groups above, characteristics present in most or all attacks have been broken down to create the following Indicators and Warnings matrix with possible indicators for each characteristic, the time period before the attack it might be seen in, and level of certainty for which each predicts an attack. Again, the list is not meant to eliminate from consideration other indicators but to instead serve as a basis.

I & W Matrix for Nationalist Attacks

Characteristic of attacks by nationalist groups	Indicator of characteristic	Time prior to attack	Prediction - Likelihood of attack
Explosives	Large orders of material used to create bombs	20 - 30 days	Likely

Explosives	Thefts of explosive material	15 - 90 days	Extremely likely
Explosives	Activity by people who build bombs	10 - 20 days	Possible
Explosives/ Test Runs	Test explosions	8 - 15 days	Likely
Warning	Warning of new targets	20 - 90 days	Likely
Warning	Phone call warning of imminent attack	0 - 1 day	Extremely likely
Action by Opposition Group	Attack carried out against members of the group by opposition	3 - 20 days	Extremely likely
Action by Opposition Group	Protest or demonstration by opposition	4 - 20 days	Somewhat likely
Arrest/Murder of Member of group	Members of group arrested	2 - 60 days	Possible against government target
Arrest/Murder of Member of group	Members of group killed by police	1 - 30 days	Possible against government target
Arrest/Murder of Member of group	Leader of group arrested or killed	1 - 60 days	Somewhat likely against government target
Target Civilians	Elections not favorable to their cause	3 - 15 days	Possible against civilian target
Target Civilians	New laws targeting group	3 - 15 days	Possible against civilian target
Target Civilians	Government statements or other actions against group	1 - 10 days	Possible against civilian target
Claiming Attacks	Group has claimed other attacks recently as part of a series	2 - 45 days	Somewhat Likely
Terrorist at Scene of Attack	Suspicious activity somewhere in city	5 - 10 days	Possible
Terrorist at Scene of Attack	Unusual interest in areas of the city/ logical targets	5 - 10 days	Somewhat Likely

Leftist and Nationalist Terrorism Contrast

The following table, like those previous, detects commonalities and differences with Mill's Methods. In this case, the results of the two separate tables were combined to contrast the two types of internal terrorism.

Characteristics of groups and attacks	Common to majority of Leftist attacks	Common to all Leftist attacks	Common to majority of Nationalist attacks	Common to all Nationalist attacks	Common to all attacks
Group is military wing of political party with at least 200 members	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Small urban group approx. 25 members	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Group opposes US presence	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Reason for attack: arrest or death of a group member	Yes	No	No	No	No
Target: Government buildings, officials, military	Yes	No	No	No	No
Target: Civilians	No	No	Yes	Yes	No*
Target: A shopping area	No	No	Yes	No	No
Busiest time for location of attack	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Warns before attack	No	No	Yes	No	No
The warning was inadequate	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	No
Uses explosives	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Uses multiple bombs	Yes	No	No	No	No
One very powerful bomb was used, over 200kg	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Bombs are remote controlled	Yes	No	No	No	No
A terrorist is seen at the scene of the attack during or right before	No	No	Yes	No	No*
High numbers of deaths/injuries	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No*
Main victims were women and children	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Attack is claimed by group	Yes	No	Yes	No	No*

As with the other two tables, the asterisk indicates a majority, in this case 5 out of 8 attacks. In addition, this table sums up the differences and similarity between attacks by the two types of organizations. There is only one similarity over all 8 attacks, and that is that explosive devices were used by the terrorists in some capacity. Four other characteristics showed up in the majority of cases, the claiming of the attack by the group, the targeting of civilians and the high number of casualties, and the presence of the terrorist on the scene right before or during the attack. The high number of casualties is a similarity that can be somewhat discounted because it was the selection criteria for the cases, so they would not have been included if they did not meet that condition in the first place, with the exception of the two chosen as recent examples. Of the three that remain, the targeting of civilians is the least unifying, with four instances in nationalist attacks and one for leftist attacks. Next is the sighting of the terrorist, with three cases in the nationalist category and two in the leftist. Finally, the claiming of the attack is the closest to all, with three attacks for each type. The major differences appear to be the nature of the groups and the ways they use explosives. Nationalist groups tend to make one big bomb that they abandon at the attack site with a timer. Leftist groups use a number of smaller bombs, some of which fail to explode, and they use remote control detonators to time the explosion to surrounding events, like moving buses.

The fact that most attacks are some sort of bombing is verified by the descriptive statistics from the first section, which found that that 63.8% of leftist attacks used explosives as the primary weapon, and 56.6% of nationalists ones did as well. In addition to that, as shown by the West German embassy attack, there are other instances where they are used as a secondary weapon. Another difference displayed by the statistics was the higher level of casualties in

nationalist attacks, which fits with the conclusion from the case studies that leftist groups do not target civilians as often nor is there main goal maximum loss of life.

I & W Matrix for Both Types of Groups

Characteristic of attacks by nationalist groups	Indicator of characteristic	Time prior to attack	Prediction - Likelihood of attack
Explosives	Large orders of material used to create bombs	20 - 30 days	Likely
Explosives	Thefts of explosive material	15 - 90 days	Extremely likely
Explosives	Activity by people who build bombs	10 - 20 days	Somewhat likely
Explosives/ Test Runs	Test explosions	8 - 15 days	Likely
Warning	Warning of new targets	20 - 90 days	Somewhat likely
Arrest/Murder of Member of group	Members of group arrested	2 - 60 days	Possible against civilian or government target
Arrest/Murder of Member of group	Members of group killed by police	1 - 30 days	Possible against civilian or government target
Arrest/Murder of Member of group	Leader of group arrested or killed	1 - 60 days	Somewhat likely against civilian or government target
Target Civilians/Government	Elections not favorable to their cause	3 - 15 days	Possible against civilian or government target
Target Civilians/Government	New laws targeting group	3 - 15 days	Possible against civilian or government target
Target Civilians/Government	Government statements or other actions against group	1 - 10 days	Possible against civilian or government target
Claiming Attacks	Group has claimed other attacks recently as part of a series	2 - 45 days	Somewhat Likely
Terrorist at Scene of Attack	Suspicious activity somewhere in city	5 - 10 days	Possible
Terrorist at Scene of Attack	Unusual interest in areas of the city/ logical targets	5 - 10 days	Somewhat Likely

Conclusions

My goal with this work was to study terrorism in Western Europe over a large span of time in the hope of establishing patterns of similarities between attacks that can be used in the future to predict and prevent other acts of terrorism. I discovered that there are quite a few similarities between attacks of the same type of terrorism, which allowed for the creation of initial indicators and warnings matrices. However, I found that once I began looking between different types of terrorism, the similarities began to decrease, leaving a rather general I & W that was less potentially helpful. Overall, though, I was able to develop a number of indicators that can be watched to assist in detecting attacks as they grow more imminent.

The work I have done here with internal terrorism is just the very beginning. Further study of the individual attacks and patterns between them would help expand our knowledge of these types of terrorism. The next stage in this research would be to access police and intelligence files from the countries where the attacks took place to develop a better picture of the events leading up to the attacks. Hopefully, this knowledge will eventually provide governments with the means to prevent attacks and eliminate terrorist organizations.

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