

Killing for Security and Utopia:

A Post-Structuralist Examination of the Strategic Perspective on Mass Killing in Central Africa

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When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers

- Kikuyu proverb

Introduction

The intentional mass killing of civilians was a major feature of many episodes of political violence in the twentieth century. Instances of genocide, strategic bombing campaigns, insurgency and counter-insurgency operations, and government repression of domestic opponents left millions dead. However, as the types of conflicts that lead to mass killing are commonly understood to have different causes, the wide range of phenomena listed above are usually studied and theorized as distinct from one another. Genocide is understood to have one set of causes, civilian death during conventional interstate war others. However, recent scholarship by Benjamin Valentino (Valentino 2004) and Alexander Downes (Downes 2008) indicates that intentional killing of civilians might result from a single source, the strategies and goals of national leaders and other elites during war and other crises.

Among genocide scholars especially, this is a radical proposition (Desch 2004, 151). Many view genocide as a wholly unique phenomenon, qualitatively and quantitatively different from other types of political violence. Genocide research has been dominated by historical case studies and quantitative analysis by sociologists and psychologists, who are interested in explanations that focus on characteristics of societies or individual perpetrators (Helen Fein 1993). Most major studies of genocide focus on social cleavages, collective psychologies, national crises, and authoritarian or communist regimes as the source of mass killing. These factors, which have been shown to correlate with the onset of mass killing, (Harff 2003; Krain 1997) are present in many states where mass killing has not occurred. Therefore, they do not provide a satisfactory explanation for the onset of mass killing for scholars working within the rationalist

school (Valentino 2004, 2). The application of theoretical approaches from International Relations and security studies, as pioneered by Valentino, is a new development in the field.

The purpose of this study is to uncover the contextual logic and regional antecedents of state-sponsored mass killing of civilians. The starting point is Valentino's strategic perspective, which posits that genocide and mass killing are the result of instrumental policies of last resort, driven by incentives present in specific circumstances, such as protracted military conflict or radical social or economic transformation. He identifies intervening variables that act to increase or decrease the likelihood of resort to policies of genocide and mass killing. He sees mass killing as the result of the policies of elites; implementation requires only the support of a small percentage of a population. Military or paramilitary forces are usually responsible for the actual killing (Valentino 2004, 32).

However, Valentino's approach is limited by his assumption of rational choice and its individualistic and materialistic underpinnings. I propose to adopt a post-structuralist approach to understand security as a discursive practice, policies dependent on "representations of the threat, country, security problem or crisis they seek to address" (Hansen 2006, 30). This will allow for an understanding of the process by which elites classify a group as an existential threat. Valentino has proposed that mass killing and genocide occur in a range of circumstances as the result of elite policies. This study will explore the creation of those policies to better understand how elites come to view certain groups as threats and gain the legitimacy necessary to successfully carry out these policies.

The strategic perspective and Downes's related theories of civilian victimization have the potential to provide a single explanation for the wide range of events that result in the intentional

killing of civilians. This paper is the first step in a long-term research project to interrogate these theories. The particular focus for this paper is on episodes of mass killing that fit within widely accepted definitions of genocide and politicide.¹ Apart from Valentino's work, the role of elite strategies in genocide has been largely unexplored.

Post-structuralism will provide the theoretical basis of the research. Discourse analysis will be used to describe the mutual constitution of identity and policy through the construction of "self" and "other(s)" and then to trace securitizing moves and processes of "othering" by elites to establish existential threats to a referent object. Securitization is a process that declares an emergency condition, removes the issue from the realm of normal political debate, and claims the right to use extraordinary means to counter the threat (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 25). This understanding of security and securitization studies through discourse analysis relies on the work of Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver as articulated in *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, and Lene Hansen in *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998; Hansen 2006).

Case selection is driven by a desire to apply a longer historical gaze to the task of unraveling the dynamics of violence. Therefore, I will focus on East and Central Africa and the Rwandan genocide of 1994, with a particular focus on how it was influenced by the mass killing that occurred in Burundi in 1993. These episodes of mass violence come from the State Failure Task Force data set of genocides and politicides. Using cases classified under a respected definition of genocide and politicide will avoid unnecessary engagement with the contentious

¹ Genocide and politicide are defined as "the promotion, execution, and/ or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents -- or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities -- that are intended to destroy, in whole or in part, a communal, political or politicized ethnic group." (Harff 2003; Valentino 2004)

definitional debates in genocide research. Examining these cases will help to indicate whether the source of genocidal violence can be located in the strategies and goals of elites.

Rather than examine each case separately, I will look for discourses of violence that are reproduced across time and throughout a region, a departure from Valentino's work which focuses on each case as discrete and unrelated to other episodes of mass killing. The post-structuralist understanding of discourse analysis relies on the idea of intertextuality, that a meaning of a text cannot be known solely by reading the text alone. The meaning is a product of other interpretations of that text as each text is situated within a larger textual web (Hansen 2006, 55). For identity and policy construction, this means that representations of identity are influenced by the representations of other individuals within the same political sphere (Hansen 2006, 7). Therefore, a contention of this paper is that elite identity and policy construction within states are reflective of regional representations.

Processes observed in Burundi between 1993 and 1994 should be reflected in the discourses identified in Rwanda in 1994. The evidence from two cases alone will not be sufficient to declare that discourses are reproduced overtime within a region, but evidence of this process will pave the way for further research into every case of mass political violence in East and Central Africa between 1955 and 2001. Those cases are Uganda (1972-1979, 1980-1986), Rwanda (1963-1964, 1994), Burundi (1965-1973, 1988, and 1993-1994), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1964-1965, 1977-1972), and Sudan (1956-1972, 1983-2001).

The core proposition is that the multiple instances of mass killing in East and Central Africa can be understood to reflect a regional lexicon of violence that shapes the mutual constitution of elite identity and policy within each state. Within each state, securitizing

processes are occurring that construct the "other" as an existential threat that can be legitimately countered through mass political violence.

In terms of research design, Hanson's conception of discourse analysis is built upon four components: the intertextual model, the number of selves, the temporal perspective, and the number of events (Hansen 2006, 4). As this study examines two cases (a departure from Hanson), each case will follow the same research design, modifying only the specific actors and events in each. This study will use intertextual model number one, which is based on official discourses and the intertextual links within them (Hansen 2006, 74). As the focus is on describing how national elites chose to engage in mass killing, this is the most relevant model. Other models allow for oppositional discourses to be identified but those are of secondary relevance because of the focus in this study on the actions of elites. A second drawback of this model is that it describes less about the hegemony of the official discourse. However, it can be assumed that the discourse had sufficient legitimacy, as the outcome, mass killing, is already known. Both cases will focus on a single self, the entity (most likely the state) that is being constructed as existentially threatened. The temporal perspective for both will be one moment, the time period during which the mass killing occurred. The number of events will be one, the episode of mass killing.

The first step will be to identify basic discourses within each case, key representations that allow for a structured analysis of how discourses are formed and interact within a foreign policy debate (Hansen 2006, 95). Second, for each case key texts must be found which articulate identity and policy, are widely read, and have the necessary authority to define a particular position within a discourse. Third, a wider range of texts will be examined to understand the

construction of identity and policy and specifically the process of securitization that legitimized the resort to policies of mass killing against an existentially threatening other. Finally, the analysis from the two cases will be compared to look for regional representations of identity and foreign policy that influenced the construction of identity and foreign policy within each state.

This study is significant because it has the potential to provide a better explanation for how elites decide to pursue policies of genocide and mass killing than Valentino is able to offer when assuming a rational actor. Valentino's strategic perspective made an important contribution to the study of mass political violence and was the first to apply theories from security studies to genocide and mass killing. Adopting a post-structuralist approach will further develop this understanding while remaining within International Relations, a field that has paid insufficient attention to genocide and other forms of mass political violence outside of conventional interstate war. Applying post-structuralism is an opportunity to further the application of theories from security studies by going beyond traditional theories of security and exploring genocide and mass killing within alternative conceptions of security.

Exploring mass killing and genocide is just the first step in a larger project to explore the role of elite strategy and decision making in the killing of civilians in a wide range of conflicts. The strategic perspective, regardless of how it is approached, has important policy implications. It suggests that efforts to prevent genocide or intervene during an episode of mass killing should focus on stopping elite perpetrators and protecting victims; long-term, costly projects such as nation-building, democratization, and efforts to repair social cleavages might be less effective and therefore unnecessary. (Valentino 2004, 8) Given that the states with the capacity to intervene when genocide occurs often lack the will, evidence that successful interventions could

be smaller and less costly could provide some motivation for governments and publics to support increased international responses to mass killing.

Literature Review

The literature on genocide and other forms of mass killing is extensive. The vast majority of the literature can be categorized as follows. It may be divided into historical case studies, theoretical work within the rationalist tradition, and theoretical work with reflectivist assumptions. The first category is by far the largest, as research on mass killing has long been dominated by historical case studies, which attempt to explain how the genocide occurred (Kuper 1981, 40-56; Helen Fein 1993, 32-50), many of which focus on the Holocaust (Goldhagen 1997; Katz 1994; Browning 1993; Hilberg 2003; Rhodes 2002). By the 1990s, many genocide scholars took a different approach, attempting to identify the factors which correlate with the onset of genocide (Krain 1997; Harff 1992; Harff 2003; Harff and Gurr 1989; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004; H. Fein 1979; Wayman and Tago 2010). This shift in focus was inspired in part by the desire to create early warning systems in an effort to prevent mass killing (Gurr et al. 1993; Staub 2000; Schmeidl and Jenkins 1998; Wallensteen and Möller 2003; DeRouen Jr and Goldfinch 2005). These scholars fall for the most part into the second category. Reflectivist theories, specifically constructivism and post-structuralism, have rarely been applied, with the exception of Lee Ann Fujii (2009), except to explain the role of identity construction as a factor in mass killing as an outcome.

As this study is designed to interrogate the strategic perspective and theories of civilian victimization of Benjamin Valentino and Alexander Downes from a post-structuralist perspective, this literature review will focus primarily on the literature that underlies their basic assumptions,

the other major theories of mass killing and genocide, and the literature within post-structuralism and the Copenhagen School of security studies specifically.

Rationalist

Within the rationalist category, statistical research to identify correlations and causal factors underlies most studies. The factors most commonly found to correlate with mass killing include: political upheaval, prior genocides, exclusionary elite ideology, autocratic regime type, ethnic and/ or religious cleavages (Harff 2003, 66-7), and "openings in the political opportunity structure," meaning opportunities for other elites to seize power (Krain 1997, 333). For example, in his study of Rwanda, Scott Straus identified civil war, state power, and preexisting ethnic/ racial classifications as the three main causal factors that led to the genocide (Straus 2006, 224).

Valentino and Downes have built on the correlation and case studies that indicate the importance of the role of elites, national leaders, or opposition members in the violence, but which do not explicitly located the source of the killing in their strategies (Hintjens 1999; R. Lemarchand 1995; Chalk and Jonassohn 1990; Straus 2006). Their specific focus is on mass killing as the result of national strategies, particularly during wartime (Valentino 2000; Valentino 2004; Downes 2006; Downes 2007; Downes 2008).

Valentino argues that intentional mass killing is the result of "specific situations, goals, and conditions that give leaders incentives" to engage in this activity (Valentino 2004, 66). It is also a policy of last resort, the result of the subjective calculations of leaders as to how best achieve their desired outcomes. Valentino examines nine cases of mass killing: in the Soviet Union, China, Cambodia, Turkish Armenia, Nazi Germany, Rwanda, Guatemala, and

Afghanistan from which he identifies six motives, which under specific conditions generate incentives for leaders to engage in mass killing. Grouped into two categories, these motives are either dispossession, when goals of leaders result in material disenfranchisement of a population, or coercive, when direct efforts to defeat the enemy during war have failed. Dispossession killings include communist, ethnic, and territorial motives. Coercive include counterinsurgency, terrorist, and imperialist. In addition to the presence of any of these scenarios, for mass killing to occur intervening variables specific to each scenario must also be present to increase the likelihood of a resort to policies of mass killing (Valentino 2004, 67-70). For example, for communist mass killing, intervening variables that increase the likelihood of violence include “the priority the communist leaders assign to the radical transformation of society,” the extent to which “the communization of society results in the dispossession of large numbers of people,” and the speed at which “communist leaders seek to implement dispossession policies” (Valentino 2004, 74).

Downes makes a similar argument, using both process tracing and large-n statistical methods to examine each case. Downes concludes that the intentional targeting of civilians, which he terms civilian victimization, occurs for one of two reasons. First, it can occur out of desperation during wars of attrition. Intended as a coercive strategy, civilian victimization is designed to destroy the enemy’s will to fight by destroying civilian morale and undermining the ability of the enemy to continue to fight. Second, it can occur during wars of territorial conquest. These types of conflicts require the pacification of the civilian population in order to gain control over the conquered territory (Downes 2008, 29).

Downes work differs from Valentino's in a few ways. First, Downes is focused exclusively on the targeting of foreign civilians in war (Downes 2008, 11). Valentino on the other hand is interested in all cases of mass killing where fifty thousand or more civilians were killed (Valentino 2004, 11-12). This difference is significant because much research on mass killing is obsessed with definitions and classifications, in part based on number killed. Additionally, by having a wider definition of what constitutes 'mass killing,' Valentino is setting himself up to create a theory with greater explanatory power than Downes. Second, Downes is less interested in the role of individuals in civilian targeting. He believes that all that national leaders need not have a particular ideology. A preference for victory is sufficient to lead to civilian targeting in specific circumstances (Downes 2008, 11). For Valentino, a particular ideology and its accompanying goals act as intervening variables that can increase the likelihood to policies of mass killing in specific circumstances. Therefore, Valentino's work is more influential for this study because of the focus here on the mutually constitutive process of identity and policy construction. However, it is important to indicate that the post-structuralist conception of identity used in this study differs greatly from Valentino's conception of identity as a bounded, discrete category that can be objectively measured.

Valentino's strategic perspective, and Downes's related work, is an encouraging development in the literature for a few reasons. First, the strategic perspective is located within the field of security studies. Despite its focus on the threat and use of military force as one of the major interests of the field (Buzan and Hansen 2009), security studies had previously offered little in the way of explanations for mass killing because the field was largely focused on violence that occurred between states instead of within them. By drawing on the security studies literature, Valentino and Downes apply many insights into why and how war is conducted to the

specific question of why mass killing occurs. The contribution is broadening the scope of topics and areas of research in security studies to include mass killing.

Both Valentino and Downes attempt to theorize a wide range of phenomena together. In much of the previous research on the intentional killing of civilians, the focus was genocide, a very narrow and contested group of cases. Many scholars focus on further refining genocide, classifying genocide into highly specific types each seen to have a different cause. An example is the work of Roger Smith, who has identified five types of genocide: retributive, institutional, utilitarian, monopolistic, and ideological (Smith 1999, 5). The motivation for such work is the theory that different episodes of mass killing have different causes and therefore require different categories and separate theories to explain each. Valentino and Downes have shown that going the opposite direction, using broad definitions of mass killing and civilian victimization can result in the identification of common causal mechanisms. This is an encouraging development from both an academic and policy perspective. Viewing divergent cases as having a common cause leads to many new insights into the broader motivations behind the targeting of civilians and is a positive step towards generating theories with greater explanatory power. These theories also have greater policy relevance than much previous genocide scholarship. They suggest that efforts to prevent genocide or intervene during an episode of mass killing should focus on stopping elite perpetrators and protecting victims; long-term, costly projects such as nation-building, democratization, and efforts to repair social cleavages might be less effective and therefore unnecessary (Valentino 2004, 8). Given that the states with the capacity to intervene when genocide occurs often lack the will, evidence that successful interventions could be smaller and less costly could provide some motivation for governments and publics to support increased international responses to mass killing.

Relativist

However, the work of both Valentino and Downes has serious limitations. As this study is designed to interrogate the strategic perspective, by applying a very different theoretical perspective to it, and the related literature, it begins with many of the same assumptions about how and why mass killing occurs. However, there are a few fundamental differences. The first is that the strategic perspective and Downes's theories of civilian victimization are based on rational choice theory, the belief that humans act rationally, meaning that, "behavior can be judged objectively to be optimally adapted to the situation" (Hansen 1997a, 371), and that individuals weigh of the costs and benefits of an action before making a decision. In Valentino's work, this assumption is apparent in his identification of intervening variables, such as extent to which a group is viewed as a threat by national leadership and the speed by which ethnic cleansing is carried out (Valentino 2004, 76), that increase or decrease the likelihood of a resort to policies of mass killing.

This study will depart from their work by adopting a post-structuralist understanding of policy formation. Post-structuralism is skeptical of the methodological and epistemological foundations upon which rational choice theory and the theories of neorealism and neoliberalism lie. They, unlike post-structuralisms, are based upon modernist understandings of truth, science, and reason, which propose that humans are capable of rationally perceiving and theorizing the world around them (Hansen 1997a, 371). Drawing upon the methodological approaches of the natural sciences, neorealism and neoliberalism seek to provide causal explanations for the social world. Instead of regarding theories of International Relations as a reflection of an objective truth,

post-structuralists, according to R. J. B. Walker, see theories as "aspects of contemporary world politics that need to be explained [rather than] as explanations of contemporary world politics" (Walker 1993, 6; cited in Hansen 1997a, 372).

Post-structuralism's alternate perspective on the nature of reality lead to different methodological choices than the rationalist theories of International Relations. Post-structuralists believe that "reality in its objective form (truth) cannot be known outside human language, thus, inexorably, reality must be a constitutive effect of discourse" (Adler 1997, 332). Therefore, one of the primary methods used by post-structuralists is discourse analysis. The aim is to describe the mutual construction of identity and foreign policy (Hansen 2006, 1), rather than adopt a causal model with identity as an independent variable, as a neorealist might.

Although the application of post-structuralism to the problem of mass killing is all but non-existent within International Relations and particularly security studies, post-structuralism has been used as a means to interrogate the theories and assumptions that underlie realism and rationalist type claims that dominate security studies, and the particular conceptions of concepts such as 'security' and 'threat' that accompany them (Hansen 1997a, 373; Hansen 2006, 35). These concepts are crucial to the study of mass killing if approach from the strategic perspective which locates their source in the goals of elites. Major post-structuralists scholars who have dealt with security as a concept include Richard Ashley, R.J.B Walker, David Campbell, James DerDerian, Ole Wæver, and Lene Hansen (Hansen 1997b, 316).

Ashley explores the realist conception of distinct domestic and international spheres of politics. He sees this view as leading to a claim by realist statesman that not only must they work to counter the security threats that come from the anarchic international sphere, they must also

resist the idealistic forces within the country who misguidedly call for extending the community and social contract that exist with the state into the international (Ashley 2006, 416-17; cited in Hansen 1997a, 373-74). The domestic and international are constructed through their mutually constituting opposition, neither can exist without the other. The result is that this conception of political organization is viewed as a "timeless reality," rather than a particular form of political organization (Hansen 1997a, 374). This view has been particularly influential in the area of security, because as Walker notes, security exists along the domestic/ international distinction. Sovereign states, as the only acceptable form of political organization in the international under the realist framework, are therefore responsible for security, meaning that national security is the only legitimate form of security. Alternative conceptions of security are therefore viewed a challenge to the sovereign state system itself (Walker 2007, 6, 10-12; cited in Hansen 1997a, 374).

David Campbell in his exploration of national security took the work of Ashley and Walker a step further, proposing that the construction of threats to national security is a means for constituting the national identity and the state itself (Campbell 1992, 55; cited in Hansen 1997a, 375). This view is counter to the realist conceptions of objective threats to national security as well as the idea of "the state as an ahistorical and uniform entity" (Hansen 1997a, 375-76).

Walker, Ashley, and Campbell are relevant to this study of mass killing because it is expected that an important discourse of violence in Rwanda and Burundi will be related to national security and identity and threats to those constructions. Control of the state in Africa is often required for maintaining any political power within a state. Although African states are

weak in the sense that at independence, the new states were granted sovereignty under the assumption that these states would automatically function as sovereign entities, meaning, for example, complete control over the territory within their borders (Herbst 1996, 121). The current situation is that many African states are 'quasi-states,' possessing only 'negative sovereignty.' They are recognized by the international community but lack the major features of statehood including monopoly over the use of armed force, control over the entire territory of the state, and a functioning domestic political system (Clapham 1998, 144). African elites also have little desire to change existing boundaries (Clapham 2001, 4). Elites are likely to support the status quo because their privileged position in the state is largely dependent on the institutional entity of the state itself (Clapham 2001, 2).

Ole Wæver clarified the post-structuralist view that security is a discursive practice through his concept of the speech act in security, arguing that security is actually both a discursive as well as a political practice. This means that the verbal articulation of the threat is in itself what makes something a security issue, a case that can be countered with any means necessary (Hansen 1997a, 376). The Copenhagen School of security studies, of which Wæver is a part, furthered this idea through the theory of securitization. Securitization is the process by which a particular issue is presented, through a speech act, as an existential threat to a referent object. A successful securitization implies that the intended audience has accepted that particular threat construction and consented to 'emergency measures' to counter it (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 23-26).

Although the Copenhagen School is firmly grounded in the reflexivist school of security studies, it is important to acknowledge the influence of realism, particularly on the theory of

securitization. Securitization theory bears a strong resemblance to Carl Schmitt's concept of the political, the idea that a sovereignty entity makes decisions as to the status of individual groups. They may be either be classified as 'friends' or as 'enemies' (Schmitt and Schwab 2007). In this way, security as the outcome of the specific social process and accomplishment that is securitization is equivalent to Schmitt's political (Williams 2003, 512-3)

It is the theory of securitization which this study will draw upon, looking for successful securitizations of threats from the victim groups as part of the identity and policy relationship grounded within Hansen's framework for a post-structuralist methodology (Hansen 2006), as well as Buzan and Wæver's understanding of regional security (Buzan and Waever 2003).

As post-structuralism posits that identity and policy are mutually constitutive, a major focus of this study will be the process of identity construction through linking and differentiation (Hansen 2006, 41). There is a rich literature on the effective mobilization and construction of identity for political purposes in Africa (Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2007; Bates 2000; Ferree 2008; Posner 2005; Young 1965; Young 1979). This study will further that literature by taking a post-structuralist perspective that does not view identity as an independent variable, but rather inseparable from the simultaneous process of policy construction, as well as focusing specifically on identity construction prior to and during acts of genocide.

Additionally, a central proposition of this study is that local acts of mass killing in Rwanda and Burundi were enabled by regional discourses of violence. The multiple instances of mass violence in Central Africa has lead to comparative studies of the types of violence and an exploration of similar histories and identity construction in these states (Prunier 1997; Prunier 2008; Brown 2009; Scherrer 2002; R. Lemarchand 1998; Gurr et al. 1993; Harff 1992;

Stavenhagen 1990). However, none of these studies go as far as to contend that more than similar histories and ethnic divisions within states related these instances of violence to each other. Additionally, some scholars contend that the dynamics that lead to violence in Rwanda and Burundi specifically represent entirely different cases (Uvin 1999). This study aims to go further by exploring the possibility that processes by which policy and identity were constructed and mutually constituted had an important regional dimension. This means that the discourses did not develop in isolation from one another, but borrowed and influenced the processes of identity construction and policy formation in neighboring countries.

This focus on the regional level of analysis is influenced by the central role it plays in the Copenhagen School (Buzan and Waever 2003). The main contention is that for most states, their highest level of security interaction will be at the regional level. This means that security interdependence is highest at the regional level, within regional security complexes (Buzan and Waever 2003, 4). However, this study does pose a challenge to one aspect of regional security complex theory (RSCT). Buzan and Weaver argue that RSCT may be ill-suited to Africa because of the weak states that characterize this region. States are less important actors in Africa than more traditional forms of political organization, such as tribes or clans. Their reading of security dynamics in Africa heavily favors the political and military sectors of security (Buzan and Waever 2003, 219). If this study finds the type of identity and policy construction expected, then the importance of these sectors would likely be reiterated. However, because of the importance of identity in mass killing, it is likely that this study could indicate that the societal sector of security plays a larger role in Africa than Buzan and Weaver contend.

There are a variety of other explanations for the onset of genocide and other forms of mass killing. The first of these relates to the regime type of the government engaged in mass killing. The comparative likelihood of mass killing by different regime types is one of the most carefully studied areas in mass killing scholarship (Valentino 2004, 8). The major scholar associated with this theory is R.J Rummel, who argues that mass killing is a result of unchecked power. His "power principle" can be summed up in the adage, "power kills, but absolute power kills absolutely." Through an examination of every case of government sponsored killing (1997), from individual deaths to the Holocaust, Rummel concludes that the more power a government has, the greater their ability to act as they desire, unchecked. They are also more likely to make war on others and kill domestic and foreign opponents. These observations lead Rummel to conclude that authoritarian and totalitarian governments are responsible for the majority of intentional killing of civilians. Democracies have been the least frequent perpetrators, as the more constrained a government's power, the less likely it will be to engage in activities that often lead to intentional killing of civilians. However, democracies have been shown to kill in large numbers in foreign wars and within their colonial holdings (Rummel 1995; Rummel 1997).

However, some scholars take the opposite position, proposing that democracy can act as a propellant for mass killing. John Mueller proposes that during prolonged wars fought by democracies, the cost of continuing to fight increases and public support for the war declines (Mueller 1973). Therefore, national leaders may respond by trying to reduce casualties, which can in turn cause civilians to be targeted (Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2006, 3347-49).

There are multiple reasons to contest the role of regime in mass killing. First, the argument that democratic norms act as a restraint on the targeting of civilians assumes that

democracies act outside their territory based on their domestic norms. Downes argues that this would mean democracies would only go to war for "liberal reasons," such as when exercising their right to self-defense or to stop another state from committing human rights abuses. He cites multiple examples of times when democracies have gone to war for illiberal reasons, such in the nineteenth century against tribes in Africa and Asia (Downes 2008, 23). A second flaw in the regime argument is that public opinion in democratic states is not always firmly against targeting the civilians of enemy states. A public who wishes revenge on the enemy or a quick end to a war may support policies that target civilians (Reiter and Stam 2002, 151-158). Additionally, the regime argument relies on the assumption that democracies are in part constrained by public opinion because leaders fear removal from office if they act against the will of the citizenry (Downes 2008, 23). However, the consequences of removal from office are low in democracies. Unlike totalitarian states, leaders who lose an election are unlikely to be jailed or killed. Therefore, if intentionally targeting civilians is a means to achieve a particular goal, a leader in a democratic state might decide to pursue that policy, despite it being counter to public opinion (Rosato 2003, 593-94). Also, it is debatable the extent to which foreign policy is really dependent on public opinion, even in democratic states (Downes 2008, 23). Especially when an issue is presented as a matter of national security, leaders are often given a broad mandate to act as they see fit. A "rally-round-the-flag" effect can take place where the public chooses to support the direction the leader sees for the country in a time of crisis (Baum 2002, 269). Finally, regime type has little predictive ability. Although authoritarian governments are responsible for a greater percentage of the incidences of mass killing than other regime types, they still do not engage in mass killing most of the time (Valentino 2004, 37).

In addition to the regime theory, various explanations based centered around social cleavages and dehumanization of domestic social groups or the enemy collectively are common. An example in much genocide research is the plural society theory popularized by Leo Kuper (Valentino 2004, 16). Kuper proposes that competing groups in society cause polarization and inter-group conflict that can escalate to mass violence (Kuper 1981). Few scholars of mass killing deny that some type of social cleavages usually play a role in mass killing. However, there is little evidence to support the claim that social cleavages are a sufficient condition for mass killing.

John Mueller provides the best summation of this position when he argues, in relation to Bosnia, Croatia, and Rwanda, that ethnic war is a "myth." Instead of the Hobbesian state of nature of groups locked in constant conflict, Mueller argues that the violence was the result of a small number of individuals who were recruited and directed by national elites, not deep seated hatreds based on ethnicity or other social identifier. For Mueller, ethnicity is an "ordering device," not the "compelling force" behind the violence. He argues that any aspect of identity could be used to mobilize and divide societies. Therefore, preexisting social cleavages are not the source of mass violence (Mueller 2000, 42-3, 62).

Statistical research also supports this position. Little correlation has been found between the extent of ethnic, religious, economic, or other social and cultural differences and the likelihood of outbreak of mass violence between groups (Fearon and Laitin 1997; Krain 1997).

Two major implications result from evidence of a decreased role for social cleavages than previously believed. As pointed out by Mueller, if divided societies are not a precondition for mass violence, the possibility of an outbreak of large-scale political violence exists in all states,

as it is only necessary for the political elite to recruit and direct small groups prepared to use extreme levels of violence to achieve their goals. Second, mass killing is not inevitable. It is not the result of the most extreme social cleavages, but instead a preventable event if the elite who support the violence are brought under control or removed from power (Mueller 2000, 43). This argument is very similar to Valentino and Downes, who simply took it further by refining the explanation of the causal mechanism behind the violence.

The plural society theory and the emphasis on social cleavages is related to a group of theories that finds the source of mass killing in national crises, such as wars, revolutions, and severe economic disruptions. These theories receive support from evidence that almost all cases of mass killing have been shown to correlate with national crises (Harff 2003; Krain 1997). One explanation for the relationship is scapegoating, where societies experiencing crisis look for a group to blame (Staub 1992, 13-50; Charny and Rapaport 1982, 107-110). This theory is based upon a conception of group psychology that proposes that mass killing occurs because it "alleviates the psychological frustration and fear generated by national crises in society at large" (Valentino 2004, 23). Therefore, it would follow that mass killing should be organized and carried out by a large segment of society. Large-scale participation in mass killing is not supported by most case studies or theoretical research however (Valentino 2004, 23-5). Levels of popular participation in genocide will be discussed at length later.

A related theory to explain mass killing and the intentional targeting of civilians is that these events are more likely to occur in conflicts where the combatants view their enemy as "barbaric" or "subhuman" (Downes 2008, 24). This argument is advanced by John Dower, who documented how the hatred between the United States and Japan during WWII lead to

mistreatment of soldiers on the battlefield and the willingness of the United States to fire-bomb Japanese cities (Dower 1986). However, it has not been conclusively proven that wars between peoples of different races are more brutal than those between people who share similar racial or religious backgrounds (Bradbury 1992; Dower 1986; Li 1975; Chang 1997; Harris and Lindee 1994). Additionally, it is a common feature of war to dehumanize the enemy, but the intentional targeting of civilians is rare. Demonizing the enemy serves an instrumental purpose for increasing support for the conflict among the public. It is not necessarily a determinant of how the enemy will be treated in battle. Finally, the brutalization caused by war has more of an effect on the combatants, rather than national leaders who are actually creating policy towards the enemy (Downes 2008, 25-6).

The specific culture and organization of militaries is also sometimes identified as a source of civilian victimization. The argument is that the organizational culture of a particular military determines whether it will choose strategies and tactics that target enemy civilian populations (Downes 2008, 26). A related argument deals with the narrow interests of militaries. Similar to Graham Allison's bureaucratic politics model (Allison and Zelikow 1971), it proposes that if intentionally targeting civilians could further the interests of the military as an organization, then a strategy that does so would be advocated for and likely accepted (Downes 2008, 27).

Downes identifies a number of flaws in this explanation (Downes 2008, 28-9). First, this argument only applies to militaries as they existed after the mid-nineteenth century when they were professionalized. It also overlooks the importance of civilians in the policy process. Parochial military interests cannot explain actions of the civilians who have control of the

military. Additionally, this argument contradicts the fact that during peacetime, when military strategies are often created, plans for civilian victimization are not often considered. Instead, it is during war when other strategies have failed that civilian targeting is implemented as part of an escalation in tactics. Downes argues that this escalation occurs regardless of the particular military culture present. Downes final argument against this thesis is that all organizations have parochial interests, while intentional civilian targeting is a rare phenomenon.

Turning away from explanations that deal with regime type and military culture, another major focus for research on the causes mass killing and genocide is the perpetrators of these acts. Valentino's views on the role of individual perpetrators and their motivations further distinguish his work from much in the field. He does not deny the role of perpetrators in mass killing, but rather proposes that their motivations and ideologies are second to national leaders who are creating policy.

A common assumption in genocide research is that the murder of large numbers of people must involve the support and participation of a large percentage of a population (Valentino 2004, 31). This view has been taken to the extent of calling societies that experience mass killing "collectively mentally ill" (Charny 1984; Aronson 2000). This focus is a result of the implicit assumption of many scholars that mass killing is a bottom-up phenomena, or at the very least, elite policies are a reflection of the desires of a large portion of a population. Ervin Staub's work is an example. He identifies instigators of genocide, specifically difficult life conditions in a society and group conflict, that are likely to lead to an outbreak of collective violence (Staub 2000, 369). These instigators begin a process by which violence "evolves." For example, Staub argues that in times of political upheaval or social change, people turn to groups

for protection. Those groups then engage in scapegoating of other groups, which "protects their identity, strengthens connections within the group, and provides a psychologically useful (even if false) understanding of events." As this process progresses, institutions are created or changed to prepare for violence against the enemy (Staub 2000, 370). The problem with this argument is that Staub and the many other scholars whose work is similar, fail to explain how genocide actually results from the feelings among individuals and groups that they describe. Staub is not arguing that genocides are the result of spontaneous and random outbursts of violence by the discontented. Yet this connection between individual and group sentiments and policy makers is tenuous. He argues that these feelings can ready a society for "destructive leaders," who may then be further influenced by sentiments within society that are designed to cause leaders to respond with violence (Staub 2000, 372).

Valentino and Downes provided an important contribution to this area of the literature because they are much more specific in identifying the precise mechanisms that produce mass killing. Most case studies produce factors present at the onset of a genocide and argue that those are the cause of the genocide. Although many of the factors identified have been shown by Harff (2003) and Krain (1997) to correlate strongly with the majority of genocides in history, Valentino and Downes were the first to provide an explanation for the process by which those conditions produce mass killing.

In contrast to many scholar's assumptions that large numbers of perpetrators and vast public support are necessary to bring about and carry out a genocide, the strategic perspective proposes that the majority of society must only not actively oppose the killing or do anything to protect the victims or oppose the government. Valentino terms this inactivity "negative support"

(Valentino 2004, 34). He does tie his argument to the regime literature by pointing out that only democratic governments require public support to act. As democratic regimes are the least likely to engage in mass killing (Rummel 1997), it follows that public support is not a requirement for a government to target civilians. He proposes that if a national leader has sufficient support to remain in power, they have enough support to adopt a policy of mass killing. Examples include the Bolsheviks during the Russian Revolution, the Nazis, and Ustasa regime in Croatia during WWII. Additionally, widespread support for a regime does not necessarily indicate that the public supports particular genocidal policies (Valentino 2004, 32-4).

Unlike scholars such as Daniel Goldhagen, who propose that support for genocidal policies must result from deep seeded hatreds within a society (Goldhagen 1997), Valentino offers a more nuanced set of circumstances that explain why a public might support the intentional targeting of civilians. Government propaganda is a major reason, especially in states without a free press where propaganda can be particularly effective. Valentino proposes that propaganda is used to deceive the public as to the true circumstances and extent of the mass killing (Valentino 2004, 35).

Additionally, the strategic perspective does not rely on broad public support for genocidal policies. Valentino finds that the actual killing is conducted by a small percentage of the population. This percentage is usually made up of young men who are members of military, paramilitary, or police organizations. The public may offer support in less direct ways, however. These include "producing weapons, providing logistical and administrative support to organizations directly involved in the killing, or informing on fellow citizens (Valentino 2004, 35-7).

While some percentage of the population is involved in the killing in the indirect ways listed above, the majority usually takes the role of bystanders. Valentino describes this as a result of a collective action problem; citizens who actively oppose a genocidal regime put themselves at great risk, yet they benefit from the actions of those who do decide to oppose the government's policies. Therefore, most citizens are likely to not act. Also important to consider are the actual perpetrators of the killing. It is a common perception that to participate in mass murder, a person must be abnormal as killing is viewed as far outside the realm of normal or acceptable human behavior. Many theories abound regarding who participates in mass killing and their motivation for doing so. It is accepted by many that abnormal psychology accounts for at least a portion of the perpetrators. Valentino proposes that a measure of intentional recruitment or self-selection of individuals predisposed to participate in such acts occurs (Valentino 2004, 38-9). It has been shown that two to fifteen percent of soldiers show no remorse or hesitation in killing (Grossman 2009, 178-185).

An interesting take on the role of average citizens in genocide comes from Lee Ann Fujii (2005). Instead of using the common approach of examining the behavior of perpetrators, victims, bystanders, and rescuers, Fujii re-categorizes populations during a genocide into profiteers, collaborators, joiners, and non-joiners. Not only do her categories allow for different roles and levels of involvement among people at the local level, an individual may have behaved in ways that fall into one or more categories. Her approach is encouraging because it bridges the gap between scholars such as Goldhagen (1996), who observe large scale atrocities and assume that implies similarly large numbers of perpetrators, and those who subscribe to the strategic perspective and find it challenging to explain the role, albeit reduced, that average citizens do play.

It is also possible that the common portrayal of perpetrators of mass killing as mentally ill not only stem from our assumptions about normal human behavior, but also from the manner in which propaganda portrays the opposing side. During the Second World War, Allied propaganda commonly portrayed Nazi's as having pathological or disturbed personalities (Waller 2002, 62). In the period preceding the Nuremberg trials, psychologists were brought in to evaluate the Nazi accused. All began their work under the assumption that they would find serious abnormalities in the accused psychologies. However, results from IQ tests revealed above average intelligence, and Rorhsach tests indicated sane and fairly normal personalities (Waller 2002, 63-4). Investigations by Raul Hilberg and Christopher Browning in their seminal works on the Holocaust support the claim that the Nazi perpetrators were essentially normal (Waller 2002, 72; Hilberg 2003; Browning 1993). Further evidence of the normality of the majority of Nazi perpetrators is the anecdotal evidence that during the killings, the perpetrators responded with revulsion, physical sickness, and other ill effects (Waller 2002, 73).

Better explanations of perpetrator motivations are provided by looking at the context in which they act. Two famous studies indicate the importance of authority and environment in shaping behavior. The first are the obedience experiments conducted by Stanley Milgram, who showed a majority of subjects in his studies would continue to deliver what they believed to be electric shocks to another person to the point of severe pain when prompted by the person running the simulation (Milgram 1974). The study participants were considered normal individuals and therefore, Milgram concluded that authority, as a situational factor, had a major impact on behavior. Similarly, Philip Zimbardo concluded from his Stanford prison experiments that the sadistic behavior of the subjects was "a product of their transaction with an environment

whose norms and contingencies supported the production of behavior which would be pathological in other settings, but were 'appropriate' in this prison (Zimbardo et al. 1975).

The conclusions reached by Milgram and Zimbardo indicate that individuals who are sadistic or have other abnormal pathologies are not the primary reason that mass killing exists during conflicts. Rather, their studies are strong evidence that the vast majority of perpetrators are motivated by the environment they are in, offering additional support to the contention that mass killing is the result of elite policy, not individual or societal psychology.

In conclusion, although the literature on mass killing and genocide is vast, it is easily categorized into case studies, rationalist theories, and reflectivist explanations and descriptions. The majority of case studies are focused on the Holocaust, although the literature on the Balkans in the 1990s and Rwanda is extensive as well. Much recent scholarship falls into the second category, the most convincing and the focus of this study is the work of Benjamin Valentino and Alexander Downes who focus on national political and military strategies and elite preferences. Other common explanations include regime type, social cleavages, scapegoating, dehumanization of the enemy, parochial interests of militaries, and a number of theories related to popular participation in the actual killing. Reflectivist literature on mass killing is rare, although post-structuralist work on security, threat, and related concepts underlie the basic theoretical assumptions of this study. Particularly important is the work of Lene Hansen, who provides the methodological basis of the research, as well as Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, whose theorizes of securitization and regional security complexes provide the basis for the interrogation of the strategic perspective and related theories of civilian victimization.

Case Background – Rwanda

Most historical accounts of the Rwandan genocide identify the period of German and Belgian colonial rule as crucial in the progression towards genocide. When Germans arrived in Rwanda in the years immediately preceding the Berlin Conference of 1884, they found a society operating with a high degree of centralized political authority capable of exerting a high degree of social control (Prunier 1997, 3). When Germany achieved political of Rwanda, they instituted a policy of indirect rule, allowing the Rwandan monarchy a large degree of autonomy (Prunier 1997, 25).

After WWI, Belgium was granted control of Rwanda by the League of Nations when Germany was stripped of its colonies after its defeat in the war. Belgian policy was to continue indirect rule, but to exert somewhat greater influence upon the Rwandan leaders (Prunier 1997, 26). They also eliminated the competing hierarchies that existed in Rwandan society, placing sole power in the Tutsi monarchy (Des Forges 1999, 34). Belgium removed King Yuhi V Musinga from power in 1931, replacing him with his more westernized, Catholic son Muttara III Rudahigwa (Prunier 1997, 30).

With colonialism came Christianity and large numbers of Rwandans began to convert to Caltholism when it became apparent that the new Rwandan elite would be comprised of Christians (Prunier 1997, 31). Mass conversion to Christianity lead to the elimination of the traiditonal *Kubandwa* cult, which had been an important element of social cohesion in pre-colonial Rwanda (Prunier 1997, 33).

In addition to the increased importance of the church in Rwanda, the Belgian authorities introduced other changes as well. Heavy taxes were levied and the traditional institution of *umuganda*, collective labor, was exploited by the Belgians as a free source of labor for

infrastructure development. It is estimated that adult males were required to spend 50-60% of their time participating in *umuganda* for the Belgians (Prunier 1997, 35).

One of the more drastic changes implemented by the Belgians was an ossification of class distinctions in Rwanda into "racial" categories. Pre-colonization, Rwanda had three main social groups, the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa (Des Forges 1999, 36). Scholars disagree over the precise nature of the distinction between groups and requirements for membership, but most accept that these groups are closest to classes, rather than distinct ethnicities or races. The matter is complicated greatly by the physical differences observed by the colonial powers between the groups. Each has an "average dominant somatic type" (Prunier 1997, 5) that became associated with the label. However, the division of individuals into these groups and the understanding the Germans and Belgians had of these groups is far different than what they are believed to have been in pre-colonial Rwanda.

The Belgians observed the physical characteristics of Rwandans, and also the wealth and power inequalities of different groups, and combined these observations with European theories of race and racial superiority. One man was particularly important in this process. John Hanning Speke, explorer of the Nile, proposed that the socially superior, minority, Tutsi population must have originated in another part of the world and migrated to Rwanda, gaining control from the inferior Hutus (Prunier 1997, 7). The Belgians used a number of pseudo-scientific methods, such as measuring the heads of noses of Rwandans, to support what became known as the Hamitic myth (Des Forges 1999, 37).

The Hamitic myth and its accompanying assumptions about Tutsi superiority came to strongly influence Belgian perceptions of, and policy towards, Rwanda. The Belgians "reconstructed" Rwanda's past and present, coming to view the Tutsi as a superior race whose

dominance over the Hutu could be justified through this reconstruction of events and social relations (Prunier 1997, 38). The result was that Tutsi alone were thought to be capable of holding positions of power and all Hutu were removed from the government and denied opportunities for higher education (Des Forges 1999, 35). In the 1930s, all Rwandans were required to declare their group identity, which was placed on an ID card. The system of ID cards persisted to the genocide and were one of the ways that victims were selected during the killing (Des Forges 1999, 38, 40).

Not only did these myths influence Belgian perceptions, but Rwandans came to accept their rewritten past and present as well. The Tutsi elite accepted the new status quo because it legitimated their dominance and served their interests (Des Forges 1999, 36). Prunier argues that even poor Tutsis who were not in a position to benefit from the new system came to believe the myth (Prunier 1997, 38). Hutus by and large accepted this new history as well, thinking "of the Tutsi as the winners and the Hutu as the losers in every great contest in Rwandan history" (Des Forges 1999, 37). The re-conceptualization of Rwandan history and society bred resentment in the Hutu population (Prunier 2008, 39).

Scholars today are still divided over the source of the physical and class distinctions between Rwandans. The two earliest major accounts of the genocide, still considered the most authoritative, by Alison Des Forges and Gerarld Prunier, differ on this point. Des Forges proposes that the physical differences associated with each group are the result of adaptations over many generations to their lifestyles. The terms Tutsi and Hutu mean 'person rich in cattle' and 'subordinate or follower of a more powerful person' respectively. Tutsis who were pastoralists tended to marry other pastoralists, adapting to a body type better suited to this

lifestyle. Hutus being of a lower class were cultivators, and over time came to have a shorter and stockier body type (Des Forges 1999, 33).

Prunier proposes an alternate perspective, one closer to the Hamitic myth, but without the accompanying assumptions of racial superiority. His view rests on the assumption of a later migration to Rwanda by the Tutsi than the Hutu, which would explain the differences in body type (Prunier 1997, 5).

However, neither explanation is able to fully account for some features of Rwandan history that both Des Forges and Prunier accept as fact. Both mention that in the pre-Colonial period, classifications as Hutu and Tutsi were fluid and possibly based on wealth. They also claim that intermarriage occurred. Although neither discredits either hypothesis, they open both to doubt.

Some scholars propose a direct causal link from this period of classification directly to the genocidal violence of the 1990s. This is a variation of the ancient racial or ethnic hatreds theory, as it acknowledges the social construction of the categories of Hutu and Tutsi, yet still thinks that the classification of the groups and the resulting resentment lead to the violence. However, that is an oversimplification of complex episodes of violence. It is important to acknowledge that no evidence exists that before colonization systematic violence ever occurred between the Hutu and Tutsi (Prunier 1997, 39).

The Tutsi began to fall out of favor with the Belgian authorities and the Catholic Church in the 1950s, as the country moved towards independence. Both the Belgians and the Church saw their influence in Rwanda threatened by the strengthened Tutsi elite. In response, they created more opportunities for Hutus to gain access to public life (Des Forges 1999, 38) and put their support behind the newly forming Hutu opposition (Prunier 1997, 42-43). With independence for

Rwanda around the corner, the newly empowered Hutu's began forming political parties. This was a period of low-level violence between party supporters as they vied for political control (Prunier 1997, 48-49). In the 1960 and 1961 elections, the Hutu party PARMEHUTU won a majority and 80% of Rwandans subsequently voted to end the monarchy (Des Forges 1999, 39). Rwanda formally gained its independence in July of 1962 under the leadership of President Kayibanda (Prunier 1997, 54).

In the early post-independence period, Kayibanda ruled Rwanda with an authoritarian and secretive hand. It was during this time that the first cross boarder attacks from Rwandan refugees began. As would be the pattern in the 1990s, these attacks, once repelled by government forces, were followed by repression and killings against the Tutsi within Rwanda (Prunier 1997, 56). These attacks were politically useful for the Hutu politicians as they could use the threat of the Tutsi refugees to create solidarity among the Hutu population. These attacks also allowed Hutu leaders to frame the transition from colonial rule to independence, what they termed the Hutu Revolution, as a struggle against Tutsi repression (Des Forges 1999, 39). The exiled Tutsi were part of an estimated 700,000 Rwandan refugees living in Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zaïre who fled Rwanda between 1959 and 1973 (Prunier 1997, 61-63). Between independence and the start of the war in 1990, Tutsi as a percentage of the total population of Rwanda fell by more than half, from 17.5% in 1952 to 8.4% in 1991 (Des Forges 1999, 40).

Near the end of his reign, as it was clear that he was losing power to the Hutu opposition, Kayibanda launched a major campaign of repression against the Tutsi elite. In an effort to create cohesion through the identification of a common enemy, and inspired by the mass violence perpetrated against the Hutu in Burundi by the Tutsi minority, Kayibanda ordered a review of the civil service, schools, universities, and private business to make sure that racial quotas were

being enforced. However, Kayibanda's policy ended up having the opposite effect. Regional divisions between Hutu elite lead to those who were carrying out the 'purification campaign' targeting their personal competition, rather than the Tutsi. The culmination of this episode was the largely peaceful coup lead by Major-General Juvénal Habyarimana in 1973. Habyarimana was a Hutu from the north and received support in his ousting of Kayibanda, who was from south-central Rwanda, from the Hutu in the north. (Prunier 1997, 60-61).

The early years of the Habyarimana regime were largely peaceful, but Tutsi remained excluded from politics in the country (Prunier 1997, 75). In 1975, Habyarimana established Rwanda as a single party state under the MRND party, the National Republican Movement for Development and Democracy (Des Forges 1999, 41). Every Rwandan was automatically a member (Prunier 1997, 76).

Things began to change dramatically in the country in 1990 when Habyarimana declared Rwanda a multi-party state at the urging of French president Mitterrand (Prunier 1997, 89). A new constitution was also drafted (Fujii 2009, 47). These acts were some of the factors that influenced the Rwandan Patriotic Front to speed up its invasion plans (Prunier 1997, 90). The RFP attacked Rwanda from Uganda on October 1st, 1990 (Prunier 1997, 93). The French government responded immediately to the invasion by dispatching a number of its troops to support the Rwandan army (Prunier 1997, 100). Belgium also contributed troops, but soldiers from both countries were ordered to maintain non-combat roles (Prunier 1997, 101). The Rwandan government chose to stage a fake attack on Kigali on the night of October 4th, which they blamed, with great success, on the RPF. In response, France increased its troop commitment (Prunier 1997, 102).

The RPF invasion led to a shift in the Habyarimana regime as he desperately tried to control the process of reform in the country (Fujii 2009, 47). He imposed harsh military and political measures, including arrests of 13,000 Tutsi and Hutu members of the opposition (Valentino 2004, 179). This was a period of state-sponsored violence distinct from the war with the RPF, although the RPF was blamed for the violence (Kirschke 1996, 32). Attacks by the RPF increased and it became clear that the RPF could not be defeated (Valentino 2004, 180).

It was during this time that the rhetoric that would emerge as crucial in identity construction during the genocide began to emerge. Habyarimana and other MRND members tried to portray the conflict as an ethnic war (Fujii 2009, 49). In 1992, Leon Mugesera at an MRND party rally called for the state to respond with violence against the Tutsi and RPF. The Tutsi link to the RPF was established, by claiming that the Tutsi were a threat to Rwanda not because they represented what the RPF was fighting for, but because Tutsis were joining the RPF as fighters. He also called on the people of Rwanda to take action, "we ourselves will take care of massacring these gangs of thugs" (Kirschke 1996, 39-40). The goal was to make ethnicity the main lens through which Rwandans viewed the upheaval in the country (Fujii 2009, 50).

A number of opposition parties formed with the demise of the one-party system. Three parties in particular were interested in bringing an end to MRND domination of Rwandan politics: MDR, a Hutu party from Northern Rwanda looking to reestablish the Northern dominance of politics that had been lost when Kayibanda was overthrown, PSD, and PL, center left and center right parties respectively (Fujii 2009, 48).

These parties, MDR in particular, rejected the framing of the conflict with the RPF presented by MRND. Instead they argued that the war was the result of a lack of ability to rule Rwanda effectively on the part of the MRND. To them, the invasion was an example of

Habyarimana's incompetence. They accused him of using the RPF and the civil war as a means to prevent opposition parties from gaining a voice and a share of the power in Rwanda (Fujii 2009, 50).

After fighting unsuccessfully with the RPF for three years and facing increasing pressure from France to sign a peace agreement, Habyariman signed the Arusha Peace Accords in July of 1993. The Accords established a power sharing agreement between the MRND, the RPF, and a coalition of MDR, PSD, PL, and the Democratic Christian Party (PDC). The agreement was designed to create a three-fold power split to prevent any one group from gaining too much power in the new government. Opposition to the Accords was immediate, especially from members of the military who resented that the RPF would be given 40% of the troops and half of the officer positions. Officers in the military and regional and local politicians, up for review under the agreement, feared for their positions and livelihoods. Extreme opposition emerged from CDR, who was not given a place in the new government. CDR, through its leader Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, advocated self-defense programs (party sponsored militias) and helped to found the radio station RTLM (Des Forges 1999, 125-6). Throughout late 1993, the self-defense programs were further developed through training of young participants and the purchase of weapons. It is estimated that 581,000 machetes were purchased during this period, double the number imported in previous years (Des Forges 1999, 127-9).

As part of the Arusha Accords, the United Nations deployed a peacekeeping force to the country, UNAMIR with 2,548 troops, far less than had been called for in the agreement. UNAMIR was given a limited mandate, allowed to use its weapons for self-defense purposes only and sent to enforce the Accords (Des Forges 1999, 130-4).

In October of 1993, the Hutu president of Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye was assassinated by Tutsi soldiers from the Burundian army (Des Forges 1999, 134). As will be discussed in depth later, this event polarized and instilled fear in Rwandans and gave rise to the Hutu Power movement, a group of hardliners who would ultimately be responsible for the implementation of the genocide and possibly the death of Rwandan President Habyarimana in April of 1994 (Des Forges 1999, 137-9).

On April 6, 1994, the airplane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was shot down as it approached the airport in Kigali, Rwanda (Des Forges 1999, 181). Within hours, roadblocks were established around Kigali by the Presidential Guard and self-defense forces and Hutu opposition members were being killed, including the new Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana (Des Forges 1999, 190). Violence spread widely over the next few days, as participation in the killings increased and the targets extended to the Tutsi population in the country. The genocide had started which would last until July of 1994, claiming between 500,000 and 1,000,000 lives (Des Forges 1999, 15-6).

Case - Rwanda

A consensus has emerged in the recent literature on the Rwandan genocide that views the genocide as modern, systematic, and intentional (Straus 2006, 32-33). This consensus is based on a historical reading that understands the genocide not as the spontaneous manifestation of ancient hatreds between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups, but rather the result of a response by Hutu hardliners to threats from the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RFP). This understanding is largely inline with the strategic perspective, which locates the source of mass killing in the strategies and goals of national elites. However, despite it being widely acknowledged that the killing was driven by a small group of Hutu who seized power after the killing of President Habyarimana,

there remain no definitive answer as to how these elites came to develop policies that targeted the entire Tutsi population of Rwanda, not simply the RPF and its direct allies. Also in question is how once the policy of extermination was decided upon, the policy was articulated in such a way as to motivate large numbers of Hutu to either directly participate in the killings of Tutsi and opposition Hutu politicians, or to not actively oppose the policies.

Lee Ann Fujii's work is especially influential for this study. Although her work is mostly focused on the various ways that average Rwandans did or did not participate, and their individual reasons for doing so, she frames the actions of Rwandans during the genocide within a particular elite construction of identity. She refers to the construction of Hutu and Tutsi during the period immediately preceding and during the genocide as "state-sponsored ethnicity" (Fujii 2009, 11). This set of constructions is distinctive in that it eliminates regional and local differences and divisions, resulting in a conception of identity that is monolithic. Where Fujii's work departs most radically from the extensive literature on ethnicity and other forms of identity as causal factors, the 'ethnic hatred' or 'ethnic fears' theories, is that Fujii does not view state-sponsored ethnicity as a cause of the genocide. Instead, she conceptualizes it as a 'script,' "a dramaturgical blueprint for an imagined world, one that is self-contained and populated by specific characters who say and do specific things at specific moments in time" (Fujii 2009, 12). In the case of Rwanda, the creators of the script were threatened elites who had the means to disseminate this particular conception of identity through elite-controlled information sources, including RTLM. Fujii's view on script and performance, which differ from other conceptions of these mechanisms in the social sciences, is of ethnicity as a set of constructions that allow individuals and groups below the national level opportunities for interpretation and

implementation. Ethnicity here is not an external force exerting pressure to act in a certain way. It is instead an opportunity for individuals to have agency (Fujii 2009, 18).

However, Fujii does not directly explore the process by which state sponsored identity is constructed and how those specific constructions relate to the policies of extermination, except to say that the construction of this specific conception of identity was viewed by the elites as the best way for them to maintain their power and as a means to distract from the regional divisions between Hutus that posed the real threat to elite power during this period (Fujii 2009, 13, 45).

Therefore, applying a post-structuralist methodology of discourse analysis to Fujii's state-sponsored ethnicity could indicate how this particular identity was constructed and its relationship to the policies that elites in Rwanda successfully implemented against the Tutsi population before the RPF seized control of the country in July of 1994.

As this study is interested in elite identity construction and its mutually constitutive relationship to policy, it would have been ideal to examine internal government and party documents in the period preceding and during the genocide. However, very few such documents exist and those that do are for the most part in French or Kinyarwanda (Valentino 2004, 183-4). However, a large set of documents does exist that can help shed light on elite identity and policy construction. These are transcripts of broadcasts by the Rwandan radio station Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) from November 1993 to June 1994.

RTLM radio broadcasts are useful source of information about elite perceptions, goals, and policies because of the unique origin and role of this station in Rwanda before and during the genocide. RTLM was founded in late 1993 after the signing of the Arusha accords ending the

civil war between the government of Rwanda and the RPF. Until 1991, and the opening of the political system in Rwanda beyond the ruling MRND party, all media was state controlled. Radio Rwanda, the state radio, was a major tool for the dissemination of party propaganda (Des Forges 2007, 42). Radio was an effective tool in this effort because many Rwandans are illiterate or lack access to other forms of media and communication. As in most of Sub-Saharan Africa, radio was the most important means of communication (Kirschke 1996, 45). RTLM was founded by members of MNRD and CDR, the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic, another center right party. Investors in the station included President Habyarimana himself, as well as a number of other Hutu elites (Des Forges 1999, 44).

RTLM immediately differentiated itself from Radio Rwanda in a number of important ways. First, RTLM broadcasted with a markedly different tone, adopting a Western style of talk radio and music, previously unknown in Rwanda. These tactics, and their marked difference from Radio Rwanda earned RTLM a major following quickly after its launch. Although intended for a young audience, it was popular across the range of spectrums and remained so, even when its broadcasts quickly turned to topics that were not solely for entertainment.

RTLM's anti-Tutsi, anti-RPF position was revealed quickly after its first broadcast, shortly after the assassination of Burundian president Ndadaye. Ndadaye's assassination, to be discussed at length shortly, polarized Rwandans. Ndadaye, the first Hutu president of Burundi, was assassinated after his election by Tutsi soldiers in the Burundian army. Their coup attempt failed and Hutu in the country retaliated, killing thousands of Tutsi. The Tutsi lead army then conducted reprisal attacks against the majority Hutu population of Burundi (Des Forges 1999, 135).

In Rwanda, many Tutsi responded by feeling as if their fear of attacks by Hutu were justified. Some took this to an extreme, believing that they could only be safe as a minority within Rwanda if they held political power. Hutu members of MRND and CDR responded to Tutsi actions in Burundi as proof that the Tutsi as a collective were bent on taking power by force across the region (Des Forges 1999, 135). Relating to RTLM specifically, members of MRND and CDR who opposed the Arusha Accords gravitated towards RTLM and the station became their mouthpiece (Des Forges 2007, 45).

Much has been written about the role of RTLM in the genocide. Famous for its 'hate speech' towards the Tutsi and RPF, it is often portrayed as one of the important factors that led to the genocide and mobilized the masses to kill. However, this study is less interested in the direct role RTLM played in mobilizing participants and more focused on the particular articulations of identity and policy broadcast over the airways. As one of the few available sources reflecting elite thought and action in Rwanda during this period, it is a means to examine the process of mutual constitution of identity and policy.

When conducting a discourse analysis, language matters, meaning that caution must be exercised when using translations or English language documents that have different linguistic or epistemological codes (Hansen 2006, 83). However, as a Westerner with limited experience in Rwanda who wishes to explore the role of elite strategies in the Rwandan genocide, some of these complications cannot be avoided. Luckily there exists a large body of literature that touches on RTLM and its role in the genocide to guide a discourse analysis (Kirschke 1996; Thompson 2007; Des Forges 1999; Prunier 1997). As Hanson points out, a thorough discourse

analysis depends on extensive knowledge of the case in question, gained through a careful study of secondary sources (Hansen 2006, 83).

All RTLM transcripts used in this study are the official translations created for use by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda located in Arusha, Tanzania.

The first step in a discourse analysis is to establish the basic discourses, constructions of radically different Selves and Others. This step serves to delineate the major 'ideal-type' constructions of identity and the policies that they argue (Hansen 2006, 95). The two basic discourses articulated on RTLM from November 1993 to June 1994 are the foreigner discourse and the Arusha discourse. However, it should first be pointed out that these discourses are based off constructions of the Tutsi as equivalent to the RPF and of this Tutsi/ RPF collective as killers responsible for the current war and upheaval.

These do not qualify as basic discourses as they are rather obvious and underlie all other constructions of identity articulated by RTLM. However, they might not be obvious to someone without a strong background in the history of Rwanda and the genocide. The construction of equalvency between the Tutsi, RPF, and various Kinyarwanda words used for these groups, including inkotanyi and inyenzi, is apparent in the frequent interchangeable use of these terms in RTLM broadcasts. For example, a report calling for Rwandans to remain vigilant and man the roadblocks against the inkotanyi in the neighborhood mean Tutsi civilians, not RPF forces (RTLM Transcript, 14 April 1994). It is likely that this construction was first articulated and accepted by the wider audience of Rwandans at numerous points in history, during the first attacks by Tutsi refugees in the 1960s, as well as the first major RPF attack in 1990. RTLM is drawing on these historical constructions as a basis for further articulations of identity unique to

the period of genocide in 1994. The second construction of this nature is the frequent reference to the RPF collective (including the Tutsi, inyenzi, and inkotanyi) as killers. Sometimes proof is given of this activity in the form of numbers killed or specific anecdotes, but usually it is taken for granted by the radio personality that the RPF are killers and uses this statement as a preface to make further points (RTLM Transcript, 10 April 1994).

The foreigner discourse can be observed in the frequent reference made during this period to the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the Inkotanyi, the Inyenzi, and by extension the Tutsi, as not 'Rwandan.' Although this discourse includes a wide variety of variation, and includes secondary constructions of the RPF and Tutsi as a minority seeking power through the elimination of ethnic distinctions, as a minority which views itself as superior, and as sorcerers, the basic discourse is based upon the construction of these groups as a collective foreign other differentiated from 'Rwandans,' which in this discourse means the Hutus who have seized control of the Rwandan government and military, their Hutu allies, and Hutus who do not actively oppose them.

The Arusha discourse at its core articulates the RPF as responsible for the breakdown of the implementation of the Arusha agreements, differentiating the RPF from the Hutu transitional government, installed in the hours after the death of President Habyarimana, which is portrayed as willing to return to the negotiating table as soon as the RPF ceases hostilities against the government, army, and citizens of Rwanda. However, internal inconsistency exists in this discourse, as RTLM just as frequently broadcasts the messages that the RPF are the enemies of the country and therefore negotiation cannot occur, that the RPF are untrustworthy, and that the Arusha accords were only a means for the RPF to prepare for war.

The foreigner discourse runs throughout the RTLM radio broadcasts analyzed for this study, and in its basic form remains a consistent articulation of identity. At its core, this discourse identifies the Tutsi and RPF as 'not Rwandan.' This is done in a number of ways. First, by differentiating the Tutsi and RPF from 'citizens.' Frequent reference to the word citizen is made, especially when describing actions taking place against the RPF and Tutsi. For example, in a statement about how the government side is winning the war, RTLM states, "citizens who are at the road blockers, citizens all over the country, Rwandan soldiers; all of them are winning" (RTLM Transcript, 14 April 1994). The word citizen serves to differentiate those fighting the RPF and killing Tutsis from the Tutsi themselves, who are technically citizens, but in this construction are not, they are instead foreigners. In addition to references made to citizens, the foreigner discourse relies on constructions of identity that link Rwandan identity to that of a family. For example, RTLM states that "the country needs, more than ever, the combined forces of all its children, especially the most devoted ones, to defend the country" (RTLM Transcript, 9 April 1994). Once again, by calling for "its children" to defend the nation, the enemy being defended against, the RPF and Tutsi, are differentiated and classified as not children of the country, as not part of the collective of Rwandans. At one point while discussing a return the Arusha Accords, a commentator states, "we told them to come like brothers, it was seemingly accepted but they refused, it is up to them. If you tell someone that he is your brother and he refuses saying he is your enemy, it is up to him, you take him as an enemy" (RTLM Transcript, date unknown). Here an illusion is made to brothers, a component of a family, yet this construction excludes the RPF/ Tutsi from this label because they "refused."

Another way this construction occurs is to admit the Rwandan origin of the RPF, yet deny that this background makes them Rwandan. The link between Tutsi and Rwandan is

severed, replaced instead with foreigner. For example, "we know that they are the Inyenzi, we know that they are the...Tutsis before anything else, that is to say they may be people of Rwandan origin, but that does not mean they are Rwandans" (RTLTM Transcript, 15 April 1994). Similarly, months later, RTLTM states, "I confirm that even if they claim to be Rwandans born of Rwandan parents, there is no proof to convince us that they are Rwandans (RTLTM Transcript, 13 June 1994). The answer to if not Rwandan than what is answered, when the commentator states that Paul Kagame, one of the leaders of the RPF, is an officer in the Ugandan army and insinuates that other RPF members are as well, "we know, for example, that people like Kagame are officers in the Ugandan army, as well as all the other officers in the Inyenzi, not so?" (RTLTM Transcript, 15 April 1994).

This connection to Uganda is an important element of the foreigner discourse. Sometimes RTLTM goes as far as to refer to the RPF as "Ugandans" and to suggest that if the RPF are successful, they will "annex Rwanda to Uganda" (RTLTM Transcript, date unknown) or to imply that the RPF are actually acting under orders by the Ugandan President Museveni and that Uganda is directing their actions. These quotes are examples, "Museveni got his men to attack us and kill us" (RTLTM Transcript, 10 June 1994) and "yet another proof that Uganda and its armed forces are very well involved in the war we are waging against the RPF-Inkotanyi" (RTLTM Transcript, 15 April 1994). These examples all come from early in the genocide. In June, as an RPF victory is looking assured, this discourse remains constant. For example, "We are Rwandans. We are Rwandans. Nobody will understand that we can flee from Rwanda, that the Ugandans will chase us out of Rwanda. So we should fight for this Rwanda" (RTLTM Transcript, 13 June 1994). In this way, RPF and Tutsi become linked in the foreigner discourse to Ugandan and differentiated from the speaker on RTLTM who is linked as the collective we to Rwandan.

In addition to references to Ugandans, the RPF and Tutsi are further differentiated in this construction from 'Rwandans' by reference to allies, including the United States and Belgium. The first reference to this comes with a mention of white fighters with the RPF (RTLM Transcript 15 April 1994). Then it is explicitly stated that the United States has interests in Rwanda and are directing the Tutsi, "the Americans with their Tutsi and Belgian friends started threatening to put their dollars elsewhere if Rwanda refused to give power to the Tutsis" (RTLM Transcript, 12 April 1994). A reference is also made to the RPF receiving support in their alleged assassination of President Habyarimana, "the RPF Inkotanyi, assisted by foreigners, succeeded in assassinating the President of the Republic (RTLM Transcript 12 April 1994). Finally, the foreigner discourse relies on a construction of the RPF and Tutsi as enemies of Rwanda (RTLM Transcript, 15 April 1994, date unknown, 23 May 1994).

However, the foreigner discourse is in practice modified by a number of other related discursive moves. The first is to construct the Tutsi as 'Rwandan,' but think them to minority, which therefore puts a limit on their right to participation in the political system of Rwanda, or 'power' as RTLM articulates it. "I have remarked it, they are a minority. The Inkotanyi form a minority group in Rwanda. Tutsi are very few" (RTLM Transcript, date unknown). This construction of the Tutsi as a minority is linked to a separate discourse of Tutsi superiority. RTLM suggests that the Tutsi believe that they, "are the only ones who must rule, others have no right" (RTLM Transcript, 12 December 1993). This leads into a discussion of Hutu and Tutsi distinctions and what these different categories mean. It is surprising that RTLM admits that these distinctions may or may not point corresponding to real, existing differences among Rwandans. However, they argue that the Tutsi are trying to eliminate these distinctions, whether or not they really exist, in order to make Rwandans forget that the Tutsi constitute a minority in

Rwanda and therefore have no right to power in a "democratic" country. For example, "the only problem we have now is that this mentality is pitting us against each other because some people are trying to monopolize power," "all those people have one objective: to distract our attention while secretly they are trying to monopolize power," "that people want to conceal the ethnic problem so that the others do not know what they are looking for power," "we have proved that the ethnic groups do exist, that the ethnic problem does exist, but that today it is being linked to...by the way, it is not only today: this dates back a long time, it is associated with the quest for power," "the RPF claim they are representing the Tutsis, but they deny that the Tutsis are in the majority," and finally "their mentality is like that of the Inyenzi, whose only target is power, yet they know very well that today, it is unacceptable to attain power without going through the democratic process." These statements are summed up, "They wonder: 'how shall we go about acceding to power?'" and they add: "the best way is to refute the existence of ethnic groups, so that when we are in power, nobody will say that a single ethnic group is in power." That is the problem we are facing now" (RTLTM Transcript 12 December 1993). In this articulation, members of the RPF and Tutsi are linked to power seeking, differentiated from the Hutu who wish to maintain their rightful position as the majority within the country.

This discourse is articulated consistently through the genocide as well, as a mention is made in late May of 1994, "clinging to their 'tutsihood' is not a sort of loneliness, but a constant will to dominate, a feeling of being special, supreme beings" (RTLTM Transcript, 23 May 1994).

The Arusha discourse is simpler than the foreigner discourse, having no major variations upon the basic discourse. The basic discourse is that the transitional government stands ready and willing to negotiate with the RPF, as long as the RPF ceases hostilities first. However, this

discourse constructs the RPF as an unwilling and untrustworthy party, therefore making negotiations impossible. At the start of the genocide, this discourse was mostly articulated through the first statement, that the current government of Rwanda was willing to negotiate (RTLTM Transcript, 9 April 1994). The transitional government was linked to a willingness to negotiate and implement an agreement and differentiated from the RPF, whose identity as constructed through linkages with refusal to negotiate. It is likely that the focus was on emphasizing the government's willingness to negotiate as a means to legitimate the government, which took power after the death of President Habyarimana, as a way counter to the provision of the Arusha Accord which stated that power transfers must occur through elections. By reaffirming the government's commitment to negotiation, the current government was able to present itself as legitimate, with authority borrowed from the accords.

However, articulations which present the RPF and Tutsi as dishonest and unwilling parties emerge. RTLTM states that one should not trust the Inkotanyi, "they end up disappointing you." They point out that the RPF has violated the Arusha Accords by continuing to fight (RTLTM Transcript, 12 April 1994, 14 April 1994, 15 April 1994).

By the end of May, RTLTM comes out strongly against the Arusha Accords themselves, stating that they were "war agreements" and that the RPF signed them in order to prepare to fight the Rwandan government (RTLTM Transcript, 17 May 1994). The discourse here has changed. No longer is Hutu linked to negotiating party, but to a refusal to negotiate because the Arusha Accords were flawed from their inception.

These discourses, although seemingly at odds with each other as they construct two very different policy positions, kill the RPF collective to avoid the Tutsi taking power, or possibly

engage in political negotiations with the RPF if they first agree to cease hostilities, do in fact make sense as part of a campaign by Hutu hardliners to stay in power. As evidenced by numerous case studies on the genocide (Valentino 2004; Des Forges 1999; Prunier 1997; Fujii 2009; Straus 2006), the violence can be understood as an attempt by an extremist group within the ruling party to maintain power in the face of an impending civil war with a rebel force and major concessions mandated by a recent peace treaty.

Members of the MRND party related to the President's wife and their allies in CDR were angry with President Habyarimana for agreeing to negotiate with the RPF and the eventual signing of the Arusha Accords that called for a major restructuring of the Rwandan government and military to include equal representation for the RPF in post-conflict Rwanda (Des Forges 1999, 170-90). Scholars are split over who was responsible for the downing of the President's plane and no consensus has emerged on this point since the genocide, but whether the RPF or Hutu extremists, it is uncontested that within hours members of the Rwandan Presidential Guard and MRND and CDR backed militias had established roadblocks in the capital Kigali, killed the interim prime minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, killed a number of other 'moderate' or opposition Hutu politicians, and were beginning to target average Rwandans carrying identity cards which marked them as Tutsi (Des Forges 1999).

Although it is seemingly not 'rational' for these embattled elites to choose mass killing as a means of political survival, as theorized by Valentino and evidenced by the course of events in Rwanda, the choice to pursue a policy of mass killing was the result of an escalation of tactics, the response to a perceived grave threat to their power, the signing and implementation of the Arusha accords and the readiness of the RPF to continue the civil war if the Accords were

derailed. Therefore, extremist Hutu elites, in charge of the broadcasts of RTLM, articulated their identity as Rwandan, differentiating themselves from the Tutsi minority in the country and the RPF, which was Tutsi dominated and based in Uganda. As a collective, the RPF and Tutsi became targets for attacks by Rwandan government troops, the Presidential Guard, party militias, and citizens who were mobilized by government structures to participate in the killings. The Arusha discourse, while articulating an identity that leaves open the possibility for renewed negotiations with the RPF is not in fact inconsistent with the foreigner discourse in that the Arusha discourse is not really advocating renewed negotiations. A return to negotiations is usually dependent on a cessation of hostilities by the RPF. However, it is likely that RTLM broadcasters know that the RPF is experiencing a series of military victories as it sweeps across Rwanda, despite their constant statements regarding RPF defeat, and that the genocidal violence being perpetrated against the Tutsi population in the country by the government and its domestic allies would likely prevent the RPF and the international community, once it was revealed to the outside world the extent of the killing, from agreeing to further negotiations. However, within the Arusha discourse itself, it is evident that renewed negotiations with the RPF is not really what the Hutu hardliners are seeking. As often as they call for negotiations, they also identify the RPF as an untrustworthy enemy that they cannot actually negotiate with. This double move eliminates the possibility that negotiations are the policy they are seeking and that they will actually occur. The Arusha discourse, although different in its articulations of identity than the foreigner discourse, is still advocating for a single policy, the destruction of the RPF and its alleged domestic allies, the entire Tutsi population of Rwanda.

Case - Burundi

One of the contentions of this study was that the violence in Rwanda was regionally influenced. Discourse analysis, supported by a number of case studies of the genocide, indicate that the assassination of President Melachior Ndadaye and subsequent violence against both Hutu and Tutsi in the country in late 1993 played an important role in shaping the articulations of identity in Rwanda before and during the genocide of 1994.

Rwanda and Burundi have always been linked, with a shared colonial past and a similar social makeup of Hutu and Tutsi (René Lemarchand 1970). Throughout the twentieth century, political events, especially political violence, in one country affected the other. For example, the Rwanda revolution of 1959-61, when Rwanda gained independence from Belgium and the Hutus took power from the Tutsi, tens of thousands of Rwandan refugees fled into Burundi (Khadiagala 2006, 44).

Patterns of political violence have been similar as well, as both Rwanda and Burundi have been marked by episodes of violence between Hutu and Tutsi within each country since independence. In 1972, genocide occurred in Burundi as part of a planned extermination campaign of Hutu elites. An estimated 100,000 people were killed (Des Forges 1999, 134). The genocide was followed by sixteen years of Tutsi rule, which ended with the election of the moderate Hutu Ndadaye in 1993 (Khadiagala 2006, 45-7). Ndadaye was assassinated a few months later by Tutsi army officers. The coup failed, but the resulting violence targeted Tutsi and moderate Hutus. The violence resulted in 50,000 killed, 800,000 Hutu fled the country, and 400,000 Burundians from both groups were internally displaced (Abdallah 2000, 32-7).

Constructions of identity as articulated through RTLM from November of 1993 to May 1994 do make reference to Burundi and the 1993 coup, but they do not drawn upon the situation

in Burundi to any great extent. However, case studies of the Rwandan genocide seem to indicate that the role Ndadaye's assassination played occurred slightly earlier, during the first days of the implementation of the Arusha Accords when strong opposition to the Accords was forming. Des Forges chronicles the result of the assassination, showing how both Hutu and Tutsi reacted to the killing in fear, feeling that their group might be next. The extremist members of CDR and MRND took the assassination as proof that the Tutsi were attempting to gain regional control and would use any means necessary to gain control of Rwanda. She argues that RTLM used the assassination as an opportunity to further differentiate itself from Radio Rwanda and take a hard line against Tutsi in the country (Des Forges 1999, 134-5).

Other accounts of RTLM's broadcasts during this period do show that RTLM blamed the Tutsi generally for President Ndadaye's death, instead of the Tutsi in the Burundian army specifically. During the violence in Burundi that followed his assassination, RTLM failed to report on attacks against Tutsi, reporting only Hutu deaths and displacements. Overall, RTLM presented the events in Burundi as connected to Rwanda's conflict with the RPF, going as far as to claim that it was actually the RPF, not members of the Burundian army who murdered Ndadaye and calling for a Rwandan army intervention in Burundi to destroy the Tutsi in that country. RTLM presented Ndadaye's assassination and killings of Hutu as just one part of a plan by the Tutsi to eliminate Hutu from the region (Kirschke 1996, 88-9).

In the RTLM broadcasts examined for this study, references to Burundi include claims that the coup was rooted in Rwanda (RTLM Transcript, 24 November 1993), that the Tutsi is a minority in Burundi whose only target is power (RTLM Transcript, 12 December 1993), and that Tutsis in Burundi are determined to decimate the Hutu in that country (RTLM Transcript, 6

January 1994). These references were all within a few months of the assassination, indicating that Burundi may have been more important in identity construction for the Hutu extremists right after his death, and long before the Rwandan genocide broke out, than during the genocide.

Conclusion

This study set out to build upon Benjamin Valentino's strategic perspective on genocide and mass killing by applying a vastly different theoretical perspective to the question of how mass killing occurs. Rejecting the rationalist approach used by Valentino, this study adopted a post-structuralist methodology of discourse analysis to explore the process by which identity and policy are mutually constituted. Focusing on the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the mass killings that occurred in Burundi after the assassination of their president in 1993, discourse analysis, as conceptualized by Lene Hansen, was used to describe the process of identity construction through linking and differentiation and the simultaneous creation of policy.

Using transcripts from the Rwandan radio station RTLM, one of the few sources available in English for exploring elite identity and policy construction, two basic discourses were identified, the foreigner discourse and the Arusha discourse. The foreigner discourse, and its multiple variations, relied on a construction of the RPF as not only equivalent to the Tutsi population of Rwanda, but equal, belonging to the same group.

From this starting point, Tutsi and the RPF are constructed as not 'Rwandan.' Although this discourse includes a wide variety of variation, and includes secondary constructions of the RPF and Tutsi as a minority seeking power through the elimination of ethnic distinctions and as a minority which views itself as superior, the basic discourse is based upon the construction of

these groups as a collective foreign other differentiated from 'Rwandans.' In this discourse, that means the Hutus who have seized control of the Rwandan government and military, their Hutu allies, and Hutus who do not actively oppose them.

In the foreigner discourse, Tutsi and RPF are linked to not family, enemy, minority, Ugandan, power seeker, and ally of Westerners. They are differentiated from the Hutu, who are linked to members of the Rwandan family, majority, national, power maintainer, and independent of foreign influence.

The policy advocated through the foreigner discourse is mass killing directed against the RPF and Tutsi. As foreigners who are seeking to take power from the majority Hutu, they are constructed as a grave threat to the Rwandan state and its citizens that must be eliminated for the Hutu to maintain their power and survive.

The second basic discourse articulated in the RTLM broadcasts is the Arusha discourse. In early articulations, Tutsi and RPF are linked to an unwillingness to negotiate, while the Hutu government that took power after the death of President Habyarimana is differentiated from the Tutsi by links to a desire to implement the Arusha Accords if the RPF agrees to a cessation of hostilities. However, in later articulations, the government is unwilling to negotiate because the Accords themselves are simply a means for the RPF to gain power. The policy that is articulated through these constructions of identity is in the end one that calls for a refusal to negotiate.

This study was also looking to explore the role an episode of mass violence in one country could have on future outbreaks of violence in the same region. The contention was made that discourses borrow from past articulations to legitimize the use of mass violence. To explore

this contention, RTLM transcripts were searched for mentions of Burundi and these were analyzed to reveal how the events in Burundi in 1993 were used in articulations of identity and policy in Rwanda in 1994. In early transcripts (November 1993-January 1994), events in Burundi were being used to support articulations of Tutsi identity. However, the effect of Burundi in the discourses was not as great as indicated from the secondary literature on Rwandan and Burundi, which emphasized the importance of events in Burundi in 1993 on the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Additionally, it was not clear that the articulations of identity and policy used in Burundi in 1993 to legitimize the mass killing were borrowed in Rwanda in 1994. Instead it appears that events in Burundi were rearticulated to fit existing and developing constructions of identity in Rwanda.

It is possible that greater borrowing of discourses did occur than was apparent in this study. Further discourse analysis needs to be conducted with documents from Burundi from 1993 as well as Rwandan government documents from the same period and into 1994. Unfortunately, few such documents exist, especially for Burundi. The documents that do exist are likely to be in French, Kinyarwanda, or Kirundi. Much of what does exist has been collected by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which was the source of the English language translations of the RTLM broadcasts.

The discourse analysis conducted on the RTLM transcripts largely supports the strategic perspective, as well as many historical case studies on the genocide, which locate the source of the violence in the goals and strategies of a group of Hutu elite within Rwanda who seized power when President Habyarimana was killed. This study sought to explore a very narrow question, how identity and policy was constructed by elites in Rwanda and Burundi in 1993 and 1994,

under the assumption that a particular construction of identity and policy by elites resulted in the genocidal violence. Therefore, direct implications of the results are limited. However this study serves as a first step towards more in-depth explorations of identity and policy construction as they relate to genocide and mass killing in Central Africa.

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