

# **Identity, Interest and International Structure in Foreign Policy: Security and reconciliation in Germany's Ostpolitik**

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Abstract:

Despite its strong attachment to the West in the post-WWII era, the German state adopted a conciliatory tone vis-à-vis the Soviet Union starting in the 1970s. How was Germany able to justify its outreach to the East amid its Western commitment? This study shows that the outreach to the East came to be represented as an essential part of a greater reconciliation process within the German past and was linked to a reinterpretation of security in light of the new foreign policy orientation. While the opportunity for reunification with Eastern Germany provided a great incentive to the German state, it also relied on legitimation strategies that appealed to the German 'Sonderweg' tradition and reconciliation with German history. This project first explores the Western connections in the immediate aftermath of WWII, then reflects on the German attempt to reach out to the East through state action and legitimation techniques, in the form of symbolic and rhetorical acts, and finally analyzes the domestic and international responses state action provoked to shed light on the process of state identity construction and transformation.

This paper contends that the shifts in German foreign policy in the 1970s in light of Brandt's Ostpolitik were intricately linked to a reconfiguration and renegotiation of state identity. While it remains out of the scope of the present paper to understand whether identity precedes action, it will become evident that identity construction is actively sought in an attempt to legitimize state action and foreign policy. Analyzing the process of identity configuration, by first understanding the German relationship to the West and then interpreting the rise of the infamous Ostpolitik that caused a drastic reorientation of West German policy and was not positively welcomed by everyone. How then did Germany manage to reconcile its Western commitment with the Eastern outreach? Many scholars have identified reconciliation as an important factor in Germany history in general, and in foreign policy making in particular. By understanding the reframing of central foreign policy issues, including power and security, this paper will seek an understanding of the legitimation attempts of the German state and the rhetorical linkage of the reorientation to the greater reconciliation process in Germany.

Rationalist accounts that put forth a static view of national interest mainly defined through security and power fail to explain this shift in German policy, while constructivist theories of state identity have been able to account for shifts in state identity. This paper does not suggest eliminating the key national interests identified by rationalist accounts, but rather it seeks to understand how these conceptions of national interest are redefined in light of new ideas, a change in the international environment, or simply a change in leadership.

This paper will survey relevant approaches to the state-society relationship and emphasize how theories of the state frame agency of the state. It will further identify approaches that allow for greater state agency and are most compatible with constructivist concepts of state identity that is studied in the second part of this paper through a comparison of national interest

in realist terms and the literature on state identity. In addition, the distinct theories on the state will allow establishing legitimacy and the process of legitimation as an important characteristic of the state and the construction of its identity.

Finally, this project surveys the indirect effect of language and state rhetoric on state identity and action to analyze the legitimation process involved in reconciling Western commitment with the Eastern outreach program in the 1970s in Germany through redefinition and reinterpretation of security, power and reconciliation. Grasping the process involved in the creation of identity and reality will help investigating the German case study. It will also emphasize the salience of external reconciliation through foreign policy that has been underemphasized in the study of reconciliation.

Highlighting the processes and mechanisms associated with identity creation will help ward off critique that identifies the circularity of the identity argument. State identities precede state interests that are constructed through interaction and process mechanisms. This paper will focus on these mechanisms of identity construction that allow the state to strive for legitimacy and adapt to novel realities. Lastly, this paper will shed light on the effect of international responses or generally international factors on state identity and the legitimation of identity and policy. This paper contends that German state identity is reshaped by the reinterpretation of security and reconciliation in the post-WWII context. The act and process of legitimation plays a significant role in shaping, reinforcing and transforming state identity. While Germany experiences multiple identities during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the prevalence of Brandt's Ostpolitik can be explained by the superiority of Brandt's argument and presentation that linked Ostpolitik to greater notions of the German future of unity, freedom, and cooperation. Capturing the sentiment and a historical moment conducive to change, Brandt was able to transform

Germany's relationship with the East and the West between 1967 and 1974 against opposition from the United States government. His legacy paved the way for increased détente between East and West and the reunification of Germany in 1990.


### Literature Review: State agency and legitimacy

The state has been the most widely studied, yet most widely neglected concept in political science. While the state has become the central figure in the study of political science and international relations theory, its substance has been left relatively unexplored. There are three basic approaches to the state that can be summarized as Weberian, Marxist and pluralist. The Weberian view today is mainly understood as a statist approach that seeks state autonomy from society. The Marxist approach entails the dissolution of the state for greater society and social groups and the Pluralist approach maintains that the state plays a role in political life, but competes with other organizations for shaping political outcomes.

The various theories on the state can be sketched on an axis that characterizes the theories' relative distance to state and society respectively. On a coordinate system, theories are characterized with a "state value" and a "society value" that describes whether theories aim at strengthening the state or dissolving the state for the sake of society. For practical purposes, society embodies all diverse social groups, including private corporations, interest groups, economic class etc. This allows an understanding of the state-society relationship throughout the different viewpoints. Assessing the theories' relative distance to state and society can allow for a better understanding of the state as an agent of action in political science. Does the state exist independent from society, embedded in society or does the state exist at all? While the answers

to these questions are beyond the scope of the present paper, they are important in understanding foreign policy making and orientation.

### State-Society “Values”<sup>1</sup>



The accumulation of literature on the state and its relevance in policymaking and political outcomes in general suggests that scholars have attempted to moderate their assumptions and embrace a middle way. The Neo-Weberians have shifted toward a more autonomous state (Evans, Rueschemeyer, & Skocpol, 1985), while scholars such as Joel Migdal have proposed a “state-in-society” approach (Migdal, 2001). Approaches that seek to identify the make up of the state rather than its position or role cannot easily be matched on the state-society spectrum.

<sup>1</sup> A “High state” value denotes a theory’s believe in state autonomy, while low state reflects a theory’s understanding of a non-unitary state. High society, on the other hand, reflects a theory’s understanding of society’s autonomy, while low society can be understood as a theory’s attempt to marginalize society in understanding the “state-society complex”. This list of authors and philosophers is by no means completes and is only suggestive of the trend in the state-society complex and its effect on state agency.

Including discussions on the personhood (Wendt, 1999, 2004), the “ontological status” (Ringmar, 1996).

The aim of surveying theories on the state in this paper is threefold: to establish analytically the state as an agent, shed light on the connection between state and society, and emphasize the importance of legitimacy in the very definition of the state and the constitution of state identity. This paper seeks to establish the state as an organizational actor that interacts with society, as Wendt holds the “state needs a society” (Wendt, 1999).

While many authors throughout the last century have relied on Weber to design their definition of the state, they have overemphasized the rational legal authority aspect in Weberian thought and underemphasized legitimacy aspects of the Weberian account, thereby distancing the state from society.

Weber provides a widely acknowledged definition of the state that regards the state as a “compulsory association, which organizes domination” (Weber, 1965, p. 25). Weber’s characterization of the state does not allow for alternative sources of power: The state “has combined the material means of organization in the hands of its leaders....the state has taken their position and now stands in the top place” (Weber, 1965, p. 25). This has led to an understanding of the Weberian state as a bureaucratic insulation and isolation of the state from the society and other players in society. Weber further characterizes the state with the “*monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory” (Weber, 1965, p. 25) [italics in original]. He emphasizes legitimacy as a necessity for the domination to persist and the state to be effective, which is indicative of Weber’s commitment to viewing the state in its relation to society, an oft-neglected aspect of Weberian philosophy on the state.

As an early challenger of the centrality of the state, Watkins argues that the scope of political science should not be limited to the state, but expanded to an investigation of all associations that are linked to the problem of power and thus pose a threat to individuals' freedom. Watkins challenges the centrality of the state by comparing its role in society to other types of private organizations, including religious and economic associations.

States and private associations can be assessed through the "degree of approximation to a common limit" of concentration of power, autonomy and political sovereignty that can never be attained due to competition from other organizations in society (Watkins, 1934, p. 6). He defines autonomy defined as complete "independence of all external and uncontrolled human forces" as another concept within the common limit that is only realized in the form of the. The only autonomous state can be found in the form of the international society.

While Watkins describes autonomy as a limiting concept, he alludes to the fact that associations cannot be independent from the greater society. Watkins suggests an autonomy view of the state, undermining the state's centrality and peculiarity in political science, but simultaneously links these ideas to societal constraints posed on organizations by arguing that the "particular sphere of influence would nevertheless form an inseparable portion of a more comprehensive whole". Thus Watkins expresses a position that is to a certain extent similar to the pluralist view of the state based on his assumption that "no insuperable gulf separates the state from the so-called voluntary associations" (1934, p.:63), but that also understands the embedded nature of state and society as described by other scholars (Migdal, 2001).

The relative American statelessness as described in Nettl's comparative analysis of states in continental Europe, Britain and the United States has led to a commensurate stateless scholarship on the state with a shift of the center of political science scholarship to America in



the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Pluralists have increasingly reduced the state to interest groups and individuals in society and highlighted the centrality of society over the state. They claim that the state is far from a united and rational actor, it is rather made up of different sectional bureaucracies and organizations each with their own agenda and set of goals. Foreign Policy can thus be seen as a result of a bargain between different organizations and agendas. The state is a loose set of ordered preferences and an aggregation of individual preferences.

Individualists, in particular, reduce states to the individuals operating within the structure and their interactions. In his analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Allison provides an individualist and pluralist perspective on the state, where he suggests to focus on bureaucracies and individuals within the state rather than the unitary state actor (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). Allison argues that bureaucratic politics in particular play an important role in interpreting foreign policy and he describes government action as “a result of bargaining among players positioned hierarchically in the government” (Allison & Halperin, 1972, p. 43). The Bureaucratic Model implies that there is not one single unitary actor, but rather many actors. Similarly, government decisions are not made by single rational choice but through a process of “pulling and hauling” (Allison & Halperin, 1972).

Not all of pluralist writing dissolves the state in complete nothingness, but rather reduces the role of the state to a competitor in the system with other social organizations, as proposed by Watkins. As foreign policy is a result of competition between different groups in society, the state does not seek a position of legitimation within society. State legitimacy becomes obsolete in the pluralist agenda.

Within the Marxist school of the concept of the state, the instrumental viewpoint places the state as reflective of the interests of the dominating class within society, while the

structuralist view expresses that the state represents the power relations in society (Block, 1982). Marx and Engels postulate, “The modern state power is merely a committee which manages the common business of the bourgeoisie”. The structuralist view, in particular, can be understood to reflect a fusion of the Weberian and pluralist view of the state, where the emphasis is on structure, but the state remains the collection of individuals in society and their interests (Wendt, 1999). Marx saw stateness more widespread in continental Europe, but excluded the United States and Great Britain from his postulate of overthrowing the state. Postmodernists, such as Ashley have dissolved the state as a central point of reference for the greater process that creates agents through discourse (Ashley, 1987).

The state experienced a revival beginning in the 1960s and 1970s through Neo-Weberians who aimed at bringing the isolated state that the Weberian definition suggests back in. As an early critic of the stateless approaches, Nettl criticizes Watkins’ “limiting concept of the state” that marginalizes the concept of the state from the study of political science, establishes the supremacy of the state over other organizations, but fails to analyze the interaction with other organizations in society, namely between “nation, territory or sovereignty in law” (Nettl, 1968, p. 562). There may be case for “bringing it back in” (562), Nettl argues, if the state can serve as an operating variable pointing out quantitative and qualitative differences between societies, where the degree of stateness can help specify the different politics in societies (588). Nettl offers a distinction between degree of stateness between continental Europe, Great Britain and the United States, among which continental Europe has developed the highest form of stateness. As Marx and Engels pointed out, Nettl observes a high degree of stateness in societies with a unitary society and non-federal structure, such as in continental Europe.

Nettl suggests that politics can be defined as a “social area of normlessness” (588). The process of political action is thus concerned with the establishing of norms for society and gain legitimacy, the political arena creates a vacuum that “contenders” fight for filling with their own norms. But if state norms or morality are prevalent, the norm-filling function is limited to expression of political interests.

Nettl thus argues for bringing the state back in and understanding the state not only as government, but also in its connection to nation and society to operationalize the state as a variable. Thus, Nettl suggests a view of the state that both isolates the state as an autonomous organization that is distinct in character from other types of associations, but interacts with society through its ‘norm filling’ function. Nettl’s approach can be related back to the initial Weberian definition of the state and the connection to legitimacy and is a genuine attempt to bring back the state as defined by Weber.

Weberians and Neo-Weberians, on the other hand, have interpreted the insulation of the state by separating state from society and elevating the state to an organizational actor that holds rational-legal authority independent from society. While Weber suggests that the essentials of a state are grounded in concentration of power, “monopoly of the use of force” and “men dominating men”, he also puts great emphasis on the legitimate character of the state and does not suggest a complete abandonment of society (*Politics as Vocation*, 23). Despite the importance given to the concept of legitimacy in Weberian philosophy, Neo-Weberians have surprisingly ignored legitimacy and separated the state from society (Seabrooke, 2002).

Evans, Reuschemeyer and Skocpol, the prominent neo-Weberians in advocating the isolation of the state, challenge the stateless pluralist and structural-functionalist perspectives wide-spread in the 1950s and 1960s in the United States and argue for “bringing back in the

state”. The authors claim that the state can only be effective in state action when it achieves complete autonomy from societal groups (Evans, et al., 1985, pp. 3-37). Despite their attempt to reintroduce the state in Weberian terms (9), the authors describe a viewpoint that distances itself increasingly from the Weberian state that not only emphasizes the centrality of the state, but also the importance of legitimacy and a state-society relation. They define state autonomy as states that are not constrained by people or societies or refrain from reflecting demands or “interests of social groups, classes and society” (1985:9). They maintain further that state capacities and autonomy can be assessed through the dominance of the state over opposing groups in society (Evans, et al., 1985, p. 9)<sup>2</sup>.

Stephen Krasner provides a “statist” approach to the study of foreign policy that assumes a distinction between state and society and supports the state autonomy perspective laid out by Evans et al (Krasner, 1978). The objectives sought by the state cannot be reduced to a set of private interests or understood in societal terms. Krasner analyzes U.S. policy on American raw material to underscore the statist agenda that purports to view the state as distinct in its interests driven either from material objectives or ideas about how societies should be structured, that Krasner characterizes as the ‘national interest’. He further reduces the state to the officials in the White House and State department (1978). Statist approaches to the state purport state autonomy and isolation from society and other organizations. The state is viewed as a peculiar type organization with interests and identities independent from society and interest groups, characterized as the national interest (Keohane, Nye, & Hoffmann).

Joel Migdal suggests a “state-in-society” view, which treats the state as embedded in other structures and analyzes the interaction between the state and other social forces (Migdal

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<sup>2</sup> Other theories such as structuralist, rationalist, historical-institutionalist and culturalist approaches share with Evans et al the neo-Weberian approach to state autonomy, namely the separation of state and society.

1997). This view does not only capture differences between states and the rise of diverse identities within a state, but it also allows understanding the state within the international system and the transformations that are imposed on the traditional definition of the state. While Migdal's analysis of the state-in-society view challenges the Weberian definition that stresses the centrality of the state, Migdal is, in reality, arguing with Neo-Weberians as presented above. Weber's ideal types of legitimacy allude to Weber's understanding of state-society relations.

While critics, such as Joel Migdal, point out that attempts to anthropomorphize the state are within the greater state-centered theories of the state (98). This can, however be challenged by interpreting the recent move to the ontological question of the state more carefully. Scholars in this approach (Ringmar, 1996; Wendt, 1999, 2004; Wight, 2004) assume a central role to the state, but nonetheless move away from statist approaches by investigating the content of the state rather than taking its existence as a priori.

Wendt suggests that the commonality of theorists of the state rests in their view of the state as a "useful fiction or metaphor" (Wendt, 1999, p. 196). Erik Ringmar suggests that the pluralist and statist agendas purport the same view, but at different distances. He holds that scholars ought to study the "ontological status of the state" through the "meta-narratives" that define it. The state can be challenged by novel views through "formative moment", the equivalent of an identity crisis of the state that are settled through "rhetorical battles" through which contenders challenge each other (Ringmar, 1996). Ringmar alludes to the personhood of the state by ascribing subjectivity both to the state and man and in a comparison of the development of both man and the state.

Wendt deals with the personification of the state by suggesting that the state cannot be reduced to its individual parts. This paper's view of the state is similar to Wendt's "synthetic

definition” of the state as both an organizational actor and its inseparable connection to society (Wendt, 1999, p. 197). Wendt further posits the a priori nature of the state to society or the international state system, which assists in developing his synthetic view. Wendt argues elsewhere that state intentions are intentional (Wendt, 2004).

Similarly, Jackson and Nexon argue that the units of the international system precede the system. While attributes of states, such as preferences, and the self-help system can change as a result of interaction, the entities themselves are not altered as a result of interaction (Jackson & Nexon, 1999). Viewing states as “conceptual or ontological primitives” can help escape the structuration problem transforming states to objects outside of the process.

The social embeddedness approach advocated by recent neo-Weberians and Migdal can be related to both the Weberian institutional insulation and legitimacy that plays a significant role in the definition of the state. Weber asserts that the conceptions of legitimacy, the “inner legitimations of domination” defined as “traditional”, “charismatic” and “legal” “are of great significance for the structure of domination” (23). By acknowledging the centrality of legitimacy in the structure of the state, Weber reveals his view of an inter-connection between the state and society. Social action is interpreted through a belief (*Vorstellung*) in the existence of a legitimate order. Weber establishes that social orders are legitimated through the principle of tradition, “affectual attitudes”, a rational belief, legal recognition and validity (130).

Seabrooke illustrates in his analysis of state and legitimacy that states enhance their effectiveness by becoming embedded with the society while retaining some “institutional autonomy” (2002). He criticizes the neo-Weberian (a la Skocpol) views on the basis of equating state autonomy with state isolation from other social groups. This interpretation suggests an

autonomous and independent state to increase effectiveness of rule. The author concedes that there is a relationship between social embedded nature of states and state legitimacy

Weber suggests that “the state is a relation of men dominating men” (Weber, 1965, p. 23), but “a relation supported by means of legitimate (i.e. considered to be legitimate) violence” (Weber, 1965). This emphasizes the importance that Weber attributes to legitimacy and actions that are considered to be legitimate by the people. The bureaucratic insulation and monopoly of force can only become meaningful in Weber’s philosophy if they are understood in relationship to Weber’s legitimacy and the importance of negotiation between people and the state.

Only the Weberian view and to a certain extent the pluralist view allow for the state to assume centrality in politics and society. The Marxist draw out the state, while the postmodernists do not believe it exists in the absence of its discursive production. This paper argues that the Weberian view of the state should be complemented by Weberian legitimacy that emphasizes state-society relations. If states are subjects in the international system or society-at-large, what are their interests and how are these defined?

### Identity Reconsidered:

Contrary to the essentialist account of identity that views identity as inherent, fixed and universal, constructivist accounts of identity have argued for a more context-dependent definition of identity. Charles Taylor has argued that identity is deep and foundational rather than accidental or fleeting. Taylor further argued against the naturalist viewpoint when he sought to establish that its relation to an outside framework that defines the “good life” and a moral foundation for the men to act defines the self (Taylor, 1989).

Others have emphasized the relationship between individual identity and collective identity and acknowledged the importance of process in identity configuration. Bloom puts forth the process of socialization of the individual into norms of society (Bloom, 1990). Hall explains that collective and individual identity are not merely co-constituted, but also mutually reinforcing (Hall, 1999). Contrary to the functional approach to identity that views identity as a product of structure (Gellner & Breuilly, 2006), Hall further explicates that while structure constraints, it does not determine the behavior of social actors and aggregates (Hall, 1999).

Goff and Dunn point out that identity has only recently found its way into international relations theory circles when the post-Cold War era increasingly experienced conflicts based on ethnic and social identities (Goff & Dunn, 2004). There is no agreement on an analytical approach to the study of identity. Rather than being constant, identities are contested and constantly adapting to the environment, identities are furthermore relational and “defined against an other” (Goff & Dunn, 2004).

Some scholars have suggested that the usage of identity as a concept in IR must be accompanied by commensurate analytical rigor. The absence of a concrete and unifying definition of identity has made identity increasingly susceptible to criticism. Abdelal et al propose an analytical framework to the study of identity and introduce novel methodological approaches to the study of identity. The authors suggest that identity should be treated as a variable in social psychology and political science alike to allow the measurement of the content of identity and control for causal mechanisms. The authors propose a diverse pool of analytical tools to assess identity as a variable, including experiments, agent-based modeling and cognitive mapping (Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, & McDermott, 2006). None of the described methods, however, capture the breadth of the identity concept. They rather control the environment and



hold factors constant to isolate identity as a variable and factor, which runs contrary to the co-constituted nature of identity purported by process-oriented constructivist IR scholars.

Brubaker and Cooper suggest a complete abandonment of the usage of identity in the different subfields of social sciences. The authors claim that the social sciences have exhausted the word “identity” to render it meaningless (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000). The authors criticize “soft constructivism” for making the term identity too all encompassing through its claim of identities being fluid, constructed and multiple. Brubaker and Cooper advocate that “If identity is everywhere it is nowhere” and suggest to move “beyond identity”. By distinguishing between identity as a “category of practice” and a “category of analysis”, the authors suggest to move beyond static notions of identity construed within analysis, but analyze the processes and mechanisms involved to avoid to reinforce terms and boundaries upon groups who may self-identify as an ethnicity, race or nation-state (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000). Focusing on process helps isolating the problem associated with Brubaker’s category of analysis that imposes boundaries on identity. Understanding legitimation of identity can help illuminate the construction of identity within a process of acceptance and dismissal of competing identities.

Margaret Somers proposes to introduce a narrative understanding of identity. Criticizing the growing essentialist accounts of identity, she suggests to incorporate the dimensions of “*time, space and relationality*” (italics in original) into the research of identity (Somers, 1994). The “narrative identity and relational setting” allows to re-conceptualize agency towards its social embeddedness and constitution through the environment. Social identities are constructed within time, social space, narrativity. Somers argues that incorporating narrative accounts to the study of identity allows social scientists to account for deviations in social action. She further warns that categories for studying identity often predict inadequately the causal power of identity, by

explaining that people with similar or the same attributes of social identity will not move to commensurate similar action. Their action rather depends on the relational setting or narrative identity (Somers, 1994).

### National Interest or State Identity?

Rationalist theories, including realism and liberalism, treat identities as exogenous, determined by structure and outside of the agents, rather than endogenous. Interests are predetermined and do not depend on the particular situation or interaction of the actors. In realist thought, the security dilemma and absence of a supranational polity in the international system creates an environment of anarchy, in which states act based on their own self-interest to secure survival (Herz, 1951). National interest of states is derived by the self-help and anarchic nature of the international system. Fundamental national interest lies in the protection of “physical, political, and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations”. Sovereign nations are in competition for power and their national interest is thus defined by a minimum of survival (Morgenthau, 1952, p. 972).

The national interest is thus defined by the international system, particularly by the distribution of capabilities and power among the great powers. The national interest is assessed objectively through state officials who interpret the distribution of power (Waltz, 1979). Realists maintain an empiricist notion of the national interest that allows state officials and policymakers to objectively weigh the distribution of power among the great powers to inform state action. In the realist view, state action and interest can be studied by identifying rational alternatives to state action and assessing the likelihood of choosing one policy option over another, which in

turn must be tested against the actual facts. The policymakers' statements are viewed as a direct reflection of the character of the state (Morgenthau, 1952).

Realists view state action in an unproblematic light. The distribution of power can be objectively assessed, which allows an objective understanding of reality and state action in response to the distribution of power. This can further be related to the belief in an objective independent reality that rationalists maintain. State interests are based on material calculations and identities are not malleable or do not change over time. Mearsheimer, for instance, argues against the liberal notion that institutions shape behavior by averring that "institutions have minimal influence on state behavior" (Mearsheimer, 1994, p. 7). This notion of state interest relies on an empiricist notion and the ability to observe national interest and the distribution of power objectively rather than through a process of interpretation.

The conception of the national interest is too all encompassing in realist accounts to explain state action adequately. It falls short of understanding the precise content of national interest or state action, and rather purports general claims about what states should do in the international environment defined by anarchy and self-help. Sondermann explains that the concept of the national interest, despite its lack of clarity will persist to serve decision makers in justifying policies and structuring situations and making decisions in the first place. For the citizen, in turn, a diversified conceptualization of the national interest can help judge policies more adequately (Sondermann, 1977).

Tucker holds that "the realist position deals with the perennial conditions that attend the conduct of statecraft, not with the specific conditions that confront the statesman" (Tucker, 1961, p. 197). Realism thus does not provide a set of tools for the statesman to select policy, but it rather limits the policy options available to the policymakers. "Good policy" is defined as policy

that seeks to “enhance or preserve the security of the state”. Realists view the state as a “unified, purposive, utility-maximizing actor” (Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 87-92). Identity and interests of the state are determined a priori, before the state enters interaction with others states. In realist theorizing, the state represents a core assumption and point of departure of analysis.

Kratochwil concedes that the concept of the national interest remains salient despite its “fuzzy” nature (Kratochwil, 1982). According to Kratochwil, the national interest cannot be assessed through the underlying phenomena defining states, such as the international system, (descriptive function) but rather national interest must be understood in terms of the justification and evaluation of action and interest in specific circumstances. The former function of national interest, descriptive, produces “unchanging” ground that determines general guidelines for action and interest, while the latter function of national interest, normative, allows a “field-independent” understanding of state action (Kratochwil, 1982, p. 3). Kratochwil’s interlinkage between state action and public opinion situates his analysis in language philosophy rather than along positivistic accounts of understanding state action.

The traditional realist account cannot help understanding adoption of certain state policies over others, but it only provides a post factum interpretation of state action in terms of security and self-help without analyzing the specific circumstances of policymaking.

Morgenthau’s understanding of national interest, whilst implying that “interest is defined as power” and “universally valid” for all states, also concedes that political action in a particular period and environment depends on the political and cultural context that determines policy formulation. This suggests that the concept of national interest can be applied to concrete situations and environments in which policy is formulated.

Wendt's criticism of realism allows a reformulation of national interest as mentioned by Morgenthau above. State interest is thus not determined by the anarchic nature of the international system, state interest depends rather on the "intersubjective understandings and expectations of self and other". A state can have multiple "relational" identities that in turn provide the "basis of interests" (Wendt, 1992, p. 398). "A fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them." (Wendt, 1992, p. 396).

Wendt argues that the national interest depends on the variety of interests that the state adopts contingent on cultural and historical realities. State identities and interests are socially constructed through the interaction with the international system. While Wendt concedes that the existence of pre-social interests runs contrary to his overall argument of construction of interests, he ascribes certain "objective" interests that states pursue in addition to the subjective interests that arise from interaction. These objective interests include physical survival, autonomy, economic well-being and collective self-esteem (Wendt, 1999, pp. 235-236)<sup>3</sup>.

Wendt emphasizes the salience of the creation of meaning and interpretation of these objectively pre-defined interests, but ignores an important feature of the state-society complex that could be defined as the negotiation of legitimacy that cannot be related to objective state interests as defined by Wendt. The state-society complex is inherently defined by the problem of legitimacy, but cannot be explained adequately by the objective interests presented by Wendt. In his analysis, state interests are constituted in relation to the international system. While Wendt's

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<sup>3</sup> Physical survival is defined as the "survival of the state-society complex", where the meaning of survival can vary historically and socially. Autonomy is characterized by the control over resources, while economic well being is views as the "maintenance of the state's resources, and collective self-esteem refers to the group's desire to feel positive about itself with regard to potential others in the international system. This can be most closely related to a positive collective memory or narrative. All these objective interests are more precisely defined and interpreted through structure and interaction.

account is an adequate starting point for the critique of realism, Wendt's analysis is limited in its consideration of domestic factors in influencing foreign policy. He considers states as unitary actors, albeit different from the unitary actors in rationalist accounts.

Wendt suggests that the constitution of states as "people of the international society" is neglected in the theories of the state (Wendt, 1999, p. 195). Not only do academics anthropomorphize the state, but also citizens and policymakers alike ascribe human-like attributes to the state. But Wendt succeeds in establishing the prevalence of the state as a "real actor" in the analysis of international relations by giving the state a "body" against the claim that states can be reduced to individual parts, and "life" to identify national interests and state identities (Wendt, 1999, p. 197). Adler similarly seeks to establish constructivism as the middle ground between rationalist and interpretivist approaches to international relations. He claims that collective understandings of the world shape the material world, where the material world does not disappear but is contingent upon the ideas and meanings ascribed to it (Adler, 1997).

Identities precede interest in the study of international relations. States derive interests according to their identity, their narrative of a self against an other, historical experiences with the specified "other". Interests are derived from state identities and social context, rather than being readily available to be deployed (*Reus-Smit 22*). Similarly, Finnemore suggests that "Interests are not just out there waiting to be discovered, they are constructed through social interaction" (Finnemore, 1996, p. 2).

Thus the international environment of anarchy does not determine state interests, but rather foreign policy is derived from a state's identity. Foreign policy represents the states' self-understanding and moral values on the global stage and is a boundary producing political performance. \_In his analysis of Russian identity through a constructivist account, Ted Hopf

contrasts interest and identities by ascribing material value to the former and “social cognitive” to the latter. An interest therefore, an immediate material interest, can best be understood through the social context and practice. The identity is defined against an “Other” (Hopf, 2002).

Devetak and True demonstrate that foreign policies are not merely defined by national collective identities, but rather by the state’s self-perception and social state identity (Devetak & True, 2006). The Australian state does not view international institutions as constitutive of its own identity and reflects a lesser commitment to international norms through its foreign policy, while New Zealand defines itself in terms of international norms and rules and constitutes its identity against the international environment, which is reflected in the New Zealand’s cooperative foreign policy with regard to international norms (Devetak & True, 2006). The authors conclude that self-perception of states are more determinant of state action and foreign policy than the “use of power” and traditional security and power interests.

Like other social groups, states can be understood to have an “external and internal” dimension to their identity (Katzenstein, 1997). Katzenstein describes the state identity as primarily external, while he notes that the national identity is internal. (State identities are internalized through governance systems)

Banchoff notes that the content of state identity can be analyzed through legal norms that are reflective of the state’s situation of itself within its environment, its relational narrative towards the international system (T Banchoff, 1999). Public opinion about a country’s international role can further serve the same goal. Banchoff concedes that research on content of state identity adequately requires eclectic analysis. Kassianavo describes state identity and foreign policy as co-constitutive, where identity can be studied as a “variable” influencing foreign policy and foreign policy produces identity in turn (Kassianova, 2001). Foreign policy

further serves as a “process of self-definition” and as the principal mechanism of self-identification of the state producing boundaries of we-ness and otherness. Kassianova further explicates that on a political level, this can lead to the creation of an external threat through the other. In Russia, the author explains, the other has always been the West (Kassianova, 2001). In Germany, the other has altered between the East and West throughout history due to its geographic location on continental Europe and its “nightmare of coalitions” that has historically been used to describe German foreign policy.

Increasingly scholars have tried to fill the empirical gap in the literature concerning national interest and state identity. Keohane et al adopt an institutionalist approach in interpreting the influence of the institutional environment in the wake of the Cold War on strategic calculations of actors on the world stage (Keohane, et al., 1993).

Finnemore defends a systemic view of state identity, state identity cannot be explained solely through domestic politics, but international norms define and values of “good and bad”. This normative international context influences decision makers in policymaking and shapes state identities. Norms are subject to change and can produce a transformation in state identities. “States are socialized new norms, values and perceptions of interest by international organizations” (Finnemore, 1996, p. 5). Overemphasizing the role of international organizations, or the international system in general, Finnemore suggests moving away from the state as the point of departure in analysis and conduct of political science. While Finnemore denotes her work as “constructivist”, it is debatable to what extent her systemic account of the international system and state interests can be regarded as constructivist.

Koslowski and Kratochwil provide an empirical account of the relationship between state identity and material changes. The authors discover that there was a transformation in the



political practices deligitimizing the Eastern European communism before the changes in the material world occurred, namely the fall of the Soviet Empire (Koslowski & Kratochwil, 1994).

Katzenstein's volume suggests a sociological view of national security that allows social structures to be causally determinant and that structures may affect state interests and identities (Katzenstein, 1996). Katzenstein et al propose that national security can be understood in the security environments in which states are embedded that are not just defined by material realities, but rather an institutional and cultural environment (Katzenstein, 1996). The authors challenge the conventional conception of national security and aver that state interests do not exist independently, but "are constructed through a process of interaction" (Katzenstein, 1996, p. 2).

Community exists at the international level, security and community leads states to redefine view of power and security as put forth by realist scholars (Adler & Barnett, 1998). Members of a security community have "shared identities, values and meanings" (Adler & Barnett, 1998, p. 31). Banchoff makes an argument for a constructivist account of German foreign policy in the wake of the Cold War. He explains that realist and liberal theories fall short of interpreting the continuity in German foreign policy amid the transformation of the international system. Neorealist theories that hold that state decisions and interests are formed by the distribution of power in the international system do not hold water in the case of German foreign policy that did not regroup as a consequence of the newly formed distribution of power (T Banchoff, 1999).

Weldes argues against the realist conception of "national interest", while acknowledging the importance of the concept in understanding state action and the international system. She further suggests that the national interest can serve as a basis for state action, legitimacy and

support for state action. She proposes an understanding of national interest in terms of its “social construction”, where the content of national interest is produced through shared meaning that helps state officials interpret the situation of the state within domestically and internationally (Weldes, 1996). Weldes criticizes the realist accounts that place emphasis on security and power as the sole purposes of national interest for ignoring the “centrality of processes of interpretation” (Weldes, 1996, p. 6).

She suggests a “Security Imaginary” (Weldes, 1996, p. 10), as “a structure of well-established meanings and social relations out of which representations of the world of international relations are created”. National interests emerge out of these representations (that are constructed through security imaginary (Weldes, 1996).

#### The Concept of State Identity, Legitimation and Language:

Against systemic approaches that state action and interest is mainly determined by the international system, by international organizations and norms in liberal theories and by anarchy and the self-help system in realist accounts; this paper is situated within the constructivist literature that understands state interests as products of interaction.

The literature on the state and state interest/identity ascribes agency to the state. The state can act and interact with actors including societal groups, international organization and nation-states to shape reality. States engage in persuasion to shape the actors’ identities and ‘win the actors over’. Similar to the realist game of power politics, state rhetoric used for persuasion represents a game of *linguistic power politics*<sup>4</sup> (Weldes, 1996).

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<sup>4</sup> Jutta Weldes, explained below.

The Weberian state is distinguished through two key aspects: monopoly over the use of power over a given territory and state legitimacy expressed through four different types of legitimacy. Thus in understanding the content of state identity, we necessarily need to account for the basic characteristics of the state as laid out in Weberian philosophy. Legitimacy as constituted between state and the people cannot be viewed as a fixed state interest, but rather should be understood as part of state identity, such as foreign policy, that the state employs to assert its self-identification. Like foreign policy can be viewed to be co-constituted in the international environment, legitimacy is created through a ‘dialogue’ between the state and the people. Jackson lays out that legitimacy, or rather the process of legitimation, occurs through intersubjective negotiations between individuals and the state that employs rhetoric as a “boundary” creating mechanism. While the cultural context does play a role in defining legitimacy, language is not targeted to a collective audience (Jackson, 2006).

The state uses language to enhance its legitimacy towards the people and internationally. Both internal and external legitimacy can thus play a role in defining state behavior. Legitimacy is adjusted in light of new foreign policy that defines state identity and must be reinterpreted by the people. Consequently, legitimacy is not fixed once it is established, but must be renewed and recreated. (Interpreting state rhetoric can consequently reflect on the state legitimacy enterprise.) Jackson and other scholars suggest to analyze the patterns of rhetorical “deployment” that are an essential part of the legitimation enterprise (Jackson, 2006).

This analysis will draw from public discourse of political circles, namely the leading and opposition parties during Adenauer’s Westpolitik and Brandt’s Ostpolitik as well as the domestic and international discourse to make sense of potential shifts in the German state identity that have led to a reorientation in German foreign policy goals. Furthermore, it will be necessary to

understand the relational aspect of state identity through Germany's historical relations with some of its neighbors and the "allied powers". The analysis of political rhetoric and the legitimization process of the German state will help reflecting on the greater reconciliation process within Germany. Germany reconciles with its Eastern neighbors by initiating the Ostpolitik. Seeking reconciliation, Germany attempted to enhance its external legitimacy as a state with a growing identity of an independent European power. Germany has relied rhetorically on the reconciliation that has confronted Germany internally in the 1960s.

While reconciliation is of a collective nature, it can be viewed as a foreign policy orientation, and is thus intricately linked to legitimacy and subject to the process of legitimation. Ann Phillips argues that reconciliation has often referred to domestic matters "from family quarrels to ethnic conflicts", it has however, not experienced a comparable rise in external reconciliation between states (Phillips, 1998). Phillips defines reconciliation as "restoring friendship, harmony or communion". She further argues that reconciliation of states presupposes a traumatic experience that creates mistrust and hatred between two peoples and that reconciliation is a process negotiated on the societal level. While reconciliation is difficult to be shaped by a powerful party, relative power and importance can affect the reconciliation process, as evident in the Franco-German reconciliation after 1945 as opposed to the absence of a Dutch-German reconciliation. Phillips contrasts reconciliation on the societal and state level found in Germany after the World War with the absence of responsibility in Japan. German reconciliation can be viewed in light of practical considerations and opportunities of the post-World War II situation.

Feldman similarly points at the fusion of "moral imperative" with "pragmatic interest" that can advance reconciliation as an alternative to long-term war (Feldman, 1999). The

particular mixture of pragmatism and morality will depend on history and institutions. Feldman further maintains that international reconciliation between states can be ascribed to the role of history, institutions, leadership and international context <sup>5</sup>. Through reconciliation, Germany was able to seek “power” and redefine power through “political responsibility” (Katzenstein, 1996) in an international context that provided a framework for reconciliation and led by leaders who found broad public support in their foreign policy orientations, both under Adenauer’s *Westbindung* and Brandt’s *Ostpolitik*.

The concept of external reconciliation consequently relates to the question of German state identity, as it played a major role in redefining state identity in the immediate post-War environment, but also throughout German history up until the 1970s during Brandt’s outreach to the East and German reunification in 1990. Events and foreign policy orientations in Germany cannot be separated from the idea of reconciliation, as Germany has often relied on this notion to reassess its policy options and legitimize its state policy. Thus reconciliation is not only a tool of legitimation, but also much like security, it is a concept that can influence foreign policy making and state identity reconfiguration.

Banchoff suggests undertaking four analytical steps in interpreting state identity. Policy context should be defined due to possible multiple identities a state can have and evidence selected that illuminates state identity. Banchoff notes that officials can express state identity through different means, including speeches, press conferences, debates in the national legislatures (Banchoff, 1999).

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<sup>5</sup> History refers to the availability of a “living past” and the recognition of past wrongs, while institutions constitute of international institutions including war tribunals or the effect of international institutions on creating new frameworks that help individuals and societies define themselves. Leadership is viewed as a necessity to gain public support that reconciliation will be contingent upon. The international context should provide a framework locking in the parties to work toward reconciliation and preventing them from avoidance of an issue that is to be reconciled.

States can have multiple identities at any point in time, but legitimacy and the process of legitimation remains a consistent goal of states regardless of the state's policy. Banchoff suggests to analyze state identity based on a descriptive dimension and narrative dimension. The former refers to conceptions of who we are, foes and friends, while the latter relates descriptive identity to roots and sources, history, collective memory etc (T Banchoff, 1999). Banchoff's characterization of state identity is incomplete at best, as it only reflects on the collective character of the state, but ignores the inherent characteristic of the "state- society complex" (Wendt), namely the search for legitimacy. Instead the content of state identity should be illuminated by analyzing the state's systematic attempts link policy goals to broader goals appealing to the collective or individual minds of the society. This process of linking is related to the process of legitimacy creation of legitimation.

Studying the process of legitimation helps us eschew the problem of a self-fulfilling prophecy that occurs in studies that view identity as both a causal factor and an end result (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000). Identity cannot be viewed as a fixed quantity or continuum, but must rather be studied in its process of construction with the environment.

Furthermore, identity cannot be understood as a given to shed light on the German case, rather identity is negotiated and constructed through foreign policy making. While the German state makes use of an a priori identity that has been constructed through narration and rhetoric in the past, it may challenge or reassert its already existing identities. As states may have distinct foreign policy goals at the same time, states can have multiple identities simultaneously. Assessing the potential identities constructed prior to Brandt's Ostpolitik can allow for a more accurate understanding of the revision or reassertion of old and new identities.

In an attempt to show that the constructivist account of German foreign policy orientation is superior, this paper will survey some of the rationalist explanations of German foreign policy under Brandt and the Social Democrats.

The German case of persuading the international community and German society of a new orientation in foreign policy through the Ostpolitik presents an opportunity to assess the validity of this claim brought forth by scholars including Weldes, Risse, Jackson etc. Furthermore this paper will shed light on legitimacy as a major identity constituting factor for the state. Contrary to the belief that the international environment shaped the change in German foreign policy, this paper advances the viewpoint that the German foreign policy formulation was the result of a multifaceted set of sources and the process of constitution of identity.

The realist account of foreign policy emphasized the pursuit of power and the national interest. While Banchoff suggests moving away from the concept of power and interest and focus on institutional aspects of foreign policy making, Katzenstein suggests reinterpreting power as a concept in Germany and European politics (TF Banchoff, 1999; Katzenstein, 1997). Katzenstein contends that Germany replaced the concept of power with “political responsibility” and a heightened multilateralism through institutions (Katzenstein, 1997). He further avers that the reformulation of German power has been sustained through practice and emphasized soft power. Katzenstein further suggests that by looking at the institutionalization of power through EU institutions, the redefinition of power relations can be understood more adequately.

Foreign policy is defined through security and power relations in the international system. In the West German context, realist understanding of state interests translates into the Germanization of Europe that reflects the German attempt to gradually seek power maximization through the tools of European integration. Liberals factor in historical processes of change and

domestic politics, while realism completely disregards state or social interests formed against a historical development. Realism views historical change as static, while liberalism attempts to introduce a more dynamic understanding of change. However, they disregard the reinterpretation of power and security through states and European institutions in the wake of European integration (Katzenstein, 1997).

Katzenstein argues that the concepts of political power and national interest have not become obsolete in light of heightened institutionalization, but they have rather been reinterpreted. Understanding the processes of reinterpretation can help shedding light on foreign policy formulation that rationalist accounts, including realism and liberalism, fall short of explaining. How has Ostpolitik taken place in the absence of a drastic change in the international system? How has Germany accomplished to integrate the notions of being both a loyal Western ally and a friendly neighbor with Eastern countries in the presence of Cold War tensions?

Rationalist accounts of national interest predict that foreign policy changes as a result of a transformation of the international structure or environment that causes domestic change. Ostpolitik can similarly be explained, in rationalist terms, through the changing attitudes of the United States toward the Soviet Union and a policy of *détente*. This paper contends that the international environment does not cause a shift in foreign policy, but can provide a framework of renegotiation of state identity. Reconciliation is a concept that has both domestic and international causes and factors and reflects the necessity to assess state identity through a multi-causal understanding. German Ostpolitik can thus be regarded as a counterargument to rationalist accounts of foreign policy analysis that rely on the shifts in the international context to understand the national interest. This paper contends that history, leadership and domestic factors do play a role in the formulation of foreign policy and shaping of state identity.



First, this paper will attempt to reconstruct the understanding created by the German state of its national interest and conception of power in immediate post-WWII situation. This will allow for a better understanding of the shift in identity towards a reinterpretation of the German “Mittelweg” (Sonderweg) through Brandt’s Ostpolitik.

State identity is necessarily linked to legitimacy, as the state is defined by its relationship to a society. As suggested by Jackson above, rather than studying legitimacy and seeking for state actions that denote legitimate or illegitimate actions, legitimacy should become an empirical question (2006). Studying the process of ‘legitimation’ rather than legitimacy itself. “Rhetorical commonplaces” allow demarking boundaries of action and are linked to policy issues and shape state action. Studying “patterns of deployment” can allow for an interpretation of state identity formation and legitimation attempts of state action. Rather than relying on a collective historical foundation that state action is based upon, state action and legitimation should be understood *intersubjectively*<sup>6</sup> (Jackson, 2006). State identity can be viewed both as an input and output, an independent and dependent variable. States shape public discourse through the choice of rhetorical deployments, which in turn define the states themselves. State identities are thus negotiated through the process of legitimation and language.

### Language

Edelman observes that “...it is language about political events rather than the events themselves that everyone experiences” (Edelman, 1977, p. 142). For Edelman “political language *is* political reality” (Edelman, 1985) (*italics in original*). As language is ambiguous, the social situation of individuals usually defines meaning of political language and thus political

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<sup>6</sup> Intersubjectivity is a crucial part of the constructivist agenda that emphasizes negotiations of meanings. Rather than appealing to a collective audience, interpretation and negotiation happens on an individual basis, where collective meanings continue to play a role.

reality. There is no objective reality that can be assessed but rather the beliefs that evoke certain meanings are crucial in understanding political reality (Edelman, 1985). A “common code” that defines the interpretive ability of the community within a given social context is further determinant of the interpretation of political reality (Clark & Dear, 1984, p. 88). Clark and Dear distinguish between distinct structural characteristics of political language that will vary with the speech setting and purpose of speakers <sup>7</sup>. The authors structure the use of vocabulary and syntax according to specific contexts. Keywords and symbols, for instance, evoke a larger structure of beliefs among listeners. Among these are political slogans or labeling of political positions and ideologies, including Communist party language, such as “iron heel” (Clark & Dear, 1984).

In his discussion of the “nonfoundationalist” turn, an expression Debrix uses to denote constructivist and poststructuralism, language is the product of interaction with the world. According to Debrix the challenge posed by these scholars, including Nof, Der Derian, Shapiro and others, relies on reinterpreting the meaning of language to undermine positivism of rationalist theories (Debrix, 2003).

Shotter maintains that shared understanding does not occur naturally, but through a process of negotiation between participants over time. Furthermore social relationships are created through the conversations. Shotter suggests to move away from the interpretation of meanings of objects to an understanding of conversations that shape social relationships through “rhetorical-responsive” methods (Shotter, 1993). Rhetoric refers to the use of metaphors that attempts to help the audience make connections to larger themes and between the speaker’s use of “utterances”, while responsive refers to the conversational aspect of the language relationships

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<sup>7</sup> Clark and Dear illustrate the definition of linguistic style by the setting first, register (formal, public, private etc.) second, sub-register (legal, bargaining etc.) third, and linguistic rules, such as vocabulary and syntax (rhetoric, jargon, metaphor, keywords, symbols, ambiguity)(Clark & Dear, 1984, p. 89) .

between individuals and groups (Shotter, 1993, p. 6). Shotter relates conversations to actions by illustrating that

“they [managers, could be replaced with state official] cannot be authors of fictions, which bear no relations to what the unchosen conditions they face will ‘permit’ or ‘afford’/ Their authoring must be justified or justifiable, and for that to be possible, it must be ‘grounded’ or ‘rooted’ in some way in circumstances others share” (Shotter, 1993, p. 149).

The author argues that the formative power of language, defined as the ability of an “author” to lend a linguistic formulation and meaning to a specific situation through the use of metaphors and “shared circumstances”. Shotter further maintains that individuals should have agency and personhood in interacting with their environment and denoting boundaries of interaction and language. Boundaries are continually reproduced and agents show how they are currently placed or positioned in relation to other agents. A sense of belonging to a certain community can assist in fostering the reproduction and development of one’s own position. To what extent can Shotter’s conceptions of language and human interaction be applied to state representatives producing and reproducing boundaries, which define actions, and positioning with regard to others? Shotter alludes to the necessity of the achieving freedom to act and interact and produce a certain social order. This could be related to the state’s attempt to seek legitimation and thereby freedom as an agent to act, interact and produce boundaries of action. Similarly, “times of social crisis”, when in Shotter’s account public life becomes contentious, a state needs to redefine its relationship to other agents, individuals, groups, and outside agents.

Poststructuralism views language as constitutive of social and political reality. Policy and identity are co-constituted through the use of language. Discourse is not equivalent to ideas, but incorporates material and ideational factors (Hansen, 2006). As language and rhetoric are constructed against a history and understanding of identity and relationship to others, texts are similarly constructed against the backdrop of other textual material (Hansen, 2006). This becomes particularly important in the analysis of newspapers that will be part of the analysis of German state identity and Ostpolitik policies. While this paper will mostly rely on state officials' statements in Parliament and in public, news sources will allow to interpret domestic and international responses against which German state identity is formed.

As Shotter suggested, understanding the conversational effects of language will help shedding light on the identity formation process. Hansen mentions potential intertextual references including "catchphrases", "implicit and explicit references" to texts (Hansen, 2006, p. 57). For the purpose of this paper, explicit references such as building upon other authors and scholars will be of little importance. Catchphrases, such as Huntington's clash of civilizations, on the other hand, will play an important role in understanding identity constitution. This paper will analyze the "wider foreign policy debate" through the analysis of political texts, including parliamentary debates, speeches and statements, as well as media texts with the goal of interpreting transformation of discourse and identity (Hansen, 2006, p. 64).

In his analysis of the Swedish involvement in the Thirty Years War in Europe, Ringmar describes a "narrative theory of action" (Ringmar, 2008, p. 66). Against the essentialist account of language that views categories of language as natural, Ringmar adopts a nominalist view of language that understand language in terms of the labels that are given to objects, which in turn depend on custom and usage. A metaphor for instance can be defined as applying an old label in

a new way. Ringmar holds further that “experiences and memories that people share are facts about a society” (Ringmar, 2008, p. 71). The collection of these meanings then makes up the culture of a people or social group. Ringmar establishes the connection between interest and action by pointing out “a good story activates the interests that we have and makes them come alive” (Ringmar, 2008, p. 74).

Ringmar holds that “all questions regarding *being* are really questions regarding *being as*” (Ringmar, 2008, p. 75) *Italics added*. Meaning is created against an audience. Interests are different from identities, Ringmar claims, as they are steadier than interests and are only under attack during “formative moments” when new potential ideas and identities compete for recognition and inclusion in social practices (Ringmar, 2008, p. 85). Formative moments are defined by a fight and contest over meanings through rhetoric and propaganda. Powerholders will attempt to reaffirm or reinterpret their meanings while alternative contestants will challenge the established meanings. Along with new meanings, new identities can be formed and established during formative moments.

Bially Mattern argues that states are part of the inter-subjective process of identity creation. Identity as a by-product of the interactions and social learning (conventional account) or post positivist regard “identity as an agent-driven process made possible through the power of actor’s words (Mattern, 2005, p. 90). Analyzing the relationship between the United States and Great Britain during the Suez Crisis, Mattern suggests that during “unsettled times or times of disorder” (Mattern, 2005, p. 52), the present international identity is under attack and is subject to renegotiation.

In the constructivist account, identity should disappear during unsettled times, or disorder, because state identities cannot exist without the foundation of inter-subjective relations

that are interrupted. In contrast, post-constructivists maintain that identities can be produced or reproduced during unsettled times intra-subjectively, by forcing shared meaning upon victims, rather than inter-subjectively through interaction and negotiation.

While constructivism is based on shared meanings and the interaction of actors against the existence of shared truths, the post-constructivist approach views “identity as a fundamentally formed and maintained through *language*” (Mattern, 2005, p. 92) (italics in original). Language is thus a practice used to form and shape “reality”. Mattern contends that the world becomes real through communication about it. “Actors produce language and language produces reality” (Mattern, 2005, p. 92).

The author claims that representations of knowledge through persuasive or manipulative language power can be effective during settled times to shape sharedness, but during unsettled times, (when the self-other knowledge is contested) representational force, defined as a form of linguistically wielded power, is the only form that will render results in creating social reality.

Representational force is similar in effect to coercive power in producing a credible threat. Unlike physical power, representational force threatens victims’ “subjectivity”, the sense of Self created in relation to the outside world and through particular configurations of identity. The “linguistic guns” that are pointed at the Self through representational force exploit the incongruities within the subjectivity of the Self, namely conflicting multiple identities within the Self. The effect of representational force on international identity or order is not defined by a power-free process of interaction as found in constructivism, but it is rather an international identity forced upon states by another state (Mattern, 2005, pp. 95-102).

Both a historical tracing of identity over the time period between 1949, defined as the end of the World War II and the beginning of a new Germany embedded in a European Community

and 1974 when Willy Brandt, the father of Ostpolitik, left office. Limiting the scope of the analysis on this era will further provide an opportunity to understand the gradual shift in policy and identity. While Ostpolitik continued after Brandt's presidency, ultimately leading up to German unification under Helmut Kohl in 1989, Brandt's early Ostpolitik can most clearly allude to the change in rhetoric and state identity breaking with the past that solely emphasized Western integration and did not view Eastern rapprochement as compatible with German Western commitment. Focusing on the shifts in discourse and international environment leading up to the inception of Brandt's Ostpolitik will thus allow an investigation of potential influences on state policy. On the other hand specific events can help understanding the particular effect on identity by studying how symbolic acts can shift public perception and state identity.

#### German State Identity:

While Mattern's analysis focuses on international identity, it has important implications for the conceptualization of state identity. A formative moment in German history has clearly been the post-WWII situation that has often been referred to as a new beginning ("Stunde Null") in German history. This formative moment has not only led to a complete halt with the German Nazi past, but also to a reinterpretation of Germanness. The "linguistic gun" that was directed towards Germany has often been in the disguise of the loyalty to the Western alliance or "Western civilization" (Jackson, 2006) and others. Jaraush describes the reorientation after 1945 towards the West as a "long term process of transnational acculturation" (Jarausch, 2006, p. 104). Jaraush further suggests that the "West" is a myth and a problematic actor with regard to German reconstruction. Adenauer, the first chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, declares in a speech in 1949, that "We do not have any doubts that we belong to the West-

European world (according to our origin and orientation)” (Jarausch, 2006). He further alludes to the German desire to build a European Union to encourage strong relations between the West European countries and particularly between Germany and France. Adenauer concludes his speech by thanking the United States for its assistance to reconstructing Germany and the fact that the German people will always remember the American help to German reconstruction, which can be interpreted as a clear orientation to the West and the United States<sup>8</sup>.

Not all Germans became loyal Westerners, a small portion of the working class circles in West Germany oriented themselves toward the Soviet model and the East (Jarausch, 2006). Jarausch illustrates the effects of the European Recovery Program and the Marshall Plan that helped convincing people of the legitimacy of American efforts in Germany, while the growing gap between Soviet propaganda and East German reality undermined Soviet efforts. Adenauer successfully convinced the German populace of the beneficial and benevolent nature of the U.S.-German cooperation and Western loyalty.

The anti-Communist sentiment that became prevalent among the political elite in West Germany supported a defensive attitude toward the East while bringing Germany closer to the Western alliance (Jarausch, 2006). As the Cold War neared, the FDR found itself forced to make a decision between the mutually exclusive camps, “the free world” on the one hand and “the socialist camp” on the other. The Western alternative assumed greater significance for the FDR in the long run. Jarausch illustrates that the West has not been unproblematic standard in the post war situation. Its negative connotations such as imperialism or exploitation through capitalism were not adopted, but rather Germany sought “normative Westernization” that eliminated the historical baggage associated with the “West” in the German context (Jarausch, 2006, p. 128).

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<sup>8</sup> Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages. 1. Wahlperiode. Stenographische Berichte, 5. Sitzung vom 20.9.1949.



German state identity can be understood as the result of an international context that forced Germany to renegotiate its understanding of power and security. The Western integration provided a formidable platform for the redefinition of German state identity. While the international structure played a significant role in defining German foreign policy, particularly due to the German submissiveness in the wake of the WWII, the international environment assisted Germany to identify friends and foes while situating itself according to its conviction. The rise of multiple identities in Germany during the several decades after the World War present an opportunity to understand the reframing of German state identity and its legitimation. Legitimation of state policy and particularly foreign policy helps shedding light on the process of adopting novel policy orientations and identities within the state, while accounting for the transformation of German society along the change in foreign policy.

#### German Foreign Policy and Ostpolitik:

It is necessary to understand the international environment of German foreign policy making after World War II to interpret German state identity. Most of the countries in Europe and the United States shared the experience of the World War II that shaped post-war relations in Europe and around the world that created an environment of mistrust vis-à-vis Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany was born out of an agreement between the three Western allied powers and became necessarily a Western Atlantic ally against the Eastern bloc that was starting to build itself in the Eastern part of Germany. The Federal Republic regained its sovereignty as a member of NATO and the Eastern community that was signaled by the Deutschlandvertrag in 1952 that came in effect in 1955 and ended Germany's status as occupied power.

While the goal of reunification remained the ultimate goal of the Adenauer administration, the German integration with the Western powers marked the first years of German foreign policy. Particularly, a close Franco-German relationship defined this new German approach, while Germany's dependence on the United States was perpetuated by the military and security reliance on the Atlantic partnership.

Germany became an indispensable geostrategic advantage to the United States that kept troops stationed in West Berlin and all over West Germany building a secure Western front against the rising power and influence of the Soviet Union in the region and heightening of the Cold War. When the German Democratic Republic was proclaimed in 1949, division was gradually consolidated, while the Germans still held out for German –wide elections that might allow immediate reunification, which became clear in the continued international claim to represent all Germans (Alleinvertretungsanspruch). The United States remained the last authority in deciding over reunification matters. This path, however, was abandoned in the late 1960s when the practical reality of German division and U.S. apathy toward the issue allowed the Federal Republic to decide over matters related to reunification.

The international environment shaped post-WWII Germany extensively, while Germany's situation and location reflected on Cold War dynamics. The heightening of the Cold War symbolized by the Korean War in 1950 brought prominence to the policy issue of rearmament in Europe. The issue of rearmament confronted increased opposition from East and West, as the memories and fears of the recent World War seemed realistic. The integration of the Federal Republic into the Western –Atlantic security alliance through membership in the NATO settled the security issue in Germany at least for the next decades or so.

The divergence of interests and ideas about the German future allowed two separate states to flourish on the West and East with the Four Power regimes established in the wake of WWII.

### I The Cold War and Western integration (1949-1967)

In an attempt to understand the historical development of the discourse in the immediate post-WWII era in Germany, reflecting on Konrad Adenauer's understanding of a post World War II European order and German involvement in the newly found order is instructive, as he has often been characterized as a strong Chancellor who has adopted both the role of Chancellor and Foreign Minister in the first years of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Adenauer's idea of "Westbindung" (tying to the West) started through a Franco-German rapprochement and has led to early attempts of founding the European Community with the European Coal and Steel Agreement (Rome Treaty) in 1957 and establishing the foundation for today's European Union. The Schuman Plan that aimed at instituting the creation of the European Coal and Steel Agreement was met with resistance, while Adenauer continuously emphasized the salience of a Franco-German friendship alliance. The Schuman plan reflects the first step towards the establishment of a supranational union of West Germany with France and the European neighborhood.

Adenauer aimed to break with the past that was dominated by the Hitler regime and international fear of the resurgence of German nationalism by mitigating doubts about German power and hegemony in the immediate region. Adenauer's party, the Christian Democrats, turned Germany westward and committed the German state that compromised the former

occupied territories by the French, British and American to an 'Atlantic-Western security and political alliance'.

Adenauer opposed the idea that a Gesamtdeutschland (unified Germany) could build a neutral bridge between East and West, facilitating understanding and cooperation; he rather viewed Germany's geopolitical location as a "power vacuum inviting Soviet hegemony" (Clemens 26). The Christian Democratic Union between the CDU and the CSU viewed reunification and self-determination as compatible emphasizing the need for German-wide (all-German) elections that would prove the will of the German people and express their desire to be reunified. The ultimate goals of the Union in the 1950s and 1960s remained Westpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik under the premise of German reunification.

Adenauer believed that the twin goals of German foreign policy should go hand in hand and a reunified Germany could only be tolerable under European auspices. This served to undermine fears that could arise as a response to a unified and strong all-German state. The underlying belief that reunification would only be made possible through a strong Western European framework contributed to the integration of the twin goals by Adenauer and his political followers. A shift in the European balance of powers toward the West would undermine independent control of East Germany by the Soviet Union.

The Soviet position with regard to German reunification would never allow democratic unification of the two states. Making Soviet influence over East Germany practically ineffective could in turn aid German reunification attempts. This was an example of the "policy of strength" that the German government exercised under Adenauer's rule. It is also interesting to note that West German policymakers were expecting a Soviet retreat and East-West détente due to the

shifting balance of power in Europe that would lead the Soviet Union towards negotiation, rather than confrontation with the West.

This policy of strength therefore involved a strong front in Europe and the unwillingness to negotiate with the East without reunification being the primary issue. Reunification was therefore never an explicit goal for Adenauer, it was the ultimate goal to be achieved through Western integration and intimidation of the Soviet Union. The “holding policy” (Griffith, 1978) explains the ambiguity of German policy stance with regard to Eastern border beyond the Oder-Neisse line that remained contested up until the 1970s. Clemens points out that maintaining German reunification on the agenda might signal the resistance of Germany to giving up their right to Eastern Germany thereby preventing the solidification of the division. The Adenauer position and practice of policy goals transformed as a result of external factors.

The initiation of the second Berlin crisis in 1958 led to a reconsideration of Adenauer’s holding policy as a result of political pressure through Germany’s Western allies. The Western allies showed conciliatory tendencies toward concessions to the Soviet Union with regard to West Berlin, when the Soviet Union required the demilitarization of Berlin, that conflicted with West German security interests that relied on the troops for its own defense. Adenauer’s fame dropped in the 1957 elections when the public became aware of the failure of Deutschlandpolitik to achieve unification. The building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 reflected that sentiment and the lack of a response through the allied powers signaled further the international acceptance of the status quo in Germany.

The goal to achieve Westpolitik successfully, i.e. integrate with other European countries to build stable democracies and a stable economy, while maintaining a special relationship the guarantor nation, the United States. Westpolitik took precedence over the goal of unification. By

refusing to accept the division of Germany that West German government feared would only legitimize the presence of the Soviet proxy regime in East Germany, the West German government inhibited the possibility of German unification. Furthermore the clear Western orientation of the German government expectedly would solidify the divide between the East and West and make unification difficult to attain at best.

The “Chancellor of the Allies” (Der Kanzler der Alliierten) understood the importance of the NATO alliance and German participation in the security of its own defense through the alliance. But the decisive security relationship, Adenauer admits, is the German-U.S. relationship. He connects Germany to the United States on the grounds of their common commitment to the freedom of the peoples and the European need for U.S. support to defend itself. This redefinition of the German understanding of security remains key in understanding the Adenauer era. The Adenauer administration did not only view a break with the past as necessary, but also a renegotiation towards reconciling with the West. The notion of security through the Atlantic alliance is thus both bound to the idea of reconciliation through foreign policy and a reinterpretation of power and security, as Katzenstein indicated through his reading of Germany “political responsibility” after the World War (Katzenstein, 1996).

Security is also clearly defined against the East and particularly the predominant power of the Soviet Union. A Christian-Democratic member of the parliament explains that the threat the construction of the Berlin wall in 1961 has increased the Soviet threat vis-à-vis West Germany. He criticizes the Soviet unwillingness to convene for negotiations about the situation in Berlin. The member of parliament compares the Soviet Union’s totalitarian system upon Chruschov unresponsiveness to German-wide elections to ‘national-socialism’. He further emphasizes that under the East-West tension, “solidarity of the free world” becomes ever more

important and particularly the continuation of the European integration that confronts a setback with the halt of negotiations on British accession to the European Economic Community<sup>9</sup>. Other members of parliament express in the same parliamentary debate that the freedom of Europe is dependent upon the United States in a “community of mutual fate” (“wechselseitige Schicksalsgemeinschaft”). It is interesting to note, that the relationship to the United States, often also referred to as the “alternative to the Communist threat” or the “Atlantic community”, is denoted as the relationship to Europe rather than Germany. This is reflective of the security reorientation of Germany in the post-WWII era. In 1963, Germany views itself part of a greater Europe (then European Economic Community) and an “Atlantic community”, a relationship with the guarantor, United States.

U.S. –German security interests have not always perfectly converged, as Berger illustrates. The change initiated under Kennedy in 1961 that attempted to maximize American control over its nuclear weapons caused great outrage in Germany that feared Germany would become a nuclear battlefield (Berger, 1998).

While the construction of the Berlin Wall and the inaction of the Western allies threatened Germany’s reliance on the United States for its security, security is still directly linked to the Western leading power, namely the United States. German diplomats viewed U.S. inaction vis-à-vis the Soviet construction of the Berlin Wall as a violation to U.S. obligations specified in the Treaty of Paris in 1954 (Berger, 1998). A member of the opposition party, the Social Democratic Party, expresses his inability to understand the level of distrust toward the United States that has rescued Germany twice from a “dangerous invader”. The SPD member explains that against the belief that the leading power attempts to reduce the Europeans to a

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<sup>9</sup> Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestages, February 7, 1963.

lower status, the United States, too, is dependent on Europe for its survival. Europe creates the boundary between the free world and the “violent world” referring to the Communist alternative during the Cold War <sup>10</sup>.

Furthermore the attempts toward détente under the Kennedy administration evoked a sense among German policymakers that the United States was overriding German interests and undermining the policies of integration with the West that legitimated this policy stance (Berger, 1998). These two incidents of divergence between the United States and West Germany are understood to have reshaped the unconditional German loyalty toward the United States. Despite this divergence, Adenauer continued to legitimize policies through the Westbindung, while starting to account for possibility of cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union by emphasizing the relentless German attempt to initiate talks with the Soviet Union <sup>11</sup>.

The German relations (“Gesamtdeutsch”) between East and West Germany were mostly necessitated by the location of West-Berlin in Soviet territory from the beginning, whose vulnerability was clearly demonstrated in the first Berlin crisis that led to a year long airlift provided by the United States Air Force to provide West Berlin with food and other necessary aid when the Eastern forces blocked West German access to the Western part of Berlin to boycott the currency reform that establishes a common currency. In a report given to the Bundestag as a response to the Soviet resistance to all-German elections, the Committee head for the German questions addresses that “The German Bundestag declares the unshakable will of the entire German people for national unity” <sup>12</sup>. The SPD speaker further refers to the Soviet Union’s practice and rule over the Eastern territories of Germany as a “forceful dominance”.

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<sup>10</sup> Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestages, February 7, 1963.

<sup>11</sup> Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestages, February 7, 1963.

<sup>12</sup> Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, 1. Wahlperiode. Stenographische Berichte, 85. Sitzung, 09/14/1950.



Interestingly, the commentator in the reports from the German Bundestag notes the silence of the German Communist Party (KDP) at the speech of the SPD speaker. In 1952, the German parliament declares that German unity in a free and united Europe shall remain the highest goal of German politics. They further link the unity of Germany to the greater peace order in Europe making German unification a European issue and goal <sup>13</sup>. In the Agreement between the occupier forces and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1952, all signatories agree to the common and foundational goal of German unification <sup>14</sup>.

Reunification remained the ultimate goal for the Adenauer administration, but was not pursued overtly, as Adenauer feared that the West and Germany's neighbors would interpret this goal as nationalistic relating it to the German Nazi past. Domestically, the left wing, Social Democrats (SPD), held the CDU/CSU Union responsible for solidifying German division through the German Westpolitik. Clemens points at the regional identities that were developed in Bavaria and the Rhineland that did not maintain a great attachment to the 1871 regime and did not insist on a gesamtdeutsch (all-German) solution (Clemens, 1989). Clemens further refers to the sentiment among Christian-Democrats that viewed the German division as unnatural and the borders the Bismarckian Empire created as reflective of the nation's will. Adenauer expresses this view in a parliamentary session in 1963 by pointing at the right of the German people to determine its own destiny <sup>15</sup>. He further emphasizes the right to self-determination and while he does not explicitly specify the means to achieve "the goal of reunification through peace and freedom" (2576), he alludes to the "common culture, history, and language that are stronger and will resist all attempts to divide Germany".

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<sup>13</sup> Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, 1. Wahlperiode. Drucksache NR. 3278. 04/05/1952

<sup>14</sup> Vertrag über die Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und den drei Mächten. Bonn, 1952.

<sup>15</sup> Verhandlungen. February 6, 1963, p. 2575.

Prior to 1958, reunification was intricately tied to German wide elections that the Federal Republic of Germany insisted on as a way to delegitimize the East German state that came to be recognized and legitimized under the new Ostpolitik. In a parliamentary debate in 1963, a member of the parliament voices the need for maintaining German reunification a priority in German foreign policy making. He further emphasizes the importance of the right of self-determination <sup>16</sup>.

Adenauer's administration held the firm belief that division of Germany would be solidified by the recognition of political reality and the presence of the German Democratic Republic. Instead, the policy pursued by the Adenauer Administration until the late 1960s consisted of a complete denial of the division of Germany and focus on German Western integration. The Chancellor's language reflects the German unwillingness to recognize German division and the state that was created in the Eastern zone, the German Democratic Republic. Rather than referring to East Germany by its official name, Adenauer uses the Ulbricht regime in the zone or as the German people in the Soviet occupied zone. He states that it should become highest priority to strengthen the feeling of belonging to a common nationality and people among the youth in the Eastern zone.

Adenauer further specifies German attempts to reach out to the Soviet Union by an offer made to Chruschtschow to gradually settle the relationship between Germany and the Soviet Union. While Adenauer's persona has greatly affected the German foreign policy orientation and discourse with regard to Western integration, his follower, Erhard from the CDU has continued Adenauer's legacy by emphasizing the end of the Cold War and the self-determination of the German people as the highest goal of German policy.

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<sup>16</sup> Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestages, February 7, 1963.

This is highlighted in outreach attempts that lead to the conclusion of a communiqué between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union in Moscow in 1955 that expresses the establishment of embassies in Bonn and Moscow to secure freedom in Europe and ultimately use the normalcy in Soviet-German relations to address the German question. Following to this communiqué, Adenauer addresses the Bundestag explaining that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union does not contradict the German foreign policy orientation towards the West. He further mentions that other Western European and NATO-Members maintain relations with the Soviet Union without being held accountable or without having to justify themselves in any way (1955). He concludes that the agreements with the West (Westverträge) do not hinder normal relations with the Soviet Union. Adenauer's preoccupation with the justification of relations with the Soviet Union can be related to different factors including the natural incompatibility of the East and the West in foreign policy in light of Cold war dynamics. By referring to other Western European members and NATO-members, Adenauer attempts to ward off potential critique toward German policy. He further emphasizes the loyalty to the West by relating the "inseparable attachment to the Christian-Western cultural circle" and by declaring firmly that "Germany is part of the West, its social structure, historical tradition..."<sup>17</sup>. He further explains that the establishment of relations contributes to the relaxation of the international situation, which is certainly of interest to the Western powers. Meaning of the West is constructed and emphasized through German state officials' discourse and the media.

Under Adenauer, Ostpolitik is mainly aimed at the "reconstruction of a free Germany" that will maintain peaceful relations with the Soviet Union and all Eastern European states. To this end, the German Republic should take any measure to normalize relations between the FRG

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<sup>17</sup> Bulletin, 09/23/1955. Nr. 179., Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Dokumente von 1949 bis 1994, p.224.

and Eastern European states. The German unwillingness to negotiate the German-Polish border poses a great obstacle to German relations with Poland. In light of these circumstances, a member of the foreign affairs committee suggests that the non-diplomatic relations should be exhausted to build Ostpolitik<sup>18</sup>. While the importance of the Soviet Union as having its place in Europe is emphasized, Soviet aggression toward Germany is interpreted to harm the politics of peace of Germany. This is reflective of the rudimentary structure of Ostpolitik in 1961 under the Adenauer government. In 1965, Erhard recites the postulate from 1961 and explains that “we are still at the outset of such a political orientation and that we need to continue its existence”<sup>19</sup>. He further explains that the foreign policy, security politics and unification policy are necessary parts of a whole. German foreign policy must thus be concerned with “external security”. German security policies, Erhard explains, serve the general balance of interests in Europe, but that they do not want to be dominated by others. Peace can only be secured if the reason for tension, the division of Germany, is eliminated. “Only freedom can lead to peace, and only security can give us freedom”. Erhard further interlinks German, European and American defense and security and emphasizes their mutual dependence.

Ludwig Erhard followed Adenauer as the second Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Franz Josef Strauss and Gerhard Schroder mainly dominated foreign policy. Strauss believed in a self-sufficient Germany and West Europe, as the United States had proven its increasing interest in détente between East and West and the absence of action against the construction of the Berlin Wall signaled the weakening of the U.S. protection of Germany.

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<sup>18</sup> Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages. 3. Wahlperiode. Stenographische Berichte, 162. Sitzung vom 14.06.1961.

<sup>19</sup> Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages. 5. Wahlperiode. Stenographische Berichte, 4. Sitzung vom 10.11.1965.

Security under Strauss was then redefined in terms of a European confederation with its own nuclear deterrent, which was portrayed as the key to German unity.

In 1963 Erhard expresses that the Federal Republic of Germany is favoring normalization of relations with East European countries, but also resents that Deutschlandspolitik is losing its momentum that increasingly forces a recognition of the status quo. He emphasizes that the will of the German people for unity and freedom remain reality as well. Erhard continued to emphasize that European security politically and militarily can only be guaranteed through cooperation between NATO and the “north-American partner”<sup>20</sup>. Erhard further alludes to the central role the United States plays in the freedom and security of the Federal Republic, as well as the German unification. This can also be interpreted as a call to the United States to express more heightened support to the Federal Republic that felt particularly abandoned by the United States during the construction of the wall and that for the foremost signaled the complete German dependence on the United States to guarantee its security.

Erhard, the second Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, declares in his first address to the German parliament in 1963 that European and German security is intricately linked to the NATO and the cooperation between European and American partners<sup>21</sup>. German defense is in addition defined through the cooperation with the NATO. In the same speech, Erhard reflects on the role the United States has played for German reconstruction, and will continue to play in German security and attempts for reunification and freedom. He expresses that Germany will continuously maintain common interests with the United States.

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<sup>20</sup> Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestages. 4. Wahlperiode. Stenographische Berichte, 90. Sitzung vom 18.10.1963. S.4192-4197.

<sup>21</sup> Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages. 4. Wahlperiode. Stenographische Berichte, 90. Sitzung vom 18.10.1963.

Schroder expresses his doubts vis-à-vis the position that détente is now ruling the world and balance of powers in the world. Instead he argues that the Soviets still desire to expand Communism to the entire world. The reserved Soviet position towards the West could be reflective of a weakening economy rather than signaling détente. Schroder's speech concludes by addressing the need for the "Atlantic community and nuclear power of the United State" to guarantee the security and survival of Germany that is located in the tense center in Europe<sup>22</sup>.

In a speech to commemorate the victims of the members of the foreign affairs office under the Nazi regime, von Brentano explains his hope that the "German people's common resolute will prevent something similar to happen in Germany again" (p.263). This shows the linking of reconciliation with the past to the higher unification goal and desire.

## II Politics of détente and new Ostpolitik (1967-1975)

While the Adenauer government viewed its regional and international relations as a tool to increase bargaining power for reunification, the Social liberals under Brandt viewed Ostpolitik as a primary step towards ultimate reunification(Whetten, 1971). Erhard's and Kiesinger's Ostpolitik was intricately linked to negotiate favorable opportunities for Bonn's influence in the East at the cost of the Soviet Union, reflective of the Cold War atmosphere.

The German chancellor, Kiesinger, and the foreign minister, Willy Brandt, were not in unison about the adequate path for Ostpolitik. Chancellor Kiesinger declares that "the Soviet Union demands the unconditional capitulation. Kiesinger declares during the election campaign in 1969 that he wished to reduce Ostpolitik to "the illumination of the political sky"

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<sup>22</sup> Bulletin vom 7/4/1964, Nr.58, S503-507.

(Beleuchtung des politischen Himmels) whereby he refers to the measures by Brandt's foreign ministry position that induced détente in Germany's relationship to the East <sup>23</sup>.

The political parties entering the election campaign in 1969 were polarized and divided between fundamental issues including Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik. Individuals were also divided on these issues. Gerhard Schroder and Helmut Kohl favored reliance on American deterrence and active engagement in Eastern Europe, while CSU leaders advocated reduced U.S. military presence and a move away from concessions to Eastern Europe. Whetten points out that "reunification and reconciliation" could become an issue for the last time in the 1969 elections, due to the age of a newer generation that had never seen the Eastern territories or had recollections of unified Germany. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) chose to focus its election campaign primarily on this issue and found a natural coalition with the FDP that advocated reconciliation with East Germany. Being aware of the popularity of a left-liberal coalition, the CDU attempted to reorient its Eastern position, but eventually withdrew to mostly domestic issues, which signaled the population that the CDU intended to continue its present policy stance towards the Eastern question. The SPD further saw a state-like entity in the increasingly independent policy behavior of East Germany. While East Germany was completely dependent on the Soviet Union and seemed more of a tool of power exertion, the 1960s shaped East German independence by ameliorating the East German burden through the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. In addition, East Germany feared that the rapprochement between Bonn and Moscow in the 1960s would settle the German question; the German Democratic Republic reflected its disagreement by protesting against the Soviet Union (Whetten).

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<sup>23</sup> Der Spiegel, 39, 1969. "Bisschen Siegen".

The late 1960s showed shifts in the public opinion toward the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line. In 1967, only 19% of the interviewed favored recognition of the border, while 50% opposed it. IN 1969, however, 50% favored the recognition if unity was achieved, and only 25% opposed it <sup>24</sup>. 74% of the West Germans interviewed favored official talks with the GDR and 50% who favored formal recognition of the GDR. Whetten alludes to the public discourse and narrative that shifted towards questioning the rigid Westpolitik formulation by Adenauer and his successors until Brandt.

De Gaulle's replacement allowed Germany to reassert a position of leadership for Western Europe. Along with this rose the hope that if the Federal Republic resolved its internal matters it could hold a position of strength towards Europe, the East and the West (Whetten 98). The changes in foreign policy orientation had different motivational factors, including the desire for German self-assertion. Although this remained a goal throughout sometime in the 1960s, it was most clearly expressed through Brandt's Ostpolitik to address the Eastern question more adequately.

The Social Democrats reinterpreting Germany's position towards the East claimed that the CDU's insistence on the German legal claim and right to the homeland to the territories East of the Oder-Neisse line implied that reunification would lead Germany to reclaim the territories on present Polish soil. The SPD advocated that the strategy of strength prominent under Adenauer should be abandoned and replaced with a more conciliatory tone vis-à-vis the Eastern territories, which would in reality help Germany assume a stronger role in Europe, the East and the West. Helmut Schmidt pointed out in 1966 that the abandonment of the legal claim would also help the populations beyond the Eastern border normalize relations with the Federal

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<sup>24</sup> Polls conducted by the semi-official Institute for Applied Social Science (Bad Godesberg) and cited in Whetten (1971).



Republic<sup>25</sup>. The implicit abandonment of the policy orientation that preconditioned reunification before détente was also expected to remove the fears that a reunified strong Germany brought upon its neighbors East and West. The Christian Democrats argued, in contrast, that accepting the “artificial” German state would not be a desired outcome, as they saw this very artificial state to be the major problem in Europe.

Willy Brandt is elected to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1966 under Chancellor Kiesinger. The change in German foreign policy orientation becomes evident when Willy Brandt addresses the European Council on the necessity of a policy of détente in Europe in 1967. He further explains the realization that the German issues cannot be resolved in the “Cold War climate”. Germany aims therefore at an improvement of relations with all Eastern European States. Brandt further explains that the mistrust apparent among peoples of Eastern Europe that are linked to the German past will wane when they can recognize Germany as a truthful and loyal partner<sup>26</sup>. This is evident of the necessary linkage of an Eastern rapprochement with the German past and a promising future that foresees Germany as part of the European community.

It is interesting to see the shift from cooperation, community and security with a unified Europe and the Atlantic relationship with the United States that were prevalent mainly during the Adenauer and Erhard era. This focus on the Western connections of the Federal Republic shifts towards the necessity of “peace and détente” as expressed by Brandt throughout speeches in the late 1960s and early 1970s. With the need for détente and peace in Europe, the central issue of relations with the East arises.

Addressing the German Bundestag in 1969, Chancellor Willy Brandt illustrates how preventing German alienation is linked to the European and broader Western interest. While

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<sup>25</sup> Speech at the SPD party Congress on 3.06.1966.

<sup>26</sup> Bulletin vom 26.1.1967, Nr.8, S. 59-60.

Brandt declares that the Federal Republic cannot recognize East Germany as a separate people and under international law, it does recognize the existence of two states in Germany. These two states are, however, not foreign lands to each other and their relationship must be a special one<sup>27</sup>. Brandt expresses that the security policies of Germany are linked to politics of balance and peace-keeping. External security is moreover linked to the alliance and the West-East balance that Germany is part of.

Security becomes a top priority in German foreign policy debate in the late 1960s and early 1970s. While German foreign policy debates were dominated by “freedom”, “alliance” and “integration”<sup>28</sup> and security remained only linked to these notions, security becomes the subject of endless foreign policy debates between Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats. In 1971, Defense minister, Helmut Schmidt, holds that German security is defined through “freedom in Europe” that in turn contributed to the security of Germany itself. He further mentions the German role in the “balance of powers”. Schmidt further avers that the Western alliance is indispensable, while the efforts toward détente are inseparable from an effort to seek defense and security<sup>29</sup>. In 1974, Helmut Schmidt, now Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, describes the German relationship to the Soviet Union within a framework of the fundamental alliance with the NATO. He further emphasizes the convergence of security interests in the U.S.-German relationship, which had come under scrutiny through the critique of the Ostpolitik by Kissinger in the early 1970s<sup>30</sup>.

The agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union in August 1970 is directed to “consolidation of peace and security in Europe and the world”. The governments agree on

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<sup>27</sup> Bulletin vom 29.10.1969, Nr. 132, S. 1121-1128.

<sup>28</sup> Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages.4. Wahlerperiode. 58. Sitzung. 7 February 1963.

<sup>29</sup> Bulletin vom 15.5.1971, Nr. 75, S.803-805.

<sup>30</sup> Bulletin vom 18.5.1974, Nr.60, S. 593-604.

common goals including détente, normalization of relations in Europe. In October 1970 the German-Polish agreement ensued that emphasized the permanency of the German-Polish border. The agreement refers to the importance of European security and to the unchanging nature of international agreements that both Poland and Germany agreed upon before.

The historic symbolic act by Willy Brandt's honoring of victims of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising in 1970 leads to international and domestic evaluation of Brandt's Ostpolitik. This symbolic act has often been viewed as causing ambivalent sentiments around the world and particularly domestically in Germany. The Spiegel magazine reports that German newspapers have been silent on commenting on this incident and a public opinion survey released immediately after the incident reports that 41% of polled Germans found Brandt's behavior as adequate, while 48% found it exaggerated <sup>31</sup>.

The wording of the 1973 treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Czechoslovakia refers explicitly to the an attempt to foster harmonic coexistence of the European peoples and the to bring an end to the "ominous past" particularly with regard to the sufferings brought upon the European peoples by the World War II. It further maintains that the new generations in both nations have a right to a secure and peaceful future and the development of good-neighbor relations. In addition, the treaty is embedded in greater European security as indicated in other agreements between West Germany and the East, which can be viewed as a justification attempt by the Federal Republic reconciling its Western commitment with its newly formulated Eastern ambitions.

In honor of the founding of the Bismarckian Reich in 1871, Brandt declares that the "German nation is alive" even if two states exist on German soil. He further emphasizes that the

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<sup>31</sup> Der Spiegel 51/ 1970. "Kniefall angemessen oder ubertrieben?"

German nation will continue to live despite attempts to proclaim a second German nation. An active German policy should lead the future in Germany, while acknowledging that the German people can only prosper in the framework of a European solution<sup>32</sup>.

Short after Brandt acknowledged the existence of another state within Germany in 1969, which reflected a great turn after the Adenauer period, under which the German Democratic Republic was usually referred to as the Soviet-occupied German territories or the German people beyond our current border without explicitly recognizing the state, the “Grundlagenvertrag” (or foundation agreement) in 1972 ensued that established the cooperation between the two German states on détente, peace, and security in Europe. The agreement establishes the German states’ relations at the international stage, by maintaining that the German states will not be able to represent or act in the name of the other German state internationally respecting the independence of each other. The German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic agree to exchange embassies. Furthermore, security and cooperation in Europe will be furthered, while both states’ earlier international agreements will remain unchanged<sup>33</sup>.

In a letter exchange shortly after the ratification of the agreement, the German Federal Republic emphasizes that the Grundlagenvertrag does not contradict the political aim of peace in Europe and self-determination and unity of the German people. This agreement reflects the first attempt to establish diplomatic relations with the GDR, which required its recognition as a separate state entity first. While the recognition is not formal in this agreement, it creates a basis for diplomatic relations between the two states. It is important to note the German insistence on its primary goal of unity of the German states and peace and cooperation in Europe. The latter serves to underline the compatibility of the two foreign policy directions. The rapprochement

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<sup>32</sup> “Zum 100. Jahrestag der Reichsgründung”, Willy Brandt. Bulletin vom 19.01.1971, Nr. 5, S. 35.

<sup>33</sup> Bulletin vom 8.11.1972, Nr. 155, S. 1841-1844.

between the FDR and GDR culminates in membership to the United Nations in 1973, which both solidifies division of the German people, but also creates a platform for change in Europe.

Walter Scheel, the West German foreign minister addresses the United Nations by referring to German membership in the League of Nations after World War I and alludes to the catastrophic events that ensued. He concludes that we, the nations of the world, can only strive in cooperation. When he refers to two German foreign ministers joining the United Nations, Scheel expresses “This shows the destiny of my people: Both origin and victim of the war, divided not of their own making, live now in two states, uncertain about a unified future”. He further admits that this was the foundation of hesitance toward German membership in the United Nations, the solidification of political reality and the seeming resignation of West Germany in this matter <sup>34</sup>. The notion of Germany’s victimization through the division of the German nation is also found in the media, where the nation is overshadowed by the German states’ attempts to incorporate seemingly incompatible aims of unification and the recognition of East Germany as a nation-state (Volkerrechtliche Anerkennung) <sup>35</sup>. There is a sentiment that views the German question part of the greater East-West relationship and can only be resolved and tackled through the this relationship. The ambivalence of the East-West relationship, oscillating between limited cooperation and deep enmity makes Ostpolitik part of a greater game of power politics rather than the politics of German entente. As mentioned earlier, the international context provides in the case of West Germany a framework of action, that can be understood to set boundaries for certain activities. These boundaries, however, can be challenged by German state identity reconfiguration, when Germany can create its own independent boundaries of action, as reflected in the independent move towards détente with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

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<sup>34</sup> Bulletin vom 20.09.1973, Nr. 114, S. 1125-1127.

<sup>35</sup> Die Zeit. 1970. Die Nation als Klammer.

In a parliamentary debate, politician Scheel points at the apparent conflict between the twin aspirations of achieving unity for the German people and recognizing the East Germany state thereby solidifying division. However, the linking between Ostpolitik and the freedom, détente and cooperation in Europe allows Germany to incorporate the solidification of division in the foreign policy goals of European cooperation. But it becomes clear that West Germany is struggling rhetorically as well as politically with this adjustment to solidifying division within the German people.

The German state identity is oscillating between different sentiments. The grand coalition between the Christian-Democrats and the Social Democrats reflects the ambiguity in the state identity of Germany. The multiple opportunities that arose in the late 1960s, a hardened belief in Cold War politics and an increasing need for cooperation between East and West also reflect the schism in German state identity. The German view of being at the mercy of the great powers reflected in the Berlin agreement and the future of Ostpolitik that is viewed as dependent on great power politics reflects part of Germany identity. This reflects that while the international system may have an effect on German politics, it is only through the definition of German identity with regard to the great powers and Cold War dynamics that it can be interpreted. Rather than having a direct effect on German political decisions, the international environment does shape German state identity and German self-perception with regard to others. As Katzenstein defined state identity as mostly external, the German case is reflective of states defining themselves through their relationship to others and expresses their self-identities through public discourse.

### III International Responses:

The international responses to Brandt's Ostpolitik are an interesting way to assess the relevance of the Ostpolitik on the one hand and the responses that in turn shape state identity on the other. The United States vehemently opposed Ostpolitik at its inception, while the Soviet Union welcomed Bonn's approach to détente and France supported its European partner in its endeavors. The U.S. reaction to Ostpolitik shaped public discourse in Germany that increasingly attempted to legitimize the Ostpolitik through a framework that would allow the United States to come on board. Thus the parliamentary debates, as well as public declarations after 1969 should be understood in relation to the United States and its insistence on a U.S. led détente policy rather than an independent German foreign policy. Consequently, this allows an understanding of the process of identity reconfiguration as a response to international pressure and the attempt to legitimize identity.

Henry Kissinger was initially one of the greatest critics of Brandt's Ostpolitik, but only later praised Kohl for his extraordinary accomplishment of reunifying the German people. Klitzing describes the United States' position towards Brandt's Ostpolitik as a "mix of encouragement, tolerance, suspicion, and jealousy" (Fink & Schaefer, 2009, p. 80). Klitzing further argues that there was a conceptual difference between Nixon-Kissinger détente and Brandt's Ostpolitik. While during the 1960s, American President, Lyndon Johnson encouraged Germany to open up towards the East, the new Nixon-Kissinger duo did not support that policy. This historical note is interesting, particularly because Ostpolitik was made possible under Brandt in Germany despite Nixon's opposition and Ostpolitik did not become reality under Adenauer who similarly to Nixon and Kissinger believed in the marginalization of the Soviet Union (Fink & Schaefer, 2009).

For Brandt a policy toward the East required close collaboration between Bonn and its Western partners. Brandt viewed Germany as “liberated” rather than “conquered”. Brandt’s foreign policy also reflected a certain degree of morality by his attempt to face up to the responsibilities of the Second World War and overcome the past through reconciliation on a moral and national dimension and détente on the political dimension. Brandt eventually did aim at overcoming the status quo and achieving unity of the German people, by accepting it.

The Nixon administration did not support the independence of the assertive Ostpolitik and feared that it may escalate into nationalism and pure national interest, despite efforts by the German government to reassert its commitment to the United States and the West. Nixon’s position can also be viewed in contrast to Lyndon Johnson who advocated détente between West Germany and its Eastern neighbors. While Germany felt abandoned in the early 1960s, particularly during the construction of the Berlin wall, the United States reasserted its preponderance over Western Europe and particularly over Western Germany. Nixon who believes greatly in the balance of powers in fears that Brandt’s Ostpolitik may upset or shift the balance of power in Europe either in form of renewed German domination of the continent or the imbalance of power in Central Europe. Furthermore, while reunification was not in sight in 1969, the United States feared that an eventual reunification of East and West Germany would render a strong state in Europe and offset power balances in the region. The United States has been careful and hesitant in a public endorsement of Ostpolitik. President Nixon declared during a visit in West Germany that the United States would no longer write German policies and that Germany should act independently <sup>36</sup>. It is unclear whether this could be read as a post factum endorsement of Ostpolitik and its assertive nature or as a practical reality of the Nixon Doctrine that foresaw independent military and defense capabilities for some of its allies.

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<sup>36</sup> “U.S. Gently Encourages Ostpolitik” . *The Washington Post, Times Herald*, 07/26/1970.



While Kissinger was not overtly supportive of Ostpolitik, he viewed it as mainly harmless to U.S. interests and agreed that the reconciliation of Germany's past could only be done through Germany itself. The United States media interprets Germany in 1969 as newly self-conscious and confident. "The image most West Germans seem to have of themselves these days is of social and economic well-being" and the integration into Europe. The New York Times compares this newly won arrogance to the crawling in front of foreigners after WWII<sup>37</sup>. Brandt's policy orientation is further interpreted as his initiative in seizing the opportunity of change in Europe.

Kissinger feared the resurgence of Nazism through an increasing independent German foreign policy. "The weight of German history hung over Bonn's initiatives" (Klitzing 85). The United States was very aware of the inherent contradiction in Bonn's foreign policy orientation that attempted to find a middle way between the East and the West. The United States was further concerned to be left out of the German-Soviet détente without having formulated East-West negotiations of their own making. Klitzing also notes that Ostpolitik led to some internal conflict between the State Department that favored Brandt's Ostpolitik and the White House resisted the German independence in asserting its foreign policy. This led to the ambiguity of the U.S. response to Ostpolitik. While the Nixon doctrine demanded greater independence from the United States militarily, it also feared to lose its stronghold in Western Europe and the general balance of power. The heightening of Ostpolitik in 1970 and the expansion of Soviet sphere of influence concerned Kissinger deeply. Kissinger argued that the long term danger of German expansion and surge of nationalism were more prevalent than any immediate threats posed to the Western alliance.

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<sup>37</sup> "A New mood pervades West Germany." *New York Times*, 10/21/1969.

The events that ensued in the Federal Republic of Germany changed Kissinger's hard stance on Ostpolitik and allowed him a reconsideration of German aspirations that he had characterized as nationalistic and expansionist. The treaty between Germany and Poland in December 1970 along with the image that Brandt's kneeling down at the memorial for the victims of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising were reflective of Germany's deep commitment to reconciliation. Kissinger ascribes a positive effect of Ostpolitik on Soviet behavior that might be tilted towards détente with the United States, as Germany might be perceived increasingly as a threat in Eastern Europe due to its proximity.

While Kissinger and the United States government seemed convinced of a genuine reconciliation effort by the German Ostpolitik, they, nonetheless, resented the loss of control over détente and German foreign policy. The Nixon administration hoped that the Social Democrats would lose power in the 1972 elections, but won a clear victory in what was considered a referendum on Eastern policy.

The German-Polish treaty is furthermore understood as eliminating the Communist fear of German expansion and revision of post-1945 borders beyond the Oder-Neisse line. An article in the Los Angeles Times expresses that the ambivalence of the Ostpolitik and with it associated détente between West Germany and the Soviet Union stems from the uncertainty over Soviet aspirations with regard to its relations to Germany<sup>38</sup>. While Germany provides a foundation for its policy orientation through the linkage of the issue to the greater reconciliation process and the redefinition of power and security, the Soviet Union does not explicitly state her ambitions.

The United States clearly showed its mixed feelings about Brandt's eastern policies and considered détente as a bilateral superpower affair. They simultaneously feared a resurgence of German nationalistic interests in the Eastern provinces. The level of independence in Brandt's

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<sup>38</sup> "Bonn's Ostpolitik and Europe's Unity". *Los Angeles Times*. 12/09/1970.

Ostpolitik undermined the future of U.S. dominance of Western Europe. Not only did Brandt's Ostpolitik indicate the growing independence of Germany, but also its growing power and say in the region. The U.S. interpretation of Ostpolitik considerably differed from the U.S. position expressed in 1963 that "the sole hope for having Germany be a responsible member of the Atlantic community is to treat her like one" (Kissinger, 1962). The different conceptions of détente and the future of security led to the divergence in interest between the United States and the FRG. While the United States used détente as a strategy to manage the rivalry with the Soviet Union, West Germany viewed détente through Ostpolitik as a means to greater peace and security for Europe with the ultimate goal of reunification. The United States sought for example bilateral arms control rather than general improved relations that were agreed upon between Germany and the Soviet Union <sup>39</sup>. This divergence of interest and orientation clearly shows the evolving nature of German state identity with regard to its Eastern neighbors.

The United States in particular shaped the legitimization process of German identity. While international factors, including continued Cold-War dynamics and U.S. pressure influenced policy debate, they did not significantly alter the German foreign policy orientation and thus German identity. German identity in the immediate post-World War situation was intensely shaped by the Western powers and particularly by the United States. As suggested earlier, identity was mainly constructed through the idea of an Atlantic security community that would allow Germany continued "political responsibility" (Katzenstein, 1996) through a redefinition of power and security. Germany had transformed itself in the 1970s through both the international factors including the presidency of Lyndon Johnson who pressured Germany into détente and domestic factors, such as the reconciliation through the Nuremberg Trials in 1963. The Social

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<sup>39</sup> An example for German-Soviet cooperation is found in the agreement on "cultural cooperation with the USSR" in 05/19/1973 that fostered student and diplomatic exchange among other things.

Democratic party, moreover, brought new notions and a younger generation of political leaders who aimed at seeking reconciliation rather than confrontation with the East.

French sentiment vis-à-vis Brandt's Ostpolitik differed from the United States. France had established a relationship between the Soviet Union in the later 1960s by initiating economic and political ties. France, aware of its special relationship to the Soviet Union, was concerned about the assertive policy through the new chancellor. Ostpolitik had the potential to challenge French primacy in its relationship with the Soviet Union, which was expected to lead to a split in the Western front creating competition between Bonn and Paris. Another fear associated with Ostpolitik is that the FRG would turn away from the construction of Europe towards the East. Pompidou, the French president, therefore emphasized the necessity to uphold the Western ties. In addition, France expressed the Soviet threat that might attempt to replace the ultimate goal for Germany that lied in reunification for neutralization of Germany in Europe.

Despite the French reservations held against Ostpolitik, Pompidou supported Ostpolitik as it resembled the French efforts to build relations with the Soviet Union and out an end to the Cold War that remained France's ultimate aim as well. Pompidou and the French government overtly supported Brandt's Ostpolitik by supporting the Soviet plan for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. France sought actively to incorporate German interests (Fink & Schaefer, 2009). Ostpolitik has supported Franco-Soviet relations rather than undermining them and has also created a platform for additional cooperation between France and Germany on the Soviet Union. This provided the opportunity for both states to incorporate the Eastern question to Western integration and to enhance the level of trust between the former "enemies hereditaires". Franco-German reconciliation had also become a diplomatic factor in the negotiations with the East, which proved the significance of the relationship internationally (Fink & Schaefer, 2009).

The Soviet Union in the late 1960s feared West Germany on the grounds of its denial to recognize the Oder-Neisse line before the treaty of 1970 and the potential to destabilize the region, as well as the rise of neo-Nazi propaganda in West Germany. The Soviet Union also feared the presence of American troops along the Soviet border.

The Soviet Union sought improved relations with the West primarily for economic and political reasons. It expected increased foreign capital and technology to infuse its economy, while slowing down the arms race between the Soviet Union and the Western front. Politically, the Soviet Union sought the consolidation and acceptance of the status quo and with that the recognition of the Soviet Union as a superpower and its empire in the East. The Soviet Union further hoped to consolidate the presence of an East German state that remained unrecognized until the 1970s. Soviet leaders under the leadership of Brezhnev were greatly happy about the Bundestag elections in 1969 that brought forth a coalition between the SPD and the FDP.

Through the relationship with West Germany, the Soviet Union hoped to exert control and power over the bilateral relations that were about to be initiated between West Germany and other Eastern European states. When the ratification of the Soviet-German treaty was linked to the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin through pressure from the Christian Democrats who did not support Brandt's Ostpolitik, the Soviet Union began to fear U.S. influence on the process of European détente. The delay in the ratification process caused great tension for Brezhnev and his government, to the relief of the Soviets; the treaty was finally ratified in 1972 after being initiated in 1971.

A memorandum released in 1973 reflects the shift in Soviet sentiment vis-à-vis the Federal Republic of Germany. The memorandum announces the confusion on the Soviet side concerning Willy Brandt's and the SPD's position toward social progress and social reforms

while maintaining the interests of private property and the social market economy<sup>40</sup>. This expression of distrust was expected to be influenced by Brandt's attempt to collaborate with the opposition parties. The previously positive image that the Soviet Union held of the SPD was transformed in a fear of resurgent German dominance and distrust toward liberal democracy. Despite this distrust vis-à-vis West Germany, Brezhnev found a great partner in Willy Brandt and resented his resignation in 1974 from office. West German policy had helped the Soviet Union reorient its political aims in Europe and the world and allow détente in the tensions between the Soviet Union and the Western European countries (Fink & Schaefer, 2009).

#### Conclusion: German state identity reconsidered

The exploration in this paper suggests that there is need for a multi-faceted understanding of foreign policy. As the case of Germany demonstrates, state identity is fluid and contested and must be interpreted against the international, domestic and historical social context. The relationship between state identity and foreign policy is clearly shown in the German reorientation through Brandt's Ostpolitik that relied both on internal and external stimuli to initiate a policy of change in Europe and between the East and West. A mixture of pragmatism and a sense of morality with regard to Germany's reconciliation with its past can help shedding light on the transformation of German foreign policy in the 1970s.

As the empirical evidence suggests, German identity was transformed through a redefinition of security that situated Germany between the East and West. Security is increasingly understood as dependent on both the Western and Eastern cooperation. The linkage

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<sup>40</sup> "On the strengthening of the influence of West German Social Democracy and the need to implement further propaganda activity toward the FRG Deputy Director of Information Department of Soviet Foreign Ministry, L. Maksudov to CC SPSU. 02/15/1973. From Edemskiy, Andrey, "Dealing with Bonn: Leonid Brezhnev and the Soviet Response to West German Ostpolitik.

of issues in state policy making influences a change in state identity and assists in the legitimization process of state policy and identity. The legitimization process reflects both a means and an ends, in that it provides an outlet for policymakers to redefine their policies, but also remains the ultimate goal of the policymakers directed language and issue-linkage.

As suggested in this paper, legitimization can only be understood within the state-society complex that allows the marriage and dependence between state and society found in Weberian philosophy, but also in his followers, such as Wendt. The state can thus be considered to be both an agent that affects reality but is also dependent on a society.

Furthermore, legitimization can best be understood through a constructivist perspective of state identity that does not presuppose national interest prior to interaction between states. The contested nature of state identity allows this study to contribute to the understanding of Germany's debate and struggle with the reconciliation of its Western commitment and Eastern ambition. Brandt's Ostpolitik provides a formidable case to analyze foreign policy making and transformation as it bears international, domestic and historical dimensions that can best be captured through studying state identity. Considering issue-linkage more deeply will add to the strength of such an analysis in the future, while the interpretation of state identity will always remain contingent.

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### Appendix: Table (In Progress)

#### The state and agency

	Theories of the State				International relations	
	Weberian State	Marxism	Pluralism	Neo-Weberians	Constructivism	Rationalism
Theory of the State and Theories of Inter-state relations	Organizational actor, Legitimacy,	Instrumental view:	States dissolves for groups in greater society	Bringing the state back in: Isolation of the state from society	State needs a society (Wendt) Personhood of the state  Some emphasize societal factors over the state (divide among constructivists)	
Foreign Policy Analysis			Decision-making models: Bureaucratic Politics and organizational process			Rational Actor Model
State Agency	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-society Dimension	Yes	Yes, strong society	Yes, strong society	No Society	Yes	No society