

Bosnia: Post-Dayton

Political party assistance in an ethnically divided society

Elly Bennett

Fall 2009

Advised by Dr. John Shosky

Honors in School of International Service

American University

In post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina political parties are increasingly nationalist. This phenomenon has been caused in part by the legacy of the Dayton Peace Accords, as well as actions taken by outside actors, such as the United States, the United Nations, and the European Union. United States political party assistance strategy has had both positive and negative results in attempting to reduce the dangerous effects of nationalism. By examining the effects of its actions, the United States can better predict what actions may be necessary in the future. The international community must understand how nationalism in Bosnia has come to permeate the national political discourse in order to avoid making the same mistakes in future post-conflict settings.

Violence is no stranger to the Balkans. Ethnic violence in particular disproportionately marks the territory. Bosnia, in the early to mid 1990s, experienced high levels of ethnic violence that to this day scar the region. While the wounds are still raw, it is short-sighted and overly fatalistic to assume that the country is unable to heal. The process will be slow, and of course will experience fits and starts, but it can be facilitated so as to mitigate the setbacks. The United States, the former leader of the NATO operations in Bosnia, continues to be involved in Bosnia today through development efforts. One such effort is democracy assistance. One key piece of democracy assistance is political party assistance.

Political parties are fundamental to democratic political systems. Competitive elections are a hallmark of democracies, but elections are not sufficient. As will be shown later, this lesson was painfully learned in Bosnia. Bosnia is an example of a post-conflict society that continues to be embroiled in ethnic tensions and nationalist rhetoric. Unfortunately, as the face of war changes, and as intrastate war becomes more common than interstate war, the post-conflict reconstruction struggles experienced in Bosnia are will become increasingly applicable to emerging conflicts. A thorough exploration of United States actions in Bosnia as relates to establishing political parties will demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of political party assistance as conducted by the United States. The lessons learned will have implications for further political party assistance in Bosnia, for future peace accords signed in other conflicts, and for United States political party assistance strategy in general.

In order to fully understand the strengths and weaknesses of US political party assistance in Bosnia, it is absolutely necessary to start from the beginning. A brief history of the conflict will be followed by an in-depth discussion of the lasting effects of the Dayton Peace Accords (the peace accords that ended the conflict) on the political environment in Bosnia. Because

political party assistance can most accurately be evaluated by looking at election results (i.e. voting behavior and patterns) elections will serve as the basis for evaluating strategy effectiveness. Following an examination of election results and their importance, we will turn to a broader discussion of US political party assistance and what its critics have to offer by way of suggestions and recommendations. Next, we will narrow in on what political party assistance recommendations as identified by others and myself may be most important to implement in future Bosnia programs. The paper will conclude with a brief examination of lessons learned from Bosnia and their implications for future political party assistance programs as part of broader democracy assistance programs.

Political Ambitions or a Clash of Civilizations?

It is not my intention to recount the entire history of the former Yugoslavia and its disintegration into the modern day countries of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia. However, it is important to briefly examine the break-up of Yugoslavia in order to explain how Bosnia-Herzegovina, hereafter referred to as Bosnia, fell into conflict. Additionally, the way in which Western countries, including the United States and the European Community countries understood the conflict colored how they responded to it, as well as the eventual peace accord that was signed. This peace accord, called the Dayton Peace Accords, has had a lasting impact on political party development in Bosnia by entrenching ethnic identities not necessarily, according to some historians, elemental to peoples in the region.

Following World War II, Josef Tito came to power in Yugoslavia. Tito had been a leader of the resistance movement in Yugoslavia during the axis invasion of Yugoslavia. In 1945,

Tito's political party, the National Liberation Movement won a majority of assembly seats and proclaimed the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.¹ Tito proceeded to rule with an iron-fist under a unique communist ideology. Political dissent was brutally repressed. His authoritarian rule masked any internal disunity among the eight republics and provinces. In 1948, Tito officially broke with Stalin, thus gaining favor with Western supporters (and their foreign aid).² Following Tito's death in 1980, the Yugoslav state was weakened to the point of disintegrations. Yugoslavia, unable to replace Tito with an equally powerful central leader, fell into conflict and various independence movements.

One way of understanding the political break down of the Yugoslav state following Tito's death is by analyzing the economic breakdown of the state. By 1987, the competition for central government resources by the republics and provinces had reached a breaking point. Serbia and Slovenia were putting opposite pressures on the central government. Serbia called for central government help in alleviating unemployment and rural-urban migration. Serbia also benefited from the strong, well-funded military because Serbs dominated the officer class. On the other hand, Slovenia sought greater local control over its finances in order to prevent its tax dollars from going to other regions. In addition, World Bank and International Monetary Fund loans called for greater austerity in government spending leading to rising civilian discontent due to fewer social services and increasing unemployment.³ Unhappy citizens make receptive targets for nationalistic rhetoric. In fact, many communist leaders turned to nationalism after the fall of

¹ Brune, Lester H. *The United States and the Balkan Crisis 1990-2005*. Claremont: Regina Books (2005), 5

² Ibid, 6

³ Ibid, 13

communism in an effort to retain power in the 1990 elections. Nationalist rhetoric was a way to shift blame to other ethnicities for the economic troubles facing any one group.⁴

Arguably, the most important figure that emerged in Yugoslavia after the death of Tito was Slobodan Milosevic, the president of Serbia. As will be discussed shortly, Milosevic is considered by many to be the impetus for the violence in Bosnia. By 1989, Milosevic enjoyed a good deal of personal power in Yugoslavia controlled four regions: Montenegro, Vojvodina, Kosovo, and Serbia. His increasing influence threatened Croatia and Slovenia. Milosevic eventually put up strong trade barriers against the two regions, prompting Slovenia to secede in order to avoid economic strangulation and Milosevic's expanding control. Milosevic was hijacking more than his fair share of the central budget for Serbia, so Slovenia was not going to miss much by seceding.⁵ Milosevic's influence over the federation continued to increase. In 1991, he forced out the Yugoslavian President and subsequently declared that Serbia would no longer follow the federal president.⁶ He followed a pan-Serbian ideology in attempting to carve out of the Yugoslavia a Greater Serbia under his control.

Milosevic took advantage of Serbian myths to create a support base. The myth most prevalent in Serbia is the following. In 1389, the Serbs suffered a military defeat at the Battle of Kosovo, which firmly put them under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. Serbs remember this as a great defeat, although, as author Tim Judah points out, it really was more of a military draw than a crushing defeat.⁷ Serbians were able to maintain some autonomy following their defeat. Serbians, however, recall this battle as a defeat from which Serbia must resurrect itself. The hero

⁴ Bieber, Florian. "Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon: Historical Lessons of Two Multi-religious States." *Third World Quarterly*. 21, No. 2 (April 2000), 276.

⁵ Malcolm, Noel. *Bosnia: A Short History*. New York: New York University Press (1996), 223

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Judah, Time. *Kosovo What Everyone Needs to Know*. New York: Oxford University Press. (2008), 23

of the battle, Lazar, is often portrayed as a Christ-like figure, further completing the resurrection image. Serbia's Foreign Minister in 1889, Cedomil Mijatovic, said, "The new history of Serbia begins with Kosovo – a history of valiant efforts, long suffering, endless wars, and unquenchable glory."⁸ This statement supports the idea that Serbia looks back to this battle as a justification for the country to seek more and more glory. Glory was understood as attainable through conquest and the resurrection of the Serbian Empire.

As early as 1987, Milosevic urged Serbians all across Yugoslavia to refuse to once again be victims. This "victimization" that he refers to is monumentally important in understanding the violence in Bosnia perpetrated by the Serbs, because it helps explain the ease with which Milosevic found believers for his propaganda. Milosevic used rhetoric that pulled from the 1389 Battle of Kosovo defeat to convince Serbians that now was their chance for revenge. Now, was their chance finally create a Greater Serbia. One of the most memorable slogans from his media campaign is taken from a speech he gave in 1987 where he told Serbians that, "Nobody would ever beat you again."⁹ He was directly attempting to convince Serbians that they must defend themselves, and he did it so successfully that many Serbs never actually stopped to wonder if they were actually under attack.¹⁰

Milosevic waged a violent campaign in Croatia in an effort to consolidate Serbs in geographic locations that could eventually join Serbia. These tactics were eventually repeated in Bosnia. In January 1992, the disputed areas of Croatia were declared a UN protectorate, effectively recognizing Croatia's right to independence. Milosevic attempted a similar campaign in Slovenia, but Slovenia's defense forces proved too strong and Milosevic abandoned his

⁸ Judah, 23

⁹ Brune, 10

¹⁰ Malcolm, 233

efforts. In February 1992, Milosevic, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic met with one another to discuss the partition of Yugoslavia. It is clear that Bosnia was meant to be the region divided.¹¹ In July 1992, Tudjman directly aided the creation of an independent Bosnian Croat zone called Herceg-Bosna within Bosnia, which contributed to further destabilization and segregation along ethnic lines.¹²

The following events served as immediate impetuses to the violence in Bosnia. Karadzic formed the Serbian nationalist SDS political party with strong support from Milosevic.¹³ The SDS, in 1991, began declaring serb autonomous regions that in turn, requested protection from the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), which was essentially under the control of Milosevic. In 1992, while the rest of Bosnia voted on an independence referendum, the SDS engaged in a Serb boycott of the referendum. The JNA dropped leaflets supporting the boycott.¹⁴ The 64% of the population that participated voted nearly unanimously for independence. Bosnia essentially had no choice but to hold a referendum after Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence in the June of 1991. Had Bosnia not sought independence it risked being swallowed by a new Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia. Karadzic declared the Republika Srpska on March 27, 1992. On April 5, 1992, the day before the international community would recognize the independence of Bosnia, Karadzic began bombarding Sarajevo using artillery the JNA had helped him put in place as early as September 1991.¹⁵ It is clear that Serb aggression in Bosnia was premeditated, not a simple result of a Bosnian declaration of independence.

¹¹ Malcolm, 232

¹² Ibid, 232

¹³ Brune, 13

¹⁴ Malcolm, 231

¹⁵ Brune, 15

Historian Noel Malcolm argues that external aggression caused the conflict. In short, he attributes power and territory grabs by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic as central to the conflict. Milosevic sought to create a Greater Serbia, and in order to do that he wanted to annex the Serbian portions of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first step in that process, however, was to geographically concentrate the Serbs in an annexable region. This necessarily meant expelling all other ethnicities from the areas. Within the first five or six weeks of fighting, Serbian paramilitaries controlled nearly 60% of Bosnian territory.¹⁶ Milosevic's assertions that the JNA was not crossing the border and that his only interests were in separating the warring factions were blatant lies. In addition to waging a physical, military campaign, Serbian forces waged a psychological campaign on Bosnian Serbs in an effort to convince them to fear their Muslim neighbors. They were told stories of murder lists and planned jihads.¹⁷ Malcolm argues that ethnic cleansing was not a by-product of the war, but central to the political aims of the violence.¹⁸

Malcolm also argues that the international community too easily accepted the idea that a state composed of three distinct ethnic identities was doomed to break up into three parts, which is precisely what United Nations and European Community leaders of the peace processes continually advocated for in the various cease-fires and peace plans that emerged. In contradiction to this idea, is an event that occurred before Bosnia was even fully officially recognized as independent. On April 5, 1992, over a hundred thousand people protested in the streets of Sarajevo in the face of Serbian paramilitary activities in the city. One newspaper reported a person as saying, "Let all the Serb chauvinists go to Serbia and let the Croat

¹⁶ Malcolm, 238

¹⁷ Ibid, 237

¹⁸ Ibid, 246

chauvinists go to Croatia. We want to remain here together. We want to keep Bosnia as one.”¹⁹ Much of the early violence was, indeed, perpetrated by Serbians from Serbia using the remnants of the Yugoslav National Army under control of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Like other authors, Malcolm portrays the Muslims and their leader, Alija Izetbegovic as a more moderate, inclusive figure who sought to preserve the existence of a multi-ethnic state.²⁰

Malcolm’s recount of the run-up to the conflict in Bosnia is quite convincing; however, he has failed to convince author Aleksa Djilas, son of Yugoslavian dissident Milovan Djilas. Djilas believes that ancient ethnic hatreds explain the disunity of Bosnia. Although, as Malcolm is quick to point out Djilas, who has lived in Serbia for much of his life, does not believe that ancient ethnic hatreds justify the independence of Kosovo.²¹ Djilas argues that Malcolm unfairly solely blames Milosevic for the problems in Bosnia. He believes that the Bosniak (Muslim) leader Alija Izetbegovic was not nearly as tolerant of Croats, Jews, and Serbs as Malcolm would like to believe. Quoting Richard Holbrooke, Djilas agrees that the former leader merely “paid lip-service to the principles of a multi-ethnic state.”²² It is true that Izetbegovic’s party, founded in 1990, was more nationalistic than another more secular Muslim party that ran in the same election. In that election Izetbegovic’s party won 86 seats in the parliament to the more moderate party’s 13.²³

As evidence of this nationalism, Djilas points to modern day Sarajevo saying that, “The remaining minority is exposed to intimidation and violence by Muslim extremists. Almost all streets with old Serbian and Croatian names have new Muslim ones, the language has been

¹⁹ Malcolm, 235

²⁰ Kaldor, *Mary. New & Old Wars*. Stanford: Stanford University Press (2007), 45

²¹ Malcolm, Noel and Aleksa Djilas. “Is Kosovo Real? The Battle Over History Continues.” *Foreign Affairs*. January/February 1999. <<http://www.foreignaffairs.com>>.

²² Malcolm and Djilas

²³ Malcolm, 222

changed through the introduction of Turkish, Arabic, and Persian words, and the media is permeated with nationalism and fundamentalism.”²⁴ In this statement, however, Djilas fails to adequately prove that ethnic hatreds are intrinsic; he merely shows that perhaps they exist now. Malcolm does not protest the *existence* of ethnic hatred, but he does not believe that the conflict was inevitable due to ancient ethnic hatreds. Ethnic hatred could certainly have more fully developed after the depths of the violence that occurred in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995.

Djilas is not the only subscriber to the ancient ethnic hatreds thesis. Authors David Owens and Robert Kaplan greatly influenced the thoughts of policy-makers during the crisis. Owens, in his book *A Balkan Odyssey* (1995) makes references to the ethnic groups needing to “preserve and safeguard their national identity.”²⁵ Use of the term national identity versus ethnic identity leads us to assume that he believes each ethnicity must have its own nation in order to preserve its identity. President Clinton supposedly read Kaplan’s book, *Balkan Ghosts*, which is what spurred him to only to act, but to act in the ways he did. *Balkan Ghosts* also finds truth in the ancient ethnic hatreds thesis.²⁶ As we will see, this attitude permeated the minds of those involved in crafting a peace accord.

This brief recount of the lead-up to the Bosnian conflict, and its various explanations, is meant to provide some context for understanding the political situation in Bosnia prior to the conflict. The conflict itself is indeed a worthy topic, but for the purposes of this paper suffice it to say that the political/ethnic divisions further entrenched themselves with the violence that occurred during the conflict. The widespread displacement and ethnic violence would have severe ramifications for Bosnia’s reconstruction and political environment. There is evidence of

²⁴ Malcolm and Djilas

²⁵ Kaldor, 199

²⁶ Tanter, Raymond. “Europe in the Present Tense.” *International Studies Review*. 3: No. 3 (Autumn 2001), 196.

wide-scale rape, murders, displacement, and campaigns of ethnic cleansing followed by the Bosnian Serbs and the Serbian paramilitaries against the Muslims, and to a lesser degree the Bosnian Croats against the Bosnian Serbs. Numerous ceasefires were agreed to and subsequently broken. NATO intervention, led by the US, finally led to an end of the conflict. The Dayton Peace Accords were eventually signed and proved to effectively stop the violence.

The Dayton Peace Accords

Stopping the violence by legitimizing ethnic nationalism

After three weeks of negotiations in November 1995 in Dayton, Ohio, the various parties to the conflict finally arrived at a satisfactory peace accord. Milosevic and Tudjman dominated the negotiations. Milosevic spoke for the Bosnian Serbs. Karadzic was not party to the negotiations but did sign the drafted document two days later in Belgrade after the conclusion of the conference. Milosevic's presence at the negotiations further underscores his dominant role in the conflict. Bosnian leader Izetbegovic assigned his Prime Minister the role of negotiator at the conference. The conference took place under the tutelage of US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, American diplomat Richard Holbrooke and former NATO Lt. General Wesley Clark.²⁷ Placing the conference in Dayton, Ohio was an attempt to limit the participants' abilities to manipulate the media to their advantages. Bargaining was to be done face-to-face at the negotiating table, not through the media.

The negotiations produced what is known as the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA). The DPA was officially signed on December 14, 1995 in Paris, France. At that point in time, various other government leaders became signatories to the agreement including: President Clinton

²⁷ Brune, 42

(United States), President Chirac (France), Prime Minister John Major (United Kingdom), Chancellor Helmut Kohl (Germany), and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin (Russia). The breadth of signatories to the DPA is evidence of the importance of the conflict to the international community. The ethnic cleansing that emerged during the conflict was limited in its targets, but the conflict's destabilizing effects on the whole region were considerable and warranted the attention of leaders worldwide.

The DPA sought to preserve the territorial integrity of the state while retaining internal separation of two semi-independent entities: the Bosniak-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska. The Bosniak-Croat federation was a partnership left over from the conflict. The two sides had eventually united against the Bosnian Serbs. The DPA successfully ended the violence of the conflict, which in reality, is the primary concern in a violent conflict. However, the DPA did not contribute to easing ethnic tensions in the region, and many argue that it has merely codified and legitimized ethnic separation. In some respects, the DPA even further denied minority rights to certain groups living within the territory. International agencies endorsed the practical need to separate ethnicities into the separate entities.²⁸ The DPA served as a de facto constitutional framework for the state. In order to understand why the DPA further entrenched ethnic identities to the detriment of the people living within the territory of Bosnia, we must first explore the main components of the agreement itself.

In brief, the DPA provided for one state, two entities, ten cantons, and various municipalities. Every level of government uses ethnic quotas as a way to ensure "equal" representation. In reality the agreed upon regulations may not actually contribute to equality. As we will see later, these ethnic quotas have had deleterious effects on the efficiency of the state

²⁸ Belloni, Roberto. *State-building and International Intervention in Bosnia*. New York: Routledge. (2007), 2

and even on the political liberties of the people. Each canton has its own legislative system, each entity has its own legislative system, and the state has a legislative system. Each legislative system includes parliamentary bodies (sometimes an upper and a lower) as well as prime ministers. In its totality, Bosnia has 5 layers of government with 14 prime ministers and governments. The national presidency is tri-partite office shared among the three ethnicities with a rotating chair.²⁹

Carl Bildt, a former UN High Representative to the country, once described it as the, “most decentralized state in the world.”³⁰ The central state is incredibly weak. Its institutional budget is smaller than that of the entities, and, in some cases, even depends on transfers from them. Between 1998 and 2000 only five laws per year were passed at the national level, and international actors drafted 60% of them.³¹ This is indicative of the gridlock that occurs at the national level, and it can be safely assumed that this gridlock is in large part caused by the nationalistic representatives that get elected to the bicameral legislatures at the national level.

The composition of the two state-level houses is ripe for gridlock. The lower house, the House of Representatives, is composed of 42 members; one-third is elected from the Republika Srpska and two-thirds from the Federation. The citizens of each entity directly vote for their own representatives. In contrast, the House of Peoples consists of 15 delegates: five Bosniaks, five Croats, and five Serbs. The House of Peoples of the Federation selects the Bosniaks and the

²⁹ Belloni, 44

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid, 47

Croats, and the National Assembly of the Republika of Srpska selects the Serbian representatives.³²

Criticisms of the parliamentary and presidential electoral system are numerous. Firstly, many scholars point out that it encourages an ethnic identification over a civic identification by the very fact that a candidate must identify his or her ethnicity in order to be counted as part of the ethnic quotas. There are no seats reserved for “independents” in either the state-level House of Peoples or the rotating presidency.³³ In an effort to unify Bosnia it uses the very aspect that so virulently divides it – ethnicity. There appears to be a zero-sum attitude among the different parts of the national legislatures. Zero-sum means that every representative sees giving up any authority or power as directly aiding another ethnicity. There is no understanding that there is potentially a greater good to be found for everyone through cooperation. At this point in time, politicians believe that cooperation only leads to less for you and your electorate and more for the other guy’s.³⁴ A USAID report stated it perfectly when the authors wrote that, “Legitimate grievances are transformed into resentment, frustration, fear and even hatred in the hands of manipulative political party hierarchies.”³⁵

Many scholars point to the overprotection of group rights in Bosnia at the expense of individual rights. In fact, one scholar, Florian Bieber, argues that the idea of group rights could even be considered antithetical to democracy itself, because democracy prizes individual rights above all else. The ethnic group has all of the rights, while the individual is denied a full range

³² Department of State: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. *Background Note: Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Updated: August 2009. Accessed: 15 November 2009. <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2868.htm>>.

³³ Belloni, 46

³⁴ Ibid, 51

³⁵ Herman, Robert, Mara Galaty and Lawrence Robertson. *USAID Bosnia-Herzegovina Conflict Assessment*. USAID. July 2005, 22

of freedoms in elections, because he or she cannot vote for whomever he or she chooses. Donald Horowitz, a political scientist who has done much work regarding electoral processes and constitution building in new democracies, once wrote:

“As the recent wave of democratization now runs its course, it is not too soon to say that a major opportunity for constitutional planning for interethnic accommodation has been largely lost, and the emerging results are there for all to see,”³⁶


What Horowitz means is that the international community missed an opportunity to take a conflict-ridden country and recreate its constitution in such a way that protected all of its citizens and encouraged non-ethnically divided legislatures.

Political scientist, Mary Kaldor, who has focused her research on the instrumentalization of ethnicity in contemporary wars, agrees that the international community did itself and Bosnia a disservice by legitimizing the ethnic divisions. She argues that the war was not one between “good” and “bad” nationalists, but one of nationalism versus civility. She believes that nationalists successfully waged a war against civil society.³⁷ Furthermore, by cooperating with the nationalists and allowing them to dictate an ethnically divided society via the DPA, the international community accepted that the various ethnicities could not live with one another. The international community mistakenly, in her opinion, bought into the nationalist rhetoric coming out of the conflict. As evidence, she cites the rate of intermarriage prior to the conflict as well as the

³⁶ Bieber, Florian. “Chapter Five: The Challenge of Democracy in Divided Societies: Lessons from Bosnia – Challenges for Kosovo.” In *Reconstructing Multiethnic Societies: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina*. Eds. Dezmel Sokolovic and Florian Bieber. Burlington: Ashgate (2001), 109.

³⁷ Kaldor, 61


previously more equal diffusion of Muslims, Croats, and Serbs across the territory. The rate of intermarriage was around 25% of the population prior to the conflict.³⁸ According to one account the rates of Muslims (Bosniaks)³⁹, Croats, and Serbs in the territory now controlled by the two different entities has been significantly altered from its initial rates. The charts below display the population changes of the three major ethnic groups between 1991 and 1997 in the modern-day Republika Srpska and the Federation.⁴⁰ No data was available for the change in Croat population in the Federation between 1991 and 1997.



³⁸ Kaldor, 35

³⁹ Bosniaks is a term that came into usage following the DPA. Bosniaks is a political term for the Muslims in Bosnia. They are often used interchangeable and are the same people.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 61



This data speaks to the idea that the territory was indeed much less ethnically segregated than one may expect prior to the conflict than it became afterwards. This is a product of the ethnic cleansing undertaken by Serbian and Croatian forces, insufficient protection for the right of return for refugees, and a lack of desire on the part of the refugees to return. Refugee indifference towards returning to their homes is likely an emotional response, as well as a practical response to the security concerns. There is also the political likelihood that they would fail to be able to elect a representative of their choosing. The way the electoral system is designed, it discourages people from voting in areas where their ethnicity does not dominate, because their votes are, for all intents and purposes, inconsequential in those areas. Prior to electoral reforms, imposed by the High Representative because they stalled in Parliament, members of an ethnicity living in an area where their ethnicity was not dominant had a minimal chance of being represented or being a representative. The High Representative was given this type of authority in the

Dayton Peace Accords. The electoral system rewards nationalists. To this day candidates still do not need to seek to represent multiple ethnic groups in order to be elected.⁴¹ The reasons for this will be explained.

The legacy of the violence of the conflict and the territorial segregation that it has resulted in has led to the success of nationalist candidates. The resulting instability has led people to believe that they must first and foremost turn to members of their own ethnicity for protection. In 1990, polls indicated that voters would support non-ethnically identified parties and candidates, but because citizens can only cast one vote, and it can be assumed that a citizen's first vote will go towards a nationalist due to concerns over personal security, non-ethnically aligned candidates effectively have no chance of being elected.⁴² There are various electoral reforms that have been proposed by scholars that could attempt to reduce this phenomenon. These reforms will be discussed later.

Damian Murphy, a former democratic development specialist for the National Democratic Institute (NDI), emphasized that the democracy promotion community learned some important lessons in Bosnia. Murphy worked in Serbia in the late 1990s for NDI where he tried to support democratic reform movements in opposition to Milosevic. In particular, the community has learned not to press too quickly for elections. However, he emphasized that it was necessary to stop the violence in any way that worked. The DPA, however imperfect, has prevented a return of the conflict. Additionally, he argues that it is unrealistic to have expected people to not vote along ethnic lines so quickly. It takes time to develop the security and confidence after such extreme violence to move

⁴¹ Bieber 2001, 115

⁴² Emerson, Peter. "How a Quota Borda System of Elections May Facilitate Reconciliation." In *Reconstructing Multi-ethnic Societies: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina*. Eds. Dezmel Sokolovic and Florian Bieber. Burlington: Ashgate (2001), 147

outside one's own ethnic community. He agrees that the international community perhaps did not facilitate the creation of this security and confidence, but at the same time, he questions whether or not it may have been possible. In his personal opinion, he believes that people genuinely are beginning to move beyond ethnic voting and moving towards more issue-based voting, albeit very slowly.⁴³ However, he has been out of the democracy promotion field since 2007, and it appears as though Bosnia experienced a high point of moderation in 2006, but that voting patterns have since retrogressed back towards entrenched ethnic voting.⁴⁴

The US was aware of the risks of elections, and the likelihood that strong nationalist candidates and parties were likely to see electoral success. Therefore, the US did undertake programs and missions in Bosnia intended to combat this. The next section of this paper is dedicated to understanding what the US has done and how they have affected electoral changes in Bosnia. While each election is a time for change, it would be impractical to analyze every election that has occurred since 1995. Key elections and events will be presented as indicative of trends or breaks from trends. Additionally, while many other countries are involved in development work in Bosnia, it is UN actions and American actions that are at the focus of this discussion.

⁴³ Damian Murphy (Legislative Assistant for Foreign Policy and Defense, Senator Robert Casey Jr.), in discussion with the author, 11 November 2009.

⁴⁴ Freedom House. Country Report: Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009. <<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2009&country=7571>>. Accessed: 5 December 2009

Electoral History: 1995- 2009

The electoral history of Bosnia is a very fragmented one. Between 1996 and 2006 there were 19 elections. In the October 2002 elections alone 57 parties and 9 coalitions competed with one another. Parties come and go, and few are lasting. I will not discuss every election, but will highlight representative events of the electoral process.

1996-1998

This period essentially consolidated ethno-nationalist rule. Elections were held nine months after the end of the war, in accordance with stipulations set out in the DPA. Some argue that the American-led NATO force felt pressure to exit the country and viewed elections as a legitimate way to hand over power to local actors.⁴⁵ It viewed elections as the primary means of establishing unity between the three parties.⁴⁶ Unfortunately, NATO's desire to leave and to hand over power was publicly known, and likely influenced the first round of voting. NATO's exit would necessarily bring security concerns, and citizens' ways of dealing with security concerns was to look to their own ethnic leaders for protections. Therefore, nearly everyone voted for their own candidates. The first elections were conducted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

There was some dissention over whether or not the country would be ready for elections by September 14, the date specified by the DPA. Retired US diplomat Robert Frowick led a group of election monitors in anticipation of the elections. Some of his teams reported that they did not believe that the country was ready for elections.

⁴⁵ Belloni, 75

⁴⁶ Brune, 61

Willieam Stuebner, a leader of one of the teams, believed that the continued ethnic disputes, the lack of opposition newspapers, and the lack of freedom of movement (refugees' inabilities to return home) would prevent legitimate elections from taking place. Frowick himself, however, disagreed believing that tensions had eased enough to allow elections. The OSCE decided to proceed with elections, and President Clinton supported this decision.⁴⁷ The decision to proceed with elections would have dire consequences and is often pointed to as a learning point for subsequent political party assistance.⁴⁸ Local elections were pushed back one year to September 1997.⁴⁹

Izetbegovic said Muslims would boycott elections unless Republika Srpska President Karadzic and General Mladic were finally arrested following their International Criminal Court indictments. General Mladic was intimately involved in the ethnic cleansing of Muslims. Izetbegovic argued that citizens were not free to move around while the two men remained in power in the Republika Srpska. The US and its security force in Bosnia, the Implementing Force (IFOR), were not vocal in pushing for their arrests. The two men were not arrested, but with pressures from both Russia and Serbia, Karadzic stepped down as RS president and leader of the SDS, the Bosnian Serb nationalist party, so that the SDS would be allowed to compete in national elections.⁵⁰

Of course, a first national election would require massive voter registration. Voter registration in and of itself became a power struggle as the various ethnic leaders tried to territorially consolidate their ethnic groups so that they could turn them into ethnically homogeneous electoral districts. In order to vote a person had to either return

⁴⁷ Brune, 61

⁴⁸ Murphy

⁴⁹ Brune, 64

⁵⁰ Ibid, 62

to their home and show proof that it was their home, or a person could use a document called a P-2 form to register in a different location. However, this is not like absentee ballots familiar to Americans. A person who wanted to use a P-2 form had to indicate their desire to permanently settle in the area where they wanted to vote. Electoral organizers hoped that this would help convince refugees to return home, but what it did was disenfranchise voters who did not want to settle where they currently were, but could not yet return home due to security concerns. Therefore, those who registered and voted most likely lived in an ethnically homogenous area where a nationalist candidate would have no problem winning an election.⁵¹ It also served to encourage people to cut ties with their past and settle permanently in whatever area they ended up during the violence. It is highly likely that they escaped to an ethnically homogeneous area dominated by their ethnicity.

Sixty to seventy percent of eligible voters participated in the first national election. For the tri-ethnic presidency, the Serbs elected Momcilo Krajinski, a colleague of Karadzic, the Croats elected Kresimir Zubak, a member of the HDZ (the Bosnian branch of a Croat nationalist party created with the support of Croatia's President Tudjman), and the Muslims elected Izetbegovic. Seven out of forty-two House of Representative seats went to moderates, a discouragingly low. Claiming security fears, Krajinski would not attend a public swearing-in ceremony, instead swearing the presidential oath in a private ceremony.⁵² The very fact that one of the presidents could not attend a public swearing-in ceremony did not bode well for the political future of the country.

⁵¹ Belloni, 75.

⁵² Brune, 63

The electoral events that unrolled in the Republika Srpska are as equally concerning as the national election results. Republika Srpska president, Biljana Plavsic, a nationalist by SDS party affiliation, took steps towards moderation after her election. She returned civilian control to the military and removed General Mladic from office. This placed her in opposition to the armed forces, which expanded to a conflict between her and Karadzic. With the support of President Clinton, Plavsic publicly denounced Karadzic's corruption and his failure to seek a genuine peace. Karadzic retained a significant amount of influence over the police and had long been evading taxes on his oil and cigarette imports.⁵³ At the same time, however, Plavsic was still a nationalist, and as such staunchly opposed a refugee right of return. As compared to Karadzic's even more hardline nationalist approach, however, she was less threatening, and President Clinton supported her. The US appears to have ignored the possibility of throwing its support behind a non-nationalist candidate in an effort to have influence with a candidate that was likely to be able to hold office.

The feud between Karadzic and Plavsic eventually resulted in her expulsion from the SDS, evidence of Karadzic's continuing influence and control of the SDS. She tried to dissolve parliament, but it refused and the Supreme Court canceled the parliamentary elections. This is evidence of the difficulties a moderate candidate would face in Republika Srpska, and she was not even a self-proclaimed moderate!

In the local elections held in Republika Srpska in November 1997, Plavsic's supporters ran under the auspices of a new party. Of the 83-member parliament, 39 seats went to radical nationalist parties. While this is still a high number, it is less than half,

⁵³ Brune, 64

which shows that the voters were not nearly as nationalistic as the leaders make national politics. Fifteen seats went to Plavsic's new party, 16 seats went to Croats/Muslims due to absentee ballots, 9 seats went to Milosevic's international socialist party, and 4 seats went to other social democratic candidates. The parliament however proved unable to approve prime minister. Only after the US Stabilization Force (SFOR, the IFOR successor) threatened to remove all obstructionists, did the 39 nationalists walk out of the parliament freeing the remaining members to approve Plavsic's nominee of Milorad Dodik. Dodik supported peace and cooperation, most likely as a way to gain access to \$5 billion in reconstruction funds that were waiting in the background for a cooperative Republika Srpska government.⁵⁴

The decision to threaten to remove all obstructionists from the parliament was a difficult one. By threatening to remove the obstructionists, the US was inherently publicly questioning the legitimacy of the government. For one nation to be able to partially dissolve another nation's parliament is highly unusual. It is impractical for the United States to expect the citizens to believe in their politicians, when the United States is denying them their legitimacy as a sovereign nation. The powers invested in the UN High Representative similarly delegitimize the government. However, the United States was trying to craft a functioning democracy. It is possible that the United States was trying to show the citizens that these candidates cannot be trusted to work effectively in parliament in an attempt to delegitimize the candidates individually. In practice, however, the United States was labeled interventionist by the Bosnian Serbs and support for nationalist candidates did not lessen.

⁵⁴ Brune, 65.

September 1998 elections brought to power more nationalist candidates in Republika Srpska. Plavsic lost the presidency to a more radical candidate, but moderates retained control of parliament. In 1998, the Republika Srpska president tried to force Prime Minister Dodik out, but ended up being forced out himself by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia, using authority given to the OHR.⁵⁵ This shows the amount of influence the UN had in Bosnia, and it also gives some credence to citizens' claims that elections do not matter if an external actor can force out their elected president. Similar to US actions in threatening to remove obstructionist elements, the UN wields great influence in the political system. By forcing out a president and threatening to remove parliamentarians, external actors are denying ownership of the government to the people. Perhaps the UN and the US should have done more to alter electoral processes instead of merely reacting to individuals who prove uncooperative once elected. USAID speculates that such invasive actions have more negative consequences now than they would have had shortly after the end of the conflict when the system was less established. Now that the system more or less functions on its own, external influence, such as this, is considerably more invasive. USAID recognizes the risk that these actions merely reinforce the idea that the international community's hostility, particularly towards the Bosnian Serbs.⁵⁶

The economic situation in all of Bosnia was dire in the post-conflict period, and as stated before, desperate economic situations have a tendency to lead people to support nationalist candidates. Between 1990 and 1995, GDP decreased 80% and industrial production decreased 95%. During the war 80% of housing units were destroyed or

⁵⁵ Brune, 72

⁵⁶ Herman et al, 30

damaged. In 1995, 90% of food was coming from foreign assistance.⁵⁷ Life was hard. While GDP has steadily increased since the Dayton Accords from \$1.26 billion in 1994 to \$18.5 billion in 2008; \$18.5 billion is not a lot.⁵⁸ That translates to a per capita GDP of \$6,500.⁵⁹ While it is encouraging that GDP is improving, there is some concern that Republika Srpska is developing at a faster rate due to aid from Serbia.⁶⁰ If unequal development continues Republika Srpska is going to clamor for independence more and more loudly, as the federation clings to unity more strongly.

2000 Constitutional Court Ruling

Five years after the DPA, the problems with the Constitution became increasingly pronounced. In July 2000, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia made a very progressive ruling that would alter the electoral processes thereafter. It concluded that the Bosnia Constitution prohibits any special privilege for certain people or any ethnic homogenization through segregation based on territorial separation. This meant that the Republika Srpska had to change its constitution from declaring it, “the state of the Serb people and of all of its citizens.” The constitutional court ruled that by declaring it the state of the Serb people it was illegally promoting ethnic homogenization through territorial separation.⁶¹ The court’s decision states that, “Despite the territorial delimitation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the establishment of the two Entities, this

⁵⁷ Brune, 68

⁵⁸ World Bank. Gross Domestic Product Bosnia and Herzegovina. <www.google.com/publicdata>. Accessed: 5 December 2009.

⁵⁹ CIA World Factbook. Bosnia and Herzegovina. <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html>>. Accessed: 5 December 2009.

⁶⁰ USAID 2007, 3 and 14

⁶¹ Constitutional Court of Bosnia Herzegovina. Decision: U-5/98. <<http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/odluke/index.php?src=2#>>. Accessed: 5 December 2009

territorial delimitation cannot serve as a constitutional legitimization for ethnic domination, national homogenization or a right to uphold the effects of ethnic cleansing.”⁶²

The court’s decision necessitated changes to the constitutions of both entities to bring them into compliance with the court’s ruling. Each constitution must make it clear that each ethnicity – Croatian, Serbian, Muslim – is a constituent people of each entity. Furthermore, there is an “other” category to constituent peoples. This is an attempt to allow people who do not identify as Croatian, Muslim, or Serbian to more fully participate in government. Their rights are not yet equal (Presidents must still identify themselves as Croatian, Serbian or Muslim), but it is a step forward.

These constitutional changes would have effects on elections within the two Entities. Prior to the court’s decision, the structure in the legislature of the Federation was officially bi-ethnic, and the court’s decision forced them to change this in allowing all three ethnicities equal access to parliamentary election. Similarly, the Republika Srpska was forced to alter its system. It created a new parliamentary house, the House of People’s, of which “others” received 1/2 the number of seats allocated to each constituent peoples. While the Venice Commission, a commission set up by the EU to promote democracy through law, praises this as numerical equality, the principle remains that ethnic quotas are necessary to ensure equality and democracy. The House of Peoples only has legislative jurisdiction when the vital interests of the constituent people are at

⁶² Constitutional Court of Bosnia

stake. Vital interests are defined as the right to representation in political institutions and issues such as languages, religion, cultural heritage, education.⁶³

It is unclear what role the United States played in these constitutional changes beyond moral support. The Venice Commission, an EU body, was the most active player in the changes, and it is an EU body. This conforms to Damian Murphy's hypothesis that the United States is content to let Bosnia become a "Europe issue." The 2000 Constitutional Court ruling shows how important laws are when it comes to elections. It is not enough to elect democratic, reformist figures. The laws must be in place that most adequately provide for democratic representation of all the citizens.

2000 Elections

The 2000 elections were significantly different from previous elections, because many electoral changes were introduced before the elections took place. Changes went even beyond the constitutional changes that occurred within in each entity. The first major change was campaign finance regulations, which included four major elements: 1) candidates were forced to disclose their contributions 2) limits were placed on donations 3) limits were placed on candidate spending and 4) mechanisms were put in place for enforcement. There is little research available as to the effectiveness of this reform, but once the rules are in place they are more easily strengthened and enforced in subsequent elections. Unfortunately, the results of the 2000 national elections indicate that the rule changes had little effect on reducing the election of nationalist candidates as nationalist

⁶³ Venice Commission. "Opinion of the implementation of Decision U-5/98 of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia Herzegovina by the amendments to the Constitution of the Republika Srpska." 25 October 2002. <[http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2002/CDL-AD\(2002\)024-e.asp](http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2002/CDL-AD(2002)024-e.asp)>. Accessed 5 December 2009.

candidates dominated the parliamentary elections. The Republika Srpska elected a more radical candidate to the Federal presidency.⁶⁴ A second electoral change was that one-third of party lists were reserved for women.

A third change was the implementation of open party lists and multi-member constituencies. Open party lists meant that a voter has some influence in the particular candidates elected from any given party, as opposed to simply being able to vote for the party. A multi-member constituency allows a person to vote for more than one person to represent them. In this way a more moderate candidate, with cross-ethnic appeal, has a better chance of winning because he or she could win more total votes than the nationalist candidate. He or she could be *everyone's* second choice, which gives him or her more total votes than the nationalist candidates who only managed to appeal to their particular ethnicities. This method is also called Quota Borda System, and will be discussed more thoroughly later.

In a similar attempt to reduce the election of nationalist candidates, the electoral process for the president of the Republika Sprska was turned into a preferential voting system where voters ranked their preferences. Again, the hope was that the more moderate candidate could be everyone's second choice, thus gaining more total "points" and winning the election. Election processes were similarly changed in the House of Representatives for the Federation.

The open lists, the multi-member constituencies, and the preferential voting system for the President of the Republika Sprska did not have much of an impact,

⁶⁴ Brune, 75

because there was little ethnic heterogeneity in the territory.⁶⁵ However, heterogeneity in the Federation is slightly stronger, which led to a decrease of municipalities under nationalist control from 124 to 76.⁶⁶ In 2005, USAID recognized this trend of increasing intraethnic political party competition, and sought to capitalize on this type of competition as a way to promote the election of moderates.⁶⁷ In this way it is clear that this system of voting can have positive effects of reducing the number of nationalists in parliament. However, as was made obvious in the election, ethnically homogeneous areas still have sufficient capacity to elect nationalists. A way to combat this, as has been suggested by some, is to make electoral districts more broad, so as to encompass more ethnicities.

October 2006 Elections

The October 2006 elections are described as both an encouraging and discouraging round of elections depending on who is doing the describing. These were the first elections wholly administered by the country's own authorities.⁶⁸ USAID was pleasantly surprised by the 55% turnout, though it is not as high as turnout was immediately following the conflict. During the lead-up to the elections, USAID increased efforts to strengthen independent media as a means of forcing politicians to respond to constituent wishes. Independent media serves as a way to educate the public about the different candidates – beyond the carefully prepared statements released by the candidates themselves. USAID reports that the higher than expected voter

⁶⁵ Belloni 80.

⁶⁶ Ibid, 85.

⁶⁷ Herman et al, 45

⁶⁸ OSCE. "First elections fully administered by Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities show further progress." Press Release. 2 October 2006. Accessed: 1 December 2009. <<http://www.osce.org/item/20825.html>>.

turnout is likely due to “better coverage drawing people to the polls.”⁶⁹ Public opinion polling was used to discover what issues constituents cared about, and then the media wrote stories about these issues. Each story was required to contain certain elements, one of which was the candidate’s stance on that issue.

What USAID did not report was that many point to the October 2006 elections as the triumph of moderate parties and candidates who adopted more nationalistic rhetoric in this particular election. There is a fear that their electoral success does not represent changing voting patterns, but more extreme moderates.⁷⁰ For example, in the Republika Srpska, the Party of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), generally considered a more moderate party, saw success in 2006. However, they were also espousing a nationalist ideology promoting separation from Sarajevo!⁷¹ On the other hand, it must be noted that 500,000 citizens signed a petition organized by GROZD, a politically minded civil society organization, asking candidates to adopt a “civil platform.” A civil platform meant that they would run an issues-based campaign and turn their backs on nationalist rhetoric. Unfortunately, as election results show, this petition was largely ineffective in getting moderate candidates elected.⁷²

Additionally, as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) reported, “Due to constitutional ethnicity-based limitations, these elections were again in violation of international standards and commitments for universal and equal suffrage.”⁷³ While the actual administration of the elections was relatively good, it is the voting patterns that should

⁶⁹ USAID. *Voters Not Politicians Set Agenda*. 7 February 2007. <http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/press/success/2007-02-07.html> Accessed: 1 December 2009

⁷⁰ Freedom House: Bosnia and Herzegovina and Belloni, 2

⁷¹ Belloni, 2

⁷² USAID May 2007, 15

⁷³ OSCE 2 October 2006

concern the international community, as well as the continuing constitutionally mandated ethnic quotas left over from the DPA, that preclude fully democratic elections in compliance with the European Convention of Human Rights.⁷⁴ The International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) deployed to observe the election reported that the real competition actually occurred among parties competing for an ethnic bloc's vote. Therefore, candidates were only trying to appeal to their ethnic group, not all ethnic groups.⁷⁵

These elections were largely dominated by debate over the April 2006 constitutional changes that failed to pass in parliament.⁷⁶ Parties used these failed proposals for constitutional change as a springboard for espousing nationalist rhetoric. The April 2006 constitutional changes included alterations to the ethnic quotas in the State-level House of Peoples to allow for the inclusion of non-Serbs, non-Croats, and non-Muslims ("others"). It also proposed changes to the organization of the presidency to allow for greater efficiency. There would be one president accompanied by two vice-presidents, and the president position would rotate among the three every 16 months.⁷⁷ At present, the chair of the presidency rotates every 8 months, which leads to mass inefficiency.

An interesting twist in this election – the SDP, a party historically supported by Bosniaks, nominated a Croat for the presidency. On the surface this appears to be a breakthrough - that a historically Muslim party would nominate a Croat. However, because of the ethnic quotas, only

⁷⁴ International Election Observation Mission (IEOM): Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 October 2006 General Elections – OSCE. "Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions." 2 October 2006. <www.osce.org/item/1525.html>. Accessed: 1 December 2009, 2

⁷⁵ IEOM 2006: 3.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 5

⁷⁷ Council of Europe: Parliamentary Assembly. Resolution 1513: Constitutional Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2006. <http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta06/ERes1513.htm#P15_98#P15_98>. Accessed: 5 December 2009

one Croat could be elected to the presidency. Because Bosniaks make up a greater percentage of the Federation's population it was highly possible that they would end up getting to choose *both* presidents – the Croat SDP candidate as well as whichever Bosniak candidate won the most votes.⁷⁸ This clearly upset the Croats and overshadowed the positive aspects of Muslims wanting to nominate a Croat representative. It also shows the injustice of constitutionally mandated ethnic quotas.

Political Party Assistance

An Introduction

Now it is time to consider what the US has been doing in Bosnia and what it can do to help Bosnia during its transition to democracy. In recent years, particularly after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, it seems as though democracy promotion has been interpreted as a dirty tactic used by an imperialist US that wants to get its way. While, the US explicitly does *not* follow a policy of regime change, there is certainly a fine line between supporting the opposition reformist elements in an authoritarian society and supporting regime change. There are certainly instances where the regime change may be the only way to achieve genuine democratic progress, but the US does not follow a regime change policy. There are two guiding principles that direct US political party assistance (PPA) strategy, one of which is that the US does not seek to determine election outcomes. The other is that PPA can only support representative, multi-party democracies.⁷⁹

It seems rather naïve, and in all honesty impractical, to believe that the United States does not seek to determine election outcomes, while seeking to promote the construction of

⁷⁸ Council of Europe, 6

⁷⁹ USAID. *USAID Political Party Assistance Strategy*. September 2003

democratic governments, which can only be achieved if democratic elements are elected. The US carefully lays out a policy that prevents them from supporting any particular democratic element over any other. In this way political party assistance does not ‘seek to determine election outcomes’, because it equally assists any party that meets its requirements for assistance.

Before examining the ways in which the US conducts political party assistance, it is useful to look at the policies that dictate what the US specifically can and cannot do in terms of assistance. USAID, the government’s main body that engages in political party assistance, produced a Political Party Assistance Strategy in 2003 that is meant to guide USAID actions and those of the NGOs to which it contracts. Three NGOs in particular stand out as major recipients of USAID democracy promotion funding: the National Endowment for Democracy, the National Democratic Institute, and the International Republican Institute. This strategy dictates the type of projects for which the organizations can request funding. The main tenets of the strategy are listed below:

- Any entity that competes for elected office, and is democratic in nature, is eligible for funding
- All efforts must be made to equitably support all democratic parties in a country
- Funding cannot seek to determine elections in favor of a particular candidate or party
- Commodity support cannot exceed \$50,000 annually
- PPA must be suspended within a reasonable amount of time before elections
- No cash grants
- No fees or wages can be paid to any political candidate
- No organized events or media buys that endorse or feature a single candidate
- Programs cannot directly endorse a candidate

- No non-democratic party can benefit from funding

Notably, as with many policies, there is a waiver available. A waiver can be requested by USAID, the Department of State, or the National Security Council. Notably, the ability to request a waiver does not rest in the hands of Congress. It is a power reserved to the Executive branch. This may serve as a way to curb waiver requests, but it also significantly decreases Congressional oversight abilities. A waiver must undergo a lengthy bureaucratic process before it can be approved. An Action Memoranda must be written to the USAID administrator and it must clear many offices including State and USAID regional bureaus; State's Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor; USAID's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance; USAID's Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination; and USAID's Office of the General Counsel.⁸⁰ At no point does the policy specify that a waiver request must be made publicly available or even available to members of Congress. A waiver is available for any of the following:

- 1) The US can withhold assistance from a democratic entity seeking office if the entity represents a danger to a particular population
- 2) The US can provide funding to a non-democratic party if not doing so puts people at risk
- 3) The US can provide funding to a non-democratic party if there are expectations that reform is possible
- 4) The US can support one party, to the exclusion of others, if fragmenting assistance may undermine democratic goals.⁸¹

⁸⁰ USAID 2003

⁸¹ Ibid

The justifications for requesting a waiver are vague, and while no policy should be 100% inflexible for each situation is different, there is some concern that the vagueness of these exceptions could be exploited. That possibility risks deligitimizing US democracy assistance efforts, which already face serious allegations.

National Endowment for Democracy: Activities, Effectiveness, and Controversies

The National Endowment for Democracy is a major recipient of USAID's democracy development funds. Because most funding to NDI and IRI comes through NED, this paper will limit itself to a discussion of NED activities in the assumption that NED carefully allocates its funding to organizations that closely match its own goals. Additionally, evaluations of NED effectiveness necessarily reflect upon the effectiveness of NDI and IRI.

President Clinton, in his 1995 State of the Union address, stated that the best national security strategy was to support democracy elsewhere. The 1995 National Security Strategy reconfirmed this same sentiment, but went further to include "market democracies." That is to say that the US should not only seek to encourage political democracy, but also economic liberalism. This refocus on democracy represented a resurgence of Democratic Peace Theory dominance in policy-making. Democratic Peace Theory states that democracies are less likely to go to war with one another. During the 1990s the USG funded it at about \$30-35 million per year.⁸² Since this reintroduction of democracy promotion, democracy assistance has been fundamental in each subsequent National Security Strategy, and has played a prominent role in President Obama's foreign policy speeches abroad.

⁸² Scott, James M and Carrie A. Steele. "Assisting Democrats or Resisting Dictators? The Nature and Impact of Democracy Support by the United States National Endowment for Democracy, 1990-99". *Democratization*. 12, No. 4 (August 2005), 440.

NED's resource allocation is the best way to understand its program priorities.

Activity	Percentage of Total Funding
Worker Organization/Participation in Politics	26.3
Strengthening Civic Organizations/Participation in Politics	25.3
Strengthening Human Rights	10.9
Supporting Free Market Reform	10.8
Political Institution Building	9.9
Press/Media Development	8.9
Supporting Elections	6.0
Conflict Resolution	2.0

It is interesting to see that over half of NED's resources go towards encouraging participation in politics. It seems a little self-defeating to encourage citizen participation in politics instead of focusing activities on giving them something worthwhile as a participation incentive. Perhaps, if more money were spent on political institution building, then political parties would not be so fleeting and citizens would be more interested in participation.

Although, it is probable that funds going towards civilian participation in politics include efforts to put voters in touch with candidates. More constituent-politician dialogue educates politicians about their constituents' wishes and constituents about their candidates. There are also efforts to continue these types of communication after candidates and parties enter into office, although it is clear why a candidate may be less interested in such dialogue after elections. As mentioned

previously, Bosnia party assistance programs have recently begun concentrating on improving candidate-constituent communication through the use of field hearings. Field hearings are essentially a town-hall style meeting between constituents and candidates and elected officials. Their goal is to 1) hold officials more accountable and 2) to make constituents feel more integral to the political party process.⁸³

Effectiveness of NED is nearly impossible to determine. There have been empirical studies that completely contradict one another. The difficulty in determining effectiveness is the influence that other variables play in political change. These other variables include, socioeconomic factors such as cultural preconditions, levels of trade liberalization, and the degree to which the recipient country is integrated into the world economy.⁸⁴

NED serves as a donor agency. In 2008, they gave nearly \$1 million to democracy assistance programs in Bosnia.⁸⁵ Notably \$400,000 went to NDI where NDI further distributed the money into its own democracy assistance programs. \$274,541 went to supporting independent media. The fact that about 25% of the program funding went to independent media shows that NED really puts faith in the ability of independent media to promote democracy. Many of the individual media programs were focused on using media to increase voter awareness and using media for investigative journalism purposes to expose corrupt politicians.

Additionally, NED strongly funds programs targeted at youth participation in politics (at \$148, 579), which as we will see later is a group that does not participate at desired levels.

⁸³ USAID May 2007, 26

⁸⁴ Scott and Steele, 443

⁸⁵ National Endowment for Democracy. Central and Eastern Europe Grants 2008: Bosnia. <<http://www.ned.org/grants/08programs/grants-cee08.html#bosniaHerzegovina>>. Accessed: 7 December 2009. (All grant values are taken from the same source).

Youth are also most prone to radicalism in a depressed economic environment where unemployment is high. Also, the particular challenge in Bosnia is that much of the youth has no memory of living in a geographically ethnically heterogeneous society. Because Bosnia is much more regionally homogenous, it is important for the youth to be exposed to interethnic politics and dialogue as much as possible.

Two areas that perhaps should see more funding are very critical and problematic in Bosnia – interethnic dialogue and minority rights. A human rights group received a little less than \$30,000 to support civil society organizations dedicated to the protection of minority rights. Similarly, an interethnic dialogue program received just under \$25,000. It is possible that these types of programs are funded from another source, but it is surprising that NED, the primary democracy promotion organization in the US, does so little with them.

Current US Political Party Assistance Actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina

In spring 2007, USAID put forth its goals for its next democracy and governance program in Bosnia. It laid out six goals for the program:

- 1) Most importantly, USAID wants to dedicate itself to creating favorable conditions for constitutional change. Constitutional reform is the primary goal, because it has come to light how badly the DPA has translated into a constitution.
- 2) USAID is concerned with improving Bosnia's democracy qualifications so it can successfully apply for NATO membership.
- 3) USAID seeks to enable the country to adopt EU standards.
- 4) USAID seeks to strengthen the state parliament's ability to propose, debate, and enact legislation

- 5) USAID wants to strengthen a state-based rule of law in an effort to create greater national unity and remove rule of law legislation from the entity level
- 6) USAID will focus on cross-entity local governance and decentralization⁸⁶

All of these goals seem worthwhile, but strengthening local governance must be done carefully with full consideration of potentially negative consequences. USAID recognizes the state government's inefficiency and inefficacy, but instead of focusing on combating the competing national visions, USAID has decided to concentrated itself at the local level, which does little to combat the inefficiency at the state level.⁸⁷ USAID recognizes that there is no consensus as to what a Bosnian state should look like among all Bosnians. Bosniak leaders want a unified state free of the two entities. The Republika Srpska on the other hand wants to maintain its independence and frequently talks of seeking total autonomy through secession.⁸⁸ It seems logical to conclude that a strengthening of local government further detracts from the power of the state. Additionally, because local governments are ethnically homogenous for the most part, courtesy of the ethnic cleansing that occurred during the conflict, strengthening local governments risks further strengthens citizens' beliefs that it is only *their* ethnic leaders who can provide for them. Whereas, if efforts were focused at the national level, there is a chance that over time citizens would come to trust a multiethnic national government.

If efforts are to be taken to strengthen local governments, they must be accompanied by efforts to increase dialogue among communities. Even the more heterogeneous communities specifically avoid natural situations where interethnic communication would take place, such as schools. There are schools where measures are taken to make sure that same-age students of

⁸⁶ USAID. *Bosnia-Herzegovina Democracy and Governance Assessment*. May 2007.

⁸⁷ USAID May 2007, 21.

⁸⁸ USAID May 2007, 6

different ethnicities do not interact.⁸⁹ There is one more reason to rightfully focus on the local level. Evidence of violence is much higher at the local level, meaning that violence was the result of local conditions rather than a national phenomenon as occurred during the conflict.⁹⁰ Because of this, it does seem critical to make more efforts at improving local governance. It must be reiterated, however, that strengthening local governance to the exclusion of national governance could have some very real negative effects that would be difficult to overcome in the future.

USAID is very cognizant of the fact that quality of life and economic progress will have strong impacts on how willing people are to take risks.⁹¹ An increase in the standard of living will increase faith in a strengthened state. If quality of life fails to improve, people will look locally for help, rather than to the national government, which has failed to prove its ability to help. With the understanding that a stronger national government must be created from the bottom up, USAID has chosen to focus on the demand side. That is to say, USAID will use civil society to create the momentum for citizens to demand more accountable and efficient state government. USAID will also seek to convince local actors to work with one another to participate nationally. In this way, working locally could have very positive results, provided that the more local actors are more conscious of the issues than ethnicity. This could work, because in order to win an election in an ethnically homogeneous area, it stands to reason that the differences between candidates are more issue-based than nationalist candidates. There are electoral process changes that will be discussed later that could do much to encourage issue-

⁸⁹ Herman et al., 20

⁹⁰ Ibid, 25

⁹¹ USAID May 2007, 21

based candidates with cross-ethnic appeal. As electoral processes currently stand, nationalist politicians are elected with ease

As for political party assistance, USAID categorizes its efforts in three categories: 1) enhancing electoral competitiveness of parties, 2) party-building, organizational development, and internal democracy, and 3) aiding parties in legislatures and governance.⁹² The three categories largely relate to the developmental stage of the democracy. Category three developments are more appropriate to more developed democracies. According to USAID analysis, Bosnia is most in need of activities in the third category – aiding parties in legislature and governance. USAID believes that it should no longer work at building parties at the grassroots level, because local politics are already overly partisan. *Note: For clarity's sake – working on local governance is different than trying to create political parties at the local level. Local governance improvement is what USAID wants to focus on. Creating new political parties is not what USAID wants to achieve.* Nor will USAID seek to strengthen the entities because the end goal is a strong national government and weak entity governments. Instead USAID will help elected officials in their roles as parliamentarians.⁹³

Providing training to parliamentarians so that they may more effectively legislate will likely be a large part of USAID programming in Bosnia. USAID anticipates that these activities will include training candidates on how to more effectively do constituent services, which includes the previously mentioned field hearings. USAID will do training for politicians on how to research policy alternatives and perform financial analyses for policies. USAID is also concerned with promoting internal party democracy. Internal party democracy efforts will include advocating inclusive party

⁹² USAID: *A Study of Political Party Assistance in Eastern Europe and Eurasia*. June 2007, ii.

⁹³ USAID May 2007, 26

membership campaigns, broader issue-based campaigns, membership development, open candidate selection, and overall more transparent processes.

Political Party Assistance Critiques

USAID has moved beyond using elections as the marker of democratic success. USAID documents critique the over-emphasis that USAID previously placed on elections.⁹⁴ Elections themselves do not actually create a “system” by which new parties can develop and govern effectively. There is also concern that USAID has historically had a disproportionate focus around election time, when assistance is necessary year-round. A focus at election time can disillusion the citizens, as well as encourage disingenuity on the part of the political parties themselves who can misuse USAID programs simply to increase their election chances.

Thomas Carothers, a scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is one of the most prolific and vocal analysts of political party assistance. He argues that there are two approaches to political party assistance, both of which are necessary, but each are distinct. There is the political approach and the developmental approach. The political approach focuses on elections and the political struggle between democrats and non-democrats. It directs aid at important political processes such as elections, parties, and political civil societies. The developmental approach is a much slower approach that focuses on integrating the values of equality and justice. It recognizes the socioeconomic effects in politics more than does the political approach. It emphasizes good governance

⁹⁴ USAID June 2007, v

and a well-functioning state.⁹⁵ The political approach can be overly confrontational and the developmental approach risks being overly ineffective.

Methods of assistance for the political track include training, advice, moral support, and funding to political actors themselves or NGOs.⁹⁶ In this capacity, the US would actively support dissidents against non-democratic authoritarian or semi-authoritarian governments. In many cases it can be a direct challenge to the host government. US activities in Bosnia are less of a direct challenge, because Bosnia is a democracy. The US is trying to challenge extreme nationalist elements – not overthrow a political system of governance.

Proponents of the development approach believe that by supporting overall socioeconomic development, the space is created to increase the demand, thus creation, of political and civil rights.⁹⁷ However, some academics argue that this reasoning is inherently flawed. As people become wealthier, inequality between the poorest and the wealthiest can rise. Even though everyone's overall income levels may rise, the wealthy have a disproportionate effect on policies. Therefore, increasing levels of inequality can lead to an even more disproportionate effect of the wealthy on policies.⁹⁸ Inequality can also lead to decreased electoral turnout, depressed political engagement, political polarization, or a potential overlap with religious or ethnic divides. Additionally, some academics point to the success of China as a country that is achieving the economic part of socioeconomic development, as an example of economic growth *not* leading to an

⁹⁵ Carothers, Thomas. "Democracy Assistance: Political vs. developmental" *Journal of Democracy*. 20: No. 1 (January 2009), 5

⁹⁶ Carothers 2009, 7

⁹⁷ Carothers 2009, 9

⁹⁸ Bermeo, Nancy. "Does Electoral Democracy Boost Economic Equality?" *Journal of Democracy*. 20: No. 4 (October 2009), 25

increase in political and civil rights. In fact, some are concerned that the economic success of China presents a problem for democracy assistance, because it serves as an example that a country can be economically viable without allowing political democracy.⁹⁹

The weaknesses of each approach warrant consideration. The political approach can be weak because it can be overly episodic. It can lead to strong democratic electoral results but overall weak governance and democracy. The developmental approach can be very difficult to evaluate. It is also unable to take advantage of events that could lead to a change in the demand for democratic change, whereas political assistance can rapidly react to events that may precipitate positive changes.¹⁰⁰

What does understanding these two approaches mean to Bosnia? First of all, one of the most common lessons learned from Bosnia is that elections cannot be pushed.¹⁰¹ Because elections occurred so quickly after the end of the violence, and because of the electoral system that was put into place, voters were more likely to vote for a nationalist candidate. The DPA's effects have previously been laid out, but it is worthwhile to mention the biggest electoral effects of the Dayton accords: Only a person who identifies as Serb, Croat, or Muslim (Bosniak) can be elected to the presidency and representation in the state-level House of People's is equally proportioned according to ethnicity. The United States adopted an overly political approach to political party assistance in the early years in Bosnia. While the political approach is important, perhaps it was too strong, or maybe too strong in certain areas, and not strong enough in others. For

⁹⁹ Carothers, Thomas. "A Quarter Century of Promoting Democracy." *Journal of Democracy*. 18: No. 4 (October 2007), 115.

¹⁰⁰ Carothers 2009, 10 and 11

¹⁰¹ Murphy

example, high levels of participation are important and suggest that the get out the vote campaigns were successful. However, because the United States did not give enough attention to the electoral system or the rules regarding absentee voting, nationalist candidates found it easy to get elected. Now a situation has been created that requires relying more heavily on the slower, developmental approach, but, unfortunately, the work is much harder now that nationalist parties and candidates are so deeply entrenched in Bosnia's political system.

USAID recognizes that a greater emphasis must be placed on capacity building of parties and politicians to communicate and respond to constituents. Part of responding to constituents is making policy that reflects constituent wishes. Not only do candidates rarely communicate with constituents, but they rarely make policy! So, USAID has begun supporting field hearings where politicians go back to their districts and listen and talk to their constituents. Additionally, USAID is becoming more involved in helping politicians actually learn how to make policy.

Another important critique of US political party assistance is the types of electoral systems that the US accepts or even prefers. Proportional representation does not necessarily represent those who need representation most desperately, it simply allows for representation of the non-majority.¹⁰² The US so readily accepts the idea of proportional representation because it is the dominant method in Western Europe. In Bosnia parties did not create themselves naturally. Parties have not matured, and at this point in Bosnia, they are almost strictly ethnically based. Parties do not have issue platforms that people can comfortably choose between. Nor do parties cooperate

¹⁰² Simon, Thomas William. "The Injustice of Procedural Democracy" in *Reconstructing Multiethnic Societies: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 25.

effectively to achieve a middle ground once elected. There is no established party system to ensure funding despite a poor electoral showing. A poor electoral showing probably means death for an emerging political party.¹⁰³ This type of political environment means that parties come and go, and the most important consideration is a good showing in elections. Because moderates are consistently trying to catch up with the nationalist parties that saw electoral success so early on in Bosnia, they are in a constant uphill battle. Nationalism is a trend running on inertia. Candidates get elected by being nationalist, so the next set of candidates that want to be elected adopt a nationalist platform too. The hardest part is finding a way to break this cycle.

Some academics argue that the US should seek electoral reform in Bosnia that would significantly alter the way in which candidates are elected. First, most everyone points to the importance of constitutional reform to alter the undemocratic ethnic quotas. Secondly, one other electoral reform suggestion is the implementation of the Quota Borda System of elections.¹⁰⁴ This is a system in which a candidate's success depends upon the opinion of every constituent within his or her district. The way it works is this: on Election Day a voter would receive a ballot listing all the candidates for an office. They would then rank candidates according to their preferences. It could be a full set of rankings where every candidate receives a rank, or the voter could rank their top 5 or so (every candidate that did not receive a rank, essentially receives a rank of "0"). The winner is then determined by the candidate receiving the highest number of points taken from the rankings.

¹⁰³ Carothers, Thomas. *Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies*. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2006), 56

¹⁰⁴ Emerson, Peter. "How a Quota Borda System of Elections May Facilitate Reconciliation" in *Reconstructing Multiethnic Societies: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 148

The logic is that each ethnicity is likely to give their first votes to the more nationalist candidates according to ethnicity, but by necessity their subsequent votes would have to go to the least offensive candidates of another ethnicity. In this way moderates have a better chance of coming out on top. It also encourages candidates to try to adopt a cross-ethnic appeal.¹⁰⁵ Of course, like any system, it has its shortcomings. Collusion is always a possibility where candidates essentially try to trade votes with other candidates by urging their constituents to vote in a certain patterned way. Also, unless the country is prepared to null ballots that do not have a sufficient number of rankings, voters can simply refuse to vote for more than one person per office.

Conclusion

The latest report from the Office of the High Representative is a mixture of pessimism and optimism – a theme that plagues Bosnia. Every step forward is accompanied by a half-step back. Progress is accompanied by very real setbacks. The High Representative praised the passing of a Constitutional Amendment in January 2009, the first in Bosnia. While this amendment does not address the most pressing issues, such as the ethnic quota requirements in government, it did successfully ensure that Brcko, a problem area for Bosnia was dealt with satisfactorily to all three ethnicities.¹⁰⁶

On the other hand, the High Representative expressed concern over the Republika Srpska's increasing challenges to the Office of the High Representative's decisions, as

¹⁰⁵ Emerson, 150

¹⁰⁶ Inzko, Valentin. 35th Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. May 21, 2009. <http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/default.asp?content_id=43537>. Accessed: 6, December 2009.

well as increasing support among elected officials for a referendum of independence in the Republika Srpska. Milorad Dodik, the one-time moderate of the SNSD party and current leader of Republika Srpska, has been increasingly vocal in calling for a referendum.¹⁰⁷ The October 2006 national elections are a prime example of *almost* progressive change. Moderate candidates were elected instead of hardline nationalists, but those moderate candidates adopted more nationalist platforms during the campaign. They are still a more progressive choice than the hardline nationalists, but it really is one step forward and a half-step back.

Much of the current challenges facing Bosnia were probably inevitable; however, the Dayton Peace Accords provided a far from perfect constitutional framework. As stated previously, its importance in ending the violence is unquestionable, but its inability to serve as a Constitution is also unquestionable. Presently, USAID is correct to focus on achieving constitutional reforms that will better enable elections to conform to international standards. The entrenched ethnic divisions following the conflict are a result of the Dayton Peace Accords, attitudes from the international community, as well as the “success” of the ethnic cleansing. The country is, for the most part, effectively territorially divided by ethnicity. While the 2000 Constitutional Court decision ensured that every ethnicity is considered a constituent people of each entity, canton, municipality, etc., the way in which political representatives are elected does not adequately ensure that all citizens are represented in the national legislature. The few electoral changes must be further improved and extended to the national parliaments and

¹⁰⁷ Inzko

presidency. It is simply undemocratic to have Bosnian citizens, born and raised, who can never run for president.

Furthermore, the weak state governmental institutions must be strengthened, another area that USAID recognizes. However, USAID is choosing to follow a path of increasing local governance as a primary concern. While this is a valid area on which to focus due to some positive changes such as the increasing election of moderates, there must continue to be efforts at the national level. Without an improved national government, Bosnia risks falling apart if the citizens see no reason to remain a part of a unified state. The fact that there are three competing visions for what a Bosnian state should even look like is very problematic, and also very difficult to change. One of the best ways to try to alter this is through interethnic dialogue and cooperation. USAID must be more proactive in finding ways to increase interethnic dialogue. Separating school children by ethnicity is antithetical to trying to build a unified national vision.

There is much left to work on, but it is not hopeless. When voter turnout began to drop, non-voters were asked why they did not vote. It was not apathy. For the most part, the non-voters were young people who simply did not feel as though they had a worthwhile candidate to choose.¹⁰⁸ They said they were concerned over issues such as unemployment and education opportunities, and that none of the candidates spoke to their concerns. This shows that there is a new generation coming that is more concerned with the practicalities of everyday life. If the United States and the EU countries can support this new wave of people; there is hope that the nationalist rhetoric will eventually die out. If the state can prove its ability to affect change and govern efficiently in response to

¹⁰⁸ Herman et al, 40

constituent concerns, Bosnia will eventually heal. The hardest part is figuring out how to do that.

Understanding how Bosnia developed politically after the Dayton Peace Accords can help the international community avoid similar pitfalls in future conflict resolution cases. In future peace accords, more attention must be given to how the peace accords will influence elections. Additionally, elections must not be rushed, because rushed elections can lead to results that repeat themselves in a cycle that is difficult to break. More consideration must be given to electoral systems in the future, because they can significantly affect the way people vote, the way people campaign, and the way people get elected. The electoral system in Bosnia is such that it is very easy for nationalist candidates to get elected. The homogeneous districts, the difficulties in refugee return and absentee ballot voting, and the initial rules of single-member districts and closed party lists all contributed to the rise of nationalist candidates in Bosnia. Some of these issues have been addressed, but some remain. Culture is not static. Whether one subscribes to the ancient ethnic hatred thesis or not, ideas change. New generations come forward. The path towards a unified, democratic Bosnia will be filled with setbacks, but with the support of the United States and the European Union Bosnia will eventually complete its journey.

REFERENCES

- Brune, Lester H. *The United States and the Balkan Crisis 1990-2005*. Claremont: Regina Books (2005)
- Belloni, Roberto. *State-building and International Intervention in Bosnia*. New York: Routledge. (2007), 2
- Bermeo, Nancy. "Does Electoral Democracy Boost Economic Equality." *Journal of Democracy*. 20: No. 4 (October 2009)
- Bieber, Florian. "Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon: Historical Lessons of Two Multi-religious States." *Third World Quarterly*. 21, No. 2 (April 2000).
- Bieber, Florian. "Chapter Five: The Challenge of Democracy in Divided Societies: Lessons from Bosnia – Challenges for Kosovo." In *Reconstructing Multiethnic Societies: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina*. Eds. Dezmel Sokolovic and Florian Bieber. Burlington: Ashgate (2001), 109.
- Carothers, Thomas. "A Quarter Century of Promoting Democracy." *Journal of Democracy*. 18: No. 4 (October 2007).
- Carothers, Thomas. *Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies*. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2006).
- Carothers, Thomas. "Democracy Assistance: Political vs. developmental" *Journal of Democracy*. 20: No. 1 (January 2009):
- CIA World Factbook. Bosnia and Herzegovina. <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html>>. Accessed: 5 December 2009.
- Constitutional Court of Bosnia Herzegovina. Decision: U-5/98. <<http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/odluke/index.php?src=2#>>. Accessed: 5 December 2009

Council of Europe: Parliamentary Assembly. Resolution 1513: Constitutional Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2006.

Department of State: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. *Background Note: Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Updated: August 2009. Accessed: 15 November 2009.
<<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2868.htm>>.

Emerson, Peter. "How a Quota Borda System of Elections May Facilitate Reconciliation." In *Reconstructing Multi-ethnic Societies: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina*. Eds. Dezmel Sokolovic and Florian Bieber. Burlington: Ashgate (2001).

Freedom House. Country Report: Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009.
<<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2009&country=7571>>.
Accessed: 5 December 2009

Herman, Robert, Mara Galaty and Lawrence Robertson. *USAID Bosnia-Herzegovina Conflict Assessment*. USAID. July 2005

International Election Observation Mission (IEOM): Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 October 2006
General Elections – OSCE. "Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions." 2
October 2006. <www.osce.org/item/1525.html>. Accessed: 1 December 2009

Inzko, Valentin. 35th Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace
Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
May 21, 2009. <http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/default.asp?content_id=43537>.
Accessed: 6, December 2009.

Judah, Time. *Kosovo What Everyone Needs to Know*. New York: Oxford University Press.
(2008).

Kaldor, Mary. *New & Old Wars*. Stanford: Stanford University Press (2007).

Malcolm, Noel. *Bosnia: A Short History*. New York: New York University Press (1996).

Malcolm, Noel and Aleksa Djilas. "Is Kosovo Real? The Battle Over History Continues."

Foreign Affairs. January/February 1999. <<http://www.foreignaffairs.com>>.

Murphy, Damian. (Legislative Assistant for Foreign Policy and Defense, Senator Robert Casey Jr.), in discussion with the author, 11 November 2009.

National Endowment for Democracy. Central and Eastern Europe Grants 2008: Bosnia.

<<http://www.ned.org/grants/08programs/grants-cee08.html#bosniaHerzegovina>>.

Accessed: 7 December 2009.

OSCE. "First elections fully administered by Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities show further progress." Press Release. 2 October 2006. Accessed: 1 December 2009.

<<http://www.osce.org/item/20825.html>>.

Scott, James M and Carrie A. Steele. "Assisting Democrats or Resisting Dictators? The Nature and Impact of Democracy Support by the United States National Endowment for Democracy, 1990–99". *Democratization*. 12, No. 4 (August 2005): 440

Simon, Thomas William. "The Injustice of Procedural Democracy" in *Reconstructing Multiethnic Societies: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina*. Eds. Dezmel Sokolovic and Florian Bieber. Burlington: Ashgate (2001)

Tanter, Raymond. "Europe in the Present Tense." *International Studies Review*. 3: No. 3 (Autumn 2001),

USAID. *Voters Not Politicians Set Agenda*. 7 February 2007.

<http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/press/success/2007-02-07.html>

Accessed: 1 December 2009

USAID. *USAID Political Party Assistance Strategy*. September 2003.

USAID. *Bosnia-Herzegovina Democracy and Governance Assessment*. May 2007.

USAID: *A Study of Political Party Assistance in Eastern Europe and Eurasia*. June 2007.

Venice Commission. "Opinion of the implementation of Decision U-5/98 of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia Herzegovina by the amendments to the Constitution of the Republika Srpska." 25 October 2002. <[http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2002/CDL-AD\(2002\)024-e.asp](http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2002/CDL-AD(2002)024-e.asp)>. Accessed 5 December 2009.

World Bank. Gross Domestic Product Bosnia and Herzegovina. < www.google.com/publicdata>. Accessed: 5 December 2009.