

The Effect of the Domestic Deployment of Armed Forces on Crime: The Case of Monterrey, Mexico

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Abstract

Before 2005, Monterrey, Mexico's third-largest city, was one of the wealthiest and safest cities in all of Latin America. In 2006, previously dormant drug cartels started a new campaign of violence against other cartels, the government, police, and civilians. In 2007 the less corrupt and more efficient Mexican Army was brought into the city to fight the cartels because the police forces were proving to be inadequate. This paper seeks to explore the change that the presence of the Mexican Army has had on crime in Monterrey during the period of 2007-2010. I found that while the military was able to reduce crime during specific operations, its presence had no effect on the level of crime in general, and contributed to an increase in organized crime. In terms of perception, the military made citizens feel more secure yet the increased organized crime made citizens feel less safe.

Introduction to the Situation in Monterrey

Monterrey is the third largest city in Mexico and is located in the north-east of the country, about six hours south of San Antonio and about twelve hours north of Mexico City. The city was first founded in 1577 by a Portuguese monk, and then again in 1596 by Don Diego de Montemayor, a Spaniard. Monterrey did not begin to obtain importance until they established heavy mining, metal, cement, and glass industries during the Porfirio era of 1877-1910. After the Mexican revolution of 1910 and the subsequent industrialization of the entire country, Monterrey began to undergo a rapid growth in population, urbanization, industrialization, and economic activity. Their economic strength has continued due to their close proximity to the United States border and to Monterrey's effective trading relations and investment strategies. As recently as 2005 Monterrey was voted as the most secure city in all of Latin America by *América Economía* (Business Magazine), and as one of the best cities to do business.

Partly due to this high standard of living and dynamic economic activity many high-level drug traffickers from different cartels based in other states moved to

Monterrey starting in about 1995. During these first few years, the cartel members kept low profiles and therefore violence was kept to a minimum. Unfortunately, they eventually brought their conflicts with them and began to fight amongst themselves, with the violence coming to a head in 2006. 2006 is considered by all to be the worst year in terms of violence, with various execution-style killing every day. Violent strikes against authorities (previously unthinkable) started February 13th, 2006 with the assassinations of the Director of Police of the municipality of San Pedro, Héctor Ayala, and of the Secretary of Security of Sabinas, Javier García Rodríguez.

In 2007 the federal government sent increased federal protection to the state of Nuevo Leon (of which Monterrey is the capital) because of the skyrocketing drug violence. On the 26th of January 2007 the federal military began Operation Nuevo Leon (*Operativo Nuevo León*)¹, which involved taking control of the entire city by establishing checkpoints and sending out roving military inspectors. The federal troops did not have the full support of the Nuevo Leon government, encountering resistance especially from the governor, Natividad Gonzales Parás. The government felt that the measure was unnecessary and that they could handle the violence themselves, but nevertheless allowed the troops to execute their mission.

In June of 2009 another major operation was launched, this time with full cooperation of the Nuevo Leon government, with a focus on cleaning up the police force.² Dozens of police officers were discovered to be corrupt, and then arrested and processed through the judicial system. The military was the driving force behind this operation, with the soldiers serving as the arresting officers for the

¹ Talavera, Gabriel. "Pega Al Sexenio Violencia Inedita." *El Norte* [Monterrey] 1 Oct. 2009: Local 1. Print.

² Ibid.

police. In fact, many of the detained police officers were taken away in Army vehicles.^{3,4}

It should be mentioned as well that elections were held in July of 2009 to elect local district representatives, mayors, and for the governors of the states of Campeche, Colima, Nuevo León, Querétaro, San Luís Potosí and Sonora. The newly elected officials assumed power on October 4th of 2009. Many criminals (especially members of organized crime) took advantage of the temporary disorganization in authority structures and lack of clear planning of the new government.

The situation at the present is still unclear. The military is still in Monterrey, but with a lack of direction. The drug violence has been increasing in complexity and severity, authority structures and institutions are alternately infiltrated from within or attacked outright, and police and military roles remain nebulous and constantly changing.

There is a large gap in knowledge as to how the presence of the military has affected the social fabric of Monterrey. This paper will concentrate on how the military has affected crime, but not necessarily narcotrafficking-related crime. Experts in this area warned me not to delve too deeply into anything narco-related due to the danger related to this type of work. Therefore I will focus on the impact that the military has had on crime, specifically that its presence had no overall effect on crime in general, yet it did contribute to an increase in organized crime. Of special interest is the fact that the military *was*, in fact, able to reduce crime during

³ "Vuelven Operativos Contra los Policías" *El Norte* [Monterrey] 18 June 2009: <http://busquedas.gruporeforma.com/elnorte/Documentos/DocumentoImpresa.aspx>

⁴ Notimex. "Ejército Y Policía Hacen Operativo En Nuevo León." *El Economista*. 1 June 2009. Web. <<http://eleconomista.com.mx/notas-online/politica/2009/06/01/ejercito-policia-hacen-operativo-nuevo-leon>>.

specific operations. In terms of perception, the presence of the military made citizens feel more secure yet the associated increase in organized crime made citizens feel less safe.



Theoretical Framework

The theories of militarization must be prefaced with an explanation of other countries that have been militarized and the effects on crime. Our first theory comes from Brazil, where over the past few decades, they have embarked on a path very similar to Mexico's. Faced with severe cases of police brutality and corruption and a growing drug trade, Brazil looked for a new method of securing public order. To make things easier, the Brazilian constitution even mixes issues of domestic safety with external security, essentially making militarization constitutionally valid. This militarization in Brazil (as in Mexico) was initiated by the civilian political elite, with the conscious support or acquiescence of the majority of the population. To outside human rights observers, the results have not been positive; massive human rights violations occur with no punishment for the military actors committing these crimes. There have been reports of enormous military operations, even involving tanks and parachutists, which have turned fatal in attempts to quell simple worker strikes or popular civilian protests.

The theoretical implication of this militarization in Brazil (or in any militarized region) is that crimes against public safety are now transformed into crimes against national security. This same phenomenon was observed by Haley Duschinski in the Kashmir region, which is also under military police control. Duschinski states that "the waging of perpetual warfare leads to a blurring of boundaries between 'crimes

of war' and 'crimes of peace,' producing a continuum of violence that scales from the routine violence of everyday social spaces [...] to the spectacular violence of hot zones [...]."⁵ Organized crime contributes to this continuum of crime and violence and to this waging of perpetual warfare. This continuum of violence is seen in Monterrey, as narcotraffickers move deftly between hiring teenage delinquents to do small jobs and using enormous quantities of automatic weapons to wage full-scale warfare with military forces. As narcotraffickers are attacked in their main activity (i.e. producing drugs and transporting them), they discover new criminal ways to control their supply routes, to keep steady revenues coming in, and to keep from facing judicial action. This is then manifested in wave of new types of crimes, crimes that might not have even been associated with organized crime in the first place.

One criticism of militarization (and an explanation for why crime increases during militarization) is that the more robust the military political culture is, the more fragile is the liberal political one. In other words, treating crime as a solely military problem to be solved by military deployment instead of a social problem only helps to strengthen the military presence in the political arena. This in turn, makes it very difficult to address the crime problem through structural changes (for example, changing the corrupt nature of the police forces). (Zaverucha, 2000) This explains why crime goes down during specific operations, but why these are only very short-term solutions. In a sort of Catch-22 scenario, militarization occurs because the police are doing an inadequate job in maintaining public security, either

⁵ Haley Duschinski *Destiny Effects: Militarization, State Power and Punitive Containment in Kashmir Valley*. p.694

because they are corrupt or inefficient. But the introduction of military forces further leads to disincentives for the police forces to do their jobs—they continue to be poorly paid, trained and equipped. Now with militarization they are further marginalized; as in the case of Monterrey, municipal police officers have had their weapons taken away and responsibilities stripped. In Zaverucha's words, this has made it that much easier for these slighted police officers "to cross the line between legality and illegality, becoming delinquents trained at the taxpayers' expense."

Besides the relationship between the police force and the military being worsened, what causes an increase in crime is the fact that legal boundaries of the social contract are commonly violated. What this means is that because militaries operate on another, immune, plane without fear of punishment for their human rights violations, and because of the collapse of police forces, violence breaks out. Violence is the visible symptom of institutional failure, which can be manifested in a crime wave. As Zaverucha quotes "...the essence of violence is the absence of legitimating rules to which the actors can refer—in that sense the silence that prevails when only the gun speaks." In Monterrey, the gun does indeed speak. We can see how the military changed patterns of crime and how crime responded to specific military operations or lack thereof.

Another case in which the use of the military in a domestic security capacity has had a large effect on crime, public safety and feelings of safety among residents is that of Tajikistan. Tajikistan, like Mexico, suffers from a drug trafficking problem, and has seen a clear link between organized crime and military involvement in their war against drugs. The primary reason why crime has risen in Tajikistan after the introduction of military forces is because transnational criminal groups have a

vested interest in asserting political influence. These groups have a strong need to control political workings in order to maintain the steady flow of the financial gains from drug trafficking. Political actors also have their own needs, including the most important need of *staying* in power. Accordingly, between these extreme points of criminal and ideological/political motives we can see groups with different degrees of both. "At one point in the spectrum there appears to be a situation that can be characterized in terms of a 'grey area', where organized crime and political violence cannot be separated from one another." (Johan Engvall, 2006) Because of this "grey area" the political actors must accept a certain level of crime in order to maintain their power. The militarization of Monterrey has provoked a battle between corrupt political actors who want to stay in power (by supporting organized crime) and the military that fights directly against organized crime. Again, as in Brazil and Kashmir, a lack of clear distinctions creates a vacuum, a vacuum that is filled by a crime wave.

This is not to say that all cases point to the fact that militarization always leads to greater levels of violence and crime. Jonathan Goodhand applies a model established by Snyder to explain why in some parts of Afghanistan drugs and corruption have actually stabilized the political order, whereas in other areas they have fuelled disorder. There is no universal, one-directional relationship between drugs, corruption, and conflict but rather that bargaining, when successful, leads to stable interdependencies. According to this model, counter-narcotics policies actually fuel conflict; the increasing militarization of this battle may lead to an even greater general deterioration of the social fabric, thereby causing the levels of violence and crime to increase. This is because certain political actors or police officers have engaged in bargaining with narcotraffickers (for example, they accept

bribes or their family has been threatened) and if they are arrested or detained by the military, the contract between these actors and organized crime has been broken. Due to the disrupted contracts and bargains, there will be more jockeying for power and control over politics, and therefore crime will increase.

This, combined with the example of Tajikistan, can give us insight into why a disruption in the corrupt police/narcotrafficker relationship can lead to disproportionately greater quantities of violence. Applying this bargaining model to the case of Brazil can help us to further understand why a disintegration in the relationship between the police forces, the military, and narcotraffickers can demonstrate the failure of the process of the institutionalization of conflict, since the boundaries of the social contract have been violated. The face of this failure, as Zaverucha states, is a wave of violence.

In order to fight the violence and crime stemming from narcotrafficking, it is necessary to focus on the violence and crime directly (Aguilar V. and G. Castañeda, 2006). In this work the authors describe the " Colombia Plan " to champion how militarization can lead to drops in crime. They give as evidence how Alvaro Uribe was able to lower the 2000 level of executions and assassinations from 236 and 26,540 respectively, to 37 and 16,140 by 2008, and the number of kidnapping from 3,572 to 437 during the same time period.⁶ The reason for this fall in the level of crime is that the military focused on lowering the collateral damage of the battles and *not* on directly attacking the drug producers and traffickers. Victory began to be declared for the battles that had the smallest possible level of collateral damage to

⁶ Aguilar V., Rubén, and Jorge G. Castañeda. "El Narco: La Guerra Fallida." Mexico City: Punto De Lectura, 2006. Print. p. 105

all involved parties rather than those battles that focused on how many enemies were killed or captured. In this vein, Mexico should focus all of their authority on "reducing or eliminating kidnappings, assaults, public robberies in broad daylight, car-jacking, and even small-scale drug dealing; they should strongly pressure organized crime against excesses of public violence."⁷ Unfortunately this is not happening now, the army is solely focusing on attacking the growers, suppliers, narcotrafickers, and allies of narcotrafickers directly. These direct attacks are, as in the cases of Tajikistan and Afghanistan, provoking that narcotraffickers and members of organized crime seek out new ways to get financial gains. The direct attacks are disrupting the bargaining processes and social contracts between corrupt police officers and political actors and the narcotraffickers that attempt to control them.

Many analysts have attempted to draw comparisons between Mexico and other countries, or as this paper has attempted to do, between Mexico and other drug producing or trafficking countries. But for as many comparisons that can be drawn, there will always exist certain peculiarities. For example, the Mexican Army and police have a unique, specialized relationship, what José Arturo Yañez Romero has called the paradox of the Gaditano Model. The Gaditano Model⁸ was established in the first Constitution of 1812, yet it continues to impact Mexican security even up to the modern era. By the time the most recent Mexican constitution was written in

⁷ Ibid. p. 117

⁸ This model is based on four principles; 1) The King or Executive branch has complete control over the armed forces (with the approval of the Judicial branch); 2) The Judicial and Legislative branches legislate the army and the national militia that serve for external defense and the preservation of internal security; 3) The military is a permanent and professional force, the national militia is not permanent and is only formed when a state government deems the circumstances necessary; and 4) the police is not a military force nor connected with internal security.

1917, the Gaditano Model had already become obsolete, but the article dealing with the National Guard or National Militia was worded in a manner to maintain the same ideas and assumptions. The implication of this model is that the mindset of the Mexicans (both politicians and civilians) is that the police should be the National Guard. This has caused the police to be given the responsibilities that the National Guard has constitutionally been given. But because the police's role is not defined clearly constitutionally, and because the police force is expected to fulfill a role that they are not prepared for, they are therefore inadequate in providing internal security. In this case, in Monterrey the Mexican army is fulfilling the historically called-for role of the National Guard. This may help to also explain why the Mexican army enjoys so much popular support and has a good standing in the public eye; this will be explained in further detail in the upcoming section as we define and explain the role of the military and police forces in Mexico.

Explaining Mexico: The Role of the Police and the Military

The Mexican military has a special distinction among Latin American countries of never having attempted to take over the government. This is part of the reason why most Mexicans have such confidence in their armed forces. Although there are many negative aspects of domestically deploying a national military, the Mexican Army has performed two operations in the state of Nuevo Leon with minimal human rights violations. This is not to say that no violations have occurred, but that the outcry against these violations has not been very strong. Part of this is because of how the citizens of Monterrey perceive the army as a dependable and incorrupt protector and part of a necessary step in the securing of their city.

Some of the major drawbacks to assigning military forces in a domestic, internal security role include the fact that soldiers are "clumsy," lack appropriate training, are inflexible in their behavior, and often overact when confronting the public (Beede, 2008). Being police officers diminishes soldiers' "combat prowess" because it causes them to lose morale, group cohesiveness, and their warrior attitude, and therefore must be retrained back into a warfighting mindset after serving as police officers (Dunlap, 1999).

Using military forces to control narcotics can be especially risky because of the increased exposure to the possibility of corruption. The other danger posed by soldiers being trained in a warrior mindset is that while they are very strong in resisting violent battlefield enemies, they are exceptionally vulnerable to sophisticated criminals that can manipulate and corrupt. This has a very compelling real world application. A few military experts recommend the Mexican army implement an American counter-insurgency tactic that had success in Iraq; the strategy forced American soldiers to leave their bases and interact with the population to get intelligence. Mexican army, which is made up of conscripts, isn't trained on how to interact with the community. The result is a great deal of patrolling that's good for show but bad for results. But there is a very real fear that contact with the city's drug traffickers could induce "desertions to the dark side," like what happened in 1997. In 1997, about 30 defectors from an elite army unit went to work for the Gulf Cartel and became the "Zetas," that cartel's violent arm.⁹

There were two operations that are pertinent to this investigation. The

⁹ De Córdoba, José, and Joel Millman. "Mexico Ramps Up Drug War With a Surge on Rio Grande." *Business News & Financial News*. The Wall Street Journal, 24 Dec. 2009. Web. <<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126143123803700665.html>>.

Mexican army participated in two major operations in the state of Nuevo Leon, the first under orders of the federal government, and the second at the request of the government of Nuevo Leon. The military has consistently enjoyed an extremely high level of public confidence, although they have been accused of violating human rights, especially the rights of lower-class citizens.

The first operation was a federal operation that focused on bringing down the levels of violence in the two border states of Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas. The main tactic of these operations was to deploy soldiers to street corners all over the city and to establish checkpoints throughout the metropolitan area. These checkpoints were specifically looking for weapons, drugs, stolen vehicles, and persons with outstanding arrest warrants. However, soldiers were under strict orders to not pat anyone down or search anybody's person, not search within closed areas of vehicles (i.e. trunk or glove compartment) nor to seize any objects or arrest anybody.¹⁰ It should be mentioned that the federal troops lacked support for their efforts from the state and city governments. This was because the governor, Natividad Gonzales Paras was opposed to military engagement unless there was extensive collaboration between the army and his Secretary of Public Security, Aldo Fasci. Dunlap also presents various risks that militarization can pose to democracy; while police forces are subject to strict control by democratically elected leaders at a local or state level, the army is under federal control. As Dunlap criticizes, in deploying a federal force, controlled by the executive branch, to a local population, the local population is effectively rendered powerless in regards to their own


¹⁰ Cazares, Marta and Dominguez, Miguel "Inicia en Tamaulipas operativo anticrimen." *El Norte* [Monterrey] 22 Feb 2007.

security. The federal government deployed soldiers to this first mission in Nuevo Leon without the full cooperation of the state government.

The second major operation in the metropolitan area of Monterrey began at the beginning of May in 2009, this time with state and city-government backing. This operation focused on cleaning the police system and resulted in 87 police officers being detained and accused of being involved in narcotrafficking. Their crimes varied from passing intelligence about military actions to members of organized crime; for being linked through evidence found during military operations; or for being on weekly, biweekly, or monthly narco payrolls. The secretaries of security for the municipalities of Monterrey proper, Escobedo, Guadalupe, Santa Catarina, Allende and Matamorelos were also detained for giving protection to organized crime or for receiving payments from organized crime. This operation also took all automatic weapons away from municipal police after various shoot-outs between military and police forces occurred.

Peoples' Perception of the Military

An extraordinarily high percentage of Mexican citizens have confidence in their national army. As we can see by this chart, Mexicans have a great deal more confidence in the army ("*Ejército*") than in the



federal police, the PGR (General Police of the Republic, akin to the United States' FBI), the Ministerial/Judicial Police, the state police, or the municipal police.

In 17 surveys that I did with university students, every single one of them said that they support the military. All of the students replied with different degrees of approval, but none of them said that it was a violation of their city's sovereignty. If they did express fear of the military, they said that the fear could be overcome by thinking about the benefits of extra safety that the military was providing. (See appendix for selected quotes from interviewed students.) Most students said that they saw the drug war as just as legitimate as any international war, and that the use of the federal army was justified.

Human Rights

One of the most troubling possible problems is that there is an increased risk for civilian populations to suffer human rights abuses at the hands of the army. Soldiers have a different interpretation of the term "self defense" and view their adversaries very differently than a police officer would. Where a police officer might see their adversaries as *suspects* of crimes that must be arrested, a soldier will see their adversaries as *enemies* that must be utterly destroyed. Soldiers' extensive training in doctrine and protocol can also be especially dangerous to civil liberties. Dunlap quotes Ricks (1996) in saying that many soldiers "when faced with violating doctrine or federal law...chose the latter course." This is more than a theoretical possibility, it is clear that human rights violations are happening, especially to poorer or marginalized members of the city.^{11,12}

In the operation of June 2009, the Secretary of Security of the Municipal Police of Monterrey, Amador Medina Flores, of the municipality of Escobedo,

¹¹ *Mexico: Laws without Justice: Human Rights Violations and Impunity in the Public Security and Criminal Justice System*. Rep. no. AMR 41/002/2007. Amnesty International, 7 Feb. 2007. Web. <<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR41/002/2007/en>>.

¹² "Interview with Jose Maria Infante." Personal interview. 9 Mar. 2010.

Fernando Torre y Cuevas, of the municipality of Guadalupe, José Santos Almaráz, of the municipality of Santa Catarina, Juan Pablo García, of the municipality of Allende, Luis Humberto Vargas and of the municipality of Montemorelos, Alejandro Esparza, were all arrested for having close ties to narcotrafficking.

Amador Medina, Fernando Torre y Cuevas, Luis Humberto Vargas and Alejandro Esparza are all currently incarcerated. Details about where they may be have been kept from the public, and it has been suspected that one or all of those incarcerated were either somehow forced or injured (i.e. tortured) by the army in order to elicit confessions. "These four men have a positive image of in Mexico," states Ernesto Sanchez. The difficulty of bring the members of the armed forces that may have committed these potentially illegal acts is compounded by the fact that no details of the case are known. No public outcry has arisen against the treatment of these four men, because there are no foundations for any accusations, only hearsay. In addition, if there does arise any opposition to their incarceration or treatment, the army will frame the situation in terms of national security and deem their treatment necessary.

As Dunlap critiques, theoretically there exists the danger of "mission creep" where the military obtains more and more power over public security but with less oversight over civil liberties. I saw this firsthand when I was doing my investigation; one of my interviewees showed me a pen that SEDENA (*Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional*—like the United States' Department of Defense) was distributing widely. The pen had their telephone number with a message saying something to the effect of "If you have any problems, call us." The dichotomy between the military's official role as non-police force and their advertisement as "the new 911" is striking. While

everyone that I interviewed in Monterrey agreed that the military was a temporary solution and that they should not stay more than a few years, their role as "the new 911" is making them become embedded, which will make it more difficult to remove the army after stability is achieved. As was observed in Brazil, if the government relies too much on the military, it creates disincentives for changes to come about structurally.

While these human rights violations and this mission creep are readily apparent to every citizen of Monterrey, in every single interview that I conducted with university students, none of them mentioned human rights.

The only time that human rights concerns were mentioned in my research in Monterrey was in an interview with Jose Maria Infante, a social science research director at the *Universidad Autonoma de Nuevo Leon*. In his words, "the lower classes feel more threatened by the military presence because they are at more of a risk to suffer human rights violations."¹³ This claim is substantiated by reports by Amnesty International and other domestic and international human rights organizations.^{14,15} The National Human Rights Commission of Mexico (CNDH or *Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos*) reported in 2010 that from December 1st in 2006 until the 31st of December 2009, complaints against the Mexican Army increased 300% and that recommendations directed to SEDENA, the Secretary for National Defense, for grave human rights offences has increased 400%.

¹³ "Interview with Jose Maria Infante." Personal interview. 9 Mar. 2010.

¹⁴ *Mexico: New Reports of Human Rights Violations by the Military*. Rep. no. AMR 41/058/2009. Amnesty International, 8 Dec. 2009. Web. <<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR41/058/2009/en>>.

¹⁵ Wilkinson, Tracy. "Rights Group Faults Mexico over Alleged Army Abuse." *Featured Articles From The Los Angeles Times*. Los Angeles Times, 9 Dec. 2009. Web. 25 Apr. 2010. <<http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/09/world/la-fg-mexico-abuse9-2009dec09>>.

The high-ranking officials, especially of those in the more well-off regions, appear to not have any concerns about human rights. The mayor of San Pedro, the richest municipality of Monterrey, has stated publically that he has no qualms about violating human rights in the name of protecting his constituents. What is most interesting about this is that the majority of civilians purposely overlook the human rights violations, as some may think, in the name of their own security. One reason why the citizens of Monterrey may be so willing to accept military control is that they were exposed to such high levels of unchecked violence in 2006.

In summary, the Mexican Army enjoys a high level of public confidence because of its history of being the least corrupt and least threatening public authority. Although there are many theoretical explanations as to why it is not recommendable to domestically deploy armed forces, including the risk of human rights violations, the Mexican Army has not demonstrated many negative qualities as of the present. While there *have* been human rights violations, the outcry against these violations has not been very strong. Part of this is because of how the citizens of Monterrey perceive the army and because they see the drug conflict in terms of war.

Police

The Mexican police force unfortunately does not have such a high level of positive public perception. This is due to their history as being corrupt, which stems in part from the police officers being undertrained, underpaid, and underequipped. One of the most interesting distinctions between the military and the police, and an important reason for the striking difference between the corruption levels of the two groups, is that the military is composed of anonymous recruits from all over the

country while the police force is made up of local members of the community. Police officers are given the infamous option of "*plata o plomo*" (silver, i.e. money, or lead) by the narcotraffickers. It is far easier to track down a police officer and present this threat because police officers are tied down to a specific zone, his or her identity, job duties and where his or her family lives is all known. Most police officers do not willingly seek out involvement with narcotrafficking, but are presented with the *plata o plomo* option and chose the money. Many officials and police officers do in fact chose to reject the money, but this often ends tragically.

On the other hand, soldiers are much less approachable; they often wear full-face masks and travel in large groups. It is very difficult to credibly present a soldier with the *plata o plomo* option, because a soldier's identity is seldom known, much less who their family is or where their family lives. In the rare case that a soldier is threatened with corruption, he or she can be easily redeployed to another region of the country with minimal chance that narcotraffickers will be able to identify the soldier again.

Another peculiarity of the Monterrey Police Force is that the police in the Metropolitan Area of Monterrey are organized into north, south, and central regions. The central region is in charge of the city Monterrey, in a strict sense, while the north and south regions of the Metropolitan Area of Monterrey fall under the jurisdictions of the state police structure. A great deal of the inefficiency in the police forces is attributed to this fragmented organization.¹⁶ On top of this, the Mexican police are divided by municipalities, metropolitan areas, states, and on a federal level. This fragmentation leads to many "cracks" in responsibility and a lack

¹⁶ Interview with Ernesto Sanchez

of clear oversight, which allow for more corruption. The horizontal relationships between the various municipalities and the vertical relationships between the different layers of government are very delicate, especially when corrupt officers are sensitive about maintaining their power. Disruption of these relationships can cause infighting and disorganization among police forces, which can lead them to not focus on performing their jobs of preventing crime and implementing justice.

Relations between Military and Police:

As much as everyone is opposed to it, the military is engaging in "mission creep" and is becoming more of a police force. As I related earlier, SEDENA or the *Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional*, is accepting emergency calls from citizens. This may soon become the Mexican version of what happened in Brazil, when police officers began to be used as back-up in times of peace, when the contrary should be the case.¹⁷ Laws had to put into place to only allow federal troops to intervene in internal matters only when all other means of maintaining public order had been exhausted and only when specifically asked to intervene by the president of Brazil.

The military is now engaged in operations where they identify and arrest police officers and bring them through the justice system. The police forces feel resentment toward the army, because the army treats them condescendingly and with suspicion. This is not an unfounded concern though, police officers and the military also have been known to actively and violently fight each other when corrupt police officers fight on the side of the narcotraffickers. Police officers have been known to block streets and create diversions so that the narcotraffickers can

¹⁷ Zaverucha, Jorge. "Fragile Democracy and the Militarization of Public Safety in Brazil." *Latin American Perspectives* Issue 112, Vol. 27, No. 3. (2000): p. 17. *JSTOR*.

escape from the pursuing army. Police officers also pick up wounded narcotraffickers in police cars and transport them away from the fight. In terms of intelligence, police officers also warn members of organized crime of the details of upcoming operations

Because of fears of extreme police corruption, automatic weapons were taken away from all of the municipal police forces after a situation on June 8, 2009. The Army was advised of a police officer from the municipality of San Nicolas that was working in collaboration with the narcotraffickers and attempted to detain her. The San Nicolas police department called in other police forces from Apodaca and Escobedo as reinforcement in order to challenge the Army and to prevent the capture of their fellow officer. Because of this unprecedented and extremely brazen confrontation, all automatic weapons were taken away from the municipal police forces.

At the time that this paper was finished, relations had deteriorated substantially, with Cadereyta, Apodaca and San Nicolas police departments being forcefully disbanded because of police participation in blockades.¹⁸



Establishing Patterns of Crime

I began this investigation to discover if the presence of the Mexican National Army in the city of Monterrey would change the level and the character of crimes committed. My research method was to find statistics on various types of crimes,

¹⁸ The blockades started in April 2010, when narcotraffickers and police officers alike began massive-scale coordinated car-jackings (including public buses, ambulances, and even an airport shuttle) and then parked the vehicles perpendicular to traffic in major avenues and freeways and set them on fire. The blockades were an innovative technique to allow the narcotraffickers to attack whom they wanted to attack and then not allow any possibility that they could be pursued.

search for and analyze patterns in the data, then ask experts in the field of public security in Monterrey to corroborate the evidence. Although the types of crimes have changed I will limit my analysis to specific types of general crimes. This is because the definitions of crimes have changed over the period that I will be studying, mostly due to the increase in drug-trafficking related crimes. Therefore, to have a coherent and stable base to measure, we will use the following definitions:

Name in Spanish	Name in English	Description
<i>Robo a Casa</i>	Burglary	Entering a house and removing possessions
<i>Robo a Persona</i>	Robbery	Removing property from a person through force or intimidation
<i>Robo a Negocio</i>	Commercial Theft/Robbery	Theft or robbery from a commercial property or theft/robbery while merchandise is in transit
<i>Robo a Banco</i>	Bank Robbery	Removing money from a financial institution
<i>Robo de Auto</i>	Car-jacking	Theft/Robbery of a car
<i>Cristelazo</i>	Breaking and entering into a car	Breaking a window (<i>cristal</i>) and removing property from within a car
<i>Lesiones</i>	Lesions	Causing non-lethal wounds
<i>Homicidio</i>	Homicide	Causing the death of another person

As mentioned before, all crimes are now crimes against national security, there is a state of perpetual warfare, and a continuum of violence emerges. This continuum of violence is seen in these crime patterns of Monterrey, as narcotraffickers hire teenage delinquents to do small jobs and participate in large-scale commercial robbery operations. This is because as narcotraffickers are attacked in their main activity they discover new criminal ways to control their supply routes, to keep steady revenues coming in.

The militarization of Monterrey has provoked a battle between corrupt political actors who want to stay in power (by supporting organized crime) and the military that fights directly against organized crime. Again, as in Brazil and Kashmir, a lack of clear distinctions creates a vacuum, a vacuum that is filled by a crime wave.

According to the Afghani model, counter-narcotics policies actually fuel conflict; the increasing militarization of this battle may lead to an even greater general deterioration of the social fabric, thereby causing the levels of violence and crime to increase.

This, combined with the example of Tajikistan, can give us insight into why a disruption in the corrupt police/narcotrafficker relationship can lead to disproportionately greater quantities of violence. Applying this bargaining model to the case of Brazil can help us to further understand why a break-down in the relationship between the police forces, the military, and narcotraffickers can demonstrate the failure of the process of the institutionalization of conflict, since the boundaries of the social contract have been violated. The face of this failure is a wave of violence.

Robo

Robo a Casa

House robbery, burglary, or breaking and entering, is usually committed by relatively small-time criminals. Although there may be a few large-scale house robbery schemes, it is generally not a crime associated with organizations.

Those who commit house robbery are usually those that see opportunities to enter a house to steal, those that are poor, and/or those that steal for a career.


Neither the military nor narcotrafficking have a great impact on house

robbery, but we can see certain patterns in the data due to military operations, change in government, and increased narco-related violence. At first, crime actually goes down, with one of the lowest times for crime being 2006, which was supposedly the most violent year in terms of narco-violence.


(NOTE: All graphs are from the “Semaforo Delictivo”, or the Traffic Stoplight. The Semaforo is a project by the Nuevo Leon government to measure and track crime levels in order to better understand and control crime. The yellow horizontal line seen in each graph is the mean/average level of that crime, and the green horizontal line is the “target” level of crime that the government is working towards.)

The Effect of Domestically Deployed Forces on Crime: The Case of Monterrey, Mex.

Robo a Casa—Yearly Historical Average



Robo a Casa—Monthly Historical Average



When examining the yearly trends, what is most interesting to note is that in 2006, supposedly the worst year for violence, had one of the lowest numbers of house robbery. At first, it seems intuitively that with the introduction of military forces into Monterrey, the crime rates would fall. This is obviously not the case, as we can see that the *robo a casa* rate was high before the military presence, fell during periods of extreme violence, and is high once again.

Turning to the monthly averages, we can begin to analyze the trends in more depth. 2006, the brown line, and 2007, the teal line, do not appear to follow any specific trends, with crime maintaining steady between about 250 and 400 robberies over the course of the year.

In the latter half of 2008, represented by the orange line, drug cartels began a full-scale war against each other to obtain control over Monterrey. This is dramatically reflected in the quantity of house robberies committed. But why is this relationship so strong? Recalling the case of Tajikistan, when militarization occurs the political order is threatened, causing corrupt political actors to intensify their struggle in order to maintain their power. Also drawing on the case of Brazil, when there is an absence of order, or when there is a violation of the social contract, this void is filled with a crime wave. The militarization to protect citizens from the fighting between the drug cartels provokes fighting between corrupt political actors, which contributes to a breakdown in the social contract.

In October of 2008, we also see a slight spike in crime. This is because, as the reader will recall, there was a change in political power due to the elections of July of that year. Many criminals took advantage of the temporary disorganization in authority structures and lack of clear planning of the new government.


Starting off in 2009, the blue line, we can see how the *robo a casa* rate starts high, as an after-effect of 2008's drug cartel infighting. But in June 2009, the other major operation, this one focused on cleaning up the police forces, was launched. We see a dramatic decline in crime during the entire rest of 2009. It is remarkable to observe how a military operation focused on police reform can have such a visible effect in all aspects of crime. In summary, the simple presence of the military had no aggregate effect on *robo a casa* during the years 2005-2009, but that during specific military operations the military had a very visible effect. Crime also responded to the lack of a strong military presence during the drug cartel war during the latter half of 2008, and to the lack of structure caused by a change in power in October 2008.

Robo a Persona


Robo a persona, or robbery in English, is also usually committed by relatively small-time criminals. Although there is no single characterization of someone who robs, because of its relative inefficiency it is generally not a crime associated with organizations.

Neither the military nor narcotrafficking would seem to have a great impact on *robo a persona*, but we can see certain patterns in the data due to military operations, change in government, and increased narco-related violence. The most striking is to see how *robo a persona* increases over the years due to a weakening of the social contract. Looking at *robo a persona* over the years, we can see the disintegration of the social contract starting in 2006.

Robo a Persona—Yearly Historical Average



Robo a Persona—Monthly Historical Average



The Effect of Domestically Deployed Forces on Crime: The Case of Monterrey, Mex.


The rate of this crime clearly increases from 2006 onward. This could also be interpreted as a result of the economic crisis of 2008, as unemployed people living in poverty began looking for other ways to obtain resources for survival.

Analyzing month by month, the same patterns as *robo a casa* emerge. In 2006 and 2007 *robo a persona* holds relatively steady within a certain band. In 2008, as the drug cartels start their full-fledged war against each other, *robo a persona* increases. We again see a spike in October, because of the instability caused by the change in government. In 2009 crime remains high until the military took over and helped in police reform. Here we can see that the military did have a clear impact on crime, but this was principally through their operation that cleaned up the police forces.


Robo a Negocio

Robo a negocio, or commercial robbery (as opposed to shoplifting) occurs when something is robbed from a commercial property or when commercial merchandise is robbed in transit. This is one example of a crime that has definitely been affected by narcotrafficking and the subsequent militarization. As Ernesto Sanchez, vice president of Security Analysis for the *Consejo Cívico de Instituciones de Nuevo León* (the Civil Advisory of Institutions of Nuevo Leon) described, Monterrey is losing a great deal of foreign investment opportunities because the theft of tractor trailers carrying merchandise has gone up significantly. I saw part of this trend when I was in Mexico in early March; while I was in Monterrey a trailer filled with large rolls of steel was stolen. This increase is seen because the organized crime groups and their primary lucrative activities were targeted by the military, and they began to search for new ways of finding income.

Robo a Negocio—Yearly Historical Average



Robo a Negocio—Monthly Historical Average




Robo a Negocio shows the same tendencies as the other cases of crimes that we have analyzed thus far. Crime remains more or less around the same level throughout 2006, 2007, and the first half of 2008. The second half of 2008 shows a dramatic increase in commercial robbery, with a spike, once again, in October. What is interesting to note is that the operation to clean up of the police force in 2009 did not have as much of an effect on *robo a negocio* as this operation had on other types of *robo*. This is because this crime has changed in composition due to the military's assault on narcotraffickers' primary lucrative activities. As Ernesto Sanchez described, before the strong narco presence poor people from small towns used to steal scrap from trains that passed by, but now organized groups run more sophisticated commercial theft schemes to steal the same scrap from the same trains. After seeing the successes of stealing scrap from trains, organized crime decided to increase their sources of obtaining resources, including robbery of merchandise and raw materials from cargo trucks.¹⁹

Robo a Banco


Robo a banco is a very unique crime—it does not happen often, but it commands a great deal of attention when it does occur. What is most interesting is the effect that bank robbery has had on other crimes, especially in 2008. Not much is known about bank robbery or who commits this crime and under what circumstances. Obviously the main (and probably sole) motive is for financial reasons; it goes without saying that narcotraffickers almost never have any complaints in that area. In addition, bank robbery is not a very efficient source of income compared to the risk associated with engaging in such a dangerous robbery.

¹⁹ "Interview with Ernesto Sanchez." Personal interview. 8 Mar. 2010.

Robo a Banco—Yearly Historical Average



Robo a Banco—Monthly Historical Average



The Effect of Domestically Deployed Forces on Crime: The Case of Monterrey, Mex.

Because of the limited data (in 2005 there were only 7 bank robberies reported) the numbers and graphs seem to jump around when compared to other crimes. At first blush it seems like 2008 was the worst year for bank robbery, but when we examine the monthly patterns we can see that only the first half of 2008 had high bank robbery rates. This goes completely against the patterns of the other crimes, which all rose after the second half of 2008.

Santiago Roel, the creator of the *Semaforo Delictivo*, explained this phenomenon. While the bank robbery rate did indeed go up starting in the second half of 2007, the media latched onto this trend and followed bank robbery very closely. What resulted was a public outcry over this rising (and some may claim, overinflated) trend of bank robbery. This public outcry led city and state officials to spend more time and resources investigating potential bank robbery schemes and assigning more police and military officers to guard banks. There is no doubt that this intense focus on preventing bank robbery was effective, the effect is very visible in the first half of 2008. Santiago Roel claims that this intense focus on bank robbers led to neglect on other sectors, which explains part of the increase seen in other crime rates in the latter half of 2008.

While *robo a banco* is not necessarily related to narcotrafficking or military operations, except in a second-degree manner, it is still very interesting to see how this crime fluctuates in regards to public opinion and political decisions.

Robo de Auto and Cristalazo

The next crime to be analyzed is *robo de auto*, or vehicle theft or car-jacking in English. In order to enhance our understanding of these vehicle-related crimes are related, this crime will be analyzed together with *cristalazo*. *Cristalazo* is when

someone breaks into a car and steals property from inside. *Robo de auto* is one of the only crimes that increased steadily since 2004, the year that data began to be collected. *Cristalazo*, as is visible in the graphs, is one of the only crimes that steadily decreased from 2004.


Those that rob from vehicles or those that actually rob the entire vehicle are related and are assumed to be from the same general demographic. The difference is that narcotraffickers are much more interested in hiring others to steal so that they can obtain vehicles for their own use, while those that commit *cristalazo* are "self-employed", as it were, and are those who want the property for themselves.

This clear decline in *cristalazo* combined with the clear increase in *robo de auto* gives a striking picture of how the social contract in Monterrey has been broken. Whereas before robbers were more "polite" and would only steal possessions from a vehicle, since the increase in narcotrafficking and related impunity, it has become acceptable to steal the entire car.


As relationships between the military and police forces worsen, there is an increasing sense that, as in Brazil, the legal boundaries of the social contract are being violated. As explained earlier, violence is the visible symptom of institutional failure, which can be manifested in a crime wave. These examples of automobile-related crimes show how the military had almost no effect on the level of crime on aggregate, but rather changed the composition of crime. While the military in itself may give people confidence, this increase in vehicle theft caused by organized crime made citizens feel less safe.

The Effect of Domestically Deployed Forces on Crime: The Case of Monterrey, Mex.


Robo de Auto—Yearly Historical Average




Robo de Auto—Monthly Historical Average



Cristalazo—Yearly Historical Average



Cristalazo—Monthly Historical Average




Lesiones

The last category of crime that we will analyze is harm done to human beings, the first of which being *lesiones*, or non-lethal wounds caused by assault. This crime is primarily committed by teenage or young adult small-time gang members. This is visible in the fact that there is an increase in *lesiones* over the summer, when young people have more time on their hands and when they can stay out late more, and around "back-to-school time" when rival gangs meet up in academic settings after a summer of being apart. The crime rate also declines around December and January, partly due to the "Christmas spirit."


When observing the yearly average of this crime rate, the most notable aspect is that the rate of *lesiones* goes down steadily every year. While at first blush, it may seem like the fact that this crime declined is a positive sign, this actually reflects a very sinister trend. The same teenage small-time gang members that used to scuffle amongst themselves are now being hired by narcotraffickers to steal cars, steal commercial property, or even kill.

This is a very clear indication of how narcotrafficking has affected the level and composition of crime. The subsequent militarization has attempted to control the violence, but as Santiago Roel states in regards to *lesiones*, "We are grateful for the army, but they have an impact on the effects, not on the causes. The real solutions does not have anything to do with the army, it is a question of creating opportunities for young people."

Lesiones—Yearly Historical Average




Lesiones—Monthly Historical Average




Homicidio

The last crime to be analyzed is another having to do with harm inflicted on another person, homicide. This is measured in deaths, not by number of convictions or number of crimes committed. This is possibly the crime most affected by militarization and its disruption of relationships between corrupt politicians, police officers, and narcotraffickers. As described in the Theoretical Framework portion of this paper, members of organized crime must control political workings in order to maintain the steady flow of the financial gains, especially from drug trafficking. Political actors that wish to remain in power must engage in bargaining processes and accept a certain amount of corruption in order to avoid upsetting the delicate balance. But with the militarization of Monterrey has come a battle between corrupt political actors who want to stay in power (by supporting organized crime) and the military that fights directly against organized crime. The military actively removes government officials and police officers that collaborate with narcotrafficking, leaving the uncorrupted politicians and police officers in power. These uncorrupted (or not-yet corrupted) individuals are at great risk for assassination attempts as different drug cartels jockey for their loyalty. Essentially the three main reasons why public servants are killed by narcotraffickers is that they work for Cartel A and did something wrong; that they work for Cartel A so they are killed by Cartel B; or if they refuse to accept illegal activity from any cartel. With militarization (especially after the operation in June of 2009) the balance between who works for which cartel and who is corrupted is disrupted, causing a rise in assassinations and execution-style killings.

Homocidio—Yearly Historical Average



Homocidio—Monthly Historical Average





Patterns in the Crime Data

On aggregate, I found many macro-level trends in the data that allow for us to make some general observations on how crime behaves following militarization. I found that while the military was able to reduce crime during specific military operations (specifically in June of 2009), its presence changed the composition of crime by increasing the activities and size of organized crime. I also found that crime generally increases during periods of narco-related violence. My last finding was that crime increases when there is a change in government as criminals take advantage of disorganization in authority structures.

As described above, *robo a casa*, *robo a persona*, and *robo de negocio* all follow the same general patterns. As the military engages in specific operations criminal activity declines, and as the military loses control of the city due to drug violence, criminal activity increases. We also saw spikes in October of 2008, because, as described by Ernesto Sanchez, "When the state government and municipality governments changed authority during the second half of 2008, all of the police departments were neglected by some degree because of the entrance and exit of government officials. The vital elements of the police forces were forgotten, such as mobile units, patrols, training and the upkeep of their equipment and buildings." The uptick in crime shows how criminals took advantage of the lack of coordination between the old and new authorities.

When analyzing vehicle-related crime, there is an almost perfectly inverse relationship between *robo de auto* and *cristalazo*. As *robo de auto* increases, *cristalazo* decreases. This demonstrates how the social contract in Monterrey is

weakening because of narco-related pressures to commit crimes. Since those that commit these two vehicle-related crimes are more or less the same demographic, the transfer of crimes shows us clearly how the military has affected narcotrafficking activity, which has in turn affected crime.

In regards to bodily injury to another human being, *lesiones* fell, which is not necessarily a positive sign. This reflects the trend of narcotraffickers hiring juvenile "delinquents" to perform more serious tasks, such as the *robo de auto* mentioned above. The homicide rate does not necessarily follow the same specific patterns as seen in other property-related crimes, but rather reacts negatively to militarization. Whereas militarization and specific military operations help control other crimes, military operations cause more homicides as the balance between corrupt and non-corrupt political servants is disrupted. The militarization of Monterrey has provoked a battle between corrupt political actors who want to stay in power (by supporting organized crime) and the military that fights directly against organized crime. This is also similar to what was found in Afghanistan, where certain counter-narcotics policies actually fuel conflict by disrupting the bargaining process. These crime patterns follow the theory established in Tajikistan, where a disruption in the corrupt police/narcotrafficker relationship can lead to disproportionately greater quantities of violence. A break-down in the relationship between the police forces, the military, and narcotraffickers can demonstrate the failure of the process of the institutionalization of conflict, since the boundaries of the social contract have been violated. As described before, the face of this institutional failure is a wave of crime and violence.

Conclusion

The city of Monterrey, Mexico, has always enjoyed a high standard of living due to their economic activity impulsed by their close proximity to the United States and their strong trading relations and investment strategies. However, this prosperity was shown to be a blessing and a curse as drug traffickers from different cartels moved to Monterrey starting about 15 years ago. During these first few years, the cartel members kept low profiles and therefore violence was kept to a minimum. Unfortunately, they eventually brought their conflicts with them which changed the composition of crime in Monterrey. Besides how the narcotraffickers changed the type and level of crime in Monterrey, the subsequent military operations in 2007 and then again in 2009 changed crime significantly. As seen in other countries, namely Brazil, Afghanistan and the Kashmir region, the "the waging of perpetual warfare leads to a blurring of boundaries between 'crimes of war' and 'crimes of peace,' producing a continuum of violence that scales from the routine violence of everyday social spaces [...] to the spectacular violence of hot zones [...]." ²⁰

As military forces attack narcotraffickers' main activity (i.e. producing drugs and transporting them), narcotraffickers must discover new criminal ways to control their supply routes, to keep steady revenues coming in, and to keep from facing judicial action. This is then manifested in wave of new types of crimes, crimes that might not have even been associated with organized crime in the first place.

The most significant explanations for what causes an increase in crime is the fact that when militarization occurs the legal boundaries of the social contract are

²⁰ Haley Duschinski Destiny Effects: Militarization, State Power and Punitive Containment in Kashmir Valley. p.694

commonly violated. The militarization of Monterrey has provoked a battle between corrupt political actors who want to stay in power (by supporting organized crime) and the military that fights directly against organized crime. This delicate balance is maintained in a bargaining process, one that may be stable in some cases, but that is increasingly being disrupted by militarization. Violence is the visible symptom of the intersections of these factors.

Starting in 2006, it becomes apparent that narco/police/military/political balance was upset. As narcotraffickers began to fight amongst themselves, they increased their efforts to corrupt and control public servants, and politicians struggled to stay in power (and stay alive). When the military was introduced into the city, the police began to fight back, often on the side of the narcotraffickers.

While these activities in the background, the government changed in October of 2009, which caused a slight spike in crime levels, especially robbery. This is because many criminals (especially members of organized crime) took advantage of the temporary disorganization in authority structures and lack of clear planning of the new government.

On aggregate, I found many macro-level trends in the data that allow for us to make some general observations on how crime behaves following militarization. I found that while the military was able to reduce crime during specific military operations (specifically in June of 2009), its presence changed the composition of crime by increasing the activities and size of organized crime. I also found that crime generally increases during periods of narco-related violence. My last finding was that crime increases when there is a change in government as criminals take advantage of disorganization in authority structures.

When analyzing vehicle-related crime, there was found to be an almost perfectly inverse relationship between *robo de auto* and *cristalazo*. As *robo de auto* increases, *cristalazo* decreases. This demonstrates how the social contract in Monterrey is weakening because of narco-related pressures to commit crimes.

In regards to bodily injury to another human being, *lesiones* fell, which is not necessarily a positive sign. This reflects the trend of narcotraffickers hiring juvenile "delinquents" to perform more serious tasks.

The homicide rate was not found to follow the same specific patterns as seen in other property-related crimes, but rather reacted by increasing in response to military operations. As described above, military operations cause more homicides as the balance between corrupt and non-corrupt political servants is disrupted. It was found that the military while the military did not cause a decline in crime in general, it was able to reduce crime during specific operations. The composition of crime was changed as militarization attacked the primary resource-obtaining methods of organized crime and they sought to recover their income in other ways. In terms of perception, the military made citizens feel more secure yet the associated increase in organized crime made citizens feel less safe.

Recommendations

There is no argument that the military has been much more effective in controlling organized crime than the police have been, and in the words of Santiago Roel "it is not the military that is important; while a definitive solution is not found the military should stay."²¹

²¹ "Interview with Santiago Roel." Personal interview. 9 Mar. 2010.

The underlying solution for the police forces is to create oversight over every sector of the police. The municipality of San Nicolas implemented a special accountability mechanism where the head police officers came together with their superiors every week to give reports about crime in their district. This level of oversight made it incredibly difficult for police officers and supervisors to be able to shirk their duties, and also increased the possibility that if someone was corrupt, their compromised status would be known very quickly. Since the United States is not solving the underlying problems, Mexico cannot solve the underlying problem, and unless police commanders are closely watched, they have no incentives to decrease the crime rate. This lack of accountability and their free reign to act as dictators causes the citizens of Monterrey to feel despair and resentment toward those that should be protecting them.

On a city-wide level, one recommendation for Monterrey is to reevaluate their society's response to the narco trafficking. An editorial in the newspaper *El Pais* of Spain sees the society of Monterrey as a facilitator for narco trafficking. The author criticizes the citizens of Monterrey for blaming the drug war on Mexico's president, Felipe Calderon's failed policies and for seeing the drug war as attack on an innocent and hard-working city. "The driving and essential values of Monterrey that used to exist over the second half of the twentieth century have been lost. The culture of hard work, the sense of unity, and the conviction of taking hold of the future in ones own hands were transformed into a culture of consumption and waste. The citizens of Monterrey thought not only that they could earn the future, but that they deserved it. The Proud City has become the Vain City. No better place for the narco to land than in a city filled with elites that pay themselves and that

obsessed with their own image."²² Essentially what the author is recommending is that the citizens of Monterrey should not take everything for granted and be so self-centered, but that rather they should band together and act proactively.

At the time that this project was finished, the situation was unclear. The military is still in Monterrey, but without a clear mandate. They have attempted to decommission corrupt police officers, but still face resistance from certain political actors. The drug violence has been increasing in complexity and severity, in late April, 30 to 50 armed gunmen stormed a Holiday Inn and kidnapped four guests and a receptionist. The massive street blockades continue to paralyze the city. Some of the more well-off business owners have begun to flee to the United States on business visas, and those that do not have the money come on refugee visas.

Hopefully this project helps to come to a greater understanding of the role that the military has played, and that will continue to play, over the course of this drug conflict. The effect that the military has had on society in Monterrey is that they had an important role on changing the composition of crime and that they were able to reduce crime during specific operation.

²² Farah, Diego Peterson. "Monterrey a Través Del Espejo." *El Pais*. 27 Mar. 2010. Web. <http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Monterrey/traves/espejo/elpepuint/20100327elpuint_8/Tes>.

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APPENDIX

How Do You Feel About the Military?	
Response in Spanish	Translation to English (translation mine)
<i>Está bien, porque creo que pueden ayudar a combatir la inseguridad.</i>	They're good, because I think they can help to combat insecurity.
<i>Considero que por ahora la única manera de mantener un poco al narcotráfico es a través del ejército, ya que las policías municipales y federales son corruptas. Sin embargo, reconozco que debido a la presencia del ejército y la labor que está haciendo, hay más muertes y violencia en las calles, quizá lleguemos a tomar las mismas medidas que se tomaron en Colombia, en donde hubo muchos muertos para controlar al narcotráfico.</i>	I consider that the only way to keep the narcotrafficking under control is through military force, since the local and federal police are corrupt. However, I do recognize that because of the presence of the police and the work that they are doing, there are more deaths and violence in the streets. Maybe we are going to arrive at the same measures that they took in Colombia, where there were a lot of deaths to control narcotrafficking.
<i>Definitivamente el ejército no puede ser la policía para siempre porque no fue creado para serlo y tiene otras funciones, pero a medida que pasen los años espero que existan servidores públicos honestos y comprometidos con su trabajo, de otra forma iremos de mal en peor.</i>	The army definitely can't be the police forever because it wasn't created to do that and it has other functions to perform. This will only come if through the passage of time we can get honest public servants who are dedicated to their work, because if they don't, we are going to go from bad to worse.
<i>Siento algo de temor verlos, pero a la vez respeto y admiración. Su presencia impone (al menos para mí) y es lo que me ocasiona verlos de esta forma. Pero también el hecho de que estén en Nuevo León me hace sentir un poco más segura, ya que lo que han realizado hasta el día de hoy habla de un trabajo objetivo, riguroso y eficiente.</i>	I feel a little bit of fear when I see them [the military], but at the same I feel respect and admiration. Their presence is really imposing (at least for me) and that's what makes me see them with a little bit of fear. But also the fact that they are in Nuevo Leon makes me feel a little safer, because up until the present day they have done an objective, rigorous and effective job.
<i>Sí me ha tocado ver a los soldados pasar por las avenidas, y los retenes, pero entiendo que están ahí para protegernos. Seremos un país pacífico con otros, pero estamos librando una guerra dentro del territorio nacional, y necesitamos de nuestro ejército y marina. Son los únicos que han dado resultados.</i>	I have seen the soldiers pass through the streets, and I've seen the checkpoints, but I understand they are there to protect us. We will be a peaceful country to other countries, but we are fighting a war within our national territory and we need our army and marines. They are the only ones that have given results.
<i>Mi percepción es que es una de las organizaciones menos corrompidas en nuestro país sin sugerir que todo lo que el</i>	Without suggesting that everything that the army does is good, my perception is that they are one of the least corrupt

<i>ejercito haga esta bien.</i>	organizations in our country.
<i>Cuando se ha demostrado que las organizaciones de seguridad publica de nuestro estado no se encuentran preparadas para combatir los problemas a los que nos enfrentamos, ya sea porque existen colusiones entre estos grupos de seguridad y los de delincuencia causados por la corrupción y la extorsión o ya sea porque el problema rebasa las capacidades de armamento del que las organizaciones de seguridad disponen, se justifica plenamente la participación activa del ejercito militar en nuestra ciudad.</i>	When it is demonstrated that public security organizations are not prepared to confront the problems before us, either because there is collusion, corruption, or extortion between these groups and criminals, or because these organizations lack the resources and firepower to fight the criminals, the active participation of the military in this city is plainly justified.
<i>Me da gusto que los soldados estén trabajando y que comprometan sus vidas para salvaguardar a los ciudadanos mexicanos y garantizar la seguridad nacional. El papel del ejército mexicano es, efectivamente, garantizarla seguridad nacional, y creo que si las autoridades locales no pueden (o están es complicidad) con el crimen organizado, entonces debe ser otro el que juegue ese rol.</i>	It makes me glad that these soldiers are working and risking their lives to keep Mexican citizens safe and to guarantee our national security. The role of the Mexican Army is effectively to guarantee national security. I think that if local authorities can't fight (or are allied with) organized crime, someone else should take their responsibilities.
<i>Dado que internacionalmente nos damos la fama de ser un país pacifista, el ejército debe de servir de algo, y por los últimos hechos me parece que está cumpliendo su función de forma muy satisfactoria. No creo que un ejército solo sirva para guardad la seguridad nacional, sino debe de ser un ente que nos proteja de cualquier crimen, en el caso que la autoridad competente no lo realice (en este caso las policías estatales o municipales). Para nada me parece que sea una violación de la soberanía.</i>	Given that internationally we are a peaceful country, our army should at least do something worthwhile. Given recent events I think that they are doing their job in a very satisfactory way. I don't think that the army should only protect our national security, but that it should be an entity to protect us from any kind of crime, in the case that the competent authority is not doing it (in this case, the state and municipal police). For me, this is in no way a violation of sovereignty.

How Has Crime Changed Since 2006?	
Response in Spanish	Translation to English
<p><i>Antes... era raro escuchar sobre asaltos (en zonas bien y a plena luz del día), robo de vehículos, bloqueos de avenidas, narcotráfico, zetas (ni los conocíamos), secuestros, fraudes telefónicos, llamadas de extorsión... terrorismo (a través de correos electrónicos y msj de texto,) tiroteos y de encuestas sobre la percepción de la inseguridad</i></p> <p><i>Antes ... sólo tomaba ciertas precauciones para evitar que me robaran el celular, los lentes, el reloj o la gorra (cosas que llaman la atención). También estaba el problema de corrupción policiaca en todos los niveles.</i></p> <p><i>El crimen sólo existía en el D.F (arriba el norte...yíjahh).</i></p> <p><i>Normalmente las personas eran asaltadas cuando entraban a colonias conflictivas, cuando estaban solos en la calle a altas horas de la noche o ambas (grave error).</i></p>	<p>Before... it was rare to hear about robbery (in nice areas and in broad daylight), car-jacking, blockades in major avenues, narcotrafficking, Zetas (we didn't even know what they were), kidnapping, telephone fraud, black-mailing calls, terrorism (through email and text messages), shoot-outs and interviews about perceptions of insecurity.</p> <p>Before... I only took a few precautions to avoid the theft of my cell phone, my sunglasses, my watch, or my hat (things that attracted attention). There was always the problem of police corruption on all levels.</p> <p>Crime only existed in Mexico City (the North is the best! Yea haw!)</p> <p>Normally people were assaulted when they went into dangerous neighborhoods, when they were wandering around in the streets late at night, or both (big mistake).</p>
<p><i>[Antes habían] robos o secuestros pero a gente de dinero. Antes había inseguridad pero no se sentía miedo. Ahora no quieres salir por temor a los "sicarios", la "policía", las "balaceras"...</i></p>	<p>[Before there were] robberies or kidnappings but of people that had money. There was insecurity before, but I wasn't scared at all. Now you don't even want to go out because of the fear of the "mercenaries," the "police," the "shoot-outs"...</p>
<p><i>La delincuencia se sentía como algo lejano a Monterrey, los delitos que más se temían era el de robo persona-persona en algún lugar por el centro. Y pues yo creo que los delitos más comunes eran a aquellos lugares como los bancos o centros de préstamos.</i></p> <p><i>El crimen ahora si te pega directo, ahora ya uno puede contar anécdotas de uno mismo o por lo menos un familiar que ha sido víctima del crimen en la ciudad. Los delitos más comunes serían el robo de coches.</i></p>	<p>Organized crime felt like something far away from Monterrey, the crimes that we feared most were person-to-person robbery downtown. I feel like the most common crimes were in places like banks or money-lending centers.</p> <p>Right now the crime hits you directly, one can tell you stories about oneself or at least a family member that has been a victim of crime in this city. The most common crime is car-jacking.</p>

<p><i>Ha ido en un aumento impresionante, es nota de todos los días, los delitos mas comunes son las ejecuciones y los secuestros.</i></p>	<p>There has been a remarkable increase, you can see it every day. The most common crimes are execution-style killings and kidnappings.</p>
<p><i>Realmente no había porque preocuparse, si había robos pero eran menores, no al grado de ser balaceras, robo masivo de autos, secuestros, bloqueos, etc.</i></p> <p><i>Los más comunes son balaceras en todas las zonas, el robo de camionetas lujosas y sobre todo muchos secuestros; prácticamente todos tenemos conocidos de gente secuestrada.</i></p> <p><i>...ya que la gente tiene más miedo, hay una psicosis masiva, las pláticas ahora son de balaceras, narcotráfico, bloqueos, etc., también ya procuran tener carros menos lujosos. Además muchos empresarios están emigrando a Estados Unidos debido a que ya no es posible tener un negocio porque te secuestran.</i></p>	<p>Before you really didn't have anything to worry about, there were robberies but they were small-scale, not on the level of these shoot-outs, massive car-jacking operations, kidnappings, blockades, etc. The most common crimes are shoot-outs all over the city, car-jacking of luxury cars, and above all, kidnapping. Practically all of us know someone who has been kidnapped.</p> <p>...People are a lot more scared now, there is a massive psychosis, conversations are now about shoot-outs, narcotrafficking, blockades, etc. Also people try to buy less luxurious cars. In addition, many business people are migrating to the United States because it's not possible to even have a business because they'll kidnap you.</p>
<p><i>[Antes] me sentía más seguro, ya que no era tan frecuente los robos a mano armada. En mi opinión el delito mas grave o con mayor frecuencia, era el robo a casa habitación.</i></p> <p><i>Ahora me parece una ciudad muy peligrosa, no solo han aumentado el robo a casa habitación, sino se han expandido otros tipos de crimen que a mi parecer son más peligrosos, por ejemplo, el robo de coches a plena luz del día, los enfrentamientos entre el ejército y los sicarios, los secuestros, etc.</i></p>	<p>[Before] I felt safer because armed robbery wasn't that frequent. In my opinion the worst crime and the most frequent was house robbery.</p> <p>Right now this city feels really dangerous, not only has house robbery gone up, but crime has expanded to other types that seem even more dangerous like car-jacking in broad daylight, violent encounters between the military and narco-mercenaries, kidnappings, etc</p>