

**Poland's Compatibility with the European Union;**  
**Transition, Integration and Future Prospects**

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## **Introduction**

Theories abound on the creation, internal organization, and operation of governing systems. Philosophers as varied as Plato and Montesquieu asserted their beliefs that governing systems or states which cover large geographic areas lose coherence and consistency and become less and less effective when they grow.<sup>1</sup> Conversely, early American philosophers, particularly James Madison and some of the other founding fathers of the United States maintained that for democratic systems to function not merely well but to achieve their fullest potential it was imperative for the land area of the system to be massive. Madison felt that having a large area with many separate and distinct regions with individual interests and goals would allow politicians to play off of one another and attain maximum governmental balance.<sup>2</sup> Any of these philosophers' views can be argued and supported by different democratic experiments throughout history.

These viewpoints can also be brought up when discussing the European Union- the EU has many supra-national elements as well as inter-governmental aspects; therefore, it is wise to analyze the institution on the level of international organizations as well as on the level of sovereign states. Is the EU getting too large to function properly, or have the recent enlargements served to widen the organization's ability to achieve broader, more inclusive goals which benefit the entire European continent? Has the European Union gotten too unwieldy in size and too diverse in nature, or are the member states just different enough from one another to ensure continued stimulus for economic progress and democratic and social advancements? The case of Poland is an exceedingly interesting one to take when examining these questions. Poland is a new member state of the European Union and has many unique aspects worth studying including

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<sup>1</sup> Kopstein, 140.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. 141.

both its communist legacy and democratic history and its Catholic identity among other things. Poland also is fairly representative of the Eastern Enlargement countries. Because of these reasons this paper will take Poland as the prime specimen to examine how the EU functions with new member states and how homogenous the EU must be in order to function effectively.

Poland was accepted into the ranks of the European Union on May 1<sup>st</sup>, 2004. For roughly a decade before this date Poland was working towards the concrete goal of membership, and since this date Poland has been working to further increase its integration into the European system. This process has gone through different phases with different levels of commitment and varying degrees of success since its accession to the EU and the level of completeness of integration is still being studied. This paper aims to analyze Poland's transition into an EU member state and its similarities and differences to the EU-15, the states which were part of the EU before the 2004 enlargement and which are often referred to as 'old Europe.' The analysis of the transition and the similarities and differences between the countries will then be used to examine the current decision making procedures that exist in the EU, the current and future compatibility of Poland with the old member states and the possibility of future enlargements in light of Poland's experiences.

The analysis of Poland's transition into the European Union will encompass the investigation of several different variables including cultural and political elements involved in the transition process as well as transitions of the economy and civil society. When examining the similarities and differences of the EU and Poland special attention will be paid to economic differences, (since the EU after all was began as and still is primarily an economic institution) the role of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland and elsewhere in Europe and the information which can be gathered from the World Values Survey and the Eurobarometer.

## Poland's Accession to the EU

There are a number of conditions that must be met before a state can join the European Union. Not least among these is the stipulation from the Treaty of Rome that the nation must be *in Europe*.<sup>3</sup> The stipulations required of candidate countries became more defined in 1993 when the 'Copenhagen Criteria' were agreed upon. The Copenhagen Criteria include three main points: every country wishing to join the union must be a democracy that respects human rights and maintains the rule of law, must have a capitalist economy that is strong enough to survive once integrated into the European market, and finally must adopt the entire *acquis communautaire* into their system of government.<sup>4</sup> The *acquis communautaire* of the European Union is comparable in some ways to the constitution in the United States. Since the EU does not have a constitution, all of its laws are drawn from the entire body of legislation of the organization- every document that the member states and the bodies of the EU have agreed upon.<sup>5</sup> This includes decisions passed by the European Court of Justice, and all of the treaties signed by the EU, and understandably takes a great deal of time to implement in candidate countries since the implementation almost always encompasses both the penning of new laws and sweeping changes to national institutions.<sup>6</sup>

These changes are not only the candidate countries' burden to bear; the EU helps candidates implement the *acquis* in a number of ways. The EU gives 'pre-accession assistance' to candidate countries (and even to possible candidate countries, though the funding goes up once a country is officially a candidate for EU membership) in the form of monetary aid. The purpose of this funding is to jump start political reforms, the growth of civil society, increased

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<sup>3</sup> The Treaty of Rome, 1957

<sup>4</sup> "European Council in Copenhagen-Conclusions of the Presidency"

<sup>5</sup> "Acquis Communautaire," *Justice and Home Affairs Glossary*

<sup>6</sup> "Acquis Communautaire," *BBC NEWS A-Z of Europe*

respect for human rights and the rule of law, as well as protection of minorities.<sup>7</sup> Achieving a level of equality on these issues with the current EU member states is a prerequisite for membership, but funding for projects that seek to harmonize the societies of EU member states does not end with accession. EU regional policy and structural funding continue to fulfill this role once a country joins the union and are constantly being used to bring member states closer and closer together.<sup>8</sup>

Many years of negotiations regarding the implementation of the *acquis communautaire* are necessary for candidate countries of the EU. However, the word ‘negotiations’ is a somewhat of a misnomer. Candidate countries are required to adopt the entire *acquis* into their national legal systems. In other words, there is not much room for political maneuvering on the side of the candidate country’s politicians since it is impossible for them to decline implementation of any part of the *acquis*.<sup>9</sup> The only political ‘wheeling and dealing’ that occurs during this process is in regards to the time frame during which each section of the *acquis* is adopted. The *acquis communautaire* of the European Union is broken up into various thematic chapters. Each chapter contains a set of EU laws pertaining to a specific issue area such as the environment, the free movement of goods, the Customs Union, or the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU.<sup>10</sup>

There are several theories of how exactly a candidate country can go through this ‘negotiation’ process. The two most prevalent theories are adopting the *acquis* as quickly as possible in a sort of race or competition against the other candidate countries versus adopting the

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<sup>7</sup> “Financial Assistance,” *European Commission; Enlargement, Europa*

<sup>8</sup> McCormick, 315

<sup>9</sup> Kułakowski and Jesień, 297.

<sup>10</sup> “Enlargement Archives” *Chapters (of the Acquis) Europa*

*acquis* in a slower fashion but doing so more thoroughly.<sup>11</sup> In the former scenario, chapters of the *acquis* are often closed temporarily after basic issues have been summarily negotiated so that the candidate country can move on to other chapters. These temporarily or ‘provisionally closed’ chapters will almost certainly have to be reopened before accession in order to iron out all of the particulars encompassed in them. The latter scenario takes more time to close specific chapters of the *acquis*, but the result is that by the time each chapter is closed it has been thoroughly negotiated and implemented in its entirety. According to Dr. Leszek Jesień and Jan Kułakowski,<sup>12</sup> the second of these two theories was the one chosen by the Polish negotiating team for the majority of their accession negotiations.<sup>13</sup> This can lead to the assumption that the implementation of the different chapters of the *acquis* was thoroughly integrated into Poland’s governmental system, with a high degree of consensus among Polish politicians and citizens on the issues.

This slower process in many instances goes hand-in-hand with the ‘Social Learning Model’ of the Europeanization process presented in Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier’s book *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*.<sup>14</sup> This is not to say that the Social Learning Model was always the form of Europeanization in Poland’s accession process or that Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s External Incentives Model did not apply to Poland. On the contrary the External Incentives Model aptly describes the use of EU conditionality which drove some of the modifications of Polish government which occurred thanks to the implementation of the *acquis communautaire* during the transition process.

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<sup>11</sup> Kułakowski and Jesień, 298.

<sup>12</sup> Dr. Leszek Jesień and Jan Kułakowski were members of Poland’s Accession team.

<sup>13</sup> Kułakowski and Jesień, 298.

<sup>14</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 18.

### **Poland's Economic Transition and Similarity to the EU**

While Poland and the other new EU member states are not yet on an economic level equal to that of the veteran members of the organization, over the past few years significant integration has occurred of both the stock markets and banking markets into EU levels.<sup>15</sup> Notable convergence of the interest rates for the currencies of the new member states (towards the levels of the countries in the Euro zone<sup>16</sup>) has also occurred, and will continue as each new member adopts the Euro.<sup>17</sup>

The road to convergence with other members of the euro zone is not an easy path for Poland to follow not only because it is a route that can at times conflict with domestic priorities. However, since the negotiation process for joining the euro zone is similar to the overall process of joining the European Union which was discussed earlier in the paper, the negotiations for entry into the euro zone have nothing to do with making compromises about the convergence process itself, but rather the time it takes to complete the process. Poland and the other member states which joined the EU in 2004 (and in 2007 for that matter) will at some point have to adopt the euro as their currency; there can be no negotiating on this issue.<sup>18</sup> It follows, therefore, that since there is no choice but to work towards the euro, domestic issues for Poland can often take a backseat to the financial reforms.<sup>19</sup> This means that the progression of economic integration can be difficult for Polish citizens to handle and fully understand. Upon accession to the EU the Polish government faced the daunting question of whether to opt for quick entry to the euro zone

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<sup>15</sup> Dvorak, 177-178.

<sup>16</sup> The Euro Zone (officially the Euro Area) is the 16-member group of EU member states that use the Euro as their currency. The countries which are not part of the Euro Zone but which are part of the EU include the UK, Denmark and Sweden which all opted out of its use when it was first implemented, and Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania all of which are obligated to join once their economies meet the rigorous standards necessary to be a member. "Map of the Euro Area" *The European Central Bank*

<sup>17</sup> Dvorak, 183.

<sup>18</sup> Małecky, 204.

<sup>19</sup> Barnes, 180.



and the chance to take advantage of the economic benefits which go along with membership, or to opt for a delayed entry into the common currency to prolong the amount of time to independently control fiscal policies and to deal with the domestic political issues of the economy.<sup>20</sup> Giving up national control of currency, as well as fiscal and monetary policy is a daunting task for most nations, since currency independence has been so strongly tied to sovereignty throughout history.<sup>21</sup> Poland has yet to conclude official negotiations regarding an exact date for the introduction of the euro, though the most optimistic predictions claim that Poland will adopt the euro by 2012.<sup>22</sup> It can be assumed that the Polish government is following a strategy here similar to the strategy utilized in Poland's accession agreements. The Polish government is taking as much time as is necessary to transition into the euro zone so that when that transition occurs it will have a solid foundation on Polish law and, perhaps more importantly, on national consensus. It is possible that it may still take decades for Poland to 'catch up' to the economic level of the old EU 15, despite the fact that the new members as a whole, including Poland have often had higher growth rates than countries already within the euro zone, since the new states started from a significantly lower economic base.<sup>23</sup> In fact, before the most recent enlargements, the *Economist* compared the accession of the Central and Eastern European nations to the EU to the United States incorporating parts of Mexico and attempting to bring them up to US levels of prosperity.<sup>24</sup> It can not be denied however, that regardless of whether Poland has chosen quick or delayed entry into the euro zone, or how rapidly Poland is achieving economic parity with the old member states, that eventually the Polish economy and all of the economies of the eastern enlargements of 2004 and 2007 will

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<sup>20</sup> Dyson, 418.

<sup>21</sup> McCormick, 94

<sup>22</sup> Slowikowska, 2008.

<sup>23</sup> Barnes, 181.

<sup>24</sup> McCormick, 100

merge completely with those of the former EU of 15. Unless the European Union experiences an unforeseen and fundamental change in its reason for existence, the economies of all of the member states will continue to converge to create the most efficient and functional economic system possible.

The transition into the European Union has resulted in favorable outcomes in Polish public finance.<sup>25</sup> Danuta Hübner, an economist by trade and the current European Commissioner from Poland, thinks that the ‘economy is the greatest challenge to ... uniting Europe.’<sup>26</sup> Hübner sees Poland’s accession to the EU as an event that increased the protection of property rights, created greater competition forces and provided for a more ‘friendly’ atmosphere for investment. She sees this investment in Poland and in the other new member states as the best way to overcome the challenge of the economy for the EU.<sup>27</sup> By furthering economic integration the economic system of the EU will become strengthened and the power of the Union will be perpetuated, rather than stagnate. Hübner also sites studies that have proven that Poland is becoming and will eventually be much more successful economically thanks to EU accession than it would have been otherwise.<sup>28</sup> EU membership and access to EU markets lead to the creation of ‘dynamic industries’ in Poland with higher quality goods and improved productivity than had existed before EU accession.<sup>29</sup> Competition in industry has improved in Poland since accession to the EU because of the expansion of the market, increased access to the EU markets and the movement towards ultimate uniformity with these markets.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Gotz-Kozierkiewicz, 79.

<sup>26</sup> Hübner, 207.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 208.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 213.

<sup>29</sup> Wziątek-Kubiak and Magda, 43.

<sup>30</sup> Hoshi, Hajdukovic and Luci, 67.

### **Poland's Cultural Transition and Similarity to the EU**

Despite these proven and projected advancements in economic integration many authors have claimed that the European Union has moved too far, too fast in relation to the 2004 and 2007 enlargements which altogether added twelve new nations to the union.<sup>31</sup> Some people subscribe to the argument that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are too culturally different from the old Western-European members of the EU for efficient working relationships to be forged among them.<sup>32</sup> It may certainly be true that there are cultural differences between the two regions, possibly stemming from the different mindsets that resulted from being on different sides of the Iron Curtain during the Cold War. Even Jacques Delors, a former President of the European Commission who was an instrumental player in the passage of the Maastricht Treaty (The Treaty on European Union), believed that the social and cultural dimensions of the community as a whole were the ‘Achilles heel of European integration.’<sup>33</sup> It is easier to mandate laws concerning the creation of uniform policies on economic issues, and even on justice or foreign security policy issues than it is on cultural and societal issues. It is next to impossible to mandate how people think and feel about their personal cultures, so critics sharing this thought of Jacques Delors’ might be correct in thinking that cultural disagreements or even just the disparities might hinder further European integration.

If this were the case, it would pose severe challenges to the recently added countries of the EU. However, it is immensely imperative now to note that according to Kopstein and Reilly, ‘cultural homogenization’ is not and has never been the goal of the European Union.<sup>34</sup> The European Union was formed primarily as an economic community, and still exists as such today.

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<sup>31</sup> Timuş, 342.

<sup>32</sup> Toktaş, 489

<sup>33</sup> Mau, 76.

<sup>34</sup> Kopstein, 142.

In the preamble of the Treaty of Rome, that is, the Treaty Establishing the European *Economic* Community, the signatories of the six founding states do call on “the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts...” but the ideal they are referring to is described in the preamble (and subsequently developed further in the body of the treaty) is economic, not cultural, in nature. The founders desired to “guarantee steady expansion, balanced trade and fair competition... strengthen the unity of their economies,” and “to ensure the development of their prosperity.”<sup>35</sup> Surely, cooperation, respect and a certain level of congruence between the societies and cultures of the European nations who share and adhere to the ideals in this treaty is imperative for economic integration to occur smoothly and for economic prosperity to increase unhindered, but cultural homogeny is not necessary for the EU to function.

### **The World Values Survey and the Eurobarometer**

The Eurobarometer and the World Values Survey are two similar projects which strive to collect information about the public opinion and values of people in different cultures throughout Europe (throughout the whole world for the World Values Survey). The Eurobarometer is a series of surveys that has been carried out on behalf of the European Commission since 1973 to gauge the general public opinion of EU citizens as well as citizens of candidate countries on issues related to the European Union.<sup>36</sup> The World Values Survey has been in existence since 1981 when it branched off from the European Values Study to include other regions of the world.<sup>37</sup> While the WVS is more comprehensive in the audience it surveys, the Eurobarometer has gathered information over a significantly longer period of time on issues that relate specifically to Europe and the EU, and has done so more frequently- data is gathered biannually from EU citizens. Neither survey is better than the other however, as each one focuses on a

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<sup>35</sup>Preamble of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,1957.

<sup>36</sup> “Public Opinion Analysis” *The European Commission*. May 2008.

<sup>37</sup> “The Origins of the World Values Survey”

different type of results. The Eurobarometer focuses on people's views on current issues usually surrounding the economies, governments, and civil societies of EU countries and the EU itself, since the survey is intended to help the European Commission take political steps that are in line with what European Union citizens think about these issues. The WVS focuses more on abstract issues, asking questions which have a large range of possible answers, which tend to be less political than those of the Eurobarometer, since the goal of the project is to identify cultural trends among different nations of the world. These differences could also be attributed to the fact that the WVS is tied to a university, as opposed to an inter-governmental organization in the way that the Eurobarometer is.<sup>38</sup>

Even though this paper has attempted to establish that it does not matter whether or not the member states of the European Union are culturally identical it is important to point out some of the significant cultural differences between Poland and the old member states, since these differences can influence the reactions of European citizens on various issues. A logical place to commence looking for proof of these cultural differences is with the results of the final Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (CCEB) surveys carried out before the 2004 enlargement. More specifically, in the findings which compare the answers of the (then) current members of the EU with those facing forthcoming membership. One clear difference between the EU-15 and the countries of the 2004 enlargement, which includes Poland, (according to the CCEB of fall 2003) was what were considered to be "personally important socio-political values." Individual freedom was seen as the fourth most important socio-political value amongst citizens of the EU 15 with 30% of them choosing it as important. Individual freedom was the 6<sup>th</sup> most important of these values for the citizens of the 2004 enlargement and only 18% of them listed it as being

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<sup>38</sup> "The Origins of the World Values Survey"

personally important.<sup>39</sup> This can be interpreted to mean that citizens of the new member states cared much less for individual freedoms such as the freedoms of press or speech than their counterparts in ‘old Europe.’ It is possible that their previous experiences under communist regimes caused the East-Central Europeans to place less value on such freedoms, but whatever the reason it means that citizens of the 2004 enlargement would be less likely to vote for legislation that ensured such freedoms in the EU, and conversely that they might be more likely than citizens of the EU-15 to vote for legislation that encroached upon these freedoms in hopes of achieving economic or other goals. There has been a recent slowing down of interest in expansion because the further east the EU expands; the less culturally similar the candidate countries are to the old member states.<sup>40</sup>

Another area in which the old member states and the new member states differed according to this 2003 survey was with the perceptions of religion. Religion was given as a personally important socio-political value by 14% of those surveyed in the new member states, and only by 7% in the EU 15.<sup>41</sup> Religion was also given as an answer for what value best defines the home country of the survey respondent 30% of the time by citizens of the 2004 enlargement, yet only 8% of the time by the old member states.<sup>42</sup> Europe is a predominantly Christian continent, and has been for millennia, but religion plays a much larger role in East-Central Europe. Seven of the ten countries which joined the EU in 2004 have a majority Roman Catholic population. In Poland almost 90% of the population self-defines as Roman Catholic. More importantly, approximately 75% of these Polish Catholics are active practitioners of their

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<sup>39</sup> Figure 1.1 CCEB Fall 2003, 5.

<sup>40</sup> McCormick, 104

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Figure 1.2b CCEB Fall 2003, 14.

religion. (Compared to the only 30% active practitioners of the Roman Catholic Italians who also make up 90% of their population; the Italian example is the trend in Western Europe.)<sup>43</sup>

While the abovementioned statistics do show some significant differences in the viewpoints and values held by Western and Eastern Europeans they do not seem to be large enough differences to cause rifts between the two parts of Europe. One way to support this statement is to look at what other values are personally important for Europeans other than the divisive ones of religion and individual freedoms- family, health, and work all come before the two previously mentioned across the entire EU. The percentages of people who place these three values as personally important are also almost identical for old and new members of the EU. 82% of both groups value family very strongly; this is the most important socio-political value across the board. Next comes health with 63% and 54% of the populations for new and old members respectively, again both groups name this as the second most important value. And finally, for the new members of 2004, 35% of the citizens value work while 39% of the people in the EU 15 do.<sup>44</sup> This correlation shows that the three most important socio-political values are the same for the entire EU. This could lead one to assume that on many socio-political issues these highly cherished valued will cause all EU citizens will react in a similar way. Surely the less important of the personally cherished socio-political values would play into reactions, but overall the importance of family, health, and work would most likely trump any disagreements among the citizens and would bring them together in their common respect of these opinions.

The differences demonstrated in the results of the Eurobarometer show that Poland, as a CEE country, has some deep differences when compared to the old member states of the EU. These differences and their perceived ramifications have contributed to friction between the EU-

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<sup>43</sup> "Poland" CIA World Factbook

<sup>44</sup> Figure 1.1 CCEB Fall 2003, 5.

15 and the new members at different points in the history of the Central and Eastern European Countries' membership in the EU, as will be discussed later in the paper. The Eurobarometer also shows that Poland, as a CEE country has many similarities with the EU-15 and that the EU as a whole has deep connections on many levels of culture and society.

Another interesting body of information of how similar and dissimilar the members of the European Union are is the World Values Survey. This survey, in researching ninety-seven countries worldwide, which represent a full ninety percent of the earth's population, has a much larger focus than the Eurobarometer which only investigates EU member states and prospective member states.<sup>45</sup> Since the World Values Survey (WVS) was born out of a project known as the European Values Survey it completes quite a comprehensive examination of Europe; all of the current 27 EU members are included in the survey, as well as many of the prospective members.<sup>46</sup>

What is possibly the most interesting and accessible result of the WVS is what is known as the Inglehart-Welzel Cultural Map of the World. (Figure 1) The Cultural Map was created by Ronald Inglehart, an American political scientist and chairman of the WVS who was influential in the creation of both the WVS and the Eurobarometer. The Cultural Map is a graphical depiction of the survey results in which Inglehart has plotted each country surveyed based on the condensation of many different values into two dimensions. The Map is a chart with two axes which represent Secular/Rational Values versus Traditional Values on one side and Survival Values versus Self Expression Values on the other. The result is an image which claims to show how closely related each country is to one another based on shared (or not) values systems.<sup>47</sup> Upon examination of the map it is interesting to note the locations of all of the EU member

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<sup>45</sup> "Learn More about the World Values Survey"

<sup>46</sup> "The Origins of the World Values Survey"

<sup>47</sup> Ronald Inglehart "The Inglehart-Welzel Cultural Map of the World"



states. Many are in predictable positions, such as the closeness of France, Belgium, and Luxembourg and their relative location on the map showing their secular and self expression values. Other countries' positions are more interesting, such as the relative distance there is between Belgium and Luxembourg and their traditional partner in Benelux- the Netherlands. The Netherlands is not drastically removed from Belgium and Luxembourg, but it is further away from the latter two than it is from countries like Iceland and Italy.

On this Cultural Map one can also see that most of the new member states of the EU, including Poland, are plotted further to the left than many of the old member states. This can generally be accounted for by remembering that the economies of these countries, while heading towards parity with Western European economies, still have a lot of growth to achieve. It is important to consider the relative positions of each country while interpreting this map. It is obvious that many East-Central European members of the EU are on the left-hand side, but notice that many of them are closer to some Western European nations than Ireland and Portugal are; and these two countries have been part of the EU for decades and are very deeply entrenched in the culture and history of Western Europe. An earlier version of this Cultural Map showed the changes in positions of countries between 1981, when the first wave of surveying was carried out, and 1990 when the second wave was conducted. This map shows that European countries were getting closer to one another, and in this most current map the convergence has continued. Even though it simplifies cultural differences down to only two dimensions, this map is a very useful tool in remembering that differences and similarities between Poland and the old member states of the EU are relative and need to be looked at with as much information as possible.

### **The Role of the Church in Poland**

Poland is a country that is roughly ninety percent Roman Catholic. Of those self-proclaimed Catholics, seventy-five percent regularly practice their religion. This means that the vast majority of the Polish population is devoutly Catholic.<sup>48</sup> This deeply ingrained and widely manifested Catholic identity of Poles hugely impacts almost all aspects of life in Poland. This Catholic identity has incredibly deep roots in Poland. The country has been Christian since the year 966 when King Mieszko I formally adopted the religion. Mieszko I was also the first ruler to unite Poland under one governmental system and the founder of the Piast Dynasty which ruled Poland for three centuries.<sup>49</sup> The adoption of Christianity in Poland is therefore synonymous with its birth as a nation; it would be impossible to ever fully separate Christianity (in the form of Roman Catholicism) out of the Polish identity.

This inherent ‘Catholic-ness’ of the Polish people has played a large role in many of Poland’s historical events. The Church has been a key participant in all of the events that have shaped Polish history in recent decades- from the Partitions of Poland, to the First World War, to the Nazi invasion and the Second World War, to the Soviet control and finally to the movements for change and freedom during the collapse of communism in Europe. Throughout these turbulent phases of Polish history, during many of which the country itself did not even exist on maps, the Roman Catholic Church was highly effective in preserving the conception of Polish nationality and Polish Identity.

Poles were able to cling to their Catholic identity during the partitions because it was an aspect of their self-definitions which distinguished them from the Eastern-Orthodox Russians and the Protestant Prussians. The Catholic Church has always been a patron of the arts and

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<sup>48</sup> CIA Factbook

<sup>49</sup> Sanford and Gozdecka-Sanford, 125.

during the partitions Catholic clergy encouraged the continued expression of Poland and ‘Polishness’ through art and literature during this period of history.<sup>50</sup>

After the end of the partitions, during the interwar years, the Catholic Church was given a special position in the new Polish government- there was no separation of Church and State at this time so the Church was able to exert much influence on public policy.<sup>51</sup> With the Nazi invasion many clergy members and Church leaders were persecuted and killed for the leadership roles they played in society. A few thousand individuals were targeted because they were powerful and popular leaders whom the Nazis believed it was necessary to eliminate in order to suppress the Polish people.<sup>52</sup> Individuals such as the Franciscan Friar Maximilian Kolbe were killed by the Nazis for their leadership roles within the Church. In many cases, their deaths, rather than dampen the Polish spirit and weaken the Polish identity, these individuals became rallying points for the oppressed population during the war and eventually became world-wide symbols of Catholic piety and integrity.<sup>53</sup>

It is common knowledge that the Nazis committed horrible atrocities during the Second World War. One of the lesser-known results of their brutal regime and evil tactics is that after the war ended the Polish population was *much* more homogenous than it had previously been. The majority of Poland’s Jews were killed during the Holocaust and the vast majority of the surviving Jews, Roma, and other minorities in Poland emigrated after peace was achieved due to lingering senses of hostility and memories of unpleasant experiences on Polish soil.<sup>54</sup> Many ethnic minorities were also forced out of the borderlands by the new communist authorities.<sup>55</sup> It

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<sup>50</sup> Sanford and Gozdecka-Sanford, 170.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 171.

<sup>53</sup> Koscianska, 160.

<sup>54</sup> Sanford and Gozdecka-Sanford, 93.

<sup>55</sup> Kulczycki, 135.

was at this time that the percentage of Poland's population that was Catholic rose above the ninety percent mark (Before the war the number had still been quite high, but closer to seventy-five percent<sup>56</sup>). This population shift contributed further to the links between the Polish identity and Roman Catholicism.

After the war Poland was much more uniformly Catholic than it ever had been, but the communist leaders worked exceedingly hard to stamp out the effects of religion on culture and society. The government even instituted secular institutions designed to supersede and eventually take the place of the Catholic sacraments. These included ceremonies for the granting of names to children and assigning 'honorary guardians' in place of baptism and godparents, the granting of a personal identity card in lieu of the sacrament of confirmation and of course civil marriages were introduced in hopes of lessening the role of the Church in family life. Throughout communist rule however, the Church continued to play the same role of preserving Poland as it had during the partitions- it was the Church that "was the popularly acknowledged guardian and repository of the nation's identity."<sup>57</sup>

The 1978 election of Karol Cardinal Wojtyła to the papacy continued to strengthen the Catholic identity of Poles, especially in relationship to their communist oppressors.<sup>58</sup> Pope John Paul II was a key player in bringing about the downfall of communism. His role is sometimes overlooked, but his visits to Poland in the late 1970s and early 1980s, his support of the worker's union *Solidarność*, and his negotiations with the Polish government greatly affected the speed and nature of the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Sanford and Gozdecka-Sanford, 171.

<sup>57</sup> Burleigh 421.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid. 420.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 435.

During the waning days of communism in Poland attending Mass and leading a devoutly Catholic life became a way to voice one's distaste for the government and one's political opinions.<sup>60</sup> Because of this aspect of the Catholic identity in Poland, many believed that after communism fell that Mass attendance would taper off and the Catholic element of Polish identity would fade into the past.<sup>61</sup> This was clearly not the case, since even today, almost two decades after the fall of communism ninety percent of Poles still identify as Roman Catholic and many are still devoutly practicing their faith. From my own experiences in Poland I never once attended a Mass that was not full of people- in most cases the Churches were filled to capacity and beyond with both women and men and the elderly and the young alike. Catholicism is still alive and well in Poland, and this undoubtedly has an effect on how Poles view their local politics and the politics of the EU.

### **Poland's Political Transition and Similarity to the EU**

After the fall of communism Poland moved rapidly into a democratic system of government. This government within just a few short years of its life was capable of holding elections that were both free and fair, of ensuring political and civil rights to the country's population and of maintaining the rule of law throughout the land.<sup>62</sup> Not all of the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe were able to transition so quickly and peacefully to a democratic system.<sup>63</sup> Part of the explanation for this in Poland is that the opposition to the communist regime was well-organized and dedicated to utilizing liberal politics to achieve their goals.<sup>64</sup> Arguably, Poland had the foundation for such an opposition to emerge because of its unique historical experiences. From *liberum veto* in the *Sejm* (not to mention the

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<sup>60</sup> Sanford and Gozdecka-Sanford, 173.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 172.

<sup>62</sup> Bunce, 34.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 34-35.

<sup>64</sup> Bunce, 36.

election of Kings),<sup>65</sup> to the late eighteenth century when Poland adopted the first modern, liberal, democratic constitution in Europe, (and only the second in the world)<sup>66</sup> to the Second Republic when Poland began to develop a multi-party system and attempted to ensure minority rights,<sup>67</sup> to the efforts of *Solidarność* in the waning years of communism,<sup>68</sup> Poland has had a democratic thread running through its entire history. Poland's ability to build up an opposition movement in its society during communism greatly aided the process of democratization in the 1990s. The Roundtable Talks in Poland are an example of how the opposition (in the form of *Solidarność*) was able to gain political strength and then to utilize it in order to acquire political experience in negotiations at the talks.<sup>69</sup>

The Polish political system is by no means perfect, however. There are times of instability, especially in the legislative branch where the number of members of any given political party in the *Sejm* frequently grow or shrink by as many as forty to fifty, and sometimes by as many as 100 seats in each election.<sup>70</sup> These extreme shifts in elections show that the Polish electorate is still adjusting to the current manifestation of democracy in Poland. Even though Poland does have a long history of democracy, the present population of Poland is still in the learning stages of how exactly to best make use of their democratic rights and responsibilities.

The political 'culture' or identity of the European Union as a whole has been evolving since the late 1950s. This is a much shorter time frame than the general history of democracy in Poland, but it is much longer than the current history of government in Poland. In terms of its stability and conventional processes the EU has a much more established political system. When

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<sup>65</sup> Sanford and Gozdecka-Sanford, 110

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 53

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 45

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 190

<sup>69</sup> Bunce, 45.

<sup>70</sup> <http://www.parties-and-elections.de/poland.html>

the EU first began it was intended to be an economic organization and only slowly, over many decades did it develop the additional function of being an international political organization. The European Parliament when compared to the Polish *Sejm* and Senate is a much more stable body with the two largest parties representing center-left and center-right views. This helps anchor the European Parliament in relatively moderate politics and prevents harsh fluctuations from one political ideology to another. The EU still has an often-discussed ‘democratic deficit’ which is the phrase used to describe the lack of transparency and direct accountability to Europeans in many of the EU institutions.<sup>71</sup> However, steps are almost constantly being taken to increase the democratic representation of the EU and the transparency of the different institutions. The process of change in the EU is much more stable than the massive transformations and reforms which Poland took on all at once at the end of communism.

The fact that the EU is the more stable and in many ways more powerful body in the Polish-EU relationship means that the EU has been able to exert its influence on Polish political life in the years leading up to Poland’s accession and in the years since. The stability of the EU’s political system has added to the external-influence classification of incentives for complying with EU laws that Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier describe.<sup>72</sup> The political sphere of the EU continues to grow and strengthen as the organization continues to branch out from the original purpose of creating an economic union. The act of joining the EU alone has helped to strengthen Poland’s government in many ways (the previously discussed implementation of the Copenhagen Criteria ensures this). There is every reason to believe that Poland’s membership in the EU (and the Cohesion Policy funding that goes along with that membership<sup>73</sup>) will continue

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<sup>71</sup> McCormick, 263.

<sup>72</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmier, 10.

<sup>73</sup> McCormick, 315

to have this effect so that the Polish government and political system will one day be as strong and effective as those of the older EU member states.

### **Civil Society in Poland**

Civil society is the sector of a society that is made up of various institutions which can include political parties, churches and religious organizations, schools, non-profit groups and other non-governmental organizations, the media, businesses and social groups.<sup>74</sup> It is through these organizations that people in a given community or society can build social capital. Many scholars believe that a strong civil society is necessary for effective functioning of democracy.<sup>75</sup> Under communism, Poland almost had no civil society to speak of, and what few vestiges of it that did exist (the Church, and in later years *Solidarność*,) did not play a role that could challenge the government. After 1989 all of this changed, and there was an eruption of civil society groups in Poland. The surge in social capital did not last long however, since underlying structures to support it were lacking, and shortly after the groups burst into society, the number of them declined almost as rapidly as it had grown.<sup>76</sup> However, the level of civil society is on the rise again, helped in some ways by the implantation of the regional policy and structural funds mentioned earlier in the paper. The process of allocation and distribution of the structural funds helps to create a type of social capital in Poland. This process brings together individuals from a similar background and with similar education and experience to work together on a shared goal<sup>77</sup> NGO's are beginning to play an important role in this field. Their unique ability to 'name and shame,' or to call attention to failings and discrepancies in the government allows for the

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<sup>74</sup> Geisler, 105

<sup>75</sup> Putnam, 290

<sup>76</sup> Karwińska, 54

<sup>77</sup> Dąbrowski, 244



people to have a greater awareness of the issues, and helps to prevent and fix corruption and incompetence within governmental structures.<sup>78</sup>

According to Anna Karwińska, a professor in Krakow's University of Economics, civil society in Poland is still weaker than it is in old Europe, but it has the potential to continue getting stronger.<sup>79</sup> She provided evidence that shows support for non-democratic forms of governance has been declining continuously, and that the number of Polish citizens who are 'well-disposed' towards democracy as the best system of government is continually increasing.<sup>80</sup> Poles have had two decades to witness that democratic processes help solve problems and are efficient within a government, but the current democracy in Poland is still relatively young and Karwińska points out that learning to accept democracy and to become involved in civil society is a slow process.<sup>81</sup> The best way to foster this growth is through increased education, particularly about democratic structures and what it means to be a responsible citizen.<sup>82</sup> Additionally, higher education corresponds with increased social capital; the higher the level of education achieved, the more likely it is for an individual to become involved with civil society.<sup>83</sup>

The European Union is undertaking efforts to increase education, and to increase interaction between students within the EU. The Lifelong Learning Programme fosters education projects within member states of the EU including the Comenius, Erasmus, Leonardo da Vinci and Grundtvig programs which cater to specific sectors of education, including university level, vocational training and adult education. The Lifelong Learning Program also

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<sup>78</sup> Dąbrowski, 242

<sup>79</sup> Karwińska, 55

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 57

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., 58

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., 59

has four key activities which include policy cooperation among member states in education innovations and language training, among other activities.<sup>84</sup> One of the programs carried out through this sector of the EU is the Socrates Program. One of the features of the Socrates Program is the creation of language textbooks for the languages spoken within the Union that include references to the EU in vocabulary and context, as well as to governmental structures.<sup>85</sup> This is one way in which the EU is fulfilling the need for education to increase civil society, both in Poland and in the entire EU.

While civil society in Poland is not yet as strong and active as it is in the old member states of the EU in Western Europe, but there is every reason to believe that with the increases in economic integration (which will lead to more and more students pursuing more and more education opportunities) the levels of social capital will continue to increase, and that the actions of the EU will foster and expedite this process.

### **Decision Making Processes in the EU**

As was explained earlier the political and governmental aspects of the European Union have been developing and evolving for roughly five decades. This results in not only a stable but also a sophisticated system. This does not mean however that there are never disagreements between member states or that from time to time business as usual gets caught up in differences of opinion. Poland has been involved in its fair share of misunderstandings and disagreements with the rest of the Union, but before those can be analyzed, a brief description of EU decision making is in order.

The EU is in many ways an inter-governmental organization, though in others it is a supra-national organization. Decision making takes places on the different levels- different

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<sup>84</sup> "Lifelong Learning Program"

<sup>85</sup> "Compendium 2008"

bodies within the EU which fall into both categories are involved in all of the aspects of decision making. The European Commission is perhaps one of the most supra-national elements of the EU, because while it currently has one commissioner appointed from each member state the commissioners themselves are supposed to be working in the best interests of the Union, not of their homelands in particular.<sup>86</sup> This is emphasized by the different portfolio areas under each Commissioner's control- the duties of the Commissioners are divided into various thematic subject areas (such as Justice, Freedom and Security; Regional Policy; Economic and Monetary Affairs; Transport and others) as opposed to the interests of regional areas or of states.<sup>87</sup> The Commission has the role of proposing new legislation to two other EU institutions- the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament (EP). The Council of Ministers is undoubtedly inter-governmental as it is made up of ministers of each member state's home government who work in accordance with national interests and agendas.<sup>88</sup> The European Parliament is in an interesting category since the European Members of Parliament (EMP's) represent individuals in Europe, not governments. In that aspect the body is in some ways supra-national, since its decisions are binding on states, yet states themselves do not have a direct voice in their proceedings.<sup>89</sup>

Throughout the history of the EU decision making has been handled in a few different ways. For all proposals from the European Commission both the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament must give their opinion. It has varied however, which of these bodies is the most powerful. In the past the Council of Ministers has in many cases had the final word on proceedings since the EP was only allowed to perform the duty of 'consultation' which allowed

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<sup>86</sup> McCormick, 109

<sup>87</sup> "The Members of the Barroso Commission"

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., 133.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., 155.

them to voice their opinion in a non-binding and powerless fashion.<sup>90</sup> Recently there has been a shift to allowing the EP participate more actively through co-decision voting, (which is a process similar to what occurs between the US Senate and House of Representatives with the Council of Ministers acting as the upper house and the EP as the lower) or through the assent procedure where the EP is able to vote in favor of or against a decision of the Council's.<sup>91</sup> Within the Council of Ministers many decisions are often taken unanimously, though there has been a push recently to increase the usage of qualified majority voting in this body to expedite EU processes. The current shift towards strengthening the voice of the EP holds the potential to give citizens of Poland more say in the EU decision making process, but the parallel shift in the Council of Ministers away from unanimity weakens the voice of all member states' governments since a veto no longer negates certain issues.<sup>92</sup>

Regardless of how the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament decide on a number of issues, particularly the serious issues affecting the structure of the EU itself such as the accession of new member states or the signing of new treaties, all of the governments of the member states must ratify the decisions of the EU for them to be implemented. This is where Poland does have a very strong voice since all of the member states are in effect equals as one veto would result in the failure of whatever measure is being considered by the Council.<sup>93</sup>

### **Cooperation between Poland and the EU in the Decision Making Process**

As is explained above, Poland has a number of ways in which it can effect decisions in the EU. Some issues of contention between the EU and Poland will now be examined to determine how well Poland works within the organization.

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<sup>90</sup> "Decision Making in the European Union"

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., 126.

<sup>92</sup> McCormick, 97.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

One area that has been a contentious one for Poland since before its accession is the issue of the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU (CAP). This is a set of policies and subsidies for farmers within the Union. France has traditionally been the prime benefactor of this system as a large percent of the French economy is involved in agriculture.<sup>94</sup> CAP, as its name implies is a common system for all EU members. However, when the 2004 enlargement was looming many in the EU-15 did not want to extend the benefits of CAP to the new Central and Eastern European member states.<sup>95</sup> Poland was a key player in arguing that the new members should benefit from CAP as well, in large part because approximately nineteen percent of the Polish population works in agriculture.<sup>96</sup> The old member states were fearful that applying the benefits of CAP in full to all of the new members would force the EU to declare bankruptcy, but the new members, especially Poland were afraid of their farmers being treated as ‘second-class citizens’ within the EU. Poland was able to exert its influence in this debate, since there was a strong desire within the EU 15 for Poland to be part of the 2004 expansion, and eventually received a compromise from the EU-15. The compromise allowed for the new member states to receive a percentage of the CAP funds and subsidies that the old members received, but that this percentage would slowly increase with time until the new members reached a level equal to that of the old.<sup>97</sup>

Another subject that has been highly contentious between the old member states of the EU and Poland has been the Iraq War. After the attacks on September 11, 2001 the members of the EU and the countries that were still in the accession process all gave their support to the US and agreed with the invasion of Afghanistan in hopes of ousting the Taliban and al-Qaida from

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<sup>94</sup> McCormick, 77.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid, 304.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., 296.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., 304.

power.<sup>98</sup> It was when the US decided to increase the efforts of the ‘War on Terror’ and invade Iraq that the old member states and what were to become the new member states split.<sup>99</sup> Poland was on the American side in this issue, much to the chagrin of France, Germany and other EU member states. Poland sent 2,500 troops to Iraq<sup>100</sup> and was so committed to US policy at this time that many began referring to the country as the new ‘protégé’ of the US.<sup>101</sup> Poland has since withdrawn many of its troops, and those that remain in Iraq are not involved in much combat or similar maneuvers, which has brought it more in line with the rest of the EU’s view on the Iraq situation.<sup>102</sup> This shift in Polish policy bodes well for the future of a Common Foreign and Security Policy in the EU, since the more closely aligned EU member states are on any given issue the more likely it is for them to agree on a common policy in this area.<sup>103</sup>

A third subject in which Poland’s role in overall EU decision making is apparent is in the failure of the Constitutional Treaty to be passed. The accumulated *acquis communautaire* of the EU is massive, there are countless treaties and laws in place but there is no unifying document succinctly explaining them all.<sup>104</sup> In 2002 the EU attempted to change this and to organize all of the legal documents of the EU into a single cohesive format. This was to be called the European Constitution and was negotiated by the member states in 2002 as well as those countries that were to accede to the Union in the following years. The Constitution had many lofty goals, but ultimately failed to be ratified thanks to referendums in France and the Netherlands.<sup>105</sup> A strong contributing factor to the failure of the Constitution in France is the idea of the Polish

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<sup>98</sup> McCormick, 98..

<sup>99</sup> Ibid, 99.

<sup>100</sup> “America is from Mars, Europe is from Venus” *The Economist* 2004.

<sup>101</sup> Zaborowski, 79.

<sup>102</sup> “Arrivederci?” *The Economist* 2005.

<sup>103</sup> McCormick, 99.

<sup>104</sup> “A Constitution for Europe,” *Europa*

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., 97.

Plumber.<sup>106</sup> The Polish Plumber was the embodiment of the idea that the European Constitution would initiate a massive influx of workers from the countries of the Eastern Enlargements into Western Europe where they would usurp jobs from native citizens and wreak havoc on the local economies. This figure of the Polish Plumber was the illustration of a division between Western and Eastern Europe created by the fear inspired by such a large enlargement which included countries so far below the economic level of the EU.<sup>107</sup>

After the failure of the European Constitution the EU was forced to re-group and re-examine what its goals were. After this analysis the Treaty of Lisbon was developed which contains many of the same initiatives as the European Constitution did, but without the broad references to supra-national elements of the Union as the former document.<sup>108</sup>

The Treaty of Lisbon is now facing similar problems to those which were faced by the European Constitution. In June 2008, Ireland rejected the treaty through a national referendum which threw the treaty into a state of political limbo.<sup>109</sup> The Irish rejected the treaty in part because its content was not well known or understood among the populace since the document contains hundreds and hundreds of pages of inaccessible legal jargon. This meant that many Irish citizens relied on second-hand accounts of the treaty's provisions and fears and assumptions about the treaty grew quickly. Among these assumptions were the fears that the Lisbon Treaty would impose certain supra-national laws upon Ireland which are contrary to their personal beliefs. While many of these fears were based on inadequate information, they are not entirely false. The Lisbon Treaty does reference the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the treaty would make it legally binding. This is the part of the Lisbon treaty that causes the most concern, since I

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<sup>106</sup> Pusca, 10.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>108</sup> McCormick, 97.

<sup>109</sup> Dilday, 75.

could supersede national laws regarding labor, abortion, euthanasia, gay marriage and other social issues.<sup>110</sup> These are all issues relating to Roman Catholic beliefs, especially those that would affect life and family values.<sup>111</sup> The UK has chosen to opt-out of certain parts of the Lisbon Treaty, particularly from the part referencing the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In the British case this disagreement is not based on religious conviction, but rather on the fear that any Treaty could infringe upon the rights guaranteed to British citizens according to British laws.<sup>112</sup>

The Irish reasons for rejecting the treaty raise special implications for Poland, a country that is overwhelmingly Catholic. Poland's president, Lech Kaczynski has made remarks questioning the logic behind signing the Lisbon Treaty now that Ireland has rejected it. For the time being, he has refused his signature which is the last step needed for the treaty to be ratified in Poland. In his view, it is useless to sign the treaty before Ireland resolved the 'no' vote from their referendum. Kaczynski has stated that he is refusing to sign because if the EU attempts to bully Ireland into ratifying the treaty it will severely harm the principle of unanimity in EU affairs.<sup>113</sup> Many in Europe consider Kaczynski's comments to be empty since Poland has many reasons to desire the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and since Kaczynski himself was instrumental in Poland in negotiating the treaty in the first place.<sup>114</sup> Donald Tusk, the Polish Prime Minister, though he heads a party which is not as skeptical of the Treaty as the President is, has stated that he will not attempt to undermine the president on this issue, largely because he needs the support of the president's party in parliament in order to keep his coalition large enough to function effectively.<sup>115</sup> It is very important to remember that issues which are

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<sup>110</sup> "Q&A: The Lisbon Treaty"

<sup>111</sup> Dilday, 75.

<sup>112</sup> "Q&A: The Lisbon Treaty"

<sup>113</sup> "Polish President Declines to Sign EU Treaty"

<sup>114</sup> Lichfield, 2008.

<sup>115</sup> "No EU Rights Charter for Poland"



important to Roman Catholics are clashing, or at least are perceived to be clashing with the ideals of the EU. With the overwhelming numbers of Catholics in Poland and the previously explained linkages between the Catholic faith and Polish identity these flash points with EU policy have great potential to cause trouble between the EU and Poland.

### **Conclusions**

It is apparent after examining this information that Poland certainly has a unique identity within the European Union, but that this identity does not and will not prevent it from having a meaningful position within the Union and meaningful relationships with other EU member states. The data from the World Values Survey and the Eurobarometer show that the differences between Poland and the old member states of the EU are not divisive enough to tear apart the integration that has already occurred. When compared to the similarities these two studies point out the differences fade into the background. The EU should certainly pay a great deal of attention to the intricacies of Polish culture where they differ from the culture of the EU-15, especially in regards to the role of the Church, as important religious issues such as abortion, embryonic stem cell research and gay rights could prove to be flash points between Poland and the EU as a whole. However, scholars studying the EU and the policy makers within the organization would do well to remember that the EU-15 countries are not identical to each other and that there are notable differences between them just as they have with Poland. Poland's case shows that a country with some different cultural values can still thrive within the European Union- it is a perfect example of the EU's slogan "United in Diversity." The success of Poland within the EU bodes well for other candidate countries, even those that may have cultural differences as great as Turkey's or Georgia's. As has been stated earlier the primary incentive

for creating the European Union and for perpetuating it has been economic improvement, and in this aspect cultural differences play only a small role.

Continuing with the idea of economic driving forces behind further EU integration and possible enlargement it is important to listen to what Danuta Hübner has to say. She points out that without the recent enlargements a great deal of production and economic value would have been lost to the EU. Without the new member states in which to invest and promote industry and services the EU would have had to look to countries not in the Union, either in Eastern Europe or elsewhere in the world.<sup>116</sup> She views the expansion of the internal market of the EU as a goal which should take precedence in the current situation. Especially in light of the ageing population of all of Europe, and the negative population growth in many EU countries it is logical to continue expanding the EU (at a rational and controlled speed) to increase the size of the internal market and thus strengthen all aspects of the EU. Taking Poland as an example it seems unnecessary to be overly concerned with cultural differences when considering new EU members. As long as candidate countries are able to withstand the market forces of the EU and meet the governmental and social requirements spelled out in the Copenhagen Criteria, then they should be given permission to enter and to help further strengthen the economic union, just as Poland has.

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<sup>116</sup> Hübner, 207.




Figure 1 The Inglehart-Welzel Cultural Map of the World, WVS. Ronald Inglehart

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