People Bringing Down Giants:
A Survey of Successful, Failed, and Turned-Violent Nonviolent Movements

"We must not allow ourselves to become like the system we oppose. We cannot afford to use methods of which we will be ashamed when we look back, when we say, '...we shouldn't have done that.' We must remember, my friends, that we have been given a wonderful cause. The cause of freedom! And you and I must be those who will walk with heads held high. We will say, 'We used methods that can stand the harsh scrutiny of history.'" – Bishop Desmond Tutu

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Abstract

Throughout the past century, dozens of nonviolent movements have been waged with varying degrees of success. While several nonviolent campaigns have succeeded, many others have failed or become violent. This paper seeks to describe what causes movements to succeed, fail, or turn into violence. This paper will stress the importance of significant population involvement, diversity of methods, some form of leadership, and effective planning in the success of a nonviolent movement. Failure in one or more of these areas or the presence of historical or contemporary examples of violence will increase the likeliness that a nonviolent movement will fail or become violent.

Introduction

Syria occupied Lebanon for thirty years, using military force to exercise influence over local politics and reinforce the sectarian identities that had driven Lebanon into a brutal twenty year civil war.[1] During his thirteen years as president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic took his country to war numerous times, using such brutal force that the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia indicted him on sixty-six charges including genocide and crimes against humanity.[2] In an effort to remain in power in Iran, Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi used his army and secret police to frighten the opposition, killing as many as 20,000 people.[3] What do all these leaders have in common? They were all removed from power by nonviolent movements. Nonviolence has the power to topple repressive regimes and bring to power leaders supported by the people, but nonviolence does not always succeed. Often, government opposition and other factors prove to be too much for the movement and its supporters. Several nonviolent movements have failed or turned into violence. What factors are most important to a nonviolent movement's success? What factors cause it to fail or become

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[1] Nisan, Mordechai. 2000. "The Syrian Occupation of Lebanon." *Coalition for Responsible Peace in the Middle East*.

[2] Stevanovic, Vidosav. 2004. *Milosevic: The People's Tyrant*. London: I.B.Tauris: XI.

[3] Zunes, Stephen. 1999. "Unarmed Resistance in the Middle East and North Africa." In *Nonviolent Social Movements*, ed. Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher, 41-51. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers: 45.

violent? Answering these questions will create greater understanding of nonviolent movements and can help guide future nonviolent campaigns.

This paper is divided into six parts. First, the argument of the paper is be stated, identifying what this paper expects to find. Next, a description of the methodology, a list of the twenty case studies, and factors to be evaluated in each case study is given. Then, a brief literature review situates this research within current research on nonviolent methods. The following section provides raw data on the three case studies that are examined in depth: the Otpor Movement in Serbia, Tiananmen Square in China, and the first *intifada* in Israel and Palestine. A complete table encompassing all the data found for the twenty case studies is included at the end of the paper for reference purposes. Following the data section is an analysis of the findings and the application of these findings to the three aforementioned case studies. Finally, a conclusion summarizes the findings.

I. Argument

There are several factors that affect the success or failure of a nonviolent movement. While all factors are important and affect the movement, it will be argued that some are more important than others. This paper will argue that leadership, organization, and choice of nonviolent methods are the most important factors affecting the success of a nonviolent movement. Other factors exist and can have an affect on the overall outcome, but if any of the aforementioned factors adversely affect the nonviolent movement, it will be incredibly difficult for the movement to succeed.

II. Methodology: Cases and Factors to be Evaluated

The research is designed to evaluate a large number a factors that affect nonviolent movements. For each of the twenty case studies, thirty factors will be evaluated to see if they are present in the case study and to what degree they affected the nonviolent movement. Once this initial research is completed, the data will be analyzed, and the factors that appeared most important in a majority of the movements will be chosen and discussed in depth.

A variety of cases were chosen for this study based on their use of nonviolent resistance. The cases represent situations when nonviolent action was successful, situations where it failed, and situations where nonviolent action dissolved into violent action. Below is the complete list of cases in chronological order:

- Germany – The White Rose
- Guatemala – 1944
- US Civil Rights Movement
- Tibet – Independence Struggle
- El Salvador – 1960-1979
- Portugal – Carnation Revolution
- South Africa – Apartheid
- Iran – Islamic Revolution
- Poland – Solidarity Movement
- Philippines – 1986
- China – Tiananmen Square
- Israel – Palestine – First *Intifada*
- Kosovo – Independence Struggle
- East Germany – Revolution of the Candles
- Czechoslovakia – Rose Revolution
- Serbia – Otpor Movement
- Georgia – Rose Revolution
- Ukraine – Orange Revolution
- Lebanon – Cedar Revolution
- Burma – Saffron Revolution

These cases represent a broad range of nonviolent action. They vary in length from fifty years to under one year. They vary in methods used and vary in success rates. Below is a

list and explanation of the factors that affect a nonviolent movement that will be evaluated in this study.

> *Length of Movement:* Nonviolent movements usually begin with small actions, making it difficult to determine an exact start date; therefore, approximate start dates will be used based upon when the movement first become viably strong, when an organization that led the movement was founded, or when the catalyst for the movement occurred. End dates will be easier to determine. These will be when the movement either achieved its goals (success), when it became unviable or no longer strong enough to affect change (failure), or when wide-spread violence broke out (violence).

> *Ethnic Distribution*: The ethnic composition of a society often affects the ability to coordinate activities. Identities and allegiances to a group other than the state present another dynamic to any social movement within a state. This section will provide the percentage breakdown of the ethnic composition of the population.

> *Religious Distribution*: Religion offers another factor around which people may organize or which may prevent people from organizing. This section will provide the percentage breakdown of the religious composition of the population.

> *Unemployment Rate*: The unemployment rate can serve as a gauge to show overall population satisfaction. When unemployment is up, more people will be dissatisfied with their economic position and, when looking for someone to blame, will often point fingers at the government. Additionally, when people do not have jobs, protesting can become their job since there is nothing else

occupying their time. Unemployment rate is an important economic indicator and will be examined.

➢ *GDP Growth*: A bad economy often plays a role in leading to conflict within a society. Presence of GDP growth or decline may be a factor in the success of a nonviolent revolution; it may also lead a nonviolent revolution to turn violent as people tend to be less patient in tough economic times. This section will provide the percentage GDP growth.

➢ *Population Growth*: The when evaluating the effect of GDP growth or decline, population growth must also be taken into affect. Meager positive GDP growth may not be enough to economically satisfy a rapidly growing population. This section will provide the percentage population growth.

➢ *Portion of Population Involved in Movement (Unity)*: Some nonviolent movements will involve entire societies, regardless of ethnicity, religion, or class. Others will motivate only portions of the population, usually only those who stand to benefit the most from the success of the movement. This section will analyze whether the movement cross religious, ethnic, or class boundaries or whether it remains within one group.

➢ *Media:* It is essential that a nonviolent movement have the ability to spread its message, whether it be domestically, internationally, or both. Often, governments will put in place a media ban or enforce censorship in an attempt to impede the movement. Types of media used (print, radio, posters, pictures, video, etc.) will be examined in this section.

➤ *Presence of Government Opposition*: Some governments strongly oppose nonviolent movements while others appear to tolerate or ignore them. This section will evaluate the action taken by the ruling government against the movement and its severity.

➤ *Turning Point or Catalyst*: Nonviolent movements are usually based on years of mistreatment or economic hardship. Despite years of unrest, one particular instance in sometimes needed to catalyze the movement or to give it the final boost it needs to succeed. This section will examine if a turning point or catalyst exists in the case studies.

➤ *Dependence on International Trade*: Dependence on international trade will greatly affect not only the national government's ability to cope with internal conflict but will also increase the number of parties who have a stake in the outcome. If a government is dependent on international trade and the international economy weakens, the government's power will also likely weaken. Likewise, if an external country is dependent on the country experiencing a nonviolent movement for a certain good, the external country will most likely choose which side to support based on which side is friendlier towards the external country's interests. In this manner, dependence on international trade can greatly affect the outcome of a nonviolent movement.

➤ *Existence of Severe Class Difference:* Severe differences in social classes are often a grievance-based motivation for conflict or a reason citizens use to demand change. Class differences may also affect a nonviolent movement's chance of

success as a presence of a ruling elite and large middle or lower classes (or vice versa) will greatly change the dynamics of a conflict.

➢ *Ruling Regime Weakened by Outside Forces*: This section is similar to the section on dependence on international trade; however, it will only focus on outside forces that weaken the regime (i.e. downturn in the international economy will weaken a regime dependent on that economy). In addition, elements such as weather (flood, drought, etc.) or war can greatly affect a volatile situation. This section will address if there are any factors beyond the ruling regime's control that are weakening it.

➢ *External Support for Movement*: This section looks at external factors that affect the nonviolent movement directly. External support will be defined as the support of another state or possibly another entity (NGO, UN, diasporas, etc.).

➢ *External Support against Movement:* This section is similar to the above section except it evaluates support against the movement. This could be support for the ruling regime against which the nonviolent movement is being waged or could be in the form of an external state or entity (as defined above) directly attempting to weaken the movement.

➢ *Effectiveness of the State:* A state can be viewed as effective in ruling a country but unjust in its laws. For example, the United States was effectively ruled as a state but possessed several unjust laws which eventually led to the Civil Rights Movement. A regime may also be viewed as ineffective if it is unable to provide the social services that are expected of a government. For example, corruption causes government funds meant for citizens to disappear into the pockets of

political elite. Ineffective leadership will cause anger amongst the people and will weaken the regime.

➢ *Justness of the State:* A state could be viewed as just if it treats all its citizens equally but viewed as ineffective if all the citizens are suffering. It may be viewed as unjust if it imprisons people with cause, shows favoritism, or discriminates against certain citizens.

➢ *Recent Drastic Political Change:* A recent drastic political change is likely to weaken the state's ability to counteract any movement against it. For example, the end of the USSR brought a drastic political change to many eastern European nations which was answered by several nonviolent movements.

➢ *Movement Made Illegal by State:* By outlawing a movement, a state officially proclaims its dislike for a movement. This declaration not only shows the position of the ruling government, but it also demonstrates that the state is willing to take serious measures to hold on to power and is not willing to compromise or work with the opposition.

➢ *Leader for Movement*: Not all nonviolent movements require leaders; some are set up specifically to not need one. Others however, rely heavily on leadership. It is important to understand how the presence or lack of a leader affects a movement.

➢ *Is the Movement Well Planned and Organized?:* Often, nonviolent movements give the impression of being unstructured and spontaneous. However, careful planning may bemvital to the success of a movement. This section will discuss whether a movement was carefully planned or allowed to grow and changed unchecked.

➢ *Concessions of Government*: In an effort to quiet or satisfy opposition movements, some governments offer concessions or give the movement a portion of the rights or goods they are demanding. This section will presents what concessions, if any, were made.

➢ *Propaganda Use:* Some movements rely heavily on propaganda to spread a message and gain supporters. The propaganda may portray the government in a poor light or may play into a certain characteristic of the population (i.e. religious propaganda to motivate a religious population) or use cultural history to motivate the population. Some movements may not use propaganda at all. This section will state whether or not propaganda is presence, and then explain what type is used for each movement.

➢ *Motivation(s) of Movement:* The motivation of the movement will be determined based on what each movement claimed to be a motivation. These may vary from government repression to unfair representation to economic unrest. In most cases, the motivations will be directly linked with the goals of the movement.

➢ *Goal(s) of Movement:* Similar to the motivation section, the goals of each movement will be determined based on the stated goals of the organization, leader, or participants of the nonviolent movement. These will depend on the motivations of the movement and may include more equal economic opportunities, more representation on government, or complete regime change.

➢ *Origin of the Movement:* This section will state where the movement originated from and will be either a physical location (such as rural, urban, or slum areas) or a group within the population (such as students, workers, or religious institutions).

➢ *Organization of Movement:* This section will discuss how the movement is organized and how different sections of the movement relate to one another. The organization of nonviolent movements vary greatly; some include community based leaders meant to engage local community members; some movements rely on a strong figure-head to lead the movement; some rely on the power of the message to sell itself.

➢ *Regime Type:* The type of ruling government will affect the organization and methods of a nonviolent revolution; it will also influence the level of opposition the government will use. It is therefore important to evaluate what type of government is in place during the movement (dictatorship, democracy, authoritarian, monarchy, etc.).

➢ *Tactics Used:* There are dozens of possible methods used in nonviolent movements; these range from protests to boycotts to strikes to voting. This section will include a list of the main tactics used by each movement.

➢ *Success, Failure, or Violence:* This section will state whether a nonviolent movement was successful in obtaining its goals, whether it turned to violence, or whether it ended without anything changing. Violence on the side of the ruling government will not count as violence; however, when the supporters of the nonviolent movement overwhelmingly turn to violence, it can be said the nonviolent movement has lost to violence.

III. Literature Review

Other scholars have approached the topic of nonviolence in a variety of ways. Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik (2006) focus on how nonviolent participation can

bring regime change through democratic elections. Their work focuses primarily on Central and Eastern Europe and addresses the power of mass protests and elections. While these forces affect nonviolent revolutions, this approach to nonviolence fails to address other types of nonviolence, such as the methods used by Martin Luther King, Jr. in the United States. Taras Kuzio (2006) discusses the power and role of youth in nonviolent protest; however, like Bunce and Wolchik, he only focuses on nonviolent electoral revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe. Though he addresses one vital aspect of nonviolent revolutions, the limited scope of his case studies do not make his findings applicable to a wider area.

Pritam Singh (2007) argues that a community's adherence to violent or nonviolent methods is determined by which method poses a strategic advantage and not by a community's devotion to one method over the other. He uses a case study of the Sikh struggle for political power in India over the past 500 hundred years to support his conclusion. Again, while understanding what causes a community to choose violence over nonviolence or vice versa is important, the limited scope of the case study makes the findings less relevant on a larger scale.

Francine Blume (1993) uses the case study of the Philippines to discuss how nonviolent movements gain strength and power over time. According to her research, nonviolent movements have an exponential growth effect where a citizen seeing another participating in the movement will then loose his own fear and begin to participate in the nonviolent movement as well. The effect is that more and more people will join the movement as they see others doing the same. Though this focuses on very key aspect of nonviolence (the power of numbers) it fails to address other factors in a movement, such

as economic conditions or government opposition. She also discusses that Filipinos have a long history of nonviolence, suggesting such a movement would come naturally to them. Therefore, these findings may not be applicable in a culture where nonviolence has little or no cultural or historical meaning.

The current literature on nonviolence is extensive and informative. Many authors address one aspect of a nonviolent movement and how it applies to one or a few case studies. While these findings are exceptionally useful in the understanding of nonviolence, it is imperative to take a broader look at the topic and understand what causes nonviolence to succeed and what causes it to fail in several different situations. By taking a more encompassing approach to this issue, the characteristics of a successful nonviolent revolution may be realized.

IV. Data

The following chart is composed of the data found for the nonviolent movements conducted in Serbia (Otpor), Palestine (First *Intifada*), and China (Tiananmen). For the complete chart, encompassing the data for all twenty case studies, see Appendix A.

Case	Start Date	End Date	Length	Ethnic Makeup	Religious Makeup	Unemploy-ment Rate	GDP Growth	Population Growth
China-Tiananmen Square	1986	1989	3	Han: 93% Others: 7%	N/A	3.00%	4.00%	1.56%
Israel-Palestine - First Intifada	1987	1993	6	Jewish: 82.2% Arabs:	Jewish: 82.2% Muslim Christianity	5.70%	2.20%	2% (Including OPT)
Serbia-Otpor Movement	1998	2000	2	Serbs: 62.6% Albanians: 16.5% Montenegrins: 5% Yugoslavs: 3.4% Hungarians: 3.3% Muslims: 3.2%	Orthodox 65% Muslim 19% Roman Catholic 4% Protestant 1% Other 11%	30.00%	2.60%	0.32%

Case	Unity of Movement	Media
China-Tiananmen Square	Several different factions with a lack of communication and coordination - movement mainly occurred in Beijing or other major cities away from the majority of the population	State newspaper called organization a threat to the state and declared military force would be used; posters used to spread information; government control over media directly related to rise and fall of movement, journalists portrayed movement in good light until forced otherwise by the government
Israel-Palestine - First Intifada	Marked by solidarity at first, then movement began to divide population into factions	Pictures of Palestinian youth and others protesting against heavily armed and brutal Israeli soldiers helped gain world sympathy
Serbia-Otpor Movement	United and committed to nonviolence; able to unite the many political factions to form one force against Milosevic	Print media needed to spread message, websites, independent TV used to announce election results before Milosevic can tamper with them

Case	Presence/Severity of Government Opposition	Dependence on International Economy	Importance of Class
China-Tiananmen Square	Yes - Martial law, police brutality, banning demonstrations, use of military - killing an estimated 1,000 and arresting thousands of others, takeover of media outlets, censorship	Yes - relies heavily on exports to Hong Kong, Japan, and the US – had a trading deficit	Inequality was on the rise, political elite unwilling to give up power, movement did not include peasants and workers, two very important segments of society
Israel-Palestine - First Intifada	Yes - Arrests, collective punishment, travel bans, raids, curfews, closing off communities, use of soldiers, death squads, spies, assassinations	Yes – approximately 25% of economy; mainly US	Israelis were usually far better off than Palestinians who did the majority of the cheap wage labor
Serbia-Otpor Movement	Yes - Police brutality, arrests, beatings, takeover of TV, radio, and newspaper, move elections up 10 months	Foreign investment not high due to lack of confidence in Serbian economy	Ruling elites, left over from Soviet era, allows Milosevic to stay in power

Case	Is regime weakened by outside forces	Presence of External Forces for the Movement	Presence of External Forces against the Movement	Appearance of Effectiveness of State	Appearance of Justice of State
China-Tiananmen Square	Yes - other social revolutions, growing awareness of better standards of living throughout the world, and remembrance of the failed cultural revolution sparked upset	No	No	No	No
Israel-Palestine - First Intifada	No	Yes - Diaspora communities and Arab countries, however Arab countries' support waned during this time due to the Gulf War and other circumstances	Yes - United States supported Israel	No	No
Serbia-Otpor Movement	Recent wars	Yes - funding and support given from abroad somewhat quietly from US and the West	No	No	No

Case	Strength of Protestors Identity with Movement	State Labeling of Movement as Illegal	Presence of a Leader	Effective Planning	Concessions made by Regime
China-Tiananmen Square	Committed to the goal but not prepared for reprisals; government's sporadic reactions to the protests gave protestors a false sense of safety which was brutally disrupted in the end	Yes	None	Movement poorly organized which led to poor resiliency	Agreed to hold dialogue with the students but this never occurred
Israel-Palestine - First Intifada	Committed to the goal; however, not committed to nonviolent means - felt other means would be necessary to secure their goals	Yes	Unified Leadership of the Uprising	Strong	Israel transferred authority of the Occupied Territory to the Palestinian Authority, however, this authority was widely viewed as corrupt and a pawn of Israel by the Palestinians
Serbia-Otpor Movement	Strong - very committed to use of nonviolent force and demanding Milosevic to step down	Yes	Otpor - no national leader, many layers of leadership; Democratic Opposition of Serbia - 18 groups committed to supporting one candidate against Milosevic	Strong - built movement slowly and sustained its nonviolent nature at all levels	None

Case	Propaganda	Motivation of Movement	Goal of the Movement	Where did movement originate
China-Tiananmen Square	Hunger strike was symbolic and used to attract more supporters; the death of Hu, one of the few high level gov. supporters of the student movements, was exploited to use as a catalyst for the movement; 70th anniversary of May 4 Day and 40th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China caused rise in protest leading up to these events in 1989	Students without good economic opportunities, lack of freedom, desire for better economic opportunities	Democracy, release of political prisoners, free press, free association, ending corruption	Students
Israel-Palestine - First Intifada	To gain support - provided food and medical aid for the Palestinian people, tried to convince Israeli public that Palestinians are committed to coexisting peaceful, thereby forcing Israelis to pressure government to withdraw from the OT; united people based on Palestinian identity	Israeli occupation and violence; suppression of Palestinian people both economically and socially - laws banning development, water usages, Israel's control of all municipal issues	Self determination, end of occupation	Towns and villages
Serbia-Otpor Movement	Otpor - resistance - clenched fist; create impression of large organization with use of media; humor extremely important; fun activities like concerts; campaign new way of life; Gotov Ye - he's done; Cake on Milosevic's birthday - broken up cake symbolizing broken up country; reminding citizens of people who died during Milosevic's wars	Corrupt government, economic downfall, authoritarian police	Regime change, free elections	Students

Case	Organization of Movement	Regime Type	Tactics Used	Success or Failure
China-Tiananmen Square	Schools and universities main site of organization; Only community/individual leaders - while they were successful in mobilizing their own base of support there was no central uniting factor or coordination between movements who often competed with each other	Communist - Single Party	Demonstrations, hunger strike, petitioning, political conferences, large posters, sit-ins	Failure
Israel-Palestine - First Intifada	Grassroots committees began to locally organize population, setting the foundation for a more widespread movement, Unified Leadership of the Uprising issued orders or plans which were carried out by local organizations	Parliamentary Democracy	Demonstrations, boycotts, strikes, tax refusals, occupations, blockades, creation of alternative institutions	Violence
Serbia-Otpor Movement	Cell phone communication, hierarchy nonexistent; creating community leaders allowed movement to operate smoothly	Parliamentary Democracy - Slobodan Milosevic	Demonstrations, marches, rallies, pamphlets, concerts, humor, use elections to dispose leaders, prison demonstrations when supporters organized, campaign in small towns, election monitoring, strikes	Success

V. Analysis and Application of Data

From the data of the twenty case studies, numerous conclusions can be drawn. By examining factors that are similar in failed or eventually violent nonviolent movements and not present in successful movements, it becomes clear what factors cause movements to not succeed. The five most prominent factors, according to the data, and their effects, will be discussed in this section. These factors are:

➢ Portion of the population involved in movement: Nonviolent movements are more likely to fail when only one portion of the population is mobilized with the movement or has a stake in the outcome (ex. Tibetans in China, Palestinians in Israel, Monks in Burma).

➢ Tactics Used: Lack of diversity of methods (relying heavily on only a few methods such as protests or sit-ins) will lessen chances of success.

➢ Presence of a Leader: Presence of one central leader does not appear to have an effect on the outcome of a movement; however, if this leader is eliminated, the movement usually dissolves quickly. Additionally, some form of leadership, in the form of a person, an organization, or a network, is necessary to properly organize and coordinate a movement.

➢ Organization of Movement: Organization is significant; sporadic protests by various groups may get attention but usually do not lead to a cohesive, successful movement.

➢ Historical or Contemporary Violence: Though this was not listed in the initial list of factors, it was found to be present in all the case studies that ended in violence and is therefore added as a factor. Cultural history of violence or contemporary

examples of violence may influence nonviolent movements to turn violent (ex. Palestinians had a history of violent attacks before attempting nonviolence; Salvadorans saw success of Sandinista revolution in Guatemala).

A) *Portion of Population involved in Movement*

Nonviolent movements rely heavily on people power as opposed to the power found in the barrel of a gun. Due to this reliance, it is extremely difficult for a nonviolent movement to succeed if only a portion of the population is involved. These movements achieve their demands by shutting down economic institutions, creating road blocks with massive protests, boycotting government goods, and through other methods which make it virtually impossible for the government to function. In order for this situation to be achieved, the cooperation of the majority of the population is needed. If a large section of the population is still going to work, paying taxes, and complying with government demands, the nonviolent movement will remain a mere inconvenience as opposed to a threatening force.

Examples of where this has played a role in the failure of a nonviolent movement are the Tibetan movement in China, the first *intifada* in Israel and Palestine, and the Saffron Revolution in Burma. In the former two cases, the movement is being conducted by one segment of society against another. Neither the Tibetans nor the Palestinians have the ability to disrupt day-to-day functions enough to bring their respective governments to the bargaining table. Unless these movements find a way to motivate ordinary Chinese and Israeli citizens, respectively, to their cause, it will be nearly impossible for the movement to succeed.

The Saffron Revolution in Burma presents a slightly different case as it is not being conducted by one segment of society against another; however, for the most part, only one segment of society participated in this movement. As the movement grew, the monks in Burma took an increasingly important organizational and symbolic role in the movement. It became not a movement of the Burmese people for a more fair and just government but rather a movement of the Burmese monks. Though the monks wield great political power in their home communities, this power was greatly diminished on a national level. The monks rely heavily on their local communities for financial support; they do not have the power, therefore, to strike or economically weaken the government. This, coupled with the lack of involvement of the remainder of society, gave the monks little power, beyond their local influence and ability to protest, against the powerful national government.[1]

While lack of participation appears to usually cause a movement to fail, there are exceptions. For example, the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, for the most part, involved only one segment of the society (African Americans) and was still exceedingly successful in attaining its goals. There are several explanations for this discrepancy. First, the three aforementioned movements were all met with violent government opposition, resulting in massive deaths, arrests, and torture. While the Civil Rights Movement met strong opposition on the state level, the national government of the United States was relatively supportive of the movement. The organizers of this movement were also to some extent successful at gaining the support of the remaining portion of the population by using the media to publicize the brutal tactics being

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[1] 2007. "Burma's 'Saffron Revolution'". *USA Today*, September 26, Sec. News 10a.

employed by governmental forces against peaceful protestors. Ordinary citizens whose lives were not affected by this movement or its potential outcomes became involved or supportive due to these images. Additionally, the goal of the Civil Rights Movement was not independence, autonomy, or regime change (as in the above mentioned cases). Instead, the Civil Rights Movement sought to change laws and could work within the existing governmental structure, in addition to using nonviolent civil disobedience, to attain its goals.

B) Tactics

The choice of tactics to employ in a nonviolent movement can make or break the movement. The tactics must be appropriately chosen with consideration to potential government responses and ability of the people to carry out the method. Also, methods should be diverse in nature. Relying too heavily on one or a few methods will make the movement unable to affect certain areas of the society or government and will make it easier for the government to adapt its opposition to combat the specific methods.

For example, the protestors in Tiananmen Square relied heavily on all a few different tactics. Their main methods were sit-ins, protests, and demonstrations. All these methods required amassing hundreds and thousands of people in one location. With all the protestors in one central location, it was easy for the government to attack the movement at its core. With one violent attack, the government was able to significantly weaken the movement to the point that it could no longer be sustained.[2] Additionally, while these methods were effective in showing the people's displeasure with the current governing force, they did nothing to weaken that force. Large scale strikes, boycotts, and

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[2] Schock, Kurt. 2004. *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 99.

other forms of economic protests may have had the ability to weaken the government to the point of negotiation.

It is important to note that a movement can succeed with the utilization of only a few methods given the right situation. For example, the Solidarity Movement in Poland relied heavily on strikes and demonstrations to wage its campaign.[3] These methods were effective because the strikes economically affected the government and demonstrators were not likely to be brutally attacked as the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square were. Additionally, the Solidarity Movement was offered many concessions by the government and was built up over the course of ten years. All of these factors allowed the movement to succeed through the use of only a few methods; in general, however, a diversity of methods will add significant strength to a movement.

C) Presence of a Leader

The presence or lack of a central leader did not significantly affect the outcome of a movement. For example, the Dalai Llama in Tibet, Hans and Sophie Scholl in Germany, and Ibrahim Rugova in Kosovo all led movements that have been either unsuccessful to this day, unsuccessful overall, or led to violence. The nonviolent movements in Tiananmen Square and El Salvador did not have a central leader and neither one succeeded. Ayatollah Khomeini, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Lech Walesa (Poland) all successfully led nonviolent movements while the movements in Guatemala, East Germany, and Georgia succeeded without a central leader.

While presence of a leader is not necessary for the success of a movement, it is important that some forum exist to carry out the responsibilities of a leader. In order for a nonviolent movement to be successful, the methods and tactics must be well organized

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[3] Curtis, Glenn E. 1992. "Solidarity." *Country Studies*.

and conducted. They need to be planned and timed accordingly and awareness about the movement needs to be raised in order to ensure participation. Also, a regulatory body, in some form, must exist in order to keep protestors loyal to the nonviolent nature of the movement. If protestors are allowed to turn to violence, the nonviolent movement could cease to exist. As long as some coordination exist within the movement, whether this be through a leader, a political party, or a network of small organizations, a nonviolent movement will have the ability to sustain itself.

Of course, having one central leader can make a movement vulnerable to directed attacks, and the death or arrest of a leader will have significant impacts on the movement. The death of a leader will tend to abruptly end the movement. For example, with the death of Martin Luther King, Jr., the civil rights movement lost a lot of power and influence. When Hans and Sophie Scholl were executed, their movement died with them;[4] however, death of a leader is not a certain end to a movement. It can also serve as a motivating or rallying factor to gain support for the movement. This was seen in the Philippines: when Benigno Aquino was assassinated, his wife and son took over the movement and used his death to demonstrate the brutality and ruthlessness of the government.[5] Exile or arrest of a leader will usually not end a movement. The imprisonment of Nelson Mandela and the exile of Ayatollah Khomeini did not prevent the eventual success of their respective movements and the exile of the Dalai Llama has only further fueled the movement. Having a leader can be a great asset or an incredible

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[4] Henderson, Simon. 2005. "The White Rose and the Definition of Resistance." *History Review*, December: 42-47.

[5] Zunes, Stephen. 1999. "The Origins of People Power in the Philippines." In *Nonviolent Social Movements*, ed. Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher, 129-157. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.

detriment, but as long as some organization is fulfilling the duties of a leader, the nonviolent movement has a strong chance at success.

D) Effective Planning

Successful nonviolent revolutions often require the participation of a significantly large portion of the population. Effective planning is necessary to organize this number of people into campaigns, ensure unity within the movement, and prevent protestors from turning violent; without effective planning, the movement will become too sporadic or loosely organized causing it to become less viable. The failure of nonviolent movements due to poor planning is illustrated by the efforts of the Scholls in Germany and the Saffron Revolution in Burma. The actions of the Scholls and their few followers were sporadic and ineffective. They relied heavily on one method: spreading pamphlets. At this time in Germany, political dissent was quickly ended by German police and the Scholls went public too quickly with their campaign.[6] Had they taken the time to organize an effective base of support, their eventual arrests and executions may not have put an end to their movement. Their support base would have been able to takeover and ensure the movement continued; instead, they chose to quickly begin spreading their message of political uprising in a society where even best friends report each other to police. Their failure to plan a fall-back campaign and build a base of support allowed their movement to die with them.

Similarly, in Burma, though the protests were widespread and well-publicized, they were often not coordinated. This lack of organization eventually led to the movement's downfall; the government began pressuring elder monks to convince the

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[6] Henderson, Simon. 2005. "The White Rose and the Definition of Resistance." *History Review*, December: 42-47.

younger monks (majority of monks protesting were young) to end their protests. Elder monks were successful in convincing some to stop since there was no hierarchy or organization with the nonviolent movement to offer the young monks alternative guidance. This lack of organization also ensured that brutal government reprisals would be able to scatter the protestors back to their home towns and villages.[7] Once they were dispersed, they had no way of reorganizing or continuing the movement. Organization would have enabled better communication which would allow more coordination, the use of different methods, and would have made the movement more resilient in the face of opposition.

The power of effective organization was clearly demonstrated in Georgia during the Rose Revolution. Organizers had planned a massive protest on November 17, 2003; however, with attendance around 50,000 and a large presence of security forces, organizers feared the safety of the protestors was in jeopardy. The rally was suspended for several days to allow opposition leaders to disperse throughout the country to motivate more people to attend the protest. When the protest resumed on November 21, 2003, more than 100,000 people were present. Two days later, Eduard Shevardnadze, current Georgian leader, conceded and resigned from office. Without the effective organization and planning displayed by the organizers of the Rose Revolution, it may not have succeeded. The original 50,000 protestors were ready and eager to face government opposition, but organizers knew a larger number would be safer and more effective for all

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[7] Selth, Andrew. 2008. "Burma's 'Saffron Revolution' and the Limits of International Influence." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 62, no. 3: 284.

involved.[8] Their decision to suspend the protest until more protestors could be rallied was significant to the overall success of the movement.

E) Historical or Contemporary Violence

The three nonviolent movements that ended in violence that were evaluated in this study all had one thing in common: the cultures in which they occurred had either a legacy of violence or contemporary, relatable examples of violence. Since Israel was created in 1948, the Palestinians and the Arab world had primarily only engaged Israel militarily. Despite massive coordinated action, the Arab world was defeated again and again. This legacy of violence failing to achieve desired goals was one of the reasons nonviolence was attempted; however, when the nonviolent movement failed to produce quick results and was met with violent opposition, the protestors began to splinter causing some to return to their violent ways.[9] Once violent methods began being employed, the nonviolent movement quickly fell apart.

El Salvador and Kosovo are slightly different cases. They did not have the cultural legacy of violence; however, both had contemporary examples of violence succeeding and these examples may have affected the movements. In El Salvador, the nonviolent movements had been making no progress in terms of government reform. Government opposition was becoming increasingly violent and widespread. At the same time, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua had just successfully and violently overthrown the ruling government. After roughly nineteen years of nonviolent action, the Salvadorans

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[8] Kandelaki, Giorgi. 2006. "Georgia's Rose Revolution: A Participant's Perspective." *United States Institute of Peace*, July: 5.

[9] Dajani, Souad. 1999. "Resistance in the Occupied Territories." In *Nonviolent Social Movements*, ed. Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher, 52-74. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers: 63-64.

decided a different approach was needed and the recent success of the Sandinistas gave them hope in a violent revolution.[10]

While the people of Kosovo were waging their nonviolent campaign, Serbia and a majority of the Balkans were busy waging war with each other. These wars, and the brutality the Serbian army demonstrated in them, may have caused the people of Kosovo to doubt the power of nonviolence against such a violent regime. Also, this regional violence was successful in gaining many ethnic groups independence and autonomy for the people. The people of Kosovo may have seen this and thought perhaps a violent campaign would be more effective at attaining their goals.[11] Whatever the reason for turning to violence, the fact cannot be discounted that violence existed as a historical or contemporary example in all the case studies of eventually violent movements.

Case Studies:

In the following case studies, the above mentioned factors will be applied to demonstrate their importance and effect on nonviolent movements. By applying the factors to specific case studies, the interdependence of the factors will be shown. Three case studies (Serbia, Tiananmen Square, and the first *intifada* in Palestine) have been chosen to illustrate how these factors apply to successful, failed, and eventually violent nonviolent movements.

Success: Serbia – Otpor Movement

Slobodan Milosevic was responsible thousands of deaths, genocide, and economic turmoil during his thirteen year run as president of Serbia.[12] His political opponents, too

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[10] Kyle, Brett. 2004. "Causes for Civil War and Failed Revolutions in El Salvador." University of Texas at Austin, January 1: 14.

[11] Reitan, Ruth. 2000. "Strategic Nonviolent Conflict in Kosovo." *Peace and Change* 25, no. 1: 92-95.

[12] Stevanovic, Vidosav. 2004. *Milosevic: The People's Tyrant*. London: I.B.Tauris: XI.

numerous to effectively oppose him, were too similar to Milosevic to inspire hope in the public.[13] It was in this depressing social, economic, and political climate that a group of young students founded Otpor ("Resistance!").Over the next two years, Otpor grew and adapted to the changing political climate. With the help of international organizations and the extreme dedication of its members, Otpor succeeded in mobilizing the Serbian population against Milosevic, eventually leading to his downfall in the 2000 election.[14] This movement succeeded because, among other things, it excelled in all of the five categories discussed above: it adequately mobilized a significant portion of the population, used a diverse set of methods, effectively lead the movement (without the use of central leaders or a hierarchy), planned the movement so that demonstrations and protests were well attended and publicized, and enforced the nonviolent nature of the movement despite a vast history of cultural violence,

Otpor began as a student movement in 1998, and it originally had no political agenda; however, over time it became clear to Otpor that the source of the problems it was trying to combat was the government, and the organization soon changed its strategy.[15] Overtime, it came to incorporate Serbians from all walks of life. Organizers began slowly, trying to convince people in the street that change was needed. They built alliances with the numerous political opponents of Milosevic. Their cooperation was key, and Otpor was successful in convincing the majority of the numerous parties to support one candidate, Vojislav Kostunica, to run against Milosevic. Chances of success were far greater with only one candidate opposing Milosevic. The movement had a domino effect

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[13] York, Steve. 2002. *Bringing Down a Dictator*. Produced, Written, and Directed by Steve York. 56 mins. York Zimmerman, Inc. in association with WETA-TV, Washington D.

[14] Chiclet, Christophe. "Otpor: The Youths Who Booted Milosevic." The Courier UNESCO.

[15] York, Steve. 2002. *Bringing Down a Dictator*. Produced, Written, and Directed by Steve York. 56 mins. York Zimmerman, Inc. in association with WETA-TV, Washington D.

in growth. By the time the September 2000 elections occurred, commitment to Otpor's movement had grown so much that when the government made an attempt to steal the election, a majority of the country shutdown. Schools were closed, miners walked off the job, and roads were blocked.[16] Then, on October 5, 2000, hundreds of thousands of people from all over Serbia descended on the capital to force Milosevic out of office.[17] Otpor had succeeded in mobilizing a significant portion of the population, and this final show of nonviolent force won over the last key segment of society: the security forces. Faced with the undeniably reality that the people no longer desired the rule of Milosevic, the security forces ignored orders to use force to disrupt the crowd and joined their fellow Serbians in solidarity against Milosevic. By the end of October 5, the Serbian army, police, and people had all joined forces, and Milosevic was out of office.[18] Since Otpor left Milosevic no support base in the population, he no longer had any legitimacy to remain in power. Otpor's ability to reach out to all Serbians aided the movement's victory.

Perhaps the area where Otpor excelled the most was in diversity of methods. Members organized dozens of traditional and nontraditional forms of protests ranging from awe-inspiring to comical to solemn. They organized or supported the traditional methods of protests, demonstrations, and strikes, but in order to keep the government guessing and keep their followers or potential followers interested, Otpor diversified their methods. On New Year's Eve 1999, they organized a concert in the capital of Belgrade. Up until midnight, it was a night of music, singing, and dancing. When midnight came,

[16] Bujosevic, Dragan. 2003. *Fall of Milosevic : The October 5th Revolution*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan: 7.

[17] 2007. "Parties, Citizens Mark October 5." B-92, October 5.

[18] York, Steve. 2002. *Bringing Down a Dictator*. Produced, Written, and Directed by Steve York. 56 mins. York Zimmerman, Inc. in association with WETA-TV, Washington D.

the mood quickly changed when Otpor began showing images dozens of Serbians who had died in Milosevic's seemingly endless wars. This was meant to show the attendees what was at stake during the next year in the run up to the 2000 elections.[19]

Otpor responded with humor when the government claimed Otpor to be a terrorist organization. They organized a comedy show in which Otpor showed how the average university student (one of Otpor's main support bases) was indeed a terrorist. The event brought much laughter and succeeded in discrediting the government's claim. For Milosevic's birthday, Otpor made him a cardboard birthday cake broken up into pieces to symbolize how he had broken up his country. They organized a successful propaganda campaign using the slogan "Gotov Je" (He's finished) around which supporters and those against Milosevic could rally. Finally, Otpor helped to ensure the polls were monitored on election day. If the government should try to steal the election, there would be verifiable proof of their deceit.[20] This method was essential in delegitimizing the government and ensuring the voice of the people would be heard.

The Serbian government was unable to control or eliminate the Otpor movement because it never formed a centralized base. In its beginning, Otpor did not even have a central office. Vidosav Stevanovic (2004) describes the Otpor network:

> Deliberately avoiding the centralizing tendency of political parties, their movement was made up of many cells, but without a hierarchy of administrative and executive committees answerable to a single leader. All the cells were equal, there were no subordinates, no one issued orders, decisions were reached through agreement, there were no leaders and anyone could be a spokesperson.[21]

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[19] York, Steve. 2002. *Bringing Down a Dictator*. Produced, Written, and Directed by Steve York. 56 mins. York Zimmerman, Inc. in association with WETA-TV, Washington D.C.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Stevanovic, Vidosav. 2004. *Milosevic: The People's Tyrant*. London: I.B.Tauris: 183-184.

Not only did this network setup prevent Otpor from being eliminated in one sweeping arrest spree, it also gave each member some degree of autonomy and power. Anyone could envision and carry out an idea. While larger activities were coordinated, day-to-day protests, poster campaigns, concerts, demonstrations, and other activities were fundamentally the doings of the local cells.[22]

Organization was essential to the success of Otpor. For example, extensive planning and coordination was necessary to protect supporters: when supporters were arrested, protests were immediately organized outside the jail were the supporters were being held. Planners foresaw that Milosevic would try to steal the election; to counteract this, the issued preliminary election results based on exit polls before the government could announce the "official" results.[23] Organization was fundamental in uniting the numerous political parties and waging a successful political campaign. When the time finally came to force Milosevic out of office, organizers were successful at mobilizing hundred of thousands from all over Serbia to travel to the capital and force Milosevic to admit defeat. Though Otpor relied heavily on networks and local leadership, organization, cooperation, and planning never broke down. The effective planning and communication were crucial to the success of Otpor.

Finally, in the recent decade leading up to the Otpor movement and the 2000 elections, Serbian life had been filled with warfare and violence. After using force in Kosovo in 1987, Serbia continued military engagements with Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo again throughout the 1990s. [24] Peace and nonviolence were

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[22] York, Steve. 2002. *Bringing Down a Dictator*. Produced, Written, and Directed by Steve York. 56 mins. York Zimmerman, Inc. in association with WETA-TV, Washington D.C.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Stevanovic, Vidosav. 2004. *Milosevic: The People's Tyrant*. London: I.B.Tauris: XIV-XV.

relatively unheard of concepts in Serbia. Despite the permeation of violence through Serbian society, the Otpor movement refused to resort to violence. Throughout the entire campaign, organizers and local leaders worked tirelessly to ensure protestors and demonstrators knew of the nonviolent nature of the movement and adhered to it at all times. During the October 5 protest, loudspeakers were used to remind the hundreds of thousands of people present to not attack the security forces. Even when faced with severe police brutality, Otpor found nonviolent ways to resist. This showed the government that arrests and beatings would only cause the movement to grow.[25] Given the profusion of violence in Serbia's history, use of nonviolence was a welcomed change. Otpor ensured the movement stayed nonviolent by constantly reminding supporters of its importance to maintaining the legitimacy and moral standing of the movement. Had organizers placed less emphasis on sustaining nonviolence, supporters may have quickly turned to violence and the movement may have failed or led to war.

Otpor's successful leadership and planning of this nonviolent movement was directly responsible for Milosevic's downfall. By mobilizing a significant portion of the population, using a diversity of methods, and ensuring the movement remained nonviolent at all times, Otpor employed nonviolence to its greatest extent and succeeded.

Failure: China – Tiananmen Square

When economic conditions took a turn for the worst, students and intellectuals in China began to demand a change. Anti-government protests started to be actively heard in 1986 and grew over the next three years, finally coming to an end on June 4, 1989 when China turned its military forces against its own people, brutally and lethally

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[25] York, Steve. 2002. *Bringing Down a Dictator*. Produced, Written, and Directed by Steve York. 56 mins. York Zimmerman, Inc. in association with WETA-TV, Washington D.C.

clearing Tiananmen Square of protestors.[26] The failure of this movement to bring about any noticeable change can be attributed to many reasons. China's willingness to use lethal force against its own people was certainly a huge factor in its failure, but other nonviolent movements have managed to overcome great adversity. So why did the movement in China fail? When applying the five factors to the case study of China, it becomes clear that the movement failed to mobilize a significant portion of the population, did not use a diverse set of tactics, lacked a leader or any leading presence, and was poorly organized and coordinated (historical or contemporary examples of violence is not applicable to this case). Given these conditions, this movement was doomed to fail in the face of opposition.

The nonviolent movement that culminated with the events in Tiananmen Square was largely a student- and intellectual-led movement. Students were upset with lack of job opportunities following graduation, and the standard of living for many of society's intellectuals was steeply declining.[27] The situation is classic J-curve example were people demand and expect quality of life to be continually increasing when, in fact, it is decreasing. As the gap between desirable conditions and reality continues to grow, people become more discontent with the situation until it reaches a point where the public is forced to confront it. By 1986, the students and intellectuals of China had reached this point; unfortunately for their movement, the farmers and workers (the backbone of China) did not feel the same way. They had no motivation to protest China's rule of law, and the students and intellectuals largely ignored this section of society. The students failed to realize that they wielded little power in China's working society. Students

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[26] Wright, David C. 2001. *History of China*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc.: 174.
[27] Schock, Kurt. 2004. *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 99.

protesting did little economic or political harm to China. They did not have the power to strike, close down industries, or weaken the government to a point of negotiation. In addition, the movement was concentrated in the cities (mainly in Beijing, though small protests occurred in other cities). Containing the movement to the cities ensured other segments of society could not be involved. By failing to mobilize a significant portion of the population, especially the farmers and laborers, the protestors had little power to weaken the ruling regime.

A second factor protestors could have improved is diversity of methods. In the beginning of the movement, some petitioning and use of posters was done; however, when the movement became strongest in the months before the Tiananmen Square massacre, protestors began to rely heavily on demonstrations. They occupied Tiananmen Square, conducting a sit-in and hunger strike in protest of the government. The tactics chosen hurt the movement in three ways. First, it is through a diversity of tactics that a diversity of followers is gained. Some people may be unwilling to march in a protest but may want to help in other ways. Diversifying one's methods ensures more people are reached and more people can be involved. Second, the protests were ineffective in shutting down or negatively effecting the government. Though protestors were at one point successful in stopping the advancement of troops to Tiananmen Square when martial law was declared in May 1989, they showed no other power over the government.[28] Third, the choice of method (sit-in) concentrated all the protestors in one location, making it extremely easy for China to find and eliminate the protestors. It is important to engage in nonviolent activities were the actors are hard to find or too

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[28] Schock, Kurt. 2004. *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 101.

dispersed to attack all at once, especially in situations where the ruling government is willing and able to use harsh methods to end a movement. Had this movement used a diversity of methods, it could have gained more supporters, weakened the government, and been difficult to swiftly destroy.

The lack of leadership and lack of organization are related to each other. As previously stated, this movement was primarily a student-lead one. The students involved formed dozens of different groups. The groups had their own leaders but failed to coordinate with each other. Each group had its own set of goals and own method of attaining these goals. The groups refused to merge or work together. This lack of overall leadership and cooperation allowed the movement to splinter and become spontaneous.

According to Schock (2004), there were three prominent groups in the movement, but the groups failed to work with one another and at times, competed with each other. This weakened the movement severely and made planning a broad-base campaign impossible. The lack of cooperation and sense of competition often lead to conflicting messages: in an effort to gain more supporters, Beijing University students established a broadcasting station. The following day, in response to this move, Qinghua University students established their own broadcasting station. The two stations broadcasted simultaneously and sent conflicting messages.[29] Without some form of overarching leadership or at the very least, communication and cooperation between the various groups, this movement had no hope of becoming an organized, resilient movement. When Chinese officials launched their attack, the protestors scattered. There was no

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[29] Schock, Kurt. 2004. *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 106.

organization left to reunite the people. All the small organizations and groups were too weak to endure the violent repression.

Had some form of leadership been established for the movement, a more broad-based campaign could have been waged. Instead of fighting each other and the government, the protestors could solely focus on the government. Methods could have been diversified to raise more support and make the movement more difficult to end. Finally, had some form of leadership been established, chances are a fragment of it would have survived the massacre of Tiananmen Square. The chance of the movement continuing after this event would have been much greater had some sort of coordination be established between the dozens of different groups.

This nonviolent movement ending with the massacre at Tiananmen Square was poorly led, organized, and thought-out. Fractionalization and internal politics prevented the movement from gaining strength. The protestors did not realize the power wielded by the segments of society they failed to engage. Had the protestors taken the time to carefully build, organize, and conduct this movement, one brutal governmental show of force may not have been enough to end it.

Violence: Palestine – First Intifada

In the forty years between the creation of Israel and the first *intifada*, Israel had been at war five times, at least two of which directly involved the Palestinian people and the remainder caused by issues relating to the Palestinians. Each war had resulted in the Palestinian people having less and less. Finally realizing violently engaging a military power was futile, the Palestinian people united in an effort to gain recognition and nationhood through nonviolence. The first *intifada* began in 1987 and ended in 1993 with

the signing of the Oslo Accords. However, towards the end of the movement and after the Oslo Accords failed to enact change, violence became an increasingly growing problem. In this case study, using a diversity of methods, leadership, and organization were not issues. Why then did the movement end in violence? This case study will examine how the failure to mobilize the Israeli population and the violent history of Palestinian-Israeli relations may have caused a promising nonviolent movement to end in violence.

Briefly, I will discuss the three factors (methods, leadership, and organization) in which this movement succeeded. The remainder of this section will be devoted to the issue of participation, the history of violence, and how these affected the nonviolent movement. The movement was initiated by a number of grass roots organizations. These organizations, and the leadership council which was eventually formed, conducted numerous and varied nonviolent activities. These ranged from boycotting products from Israel, withdrawal of money from Israeli banks, creation of parallel institutions (including educational and economic institutions), labor strikes, and sit-ins. Several of the campaigns were conducted with specific goals in mind, such as the release of political prisoners. Setting smaller goals for each activity made the goal appear more attainable.[30]

While the movement began as a decentralized, localized movement, Palestinian leaders quickly recognized the need for some form of centralized leadership. The Unified Leadership of the Uprising was formed to organized and coordinate activities. This body coordinated protests, and local organizations implemented them. They were successful at leading the movement in this aspect; however, they failed to notice or address the growing levels of violence coming from some Palestinians. Their failure to react and

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[30] Stephen, Maria J. 2003. "People Power in the Holy Land: How Popular Nonviolent Struggle can Transform the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict." *Journal of Public and International Affairs* 14: 6-8.

attempt to control these more violent factions allowed the movement to eventually dissolve into violence.[31] So, while the leaders organized and planned the movement efficiently, were unsuccessful at maintaining the population's commitment to nonviolence.

The movement was successful in mobilizing a majority of the Palestinian population. The initial activities were conducted by grass roots organizations which grew out of many different communities and were centered around women, students, educators, medical personnel, and agricultural workers. Here, mobilizing a significant and diverse portion of the Palestinian population was not an issue; however, they failed to mobilize the Israeli people, a vital portion of the population. Economic and political noncooperation conducted by the Palestinians could not significantly weaken Israel. As long as the people of Israel supported its government politically and economically, the government would have no incentive to change its policy towards the Palestinian people. Though the movement did gain some support from Israeli citizens and the brutal repression of the protestors did damage Israel's image internationally, it was not enough to effect change. Without the cooperation of the Israeli people, the Palestinians would suffer considerably more from the movement than the state of Israel. For example, the cost of boycotting Israeli goods was much higher for the Palestinians than the Israelis.[32] They simply did not have enough Israeli support to pressure the Israeli government to change.

[31] Dajani, Souad. 1999. "Resistance in the Occupied Territories." In *Nonviolent Social Movements*, ed. Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher, 52-74. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers: 57.

[32] Stephen, Maria J. 2003. "People Power in the Holy Land: How Popular Nonviolent Struggle can Transform the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict." *Journal of Public and International Affairs* 14: 9-11.

The first *intifada* was marked by unprecedented cooperation and solidarity among the Palestinian people. Though a significant portion of the population adhered to the nonviolent methods, the entire population was never united behind it. Leaders and organizers of the movement were lax in compelling fellow Palestinians to remain nonviolent. Brutal Israeli responses to nonviolent protests angered Palestinians. Some began to resort to violence out of frustration and anger. The nonviolent movement appeared to be bringing more negative results than positive, and people began to loose faith in the movement. At this crucial point, the leaders failed to keep the movement united. The Palestinians began to fragment into two groups: one who used nonviolence and others who used violence. Slowly, violence began to replace nonviolence.[33]

The first *intifada* ended with the Oslo Accords meant to serve as the beginning of Palestinian statehood (they are widely considered a failure). During the negotiations for Oslo and afterwards, violence became much more prominent, as demonstrated below:

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
[33] Dajani, Souad. 1999. "Resistance in the Occupied Territories." In *Nonviolent Social Movements*, ed. Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher, 52-74. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers: 63-64.

[34] "Peace or Terror." *Information Regarding Israel's Security*.

The Palestinian people came to interpret the nonviolence during the first *intifada* as a method "tried and failed, and, therefore, one that would need to be supplanted by more 'effective' violent means."[35] Violent reactions had been a way of life for the Palestinian people. Even though it failed to bring positive results before, it was a method they were used to and at ease with. Here, one Palestinian describes how violence was a part of his life:

> Since the community where I was born and bred sanctifies individual acts of heroism, I unconsciously aspired to become one of the heroes. When I became a teenager, politics, or rather political violence, became part of my life. I threw rocks at the occupation vehicles patrolling the streets of my city. I was arrested for three days when I was 14. I was badly tortured during incarceration. I became more violent against the occupation.[36]

Brutality on the side of the Israelis undoubtedly motivated a number of Palestinians to resort to violence. Though leadership was present, it failed in the vital task of reinforcing the idea to its followers that nonviolence is powerful. The movement was allowed to splinter and eventually dissolve. The history of violence in Palestinian society made it an easy choice when nonviolence appeared to fail. Stronger leadership may have held the movement together, but the fact that violent resistance was familiar to the Palestinians made it easier for them to return to it.

One might argue that Israeli brutality and unwillingness to compromise may have caused this movement to be doomed from the start. However, other nonviolent movements have stood against similar odds and succeeded. For example, the Islamic Revolution in Iran faced severe government opposition including massacres, martial law, and arrests. The government attempted to offer concessions but never followed through

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[35] Dajani, Souad. 1999. "Resistance in the Occupied Territories." In *Nonviolent Social Movements*, ed. Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher, 52-74. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers: 64.

[36] Nusseibeh, Lucy. 2006. "Breaking the Cycle of Violence. *Forced Migration Review*, No. 26, August: 41.

with them.[37] During the Revolution of the Candles in East Germany, police brutality and arrests were common; media was censored and banned. The government offered no concessions.[38] Both these movements faced overwhelming opposition and succeeded. When conducted correctly, nonviolent movements can conquer even the most intimidating forces.

Conclusion

The power of nonviolent movements can not be dismissed. The movements evaluated in this paper alone have toppled repressive regimes, fought discrimination, and challenged corrupt, nepotistic governments. When orchestrated effectively, nonviolent movements have the ability to confront even the most violent of regimes. However, when allowed to grow unchecked, success will be difficult. Effective leadership, whether it be a central leader, an organization, or a loose network of smaller organizations, is needed to successfully plan and organize the movement. Coordination among activities is needed to ensure the activities complement each other as opposed to interfere or conflict with each other and also to ensure the events are well publicized and attended. Diversity of methods is essential to prevent effective government repression and to attract as many supporters as possible. If historical or contemporary violence is a factor, organizers must focus extra energy on guaranteeing the supporters and protestors remain nonviolent. Finally, nonviolent movements rely on the power of numbers as opposed to the power of weapons. This being said, it is vital that a large and diverse portion of the population

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[37] Zunes, Stephen. 1999. "Unarmed Resistance in the Middle East and North Africa." In *Nonviolent Social Movements*, ed. Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher, 41-51. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers: 44-46.

[38] Hadjar, Andres. 2003. "Non-Violent Political Protest in East Germany in the 1980s: Protestant Church, Opposition Groups, and the People." *German Politics* 12, no. 3: 107-128.

become involved in the movement. One segment of the population can not, in most instances, topple a regime on its own. Once these factors have been met, a nonviolent movement will have a high chance of success. Of course, there are other mitigating factors that vary from case to case, and these must always be taken into consideration; however, without the favorable implementation of the five aforementioned conditions, success for a nonviolent movement will be extremely difficult to attain.

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Appendix A
Complete Data for All Case Studies

Case	Start Date	End Date	Length	Ethnic Makeup	Religious Makeup	Unemployment Rate	GDP Growth	Population Growth
Germany - The White Rose	1942	1943	1					
Guatemala	1944	1944	0				-3.10% (2)	
US Civil Rights	1955	1968	13	White: 89.7% Black: 9.9% Other: 0.4% (5)	Protestant: 57.6% Catholic: 32.67% Jewish: 6% Others: 3.73% (5)	4.98% (5)	7.52% (5)	1.45% (5)
Tibet - Independence Struggle	1959	Present	50				8.23% (8)	2.33% (8)
El Salvador	1960	1979	19					3.66% (10); 1969 Honduras expels 130,000 Salvadorans and boycotts Salvadoran goods - caused great economic stress (11)
Portugal - Carnation Revolution	1974	1976	2		Primarily Roman Catholic (14)	2.40% (15)	1% (16)	-0.21% (14)
South Africa - Apartheid	1976	1994	18	Africans: 71.2% Whites: 16.7% Coloureds: 9.3% Asians: 2.8% (20)	Dutch Reform Church: 55% (white) African Separatist Church: 20% (African) Methodist/Anglicans Hindu (Asians) (20)		2% (21)	2% (21)
Iran - Islamic Revolution	1977	1979	2		Shia Muslims: 94% Sunni Muslims: 5% Baha'I: .2% Zoroastrians: .12% (23)	1.15% (23)	13% (26)	2.76% (23)

Case	Start Date	End Date	Length	Ethnic Makeup	Religious Makeup	Unemployment Rate	GDP Growth	Population Growth
Poland - Solidarity Movement	1979	1989	10		Roman Catholic: 70% Orthodox: 1.4% Protestant: .3% (27)			9.33% (27)
Philippines - 1986	1983	1986	3		Christian: 90% (RC: 85%) Muslim: 7% (32)	5% (33)	2% (33)	3.91% (32)
China - Tiananmen Square	1986	1989	3	Han: 93% Others: 7% (36)		3% (37)	4% (37)	1.56% (38)
Palestine – First *Intifada*	1987	1993	6	Jewish: 82.2% Arabs (40)	Jewish: 82.2% Muslim/Christianity (40)	5.7% (40)	2.2% (40)	2% (Including OPT) (40)
Kosovo- Independence Struggle	1988	1996	8	Albanian majority Serbian minority (43)	Orthodox: 40% Roman Catholic: 33% Muslim (43)	6.2% (43)	1.2% (43)	0.59% (43)
East Germany - Revolution of the Candles	1989	1990	1		Protestant: 50% Catholic: 8% (46)		4.3% (46)	0.1% (46)
Czechoslovakia - Velvet Revolution	1989	1989	0	Czech 62.7% Slovak 32% Hungarian 3.8% (49)	Roman Catholic 70% Protestant 15% (49)	0.6% (49)		0.2% (49)
Serbia - Otpor	1998	2000	2	Serbs: 62.6% Albanians: 16.5% Montenegrins: 5% Yugoslavs: 3.4% Hungarians: 3.3% Muslims: 3.2% (53)	Orthodox 65% Muslim 19% Roman Catholic 4% Protestant 1% Other 11% (53)	25.4% (54)	2.5% (54)	0.32% (53)

Case	Start Date	End Date	Length	Ethnic Makeup	Religious Makeup	Unemployment Rate	GDP Growth	Population Growth
Georgia - Rose Revolution	2003	2004	1	Georgian 70.1%, Armenian 8.1%, Russian 6.3%, Azeri 5.7%, Ossetian 3%, Abkhaz 1.8%, other 5% (56)	Georgian Orthodox 65%, Muslim 11%, Russian Orthodox 10%, Armenian Apostolic 8%, unknown 6% (56)	17% (56)	4% (56)	-0.55% (56)
Ukraine - Orange Revolution	2004	2005	1	Ukrainian 77.8%, Russian 17.3%, Other 4.9% (60)	Ukrainian Orthodox 34.7%, Protestant, Jewish, none 38% (60)	3.7% (60)	9.4% (60)	-0.66% (60)
Lebanon - Cedar Revolution	2005	2005	0	Arab 95%, Armenian 4%, other 1% (65)	Muslim 59.7% Christian 39% Other 1.3% (65)	18% (65)	4% (65)	1.26% (65)
Burma - Saffron Revolution	2007	2007	0	Burman 68%, Shan 9%, Karen 7%, Rakhine 4%, Chinese 3%, Indian 2%, Mon 2%, other 5% (69)	Buddhist 89%, Christian 4% Muslim 4%, animist 1%, Other 2% (69)	9.4% (69)	0.9% (69)	0.8% (69)

Case	Unity of Movement	Media	Presence and Severity of Government Opposition
Germany - White Rose	Supporters were unified by were unsuccessful at gaining the support of others (1)	Spread message through pamphlets - distributed pamphlets randomly on streets in main cities and gave some to targeted community leaders (1)	Yes - Executed members (1)
Guatemala	Solidarity (3)	No free media(3); publication of Memorial de los 311 important in uniting oppositional forces (2)	Yes - Arrests, firings, police brutality, ban on meetings, declaring state of emergency, police and army fired guns on peaceful protestors (3)
US Civil Rights	Solidarity (6)	Media was important to show the white community and America at large the lengths the protestors were willing to go for equality, publicized police violence against peaceful protestors gained support for movement (7)	Yes - Federal government provided little opposition while local and state governments refused to comply: used national guard enforce segregation, used firehouse on protestors(6); arrests, use of police dogs, police would not protect protestors from angry mobs (7)
Tibet - Independence Struggle	Monks, nuns, youth, and ordinary citizens all participate and support the movement; however, the rest of Chinese society tends to be apathetic to movement (9)	Pamphlets and posters used often; appeal to international media becoming increasingly important; US Olympics in China brought massive media attention to Tibet, though this had no effect on the situation (9)	Yes - Arrests, torture, beatings, deaths, outlawing Dalai Llama's image (9)
El Salvador	Peasant majority united to end regime but violent regime repression led to splintering of movement (11)	No significant role (11)	Yes - Media blackout, fraud in elections, suppressed grassroots movements violently which led to peasants arming themselves for protection, assassinations, occupied university, arrests (11)
Portugal - Carnation Revolution	Though primarily a military movement, civilians from all walks of life supported the military's efforts; after coup, people were dissatisfied with reforms, turned against military leadership (17)	Radio used to send signal song out to tell rebelling military to ready for the coup (17)	Yes - House arrest, transfer soldiers to different locations, arrests, firing of soldiers (17)
South Africa - Apartheid	Goal was agreed upon, however methods of attaining it were not, violence and nonviolence were both employed (22)	Names and photos of informants and government workers were published to promote social ostracism instead of violent confrontations, international media pressured government for reform (22)	Yes - Killings, arrests, ban on political organizations, state of emergency, outlawing boycotts (22)
Iran Islamic Revolution	Solidarity (24)	Cassettes used to spread Khomeini message when all other media was banned (24)	Yes - Massacres(24); police brutality, arrests, martial law, attempts to force striking workers back to work (25)

Case	Unity of Movement	Media	Presence and Severity of Government Opposition
Poland - Solidarity Movement	Solidarity (28); though had some violent factions, nonviolent methods prevailed (29)	Media was censored but some church publications defied the government and produced publications critical of the government, Soviet news agencies broadcast US Civil Rights footage to show USA in bad light - actually encouraged protestors (28)	Yes - Martial law, arrests, executions (28); closing of borders, media/communication ban, takeover of Solidarity's headquarters (30)
Philippines - 1986	Two main movements - one in the country by peasants (early/beginning), one in the city by middle class (later/bigger) (34); many different factions but united to the goal of ending Marcos ruling through nonviolence (35)	In middle class movements in the cities, international press was important; media was crucial to Aquino movement - set up communication networks through churches in order to avoid gov. crackdown - Radio Veritas (Catholic) (34); gov. controlled most other forms of communication (35)	Yes - Massacres, martial law, arrests, torture, killings, police attempted to agitate crowd into becoming violent, media crackdown (34); curfew (35)
China - Tiananmen Square	Several different factions with a lack of communication movement mainly occurred in Beijing or other major cities (39)	Posters used to spread information; government controlled media - journalists portrayed movement in good light until forced otherwise by government (39)	Yes - Martial law, police brutality, banning demonstrations, use of military - killing an estimated 1,000 and arresting thousands of others, takeover of media outlets, censorship (39)
Palestine – First *Intifada*	Marked by solidarity at first, then movement began to divide population into factions and some factions began to turn to violence (41)	Pictures of Palestinian youth up against heavily armed and brutal Israeli soldiers helped make their cause appear legitimate in the eyes of the world (41)	Yes - Arrests, collective punishment, travel bans, raids, curfews, closing off communities, use of soldiers, death squads, spies, assassinations (41)
Kosovo - Independence Struggle	Albanians were united in goal and methods, but they were only a portion of the population; did not have support from other ethnicities; as time went on, radical youth began to demand more violent methods (44)	Used Albanian news media to spread word of rallies and meeting places, appealed to international media for support, created underground newspapers, Rugova convinced NY Times to cover movement - influential in gaining American public and political support (44)	Yes - Police brutality, banning of Albanian media, indiscriminate killings, arrests, torture, suspension of Kosovo politicians, checkpoints, plundering, military occupation (44)
East Germany - Revolution of the Candles	Solidarity - involved or supported by most of GDR population because they were all experiencing the same dissatisfaction with current leadership (47)	Soviet news agencies broadcast US Civil Rights footage to show USA in bad light - actually encouraged protestors (48); West German media covered non violent protests, Neues Forum published pamphlets to advertise movement, placed banners to advertise, parish publications used to spread message through legitimate body (47)	Yes - Violent response to peaceful demonstrations (48); arrests, control of media, banning of forms of protest (47)

Case	Unity of Movement	Media	Presence and Severity of Government Opposition
Czechoslovakia - Velvet Revolution	Solidarity (50)	Attack on peaceful protestors was videotaped and the tapes were shown throughout Prague and the countryside, increasing the number of witnesses to the attacks and thereby increasing the number of supporters for the movement (50)	Yes - Police brutality, beatings (50)
Serbia - Otpor	United and committed to nonviolence; able to unite the many political factions to form one force against Milosevic (55)	Print media used to spread message, websites, independent TV, announced election results before Milosevic can tamper with them (55)	Yes - Police brutality, arrests, beatings, takeover of TV, radio, and newspaper, moved elections up 10 months (55)
Georgia - Rose Revolution	Movement was unified but country was very split among different political factions and separatists movements (57)	Painting Kmara thousands of times allowed for the movement to appear bigger than it was; news stories picked up on it and ran with it; independent media publicized election fraud and exit polls- essential (57)	Yes - Occasional arrests, beatings, scare tactics, and repression; Current president order state of emergency and told troops to disband protests by force but by then he had lost all support and was forced to resign (57)
Ukraine - Orange Revolution	Movement appears unified but country is not; eastern part backs Russian-style leadership while western parts desire closer ties to Europe (61)	Used media to spread message, gather support, USAID trained many in investigative reporting, pamphlets informed voters about election, media converge ensured the fraudulent election would be known(62); free media nonexistent but news reporters discussed the fraud anyway (63)	Yes - Voter intimidation, assault, torching of ballot boxes (61)
Lebanon - Cedar Revolution	Dozens of different factions within Lebanon who all have their own goals but united behind the goal of removing Syrian forces (excluding Hezbollah) (66)	Local and international TV and newspapers helped spread the message, cell phones/texting used to spread message of meeting times and places, radio and TV used to mobilize population (67)	Yes - Cordoned off tent city, ban on protests (67)
Burma - Saffron Revolution	Movement came out powerful and people were rallied around the same goal; much of the population was included but came to be viewed as a spiritual uprising due to the overwhelming presence of the monks (70)	Use blogs to spread the message to a worldwide audience, *Mandalay Gazette* - based in California spread news and photos to the world (71); use internet and cell phones to send out pictures and messages since state controls other media (72); use of media essential in garnering international attention (70)	Yes - Use of army, shootings, killings (73); curfews, crackdown on internet and other media (72); arrest key activists, police brutality, tear gas, midnight raids, massive arrests of protestors (70)

Case	Turning Point or Catalyst?	Dependence on International Economy	Importance of Class	Is regime weakened by outside forces
Germany - White Rose	None	Minimal (1)	Distributed initial pamphlets to people of influence (1)	Yes - fighting war on several fronts and recently expanded empire stretched forces thin (1)
Guatemala	Firing on peaceful protestors, killing one - Maria Chincilla Recinos - who became the first martyr and showed the true face of the Ubico Regime (3)	Heavily depended on banana and coffee exports (4)	Main leaders and players were prominent Guatemalans, but the whole society engaged in protests and boycotts (3)	Recent fall of El Salvador to non violent movement motivated the Guatemalans (3)
US Civil Rights	1955 - Rosa Parks refuses to move to the back of the bus, boycotts follow, eventually having the law removed (6)	No (6)	Very important - blacks treated as second class citizens and were fighting towards equal rights (6)	Bankrolling world reconstruction and fighting in Korea, not necessarily weakened (6)
Tibet - Independence Struggle	Chinese takeover of Tibet in 1950 and the subsequent failed campaign of violent resistance ending in 1959 (9)	Strong (9)	Ethnicity important - Chinese and Tibet two different people with different histories and culture (9)	No (9)
El Salvador	Reason for end: 1972 elections - Christian Democrats knew they had won but were denied position anyway; supporters lost faith in electoral system (11)	Majority of land owned by elites used for cash crop farming - crops exported, relied heavily on foreign buyers (11)	Land and income inequality were major motivating points; wealthy controlled the actions of the government, prevented land reform, and political change (11)	Success of foreign guerilla movements may have given hope to movement; Honduran boycott of goods (11)
Portugal - Carnation Revolution	Lieutenant Colonel Ataide Banazol in 1973 demands a coup (17)	State controlled the foreign sector of the economy; foreigners took advantage of cheap labor conditions; Western countries refused to offer loan help until Portugal changed to more Western ideals (18)	Military class was main impetus behind movement; after coup, workers and peasants yielded much power, demanding reforms, higher wages, and occupying homes of previous elite (17)	Refusal of Western states to offer monetary help until Portugal falls more in line with their world views (18); fighting colonial wars still ongoing but largely viewed as a losing battle; loss of Goa blamed solely on army by government (17)
South Africa - Apartheid	1976 - state killing of student protestors (22)	Due to striking workers, international economy was essential, and regime was weakened by international boycott (22)	Very important - struggle between the white elites and the marginalized black community(22); Africans are most of the unskilled labor while whites are most of the management, large wage disparity (20)	During the movement, external forces exerted extreme pressure on regime to change (22)

Case	Turning Point or Catalyst?	Dependence on International Economy	Importance of Class	Is regime weakened by outside forces
Iran - Islamic Revolution	October/November 1978 - massive strikes paralyze economy, Shah eventually fled the country in January 1979 (24)	Yes - oil was main source of income for government (24)	Viewed as people's movement; the elite were usually the ones who supported the Shah and were widely discriminated against after the revolution was completed (24)	Economic downturn - oil crisis (24)
Poland - Solidarity Movement	Pope's visit in 1979 drew enormous crowds and encouraged people to seek self determination (28)	Yes - relied heavily on Soviet Union as a buyer of Polish produced goods; opened economy up to West in late 1970s (30)	Political elite existed but class disparity minimal due to socialist regime (30)	Other local nonviolent movements contributed to the dedication to the cause, USSR refused to offer troop help, Gorbachev's distaste of China's use of force in Tiananmen put protestors at ease (28)
Philippines - 1986	Escalante massacres of peaceful protestors began to spark widespread unrest, assassination of opposition leader Benigno Aquino sparked unrest among middle class (34)	Yes - relied heavily on the US and other countries for support (34); US and IMF provided monetary support (35)	Peasants and laborers as well as middle classes led movement - middle class in the cities, peasants in the country, elites generally supported Marcos (34)	Other ongoing nonviolent campaigns provided necessary motivation (34)
China - Tiananmen Square	Death of Chinese Communist Party Politburo member Hu Yaobang - mourning his death turned into protests for political reform (39)	Yes - relies heavily on exports to Hong Kong, Japan, and the US - trading deficit (38)	Inequality was on the rise, political elite unwilling to give up power, movement did not include peasants and workers, two very important segments of society (39)	Yes - other social revolutions, growing awareness of better standards of living throughout the world, and remembrance of the failed cultural revolution sparked upset (39)
Palestine - First *Intifada*	None (41)	Yes (41)	Israelis were usually far better off than Palestinians who did the majority of the cheap wage labor (41)	No (41)
Kosovo - Independence Struggle	Serbian attempts to limit Kosovo's autonomy in 1988 (44)	Foreign investment not high due to lack of confidence in Serbian economy (45)	Economic class unimportant - ethnicity very important (44)	Yes - 1992 break up of Yugoslavia (44)
East Germany - Revolution of the Candles	Opening of passage through Berlin Wall (48)	Forced to borrow money from West Germany while attempting to maintain a closed system (47)	Erich Honecker wanted to attack all the protestors and forcibly put down the revolution - his advisors refused saying they could not do that (48); unequal distribution of money and power - political elite (47)	Opening of Hungarian borders allowed for a mass exodus from East Germany, USSR refused to offer troop help, Gorbachev's distaste of China's use of force in Tiananmen put protestors at ease (48)

Case	Turning Point or Catalyst?	Dependence on International Economy	Importance of Class	Is regime weakened by outside forces
Czechoslovakia - Velvet Revolution	1989 - peaceful protestors met by police who proceed to attack them (50)	Negligible (50)	Did not play a role (50)	Other local nonviolent movements contributed to the dedication to the cause, USSR refused to offer troop help, Gorbachev's distaste of China's use of force in Tiananmen put protestors at ease (50)
Serbia - Otpor	Attacks by regime - police violence added supporters to resistance movement (55)	Foreign investment not high due to lack of confidence in Serbian economy (54)	Ruling elites, left over from Soviet era allow Milosevic to stay in power (55)	Recent wars (55)
Georgia - Rose Revolution	Massive protests to the obviously fraudulent 2003 elections - 20 days of protests in capital city until current president left peacefully; current President wanted a least 1 million people to show their support against him - within two days he had a petition with 1 million signatures calling for his resignation (58)	Very dependent on Russia for supplies and trading routes; 2003 IMF stopped helping Georgia due to corruption charges (58)	*lowest 10%:* 2% highest 10%: 28% (56)	2003 IMF suspends payments (58); Abkhaz separatists and tensions from Chechnya occupied Georgia's military (59)
Ukraine - Orange Revolution	Massive protests to the obviously fraudulent 2004 elections - 1,000,000 protestors; tens of thousands camped out for weeks in winter demanding Viktor Yushchenko be president (62)	Somewhat dependent - more for imports than exports (64)	Industrialists tend to back Moscow leaning regime while agriculturalist back opposition; business and political elite vying for Yanukovych because he won't disrupt current system (61)	No (64)
Lebanon - Cedar Revolution	Assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri (66)	No (66)	lowest 10%: 3.7% highest 10%: 23.2% Sectarian differences much more important (65)	No (67)
Burma - Saffron Revolution	Raise in the price of gasoline (71); beating of a few protesting monks got the monk population involved (70)	Yes - UN sanctions tend to hurt the regular population more than elite; trade deals with China allow economy to continue functioning (70)	*lowest 10%:* 2.8% highest 10%: 32.4% (69)	Yes - UN Sanctions (73)

Case	External Forces for the Movement	External Forces against the Movement	Is State Effective?	Is State Just?	Recent Political Change	State Labeling of Movement as Illegal
Germany - White Rose	No (1)	No (1)	No (1)	No (1)	No (1)	No (1)
Guatemala	US troops were stationed in Guatemala during World War II - they preached the idea of democracy that appealed to many students living there (3)	No (3)	No - reinforced cheap labor, forced peasants into work (4)	No (3)	No - election (3)	Yes - banned freedom of association (2)
US Civil Rights	No (6)	No (6)	Yes (6)	No (6)	No (6)	No (6)
Tibet - Independence Struggle	Yes - Diaspora community and support of many international organizations; Dalai Llama won Nobel Peace Prize; US gave him Congressional Medal of Honor (9)	No (9)	No (9)	No (9)	No (9)	Yes (9)
El Salvador	Yes - US supported Duarte (12)	No (11)	No - economy in bad shape; wealthy landowners able to control military government (11)	No (11)	No - election (11)	No (11)
Portugal - Carnation Revolution	Yes - indirectly; external pressure on former regime helped military coup succeed and gain support of people (17)	No (17)	No - bad economic conditions (17)	No - secret police, false arrests (17)	No (17)	Gathering for political purposes illegal; therefore, movement was illegal by nature (17)
South Africa - Apartheid	Yes - ANC was very influential and successful at gaining political and monetary support from other nations, particular the UN and the West (22)	No (22)	No - Political elites used money for their own gain (22)	No (22)	No (22)	Yes (22)

Case	External Forces for the Movement	External Forces against the Movement	Is State Effective?	Is State Just?	Recent Political Change	State Labeling of Movement as Illegal
Iran - Islamic Revolution	No (24)	Yes - indirectly United States supported the Shah due to reliance on oil (24)	No - oil wealth mainly spent on extravagant personal needs rather than on social needs of the country (24)	No (24)	No (24)	No - but Khomeini exiled and followers arrested or killed (25)
Poland - Solidarity Movement	Poles counted on US support, during the mid 1980s, international NGOs helped Solidarity to maintain movement (31)	No (28)	No (28)	No - promoted supporters to important positions (30)	No - election (28)	Yes (28)
Philippines - 1986	Support of Catholic Church worldwide, international pressure for Marcos to step down (34)	US tended to support Marcos (35)	No - accepted bribes to approve projects bad for the population (34)	No - control of economic industries given to family and friends (35)	No - election (34)	No (35)
China - Tiananmen Square	No (39)	No (39)	No (39)	No (39)	No (39)	Yes (39)
Palestine - First *Intifada*	Yes - Diaspora communities (42); Arab countries, however Arab countries' support waned during this time due to the Gulf War and other circumstances (41)	Yes - United States supported Israel (42)	No (41)	No (41)	No (41)	Yes (41)
Kosovo - Independence Struggle	Diaspora remittances supported parallel society, student and youth groups in Europe offered support (44)	No (44)	No (44)	No (44)	Yes (44)	Yes - associating for political purpose ruled illegal as well as funding parallel government (44)
East Germany - Revolution of the Candles	No (47)	No (47)	No - inability to supply consumer goods (47)	No - Stasi security forces, control of media and of movement of people, faked election results (47)	No - election (48)	Yes - refused to allow Neues Forum to register, thereby making it illegal (47)

Case	External Forces for the Movement	External Forces against the Movement	Is State Effective?	Is State Just?	Recent Political Change	State Labeling of Movement as Illegal
Czechoslovakia - Velvet Revolution	No (50)	No (50)	No (50)	No (51)	No (50)	No (51)
Serbia - Otpor	Yes - funding and support given from abroad somewhat quietly from US and the West (55)	No (55)	No (55)	No (55)	No - election (55)	Yes (55)
Georgia - Rose Revolution	Yes - US aid supplied money and gave training to leaders of the movement - trained judges, journalists, elected officials, improved local governments, funded NGOs, held press conferences, gave campaign training (58)	No (58)	No - corruption made it difficult for state to effectively rule - allowed taxes to be used for personal expenses (57)	No (58)	No - election (58)	No (58)
Ukraine - Orange Revolution	Yes - USAID: trained journalists, funded civic groups, trained election officials, broadcast elections guides on TV/radio, trained judges, promoted youth involvement, trained government officials (62)	Yes - Russia provided millions of dollars for the election campaign of the current regime and congratulated him on victory before it was officially announced; claimed would not accept a Yushchenko victory (61)	Yes - economy was on the rise (64)	No - fraudulent elections, corrupt police, selling government companies below market value to cronies (62)	No - election (62)	No (62)
Lebanon - Cedar Revolution	Yes - USAID: improved tax/financial system, issued guides to local towns on how to hold productive meetings/keep minutes, funded opinion polls and dialogues (66)	Syria - though Syria was directly involved and one of the targets of the movement (67)	No (67)	No - viewed as illegitimate and biased due to its Syrian influence (67)	No (67)	No (67)
Burma - Saffron Revolution	Diaspora group and indirectly the UN, ASEAN, and other states though their influence is negligible (70)	Yes - China supports the government because it benefits economically and militarily from doing so, also India and Russia (73)	No - military elite exploit economy while a majority of the population remains poor (70)	No (70)	No (70)	No - but some protestors were accused of being terrorists/traitors (70)

Case	Presence of a Leader	Ability of Leader to Plan	Concessions made by Regime	Propaganda
Germany - White Rose	Hans and Sophie Scholl (1)	Poor - actions were random or spontaneous and aside from targeting a few key individuals, no concrete method of distribution appeared to exist (1)	None (1)	Used quotes from famous philosophers and the Bible to add credibility to movement; used paint and tar to write "Down with Hitler" and "Freedom" on numerous different public buildings and University of Munich; appeals to the German spirit and German image (1)
Guatemala	No true public leader (2); Carbonell and Serrano - delivered petition with 311 signatures (3)	Strong (3)	Agreed to talk, but usually told opposition leaders to control their crowds (3)	Women dressed in black for protests; Memorial de los 311 served as uniting factor among elites (2)
US Civil Rights	Martin Luther King, Jr. (6)	Strong - effectively organized marches, boycotts, etc. (7)	Slowly began ruling segregation illegal, offered more voting rights, integration of armed forces (6)	Used imagery of police brutality in addition to American ideals to gain support for movement; King appeals to Christian and American values to show the immorality of segregation (7)
Tibet - Independence Struggle	Dalai Llama (9)	Largely responsible for maintain nonviolent nature of resistance but does not provide overarching plan of movement - more based on community leaders; helps gain international attention (9)	None (9)	Used to gain support from international and local communities; replace Chinese flags with Tibetan flags; elected Tibetan student "student of the year" though he had been in jail for past 5 months; honored dead; Buddhist traditions interwoven into protests whenever possible as resistance to Chinese attempts to erode the importance of the religion (9)
El Salvador	Christian Democratic Party and UNO; Revolutionary Democratic Front (11)	Planned and campaigned well, raised hopes, and got votes but did not follow up when government refused the election results (11)	Military sometimes acknowledged where change was needed but never acted (11); eventually formed coalition gov. with Duarte but failed to satisfy public with reforms (12)	Used (13)
Portugal - Carnation Revolution	Movement of Armed Forces (17)	Strong - drew up plans for new government, organized various military officials for secret meetings and planning of the coup, coordinated multi-location takeover (17)	No - reforms were ongoing but failing and not made in response to soldiers' demands (17)	Carnations came to symbolize the revolution and helped gain supporters in the aftermath of the coup (17)

Case	Presence of a Leader	Ability of Leader to Plan	Concessions made by Regime	Propaganda
South Africa - Apartheid	Nelson Mandela, UDF, COSATU, Desmond Tutu(22)	UDF - Strong, umbrella organization able to conduct a coordinated national campaign (22)	Ended segregation in stores, negotiated with strikers (22)	Used fear propaganda to persuade members of the black community who wanted to work with the whites; strengthening black identity, camaraderie, and history was a main goal (22)
Iran - Islamic Revolution	Ayatollah Khomeini (24)	Strong (24)	Relaxing censorship, appointing new leaders with ties to clergy, freeing some political prisoners (25)	Uses mainly Islamic propaganda (24); Islamic values (morality, justice, etc) to delegitimize the rule of the Shah; wearing of traditional Muslim clothing and renunciation of Western goods/clothing (25)
Poland - Solidarity Movement	Solidarity political movement main organizer led by Lech Walesa (29)	Strong - able to control many factions and unite in common goal of nonviolent regime change (29)	Allowed Solidarity to organize legally in early 1980s, then declared organization illegal and arrested members; allowed Solidarity access to TV, radio, and print media (28); allowed workers to organize unions (29)	Churches and Solidarity told Poles to live as if Poland was free, used speeches by the Pope to motivate population to fight for freedom (28); used cultural symbols to strengthen identity with movement (30)
Philippines - 1986	Cory Aquino, Benigno Aquino until his death (35);	Strong - movement well organized and publicized (34)	Began period of "normalization" in late 1970s in which the state promised to reform its political system but in reality nothing changed (35)	Convince people that the ruler does not have power unless the people give it to him - they must take the power away, "Cory's Crusaders" (34)
China - Tiananmen Square	None (39)	Movement poorly organized - lacked resiliency (39)	Agreed to hold dialogue with the students - never occurred (39)	Hunger strike was symbolic and used to attract more supporters; the death of Hu, one of the few high level gov. supporters of the student movements, was exploited to use as a catalyst for the movement; 70th anniversary of May 4 Day and 40th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China caused rise in protest leading up to these events in 1989 (39)

Case	Presence of a Leader	Ability of Leader to Plan	Concessions made by Regime	Propaganda
Palestine - First *Intifada*	Unified Leadership of the Uprising (41)	Strong (41)	Yes - Declaration of Principles - Israel transferred authority of the Occupied Territory to the Palestinian Authority, however, this authority was widely viewed as corrupt and a pawn of Israel by the Palestinians (41)	To gain support, provided food and medical aid for the Palestinian people, Convince Israeli public that Palestinians are committed to coexisting peaceful, thereby forcing Israelis to pressure government to withdraw from the OT; united people based on Palestinian identity (41)
Kosovo - Independent Struggle	Democratic League of Kosovo and Ibrahim Rugova (44)	Strong - established parallel state but failed in gaining support of radicalized youth (44)	Agreed to allow Albania students to attend university after banning them; however, this took years to put into effect (44)	Signs - "America is with Kosovo" "We want freedom" "Peace not war," release of white doves to show commitment to nonviolence; Albanian language and culture was no longer taught in Serbian sponsored schools so parallel institutions were constructed to keep this identity strong (44)
East Germany - Revolution of the Candles	Neues Forum was main organizing body - no figure head (47)	Well - organized protests, ensured crowd control and prevented the violent destruction of government property (47)	Yes - attempted to address people's concern - viewed as insufficient adjustments (48)	Use of candles to symbolize peace - left candles on windows and doorsteps, patch Schwerter zu Pflugscharen "swords of ploughshares," wore alternative banners or symbols of statehood during protests - quotes demanding freedom of speech/thought (47)
Czechoslovakia - Velvet Revolution	Civic Forum and Vaclav Havel (50)	Strong - effectively organized marches, boycotts, etc. (52)	Agreed to negotiations which eventually led to the resignation of the leader; control of media was relaxed which allowed for propaganda to be spread easier (50)	"Massacre of peaceful students;" used to change ideology away from communism; stopping clock hands at 11:55 = "time is up for the Communist Party"; martyrdom of Jan Palach twenty years early - organized remembrance ceremonies that were forcibly dispersed and aided the movement (50); anniversary of protests against Nazi rule (51)
Serbia - Otpor	Otpor - no national leader; Democratic Opposition of Serbia - 18 groups supporting one candidate (55)	Strong - built movement slowly and sustained its nonviolent nature at all levels (55)	None (55)	Otpor - resistance - clenched fist; create impression of large organizational with use of media; humor extremely important; fun activities - concerts; campaign new way of life; Gotov Ye - he's done; Cake on Milosevic's birthday - broken up cake symbolizing broken up country; reminding citizens of people who died during Milosevic's wars (55)

Case	Presence of a Leader	Ability of Leader to Plan	Concessions made by Regime	Propaganda
Georgia - Rose Revolution	Youth group Kmara, Saakashvili - political opponent (57)	Strong, meetings and protests well organized and planned, realized the movement needed more support from the rural areas - campaigned there (57)	Refused to compromise (57)	Humor very important in promoting message; made Kmara appear unknown but huge through Kmara graffiti campaign and "borrowing" supporters from political parties' youth groups; rock concerts, book collections, etc. showed people that they could participate in government - thus got more people involved; portrayed current regime as a Soviet-like government thus delegitimizing it (57)
Ukraine - Orange Revolution	Viktor Yushchenko (62)	Able to organize and promote effective opposition movement against Moscow backed regime (61)	Allowed for another election to occur after days of protest over disputed elections (61)	Color orange used to unite people - orange is the color of Yushchenko's Our Ukraine Party (61); Pora youth group gets name from historical hymn telling people to rise up against oppression and demand freedom (63)
Lebanon - Cedar Revolution	"La Chambre Noire" main organizational body (67)	Strong - though initial protests were spontaneous, movement leaders recognized the need for planning and coordinated action and came together to make this happen to allow the movement to be sustained (67)	Three day mourning period was declared after Hariri's assassination in hopes the population would forget about it after that (67)	Imagery of the Cedar tree, the national tree of Lebanon, "The Truth," "100% Lebanese," use of color as a unifying symbol - red and white; Use of Lebanese flag and nationalism to build support for the withdrawal of Syrian forces; slogan "independence '05" chosen to set deadline so movement would not repeat former independence movements - give people hope this one will work (67)
Burma - Saffron Revolution	Suu Kyi - more of a figurehead, won 1990 elections and was then placed under house arrest; allowed to address protesting monks briefly, then forced back under house arrest (72); All Burma Monks Alliance (70)	Poor - protests tended to be sporadic and held in response to attacks instead of premeditated (70)	Allowed Suu Kyi to speak with protestors briefly; no concessions in terms of political change (70)	"Free Burma" stencils; protest with down-turned bowls - means refusing a gift which is equal to inflicting the highest form of punishment in Buddhist society - meant to show monks were no longer accepting gifts from the military (71)

Case	Motivation of Movement	Goal of the Movement	Where did movement originate	Organization of Movement
Germany - White Rose	Restrictions on freedom of expression, human rights abuses, discontent with structure regime imposed on society (1)	Regime change (1)	Students (1)	Group of less the a dozen students and one professor at University of Munich - took trains to distribute pamphlets in different cities (1)
Guatemala	Oppressive government, lack of rights, secret police, indiscriminate killings (3)	Free speech, free association, democracy, removal of oppressive government (3)	Students and teachers (3)	Students and teachers started movement; disaffected elites and military officials eventually overthrew Ubico (2)
US Civil Rights	Segregation, lack of opportunity, unjust laws (6)	Equal opportunity, equal access, and fair laws (6)	Workers in Birmingham, AL and within southern churches (7)	Three main bodies (NAACP/SLCL/SNCC) were responsible for most of the movement; individual filing lawsuits also aided the movement; several grass roots movements occurred such as the 1960s restaurant sit-ins that ended segregation in many food establishments - SNCC focused on change at the local level (7)
Tibet - Independence Struggle	Repressive regime; takeover of Tibet by China (9)	Autonomy, freedom of religion and culture (9)	Monasteries (9)	Dalai Llama figure head while monasteries and ordinary citizens organize day-to-day activities, monks and nuns serve as community leaders and organizers (9)
El Salvador	Oppressive government and military, severe economic disparity, repressed dissent (11)	Regime change and land reform (11)	Student groups and labor unions (11)	Several different factions; political parties centralized but not united; community leaders led to confusion (11)
Portugal - Carnation Revolution	Rulers' of Portugal refusal to relinquish hold on African colonies, seen as a waste of money and effort in an all ready poor nation (19); bad economy (18)	Ending of Portuguese imperialism (19)	Soldiers (19)	Country and plan was broken into parts and each part was headed by a different individual to ensure key bridges, roads, airports, and buildings were all effectively secured (17)
South Africa - Apartheid	Segregation, lack of opportunity, unjust laws (22)	End of apartheid governing and better access for local population (22)	Students, workers, women's groups, civic groups (22)	Decentralized grass roots with communication networks that allowed for effective communication while making the organization difficult to combat; leaders on the local level important, especially in controlling the actions of violent youths (22)
Iran - Islamic Revolution	Oppressive government, mass detentions, secret police, torture, corruption within government (24)	Regime change (24)	Mosques and schools (24)	Hierarchical with Khomeini as leader - though Khomeini exiled, he continued to have influence over population thanks to cassette recordings of his speeches distributed by former students (24)

Case	Motivation of Movement	Goal of the Movement	Where did movement originate	Organization of Movement
Poland - Solidarity Movement	Rigged elections (29); economic downturn, housing shortages (30)	Political plurality (28); free elections (29)	Laborers - mainly industrial (29)	Trade union Solidarity was the main force; churches were used as organizing institutions since they had some autonomy; church summer camps also helped spread the non violent message (29); various groups (students, farmers, police, etc.) organized their own movements with Solidarity (30)
Philippines - 1986	Oppressive government, bad taxes, expensive imported commodities, land ownership problems (34)	Better economic conditions, investigation of political deaths, dismantling US installations, repeal repressive law (34)	Peasants/ country - leaders trained by foreigners/ church - they then trained others (34)	Network of organizations based on different interests/ geographical locations - grassroots organizations to respond to local concerns; parallel institutions - education, political, etc. established to spread message - orgs. Created an alliance of 1.5 million people (34); network of churches used to spread messages legitimately (35)
China - Tiananmen Square	Students without good economic opportunities, lack of freedom, desire for better economic opportunities (39)	Democracy, release of political prisoners, free press, free association, ending corruption (39)	Students (39)	Schools and universities main site of organization; Only community/individual leaders - while they were successful in mobilizing their own base of support there was no central uniting factor or coordination between movements who often competed with each other (39)
Palestine - First *Intifada*	Israeli occupation and violence; suppression of Palestinian people both economically and socially - laws banning development, water usages, Israel's control of all municipal issues (41)	Self determination (42); end of occupation (41)	Grassroots movement - towns and villages (41)	Grassroots committees began to locally organize population, setting the foundation for a more widespread movement (41)
Kosovo - Independence Struggle	Serbian attempts to limit Kosovo's autonomy (44)	Original goal was return to autonomy; then complete independence became the goal (44)	Workers - miners (44)	Rugova organized a parallel state complete with political hierarchy, schools, and private economy; students tended to organize themselves and were not effectively integrated into movement (44)
East Germany - Revolution of the Candles	Oppressive regime (47)	Regime change, freedom of speech, freedom of thought (47)	Protestant church groups (47)	Network of churches gave space for people to organize, beginning of movement(47); university, and opera houses used to get message out (48)

Case	Motivation of Movement	Goal of the Movement	Where did movement originate	Organization of Movement
Czechoslovakia - Velvet Revolution	Illegitimate regime, police brutality (51)	Resignation of communist government; release of political prisoners (51)	Students (50)	Use of school buildings and resources to organize movement and spread information; Civic Forum - artistic community volunteered theaters to spread message (50); movement mainly occurred in Prague - supporters went into countryside to gather support (51)
Serbia - Otpor	Corrupt government, economic downfall, authoritarian police (55)	Regime change, free elections (55)	Students (55)	Cell phone communication, hierarchy nonexistent; creating community leaders allowed movement to operate smoothly (55)
Georgia - Rose Revolution	Corrupt government, stifled media, authoritarian police (58)	Regime change (58)	Political parties with support from artists, writers, and students (57)	Political parties called for civil disobedience while artists and writers spread the message and youth groups and university committees organized; organizations had horizontal structure so no one arrest could dismantle it; university committees and Kmara activists gathered support from all over; artists and politicians traveled throughout the country (57)
Ukraine - Orange Revolution	Corrupt government (62); voter fraud: intimidation, torching ballot boxes, physical assault (61)	Regime change (62)	Political parties (62)	Yushchenko promoted demonstrations in capital but youth groups and other grassroots organizations throughout the country organized other protests, towns and youth leaders where important in organizing local demonstrations and strikes (61); supporters within city and government helped movement greatly, youth movement Pora vital (63)
Lebanon - Cedar Revolution	Syrian occupation and interference in local politics, regime change (66)	End Syrian occupation, free elections (66); investigations into Hariri's death (68)	Students and civil society groups (67)	Youth movements, civil society movements, and Bristol Gathering were many organizational bodies behind the movement (67)
Burma - Saffron Revolution	Repressive regime, poor economic conditions (70)	Political and economic reform (70)	Emerged from pro-democracy activists then taken up by Buddhist Monks (70);	At first organized at the grassroots levels where it was kept in check by arresting key leaders; when protesting monks were beaten by police, movement spread through the monasteries - All Burma Monks Alliance (70)

Case	Regime Type	Tactics Used	Outcome
Germany - White Rose	Dictatorship - Hitler (1)	Pamphlets addressed to the public and to political intelligentsia (1)	Failure (1)
Guatemala	Dictatorship - Ubico (3)	Petition, boycott, teacher strike, forming political party, demonstrations, economic shutdown - strikes everywhere (3)	Success (3)
US Civil Rights	Constitutional Republic (6)	Demonstrations, marches, speeches, boycotts, sit-ins (6)	Success (6)
Tibet - Independence Struggle	Communist - Dictatorship (9)	Pamphlets, posters, protests, appeals to international communities, songs, graffiti, road blocks, replacing Chinese flags/signs with Tibetan flags/signs; honored dead, hunger strikes, silence (9)	Ongoing - Failure (9)
El Salvador	Democracy - President/Legislature ruled by the military who was unwilling to relinquish power (11)	Protests, election boycotts, demonstrations (11); seizures of buildings, strikes (13)	Violence (11)
Portugal - Carnation Revolution	Cooperative Republic - President elected by electoral college, legislature elected every four years (14)	Petitioning government, coup; blockades, protests, strikes (in aftermath of coup by citizens demanding more change) (17)	Success (17)
South Africa - Apartheid	Parliamentary Democracy - only open to white citizens (22)	Demonstrations, marches, rallies, political funerals, boycott elections - rents - schools - businesses, creation of parallel institutions to bypass state institutions, hunger strikes (22)	Success (22)
Iran - Islamic Revolution	Constitutional Monarchy - Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi; Legislative Power to elected legislature (single party system) (24)	Strikes, boycotts, tax refusals, demonstrations, recorded speeches of exiled leader (24)	Success (24)
Poland - Solidarity Movement	Single Party Socialist - Polish United Worker's Party (29)	Strikes, demonstrations (29)	Success (29)
Philippines - 1986	Democracy - Ferdinand Marcos was elected president but declared martial law in 1972 in order to maintain presidency (34); martial law lifted after Marcos changed constitution to allow him to remain in power (35)	Strikes, demonstrations, small demonstrations gathered more supporters and grew, building of alternative institutions to bring down economy - farming co-ops, etc, rallies, marches, strikes, demonstrations, election boycotts (34); election monitoring, street blockades, withdrawal of money from gov. banks, refusal to pay utility bills, boycott of gov./crony run business/media, noise (35)	Success (34)
China - Tiananmen Square	Communist - Dictatorship (38)	Demonstrations, hunger strike, petitioning, political conferences, large posters, sit-ins (39)	Failure (39)

Case	Regime Type	Tactics Used	Outcome
Palestine - First *Intifada*	Parliamentary Democracy (40)	Demonstrations, boycotts, strikes, tax refusals, occupations, blockades, creation of alternative institutions (41)	Violence (41)
Kosovo - Independence Struggle	Parliamentary Democracy - Slobodan Milosevic - Serbia (43)	Marches, strikes, election boycotts, parallel institutions: political-social-economical, sit-ins, appeals to international community, refusal to serve mandatory year in the army (44)	Violence (44)
East Germany - Revolution of the Candles	Socialist Democratic (46)	Demonstrations in major cities every Monday, marches with candles pilgrimages, "prayers for peace;" immigration – talented workers left the country, destruction of the Berlin Wall (48); human chains, election boycotts, writing formal complaints, picnics, concerts, bicycle rides (47)	Success (48)
Czechoslovakia - Velvet Revolution	Communist (49)	Demonstrations, marches, strikes, petitions (50)	Success (51)
Serbia - Otpor	Parliamentary Democracy - Slobodan Milosevic (53)	Demonstrations, marches, rallies, pamphlets, concerts, humor, use elections to dispose leaders, prison demonstrations when supporters arrested, campaign in small towns, election monitoring, strikes (55)	Success (55)
Georgia - Rose Revolution	Liberal Authoritarian (56)	Demonstrations, trained judges to practice independent law - eventually allowed the Supreme Court to throw out the 2003 election results and call for new elections, election monitoring, blocked roads (58)	Success (58)
Ukraine - Orange Revolution	Parliamentary Democracy (60)	Protests, election monitoring, advertising the fraud that occurred, working within current system, using courts to disapprove/uphold certain practices (62); mocking authority, obstructing traffic, street parades (63)	Success (62)
Lebanon - Cedar Revolution	Parliamentary Democracy (65)	Demonstrations, dialogues, training government officials about democracy, opinion polls (66); boycotts, sit-ins, petitions, setting up tent cities for constant pressure, gained support of security forces (67)	Success (66)
Burma - Saffron Revolution	Military Junta (69)	Protests, marches, appeal to foreign media (70)	Failure (70)

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