

**McCarthyism-The Chill of the Anglo-American and Franco-American
Relationships as Deprivations of Liberty based upon a Hobbesian Framework**

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Introduction

This paper will focus on a little written subject, the foreign policy reaction to the turbulent issue of McCarthyism in a deprivation of liberty context. Under Thomas Hobbes' social contract theory of government, outlined in his seminal *Leviathan*, the citizens give up their natural rights within the state of nature to the government to execute natural rights on their behalf. The government is thus given a freedom of action to act on behalf of the citizenry for the general good and public welfare of the nation state. While not following Hobbesian principles steadfastly, such as separation of powers and the Bill of Rights, the United States has embraced Hobbes' organization of government in its delegation of rights/powers to sovereign instruments or departments of the U.S. Government, namely in the realm of foreign policy

It will be proven that Senator Joseph McCarthy's ascendance in the period of 1950-1954 severely hampered Hobbes' social contract theory and deprived the U.S. government of its liberty of action to perform foreign policy effectively. This natural right entrusted to the Executive Branch by social contract to perform foreign policy in pursuit of public welfare, was limited most notably in United States soft power relations with Western Europe, specifically the British and French. Volumes of correspondence out of the Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files, British Foreign Office, British Public Records Office, British Archives, and *Foreign Relations of the United States* volumes reveal an almost apocalyptic tone coming out of Britain and France on the future of U.S. power, the global struggle against Communism, and the burgeoning trans-Atlantic/NATO alliance. This apocalyptic tone is driven by McCarthyism and created a major obstacle in U.S. foreign policy goals of a united trans-Atlantic front against global Communism. Confidential U.S. State Department Central files will also reveal that the

Soviet peace offensive worked in concert with McCarthyism in attempting to deprive the Executive of its liberty of foreign policy action and achievement of goals in Western Europe.

Leviathan

Hobbes' political theory is dramatically tinged by his love for the power of the sovereign and centralized authority over the masses in the pursuit of public welfare and protection. As David Gauthier writes in *The Logic of Leviathan*, "Hobbes's greatest aim is to show men the way to security. His argument is that only in a commonwealth ruled by a sovereign who exercises without limitation the rights of all his subjects, and whose power is sufficient to make that exercise effective, can men find security."¹ Hobbes writes in Chapter 21 of *Leviathan*, "The liberty, whereof there is so frequent and honorable mention in the histories and philosophy of the Ancient Greeks and Romans, and in the writings, and discourse of those that from them have received all their learning in the politics, is not the liberty of particular men, but the liberty of the Commonwealth."² As a result, the second part of Hobbes' *Leviathan* is devoted to 'Of Commonwealth.' In this section Hobbes develops his famous social contract, as the means to create a commonwealth, in which, "each individual agrees to give up his or her right to self-preservation in nature and hand over all authority to a sovereign power, where it becomes irrevocable,"³ in the form of a covenant. The rights of the sovereign are indivisible, specifically regarding the public welfare of the Commonwealth and protection from foreigners.

The sovereign powers of unlimited authorization and unrestricted right to rule all parties is not the function of the social contract's structure, but its purpose.⁴ While Hobbes makes reference to the potentiality of an assembly as an instrument of sovereign power, he also cites the

¹ Gauthier, David P. *The Logic of Leviathan- The Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969, p. 161-62.

² Macpherson, C.B., ed. and Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan*. Maryland: Penguin Books, 1968, p. 266

³ Bagby, Laurie M. Johnson. *Hobbes's Leviathan- Reader's Guide*. New York: Continuum, 2007, p. 12

⁴ Kavka, Gregory S. *Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 386

English Civil War and its division of public welfare power between the King, House of Lords, and House of Commons, as an example of the deleterious effects of division of power.⁵ In Chapter 25, 'On Counsel,' Hobbes writes, "counsel is best if it is given by one advisor at a time to a single man who can evaluate it and think how best to use it. But counsel becomes mere political rhetoric in assemblies of men."⁶ Perhaps even more seminal in Chapter 18 Hobbes writes,

It is understood, they [subjects] are not obliged by former Covenant to anything repugnant hereunto...the conservation of Peace and Justice, [is] the end for which all Commonwealths are instituted, and this division is it, whereof it is said, a kingdom divided in it self cannot stand.⁷

But how is power of self-rule transferred from man in the state of nature to the sovereign in a commonwealth? In Chapter 21, Hobbes maintains that commonwealths arise either by acquisition or institution. "A party achieves dominion over a group by acquisition when its members, who are in his power, explicitly or tacitly pledge obedience to his rule."⁸ An example of a commonwealth by acquisition would be the Nazi expansion throughout Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and North Africa from the late 1930's through 1945. Conversely, commonwealths by institution are formed, "when a number of independent individuals create a common power over themselves by mutual agreement."⁹ This is also known as authorization, which confers upon the sovereign the power of representation.¹⁰ To have authority, Hobbes explains in Chapter 16 of the section 'Of Man', is to have the right of doing an action and an author is someone who owns the words or actions of another, who is the actor, and who acts by authority of the author.¹¹ This agreement among individuals surrenders the individual's right to

⁵ Macpherson, p. 236-7

⁶ Bagby, p. 51

⁷ Macpherson, p. 229 and 236 (Brackets added)

⁸ Kavka, p. 180

⁹ *Id.*, p. 180

¹⁰ McNeilly, F.S. The Anatomy of Leviathan. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968, p. 216

¹¹ *Id.*, p. 214 and Macpherson, p. 218

self-rule to the sovereign irrevocably.¹² “The parties authorize all of the sovereign’s acts,”¹³ to be elected later by the parties by majority vote into a covenant.¹⁴ Thus the actual sovereign is selected only after the parties are joined into a social union,¹⁵ and only then is an obligation formed.¹⁶ An example of such an institutive commonwealth would be the United States with its over arching Constitution establishing means of representation. However Hobbes pictures the state-creating pact as a complex structure, “not really a single agreement but a set of bilateral agreements linking each contractor with every other.”¹⁷ As a result, a single party can rightly demand fulfillment of the agreement by each of the others.

The sovereign is not a party, or bound to the social contract, he receives power as, “a free gift which parties bestow him.”¹⁸ As Tom Sorell writes in *Leviathan After 350 Years*, “He is a uniquely free agent in a commonwealth, and though can in principle become the subject of another sovereign; in domestic politics he seems to be law unto himself.”¹⁹ Thus Hobbes considers roughly eight powers, or liberties, to be essential to the existence and continued functioning of a government and sovereign. Five are not under dispute, including legislative or lawmaking, law enforcement, taxation, appointment of officials, and most importantly for this paper, formulation and execution of foreign and military policy.²⁰ As Sorell writes, “To the extent that they are involved in threatening international relations...they are making judgments in *extremis*, and so long as they genuinely think public safety depends on it, they cannot be blamed for adopting measures that turn out to inappropriate.”²¹ While Hobbes does not explicitly

¹² Kavka, p. 390

¹³ *Id.*, p. 390

¹⁴ Gauthier, p. 149

¹⁵ Kavka, p. 180-81 and p. 190

¹⁶ Gauthier, p. 149

¹⁷ Kavka, p. 180

¹⁸ *Id.*, p. 386

¹⁹ Sorell, Tom and Luc Foisneau. *Leviathan After 350 Years*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004, p. 183

²⁰ Kavka, p. 225

²¹ Sorell, p. 187

reference foreign and military policy he makes reference to the issue in numerous sovereign rights, such as the ability to make, “war and peace with other nations...that is to say of judging when it is for the public good.”²² Similarly Hobbes states the sovereign may,

Be Judge of both of the means of Peace and Defense; and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both before hand, for the preserving of Peace and Security, by prevention of Discord at home and hostility from abroad; and when peace and security are lost, for the recovery of the same.²³

It is important also to note for this paper that Hobbes has a very distinct concept of political obedience towards the sovereign, which would seem to certainly expand to foreign policy. While subjects may claim rights against the sovereign, they are only by virtue of such law as is made by the sovereign.²⁴ Subjects are bound by a double tie of obligation, by contract, owing every other citizen obedience to the sovereign, and by obligation to carry out the terms of a free gift, which each individual directly owes to the sovereign.²⁵ Moreover, Hobbes acknowledges that the sovereign has no limit on his reign of rule for lasting peace and defense.²⁶ Thus, “the unlimited stint together with the double tie obligation implies that so long as the State holds together, the parties may not withdraw their allegiance to the social contract and alter or replace it.”²⁷ However, if the state dissolves under a new sovereign the subject may transfer his obedience because, “he owes no loyalty to a sovereign who cannot offer protection.”²⁸

Anglo-American Foreign Policy Post World War II, the Rise of McCarthy, and Franco-U.S. Response

I.

²² Macpherson, p. 234

²³ *Id.*, p. 232-33

²⁴ McNeilly, p. 233

²⁵ Kavka, p. 386

²⁶ *Id.*

²⁷ *Id.*

²⁸ Bagby, p. 48

Yet before analyzing McCarthyism in the above Hobbesian framework it is necessary to expound upon Anglo-American foreign policy goals, McCarthy's rise, and response.

Post World War II, "Britain was America's principle ally, in Europe and globally, at a time when twin challenges of communism and anti-colonialism were contorting world politics."²⁹ Quickly following World War II, both the United States and Britain became engrossed with the creation of a trans-Atlantic alliance that would not only strengthen Anglo-American ties, but create ties with the democratic countries of Western Europe, as a bulwark against the Communist menace in Asia and Eastern Europe. As David Reynolds writes in his seminal *Britannia Overruled*, "The postwar Anglo-American alliance was forged from common anxiety about Soviet policy and more, generally, the challenge of communism."³⁰ A confidential British Foreign Office Cable from May 23, 1952 entitled "United States: Review for the years 1950 and 1951," similarly states,

The Pax Americana as it is now evolving is essentially inspired by the soldiers and reflects the growing authority to America's world policy of the Chiefs of Staff. The Americans have shown a remarkable willingness to set aside their own preconceptions both about democracy and about the general application of a tidy formula to international organizations; and feel that they have deferred to the susceptibilities of the team they are trying to lead by elaborating a complicated and varying degree of defense arrangements.³¹

In 1945/6 the British and American military maintained clandestine contacts under cover of the Combined Chiefs of Staff from World War II due to anxiousness about Soviet policy.³² With the Communist revolts of 1946/7 taking place in Greece and Turkey, and British announcement of withdrawal for aid, the U.S. stepped in with the Truman Doctrine portraying

²⁹ Reynolds, David. *Britannia Overruled- British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Longman, 1991, p. 173

³⁰ *Id.*, p. 182

³¹ Preston, Paul and Michael Partridge. *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print- Part V- Series C- North America 1952, United States, Volume 2*. Lexis Nexis: 2006, "United States: Review for the Years 1950 and 1951," from Sir O. Franks to Anthony Eden, May 23, 1952, p. 10.

³² Reynolds., p. 174

aid programs as part of a global struggle between democracy and totalitarianism. This news was welcomed within Britain as evidence that, “the USA was ready to offer public and concrete support in the stabilization of Europe.”³³ Further seeds of trans-Atlantic harmony were laid when U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall offered U.S. financial aid if the Europeans formulated a joint recovery plan, this soon became known as the Marshall plan. In 1948-1950 America provided \$12 billion for European economic recovery, Britain received the largest share at \$2.7 billion.³⁴

However, Soviet intransigence over disallowance of Eastern Europe into the Marshall Plan, along with the partition of Europe through: Communist strikes in France and Italy, the geographic partition of Germany between the Soviets and Allies, and communist seizure of Czechoslovakia, accelerated a crisis atmosphere. British policymaker Ernest Bevin, “was now convinced by the Foreign Office that a divided Europe was inevitable and it seemed essential to consolidate the western half or risk economic and political collapse abetted by the resurgent communist parties.”³⁵ Bevin urgently pressed the Americans on this alliance as they alone had the wealth and power to shore up Western Europe. But the US maintained commitments would depend on evidence that the Europeans were ready to help themselves. The Berlin blockade greatly accelerated the process. Stalin’s actions in Berlin and Czechoslovakia exposed the nakedness of western defenses. In Central Europe thirty Soviet divisions faced a dozen disorganized and ill-trained Western counterparts. As U.S. Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett stated after the Czech coup, “All the Russians need to get to the Channel is shoes.”³⁶

Anglo-American bonds were further cemented with joint airlifts into beleaguered Berlin for eleven months, and these bonds expedited the evolution of the Brussels Pact, in which

³³ *Id.*

³⁴ *Id.*, p. 175

³⁵ *Id.*, p. 175

³⁶ Beisner, Robert L. Dean Acheson- A Life in the Cold War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 128

Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg moved the Western Union to defend one another from external attack,³⁷ into the North Atlantic Treaty which was signed in April 1949. “This pledged America, Britain, and other nations to treat an attack on one as attack on all.”³⁸ However isolationist sentiment in the U.S. Senate watered down the critical mutual defense portion of the treaty, Article V, to maintain that in the event of armed attack each party would, “take such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”³⁹ This left the US in principle free to choose war or not, which the British seemed to support in theory but remained a source of concern.⁴⁰ Moreover, U.S. military presence in Europe and NATO remained open question marks in Washington. In late 1951 when Eisenhower was asked how long U.S. troops would stay in Europe, “he replied six to seven years.”⁴¹ Yet despite this tenuous American commitment to NATO and European security, British leaders believed their position was well consolidated due to strengthened Anglo-American cooperation. While reliant on the U.S. for security and nuclear deterrence, it also removed themselves for the prime responsibility of European security, allowing for the maintenance of their own superior colonial position.⁴² As Bevin exploded in 1950 regarding British integration into Europe, “Great Britain was not part of Europe; she is not simply a Luxembourg.”⁴³ With Churchill’s return to power in 1952 the Anglo-American bond grew. As he told Eisenhower on April 5, 1953, “my hope for the future is founded on the increasing unity of the English-speaking world.”⁴⁴ In May of 1952 the NATO alliance was further affirmed with the European Defense Community in which Britain declared a Treaty of

³⁷ *Id.*

³⁸ Reynolds, p. 176

³⁹ *Id.*, p. 177

⁴⁰ Beisner, p. 131

⁴¹ Reynolds, p. 177

⁴² *Id.*, p. 177-78

⁴³ *Id.*, p. 198

⁴⁴ *Id.*, p. 184

Mutual Security between itself and Europe as well as a Declaration of Faith to the European Defense Community's purpose along with France and the U.S.⁴⁵

Yet fault lines did emerge in the Anglo-American entente. Profound differences emerged over the rise of Communist China in 1949. The Truman administration opposed diplomatic recognition due to the powerful China lobby in Congress, which still supported the Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-Shek. Conversely, a hostile regime in Beijing could make the administration of British controlled Hong Kong a nightmare, while also damaging the business interests of Britain in China, which far exceeded America's. While Truman believed a communist monolith of the Soviet Union and China could only be countered through isolation, Bevin believed, "the only counter to Russian influence is that China should have contacts with the rest of the world."⁴⁶ Thus in January of 1950 Britain recognized the People's Republic of China.

Similarly, in regards to Korea fissures emerged which would, "put a great strain on the American relationship with Britain."⁴⁷ Britain was highly critical of pro-nationalist activities undertaken by the U.S. in China, jeopardizing burgeoning Anglo-Chinese relations. While Britain endorsed the American led UN action, and agreed to contribute a token force, with the U.S. military involvement in Korea post 1950 Britain worried that, "Washington be diverted away from Europe into a major land war in Asia,"⁴⁸ jeopardizing aforementioned British policy goals. With MacArthur's defeat at the hands of the Chinese and his then in-cautious talk about the use of atomic weapons in the Korean conflict a further chill emerged on Anglo-American relations. Prime Minister Clement Atlee quickly visited Washington to calm Labour Party dissension over nuclear war and Britain's strong allied position, "outside the queue of European

⁴⁵ Bardens, Dennis. Portrait of a Statesman. New York: Philosophical Library Inc., 1956. p. 283

⁴⁶ Reynolds, p. 183

⁴⁷ Rossi, John P. "The British Reaction to McCarthyism, 1950-1954." *Mid-America*, 1988, Volume 70, Issue 1, p. 5-18., p. 6

⁴⁸ Reynolds., p. 183

countries”⁴⁹ was confirmed. With U.S. calls for increased NATO re-armament, British military spending exponentially grew (moving from 2.3 billion pounds to 4.7 billion pounds for the 1951-53 defense budgets) and a new payments crisis grew for the newly stabilized British economy. Deleterious charges were imposed on National Health Service and anti-Americanism began to percolate with Labour opposition to the burgeoning Anglo-American alliance.⁵⁰ As one prominent Cabinet member stated, “we have allowed ourselves to be dragged too far behind the wheels of American diplomacy.”⁵¹

II.

However a new threat emerged to Anglo-American relations on Lincoln Day, 1950. In Wheeling, West Virginia, Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin intoned with a sheaf of papers in his hand,

While I cannot take the time to name all of the men in the State Department who have been named as members of the Communist Party and members of a spy ring, I have here in my hand a list of 205 that were known to the Secretary of State as being members of the Communist Party and who nonetheless, are still working and shaping the policy of the State Department.⁵²

The ground work had been laid for McCarthy’s lavish claim prior to Lincoln Day 1950.⁵³

William Buckley points out in *McCarthy and His Enemies*, that pre-1950, the security and loyalty requirements of the civil service were lax. As a result, in 1942 the Attorney General created an Interdepartmental Committee on Investigation to assist in standardizing procedures.⁵⁴ However dissension from the Federal Works Union led to the dismantling of this program and other Civil Service Commission loyalty programs. Thus, “during the war there was no effective

⁴⁹ *Id.*

⁵⁰ *Id.* P. 183-84

⁵¹ *Id.*, p. 184

⁵² Johnson, Haynes. *The Age of Anxiety- McCarthyism to Terrorism*. New York: Harcourt Inc., 2005, p. 14

⁵³ Gupta, Surendra K. “America’s China Policy and McCarthyism: The Case of John Carter Vincent,” *China Report*, 1981, Volume 17, Issue 5, p. 35-42. p.38

⁵⁴ Buckley Jr., William F. and L. Brent Bozell. *McCarthy and His Enemies- The Record and its Meaning*. New York: Arlington House, 1961, p. 6

program to keep Communist agents out of sensitive government areas,”⁵⁵ with incriminating evidence not eliciting a response, and this continued well into the post World War II era.⁵⁶

However Tom Wicker disagrees in *Shooting Star- The Brief Arc of Joseph McCarthy* maintaining that subversives had been eliminated by time, death, and witnesses such as Whittaker Chambers, Smith Act prosecutions, and Truman’s security measures.⁵⁷ The KGB itself stated in a March 1950 memo that, “more than 40 most valuable agents in the United States have been exposed and are impossible to replace.”⁵⁸ Yet upon the conviction of Alger Hiss,⁵⁹ top diplomatic aide to Franklin Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference, of perjury in a highly publicized espionage trial, facts of Communist infiltration into government came to public light. Soon after British subject Klaus Emil Fuchs, who worked for three years on the Manhattan atomic bomb project, was arrested in London for transmitting to Soviet agents in the U.S. all information regarding America’s atomic bomb development. Anxieties were further exacerbated when President Truman announced hydrogen bomb development and the Republicans in 1950 opened their campaign with a platform charging the Truman administration with promoting socialism in America and allowing Communist and fellow travelers to infiltrate the government.⁶⁰

Upon wide publicity of his Wheeling speech, McCarthy continually revised his numbers as to known Communists in the State Department in Salt Lake City (57) and upon return to Washington in the U.S. Senate (81). Roy Cohn, McCarthy’s former counsel maintains that these numbers were the result of McCarthy’s inattention to detail and that he, “did not intend the

⁵⁵ *Id.*, p. 7

⁵⁶ *Id.*

⁵⁷ Wicker, Tom. *Shooting Star- The Brief Arc of Joe McCarthy*. New York: Harcourt, Inc., 2006. p. 73-4

⁵⁸ *Id.*, p. 74

⁵⁹ It is interesting to note that the State Department and White House were informed about Hiss twice prior to Congressional and judicial proceedings. (Buckley, p. 7)

⁶⁰ Johnson, p. 13-4

statement to be accepted at face value. He meant to shock, to awaken.”⁶¹ However, these eighty one cases were from a distorted but recognizable version of the ‘Lee List.’⁶² This list was a collection of dossiers of past, present, and would-be State Department employees compiled in 1947 by a House investigative team, already investigated, and widely available around Capitol Hill for three years, even appearing in the *Congressional Record*. Yet McCarthy informed his colleagues that these were new names and managed through, “innuendo, omission, distortion, misstatement, and exaggeration both subtle and outrageous to be convincing in his assertion that the State Department was a sinkhole of subversion.”⁶³

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was convened under the leadership of Millard Tydings to investigate McCarthy’s claims. However, the committee was severely hampered by partisan in-fighting. McCarthy moved off the Lee List to implicate nine specific individuals: most notably Owen Lattimore and John Stewart Service. McCarthy called Lattimore a communist sympathizer, Moscow’s top spy in the U.S., despite lack of evidence, and claimed Lattimore was responsible for the State Department’s, “subversive and procommunist Far East policy,”⁶⁴ despite Lattimore’s protestations. Similarly Service, a top policymaker in the State Department’s Far Eastern Division, was charged, based upon his reports, with being, “part of the pro-Soviet group which advocated that the United States overthrow Chiang Kai-shek because the only hope of Asia was Communism.”⁶⁵ While this hyperbolic statement was acknowledged by many as insufficient evidence, Service was then accused of transmitting classified documents to the Soviet magazine *Armesia*, creating a further furor.⁶⁶

⁶¹ Cohn, Roy. “He Was Right on the Essentials,” in Matusow, Allen J., ed. Joseph R. McCarthy. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970, p. 117

⁶² Wicker, p. 63

⁶³ *Id.*, p. 64

⁶⁴ *Id.*, p. 71

⁶⁵ Buckley, p. 147

⁶⁶ *Id.*, p. 150-51

The Republican old guard had a new ally against the Truman administration. As Wicker writes, “An unexpected new leader was suddenly standing side by side with the Old Guard and slugging it out with the president of the United States.”⁶⁷ The partisanship of the Committee took over and a split decision based upon party lines was written, with the majority opinion being Democratic and finding no responsibility for the individuals McCarthy named. The Senate similarly divided among party lines. Republicans began launching attacks on Dean Acheson, new Secretary of State after Marshall’s resignation in 1949.⁶⁸ McCarthyism began to emerge in the American lexicon among members of the news media as a definition for demagoguery, defamation, and baseless mud-slinging in Herbert Block’s famous *Washington Post* March 29, 1950 cartoon, while McCarthy employed the title in his 1952 book called, *McCarthyism: The Fight for America*. However, despite the lack of evidence from McCarthy regarding Lattimore or others, and media disapproval, he emerged with greater popular and party support due to the boldness of his performance and the aforementioned anxiety surrounding the times.⁶⁹ As Michael Paul Rogin writes, “McCarthy and his most vociferous supporters...saw a government overrun with dupes and traitors. For them, the Communist issue was the issue of Communists in government; internal subversion was the danger.”⁷⁰ Thus, “hardly a day passed without an attack on the Department of State.”⁷¹

Following Tydings, McCarthy began a bid to become the leader of the resurgent right wing of the Republican Party.⁷² He also launched attempts to destroy his political opposition in the 1950 Congressional elections. He used deceitful means to bring down Millard Tydings with

⁶⁷ Wicker, p. 71

⁶⁸ Beisner, p. 261 and 305

⁶⁹ Wicker, p. 78 and Griffith, Robert. *The Politics of Fear- Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate*. Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1970, p. 101-2

⁷⁰ Rogin, Michael Paul. “McCarthyism Not a Mass Movement,” in Matusow, p. 169

⁷¹ Griffith, p. 87

⁷² Matusow, p. 44

campaign literature making it seem as if he was sitting with Socialist leaders and called Tydings a protector of Communists. Tydings lost his seat along with other Democrats that McCarthy worked against. In 1951 he began attacking former Secretary of State, and now Defense Secretary, George Marshall and continued on Dean Acheson for the loss of China and stated that Marshall and Acheson had been part of, “a conspiracy of infamy so black that, when it is finally exposed, its principals shall be forever deserving of the maledictions of all honest men.”⁷³ However, while Acheson was loathed by many,⁷⁴ this attack would backfire as Marshall was widely known to be a man of impeccable character;⁷⁵ alienating some McCarthy supporters. Marshall himself stated, “the hardest thing I ever did was to keep my temper at that time.”⁷⁶ Moreover, the Republican presidential nominee of 1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower, was a staunch supporter of Marshall. Eisenhower planned to defend Marshall at a campaign appearance with McCarthy in Wisconsin, specifically referencing McCarthy as a “self appointed censor”⁷⁷ and stating that the McCarthy-Marshall episode was, “a sobering lesson in the way freedom must not defend itself.”⁷⁸ However Eisenhower deleted the defense of Marshall as he could, “ill afford...to alienate the great mass of voters which McCarthy was believed to control.”⁷⁹ The press publicized the deletion and the McCarthy-Eisenhower relationship became stormy.

With Eisenhower’s election, and McCarthy’s re-election the Wisconsin senator took on an increasingly aggressive tone towards Eisenhower and the State Department. The American people were beginning to tire of McCarthy’s tactics and charges with only 3% in 1952 expressing concern over Communism in government.⁸⁰ However, this was also the time of

⁷³ Wicker, p. 98

⁷⁴ Beisner, p. 307-8

⁷⁵ Wicker, p. 97

⁷⁶ Cooke, Alistair. Memories of the Great and Good. New York: Arcade Publishing, 1999, p. 86.

⁷⁷ Griffith, p. 191

⁷⁸ *Id.*

⁷⁹ *Id.*, p. 190

⁸⁰ Rogin in Matusow, p. 169

Eisenhower's attempted absorption of McCarthy, which allowed McCarthy to gain control of whole segments of the Executive branch. As Louis Halle writes in *The New Republic* on April 8, 1957, "the consequent price which had to be paid in the process of absorbing McCarthyism was heavy."⁸¹ He exposed the Government Printing Office, threatened the CIA, launched investigations of Communists in schools and colleges, and investigated the army's Signal Corps at Fort Monmouth,⁸² which would eventually lead to his downfall in 1954. In 1953 McCarthy was made chairman of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, which included the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. From here McCarthy made many of his grand-standing hyperbolic speeches for the media and observers. As Wicker writes,

In 1953...a mostly untroubled subcommittee conducted 117 executive sessions. With other senators seldom present to check him, McCarthy bullied many of the hundreds of witnesses heard, and then met an eager press to describe what had happened- who supposedly had said what, and who had refused to answer questions or say anything.⁸³

McCarthy alienated the White House by opposing the nomination of Charles 'Chip' Bohlen to the Ambassador post in the Soviet Union, one of Eisenhower's close friends, and confirmed with Democratic assistance. Yet more importantly, McCarthy's foreign policy damage and publicity began upon: investigating the State Department's loyalty and security files (leading to a dramatic overhaul of the Department's procedures), the negotiation of a private agreement with Greek ship-owners to cut off their commerce with communist nations,⁸⁴ and investigations of the Voice of America; radio program and propaganda arm for the State Department. McCarthy and associates went on a foreign tour of American embassies to inspect

⁸¹ Halle, Louis J. "The Eisenhower Approach- McCarthy and Nasser," *The New Republic*, 4/8/1957, Volume 136, Issue 14, p. 7. p. 7

⁸² Wicker., p. 65

⁸³ *Id.*, p. 128

⁸⁴ Matusow, p. 65

Voice of America public libraries and uncover communist literature being offered to the foreign public at the U.S. taxpayer's expense.

However, the trip turned into much holidaying and the team received much derision in foreign capitals, despite their wide publicity at homes, as, "junketeering gumshoes,"⁸⁵ while discrediting the U.S. and embarrassing its foreign relations.⁸⁶ Upon return, McCarthy and associates forwarded names of titles over to the State Department to be banned. "The State Department, like some wounded prehistoric animal, aroused itself first in puzzlement and then in panic. Between February and June there was a steady stream of directives and counter directives on book policy in library centers across the world. Books were removed, replaced,"⁸⁷ and librarians in Germany began burning books. Eisenhower, while initially speaking out against the book burning, retracted his statement three days later stating, "If the State Department is burning a book which is an open appeal to everybody in those foreign countries to be a Communist, then I would say that falls outside the limits I was speaking of and they can do what they please to get rid of them."⁸⁸

McCarthy's foreign policy damage continued in May 1953 when Labour leader, and former British Prime Minister, Clement Atlee launched a speech in the House of Commons implying that McCarthy not Eisenhower controlled foreign policy. This speech served to further bolster McCarthy's foreign policy credentials placing him as an equal with a former Prime Minister.^{89,90} McCarthy denounced British trading with China during the Korean war, denounced

⁸⁵ Wicker, p. 129

⁸⁶ Halle, p. 7

⁸⁷ Griffith, p. 215-6

⁸⁸ Wicker, p. 131

⁸⁹ Rossi, p. 13

⁹⁰ It is interesting to note that the press within a week expressed regret for, "having jumped to conclusions based on partial reports of Atlee's speech and...dissociated themselves from the remarks of Senator McCarthy." (British Foreign Office, Secret Correspondence, British Archives (FO 371/103519), Sergeant Anthony Nutting to John Rodgers, Esq., M.P, House of Commons, May 30, 1953, 1 page) However, by this point McCarthy's foreign policy victory was complete.

British fellow travelers such as Lattimore, Acheson, and Vincent, while accusing Atlee of sponsoring the Communists during the Spanish Civil War by releasing a picture of Atlee receiving the communist salute in Spain while reviewing troops.⁹¹ In late 1953 public opinions polls listed McCarthy among the ten most admired men in America and a Gallup poll found McCarthy's approval ratings at 50% for the first time.⁹²

However the end was quickly approaching for McCarthy. In late 1953 McCarthy began his attacks on the U.S. Army as a sinkhole of subversives. While growing in power through early 1954, McCarthy was promptly attacked by Eisenhower on March 3rd⁹³ and more importantly Edward R. Murrow in a now famous television broadcast on *See It Now* indicting McCarthy's tactics and investigations on March 9th. It was divulged that McCarthy blackmailed wrecking the Army through investigations, for preferential treatment for a McCarthy investigator, David Schine, drafted into the Army as a private.⁹⁴ McCarthy's flailing counter-charges against CBS and Murrow of communist sympathies served to raise debate on McCarthyism⁹⁵ and inculcate American opinion against McCarthy when coupled with Eisenhower's support of conservative Republican Ralph Flanders. Flanders attacked McCarthy and called for resolutions on McCarthy for: abusing the Senate, diverting attention from dangerous problems abroad, and shattering the Republican Party on March 9, 1954, June 1, 1954, and June 11, 1954.⁹⁶

Moreover, the televising of the aggressive hearings lasting over 36 days between the Army (most notably General Zwicker and Secretary Stevens) and McCarthy revealed

⁹¹ Rossi, p. 13

⁹² *Id.*, p. 14

⁹³ It was decided by certain officials in the Administration that it was time for a showdown with McCarthy, even before the Zwicker affair and on January 21st 1954 a high level meeting was held at the Justice Department in which Sherman Adams, Eisenhower's Chief Assistant, asked the Attorney General to keep a record of his dealings with McCarthy. (Confidential Correspondence from A.R.K. Mackenzie (British Embassy, Washington D.C.) to Anthony Eden, July 14th 1954, British Archives, FO 371/109108, Memo (9 pages), p. 7 of 9, paragraph 15.)

⁹⁴ Cooke, Alistair. *America Observed- From the 1940s to the 1980s*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989. p. 64

⁹⁵ Confidential Correspondence from A.R.K. Mackenzie (British Embassy, Washington D.C.) to Anthony Eden, July 14th 1954, , British Archives, FO 371/109108, Memo (9 pages), p. 7 of 9, paragraph 16.

⁹⁶ Rossi, p. 16 and Cooke, *America Observed*, p. 66

McCarthy's arrogance towards colleagues and the groundlessness of many of his charges, especially when McCarthy took the stand in an attempt to re-assert his validity; publicity was finally harming Joe McCarthy. An intense media battering followed throughout the spring of 1954. As The New York Times wrote, "through all the smoke, all the digressions, all the repertory employed, the real issues have forced themselves into the open and have entered the consciousness of the millions of Americans, who for days and weeks, have read and seen what has been going on in the Senate caucus room."⁹⁷ A Special Senate Committee headed by conservative Republican Arthur Watkins was convened on August 31, 1954 to investigate Flanders' charges of McCarthy abusing the Senate. No publicity was allowed into the Watkins hearings and when the Democrats re-captured Congress in November 1954 McCarthy lost his chairmanship.⁹⁸ Upon condemnation by the Watkins Committee he was censured in the full Senate on December 2, 1954. McCarthy continued his Senatorial duties for two and a half more years before dying on May 2, 1957 of an inflamed liver due to alcoholism.

III.

Amazingly enough, as Bob Beisner writes in *Dean Acheson- A Life in the Cold War*, Truman and Acheson were able, "to gain most of their foreign policy objectives."⁹⁹ Yet while McCarthy's charges were clearly not new, and many foreign policy successes occurred during the period of McCarthyism, U.S. soft power took a great hit during the period of McCarthyism; as reflected in the aforementioned Voice of America episode. Claudette Bordet wrote on December 12, 1953 in "V. The Watching World. This Strange America" in *The Nation*, "The image of McCarthy is impinging on world vision as the image of America....Today McCarthyism is rapidly isolating the United States, even from such a close and indulgent

⁹⁷ Confidential Correspondence from A.R.K. Mackenzie (British Embassy, Washington D.C.) to Anthony Eden, July 14th 1954, British Archives, FO 371/109108, Memo (9 pages) p. 9 of 9, paragraph 20.

⁹⁸ Rossi, p. 17

⁹⁹ Beisner, p. 307

neighbor as Canada.”¹⁰⁰ The intensity of which McCarthy attacked and destabilized American prestige/foreign policy abroad through vitriolic attacks on the State Department, Presidency, and execution of single-minded policy, is highly reflected in both the U.S. and France.

During the Own Lattimore issue Truman told a news conference that the Kremlin had no greater asset than efforts by the likes of McCarthy to undercut U.S. foreign policy.¹⁰¹

Unfortunately the immediate result of Truman’s remarks was to further inflame Congressional critics and force McCarthy more firmly than ever into the Republican leadership. Robert Taft denounced the attack as, “bitter and prejudiced and praised McCarthy as a fighting marine who had been slandered by the president.”¹⁰² However the damage to the State Department was far more severe. As Beisner writes, “Acheson had barely completed rescuing State from the crypt to which Roosevelt’s contempt had consigned it than Joseph McCarthy’s defamatory campaign and controversies over China returned it there.”¹⁰³ McCarthy’s hard-line stance destroyed any chances of a moderate line in China while the Chinese themselves hardened their anti-Americanism and embraced Moscow more tightly just as Acheson tried for accommodation.¹⁰⁴

Moreover, Acheson was powerless to energize NATO in the face of a monolithic Soviet military machine and consolidate French fears of a reconstituted Europe based upon an integrated and powerful Germany.¹⁰⁵ Acheson himself stated of the McCarthyites that they, “struck at the character and patriotism of high policymakers and gutted the house of government.”¹⁰⁶ The State Department fell to a defensive crouch, as opponents chose the times

¹⁰⁰ Bordet, Claudette. “V. The Watching World: This Strange America,” *Nation*, 12/12/1953, Volume 177, Issue 24, p. 523-526. p. 523

¹⁰¹ Wicker, p. 70

¹⁰² Griffith, p. 75

¹⁰³ Beisner, p. 104

¹⁰⁴ *Id.*, p. 197

¹⁰⁵ Preston, Paul and Michael Partridge. *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print- Part V- Series C- North America 1952, United States, Volume 2*. Lexis Nexis: 2006, “Franco- American Relations” from Sir O. Harvey to Mr. Anthony Eden, p. 175-77 and “United States: Weekly Summary- Period- 9th-15th February 1952”, from Sir O. Franks to Foreign Office, p. 229-233.

¹⁰⁶ Beisner, p. 305-6

and places of battle. As Gary May writes in *China Scapegoat*, “The State Department was incapable of mounting an aggressive campaign against McCarthyism because of political and administrative factors.”¹⁰⁷ While Acheson was able to successfully rebut McCarthy, with one listener stating, “Pour it on ‘em, Mr. Secretary,”¹⁰⁸ State Department morale was damaged for decades, especially in the diplomatic corps. As Halle writes, “the American Foreign Service was disrupted and demoralized. A large number of its most distinguished members...were sacrificed to McCarthy.”¹⁰⁹ Many officials working in highly controversial areas had a growing belief, “they would get in trouble whatever they said.”¹¹⁰ In March of 1950 Acheson stated that McCarthy’s charges, “were chewing up his people, who spent hundreds of hours just defending themselves.”¹¹¹ By 1954 the Foreign Service would lose four of its ablest members: John Service, John Carter Vincent, John Davies, and Edmund Clubb, not to mention the toll taken on Acheson himself. As Alistair Cooke writes in *Memories of the Great and Good*, “during his last two years as secretary of state, Acheson’s public appearances were frequently booed, he went in danger of physical harm, and his telephone rang incessantly with threats and obscenities.”¹¹² In May of 1950 the CIA began to worry that Moscow’s leaders would view American internal strife as a green light to act adventurously.¹¹³ Acheson stated in October 1951 that anti-communist critics were responsible for a 50% decline in applications to the Foreign Service.¹¹⁴

This decline in U.S. prestige and diplomatic corps morale would last long past Acheson into Dulles’ State Department (1952-1957) and it is highly reflected in U.S. interactions with

¹⁰⁷ May, Gary. *China Scapegoat- The Diplomatic Ordeal of John Carter Vincent*. Washington, D.C.: New Republic Books, 1979. p. 203

¹⁰⁸ Beisner., p. 307

¹⁰⁹ Halle, p.7

¹¹⁰ Beisner., p. 307

¹¹¹ *Id.*, p. 312

¹¹² Cooke, *Memories of the Great and Good*, p. 95

¹¹³ Beisner., p. 312

¹¹⁴ *Id.*, p. 310

France. At the same time as the height of McCarthyism (1952-54) Russia was launching a peace offensive upon the death of Stalin in 1952, which a confidential State Department cable of April 29, 1953 from Taipei described as causing, “Europe to lose its balance and those countries who have been dreaming of an easy peace to pray earnestly for the early success of Russia’s peace movement...to prevent the ratification of the European Defense Community and sabotage the successful completion of the NATO Program...[and] to weaken the U.S. leadership among the democratic powers”¹¹⁵ France was one of the nations that fell into this Soviet peace offensive.

An April 11, 1953 confidential State Department cable from the American embassy in Paris describes the French position towards the Soviets as unchanged due to the peace offensive. The French were in agreement with Washington over the commonality of Western defense, strength against the Soviets, and using the peace offensive for, “the benefit of the west,”¹¹⁶ with increased militarization. This is confirmed by the British Foreign Office in a confidential cable of March 28, 1953 regarding the Franco-US relationship writing that, “It was agreed in the absence of any tangible proof to the contrary, that recent developments in the Soviet Union had not changed the basic nature of the threat confronting the Free World.”¹¹⁷ However a confidential cable from the U.S. Ambassador to France on August 4, 1953, just 4 months later, entitled ‘The Decline of French Confidence in US Leadership’ shows the deleterious effects of McCarthy on American prestige abroad and French movement in the Soviet peace offensive. The Ambassador says the decline in opinion started at the beginning of 1953 and three of the five basic causes cited for the shift in French opinion are,

¹¹⁵ Confidential U.S. State Department- Central Files- Soviet Union- 1950-1954- Foreign Affairs. Maryland: University Publications of America, 1985, 4/29/1953- Desp. No. 597 from Taipei, Taiwan to Washington, D.C., p. 3-4. (Bracket added)

¹¹⁶ *Id.*, April 11, 1953, Paris Embassy to Secretary of State Dulles

¹¹⁷ Preston, Paul and Michael Partridge. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print- Part V- Series F- Europe 1953, Germany, France, Western Europe (General), Volume 10. Lexis Nexis: 2007, “Franco- American Talks,” March 28, 1953, Sir R. Markins to Mr. Churchill, p. 360

1. Domestic political developments, in particular, the method of opposing Communism at home summed up in the term 'McCarthyism' and...the fact that the Administration has not made any direct public denunciation of McCarthyism...
2. Doubts as to who speaks for the US in foreign affairs...
3. Doubts as to whether the present US government believes in the possibility of a long period of peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union and hence constant worry that US may ultimately direct its policy toward military victory rather than toward preservation of peace...Our reluctance to enter into broad negotiations with the Soviet Union means we do not sincerely desire peace.¹¹⁸

The Ambassador links McCarthyism and French distrust over U.S. military means in writing that, "the violence of McCarthy's attacks on American Communists and on the conduct of our allies lends credence to the belief that we may be tempted by our increasing military strength to stamp out the threat of world Communism by military means...and to force our allies either to follow our policies or to give us a free hand to go-it-alone."¹¹⁹ Similarly Bourdet writes in 1953 of French distrust towards America. "Today...simply as an effect of McCarthyism, the tendency here is to look at America with intense distrust...Is America going fascist?...In many European countries McCarthyism has already caused nearly as much distrust and even direct dislike...as that felt for the Soviet Union"¹²⁰ A later confidential State Department cable from April 3, 1954 from the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State to Secretary of State Dulles further confirms French antagonism towards the U.S. in 1953 as confirmed with: Frenchmen believing 50% of Americans support McCarthy, McCarthy dominating the French press with the term 'chasse aux sorcieres' or witch hunt,¹²¹ and the French government unable to pass anti-

¹¹⁸ *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, Volume VI, Western Europe and Canada, Part 2, 1952-54, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952-54, p. 1372-73. Accessed and retrieved: 2008 January 26: <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=turn&entity=FRUS.FRUS1952-54v06p2.p0282&isize=M&q1=McCarthy>

¹¹⁹ *Id.*, p. 1373

¹²⁰ Bourdet, p. 525-26

¹²¹ *Id.*, p. 524

Communist measures due to the fear of McCarthyism.¹²² The cable concludes by stating that, “American prestige in France...has dropped to the lowest point we can remember.”¹²³

This burgeoning French antagonism to U.S. foreign policy is also confirmed by the British Foreign Office in a confidential cable of November 5, 1952 in which the author writes, “The Americans have been becoming more and more unpopular in France, and it has become an obsession with the French people to blame them for everything which goes wrong,”¹²⁴ citing issues of: German re-armament, American policy in North Africa, and military aid. The Foreign Office even worries of the future of the seminal NATO alliance, writing that pro-American Frenchmen, “will have to be made to come forward and say what they think,”¹²⁵ at the risk of co-optation and destruction of NATO. It is interesting to note that this British fear was beginning to be confirmed in the above mentioned April 1954 State Department cable which states that, “Many pro-American businessmen are stating they find it increasingly difficult to maintain and defend their pro-American sentiments before unfriendly criticisms.”¹²⁶

The British Response

Yet while these facts out of the State Department and France give a substantial picture of the damage McCarthy caused to American prestige, the mechanism of U.S. foreign policy, and the burgeoning NATO alliance, it is important to recognize that France was caught up in a wave of anti-Americanism, as acknowledged by the British Foreign Office, possibly tingeing their perceptions of the United States. As a result, a far more elucidating example of McCarthy’s damage to U.S. foreign policy comes from the United Kingdom, as mentioned, a staunch ally of the United States prior to McCarthyism.

¹²² FRUS, Volume VI, Part 2, 1952-1954, p. 1405-6.

¹²³ *Id.*, p. 1406-7

¹²⁴ Preston, 11/5/1952, “Franco-American Relations,” Sir O. Harvey to Mr. Anthony Eden, p. 175

¹²⁵ *Id.*, p. 177

¹²⁶ FRUS, Volume VI, Part 2, 1952-54, p. 1406.

While it must be acknowledged that there were other forces at work during this period fostering Anglo-US discord including: aforementioned China and Korea, the Suez crisis,¹²⁷ enmity of John Foster Dulles whom Churchill found physically repulsive and the British blamed for allowing McCarthy to terrorize the State Department,¹²⁸ and intransigence by Foreign Minister Anthony Eden on the declining role of Britain in the international arena¹²⁹ and view of Britain as a, “bridge between the United States and the European members of NATO,”¹³⁰ McCarthy was a very large motivating factor. Upon McCarthy’s original rise in 1950 the British embassy dismissed McCarthy as a buffoon, whose charges were ludicrous and groundless. As John Rossi writes in “The British Reaction McCarthyism, 1950-54”, “The first reaction of the British embassy to McCarthy’s charges was to suspect that election year politics lay behind his more absurd assertions...Overall there was a tendency for the British to underestimate McCarthy and to believe that his charges would backfire against him and his party.”¹³¹ However with McCarthy’s survival, and seeming resurrection in the Tydings Committee, British opinion began to markedly shift.

Left wing journals and politicians were especially radicalized in Britain and, “McCarthyism came to symbolize everything wrong with the United States.”¹³² Blame was placed squarely at the feet of the insecure American middle class desperate to hold power and insecure American intellectuals in relation to British intellectuals. However, there was scorn on the right as well; more even handed in distributing blame for McCarthy’s success, attributed to Truman’s blunders with China, the Hiss case, and a rapidly developing Soviet Union. Unlike initial Foreign Office reaction, the conservative newspaper *Round Table* believed McCarthy to

¹²⁷ Carlton, David. *Anthony Eden- A Biography*. London: Allen Lane, 1981. p. 305

¹²⁸ Rossi, p. 11

¹²⁹ Carlton, p. 300-01

¹³⁰ *Id.*, p. 313

¹³¹ Rossi, p. 6-7

¹³² *Id.*, p. 7

be a more permanent force and a, “demagogic operator of the very highest talents. He is the master of the unfinished sentence, of the innuendo, the sneer and the leer...and he might in some future crisis, perhaps an international economic one, become a menace of the first order.”¹³³ The British Embassy agreed with this assessment in its November 4-November 10th report in 1950 stating that McCarthy was gaining an audience even among those initially suspicious of him and having success in creating the feeling that, “there must be at least some fire behind so much acrid smoke.”¹³⁴

Yet in 1951 there was hardly any mentions of McCarthy out of the British Foreign Office in its Confidential Prints save for the occasional mention of his rabble rousing in Congress against the State Department/Owen Lattimore, or nefarious political tactics in the upcoming 1952 elections. Most energy was devoted to the Korean struggle, fledgling NATO program, and European rearmament against the Soviet menace.¹³⁵ However, the McCarthy probe into Marshall in 1951 greatly poisoned British leftists and exacerbated their aforementioned tensions with military spending and anti-Americanism. To many the United States was politically irrational and an analogy began to be drawn between McCarthy and Hitler and between McCarthyism and fascism.¹³⁶ With McCarthy’s increasing role in the 1952 Congressional elections, leftists began to succumb to the embryonic Soviet peace offensive. Prominent Labour leader Aneurin Bevan stated on March 17 1952, “the United States policies in the world now posed a greater threat to freedom than anything that Stalin did.”¹³⁷ In America unfortunately these statements from the British left merely confirmed McCarthy’s charges of pro-communist British fellow travelers sabotaging America’s efforts to win the Cold War.

¹³³ *Id.*, p. 7-8

¹³⁴ *Id.*, p. 8

¹³⁵ Preston, Paul and Michael Partridge. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print- Part V- Series C- North America 1951, United States, 1951, Volume 1. Lexis Nexis: 2005

¹³⁶ Rossi, p. 9

¹³⁷ *Id.*

With Eisenhower's victory in 1952 disgust began to spread from the left to the embassy. While the left maintained that Eisenhower would do nothing to stop McCarthy, the British embassy was also saddened by Eisenhower's aforementioned endorsement of McCarthy in Wisconsin and his refusal to denounce character assassination and witch-hunting.¹³⁸ The very nature of American loyalty investigations was decried in a December 23, 1952 cable stating, "the present loyalty procedures clearly leave much to be desired. It is doubtful however, whether a change in methods or machinery would put the matter right so long as Congress is free to reopen old cases at will and so long as Americans continue to feel that they are somehow responsible for the failure of events anywhere in the world."¹³⁹ McCarthy's increasing prominence, Committee chairmanship, and lack of Eisenhower confrontation post 1952 were similarly decried by all political persuasions. In its final cable of 1952, the Embassy worried of McCarthy's increasing attacks stating the danger of McCarthy enhancing, "his personal prestige and will make his crude, bludgeoning methods appear sufficiently effective to gain further public support and that he will intimidate or wreck the careers of many liberal-minded educators who are neither Communists nor fellow-travelers."¹⁴⁰ However, the Embassy still attempted to maintain its moderate position. In February 1953 a cable was written stating that, "every time the Eisenhower administration placated the wild men of the Republican right with some concession, it should not be interpreted as another triumph for McCarthy."¹⁴¹

Yet Embassy opinion would take a marked shift in 1953. American prestige was greatly harmed with McCarthy's aforementioned 1953 trip to Europe regarding the Voice of America

¹³⁸ *Id.*, p. 10

¹³⁹ Preston, 12/23/1952, "United States: Weekly Summary- Period 13th-19th December 1952," from Washington to Foreign Office, Sir C. Steel, p. 339

¹⁴⁰ Preston, 1/5/1953, "United States: Weekly Summary- Period 20th December 1952- 2nd January 1953" from Washington to Foreign Office, Sir C. Steel, p. 342

¹⁴¹ Rossi, p. 11

program, aiding the Soviet peace offensive, and hampering America's desires¹⁴² to, "remake Europe,"¹⁴³ foster the NATO alliance, and create a strong European defense program.¹⁴⁴ Britain similarly shared these goals.¹⁴⁵ Dulles himself called in late 1952 for, "a new dynamism to counter-balance the sense of momentous revolutionary movement and the claim to be leading to a new order of peace and social betterment with which the Communist dictators attract support."¹⁴⁶ Yet foreign capitals, especially London, ridiculed the McCarthyites upon the Voice of America episode. As Wicker writes, "Cohn and Schine were so badly received by the British press that they stayed only five hours in London before returning to Washington."¹⁴⁷ The *Economist*, traditionally pro-American, ridiculed the trip as, "McCarthy's Baker street irregulars."¹⁴⁸ Many in Britain blamed Dulles for failure to control McCarthy's incursions into foreign policy and around the same time the British based *Report on Foreign Affairs* stated that McCarthy had established a, "Robespierre-like ascendancy in the U.S. and was perceived as the single greatest threat to American influence in the free world."¹⁴⁹

The Embassy adopted this frantic tone, just a month after writing their aforementioned February cable, and upon McCarthy's negotiation of the Greek shipping deal mentioned above. As Rossi writes, now, "the British embassy believed that McCarthy had not only cowed Eisenhower's administration but he also was preparing to challenge the President for control of the Republican Party in 1956. Eisenhower...did not grasp the full dangers of McCarthyism."¹⁵⁰

¹⁴² Halle, p. 7

¹⁴³ Preston, 2/18/1952, "United States: Weekly Summary- Period 9th-15th February," from Washington to Foreign Office, Sir O. Franks, p. 230

¹⁴⁴ *Id.*, 7/15/1952, "United States: Weekly Summary- Period 4th-11th July," from Washington to Foreign Office, Sir O. Franks, p. 280

¹⁴⁵ Bardens, p. 293

¹⁴⁶ Preston, 12/15/1952, "United States: Weekly Summary, Period 6th-12th December 1952," from Washington to Foreign Office, Sir C. Steel, p. 335

¹⁴⁷ Wicker, p. 129

¹⁴⁸ Rossi, p. 11

¹⁴⁹ *Id.*, p. 12

¹⁵⁰ *Id.*

British concern was great over McCarthy's hold over large segments of the Republican Party,¹⁵¹ America's sound and constructive leadership of the West, the constancy of military and economic support for Allies, proper weighting of allied concerns in U.S. policy, and the ability to establish sound, long-term economic relationships with the rest of the free world.¹⁵² Later in May, the Foreign Office wrote that, "the confusion sowed by McCarthy will persist until the rats have gnawed so deeply into the sub structure of the American position that the President will be rendered powerless."¹⁵³ In August 1953, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom wrote secret correspondence entitled 'British Attitudes towards US Policy' to the State Department regarding epidemic British anti-Americanism and McCarthy, who was now associated with neo-fascism,

McCarthyism tarnishes America's claim to leadership of the Free World and offers the Soviets powerful propaganda weapons in their efforts to split the Western alliance...McCarthyism's continued existence has inculcated doubts as to the strength of America's adherence to traditions of freedom of thought and speech and of respect for the individual; it has therefore raised doubts as to the integrity of our institutions, the strength of our democracy, and our reliability as Free World leaders.¹⁵⁴

While the Foreign Office attempted to re-cast their dire assessments of McCarthy writing in October 1953 that, "in present circumstances it is not likely that he will be strong enough to get beyond a certain point of influence,"¹⁵⁵ fears of McCarthy's demoralization of the foreign service and destruction of American prestige abroad are still in place in the October cable and worried by the Foreign Office.¹⁵⁶ The State Department is quick to point out in their

¹⁵¹ *Id.*

¹⁵² FRUS, Volume VI, Western Europe and Canada, Part 1, 1952-54, 1952-54, p. 998.

¹⁵³ Rossi, p. 12

¹⁵⁴ FRUS, Volume VI, Western Europe and Canada, Part 1, 1952-54, p. 998

¹⁵⁵ Preston, Paul and Michael Partridge. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print- Part V- Series C- North America 1953, United States, Volume 3. Lexis Nexis: 2007, "Senator McCarthy: His Career, Present Political Power, and Prospects," 10/2/1953, Sir R. Mukins to Lord Salisbury, p. 118

¹⁵⁶ *Id.*

aforementioned August 1953 cable that Britain maintains no distrust towards the US over Soviet policy and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden himself wrote on March 21, 1953 that, “the time had not come to attempt an accommodation with the Soviets; there is not enough evidence yet. We must go cautiously, developing contact when we can and sounding out the Russians.”¹⁵⁷ However cracks did seem to emerge with the Soviet peace offensive, similar to France, in 1953 with Churchill’s non-rejection of Soviet informal talks and not wanting Britain to be excluded from a fair peace.¹⁵⁸ Moreover, in October 1953 Churchill wanted to issue a public statement of a real change in Soviet foreign policy since Stalin’s death. Eden prevailed and the statement was not issued.¹⁵⁹

With the Atlee/McCarthy speech squabble Labour rallied around Atlee and a national ‘Hate England’ week was begun in the U.S. On May 18, 1953 the Labour Party passed two resolutions at their Constituency General Committee calling for, “repudiation from the President of the United States of the scurrilous attacks on the Leader of Her Majesty’s Opposition by Senator McCarthy.”¹⁶⁰ The British Embassy warned the Foreign Office that, “the incident was enhancing McCarthy’s reputation because it gave the Anglophobes a splendid opportunity to vent their grievances.”¹⁶¹ British consuls throughout the U.S. warned that Anglophobia was at an all time high and Eisenhower’s continued silence reinforced the impression that U.S. foreign policy was controlled by McCarthy and he represented the nation’s mood. Even more ominous for Anglo-American relations, Labour MP Richard Crossman, “warned that the Attlee/McCarthy

¹⁵⁷ Rothwell, Victor. Anthony Eden- A Political Biography, 1931-1957. New York: Manchester University Press, 1992. p. 136

¹⁵⁸ Confidential U.S. State Department- Central Files- Soviet Union- 1950-1954- Foreign Affairs, 4/30/1953, from Raymond F. Courtney, First Secretary of Embassy to The Department of State, Washington, p. 1 of 1 and Rothwell, p. 136

¹⁵⁹ Rothwell, p. 137

¹⁶⁰ Secret Correspondence between Labour Party Agent and Secretaries of State for: Foreign Affairs, Foreign Office, and Downing Street, as well as the American Embassy, British Archives FO 371/103519, May 18, 1953, 1 page.

¹⁶¹ Rossi, p. 13

squabble would swing politics further to the left in British politics and transform anti-Americanism into normal Opposition practice.”¹⁶²

Caught up in this ‘Hate America week’ was the seminal British journalist Alistair Cooke. Cooke found himself quoted by a McCarthyite, George Sokolsky, unflatteringly as linked to Alger Hiss. Cooke threatened to sue Sokolsky but had to turn some of his writing over to a Senator. However while Cooke reviled McCarthy he warned liberals to know their enemy and did agree with McCarthy’s assertions, believing there might be truth, including in McCarthy’s claims to have files on eighty one Communists working in the State Department. As Cooke himself told a reporter, “He did everything to describe these people short of naming them...My God he had them all. I recognized one after another. And a lot of those people aren’t around any more. He must have worked like a slave getting that speech together.”¹⁶³ Yet Cooke did not realize that these names were based off the aforementioned Lee List. Moreover, Cooke’s revulsion based as a liberal journalist, not conservative, eventually interceded. In a June 12, 1954 letter Cooke wrote, “It looked as if finally an impulse of moral revulsion had galvanized the country and braced the backbone of an incongruous variety of his victims.”¹⁶⁴

Following the Attlee/McCarthy controversy, and McCarthy’s continued influence, all segments of British political opinion were radicalized believing him to be, “a Frankenstein monster.”¹⁶⁵ Moderate politician Harold MacMillan lamented that McCarthy was responsible for alienating moderate opinion in Britain from supporting American objectives in Europe. With McCarthy’s attacks on the Army, tensions were not ameliorated. To the British McCarthy’s attack seemed a logical out-growth of McCarthy’s sustained attack on Eisenhower and his moves

¹⁶² *Id.*

¹⁶³ Clarke, Nick. *Alistair Cooke- A Biography*. New York: Arcade Publishing, 1999. p. 288

¹⁶⁴ Cooke, Alistair. *America Observed- From the 1940s to the 1980s*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989. p. 64

¹⁶⁵ Rossi, p. 5

towards the Presidency in 1956.¹⁶⁶ Many felt that McCarthy would be impossible to stop politically and in early 1954 with the conflict reaching a crescendo, similar to the French, “many in Britain accepted the argument of the American-haters that McCarthy made the United States a greater threat to western freedom than the Soviet Union.”¹⁶⁷ Moreover, British opinion had lost respect for Eisenhower due to his mishandling of McCarthy.

However by mid 1954 the tide had greatly shifted. McCarthy’s miscalculation with the Army and the Murrow affair began to give Britons hope of McCarthy’s downfall. In March of 1954 the Embassy now, “believed that the evidence now indicated that the American public was tiring of McCarthy and his antics.”¹⁶⁸ By April, and McCarthy’s further decline, the embassy predicted that McCarthy would never again be a major force in American politics.¹⁶⁹ Yet in June 1954 a more paranoid tone came out of the foreign office stating that, “Although Senator McCarthy’s stocks are no longer rising, he is not yet a definite political liability...Indeed, another newspaper poll in the Middle West found that 2,085 people now liked McCarthy more against 1,482 who liked him less [following the Army hearings.] Thus McCarthy’s early political demise may be a consummation devoutly to be wished, but it is just not going to happen.”¹⁷⁰ In that same cable the Embassy also cited that in the latest Gallup poll twenty eight percent of those questioned believed Stevens ‘came out on top,’ twenty four percent think McCarthy did, eighteen percent thought neither did, and thirty percent were undecided. The Embassy also worried about Democratic Party promises to make McCarthy an issue in the 1954 election and that Eisenhower

¹⁶⁶ *Id.*, p. 14-5 and Preston, 11/30/1953, “United States: Weekly Summary, Period November 21st- November 27th” from Washington to Foreign Office, Sir R. Makins, p. 309-310.

¹⁶⁷ *Id.*, p. 15

¹⁶⁸ *Id.*, p. 16

¹⁶⁹ *Id.*, p. 17

¹⁷⁰ Confidential Correspondence from A.R.K. Mackenzie (British Embassy, Washington D.C.) to Anthony Eden, July 14th 1954, British Archives, FO 371/109108, Minutes (2 pages), p. 2 of 2, paragraph 4. (Bracket added)

would be obfuscated from confronting McCarthy before the November elections.¹⁷¹ However with the convening of the Watkins hearings to investigate McCarthy's abuse of the Senate and his brutal media battering in August, "the British were now losing interest in him and his 'ism.'"¹⁷² References of McCarthy dropped off sharply from the Embassy and, "there was now a general conviction among British observers that McCarthy would never again recover the influence that he had wielded in American politics."¹⁷³

Conclusion- McCarthyism and *Leviathan*- The Sovereign Deprived of Liberty

In a 1950 editorial *The Saturday Evening Post* wrote, "Senator McCarthy may have alerted people to the fact that some queer birds have managed to infiltrate into the inner circles of the Government."¹⁷⁴ Similarly with the issue of Owen Lattimore *The Saturday Evening Post* decried the argument of freedom of speech and discusses the linkage of Lattimore's influence to US foreign policy.¹⁷⁵ Meanwhile Buckley maintains that McCarthy did not present conclusive evidence ever that there were 57 card carrying Communists in the State Department. However, this does not mean none were Communists.¹⁷⁶ As Roy Cohn stated, "he tended to sensationalize the evidence...he was impatient, overly aggressive, overly dramatic. He acted on impulse."¹⁷⁷ However, to focus on the validity of McCarthy's claims is fallacious. As Buckley writes, "Senator McCarthy's method is abhorrent."¹⁷⁸ A seminal question hitherto discussed in academic literature has been the linkage between McCarthy's above discussed foreign policy damage and Hobbes' deprivation of liberty context.

¹⁷¹ Confidential Correspondence from A.R.K. Mackenzie (British Embassy, Washington D.C.) to Anthony Eden, July 14th 1954, British Archives, FO 371/109108, Memo (9 pages), p. 8 of 9 and 9 of 9, paragraphs 17 and 19.

¹⁷² Rossi, p. 17

¹⁷³ *Id.*

¹⁷⁴ Editorial, "A Diplomat Needs Something Besides Not Being a Spy," *Saturday Evening Post*, 4/22/1950, Volume 222, Issue 43, p. 10. p. 10.

¹⁷⁵ Editorial, "Free Speech was not the Issue in the Lattimore Affair," *Saturday Evening Post*, 9/16/1950, Volume 223, Issue 12, p. 12. p. 12.

¹⁷⁶ Buckley, p. 190

¹⁷⁷ Cohn in Matusow, p. 115

¹⁷⁸ Buckley, p. 267

Edward R. Murrow stated in his seminal broadcast against Joseph McCarthy that, “the actions of the Junior Senator from Wisconsin have caused alarm and dismay among our allies abroad and given comfort to our enemies.”¹⁷⁹ Similarly, in May 1954, Jacob Potofsky wrote in “Labor Views the 1954 Elections,” in *The Nation* that, “America’s prestige among the free nations has steadily declined since the new Administration came to power. Those who looked to the United States as the citadel of freedom cannot comprehend the role of Senator McCarthy.”¹⁸⁰ The US, as well as Britain and France, desired a strong trans-Atlantic bond of Western powers to stand against the growing Soviet menace of the East post World War II. This bond took many forms including a NATO alliance and European Defense Community. However, these goals, while not thwarted, were greatly impeded during the period of McCarthyism due to European angst. This angst has been amply proven above in the classified and unclassified reactions of British and French policymakers, journalists, and citizens concerning the continued viability of American leadership of the Western world, assistance to Western allies, including NATO, the militaristic intentions of the U.S., and the control of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus. When the Soviet peace offensive entered the equation, post 1952, with the continued inability of Truman and Eisenhower to neutralize McCarthy; Britain and France were knocked further off-balance creating greater divisions between US policy goals and reality.

McCarthy was not the single motivating factor behind this angst; however he played a large role as reflected in the aforementioned British, French, and U.S. reactions to his saber rattling. This becomes especially evident when looking at the British reaction. While the French reaction and blame of McCarthy may be derided as due to other policy considerations the British and Americans had a very close working relationship post World War II well through 1955,

¹⁷⁹ Cooke, *America Observed*, p. 67.

¹⁸⁰ Potofsky, Jacob S. “Labor views the 1954 Elections,” *Nation*, 5/18/1954, Volume 178, Issue 9, p. 403-404. p. 403

despite the intransigence of Anthony Eden. As a result, the reactions coming out of Britain between 1950 and 1954 give an excellent window into McCarthy's true foreign policy damage. Perhaps most illuminating in terms of British reaction to McCarthy is Cooke's reader correspondence from Britain to America. Cooke maintains that prior to McCarthy as many as eighty to ninety percent expressed their support for America however, "by the time McCarthy was dominating Congress...the mail on the *Letters* was frightening. Approval of America...had dropped to about one letter in four."¹⁸¹

McCarthy's undermining of morale in the diplomatic corps and destruction of U.S. prestige, especially in the Voice of America and Greek shipping episodes, not only hampered the day to day operations of the State Department as reflected above, but served to further inculcate an image of America in Britain in which the Executive Branch and the American foreign policy apparatus had been co-opted by a single Senator from Wisconsin. When coupled with increased U.S. militarism in defense spending and weapons development, and a seeming lack of openness to Allied dialogue; as reflected in calls for increased British defense spending over national health, angst turned into dismay. Elements of the left, ever distrustful of America, were joined with moderates and eventually conservatives, while the Foreign Office attempted to walk a tight rope of moderation. However by 1953 even the Foreign Office was engulfed in McCarthy hysteria. Overtures began to move towards the Soviet Union and U.S. foreign policy goals of a strong-trans Atlantic alliance, prevalent since 1946, seemed to be unraveling until McCarthy's sudden fall in the Army-McCarthy hearings.

But how does this tie into Hobbes' deprivation of liberty context? As mentioned the sovereign maintains the rights and two-pronged subordination/obedience of individuals possessed in the state of nature upon institutive authority of a social contract. This reign has no limit absent

¹⁸¹ Clarke, p. 289

war or overthrow of the commonwealth. The United States clearly fits into this mold with its delegated natural authorities to different branches of government including most notably foreign policy to the Executive Branch, or Presidency, through a Constitution or social contract. Hobbes, while not explicitly mentioning foreign policy decisions as a sovereign right, clearly implies through language that the sovereign is to exercise control over this realm. Moreover, when coupled with Hobbes' discussion against the division of power/sovereignty it can be easily discerned that the right over foreign policy is not to be shared among sovereign and advisors. Hobbes himself mentions in Chapter 29 that elements that can dissolve a commonwealth include the opinion that there are more sovereigns than one in the commonwealth and mixed government.¹⁸² Applied to the United States in its narrowest reading this would mean that the President is not to share foreign policy rule making with Congress.

To be sure this authority is embraced in certain instances, such as in cases of foreign emergency or response to imminent foreign attack. However, the United States has moved past Hobbes' fear of separation of powers and iron clad subordination/rule; having Presidential term limits and 3 co-equal branches of government. Foreign policy is no different. With any given foreign policy issue there can be held: Presidential requests for troops or funding, Congressional committees to analyze foreign policy issues, Congressional votes on Executive foreign policy requests and measures of war, and Supreme Court rulings on the constitutionality of Presidential military directives. Thus in a pluralistic society, such as the U.S., in which powers are separated between branches of government and among the people, it would seem that the sovereign cannot go without challenge when attempting to exercise sovereign power. Hobbes even himself acknowledges the role of ministers. As Gauthier writes,

¹⁸² Bagby, p. 62

He requires counselors, magistrates, ministers, and other agents whom he authorizes to act on his behalf. Without these the sovereign would be isolated from society, unaware of the problems requiring his decision, and unable to translate his decision into an effective resolution of the problems. These agents...must then in practice...share the exercise of that power with the sovereign. The sovereign can only be the focal point of a set of rights and powers whose actual exercise is divided among all those who represent him.¹⁸³

Taken in this context McCarthy would be exonerated from a deprivation of the sovereign's foreign policy liberty as at worst an ornery troublemaker. For the U.S. has had struggles over issues of foreign policy between advisors and sovereign throughout its history including: over the War of 1812, entrance into World War II, and the anti-nuclear movement post-McCarthy. However, there is a seminal difference from Hobbes' conception of ministers, McCarthy, and these aforementioned historical debates/irritants; they did not take on the context of American foreign policy writ large. Surendra Gupta maintains that McCarthyism is a highly new phenomenon in that, "the American republic, despite its great democratic traditions and a highly developed legal system, was not able to stand up to these forces."¹⁸⁴ Yet this analysis remains mired in the arguments of Buckley and *The Saturday Evening Post* looking merely at the legal and domestic phenomenon of McCarthy. McCarthy's international prowess must be analyzed.

McCarthy himself entered realms of foreign policy expressly reserved for the Executive Branch, such as in the Voice of America or Greek shipping episodes. In both these episodes McCarthy himself dictated and executed U.S. foreign policy; not the State Department, Truman, or Eisenhower. Moreover, McCarthy's harsh measures against State Department employees such as John Carter Vincent, John Stewart Service, and Owen Lattimore not only served to undermine the morale at the State Department, more importantly they served to alter the faces and strategies

¹⁸³ Gauthier, p. 167

¹⁸⁴ Gupta, p. 41

that Mao Tse Tung, Eden, and Churchill were having to encounter to deal with the weighty issues of Chinese Communism, Soviet aggression, and NATO. As Acheson acknowledged this was a huge factor in both the non-recognition of Communist China and atmosphere of diplomatic discourse, which moved from open and knowledgeable to stifling, greatly affecting U.S. foreign policy and that of France, Britain, and China. More abstractly McCarthy's consistent negative incorporation as the pacemaker of American foreign policy and image of America in Britain and France, whether conscious or unconscious, removed from the President the foreign policy power of judging necessities for peace and defense as chief diplomat with the usage of soft power/propaganda. As Frederick Kirgis writes regarding the recent struggle between President Bush, the Supreme Court, and International World Court over a Texas Mexican national inmate facing death, and its foreign policy implications, "It is a matter of diplomacy, after all, and the President is the chief diplomat."¹⁸⁵ Perhaps most seminal, McCarthy developed international dialogues with foreign leaders such as in the Clement Atlee fiasco.

In these ways McCarthy in effect was not just discussing and advising the Executive Branch on foreign policy, as Hobbes would find acceptable, he was carrying out foreign policy. It is when looked in this context that McCarthy is clearly guilty of depriving the sovereign of liberty of foreign policy action. As Sorell writes, "Chapter 10 of *Leviathan* suggests that the power of sovereignty and the honor shown to sovereignty are reasons for accepting it. To be the sovereign is not just to be more powerful...it is to have the greatest of human powers."¹⁸⁶ Incursions into the foreign policy realm of the Executive are not violations of liberty, incursions and execution **in that same foreign policy realm** at the expense of delegated Executive power is

¹⁸⁵ Barnes, Robert. "Justices Rebuff Bush and World Court." *Washington Post*, Final Edition, 2008 March 26, P. A01. Accessed and retrieved: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/25/AR2008032501185.html?referrer=emailarticle>

¹⁸⁶ Sorell, p. 194

a violation. As Hobbes writes in Chapter 29 of *Leviathan*, another element bringing dissolution of a commonwealth is absolute power.¹⁸⁷ McCarthy clearly attempted and executed this absolute power in foreign policy, whether consciously or unconsciously, and executed the delegated authority of the Executive Branch's foreign policy realm in: internal State Department management, diplomatic strategy, including propaganda/soft power, negotiation of agreements, foreign correspondence, and overall U.S. strategy towards China and the trans-Atlantic alliance against Communism.

These insidious foreign policy edicts when coupled with McCarthy's demagogic U.S. soft power, undermining U.S. prestige, served to destroy any hope of Sino-U.S. relations post 1949 and poison the post-war harmony engendered between the U.S., Britain, and France; launching a new era of distrust between the Atlantic powers. While the powers would remain tied due to the Soviet menace, divisions between the powers became further in-grained throughout the course of twentieth century through the fall of the Berlin Wall and would begin as early as the Suez Crisis. Thus the NATO alliance survived McCarthy but his foreign policy failures and impact lived on. As Rossi writes, "For Anglo-American relations McCarthy's fall eliminated the single greatest irritant to the close working relationship between the two main branches of the English speaking world. But McCarthy and his 'ism' had left a dangerous legacy. They proved just how tenuous was the ground on which this 'special relationship' was built, the nature of which would become even clearer during the Suez crisis of 1956."¹⁸⁸ This backlash from McCarthy proves the burdensome freedom of Hobbes' sovereign. While a great gift, it can burden its recipient and make him vulnerable to the revenge of those disappointed in the social contract bargain;¹⁸⁹ individuals such as Joseph McCarthy.

¹⁸⁷ Bagby, p. 60

¹⁸⁸ Rossi, p. 18

¹⁸⁹ Sorell, p. 196

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