THE VOTE-CRIME TRADEOFF IN NAPLES FROM 1983-1992

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ABSTRACT

Literature regarding the Camorra, the organized criminal organization that operates in Naples, Italy, abounds with evidence that crime bosses and politicians are linked in a relationship that is mutually beneficial, yet ultimately corrosive to the economic and social welfare of Naples. During election seasons, politicians find themselves most in need of the Camorra's influence on the voting public. The Camorra, in turn, relies on politicians to shield them from investigation and prosecution. We should therefore observe spikes in Neapolitan crime during election seasons. This paper uses data on the incidence of particular crimes from 1983 through 1992 to predict spikes in Neapolitan crime during election seasons. Until more variables to explain criminality can be gathered and incorporated into an econometric model, the strength of the relationship will remain unclear. However, results included herein indicate that from 1983 through 1992 there was in fact a positive relationship between spikes in crime in Naples and the occurrence of an election.

INTRODUCTION

From 1978 to 1983 the city of Naples, Italy is terrorized as two major clans of the Camorra battle for supremacy (Allum, F. 2006, 118). The victorious clan tears itself apart during the following three years as its two most powerful bosses turn against each

other (Allum, F. 2006, 118). Amid the carnage and criminal expansion, smaller clans vie for larger pieces of turf. This violence is the product of a powerful yet decentralized criminal organization responding to the extremely large profits afforded by the drug trade. Profits from drugs flow through every corrupt channel in Naples, connecting Camorra bosses to politicians. Camorra bosses of the 1980s use their influence over the voting public and monetary campaign contributions to purchase protection from politicians.

This relationship presents a serious conflict of interest. How can politicians be expected to protect their citizens by minimizing crime if they are dependant upon criminals? Furthermore, can the existence of this relationship be used to explain trends in the incidence of crime? Could it be that the vote-gathering services of the Camorra in Naples affords it extra protection from investigation and prosecution during election seasons?

LITERATURE REVIEW

Felia Allum, in *Camorristi, Politicians, and Businessmen*, reveals the root of the relationship between crime and politics in Naples when she discusses Neapolitan "clientelism," a political system that renders voters dependant on politicians for jobs, transfer payments, and other favors. In Naples, this system strengthens the ties between politicians and *camorristi* in the decades after World War II. A system in which once wealthy nobles served as politicians, turns into "a set of methods where 'everything goes,' used by corrupt politicians, administrators and businessmen within a strategy of

'party-directed patronage' and then to a fully-fledged 'politico-criminal machine' in which 'organized crime and organized political corruption have formed a partnership."[1]

P. A. Allum expands on this relationship in *Politics and Society in Post War Naples*. He notes that as early as the 1950s "[racketeers] and other outlaws are well aware that their freedom from law-enforcing agencies depends on how useful they can make themselves to the politicians."[2] He writes of a Neapolitan man who complains about criminals shooting their guns in public squares, only to walk about town with impunity later on (Allum, P. A. 1973, 164).

By the 1950s, Camorra bosses are active in the Neapolitan political process, campaigning for DC politicians (Allum, F. 2006, 159-60). Initially, the dominant member in the politician-mobster relationship is the politician. But in the 1970s, the Italian Communist Party begins to win Neapolitan parliament seats over DC candidates. At this point the balance of power shifts to the Camorra bosses, because DC leaders need their help to reestablish political influence in Naples. Camorra bosses use their influence over the electorate to conduct criminal activity under a blanket of political protection (Allum, F. 2006, 185).

Tom Behan, in *See Naples and Die*, writes that Camorra bosses are sometimes called into service by the Neapolitan DC for reasons other than vote-gathering. In April of 1981, the Red Brigades, an Italian terrorist group associated with the Communist party, kidnaps senior Neapolitan DC politician Circo Cirillo (Behan 2002 131). Police flood the streets of Naples in response. One Camorra member is quoted as saying "The situation has practically paralyzed all our activities: from murders to bank robberies, from

theft to picking up money due form protection rackets, it also prevented the unloading of contraband cigarettes and drugs as the coast was under surveillance."[3]

Neapolitan DC politicians trying to free Cirillo tap Raffaele Cutolo, the imprisoned leader of a powerful Camorra gang, to serve as an intermediary in their negotiations with the Red Brigades (Behan 2002, 138-39). Through Cirillo, Cutolo sees an opportunity not only clear the excess police from the city, but to purchase political capital that would make his operations run much more smoothly in the future. One of Cutolo's fellow camorristi refers to a member of the DC when he says: "[He is] in our pocket now. Thanks to our intervention, he got 10,000 more votes than he expected at the election. If we get Cirillo free for him, who knows how important he'll become."[4]

The Red Brigades eventually release Cirillo. Since the release, many people have speculated as to who was involved, and for what motives. A judicial investigation commissioned to establish what really happened during the kidnapping concludes that "there were members of the [DC] party who… were active in various ways to obtain Cirillo's release, turning above all to the mediation of Rafaele Cutolo…"[5] A member of the Red Brigades involved in the kidnapping would say, years later, that "all these elements led us to the historical and political conclusion that all high levels of organized crime… were nothing more than the other side of the coin of the state…"[6]

Behan explains the emergence of the contraband trade in Naples. It begins as a fantastically profitable market in illegally imported cigarettes. Camorra bosses legally purchase American cigarettes and smuggle them into the Port of Naples, circumventing steep national taxes. At the height of the trade, the Camorra sells cigarettes at an estimated markup of over 300 percent (Behan 2002, 175). Illegal cigarettes also provide

jobs to many Neapolitans who would otherwise remain unemployed. This affords the

Camorra legitimacy, even respect and praise among law-abiding citizens.

To conduct business on a street-level, the Camorra hires young men, protected

from prosecution due to their age, to commit violent crimes and sell contraband (Behan

2002, 151). A relationship develops between crime rates in Naples and the health of

Camorra activity.

The Camorra's expertise in cigarette smuggling eases its transition into smuggling

heroin and cocaine. By the 1980s, Camorra coffers are flooded with cash from nearly a

decade of drug trafficking. To launder money and extend their influence, Camorra

bosses begin to invest in legitimate enterprises. They also make ever-larger campaign

contributions to DC politicians, many of whom now operate under the influence of the

crime bosses (Allum, F. 2006, 50).

Despite the wealth of intuitive evidence indicating a relationship between crime

and the political process in Naples, none of the literature I have reviewed explores the

possibility that crime rates may spike during Neapolitan election seasons as a result of the

close relationship between Camorra bosses and DC politicians.

Using month-by-month data of reported crimes for the city of Naples from

January 1983 through December 1992, I will show that it is possible to predict spikes in

crime during the parliamentary elections of 1983 and 1987. It is worth noting that the

Italian Communist party wins the majority of the Neapolitan vote in the '83 election, but

by the '87 election, the pendulum swings back, and the DC takes control of Naples once

again. Recall from earlier that the opportunity for the Camorra to help return the DC to

power solidifies its role as the dominant partner in the politico-criminal relationship. The

years of my observations conform to a unique time period. By 1983, as previously

indicated, the Camorra had developed a sophisticated drug trade in Naples, and had

established close ties with the DC. In 1992, the national *Tangentopli* ("Bribes-ville")

scandal eliminated the DC from the Italian political scene. Therefore, if a relationship

between criminality and election seasons did exist in Naples, it would be during this

period.

THE MARKET FOR DRUGS

In my model I assume that the market for drugs in Naples is oligopolistic. It is

controlled by the Camorra; however the several Camorra clans operate as a cartel.

Demand is relatively inelastic, because there are few alternatives (legal or otherwise) to

illegal drug use.

The market for drugs in Naples ordinarily looks like figure 1. Markups placed by the Camorra on drugs and the revenue drugs generated (over ten million dollars per month at its peak) were enormous (Allum 2006, 49). I have therefore drawn figure 1 to feature large profits.

Since the 1950s, the Camorra has enjoyed substantial legal protection (bribing judges, influencing police officers, etc.) from corrupt politicians. Since the Camorra's end of the bargain is primarily the guarantee of votes and campaign finance, I hypothesize that in the months surrounding a Neapolitan election the market for drugs in Naples resembles figure 2. Here I have shifted the AC curve downward for two reasons.

- Variable cost decreases due to the fact that camorristi can be more assured of protection from investigation and prosecution. They devote fewer resources to police informants and outright bribes.
  - This decreases variable cost, and lowers the average cost.
  - The decrease in variable cost also decreases marginal cost.

- Quantity produced increases due to the decrease in marginal cost. Camorristi can expand their territory and offer drugs to more people. This increases quantity produced.

When the AC and MC curves shift downward, as shown in figure 2, profits for the Camorra increase. These increased profits create incentive for Camorra clan bosses to expand their drug-related operations. I hypothesize that this temporary expansion of the drug trade around elections will lead to increases in crime rates, because increased activity in this market leads to turf battles between different clans. It is also common for

addicts to steal money to feed their habit. I therefore use Neapolitan crime as a proxy for my predicted increase in Camorra activity during election cycles.

<div align="center">THE DATA</div>

The Instituto Nazionale di Statistica is the national Italian statistical bureau, and it has provided detailed data to study this phenomenon. The data are monthly tabulations of reported crimes listed by type for the years 1983 through 1992. According to my hypothesis, crime rates should spike during the months surrounding an election year.

From graph 1 we can see that total crimes and thefts in particular spike around the June '83 and June '87 parliamentary elections.

Turning to two sub-categories of theft, we see that the trends in pick-pocketings and purse snatchings exhibit similar, though less defined patterns around the two elections.

<div align="center">9</div>

Moving forward with these data, I will test the relationship between the incidence of crime and the occurrence of an election using an econometric model. I have isolated the statistics of total crime, total thefts, homicides, pick-pocketings, purse snatchings, and store robberies. Intuitively, increases in these crimes are consistent with the expansion of organized crime and the proliferation of drugs. The "Camorra Wars" mentioned in the indtroduction resulted in increased homicides. Increased sales of drugs leads to increased consumption, and with it the liklihood that drug-addicts will steal money through pick-pocketings, purse snatchings, and store robberies in order to feed their habbit. These crimes are also valuable because of how quickly they are reported. Missing persons and stolen property are brought to the attention of the police qicker than, say, a person defrauding the state, or a merchant of contraband ciggarettes. We can therefore reliably study the movement of these crimes with greater accuracy around a short time period, such as an election season.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

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Consider the following model.

$$C_t = \alpha + \beta_1 E_t + \beta_2 M_{2t} + \beta_3 M_{3t} + \ldots + \beta_{12} M_{12t} + \epsilon$$

The dependent variable is the magnitude of the crime statistic that we are trying to determine. The variable E is binary, and I have set it equal to one for four months out of an election year: the two months leading up to an election, the month of the election, and the month after the election. I assume that these months represent a typical election season in Naples; I have chosen them because of their proximity to the election. Because the elections of '83 and '87 were held in June, E is equal to one during April, May, June and July for 1983 and 1987. The occurrence of crime is likely to vary predictably throughout the year. To observe this variation, I have chosen the base month of January and set the binary variables M_2 through M_{12} equal to one for the months of February through December, respectively.

As I review my results for each dependent variable, I will look at the seasonal trend for each dependent variable during the months associated with the two elections of the 1980s (April through July). I will then interpret my election variable and determine whether an increase in the dependent variable is likely during the months of an election.

Referring to Table 1 we see that with total crime as the dependent variable, the monthly coefficients for April through July are not significant. Yet each coefficient save the one for May is negative. This indicates that crime may decrease during April, June, and July relative to January. From the election coefficient, which is statistically significant, we see that crime can be expected to increase during these months if they occur around an election relative those same months when there is no election. The magnitude of this coefficient is large (it shows a marginal increase of about 1157 crimes

for the months surrounding an election), but we cannot be certain that this is the true size do to the absence of other explanatory variables. We also see that August shows a statistically significant decrease in total crimes every year. August is a popular vacation month for Italians. Many businesses close for extended periods of time during this month, and many Neapolitans leave the city for the beaches. Therefore, it is not surprising to observe this decrease. The R^2 is 0.17, and would probably increase if additional explanatory variables are added to the model.

Table 2 features total thefts as the dependent variable. Similar to total crimes, total thefts seem to decrease from April through July with respect to January, but again, the coefficients are not statistically significant. The election coefficient, however, is significant and has a magnitude of about 842. During the months of an election we can expect an increase of about 842 thefts relative those same months when there is no election. Again, the magnitude of this coefficient is suspect due to the absence of additional explanatory variables. We observe once again a statistically significant decrease in total thefts during the month of August. The R^2 for this model is 0.22, higher than that of the total crime model, but still relatively low. This model clearly needs additional variables in order to explain changes in the amount of thefts from month to month.

Skipping to Table 4 we see the results of the regression with the dependent variable "pick-pocketings" take on the same pattern. Monthly coefficients indicate that occurrences typically decline from April through July with respect to January, but the coefficients are statistically insignificant. The election variable's statistically significant coefficient of 32 suggests that 32 additional pick-pocketings occur during election

months relative those same months when there is no election. We again see a statistically significant decline in occurrences during August, and a relatively low R2 of 0.21.

Table 3, in which total homicides is the dependent variable, gives us little information that is statistically significant. We see a decline in incidence relative to January from April through July, but without statistical significance. Also, here our election variable, though positive, is not statistically significant. The R2, at 0.12, is our lowest yet. There is little we can infer from this model, except that since the election coefficient is positive, the fact that an election is taking place could explain an increase in homicides for the months of the election relative those same months when there is no election. But this is far from certain.

My next regression set purse snatchings as the dependent variable. Monthly coefficients in Table 5 indicate that occurrences decrease relative to January in April, but then increase relative to January each month from May to July. However, these coefficients are not statistically significant. The election coefficient, on the other hand, is statistically significant and its magnitude indicates that during the months of an election purse snatchings will increase by about 139 occurrences relative those same months when there is no election. The amount of purse snatchings does not vary for any month relative to January with statistical significance. Our R2 here is 0.3, indicating that the explanatory power of this regression is more powerful than our previous models. Yet there is still a lot of room for additional explanatory variables.

Our final regression sets store robberies as the dependent variable. We see in Table 6 that the model predicts with statistical significance that store robberies decrease in July relative to January by about 27 occurrences. The statistically significant election

variable, however, shows that during the months of an election, the incidence of store

robberies increases by about 50 occurrences relative to those same months when there is

no election. We see therefore that normally in this period that store robberies in July

decrease by 27 with respect to January, but during election seasons store robberies in July

will increase, instead of decrease. The integrity of this assertion is vulnerable because of

lack of additional variables to explain changes in store robberies. The R2 of 0.32 gives

us our strongest model yet in terms of predictive power.

PROBLEMS WITH DATA

As I have stated repeatedly above, my regression model lacks additional variables

that can explain changes in crime. Those absences could explain my low R2 values.

Perhaps statistics on employment, education, migrant workers, or tourism could help to

explain the variation of crime during my time period. The absence of additional variables

probably gives greater explanatory power to my election statistic in the model than the

statistic has in reality. To get a better idea of how the occurrence of an election in Naples

during my time period explains variations in crime, and by extension to better test my

hypothesis that Camorra bosses expand their operations during election seasons due to a

decrease in the variable costs of conducting criminal activity, I must strengthen my

econometric model by introducing other variables that can predict variation in crime.

Also useful would be to expand my time period to extend after the fall of the DC

in order to study whether the relationship between the Camorra and politicians hold

despite a change in the major Neapolitan party. Incorporating other Italian cities into this

study, in order to see if they suffer from a similar relationship would also be interesting as a basis of comparison.

I plan to continue this research by collecting data on additional explanatory variables. A major challenge to the gathering of this data is that most Italian economic data prior to 1990 exists in paper form only. Hopefully, through my contact at the Italian statistical bureau who provided me with Neapolitan criminal statistics, I can find ways to have useful data sets transcribed into Excel format and sent to me so that I may continue my research.

CONCLUSION

Due to the deficiencies of my regression model it is difficult to come to any definite conclusions regarding my hypothesis. However, the fact that the election variable had a positive and statistically significant coefficient for every regression (except for the regression with "homicides" as the depended variable) suggests that a relationship exists between the occurrence of an election in Naples from 1983 through 1992 and an increase in crime. These results command attention, and I will investigate further.

Furthermore, should I find that my election statistic retains a positive coefficient and statistical significance after additional explanatory variables are accounted for, the implications are severe. A working relationship between Camorra bosses and politicians poses a danger not only to the safety of Neapolitans, but to the efficiency of the economy. Among many problems that can arise from close ties between organized crime and politics is the smothering of competition from non-Camorra-operated firms for public

contracts, the evasion of huge sums of taxes, and the general promotion of a black-market

economy.

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[1] Felia Allum, *Camorristi, Politicians, and Businessmen*. [Leeds: Northern Universities Press, 2006], 27.

[2] P. A. Allum, *Politics and Society in Post-War Naples*. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973], 163.

[3] Quoted in V. Vasile, *L'Affare* Cirillo. [Editori Riuniti, 1989], 47, quoted in Tom Behan, *See Naples and Die*. [New York: I. B. Tauris and Co. Ltd., 2002], 138.

[4] *La Voce della Campania*, December 1998, quoted in Tom Behan, *See Naples and Die*. [New York: I. B. Tauris and Co. Ltd., 2002], 140.

[5] V. Vasile, *L'Affare* Cirillo. [Editori Riuniti, 1989], 158-59, quoted in Tom Behan, *See Naples and Die*. [New York: I. B. Tauris and Co. Ltd., 2002], 147-48.

[6] Quoted in V. Vasile, *L'Affare* Cirillo. [Editori Riuniti, 1989], 26, quoted in Tom Behan, *See Naples and Die*. [New York: I. B. Tauris and Co. Ltd., 2002], 147-48.

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  by month, from 1983 through 1992. Acquired via email from Dott. Franco

  Turetta.

Vasile, V. *L'Affare Cirillo*. Editori Riuniti, 1989.

Table 1

Determinant of Total Crime

Dependent Variable is Total Crime in Naples

Election Season	1157.31*	July	-337.26
	[3.52]		[-0.620]
February	-230.9	August	-1055.31*
	[0.39]		[1.99]
March	123.9	September	-48.7
	[0.21]		[0.09]
April	-363.16	October	154.8
	[0.66]		[0.25]
May	370.54	November	413.7
	[0.60]		[0.70]
June	-116.36	December	119.7
	[0.20]		[0.21]

N	120
R2	0.17

Source: Crime statistics from Instituto Nazionale di Statistica - Servizio Giustizia, acquired via email from
Dott. Franco Turetta, who may be reached at turetta@istat.it

Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets *indicates p<.05. Constant term estimated but not reported.

Corrected for heteroskedasticy.

Table 2

Determinant of Thefts

Dependent Variable is Total Thefts in Naples

Election Season	841.66* [5.02]	July	-425.13 [1.27]
February	-250.9 [0.66]	August	-962.4* [2.77]
March	-63.2 [0.17]	September	-177.7 [0.49]
April	-394.33 [1.07]	October	-130.4 [0.31]
May	-18.33 [0.05]	November	113.5 [0.28]
June	-346.83 [0.99]	December	-35.9 [0.10]
N	120		
R2	0.23		

Source: See previous table.

Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets *indicates $p<.05$. Constant term estimated but not reported.

Corrected for heteroskedasticy.

Table 3

Determinant of Homicides

Dependent Variable is Total Homicides in Naples

Election Season	4.063 [1.30]	July	-4.51 [1.84]
February	-2.5 [1.00]	August	-5.5* [2.29]
March	-2.1 [0.83]	September	-1.3 [0.47]
April	-3.11 [1.18]	October	-1.6 [0.64]
May	-1.81 [0.66]	November	-0.5 [0.18]
June	-3.51 [1.22]	December	-2.2 [0.77]

N   120

R2   0.12

Source: See previous tables.

Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets *indicates $p<.05$. Constant term estimated but not reported.

Corrected for heteroskedasticy.

Table 4

Determinant of Pick-Pocketings in Naples

Dependent Variable is Total Pick-Pocketings in Naples

Election Season	32.4 [2.86]	July	-21.88 [1.00]
February	-20.4 [0.90]	August	-56.1* [2.55]
March	-5.7 [0.22]	September	2.9 [0.11]
April	-15.68 [0.60]	October	19.5 [0.74]
May	20.51 [0.92]	November	14.3 [0.53]
June	-3.88 [0.18]	December	20.9 [0.86]
N	120		
R2	0.21		

Source: See previous tables.

Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets *indicates p<.05. Constant term estimated but not reported.

Corrected for heteroskedasticy.

Table 5

Determinant of Purse Snatchings in Naples

Dependent Variable is Total Purse Snatchings in Naples

Election Season	138.91*	July	41.42
	[7.70]		[0.93]
February	-63	August	44.8
	[1.42]		[0.84]
March	-10.7	September	63.8
	[0.23]		[1.30]
April	-16.88	October	66.4
	[0.38]		[1.37]
May	24.72	November	23.4
	[0.56]		[0.48]
June	9.22	December	-9.8
	[0.21]		[0.22]
N	120		
R2	0.3		

Source: See previous tables.

Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets *indicates $p<.05$. Constant term estimated but not reported.

Corrected for heteroskedasticy.

Table 6

Determinant of Store Robberies in Naples

Dependent Variable is Total Store Robberies in Naples

Election Season	50.47* [4.26]	July	-27* [-2.69]
February	-8.6 [0.73]	August	-25.3 [1.95]
March	18.8 [1.22]	September	-15.6 [1.45]
April	-13.4 [1.29]	October	0.3 [0.03]
May	4.11 [0.35]	November	2.4 [0.19]
June	-12.7 [1.18]	December	9.3 [0.72]

N   120

R2   0.32

Source: See previous tables.

Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets *indicates p<.05. Constant term estimated but not reported.

Corrected for heteroskedasticy.

	Homicides	Pick-Pocketings	Purse Snatchings	Store Robberies	Thefts	Crimes
Jan-83	24	116	89	28	2812	3644
Feb-83	11	145	89	32	2956	4370
Mar-83	14	209	381	195	3895	5981
Apr-83	21	237	383	110	4156	6005
May-83	23	300	498	131	4549	6572
Jun-83	12	227	441	99	3771	5503
Jul-83	10	195	524	115	4056	5549
Aug-83	5	155	593	118	3640	5252
Sep-83	16	165	502	87	3987	5532
Oct-83	15	280	514	133	4191	5937
Nov-83	8	294	453	135	4512	6175
Dec-83	19	236	368	161	4201	5896
Jan-84	5	242	372	98	4179	4996
Feb-84	6	216	245	93	4003	4566
Mar-84	2	202	251	100	4009	4758
Apr-84	1	133	229	72	3636	4189
May-84	2	214	335	81	3678	4598
Jun-84	7	180	254	57	3008	3543
Jul-84	5	160	280	37	3334	3864
Aug-84	2	149	292	91	2760	3311
Sep-84	4	193	321	68	3006	3638
Oct-84	7	161	292	76	3111	3833
Nov-84	3	160	252	88	3683	4196
Dec-84	4	227	272	73	3373	3923
Jan-85	3	222	245	62	2276	2887
Feb-85	3	212	247	71	2379	3141
Mar-85	8	161	331	109	3200	3801
Apr-85	3	211	278	66	3284	3869
May-85	8	189	276	61	3009	3691
Jun-85	4	194	242	54	2967	3498
Jul-85	1	169	320	66	3431	3957
Aug-85	3	233	332	58	2638	3196
Sep-85	6	273	414	95	2772	3518
Oct-85	5	216	288	82	2020	2798
Nov-85	7	225	316	92	3063	3674
Dec-85	2	221	303	86	3166	3777
Jan-86	6	214	287	79	2763	3326
Feb-86	2	159	196	45	2617	3115
Mar-86	6	115	130	56	2579	3219
Apr-86	5	280	373	84	3180	3901
May-86	3	266	333	72	3149	3805
Jun-86	2	218	361	73	3423	4004
Jul-86	5	246	406	64	2969	3731
Aug-86	0	204	359	45	2804	3327
Sep-86	1	334	310	63	3475	4101
Oct-86	3	245	362	72	3160	3884

	Homicides	Pick-Pocketings	Purse Snatchings	Store Robberies	Thefts	Crimes
Nov-86	3	161	244	87	3071	3989
Dec-86	6	140	166	81	2719	3593
Jan-87	2	187	242	92	3463	4387
Feb-87	2	199	227	72	3426	4292
Mar-87	4	185	287	121	3576	4284
Apr-87	3	227	332	83	3919	4809
May-87	1	309	466	211	5255	8034
Jun-87	1	236	452	118	4778	6746
Jul-87	2	252	485	118	4120	5432
Aug-87	1	149	332	38	3170	4124
Sep-87	9	222	468	76	4158	5468
Oct-87	5	194	419	89	4109	5220
Nov-87	4	297	381	73	4571	5779
Dec-87	6	216	336	114	4388	5542
Jan-88	8	334	587	129	3917	5085
Feb-88	2	160	303	113	4095	6315
Mar-88	4	252	294	102	4026	6029
Apr-88	3	123	342	77	3423	5422
May-88	5	229	333	94	3936	6075
Jun-88	3	199	362	77	3791	5820
Jul-88	2	203	348	67	3780	5761
Aug-88	2	143	426	83	2851	4374
Sep-88	6	204	416	76	4154	5990
Oct-88	4	209	478	117	4316	6299
Nov-88	5	209	426	92	3989	6104
Dec-88	1	255	359	115	3564	5019
Jan-89	7	157	301	105	4064	5899
Feb-89	8	188	300	66	3963	5713
Mar-89	1	225	262	126	3726	5732
Apr-89	4	227	315	100	2842	4873
May-89	6	236	316	107	4058	5887
Jun-89	1	246	329	75	3690	5812
Jul-89	3	199	328	62	3033	4534
Aug-89	4	152	231	37	2448	3656
Sep-89	8	212	318	56	3192	4584
Oct-89	8	280	329	74	3842	5809
Nov-89	16	240	277	73	3763	5722
Dec-89	12	315	333	104	4294	6745
Jan-90	5	214	302	71	4123	6112
Feb-90	10	232	264	89	3834	6101
Mar-90	9	290	365	93	4213	6450
Apr-90	5	284	286	85	4051	5627
May-90	9	290	417	89	4451	6312
Jun-90	7	261	339	94	3597	5722
Jul-90	6	246	424	69	3729	5655
Aug-90	2	153	353	65	3215	5166
Sep-90	15	234	329	85	4104	6397
Oct-90	10	348	371	76	4721	6507
Nov-90	17	334	382	129	5291	7096

	Homicides	Pick-Pocketings	Purse Snatchings	Store Robberies	Thefts	Crimes
Dec-90	6	277	254	68	4352	5531
Jan-91	18	280	273	83	5665	7388
Feb-91	6	253	235	80	4363	5798
Mar-91	8	270	304	61	4590	6096
Apr-91	9	201	310	69	4499	6261
May-91	6	241	275	64	4590	6964
Jun-91	2	225	286	108	4162	5818
Jul-91	5	199	289	37	3776	5866
Aug-91	9	185	270	41	2694	3938
Sep-91	4	244	301	61	4141	5503
Oct-91	5	272	309	70	4297	6388
Nov-91	8	245	240	47	4184	6365
Dec-91	5	254	220	72	3768	5947
Jan-92	5	241	243	102	4538	6631
Feb-92	8	239	205	102	3655	4635
Mar-92	6	241	229	74	3354	5244
Apr-92	6	192	202	70	2550	4082
May-92	10	203	217	81	2625	4437
Jun-92	17	247	245	68	2828	5040
Jul-92	7	184	229	45	3004	4948
Aug-92	0	123	201	20	1956	3458
Sep-92	1	155	200	26	3034	5137
Oct-92	5	197	243	63	2729	5228
Nov-92	7	185	204	57	2808	5392
Dec-92	0	275	232	68	3616	5579

ENDNOTES