

# China's Christians

The Vanguard of Democratic Reform?

基督教在中國



*Image taken from <[http://china.digitaltimes.net/2006/06/christianity\\_in\\_china\\_baiting\\_religion.php](http://china.digitaltimes.net/2006/06/christianity_in_china_baiting_religion.php)>*

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## **Abstract**

China is a nation undergoing tremendous change, and many consider it an emerging superpower. Of particular interest is the pace and nature of Chinese political reform, especially to the United States, which justifies its engagement with the Leninist Party-state as a catalyst toward Chinese democracy and civil rights and liberties. While various sources of Chinese democratization have been proposed, such as a rising middle class, and ferment over environmental pollution and governmental corruption, little research has been done on Christianity in China as a seed of political liberalization. Christianity is one of the fastest growing religions in China, and has suffered from unusual hostility by the Chinese Communist Party. My research aims to explain the relationship between Christianity and Chinese political attitudes, and through surveys of over 130 Chinese university students studying in Washington DC, fill a gap in the literature regarding religion and democratic reform.

## Acknowledgements

My capstone is inspired by my years of study at American University and abroad, as well as the time I spent as a Buddhist monk at a Laotian temple, which allowed me the opportunity to reflect on the role of faith in global politics. The issue of Christianity and democracy in China was first presented to me in my freshman year Cross-Cultural Communication class, where we read works by Amartya Sen and Samuel Huntington on the role of religion and culture in Chinese politics. Studying abroad in Beijing gave me new, valuable insights on Chinese political reform and culture. When I returned to the States, China reemerged as a persistently controversial, and persistently fascinating, case study in my Human Rights class. I was greatly inspired by the Total Peace Honors Colloquium, which challenged me to think deeply about the kind of order that we want for the world and how best to achieve it. My internship at the American Enterprise Institute was an engaging opportunity to interact with brilliant Asia scholars and China-watchers as they worked at the nexus between academia and policymaking. I believe this project represents a faithful distillation of the most influential experiences I've had at AU and truly merits the label of a "capstone."

I would like to thank all my teachers on this journey for making this capstone possible, but in particular my capstone advisor Jun Lu, my human rights professor Maria Stephan, Asian studies professors Pek Koon Heng and Quansheng Zhao, Cindy Collins, and of course, my Total Peace professor Abdul Aziz Said. I am also grateful to the AU Honors program for providing research grant support, as well as the international student offices at American, George Washington, Georgetown, and Catholic universities in Washington DC for their assistance in conducting my survey. This capstone is dedicated to my grandmother.

## Introduction

The global consensus is that China will emerge as the world's next superpower, possibly rivaling the United States for international primacy. With a GDP growth rate averaging ten percent for the past three decades, rapidly modernizing military capabilities, and newfound confidence in its diplomatic endeavors, China presents a conundrum that American policymakers simply cannot afford to ignore. While its initial efforts to engage China were motivated by the pressures of the Cold War, the US now struggles to justify its relationship with a nation that has profound disagreements with American attitudes on democracy, human rights, and national sovereignty. The predominant rationale for sustaining the Sino-U.S. relationship is that continued engagement will lead to China's political liberalization, through either pressure from the growing middle class, the disenfranchised poor, or changes in political sympathies at the elite level. However, scholars have shied away from investigating another important, potential source of political change in China: religion.

The dearth of systematic analyses of the intersection of Chinese Christianity and politics has been to the detriment of Sinology as a whole since Christianity may well prove to be a more significant factor in determining political attitudes than traditional explanations. For example, the prospects of success of political movements in Tibet and Xinjiang may be low and unlikely to spread to the broader Chinese population due to their localized, ethnoreligious nature. In his classic sociology of Chinese society, Fei Xiaotong writes that unlike in Western societies which are characterized by organizational divisions, Chinese society is defined by bonds of kinship.<sup>1</sup> “In the Western pattern,” writes Fei, “the fundamental concept of morality is built on the relationship between the organization and the individual,”<sup>2</sup> with God as the symbol of the

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1 Fei Xiaotong, *From the Soil: The Foundations of Chinese Society*, trans. Gary G. Hamilton and Wang Zheng (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

2 Fei, 72.

universal organization which grants all individuals a basic, minimum level of rights. In China however, morality is determined on a case-by-case basis that is dependent on the nature of the relationship between the individual and the potential target of moral behavior. The farther away another person is from being related to someone, the less considerate behavior must be towards one another. This leads to what Fei calls “selfish” behavior:

...The problem of selfishness in China is really more common than the problem of ignorance or illness. From the top of society to the bottom, no one seems to be without this shortcoming....The problem defined by this kind of selfishness is thus actually one of how to draw the line between the group and the individual, between others and our own selves.<sup>3</sup>

Chinese societal structure makes it possible for individual members of the majority Han ethnicity to behave egocentrically vis à vis one another, which makes it unlikely that the pleas for autonomy from ethnic minority groups in China will fall on sympathetic ears. Barry Sautman has written that “separatism in Tibet is unlikely to contribute to regime change in China, which would not in any case result in a ‘free’ Tibet, nor is it apt to foster disintegration.”<sup>4</sup> As another example of the shortcomings of traditionally speculated sources of Chinese political reform, the government has become increasingly sophisticated in its ability to co-opt the educated middle class with economic incentives.<sup>5</sup> This casts doubt on the idea that trade and economic development will lead to the opening-up of Chinese politics.

Can Christianity serve as the seed of democratic reform in Communist China? What is the relationship between Christianity (and Catholicism) and Chinese attitudes on political

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3 Fei, 61.

4 Barry Sautman, “China’s Strategic Vulnerability to Minority Separatism in Tibet,” *Asian Affairs, an American Review* 32:2 (Summer 2005), 87.

5 Bruce J. Dickson, “Cooptation and Corporatism in China: The Logic of Party Adaptation,” in Lowell Dittmer and Guoli Liu, ed.s, *China's Deep Reform: Domestic Politics in Transition* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006). 119-146.

liberalization? China's Christians form a growing population (by some accounts Christianity is the fastest growing religion in China) who have suffered from the hostility of the Chinese Communist Party towards organized religion. In fact, the CCP may be more hostile towards organized Christian and especially Catholic bodies than those of any other religion; an entire section of its 1997 White Paper on Freedom of Religious Belief in China is devoted to “aggression” by these religions since the Opium War.<sup>6</sup> This suggests that Chinese Christians in particular have a vested interest in altering the political status quo. Previous scholars and authors have proposed a strong link between Christian attitudes and democratic government, and Christian as well as Catholic churches have served prominent roles in movements for democracy around the world, from the American South, to Poland, to South Africa, to the Philippines.<sup>7</sup> These trends merit a closer investigation of Chinese Christians as instigators of political liberalization.

While there have been many studies on Christianity in China, and the factors that support democratic reform, there have been few, if any, quantitative analyses of the political attitudes of Chinese Christians and its resulting implications. My study will proceed with a brief history of Christianity in China, followed by a literature review. The format of this study is as follows: Part One presents a brief history of China's experience with Christianity; Part Two presents a review of literature concerning two themes: the connection between Christianity and democracy, and the politics of Christianity in China; Part Three describes methodology; Part Four presents my findings; and Part Five offers concluding remarks.

My hypothesis is that Chinese Christians are more supportive of democratic reform than their non-Christian counterparts. I will test this hypothesis through a survey of Chinese foreign

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6 *White Paper—Freedom of Religious Belief in China*. Section IV. Chinese Communist Party, Beijing, October 1997. <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/zjxy/t36492.htm>.

7 See Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall, *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000).

students studying in Washington DC at American University, George Washington University, Georgetown University, and the Catholic University of America, which all have significant international student populations. Though international students from a small cross-section of the entire Chinese population, surveying them can provide valuable insights on the attitudes of China's political elite because many leaders in the CCP are highly educated technocrats who have studied abroad in Western countries.<sup>8</sup> The survey will be conducted online using the SurveyMonkey provider, which has various measures for eliminating statistical biases, and analysis will be conducted using the R software package. The categorical variable of interest is religious inclination, as well as a variable ranking priorities for the CCP (military modernization, environment, democracy, economic redistribution, etc). Control variables will include amount of time spent studying in the United States, size and location of hometown, and whether respondent is a member of an ethnic minority. A quantitative approach will allow me to assess the relative significance of the variables of interest versus control variables, providing a more concrete picture of the relationship between Christianity and Chinese political attitudes.

American relations with China have long been characterized by suspicion of the other's intent, unclear objectives regarding the national interest, and a “two steps forward, one step backwards” approach to negotiations. In conducting relations with a Leninist dictatorship that espouses an unpopular stance on human rights and civil liberties, the United States has had to rely on various justifications of its foreign policy, from a means to protect South Vietnam and the need to balance against the Soviet Union, to today's rationale of economic-driven political transformation. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice wrote in 2000:

It is in America's interest to strengthen the hands of those who seek economic

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<sup>8</sup> For a discussion of this, see Cheng Li and Lynn White, “The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Emerging Patterns of Power Sharing,” in Lowell Dittmer and Guoli Liu, ed.s, *China's Deep Reform: Domestic Politics in Transition* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006). 81-118.

integration because this will probably lead to sustained and organized pressures for political liberalization. There are no guarantees, but in scores of cases from Chile to Spain to Taiwan, the link between democracy and economic liberalization has proven powerful over the long run....Trade in general can open up the Chinese economy and, ultimately, its politics too.<sup>9</sup>

Eight years later, this is still the predominant belief, even though China remains staunchly committed to the model of the authoritarian party-state. The goal of this paper is not to inject a patronizing, nineteenth-century missionary attitude in America's modern China policy. Nor do I seek to preach the benefits of democratic universalism in foreign policy. Rather, my true intent is to challenge some of the assumptions that underlie U.S. policymaking towards China, and to shed light on a little-understood area of Sinology. My hope is that this will lead to a more informed Sino-U.S. relationship, and that in engaging this rising superpower, we can make decisions that serve the interests of a peaceful future.

### **Christianity in the Middle Kingdom**

Before setting out to answer the questions we have posed, it may be pertinent to retrace the history of China's experience with Christianity. The strength of Christianity in China has ebbed and flowed like a tide in Chinese history. The first wave of Christians who arrived were the Nestorians, followers of a branch of Christianity founded by Nestorius, a former bishop of Constantinople who was declared a heretic “in 431 by the Council of Ephesus for not accepting Mary as *Theotokos* (Greek for 'God-bearer') and preferring the term *Christokos* ('Christ-bearer').”<sup>10</sup> The history of the Nestorians in China has been well-preserved by the Nestorian

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9 Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest.” *Foreign Affairs* 79:1 (Jan.-Feb. 2000). 55-56.

10 Julia Ching, *Chinese Religions* (New York: Orbis Books, 1997). 187.



Tablet, a stone tablet weighing two tons, standing more than nine feet tall and three feet wide, and inscribed with 1,900 Chinese characters. The inscription was done at the orders of Emperor Dezong as an official account of the first major Christian mission to China.

The Nestorians arrived in Changan, the capital of the Tang Dynasty, in the year 635. There they enjoyed great favor from the Chinese emperor, who declared “Proclaim the teachings everywhere for the salvation of the people. Aluoben [leader of the mission], the man of great virtue from the Da Qin empire [i.e., the West], came from a far land and arrived at the capital to present the teachings and images of his religion. His message is mysterious and wonderful beyond our understanding.”<sup>11</sup> While the first 150 years of Nestorian missions enjoyed great success, disaster struck as Islam swept through Central Asia. “In 751, Muslims defeated the Chinese armies in Central Asia.”<sup>12</sup> The Silk Road fell under the control of those hostile to Christianity, and Chinese authorities began a domestic backlash against foreign religions that threatened to “adulterate the customs of China.”<sup>13</sup>

Christianity's second wave in China came in the form of Franciscan friars sent by the Pope “to win the Mongols over as allies against the Muslim Turks.”<sup>14</sup> China's first Catholic archbishop, John of Montecorvino (1307), apparently baptized six thousand people before his death in 1328. The mission reached Quanzhou in the south, where Latin-inscribed tombstones can still be found. Overall, however, Franciscan influence was ephemeral and disappeared faster than the Nestorians'.

The third Christian wave was more successful. “The European Reformation of the sixteenth century, and the Roman Catholic response to it, the Counter-Reformation...sparked a

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11 David Aikman, *Jesus in Beijing* (Washington DC: Regnery Publishing, 2003). 23.

12 Aikman, 24.

13 Aikman, 24.

14 Ching, 190.

renewed European effort to bring Christianity to China.”<sup>15</sup> This time, Christianity was represented by the Jesuits, led by Matteo Ricci, the best-known China missionary. Ricci and his fellow missionaries impressed their hosts in the Chinese court with their knowledge of the sciences of the Renaissance. Significant converts from the Confucian elite included Xu Guangxi, who held the office of Grand Secretary, Li Chicao, who collaborated with Ricci on scientific and religious publications, and Yang Tingyun. Ricci's skill as a clockmaker gained him entry into the court of the emperor. “Ricci in his initial meeting with the emperor presented him with a clock, which none of the Chinese court mechanics knew how to rewind and adjust.”<sup>16</sup> When Ricci died in 1610, there were about 2,500 Catholics in China.

The Jesuits introduced European mathematics, calendrical reform, the telescope, and European cartography to the Chinese. So skillful were the Jesuits at this technological diplomacy that they remained influential even when the Ming Dynasty was usurped by the Manchus:

Two of Ricci's most gifted successors, the German Adam Schall von Bell and his successor Ferdinand Verbiest, were given imperial appointments in the important area of astronomy. The Jesuits had demonstrated that they could predict astronomical events such as eclipses more accurately than China's domestically trained observers of the stars. Their linguistic skills also benefited China in its diplomatic contacts with outside powers. In 1689, at the Treaty of Nerchinsk, which established the terms of relations between China and the emerging power of Russia, the main negotiators on each side were Latin-speaking Jesuits.<sup>17</sup>

The Jesuits were undone by internal disagreements over acculturation. Part of the reason for their success was the Jesuits' willingness to accommodate Chinese traditions such as

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<sup>15</sup> Aikman, 30.

<sup>16</sup> Aikman, 31.

<sup>17</sup> Aikman, 32.

ancestor-worship. In 1715, the pope issued a papal bull that criticized the Jesuits for corrupting the Gospel with these pagan, polytheistic beliefs. New missionaries sent from Europe were unfamiliar with the Chinese language and culture, and increasingly alienated from the imperial court. In the year 1807, there were still more than 1,800 adult Roman Catholic baptisms in China, but it seemed that Christianity in China was again in danger of being swept away by the currents of history.

A fourth wave of Christian evangelism was conducted by Anglo-Saxon Protestants. A prominent figure in the Protestant movement was Robert Morrison, a Presbyterian. Although he baptized only ten Chinese by the time of his death in 1834, he is notable for his translation of the the New Testament in 1813 and the Old Testament in 1819. Protestant influence was most visible in the infamous Taiping Rebellion, which lasted from 1850 to 1864. Hong Xiuquan, a southerner who had been influenced by Morrison's translation of the Bible, gathered a group of 10,000 people against the imperial government in late 1850. Calling themselves the “Worshippers of God,” and practicing an austere and pious lifestyle characterized by segregation of the sexes, they initially enjoyed considerable Protestant Christian support, until Hong announced he was Jesus' younger brother and had been called by Jehovah.

This episode burned a negative image of Christianity as a tool of rebellion into the minds of Chinese leaders even to this day, but evangelism plodded on. It suffered a serious blow under the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, a violent anti-foreign movement that targeted Europeans and Christians in general. “Of the 230 Western missionaries killed, 189 were Protestants, and seventy-nine were from the China Inland Mission.”<sup>18</sup> After the Qing Dynasty was overthrown, China's first leader, Sun Yat-sen, was a Christian. Political turmoil in ensuing years, however, saw the rise of anti-Christian movements, such as those sparked by the New Culture Movement

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<sup>18</sup> Aikman, 42.

in 1915 and the May Fourth Movement in 1919.

When the Chinese Communist Party took power in 1949, it seemed their harsh, oppressive atheism would wipe out Christianity forever. In 1951, Lu Dingyi, chairman of the Cultural Education and Religious Bureaus of the Government Administrative Council, said:

The goal of the struggle is to wipe out the influences of the past more than a hundred years of imperialistic cultural aggression toward our country. In this struggle it is necessary for patriotic Christians from the various religious groups to unite with the government in a common effort under the supervision of the People's Government led by the Chinese Communist Party.<sup>19</sup>

The CCP instructed Chinese Christian groups to eliminate all forms of contact with the West to achieve “self government, self-support, and self-propagation in the Chinese church.”<sup>20</sup> Chinese leaders became particularly wary of Catholicism after the collapse of Communism in Europe: “They [saw] the Church as having played an instrumental role in the downfall of the Communist Party in Europe and the Soviet Union, and the post-Soviet government has given credence to [these] theories...by rebuilding, at vast public expense, the great Orthodox cathedral in Moscow.”<sup>21</sup> As previously mentioned, as late as 1997 the CCP issued a white paper enumerating and denouncing the offenses of Christianity during the period of semi-colonialism. Christianity survived however, mostly underground. Today, with China's increasing contact with the rest of the world, Christianity appears to be enjoying a fifth wave of resurgence in China. While no one knows for certain how many Christians are in China, some estimates place the Catholic population around 12 million, and Protestants as high or higher than 45 million.<sup>22</sup> Others say that

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19 Documents of the Three Self Movement, quoted in Aikman, 153.

20 Documents of the Three Self Movement, quoted in Aikman, 153.

21 Beatrice Leung, “The Sino-Vatican Negotiations: Old Problems in a New Context” in *China Quarterly* No. 153 (Mar. 1998). 133.

22 Jason Kindopp, “Policy Dilemmas in China's Church-State Relations: An Introduction,” in Jason Kindopp and Carol Lee Hamrin, ed.s, *God and Caesar in China: Policy Implications of Church-State Tensions* (Washington

there are more than 100 million Christians in China.

The history of Christianity in China indicates that the religion has not only the capability to thrive, but to become politically and socially influential in Chinese culture. Examining the reasons for the Christians' failure in China gives hope for the prospects of Christian resurgence in the country today. The first and second waves of Christian missions to China failed because contact with their Western sources eroded, allowing the movements to dissipate. Today however, with China's ever-increasing engagement of the developed nations of the West this seems unlikely to be repeated. The third movement failed because of interference from the Church hierarchy which is generally not seen today. As an example of the Church's greater tolerance toward cultural integration in the modern era, in 1939, Pope Pius XII "reversed the decision of 1742, authorizing Christians to take part in ceremonies honoring Confucius and to observe the ancestral rites."<sup>23</sup> The fourth wave of Christianity dithered because of political turmoil including the disintegration of the dynastical system of government and the struggle to establish modern government. For the past few decades, under more responsible leadership and relative international order provided by the Pax Americana, China has enjoyed a stability it has not seen since the height of the Qing Dynasty in the eighteenth century. With these conditions in place, a Christian revival in China could regain and even surpass the social and political accomplishments of the past.

## **Review of Literature**

### *Christianity and Democracy*

In investigating the relationship between democracy and Christianity in China, one might

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DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004). 2.  
 23 Ching, 195.

start by asking whether it is reasonable to assume that a relationship exists between democracy and Christianity at all. On this subject the literature is pleasantly prolific. One of the most well-known political scientists examining this issue, Samuel Huntington, has counted the “striking shift in the doctrine and activities of the Catholic Church...from defenders of the status quo to opponents of authoritarianism,” as one of five major factors contributing to transitions to democracy.<sup>24</sup> Huntington calls the transition of thirty nations to democracy between 1974 and 1990 democracy's “third wave,” with the first two waves occurring in 1820 with the widening of suffrage in the United States, and after World War II with the defeat of fascism. He characterizes this latest phenomenon as “predominantly a Catholic wave.”<sup>25</sup> Huntington notes that cultural factors play an influential role in determining the success of political liberalization and cites a theory stating that “only Western culture provides a suitable base for the development of democratic institutions and, consequently, that democracy is largely inappropriate for non-Western societies.”<sup>26</sup> He admits three weaknesses in this cultural thesis, namely that similar views regarding Catholicism and democracy have not held up in the past, that all cultures have elements that both support and conflict with democratic principles, and that cultures are dynamic and cannot be characterized as solidly in opposition to any political system. However, Huntington does not step away from his earlier characterization of the third wave as predominantly Catholic, suggesting a need for more research explaining this strong correlation.

According to Alfred Stepan, it is a fallacy to assume that separation of church and state is a characteristic of democracy.<sup>27</sup> Stepan looks at the 15 (as of 1990) member states of the European Union and notes that five of them—Denmark, Finland, Greece, Sweden, and the United Kingdom—have established churches, as do some non-EU nations like Norway. While

24 Samuel P. Huntington, “Democracy's Third Wave” in *Journal of Democracy* 2.2 (Spring 1991). 13.

25 Huntington, 13.

26 Huntington, 22-23.

27 Alfred C. Stepan, “Religion, Democracy, and the Twin Tolerations” in *Journal of Democracy* 11.4 (2000). 37-57.

the Netherlands does not have an established church, it allows local communities to establish religious public schools, a practice emulated by Germany and Austria, which do have official religions. Stepan finds that most Western European nations “have arrived at a democratically negotiated freedom of religion from state interference, and all of them allow religious groups freedom not only to worship privately but to organize groups in civil society and political society.”<sup>28</sup> Stepan concludes that democracies do not require secularism, but political dialogue regarding the “twin tolerations,” the minimum boundaries for freedom of action for political institutions with respect to religious bodies and vice versa. Stepan's concept of “twin tolerations” will be further elaborated upon by the authors to follow.

In “The Catholic Wave,” Daniel Philpott examines the cases of Catholic-led opposition to authoritarianism in various countries around the world, including Poland, the Philippines, Brazil, Spain, and Argentina, and identifies the factors which have led some movements to be more effective than others.<sup>29</sup> He notes that historically, Catholicism has clashed with liberal democracy. In the nineteenth century, the Catholic church condemned religious liberty, and in the twentieth century, concordats were signed with fascist dictatorships. This relationship changed, however, as the Church came to accept Stepan's “twin tolerations:” whereby

the state respects the rights of all religious bodies to practice and express their faith and to participate in democratic politics, while religious bodies accept religious freedom for people of all faiths (and no faith) and renounce claims to special constitutional status or prerogatives.<sup>30</sup>

Recognition of the twin tolerations was key. The rapprochement between Catholicism and democracy occurred during the Second Vatican Council convened by Pope John XXIII, and the

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<sup>28</sup> Stepan, 42.

<sup>29</sup> Daniel Philpott, “The Catholic Wave” in *Journal of Democracy* Vol. 15 No. 2 (Apr. 2004). 32-46.

<sup>30</sup> Philpott, 32.

most popular advocate of its message was Pope John Paul II who presided over much of the Catholic-led democratic transformations of the late twentieth century.

In exercising its democratizing influence, however, the effectiveness of the Church varied. In countries like Spain and Poland, energetic democratic movements were spurred by the Church, while authoritarian regimes in Hungary and Czechoslovakia did not face strong Catholic opposition. Philpott attributes this variation to extent of differentiation between the Church and state. In a democracy, a differentiated Church can flourish under a constitutionally-protected freedom of religion, while remaining politically influential through persuasion, protest and appeals to legitimacy. Under authoritarianism, churches are effective in triggering democratic transformation when they “already embody—albeit in a limited, beleaguered way, to be sure—the differentiation that they will enjoy far more fully once a democratic constitution has been realized.”<sup>31</sup> Churches which were influential in overthrowing authoritarian regimes had succeeded in claiming a small measure of political space in which to operate.

Philpott identifies six factors which constitute differentiation between church and state: autonomy in finances, appointments, doctrine and practice; inheritance of a legacy of autonomy that predates authoritarianism; transnational ties with allied outsiders; strength of these transnational ties; links to non-Church movements and organizations within the country; and an alliance with national identity that creates solidarity with citizens. Philpott concludes by noting that when it comes to democracy, the nature of the relationship between Church and state is far more important than the level of religious belief or practice.

Woodberry and Shah also draw on Stepan's concept of the “twin tolerations” to make the case for a causal association between Protestantism and democracy.<sup>32</sup> They use a cross-national

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<sup>31</sup> Philpott, 42.

<sup>32</sup> Robert D. Woodberry and Timothy S. Shah, “The Pioneering Protestants” in *Journal of Democracy* Vol. 15 No. 2 (Apr. 2004). 47-61.



statistical analysis of religion and level of political democracy, account for time, region, and various definitions of democracy, and control for variables such as identity of colonial power, number of years that power was a democracy, and penetration of the English language. The authors find seven mechanisms that “explain how and why Protestantism tends, on balance, to promote democracy and democratization over time.”<sup>33</sup> While these mechanisms do not always result in democratization, there is nevertheless a strong and consistent statistical relationship between Protestantism and democracy, as well as durability of democratic institutions.

The first mechanism mediating between Protestantism and democracy is religious pluralism. The Protestant movement divided into many sects due to the lack of a central authority for resolving doctrinal disputes; this gave rise to the religious pluralism that fostered the existence of the twin tolerations. Protestantism also allowed relative religious liberty, spurred by the Protestant conviction that true faith could not be coerced by an external force. The second mechanism was the religion's contributions to democratic theory and practice. For example, the Calvinist “societal covenant” gave rise to the “social contract” and “belief in the inviolability of the individual conscience fueled the urge to limit state power.”<sup>34</sup> Third, Protestantism contributed to the development of civil society because its many groups were often discriminated against by state churches and had to fight for their own rights, establishing the principle that organizations could exist outside of governmental control. Church leaders and lay organizers “learned leadership skills, built wide geographical networks, and accumulated other resources helpful in organizing non-governmental organizations and social movements.”<sup>35</sup> Fourth, Protestants contributed to mass education by promoting literacy so that ordinary people could read the Bible in their own language. “Mass education fosters democracy by increasing exposure to democratic

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33 Woodberry and Shah, 48.

34 Woodberry and Shah, 51.

35 Woodberry and Shah, 52.

ideals, promoting economic growth and the rise of a middle class, and dispersing influence beyond a small elite.”<sup>36</sup>

The fifth mechanism that linked Protestantism to democracy was printing, which was closely linked to the Church's promotion of education. Printing made possible the development of a public sphere of discourse and debate. Sixth, Protestantism may have contributed to economic development through the transfer of resources and, as Max Weber famously argued, the advocacy of ethics that lead to material well-being. Finally, Woodberry and Shah contend that Protestantism contributes to economic development and a vibrant public sphere by reducing corruption:

Scholarly research suggests that political corruption inhibits the emergence and survival of democracy by hampering social organization, undermining trust, and undercutting support for the political system. Corruption also indirectly hampers democracy by stifling economic development, increasing economic inequality, and restricting education.<sup>37</sup>

Woodberry and Shah's statistical analysis shows that societies with more Protestants have less political corruption and inefficiency. The authors note that some Protestant areas in Africa and Latin America seem to buck the trend between the religion and lower levels of corruption and authoritarianism, but argue that it is only a matter of time before these societies reform, and that the evidence linking Protestantism and democracy is too strong to ignore.

In an article entitled “The Ambivalent Orthodox,” Elizabeth Prodromou discusses the factors that make Orthodox Christianity compatible with democratic politics, as well as the reasons Orthodox churches have displayed ambivalence about the pluralism necessary in

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<sup>36</sup> Woodberry and Shah, 53.

<sup>37</sup> Woodberry and Shah, 56.

democracies.<sup>38</sup> Certain elements within Orthodoxy's theological doctrines can reinforce democratic ideals. Among these are the Orthodox Church's belief that communion with God is only possible if humans use their free will responsibly. "Thus Orthodoxy, like other Christian traditions, affirms both freedom and responsibility."<sup>39</sup> The structure of the Church is influenced by the Trinitarian view of God: there is unity in a division of responsibility between bishops, clerics, and lay believers, just as God is one being who is manifested in diverse forms. The Church is "unified at the global level by common beliefs, practices, and institutions, but also allows for a measure of diversity and distinctiveness through the practice of decentralization, which spreads authority out to the regional, national, and local levels."<sup>40</sup> These theological characteristics suggest that Orthodoxy is compatible with democracy.

Prodromou attributes the Orthodox Church's tepid support and even hesitant suspicion of religious pluralism to its negative historical experiences with religious competition. Historically, regions of the world the Orthodox church have enjoyed the most prominence in, such as the Byzantine Empire and Russia, were susceptible to conquest by non-Christians like the Turks and Mongols. This led the Church to associate difference with subjugation and oppression. In recent history,

Orthodoxy's experience of difference has been dominated by the struggle for survival under powerful secularist and totalitarian regimes intent on either coopting or eliminating Orthodoxy in its historic homelands, or by efforts to survive as an insecure minority religion under authoritarian Middle Eastern or African regimes with records of repressing or abusing communal minorities.<sup>41</sup>

Additionally, many Orthodox Christian communities have little experience living under

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38 Elizabeth Prodromou, "The Ambivalent Orthodox" in *Journal of Democracy* Vol. 15 No. 2 (Apr. 2004). 62-75.

39 Prodromou, 65.

40 Prodromou, 65.

41 Prodromou, 66.

democracies, and are wary of state-imposed religious pluralism.

Prodromou argues that the Orthodox Church's apparent ambivalence toward pluralism does not undermine the capability of coexistence between Orthodoxy and democracy. For one thing, "when Orthodox figures express ambivalence toward pluralism, they frequently do so by relying on democratic premises, processes, and practices."<sup>42</sup> For example, the Russian Orthodox Church's opposition to proselytizing by non-Orthodox religions was justified by the Church's disadvantage vis-a-vis the Catholic and Protestant churches in terms of transnational resources—a side effect of the Soviet years. Furthermore, "the latest Freedom House report ranks the twenty countries that can be included within the Orthodox well within the range of those it defines as Free or Partly Free."<sup>43</sup> There is also a movement within the Church for greater internal pluralization: some Orthodox churches in the United States have sought to abandon their ethnic separations in favor of a single American Orthodox Church. The author asserts that Orthodoxy's own solution to the dilemma of pluralism and democracy will enrich the democratic transitions of Orthodox communities throughout the world.

According to Francis Fukuyama, democracies were able to originate and flourish in Western societies because Christian values are predominant in Western culture.<sup>44</sup> Christianity upholds individual rights by asserting that all people have a duty to God that takes precedence over all other obligations, from family to the state. "In modern liberalism, the Christian concept of a universal God is replaced with the concept of an underlying human nature that becomes the universal basis of right."<sup>45</sup> For example, while human rights advocates are not all Christian, they all nevertheless share Christianity's emphasis on universal rights and the individual conscience as the ultimate authority. Furthermore, Christianity shares close association with democracy as a

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42 Prodromou, 71.

43 Prodromou, 71.

44 Francis Fukuyama, "Confucianism and Democracy" in *Journal of Democracy* 6.2 (1995). 20-33.

45 Fukuyama, 30.

means for people to achieve universal and equal recognition, an essential human desire that is expressed when minimum subsistence levels of income are met. In a 1992 article, Fukuyama clarifies, "The principle of universal recognition originated historically in the Christian doctrine of the universal equality of man before God, which explains the high degree of correlation between stable democracy and Christian culture in the world today."<sup>46</sup> Fukuyama argues that while there is no analogous ideology in Chinese Confucianism, Confucian tradition does not serve as an inherent obstacle to Chinese political liberalization.

### *Political Attitudes of Christians in China*

Tinming Ko's survey of 272 Protestant ministers in Hong Kong prior to its reunification with China found that they were participatory in political acts, particularly, "citizen contacting, taking a public stand on public issues, taking a pulpit stand on political and public issues, taking a pulpit stand on political groups and parties, and engaging in group actions."<sup>47</sup> In general, while the ministers approved of personal political behavior, they disapproved of collective adoption of a political stance by the Church: the top five acts of political participation approved by the ministers were writing to the media, contacting public officials, contacting council members, signing petitions, and encouraging their congregations to vote, while the bottom five were running for political office, taking a post in a political party, taking a stand on social action groups when preaching, taking a stand on a political party when preaching, and encouraging their congregations to vote for a political candidate.

When questioned about their views of democracy, "68.4% agreed and 18.6% emphatically, that every citizen should have an equal chance to influence government policy, but

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46 Francis Fukuyama, "Capitalism & Democracy: The Missing Link" in *Journal of Democracy* 3.3 (1992). 106.

47 Tinming Ko, *The Sacred Citizens and the Secular City: Political Participation of Protestant ministers in Hong Kong during a time of change* (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2000). 159.

only 38.3% agreed and 9.3% strongly agreed that democracy is the best form of government, in fact, 40.9% of them felt half and half about the pros and cons of a democratic form of government.”<sup>48</sup> According to Ko, this result may indicate that religious people are less committed to democratic values because of their faith. However, Ko's findings on the supportiveness of Protestant ministers of political participation are encouraging to this essay's purpose, even though Ko's work does not extend to Christian and Catholic churches in general, the lay population, or the mainland Chinese population.

In his 2003 book *Jesus in Beijing*, David Aikman conducts interviews with dozens of figures in China's Christian revival: the patriarchs: old-timers who endured harsh years of repression in China's political consolidation, uncles: leaders of the Christian revival under communism, prominent female and youth church leaders, seminary professors, house church leaders, Christian dissidents, academics, artists, writers, and foreigners. Aikman also conducts a detailed historical examination of the Christian experience in China. His findings lead him to infer that:

[at] the present rate of growth in the number of Christians in the countryside, in the cities, and especially within China's social and cultural establishment, it is possible that Christians will constitute 20 to 30 percent of China's population within three decades. If that should happen, it is almost certain that a Christian view of the world will be the dominant worldview within China's political and cultural establishment, and possibly also within senior military circles.<sup>49</sup>

Aikman hypothesizes that this transformation could make China a more responsible power in the international system in terms of support for Israel, human rights, and the rule of law. He

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48 Ko, 130.

49 Aikman, 285.

describes Chinese Christians as moderate reformers who are cautious about regime change in the short-term future: “They want to see religious and political freedom come to China, but in an evolutionary, reformist process, not through political violence against the authorities.”<sup>50</sup> While Aikman's conclusions support the hypothesis of this paper, his targeted sample does not provide the opportunity to compare support for political reform between Christians and other segments of the Chinese population, nor whether this support truly stems from religious sources.

Leslie Hook follows Aikman's methodology of conducting interviews with Christians in various segments of the Chinese elite.<sup>51</sup> She finds that Christianity has been gaining popularity in China's cities because of its ability to serve a dual function: providing a humanistic framework in which to exercise intellectual freedom as well as offering societal values that counter problems which have emerged in China's market transition. Hook's interviews indicate that “many in Beijing bring up disillusionment with communism to explain the trend of Christian conversion among China's intellectuals.”<sup>52</sup> According to Hook, the increasing number of Christians in China will facilitate greater religious freedom in the future.

One surprising result of Hook's research, however, is that some Christians in China were attracted to the religion because of disillusionment with the democracy movement. The failure of the 1989 student democracy protests left many bitter and disappointed with the movement's internal struggles. “They started to think that they needed something more—a religious faith—so many became Christian.”<sup>53</sup> Chinese Christians are divided over the association of their religion with any political ideology: “There are deep disagreements within the Christian camp between those who see Christianity as a necessary background for a democratic society in the future, and

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50 Aikman, 289.

51 Leslie Hook, “Christianity Comes to China's Cities” in *Far Eastern Economic Review* Vol. 169 No. 10 (Dec. 2006), 10-16.

52 Hook, 14.

53 Yu Jie, quoted in Leslie Hook. 14.

those who strongly oppose any such association.”<sup>54</sup> The majority of people interviewed by Hook denied any political implications of their faith. As is the case for Aikman's work, it remains to be seen whether there is nevertheless a difference in political attitudes between Christians and non-Christians, and whether Hook's findings can be verified through a quantitative analysis.

Yang's investigation of conversion to Christianity in urban China also finds that the Tiananmen movement played a significant role in the decision to convert.<sup>55</sup> However, rather than interpreting Christianity as a replacement for democratic aspirations, Yang interprets this phenomenon as the search for an alternative to communism. He bases his findings on biographical sketches and interviews of Christian converts, mainly in Nanfang City, and cites the significant number of former political activists who converted to Christianity, as well as a large increase in baptisms following 1989 as evidence supporting his interpretation.

In an article entitled “Accession to the World Trade Organization and State Adaptation,” Kim-Kwong Chan discusses how China's integration into the global economy has been accompanied by sweeping socioeconomic changes such as “economic polarization, countervailing regional dynamics, massive population flows, new social classes, and diverse opportunities.”<sup>56</sup> This transformation has catalyzed religious growth and revival by providing greater transnational interaction, regionalism, and internal mobility. Increased transnational interaction gives China more contact with more value systems such as Christianity. Regionalism sparked off by regional economic diversification has led local communities to look toward religion as a means of defining identity, and a source of stability amidst massive change. Greater internal mobility, as represented by migrant workers seeking jobs in the new open economy, has

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54 Hook, 15.

55 Fenggang Yang, “Lost in the Market, Saved at McDonald's: Conversion to Christianity in Urban China” in *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* (2005) 44(4). 423-441.

56 Kim-Kwong Chan, “Accession to the World Trade Organization and State Adaptation” in Jason Kindopp and Carol Lee Hamrin, ed.s, *God and Caesar in China: Policy Implications of Church-State Tensions* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004). 58-74.



made Chinese society more permeable by religious transmission than ever before.

The CCP has instituted a five-pronged response to the challenges posed by WTO accession and religion. The first policy is recognition, the acknowledgment that religion is a fundamental component of civilization and the adoption of a pragmatic stance toward it, akin to Chinese pragmatism regarding capitalism. The second response is containment, the attempt to define those religions which are acceptable and legal, and those like the Falungong, which are “evil cults” or “splittists.” The third theme is guidance, whereby “the party provides guidance to the religious groups, directing them toward a particular orientation and role in Chinese society, and these groups are expected to follow its leadership if they hope to be 'adopted' into the socialist Chinese 'family.'”<sup>57</sup> The fourth response is nationalism, the insistence that Chinese religious groups, such as the Catholic church, remain distant from their international counterparts in favor of state-sanctioned authorities. The final policy is suppression, the willingness to use force to suppress autonomous religious groups like the Falungong.

Chan notes that religious control has been the prerogative of Chinese government for centuries and is unlikely to disappear anytime soon. However, he notes that with the sea change brought on by WTO accession, “religion in China will begin to seek a new church-state relationship, shifting from the subservient model envisioned by the Chinese authorities to something yet to be defined.”<sup>58</sup> One aspect of this new relationship will be greater participation by faith-based groups in building civic society, providing social services, and assisting in economic development. “By further cultivating national networks and international linkages, religious groups can become an important element in society change, both nationally and internationally.”<sup>59</sup> Religion might also transform society by channeling frustration and

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<sup>57</sup> Chan, 68.

<sup>58</sup> Chan, 71.

<sup>59</sup> Chan, 71.

disenfranchisement into a political force. Chan's enlightening discussion shows the need for greater research in the areas of Chinese religion and politics to how successful the CCP has been in mediating the tension between the religious issues springing from economic modernization and the government's religious policy.

Peng Liu describes religion as one of the most persistent problem areas plaguing Sino-U.S. relations.<sup>60</sup> On this issue, he is cautiously optimistic. According to Liu, China's new leaders will increasingly be forced to initiate political reforms to maintain public support, because there is not much room left for reform in economic policy. "Compared with other sensitive political demands—such as demands to allow the freedom of political association, to loosen media controls, or to reform the election system—religion is a relatively easy arena in which to make adjustments."<sup>61</sup> Political elites are increasingly discussing religious issues, whereas in the past they ignored religion altogether. "The senior leaders of the Chinese Communist Party are mentally preparing for changes in religious policy."<sup>62</sup> There has been a de facto loosening of the restrictions on communicating with international religious bodies. Liu asserts that "efforts to maintain current religious policies will give way to the next generation of leaders' political need to win over the broadest internal and external support."<sup>63</sup> Liu's article highlights the enormous potential of religion as a source of Chinese political liberalization.

Chung et al., recognizing that many of the assessments of societal challenges to the Chinese regime "are made on the basis of fragmented and anecdotal evidence without providing systematic and empirical grounds for their claims"<sup>64</sup> attempt to describe the origins of Chinese

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60 Peng Liu, "Unreconciled Differences: The Staying Power of Religion" in Jason Kindopp and Carol Lee Hamrin, ed.s, *God and Caesar in China: Policy Implications of Church-State Tensions* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004). 149-164.

61 Liu, 162.

62 Liu, 162.

63 Liu, 163.

64 Jae Ho Chung, Hongyi Lai and Ming Xia. "Mounting Challenges to Governance in China: Surveying Collective Protestors, Religious Sects and Criminal Organizations" in *China Journal* No. 56 (Jul. 2006).

social instability and trace its evolution, particularly since the 1990s. Their study focuses on three dimensions of social instability in China: rising popular protests, the existence of “unofficial” religious groups, and expanding criminal networks. The authors analyze data on collective public security incidents, number of religious protests and independent religious organizations, and crime data as reported by the Chinese government to examine the magnitude and evolutionary trend of these three sources of instability, respectively.

In the realm of religion they note that missionaries have enjoyed greater freedom to operate since the 1980s. The number of independent religious organizations grew from the 1980s to the 1990s, peaking in 1999, and then falling since 2000 as a result of the Falun Gong crackdown. The authors explain, “in the decades of reform, religious protests have persisted although their frequency has fluctuated dramatically and perhaps cyclically. These protests largely reflect discontent with state restrictions or crackdowns and the state’s atheist stance.”<sup>65</sup> Interestingly, they find that fluctuations in religious protests have been correlated with periods of inflation and unemployment. Most recently:

Religious protests resurfaced between 1998 and 2002, riding on urban discontent with high unemployment and peasants’ discontent with heavy fiscal burdens.

They peaked in 1999 and registered 10 to 33 protests for each of the remaining years. They again dwindled to a near-bottom level between 2003 and 2005.<sup>66</sup>

Chung et al. indicate that horizontal linkages between religious groups and interconnectedness between these groups and the other two dimensions of social instability compound the problem for the Chinese Communist Party. They conclude that “for the weak and the lost in China, [collective public security incidents] are their groaning, religious sects their opium, and

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<sup>65</sup> Chung et al., 14.

<sup>66</sup> Chung et al., 15.

organized crime ‘a stepladder of social ascent.’”<sup>67</sup> Though the authors’ quantitative analysis supports the assertions of religion’s potential to challenge CCP authoritarianism posed by other scholars in this literature review, for the purposes of this essay it raises more questions than it answers. By treating all religious sects as a monolith, we are unable to distinguish political attitudes of Christians from other groups, like the Falun Gong. The findings of this article also seem to indicate that economic factors may be a source of political instability in China, and does not yield insight as to whether religion or economic concern is the more significant catalyst of instability.

## **Methodology**

Two themes emerge from the literature reviewed herein. First, scholars have posited that a positive, and perhaps strong, relationship may exist between Christianity and support for democratic politics. Second, the magnitude and significance of this relationship has not been quantified in the Chinese case, and there have been little attempts to separate the effect of Christianity from other, possibly confounding, variables that influence liberal political attitudes. As previously stated, my research design hypothesizes that there is a positive relationship between profession of Christianity and support for democracy.

Primary methodology used to test this hypothesis was an online survey. The survey was created using SurveyMonkey (<http://www.surveymonkey.com/>) on 3 February 2008, and data collection continued until 8 March 2008. The survey was sent to 55 students at American University, 214 students at George Washington University, 132 students at Georgetown University and approximately 30 students at the Catholic University of America (total population: 431). A sample of 137 responses was collected, for a response rate of 31.79%.

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<sup>67</sup> Chung et al., 30.

Respondents were given an opportunity to be entered into a drawing for a \$50 gift card to a store of their choice.

Variables in the study included: gender (male/female), whether or not respondent was a member of a Chinese ethnic minority (i.e. Uighur, Mongolian, other non-Han?), number of months studied in the U.S., major/field of study, religion (Atheist/Agnostic, Buddhist, Christian/Catholic, Confucian, Daoist, Jewish, Muslim, or Other), family's approximate annual income in Chinese RMB, whether hometown is a large city, a medium city, a town, or a small village, and whether respondent is a member of the Chinese Communist Party. The dependent variable asked the respondent to rank—choosing between “Not important,” “Somewhat important,” “Important,” and “Very important”—eight challenges facing the CCP: Controlling population growth, fixing governmental corruption, modernizing the military, redistributing wealth to the poor, democratic political reform (direct elections), protecting the environment, expanding the economy and trade, and integrating Taiwan. The order that these challenges appeared in the survey was randomized for each respondent to eliminate bias.

Data analysis was conducted through multinomial ordinal logistic regression using the R statistical programming language. R code is provided in Appendix A. Dummy variables were created for each categorical variable, such that: (Sex: Male=1, Female=2), (Minority: 1=yes, 2=no), (Religion: 1=Atheist/Agnostic, 2=Buddhist, 3=Christian/Catholic, 4=Confucian, 5=Daoist, 6=Jewish, 7=Muslim) [responses for the ‘Other’ variable were readily encoded into the other seven categories], (Hometown: 1=a large city, 2=a medium city, 3=town, 4=village), (member of CCP: 1=yes, 2=no), and (Major: 1=business, 2=engineering, 3=science/math, 4=social sciences, 5=liberal arts, 6=law). Months studied in the United States and annual income were left as continuous variables. The design of the survey suggests a sample size of  $n=95$  is the

bare minimum required for statistical significance; the actual sample size collected exceeds this threshold, but we should note that it still might not be large enough to be statistically representative of mainstream Chinese political perception.

## **Results**

Graphical representation of the proportion of responses regarding Christian vs. non-Christian attitudes on the questions asked in the survey is given in Figures 1 and 2. Rankings are coded such that a value of 1 corresponds to “not important,” a value of 2 to “somewhat important,” a value of 3 to “important,” and a value of 4 to “very important.” Graphs that are similar in shape, such as environment and population control, indicate that Christianity is not a factor in differentiating political attitudes on the issue. The response graph in Figure 1 for our variable of interest, support for democracy, shows that Christian and non-Christian attitudes are not as similar as on environment, but a more systematic test is needed to see whether a difference truly exists.




Figure 1: Rankings for democracy, environment, military, and redistribution.




Figure 2: Rankings of trade, corruption, Taiwan, and population control.



Variable	Fisher Test P-Value
Democracy	0.0004421
Environment	0.2097
Military	4.915e-05
Redistribution of wealth	0.08752
Trade	0.01009
Corruption	0.0004334
Taiwan	0.03538
Population Growth Control	6.223e-05

*Table 1: Fisher test values for distributional differences.*

To test whether differences exist in the distribution of Christians versus non-Christian political opinions across our eight dependent variables, a Fisher exact test for contingency table independence was conducted (Table 1). At the  $\alpha=0.01$  significance level, there is no reason to reject the hypothesis that there is no difference in rankings of environment, wealth distribution, trade, and the Taiwan strait issue between Christians and non-Christians. For democracy, military modernization, corruption, and population growth control, being a Christian alters the distribution. The Fisher test, however, does not reveal how the distributions differ, nor does it offer insight on the relative significance of Christianity vis à vis our other control variables.

In order to test the effect of religion on attitudes regarding political reform, our dependent variable of interest, a multinomial ordinal logistic regression was conducted on the data (Table 2). The full model yields:

Logistic Regression Model									
<pre> lm(formula = as.factor(democracy) ~ factor(sex) + factor(minority) +   months + +buddhist + christian + confucian + daoist + jew +   muslim + engineering + mathsci + socsci + libarts + law +   income + midcity + town + village + factor(ccp), data = data,   x = T, y = T) </pre>									
Obs	Max	Deriv	Model	L.R.	d.f.	P	C	Dxy	
137		3		25.58	19	0.1424	0.666	0.332	
Gamma		Tau-a		R2	Brier				
0.335		0.242		0.183	0.123				
	Coef	S.E.	Wald	Z	P				
sex=2	-1.600e-01	3.634e-01	-0.44	0.6597					
minority=2	-9.732e-01	7.787e-01	-1.25	0.2114					
months	-1.607e-02	1.038e-02	-1.55	0.1217					
buddhist	-1.465e-01	5.133e-01	-0.29	0.7754					
christian	6.497e-01	5.999e-01	1.08	0.2788					
confucian	-6.064e-02	6.063e-01	-0.10	0.9203					
daoist	3.013e+00	1.263e+00	2.39	0.0171					
jew	-9.413e-01	1.872e+00	-0.50	0.6152					
muslim	8.344e+00	3.078e+01	0.27	0.7863					
engineering	-8.916e-02	5.430e-01	-0.16	0.8696					
mathsci	-5.424e-02	5.152e-01	-0.11	0.9162					
socsci	7.345e-01	5.248e-01	1.40	0.1617					
libarts	1.031e+00	7.143e-01	1.44	0.1489					
law	-1.270e-01	5.547e-01	-0.23	0.8189					
income	2.082e-08	1.212e-07	0.17	0.8637					
midcity	-8.837e-01	3.757e-01	-2.35	0.0187					
town	3.738e-01	6.703e-01	0.56	0.5771					
village	-1.232e-01	9.312e-01	-0.13	0.8948					
ccp=2	-3.422e-01	4.787e-01	-0.71	0.4748					

*Table 2: Full Regression Model for Democracy*

The results of the regression indicate that being Christian has a positive effect on democratic political inclinations, which supports our hypothesis. However, the p-value for the Christianity variable indicates that it is not the most significant determinant of support for democracy (at  $\alpha=0.10$ ). Additionally, with so many insignificant factors, the model itself is not statistically significant ( $P=0.1424$ ). To streamline this model, we use backward elimination based on p-values and find that the most efficient explanatory factors for variation in democratic support are whether or not the student is a member of a Chinese ethnic minority, months spent studying in the U.S., being a Daoist, studying the social sciences, majoring in the liberal arts, and

coming from a medium-sized city (Table 3). Though not statistically significant, the variable for Christianity is left in the model to show the direction and relative strength of the Christianity variable in determining support for democracy. Furthermore, the reduced model's overall significance has much improved over the full model ( $P=0.004$ ).

Logistic Regression Model									
<pre> lrm(formula = as.factor(democracy) ~ factor(minority) + months +   christian + daoist + socsci + libarts + midcity, data = data,   x = T, y = T) </pre>									
Frequencies of Responses									
1	2	3	4						
20	47	44	26						
Obs	Max	Deriv	Model	L.R.	d.f.	P	C	Dxy	
137		6e-10		20.87	7	0.004	0.654	0.307	
Gamma		Tau-a		R2	Brier				
0.317		0.223		0.152	0.123				
	Coef	S.E.	Wald	Z	P				
y>=2	3.47352	0.789478	4.40	0.0000					
y>=3	1.60768	0.748666	2.15	0.0318					
y>=4	-0.08364	0.731802	-0.11	0.9090					
minority=2	-1.42761	0.723366	-1.97	0.0484					
months	-0.01672	0.009585	-1.74	0.0812					
christian	0.63606	0.552935	1.15	0.2500					
daoist	2.93564	1.244744	2.36	0.0184					
socsci	0.81199	0.418840	1.94	0.0525					
libarts	1.14705	0.648731	1.77	0.0770					
midcity	-0.82694	0.348503	-2.37	0.0177					

*Table 3: Reduced Regression Model for Democracy*

Table 4 summarizes influential explanatory factors for the remaining seven political issues. A similar process of backwards stepwise regression was performed for each dependent variable. Although explaining these exceeds the scope of our inquiry, they may warrant future research and investigation.

Issue	Estimate for Christianity	P-Value	Statistically Significant Covariates ( $\alpha=0.10$ ).
Environment	0.2285	0.7260	Not an ethnic minority (-), Being from a medium city (-), Being from a town (-)
Military	-0.5780	0.2963	Math/science major (-), Social science major(-), Law student (-), being from a medium city (-), From a village (+), Not a member of CCP (-)
Economic Redistribution	1.4127	0.0380	Christian (+), Buddhist (-)
Trade expansion	0.4124	0.4675	Muslim (-), Social science major (-)
Government Corruption	0.9486	0.1446	Math/science major (+), Medium city (-), Not member of CCP (-)
Taiwan	0.31911	0.5701	Female (-), Months studied in U.S. (-), Law student (-), Not member of CCP (-)
Population Growth Control	-0.7486	0.1868	Female (+), Social science major (-), From a medium city (-)

*Table 4: Significant covariates for sociopolitical issues other than democratic reform. Direction of support given in parentheses.*

## Conclusion

Many scholars have contended that Christianity and democratic government are mutually supportive, and that in authoritarian governments like China, Christianity is a force for political liberalization. This study sought to quantify the strength and direction of the relationship

between Christianity and democracy in China, and to shed light on the broader question of religion and democracy in general. Through surveys of 137 Chinese international students in Washington DC, we found a positive relationship between being a Christian and support for greater political freedom, but that the factors that best explained variation in democratic support were length of time spent studying in the U.S., being a Daoist, being a liberal arts major or social science major, being a member of a Chinese ethnic minority, and being from a mid-size city.

Why would these factors emerge as the most significant questions in our survey? Membership in an ethnic minority group has perhaps a more apparent explanation. Chinese minorities often have little political space in which to organize and preserve their own cultural traditions, outside of those organizations created by the central government. They may favor greater democratization because they believe their political concerns are not being addressed under the current regime; the cases of political unrest in Xinjiang and Tibet today are illustrative of this dissatisfaction.<sup>68</sup> Majoring in the liberal arts or social science and support for democracy at first glance seem totally unrelated. Liberal arts and social science majors may be more likely to support political liberalization because in China, parents urge their children to study career-oriented subjects such as engineering, law, or science. By enrolling in alternative majors, Chinese students show a resistance to central authority and desire for personal control of their lives which may translate to favoring a decentralized and democratic government in the political arena.

The other significant covariates seem to be less easily explained. Perhaps being a Daoist makes a Chinese person more receptive to democratic reform because Daoism venerates coexistence with a natural order. Some have argued that democracy is the most natural and

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68 For example, see the case of Uighur activist Rebiya Kadeer in Paulette Chu Miniter, "Taking a Stand for China's Uighurs," *Far Eastern Economic Review* Vol. 170, No. 2 (Mar. 2007), 27.

sustainable form of government, that people will desire political agency once their basic economic needs are met, and that democracy is a singular solution to traditional dilemmas: “to ensure majority rule and to respect minority rights, to strengthen communities and to liberate individuals, [and] to empower governments and to limit that power at the same time.”<sup>69</sup> The negative relationship between support for democracy and length of time spent studying in the U.S. seems to contradict the widely held belief about the appeal of U.S. political institutions.<sup>70</sup> Perhaps our results are skewed because the sample was taken in Washington D.C., and proximity to the nation's political center has exposed the foreign students to the less appealing aspects of American politics. Why would being from a medium-sized city lead to less support for democratic reform compared to those from large cities, towns, and villages? The most likely answer to this question, and probably the most likely explanation for the appearance of the previous two covariates in our model as well, is that our sample is not large enough to accurately describe the relationship between the size of one's hometown and support for democracy. Statistically significant results may have resulted from this model due to an inadequate sampling size or multicollinearity within the data.

As for whether Christianity will be the seed of Chinese democratic reform, the answer is far from clear. Because Christians are more likely to value political liberalization than non-Christians, the potential is there, but only time will tell how China will ascend to the ranks of the industrialized democracies. When a nation is swept by the tide of political change, it is often difficult to discern which current—economic, social, military, etc.—is most responsible for

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69 Condoleezza Rice, “Liberal Democracy,” *Vital Speeches of the Day* 72 (May 2006), 426.

70 The U.S. Department of State has remarked that one tool of democracy promotion is to “create many more opportunities for foreign students and visitors to come to the United States for study, internships, and participation in programs designed to expose them to the workings of American democracy and the American people.” See Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Recommendations to the Secretary of State from the Advisory Committee on Democracy Promotion,” U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. Washington DC. 1 October 2007. <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/93031.htm>.

pulling that nation out to the sea of democratic reform. Thus, U.S. foreign policy does not need a religious- or ideologically-based foreign policy so much as it requires the patience to realize that democratization will take place on China's terms, not our own. In the meantime, further research can be done by expanding the scope of this survey, providing a more comprehensive explanation of why the factors in our final model are correlated with democratic support, and explaining how the CCP has resisted and accommodated these challenges. That way, when China's 1.3 billion citizens join the millions living democratically throughout the world, we will be ready for it.

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## Appendix A: R Code for Statistical Analysis

```
#John O'Trakoun
#Capstone: China's Christians: The Vanguard of Democratic Reform
#Source code for data analysis
```

```

#load data and libraries
library(Design)
library(MASS)
data=read.csv("c:/john/capstone.csv",header=T)
attach(data)

#variable change
atheist<-(religion==1)*1
buddhist<-(religion==2)*1
christian<-(religion==3)*1
confucian<-(religion==4)*1
daoist<-(religion==5)*1
jew<-(religion==6)*1
muslim<-(religion==7)*1
business<-(major==1)*1
engineering<-(major==2)*1
mathsci<-(major==3)*1
socsci<-(major==4)*1
libarts<-(major==5)*1
law<-(major==6)*1
bigcity<-(hometown==1)*1
midcity<-(hometown==2)*1
town<-(hometown==3)*1
village<-(hometown==4)*1
sqmonths<-months*months

#exploratory analysis
summary(data)
crank=democracy[religion==3] #christians rankings of democratic reform
ncrank=democracy[religion!=3] #other religions rankings of dem. reform

crank.1=vector(length=length(crank))
crank.2=vector(length=length(crank))
crank.3=vector(length=length(crank))
crank.4=vector(length=length(crank))
ncrank.1=vector(length=length(ncrank))
ncrank.2=vector(length=length(ncrank))
ncrank.3=vector(length=length(ncrank))
ncrank.4=vector(length=length(ncrank))

crank.1[crank==1]=1
crank.2[crank==2]=1
crank.3[crank==3]=1
crank.4[crank==4]=1
ncrank.1[ncrank==1]=1
ncrank.2[ncrank==2]=1
ncrank.3[ncrank==3]=1
ncrank.4[ncrank==4]=1

crank=envirom[religion==3] #christians rankings of environment
ncrank=envirom[religion!=3] #other religions rankings of environment

crank.1e=vector(length=length(crank))
crank.2e=vector(length=length(crank))
crank.3e=vector(length=length(crank))

```

```

crank.4e=vector(length=length(crank))
ncrank.1e=vector(length=length(ncrank))
ncrank.2e=vector(length=length(ncrank))
ncrank.3e=vector(length=length(ncrank))
ncrank.4e=vector(length=length(ncrank))

crank.1e[crank==1]=1
crank.2e[crank==2]=1
crank.3e[crank==3]=1
crank.4e[crank==4]=1
ncrank.1e[ncrank==1]=1
ncrank.2e[ncrank==2]=1
ncrank.3e[ncrank==3]=1
ncrank.4e[ncrank==4]=1

crank=military[religion==3] #christians rankings of military
ncrank=military[religion!=3] #other religions rankings of military

crank.1m=vector(length=length(crank))
crank.2m=vector(length=length(crank))
crank.3m=vector(length=length(crank))
crank.4m=vector(length=length(crank))
ncrank.1m=vector(length=length(ncrank))
ncrank.2m=vector(length=length(ncrank))
ncrank.3m=vector(length=length(ncrank))
ncrank.4m=vector(length=length(ncrank))

crank.1m[crank==1]=1
crank.2m[crank==2]=1
crank.3m[crank==3]=1
crank.4m[crank==4]=1
ncrank.1m[ncrank==1]=1
ncrank.2m[ncrank==2]=1
ncrank.3m[ncrank==3]=1
ncrank.4m[ncrank==4]=1

crank=redistribution[religion==3] #christians rankings of redistribution
ncrank=redistribution[religion!=3] #other religions rankings of redistribution

crank.1r=vector(length=length(crank))
crank.2r=vector(length=length(crank))
crank.3r=vector(length=length(crank))
crank.4r=vector(length=length(crank))
ncrank.1r=vector(length=length(ncrank))
ncrank.2r=vector(length=length(ncrank))
ncrank.3r=vector(length=length(ncrank))
ncrank.4r=vector(length=length(ncrank))

crank.1r[crank==1]=1
crank.2r[crank==2]=1
crank.3r[crank==3]=1
crank.4r[crank==4]=1
ncrank.1r[ncrank==1]=1
ncrank.2r[ncrank==2]=1
ncrank.3r[ncrank==3]=1
ncrank.4r[ncrank==4]=1

```

```

crank=trade[religion==3] #christians rankings of trade
ncrank=trade[religion!=3] #other religions rankings of trade

crank.1t=vector(length=length(crank))
crank.2t=vector(length=length(crank))
crank.3t=vector(length=length(crank))
crank.4t=vector(length=length(crank))
ncrank.1t=vector(length=length(ncrank))
ncrank.2t=vector(length=length(ncrank))
ncrank.3t=vector(length=length(ncrank))
ncrank.4t=vector(length=length(ncrank))

crank.1t[crank==1]=1
crank.2t[crank==2]=1
crank.3t[crank==3]=1
crank.4t[crank==4]=1
ncrank.1t[ncrank==1]=1
ncrank.2t[ncrank==2]=1
ncrank.3t[ncrank==3]=1
ncrank.4t[ncrank==4]=1

crank=corruption[religion==3] #christians rankings of corruption
ncrank=corruption[religion!=3] #other religions rankings of corruption

crank.1c=vector(length=length(crank))
crank.2c=vector(length=length(crank))
crank.3c=vector(length=length(crank))
crank.4c=vector(length=length(crank))
ncrank.1c=vector(length=length(ncrank))
ncrank.2c=vector(length=length(ncrank))
ncrank.3c=vector(length=length(ncrank))
ncrank.4c=vector(length=length(ncrank))

crank.1c[crank==1]=1
crank.2c[crank==2]=1
crank.3c[crank==3]=1
crank.4c[crank==4]=1
ncrank.1c[ncrank==1]=1
ncrank.2c[ncrank==2]=1
ncrank.3c[ncrank==3]=1
ncrank.4c[ncrank==4]=1

crank=taiwan[religion==3] #christians rankings of taiwan
ncrank=taiwan[religion!=3] #other religions rankings of taiwan

crank.1tw=vector(length=length(crank))
crank.2tw=vector(length=length(crank))
crank.3tw=vector(length=length(crank))
crank.4tw=vector(length=length(crank))
ncrank.1tw=vector(length=length(ncrank))
ncrank.2tw=vector(length=length(ncrank))
ncrank.3tw=vector(length=length(ncrank))
ncrank.4tw=vector(length=length(ncrank))

crank.1tw[crank==1]=1
crank.2tw[crank==2]=1
crank.3tw[crank==3]=1

```

```

crank.4tw[crank==4]=1
ncrank.1tw[ncrank==1]=1
ncrank.2tw[ncrank==2]=1
ncrank.3tw[ncrank==3]=1
ncrank.4tw[ncrank==4]=1

crank=popgrowth[religion==3] #christians rankings of population
ncrank=popgrowth[religion!=3] #other religions rankings of population

crank.1p=vector(length=length(crank))
crank.2p=vector(length=length(crank))
crank.3p=vector(length=length(crank))
crank.4p=vector(length=length(crank))
ncrank.1p=vector(length=length(ncrank))
ncrank.2p=vector(length=length(ncrank))
ncrank.3p=vector(length=length(ncrank))
ncrank.4p=vector(length=length(ncrank))

crank.1p[crank==1]=1
crank.2p[crank==2]=1
crank.3p[crank==3]=1
crank.4p[crank==4]=1
ncrank.1p[ncrank==1]=1
ncrank.2p[ncrank==2]=1
ncrank.3p[ncrank==3]=1
ncrank.4p[ncrank==4]=1

#make nominal logistic regression response matrix
res<-matrix(c(
sum(crank.1),sum(crank.2),sum(crank.3),sum(crank.4),
sum(crank.1e),sum(crank.2e),sum(crank.3e),sum(crank.4e),
sum(crank.1m),sum(crank.2m),sum(crank.3m),sum(crank.4m),
sum(crank.1r),sum(crank.2r),sum(crank.3r),sum(crank.4r),
sum(crank.1t),sum(crank.2t),sum(crank.3t),sum(crank.4t),
sum(crank.1c),sum(crank.2c),sum(crank.3c),sum(crank.4c),
sum(crank.1tw),sum(crank.2tw),sum(crank.3tw),sum(crank.4tw),
sum(crank.1p),sum(crank.2p),sum(crank.3p),sum(crank.4p),
sum(ncrank.1),sum(ncrank.2),sum(ncrank.3),sum(ncrank.4),
sum(ncrank.1e),sum(ncrank.2e),sum(ncrank.3e),sum(ncrank.4e),
sum(ncrank.1m),sum(ncrank.2m),sum(ncrank.3m),sum(ncrank.4m),
sum(ncrank.1r),sum(ncrank.2r),sum(ncrank.3r),sum(ncrank.4r),
sum(ncrank.1t),sum(ncrank.2t),sum(ncrank.3t),sum(ncrank.4t),
sum(ncrank.1c),sum(ncrank.2c),sum(ncrank.3c),sum(ncrank.4c),
sum(ncrank.1tw),sum(ncrank.2tw),sum(ncrank.3tw),sum(ncrank.4tw),
sum(ncrank.1p),sum(ncrank.2p),sum(ncrank.3p),sum(ncrank.4p)),ncol=4,byrow=T)

rtotal=apply(res,1,sum)
prop=res/rtotal

#graphical plots
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot(c(1:4),prop[1,],type="b",ylim=c(0,0.8),main="Rankings of democracy",
      xlab="Ranking",ylab="Proportion",xaxp=c(1,4,3))
lines(c(1:4),prop[9,],type="b",lty=2,pch=2,col=2)
legend(1.2,0.75,legend=c("Christians","Non-Christians"),lty=c(1:2),col=c(1:2))

plot(c(1:4),prop[2,],type="b",ylim=c(0,0.8),main="Rankings of environment",

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```

      xlab="Ranking",ylab="Proportion",xaxp=c(1,4,3))
lines(c(1:4),prop[10,],type="b",lty=2,pch=2,col=2)
legend(1.2,0.75,legend=c("Christians","Non-Christians"),lty=c(1:2),col=c(1:2))

plot(c(1:4),prop[3,],type="b",ylim=c(0,0.8),main="Rankings of military",
      xlab="Ranking",ylab="Proportion",xaxp=c(1,4,3))
lines(c(1:4),prop[11,],type="b",lty=2,pch=2,col=2)
legend(1.2,0.75,legend=c("Christians","Non-Christians"),lty=c(1:2),col=c(1:2))

plot(c(1:4),prop[4,],type="b",ylim=c(0,0.8),main="Rankings of redistribution",
      xlab="Ranking",ylab="Proportion",xaxp=c(1,4,3))
lines(c(1:4),prop[12,],type="b",lty=2,pch=2,col=2)
legend(1.2,0.75,legend=c("Christians","Non-Christians"),lty=c(1:2),col=c(1:2))

plot(c(1:4),prop[5,],type="b",ylim=c(0,0.8),main="Rankings of trade",
      xlab="Ranking",ylab="Proportion",xaxp=c(1,4,3))
lines(c(1:4),prop[13,],type="b",lty=2,pch=2,col=2)
legend(1.2,0.75,legend=c("Christians","Non-Christians"),lty=c(1:2),col=c(1:2))

plot(c(1:4),prop[6,],type="b",ylim=c(0,0.8),main="Rankings of corruption",
      xlab="Ranking",ylab="Proportion",xaxp=c(1,4,3))
lines(c(1:4),prop[14,],type="b",lty=2,pch=2,col=2)
legend(1.2,0.75,legend=c("Christians","Non-Christians"),lty=c(1:2),col=c(1:2))

plot(c(1:4),prop[7,],type="b",ylim=c(0,0.8),main="Rankings of Taiwan",
      xlab="Ranking",ylab="Proportion",xaxp=c(1,4,3))
lines(c(1:4),prop[15,],type="b",lty=2,pch=2,col=2)
legend(1.2,0.75,legend=c("Christians","Non-Christians"),lty=c(1:2),col=c(1:2))

plot(c(1:4),prop[8,],type="b",ylim=c(0,0.8),main="Rankings of population
control",
      xlab="Ranking",ylab="Proportion",xaxp=c(1,4,3))
lines(c(1:4),prop[16,],type="b",lty=2,pch=2,col=2)
legend(1.2,0.75,legend=c("Christians","Non-Christians"),lty=c(1:2),col=c(1:2))

#fisher test for difference
democ.f<-matrix(cbind(res[1,],res[9,]),nrow=2)
fisher.test(democ.f)

environ.f<-matrix(cbind(res[2,],res[10,]),nrow=2)
fisher.test(environ.f)

mil.f<-matrix(cbind(res[3,],res[11,]),nrow=2)
fisher.test(mil.f)

redist.f<-matrix(cbind(res[4,],res[12,]),nrow=2)
fisher.test(redist.f)

trade.f<-matrix(cbind(res[5,],res[13,]),nrow=2)
fisher.test(trade.f)

corrup.f<-matrix(cbind(res[6,],res[14,]),nrow=2)
fisher.test(corrup.f)

taiwan.f<-matrix(cbind(res[7,],res[15,]),nrow=2)
fisher.test(taiwan.f)

```

```

popgrowth.f<-matrix(cbind(res[8,],res[16,]),nrow=2)
fisher.test(popgrowth.f)

#perform ordinal logistic regressions with each dependent variable
#democracy original
democracy.a=lrn(as.factor(democracy)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  +buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+jew+muslim+engineering+mathsci
+socsci+libarts+
  law+income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)
democracy.a1=lrn(as.factor(democracy)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  +buddhist+christian+daoist+jew+muslim+engineering+mathsci+socsci+libarts
+
  law+income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)
democracy.a2=lrn(as.factor(democracy)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  +buddhist+christian+daoist+jew+muslim+engineering+socsci+libarts+
  law+income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)
democracy.a3=lrn(as.factor(democracy)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  +buddhist+christian+daoist+jew+muslim+socsci+libarts+
  law+income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)
democracy.a4=lrn(as.factor(democracy)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  +buddhist+christian+daoist+jew+muslim+socsci+libarts+
  law+income+midcity+town+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)
democracy.a5=lrn(as.factor(democracy)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  +buddhist+christian+daoist+jew+muslim+socsci+libarts+
  income+midcity+town+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)
democracy.a6=lrn(as.factor(democracy)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  +buddhist+christian+daoist+jew+muslim+socsci+libarts+
  midcity+town+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)
democracy.a7=lrn(as.factor(democracy)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  +buddhist+christian+daoist+jew+socsci+libarts+
  midcity+town+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)
democracy.a8=lrn(as.factor(democracy)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  christian+daoist+jew+socsci+libarts+
  midcity+town+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)
democracy.a9=lrn(as.factor(democracy)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  christian+daoist+jew+socsci+libarts+
  midcity+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)
democracy.a10=lrn(as.factor(democracy)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  christian+daoist+jew+socsci+libarts+
  midcity,data=data,x=T,y=T)
democracy.a11=lrn(as.factor(democracy)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  christian+daoist+socsci+libarts+
  midcity,data=data,x=T,y=T)
democracy.a12=lrn(as.factor(democracy)~factor(minority)+months+
  christian+daoist+socsci+libarts+midcity,data=data,x=T,y=T)

#environment original
environ.a=lrn(as.factor(environ)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+jew+muslim+engineering+mathsci
+socsci+libarts+
  law+income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)
environ.a1=lrn(as.factor(environ)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+jew+muslim+engineering+mathsci
+socsci+libarts+
  law+income+midcity+town+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)
environ.a2=lrn(as.factor(environ)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+jew+muslim+engineering+mathsci

```

```

+socsci+libarts+
  law+midcity+town+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
environ.a3=lm(as.factor(enviro)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+jew+engineering+mathsci+socsci
+libarts+
  law+midcity+town+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
environ.a4=lm(as.factor(enviro)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+jew+engineering+mathsci+socsci
+libarts+
  midcity+town+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
environ.a5=lm(as.factor(enviro)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+jew+engineering+mathsci+socsci+
  midcity+town+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
environ.a6=lm(as.factor(enviro)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+engineering+mathsci+socsci+
  midcity+town+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
environ.a7=lm(as.factor(enviro)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  christian+confucian+daoist+engineering+mathsci+socsci+
  midcity+town+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
environ.a8=lm(as.factor(enviro)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  christian+confucian+daoist+engineering+socsci+
  midcity+town+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
environ.a9=lm(as.factor(enviro)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  christian+confucian+daoist+socsci+
  midcity+town+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
environ.a10=lm(as.factor(enviro)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  christian+confucian+socsci+midcity+town+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
environ.a11=lm(as.factor(enviro)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  christian+socsci+midcity+town+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
environ.a12=lm(as.factor(enviro)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+
  christian+socsci+midcity+town+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
environ.a13=lm(as.factor(enviro)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+
  christian+midcity+town+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
environ.a14=lm(as.factor(enviro)~factor(minority)+
  christian+midcity+town+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
environ.a15=lm(as.factor(enviro)~factor(minority)+
  christian+midcity+town, data=data, x=T, y=T)

#military original
mil.1=lm(as.factor(military)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+jew+muslim+engineering+mathsci
+socsci+libarts+
  law+income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
mil.2=lm(as.factor(military)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  christian+confucian+daoist+jew+engineering+mathsci+socsci+libarts+
  law+income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
mil.3=lm(as.factor(military)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  christian+confucian+daoist+jew+engineering+mathsci+socsci+
  law+income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
mil.4=lm(as.factor(military)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+
  christian+confucian+daoist+jew+engineering+mathsci+socsci+
  law+income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
mil.5=lm(as.factor(military)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+
  christian+confucian+daoist+jew+mathsci+socsci+
  law+income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
mil.6=lm(as.factor(military)~factor(sex)+christian+confucian+daoist
+jew+mathsci+socsci+law+income+midcity+town+village

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+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
mil.7=lm(as.factor(military)~factor(sex)+christian+confucian+daoist
+mathsci+socsci+law+income+midcity+town+village
+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
mil.8=lm(as.factor(military)~factor(sex)+christian+confucian+daoist
+mathsci+socsci+law+income+midcity+village
+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
mil.9=lm(as.factor(military)~factor(sex)+christian+confucian+daoist
+mathsci+socsci+law+midcity+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
mil.10=lm(as.factor(military)~factor(sex)+christian+confucian+
mathsci+socsci+law+midcity+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
mil.11=lm(as.factor(military)~christian+confucian+
mathsci+socsci+law+midcity+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
mil.12=lm(as.factor(military)~christian+mathsci+socsci+law+midcity+village
+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)

#redistribution
redist.1=lm(as.factor(redistribution)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+jew+muslim+engineering+mathsci
+socsci+libarts+
law+income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
redist.2=lm(as.factor(redistribution)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+jew+muslim+engineering+mathsci
+socsci+libarts+
law+income+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
redist.3=lm(as.factor(redistribution)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+jew+muslim+engineering+mathsci
+socsci+libarts+
income+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
redist.4=lm(as.factor(redistribution)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+muslim+engineering+mathsci+socsci
+libarts+
income+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
redist.5=lm(as.factor(redistribution)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+engineering+mathsci+socsci+libarts+
income+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
redist.6=lm(as.factor(redistribution)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+engineering+mathsci+socsci+libarts+
town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
redist.7=lm(as.factor(redistribution)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+mathsci+socsci+libarts+
town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
redist.8=lm(as.factor(redistribution)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+socsci+libarts+
town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
redist.9=lm(as.factor(redistribution)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+
buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+socsci+libarts+
town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
redist.10=lm(as.factor(redistribution)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+
buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+libarts+
town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
redist.11=lm(as.factor(redistribution)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+
buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+town+village
+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
redist.12=lm(as.factor(redistribution)~factor(minority)+
buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+town+village
+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)

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redist.13=lm(as.factor(redistribution)~factor(minority)+
  buddhist+christian+confucian+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
redist.14=lm(as.factor(redistribution)~factor(minority)+
  buddhist+christian+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
redist.15=lm(as.factor(redistribution)~factor(minority)+
  buddhist+christian+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
redist.16=lm(as.factor(redistribution)~factor(minority)+
  buddhist+christian+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
redist.17=lm(as.factor(redistribution)~buddhist+christian
+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
redist.18=lm(as.factor(redistribution)~buddhist+christian, data=data, x=T, y=T)

#trade
trade.1=lm(as.factor(trade)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+jew+muslim+engineering+mathsci
+socsci+libarts+
  law+income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
trade.2=lm(as.factor(trade)~factor(sex)+months+
  buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+jew+muslim+engineering+mathsci
+socsci+libarts+
  law+income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
trade.3=lm(as.factor(trade)~factor(sex)+months+
  buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+jew+muslim+engineering+mathsci
+socsci+
  law+income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
trade.4=lm(as.factor(trade)~factor(sex)+months+
  christian+confucian+daoist+jew+muslim+engineering+mathsci+socsci+
  law+income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
trade.5=lm(as.factor(trade)~factor(sex)+months+
  christian+confucian+daoist+muslim+engineering+mathsci+socsci+
  law+income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
trade.6=lm(as.factor(trade)~factor(sex)+months+
  christian+confucian+daoist+muslim+engineering+mathsci+socsci+
  income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
trade.7=lm(as.factor(trade)~months+
  christian+confucian+daoist+muslim+engineering+mathsci+socsci+
  income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
trade.8=lm(as.factor(trade)~months+
  christian+confucian+daoist+muslim+mathsci+socsci+
  income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
trade.9=lm(as.factor(trade)~christian+confucian+daoist+muslim+mathsci+socsci+
  income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
trade.10=lm(as.factor(trade)~christian+confucian+daoist+muslim+mathsci
+socsci+
  income+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
trade.11=lm(as.factor(trade)~christian+daoist+muslim+mathsci+socsci+
  income+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
trade.12=lm(as.factor(trade)~christian+muslim+mathsci+socsci+
  income+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
trade.13=lm(as.factor(trade)~christian+muslim+mathsci+socsci+
  income+town+village, data=data, x=T, y=T)
trade.14=lm(as.factor(trade)~christian+muslim+mathsci+socsci+
  income+village, data=data, x=T, y=T)
trade.15=lm(as.factor(trade)~christian+muslim+mathsci+socsci
+income, data=data, x=T, y=T)
trade.16=lm(as.factor(trade)~christian+muslim+mathsci
+socsci, data=data, x=T, y=T)

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trade.17=lm(as.factor(trade)~christian+muslim+socsci,data=data,x=T,y=T)

#corruption
corrup.1=lm(as.factor(corruption)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+jew+muslim+engineering+mathsci
+socsci+libarts+
  law+income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)
corrup.2=lm(as.factor(corruption)~factor(sex)+months+
  buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+jew+muslim+engineering+mathsci
+socsci+libarts+
  law+income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)
corrup.3=lm(as.factor(corruption)~factor(sex)+months+
  buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+jew+muslim+engineering+mathsci
+libarts+
  law+income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)
corrup.4=lm(as.factor(corruption)~factor(sex)+months+
  buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+jew+engineering+mathsci+libarts+
  law+income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)
corrup.5=lm(as.factor(corruption)~factor(sex)+months+
  buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+jew+engineering+mathsci+libarts+
  law+income+midcity+village+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)
corrup.6=lm(as.factor(corruption)~factor(sex)+months+
  buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+jew+engineering+mathsci+libarts+
  law+income+midcity+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)
corrup.7=lm(as.factor(corruption)~factor(sex)+months+
  buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+engineering+mathsci+libarts+
  law+income+midcity+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)
corrup.8=lm(as.factor(corruption)~factor(sex)+buddhist+christian+
  confucian+daoist+engineering+mathsci+libarts+
  law+income+midcity+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)
corrup.9=lm(as.factor(corruption)~factor(sex)+buddhist+christian+
  daoist+engineering+mathsci+libarts+
  law+income+midcity+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)
corrup.10=lm(as.factor(corruption)~buddhist+christian+
  daoist+engineering+mathsci+libarts+
  law+income+midcity+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)
corrup.11=lm(as.factor(corruption)~buddhist+christian+
  daoist+engineering+mathsci+law+income+midcity
+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)
corrup.12=lm(as.factor(corruption)~buddhist+christian+
  daoist+engineering+mathsci+income+midcity+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)
corrup.13=lm(as.factor(corruption)~buddhist+christian+
  daoist+mathsci+income+midcity+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)
corrup.14=lm(as.factor(corruption)~buddhist+christian+
  daoist+mathsci+midcity+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)
corrup.15=lm(as.factor(corruption)~buddhist+christian+
  mathsci+midcity+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)
corrup.15=lm(as.factor(corruption)~christian+mathsci+midcity
+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)

#taiwan
taiwan.1=lm(as.factor(taiwan)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+jew+muslim+engineering+mathsci
+socsci+libarts+
  law+income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp),data=data,x=T,y=T)
taiwan.2=lm(as.factor(taiwan)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+jew+muslim+engineering+mathsci

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+socsci+libarts+
  law+income+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
taiwan.3=lm(as.factor(taiwan)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  buddhist+christian+daoist+jew+muslim+engineering+mathsci+socsci+libarts+
  law+income+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
taiwan.4=lm(as.factor(taiwan)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  buddhist+christian+daoist+jew+muslim+engineering+socsci+libarts+
  law+income+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
taiwan.5=lm(as.factor(taiwan)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  buddhist+christian+daoist+jew+muslim+engineering+libarts+
  law+income+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
taiwan.6=lm(as.factor(taiwan)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  christian+daoist+jew+muslim+engineering+libarts+
  law+income+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
taiwan.7=lm(as.factor(taiwan)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  christian+daoist+jew+engineering+libarts+
  law+income+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
taiwan.8=lm(as.factor(taiwan)~factor(sex)+months+
  christian+daoist+jew+engineering+libarts+
  law+income+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
taiwan.9=lm(as.factor(taiwan)~factor(sex)+months+
  christian+daoist+jew+libarts+law+income+town+village
+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
taiwan.10=lm(as.factor(taiwan)~factor(sex)+months+
  christian+daoist+jew+libarts+law+income+village
+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
taiwan.11=lm(as.factor(taiwan)~factor(sex)+months+
  christian+daoist+jew+law+income+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
taiwan.12=lm(as.factor(taiwan)~factor(sex)+months+
  christian+daoist+law+income+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
taiwan.13=lm(as.factor(taiwan)~factor(sex)+months+
  christian+law+income+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
taiwan.14=lm(as.factor(taiwan)~factor(sex)+months+
  christian+law+income+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
taiwan.15=lm(as.factor(taiwan)~factor(sex)+months+
  christian+law+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)

#population control
popgrowth.1=lm(as.factor(popgrowth)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+jew+muslim+engineering+mathsci
+socsci+libarts+
  law+income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
popgrowth.2=lm(as.factor(popgrowth)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  buddhist+christian+confucian+daoist+jew+engineering+mathsci+socsci
+libarts+
  law+income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
popgrowth.3=lm(as.factor(popgrowth)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  buddhist+christian+daoist+jew+engineering+mathsci+socsci+libarts+
  law+income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
popgrowth.4=lm(as.factor(popgrowth)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  buddhist+christian+daoist+jew+engineering+mathsci+socsci+libarts+
  income+midcity+town+village+factor(ccp), data=data, x=T, y=T)
popgrowth.5=lm(as.factor(popgrowth)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  buddhist+christian+daoist+jew+engineering+mathsci+socsci+libarts+
  income+midcity+town+village, data=data, x=T, y=T)
popgrowth.6=lm(as.factor(popgrowth)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  buddhist+christian+daoist+engineering+mathsci+socsci+libarts+

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income+midcity+town+village,data=data,x=T,y=T)
popgrowth.7=lm(as.factor(popgrowth)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  christian+daoist+engineering+mathsci+socsci+libarts+
  income+midcity+town+village,data=data,x=T,y=T)
popgrowth.8=lm(as.factor(popgrowth)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  christian+daoist+engineering+mathsci+socsci+libarts+
  income+midcity+village,data=data,x=T,y=T)
popgrowth.9=lm(as.factor(popgrowth)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+months+
  christian+daoist+engineering+mathsci+socsci+libarts+
  midcity+village,data=data,x=T,y=T)
popgrowth.10=lm(as.factor(popgrowth)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+
  christian+daoist+engineering+mathsci+socsci+libarts+
  midcity+village,data=data,x=T,y=T)
popgrowth.11=lm(as.factor(popgrowth)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+
  christian+engineering+mathsci+socsci+libarts+
  midcity+village,data=data,x=T,y=T)
popgrowth.12=lm(as.factor(popgrowth)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+
  christian+engineering+mathsci+socsci+libarts+
  midcity,data=data,x=T,y=T)
popgrowth.13=lm(as.factor(popgrowth)~factor(sex)+factor(minority)+
  christian+engineering+mathsci+socsci+midcity,data=data,x=T,y=T)
popgrowth.14=lm(as.factor(popgrowth)~factor(sex)+
  christian+engineering+mathsci+socsci+midcity,data=data,x=T,y=T)
popgrowth.15=lm(as.factor(popgrowth)~factor(sex)+
  christian+engineering+socsci+midcity,data=data,x=T,y=T)
popgrowth.16=lm(as.factor(popgrowth)~factor(sex)+
  christian+socsci+midcity,data=data,x=T,y=T)

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