


European Muslim Integration:
A Comparative Case Study of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom



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Evidence of the challenges of integrating Muslims into European society is present across Europe. One third of Muslim respondents in a European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia survey reported experiencing discriminatory practices including lack of access to jobs, missing promotions, or harassment in the workplace.¹ According to a 2005 report by the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights another third say that “they or their family members have experienced hostility and abuse because of their religion.”² In Belgium, 38% of Turkish and Moroccan nationals are believed to be unemployed.³ A 2005 Pew Global attitudes survey found that the majority of Europeans surveyed believed that Muslims “want to remain distinct” and have an “increasing sense of Islamic identity”⁴ In the United Kingdom, 33% of Muslims in the workforce have no educational qualification.⁵ In 1991, then Paris mayor Jacques Chirac stated,

“It is clear that having Spanish, Polish, or Portuguese people [...] poses fewer problems than having Muslims or blacks. How do you think a French worker feels when he sees on the landing a family with a man who has maybe three or four wives, about 20 kids, who receives around 50,000 francs in social services, of course without working [...] and if you add the noise and smell [...] no wonder the French worker across the landing goes mad.”⁶

¹ European Monitoring Center on Racism and Islamophobia, "Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia," (2006).

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³ibid.

ibid.

⁴ "Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns about Religious and Cultural Identity," *Pew Global Attitudes Project*, July 6, 2006, <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=254>.

⁵ National Statistics, "Focus on: Religion," <http://www.statistics.gov.uk/focuson/religion/> (2007).

⁶ European Monitoring Center on Racism and Islamophobia, *Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia*

Although highly biased, this statement displays strong evidence of the enormity of the challenge that some Europeans feel in integrating migrant Muslim populations.

Europe's Muslim population is largely the result of guest worker programs in the 1950s and 1960s when unskilled labor was in high demand due to the post-war economic boom. Some countries, such as France, the Netherlands, and Great Britain, recruited workers from Muslim countries to which they had colonial ties. These countries included Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia for France, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India for the United Kingdom, and Indonesia for the Netherlands. Other countries, such as Denmark and Germany recruited guest labor from other countries, most importantly Turkey, due to their proximity to Europe and large amounts of available labor.⁷ While many European countries have established policies for the integration of Muslim populations, they have taken divergent paths, with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands advocating policies of multiculturalism, France adopting a policy of assimilation, and Germany and Spain largely ignoring immigrant communities from a policy perspective.⁸

It is estimated by the Center for Strategic and International Studies that there are currently 21 million Muslims living in Europe, an estimated 83% increase in the ten to twelve years between the early 1990s and the early 2000s.⁹ (However, another estimate by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia is much more conservative, at approximately 13 million¹⁰) This means that Muslims make up approximately five percent of the total European population. 7.5 million European Muslims can be termed "old Muslims"; they descend from the Ottoman Empire and live predominantly in Eastern Europe, in the former Yugoslav and Baltic

⁷ Frank Buijs and Jan Rath, "Muslims in Europe: The State of Research," *Russell Sage Foundation* (October 2002) .


⁸ Paul Gallis, *Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries* Congressional Research Service, (2005).

⁹ Ceri Peach, "Muslim Population of Europe: A Brief Overview of Demographic Trends and Socioeconomic Integration, with Particular Reference to Britain" In *Muslim Integration: Challenging Conventional Wisdom in Europe and the United States* (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), 7.

¹⁰ European Monitoring Center on Racism and Islamophobia, *Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia*

states. Europe's "old Muslims" generally are not under discussion in debates of Muslim integration. The integration debate centers on the 13.5 million "new Muslims" who live predominantly in the advanced industrial economies of Western Europe. These groups are those that came to fill labor needs during the 1950s and 1960s or have immigrated for purposes of family reunification, employment, or asylum in recent decades.¹¹ Among Western European countries, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Spain have the largest number of Muslim residents in terms of absolute numbers, with total Muslim populations of more than one million. As a percentage of the population, France, the Netherlands, and Denmark have the most Muslims. Muslims constitute more than five percent of the total population in each of these three countries.¹²

Major Muslim Immigrant Populations in Europe¹³



¹¹ Peach, *Muslim Population of Europe: A Brief Overview of Demographic Trends and Socioeconomic Integration, with Particular Reference to Britain*, 7

¹² "Muslims in Europe: Country Guide," BBC News February 23, 2005, 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4385768.stm> (accessed November 28, 2007).

¹³ Peach, *Muslim Population of Europe: A Brief Overview of Demographic Trends and Socioeconomic Integration, with Particular Reference to Britain*, 7

Islam is Europe's fastest growing religion, and the number of Muslims in Europe will continue to grow due to immigration and a higher birthrate among Muslims than native Europeans. The European Muslim population is much younger than the general European population. Based on available data, one third of Muslims in France are under the age of 20, one third of Muslims are under the age of 18 in Germany, and one third of Muslims are under the age of 15 in Belgium and the United Kingdom. The portion of the overall population that is under the age of 20, 18, and 15 in France, Germany, and Belgium and the United Kingdom, respectively, is between 18% and 20%. The increasing representation of Muslims in the youngest age demographic suggests that Europe's Muslim population will grow significantly in the coming years. Some estimates predict that the Muslim population will double by 2015, and will reach twenty percent of the total European population by 2050.¹⁴ Therefore, there is a young and growing Muslim population among an aging and declining native population.¹⁵

The increasing role that Muslims will play in European society makes the challenge of integration especially important due to cultural, economic, and security concerns. Recent events across Europe and the Western world, to include terrorist attacks in the United States perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalists who trained in Germany in September 2001, the Madrid terrorist attacks in March 2004, the London subway bombing in July 2005, rioting among Parisian Muslim in October 2005 and November 2007, the religiously instigated murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in November 2004, and widespread rioting due to a Danish cartoon that was considered offensive to Muslims in September 2005, have highlighted the need for Muslim integration in Western Europe and have suggested that poorly integrated Muslim populations are increasingly turning to Islamic fundamentalism.

¹⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁵ *Muslims in Europe: Country Guide*

This paper will seek to identify the challenges for Western European nations in integrating Muslim populations by analyzing integration goals and policies adopted by European nations as well as integration indicators. It will begin by discussing recent integration policy developments at the European Union level. The second portion, and majority of the research, will evaluate Muslim integration policies in three selected case studies, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The fact that these nations have 1) the largest overall populations, 2) the largest Muslim populations, 3) significant percentages of Muslim residents, and 4) roughly similar histories of Muslim immigration, make them ideal cases for this study. The following analysis will include information regarding the Muslim population, integration goals, current and historic integration policies, and the current status of integration for France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Integration policies in each country will be evaluated from the perspective of four viewpoints: education, economic factors, political participation, and naturalization and civic participation. The final portion of the research will include a comparative analysis of the information presented in the three case studies.

Immigrant Integration and the European Union

Although integration policy is predominantly left to national governments and there is no explicit basis for EU integration policy in any of the EU treaties, European countries increasingly see a role for the EU in encouraging common integration policies, policy coordination, and monitoring. All EU activity in the field of immigrant and Muslim integration is on a strictly advisory or consensus basis and implementation is left up to individual national governments. Members have begun to look to the EU for some degree of coordination of integration policy because the 1985 Schengen Agreement allows for generally open borders between many of the members of the EU. Therefore, assuming a link between unsuccessful integration and extremism,

one country's integration mistakes may adversely affect other nations. As of yet, the European Union has been careful to discuss all integration guidelines in the context of third country immigrants in general, in the belief that documents which target Muslim integration could be seen as a discriminatory or stereotypical and prevent, rather than encourage, integration.¹⁶

The concept of a common EU immigration and integration policy was first called for at the October 1999 European Council meeting in Tampere, France. At this meeting, EU leaders agreed that the integration of third-country nationals would be an important concern of any common EU immigration policy. EU policy would gradually convey rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens on third-country nationals. In 2002, the European Commission created a system of National Contact Points on Integration for the purpose of creating an exchange for sharing information and best practice in integration. The Commission also recognized immigrants as a desired commodity in order to fill labor and skill shortages due to Europe's aging population as opposed to an unwanted burden that states were forced to deal with because of long-standing policies. In its 2003 Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment, the Commission stated the necessity of sound integration policies in order to maximize the economic potential of immigrants. In the same Communication, the Commission announced that it would regularly monitor the development of a common immigration and integration policy, and announced that it would release the first Annual Report on Migration and Integration in Europe in 2004.¹⁷

Successive Annual Reports on Immigration and Integration were released in 2006 and 2007.¹⁸ The 2007 Annual Report states, "During the last year, the debate on integration has further intensified both at EU and national levels. An increasing number of Member States are

¹⁶ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries*

¹⁷ "A Common Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals," European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/immigration/integration/fsj_immigration_integration_en.htm

¹⁸ *ibid.*

implementing new integration policies and adjusting strategies that build on previous experience.”¹⁹ The report details European developments in achieving a common policy for the year 2007 and reports on developments in domestic integration policies for parts of 2005 and 2006.²⁰

On September 1, 2005 the European Commission released to the Council the Communication, “A Common Agenda for Integration - Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union,” which was the first step toward creating a cohesive European framework for integration. The document attempted to strengthen the nine “Common Basic Principles” which the Justice and Home Affairs Council, a body of high-ranking European domestic policymakers, adopted in 2004. These principles include the following;

- 1) Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States,
- 2) Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union,
- 3) Employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the participation of immigrants, to the contributions immigrants make to the host society, and to making such contributions visible,
- 4) Basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history, and institutions is indispensable to integration; enabling immigrants to acquire this basic knowledge is essential to successful integration,
- 5) Efforts in education are critical to preparing immigrants, and particularly their descendants, to be more successful and more active participants in society,
- 6) Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and services, on a basis equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way is a critical foundation for better integration,
- 7) Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration. Shared forums, intercultural dialogue, education about immigrants and immigrant cultures, and stimulating living conditions in urban environments enhance the interactions between immigrants and Member State citizens,
- 8) The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed under the Charter of Fundamental Rights and must be safeguarded, unless practices conflict with other inviolable European rights or with national law,

¹⁹ *Third Annual Report on Migration and Integration*, COM(2007) 512, (September 2007,); , http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/immigration/docs/com_2007_512_en.pdf.

²⁰ *ibid*.

- 9) The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their integration.²¹

While these common principles create a foundation for the development of a common integration policy, they leave a number of questions unanswered, especially as to their extent and precise meaning. For instance, at what point do traditional Muslim women's roles come into conflict with "inviolable European rights?" Can immigrant communities participate in the democratic process through their vote alone or must they also be proportionally represented in government? Regarding education, must immigrants be assimilated into the domestic school system, or should states provide or subsidize separate schools for Muslim students? Also, the Common Basic Principles say very little about the accommodation that should be afforded to immigrant groups, in terms of Mosques, the wearing of religious symbols, the status of minority religions, etc. This is, in all likelihood, due to the contentious nature of this debate.

In order for the European Union to create a common integration policy, it is necessary to analyze policies that have already been enacted by European governments in order to evaluate their comparative success, and to understand the integration goals in individual EU member countries. Because Muslims are by far the largest minority group which demands integration in Europe, and due to the current challenges to Muslim integration discussed above, it makes most sense to evaluate integration policies specifically directed at Muslim populations. By looking at Muslim integration alone, one can establish a detailed set of integration policies with some fundamental commonalities. The following case studies will analyze the integration policies directed at Muslim immigrants in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

²¹ *A Common Agenda for Integration: Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union*, COM(2005) 389, (September 2005,); , http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0389en01.pdf.

France

Muslim integration in France is particularly important because France is home to Europe's largest Muslim population and Muslims constitute the largest minority group in the country. Also, integration is an issue of importance on the political agenda in France due to several high profile events in the recent past. Estimates of France's Muslim population range from four to six million, 6% to 10% of the overall population. This number will grow in the future due to the relatively high fertility rate of Muslims compared to their French counterparts as well as continuing immigration flows. Islam is the fastest growing religion in France, and is the second largest religion after Roman Catholicism.²²

France's large Muslim population is due, in large part, to colonial relationships with Muslim countries in North Africa and the Middle East. During the 1950s and 1960s, France recruited labor from Southern Europe and North Africa in order to fill domestic labor shortages. As European labor from Italy, Spain, and Portugal became less available, France became increasingly dependent on labor, both short term and long term, from the Maghreb, the term assigned to Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and sometimes Libya. These countries are relatively close to France geographically, and France had a large number of colonial ties to the region. Also, it is important to note that prior to Algerian Independence in 1962, there was a free flow of labor between France and Algeria, which the French government considered to be a part of France. The Algerian War had a dramatic impact on the French population. Not only did it cause the return of almost one million French settlers who had been living in Algeria, somewhere between 50,000 and 100,000 "harkis" also immigrated to France, despite discouragement by the French government.²³ Many harkis, Algerian soldiers who fought with the French during the eight year war, fled Algeria in fear of reprisal by the new Algerian government. It is estimated that between

²² Gallis, *Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries*, 22.

²³ Michel Gurfinkel, "'Islam in France: The French Way of Life is in Danger'," *Middle East Quarterly* (1997).

450,000 and 500,000 French residents today are descendants of the original Harkis.²⁴ They and their descendants, along with North African immigrants who originally immigrated for economic reasons, compose the majority of the French Muslim population.

Approximately 70% of French Muslims come from the Maghreb, meaning that there is some degree of homogeneity in the population. However, in terms of their religious devotion and adherence to religious tenets, France's Muslim population is diverse. El Hamel, as quoted by Freedman, states that it is necessary to think of "Islam in France ...as constituting something of a spectrum, a continuum of diverse practices and levels of commitment extending from religious to rejection or mere absence"²⁵ While devout Muslims exist in France, the Muslim population, especially that which is French born, is secular in much the same way as their Christian counterparts. Studies by Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques (INED), for example, show that "there are similar levels of disaffection toward religion among children born in France to Algerian parents and children of native French origin."²⁶ Survey data suggests that approximately 35% of the French Muslim population practice Islam.²⁷ However, surveys also show that while French Muslims are unlikely to actively practice Islam, they are likely to observe Ramadan and Islamic dietary restrictions. This suggests that young Muslims in France identify with Islam as a cultural identity, and may also explain the desire of some Muslim girls to wear the veil as a sign of cultural identity rather than religious observance. North African Muslims come from native cultures that are typically more conservative than French culture. This means that there is sometimes tension between majority French culture and that of France's Muslim minority.

French Culture

²⁴ Catherine de Wenden, "'Assimilation and Struggle: Maghrebi Immigration and French Political Culture'," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 4, no. 2 (Summer 2003) , 69.

²⁵ Jane Freedman, "Secularism as a Barrier to Integration? the French Dilemma," *International Migration* 42, no. 4 (2004), 5., 8.

²⁶ *ibid.*, 9.

²⁷ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries*, 26.

In order to understand the challenges of integrating an immigrant Muslim population, it is necessary to have some understanding of modern French culture. France, similar to the United States, is said to have a central creed which ties together the French nation. This creed has its underpinnings in the French revolutionary slogan of “liberty, equality, and fraternity,” and it is around this set of beliefs that the French Republican ideal was established. The French ideal places central importance on individual rights, but affords little protection for collective rights. Ideally, identity groups within France should not matter, because each Frenchman is French first and foremost. The French language is a unifying link among the French, and is therefore of utmost importance. Equally vital is a fundamental belief in “laïcité,” the very French brand of secularism, established by a 1905 law mandating a separation between church and state. In the French ideal, this means that citizens are allowed to practice any religion freely, but there is little public accommodation for religion. In part due to the laïcité of the state, the French population as a whole is very secular. Although the majority of the population is nominally Roman Catholic, many citizens do not practice any religion.²⁸

The Republican ideal places central importance on equality of opportunity, which was historically guaranteed by the public education system, employment, and military service (before the end of peacetime conscription in 1996).²⁹ France’s public education system is a means of establishing elites based on merit as opposed to birth, and is widely used by the French population through the post-secondary level. Employment has been an equalizing factor in French society due to the large percentage of the population who work in civil service positions and the protections afforded to French workers. However, if Muslim immigrants do not participate or are discriminated against in education and are unemployed or underemployed to a much greater extent than their French counterparts, equality of opportunity is compromised.

Integration Goals

²⁸ Stephanie Giry, “France and its Muslims,” *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 5, 89.

²⁹ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries*, 21.

Michael Walzer, in his book *On Toleration*, discusses five “regimes of toleration,” and the institutional systems which secure toleration of difference in each of these regimes. Walzer deems France a “complicated case”, because France is both “the classic nation state” as well as a society of immigration. Walzer argues that although France has a large amount of ethnic and cultural diversity, it has attempted to remain a “monocultural” society.³⁰ The importance of a single Republican culture in France has meant that it has largely pursued a policy of assimilation toward immigrant populations. Once assimilated, immigrants can, in theory, “become French” because “national identity is not a biological but a political fact: one is French through the practice of a language, through the learning of a culture, through the wish to participate in an economic and political life.”³¹ Therefore, France’s historical method of integrating Muslims and other immigrants has focused on providing immigrants with the individual rights and social protections provided to the French, in order to socialize immigrants into Frenchmen. France has avoided collecting census data based on religion or ethnicity, providing programs specifically for immigrants, or practicing any sort of affirmative action. They view such practices as discriminatory and anti-integrationist because they treat immigrants differently than other residents. While this policy, in theory, supports integration, “France’s secular republican creed, which shuns notions of special lobbies or communities, has made it particularly hard for Muslims to advocate for state accommodation” in areas such as separate Islamic schools or Muslim social service organizations.³² Therefore, from the standpoint of some Muslims, France is “not neutral toward religion, but instead hostile, and explicitly preference(s) a secular over a religious worldview.”³³

³⁰ Jeremy Jennings, "Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France," *British Journal of Political Science* 30, no. 4 (October 2000), 575., 576.

³¹ *ibid.*, 577.

³² J. Christopher Soper, "Explaining the Accommodation of Muslim Religious Practices in France, Britain, and Germany," *French Politics*, no. 1 (2003), 39., 48.

³³ *ibid.*, 53.

One movement toward government accommodation for Islam occurred in 2002 with the establishment of the French Council for the Muslim Religion (CFCM). The CFCM, which is partially an elected body and partially nominated by the Muslim community, negotiates with the government on matters important to Muslims as a religious community, such as mosque construction and the observance of Ramadan. However, the CFCM does not deal with some of the most contentious areas of integration, such as education or economic status. Also, while the moderate Muslim movement in France is represented within the CFCM, more radical forms of Islam are not.³⁴

Education

The French public education system is the pillar of the secular state. It is widely used by the French public, and no education in religion takes place in French public schools. At this time, there are also no publicly funded Islamic schools, which means that French Muslims must either participate in the public school systems or attend costly privately funded schools.³⁵ In addition to not offering religious education classes in public schools, the French government has taken pains to keep religious influence out of the school system in order to maintain the secular society. This principle has been reflected in the debate over the wearing of Islamic headscarves in public schools.

The headscarf debate first reached levels of national prominence in 1989 when the Conseil d'Etat, France's highest court, heard a case which asked whether Muslim girls should be allowed to wear their headscarves in French public schools. At the time, the Conseil d'Etat chose not to make a concrete ruling in the case, and instead gave French schools the power to limit the right of students to wear religious symbols if they 1) caused a disruption to the school day, or 2)

³⁴ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries*, 28.

³⁵ Soper, *Explaining the Accommodation of Muslim Religious Practices in France, Britain, and Germany*, 49.

constituted a safety threat, for example, during physical education classes. While only a small part of the French Muslim population wished to wear Islamic headscarves during the school day, this subject came to represent the clash between state secularism and the right of French Muslims to practice their religion. Over the next decade, French courts decided numerous cases on the subject of headscarves in public schools due to the lack of a definitive law. Judicial decisions varied widely based on the individual characteristics of each case, and the issue became a burden to the court and education systems.³⁶

In 2003, President Jacques Chirac appointed a commission of “wise” persons to investigate the role of *laïcité* in public life in general and in public schools in particular. School officials hoped for further resolution to the headscarf debate, because the lack of a coherent national policy created conflict in individual schools and the ensuing controversy used time and resources.³⁷ The Commission found that “French secularism is threatened by increasingly strong claims of a cultural and religious nature...threatening the social contract at the basis of the Republic.”³⁸ Among the Commission’s findings was a recommendation to prohibit the wearing of religious symbols in public schools. On March 14, 2005, the French parliament passed a law which stated, “In public schools, the wearing of symbols or dress by which the students ostensibly manifest religious membership is prohibited.”³⁹ Four days later, on March 18, the Minister of Education published a document which clarified the law stating the wearing of “the Islamic veil...the kippa, or a crucifix of manifestly exaggerated proportions” would be prohibited in public schools under French law.⁴⁰

³⁶Leslie J. Limage, "Education and Muslim Identity: The Case of France," *Comparative Education* 36, no. 1 (February 2000), 73.

³⁷ Eva Brems, "Diversity in the Classroom: The Headscarf Controversy in European Schools," *Peace & Change* 31, no. 1 (January 2006), 120.

³⁸ *ibid.*, 121.

³⁹ *ibid.*, 121.

⁴⁰ *ibid.*, 121

Since the enactment of the headscarf law in 2004, there has been controversy as to the intent and reality of the ban. Muslim populations found that this law, notwithstanding its secular intent, placed an unnecessary and unequal burden on Muslim girls that it did not place on adherents of other religions. There is a portion of the French Muslim population who feel that policies such as this one demonstrate the French government's refusal to respect Muslim culture, and hinder integration, because they force Muslims to withdraw from French society or lose their Muslim identity.⁴¹ For example, some Muslim girls have left the public school system rather than foregoing their headscarves. However, there is an argument on the part of others, to include the Commission and the government that, in the "context of the French concept of secular republic and of the public school as the place to train republican citizens in the same tradition" the ban of religious symbols is necessary to integration.⁴²

If no religious education takes place within the public school system, Muslims who wish to educate their children in religious tradition must either send them to Muslim schools or extracurricular programs through France's Mosques. However, this is problematic because the French government has become distrustful of imams in France. Because mosques are not supported financially by the state, they are supported primarily through funding from immigrants' home countries. Often imams do not speak French or have any knowledge of or affection for French culture. In recent years, the French government has attempted to change this situation by demanding that imams being sent to France have French language skills or have been educated in France.⁴³ However, it is estimated that only ten percent of French imams are French citizens, and approximately half speak French. The French government deports imams who promote ideology that is inconsistent with French law and values, especially with regard to

⁴¹ Freedman, *Secularism as a Barrier to Integration? the French Dilemma*, 5

⁴² Brems, *Diversity in the Classroom: The Headscarf Controversy in European Schools*, 121.

⁴³ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries*, 30.

gender equality or support for terrorist activities. The moderate Muslim community in France argues that government funding for Mosques and greater opportunities to become an imam in France would give the French Muslim community an important degree of separation from radical foreign sects.⁴⁴

Economic Factors

Stephanie Giry argues that recent tensions between the French government and France's Muslim population are not so much a result of a lack of cultural integration but due to a lack of economic equity between Muslims and the native population.⁴⁵ In the area of economic equality, the French government has taken very little action in support of integration. This is due, in part, to the decision not to collect data on the economic situation of the Muslim population as well as opposition to affirmative action policies. However, there is a significant body of privately collected statistics which suggest that France's Muslim population is much worse off in terms of economic and socioeconomic status than the general population.

The unemployment rate for all immigrants is double that of the overall population at 18%. However, for some subsets of the Muslim population, unemployment figures are much higher. For example, for young males, aged 18 to 30, of Algerian descent the unemployment rate is estimated to be as high as 30%.⁴⁶ There are several factors which explain high unemployment among Muslims, including limited access to higher education through the public education system due to discrimination. One study revealed that applicants to a Paris University were five times less likely to be admitted if they had a last name which appeared to be North African.⁴⁷

Also, employment is difficult to obtain for those that are poor, creating a self-fulfilling cycle. A

⁴⁴ "Villepin Targets Non-French Imams," *CNN*, April 22, 2004, ,
<http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/04/22/france.imams.reut/index.html>.

⁴⁵ Giry, *France and its Muslims*, 87.

⁴⁶ Jocelyne Cesari, "Islam and French Secularism: The Roots of the Conflict," *PBS*, August 23, 2004 ,
<http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/shows/france/index.html>.

⁴⁷ "Minority Report," *Economist*. October 28, 2006.

large number of France's poor live outside of its major cities in banlieues, or suburbs. The banlieues are characterized by the lack of access to city centers, large tenement-style buildings, overcrowding, and high crime rates. For instance, the banlieue of Clichy-sous-Bois, where the 2005 riots began, is nine miles from Paris city center but takes 90 minutes to reach by public transportation. A PBS study of 603 French banlieues, found that over 300 were predominantly inhabited by Muslim immigrants and could be characterized as ethnic ghettos.⁴⁸

The large scale urban riots which erupted in Paris and spread throughout France and other parts of Western Europe in October 2005 suggested to many French politicians and scholars that France's system of assimilation had been a dismal failure and masked a large unintegrated Muslim population, many of which were second and third generation immigrants. The catalyst of the riots was the electrocution of two Muslim boys in the Paris banlieue of Clichy-sous-Bois while attempting to evade police. The event sparked twenty-one nights of rioting, during which over 9000 cars were burnt and almost 3000 rioters were arrested.⁴⁹ The rioting population was overwhelming young and Muslim. During the riots, Nicholas Sarkozy, then Minister of the Interior, drew the ire of large parts of the Muslim population for referring the rioters as "rabble" and promising "zero-tolerance" for those involved in the riots, as opposed to seeking an end to the ethnic conflict and economic marginalization of those that live in the banlieues.⁵⁰

Political Participation

The vote of Muslims in France is heavily underrepresented due to the large number of Muslim residents who do not hold French citizenship; only one third to one half of all Muslims are French citizens.⁵¹ However, Muslim political representation in France remains low, even if one removes foreign nationals from the data. France's first Muslim parliamentarians were

⁴⁸ Cesari, *Islam and French Secularism: The Roots of the Conflict*

⁴⁹ "France Extends Laws to Curb Riots," *BBC News*, November 16, 2005, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4441246.stm>>.

⁵⁰ "Immigration and the 2007 French Elections," *Migration Policy Institute* (May 2007, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/France_Elections050307.pdf).

⁵¹ Cesari, *Islam and French Secularism: The Roots of the Conflict*

elected in 2004, both to the Senate, the less powerful house of the French legislature. Although record numbers of Muslim candidates sought seats in the National Assembly, the more powerful house of the French legislature, in the June 2007 elections, none were ultimately elected. This means that Muslim representation in the total legislature remains two of 908 parliamentarians. The representation of French Muslims holding local elected positions is slightly higher; Muslims made up 2.4% of all local elected positions in 2004.⁵² Inclusion of women and minorities has been a priority in President Nicholas Sarkozy's 2007 government. Sarkozy named Muslim Rashida Daki, now the highest ranking Muslim in French history, as his justice minister. Sarkozy named two other women of African descent, one Algerian and one Senegalese, to junior minister positions. One, Fadela Amara, has been named the junior minister for urban affairs. The daughter of Algerian immigrants, she now has the task of representing the French government in the predominantly Muslim banlieues.⁵³ Although Muslim representation in French political life remains very low, well below those numbers which would be proportional to the Muslim population in French society, the substantial increase in Muslim candidates, from less than 20 in 2002 to 250 in 2007, demonstrates that French Muslims would like to enhance their status within the French political system.⁵⁴

Naturalization and Civic Integration

France differed from some of its European neighbors throughout the 1950s and 1960s, by permitting and sometimes encouraging immigrants to remain in France as residents or citizens. This is still the case today, and naturalization has increased significantly since the mid-1990s due to several policies which have regularized the process. France is considered to have one of the least stringent naturalization policies in Western Europe. Foreigners born in France may opt to

⁵² Giry, *France and its Muslims*, 89

⁵³ "Sarkozy Reshuffles French Government," *International Herald Tribune* June 19, 2007.

⁵⁴ "Record Number of Muslim Candidates Run for French Parliament," *Islam Today*, June 10, 2007, http://www.euro-islam.info/spip/article.php3?id_article=949.

have French citizenship upon reaching the age of eighteen, if they have been a French resident for the five preceding years. This supports the French principle that a person may become French provided that they accept French ideals and language. French immigrants are eligible to apply for French citizenship provided that they have been a resident of France for five years, have learned the French language, and can prove that they do not need to rely on the French social security system for support.⁵⁵

Beginning in 1998, some categories of immigrants to France, most notably those coming for reasons of family reunification, are required to undergo civic integration programs sponsored by the government. France's civic integration policy is based on the Dutch model, which requires integration classes on Dutch language and values for immigrants. In theory, civic integration programs are important, because they depict integration as a duty of residency as opposed to a right. The current integration program was implemented in 2006 and mandates one full day of civics instruction followed by 500 hours of French language instruction when necessary. However, France has not experienced the civic integration challenge to the same extent as its neighbors due to the fact that most French immigrants, including Muslim immigrants from North Africa, speak French. In its first year, approximately one third of the 150,000 immigrants who went through the civic integration program were mandated to take the language course because they did not display adequate French knowledge. Renewal of residency permits and eventual application for citizenship is contingent upon fulfilling the requirements of civic integration.⁵⁶

Evaluation of Current Policies and the Future of Integration

Scholars are strongly divided on the extent to which France has been successful in assimilating its Muslim immigrants. Some critics feel French policies which deny differences

⁵⁵ "France: Country Profile," <http://www.focus-migration.de/France.1231.0.html?&L=12007>).

⁵⁶ Christian Joppke, "Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe" *West European Politics* 30, no. 1 (2007), 1.

among French citizens have led to exclusion of and discrimination against Muslims. Critics argue that “while Islam is statistically the second religion in France...it is practiced by a group of people that is dominated, underprivileged and reduced to political silence”.⁵⁷ The unfavorable impression that the French public holds toward Islam leads to widespread discrimination and causes Muslims to turn toward Islamic extremism. For example, “an opinion poll carried out” by a leading French newspaper in 1989 found that respondents characterized Islam with the principles of “women’s submission, fanaticism, antimodernism, and violence.”⁵⁸

However, other evidence supports the view that Muslims in France, especially second and third generation immigrants, are becoming more assimilated into French society. By 1990s estimates, “20% of Muslim men who had come to France by the age of 15 were married to French women (defined as a woman born in France of parents born in France). Among Muslim men born in France, 50 percent were married to a French woman.”⁵⁹ These figures suggest that Muslims have integrated into French society. If one considered integration to be a matter of self-definition, a recent study suggests that French Muslims are more integrated than other European Muslims. Only 46% of French Muslims consider themselves to be Muslim before they are French, compared to 81% of British Muslims.⁶⁰

Germany

Between 3 and 3.2 million Muslims live in Germany today, and constitute between 3.6% and 3.9% of the German population.⁶¹ Germany’s Muslim population is smaller than that of France, but is the second largest in Europe.⁶² Approximately one third of the foreign population

⁵⁷ Freedman, *Secularism as a Barrier to Integration? The French Dilemma*, 8.

⁵⁸ *ibid.*, 10.

⁵⁹ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries*.

⁶⁰ *Minority Report*

⁶¹ Nina Muhe, “Germany: Preliminary Research Report and Literature Review,” *Muslims in the EU: Cities Report* (2007),

http://www.eumap.org/topics/minority/reports/eumuslims/background_reports/download/germany/germany., 5.

⁶² Gallis, *Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries*

in Germany is Muslim.⁶³ Turkish Muslims, who make up approximately three fourths of Germany's Muslim population, are the largest Muslim ethnic group, although there are also significant numbers of Yugoslav, Arab, and Southeast Asian Muslims.⁶⁴ Almost all naturalized Muslims are of Turkish descent.⁶⁵ Because the fertility rate among Muslims is three times higher than that of native Germans, the Muslim population will double by 2015.⁶⁶

Like France, the German government does not collect information on the religion of German residents. For Germany, questions regarding religion would be considered a privacy violation. Therefore, most estimates of the status Germany's Muslim population are based on the country of birth or citizenship. These estimates may fail to take into account foreigners that may be a part of non-Muslim religious minorities in predominantly Muslim countries and the extent to which residents of Muslim heritage may not identify with Islam.⁶⁷

Germany's Muslim population originates in part from guest worker agreements that Germany signed with four nations, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, with large Muslim populations in 1961. This program was based on the "three R's" principle, which stands for "recruitment, remittance, and returns". The idea behind Germany's guest worker program was that workers, usually former farmers or skilled laborers, would come to Germany for one year to work in manual labor positions and then would return to their home countries and invest their savings in the domestic economy to be replaced with a new guest worker in Germany. While this program worked as planned for many immigrants, some guest workers chose to continue to reside in Germany, creating a substantial Muslim population that has been in the country for decades. Although Germany placed a stop on worker recruitment in 1973, the foreign

⁶³ Muhe, *Germany: Preliminary Research Report and Literature Review*, 5.

⁶⁴ Trudy Rubin, "Germany's Identity Debate Bodes Well," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 6, 2007.

⁶⁵ Muhe, *Germany: Preliminary Research Report and Literature Review*, 5.

⁶⁶ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries*, 34.

⁶⁷ Muhe, *Germany: Preliminary Research Report and Literature Review*

population in Germany continued to grow due to increased family reunification. This occurred despite German efforts to restrict reunification by passing legislation which prohibited spouses from working for one to four years after immigration and limited the internal migration rights of foreigners.⁶⁸ Additional Muslim immigrants have also arrived, particularly from Turkey and the former Yugoslav countries, as asylum seekers taking advantage of Germany's relatively lenient asylum policies.⁶⁹

Muslim immigrants have faced significant discrimination and misunderstanding from German citizens and policy makers. For instance, because Turkish immigrants were the most visible minority in Germany and the last to arrive in significant numbers, the political dialogue in the 1980s characterized Turks as "problem foreigners" who caused significant integration challenges.⁷⁰

There is some diversity within the overall Muslim population, as well as within the Turkish Muslim population, in Germany, in terms of language, ethnicity, type of Islam practiced, and devotion to Islam. Turkey is often considered the most secular country in the Middle East, and Germany's predominantly Turkish Muslims display this secularism. A study by Gerdien Jonker estimates that only ten percent of Muslims actively practice Islam, while approximately forty percent of German Muslims observe fasting rituals and religious holidays. Another study shows that 7.5 percent of German Muslims categorize themselves as "quite religious". In terms of language, Turkish Muslims usually speak Turkish as their first language, while Muslims from Northern Africa and the other parts of the Middle East speak Arabic dialects. Also, while the

⁶⁸ Philip Martin, "Germany: Managing Migration in the Twenty-First Century" In *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, eds. Wayne Cornelius and others, 2nd ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 221., 226.

⁶⁹ Muhe, *Germany: Preliminary Research Report and Literature Review*, 5.

⁷⁰ Martin, *Germany: Managing Migration in the Twenty-First Century*, 221, 231.

German Muslim population is mostly composed of Sunni Muslims, there also exists a significant population of Shia Muslims and Turkish Muslims of Kurdish descent.⁷¹

German Culture

Germany's source of national identity has been described by Friedrich Heckmann as an "ethnic nation concept". This idea is rooted in Germany's nineteenth century unification when citizens from diverse states formed a larger state under the notion of shared nationhood, or German ethnicity. Therefore, one is considered to be German because one is of German parentage and is descended from the German nation. Due to Germany's reliance on ancestry as the measure of one's being German, Germany has not historically been open to migrants who were not ethnically German. For many years, the most important and commonly cited phrase in the German immigration dialogue was "Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland" or "Germany is not a country of immigration."⁷² Changes in German policy in recent years have not reflected a desire on the part of Germany to become a country of integration, but instead the necessity, on the part of the German state, to address the situation of immigrants living in Germany. German politicians often cite Germany as a "country of integration" as opposed to a "country of immigration" in order to highlight the fact that Germany does not encourage immigration, but will deal with the immigrant situation within its borders.⁷³

The relationship between the German state and the church is significantly less secular than the French model. German law establishes a separation between state and church and prohibits the state from establishing a church or favoring any one religion. However, the German state plays a role in some aspects of German religious life. The state levies a church tax on

⁷¹ Muhe, *Germany: Preliminary Research Report and Literature Review*, 14.

⁷² Friedrich Heckmann, "Integration Policies in Europe: National Differences Or Convergence?" (Paper prepared for the European Forum for Migration Studies Research Conference, 1999).

⁷³ "Can Merkel's Integration Summit Deliver More than just Promises?" *Spiegel Online*, July 11, 2007.

members of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish congregations which provides the majority of the operating budget for most churches, cathedrals, and synagogues.⁷⁴

The German political system also has a much higher degree of federalism than the French system, and public accommodation of the Muslim religion varies for state to state. While no state has officially provided Muslims with the same status reserved for Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, some states have provided public funding for Muslim social welfare or cultural organizations. One Muslim school exists in Berlin, and public schools in the state of North Rhine/Westphalia include Islam in the religious courses offered by public schools. This policy was enacted on the belief that by offering state-sponsored Islamic education courses, children could learn a brand of Islam that was consistent with German liberal values.⁷⁵

Integration Goals

Current German Chancellor Angela Merkel has stressed the need for integration of immigrants and foreigners. Among these groups, special attention is given to Muslims due to the size of Germany's Muslim population as well as the image of Muslims, and especially Turks, as problem foreigners. Also, Germany's recent decision to make integration a priority is highly correlated with the attacks of September 11, 2001, because several of the terrorists involved in the attacks on the United States resided and made their plans from Hamburg, Germany. German officials are increasingly concerned with the presence of fundamental Islamists among German Muslims.

Chancellor Merkel has attempted to highlight her focus on integration with a series of summits between government officials and minority leaders. According to one study, "The issue

⁷⁴ Soper, *Explaining the Accommodation of Muslim Religious Practices in France, Britain, and Germany*, 48.

⁷⁵ *ibid.*, 52.

of Muslim integration is particularly reflected in discussions about such topics as forced marriages, honour killings, the wearing of headscarves, Islamic religious teaching in state schools, and the appointment of Muslim political representatives.”⁷⁶ German politicians speak of the necessity of creating a European brand of Islam which fits within German ideals. This idea was explained in an interview with Germany’s Minister of the Interior:

I don't want to change Islam, but if there is to be a European Islam, it must incorporate European values. During the centuries-long process of Reformation and Enlightenment, Christian churches had to accept some things they didn't like. Islam will have to do the same; otherwise it isn't part of Europe.⁷⁷

In July 2006, Chancellor Merkel called the country’s first “Integration Summit” to discuss the challenges and possibilities of integrating Germany’s foreign population. This summit was deemed necessary because almost one in five Germans today is an immigrant or is the child of an immigrant. Following the integration summit, in September 2006, Germany held an “Islamic conference” of government officials and representatives from Muslim organizations. In an interview prior to the summit with *Spiegel Online*, conservative Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble, when asked of the motivation behind the conference, stated

About three million Muslims live in the country, but we have no relationship to our diverse Muslim society, despite the fact that it's an established part of our larger society. We need to build a stronger foundation for the relationship between Muslims and the state. Otherwise we will not be able to meet the challenges of integration and the threats posed by international terrorism.⁷⁸

Germany held a second Integration Summit in July 2007. This summit’s importance was decreased by the fact that four of Germany’s strongest Muslim organizations boycotted the summit in protest against increasingly restrictive German immigration policy. Many critics felt

⁷⁶ Veysel Özcan, "Country Profile: Germany," *Focus Migration* 1, http://www.focus-migration.de/uploads/tx_wilpubdb/CP01_Germany_v2.pdf

⁷⁷ *ibid.*

⁷⁸ "We have no Relationship to our Diverse Muslim Society," *Spiegel Online*, September 20, 2006.

that this boycott demonstrated the refusal of German Muslims to integrate and work within the German political system.

Education

There are approximately 700,000 Muslim students in the public school system. While this figure constitutes approximately six percent of the total student population, Muslim students are highly concentrated in certain areas, with a much larger number of Muslim students in the states of former West Germany and a Muslim majority in at least two Berlin districts. Studies show that Muslim children have experienced discrimination in the school system and are often disadvantaged due to inferior German language skills.⁷⁹

A report by the Transatlantic Taskforce on Immigration and Integration claims mixed results for the success of Turkish second generation immigrants in high schools in comparison to other European countries with significant Turkish populations. The number of Turkish youths in Germany who participate in vocational education tracks, considered the lowest in the public school system, is high, between two thirds and three fourths. This is a larger percentage than in France, Belgium, or the Netherlands. However, the drop-out rate of Turkish Muslim youths in Germany is low when compared to the same countries.⁸⁰ A 2001 study by PISA, a body of the OECD which analyzes school performance among fifteen year olds, demonstrated that immigrant children lagged significantly behind native Germans in public schools. Possible causes of this problem include the lack of public preschools or full day schooling for young children, a dearth in German language education in the formative years, and the early age at which German schools divide students into tiered schools. Germany tracks students when they

⁷⁹ Muhe, *Germany: Preliminary Research Report and Literature Review*

⁸⁰ Maurice Crul, "Pathways to Success for the Children of Immigrants," *Transatlantic Taskforce on Immigration and Integration* (2007), <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/CrulEducation091907.pdf>

are very young, ten to twelve, and one's tier determines whether one will take a vocational path or be qualified for post-secondary education.⁸¹

An additional question regarding Muslim rights in public schools is present in Germany where it is not present in France, because the German Constitution guarantees students the right to state-funded religious education in public schools. However, states have the right to apply this principle as they see fit, and are not bound to provide specific religious education for Muslim students. In some states, such as Berlin, students may choose between Christian, Muslim, and a general humanistic religion course. In other states, religious education takes the form of comparative religion which may or may not include Islam or allows students to choose between religions, which may not include Islam at all or all appropriate sects of Islam. Muslim organizations in Germany advocate the offering of Islamic education in public on a state-by-state basis. Also, there is sometimes controversy over the content of Islam taught in public schools, due to the pervading belief among school officials that all religion taught in the public school system must conform to German ideals and values.⁸²

Although the headscarf controversy has not occurred in Germany to the extent that it has in France, several government and school officials have stated that hijabs are a sign of female oppression and a divisive religious symbol and should not be tolerated in public schools. However, this matter has also been left up to the states for the time being, creating diverse policies across Germany. As of 2005, Muslim women and girls in Berlin are prohibited from wearing the hijab in areas of public service including schools.⁸³

Economic Factors

⁸¹ Özcan, *Country Profile: Germany*, November 1 2007

⁸² Muhe, *Germany: Preliminary Research Report and Literature Review* , 25.

⁸³ *ibid.*, 7.

Unemployment rates in Germany, which are approximately 11%, are not available as a function of religion. However, several factors suggest that the Muslim unemployment rate is much higher than that of the general population. Unemployment among Turkish immigrants, which includes a large number of German Muslims, is approximately 23%, and for Turkish immigrants in some federal states it is as high as 30%. Because Muslims are on average less educated than native Germans, they are considered unqualified for many jobs, and those that do find employment most often work in fields which require unskilled or semi-skilled labor.⁸⁴

There are some barriers to the German labor market which have been partially addressed by a 2004 law which removes or lessens waiting periods for access to the labor market through the withholding of a work permit. Under the new legislation, bans will be removed for all immigrants with the exception of asylum-seekers, who must complete a one year waiting period and will receive a work permit which only allows employers to hire them when there are no citizens who wish to take the position. Due to the high rate of general unemployment in Germany, it is often difficult to find work on the basis of the work permit. Also, devout members of the Muslim community often face de facto exclusion from the labor market due to the absence of laws which mandate that employers provide special accommodations for the practice of religion, such as time off from work for five daily prayers or the inclusion Halal food in canteens and cafeterias.⁸⁵ In addition the structural barriers to employment, Muslims in Germany face as great deal of discrimination of a de facto nature in hiring and promotion.

In terms of housing, German Muslims, unlike their French counterparts, tend to live in ethnically homogenous inner-city neighborhoods as opposed to suburban slums.⁸⁶ However, there is little data available on the specific housing situation of German Muslims. It is important

⁸⁴ *ibid.*

⁸⁵ *ibid.*

⁸⁶ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries*

to note that asylum-seekers, who constitute a significant portion of the Muslim population, are not allowed free internal movement and are instead housed in government housing facilities in assigned cities.⁸⁷

Political Participation

In terms of political participation, it is important to remember that the vast majority, approximately 80%, of Muslims in Germany are not German citizens and are therefore not represented in the political process. However, there have been recent attempts by the government to bring Muslim leaders and organizations into the political dialogue, as were outlined above. In large part due to the fact that the majority of the Muslim population are not citizens, there is very low Muslim participation in the German government. Currently, five of 614 members of the Bundestag, the lower house of the German parliament, are Muslim.

Muslims' exclusion from the political arena is demonstrated by the fact that in a survey of over 1000 Muslims in Germany, less than five percent claimed that they were a member of a political party. Because individual Muslims play such a small role in the political process, Muslim organizations, which do not represent all or even most of German Muslims, play the largest role in advocating for Muslim rights and protections in the government. In the modern world, this process is often complicated by the suspicion on the part of the government that several Muslim organizations encourage extremism in their members.⁸⁸

Finally, Islam is not afforded the same status by the government as Christian and Judaic religions, meaning that Islamic mosques are not eligible to receive funding from taxes which the government levies on members, commonly referred to as the church tax. Therefore, a central focus of Muslim organizations in relations with the government is not public accommodation of

⁸⁷ Muhe, *Germany: Preliminary Research Report and Literature Review* , 42.

⁸⁸ *ibid.*, 42.

religion, which is theoretically guaranteed in Germany, but obtaining official recognition of the Islamic faith from the government.⁸⁹

Naturalization and Civic Integration

Historically, German citizenship was based on the *jus sanguinis* principle. In other words, German citizenship was determined in terms of ancestry as opposed to country of birth. Prior to the passage of the 1993 Nationality Act, it was virtually impossible for anyone without German heritage to obtain citizenship, which excluded the vast majority of the Muslim population.⁹⁰

Although immigrants were not able to seek naturalization, the government attempted to make up for strict naturalization laws by providing foreigners living in the country with a large number of social and civil protections and benefits.⁹¹ However, this system left large numbers of Muslim families who had immigrated to Germany under guest worker programs in the 1960s, and who had been living in Germany for decades without citizenship. Second and sometimes third generation immigrants were born on German soil as foreigners.

In 2000, Germany passed a second Nationality Act, which loosened the requirements for foreigners applying for citizenship. However, Germany's naturalization policy remains one of the strictest in Western Europe. An immigrant is eligible to apply for citizenship if he can prove eight years of legal and permanent residency, German language fluency, no criminal record, allegiance to the Constitution, and the ability to support oneself. Children born in Germany to foreign parents are only eligible for citizenship at birth if one parent has legally resided in Germany for the eight years prior to the birth and has carried a permanent residence permit for the past three years. Children must choose between the citizenship of their parents and German citizenship between the ages of 18 and 23.

⁸⁹ Soper, *Explaining the Accommodation of Muslim Religious Practices in France, Britain, and Germany*, 51.

⁹⁰ Özcan, *Country Profile: Germany*, November 1 2007

⁹¹ Martin, *Germany: Managing Migration in the Twenty-First Century*, 221.

Due to the passage of the second Nationality Act, naturalization increased in 2000, but annual citizenship recipients have decreased since that year. Residents of Turkish descent are the group most commonly naturalized.⁹² Taking into account the year 2000, which displayed peak naturalization, only 480,000 of 3.2 million Muslims were German citizens by Interior Ministry estimates.⁹³ Although Germany has taken steps to allow a greater amount of naturalization, the stringent nature of German policy means that there are a large number of Muslims and other foreigners living in Germany who have not been integrated in one of the most fundamental ways.

In terms of civic immigration, Germany offers obligatory integration courses to would-be immigrants that are composed of 600 hours of German language education and thirty additional hours of instruction in German values and culture. Germany established its civic integration program for foreigners wishing to migrate to Germany by expanding the structure that it had created in the 1990s in order to provide German language and culture education to ethnically German immigrants who returned to Germany after decades of living in the Soviet Union. The language component of civic integration is especially important for Muslim immigrants to Germany, because, unlike Muslim immigrants to France and the United Kingdom, German Muslims do not come from countries with prior colonial ties to Germany where the language is taught and widely used.⁹⁴

Evaluation of Current Policies and the Future of Integration

The future of Muslim integration in Germany is severely limited by the fact that the vast majority of Germany's Muslim population are not German citizens, and therefore cannot be fully integrated into the German political system. Due to the disenfranchisement of the Muslim population, it is very difficult for German Muslims to seek governmental change in policies

⁹² Özcan, *Country Profile: Germany*, November 1 2007

⁹³ Muhe, *Germany: Preliminary Research Report and Literature Review*

⁹⁴ Joppke, *"Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe"*, 1.

toward integration and Islam. Therefore, while Germany can take short run steps to integrate Muslims in terms of language and education, German Muslims will not feel integrated until they can play a part in the German political system and are not treated as outsiders or non-Germans by native German, whether or not they are naturalized citizens.

High profile events which suggest that German Muslims adhere to beliefs which strongly differ from those of native German society often spark an intensification of the integration debate in Germany. However, these events also cause the development of negative stereotypes about Muslims and Islam. An example of this phenomenon occurred in 2005, when three Muslim males were tried for the murder of their sister in an event described as an honor killing. This event sparked additional headlines in August 2007, when a German court reopened the case against two of the brothers. The case and ensuing news coverage caused Germans to question the integration of Muslim immigrants and to think of Islam as a religion which promotes violence and the marginalization of women.⁹⁵

Because Germany became engaged in the practice of Muslim integration in the recent past, Germany's Muslim population is still largely unintegrated. Like France, it is difficult for the German government to adopt policies which lead to the integration of its Muslim population, because there is a dearth of available data and information on the German Muslim population. However, it seems apparent that Germany faces significant language, economic, and cultural barriers in integrating its Muslim population.

The United Kingdom

According to the 2001 census, Great Britain's Muslim population numbers approximately 1.6 million of a population of 60 million. Muslims make up 2.8% of the British population and

⁹⁵ ""Brothers of Slain Turkish Woman to be Retried", " *Spiegel Online*, August 29 2007, , <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,502651,00.html> (accessed November 4 2007).

slightly over half of the non-Christian population in the United Kingdom.⁹⁶ One striking characteristic of British treatment of religion and integration is the fact that the British government, unlike the French and German governments, asks residents questions regarding religion, identity, and ethnicity in government surveys and data collection efforts. For the first time in 2001, the United Kingdom included religion among census questions. The British government releases national statistics on religion, among other variables, which are derived from census data as well as other sources. However, there are also problems with data on religion and ethnicity collected by the state; some sources argue that the actual Muslim population is closer to two million if one accounts for illegal and undocumented residents which census data does not capture.⁹⁷

The majority of British Muslims immigrated to Great Britain in response to recruitment in order to fill labor shortages in the 1950s and 1960s and due to policies which allowed a great deal of immigration of immigrants from former British colonies.⁹⁸ Three quarters of British Muslims are from the South Asian sub-continent, particularly from the former British colonies of Pakistan and Bangladesh. Pakistanis make up the largest Muslim ethnic group, accounting for 43% of all British Muslims. Bangladeshis and Indians account for sixteen and eight percent of British Muslims, respectively. Eleven percent of British Muslims are of a white racial background; four percent are native British, and seven percent are from other parts of Europe and the Middle East. Six percent of British Muslims are Black African.⁹⁹

Muslims are also more likely to identify with their religion than their native counterparts. Approximately half of Muslims consider religion to be a significant factor in their identity as

⁹⁶ National Statistics, *Focus on: Religion*

⁹⁷ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries*

⁹⁸ Wayne Cornelius and others, *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, 2nd ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 221.

⁹⁹ National Statistics, *Focus on: Religion*

compared to one in five Christians.¹⁰⁰ However, due to the diversity of the British Muslim population, it is difficult to make generalizations regarding the religiosity of British Muslims.

Muslims in Britain have the youngest age structure of all Britons and are significantly younger than the white British population. Thirty-four percent of Muslims were under the age of sixteen in 2001 compared with less than ten percent of white Britons. Meanwhile, less than five percent of Muslims are over sixty-five years of age compared with nineteen percent of the white British population. These facts are due to several factors. First, they reflect recent immigration flows. Second, Muslim families are significantly larger than British families. The average Muslim family consists of 3.8 members, while the average Christian family has 2.3 members. Also, Muslim males outnumber Muslim females by four percent. This is reflective of past trends that led Muslim males to immigrate to Great Britain in search of work leaving female relatives behind.¹⁰¹

British Culture

As with France and Germany, it is necessary to understand British culture, the culture which Muslims must integrate into, in order to understand British challenges to Muslim integration and the ways in which the British political establishment responds to the need for immigrant integration. In the case of the United Kingdom, it is important to remember that the UK is a multi-national state, which has had ongoing and historical struggles about the extent to which differing cultural groups should be allowed to maintain individual customs such as religion and language. For the purposes of understanding British relations with its Muslim citizens, it is also important to make a distinction between the British case and that of France and Germany. Due to Great Britain's colonial history and immigration flows, Great Britain has a

¹⁰⁰ *ibid.*

¹⁰¹ *ibid.*

diversity of population that is not present in the other countries. In addition to the significant Muslim minority, large numbers of Indian, Caribbean, and East Asian immigrants live in Britain and have caused integration challenges, some of which are unique and some of which similar to the Muslim integration challenge.¹⁰²

There are other cultural reasons which have caused Great Britain to historically allow a high degree of public accommodation for minority groups. Some scholars argue that Britain has experienced a higher degree of colonial guilt over the past half century than the other colonial power. This causes Britain to be hesitant to push the superiority of British culture and heritage on its immigrants, most of which come from countries with colonial ties to Britain.¹⁰³

Of the three countries discussed in this study Great Britain is the only country which does not have a formal position of state neutrality in regards to church-state relations. The Church of England is the official national church. However, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the system of religious accommodation in Britain was relatively stable, with protections and measures afforded to Britain's religious minorities. Therefore, far from enforcing strict state secularism, the British state funds religious education and has a blasphemy law which protects Christianity. State accommodation for religious traditions is generally high. This lack of secularism has shaped the religious accommodation demands that Muslims have placed on the British government.¹⁰⁴

However, although Great Britain has an official state church and public accommodation for religion, it is not a particularly devout country in the modern age. 2001 census data shows that Great Britain is undergoing a process of secularization. Almost a quarter of young Britons

¹⁰² *ibid.*

¹⁰³ Dan Bilefsky and Ian Fisher, "Doubts on Muslim Integration Rise in Europe," *The International Herald Tribune*, sec. NEWS, October 12, 2006.

¹⁰⁴ *ibid.*

aged sixteen to thirty-four said that they did not associate with any religion, while only five percent of Britons over the age of sixty-five did not identify with any religion.¹⁰⁵

Integration Goals

In 1997, Home Secretary Jack Straw released a report by the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia of the independent Runnymede Trust entitled, *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All*. It stated, "The UK government's official stance is one of inclusion, and to enable minorities such as the Muslims to participate freely and fully in the economic, social and public life of the nation, while still being able to maintain their own culture, traditions, language and values."¹⁰⁶ This statement reveals a divergence in the traditional integration goals of Britain, as compared to France and Germany, in that the United Kingdom has allowed for a multicultural society. Whereas the French Republican ideal allows foreigners to become French, it has little tolerance for additional identities which may equal or supersede one's French identity. Traditionally, German culture has allowed foreigners to maintain their cultural and religious identity, and has not permitted them to acquire German identity through methods other than ancestry. The United Kingdom established a precedent which allowed immigrants and Muslims to maintain their unique culture, values, and language, while becoming members of British society.

However, British multiculturalism is increasingly questioned in modern political debate. This questioning did not begin with the 2005 London subway attacks, which were planned and carried out by Islamic fundamentalists born and raised in Britain, but the attacks certainly intensified debate. Race riots in Northern England in 2001 also led the government to doubt whether government policies were leading to the successful integration of Muslims. The Cattle

¹⁰⁵ National Statistics, *Focus on: Religion*

¹⁰⁶ Zafar Khan, "Muslim Presence in Europe: The British Dimension - Identity, Integration and Community Activism," *Current Sociology* 48, no. 29 (2000), 29.

Commission, instituted by the government to investigate causes of the riot, pointed to local multicultural policies and the self-segregation of minorities as part of the problem and recommended the adoption of policies which “reinforce feelings of citizenship and shared elements of nationhood.”¹⁰⁷

The government has come to place additional importance on the necessity of learning the English language and accepting British culture and values. In response to a question on whether Britain should maintain multiculturalism during a press conference in early August 2005, shortly after the terrorist attacks, then Prime Minister Tony Blair stated, “Most people understand that you can have your own religion and your own culture,” but he also asserted that, “Coming to Britain is not a right, and even when people have come here, staying here carries with it a duty. That duty is to share and support the values that sustain the British way of life.”¹⁰⁸

Education

A significant amount of debate regarding integration of Muslims in Britain takes place within the frame of education, especially public education. Studies show that Muslims lag behind their peers in terms of educational achievement. Critics are concerned that if Muslims are not educated and are therefore unable to find employment, they will turn to extremist forms of religion. According to 2001 census data, “five in ten (49 per cent) Bangladeshi women and four in ten (40 per cent) Bangladeshi men had no qualifications. Among Pakistanis, 35 per cent of women and 29 per cent of men had no qualifications.” Pakistani and Bangladeshi performance on the GCSEs, a test which British school students take at age sixteen, is slightly worse than that of white Britons, and significantly worse than those of Indian and Chinese ethnicity. In general,

¹⁰⁷ Christian Joppke, "Do Obligatory Civic Integration Courses for Immigrants in Western Europe further Integration?," *Focus Migration* (October 2007, , <http://www.focus-migration.de/index.php?id=2562&L=1>).

¹⁰⁸ Bennett Rosemary and Richard Ford, "Row Over Tougher Rules on Preachers of Hate," *The Times (London)*, August 6, 2005, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article552248.ece>.

one in three working age Muslims has no qualifications. Approximately twelve percent of Muslim Britons hold a degree. The chances of completing a degree are much better for Muslims who were born in Britain than for those who were born abroad.¹⁰⁹

Great Britain has a state-maintained system of faith schools. However, Muslims are significantly underrepresented in this system. There were over 350,000 Muslim school students in 2001.¹¹⁰ In 2006, there were seven publicly funded Islamic schools, compared to twenty-five Jewish schools and 7,000 Christian. In total, there were approximately 140 Islamic schools, most of which charged tuition and were privately funded.¹¹¹ Only three percent of the Muslim student population attends an Islamic school as his or her primary form of schooling. Other British children receive religious education from private religious institutions in the evenings or on weekends, but the government has stated concerns that foreign at these institutions will encourage radical Islam. In light of this evidence as well as the evidence that Muslim students underperform in most public school, Muslim organizations spend a great deal of effort attempting to convince the government to fund more Muslim schools.¹¹²

In 2005, Great Britain became engaged in a discussion that has dominated French discussion of Muslim integration as it relates to public education for the past eighteen years. Officials at Headfield Church of England Junior School suspended teacher Aishah Azmi because she refused to remove her niqab, an Islamic headscarf which reveals only the eyes, while in the classroom. In October 2006, the Labour government spoke out against Azmi's wearing of the niqab as an action which suppressed integration. Then Prime Minister Tony Blair states that the niqab was an unnecessary "mark of separation" which caused non-Muslims to be uncomfortable. Meanwhile Culture Minister Tessa Jowell called the niqab a "symbol of women's subjugation".

¹⁰⁹ National Statistics, *Focus on: Religion*

¹¹⁰ *ibid.*

¹¹¹ *ibid.*

¹¹² Gallis 12.

However, although there was support in the Labour government for an allowance of schools to suspend teachers who refused to remove the niqab, Britain's Employment Tribunal ruled that the suspension was not permitted and awarded Azmi a small sum of money.¹¹³ The hijab, a headscarf which leaves the face uncovered, is considered acceptable in most British debate, denoting that public accommodation of religion in Britain is greater than in France.

Economic Factors

A 2004 British government report states that Muslims in the United Kingdom are economically disadvantaged. They have three times the unemployment of the general population, high rates of economic inactivity, low education levels, and live in economically disadvantaged areas. They are also disproportionately represented in the UK prison system. Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims have higher rates of economic disadvantage than other British Muslims.¹¹⁴

At less than five percent, the unemployment rate in Britain was significantly lower than in other European countries in 2001. However, the unemployment rate among Muslims was much higher than the overall rate, thirteen percent among males and eighteen percent among females. Also, a much larger portion of the Muslim population is economically inactive than in other populations.¹¹⁵ This is explained in part by the young age structure of the Muslim population; because the working age is defined to be aged sixteen to sixty-four, a large number of young people of working age are economically inactive because they are students. However, this explanation cannot fully explain the economic inactivity of Muslim females, which is much higher than females in any other religious group, at approximately seventy percent. This is due to the fact that it is not customary in Muslim cultures for females to work outside the home.¹¹⁶

¹¹³ Kevin Sullivan and Washington Post Foreign Service, "British Panel Reprimands School in Veil Dispute; Muslim Aide Awarded \$2,000 After Suspension," *The Washington Post*. October 20, 2006.

¹¹⁴ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries*

¹¹⁵ National Statistics, *Focus on: Religion*

¹¹⁶ *ibid.*

However, this poses implications for the integration of Muslim women. If Muslim women confine themselves mostly to their home and neighborhood and large numbers of Muslims live in ethnically homogenous areas, then Muslim women have little opportunity to interact with non-Muslims in British society.

The economic disadvantage of British Muslims is also apparent from their housing situation. Muslims in Britain are less likely than other religious groups to own their own home, although over fifty percent of Muslims do own a home. Muslims are more likely than any other religious group to live in government subsidized housing and to experience overcrowding in their living situation. This may be explained in part by the fact that Muslim families are the largest in Britain. British Muslims are geographically concentrated in urban centers. Almost two in five Muslims live within the greater London area, and their residence within London is concentrated in several neighborhoods. However, a larger percentage of Muslims live outside of London than other religious minorities. Large Muslim populations live in urban industrial centers in the West Midlands, Northwest, Yorkshire, and the Humber. Almost all British Muslims live in England as opposed to Scotland, Wales, or Northern Ireland.¹¹⁷ Unlike French Muslims, who live in economically downtrodden suburban areas, British Muslims tend to live in ethnically homogenous inner-city areas. This means that although British Muslims' housing situation reflects a lack of economic integration, they are not isolated to the extent of French Muslims.¹¹⁸

Political Participation

The number of Muslims in the House of Commons doubled from two to four after the May 2005 general election.¹¹⁹ Britain's first Muslim MP, Mohammed Sarwar, was elected in 1997, not from England, where the vast majority of British Muslims live, but from Glasgow,

¹¹⁷ *ibid.*

¹¹⁸ Gallis, *Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries*

¹¹⁹ Mustafa Abdel-Halim, "Four British Muslims make it to Parliament" *Islam Online*, May 6, 2005, <http://www.islamonline.net/English/News/2005-05/06/article03.shtml>.

Scotland.¹²⁰ There are also seven Muslims currently in the House of Lords, including Sayeeda Warsi, who, in July 2007, was named to the conservative shadow cabinet as the community cohesion minister, making her the first Muslim of cabinet or shadow cabinet rank.¹²¹ In comparison to France and Germany, these figures suggest that British Muslims experience a higher level of political participation. Also, British Muslims have a greater ability to participate in political activity because the percentage of Muslims who are citizens is much higher than in France or Germany. However, Muslims are still underrepresented in the British Parliament. In the House of Commons, there would need to be approximately twenty Muslim parliamentarians for Muslims to be proportionally represented. British Muslims have also not had a great deal of success in organizing ethnically and religiously disparate Muslim groups behind a single set of policy objectives, although there have been attempts in organizations such as the Muslim Parliament and Muslim Council of Britain.¹²²

Naturalization and Civic Integration

In 2005, the United Kingdom adopted a program of civic integration. However, this program differs in several ways from similar programs adopted in France and Germany which are based on the Dutch model. First, the British system was first enacted as part of the naturalization process as opposed to the immigration process. In 2007, this program was extended to immigrants coming to Britain for purposes of residency. Second, the British system does not reflect the strict coerciveness of the French and German programs. Because the United Kingdom does not plan to allow a great deal of low skilled immigration in the future, British civic integration attempts to assist immigrants, many of whom are recruited for their skills, in their transition to British culture. Those wishing to become immigrants and citizens must pass a

¹²⁰ "Sarwar: I'm Ready to Quit Westminster Role," *The Express*, June 22, 2007.

¹²¹ Carole Malone, "Woman we all must Listen to," *Sunday Mirror*, sec. FEATURES, July 8, 2007.

¹²² J. Christopher Soper and Joel S. Fetzer, "Explaining the Accommodation of Muslim Religious Practices in France, Britain, and Germany," *French Politics*, no. 1 (2001), 29.

cultural knowledge test based on government provided study materials, and well as a test which demonstrates some knowledge and a willingness to learn the English language, but does not require fluency.¹²³ This suggests that one can continue one's transition to British culture post-immigration or naturalization and the civic integration process only requires a display of dedication to integration.

In terms of naturalization, once one has achieved residency status, becoming a British citizen is relatively easy. Recently, the British government has begun to require the language and cultural knowledge test discussed above prior to naturalization. Also, recent reforms include the adoption of American-style naturalization ceremonies which ask immigrants to pledge allegiance to British values and the Queen and are meant to instill a sense of British pride. A large proportion of British Muslims are British citizens, including over eighty percent of all Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims.¹²⁴

Evaluation of Current Policies and the Future of Integration

In April 2007, the Gallup Organization released a study which showed positive results which contradict the typically negative stereotype assigned to Muslim integration, although it also indicated that there were several ways in which Muslim beliefs differed strongly from those of other Britons. The study, which was only conducted in the greater London area, suggests that Muslims have greater confidence in the British political, judicial, and law enforcement systems than their non-Muslim peers. Over half of British Muslims identify strongly with Britain, and nearly eighty percent feel that integration into British culture, to include learning the English language, obtaining education, and finding a job, are vital steps. The vast majority of Muslims, like other Britons, also do not condone violence for moral causes. However, the study also

¹²³ Joppke, *Do Obligatory Civic Integration Courses for Immigrants in Western Europe further Integration?*

¹²⁴ Cornelius and others, *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, 221

showed that Muslims in Britain were considerably more likely than non-Muslims to identify with their religion, and that on certain issues relating to Islam, such as the wearing a niqab or hijab, Muslims were much more permissive of Islam than others.¹²⁵ British census data suggests that a large proportion of Muslims, approximately seventy percent, living in Britain identify themselves as British. Among British born Muslims, this number is even higher, approximately ninety percent. As only forty-six percent of British Muslims were born in Britain, this suggests that many Muslims who immigrated to the United Kingdom have come to consider themselves British.¹²⁶

Some private studies suggest a less positive view of Muslim integration. A recent study by the Pew Center indicated that over eighty percent of British Muslim considered their religion to be their primary identity, while less than ten percent considered their primary identity to be British. The rate at which British Muslims consider their religion to be of primary importance is greater than the rate among French Muslims. While thirty percent of British Christians consider their religion to be their primary identity, this is of less concern to the government, because in theory a Christian ethos is more in line with Britain Judeo-Christian tradition. It is important to note that this study only asked participants to identify their primary identity. It is possible that many survey participants do identify with Britain as a secondary identity. It is also possible that a great many devout followers of any religion would consider their religious identity to be more important than their national identity. However, if one believes that some facets of the Muslim religion contradict British and Western values, it may be a problem for British Muslims to value their religious identity foremost. Many Britons are concerned that Muslims who identify

¹²⁵ Michael Binyon, "Poll of Muslims in London shows Hidden Face of a Model Citizenry," *The Times (London)*, sec. HOME NEWS, April 17, 2007.

¹²⁶ National Statistics, *Focus on: Religion*

primarily with Islam may have views on women's rights, homosexual rights, and religious law which are not aligned with British culture.¹²⁷

Comparative Analysis of the Case Studies

Many divergences in domestic integration policies and the situation of Muslim residents are evident at first glance from the above portrayals of Muslim integration in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. All three countries face significant, if slightly different, challenges in integrating Muslim populations, all of whom have been in existence since labor recruitment programs in the 1950s and 1960s. It is important to note that the Muslim populations of the three countries are not alike. The French population is predominantly from the Maghreb, the German population from Turkey, and the British population from the Indian subcontinent. French and British Muslim immigrants came primarily from countries with which France and Britain had colonial ties; these immigrants may have had some knowledge of the respective languages and cultures of the original mother country, but may also have carried certain perceptions due to their colonial experience. In contrast, German Muslims emigrated from a country without any colonial ties to Europe and with no knowledge of the German language. It is equally important to note that, while they all have some history with integration policies, the three countries have not pursued integration to the same extent or by using similar methods. While France and the United Kingdom have made greater attempts to integrate their Muslim populations than Germany who from a policy perspective largely ignored immigrant populations for several decades, France pursued a historically assimilationist integration policy, while Britain adopted a policy of multiculturalism.

In confronting immigration, each of the three countries has had to address education, economics, political participation, naturalization and civic integration.

¹²⁷ *Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns about Religious and Cultural Identity*

Education

Education has played a very important role in the integration debate in all three countries, although it is here that national policies are most divergent. However, low levels of Muslim education are common across the board, and Muslims in all three countries say that discrimination is present in education. However, the three countries face several very different challenges. For example, in Great Britain and Germany where religion plays some role in public education, the debate centers on whether Islam should receive the same treatment as Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism. It is difficult to compare this across countries due to the fact that religion plays absolutely no role in the public education in France, which has very stringent secular policies, and policies differ on a state by state basis in Germany.

An issue that has become an important integration policy sticking point in all three countries is the extent to which Muslim girls and women are permitted to wear headscarves in public education settings. There is the most marked difference in this matter between the United Kingdom, where contention only surrounds the most drastic forms of headscarves such as the full face burqa or niqab, and France, where all large religious symbols are banned from public schools. Germany is, again, difficult to compare because policies differ on a state by state basis.

Economic Factors

Muslims are economically disadvantaged in all three countries studied, although the extent of the disadvantage varies from country to country. Unemployment data cannot definitively identify which Muslims are most or least challenged in finding employment. In Germany and France unemployment for the general Muslim population is approximately twice the national average, while in Great Britain Muslim unemployment rate approaches three times the national average. However, both the national average and the rate of unemployment among

Muslims are significantly lower in the United Kingdom. A recent study by the Pew Global Attitudes Project suggests that Muslims in Europe are more concerned with socioeconomic disadvantage than they are with other integration issues. Muslims in all three countries were more likely to be worried about unemployment than Islamic extremism, decline of religion, the influence of pop culture, or modern roles for women.¹²⁸

Muslims More Concerned About Unemployment Than Religious and Cultural Issues				
	----- Muslims in -----			
	Great Britain	France	Germany	Spain
% very worried about...	%	%	%	%
Unemployment	46	52	56	55
Islamic extremism	44	30	23	22
Decline of religion	45	21	18	18
Influence of pop culture	44	17	18	17
Modern roles for women	22	16	9	10

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Muslims in all three countries tend to live in ethnically homogenous neighborhoods in urban environments in Paris and southern cities in France, London and industrial cities such as Birmingham in the United Kingdom, and in Berlin in Germany. However, a lack of Muslim integration is most evident in the French housing situation where a large number of Muslims live in economically disadvantaged banlieues, housing projects in city suburbs. Another factor which suggests a lower level of economic integration among French Muslims as compared to British Muslims is representation in the prison population (data is not available for Germany). Although Muslims are overly represented in both countries, estimates reach as high as fifty percent for French Muslims. Economic disadvantage and discrimination are largely thought to have been a contributing factor to French riots during the fall of 2005 and 2007.

¹²⁸ Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns about Religious and Cultural Identity. *Pew Global Attitudes Project*, July 6, 2006, <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=254>.

¹²⁹ Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns about Religious and Cultural Identity. *Pew Global Attitudes Project*, July 6, 2006, <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=254>.

Political Participation

Although Muslims are underrepresented in all three national governments, British Muslims have the highest representation in both absolute and percentage terms. One explanation for the increased representation of British Muslims may be that, although they make up the lowest percentage of the overall population compared to Germany and France, a significant majority of Muslims in the United Kingdom are citizens, and can therefore vote. Muslims in both the United Kingdom and France also have reached ministerial rank in recent years.

Another way to measure Muslim political participation is to study the way that Muslim organizations interact with the government. Islam receives religious recognition in both France and the United Kingdom, although Muslim organizations in both countries have faced a similar challenge in speaking for heterogeneous Muslim populations. German Muslims face a unique challenge due to method with which the German government funds some religious congregations through taxes, but has not yet afforded Muslim mosques this benefit.

Naturalization and Civic Integration

British Muslims are much more likely to be British citizens, at approximately 80%, than their French or German counterparts are to be French or German citizens, at approximately 33-50% and 20%, respectively. Today, naturalization policies in the United Kingdom remain less strict than French and German policies, although policies in the former are also much less restrictive than in the latter. These figures have significant implications for the integration of Muslims into society. The naturalization of immigrants removes a stigma attached to a lack of citizenship, allows immigrants every right afforded to native citizens, and allows participation in government through voting or running for office.

All three countries have adopted civic integration policies in recent years. The programs of the Germans and the French are similar in structure and are largely based on the Dutch model, while the British program is different in that it is less obligatory and views civic integration as a more long term process. This difference is consistent with the historic British policy of multiculturalism. It is also important to note that the language portion of civic integration is a special challenge in Germany. Very few immigrants to Germany have knowledge of the German language, and therefore German policy must address this challenge or face a significant language divide in society.

Conclusion

It is difficult to make any sort of judgment regarding the overall integration of Muslims in Europe. In terms of political participation and naturalization and British Muslims appear to be better integrated than their French and German counterparts. There may be less striking evidence in favor of British integration in terms of economics as well. There is certainly vastly more information available about the British Muslim population due to the willingness of the British government to conduct national research on matters of ethnicity and religion. This may mean that the British government will be better able to assess the integration needs of its Muslim population in the future and measure its progress in terms of integration. Between Germany and France, the most striking comparison is the extent to which there is a dearth of national integration policy in Germany compared to France which has a strong national policy. One can see the potential benefits and potential problems in this divergence.

Nonetheless, there are clearly significant challenges to Muslim Integration in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom; none of the countries has seamlessly integrated a growing Muslim population in terms of education, economic factors, political participation, or

naturalization and civic integration. Also, the fact that integration policy continues to be debated and laws passed demonstrates that Muslim integration is a growing as opposed to a fading policy concern. The overall findings of this research are that clearly defined integration policies are necessary in Europe in order to promote peace, security, civil rights, and economic efficiency, whether that policy comes from national governments or the European Union system. Because there are significant policy differences and some variance in the challenges to Muslim integration in different countries, any common integration policy will be hard to achieve. It will require skillful recognition of the historical and cultural differences within and among the countries of Europe and their Muslim populations.

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