

CAPSTONE – THE MOVING FORCES BEHIND SHIFTS IN NATO DOCTRINE

Introduction

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is one of the oldest security institutions in the world, having emerged after the end of the Cold War as a way to ensure a lasting peace in Europe and the transatlantic community. NATO, which has seen its membership expand from 6 to 28 members, and is expected to keep expanding in the near future. NATO has been struggling to find a solid identity as the international context has shifted dramatically after the Cold War. No longer is there a balance of power threat from Russia, but instead, non-state actors and sub-state actors are posing the greatest threats to state sovereignty; no longer is Europe the decisive battlefield, but it is Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. **From examining in detail the three major out-of-area NATO missions (SFOR, KFOR and ISAF), it is clear that many factors – specifically bureaucratic politics, EU-NATO competition and individual leadership – all contribute to the informal shifts in NATO’s doctrine (by accepting new missions), but none so much as the domestic politics of the member states, which covers aspects of public opinion, coalition members and other competing claims on the limited resources of the state.**

For the purposes of this research paper, I am defining the term “doctrine” informally as relates to NATO. A doctrine is generally defined as “a belief (or system of beliefs) accepted as authoritative by some group or school.”¹ While NATO officially operates on Standardization Agreements, which are agreements that are ratified by the member states to harmonize the processes, procedures, terms and conditions for the common

¹ “Doctrine”, from wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn

military/technical procedures between the member states of NATO, informal doctrine can be inferred from NATO's actions. Each NATO state ratifies the Standardization Agreement and implements it within their military to provide a common operational and administrative procedure so that the militaries may become more interoperable. "NATO Standardization Agreements for procedures and systems and equipment components, known as STANAGs, are developed and promulgated by the NATO Standardization Agency in conjunction with the Conference of National Armaments Directors and other authorities concerned."² In addition to the Standardized Agreements (STAGNAG), NATO formally has other documents, such as the Allied Tactical Publications (ATP) and Allied Ordnance Publications (AOP), which define its formal role in the international community. While these formal documents are important in maintain NATO's legitimacy and sense of history, they are technical and highly specialized, and are not updated often. *Many of the NATO documents were produced during the era of the Cold War, and are purely military and operational – not political, which is what I argue NATO puts first and foremost – politics.* In the context of this research, I will be looking at the **informal NATO doctrine**, which I define based on the de-facto and case-by-case basis of NATO's missions after the Cold War: Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Informal doctrines can be inferred through the actions of the institution – as NATO takes on a new mission, it is in some ways changing its doctrine, its raison d'être. The fact that NATO took on out-of-area missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, and then an Article 5 mission in Afghanistan shows that NATO is informally shifting its priorities, providing the proof for the argument that subtle (and not so subtle) doctrinal shifts occur in NATO, and this paper seeks to examine the driving forces behind these shifts

² NATO e-Library: Standardization Agreements, <http://www.nato.int/docu/standard.htm#ATP>

(why NATO took on these new missions and expanded beyond its traditional area) in the post-Cold War context.

In order to understand why NATO's doctrine shifted, it is first necessary to understand the international context that NATO operated in during the Cold War and after the Cold War, especially focusing on the circumstances surrounding and NATO's behavior during the three missions in examination. Post 1989, NATO found itself at a crossroads – questioning its relevance and potential tasks, a debate that continues today. Even though NATO has participated in the Balkans War and in the 2001 Afghanistan War, the overall strategy of this institution is still unclear. There have been many shifts in NATO doctrine, and with each shift, new missions and new tasks are taken on, as old taskings become irrelevant. As NATO fights to stay relevant in the current century, threats are shifting faster than NATO can adapt, and another doctrinal shift needs to occur to ensure the survival of NATO. But, no doctrinal shift can occur unless there is consensus between all 28 members, making it necessary to examine the real reasons behind past NATO doctrinal shifts. Once policy makers understand the real mechanism of NATO doctrine, they can attempt to replicate the situation to create a new strategy shift.

NATO during the Cold War: Keeping the Russians out, Americans in, and the Germans down

Before the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, NATO functioned as the predominant security organization that rivaled the Warsaw Pact, a security pact of the countries behind the Iron Curtain allied with the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, NATO served a variety of political, security and military functions, but the three most important functions of NATO included: extending the U.S. nuclear umbrella to

Western Europe as a deterrence to Russia; ensuring the defense of Western Europe via conventional weapons; and promoting greater European security while ensuring American interests would be represented and carried out via NATO command and control, resources and planning. During the four decades of NATO existence, NATO existed in the international context of a bipolar world – the Soviet Union and its satellite states (and any communist country in general, including China, Vietnam, and North Korea) against Western democracies, consisting of the United States and its Western European allies – with its main threat contained within the European continent on which NATO drew its membership. After the Cold War was over, Europe was no longer the United States' top security priority, as the Middle East, East Asia and Latin America have taken priority over a relatively capitalist and peaceful Europe. Europe was no longer a source of major contention, save for some Russian aggression and regional issues in the Caucasus and Balkans, but nothing compared to the damage of sub-state actors and transnational terrorism in the Middle East and South Central Asia.

NATO, established by the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949, is a military alliance built around the theme of collective defense, whereby its member states agree to mutual defense in response to an attack by any external party. NATO originally consisted of the U.S., Canada and Western European states.³ NATO was formed after the Cold War, with as other intergovernmental organization such as the UN and the EU. NATO was unique in that it was a solely political-military alliance, with its own standing army (theoretically, member states were able to designate troops for NATO command) as opposed to the UN's

³ Original countries in NATO included: Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, the UK, Portugal, Italy, Norway, Denmark and Iceland

focus on inclusion and the EU's economic development – NATO was exclusionary (limited only to the transatlantic community) and military in character. While it was always touted as a military alliance, NATO had no military plans or any significant funding for the first years of its existence. NATO was not taken seriously until the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, which was seen by the Allies as the spread of monolithic communism. At this point in history, NATO member states did not differentiate between the various communist countries, and assumed they were all the same, and all allies working together, despite the varying differences in each country's strand of communism. This wakeup call led to NATO's first concrete steps toward military planning, leading to an integrated military structure designed to ensure operability of member state troops. At this time, troops were limited to mostly ground troops, as the troop structure of the Cold War consisted of large conventional armies that were trained to fight the Soviets in case of conventional, all-scale war. NATO's job was to ensure that these troops, from all its member states, could be able to operate together on the ground against the communists, should such an occasion occur.

During the first years of NATO's existence, a clear structure began to take place. The Secretary General, the civilian leader of NATO, tended to be European; whereas the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (or SACEUR), the military leader of NATO, tended to be American. The Alliance focused on developing militaries for the threat of war while extending the U.S. nuclear umbrella to Western Europe with regard to mutual defense, as articulated in Article 5. Article 5 states:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the

United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area...

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.⁴

This clause was originally envisioned for the Americans to protect Europe from the Soviet Union, but ironically, it was used for the first and only time in justifying the NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks on the U.S.

During the Cold War, NATO functioned cohesively in regards to European security, as it extended membership invitations to Greece and Turkey in 1953, to Western Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982 – but NATO was not without its internal problems, as any organization is susceptible to. In 1959, France announced its intention to withdraw its troops from NATO, and by 1966, it had fully withdrawn itself from NATO's integrated military command. While France still participated in the political aspects of NATO and showed solidarity with the Alliance during the Cuban Missile Crisis, France withdrew from NATO over disputes with the U.S. and UK over France's nuclear ambitions and France's anger regarding the special relationship shared between the U.S. and UK. After this episode, NATO continued to function, led by U.S. foreign policy with strong backing from the UK. In the 1970s, the U.S. pursued a policy of détente under Nixon, leading NATO to officially define two complementary aims of the Alliance, "to maintain security and pursue détente."⁵ Years later, the U.S. switch to an aggressive policy of escalation and weapons build up

⁴ The Official NATO Treaty, retrieved from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty.htm>

⁵ NAC Final Communiqué, Conference in Washington DC on May 30-31, 1978, retrieved from <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c780530a.htm>

under Reagan led the Alliance to deploy missiles and show their willingness to use force against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. The weapons race, led by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, cumulated in the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was unable to keep up with its spending and adequately maintain control of its satellite states (some of which, like Czechoslovakia, were revolting for democratic governance) – which led to its dissolution.

NATO's evolution post-Cold War: an organization in search of a mission

After the Cold War had ended, it seemed that NATO had won. NATO had won, in regards to outlasting the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, but found itself in a new quandary – its reason d'être for the first four decades was no longer valid. The Soviet Union was no longer a threat, and the NATO member countries were not sure what to do with this military alliance born out of necessity during the Cold War. Now that the Soviet Union had collapsed, Europe had no more obstacles on its path toward being whole and free. NATO was left without a mission, but was quickly saved by the troubles in the Balkans. NATO participated in two missions in the Balkans – the first in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, and the second in the Serbian province of Kosovo in 1999.

After the Balkans conflicts, NATO began to expand membership to the former Warsaw Pact states, beginning with Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary in the first round of enlargement in 1999, followed by a larger round in 2004. These former satellite states embarked on a double path of EU and NATO membership after 1991, and now NATO has expanded to 28 members, adding Croatia and Albania in the 60th Anniversary Summit in 2009.

New missions: the Balkans and Afghanistan – buying time for NATO

Bosnia

The first NATO military operation caused by the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was Operation Sharp Guard, which ran from June 1993–October 1996. This operation provided maritime enforcement of the arms embargo and economic sanctions against the FRY. On April 12, 1993, Operation Deny Flight (ODF), a no-fly-zone enforcement mission, was started, and lasted until December 1995. NATO's first military actions, however, did not occur until February 1994, when NATO shot down four Bosnian Serb aircrafts that were violating a U.N.-mandated no-fly zone over central Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was the first of NATO's air campaign against the Bosnian Serbs, with the goal of undermining the military capability of the Bosnian Serb Army, who regularly threatened and attacked UN-designated safe havens in Bosnia. This specific operation, known as Operation Deliberate Force, was carried out between August–September 1995 and involved over 400 NATO aircraft and 5000 personnel from 15 nations. This, in turn, led to the Dayton Agreement, under which NATO was able to deploy a peacekeeping force, under Operation Joint Endeavor, first named IFOR, and then renamed SFOR. SFOR ran from December 1996 to December 2004, until it was replaced by the EU's own EUFOR.

The Implementation Force (IFOR) was a NATO-led multinational force in Bosnia and Herzegovina under a one year mandate from December 1995 to December 1996, under the codename Operation Joint Endeavour, having taken over from UNPROFOR, the UN's interim government. At its height, IFOR involved troops from 32 countries and numbered some 54,000 troops in-country and around 80,000 involved troops in total, including

reserves. In December 1996, SFOR took over the IFOR mission. The Stabilization Force (SFOR) was a NATO-led multinational force in Bosnia and Herzegovina tasked with upholding the Dayton Agreement. SFOR operated under the code name Operation Joint Guard (December 1996 - June 1998) and Operation Joint Force (June 1998 - December 2004), with 26 NATO and 12 non-NATO countries providing troops.⁶ Troop levels were reduced to approximately 12,000 by the close of 2002, and to approximately 7,000 by the close of 2004. During NATO's 2004 Istanbul Summit the end of the SFOR mission was announced, and in December 2004, SFOR was officially replaced by EUFOR.

European Union Force Althea (EUFOR) is a military deployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina to oversee the military implementation of the Dayton Agreement. It is the successor to NATO's SFOR and IFOR. The transition from SFOR to EUFOR was largely a change of name and commanders, over 80% of the troops remained in place.⁷ EUFOR currently has 2,153 troops from 14 EU countries.⁸ The multinational presence in Bosnia has come a long way from 1995, where NATO was bombing the Bosnian Serb army, to IFOR, then SFOR and now EUFOR. These international forces charged with maintaining security and peace in Bosnia represent NATO's first out of area mission – the Balkans. NATO took a gamble in getting involved with the Balkans, but a perfect storm gathered before taking on this mission, as NATO was an organization without a mission and the Balkans were falling apart, and the Europeans were hesitant to act. NATO resources and

⁶ From www.nato.int; NATO countries that provided troops in SFOR included: Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, UK and US. Non-NATO countries were Australia, Albania, Austria, Argentina, Finland, Egypt, Ireland, Malaysia, Morocco, New Zealand, Russia and Sweden.

⁷ EU FOR, retrieved from www.euforbih.org

⁸ Ibid, EUFOR Troop Strength, from http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=145&Itemid=62

capabilities made it possible to carry out an effective air campaign leading to the Dayton Accords, and fourteen years later, Bosnia is part of NATO's PfP and is being considered a potential candidate state for the EU. The results of NATO's first non-transatlantic mission have far-reaching effects, as this marked the beginning of NATO intervention in the Balkans, and eventually in other regions of the world outside of Europe and North America. This, however, was not the end of the drama in the Balkans, as next mission NATO was significantly involved in was Kosovo, a former province of Serbia. This mission and the implications of the UNSC Resolution and KFOR have lead to controversial new international precedents.

Mission of SFOR

SFOR's main goal was to implement the Dayton Accords. NATO lists SFOR's mission as: "[to] deter hostilities and stabilize the peace, contribute to a secure environment by providing a continued military presence in the Area Of Responsibility (AOR), target and coordinate SFOR support to key areas including primary civil implementation organizations, and progress towards a lasting consolidation of peace, without further need for NATO-led forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina,"⁹ with the desired outcome of a functional, democratic end-state that does not need international forces to maintain security.

At first, NATO members contributed over 60,000 troops to achieving security and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, as the security situation has increased, and government of Bosnia has grown more capable, SFOR has adjusted its deployment, both in

⁹ NATO, "SFOR", retrieved from <http://www.nato.int/sfor/organisation/mission.htm>

terms of tasks and numbers to reflect the changing environment. “In 1999 the force was reduced to 33,000; in 2006, 16, 000 and 7,000 by June 2004.”¹⁰

Kosovo

Kosovo was the second major NATO mission after the Cold War, but the effects of the Kosovo War have wider implications for the rest of the world. Kosovo, the southern province of Serbia, consists of mostly Albanians, with a Serb minority in the north. In the 1990s, Milosevic revoked the autonomy and freedom granted the region under Tito’s rule, and used Kosovo as a way to gain domestic support for his nationalist platform. After Milosevic was elected president, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia started to disintegrate, with declarations of independence by Slovenia, Croatia and then Bosnia, which led to an all out war. After the Dayton Accords, which did not address Kosovo, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisted of only Montenegro and Serbia, which has two autonomous regions- Vojvodina in the north and Kosovo-Methohija in the south. Kosovo had been largely Albanian-dominated since the 1300s, with the rise of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, but tensions were quelled under Tito’s policy of brotherhood and friendship, all of which vanished under Milosevic. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) attacked Serbian troops, and Milosevic reacted. What occurred next was a 78-day NATO bombing campaign known as Operation Allied Force (OAF).

The decision to launch OAF was justified on humanitarian means. NATO has estimated that by the end of 1998, “more than 300,000 Kosovars had already fled their homes, the various cease-fire agreements were systematically being flouted and

¹⁰ NATO Factsheet, retrieved from
<http://www.otan.nato.int/sfor/factsheet/restruct/t040121a.htm>

negotiations were stalled” (the two rounds of internationally brokered talks in Rambouillet in February and in Paris in March 1999 failed to break the deadlock and “exhausted diplomatic avenues,” forcing NATO to resort to military means).¹¹

The result of this air campaign, after 78 days of air strikes in which more than 38,000 sorties were flown without a single NATO fatality,¹² was UN Resolution 1244, which authorized an international civil and military presence in Kosovo, as part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, thereby placing it under interim UN administration (UNMIK), with the possibility of future statehood.¹³ KFOR was initially composed of some 50,000 troops from NATO, NATO partner and non-NATO countries under unified command and control. “By early 2002, KFOR was reduced to around 39 000 troops. [Like Bosnia,] the improved security environment enabled NATO to reduce KFOR troop levels to 26 000 by June 2003 and to 17 500 by the end of 2003 ... Today, over 14 000 troops from the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) are still deployed in Kosovo to help maintain a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement for all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origin.”¹⁴

Mission of KFOR

KFOR’s goals were initially to carry out UNSC Resolution 1244 by:

- deter renewed hostility and threats against Kosovo by Yugoslav and Serb forces;
- establish a secure environment and ensure public safety and order;
- demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army;
- support the international humanitarian effort;

¹¹ NATO, Kosovo Air Campaign, retrieved from http://www.nato.int/issues/kosovo_air/index.html

¹² Ibid

¹³ NATO, Kosovo, retrieved from <http://www.nato.int/Kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm>

¹⁴ NATO, Kosovo Air Campaign, retrieved from http://www.nato.int/issues/kosovo_air/index.html

- coordinate with and support the international civil presence¹⁵

In addition to these goals, NATO agreed to start implementing its new tasks in Kosovo after June 2008 (following Kosovo's declaration of independence) such as assisting in the standing down of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), training the newly established Kosovo Security Force (KSF), in addition to assisting the Kosovo government with the creation of a civilian structure to oversee the KSF. These tasks are implemented in close coordination and consultation with the relevant local and international authorities.¹⁶ These missions have drastically changed the path of NATO, at a time when many were not sure if NATO would survive once its main adversary no longer existed. The NATO missions in Bosnia and Kosovo have bought increased stability to Europe, yet the relevance, path and usefulness of NATO is still being questioned as a result of the ever-increasing out of area missions, especially Afghanistan.

Afghanistan – testing the waters in the South Central Asian theatre

Many NATO members, including the United States, argue that NATO's credibility is on the line with Afghanistan. NATO's article 5, intended to protect Western Europe from the Soviet Union, was invoked, for the first and only time in NATO's history, shortly after the 9.11 terrorist attacks on the United States. NATO deployed ISAF, the International Security Assistance Force, with the blessing of UN Security Council Resolution 1387 in December 2001. UNSCR 1387 was passed unanimously by the members of the Security Council and authorized a peacekeeping force in Afghanistan under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. While the UN did not formally authorize the war until December 2001, the actual

¹⁵ Ibid

¹⁶ NATO, Kosovo, retrieved from <http://www.nato.int/issues/kosovo/index.html>

war began on October 7, 2001 led by U.S. and UK forces in response to the 9.11 attacks, dubbed Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The stated purpose of this invasion was to capture Bin Laden and remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. After the UN Resolution, NATO-led ISAF troops were sent to Afghanistan alongside U.S./UK troops already under OEF. ISAF was established initially to secure only Kabul and its surroundings, and it was not until 2003 that UN expanded ISAF's mission to all of Afghanistan. While the doctrine of NATO, in terms of its Strategic Concept and other military Standardization Agreements, have not been updated since 1999, the Prague Summit in 2002 put into writing some of the informal shifts NATO doctrine has been evolving to expand. The NATO Heads of State and Government reaffirmed their commitment "to transforming NATO with new members, new capabilities and new relationships with our partners. [NATO is] steadfast in our commitment to the transatlantic link; to NATO's fundamental security tasks including collective defense; to our shared democratic values; and to the United Nations Charter," in addition to inviting Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to begin accession talks to join the Alliance.¹⁷ This communiqué was the formalization of NATO's acceptance of the new threats after the Cold War, such as terrorism and non-state actors, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, cyber warfare, biological and chemical warfare, in addition to conventional warfare – and its dedication to adequately fighting them with enhanced political cooperation, military interoperability and

¹⁷ NATO, Prague Summit Declaration, retrieved from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>

enlargement of NATO as an institution, including the creation of the NATO Reaction Force (NRF).¹⁸

As of January 2009 ISAF troops number around 55,100 from 26 NATO, 10 partner and 2 non-NATO countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Azerbaijan, and Singapore. Overall, the United States supplies over 23,000 of the total 60,000+ ISAF troops, with the UK providing the second highest amount (8,000 troops) and the other NATO member states are providing smaller contingents of troops varying from 1 to 2,000.¹⁹ The intensity of the combat faced by contributing nations varies greatly, with the United States, United Kingdom and Canada sustaining substantial casualties in intensive combat operations, as they are located in the southern provinces of Afghanistan where the Taliban and insurgency are most active, whereas many Allied troops are stationed solely in the north, avoiding most of the conflict and bloodshed. ISAF is also backed by the 76,000 newly trained troops of the Afghan National Army and 30,200 Afghan policemen.

The current ISAF mission faces many problems – as it is the first NATO mission in this region, and there is a clear a division of labor between the countries stationed in the north, where it is more peaceful; and the countries stationed in the south – where the opium and insurgents are located. Countries stationed in the south include the U.S., Canada, UK and the Dutch – who rightfully complain that the other countries are not participating fully in the NATO mission because of national caveats, which limit the actions of their

¹⁸ The Prague Summit Declaration envisioned the NRF as: “consisting of a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed, as decided by the Council. The NRF will also be a catalyst for focusing and promoting improvements in the Alliance’s military capabilities.”

¹⁹ NATO, ISAF Placement, retrieved from http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf

troops in Afghanistan, and a general unwillingness to contribute more resources, in troops and funding, to the ISAF mission, causing a clear burden-sharing problem between NATO members.

Understanding NATO today: new missions and new members

Europe is no longer the communist split, war-torn recovering shamble it once was, mostly due to the American and NATO efforts in ensuring peace and stability during the Cold War. After the Cold War ended, NATO grew stronger, both in membership size and international influence, but its original mission had seemingly expired. NATO was created to ensure a security community for its members, but recently NATO has been engaging in out of area missions. The landscape of Europe had changed drastically in the twenty years following the collapse of the Soviet Union – the EU, the economic and political union of Europe, along with NATO, have expanded to include former Warsaw Pact members, bringing countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic from authoritarian satellite states to highly functional and capitalistic democracies. The expansion of NATO and the EU has increased the stability and prosperity of Europe, while at the same time, downgrading the Europeans from the list of American foreign policy concerns.

Upon examining the three main NATO missions of importance post-Cold War, it is clear that NATO is an evolving and changing institution – one that adapts to its current security environment. There is no question that NATO doctrine and strategy has changed dramatically after the fall of the Soviet Union, first with Bosnia, then Kosovo and currently, Afghanistan, but the question is **why**.

Research Question:

The paper will address the complexities behind the shifts in NATO doctrine over the years, from the Cold War, to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Balkans Wars and most recently, the war against Afghanistan in 2001. In each of these periods, the NATO doctrine informally shifted (NATO doctrine can be inferred from communiqués, strategy papers and SYG statements; including troop and funding toward NATO missions), and this paper will examine the possible reasons for the change. Potential explanations include: domestic politics – where countries determine the path of NATO based on specific domestic concerns and situations, explaining DeGaulle’s withdrawal from NATO command; bureaucratic politics, in which NATO, as a bureaucracy with an organizational identity and culture, struggles to maintain relevance once the balance of power argument has faded away; EU-NATO competition, where the interaction between the growing EU security organizations and NATO have impacted the resources allocated to NATO; and political entrepreneurship, in the form of individual leadership, where NATO policy is in reality determined by a tight-knit group of personalities, and certain personalities have been the real force behind NATO doctrinal shifts. In examining these theories, this paper will try to deduce what is the main driving force behind NATO strategy shifts.

This paper will argue that it is domestic politics that drives NATO doctrine more than any other explanation. NATO as an Alliance is dependent on individual member states to earmark and contribute troops/funding, which is actually determined by the various interest bureaucracies and interest groups in each state, in addition to a state’s current domestic situation, which may be influenced by a whole host of factors including security, economics, politics and disasters. While

competing theories such as bureaucratic politics and political entrepreneurship certainly have credence as possible drivers behind NATO doctrinal shifts, it is the pressure that national governments face from within, in the form of bureaucracies and interest groups, that determines not only the national allocations to NATO, in the form of troops and funding, but also the overall domestic public opinion and participation of that country in NATO missions/command.

NATO is highly susceptible to fluctuations in member states, as domestic politics have the biggest impact on NATO doctrine, making NATO an unsteady Alliance. If a member state goes through political/economic turmoil, it will still be a part of NATO, but its contributions and participation will have changed, thereby changing the internal dynamics of NATO. This argument helps fill in the blanks regarding the complicated decision making processes of NATO by taking NATO out of the equation. NATO is, at the end of the day, what its member states want it to be, and by showing that member states wield the final say in NATO doctrinal shifts and examining when these key shifts have taken place and why, it will be possible to predict or create a situation where NATO member countries are more amicable to a new doctrinal shift.

Hypothesis:

There are many contending theories as to the reasons behind NATO's doctrinal shifts, and in order to prove that domestic politics is the best explanation, this paper will attempt to prove the other three most plausible theories wrong, or at the very least, insufficient. By examining the domestic politics approach, as compared to the bureaucratic politics, competition between EU-NATO and political entrepreneur

theories, I will show that the domestic politics approach is superior to the others, if it accounts for more instances of informal NATO doctrinal shift than the other explanations. I will use previous literature on these theories and compare them to the assessment of the three missions. **The missions will be assessed on their troop levels, funding, and official NATO statements, as to infer the type of statement and doctrine that NATO has embarked on per each mission, and for each mission (SFOR, KFOR and ISAF), each of the four theories will be tested to see how well they explain the specific NATO doctrine.** The theory that applies to the cases most consistently will show what the rationale behind NATO decisions truly is.

Literature Review:

An essential part of my research is the literature review, looking at past scholar's works regarding the role of domestic politics, bureaucratic politics, the EU and individual leaders in influencing shifts in NATO doctrines. In order to prove that each theory is the most valid, we must see proof that it works: in regards to the possible explanation of EU-NATO competition, we would need to see that member states' involvement with the EU directly took away from their involvement in NATO, by decreasing support (in political, military and funding terms) for NATO missions in favor of EU ones to prove that the EU-NATO competition actually affects NATO's ability to take on new missions; for bureaucratic relevance, we would need to see NATO as an institution actively fighting to maintain relevance by promoting the acceptance of new missions, even despite a flimsy connection to NATO's original intentions; for the leadership theory to hold weight, we would need proof that leadership made an impact on NATO decisions to intervene in the Balkans, in either individual or state-level leadership; and for the domestic politics explanation to hold

firm, we would need to see that domestic politics, in the form of public opinion, domestic coalitions and other domestic problems, such as economic recessions, scandals, elections or other chaos, impacts NATO missions – such as a high public opinion favoring intervention leading a state to intervene, or a fragile domestic coalition pushes a state to maintain its distance from the NATO mission in order to preserve its domestic staying power. The validity of these four arguments will be assessed in the data and analysis section, and the conclusion will describe their interactions and relevance in the shifting of NATO's informal doctrines for the missions in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan.

The Effect of ESDP on NATO

Shifting NATO-EU relations, in the form of the European ESDP program, is another possible explanation for the shifts in NATO doctrine. While progress has been made in regards to unifying European security and defense policy, “EU member states' continued preference for non-binding, intergovernmental forms of 'soft' or 'new' governance in this policy field has limited progress significantly.”²⁰ Reynolds argues that the EU agreements are easily broken, as the language is often nonbinding and loose, but there is potential for improvement if the EU implements stronger governance and enhanced cooperation to create the “credible, deployable military”²¹ the member states want, but improving EU military capabilities may take away from members' NATO commitments, considering the limited defense forces/budgets of EU countries.

²⁰ Reynolds, Christopher. “Military Capability Development in the ESDP: Toward Effective Governance?” Contemporary Security Policy 28:2 (2007), 357-383

²¹ Ibid

In reviewing the literature regarding EU-NATO relations, a few things are clear: there is an unmistakable divergence of viewpoints from the U.S. and the EU regarding military operations and the use of force; that the EU is increasingly trying to enhance its status as a foreign policy organization, instead of an economic one; and that NATO, despite all the drama with the EU, is still the main mechanism in which political-military decisions are made in the transatlantic community. The evolution of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has been gradual and increment, especially in comparison to the EU's progress in the field of trade and monetary affairs, but the EU is definitely taking major strides which would potentially affect transatlantic relations and increasing the potential conflicts as NATO and the EU increase.²²

With the non-military aspects of security rising in prominence, the EU is striving toward greater economic and political integration as it takes on these softer tasks.²³ Ackerman argues that there are three sociocultural factors that have lead to the growing rift in transatlantic relations: the Europeanization of socialization; the emergence of Europe as a norms leader; and the diverging discourse between Europe and the United States.²⁴ While the EU and U.S. do share values of interests and norms such as democratic beliefs such as human rights, freedom, and neoliberal economic systems, the cultural differences are becoming more pronounced. As the EU has strengthened, it has leaned more toward the direction of peaceful resolutions and carrots, instead of sticks. Europe, given its past history of warfare and damage, is very uncomfortable to act if they feel the

²² E Kirchner, "Will Form Lead to Function? Institutional Enlargement and the creation of a European security and defense initiative (ESDI)", Contemporary Security Policy 21:1 (2000), 34

²³ E Kirchner, 40

²⁴ Alice Ackerman, "The changing transatlantic relationship: a sociocultural approach", International Politics 40:1 (2003), 122

war could be protracted, but is more likely to act if the military action can be morally justified as legitimate; whereas the U.S. seems to have a higher tolerance for the use of force – leading to perhaps irreconcilable differences between the two actors. The security culture, defined by Sedivy as “enduring and widely shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes and symbols that inform the ways in which states/society’s interests and values with respect to security, stability and peace are perceived, articulated and advanced,”²⁵ which varies greatly between the U.S. and EU. This strategic culture lasts over time, although it is not a permanent or static feature. The first split in the transatlantic consensus occurred over Iraq, but there were a multitude of smaller differences that were brewing underneath the surface and exploded during the 2003 War in Iraq, led by the U.S. and condemned by much of the EU. Sedivy argues that Europe has moved onto a post-modern status, whereas the U.S. still operates in a modern world, using force and strength instead of economics and diplomacy.²⁶

While clear U.S.-EU differences affect the dynamics between NATO-EU, explaining some of the tensions and differences that have arisen, it is also important to note is the fact that Europe is not united. There are many countries in the European continent not included in the EU, namely the Balkans and arguably the Caucasus, and even within the EU, there is a divide between the more independent EU-minded Europeanists and the more pro-American Atlanticists, such as the newer EU countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The transformation of the global political and security environment after 9.11 only deepened the split between the two Europe’s.

²⁵ Jiri Sedivy, “old Europe, new Europe and transatlantic relations”, *European Studies* 27 (2005), 190

²⁶ Jiri Sedivy, 197

Leadership Literature Review

The issue of leadership is a controversial one regarding NATO policy, as the Secretary General, the head civilian leader, must consult with SACEUR, the head military leader, in addition to all the PermReps of the NATO member countries located in Brussels, who report to member state government's Presidents, Prime Ministers, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense. It is difficult to exactly assess the quality and impact an independent leader has on the direction of NATO policy. Leaders of NATO, notably the Secretary Generals, have varying influences on the policy of the Alliance for the three missions this paper will examine, but leaders such as SYGs Woerner, Claes, Robertson and Solana; Presidents Bush, Chirac and Sarkozy and Prime Ministers Blair and Chancellors Schroeder and Merkel have had a real impact on NATO policy.

Upon examination of SYG Woerner and the crisis in Bosnia, Hendrickson's findings suggest that Woerner was a critical leader in influencing NATO decisions, which provides new explanations for NATO's conduct in the Balkans.²⁷ Woerner served as the Secretary General right before NATO used force for the first time in its history, in 1994, and Woerner was a critical leader in shaping this critical decision. The evidence Hendrickson gathered regarding Woerner's personality, diplomatic skills and interpersonal relations show that Woerner did indeed have an independent impact on the policy of the Alliance. Hendrickson found that "while Woerner never achieved the comprehensive policy aims that he wanted in the Balkans, the evidence suggests that he had an independent influence on major decisions for the alliance, and assisted in setting the foundation for NATO's more extensive

²⁷ Ryan Hendrickson, "Leadership at NATO: Secretary General Manfred Woerner and the Crisis in Bosnia" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 27:3 (2004) 508

military actions, which came after his death.”²⁸ Upon examining the various other factors in NATO’s decision to use force in Bosnia, the “quality of executive leadership may prove to be the single most critical determinant of the scope and authority of international organization.”²⁹ While Woerner presided over an Alliance deeply torn about the direction of future missions, he ultimately led the Alliance toward its decision to use force in Bosnia, largely due to U.S. support and his close ties to the Clinton Administration. Unfortunately, Woerner died before the actual NATO mission, but his successes in the field of diplomacy and NATO policy lived on, and NATO did indeed take military action in Bosnia under SYG Claes.

Willy Claes, the Belgian SYG that followed Woerner, faced major personal scandal that tainted his tenure as NATO’s top civilian leader. Hendrickson assesses Claes’ leadership from three perspectives, which he also applied to Woerner: his leadership efforts under the international systemic constraints prior to the use of force in 1995; his organizational leadership at NATO, focusing primarily on his chairmanship of the North Atlantic Council (NATO’s principal decision-making body); and his relationship with NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR), which speaks directly to the interplay between civilian and military leaders at NATO. “The findings demonstrate that Claes’ influence and role were substantial. And represent an unrecognized aspect of Operation Deliberate Force’s success, and more generally, on the secretary general’s role in assisting NATO to be a meaningful player in European security.”³⁰ Claes was critical in moving the

²⁸ Ibid, 509

²⁹ Ibid, 509

³⁰ Hendrickson, “NATO’s Secretary General and the Use of Force: Willy Claes and the Air Strikes in Bosnia” *Armed Forces & Society* 31:1 (2004), 98

North Atlantic Committee (NAC) to the use of force in Bosnia. His open and abrasive leadership skills laid out all the issues on the line, and convinced his colleagues that “the military option for the Alliance [was legitimate because] the Council had already authorized military action ... [making the question of force] not open to debate.”³¹

The use of force in Bosnia was the first even show of force from the Alliance and led to a UN peacekeeping force led by NATO’s IFOR, which was replaced by SFOR, which was then replaced by EU’S EUFOR. For the next four years, the problems in the Balkans intensified, especially in Kosovo, which was an issue not addressed during the Dayton Peace Accords, and when war broke out in Serbia over Kosovo, NATO ended up intervening. Perhaps it is the certain leadership and personalities at the helm of NATO that provide the doctrinal shifts, as SYG Solana played a critical role in the way the NATO mission in KFOR was shaped. Hendrickson “examines Secretary General Javier Solana's contributions to Operation Allied Force, and how these findings relate to the issue of the role of Secretaries General in NATO after the Cold War” and finds that “greater leadership possibilities exist for the Secretary General & that Solana contributed to alliance cohesion on many fronts.”³² The article follows Solana’s leadership, including his legal foundation and relationships with other NATO leaders, and provides a narrative of how personalities determine the outcome of NATO missions. During this war, SYG Solana, who is now the EU’s High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (HR-CFSP), led the Alliance into the decision to use force against Serbia. “Traditionally, alliances are not viewed as organizations that undergo fundamental revolutions in purpose and mission, but

³¹ Ibid, 106

³² Hendrickson, Ryan C. “NATO’s Secretary General Javier Solana and the Kosovo Crisis”, Journal of International Relations and Development 5:3 (2002), 240-257

rather as institutions that remain focused on their external challenger.”³³ Solana’s achievement was due to his ability to find a legal consensus using the semantic ambiguity of “sufficient legal basis”, which allowed each member of the Alliance to justify to his varied domestic constituencies that NATO had international legal authority to act without a UN Resolution. While Solana benefitted from the U.S. and UK’s backing “but interviews with leading participants, as well as journalistic coverage of these events, viewed Solana as the principal architect of NATO’s legal claims ... Solana’s ability to find a consensus was one of his most important achievements as Secretary General, and reveals a markedly different role for a Secretary General of NATO compared to the Cold War era”³⁴

Bureaucratic and Organizational Considerations

Bureaucratic politics argues that NATO, as an institution, actively sought to remain relevant during a time of uncertainty by expanding to new members and adopting new missions, explaining why NATO took on the missions in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan; in addition to the 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concept documents.³⁵ The 1991 Strategic Concept acknowledged that “the developments taking place in Europe would have a far-reaching impact on the way in which its aims would be met in future. In particular, they set in hand a fundamental strategic review ... [including stating that] NATO is purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defense.”³⁶ The 1991 Strategic Concept did not take into account the breakdown of the Soviet Union and potential conflicts in the Balkans. “The 1999 Concept confirms that the Alliance’s essential and enduring

³³ Hendrickson, Ryan C. “NATO’s Secretary General Javier Solana and the Kosovo Crisis, 241

³⁴ Ibid, 244

³⁵ NATO’s strategic concept is the authoritative statement of the Alliance’s objectives and provides the highest level guidance on the political and military means to be used in achieving them.

³⁶ <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm>

purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members by political and military means. It affirms the values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law and expresses the commitment of the Allies not only to common defense but to the peace and stability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area,” in addition to the addition of three new members to the Alliance.^{37 38} These documents provide guidance as to NATO’s continually changing *raison d’être* and define the broad tenets of NATO as they apply to taking on new missions.

NATO still operates on the 1999 Strategic Concept, even though it was created before rise of sub-state actors and transnational crime and terrorism cumulating in the 9.11 attacks. At the 2009 Summit, NATO members “launched the process to develop a new Strategic Concept which will define NATO’s longer-term role in the new security environment of the 21st century.”³⁹ The 2009 Summit Communiqué also stressed the importance of existing transatlantic organizations and their role alongside NATO, but not replacing NATO’s functions: “we recognize the importance of existing structures – NATO, the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe – based on common values, continue to provide every opportunity for countries to engage substantively on Euro-Atlantic security with a broad *acquis*, established over decades, that includes respect for human rights; territorial integrity; the sovereignty of all states, including their right to decide their own security arrangements; and the requirement to fulfill international commitments and

³⁷ NATO handbook, retrieved from <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0203.htm>

³⁸ NATO’s 1999 strategic document focused on: collective defense, military capabilities, new missions, new members, strengthened partnerships and European capabilities

³⁹ NATO Summit Declaration, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52837.htm?mode=pressrelease

agreements.”⁴⁰ This shows the organizational politics at work in NATO – the preservation of the organization is done so by expanding the missions and goals to fit the changing global environment.

International regime theory, which sees interstate institutions as “mechanisms to facilitate cooperation that might otherwise be infeasible” helps to explain NATO’s “eagerness to take on new missions by arguing that institutions are easier to adapt once in place, [than to build an entirely new one] from scratch.”⁴¹ When the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, many questioned the use of NATO in an environment without a Soviet threat, but the strategic conditions in Europe were too unstable for NATO to be completely disregarded, as the member states top diplomats realized that trouble was brewing in Eastern Europe. NATO’s development as an institution only increased during the 1990s, as it searched for a new mission, while building a distinct institutional character out of necessity. The development of an institutional personality happened slowly, first in 1992, when NATO agreed to consider enforcing decisions of the UNSC and OSCE on a case-by-case basis – representing a major organizational response to the end of the Cold War, where NATO was now actively engaging with international organizations.⁴² NATO portrays itself as necessary to security because it has to be relevant in order to support its argument for legitimacy. Then, as NATO took on the Balkans, first in Bosnia (albeit somewhat hesitatingly), and then in Kosovo (with more gusto) – NATO members realized the value added of a security institution that would adapt and evolve with the changing international

⁴⁰ Ibid

⁴¹ J Leggold, “NATO’s Post Cold War Collective Action Problem”, *International Security* 23:1 (1998), 78

⁴² Ibid, 80-81

threats, as negotiating a new treaty, especially with a mutual defense clause, would be almost impossible to duplicate in Europe now that there was no immediate threat of Soviet invasion, in addition to the rise of the EU.

Domestic Policy

Domestic politics may have a large role in NATO politics, because it is the member states that determine the contributions to NATO. In Germany, for example, the Bundeswehr (legislative branch) is faced with the challenge of a growing “conviction in German domestic politics that the Bundeswehr should only be employed for the purposes of stabilization and reconstruction is increasingly challenged by a changing operational reality in Afghanistan, and allies' reluctance to continue to accept German policy. In essence, the issue at contention is German participation in counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. To continue current policy undermines Germany's military credibility among allied partners and restrains Germany's ability to utilize fully military power as an instrument of policy.”⁴³ This article shows that domestic politics is therefore the driving factor behind German contributions to the ISAF mission, by comparing the instances of German forces in NATO during each specific mission with the domestic policy situation. The domestic politics of each country determine the overall strategy of NATO, because strategy is only determined by what the members are willing to contribute.

Foreign policy is not controlled by a predominant leader or a single group, but by a coalition of politically autonomous actors. This is especially prevalent in parliamentary democracies with multi-party cabinets, which happens to be the preferred type of

⁴³ Noetzel, Timo and Schreer, Benjamin "All the way? The evolution of German military power" International Affairs 84:2 (2008), 211-221

government for much of Europe. The defining feature of this type of government is the “absence of any single group or actor with the political authority to commit the state in international affairs.”⁴⁴ Hagan argues that these coalition decision units have two defining traits: the sharp fragmentation of political authority within the decision unit, as no single actor/group has the authority to commit the resources of the state on its own; and the effects that each actor’s constituencies have on members of the decision unit because the individuals in the unit do not have the authority to commit to a decision without first consulting the key members of those they representing – as policymakers are responsible to the public.⁴⁵ Domestic politics is important in this context, because the domestic situation determines the state’s foreign policy priorities.

Analysis and Evaluation of the Four Possible Explanations:

EU-NATO competition

What the EU is and its history is essential to understanding why it behaves the way it does. The EU believes in soft power, and uses carrots not sticks when dealing with foes. The EU and NATO share 21 common member states, but there are current tensions, especially regarding Cyprus (an EU member) and Turkey (a NATO member) over the implementation of the Berlin Plus program. The ESDP is the successor of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) under NATO, but differs in that it falls under the jurisdiction of the European Union itself, including countries with no ties to NATO. Earlier efforts were made to have a common European security and defense policy, beginning in 1948, with the creation of the Western European Union (WEU). The WEU is a collective

⁴⁴ JD Hagan, “Foreign Policy by Coalition: deadlock, compromise and anarchy”, 169

⁴⁵ Ibid, 170-171

defense organization composed of Treaty of Brussels states— all NATO member states as well—but the WEU has historically been overshadowed by the larger and U.S. supported NATO. In the 1950s, the EU proposed a European Defense Community, similar in nature to the European Coal and Steel Community, but the French parliament failed to ratify the treaty, and the project was soon abandoned.

In 1992, the WEU agreed to take on the Peterberg Tasks,⁴⁶ but again, was rendered semi-irrelevance compared to NATO. At the 1996 NATO ministerial meeting in Berlin, it was agreed that the Western European Union (WEU) would oversee the creation of a European Security and Defense Identity within NATO structures. The ESDI was to create a European 'pillar' within NATO, partly to allow European countries to act militarily where NATO wished not to, and partly to alleviate the United States' financial burden of maintaining military bases in Europe, which it had done since the Cold War. The Berlin agreement allowed the WEU to use NATO assets if it so wished. Later on, the Berlin agreement was revised to the Berlin-Plus agreement – it was amended to allow the EU (instead of just the WEU) to conduct such missions using NATO equipment and resources for planning and operational purposes.

In 1999, the bilateral St. Malo meeting between the UK and France led to the first substantive talks regarding the creation of ESDP. The St. Malo Declaration said that the European Union ought to have the capability for “autonomous action backed up by credible military forces” as part of a common defense policy and laid out the political foundation which facilitated the launch of the European Security and Defense Policy and the

⁴⁶ The WEU's Petersberg tasks included: humanitarian and rescue tasks' peacekeeping tasks' and tasks for combat forces in crisis management and peacemaking

formulation of the Headline Goal. The Helsinki Headline Goal was a military capability target set for 2003 in which the European Union pledged itself during the Helsinki summit to be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks (as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty), including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 people). The aim was to make those forces self-reliant, deployable within 60 days and over 4,000 km, and sustainable in the field for a year. This means the force would actually have to number around 180,000 troops so as to provide rotating replacements for the initial forces.⁴⁷ As the Helsinki Headline Goal became fulfilled, the European Council of June 2004 approved to further develop the EU's military crisis management capability and a new target was set: the "Headline Goal 2010." The Headline Goal 2010 was a commitment EU members made to be capable of responding "with swift and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach" to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty of the EU and the 2003 EU Security Strategy by 2010. The EU also aimed to address the shortfalls from the previous headline goals, which are still considered to be a limiting factor to the operability of the designated forces, especially in more demanding crisis management operations.⁴⁸

In theory, the EU's Headline Goals are not in conflict with state's NATO obligations, but the goals of the EU's Rapid Reaction Force are lofty and seek to deploy troops faster than the NATO reaction corps, which is impossible, given that NATO is still in the process of perfecting its different reaction forces, and it is the U.S. technology, expertise and

⁴⁷ Colin Robinson, *The European Union's "Headline Goal" - Current Status*, Center for Defense Information, May 23, 2002

⁴⁸ European Council, Headline Goals 2010, retrieved from <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf>

equipment that give NATO's forces credibility, something lacking in the EU's ESDP. In addition to the competition over resources and supposed capabilities, there is a big political problem – Turkey and Cyprus. Cyprus was admitted into the EU in 2004, whereas Turkey has been applying for membership since the 1960s with little success. In fact, many European leaders have spoken out against Turkish inclusion in the EU arguing that it is not part of continental Europe, and have expressed worries about its almost homogenous Muslim population, even though it is a secular state. Turkey has been a member of NATO since the 1960s, whereas Cyprus is not. Because of the conflict on the island of Cyprus, and Turkey's recognition of the North Cypriot Turks (they are the only country in the world to do so) – the two countries are at odds with each other, bringing Greece, a traditionally close ally of Cyprus, into the conflict. As a result, the Cyprus conflict has not been resolved, and it is the UN's longest standing mission having begun in 1974, and the two countries frequently block each other from inclusion into the organizations to which they have membership in, often causing deadlock for the other members of the EU or NATO, as both countries refuse to budge. The Turkey-Cyprus conflict is what has held up the successful implementation and usage of the Berlin Plus agreement.

The Berlin Plus agreement has been used successfully twice by the EU and NATO – once in Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where the EU took over for NATO's Operation Allied Harmony and deployed 300 troops to provide security to the EU and OSCE monitors overseeing the implementation of the Ohrid Framework agreement; and again EUFOR Althea in BiH, after NATO's decision in 2004 to terminate SFOR and hand the reins over to EUFOR, a 7,000-strong EU mission to

implement the military aspects of the Dayton Accords and to generally maintain a secure and stable environment.⁴⁹

Sometimes, being a part of both institutions can lead to difficult decisions in the domestic realm, as is seen in the case of the Netherlands. In the 1990s, the government of the Netherlands had to face a decision between the emerging ESDP and NATO. The country is known as a strong proponent of international organizations such as the UN, ICC and the OSCE, as The Hague is known as the capital for human rights – home to the ICC and other international tribunals, yet was a founding member of NATO.⁵⁰ In the end, the Netherlands decided to maintain the delicate balance between EU's ESDP and NATO, which is what most of the smaller countries already do, by participating in the ESDP but maintaining close relations with the U.S.

Even given the EU's "post-modern" view of foreign policy, the EU's ESDP "continues to be limited and constrained by recognized capability shortfalls – a gap between what the

⁴⁹ Berlin Plus has seven major parts: (from NATO, at http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm)

1. The NATO-EU security agreement, which covers the exchange of classified information under reciprocal security protection rules
2. Assured access to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations (CMO)
3. Availability of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led CMOs
4. Procedures for the release, monitoring, return and recall of NATO assets and capabilities
5. Terms of Reference for DSACEUR and European Command Options for NATO
6. Arrangements for coherent and mutually reinforcing capability requirements, in particular the incorporation within NATO's defense planning of the military needs and capabilities required for EU-led military operations
7. EU-NATO consultation arrangements in the context of an EU-led CMO making use of NATO assets and NATO capabilities

⁵⁰ Rob de Wijk, "Transatlantic Relations: a view from the Netherlands", *International Journal* (2004), 169

member states were ready to agree to and what they were able to achieve.”⁵¹ This output vs. outcome problem is further complicated by the domestic policies of the EU countries – some countries, like France, are strongly pro-ESDP; whereas other countries prefer to maintain their special relationship with the U.S., like the UK; and there are other countries who are attempting to cultivate their own special relationship with the U.S. – mostly the newer Central and Eastern European countries. It is clear that the source of tension in ESDP is the U.S., and subsequently NATO. The question seems not to be, “what effect does the ESDP have on NATO?” but “what effect does NATO have on the ESDP?” as it seems that the relationship individual EU member states have with the U.S. determine their activity and support in NATO, which in turn, takes away from their ESDP support. With limited resources and limited capabilities, it is difficult for states to allocate fairly between the two organizations, and NATO, with its history and U.S. participation, seems to be the winner at the end of the resource and budget battles. While this benefits NATO greatly, the EU’s ESDP is not without merit, and could be of great use to NATO in the future – if the existing disputes are resolved peacefully – for use during more civilian and peacekeeping missions.

Whereas the future role of the U.S. in European military affairs is uncertain, Europe’s future role in world affairs depends on the way EU member states use their collective economic power to enhance CFSP, which admittedly, has a long way to go in becoming an effective security mechanism.⁵²

⁵¹ Reynolds, Christopher. “Military Capability Development in the ESDP: Toward Effective Governance?” Contemporary Security Policy 28:2 (2007), 357

⁵² Rob de Wijk, “Transatlantic Relations: a view from the Netherlands”, 171

EU-NATO competition in action: varying approaches to Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan

EU-NATO competition has impacted the NATO missions in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. In regards to Bosnia, the EU had not yet developed the framework for an ESDP as of 1994, but the inklings of a preliminary European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI) had been laid. In April 1992, the nationalistic Bosnians-Serbs fire on peaceful demonstrators in Sarajevo, marking the beginning of the war. In May 1992, the West (led by Germany) recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state and supported the UN-imposed sanctions on Yugoslavia. The EU was not very active in Bosnia, as the UN was the main international organization involved in the conflict and declaring safe havens in parts of war-torn Bosnia. NATO was involved in Bosnia in 1994, shooting down Serbian aircrafts that violated the UN's no-fly zone. The EU was not the main driving factor in the Bosnian War, and played a relatively small role in this conflict. While in 1992, the EU had established the Petersberg tasks, which was the realization of a European security and defense policy was still far off. In 1994, the EU was in the midst of building upon the Pillars it had agreed upon in the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, and was not politically cohesive enough to act as one, and in 1994, the EU was not the economic powerhouse it is in 2009, giving it very little persuasive power. Moreover, the Serbs did not consider the EU a threat, as they perceived them to be weak. The NATO secretary generals (Woerner and Claes) pushed for intervention in the Balkans, and a large part of their success was the U.S. backing for their solutions, with the EU playing almost no role in Bosnia other than recognizing its independence, in hopes that it would stop Milosevic from full scale war. The failure of the EU to develop a policy to intervene in the wars in the former Yugoslavia led to a push for

the creation of a strong CFSP to create stability in a region bordering the EU, leading to the creation of the ESDP in 1999.

In the Kosovo conflict, the EU had more solid plans for a CFSP, but it was still in the incipient stages, having just concluded the Berlin agreement in 1996. As war broke out in Kosovo in 1999, the EU was again hesitant to act, despite having seen the failure of inaction in Bosnia. This time the West did not recognize Kosovo's declaration of independence, mostly because Kosovo was never its own republic, but an autonomous region of Serbia. Again, the EU was not very active in Kosovo until 2006, when it took over the UN Mission in Kosovo with an 1,800-strong police and justice mission. This international civilian presence in Kosovo has been tasked with supervising implementation of any agreement and have the power to intervene if necessary. During the 1999 war, however, it was the U.S.-led NATO bombings that helped bring about the resolution of the war. While all the NATO members contributed some resources or personnel to the war, it was a purely NATO effort. As in Bosnia, the EU did not have an independent role in Kosovo. Again, the UN played a large role in Kosovo, but there is controversy because the UNSC did not legitimize the air campaign due to Serbia's alliances with China and Russia. The UN took responsibility over Kosovo after the war, and EU troops replaced the UN troops in 2007, on the eve of Kosovo's second declaration of independence (which was recognized by the United States and most of the European Union), but there was limited EU action during the actual war.

By the time the 9.11 terror attacks had happened, the EU had established its ESDP and set out Headline Goals to accomplish by 2003, but it was still a weak institution. After the invoking of Article 5 and the subsequent war in Afghanistan, the ESDP started to grow

into its own. In 2002, the Berlin Plus agreement was finalized; in 2003, the new Headline Goals for 2010 were set and the first set of European troops under ESDP was deployed to FYROM for policing and judicial training; and in 2004, the European Defense Agency was formed (although it still has a long way to go) before being an effective information-sharing defense agency. In regards to Afghanistan, the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom works side by side with NATO's ISAF troops, which are comprised of troops from all NATO countries (even if some troops are limited in movement/actions by national caveats). The EU does not play a military role in NATO, as it did not play a military role in Bosnia or Kosovo. Instead, the EU, like it had in Bosnia and Kosovo, has taken more of a civilian-oriented approach to the conflict. The EU has a Joint Declaration with the Government of Afghanistan to "increase cooperation, based on Afghan ownership, across a range of areas. It also establishes a regular political dialogue, with annual meetings at Ministerial level and reaffirms the EU's long-term commitment to Afghanistan."⁵³ The EU provides civilian assistance with enhancing rule of law and good governance, and providing economic aid to the Afghans. The EU's strong soft power, in terms of funding and diplomatic support, balances out NATO's military approach. The EU has money, and NATO has the weaponry, and the EU is taking a more active role in Afghanistan than it had in the previous NATO missions in the Balkans.

Clearly, there is competition and infighting for resources, capabilities and glory between the EU and NATO, but that fight has not really impacted or limited NATO's abilities to act, as in each of the three missions examined here – the EU did not play a large part, and

⁵³ European Commission, External Relations: Afghanistan, from http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/afghanistan/index_en.htm

all of the EU members also in NATO contributed to the NATO missions. It seems given a choice between siding with NATO or with EU's ESDP, most European countries choose NATO. In the three missions examined above, a clear separation of duties is shown – NATO, led by the U.S., seems to adapt a more military and tactical solution; whereas the EU, despite touting the successes of a cohesive ESDP policy, plays more of a civilian role by providing technical experts, economic assistance and diplomatic support. The competition between EU and NATO for resources, membership and alliance seems to favor NATO in regards to political-military matters, as the EU encompasses economic and social measures as well (which NATO does not cover) and from examining the role of NATO and the EU in each case, **I conclude that EU-NATO policies do not significantly explain the shifts in NATO doctrine and NATO strategy.** If the EU-NATO competition was the real reason behind shifts in NATO policy, then we would have seen different roles for the EU during Kosovo and Afghanistan, and a stronger EU military force at the expense of a weaker NATO military force, but we have seen the opposite – the de facto separation of responsibilities works well, making the argument for the continuation and correct implementation of the Berlin Plus agreement. If this was the underlying reason behind the shifts in NATO doctrine and the NATO decisions to accept these missions, then we would have seen two things: the EU developing a more cohesive foreign policy plan after Bosnia, and a larger EU military (instead of solely civilian) role in Kosovo and Afghanistan; and EU members sending EU troops to wars, but instead we see NATO member state militaries sending national troops to fight under NATO hats (many states have designated the same troops for NATO and EU missions) – and neither of these two things have happened. While the transatlantic viewpoints have been changing for the worse, especially after U.S. invasion of Iraq – the

competition between the EU and NATO does not seem to be a real competition at all. Based on the evidence above and evaluation the role of the EU in NATO's decision to accept missions - **I conclude that NATO has a monopoly on the use of force as the premier political-military alliance in the transatlantic community, mostly because NATO includes the U.S. when the EU does not. The U.S. is still the main provider of security goods, and many of the European countries are aware that they are free-riding and do not want to lose the privileges they receive in being in a collective security alliance with the U.S. – especially Article 5. The national governments know that if they were to lose U.S. collective security, it would cause a domestic disaster, and leaders seem to be willing to deal with some anti-Americanism and balancing the EU and NATO to ensure that, at the end of the day, they are still protected by the United States.** In the end, it seems that ESDP has big goals and a lot of big talkers behind it, but it is questionable as to whether a security organization can effectively engage in military operations without the United States, and most European countries do not want to take that gamble. In any matter, even if the ESDP were to come into its own and overshadow NATO as a political-military alliance, it would not be any time in the near future – ESDP still has a long way to go, and a lot more to do before it becomes anywhere as effective as NATO. EU-NATO infighting is not the reason for the changing NATO strategies, but what the EU and NATO have in common is that they are staffed by bureaucrats from their respective member state countries who become involved in the organization (mission creep) who begin to advocate positions from the viewpoint of the position, and not of the national government. This is organizational politics, and it comes in many forms.

NATO's bureaucratic push for relevance

NATO is staffed by international bureaucrats from its member states. The NATO headquarters is located in Brussels, Belgium, isolated from the towering EU institutions in the city center. NATO is instead located on a road near the airport, isolated from much of the city and many of its peoples. These NATO bureaucrats (International Staff, or IS) do not advance the interests of their national countries, that is the job of the member state Missions to NATO, led by an Ambassador/PermRep with a direct line to its home government. The international staff does not serve a national agenda, much like the international staff at the European Union, but serve NATO. These international bureaucrats become attached to the mission of NATO, and like in all bureaucratic institutions, and loyalties and dedication to the institution start to form.

Mission creep is defined as the expansion of a project or mission beyond its original goals, often after initial successes – like NATO after the successful protection of Europe during the Cold War. This tendency of military operations in foreign countries to increase gradually in scope and demanding further commitment of personnel and resources as the situation was originally applied solely to military operations, but with the growth of bureaucracies and their power, bureaucracies, including international bureaucracies like NATO, the UN, the OSCE and the EU have all been accused of mission creep.⁵⁴ NATO is both a bureaucracy and an actor in military operations – making mission creep an inevitable part of NATO's self-evolution. Logically it makes sense: NATO bureaucrats want NATO to continue, as it is not only their source of livelihood and employment, but they become attached to the idea of NATO and believe in its usefulness and relevance in international

⁵⁴ "Definition - Mission Creep" retrieved from http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_701707548/mission_creep.html

security outside of the traditional transatlantic framework. The bureaucratic politics model explains the “motivation by the relevant officials in the government bureaucracy to protect or promote their own agency's special interests (in competition with other agencies) as a major motivating factor in shaping the timing and the content of government decisions.”⁵⁵

Bureaucratic Politics Creeps in: Different Responses & Solutions to the NATO missions in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan

In Bosnia, NATO was in the midst of its identity crisis, and searching for a reason to continue existing at a time where many in the international community was questioning its relevance. What kept NATO from being disbanded was the collective action clause, where the mutual defense of Alliance members by all other members was guaranteed, meaning that even after the Cold War, the U.S. was still bound by NATO to protect its European Allies. This playing card was not something the Europeans wanted to give up, and definitely not something the NATO staff was ready to renegotiate under different terms. The 1991 Strategic Concept, pushed for by NATO bureaucrats, insisted that NATO was still relevant to the international community, and that it had purpose beyond deterrence and defense against the Soviet Union. This document was the first of many attempts to upgrade/update NATO to reflect changing security situations. While this new Strategic Concept laid out for the first time, in writing, NATO's missions and concepts, it did not really accomplish much else. In 1994, with the troubles in the Balkans – the backyard of Europe – NATO rediscovered its purpose. The aim was, as always, the protection of Europe but this time, it was not against the Soviet Union, but from chaos and regional instability in an area

⁵⁵ “Bureaucratic Politics” retrieved from http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/bureaucratic_politics

traditionally prone to conflict – the Balkans. NATO already acknowledged in 1991 that it needed broader missions to stay relevant, so when the explosion in Bosnia happened in 1994, NATO the institution readily accepted the mission of protecting UN-designated safe havens and shooting down Serb aircraft and overall stability and peace functions – it now had to convince its member states to go along with this.

After Bosnia, NATO underwent the process for a new Strategic Concept. The product was the 1999 Strategic Concept, which was the same year that NATO got involved in the Kosovo War. NATO experienced a new sense of mission, as Bosnia was its first real mission, after seeing no action during the Cold War. In addition to the extra legitimacy of the UN backing, NATO realized that it was good at stability operations and predicted this was the future of warfare. When Milosevic attacked the KLA in 1999, NATO responded with a 78-day air campaign. The organization had already started its involvement in the Balkans in 1994, so the mission in Kosovo was seen as a logical extension of NATO policy – which now had shifted toward operations of this kind. Kosovo tested NATO power as this air campaign was done without the backing of the UNSC, but it increased NATO's sense of purpose and pride as Milosevic withdrew his forces and agreed to negotiate after relentless bombing.⁵⁶ The air campaign took place without a single NATO casualty, a very successful mission in military terms – NATO achieved its goal without any loss of life, and the aggressor agreed to peace talks that led to a UN-led temporary government in Kosovo with permanent NATO troops as protection (KFOR). The mission in Kosovo was the deepening of NATO into the Balkans after Bosnia, pushed for by the international staff that lobbied their home

⁵⁶ Although some argue it was the Russian persuasion and not the NATO air campaign that ultimately led Milosevic to decide to negotiate

governments for active involvement. NATO, as an organization, needed the Balkans – because without the Balkans, NATO would have had no sense of purpose after the Cold War, and it may have even disbanded before the terrorist attacks of 9.11.

ISAF, however, requires a different view of bureaucratic politics. With the Balkans, NATO was actively seeking to maintain importance in an international regime with norms of peace and stability after the Cold War, and the Balkans were the perfect opportunity for NATO to show the world that security operations were still needed, and that security and peace often came hand in hand with the stabilization operations such as the NATO operations conducted in Bosnia and Kosovo. This was not the case with Afghanistan. Afghanistan was the first ever NATO mission invoked under the mutual defense clause. For the first time in over half a decade, a NATO member was attacked by outside aggressors and the entire bureaucracy responded – this was just what they had been waiting for, it was why NATO was created. Ironically, NATO's first Article 5 mission was initiated on behalf of the United States, and supported by the Europeans, when it had largely been expected that it would be a European member state to be the first to invoke Article 5 to gain U.S. support if attacked. NATO members were bound by Article 5 to respond to the attacks on U.S. soil, resulting in the ISAF mission (months after the U.S.-led mission OEF was deployed). NATO members all contributed to the mission, each varying in the level of troops and amount of resources, but they all contribute nevertheless. NATO's first true Alliance mission is Afghanistan – meaning that NATO's credibility is on the line here, and NATO as an institution is aware of this. SYG de Hoop Scheffer has stated on many occasions that NATO needs to stay in Afghanistan and see this mission through for its own

legitimacy.⁵⁷ While NATO has been tested before, in the early 1990s, when its survival was uncertain and in the late 1990s, when it was unsure that it could pull off stability missions in the Balkans, this is the true test of NATO's staying power – to see if the Alliance can truly commit to the mutual defense clause.⁵⁸ If NATO pulls the ISAF mission without ensuring that the country is secure on its own, Afghanistan is likely to fall back into chaos and NATO's credibility will be shattered. Currently, the problems of fractured central government, competing domestic coalitions and ethnic tensions, in addition to increase in the instability via insurgent attacks and rise of narco-traffickers with ties to the Taliban – all show that Afghanistan is not ready. This first Article 5 mission cannot be a failure, as it would put the credibility of the Alliance to follow through on Article 5 for future references in jeopardy. NATO realizes that the continuation of ISAF is necessary to maintain NATO's reputation as a security institution, but the hardest part is swaying its member countries to contribute more resources and troops. In order to gather continued support for NATO missions, it is necessary to take the argument to national leaders – something that effective Secretary Generals have done in the past. Leadership matters, and sometimes it is leadership that is the determining factor in a country's decision regarding the allocation of NATO resources.

Traditionally, alliances are not viewed as organizations that undergo fundamental revolutions in purpose and mission, but rather as institutions that remain focused on their

⁵⁷ Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, "Op-Ed: We Can Do Better" 18 January 2009, retrieved from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/16/AR2009011603717.html>

⁵⁸ It is important to note that some member states considered the mission "complete" once the Taliban was toppled and a new government took power in Afghanistan, but all NATO members acknowledge that Afghanistan is by no means a fully functional state and there needs to be a lot of work, in terms of reconstruction and governance, done before the international community can fully pull out.

external challenger, and once that external challenger (the Soviet Union and communism in Central and Eastern Europe) was gone for NATO, the institution adapted to ensure its survival.⁵⁹ **From this examination of the bureaucratic politics involved within NATO leading up to the determination to intervene in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, it is clear that bureaucratic politics does play an important role in NATO. NATO is an institution that functions like any other, which seeks to maximize their utility and competitiveness against other institutions (UN and ESDP) by maintaining their relevance; in this case, by informally adapting NATO doctrine to out-of-area missions that increase NATO's importance and ensure its relevance in a new international context. Bureaucratic politics provides a necessary but not sufficient explanation of the forces behind NATO's informal doctrinal shifts, as the IS lack the sufficient political sway to commit their host governments to NATO missions – making leadership and domestic politics all the more important.**

Individual leadership within NATO and member states

This school of thought believes that certain personalities influence the path institutions take more so than any other factor. Leaders have a greater role than expected, and serve as more than just a figurehead. Notable personalities, such as Jacques Chirac, Willy Claes and Javier Solana have all made their impact on NATO policies, but to what extent were the policies individually-driven instead of institutionally-driven? This micro-level analysis focuses on the specific individual's personalities, friendships and baggage to understand why NATO acted the way it did in a specific time frame or conflict.

⁵⁹ Ryan Hendrickson, "NATO's Secretary General Javier Solana and the Kosovo Crisis," 241

The literature review discussed the specific cases of Woerner, Claes and Solana, but there other leaders have made considerable impacts on NATO, but are not directly related to the three missions in study, or are fairly contemporary, making it hard to accurately assess their impacts. Also important is the nexus and relationship among NATO leaders – as the contentious relationship between DeGaulle, Eisenhower and Macmillan led to France’s withdrawal from NATO in 1959. DeGaulle felt marginalized by the U.S. and UK when they rejected his call for a tripartite directorate to give France more power and expand NATO to areas where France had colonies.⁶⁰ The relationship between the three biggest countries (at the time Germany was still split) led to France withdrawing from NATO military command and pursuing its own nuclear weapons, in response to the U.S. and UK possession of weapons. Another leader for future analysis is Lord Robertson, the NATO Secretary General from 1999-2003, considered one of the most effective SYGs in history, and presided over NATO during the 9.11 terror attacks on the United States.⁶¹ He played a large role in the lead up to the ISAF mission and the Alliance’s reaction to the attacks. He was a uniter and much will be written about Lord Robertson in the future. Another interesting relationship involves the triangle between the U.S., UK and France again – between President Bush, Prime Minister Blair and President Chirac. Bush and Blair were very close, and the U.S.-led OEF was backed by UK funds and troops, whereas Chirac was very much antagonistic and anti-American compared to Blair, making the gap between continental Europe and North America wider. This changed with the election of the more pro-American

⁶⁰ Geir Lundestad. *The United States and Western Europe since 1945*, Oxford University Press: London (2003), 129-130

⁶¹ While the 9.11 terror attacks happened in 2001, NATO did not formally respond with ISAF until late 2003, so Lord Robertson was not part of the decision to send troops into Afghanistan because the U.S. refused European offers to help in Afghanistan for the first few years of the U.S.-led OEF

Sarkozy as French president, and he has since improved relations with the U.S. and NATO. Just this month, Sarkozy recommitted France into NATO's military structure for the first time in forty years. In the future, it would be interesting to examine the new transatlantic relations after Obama's inauguration, because it seems that there is a wave of positivity toward the U.S., especially following the Bush years, but that optimism has not translated into any official action. While public relations and the image of the U.S. might be better, there were no substantial European increases to the ISAF mission during the last NATO summit.⁶² These personal relationships among the leaders of NATO and NATO member states play a large role in the informal shifting of NATO doctrine in the form of accepting out-of-area missions, but it is hard to properly assess contemporary leadership because we are not able to clearly see the full ramifications of these relations given their relatively short history, so this paper will examine case studies in Bosnia and Kosovo, where there has been sufficient time to properly analyze the importance of leadership. In regards to ISAF, some preliminary assessments regarding leadership may be made, but nothing concrete and definite can be concluded as of yet.

Leadership in Retrospect: Different Leaders & Approaches to Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan

Leadership, in the form of individual people or an individual country, plays a huge role in NATO's decision to accept missions. NATO members all conform to international norms of democracy, peace and economic prosperity, but they all realize that at times, military force is necessary, after having experienced WWI and WWII in the twentieth century. After the Cold War, however, member states' views regarding the use of force have

⁶² NATO, Summit Meeting of NATO Heads of State and Government April 2009" retrieved from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2009/p09-008e.html>

changed significantly now that the Soviet Union no longer posed a threat. Many of the NATO members are also members of the EU, an institution that focuses on economics and diplomacy more than military force. There has been a shift in the way many EU members think, as the EU leads in the way the international norm of soft diplomacy and economic incentives – leading to some reluctance in the use of force for these same members when they are in the NATO forum. This reluctance, often in the domestic arena from the public and parts of government coalitions, is hard to overcome without effective leadership that is willing to commit to fighting for increased NATO resources or increased participation in NATO missions. These leaders can come from the domestic stage, as a Prime Minister, President or Minister of Foreign Affairs or Defense, or from a more international sort – such as the NATO Secretary General, who is always a member of one of NATO's member states, but is neutral in that he represents NATO's interests, not those of his home country.

Leadership played a particularly important role in the NATO missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, as these missions were not sanctioned under Article 5, and many member states were unsure of signing onto them. In many instances, it was the leadership at NATO that coordinated with the leadership at home that made the difference in the acceptance of the missions. NATO missions had to be presented in a way that would benefit the home country and acceptable to the public opinion because NATO is based on consensus. Leadership was essential to the Bosnian mission, NATO's first ever mission, as there was no precedence for anything of this sort before. Secretary General Woerner was a forceful figure in the events leading up to NATO intervention in Bosnia, as was Secretary General Claes following Woerner's death. Woerner was known as a forceful advocate for intervention in the Balkans, and was not shy about his feelings towards PermReps who did

not agree with his viewpoint. As a Secretary General, Woerner was an independent force, and represented the interests of NATO as a whole, not any specific member state. "The quality of executive leadership may prove to be the single most critical determinant of the scope and authority of the international organization," and Woerner embodied such leadership.⁶³ In addition to being a skilled diplomat, Woerner was also had exceptional credentials in the realm of military affairs and defense policies, being Germany's Minister of Defense for many years. Woerner was seen by many as "forward-looking", and as someone who felt that NATO should reach out to the newly created Central and Eastern European states, and Russia, to increase the overall security situation in Europe for the future.⁶⁴ As countries in Europe and North America wavered on what exactly to do with the looming crisis in the Balkans after the successive declarations of independence by Slovenia, Croatia and then Bosnia, Woerner was lobbying hard for NATO to take action. The Alliance was deeply torn about how to handle the Bosnia question, and most of the Allies preferred "limited intervention" in the region.⁶⁵ Woerner, ever the diplomat, at first reserved his complaints behind closed doors but eventually became public in his criticism of the United States in particular for not wanting to intervene in the Balkans. As the U.S. policy toward the Balkans started to realign toward Woerner's view, he became an advocate supporter of "American leadership at NATO."⁶⁶ In the North Atlantic Council (NAC), where NATO decisions are made, Woerner would unabashedly advance his hawkish views toward intervention in Bosnia, and frequently visited member states to cultivate relationships and

⁶³ Ryan Henrickson, "Leadership at NATO: Secretary General Manfred Woerner and the Crisis in Bosnia", 509

⁶⁴ Ibid, 513

⁶⁵ Ibid, 514

⁶⁶ Ibid, 515

lobby for his view. Despite massive internal constraints and bureaucratic limitations, Woerner proved to be an effective force behind NATO policy, and was far more active than his predecessors. Woerner fell ill during his last years as NATO's SYG, but he still managed to maintain immersed in all aspects of NATO decisions and showed up at NAC meetings to advocate for his cause, Bosnia. Woerner ultimately died before action was taken in Bosnia, but his successor, Willy Claes continued the fight. Claes was appointed NATO's SYG in September 1994, despite a political scandal at home.⁶⁷ Despite the drama, Claes proved to be an effective SYG and aptly led the Alliance prior to and during Operation Deliberate Force. Claes, like Woerner, was known for bringing "all issues into the open so that there was little confusing on what states were agreeing to, and he demanded that states take policy positions."⁶⁸ While Claes is remembered for his temperamental outbursts at NATO, he was also a straight talker who paid great attention to detail, making him an effective Secretary General. When the UNSC had authorized NATO to use force as a response to the Serb violation of the UN mandated no-fly zones, Claes decided not to convene the NAC, for he knew the debate within the NAC could potentially hold up the campaign. This decision was crucial in that "it prevented additional policy debate and allowed the bombing campaign to ensure [that NATO could act without further delay.] Claes is credited with making an important decision at the organizational level: he defined the military operation for the Alliance by arguing that the Council had already authorized military action, and

⁶⁷ The political scandal that followed Claes until his last days as SYG was the accusation that he knew of bribes regarding government bids, and many assumed that he would not be able to be an effective SYG because of his personal baggage and problems. While Claes was an effective leader and a skilled diplomat who led NATO into Bosnia, this political scandal plagued him during his entire tenure as NATO Secretary General, and ultimately, he resigned from the pressure.

⁶⁸ Ryan Hendrickson, "NATO's Secretary General and the Use of Force: Willy Claes and the Air Strikes in Bosnia", 104

therefore, the question was not open to debate.” Claes had a great friendship with the SACUER, and allowed the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe great discretion in military tactical decisions.⁶⁹ Like Woerner, Claes also benefitted from a good relationship with the U.S., as the U.S. was pushing for intervention in the Balkans to its reluctant European Allies. In this light, leadership was essential in NATO’s acceptance of the Bosnian mission – which took two Secretary Generals and the United States to lobby for the cause. Understandably, many countries were not sure of the mission as it would be NATO’s first, and it did not seem to fit with the mindset of the last half-decade, anti-communism. Leadership proved to be vital in Bosnia, and five years down the line, the same coalition of SYG + the U.S. + a few essential European Allies (UK, Germany, etc) would lead another NATO mission into Kosovo.

The Kosovo War in 1999 was a different type of mission, but similar to Bosnia in tactical and operational terms. NATO launched an air campaign to get the Serbs to agree to peace talks but did not anticipate the campaign to last more than a few days. Milosevic had called NATO’s bluff, and NATO was left with no choice but to continue bombing Serbia to maintain credibility. The problem with this mission was that there was no UN sanctioning of the air campaign, thanks to UNSC members such as Russia and China. At the time, the SYG of NATO was Javier Solana, a Spanish diplomat and the current High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy at the EU (HR-CFSP), or chief of EU foreign policy.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ Ibid, 105-106

⁷⁰ While Solana’s job theoretically makes him in charge of EU policies, it is the EU Commissioner for External Relations (RELEX) that holds the purse strings, and Solana also faces the problem of trying to coordinate 27 member states individual foreign policy goals, and many of these states are loathe to hand over foreign policy power to the EU, as the EU’s foreign policy reputation has not grown as fast as its impressive economic integration, making a common Community policy almost

Solana took rein of NATO at a time when NATO was still unsure of its exact mission, but it is clear that Solana “occupied a highly visible and instrumental position... [and his] leadership and authority during the bombing campaign was considerably different from NATO’s Cold War Secretary Generals.”⁷¹ During this time, Solana tried to lead NATO in an effort to unify and focus on new threats, but despite NATO’s efforts to “further integrate and encourage consultation, those measures were not enough as internal problems within the Alliance generation additional disunity, mostly due to France’s opposition [even though they had formally pulled out of NATO military structure in the 1970s] to the strong leadership by the Secretary General.”⁷² Broad historical surveys tend to neglect Solana and his role in the NATO campaign in Serbia, but the former Socialist Foreign Minister made a huge impact on NATO’s decision to respond to Serbian aggression. Solana was an advocate of force, but he knew that many member states were hesitant due to the lack of international support (i.e. no UNSC resolution), so Solana came up with a solution - “[his biggest technical] achievement was due to his ability to find a legal consensus using the semantic ambiguity of ‘sufficient legal basis’, which allowed each member of the Alliance to justify to their various domestic constituencies that NATO had the international legal authority to act.”⁷³ He benefited greatly from U.S. and UK backing, but “Solana was the principal architect of NATO’s legal claims.”⁷⁴ Solana was clear about his views regarding Kosovo: that action must be taken against the Serbs, and actively lobbied for NATO move into new legal and political territory that empowered the SYG while protecting NATO members. Like Claes,

impossible; as many states in the EU have recognized Kosovo’s independence, but there are a few holdout states that state they refuse to.

⁷¹ Ryan Hendrickson, “NATO’s Secretary General Javier Solana and the Kosovo Crisis”, 240

⁷² Ibid, 242

⁷³ Ibid, 244-245

⁷⁴ Ibid

Solana had a good working relationship with SACEUR (U.S. General Wesley Clark at the time) and allowed Clark sufficient leeway in determining military and tactical actions, and Clark in turn consulted greatly with Solana. The two men both believed that NATO should have a wider role in European security and worked together to achieve this main objective. Part of Solana's effectiveness was his ability to "go above" the NATO ambassadors in order to place pressure on more senior NATO member government officials to cooperate – a last resort but ultimately successful tactic.⁷⁵ Solana also knew the importance of maintaining a close relationship with the UN, and was in constant contact with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan during the air campaign. Clearly, Solana played a large role in drumming up support from NATO members, even if it meant pursuing aggressive diplomatic means and unabashedly advocating his position to those who would listen, but it paid off – NATO intervened in Kosovo and while there was no official UNSC Resolution to sanction the actions, the UN stepped in Kosovo after the NATO war under the authority of UNMIK to ensure stability after Milosevic surrendered. Another important point of leadership was the U.S. – the Clinton Administration, which emphasized multilateral cooperation and international organizations, stressed to Solana that the U.S. "wanted to work through NATO", making Solana's job easier because he did not have to convince NATO's most powerful member to join its cause – the U.S. was already fully invested in intervening in Kosovo under NATO auspices.⁷⁶

With regards to the current NATO mission in Afghanistan, the question of leadership is less micro-level (i.e. not individuals), and focuses on more of a state-centered macro

⁷⁵ Ibid, 250

⁷⁶ Ibid, 252

approach to leadership. The mission in Afghanistan is unique in that it is NATO sanctioned and UN backed under NATO's Article 5. The ISAF leadership seems more country based, as the biggest proponents of this mission were the United States and the United Kingdom (similarly, these were the two countries that advocated loudest for intervention in the Balkans). SYG de Hoop Scheffer supported the ISAF mission as well, calling it a "mission of necessity"⁷⁷ and actively encouraging member states to contribute more resources to the mission, despite great internal opposition to the war in Afghanistan, especially after 2003, when the U.S. invaded Iraq. The 2003 invasion of Iraq was seen as unjustified by many NATO partners, and it can be argued that the U.S. lost its credibility among its European Allies with this act of war, despite it being two unrelated wars. The War in Afghanistan has always been justified as the retaliation of the Taliban regime that supported Al Qaeda (among various other terrorist groups), who were responsible for the mass atrocities of 9.11, and that logic made sense to the NATO Allies as they prepared for the ISAF mission, but Iraq was (and still is) a point of contention between the U.S. and Europe, and while they are two different theatres, many people link them together, hurting Afghanistan's legitimacy and relevance as it is looped in with what many in Europe consider an unjust war. In ISAF and the war in Afghanistan, it is too soon to look back and adequately describe the effects of the leadership of SYG de Hoop Scheffer or the United States, but it is clear that the mission in Afghanistan would have happened without any prodding, as it warranted the invocation of Article 5, something no NATO member could ignore, but would have been stalled if not for the sense of urgency the U.S. and UK added to the mission.

⁷⁷ BBC, "West warned over Afghan failure" 7 Feb 2008, retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7231959.stm

The current problems NATO has in ISAF is not due to the mission, as almost all governments justify and believe in the NATO on some level, but has to do with its presentation to the general public and its coupling with Iraq. **It is obvious that leadership considerations weigh heavily on NATO's decision to intervene in conflicts, and leadership is often the final factor that pushes the institution into accepting the burden, but leadership can only do so much. The domestic issues of member states often restrain international leaders because NATO must act in total unanimity – meaning every member must agree to the mission before it can be accepted. Leaders must lobby domestic governments that often do not have full control of their states resources. Domestic considerations weigh strongly and constrict the ability of NATO members to make decisions for purely security and military reasons, because they must take into account domestic backlash and their constituencies.**

Domestic considerations of member states

NATO is by definition an Alliance of member states. While it is an international organization, it is not supra-national. NATO theoretically is the security instrument in which all member states consult and act in accordance with, but the reality is that at the end of the day, domestic considerations override the international organization. There is no NATO constitution, and no penalty for not following the rules. Most of the countries in NATO are from Western Europe, and have few standing international beefs with one another. NATO functions as a forum for enhanced cooperation and security, first convened during the height of the Cold War to ensure stability and peace in Europe, by extending the American nuclear umbrella over Western Europe to deter Russia and expanded out of necessity to the institution it is today.

NATO is a conglomerate of over 28 countries defense personnel, and does not have its own standing army – but has instead national troops designated for NATO use. It is up to the national governments to allocate troops and resources for NATO use, and NATO, as an organization, has no real say in determining its troop levels. It can ask for more, but it is not guaranteed anything. For example, the Dutch government faced a foreign policy deadlock regarding the issue of NATO's deployment of new generation nuclear weapons in Western Europe in the early 1980s. During the Cold War, NATO's doctrine of security and nuclear deterrence was accepted by some, but faced resistance in some NATO countries. The Dutch were under pressure from the United States, who wanted to deploy the weapons, and Germany, who did not want to be the only state to house the nuclear weapons, but the largest problem the Dutch government had was internally. The Dutch government coalition was internally fragmented and unable to come to a compromise for quite some time, as their ability to maneuver was hampered by a "climate of antimissile public opinion" from not only the far left, but from various factions within the ruling party.⁷⁸ The Dutch government, unlike Presidential systems, was vulnerable to being overthrown by Parliament in a vote of no confidence, so they had to ensure that the domestic environment was right despite government support and massive external pressure. Ultimately, the pro-missile leadership of the Christian Democrat Party (Dutch-CDP) was able to commit to the deployment of missiles after a five-year deadlock thanks to the eventual support of political elites and the existence of well-established rules governing decision making.⁷⁹ In this case, and in many other countries in Western Europe, the domestic situation almost prevented

⁷⁸ JD Hagan, "Foreign Policy by Coalition: deadlock, compromise and anarchy", International Studies Review 3 (2001), 182

⁷⁹ Ibid, 187-188

NATO policy from being implemented, as the deployment of nuclear weapons in Western Europe was a vital part of NATO's Cold War strategic policy of nuclear deterrence. The importance of domestic politics mattered for Western European countries in the matter of accepting the U.S. nuclear weapons, as it took years for the domestic coalition to quell, bargain and convince its coalition partners and the public that this was for the good of the country. In the Dutch case, the NATO doctrine won out, but in many other cases, domestic pressures overrode NATO priorities.

Domestic policies does more than explain a country's acceptance/implementation of NATO decisions in the realm of foreign policy, it impacts greatly the military capability of NATO. The German history with war and military has made it hard for the Germans (and most of the Western Europeans) to accept force as a first response, as the devastations of WWII are only in recent history. While every member state has contributed to the ISAF mission, their contributions vary in effectiveness. Many member states place national caveats or limitations on the actions of their troops while they have their ISAF hats on.

Domestic Politics in NATO missions: Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan

It must be noted that domestic policy is more complicated than just poll data, country history and ruling coalitions – there are more sub-state actors in the form of bureaucracies, political parties, and interest groups (environmentalists, pro-labor, big business, etc) that weigh into the broad umbrella category of 'domestic politics', but for the sake of brevity, this paper will define domestic politics to focus on public opinion and domestic coalitions and how they translate into foreign policy decisions by a government, as the full explanation of the sub-state interest groups would require more in-depth research on

domestic politics real impact on NATO, and could be the grounds upon which future research could be conducted.

Domestic considerations are never far from the policy-makers mind, as in any democratic system, parliamentary or presidential, the core of the government rests upon the satisfaction of the general public. And according to recent poll data, the general public is not happy with the wars – making it more politically costly for the ruling coalition to justify increased involvement in Afghanistan. Domestic considerations include: internal turmoil (such as a revolution or political scandal); economic crises (such as a recession or stock market crash); fractured political coalitions (when governments cannot move due to paralysis in either the legislative or executive branch due to differences in political parties); and most importantly, public opinion – which is what governments basically rely on to maintain power. Public opinion determines whether a government will make it or break it at any given time, because at the end of the day, they are responsible to the public, and policymakers must ensure the public is satisfied in order to maintain their position of power, very much constraining their ability to act and make sometimes unpopular (but ultimately correct) decisions regarding the path their country will take.

The global public opinion of America has decreased in the past few years, especially among our European/NATO Allies, but this drop has been consistent with how the rest of the world views America.

“Global distrust of American leadership is reflected in increasing disapproval of the cornerstones of U.S. foreign policy. Not only is there worldwide support for a withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, but there also is considerable opposition to U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan. Western European publics are at best divided about keeping troops there [and that] many of the publics of NATO countries with significant numbers of troops in Afghanistan are divided over whether U.S. and NATO forces should be brought home immediately, or

should remain until the country is stabilized. In the U.S., 50% favor keeping U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan, while 42% say they should be withdrawn as soon as possible...

[The study also found that:] among key U.S. allies in Western Europe, the view that the U.S. acts unilaterally is an opinion that has tracked closely with America's overall image over the past five years. Ironically, the belief that the United States does not take into account the interests of other countries in formulating its foreign policy is extensive among the publics of several close U.S. allies. No fewer than 89% of the French, 83% of Canadians and 74% of the British express this opinion”⁸⁰

This is not good news for a mission that is so closely tied to the United States in the eyes of the European public. In the past, public opinion has been vital to member state governments in their decisions to participate in NATO missions after the Cold War.

In Bosnia, the general attitudes of domestic governments were cautious at first, as this was a new situation for everyone, but some EU leaders (Germany and the UK) decided to officially recognize Bosnian independence in hopes that it would quell the violence. At the time, public opinion polls showed that the European public opinion “favored a military intervention to stop the conflict in Bosnia, yet no government was prepared to commit ground troops for combat (as opposed to protection of humanitarian relief supplies) without U.S. readiness to intervene, or at least to support a European military intervention.”⁸¹ The European countries voiced their diplomatic support for Bosnia in accordance with the general public sentiment in their countries, but were politically unable to act without reassurances from the U.S. while hoping out hope for a peaceful solution. While the general public remained supportive of military intervention, it was not until 1995 when the first televised coverage of Serbia’s siege of Sarajevo was shown that Western public opinion realized that “Slobodan Milosevic would only be prepared to

⁸⁰ 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=256>

⁸¹ Fraser Cameron, “Europe, Yugoslavia and Blame Game” retrieved from <http://www.afsa.org/fsj/feb00/cameron.cfm>

negotiate seriously under the threat of force.” Because of the massive public uproar in Europe and the United States, and the individual leadership of SYG Claes and the Clinton Administration, NATO finally agreed in 1995 (with U.N. authorization) to launch air strikes against Serbian positions.⁸²

In Kosovo, public opinion did not seem to favor a military solution initially, but “what changed the simmering conflict into a full-blown crisis was the massacre of 25 Kosovo civilians at Raczek in October 1998. The TV pictures broadcast around the world provoked widespread revulsion and prompted the international community to take action.”⁸³ Once this was broadcasted, the transatlantic public opinion shifted and domestic groups began pushing for their government to get involved with Kosovo, providing NATO governments a way to both satisfy their public and partake in NATO missions for stability and security. In regards to Kosovo, “the principal policy objective of the use of military force in Kosovo was ‘humanitarian intervention’, which was to provide humanitarian protection against Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians or establishing peacekeeping. However, in spite of the fact that it was engaged with humanitarian considerations, [the] American public evenly supported the Kosovo war [when] asked with reference to the foreign policy restraint and humanitarian intervention objectives (54 %). Such questions as [should the U.S.] use military forces to end starvation or a major refugee problem in the region, or if multinational NATO forces should be sent to protect the people of Kosovo from the Serbs ... registered consistently over 60 % support in Europe. The Americans were bifurcated over question of whether to support the use of force in Kosovo in order to pursue an internal

⁸² Ibid

⁸³ Ibid

political change objective (54 %), i.e. forcing Yugoslav President Milosevic to agree to a NATO peace plan or removing the Serbian leader from power, or in order to participate for rather humanitarian reasons (54 %),” but there was clear domestic support for the humanitarian mission in Kosovo, UNSC Resolution or not.⁸⁴ The domestic considerations here were clear: NATO leaders and those who wanted to maintain NATO as an institution were pushing for NATO involvement in Kosovo, which it could not do for two reasons: the lack of a UNSC Resolution and the lack of NATO resources (i.e. resources not designated by member states), but because of the shift in public opinion of NATO members, especially the public opinion of the United States, NATO governments were pushed into accepting SYG Solana’s view that NATO should be involved in the Balkans.

As with leadership, it is hard to see exactly what effect public opinion and domestic considerations have in the ISAF mission as it is still ongoing. What is clear is that public opinion clearly matters to policy makers, and it should be noted that when it was first announced, the ISAF mission was highly supported by almost all NATO members and their respective constituencies. “The primary purpose of engaging a war in Afghanistan was to fight terrorism, to immobilize terrorist groups and to restrain or cut down the networks, which were believed to be involved in terrorist actions. In other words, the war in Afghanistan waged against terrorism was to achieve the objective of ‘foreign policy restraint’. Both Americans (74 %) and Europeans (57%) supported the war against terrorism when the military force to be used was to serve to the principal policy objective

⁸⁴ Ebru S. Canan, “Comparative Analysis of American and European Public Opinion on the Post-Cold War Use of Military Force: Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq”, prepared for the 46th Annual Convention of International Studies Association, March 1, 2005, 20

of foreign policy restraint.”⁸⁵ While the initial support for the war in Afghanistan was high in both North America and Europe, support for the war waned after the 2003 invasion of Iraq⁸⁶ and the 2005 resurgence of the Taliban and insurgency. At first, “Europeans and Americans (55 % and 65 % respectively) supported the use of military force in Afghanistan, when it was to contain the Afghan ruling party, which was believed to harbor Osama bin Laden, to force Afghanistan to agree the terms of the allied forces, to capture bin Laden in Afghanistan or to turn him over to the US,⁸⁷ but

“national opinion polls conducted in recent years in European countries making significant military and development aid contributions to Afghanistan – notably the UK, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and France – point to shrinking support for the mission and a growing public sentiment that the mission is doomed... In the aftermath of 9/11, NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan benefited from the overwhelming support of Western public opinion. The contrast during 2003 and 2004 with the controversial Iraq war only reinforced the widely-shared view that Afghanistan was the ‘right war’. But since the renewed Taliban offensive in 2005, this broad support has been dangerously eroded...

In a recent survey, 63% of those surveyed in France and in Britain, 66% in Italy and 69% in Germany think the war against the Taliban has been a failure... The consequences of this failure are dire. European troops and civilian experts on the front lines do not enjoy the moral support they deserve. At the same time the capacity of governments, especially in Italy and Germany, to make hard choices and strengthen or even renew their commitment to Afghanistan is now seriously limited. The problem goes wider than that, of course. The inability to build broad and genuine public support for Afghanistan calls into question Europe’s ability to defend its common security and work with its American partner.”⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Ibid, 19

⁸⁶“In Iraq, [the war was designed to] instigate an ‘internal political change’ in the country in the various forms such as to overthrow the Iraqi government threatening the stability in the region with its WMD, or overthrowing the authoritarian dictatorship. It was good enough reason to send US military troops to Iraq in order to coerce Saddam Hussein to end his authoritarian regime for 61 % of Americans. On the contrary, European publics, besides being the non-supportive of the Iraqi war in general regardless of the purpose it was taken, did not embrace the idea of using military force to bring about internal political change” from Ebru S. Canan, “Comparative Analysis of American and European Public Opinion on the Post-Cold War Use of Military Force: Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq”, 20

⁸⁷ Ibid, 19

⁸⁸ Fabrice Pothier, “Winning European hearts and minds on Afghanistan” Autumn 2008, from <http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21278/Default.aspx>

The problem of domestic politics is clear in Afghanistan today – low public opinion and public support of the mission has led to many NATO member states governments unwillingness to discuss increased NATO contributions for fear of domestic backlash. NATO is suffering because governments are not willing to risk their political viability for the sake of purely security and military affairs. Given the current economic recession, many countries are instead choosing to focus on developing economic stimulus plans to re-boost their failing economies making increased war expenditures very unpopular. Increased contributions to the war in Afghanistan seems unlikely, as the idea is already unpopular with most of the European public, and will be tougher to sell given that almost all NATO member governments are faced with an economic crisis and other domestic problems, in addition to the daily stressors of maintaining fragile multiparty coalitions and working toward electoral success at any given moment.

In addition to the public opinion problem, it is clear that the government of the day seeks to not only remain in power, but continue electoral successes at the next election cycle. The American government is unique in that the legislature does not elect the executive branch, and if there is a shift in the electoral makeup of the legislative branch, the executive still remains. In Europe, the most popular system is a parliamentary democracy, where the executive is a member of the legislative branch and a vote of no-confidence can bring down the government any day. These governments are usually comprised of multiparty coalitions, as no one party is strong enough to garner a majority of the votes and commit the State's resources.

The ruling coalition is particularly sensitive to domestic opposition, which in many cases cites the ruling coalition's foreign policy. In some cases, the ruling party must make

electoral sacrifices to continue doing the right thing. The political parties that make up the core of the ruling parties in countries like Germany, France and the United Kingdom are suffering based on the unpopular war in Afghanistan and public opposition. The clearest case of domestic politics interfering with NATO's ability to act is in Germany. In Germany, Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union has been predicted to suffer in the June 2009 European Parliament elections,⁸⁹ in addition to the uphill battle to Merkel must face to remain Chancellor in September. "The Afghanistan mission is Germany's first major operation since the end of World War II. It was and remains unpopular... A Forsa opinion survey released this week found that 58 percent of Germans want their troops to come home while only 36 percent are in favor of a continued German presence there,"⁹⁰ making Merkel, who is determined not to give up in Afghanistan, likely to pay the price for her support of the war. Though she is invested in the war, she is reluctant to increase German contributions or lift national caveats (which keep German casualties low) because that would further jeopardize her political career and negatively affect her party and coalition. This pattern has occurred in other European countries, even in one of our staunchest Allies, Poland. In late 2007, PM Kaczynski was ousted by Donald Tusk, who campaigned on the basis of withdrawing Poland's troops from Iraq and limiting Poland's contributions to Afghanistan.⁹¹ ⁹² Kaczynski and Tusk both hailed from center-right parties, and had fairly

⁸⁹ AP, "Merkel Allies to Lose Seats in EU Parliament Vote" 7 April 2009, retrieved from <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601100&sid=aJ6f86VIn8vE&refer=germany>

⁹⁰ D-W World, "Merkel Calls Afghanistan NATO's 'Biggest Test'" 23 March, 2009, retrieved from <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4128887,00.html>

⁹¹ AP, "Opposition party wins Poland election" 21 October 2007, retrieved from <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21411682/>

⁹² Again, it should be stressed that the war in Iraq is completely a different thing than the war in Afghanistan but for much of the world, there is little difference between the two missions, with Iraq taking away from American legitimacy in Afghanistan

similar economic agendas, but differed on the issue of foreign policy, which is what ultimately cost Kaczynski his election. It was Kaczynski's support for Iraq and association with the unpopular President Bush that led to his political demise. While Poland still remains a close Ally of the U.S. and the sixth-largest contributor in Afghanistan, it is clear that association with the United States and Iraq⁹³ have damaging effects on ruling coalitions. In Spain, the center-right Partido Popular lost the 2004 elections because of the terrorist attacks in Madrid. The Madrid Bombings shattered the Spanish population's faith in the Partido Popular and gave the Socialists an easy win in the election that the Partido Popular had been predicted to win by a landslide just days ago. The PP was in favor of closer relations with the United States, and public opinion turned against them because they blamed Spain's involvement in the war as the reason for the attack.⁹⁴

Domestic politics also plays an important role within NATO policy today – causing policy disagreements between Allies. NATO as an Alliance faces many threats, but few threats are given unanimous priorities because member states have different security concerns. Domestic considerations determine foreign policy priorities, along with recent history and geographic location. For countries like Germany, Italy and Spain, relations with Russia are good – as they are energy dependent (like Germany) or possess excellent economic bilateral relations (such as the relationship between Italy's ENI and Russia's Gazprom). On the other hand, countries like Estonia, Poland and the Czech Republic have

⁹³ Note: Iraq is a completely different war than Afghanistan. Iraq was a U.S.-led invasion without NATO or UN backing, though many of our NATO Allies participated in sending troops to Iraq. Many people across the world don't seem to see the difference between Afghanistan and Iraq, making it hard to decouple the two wars in the eyes of the global public, hurting the legitimacy of the ISAF mission

⁹⁴ AP, "Socialists Declare Victory in Spanish Election" 15 March 2004, retrieved from <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,114147,00.html>

more contentious relations with Russia – given the history of the Soviet Union’s influence in these Central and Eastern European countries and Russia;s repeated attempts to interfere in sovereign domestic politics. The proximity and threat of Russia is more prevalent in these countries, as Estonia fought off a cyber-warfare campaign many attributed to Russia in 2007. Estonia and other former satellite states see Russia as a threat, but it is hard to create a unified NATO stance on Russia because other member states have good relations with Russia. Because of their country’s individual histories, the domestic population has different priorities – making the coordination of NATO policy even more difficult. There are 28 different national governments in NATO, all of which possess different foreign policy priorities that sometimes conflict with those of other member states.

In conclusion, domestic politics the vital force in NATO’s decisions to accept the out of area missions which have informally changed NATO’s doctrine. It is the member states that hold the most power at the end of the day, because it is the members that decide how much to give to NATO, how many troops and for how long, and under what caveats/restrictions, if any. NATO as an organization seeks to reproduce itself and maintain relevance in the international community, and strong NATO leadership has contributed greatly to the decision to intervene in the Balkans and Afghanistan, but it is ultimately a decision for the individual member states. Domestic considerations, in the form of public opinion, multiparty coalitions and competing claims on the limited resources of the state, greatly constrict and define NATO. NATO cannot act without the agreement of all members, making consensus a difficult goal to achieve.

Most Plausible Explanation: Domestic Politics – the Bottom Line

It is clear from the analysis of NATO's doctrinal shifts and the four theories examined above that all of these theories play a large role in NATO's future, and none of them are more important than the other. However, domestic politics is the driving force every single one of the other theories – EU-NATO competition, leadership (in the form of national not NATO leader), and organizational politics (as member state's provide international bureaucrats to staff NATO and realize it is much easier to work within an existing framework rather to create a new regime altogether). **From this, the most plausible explanation has to be domestic politics.** It is undoubtedly domestic politics of member states control the NATO direction in a variety of ways – domestic politics reaches into all theories of decision making, making it ubiquitous in NATO decisions. NATO is not a supra-national institution, but an intergovernmental one. This means that the SYG and SACEUR do not have complete control over member state's security policy – it is up to the home governments to decide. What NATO does is streamline the decision making process by creating a forum where member states send an Ambassador to represent their interests in NATO, in addition to providing working-level contact groups on a variety of issues so that if and when NATO needs to be used, the process will not be as tenuous and long, but domestic politics always get in the way of Alliance security rationale.

A summary of the four explanations and their assessments follows below:

PLACEHOLDER FOR CHART

PLACEHOLDER FOR CHART

Policy Recommendations for Future NATO Missions:

It is vital to understand the theoretical framework regarding NATO shifts in doctrine and force structure because it determines the path NATO continues on and sheds light on how NATO really works. If policy makers can understand the logic behind the shifts, instead of viewing them as an all-evolving natural spectrum, they can manipulate the domestic considerations or frame conflicts in a way that would appeal to the domestic population and drum up domestic support for future missions.

Based on the evidence and analysis regarding the historical shifts of NATO policy it is clear that NATO needs a large organizational overhaul, in addition to fairer burden sharing processes. It is also a fact that domestic politics are vital and that any reforms must be presented in a way that the national governments can garner domestic support or quell public anger. NATO needs many reforms, and perhaps an overhaul of the entire system of military burden sharing, but unfortunately, largely political issues will always stand in the way to real and complete Alliance military and security enhancement. At the end of the day, politics overrule security and NATO has a tough uphill battle to fight for reforms, which to be frank, do not stand a very strong chance of being implemented especially because of the domestic politics situation – many states are just not willing to give because they do not feel an immediate security threat, and they can free-ride off the United States and the UK and other contributing members. Thus, the problem that needs to be resolved is this attitude of free-riding and lack of collective action – because each member state does not have to contribute equally to be equally protected, so NATO must find new ways to make the Alliance more cohesive, and the burdens more evenly divided. The five most important policy recommendations for NATO are:

- *An updated Strategic Concept that takes into account the threats of sub-state actors, transnational crime and terrorism, piracy, technological warfare/cyber war, and other forms of warfare*
 - NATO leaders have just started the process for a review and update of the Strategic Concept, which, if agreed upon, should take into consideration NATO's global partners such as Japan, South Korea and New Zealand, countries that are not NATO members but contribute to NATO missions due to a mutual sense of security values and interests.
 - NATO should expand its definition of security, and make the Alliance more responsible for mutual defense by accepting new concepts like cyber warfare and piracy into NATO's official doctrine
- *Continued expansion of NATO membership through Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Membership Action Plans (MAP)*
 - NATO as an Alliance should also expand, as NATO membership is the best way to tie-in reforms in states such as Georgia, Ukraine, Macedonia and Serbia while sending strong messages of support for membership and inclusion in the grand transatlantic partnership.
 - NATO expansion into problematic countries may have little value added in the sense of overall security and capability, but the political benefits of enlargement outweigh any security costs – countries in Eastern Europe want to be part of the transatlantic community and feel left out, and by providing much needed support and help to the fledgling pro-Western coalitions in

countries like Serbia and Georgia, which are being threatened constantly by pro-Russian and anti-American/European domestic opponents.

- *Enhanced EU-NATO coordination in regards to the Berlin Plus agreement*
 - Clearly, the tensions with EU's ESDP and NATO have impacted NATO decision making, as ESDP potentially could take away much-needed NATO resources and capabilities, which wouldn't matter so much if the ESDP weren't so ineffective.
 - Berlin Plus must be coordinated better, so that a better shared sense of responsibility can be fostered
 - This would include, of course, the resolution of the Turkey-Cyprus issue, or some sort of agreement that would allow the two states from obstructing each other on EU or NATO missions, respectively
 - The EU, with its post-modern era and focus on soft power and preference for peace-keeping mission, does not have the capabilities necessary to adequately carry out such a mission, and needs NATO equipment and NATO planning to do so, while NATO is suffering from a lack of popularity in the EU and anti-American sentiments – this solution could potentially solve both problems: giving the EU the necessary materials to carry out peacekeeping missions, while increasing the popularity of NATO and the U.S. because of the shared responsibilities over the usage of NATO and EU resources
 - This could run into the potential problem of EU members favoring ESDP over NATO missions, but NATO military missions will never be

irrelevant, as NATO is decades ahead of ESDP in organization and power. Also, ESDP contributions can help NATO because ESDP draws upon NATO's technology, weapons and planning – forcing European Allies to contribute more to NATO's structure to enhance ESDP.

- But by pooling together resources, it will create a more effective (in terms of economy of scale and usefulness) pool of equipment, personnel and technology that could benefit the EU and NATO at the same time; it is not one gaining at the expense of the other, but a fair solution in which both organizations can benefit from the highest quality resources.
- Berlin Plus can serve as an indirect way for EU countries to up their increases to NATO. They can support NATO without losing domestic support by claiming to fund ESDP, which focuses on peacekeeping and civilian missions, and is highly supported in the European public by adding to a joint NATO-ESDP fund for research and development of joint capabilities and resources.
- *Work on a more manageable burden sharing system*
 - This will be the most controversial reform, as member states do not want to contribute more to NATO, due to domestic issues such as other pressing budget concerns and anti-American public sentiment
 - NATO could perhaps put out a strong public relations campaign that stresses the importance of NATO to ALL Allies, especially the Western Europeans, and

highlight the real and imminent threat posed by transnational crime and terrorism in Europe, not just the United States – focusing on the recent terror attacks in Madrid and London.

- Implement a 2% mandatory defense spending – which would be controversial as a number of European states are moving away from military resolutions to diplomatic/economic ones, but NATO needs to set standards for membership in order to combat the lack of incentives and collective action problem that has been unresolved since 1949
 - While the U.S. extended its nuclear umbrella over Europe, the European powers were free-riding (except the UK and France) from the U.S. nuclear deterrence without supporting the research, funding, building and maintenance of weapons of mass destruction
 - Now, the problem is military free riding, as many European military are still largely territorial ground-based troops. These troops are not mobile, sustainable and survivable over long distances and in harsh terrain, such as Afghanistan, unlike U.S. troops. Many newer NATO countries such as Poland, Bulgaria and Romania are trying to modernize and upgrade their large armies into smaller mobile troops based on NATO niche capabilities, which is admirable, but many countries in Western Europe have not done the same. Given their history of war in the 20th century and the importance of the norms of peace and democracy in the EU – so this will definitely be a hard reform to pass, and is likely that this reform will never be bought up

in the NAC, unless the SYG specifically calls for the such a reform in front of the member state's PermReps and is supported by a significant coalition of NATO member states.

- *Resolving NATO's collective action problem*
 - NATO's collective action problem arises from the existence of free-riders in NATO that benefit fully from security without contributing much/at all. In order for this problem to be effectively combated, NATO needs to work out a system of inputs and outputs, and make difficult decisions, such as excluding an Ally because of its lack of contribution. While this could cause resistance in Europe, as many countries do not feel any sort of imminent threat, this will end in two ways:
 - A country increasing its defense budget and contributions to NATO because it feels pressured to do so to maintain membership;
 - Countries will leave NATO and could potentially sign their own political-military alliance, but it would be nowhere as sophisticated as NATO, nor would it be any effective without U.S. backing – making the countries without NATO protection weaker. This could lead countries to ask to re-join NATO if an attack were to occur in neighboring NATO (or non-NATO) country.
 - It is also important to note that it is very unlikely any country will actually fully withdraw from NATO, because of the mutual defense clause. Even France, after public disagreements with the U.S. and UK never fully withdrew participation from

NATO's political institutions, because they did not want to lose the security guarantee.

Conclusion and Thoughts on Further Research:

While the future of NATO reforms and effectiveness seem bleak given the reality of the situation in the organization itself and in member states, staring down the face of a global recession – the future of NATO is not doomed. This paper aimed to understand why NATO took on new missions, and has found out that new international situations call for new types of warfare, and working within the confines of an existing collective security organization is easier than trying to formulate a new one. The threat of non-state actors is not as imminent or emotional as the days of widespread fear over communism, so new negotiations over a collective defense treaty would go nowhere – because the pressing sense of urgency is gone. It is clear that domestic politics has the biggest role in shaping NATO doctrinal shifts post-Cold War – as it affects the staff of NATO itself, the leadership of NATO and member states, and the at times contentious EU-NATO relations. The realization that it is domestic politics, and not bureaucratic politics or political leaders that shape NATO policy in missions such as SFOR, KFOR and ISAF is important to NATO because it provides an explanation to why the force levels and doctrines differed between the various NATO missions. More research could be done on the specifics of domestic policy, such as which groups are more influential than others in lobbying the government (military, diplomatic corps and businessmen); looking at a timeline of NATO contributions as compared to instances of domestic interruption (coups, massive political changes and economic recession); or at the public opinion of NATO during the various missions in

Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan compared to the country's specific policies regarding the missions.