

Part I

Conceiving and Measuring Turkish Identity

The recent history and current policy in Turkey defy most of the Western world's assumptions about secular and Islamist governments. For instance, in the debate over Turkey's accession to the European Union, a Western observer might expect the country's leading Islamist political party to oppose Turkey's entry into an organization of historically Christian countries. Currently, however, Islamist political elites support the accession process while secularist politicians are among its most vehement opponents. In the Western mind, furthermore, secular governments tend to support democracy and human rights more than Islamist governments. In Turkey, though, the secularist military and courts have overthrown four popularly-elected governments and outlawed dozens of political parties, many of them Islamist in orientation. The divide between political parties' secular and Islamist identities in Turkey has created clear differences that challenge Western expectations in domestic policy.

When it comes to foreign policy, Turkey has also been caught between two poles: the Kemalist ideal of full integration with Europe and the history of involvement with the former Ottoman Empire. Do analogous differences exist between various stakeholders' positions on foreign policy, as well? In order to determine whether this is the case, it is necessary to examine how, if at all, different constructions of Turkish national identity inform Turkey's national discussion of foreign and security policy.

Part I, Chapter One

Why Study Turkish Security Policy in the Context of Identity?

This project sought to determine whether competing perceptions of Turkish national identity—both secular versus Islamist as well as Europe-oriented versus Ottoman-oriented—have been related to Turkish justifications and recommendations for security policy decisions toward the United States and Europe since the end of the Cold War. The project focuses on two individual yet overlapping events in Turkish security policy from 1990 to the present. The time period encompasses the end of the Cold War and the entire post-Cold War era up to the current day, allowing comparison between the different conceptions of Turkish national identity as manifested by different governing political parties and shifting public opinion. The time period was also one of a relatively stable global security situation, lacking catastrophic power shifts on the level of the Soviet Union's fall. Although the United States has experienced a shift in security focus toward dealing with terrorism since the mid- to late-1990s and especially since September 11th, 2001, Turkey has dealt with the threat of terror from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (*Partiya Karakeren Kurdistan*, or PKK) and Islamic extremist groups like Turkish Hizbullah as a main issue of its security policy since the mid-1980s. Therefore, the relation of Turkish security policy to the threat of terrorism was relatively constant throughout the period examined.

What Does It Mean to Be Turkish?

In order to study Turkish security policy in the context of Turkish identity, it is important to understand the history of what it means to be Turkish. The concept of “Turkishness” as an ethnic identity had its birth in the waning days of the Ottoman Empire, during the *Tanzimat* era of reforms. The Ottoman elites imported the European concept of patriotic nationalism based on

ethnicity. At the same time, increased communication between the Ottoman Empire and Central Asia raised awareness of Turkic groups outside the Ottoman sphere.¹ In the strictest sense, however, most of those who called themselves Turks had little real Turkic ancestry, owing to nearly one thousand years of mixing with other highly-mobile populations in the region. They considered themselves Turks because they spoke Ottoman Turkish as their native language and identified with the history of the Ottoman Empire.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk reconstructed Turkishness as a civic national identity during the Turkish Revolution. Atatürk's party program stated, "Any individual within the Republic of Turkey, whatever his faith, who speaks Turkish, grows up with Turkish culture and adopts the Turkish ideal, is a Turk."² A Turk, then, was a citizen of Turkey who eschewed the "traditions and superstitions" of the Ottoman era, including the open practice of Sunni Islam, and subscribed to the principles of republicanism, secularism, and western orientation.³ Despite Atatürk's wish for Turkey to renounce Islam and become more Western, the Islamic religion continued to be an important part of most Turkish citizens' lives. Indeed, religion was one of the few non-civic commonalities that united Turks of different identities, particularly the country's two largest groups: the civically-defined Turks and the ethnically-defined Kurds, who spoke Kurdish, rather than Turkish, as their native language and were largely disenfranchised in the early years of the Turkish Republic.⁴

¹ David Kushner, "Self-Perception and Identity in Contemporary Turkey," *Journal of Contemporary History* 32, no. 2 (Apr 1997): 219 – 233.

² *Tarih IV Türkiye Cumhuriyeti* (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931): 132, translated into English and quoted in Erik J. Zürcher, "'Fundamentalism' as an Exclusionary Device in Kemalist Turkish Nationalism," in Willem van Schendel and Erik J. Zürcher, eds., *Identity Politics in Central Asia and the Muslim World: Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Labour in the Twentieth Century* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001).

³ For a clear explanation of several aspects of Turkish identity, see Ioannis N. Grigoraïdis, "Türk or Türkiyeli? The reform of Turkey's minority legislation and the rediscovery of Ottomanism," *Middle Eastern Studies* 43, no. 3 (2007).

⁴ Murat Somer, "Resurgence and Remaking of Identity: Civil Beliefs, Domestic and External Dynamics, and the Turkish Mainstream Discourse on Kurds," *Comparative Political Studies* 38 (2005): 591 – 622.

When Turkey became a multiparty democracy in 1950, the problem of constructing Turkish national identity began to play itself out in the domestic political arena. Most political parties since that time have espoused, to varying degrees, secularist or Islamic constructions of Turkish identity.⁵ Furthermore, the Turkish military, which has adopted a staunchly secularist attitude, has maintained a great deal of power in Turkey and is not under civilian control. The military, which sees itself as the protector of Atatürk's secular republic, has interfered in Turkish politics five times: they staged three coups against governments in 1960, 1971, and 1980; they staged a "postmodern coup" in 1997 by pressuring the Islamist party in power to step down, and they threatened a coup against the current moderate Islamist government in 2005.⁶ Each of these coups was defended as necessary to protect Turkey's unitary, secular republic against unsecular forces. Meanwhile, these "unsecular forces" were frequently popularly-elected governments, which won votes by appealing to the traditions and values of Turkey's predominantly Sunni Muslim population.⁷

Contentious Identities in Contemporary Turkey

Clearly, the tension between different constructions of Turkish identity has had an impact on Turkey's domestic political scene. However, Turkey's military also has a strong influence on the country's foreign and security policies, and there may be a relation between contentious issues of Turkish identity and contentious issues of Turkish foreign policy. For instance,

⁵ For further reading on the history of Turkish national identity, see David Kushner, "Self-Perception and Identity in Contemporary Turkey," *Journal of Contemporary History* 32, no. 2 (1997): 219 – 233. For more information on the current conflict in Turkish identity construction and its effect on Turkish domestic politics, see M. Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan, "Crisis in Turkey: The Conflict of Political Languages," *Middle East Policy* 14, no. 3 (2007): 118 – 135.

⁶ For a brief but detailed history of military coups and their role in Turkish politics, see Stephen Kinzer, *Crescent and Star: Turkey Between Two Worlds* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, & Giroux, 2001).

⁷ Some 99 percent of Turkey's population identifies as Sunni Muslim; see Central Intelligence Agency, "Turkey," The CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html> (accessed 4 March 2009).

Necmettin Erbakan, the longtime leader of Turkey's Islamist political movement, rejected the prospect of joining the European Union up until the 1990s. He viewed the organization as a "Christian club," and advocated instead forming a union with other Muslim countries, which would be modeled on the *umma*.⁸ Erbakan's views were integrated fully with his identity as a pious Muslim, and revealed a conception of Turkish identity as a Muslim country. Furthermore, his views had historical depth; During the Ottoman era, Istanbul was a center of Muslim learning and the Ottomans controlled much of the Muslim world, including Mecca.

The era of Atatürk, on the other hand, represented a clean and deliberate break from the Ottomans' involvement in the Muslim world.⁹ The Ottoman Empire had disintegrated, creating new nation-states in the Balkans, North Africa, and the Arabian Peninsula. After the Turkish revolution, Turkey abdicated its leadership of the *umma*, abolishing the caliphate and replacing its domestic laws, which were based in the Islamic codes of *shariah*, with secular laws. These changes were inspired by and fashioned after European legal codes. The alphabet was changed from Arabic script to Latin characters. Men were required to abandon their traditional clothing and wear Western attire.¹⁰ In short, Atatürk's model for secularism, republicanism, and modernity came from Europe. In this spirit, Turkey applied to join the European Economic Community in 1959. The Turkish government at the time hoped that joining the EEC would strengthen the country's economy and solidify its ties to Europe.¹¹ However, a succession of military coups in Turkey—set against the backdrop of a European Union that was expanding into other countries and into new realms of cooperation—led to difficulties for Turkey's accession

⁸ Philip Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2002), 155.

⁹ Erik J. Zürcher, "'Fundamentalism' as an Exclusionary Device in Kemalist Turkish Nationalism," in Willem van Schendel and Erik J. Zürcher, eds., *Identity Politics in Central Asia and the Muslim World: Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Labour in the Twentieth Century* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001).

¹⁰ For further information about the internal reforms that changed the Ottoman Empire into the Turkish Republic, see Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 166 – 206.

¹¹ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774 – 2000* (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 128.

process. Fifty years after it first applied to join, Turkey is still not a member of the European Union.

In the meantime, Turkey has shown its commitment to the West in other ways. For instance, Turkey joined NATO in 1952 and has worked since then to strengthen its military and political ties to the United States. Despite a number of setbacks related to the conflict over Cyprus in the 1960s and 1970s, the United States and Turkey enjoyed a relatively stable partnership during the Cold War.¹² Turkey and the United States, along with Canada and other countries in Europe, stood united against the Soviet threat. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the policies and viewpoints of Turkey and the United States have diverged. The decision of Turkey's parliament not to support the United States' March 2003 invasion into Iraq is an important example of that divergence.

This project approaches Turkish security policy from a constructivist perspective. The project assumes that Turkish security policy has changed considerably since the Cold War because the norms concerning security have changed—both in the international system and in Turkey's domestic environment. This project will analyze Turkish security policy in the context of these changes, with the understanding that the changes are socially constructed through the interactions between states and within the society.¹³

International norms have changed considerably since the end of the Cold War, especially with regard to the construction of allies and enemies. During the Cold War, allies of the United States were cautious of the Soviet Union and vice versa. Now, Turkey and other allies of the United States may seek to improve their diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with former Soviet states without fear of the United States interpreting their overtures as a shift away from

¹² Ibid., at 147.

¹³ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992)

the Western world. Indeed, Turkey has increased trade with Russia and the other former Soviet republics since the early 1990's. This leads to another way that international norms have changed: during the Cold War, Turkey and the West were united against the Soviet Union, a common threat. However, the threat has disappeared since the end of the Cold War. It is unclear whether it is some shared value or institutional inertia that is keeping the Turkish-Western alliance together.

Domestic norms within Turkey are also currently uncertain. Norms are contingent on identity, and since Turkey's national identity is unclear, its norms are in a state of flux. Turkey is torn between the expression of its Islamic religious identity and the Kemalist ideal of secular modernity. For instance, the vigorous debate over whether women should be allowed to wear headscarves in public places is part of the larger debate over the place of Islam in Turkish society. The purpose of this research is to determine whether a debate over Turkey's relationship with and security policy toward the West—defined here as the United States and the European Union—might also have a place in the larger debate about Turkish identity.

While Turkey is not traditionally thought of as a major actor on the global stage, it is situated in a volatile neighborhood at the confluence of the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus. Bulgaria, the former Yugoslavia, and other Balkan countries are all home to Turkish and Turkic minorities.¹⁴ Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey has pursued a closer relationship with other countries that have Turkic populations, like Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, with some success.¹⁵ Furthermore, Turkish citizens belong to 26 different ethnic groups, including Kurds and Arabs, Armenians and Chechens, Bulgarians and Romanians. Foreign policy experts in

¹⁴ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774 – 2000* (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 261.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, at 299.

Turkey have argued that their country's physical proximity and ethnic ties to its neighbors gives Turkey an important role in the region.¹⁶

It is impossible to consider Turkey's ethnic ties to its neighbors without examining the country's historical legacy: the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans once ruled territory that ranged from the Mahgreb to the Arabian Peninsula to the Caucasus to the Balkans. That history is still fresh for Turkey's neighbors, and Turkey cannot introduce any foreign policy initiatives in the Balkans or the Middle East without inciting charges of neo-Ottomanism. Additionally, Turkey's diversity of ethnic groups is also part of the legacy of the Ottoman Empire's far-flung holdings, since people from all over the Empire had been able to settle in what is now Turkey. Looking at how Turkey has constructed its interests and threats in the context of Turkish national identity during the past twenty years may provide some idea of how Turkey will decide to act on matters important to its strategic neighborhood in the years to come. Furthermore, knowing about how the construction of Turkish national identity relates to its security policy will enable scholars to better evaluate the possible policy consequences of future developments in Turkish identity construction.

Plan of Research

This project will examine current trends in Turkish security policy in the context of the competing constructions of Turkish national identity, with the intent of understanding the role of these contentious identities in discussions of Turkish foreign policy. This project will have significance for diplomats and other practitioners of foreign and military policy in the United

¹⁶ Ahmet Davutoğlu, a Turkish academic and foreign policy adviser to Turkish President Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan, made this point in his keynote address to a conference at the Brookings Institution, "Turkey, the Region and U.S.-Turkey Relations: Assessing the Challenges and Prospects," on October 28, 2008.

States, Europe, NATO, and the United Nations, since Turkey now holds one of the rotating seats on the Security Council.

Part I of this paper includes an introduction to the problem of Turkey's national identity and a brief history of major Turkish security policy decisions since the end of the Cold War, as well as an explanation of this research project's basis in constructivist international relations theory and a discussion of where the project fits within the current literature on security policy. The current literature on identity construction, both in general and in the Turkish case, is then examined in greater depth, with an explanation of how this project relates to that literature. The paper then explores how to measure changing conceptions of Turkish national identity in relation to Turkish security policy and outlines the design of the research project, including issues of case selection, methodology, and sampling. Part II of this paper reports what the research has found in regard to each case and assesses the project's findings, interpreting what those findings mean in the context of the current literature on identity and security. Finally, the paper will explain the significance of the findings and draw conclusions for scholars, foreign policy practitioners, and the general public.

Part I, Chapter Two

Assessing the Security Studies Debate

Although historians have studied the actions of states and the causes of war at least since the days of Thucydides, formal scholarship in the field of security studies grew out of the Cold War context. Initially and throughout the Cold War, scholars of international relations and practitioners of foreign policy approached security from a realist paradigm, focusing on the relative military power of the NATO allies and the Eastern Bloc. They studied the variables that national governments could control, including “military doctrine and strategy, the tools of statecraft... or the size and character of armaments.”¹⁷ Nuclear weapons; the doctrines of coercion, deterrence, and escalation; and arms control regimes were all studied and debated throughout the Cold War.¹⁸ Scholarship on these issues dominated the field of security studies until the latter half of the Cold War, when new ideas of how to think about security entered the literature. The paradigms of neorealism, neoliberalism, and constructivism emerged from this period, and they continue to dominate the scholarly debate on security studies to this day.

The Positivist Paradigm

In the mid-1970s, a new emphasis on positivist methods emerged within the old assumptions of realist theory. The new scholars, including Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt, called themselves neorealists. They proceeded from the idea that the structure of the international system, rather than human nature, was responsible for state actions under anarchy.¹⁹ Structural neorealists assume that the state is a unified, rational actor, and that every state has certain immutable interests, primary among which is survival. Furthermore, neorealists assume that external and

¹⁷ Stephen Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (1991): 212.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, at 213.

¹⁹ For more information, see Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979)

strategic factors are the main influences on how states make decisions about security.²⁰ According to the neorealists, states consider themselves secure when they have enough relative military power to deter, preempt, or defend against threats to their survival or relative power position.²¹

Neoliberals critique the neorealists' assumptions of mutual state hostility and the value of relative power. Experiments with game theory have convinced the neoliberals that "for a broad range of realistic problems," absolute gains as well as relative gains are in the state interest.²² Because absolute gains are possible and desired within this system, neoliberals believe that cooperation is possible under anarchy "if states have significant common interests."²³ The neoliberals argue that international institutions matter within the field of security studies because they increase information sharing between states. This allows states to know more about each others' motivations and to coordinate action with one another, undermining the neorealists' assumptions of mutual state hostility and unilateral action.²⁴ Joseph Nye explains that the exchange of information between states also allows actors to influence one another with "soft power" in ways that do not involve the threat of violence. According to Nye, this conception of power "co-opts people rather than coerces them."²⁵

Although the paradigms of neorealism and neoliberalism are often portrayed as opposing schools of thought, they share many core assumptions and philosophical principles. Both are based in the positivist tradition, which tried to bring "science" into the social sciences and

²⁰ Colin Elman, Miriam Fendius Elman and Paul W. Schroeder, "History vs. Neo-realism: A Second Look," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995): 183.

²¹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 105.

²² Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," *The American Political Science Review* 85, no. 3 (1991): 701.

²³ Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995): 39.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005), 5.

became popular in the field of international relations during the mid-twentieth century. Both believe that the international system can be reduced to the sum of interactions between individual states²⁶ and assume that state actors are unitary and will always act rationally to further their interests in a condition of anarchy. Finally, neorealism and neoliberalism share the assumption that all states have similar, exogenous interests that are unrelated to their internal conditions.²⁷

Constructivism: A Critique of Positivism

At the Cold War's end, the reordering of the international system precipitated a rethinking of security studies. Many critics believed the positivist models' inability to predict the fall of the Soviet Union meant that a new theory was necessary. Constructivism, which was developed just before the Cold War ended and is based in sociology and critical social theory, forms a cogent, coherent, and persuasive critique of the positivist paradigms in security studies.²⁸ Constructivists understand interests as social constructs that reflect the cultural norms and identities within a society. Therefore, every state has different interests. The constructivists define norms as the expectations that actors with the same identity have for one another. Identities are the way actors conceptualize their similarities to each other and differences from everyone else. Culture is the sum of values, rules, and models that determine who the actors are, how they work, and how they interact.²⁹

The constructivists, including Alexander Wendt and Charles Kupchan, agree that anarchy rules in the international context, but posit that "anarchy is what states make of it," so the

²⁶ Idea adapted from Alan Bullock and Stephen Trombley, eds., *Harper Dictionary of Modern Thought* (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), 679.

²⁷ Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives in National Security," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996)

²⁸ For more information on the history of constructivist theory, see Alan Bullock and Stephen Trombley, eds., *Harper Dictionary of Modern Thought* (New York: Harper & Row, 1988).

²⁹ *Ibid.*, at 5-6.

anarchical system will not necessarily determine how states act.³⁰ In contrast to the positivists, constructivists believe that state interaction not only constructs the international system, it constructs the states themselves.³¹ Therefore, scholars need to examine both the social forces at work within the state and the construction of norms on the international level in order to understand state security policy in the international context.

Robert Keohane argues that “without a theory of interests, which requires analysis of domestic politics, no theory of international relations can be fully adequate...”³² Security studies is especially in need of a theory of interests, with its focus on variables that the leaders of nations can control. Since constructivism focuses on socially-created interests, norms, and attitudes, it is a particularly appropriate theory for assessing interests in democratic societies. Furthermore, constructivism recognizes that even states with a similar interest may interpret that interest differently or pursue it in different ways, based on how their society constructed the interest. Constructivist scholarship on strategic cultures has shown how the beliefs of political elites, policymakers, and the military affect state security policy.³³

Constructivism and Turkish Security Policy

Current Turkish security policy is fascinating from a constructivist perspective because the competing constructions of national identity at work in contemporary Turkey have roughly equivalent political power. Turkey’s president and prime minister are personally devout Muslims who have promoted their values through their moderately Islamist political party, while the Turkish military remains a bastion of secularism, as does much of Turkey’s academic and

³⁰ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992)

³¹ Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” *International Security* 23, no. 1 (1998): 173.

³² Robert O. Keohane, qtd. in Katzenstein, *Culture of National Security*, 14.

³³ See Alastair Iain Johnson, “Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China,” in Katzenstein, 216-270, and Thomas U. Berger, “Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan,” also in Katzenstein, 317-356.

business elite. Furthermore, secular and Islamist parties have alternated between the government and the opposition since the mid-1990's, illustrating the secularists' and the Islamists' struggle for Turkey's national identity.

However, studies of Turkish security policy since the Cold War have come from a realist or neorealist point of view. Security-focused studies of Turkey have focused on the country's geopolitical position in the region, its interactions with Iraq and Iran on the Kurdish issue, and its economic ties to Europe, Russia, Central Asia, and the Middle East.³⁴ Meanwhile, studies of Turkish identity during this period have occurred primarily in the context of the headscarf issue and Turkish accession to the European Union.³⁵ No study on Turkish security policy has been conducted from a constructivist perspective, examining the role of identity in the construction of Turkish foreign policy. This project will seek to fill this gap in the literature by examining the competing constructions of identity in Turkish society and explore whether those constructions have an effect on Turkey's security policymaking discussions.

³⁴ Mustafa Aydın and M. Nail Alkan, *An Extensive Bibliography of Studies in English, German, and French on Turkish Foreign Policy (1923-1997)* (Ankara: Center for Strategic Research, 1997)

³⁵ See Emelie A. Olson, "Muslim Identity and Secularism in Contemporary Turkey: 'The Headscarf Dispute'," *Anthropological Quarterly* 58, no. 4 (1985): 161 – 171; and Aydın and Alkan, *An Extensive Bibliography of Studies in English, German, and French on Turkish Foreign Policy (1923-1997)*.

Part I, Chapter Three

Project Design and Execution

This research project has examined whether and how competing perceptions of Turkish national identity have affected Turkish security policy since the end of the Cold War. To do so, it used a qualitative approach. The research has analyzed the discourse used in major Turkish newspapers to discover how, if at all, different constructions of Turkish national identity affect public justifications for, and assessments of, the government's security policy decisions. Before entering a more detailed discussion of the project's research design, however, the two significant terms in the research question must be clarified: "national identity" and "security." Afterward, the methods for measuring those concepts will be explained, case selections delineated, and information sources specified.

Project Design

How to Examine and Assess Identity?

The term "national identity" is closely associated with the term "nation." Those who identify themselves as belonging to a certain nation share a national identity. If the nation is "an imagined political community," which is "both inherently limited and sovereign," the national identity is the set of shared values, definitions, and views of history that lead a group of people to imagine the same community.³⁶ This definition is particularly fitting for the Turkish case because it avoids ethnicity; therefore, "Kurdish Turks," "Circassian Turks," "Armenian Turks," and others are included. Although the Turks were an ethnic group within the Ottoman Empire,

³⁶ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. (New York: Verso, 1991), p. 1-9.

Mustafa Kemal built the Turkish Republic as a civic nation: “all citizens of the Turkish state were deemed constitutionally Turks.”³⁷

Since the end of the Cold War, scholarly definitions of security have broadened to include considerations of human rights, gender roles, and environmental issues. Many constructivist scholars have examined these issues in the context of national security. However, this research has focused on a narrower, more traditional conception of security studies, including elements such as military action, alliance formation, and high diplomacy, for two reasons: first, if constructivist conceptions of security can be applied to the “hard” areas of international security most dominated by realism, their viability will be proven on the realists’ terms.³⁸ Secondly, the focus on traditional conceptions of security has helped to close a gap in the literature on Turkish security studies, since no constructivist study of traditional Turkish security policy was uncovered in the course of this research.

Case Selection

In order to measure whether—and how—competing perceptions of Turkish national identity have affected Turkish security policy, this project has examined two cases that involve major events and decisions in Turkish security policy toward the United States and Europe since 1990. For each case, background research has determined what decisions were made and by whom, what action was taken, who the actors were, who opposed the action, and the sociocultural context in which the action took place. Discourse analysis of contemporary and pertinent articles from Turkish newspapers has examined the public justifications employed by

³⁷ David Kushner, “Self-Perception and Identity in Contemporary Turkey,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 32:2 (April 1997), 222.

³⁸ This argument is inspired by that of Peter Katzenstein in his edited volume on constructivist perspectives on security studies. See Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives in National Security,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 11.

the foreign policy decision makers and by those who opposed those decisions. The cases were selected based on a number of factors in order to provide the most representative and meaningful sample possible.

One major goal in the selection process was to choose cases that represent the full spectrum of Turkish political parties in power during the period. From 2000 to the present, Turkey has had two very different governments that included different political parties, different leaders, and different power landscapes. Besides having varying political ideologies, some of the parties involved have appealed to secularist constructions of Turkish national identity while others have appealed to more Islamic identity constructions. Therefore, studying their justifications for foreign policy decisions will help reveal how their justifications differed and whether, if at all, the political leaders' different conceptions of Turkish identity help account for those justifications.

The case selection aimed to examine one discrete event in the context of a larger, ongoing process. In this manner, the research explored how two very different Turkish governments responded to a single crisis, as well as how they responded to one issue over a longer period of time. Turkey's discussion and decision about participation 2002-2003 conflict in Iraq represents the discrete decision, while the ongoing question of accession to the European Union has been examined over a five-year period from 2000 to 2005. This project has examined each of these cases in order to determine the changes in attitude between opinion makers with different political views, how those views have changed over time, and to determine the differences in approach between policymakers and other opinionmakers with different constructions of Turkish identity. Finally, the study has focused on overt action rather than covert action. Not only is information on covert actions scarce, but by their nature covert actions would have no public

justification. Since public justification based on cultural norms and identity is the main focus of this research, overt decisions and actions are the only ones of interest to this study.

The Role of Discourse in the Media

When decisions, actions, and justifications enter the public sphere in a democratic society, they become part of the contemporary discourse, where they both affect and are affected by the society at large. Cultural norms and identities shape policymakers' decisions as well as the way the society reacts to those decisions. Similarly, public reaction to a decision and its consequences, based on popular perceptions and informed by popular norms, shapes the way policymakers make later decisions.

This interaction between policymakers and the public is part of the democratic process, because it is one way in which people hold their government accountable for its actions. Since Turkey has a democratic government, Turkish citizens and policymakers participate in this process. The interaction takes place largely through the media— magazine articles, newspaper editorials, television broadcasts, and opinion polls express popular sentiment, while press releases, speeches, and interviews express policymakers' justifications. Newspapers present many diverse opinions and are widely read in Turkey; as such, newspaper articles and columns are the primary sources of data that were analyzed for this study. Primary sources for information about the sociocultural context of these issues include the text of specific treaties and agreements and the researcher's personal experiences in Turkey, while secondary sources have included historical and contemporary policy analysis from U.S., European, and Turkish academics and think tanks.

The data from primary sources have been analyzed through discourse analysis, with the intent of discovering whether public justifications for security policy actions and decisions are

related to constructions of Turkish identity. Specific newspaper articles, opinion pieces, and interviews were chosen from the universe of data with a stratified sampling technique and with secondary sources providing background information on the formation of the strata. The project has attempted to sample sources from various ideological points of view within Turkey, as well as sources that represent a diverse sample of stakeholders in the Turkish security structure, such as ethnic minority groups and the military. Due to the researcher's linguistic limitations, English-language sources have been analyzed exclusively. The analysis has attempted to categorize or code justifications in the source material into a schematic that will show how strongly, if at all, the theme of the justification (i.e. sovereignty, economic interest, morality) relates to the speaker's identity frame.

While discourse analysis is the best choice for this project, it is not a perfect method: because coding is a subjective exercise, issues of reliability have inevitably arisen. The researcher's beliefs about the current political situation in Turkey may have had some effect on the coding of statements from military leaders and members of different political parties. However, through extensive background research about the people, political parties, newspapers, and events concerned, the researcher has striven to make informed, unbiased decisions about how to code various points of data.

This analysis will examine the justifications that Turkish security policymakers and commentators give for their actions and decisions, with the intent of discovering whether identity plays a role in the construction and justification of their decisions on foreign and security policy. In order for this project to find identity to be part of the process of security policy decision making, Turkish opinion makers must be found to use the language of identity when justifying or arguing for or against a certain security policy decision. If opinion makers are found to use the

language of identity when stating their positions on security policy, it will show that those opinion makers consider the conception of Turkish identity to be a valid factor in the formation of Turkish security policy toward the United States and Europe.

It is useful to understand how Turkish political and military elites conceive of their own national identity and to what extent they believe that identity influences their security policymaking process. Understanding identity differences between Turkish institutions involved in security policymaking, as well as their varying ideas on how identity should affect the policy process, can aid security policymakers within Turkey as well as foreign diplomats in Turkey, Turkish area specialists, and security policymakers in Turkey's neighborhood.

Project Execution

Methodology and Technique

Mass media play a prominent role in the development of a nation's political discourse, because they are the way in which most citizens learn about the problems, actors, and prospective solutions in domestic and international politics. Therefore, mass media have an important effect on the way people think about the world around them. In most democracies, the chief sources of political language are journalists and the news media, government officials, and citizens.³⁹ All three groups are both producers and consumers of political language; that is, they all interrogate one another's narratives and form counternarratives of their own.

The news media is not exempt from this exchange; although journalists strive for objectivity, the interests, points of view, and priorities of journalists and editors are usually extant in the words they choose, the choices they make, and the structure of their stories. This is

³⁹ Kenneth L. Hacker, "Political Linguistic Discourse Analysis: Analyzing the Relationships of Power and Language," in *The Theory and Practice of Political Communication Research*, ed. Mary E. Stuckey (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 47.

because “reporters and editors. . . both make and consume their society’s culture. . . . By (re)producing symbols familiar to their audience, reporters and editors proclaim the ‘preferred reading’ of a text.”⁴⁰ In explaining a situation to the general readership, journalists inevitably favor one interpretation over another. Currently, therefore, “the most interesting questions about news. . . concern. . . the general relationship between news and ideology, or the specific processes by which news reproduces or alters ideology.”⁴¹ Research that asks these questions may use discourse analysis “to illuminate how power, language and ideology are interrelated.”⁴²

Discourse analysis is an especially apt method for studying news media, because the study of discourse is the study of “descriptions, claims, reports, allegations, and assertions as parts of human practices.”⁴³ What discourse describes, then, is precisely the things that make up the news. Furthermore, the news, like all discourse, “is constructed in the sense that it is assembled from a range of different resources... [it] is *constructive* in the sense that these assemblages of words, repertoires, and so on put together and stabilize versions of the world...”⁴⁴ Importantly, discourse analysis is interested only in the language and the way it is employed, and claims of fact are not evaluated. With some knowledge of the news organization’s sociocultural context, only the media texts themselves must be examined in order to learn about the ideology and power structure behind the language.

This research project used discourse analysis to examine articles from three newspapers that represent the spectrum of popular ideology in Turkey: *Hürriyet*, *Milliyet*, and *Sabah*.

⁴⁰ Gaye Tuchman, “Qualitative Methods in the Study of News,” in *A Handbook of Qualitative Methodologies*, ed. Klaus B. Jensen and Nicholas W. Jankowski (New York: Routledge, 1991), 89-90.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 79.

⁴² Kenneth L. Hacker, “Political Linguistic Discourse Analysis: Analyzing the Relationships of Power and Language,” in *The Theory and Practice of Political Communication Research*, ed. Mary E. Stuckey (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 47.

⁴³ Jonathan Potter and Alexa Hepburn, “Discursive Constructionism,” in *Handbook of Constructionist Research*, ed. James A. Holstein and Jaber F. Gubrium (New York: The Guilford Press, 2008), 275.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 277.

Hürriyet (Liberty) is a centrist newspaper with a staunchly secularist angle. *Milliyet* (Nation) generally takes the most moderate positions, and *Sabah* (Morning) is popular among moderate Islamists. These labels, rather than the traditional labels of liberal or conservative, work best for Turkey; secularists and Islamists generally adopt a variety of ideas from both sides of the traditional spectrum.

Selection and Sampling

The articles for this project were collected from World News Connection, an online database of newspaper articles from around the world translated into English.⁴⁵ Two other Turkish newspapers were sought for inclusion in this study: *Radikal*, a left-leaning Turkish daily, and *Zaman*, a newspaper associated with Fetullah Gülen, a nonpolitical Islamic social leader. Unfortunately, World News Connection's archives did not include articles from these papers for the time period queried. However, *Hürriyet*, *Milliyet*, and *Sabah* were Turkey's most widely-circulated broadsheet newspapers in the time period examined, so they do have an important impact on Turkey's public opinion.⁴⁶

The articles examined for the European Union accession portion of this study were published between January 2000, one month after the European Union formally accepted Turkey as a candidate state at the Helsinki Summit, and December 2005, a few months after Turkey's membership negotiations commenced. The time period also extends for two years before and two years after the Iraq War time period, which enables comparisons of attitudes toward EU accession before and after that event. The 2000-2005 time span gives a clear picture of the

⁴⁵ The World News Connection database is maintained by the National Technical Information Service, United States Department of Commerce, and the articles are translated into English by the United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

⁴⁶ Medyatava, "Gazete Net Satışları, 06.01.2003-12.01.2003," Medyatava, <http://www.medyatava.com/tiraj.asp> (accessed Feb. 10, 2009).

intense negotiations between Turkey and the European Union as Turkey began to adopt some political and economic reforms. These reforms sparked a vigorous public debate in Turkey, which provided a good deal of material for this project.

The articles for the European Union section of this paper were gathered using the advanced search function in the World News Connection database, with search terms “European Union or EU” for articles from *Hürriyet*, *Milliyet*, and *Sabah* between 1 January, 2000 and 31 December, 2005. The total number of articles found was 593. The articles were then stratified by newspaper, and twenty percent of the articles from each newspaper were chosen for closer analysis by a random number generator. The total number of articles on the European Union that were analyzed closely for this study is 119.

The articles examined for Iraq War portion of this study were published between January 2002, when United States President George W. Bush declared Iraq to be part of the “axis of evil,” and May 2003, when President Bush declared major combat operations in Iraq to have ended. This time period encompasses the entire construction of the United States’ case for war against Iraq, popular reactions from around the world, American preparations for combat operations, and the operations themselves. More importantly for this project, the time period includes a parliamentary election, an extended public debate within Turkey over what role the country should take in Iraq, and reactions to the government’s decisions. This time period gives a comprehensive picture of the conflict and is ideal for discussing the discourse that surrounded the conflict. The articles for the Iraq War case were gathered using the advanced search function in the World News Connection database with the search term “Iraq.” There were 494 articles in total.

Due to the shorter time period examined and the larger number of articles per month from each newspaper in this data universe as compared to the European Union data universe, different strata were created to provide a more representative sample of articles. The articles were sorted by original date of publication and divided by month of publication. Next, a random list generator was used to select twenty percent of the articles from each month. Due to the extremely low number of articles collected from the months of April until June 2002, those months were combined into one stratum. The randomly-selected twenty percent from each stratum, or 100 articles in total, were then analyzed more closely. The total number of articles studied from both cases is 219.

Analytical Model

The analytical model employed in this study attempted to combine elements from van Dijk's conceptualization of discourse analysis and Bell's detailed model for analyzing the discourse structure of news articles. These questions were created and adapted with the intention of discovering the underlying ideologies and identity frames of the author and any other key actors within the text. The model asked the same questions of each news article and column analyzed in the study:

- What propositions (claims of fact) does the text articulate?
- How are the subsequent propositions bound together?
- What implications does the text make?
- Which parts of the text are assigned the most importance? Which are made least important?
- What stylistic decisions are evident? What rhetorical devices and syntactical structures are used?

- What scripts (culturally-shared, conventional knowledge) does the text use?⁴⁷
- Who are the political agents involved? What views do they espouse and how are those views expressed?
- How do the political agents and their views interact in the text?
- How are the resources of the order of discourse drawn upon in the management of interaction?
- Whose views appear to be favored in the discourse structure of this text?
- How does this text and its views interact with its sociocultural context?⁴⁸

The answers to these questions helped to illuminate both the author's ideology—his or her “fundamental interpretation framework,” as well as article's frame—its “central organizing idea, for making sense of relevant events, suggesting what is at issue.”⁴⁹ Furthermore, the questions “pay special attention to ideological and political dimensions of media messages,” as is appropriate for a discourse analytical study of the news.⁵⁰ For columns and opinion pieces, an additional question was added regarding policy narratives, which are predictions of what will happen if the government pursues a certain policy:

- What does the author suggest will happen, and what do those suggestions reveal about the author's assumptions about Turkish society?⁵¹

This question was necessary to account for and accurately measure the overt, rather than implied, claims and opinions written about in the Turkish newspaper columns. In order to determine

⁴⁷ Questions 1-6 are adapted from Teun Van Dijk, “The Interdisciplinary Study of News as Discourse,” in *A Handbook of Qualitative Methodologies*, ed. Klaus B. Jensen and Nicholas W. Jankowski (New York: Routledge, 1991), 112 – 118.

⁴⁸ Questions 7 – 11 are adapted from Allan Bell, “The Discourse Structure of News Stories,” in *Approaches to Media Discourse*, ed. Allan Bell and Peter Garrett, (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 76 – 80.

⁴⁹ Teun Van Dijk, “The Interdisciplinary Study of News as Discourse,” in *A Handbook of Qualitative Methodologies*, ed. Klaus B. Jensen and Nicholas W. Jankowski (New York: Routledge, 1991), 118; Gamson and Modigliani, quoted in Gaye Tuchman, “Qualitative Methods in the Study of News,” in *A Handbook of Qualitative Methodologies*, ed. Klaus B. Jensen and Nicholas W. Jankowski (New York: Routledge, 1991), 91.

⁵⁰ Teun Van Dijk, “The Interdisciplinary Study of News as Discourse,” in *A Handbook of Qualitative Methodologies*, ed. Klaus B. Jensen and Nicholas W. Jankowski (New York: Routledge, 1991), 109.

⁵¹ For more information on policy narratives and their role in political communication, see Emery Roe, *Narrative Policy Analysis*, (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1994), 40-41.

whether the opinion- and policy makers' constructions of identity were related to their suggestions or justifications for foreign policy decisions, this analysis looked at whether the individuals' ideologies, identity frames, economic interests, geopolitical strategies, or domestic political considerations were most important in devising their position on the issue.

Throughout the discourse analytical process, it was important to keep the sociocultural context of the news articles in mind, since the texts both informed and were informed by the societies in which they were produced. Because of this interaction between the text and the context, approaching the social structure and cultural context as exogenous to the discourse would have been both counterintuitive and methodologically unsound. How, then, should the research have acknowledged and examined the context as important in its own right, while also keeping in mind its interaction with the texts and their creators? The approach used in this research "considers how social structure is an ongoing accomplishment of the different parties."⁵² By acknowledging the interactions between individuals and groups as key factors in both the creation of the text and in the creation of the sociocultural context, this analysis attempted to resolve this methodological issue.

⁵² Idea based on research conducted by Drew and Heritage and reproduced in Jonathan Potter and Alexa Hepburn, "Discursive Constructionism," in *Handbook of Constructionist Research*, ed. James A. Holstein and Jaber F. Gubrium (New York: The Guilford Press, 2008), 289.

Part II

Determining Identity Constructions' Relationship to Turkish Foreign Policy Debates

Part I of this paper established the project's reasoning and method: the theoretical framework, the relevant literature in the fields of security studies and of Turkish identity, the rationale for studying discussions of Turkish foreign policy through newspaper articles and columns, and the techniques for decoding their language and structure to determine whether constructions of identity played a role in those foreign policy debates. Part II recounts the practice of these techniques, the analysis of the findings through the project's analytical framework, and the assessment of whether and for whom these findings matter.

This paper posits that just as Turkish domestic policy debates have been related to the competing secularist and Islamist constructions of Turkish national identity, competing European-oriented and Ottoman-oriented constructions of Turkish national identity have been related to Turkish foreign policy debates. In Part II, this paper will explore whether, how, and to what extent this is the case.

Part II, Chapter One

The Debate over EU Accession, 2000 – 2005

Turkey's formal acceptance as a candidate for European accession at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 was a sign of hope for Turkey, which had applied for membership in the European Economic Community forty years earlier.⁵³ However, Turkey's acceptance as a candidate state was not the culmination of its quest to orient the country toward the west; rather, it was the beginning of a new and more difficult stage in Turkey's relationship with Europe. Between Europe's acceptance of Turkey as a candidate state and the beginning of accession negotiations in 2005, Turkey debated and underwent several important political changes. These changes included the election of a moderate, reform-oriented Islamist political party as well as the debate over and passage of laws to increase freedom of speech, minority rights, and rule of law within Turkey. The Turkish government's, media's and public's opinions about these changes, and the language they used to explain those opinions, reveal some interesting conceptions of Turkish identity.

Turkey's Actors and Their Attitudes

Between 2000 and 2005, a large number of foreign policy stakeholders and their attitudes affected Turkey's policies and actions toward accession to the European Union. Before summarizing, analyzing, and explaining the findings of this research on the European Union issue, it will be useful to provide the reader with a concise explanation of the various stakeholders involved, along with their attitudes toward European accession and reform. In order to explain the variety of attitudes toward European accession and the relative power those ideas

⁵³ For a concise history of Turkey's involvement with the European Union and its predecessor organizations, see Ioannis N. Grigoraidis, "Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Debating the Most Difficult Enlargement Ever," *SAIS Review* 26, no. 1 (Winter – Spring 2006): 147 – 160.

held in Turkish society prior to November 2002, an explanation of the pre-November 2002 parties' positions is provided in table form below.

Table 1.1. Turkish Political Parties and Their Attitudes Toward EU Accession, 2000 – 2002

<u>Party Name</u>	<u>Position and Ideology</u>	<u>Attitude Toward EU</u>
Democratic Left Party (<i>Demokratik Sol Partisi</i> , or DSP)	lead member of ruling coalition, social democrats	Pro-EU, but needed to strike a balance between pro & anti stances of coalition partners
Motherland Party (<i>Anavatan Partisi</i> , or ANAP)	smaller member of ruling coalition, center-right party	Enthusiastic about EU membership, willing to make sweeping reforms
Nationalist Action Party (<i>Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi</i> , or MHP)	smallest member of ruling coalition, nationalist party	Did not want Turkey to increase minority rights and religious freedom to join EU
Virtue Party (<i>Fazilet Partisi</i> , or FP)	opposition, Islamist party	Did not approve of reforms for EU, wanted stronger relationship with Middle East
True Path Party (<i>Doğru Yol Partisi</i> , or DYP)	opposition, center-right party	Wanted EU membership, but did not approve of domestic reforms ⁵⁴

The discord between coalition parties before Turkey's elections in November 2002 led to a significant delay before the reforms were agreed upon and Turkey's membership negotiations could move forward.⁵⁵ The Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, or AKP),

⁵⁴ Information on political parties' views on EU membership was taken from a number of the articles studied, including "Turkish Officials on Abolishing Death Sentence," *Milliyet*, 6 July 2000; "Turkey to Take Part in EU Summit in Nice on 7 – 8 December," *Sabah*, 6 Dec 2000; and Muharrem Sarikaya, "Turkey: Pundit Foresees Early Elections If Coalition Parties Cannot Reach Consensus," *Hürriyet*, 28 February 2002; Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

⁵⁵ Although Turkey was accepted as a candidate state in December of 1999, membership negotiations over Turkey's adoption of the *acquis communautaire* did not commence until October of 2005. In contrast, Poland was accepted as an EU candidate in December of 1997, membership negotiations commenced in 1998, and Poland was admitted as a new member of the European Union in May of 2004. See BBC News, "Timeline: Turkey," British Broadcasting Corporation, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1023189.stm> (accessed 3 March 2009) and BBC News, "Timeline: Poland," British Broadcasting Corporation, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1054724.stm

whose single-party government was elected in November 2002, was in favor of Turkish accession to the European Union during the period examined in this study. For AKP, the political reforms requested by the EU would protect the moderately Islamist political party from closure threats from the military and secularist courts, and would establish the government's pro-western reputation to distinguish itself from previous Islamist parties in Turkey. However, AKP would also have to strike a balance between reforming the governmental structure to protect itself and keeping the anti-reform establishment satisfied enough not to launch a coup.

The Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, or CHP) was the main opposition party during AKP's rule. The CHP is the party that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk founded, and claims to be the party that most closely aligns with Kemalist principles. In accordance with the Kemalist principles of secularism and Western orientation, the CHP also supported Turkish membership in the European Union, and acted in concert with the AKP government during its early stages.⁵⁶ However, the CHP later became skeptical of the many reforms the European Union required Turkey to make, fearing that increased minority rights and freedom of expression might ultimately do the Republic more harm than good.

The military, which is considered the protector of the Turkish Republic and is a bastion of Kemalist principles, also initially came out in favor of Turkish accession to the EU. However, the military was concerned that joining the European Union would threaten Turkey's national security by granting too many rights to the Kurds and other minority groups. In 2000, then-Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt said "the path to Europe is the path

(accessed 3 March 2009). For more information on the European Council Summit in Luxembourg in December of 1997, see Council of the European Union, "Presidency Conclusions," European Council, http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/032a0008.htm (accessed 3 March 2009).

⁵⁶ Sami Kohen, "Turkish Columnist Welcomes AKP's Decision to Give Priority to EU Issues," *Milliyet*, 6 Nov 2002. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

of Atatürk,” but as he continued, he said that Turkey should join Europe “by preserving its unitary and secular structure.”⁵⁷ His comments reflected the views of both the CHP and the Turkish General Staff; General Büyükanıt meant that joining the European Union was the fulfillment of Atatürk’s wishes for Turkey to join the West, but it also meant that the principles of Kemalism were the only acceptable way to achieve European accession. In the name of Kemalism, then, the military came out against some of the EU’s proposed reforms, including the introduction of Kurdish broadcasts, provisions to protect freedom of expression, and civilian control of the military.

The Turkish military’s view mirrored that of the CHP; these and other proposed reforms would have damaged the “unitary state” that Atatürk had constructed and were therefore unacceptable. Increased linguistic rights for minority groups might have harmed the construction of Turkey’s civic identity, which was founded on a common language—Turkish. The Turkish military claims to be oriented toward the West, but in reality they are more committed to the vision Mustafa Kemal Atatürk articulated 70 years ago than to the standards of the Western world today.

Additionally, Turkey’s military took a particularly skeptical view toward reforms that would empower the Kurdish ethnic minority within Turkey. The Turkish General Staff chose to review every policy related to Southeastern Turkey because the military sees the predominantly Kurdish region as a security risk.⁵⁸ The Turkish military considered the Turkish identity to be mutually exclusive from the Kurdish identity; it may have been possible for an ethnic Kurd to become a Turk by adopting the Kemalist principles and speaking only Turkish, but it would be

⁵⁷ Hasan Cemal, “On the Speech of the Second Chief of General Staff,” *Milliyet*, 12 Oct 2000. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service’s World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

⁵⁸ For more on how the Turkish security establishment has treated Southeastern Turkey, see Philip Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2002), 172 – 181.

impossible for that Kurd to embrace Turkish society politically while still acknowledging and celebrating his or her Kurdish ancestry. From the military's point of view, even allowing Kurds to broadcast in their native language might threaten the "unitary integrity" of the Turkish Republic.⁵⁹ The thinking goes that Kurdish-language broadcasting would help the Kurds consolidate their language and culture, potentially helping them to consolidate politically and economically, and possibly helping them to form their own state or autonomous region in the future.⁶⁰

Turkish popular support for accession to the European Union showed a demonstrable decline over the five-year period covered by this study. The percentage of people in favor of Turkish accession declined every year after 2002. The percentage of people opposed to accession fluctuated between ten and twenty, while the percentage of people who did not know or were neutral on the issue increased from 21 percent to 30 percent, which reflects a growing level of uncertainty about the European Union as it catalyzed changes to the Turkish political system. The table on the next page shows the evolution of Turkish public opinion about EU membership.

⁵⁹ "Turkish Government, Military Views on Kurdish TV Examined," Fikret Bila, *Milliyet*, 16 Nov 2000. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

⁶⁰ Philip Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2002), 173.

Fig. 1.2. Turkish Public Opinion on EU Accession, 2000 – 2005 (all numbers are percentages)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Polling Organization</u>	<u>In favor</u>	<u>Opposed</u>	<u>Neutral/Not Sure</u>
2000	PIAR-Gallup	68.7	9.9	21.4 ⁶¹
2001	Eurobarometer	68	20	12 ⁶²
2002	Eurobarometer	71	18	11 ⁶³
2003	Eurobarometer	67	10	23 ⁶⁴
2004	Eurobarometer	62	12	26 ⁶⁵
2005	Eurobarometer	55	15	30 ⁶⁶

As is to be expected, each newspaper exhibited its own editorial slant on the issue of accession to the European Union. However, all three papers reflected the popular opinion during this period, with a majority of articles in each newspaper supporting EU accession and its attendant reforms. However, *Hürriyet* tended to post more articles that were critical both of the reform process and of its ultimate goal, accession, especially after the Justice and Development Party's election in November 2002. The articles in *Milliyet* tended to support the ultimate goal of European accession, but were more skeptical of several reforms that the EU wanted. Of all the

⁶¹ Sukru Eledag, "Attention Turned to Europe," *Milliyet*, 21 September 2000 Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce..

⁶² European Commission, *Applicant Countries Eurobarometer 2001: Results Summary* (Brussels: General Press and Communication Directorate, December 2001).
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/cceb/2001/aceb20011_summary.pdf.

⁶³ European Commission, *Applicant Countries Eurobarometer 2002: Highlights* (Brussels: General Press and Communication Directorate, November 2002).
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/cceb/2002/cceb_2002_highlights_en.pdf.

⁶⁴ European Commission, *Applicant Countries Eurobarometer 2003: Highlights and First Annexes* (Brussels: General Press and Communication Directorate, November 2003).
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/cceb/2003/cceb2003.4_first_annexes.pdf.

⁶⁵ European Commission, *Applicant Countries Eurobarometer 2004: Highlights* (Brussels: General Press and Communication Directorate, May 2004).
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/cceb/2004/cceb_2004.1_highlights.pdf.

⁶⁶ European Commission, *Eurobarometer 64 National Report, Autumn 2005*, "Executive Summary: Turkey" (Brussels, General Press and Communication Directorate, January 2006).
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_tk_exec.pdf.

newspapers, *Sabah*'s articles appeared to be most favorable toward European Union accession, and its articles tended to support in a more explicit fashion the domestic reform processes to reconcile Turkey's laws with the Copenhagen criteria for European accession.

Turkish Perspectives of Their Relationship with Europe

While different stakeholders and political actors had differing perspectives on EU accession and political reforms, they tended to look at the European Union through a few common lenses. Although each lens tended to be more prevalent among actors who were either for or against accession and reform, each way of looking at the European Union could have been plausible for those with a variety of legitimate positions, including both supporters and detractors of European accession and political reforms. By using discourse analysis on newspaper articles written about the processes of European accession, this research discovered several important structures that describe Turkish views of their relationship with the European Union.

The structure of an article detailing a European "donation," or "gift," to Turkey displayed one way in which Turks thought about the EU during this period.⁶⁷ In this structure, the European Union was constructed a group of benevolent outsiders bestowing a gift upon Turkey, their needy supplicant. This article accepted that Turkey was inferior to the European Union economically, and that Turkey needed help to get on the level of the EU, as evidenced by the use of the term "financial harmonization." Implying that Turkey needed help also shows that, in this conception, Europeanness is constructed as being superior, at least economically, to non-Europeanness. The structure and the specific terms used show that this article envisioned Turkey as a country associated with, but not part of, the European Union, akin to a younger stepsibling

⁶⁷ "Turkey Said to Receive \$300 Million in EU Aid," *Milliyet*, 29 March 2000. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

who needs to catch up. Turkey may not have been part of the EU at that point, but Europe had certain obligations to Turkey within the relationship this article described.

However, this relationship did open the possibility for Turkey to become part of the European Union at a later date, after significant reforms and developments, and once Turkey had “internalized the EU criteria,” and accepted Europe’s values as part of Turkey’s own identity.⁶⁸ This structure corresponded with the agreement that the European Union had made to accept Turkey as a candidate for membership a few months previously.⁶⁹ Other articles called for “comprehensive changes” to Turkey’s political system in order to bring Turkey up to Europe’s standards for freedom and rule of law.⁷⁰ Even the words “reform” and “development” suggest an improvement must occur, thereby implying that Europe is superior to non-Europe politically as well as economically. All in all, the overwhelming majority of articles examined took this view of European accession.

One view that is based in the same identity construction of superior Europe and inferior non-Europe, but taken from a different perspective, is the conception of a European Union that has high expectations for Turkey’s government and society, and which through its approval or disapproval of Turkey’s behavior may control that country’s future. Quotations from European officials reinforce the perception of this identity construction in Turkey when those officials use phrases like, “We expect Turkey to take positive steps,” or expressing hope that the Turkish

⁶⁸ Ilter Turkmen, “Columnist on Turkey’s Accession to the EU, Criticizes Bahceli’s Stand,” *Hürriyet*, 8 June 2002. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service’s World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

⁶⁹ “EU Giving \$300 Million Gift,” *Milliyet*, 29 March 2000. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service’s World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

⁷⁰ Sukru Eledag, “Poll Outcome on Turkey’s Accession to EU Viewed,” *Milliyet*, 21 Sept 2000. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service’s World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

government “behaves” according to the proposals issued by the European Union.⁷¹ In an interview with *Milliyet*, Prime Minister Wim Kok of the Netherlands said, “If Turkey wants to become a respected country in the world, it must adopt democracy and respect human rights, including the rights of minorities.”⁷² This article appears to conflate membership in the European Union with international respectability, imposing another positive value judgment on European identity. Another article with this perspective reports that members of the European Union think “Turkey should win over Europeans’ support for its EU membership.” The rest of this article listed several other demands that the European Union asked of Turkey, reinforcing the impression that Europe has high expectations of Turkey that must be met in order for Turkey to gain EU membership.⁷³

Another way of looking at the European Union is also common in these articles: many of the articles display the European Union as an outside force that lacks legitimate power over Turkey, but nonetheless wants to change the way that Turkey operates. These articles do not necessarily construct Europe as inferior to Turkey, but they tend to argue that European values and norms do not or should not apply in Turkey’s case. An article in *Hürriyet* characterizes the list of needed reforms as a “wish list,” a term implying that those wishes may not come true, and also calls the proposals “interesting and controversial,” displaying skepticism about the Turkish Parliament’s willingness and ability to pass the reforms.⁷⁴ Another article from *Hürriyet* calls

⁷¹ Guven Ozalp, “EU: We Did Not Say Kurd, We Did Not Give Any Draft Plan,” *Milliyet*, 20 July 2000. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service’s World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

⁷² Ferai Tinc, “Turkey: Netherlands Prime Minister Kok Interviewed,” *Milliyet*, 21 October 2000. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service’s World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

⁷³ Zeynel Lule, “Three Conditions for EU Membership,” *Hürriyet*, 21 September 2000. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service’s World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

⁷⁴ Nuray Babacan, “EU Report for Parliament,” *Hürriyet*, 1 June 2000. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service’s World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

Mesut Yilmaz, leader of the Motherland Party and a strong supporter of European accession, “the most leading subcontractor the EU has in Turkey,” implying that Mr. Yilmaz would gain personally from EU accession and did not necessarily believe that joining the European Union was best for Turkey.⁷⁵ Finally, when the EU asked Turkey to issue visas to tourists from Arab countries, representatives from Turkish tourism boards reacted sharply, saying “The EU does not bring any blessings to us, but it is asking us to take the pains (to introduce the necessary laws).”⁷⁶

The final construction of Turkish identity vis-à-vis the European Union found in these articles was one that perceived Turkey as a perpetual outsider to the European Union. Some articles that espoused this view identified Turkey as a Muslim country, blaming Europe’s high standards for EU membership on European countries’ reluctance to allow a non-Christian country to join. One article stated as early as 2000, “the Vatican wants only crosses to appear on Europe’s map; it does not want to see any crescents.”⁷⁷ Other articles that portrayed Turkey as an EU outsider had to do with the Cyprus issue; in a 2001 article on this topic, Foreign Minister Ismail Cem said, “Turkey will fulfill its responsibilities up until their final point if the Greek Cypriot side joins the EU. Turkey can use the trump cards it holds, including annexation.”⁷⁸ The construction of Turkey as a perpetual outsider—one that has no hope of joining Europe, no matter what reforms Turkey passes—constructs the European identity as mutually exclusive from the Turkish identity. It posits, then, that Turkey should not try to become European, but

⁷⁵ Emin Colasan, “Turkey: Columnist Blasts Politicians’ Silence on EU, Demands Answers From Yilmaz,” *Hürriyet*, 1 June 2002. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service’s World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

⁷⁶ “Turkey’s Tour Operators Rap Government Decision to Impose Visas on Arab Tourists,” *Hürriyet*, 23 August 2002. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service’s World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

⁷⁷ Gungor Mengi, “Vatican Said Trying to Block Turkey’s Entry into EU,” *Sabah*, 24 Nov 2000. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service’s World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

⁷⁸ “Turkey’s Cem Warns Against Cyprus’ Accession to the EU,” *Hürriyet*, 24 Nov 2001. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service’s World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

should strike its own path. Most importantly, this relationship of this identity construction to Turkey's Islamic character leaves open the possibility of aligning Turkey more closely with the Middle East.

Perhaps the best example of Turkey's struggle to negotiate its identity in relation to the poles of Europe and the Middle East is the role of the Kurds, Turkey's largest minority group, in the EU accession process. As stated previously, the Turkish security establishment was wary of granting the Kurds full cultural rights, like the right to broadcast in Kurdish. Meanwhile, the European Union required that Turkey enter a dialogue with the PKK and grant minority groups additional rights under the Copenhagen political criteria for accession.⁷⁹ In this situation, Turkish policymakers and journalists attempted to negotiate the European Union's requirements and the perceived Kurdish security threat coming from the Southeast. Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the Nationalist Action Party, said in an interview, "As we are continuing to make efforts . . . to ensure that universal values are upheld in Turkey, some circles are displaying attitudes which overlap with the PKK's objectives. If we fail to notice the critical line here, we would [sic] not be able to safeguard our historical heritage."⁸⁰ The structure of an article that was published in *Milliyet* in September 2002 showed that they thought many people were wary of granting the right to education in Kurdish; the article appeared in the form of five questions and answers about the new laws for Kurdish-language classes. By displaying the uncertainty of questions alongside the certainty of their attendant answers, this article established the reality of the European reforms while acknowledging

⁷⁹ The accession criteria, agreed upon at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, outline the requirements for a candidate state to join the EU. In order to begin accession negotiations, a candidate state must satisfy the political criteria, which include "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities." See European Commission, "Accession criteria (Copenhagen criteria)," http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhagen_en.htm (accessed 26 April 2009).

⁸⁰ Yavuz Donat, "Turkey's Bahçeli on Death Penalty, PK, Relations With EU, Election Law," *Sabah*, 22 Feb 2002. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

The Justice and Development Party victory in the November 2002 elections, which won them an outright majority, created a new kind of rhetoric around political reform and EU accession. This new discourse framed Turkey's move toward Europe as a model for Middle Eastern countries, which suggested that Turkey's European-oriented and its former Ottoman identities were not mutually exclusive, and that Turkish policymakers could successfully construct Turkey as both a European and a Middle Eastern country. Just a few days after his party's election, Tayyip Erdogan "underscored that Turkey's success in this process would set an example for other Muslim peoples and prove that Islam and democracy can live together in an administration that is transparent and compliant with the world."⁸¹ This was a statement of Turkey's aspirations toward both membership in Europe and leadership in the Middle East, but it was also a demonstration that the Justice and Development Party, though thought of as an Islamist party, would stay committed to the EU accession process.

Examining different Turkish stakeholders' opinions on accession to the European Union, as well as the lenses through which those stakeholders viewed their relationships to the European Union, is an effective way to discover the identity frames of these stakeholders. Analyzing the way in which Turkish people view themselves in relation to Europe may help to discover whether they feel more drawn to the European or the Ottoman pole. Naturally, the Turkish population is not monolithic; not all Turks will have the same conception of Turkish identity, and some identity constructions will evolve over time.

⁸¹ "Turkey: Erdogan Seen Pledges Rapid Reforms on EU Matters, Foundations, Politics," *Sabah*, 8 Nov 2002. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

Assessing the Role of Identity in the Case of EU Accession

When policymakers, journalists, and the public form their opinions, identity is only one factor out of many that comes into consideration. Other issues that can affect political decisions include ideologies, economic conditions, geopolitical strategies, and domestic political situations. In order to discover whether constructions of Turkish identity affected policy- and opinion makers' positions on accession to the European Union, then, it is important to consider identity frames against all of the other considerations.

However, in addition to being intrinsic reasons for Turkey to take a certain position, identity frames proved to be important for policy- and opinionmakers as they constructed Turkey's various options and determined the salience of the economic and political factors. When the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TUSIAD), for instance, argued for reform and European accession, they employed an economic argument within the first identity frame discussed in this chapter—that Turkey is not yet worth the European Union and should improve:

Would you prefer a prosperous Turkey upholding highest political and democratic principles and a with sound economy, which provides modern education and employment for its young people, and is on a par with the industrialized countries, or a Turkey which regularly goes through economic shocks and whose future hangs in the balance due to its unstable political system and is condemned to a national income of \$2,000 per capita?⁸²

TUSIAD wants Turkey to be “on a par with the industrialized countries,” and judges poorer countries as “condemned.” TUSIAD appears to believe that economic growth is the criterion for becoming more European, but also defines Europeanness as superior to non-Europeanness, as the first identity construction in this case does.

⁸² “Turkey: Businessmen’s Call for Acceleration of EU Accession Process Highlighted,” *Hürriyet*, 29 May 2002. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service’s World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

In the newspaper articles examined for this case, Turkish opinionmakers were found to use the language of identity in their justifications for support—or lack of support—for European Union membership. However, identity was not present solely in language; it also appeared in the structure of the newspaper articles. Identity constructions, then, were not simply explicit arguments for or against a specific result. Rather, constructions of Turkish identity helped to frame the problem of membership in the European Union and suggest possible solutions for that problem.

Part II, Chapter Two

The Debate over Involvement in Iraq, 2002 – 2003

At the midpoint of Turkey's journey from acceptance as a candidate for European Union accession to the commencement of accession negotiations, a series of world events changed the international landscape: the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, NATO's mission in Afghanistan, and the United States' determination to wage pre-emptive war against Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. These events made Turkey's geographic position between Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia more important than ever to the European Union and the United States.

When the United States requested that Turkey support their invasion of Iraq, they forced Turkey to decide between two western allies, as well as between an explicit foreign policy alignment with Europe and an increased involvement in the Middle East. Furthermore, in asking Turkey to help destabilize its own neighborhood and change its relationship with Saddam Hussein's regime, the United States brought another dimension of Turkey's former Ottoman identity into consideration for Turkish foreign policy.

Turkey's Actors and Their Attitudes

It is more difficult to examine the attitudes of Turkish actors during the debate about the Iraq conflict than to examine their beliefs about the EU accession process, since EU accession was (and still is) a long, drawn-out process, whereas the decisions surrounding the United States' conflict with Iraq were made in a matter of months. However, nearly all the same actors were involved in the debate over the conflict in Iraq as in the debate on European Union accession—although the Turkish General Staff was more openly involved with decisions on the Iraq

conflict—and policy- and opinion makers had to take similar factors into account when deciding on their positions for each of the situations.

After the dissolution of Turkey's ruling coalition caused the government to hold early elections, the failing Turkish economy took a toll on DSP, the party of Prime Minister Ecevit. Since Democratic Left Party was voted out of Parliament before the United States' plans for invasion were finalized, its government was never forced to take a position on the war in Iraq. On 3 November 2002, Turkey's election ushered the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, into power, and DSP failed to win enough votes to retain even a single seat in Parliament. The electoral campaign paid almost no attention to Turkey's role in the potential conflict with Iraq, or even to the Kurdish dimension of the problem, as "the distinctive themes of the 2002 election... were society and its prosperity rather than the state and its security."⁸³ In its party program, AKP committed itself to maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity and following all UN decisions. The Republican People's Party established its commitment to international cooperation and a peaceful process during the campaign, and maintained that stance after the elections.⁸⁴ Neither party made a definitive statement for or against the United States' actions, since it had not yet been made public if—or when—the United States would invade.

After the election and a period of intense negotiations with the United States and intense debate within Turkey, the Justice and Development Party leadership came out in favor of supporting the United States in Iraq in late December, 2002. However, it proved difficult and ultimately impossible for the governing party's leadership to turn public opinion in support of the war and enforce the pro-war position with their parliamentarians. As early as December 2002, it

⁸³ Ziya Onis and Emin. Fuat Keyman, "Turkey at the Polls: A New Path Emerges," *Journal of Democracy* 14 no. 2 (April 2003): 97. Accessed through Project Muse at American University Library, 7 Dec 2008.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

was clear that many AKP parliamentarians did not want to support the war.⁸⁵ Ultimately, several of the Justice and Development Party's parliamentarians voted against supporting the American invasion of Iraq, joining many members of the Republican People's Party, which was the Justice and Development Party's main opposition in Parliament, against the war. The Turkish Grand National Assembly denied the United States use of Turkish ports and military bases, preventing the Americans from opening a northern front in their invasion of Iraq.

The Turkish military deals with every issue related to Southeastern Turkey, through the National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Konseyi*, or MGK). They have chosen to review all these policies because the military sees this predominantly Kurdish region as a security risk. The actions of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (*Partiya Karakeren Kurdistan*, or PKK), a terrorist organization that has conducted dozens of attacks on Turkey in past years, legitimize the Turkish military's concerns about the region's security. In the military's view, it was in Turkey's interest to gain as much influence as possible over Northern Iraq, where the military suspected the Kurdish, who had de facto control over the region, had been harboring PKK terrorists and enabling them to attack Turkey. The Turkish military wanted the United States to guarantee a unitary state, rather than a federation, for post-Saddam Iraq, because a strong Iraqi central government would be less likely to allow the PKK a refuge in Northern Iraq.⁸⁶ Because of these misgivings, the Turkish General Staff, which was perceived as the most legitimate authority on national security issues, and which the United States could usually count on in military matters,

⁸⁵ Muharrem Sarikaya, "Turkey: Iraq Issue Seen as Fracture Point Within AKP Parliament Group," *Sabah*, 22 Dec 2002. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

⁸⁶ Tufan Turenc, "Ret. General Bir: Turkey Must Seek Guarantees Before Joining Iraq War," *Hürriyet*, 25 Dec 2002. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

made only a tentative statement supporting the American plan.⁸⁷ That statement did not provide adequate political cover for the Turkish parliamentarians to openly defy their constituents' wishes, so the politicians were much more likely to be swayed by the prevailing winds of Turkey's public opinion.

By late 2002, as it became clear that the United States was intent on forcing out Saddam Hussein's regime, Turkish public opinion was firmly against the United States' potential invasion in Iraq. In late January 2003, protesters staged simultaneous demonstrations against Turkish involvement in the war at Beyazit Square in Istanbul and a United Nations building in Ankara.⁸⁸ A public opinion survey conducted in early 2003 found that only 12 percent of Turks supported the American war in Iraq, and the same small number had a favorable view of the United States. Furthermore, according to the same poll, 60 percent of Turks believed that the United States would go to war against Iraq as part of a war against Muslim nations, while only 22 percent of Turks believed that Saddam Hussein was a threat to stability in the Middle East.⁸⁹ It is clear that Turkish public opinion was strongly against the war in Iraq, and it can be inferred that the Turkish public did not want their country's territory or military resources to aid in the United States' invasion.

Of course, each of the Turkish newspapers examined had its own editorial slant on the prospect of war with Iraq. Articles in *Hürriyet* tended to explore or explain issues of security; they provided nearly all of the coverage of Turkish military maneuvers in the articles studied and

⁸⁷ William Hale, *Turkey, the US, and Iraq*, (London: SAQI and the London Middle East Institute at SOAS, 2007), 106.

⁸⁸ "Istanbul: Demonstrators Protest the War in Iraq," *Anatolia News Service*, 26 Jan 2003; "Ankara: Antiwar Protesters Gather at a UN Building," *Anatolia News Service*, 26 Jan 2003. Both articles were translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce; however, they were used as background research only and were not part of the data set analyzed for this study.

⁸⁹ The Pew Global Attitudes Project, "American's Image Further Erodes, Europeans Want Weaker Ties," The Pew Research Center for People and the Press, 18 March 2003. Available online at <http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/175.pdf>.

also had several interviews with high-level Turkish military officials.⁹⁰ By comparison, articles in *Sabah* tended to place more emphasis on the United States and analyzing what American actions would mean for Turkey.⁹¹ *Milliyet* tended to be more outwardly negative about the war than the other two newspapers; many of its articles focused on the economic results of a possible war, which the newspaper predicted would be disastrous for Turkey.⁹²

The slant was apparent not only in the types of stories the newspapers tended to publish on the issue, but also in the differing words the papers used to describe certain aspects of Turkey's interaction with the United States. For example, *Hürriyet* and *Sabah* tended to use the word "requests" to describe what the United States wanted from Turkey, while *Milliyet* tended to use the word "demands."⁹³ While there was some variation in the positions of each newspaper as the American invasion of Iraq evolved from a possibility to a certainty, there was enough consistency in the language and structure choices of each newspaper to be considered an editorial slant on the issue.

⁹⁰ "Secret Talks Reported Between Turkish, US Officials On Missile Shield Project," *Hürriyet*, 31 July 2002; Muammer Elveren and Ugur Yazgan, "Turkish Daily Highlights Army Commander's Visit to Jordan," *Hürriyet*, 7 Feb 2003; Tufan Turenc, "Ret. General Bir: Turkey Must Seek Guarantees Before Joining Iraq War," *Hürriyet*, 25 Dec 2002. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

⁹¹ Sedat Sertoglu, "Turkey: 'Beltway Team' Says US Ambassador Pearson May Be Recalled To Washington," *Sabah*, 18 Aug 2002; Mehmet Cetingulec, "Turkey: PM Bulent Ecevit Says US Engaged in 'Psychological Warfare' Against Iraq," *Sabah*, 23 Oct 2002; Fatih Erturk and Zubeyde Yalcin, "Turkish Daily Highlights General's Briefing on Iraq, U.S. Requests," *Sabah*, 7 Jan 2003. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

⁹² Mert Ilkutlug and Nedim Sener, "Impact of Military Operation Against Iraq on Turkey's Economy Viewed," *Milliyet*, 9 Feb 2002; Sami Kohen, "Turkish Govt Against Iraqi Operation Due To Political, Economic Results of War," 2 Oct 2002; Hursit Gunes, "Columnist Views Impact of Possible War on Turkish Economy," *Milliyet*, 8 Jan 2003. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

⁹³ See "Turkey: Ecevit Said Discussed UN Inspectors' Entry Into Iraq With President Bush," *Hürriyet*, 20 Jan 2002; "Cheney Request to See Kivrikoglu Said Bid To See If Army, Govt Differ On Iraq," *Hürriyet*, 20 March 2002; Hale Gonultas, "Turkey's Sezer Said To Chair Summit To Discuss U.S. Request to Use Military Bases," *Sabah*, 16 October 2002; Ayhan Demir, "Turkey: Foreign Affairs Commission Briefed On Iraq, Tuzmen's Trip Cautioned," *Milliyet*, 7 Jan 2003; Derya Sazak, "Turkish Envoy In U.S. Discusses Iraq, Bilateral Relations In Interview," *Milliyet*, 10 Feb 2003. All articles translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

Turkish Perspectives on Their Relationship with the United States

The dominant Turkish sentiment towards the United States during the lead-up to the Iraq war was anti-American. This was in part related to disappointment with George W. Bush, the United States' president at the time, but the sentiment was rooted in a perception that the Turkish-American relationship was unfair to Turkey. O. Faruk Loğoğlu, a former Turkish ambassador to the United States, explained this perception to the United States military's Strategic Studies Institute, saying "U.S. demands and expectations from Turkey are presented as if they are sacrosanct while Turkish needs and priorities are treated by the United States as only one small voice in a chorus of importunate petitioners."⁹⁴ This perception bred resentment among both Turkish security elites and among the general Turkish population, who felt that if they agreed to the United States' requests, they would be sacrificing their own interests to help the United States without receiving much help in return. When the United States requested that Turkish soldiers serving in Northern Iraq be put under American military command, the Turkish Army put out a statement saying, "Turkish soldiers are not Gurkhas," meaning that Turkey was a sovereign nation and would not simply lend its soldiers to the United States Army outside of an internationally recognized mission.⁹⁵ This statement vividly illustrates how Turkey constructs its identity toward the United States: as a perennially put-upon servant-state that must bow to the demands of its American masters.

⁹⁴ O. Faruk Loğoğlu, "The State of U.S. – Turkey Relations: A Turkish Perspective," in *The Evolution of U.S. – Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context: A Colloquium Report*, ed. Frances G. Burwell, U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=861> (Accessed 9 Dec 2008), 32.

⁹⁵ The Gurkhas are a people from Nepal; during the British Empire's rule over India, the Gurkhas served as mercenaries for the British and were later incorporated into the British Army. Fikret Bila, "Turkey's Military Said Want No Action by Ankara Until Memorandum With U.S. Signed," *Milliyet*, 10 Feb 2003. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

Many of those who discouraged Turkey from participating in the United States' invasion of Iraq framed the problem in these transactional terms, arguing that Turkey would not ultimately benefit from its sacrifices for the United States—and implying that Turkey deserved or expected such a benefit. Newspaper columns and some straight news articles corroborated this transactional view. One article from *Milliyet* in December 2002 discussed the war's probable economic effects on Turkey, outlining the specific costs of Turkey being “seen as a nation at war.” The article estimated that the invasion could have cost Turkey up to 70 billion US dollars.⁹⁶ In return, as another *Milliyet* article states, the Turkish government expected financial aid from the United States and American support for Turkey's bid to join the European Union in return for supporting the United States' invasion of Iraq.⁹⁷

The Kurdish Democratic Party, a minor Turkish political party that was strongly against Turkish support of the American invasion, believed that occupation of Northern Iraq would be Turkey's price for helping the United States, saying, “Turkey is playing the role of an expensive hooker . . . the Turks are insisting on entering (northern Iraq).”⁹⁸ Although the Turkish security establishment certainly wished to gain influence in northern Iraq if Turkey helped the United States invade Iraq, they were skeptical regarding how much financial and political support

⁹⁶ “Two Scenarios Giving Turkey's Probable Economic Losses In Operation Against Iraq,” Seckin Urey, *Milliyet*, 26 Dec 2002. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

⁹⁷ “Columnist Views Impact of Possible War on Turkish Economy,” Hursit Gunes, *Milliyet*, 8 Jan 2003. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

⁹⁸ Ihsan Dortkardes and Faruk Balikci, “Website Close to KDP Seen ‘Insulting’ Turkey With Comments on Relations With U.S.,” *Hürriyet*, 25 Feb 2003. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

Turkey could expect from the United States, especially given Turkey's disappointment after sacrificing economically to support the Americans during the first Gulf War.⁹⁹

Those in favor of supporting the United States' invasion of Iraq often framed their argument in transactional terms, as well. In an article opposing the war, a columnist for *Milliyet* said that "getting a 10:1 return on our investment" was a primary reason why some people supported the war. Although many were skeptical about the United States' willingness to agree to Turkey's "red lines" in the negotiations, a few columnists thought that the United States would grant Turkey certain considerations regarding Northern Iraq if Turkey agreed to help the American invasion. These considerations might have included profit-sharing from the oil fields in Northern Iraq, agreement to Turkey's conditions regarding the political, military, and economic status of the Kurds, and additional protections for the Turkomans. One article from September 2002 stated, ". . . Turkey cannot help but get embroiled in developments when America does strike. . . . Ankara is aware that staying out of things too much is also risky for Turkey."¹⁰⁰ An opinion piece from the same week said, "It appears that Ankara believes that the cost of remaining outside of an intervention would be even greater for Turkey. . . . Turkey would also be deprived from the opportunities of being able to exert its influence."¹⁰¹ The articles cited never suggest, however, that Turkey should get involved with the Americans' conflict in Iraq. They only assert that the Turkish government thinks this way.

⁹⁹ "Ret. General Bir: Turkey Must Seek Guarantees Before Joining Iraq War," Tufan Turenc, *Hürriyet*, 25 Dec 2002. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

¹⁰⁰ Hasan Cemal, "Turkey Urged to Consider Accepting Federation in N. Iraq," *Milliyet*, 28 Sept 2002. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

¹⁰¹ Sami Kohen, "Turkish Govt Against Iraqi Operation Due To Political, Economic Costs of War," *Milliyet*, 2 Oct 2002. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

Turkish Perspectives of Their Relationship with Saddam Hussein's Iraq

In the view of Abdullah Gül, Turkey's former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and its current President, Turkey holds a special position in the Middle East as "one of the leading countries in the region."¹⁰² Turkey is not an Arab state like most of its neighbors to the south, so its position as a "leading country" in the Middle East is not based on common ethnicity. For a variety of reasons, however, Turkey believed it could influence Saddam Hussein to cooperate with the international community. In an interview with *Milliyet*, Turkish Ambassador to the United States Faruk Logoglu said, "All avenues of peaceful resolution must be explored until the last minute. . . . Turkey is doing more than anyone else."¹⁰³

As early as January of 2002, Turkey's Minister of Foreign Affairs called on his counterpart in Saddam's regime to allow weapons inspectors from the United Nations enter Iraq, and to "make socioeconomic investments instead of making weapons" in order to "increase Iraq's prestige in the world."¹⁰⁴ This statement draws interesting comparisons to those made by European leaders about Turkey's accession to the European Union—the words in both cases seemed to condescend to the party addressed. On EU accession, European leaders talked to Turkey, while Turkey, in turn, talked to Iraq about the need for peace. This arrangement implies that Turkey constructed itself in a sort of regional hierarchy, with Europe at the top of the ladder in terms of political and economic development, the Middle East (or at least Iraq) at the bottom of that ladder, and Turkey in the middle. Turkey attempted to use its middle position to liaise

¹⁰² Taha Akyol, "Turkish Daily Interviews PM on Iraq, Sees 'Cautious, Prudent' Approach," *Milliyet*, 28 Dec 2002. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

¹⁰³ Derya Sazak, "Turkish Envoy in U.S. Discusses Iraq, Bilateral Relations in Interview," *Milliyet*, 10 Feb 2003. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

¹⁰⁴ "Turkey: Ecevit Said Discussed UN Inspectors' Entry Into Iraq With President Bush," *Hürriyet*, 20 Jan 2002. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

between the West and the Middle East, calling a conference of Middle Eastern countries to encourage Saddam Hussein to “move irreversibly and sincerely towards assuming their responsibilities in restoring peace and stability in the region” and allow weapons inspectors even as late as January 2003.¹⁰⁵ Although little came of this effort, it shows that the Turkish government was willing to act on its construction of Turkey’s identity in relation to both Europe and the Middle East, and that the government used those identities as a framework for public justification for its actions.

Turkish Perspectives of Their Relationship with the Kurds

Turkey has historically felt threatened by the Kurds, an ethnic minority group that lives in Southeastern Turkey, parts of Syria and Iran, and Northern Iraq. Since the mid-1980’s, the PKK, a Kurdish terrorist group, has attacked Turkish political, military, and civilian targets with the goal of Kurdish autonomy. The first Gulf War drove thousands of Kurdish refugees into Southeastern Turkey and created a de facto Kurdish autonomous region in Northern Iraq, since the no-fly zone kept Saddam Hussein from exerting power over the area.¹⁰⁶ These developments were associated with an increase in terrorist attacks, leading Turkey to believe that the Kurdish region in Northern Iraq was harboring the PKK. For this reason, Turkey was wary of the Kurds gaining any military, political or economic power in the conflict over Iraq.

The Turks’ concerns led them to develop several “red lines” in their negotiations with the United States on the prospective invasion. The Turkish military establishment was especially firm on these points, because they saw an empowered Kurdish region in Northern Iraq as a security threat to Turkey. The Turks did not want the United States to arm the Northern Iraqi

¹⁰⁵ William Hale, *Turkey, the US, and Iraq*, (London: SAQI and the London Middle East Institute at SOAS, 2007), 104.

¹⁰⁶ Murat Somer, “Resurgence and Remaking of Identity: Civil Beliefs, Domestic and External Dynamics, and the Turkish Mainstream Discourse on Kurds,” *Comparative Political Studies* 38 (2005): 591 – 622.

Kurds and turn them into an ally, as they did with the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, for fear that those weapons could find themselves in the hands of anti-Turkey organizations like the PKK. Furthermore, Turkey advocated that Iraq remain a unitary state with a strong central government that would keep the Kurds in line, rather than become a federation divided among ethnic lines, so the central government could maintain some control over the northern region of the country. Finally, Turkey wanted to ensure that the Kurds did not gain economic power by profiting disproportionately from the oil-rich areas around Kirkuk and Mosul.¹⁰⁷

The Turkomans' Ethnic Relationship to Turkey

Turkey was cautious about letting the Kurds gain more power in Northern Iraq for another reason, as well. Turkey also wished to protect the Turkomans, a minority group in Northern Iraq that shares linguistic ties to the Turks. According to *Hürriyet*'s Sedat Ergin, the Turkish Foreign Ministry believed the Turkomans to be "of the same race with the Turks," indicating that Turks believe their linguistic ties to the Turkomans are also ethnic ties.¹⁰⁸ Those ties appear to complicate the role of ethnicity in Turkish national identity, asserting that Turkishness may have an ethnic, as well as civic, component. As shown before, Turks do not explicitly construct their national identity in ethnic terms, but that has not stopped Turkish policymakers from aiding an ethnic group in Iraq that they believe has historical ties to the majority of Turkish people. A *Hürriyet* column called the Turkomans "our kinsmen" and

¹⁰⁷ Sukru Eledag, "He Who Does Not Have a Track in the Field, Cannot Have a Say in the Thrashing," *Sabah* (Istanbul edition), 15 October 2001. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce. See also United States Institute of Peace, "Turkey and Iraq: The Perils (and Prospects) of Proximity," by Henri J. Barkey. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 2005, <http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS104256> (accessed 13 December 2008).

¹⁰⁸ Sedat Ergin, "Turkey: Foreign Minister Yakis Interviewed On US Operation Against Iraq, Cyprus," *Hürriyet*, 6 Jan 2003. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

regretted “the inclination to exclude them from the system in the area.”¹⁰⁹ In addition, Faruk Logoglu advocated for giving “the Turkomans an equal say in the future structure of Iraq.”¹¹⁰

Aside from the two groups’ ethnic ties, Turkey has been especially attentive to the Turkomans because both groups feel threatened by increased autonomy of the Kurds in Northern Iraq: Turkey because of PKK terrorism, and the Turkomans because of worries the Kurds will persecute them for their Turkic identity. This indicates that Turkey may construct itself as aligned with the Turkomans not just for ethnic reasons, but also because the two groups are both concerned about the Kurds. The Turks’ perceived affinity for the Turkomans, and the two groups’ shared distrust of the Kurds, led Turkey to push the United States for guarantees in the region, including cultural rights and political and economic advantages for the Turkomans. The wish to pursue a pro-Turkoman policy was another reason some Turkish opinionmakers gave to support the United States’ invasion. If Turkey refused to help the United States, they reasoned, Turkey would likely have little say in the Turkomans’ future.

Assessing the Role of Identity in this Case

Identity frames were, of course, not the only factor discussed as Turkish politicians, reporters, public officials, and columnists weighed Turkey’s possible roles in the Iraq conflict. Considerations like the economy, geopolitics, and domestic political rivalries also played a role in the discussions. However, in addition to being intrinsic reasons for Turkey to take a certain position, identity frames proved to be important for policy- and opinionmakers as they

¹⁰⁹ Emin Colasan, “Columnist Criticizes Turkey’s Talks With U.S. On War, Views Authorization Bill,” *Hürriyet*, 1 March 2003. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service’s World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

¹¹⁰ Derya Sazak, “Turkish Envoy in U.S. Discusses Iraq, Bilateral Relations in Interview,” *Milliyet*, 10 Feb 2003. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service’s World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

constructed Turkey's various options and determined the salience of the economic and political factors. In a *Sabah* column that discussed the importance of domestic politics in the decision to support the United States' invasion of Iraq, the importance of Islamic identity in Turkish society is contrasted with the geostrategic need to support the Americans. The article presents a problem, which is that the Justice and Development Party will have difficulties in getting its parliamentarians to support the United States' request for use of Turkish bases. The solution set forth in the article is to "secure support from the *other* Islamic countries for the operation in Iraq (emphasis added)." This implies that Turkey itself is an Islamic country, whose citizens will not tolerate the war if the impression is that "they are having Muslims attacked and killed by heathens."¹¹¹ Here, the identity given is that Turkey is a Muslim country, and the norm to be followed is that Muslim countries support each other against "heathens." Even in an article that focuses on the role of domestic politics in Turkish foreign policy, identity frames permeate the news story's language and structure. All in all, it is fair to say that Turkish politicians, journalists, and others used identity frames, as demonstrated through the language and structure of their discourse, to define problems and propose solutions for Turkey's involvement in the American invasion of Iraq.

Views of European Accession before and after Iraq

Before the United States started its international diplomatic campaign against Iraq in 2002, most Turkish citizens supported accession to the European Union. By the time major combat operations had ended in 2003, interest in joining Europe had flagged somewhat and would continue to decline. This development surprised some Turkish commentators, who had

¹¹¹ Muharrem Sarikaya, "Turkey: Iraq Issue Seen as Fracture Point Within AKP Parliament Group," *Sabah*, 22 Dec 2002. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

seen Turkey's opposition to war with Iraq as an opportunity for the country to distance itself from the United States and align itself more closely with the European Union in foreign policy matters, perhaps smoothing the road to membership in the EU. As Sami Kohen, one of the foremost Turkish columnists on the subject of foreign policy, wrote in January 2003,

Naturally, Turkey has to act more carefully due to its sensitive position and its strategic relations with the United States. However, this does not constitute an obstacle before Turkey in maintaining close relations with the EU in this field. On the contrary, this would strengthen the front against war on Iraq even further. Moreover, this would also facilitate a rapprochement between Turkey and the EU.¹¹²

Another *Milliyet* columnist agreed with this assessment in May of 2003, writing, "Up to the Copenhagen Summit of December 12 [2002] Turkey was seen as the 'Trojan horse' of the United States in the Middle East. Now, because of Ankara's policy on Iraq, the EU is more warmly disposed toward Turkey."¹¹³ As Turkey rejected the United States' position on the war in Iraq, political commentators believed that moving away from the Americans would help Turkey move closer to the Europeans.

However, Turkey's anti-war stance aligned with the views of people all over the world, not just in Europe, and particularly with those in many Middle Eastern nations. For example, Egypt and Jordan, like the Turks, were concerned about how an American invasion in Iraq would affect regional stability. As noted in the section about Turkey's relationship with Saddam Hussein's regime, the Turkish government and the governments of other countries in the Middle East pursued a diplomatic strategy to encourage Iraq to accept weapons inspectors. In its anti-war efforts, then, the Turkish government aligned itself with the European Union in sentiment

¹¹² Sami Kohen, "Milliyet Writer Calls on Turkey To Cooperate With EU To Prevent War on Iraq," *Milliyet*, 24 January 2003. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

¹¹³ Derya Sazak, "London Institute Report On Possible 'Military Coup' In Turkey Viewed," *Milliyet*, 15 May 2003. Translated into English and accessed through the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's World News Connection, United States Department of Commerce.

but with the Middle East in both sentiment and action, and Turkey's foreign policy on this issue ultimately brought Turkey no closer to membership in the European Union. Despite the government's actions, though, newspapers in Turkey nevertheless predicted that their country's anti-war stance would align them more closely with Europe.

Part II, Chapter Three

Conclusions

Turkey's current national identity crisis has influenced the country's debate over domestic policies like the issue of whether women should be able to wear headscarves in universities and public buildings. The competing identities within Turkey have also affected the domestic political landscape, creating volatility between secular and Islamist political parties. This project sought to determine whether the country's competing national identities have influenced Turkey's discussions on security policy, as well. Specifically, this project set out to discover whether and how, if at all, Turkish politicians, journalists, columnists, and public officials employed their identity frames to discuss, discourage, or advocate for certain foreign policy decisions in public discourse.

By employing discourse analysis of the structures and language embedded in articles from three mainstream, wide-circulation Turkish newspapers, this project has attempted to discover whether and to what extent contentious constructions of Turkish national identity and their attendant cultural norms affected decisions on and justifications for Turkish security policy in recent history. The articles examined for this study covered two important events for Turkey's foreign relations in the post-Cold War era. These included Turkey's reform process and diplomacy toward beginning accession negotiations with the European Union, as well as the intense period of bargaining with the United States just before their invasion of Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

Summary of Findings

In both of the cases examined here, the language of identity was found to be used when politicians, columnists, journalists, and other public figures discussed Turkey's foreign policy. Given the how clearly Turkish media uses the language of identity in its domestic policy debates, however, it was surprising how rarely the language of identity was used overtly when discussing foreign policy. In the case of accession to the European Union, competing conceptions of Turkish national identity appeared to prescribe certain policy positions. In articles where Turkey was constructed as an inferior to Europe that needed help to advance, a pro-accession argument usually resulted. In articles where Turkey was cast as a perpetual outsider to Europe, there tended to be an implicit argument for closer alignment with the Middle East.

In the case of the war in Iraq, on the other hand, competing conceptions of Turkish identity did not tend to suggest solutions; rather, they tended to define the problem in such a way that any one of several solutions may have been correct. The most prominent example of this was the construction of Turkey's identity in relationship to the United States. In this construction of Turkish identity, Turkey was a "Gurkha state" that the United States could compel to do its bidding without giving Turkey adequate compensation for their service. This construction was clearly anti-American, and many columnists who were against helping the United States employed this construction to frame their arguments. However, some who used this identity frame acknowledged that, while the situation was not fair to Turkey, it was in Turkey's long-term interest to give into the United States' demands. In the case of the American invasion of Iraq, constructions of Turkish identity were used as frames to describe Turkey's situation, but did not suggest that one course of action was necessarily better than another.

Finally, some of the articles analyzed did not appear to reflect identity frames at all. Twenty-four articles, or just over ten percent of those examined, seemed not to prefer one identity construction over any other through their content or their structure; at the very least, the questions asked of each article were not useful in determining the identity constructions present in these articles. Did the articles construct Turkish identity in a way that this project could not identify? It is possible. Despite this shortcoming, however, the analytical model employed in this study did uncover the underlying identity constructions present in the other articles, so it was a relatively effective method overall.

Other Shortcomings of the Research

Although every attempt was made to create a consistent and rigorous analysis of the data, some shortcomings were inevitable given the limited time and resources available for this project. Due to the researcher's lack of fluency in Turkish, for example, the sample of newspaper articles for analysis was limited to those that had previously been translated by the United States Department of Commerce's Foreign Broadcast Information Service. While there were many articles available, only the three largest, most mainstream newspapers were represented in the selection. A wider selection of articles from a variety of other perspectives might have enriched the sample considerably.

Interviews with government and media elites in Turkey may have also provided more context for the analysis, especially where certain actions and rhetoric and their motivations were concerned. Geographic and linguistic limitations prevented those interviews from occurring. Similarly, linguistic limitations prevented examination of Turkish opinion polls not published in the translated newspaper articles, leaving only Eurobarometer and Pew Research polls, which

framed their questions in an international context. The availability of domestic opinion polls, which frame their questions only for Turkish respondents, would have provided a clearer picture of how Turkish people view their country and which actions they believe the government should take.

Suggestions for Future Research

In order to undertake a more sophisticated study of the words and phrases used in these articles, an analysis of the articles in their original Turkish should be completed. In addition to the finer interpretation of words, phrases, and rhetoric that such a study would afford, a project in the original Turkish would also be able to analyze articles from newspapers with a wider range of ideologies, from the left-leaning *Radikal* to the more openly Islamist *Zaman*, as well as a variety of primary sources from other stakeholders, such as the Turkish military and the Kurds within Turkey. Furthermore, a future study would ideally include interviews with Turkish elites, including politicians, newspaper columnists, and other policy- and opinionmakers in order to better determine the power and discourse structure of the Turkish media elite itself.

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