

Introduction

Xenophobia can be defined as a sensation of fear or phobia toward a person or a given group of people deemed strange or foreign. When such a sensation becomes collective it may lead to rejection of the “other”. By rejecting others from one’s community, one *de facto* denies or chooses to ignore any positive contribution from them to this community. This paper intends to demonstrate the impact of such behavior on the wellbeing of the different communities involved. In the specific case of the African continent, misery and instability have dominated many people’s lives for decades despite the enormity of human potential and natural resources. Why have African countries not been successful in their efforts toward regional integration? Does a xenophobia-driven acrimony among Africans play an important role in explaining such failures?

The Africa of hunger, rebellions and genocides, we all know it; the Africa of HIV/AIDS, we have heard about it over and over again; the Africa of misery, it is everyday in the news; but the Africa of xenophobia, this sounds new! It is real and serious, and it is happening at the very moment when economic liberalization is more and more referred to as a possible magical potion to cure the continent’s backwardness and set the basis for what many leaders like to call the “African Renaissance”. Immigration issues are no longer an exclusively ‘western matter’; it is a global concern and Africans deal with it as well and in a much harder way: the masses, instead of public officers, enforce the laws, their own laws. From Dakar to Djibouti and from Cape Point to Cairo and everywhere in between, xenophobic incidents are more and more noticeable.

During a recent sojourn in Cape Town I had the opportunity to witness close-up the xenophobic attacks in Alexandria Township and in many other townships in South

Africa. Immigrants and refugees from Zimbabwe and other neighboring countries became the target of inter-ethnic attacks. I have been wondering how the South African Republic manages to claim its leadership in the region while remaining unwelcoming to foreigners.

On the west coast of the continent, Côte d'Ivoire, a leader within the UEMOA (West African Economic and Monetary Union) has gone through similar inter-ethnic violence aimed at foreign workers. The Mossi, arguably from Burkina Faso and who have settled in the cocoa plantations in Côte d'Ivoire for many generations, are the target. "Ivoirité (Ivority)" suddenly became the new identity for "true citizens" of the country, and being Mossi became synonymous with anti- Ivoirité or non- Ivoirité, which exposed all the Mossi tribes to constant danger of attacks. In Northern Africa, Libyans do welcome Sub-Saharan Africans. Many job seekers from the sub-Saharan region of the continent suffered attacks and most are forced to leave the country of President Khadafy and return to where they came from.

These three nations happen to be among the most prominent and the biggest advocates of a stronger integration of the continent. South Africa, along with Nigeria, Senegal, Egypt and Algeria, is the artisan of the ambitious NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa's Development); Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire) had remained the headquarters of the ADB (African Development Bank) until the explosion of violence partly due to attacks on foreigners, and the country claims about forty percent of the wealth within the UEMOA region (Benin, Bissau-Guinea, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo). Libya, since its return on the international arena, has become the most powerful and the loudest voice for the idea of United States of Africa.

Through such individual and collective endeavors, these nations have asserted that they have so much to gain in having a more united and integrated Africa; yet through their incapability to contain and extinguish the anger of their respective citizens against foreigners, they have shown the rest of the world that the road to a full “African Renaissance” is quite long indeed.

The NEPAD project, despite the dreams it created and the hopes it inspired, failed. This has led to many interrogations and triggered blame across the continent and around the world. Some have contended that the state system is not mature enough in Africa for individual nations to undertake such a bold project; others, on a completely opposite side, argue that the state system is too rigid in Africa to allow governments to think of economic integration.

Table 1: Causes of Failures

Causes of Failures	Supporters	Arguments
Rigidity of borders and Sovereignty	<i>Economic Commission for Africa</i>	- member countries’ unwillingness to give up some of their sovereignty for progress in integration ¹
Colonial Legacy	- Agyemang Attah-Poku	- “Africa is the only continent in the world, whose destiny has been forcefully and unilaterally intervened by non-Africans for the longest period of time” ² - Loss of Community-oriented instinct - “The chopping of Africa into bits and pieces . . . only served the divide-and-conquer and the exploitative interests, of the colonizers and the European imperial hegemony” ³

¹ Economic Commission for Africa and African Union. *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II: Rationalizing Regional Economic Communities*. (Addis Ababa, 2006), 12.

² Agyemang Attah-Poku, *African Stability and Integration: Regional, Continental and Diasporic Pan-African Realities* (New York: University Press of America, 2000), 46.

³ Agyemang Attah-Poku, 48.

		- “a defining characteristic of the colonial situation is authoritarian rule by bureaucrats.” ⁴
Responsibility of Governments	- <i>Economic Commission for Africa</i> - Antonia Juhasz ⁵	- Unwillingness to suppress tariffs - Lack of good governance - Lack of political will - “The involvement of politics in integrative schemes is more pervasive in the case of Africa.” ⁶ - “Only 16% of countries ratify treaties and protocols in less than three months. In most countries the process takes up to a year.” ⁷
Overlapping Memberships	- Colin McCarthy - Ernest Aryeetey	- “multiple memberships hinder regional integration by . . . leading to duplication of effort.” ⁸ - “The multiplicity of regional economic communities has contributed to significant overlap in trade programmes.” ⁹
Structural Adjustment Programs	<i>Economic Commission for Africa</i>	- “After two decades of structural adjustment and policy reform in Africa, many institutions have been weakened or simply abolished.” ¹⁰
Competition over resources	<i>Economic Commission for Africa</i>	- “The process of seeking agreement among so many regional economic communities could delay creation of the African Economic Community.” ¹¹ - “Countries’ reluctance to adhere to integration programmes . . . because of concerns about uneven gains and losses.” ¹² - “Divergent and unstable national macroeconomic policies.” ¹³

⁴ Harvey Glickman, ed., *The Crisis and Challenge of African Development* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 8.

⁵ International Forum on Globalization, “NEPAD: Foothold for Corporate Globalization in Africa,” [International Forum on Globalization Online]; available from http://www.ifg.org/wssd/nepad_juhasz.htm; Internet; accessed 5 March 2009.

⁶ S.K.B. Asante, *Regionalism and Africa’s Development: Expectations, Reality and Challenges* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 27.

⁷ Economic Commission for Africa and African Union. *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II: Rationalizing Regional Economic Communities*, 78.

⁸ Economic Commission for Africa: ECA Policy Research Report. *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa*. (Addis Ababa, 2004), 40.

⁹ Economic Commission for Africa and African Union. *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II: Rationalizing Regional Economic Communities*, 11.

¹⁰ Ibid, 23.

¹¹ Ibid, 9.

¹² Ibid, 33.

¹³ Ibid.

The explanation many overlook is the animosity amongst the people such projects are intended to benefit: the masses. As we will see, populations living in relatively richer countries tend to be more opposed to the idea than those living in poorer regions. Economic liberalism might make national borders more accessible and immigration much easier: this is what triggers such a phobia. The rationale behind this, some observers contend, is that the easier it is for 'others' (outsiders) to cross their border the harder the competition gets on the job market and the harder it will be for them to find and/or keep their jobs in their own country. Therefore, I intend to demonstrate that one of the greatest obstacles to organizations such as NEPAD is the one very few talk about, the one that constitutes the very base of the countries' socio-economic and socio-political pyramids, the attitude of the masses.

The African continent is home to 900 million people, half of whom are 20 years old or younger. Thanks to this demographic structure, Africa, in comparison to most of the other continents, is usually referred to as the future of human kind. With the steady rate of population growth in most African countries, there is a chance that, in the near future, Africa's numbers may bring it greater 'demographic power' along the lines of China and India. In this globalized world where consumption is a driver of economic growth, and where national politics are determined by economic strengths, there are certain reasons to contend that demography really matters.

Africa, for decades, has remained a major provider of raw materials for the world's superpowers. When the minerals' regions are peaceful their exploitation is easier and their prices are consequently cheaper. The direct effect on the oil prices every time there is political instability, inter-ethnic violence or social unrest in Nigeria is a perfect

example. This being said, a more stable Africa is a good thing for the global economy and a serious boost for the local economies.

Xenophobia has a two-way effect both on the victims who lose some socio-economic and civic rights and on the nations involved, which usually pay the price of economic instability. Immigrants are more likely to occupy the hardest and least desired jobs in all nations. Their insecurity directly shakes local and regional productions and as a result the prices of the final products increase. In Côte d'Ivoire, the attacks against the presumed Burkina Faso-originated Mossi caused many of them to flee the country abandoning cocoa plantations. The direct effect was a dramatic fall of production, sinking the country's economy and jeopardizing the overall UEMOA's economic assets. The global prices of cocoa rose and major chocolate producers and consumers paid the price. The victims lost not only their economic patrimony, but also the enormous political and civic rights they used to benefit from under late former President Felix Houphouët Boigny.¹⁴ Jeanne Maddox Tougara of Howard University reports the downturn of the cohabitation and the deterioration of the socio-economic conditions of immigrants in Côte D'Ivoire over the past few years: "Nearly two million Burkinabe who had made Côte d'Ivoire their home and been allowed to vote under Houphouët now found themselves disenfranchised."¹⁵ According to Norimishu Onishi of of New York Times, Houphouët Boigny was, indeed, an "autocrat who made Ivory Coast into one of Africa's most stable countries . . . emphasizing ethnic harmony in a region with sharp divisions. When he went, so did his vision."¹⁶

¹⁴ Jeanne Maddox Tougara, "Francophone Africa in Flux: Ethnicity and Political Crisis in Côte D'Ivoire," *Journal of Democracy* (July 2001):68.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Norimishu Onishi, "Ethnic Clenching: Misrule in Ivory Coast." *The New York Times*, 1 October 2002.

To set the context for exploring the arguments of the impact of xenophobia on the continent's economic integration, this paper will cover the past half-decade, and the analysis will revolve around the different geographical regions of Africa. It will begin with a well-detailed overview of the many xenophobia-driven events that have occurred in the different countries. In South Africa for example, I shall discuss how the country reconciles its uniquely tough non-discriminatory legislation with the rising phobia of its citizens towards immigrants from other African nations, despite the tremendous contribution of the whole continent during the struggle against Apartheid. On Nigeria, the paper will present the paradox between the desire of the successive governments to make their state a regional or continental leader and the widespread acts of violence among people within it. As a background and for the sake of comparative and illustrative examples, however, my analysis will be extended to more countries than these two case studies.

Given the complexity of the issue and the difficulties in determining direct correlations between xenophobia and economic development, my paper will consist of two major parts. To understand the factors that drive such ignoble incidents, I shall first analyze the real socio-economic as well as psychological motives behind these behaviors, such as the definition of social identity. The second half of the paper will evaluate the direct impact, if there is any, of this series of xenophobic comportments across individual countries on a durable socio-economic integration of the African continent. To do so, I intend to analyze possible pattern between what people from different countries think of one another and their positions on economic issues. Across the fifty-three nations of the continent, there are hundreds of millions ways in which individuals define their identity

as well as their priorities in terms of socioeconomic matters. Reviewing these different conceptions and opinions on important issues that affect Africa will help presage the continent's potential assets and shortcomings in terms of socioeconomic wellbeing. Therefore, regional Economic Development and Cross-Cultural Communication are the major International Relations theories I shall use.

Intergroup relations: source of scholarly debate

My paper intends to examine the contours, ups and downs of different economic blocs around the world in comparison with NEPAD and other regional alliances on the African continent. Why does it seem to work better in the other parts of the world than it does in Africa? Answers to this question have helped create two major schools of thought with many scholars sharing their thoughts over what each of them believes is the secret key to success in international economic integration. Some analysts – mostly political economists – contend that for economic integration to occur and succeed, political compromises are necessary. From their perspective, countries should not expect to always have it both ways using power to defend their national interests while urging other nations to consider free trade and cooperation. Countries that manage to transcend their ideological and political rivalry for economic purposes have greater chances of succeeding. Another school of thought focuses on how important cross-cultural integration is for economic alliances to succeed. This group of scholars contends that for every project of regional or international integration the governments undertake, mutual understanding among citizens of these nations is a *sine qua non*.

According to some political economists such as Sheila Page, economic blocs succeed only when member-states clearly define and share the agenda behind their

membership as well as what they expect to contribute for the greater good.¹⁷ Proponents of this approach think that every time states hide their agenda of winning by force behind the pretence of willingness to adhere to more cooperative alliances, the alliance always fails. In a debate among African policy makers over African integration, Sheila Page argued that the reason why MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market) in Latin America has succeeded is because its initiators have resolved to make their economic interests prevail over any eventual political or ideological differences they may have toward one another. Brazil and Argentina indeed used to have “a history of distrust and preparation for war . . . but had acquired common interests in the 1980s.”¹⁸ Founded in 1985 and broadened in 1990, MERCOSUR is a Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) involving four South American nations: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. According to Page, MERCOSUR, not only helps improve economic conditions of the member-states, but it also contributes to regional stability: “The agreement was seen as a way of defusing regional tension and providing the regimes with support as each country tried to integrate itself into the international economy.”¹⁹ Page’s pragmatic view on how countries should deal with one another is really convincing, for it follows the logic of the Democratic Peace Theory. Consistent with this theory, Page tries to demonstrate that when nations pursue common interests and work side by side, they are less likely to engage in war, and with less war there is a chance of more prosperity.

This pragmatism rarely exists on the African continent where countries still have a hard time drawing lines between defending self-interests by force and advancing

¹⁷ Sheila Page. “Regionalism and/or Globalisation,” in *Regionalism and Regional Integration in Africa: A Debate of Current Aspects and Issues*, ed. Henning Melber (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2001), 14.

¹⁸ Ibid, 7.

¹⁹ Ibid.

economic cooperation. South Africa's ambiguous behavior toward regional and continental alliances has contributed a great deal to the failures in the successive attempts to integrate the fifty-three nations into a single economic bloc. Paul Williams emphasizes this ambiguity by giving the example of South Africa whose economic and foreign policy looks to him like an "electric synthesis of neo-realist and neo-liberal principles."²⁰ The idea is that South Africa wants to expand its political domination while urging other nations to adhere to its economic plans. William's point is very justified given the reality in the region. For example, despite their leverage in the region, South African leaders do little to end the crisis in Zimbabwe as it did not impede the progress of spreading its multinationals in the region even though migrants poured across its borders. This ambiguity has shaped the relations between the Rainbow Nation and its neighbors since the time of President Mandela. Didier Gondola reveals that President Mandela's "postapartheid regime has simultaneously adopted peacemaking and diplomatic strategies to end the conflict in DRC [Democratic Republic of the Congo] and pursued its own economic interests, which include selling weapons to the belligerents."²¹

The consensus between Page and Gondola is that self-interests should always come after successful economic alliances, not before them. The European Union, before becoming political, started as an exclusively pro-economic coalition between countries that just a few years earlier were battling one another during World War II. Page and other defendants of the political economic approach see in the EU's and MERCOSUR's

²⁰ Paul Williams, "South African foreign policy: getting critical?" *Politikon* 27 (May 2000): 73.

²¹ Didier Gondola, *African Studies Review* [book on-line] (Indianapolis: Indiana University, 2003), available from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1514875?seq=3> (accessed 21 September 2008).

successes the importance of political willingness to bring about economic stability. This is the magical key that is lacking in the case of African nations.

The hypocrisy that has shaped the foreign policy of the post-apartheid South Africa looks scary to other nations that interpret it as a new form of domination not from the traditional west, but within the continent. This helps explain the tragic failure of NEPAD as well as the unsatisfactory results of SADC (Southern African Development Community). Despite the undeniable merits of Williams' approach in explaining the causes of African economic inertia, it is still limited exclusively to one country and does not apply to other situations such as in Côte D'Ivoire and Libya where problems are much deeper than simple political will. In most of African countries including South Africa, inter-ethnic animosity and cross-cultural misunderstandings have also contributed a great deal to the failures in building a prosperous economic bloc. To help understand the roots of such animosity, another literature suggests a solution based on cross-cultural communication. An additional shortcoming of William's approach is that it mostly praises the *usefulness* of regional cooperation to sustain peace and stability, and tends to overlook the *necessity* of stability in order for a cooperation to succeed. Again a cross-cultural approach may help to establish this crucial relationship.

The cross-cultural theorists' response to the issues obstructing economic integrations around the world can be summarized in two fundamental words: "Culture Matters."²² The successive failures of most African nations to break through economically are due to the populations' inability to accept one another. This literature is

²² Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington, ed., *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress* (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

divided into two sub-theories: the realistic conflict theory and the social identity theory. Both deal with how culture and conflict can affect each other in intergroup relations.

The realistic conflict theorists tend to see every conflict through the lenses of *homo economicus*, meaning rational interests always guide human actions. Muzafer Sherif, for instance, contends that competition for scarce resources is one of the most powerful forms of functional relationship, and can cause many sorts of biases or stereotypes towards others. The primary reason for the conflicts revolves around the competition over scarce resources. The inter-ethnic or cultural biases come second: “The groups in question may be competing to attain some goal or some vital prize so that the success of one group necessarily means the failure of the other. One group may have claims on another group in the way of managing, controlling or exploiting them, in the way of taking over their actual or assumed rights or possessions.”²³ In Côte D’Ivoire, Mossi-speaking tribes are believed to be the cause of unemployment in the country; this is the reason why they are no longer welcome in the country. They are primarily defined by the self-proclaimed true citizens as potential job predators, and then regarded as a group to keep away from.

The social identity theorists such as Henri Tajfel contend that in intergroup relations, conflicts arise when emphasis is placed on ethnic differences before, or instead of, economic goals. People tend to categorize themselves and others on in-group and out-group bases: “The characteristics of one’s group as a whole (such as its status, its richness or poverty, its skin color, or its ability to reach its aims) achieve most of their significance in relation to perceived differences from other groups and the value connotation of these

²³ Muzafer Sherif *et al.* *Intergroup conflict and cooperation; the Robbers Cave experiment* (Norman: University Book Exchange, 1961), 198.

differences.”²⁴ I intend to emphasize the social identity theory, because it reflects more the reality we witness in Africa. Indeed any glance at the socio-cultural life in Africa shows that people tend to categorize one another more on the basis of ethnic and social differences than on any other criteria. Most people tend to consider their “in-group” to be better or distinctive, while the “out-group,” such as immigrants, is looked down upon. The competition, which results from these categorizations, leads to rivalry that can translate into conflicts over material or economic resources.

Cases around the world help understand how social identity theory can explain the status of intergroup relations. If Turkey, a NATO member, is still being denied access to the European Union, for example, this has a lot more to do with religious differences than material competition. Some Europeans seem more concerned about the cultural differences with Turkey than potential competition over jobs and other resources. Many other eastern nations such as Romania are important labor intensive states; yet this did not affect their membership in the Union. Within member-states of the EU, the few residual xenophobic attacks target primordially non-Catholics, especially Muslims and Jews. Through a social identity approach, David Smith analyzes the highly heated debate of the late 1990s over the hegemonic German culture vis-à-vis immigrants from the Muslim world.²⁵ He specifically points out the many discriminatory and xenophobic occurrences faced by immigrants who happen to wear headscarves. Concerns over religious attire were put forth first and foremost, and issues around job scarcity came

²⁴ Henri Tajfel, *Differentiation between social groups: Studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations* (London: Academic Press, 1978), 66.

²⁵ David Smith, *Central European History: Cruelty of the Worst Kind* (Sydney: University of Sydney, 2007), 89.

second. I agree with Smith's analysis because with similar ethnic and religious heterogeneities on the African continent, similar results occur.

In Côte D'Ivoire, Libya and many other African nations, ethnic, racial and cultural differences between immigrants and nationals are the main cause of the series of xenophobic acts witnessed over the past few years. We could understand this by comparing the treatments different immigrants receive according to their national origins. Immigrants from the Maghreb region tend to have better treatments in Libya, for example, than their Sub-Saharan counterparts. Mossi-speaking immigrants tend to have endured much worse treatments in Côte D'Ivoire than any other immigrants from the region. Taking into account cross-cultural differences and working on harmonizing them could be an important step toward formation of more successful macroeconomic alliances on the regional and continental levels in Africa.

The two cross-cultural approaches – social identity and realistic conflict – to this question have raised a very important issue that tends to be ignored by proponents of the international political economic approach. While the realistic conflict theory rationalizes the causes of intergroup animosity, the social identity theory reveals the reasons of stereotypes and negative mindsets among people. This is why I intend to emphasize the latter more than the former; the social identity approach is more relevant in the case of Africa. By analyzing the issues through this theory, my paper will better explain the origins of xenophobia as well as its impact on policymaking and on the overall economic integration.

As mentioned earlier, another part of scholarship about Africa's economic paralysis tends to show more historical factors than any other factors. Indeed, "African

Slavery in the Americas and the Holocaust in Europe have generated numerous scholastic historical works. But for some reason, the same suffering, injustice, tragedy, and oppression that is taking place in modern-day Africa receives little mention.”²⁶ These suffering, injustice and tragedy are both symptomatic and responsible of the current economic uncertainty on the continent. Therefore, and as I mentioned earlier, the ultimate goal of my research is to determine the relationship between intergroup animosities and the probability of failures in inter-state integration on the continent. To reach such a result, a bulk of my work will consist of two important steps: first of all I shall work on finding what causes such animosity among people, and second I shall determine the impact of these behaviors on socioeconomic well-being of communities involved. In other words I shall show the impact xenophobia-driven actions on the socioeconomic health of African societies. As the African continent is struggling under the heavy burden of poverty, the lack of regional economic alliances is usually regarded as the main cause; however factors that lead to these failures are rarely talked about. Xenophobia, in my view, is one of these crucial factors, and I intend to construct my research around it.

Through a quantitative method, I shall organize my paper using three important factors – intragroup identity, xenophobia, and interstate integration – all built around two key hypotheses. To achieve this, African nations’ embassies, the United Nations’ reports, UNDP annual reports, the U.S. Department of State, as well as survey results of *Afrobarometer* will be relied upon. The plethora of African and world’s scholars who have worked on the issue will be referred to as well. As a quantitative analysis,

²⁶ Sidney Robbins and Shirley Robbins, *The Devil’s Annexe: a Continent in Agony*, 2nd ed. (Milnerton, South Africa: Capsal Publishers, 2005), 8.

numerical data are key to conclusive hypotheses, and the viability of the results will depend on the credibility of these data. Therefore, the following information will be useful:

i. Source of data:

The data used in this study are mostly based on a multi-annual surveys conducted by *Afrobarometer*. The multiple surveys involve countries from different parts of the continent including those having experienced xenophobic acts in recent years. The survey's questions are multidimensional and responders are from different ethnic, educational and cultural backgrounds. The raw data collected are tabulated into charts based on the topics and along with the year of their collection. Countries and numbers of participants involved in the 2004 interview are listed in *Table 2*

Table 2: Countries and Numbers of Participants (based on data drawn from *Afrobarometer*, 2004)

Countries	Numbers of Participants	Countries	Numbers of Participants
Botswana	1,200	Tanzania	1,223
Ghana	1,200	Uganda	2,400
Lesotho	1,200	Zambia	1,198
Malawi	1,200	Cape Verde	1,268
Mali	1,200	Kenya	2,398
Namibia	1,199	Mozambique	1,400
Nigeria	2,428	Senegal	1,200
South Africa	2,400		

ii. Selection of data:

As I mentioned above, *Afrobarometer* data are multidimensional and involve more questions than I actually need and more countries than those I preselected. They also covered a much longer period of time than my timeframe. Therefore, I have selected only surveys conducted in 2004 and involving the five major regions of the continent. Also due to the specific focus of my research, I selected answers to questions related to social identity definition, xenophobic sentiments, and socioeconomic priorities. Data and researches revolving around other factors of Africa's impoverishment are not used. From the *Afrobarometer* data, I selected answers given by respondents from diverse ethnic, professional and social backgrounds, which ensures equity and representativeness of the entire continent. Finally and to ensure the viability of my data selection, I make sure that all participants in *Afrobarometer's* surveys are 18 years or older. Any data related to my research focus and that involve underage participants are not considered.

iii. Variables:

A set of three main data – identity, xenophobia and integration – will constitute the content of my research. Data are collected and tabulated according to the number of respondents in each country and according to each survey question. For example if answers to a question are options to choose from, such as *never*, *sometimes* or *always*, and if 3 people out of 10 choose *never* and 4 people choose *sometimes*, then the chart will be tabulated accordingly. Another technique used by *Afrobarometer* to ensure the accuracy of the data is to establish a codebook for each survey. The codebook assigns each variable a label based on the question.

Table 3: Variable Codebook (based on data drawn from *Afrobarometer*, 2004)

Variable Code	Variables	Indicators
Q53ANEW	Integration	Effectiveness of AU/OAU
Q53CNEW	Integration	Effectiveness of the UN
Q53GNEW	Integration	Effectiveness of SADC/ECOWAS/EAC
Q54	Identity	Identity groups
Q71c.	Xenophobia	Violent Conflicts between groups in country
Q82	Identity	Ethnic or national identity?
Q82d-SAF	Identity	South Africans first?
Q84d.	Xenophobia	Trust people from other ethnic groups?

This coding facilitates the tabulation of answers on the SPSS or excel chart, because short codes are easier to fit into charts, and their content is easier to grasp. Since I am using graphs, tables and curves to test my hypotheses, coded data ensure more accuracy and consistency.

iv. Testing hypotheses:

Two hypotheses guide my research:

Hypothesis 1: if emphasis is placed on social identity, there are higher risks of xenophobic acts.

Hypothesis 2: if xenophobia increases, chances of regional and continental integration are slimmer.

Consistent with these hypotheses, the first part of the paper establishes the relationship between social identity and xenophobia. I will use all the indicators of

identity to determine the degree to which respondents value their self-defined identity. From the chart above, the indicators of *identity* are: *Q54*, *Q82* and *Q82d-SAF*. The indicators of *xenophobia* are *Q71c.* and *Q84d.* Finally for the variable *integration*, the main indicators are *Q53ANEW*, *Q53CNEW* and *Q53GNEW*

The first part of the paper will focus on the correlation between variable *identity* and variable *xenophobia*. For each nation surveyed, I intend to first determine what social group people identify with the most, by relying on indicators *Q54*, *Q82* and *Q82d-SAF*. I will then move to the second variable *xenophobia* with indicators *Q71c.* and *Q84d.* This will enable me to determine the correlation between these first two variables. This also allows me to see what social group(s) tend(s) to be more violence-oriented. For instance if for any given country *xenophobia* is high, *identity* will tell me what identity group is dominant in this country. Similar results on the continental level will allow me to see any eventual patterns across nations. The goal is to see if high emphasis on *identity* leads to high degree of *xenophobia*. For instance if a high *Q54* matches with a high *Q71c.* in Cape Verde, I will then apply the same hypothesis to the other nations; and if I receive similar results from many countries, then my first hypothesis is positively tested, meaning higher *variable identity* leads to greater *variable xenophobia*.

The second part of my paper involves the relationship between xenophobic sentiments and risks of failures of integration plans. The variables involved at this stage are *xenophobia* and *integration*. The methods of testing will be similar to those applied for the first hypothesis. However, unlike in the first part, the hypothesis will be tested if only the two variables are negatively correlated; meaning high *xenophobia* goes with negative perception on *integration*. If this is the case in Mali, for instance, I will then see

what respondents from other countries think about these issues. My hypothesis will test positive if the countries with the greatest reluctance to regional and continental integration have the most xenophobic citizens.

As previously mentioned, the final goal of my paper is to show that when the intragroup identity is great (high *variable identity*), so are the risks of xenophobia (higher *variable xenophobia*), which increases the probability of failures for integration (fall of *variable integration*). The entirety of my paper will revolve around the following notions:

1. Emphasis on Identity as Cause of Xenophobia
 - a. Variables:
 - Identity and indicators *Q54*, *Q82* and *Q82d-SAF*
 - Xenophobia and indicators *Q71c.* and *Q84d*
 - b. Analysis of findings
2. Xenophobia as the main cause of multiple failures in African integration
 - a. Variables:
 - Xenophobia and indicators *Q71c.* and *Q84d*
 - Integration and indicators *Q53ANEW*, *Q53CNEW* and *Q53GNEW*
 - b. Analysis of findings

1. Emphasis on Identity as Cause of Xenophobia

Throughout history and around the world, all societies and civilizations have more or less shown more protection and preference for their own kind. Identity issues are among the major factors of hatred and misconduct, which have precipitated communities to fight against one another in many disastrous and despicable wars. Wars are very often

waged under the classic notion of “us versus them” meaning belligerents are different from each other.

1.1. Theories of intergroup conflicts:

Two opposing theories have tried to explain why violent clashes arise among groups living together. Their arguments appear more like a *chicken-and-egg* scenario, in which causes for some are consequences for others. On the one hand, social identity theorists consider intergroup violence as caused first and foremost by group kinship, identity distinctiveness and incompatibility with others, which trickle down onto competition over material resources. On the other hand, relative conflict theorists contend that conflicts arise along social group lines primarily because human beings compete over material scarcity, and that by group solidarity, kinship is reinforced.

1.1.1. Relative conflict theory

Searching for explanations, causes, and justifications of the many despicable crises across history, some analysts have pointed to the human reflex of material need for survival. According to many modern Peace and Conflict Resolution experts, people fight and argue primarily because of their conflicting material interests. Intergroup conflicts tend to be seen exclusively through rational and realistic lenses. Human beings, according to this analysis, operate on the basis of *homo economicus*, meaning their actions are guided by material and economic interests, and they engage in battle in order to defend and protect these interests. According to Taylor and Morghaddam “ecologists and ethologists, among others, have focused upon the use of material resources, so that the vacant spaces with which they are concerned are principally food and territorial

space.”²⁷ Such a view may appear misleading however, and would cause to consider heinous actions, such as the Holocaust, as exclusively material-driven crises. This is why “in social psychology a tendency has developed, fully crystallized in social identity theory, to extend the same principle to include the use of social identity and the need for groups to find (or create) vacant (distinct) identities for themselves to occupy.”²⁸

1.1.2. Social identity theory on violence

A much closer observation of some conflicts convince us that hates are not always material-driven and may appear irrational sometimes, and human behavior may appear no different from “animals”: “While basic biological needs are seen as a drive behind animals moving to find the vacant spaces that make food and territory available to them, psychological motives are postulated by social identity theory to be the drive behind attempts by groups to find identities that show in a distinct and positive light.”²⁹ Plenty of examples around the world confirm this irrational side of some conflicts.

The horrible holocaust by German Nazis against the Jewish community during World War II can be anything but rational. There was no clear or objective economic justification of adopting a fascist ideology and hating one specific race or ethnicity although some leaders have manipulated economic issues and grievances. Nowadays, news media and TV networks report a sharp rise of the number and activities of hate groups similar to the infamous Ku Klux Klan in the United States, and whose agendas are driven less by the goal of enriching their communities than purging them from the impurity of other races. These different attacks and wars are mostly identity-related and

²⁷ Taylor and Morghaddam, 80.

²⁸ Ibid, 81.

²⁹ Ibid.

have caused major human and humanitarian disasters around the globe over centuries. Many conflicts on the African continent have indeed occurred along similar lines. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda originated less from the necessity of improving economic conditions of the Hutu community than getting rid of the Tutsi enemies. From Rwanda to Democratic Republic of Congo, to Côte D'Ivoire, African nations have gone through the most unstable moments of the continent's history. Nonetheless, over time, the tendency seems to have evolved, and by comparison, the African continent remains nowadays one of the most unstable ones on the planet. Indeed, other parts of the world have managed to drastically reduce the occurrence of violence and relatively increase the chances of cooperation among nations and understanding among ethnic subgroups. For example, by mid-1990s, "violent conflicts in Europe were reduced to half and conflicts in Asia decreased by one-fifth. Only in Africa did conflicts increase dramatically by more than 50%."³⁰ Millions have died and millions have been displaced due some biased perceptions of the "otherness" which have led to battles over presumed identity incompatibility with a more conceivable façade of resources scarcity.

1.2. Intragroup identity or a xenophobic weapon

Ethnic groups can be defined as "groups of people who share ancestral, language, cultural, or religious ties and a common identity (individuals identify with the group) . . . ethnic conflict itself stems from a dislike or hatred that members of one ethnic group systematically feel toward another ethnic group."³¹ On the other hand, 'xenophobia' is, according to *New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy*, an "unreasonable fear, distrust, or

³⁰ Christian P. Scherrer and Hakan Wiberg, Christian P. Scherrer, ed. *Ethnicity and Intra-State Conflict: Types, causes and Peace Strategy* (Brookfield, VT : Ashgate, 1999), 68

³¹ Joshua Goldstein S., *International Relations*, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1996), 198.

hatred of strangers, foreigners, or anything perceived as foreign or different.”³² *New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy*, therefore, does not limit the definition exclusively to the dynamics or feeling between people of different national origins; it includes everything people perceive as “foreign or different” by their own standards. For the sake of this research, I intend to use this broad definition of xenophobia.

African countries are known for their strong ethnic and religious diversity. The special cultural and ethnic landscape of most African states makes them look more like ‘nations within countries’, with citizens speaking different languages, having nothing else in common than their official citizenship. As a direct result of the colonial division of the continent, communities from different backgrounds are led to coexist within countries. In some cases, coexistence appears relatively peaceful with mutual respect among different members, while in other cases (the majority), relations and interactions are usually confrontational or lack cooperation. Historical heritage and pride of belonging to specific ethnic entities push many to overemphasize their ethnicity and undervalue others, or to claim more rights over the land than others. The direct consequence is the risks of “our way or highway” situations where compromises are not permitted, care for the other is out of question, and share of the common destiny is unthinkable.

1.2.1. South Africa: a new and improved “test” of identity

Over the previous decade, South Africa had shown to the entire world its ability to overcome its history of racial discrimination and to seek to establish a more egalitarian society through a highly progressive Constitution. Unlike in the previous system, the

³² The American Heritage, *New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy*, 3rd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005).

new supreme law of the republic (in its article 9) outlaws all types of discrimination and outlines a set of measures to prevent them from occurring:

1. Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.
2. Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.
3. The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.
4. No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.
5. Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair.³³

However despite this constitutional push for equality, interethnic rivalries have spiked over the past few years and led to some practices, which recall the Apartheid period: “In a practice that recalls the humiliating “tests” used by apartheid officials to classify coloureds as white or black, reports came in that South African mobs were using similar techniques to identify foreigners. A language test is first, where one is asked to label certain body parts in isiZulu.”³⁴ ‘Foreign’ accent is not permitted and stumbling comes with risks of immediate expulsion. The notion of group identity distinctiveness leads native Zulu to have a psychological assumption that their ethnicity is the sole proof of citizenship. According to some social identity psychologists, “in social identity theory it is postulate that group members will desire to achieve an identity for their group that is

³³ South African Government Information, “Constitution,” *Chapter 2 – Bill of Rights* [South African Government Information on-line]; available from <http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/96cons2.htm#9>; Internet; accessed 17 February 2009.

³⁴ Nosimilo Ndlovu, “The 21st century pencil test,” *Mail and Guardian Online* (May 24 2008). [e-journal] < <http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-05-24-the-21st-century-pencil-test> > (accessed 17 February 2009).

both distinct from, and positive in comparison with, other groups.”³⁵ Therefore, isiZulu has indirectly become synonymous with national identity and one’s inability to speak it in the region strips one of one’s right to live there.

1.2.2. Identity distinctiveness and its indicators across social groups

I have selected data according to their significance in terms of ethnic identification and subsequent pride that comes with it. Therefore, among others, questions such as *which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?* give me a set of data about how people perceive and define their personal identity. The rationale is to see if such a definition has any impact on how they perceive members of out-groups. It also reveals the extent of in-group bias because with extreme emphasis on one’s community come the risks of stereotypical attributes to outsiders as well as self-categorization “in the direction which represents a depersonalization of self-perception, a shift towards the perception of self as an interchangeable exemplar of some social category and away from the perception of self as a unique person defined by individual differences from others.”³⁶ This self-categorization leads individuals to contend and believe in the superiority of their in-group and its culture over others; and the direct consequence will be a push for others’ subjugation or expulsion with violent means. According to Steve Fenton, this “cultural content – the shared ancestry, the claims to a shared inheritance, the common customs and language – is . . . used or ‘drawn upon’ by ethnic group members, to give substance to an ethnic label. It may be drawn upon, too,

³⁵ Taylor and Morghaddam, 80.

³⁶ John C. Turner, Michael A. Hogg, Penelope J. Oakes, Stephen D. Reicher, and Margaret S. Wetherell, *Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory* (New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1987), 50-51.

by those who do not belong and do not share the cultural inheritance – that is, to mark them off us.”³⁷

In addition to these indicators of in-group pride and distinctiveness, another important set of data I am using is the one that deals directly with South Africa and the aspirations of its men and women: “*people should realize that we are South Africans first, and stop thinking of themselves in terms of the group they belong to.*” The reason why I have selected these data is to determine the immediate impact of such identity distinctiveness on the perception of the ‘other’. This may lead to the end or reduction of multiculturalism and a potential push for cultural conformity. A direct consequence would be a possibility of identity cleansing against those presumed to be non-nationals. This push for identity conformity is caused by the perception that one’s identity is best and more distinctive than others, and that outsiders must conform or be forced out. This can be referred to as xenophobia. The sole fact for someone to view his or her in-group as the “best” shows a biased undertone that “stereotypes of the ingroup tend to be evaluatively positive and those of the outgroup negative.”³⁸ The hypothesis is that with more people considering their in-group as the distinctively best, chances of attacks on ‘inferior groups’ are greater. Taylor and Morghaddam have established a similar correlation between the strength of in-group distinctiveness and the nature of intergroup relations: “the stronger the identification of the individual with the group, the more he or she will attempt to achieve intergroup differentiation.”³⁹ With strong intergroup differentiation comes the tendency to impose one’s will upon others. The need for

³⁷ Steve Fenton, *Ethnicity: Racism, Class and Culture* (Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999), 63.

³⁸ Michael A. Hogg and Dominic Abrams, *Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Proces.* (New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc., 1988), 73.

³⁹ Taylor and Morghaddam, 86.

cultural dominance of the differentiated and distinctive group over others leads to discrimination and segregation, which are both two major factors and actual manifestation of xenophobia.

1.2.3. Xenophobic violence and its indicators

The above series of data have one thing in common: the notion of intragroup identity and its impact on the others. Therefore, and as mentioned earlier, all three represent the independent variable *identity* and the dependent variable *xenophobia* is hate-related attacks on ‘foreigners’ and intergroup violence. The dependent variable consists of data revealing the frequency of intergroup confrontations responders believe having witnessed. The data are collected based on the answers to the question “*In your experience, how often do violent conflicts arise between different groups in this country?*” For the sake of this research, I have found it more relevant to pick answers ranging from *sometimes* to *always*. Through a *regression* method, I am evaluating the extent to which the many components of the independent variable affect the dependent one. The results on the graph, compared with the recent situations in different African nations will confirm or reject my hypothesis. In effect, my hypothesis is tested and confirmed if the data show that in the countries with recent intergroup altercations, citizens have a greater regard to their identity, and testify having seen or been involved in any type of xenophobia-driven violence. A cross-tabulation of the data enables me to determine the results per country as well as the overall results of the continent as a whole.

1.2.4. Correlation between identity and violence

In a 2004 survey, *Afrobarometer* asked individuals to determine what identity group they think they belong to first. The survey was conducted in sixteen African countries with different geographical and linguistic backgrounds. To the question Q54: (*which specific group you feel you belong to first and foremost?*), most Africans answered that they belong to the category *language/tribe/ethnic group* (22.4 percent of the respondents). *Figure 1* is my graph-summary of the group identity data, which data vary from countries to countries:

- About 1 percent of Cape Verdean respondents identified with this group
- About 14 percent of Malawians identified with this group.
- In Nigeria, 48 percent said they belong first and foremost to their tribe/language/ethnic group.
- 9 percent of South Africans chose this group

If most Nigerians identify with their social and cultural groups, South Africans tend to prefer none of the categories listed. This led the interviewers to conduct a supplemental survey in South Africa.




Figure 1 – Identity Groups (based on data drawn from *Afrobarometer*, 2004)

Question Q82SAFd asked indeed if “*people should realize that we are South Africans first, and stop thinking of themselves in terms of the group they belong to.*”

Table 4 : Crosstabulation of “South African” Identity and Other Types of Identity (based on data drawn from *Afrobarometer*, 2004)

		Q82d-SAF. South Africans first						Total (respons.)
	%	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't know	
Q82. Ethnic or national identity	National identity	5.15	2.7	4.1	35.4	52.4	0.2	1436
	Ethnic group	6.3	12.9	14.2	17.6	22.3	0.86	583
	Not applicable	7.9	1.12	3.6	40.4	46.3	0.56	356
	Don't know	4	12	28	36	16	4	25
Total		5.8	5.00	6.75	38.00	43.8	0.46	2400

The first and most striking observation on South Africa is that most respondents prefer to be identified as South Africans first and foremost. Even those who still have strong attachment with their ethnicity agree overwhelmingly – by 40 percent – that they are South Africans first and foremost. This percentage of being “*South Africans first*” is much higher among those who revere national identity – about 88 percent of the respondents. By 82 percent, South Africans – both categories combined – would rather identify with their citizenship than with anything else.

Do these high percentages on social identity necessarily translate into acrimony among different groups living together? In question Q71c, *Afrobarometer* asked individuals “*In your experience how often do violent conflicts arise between people within the community where you live?*” (Table 5).

Table 5: Violent conflicts between groups within the country (based on data drawn from *Afrobarometer*, 2004)

Q71c. Violent conflicts between groups in country								
	Missing %	Never %	Rarely %	Some-times %	Often %	Always %	Don't Know %	Total (respond.)
Botswana	0	31.75	14.4	30.00	10.00	4.00	10.00	1200
Ghana	0	32.7	14.2	39.00	12.4	2.7	7.5	1200
Lesotho	0	10.00	19.00	23.7	31.3	5.75	10.00	1200
Malawi	0.16	36.00	27.00	16.4	10.3	3.5	6.8	1200
Mali	0	28.00	22.7	23.00	16.00	2.9	7.2	1200
Namibia	0.16	39.6	15.4	26.9	10.6	3.2	4.00	1199
Nigeria	0	11.6	13.3	40.8	21.5	11.6	1.11	2428
South Africa	0	32.5	11.3	26.3	14.3	7.9	7.6	1400
Tanzania	0	35.8	12.8	30.4	17.7	1.00	2.20	1223
Uganda	0.20	6.4	13.6	44.7	20.3	9.08	5.7	2400
Zambia	0	52.2	15.9	23.4	5.4	2.75	0.17	1198

Cape Verde	0	57.2	10.9	12.1	8.44	2.8	8.6	1268
Kenya	0.17	15.4	19.1	42.4	17.6	3.00	2.12	2398
Mozamb	0.36	48.1	10.4	9.00	8.4	6.7	16.8	1400
Senegal	0.6	24.00	27.9	28.00	12.00	0.7	6.75	1200
Total	0.11	27.6	16	29.8	15.2	5.24	6.00	23197

To this question, Nigeria and South Africa are among the top three in the *always* category, with respectively 11.6 percent and 8 percent. These numbers are striking compared to most other countries such as Senegal (0.7 percent), Tanzania (1 percent), and Zambia (less than 3 percent). In the *rarely* category, the same pattern is also visible, with Nigeria (13.3 percent) and South Africa (11.3 percent) at the bottom two spots of the continent. These numbers are considerably big, given the average on the continent (16 percent).

In general three nations on the continent – Nigeria, Uganda and South Africa – show significantly high percentage of intergroup conflicts. South Africans (48.5 percent) answered having *sometimes*, *often*, or *always* experienced intergroup conflicts in their country. In Nigeria and Uganda, respondents testified with a much greater majority (up to 74 percent) having either *sometimes*, or *often*, or *always* witnessed or been part of conflicts involving different communities within their country. The unprecedentedly high number of conflicts in Uganda will be discussed later in this section. By comparison, 23 percent of Cape Verdeans, 24 percent of Mozambicans, and 30 percent of Malawians gave similar answers (*Figure 5 in Appendix*).

However not all conflicts between groups in a society can be referred to as social identity caused or xenophobia-driven. Indeed in Uganda, there is another type of conflict that has been going on for close to three decades. However, unlike the conflicts opposing

different socio-cultural groups in Nigeria, or those opposing South Africans to foreigners, the decades-long war in Uganda opposed the rebels of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to the Government of Uganda (GoU).⁴⁰ This generation-long war has almost become a part of everyday life in the country; and this may explain why most Ugandan respondents (74 percent) testified having *sometimes, often, or always* witnessed violent conflicts. This war, albeit lengthy and destructive, does not oppose different social groups, but a social group to the central government. Therefore, it does not fit into the category I have selected to work on.

To put everything into perspective, I have selected additional data pertaining to xenophobic feelings. To apply the general definition of xenophobia, *Afrobarometer* asked a follow-up question Q84d. intended to determine how much trust each South African really has vis-à-vis his or her neighbors: *Do you trust people from other ethnic groups?*

Table 6 : Crosstabulation of "South African" Identity and Trust in Others (based on data drawn from *Afrobarometer*, 2004)

		Q82d-SAF. South Africans first						Total (responses)
%		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't know	
Q84d. Trust people from other ethnic groups	Not at all	7.9	7.2	8.6	40	34.9	1.3	455
	Just a little	4.6	6.2	7.5	41	40.3	0.33	908
	Somewhat	5.05	2.9	5.7	37.3	48.9	0.13	732
	A lot	8.5	3.7	4.8	25.9	57.00	0.00	270
	Don't know	5.7	0.00	0.00	48.6	42.8	2.8	35
	Total	5.8	5.00	6.75	38.00	43.8	0.45	2400

⁴⁰ Invisible Children, "History of the War," *Invisible Children Online* [Uganda Today]; available from <http://www.invisiblechildren.com/about/history/>; Internet; accessed 23 April 2009.

South Africans are so nationalist that they tend to trust other local ethnicities more than they do foreigners. Those who *trust people from other ethnic groups* are by far the strongest supporters of the nationalistic identity, and those who are more suspicious of other ethnic groups are relatively more opposed to the notion of *South Africans first*. In general, most South Africans – by 82 percent – *agree* or *strongly agree* to be identified as South Africans first and foremost. Now that I have analyzed the series of data pertaining to in-group identity issues and their impact on intergroup conflicts, is my first hypothesis tested?

1.2.5. Different definitions of identity for different cases of xenophobia

I previously said that I intend to show that a greater emphasis on intragroup identity leads to greater chances of enmity among different groups. From the results of my data analysis, I have realized that social identity does play a paramount role, yet not a monolithic one in prompting individuals against one another.

Nigerians are hostile to one another, and often opt for violence primarily for three main reasons: first they are deeply attached to their socio-cultural identities. About one in two Nigerians considers their ethnic, linguistic and religious identity more than anything else. For about 50 percent of Nigerians, materialistic and other rational conditions do not mean much compared to the significance of being part of one's social group. A closer analysis of the current intergroup acrimony between southern states and the northern states in Nigeria reveals that they are deeply rooted in some irrational bases of ethnic, cultural and religious incompatibility or their failures to peacefully coexist. Therefore yes, with higher intragroup identification, chances of violent clashes are much greater.

In South Africa, the majority respondents just want indeed to be referred to as South Africans first and foremost. Their social identity is the same as their national one, and national borders and citizenship are the tools which help define the otherness. Sharing South African citizenship increases trust people have toward one another, and aggravates the enmity they have towards the outsiders. The rationale behind this feeling may be seen as the necessity to unite in order to protect the common patrimony, but the irrational result is that the techniques used to identify non-South Africans are subjective and sometimes arbitrary, such as through language tests.

Secondly, Nigerians and South Africans are deeply hostile to their presumed foreigners. Overwhelmingly, Nigerian respondents hold confrontational feelings towards those they consider outsiders. Indeed more than three quarters of Nigerians have witnessed some sort of physical or psychological violence among different groups in the country. When different communities and ethnic groups – and Nigeria has hundreds of them – rely on violence to defend and protect their highly cherished socio-cultural identity, the obvious outcome will be a mutual and perpetual destruction of cultural and religious items and edifices. In some cases, belligerents, out of faithful devotion for their in-group identity, go even farther to push for complete cleansing or complete elimination, which leads to mass murders as well as potential internal exoduses. This is exactly what the press and other news media have been reporting recently about Nigeria.

In the Rainbow Nation intergroup conflicts are also frequent, not only through the survey data, but also in everyday life as reported by the media. Xenophobic attacks, along with other security issues such as rapes and robberies, have made South Africa one

of the most dangerous countries on the planet.⁴¹ With most South Africans thinking they prefer their national identity to any other sort of identity, the major outcome of this choice is that nationality would become the prime source and proof of identity, and as a result, xenophobia could be institutionalized and become much more aggressive. For instance, being able to speak local languages or practice local costumes would no longer guarantee better treatment, for it would no longer be groups attacking groups; it would be a nation purging against the non nationals. Therefore, the equation nationality = identity shared by many South Africans has an implicit agenda of national identity distinctiveness. So based on this information I am in the position to say that, by stressing the necessity of converting all sub-identities into the larger national one, South Africans are expressing their willingness to remain a distinctive nation from which all “impurities” must be eliminated.

If there is a lesson to be learned from the data above and *Tables 7 and 8 in Appendix*, it is that people do not just fight over money or any other materialistic goods; people do fight to defend, promote, or preserve the integrity of their identity. In fact, in Nigeria, ethnic, religious and linguistic differences amount for most of the causes of intergroup conflicts (about 38 percent). In South Africa, one may assume that the reason why the majority of the respondents chose *other* as the prime cause of violent conflicts is the absence of *national identity* option. Unfortunately most analysts seem to consistently view the issue on the exclusive basis of *homo economicus*. For example, countries like Ghana, Mali, and Mozambique, where most people point to resources and economic inequalities as causes of conflicts (*Figure 6 in Appendix*), are not the most cited as

⁴¹ Carolyn Dempster, “SA targets rampant crime.” *BBC News* (Monday, 8 April 2002), [e-journal] <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1913618.stm>> (accessed 23 April 2009).

examples of xenophobia-caused violence on the continent. In fact none of these nations has significantly experienced xenophobic incidents in the recent years. More importantly, in Botswana, seen as one of the few monoethnic nations on the continent – with a tiny number of ethnic minorities – the majority of the respondents (19 percent) think that ethnic and tribal differences are the primary causes of intergroup conflicts. Therefore, the realistic conflict theory, which contends that materialistic needs are the first and the most important reason why people fight one another, cannot apply to this case. Scarcity of jobs usually put forward as the main reason why xenophobic attacks occur, does not explain the entirety of the issue either. For instance in their search of the causes of the xenophobic outbreaks in South Africa, the first hypotheses some analysts came out with revolved around the impact of the immigrants on the socioeconomic balance of the host-communities and the government's political and legislative responsibilities:

More than 50 people died and tens of thousands of people were displaced as a result of 'xenophobic' violence in South Africa during 2008. A number of urgent questions resulted from these attacks: Why are foreign African migrants the targets of violence in informal settlements? What is the explanation for the timing, location and scale of the outbreaks? Was this sudden and unexpected or was it predictable? And, what are the main drivers behind this violence? This rapid response study was conducted to inform policymakers, identify areas where more research is needed and to think through how to prevent further outbreaks. Five themes were identified as being critical to the emergence of tensions:

- the role of government
- the scale of the influx of 'migrants'
- the impact of migrants on gender dynamic
- the pace of housing policy and the administration of housing
- the politics of economic livelihoods and the competition for resources.⁴²

⁴² Democracy and Governance Programme Human Sciences Research Council, "Migration: Citizenship, violence and xenophobia in South Africa: perceptions from South African communities," *Eldis Online* [Migration on-line]; available from <http://www.eldis.org/go/topics/resource-guides/migration&id=37809&type=Document>; Internet; accessed 23 April 2009.

This list of presumed causes of xenophobia in South Africa is incomplete or needs to be completely updated, for it focuses mostly on the rational aspects of the issue and ignores the important role group differences play in triggering conflicts. This long list of factors presented by Human Sciences Research Council may well be addressed by the government; however this would serve only to abate the tension. As long as the core factor – the one related to identity issues and lack of cross-cultural comprehension – is not fully addressed, the bubble could burst again sooner or later.

2. Xenophobia as the Cause of Multiple Failures in African Integration

A regional integration can be defined as “a preferential (usually reciprocal agreement among countries that reduces barriers to economic and noneconomic transactions.”⁴³ If there is a lesson to be learned from the post-World War reconstruction period, it is that cooperation is a key to durable stability and trust among nations. Right after and even during World War II, the western allies realized that an important factor to the animosity among them was the lack of mutual understanding fueled by the extreme rigidity of the national borders. To remedy the issue and avoid similar catastrophes in the future, a new global structure needed to be installed. In their search for ideas likely to reduce mistrust and foster prosperity on the planet, experts on the field of conflict resolution and socioeconomic integration came up with ambitious plans of cooperation

⁴³ Economic Commission for Africa: ECA Policy Research. *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa Report*, 9.

and global government. From United Nations and its affiliations to the variety of international monetary and financial institutions, to the global market system, the newer deal had collected all the necessary ingredients to make the world smaller and peace more than a necessity.

2.1. International sociopolitical organizations

The United Nations, unlike its predecessor League of Nations, came to life with a wider support from across the globe. Also unlike the League of Nations, the United Nations had a better structure and was assigned greater responsibilities with the end goal that events of 1939-1945 should not happen anymore. The UN became the global stage for dialogue and problem solving. There was a belief that dialogue and mutual solidarity among communities, as well as intergroup tolerance could facilitate cross-cultural communication, which was seen as a key to ending hatred: “to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors.”⁴⁴ Even nations, such as the United States, primarily opposed to President Wilson’s idea of League of Nations, had come to realize that isolationism and indifference vis-à-vis global affairs can lead to tragic events. As a result, the U.S. became a heavy weight on the new institution for the past six decades of UN existence. Today, despite many cases of conflicts around the globe (from Democratic Republic of Congo to Sri Lanka, to Sudan), despite criticisms due to flaws and imperfections in some operations⁴⁵, examples are plenty on the different continents to recognize the successes of the New York-based organization.

⁴⁴ Charter of the United Nations, “Preamble,” *UN Charter Index Online* [Charter of the United Nations online]; available from <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>; Internet; accessed 18 April 2009.

⁴⁵ Sandra Whitworth, *Men, militarism, and UN peacekeeping* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 59-60.

2.2. International socioeconomic organizations

On the socioeconomic field, similar global structures, for the first time in human history, came to life with the ambition to deepen interdependence among nations and communities. In fact when interdependence replaces conflicting interests, chances are that the world would end up becoming a global family rather than a battlefield for scarce resources and stereotypical behaviors. This was the agenda which drove western leaders to Bretton Woods to set up the global economic and financial system, which still plays a crucial role around the world. The World Bank was, for example instrumental in the European post-war reconstruction. Ultimately never before in human history had the world become so small and better integrated. Using similar models, many other organizations have been popping up around the world with different outcomes. For instance, the Asian Development Bank, a sixty-seven member institution was founded in 1966 to free Asia and Pacific of poverty, as well as “help its developing member countries reduce poverty and improve the quality of life of their people.”⁴⁶ Today, partly thanks to this vision the Asian and Pacific regions – with countries like India, China, and the Asian Tigers – are among the most flourishing economies in the world.

Another successful example is the European Union (former European Economic Community), which still inspires by its evolution as well as its results. In the Latin American region, the MERCOSUR has relatively successfully become an engine of development and stability among member states. In North America, NAFTA has been credited for having lifted millions out of poverty, although it has many critics. This long

⁴⁶ Asian Development Bank, “About ADB,” *Asian Development Bank Online* [Asian Development Bank: Fighting Poverty in Asia and the Pacific on-line]; available from <http://www.adb.org/default.asp>; Internet; accessed 23 April 2009.

list of successes has inspired African nations to think about regional and continental blocs aimed at ensuring security and prosperity among all member states and their respective citizens. But unlike the previous examples, very few organizations in Africa have proven their viability and sustainability in terms of benefiting public interest and the greater good.

2.3. Interstate organizations in Africa

Today's African Union, born to former Organization of African Unity, still stumbles in its ambitions and has a hard time fulfilling its goals. Unlike in other parts of the world, and due to the ever-increasing divisions among people, the organization looks better on papers than it does in reality. Widespread conflicts and deepening poverty are still defining the lives of millions of civilians. Agreements regarding freedom of movement and common passports, such as the one adopted by members of ECOWAS in 2000, have been regarded by some as a baby step toward a comprehensive integration of the continent as a whole: "During the 23rd session of the ECOWAS leaders held in Abuja in May 2000, the leaders said they were convinced about the need to adopt an ECOWAS passport with a view to facilitating the movement of nationals both within and outside the ECOWAS Community, and consecrating the fact of West African citizenship."⁴⁷ As of today, very few member states have made substantial efforts to implement this agreement. Other nations, such as Liberia have chosen to ignore or down play it.

The NEPAD, which prompted hopes and dreams of African Renaissance across the continent, seems to have reached its limits. Its initiators and the once most outspoken

⁴⁷ Melissa Chea-Annan, "West Africa: Ecowas Passport Takes Precedence," *AllAfrica.com*, [e-journal] <http://allafrica.com/stories/200802270515.html> (accessed 5 March 2009).

advocates for its implementation have over time abated their plea, and the less lucky ones, such as President Mbeki, have ended up paying political prices for their stance on it. Questions have been raised to explain why African nations are not capable of achieving these noble missions of regional and continental integrations. Observers and analysts have never agreed on the primary reasons of these failures, and in the majority of the case studies and reports on the issue, governments tend to solely share the blame. For instance, the 2004 policy report by *Economic Commission for Africa* enumerated the following as being the main reasons why most regional organizations fail to sustain:

- The failure of governments to translate their commitments under regional treaties and arrangements into substantive changes national policies, legislation, rules, and regulations.
- The unwillingness of governments to subordinate immediate national political interests to long-term regional economic goals (which would have had much higher payoffs for long-term national welfare) or to cede essential elements of sovereignty to regional institutions.
- The absence of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to ensure adherence to agreed timetables on such matters as reducing tariffs and nontariff barriers or achieving more difficult objectives, such as macroeconomic stabilization.
- The frequent failure of national policymaking to take into account the provisions of *African Economic Community* and countries' involvement with regional economic communities.⁴⁸

Much of the blame, according of the Commission, seems to go to the governments and their policymaking bodies. This position is among the most widespread from the specialists and experts on the issue. It implies that the top-bottom approach is the most suitable for regional integrations to be successful in Africa. Other analysts have taken a middle-ground approach contending that for Africa to succeed in its efforts of integration and development, governments must consult civil society prior to making

⁴⁸ Economic Commission for Africa: ECA Policy Research Report. *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa*, 43.

important decisions on alliance, and that the quasi-failure of NEPAD, for example, stem from the exclusion of civil society in the policy making or agreement design process:

The lack of African civil society input is reflected in the fact that NEPAD rejects the multitude of alternative African development strategies that have emerged from civil society and academic movements over the past two decades. These include the Lagos Plan of Action (1980) and the Abuja Treaty (1991), African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes (1989), the African Charter for Popular Participation and Development (Arusha Charter, 1990) and the Cairo Agenda (1994).⁴⁹

These widespread and strongly agreed upon explanations for the many failures of integration, however legitimate, seem to raise more questions than they actually answer: are all fifty-three leaders on the continent equally corrupt or incompetent to have identical ways of running their states? If most nations are considered undemocratic on the continent, is there not any exception where civil society's participation could make a difference? Could this very society somehow share responsibility of these failures? The search for answers to these questions has led me to come up with a new hypothesis revolving around the role of the masses in the status quo.

2.4. Explanations of failures in Africa

During our summer trip to Cape Town, we had the opportunity to spend some time at the University of Western Cape, where Professor K. A. Gottschalk⁵⁰, an expert on the African Union and NEPAD issues, pointed to intergroup conflicts across the continent as one of the main causes of these two institutions' failures or at least their

⁴⁹ International Forum on Globalization, "NEPAD: Foothold for Corporate Globalization in Africa," [International Forum on Globalization on-line]; available from http://www.ifg.org/wssd/nepad_juhasz.htm; Internet; accessed 5 March 2009.

⁵⁰ Professor K.A. Gottschalk, Western Cape, South Africa, May 30, 2008.

limited results. The durable union, he said, cannot be possible in the ongoing context of xenophobic attacks on foreigners in Cote D'Ivoire and South Africa for example. African peoples, according to him, are not ready to embark for such an open ended journey. He suggested a new system of education to familiarize children and communities with their share of common dreams and common destiny. At first I was skeptical and thought, just like many people on the continent, that all the blame should be put on the leaders.

A closer analysis of the situation, however, convinced me of how much we tend to underestimate the crucial role of ordinary people if such major projects are to succeed. Europeans have adhered to the idea of uniting in part because they have learned over time that, despite some conflicting material interests, that they have some common economic interests and more significantly they still have a common heritage built on the legacy of the Roman Empire and deeply rooted in their share of Christian, especially Catholic values. Unlike Europeans, Africans have no common cultural identity, and violence is very often used as a means to culturally prevail. This recourse to hate-driven violence, according to my hypothesis, is primarily responsible for the repetitive failures in terms of integration.

As xenophobia among different groups rises, so do the failures of socioeconomic bloc formation on the African continent. Here is how I intend to test this hypothesis: from the survey, some questions test the enthusiasm of different groups with respect to regional, continental, and even global organizations. If the enthusiasm is lower among those who have hard feelings toward others and positive appraisal of their intra-identity, I could then conclude that xenophobic feelings have much to do with the status quo Africa

has been in for many years. Like in the previous hypothesis, I am relying mostly on the findings of *Afrobarometer* showing the different views of the African public opinion regarding these important issues. On one side of the correlation, I present the variable *xenophobia* and on the other side I present the variable *integration*. Both variables consist, each, of a set of data dealing with the specific or related issues.

For the variable *xenophobia*, I have chosen data from questions such as *which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?* or *do you trust people from other ethnic groups?* The rationale behind these data is that it gives a sense of how serious an obstacle identity is to trust and tolerance among people. Based on the answers given, it appears that most Nigerians and South Africans hold their identity to very high esteems, and show little trust to their neighbors. Do these reserves, lack of trust and enmities translate into the way they perceive the plans of oneness, mutual assistance and unity-led development? The next part of the analysis is to gauge the level to which this identity-caused mistrust constitute an obstacle to cooperation among people and integration among nations.

2.5. Africans and regional integration

Another important series of variables I am using is to see how African men and women assess global, continental and regional blocs of integration. The first category of variables deals with the assessment of the United Nations on the different African countries. Q53CNEW asked respondents how they think of the UN in a scale of 0 to 10, and the answers are reported in a spreadsheet along with their country. *Figure 2* is a summary I made out of these answers.




Figure 2 - Africans' assessment of the UN (based on data drawn from *Afrobarometer*, 2004)

The most striking finding is that up to 44 percent of Africans have either no clear knowledge of the UN or not heard enough about it. In this category, Lesotho has the lion share with up to 80 percent of respondents. Other countries above the continent's average are Mozambique (62 percent), South Africa (46 percent). All these countries happen to be members of the SADC (South African Development Community). Later in the assessment of SADC, I will see whether these results are a matter of coincidence.

On the grading scale, 29 percent of Nigerians give a score of 6 or below, compared to 37 percent who give a score of 7 or above. Over one third of South Africans give grades between 0 and 6; and about 19 percent have good or very good regards for the UN. This contrasts drastically with other countries such as Cape Verde, where only 19 percent of respondents do not consider the UN effective enough and one third approve its work.

The next question on assessment is about the effectiveness of AU/OAU (African Union/ Organization of African Unity). Q53ANEW asked respondents to grade the largest continental organization and symbol of Africans' unity. Just like in the case of the UN, Africans of the south seem to be the least aware of what the African organization really stands for. Again, Lesotho leads this group with 85 percent of respondents – an even higher percentage than for the UN – claiming having no knowledge or not enough information about the panafrican organization. In an similar an exact order, Mozambicans follow with 65 percent of the respondents, then South Africans with 51 percent. No other country, in the other regions of the continent, comes even close.

As far as grading goes, more than 39 percent of Nigerians give the AU/OAU grades of 6 and below; while 28 percent have good appraisals of the continental organization. Like for the United Nations, one in three South Africans has a poor assessment of the African Union versus 15 percent who appreciate it. By comparison, 27 percent of Cape Verdeans think AU/OAU deserve a grade 7 or below, and 16 percent are positively appreciative to it.




Figure 3: Assessment of African Union/Organization of African Unity (based on data drawn from Afrobarometer, 2004)

The next organizations respondents were asked to assess are the group of regional organizations from the different corners of the continent. In Q53G_NEW, Africans of the south are asked to assess SADC, West Africans have to grade ECOWAS (Economic Community of West Africans States), and East Africans are asked to share their appreciations of EAC (East African Community). With the same total numbers of respondents, answers vary from regions to regions and from states to states. In this category again, southern states have relatively worse records than other parts of the continent in terms of knowledge about the organization, with Lesotho, Mozambique and South Africa still leading the group.




Figure 4 - Assessment of regional organizations (based on data drawn from *Afrobarometer*, 2004)

With percentages of 65 percent for both Lesotho and Mozambique, and 51 percent in South Africa, responders acknowledge having little or no knowledge whatsoever regarding SADC. On the west coast of the continent, Cape Verdeans have the worst record with up to 60 percent of responders ignoring the existence of ECOWAS, followed by Nigerians with 30 percent. On the east coast, at least one in every three Kenyans admits knowing little or nothing about EAC, and 42 percent of Tanzanians admit the same thing.

On the scoreboard, the results are not monolithic and vary as well according to regions and states. According to 28 percent of South Africans, SADC deserve a grade of 6 or lower, whereas 20 percent give a good grade to the regional organization. Close to one quarter of Nigerians do not appreciate the role of ECOWAS, and 45 percent salute

the greatness of the West African organization. On the east coast, 28 percent of Kenyans give high marks to their regional organization, and 37 percent do not appreciate it much. Now that result by country are revealed, it is important to find out what identity groups are more favorable to regional and international organization, and which ones are more opposed to it. This will allow me to see if identity perception has any role in how people rate organizations.

In a crosstabulation (*Tables 9 & 10 in Appendix*) between variables *identity group* and *Effectiveness of AU/OAU*, the most striking result is that people who identify more with their occupation are about as clueless about the organization (44 percent) as those who identify with their language, tribe and ethnicity (48 percent). Another interesting finding is that, among those who claim to not differentiate between national identities – and presumably the most identity-tolerant group and probably the most internationalists – over 31 percent do not appreciate the role of AU/OAU, compared to only 16 percent who have positive appraisals for the organization. Another group that does not give good grades to the AU/OAU is the one which identify with ethnicity, tribes and language, with 30 percent of disapproval marks compared to 21 percent of respondents who think the panafrican organization is doing a great job.

In the crosstabulation between *identity group* and *effectiveness of SADC/ECOWAS/EAC*, the grades, again, followed some identity lines. In this category, there is a better appreciation among those who identify mostly with their ethnic/tribe/linguistic group (32 percent of the respondents), compared to 23 percent who give bad grades and 45 percent saying they have little or no knowledge at all about their regional organization. The biggest surprise comes once again from those who claim to

make no difference of national identity, and whom one can a priori consider more open to diversity and internationalism. Indeed about one in two respondents of this category does not know what these regional organizations do or stand for.

2.6. Shared responsibilities of failures

As stated earlier, the hypothesis was intended to test whether xenophobia-related animosity comes with deficient willingness to integrate and cooperate. I wanted to see whether countries with highest percentages of intergroup hatred – Nigeria and South Africa for example – are obstacles to integration. Per most of my statistical results, what I have found convinces me that my hypothesis is not confirmed, or at least more work is needed to for more complete conclusion. Indeed *Table 11 & 12 (Appendix)* show that respondents' appraisal is scattered in almost all the categories of conflict occurrence. About one third of the respondents, who testify having *always* seen intergroup conflicts, gives good grades to the regional organizations; another third gives them bad grades. 30 percent of those who *rarely* see violent conflicts think that regional organizations are not effective, and about the same percentage (30.5 percent) gives them high marks.

Another important finding is that, on the continental level, most countries tend to prefer more local organizations to the larger ones. Therefore, ECOWAS is preferred to the African Union in Nigeria, and South Africans are relatively more satisfied with SADC than they are with the African Union. While 20 percent of South Africans contend that SADC deserve a passing score, only 15.5 percent have the same feeling about that African Union. On the west coast, a majority of Nigerians (45.5 percent) give 7 or above to ECOWAS, while only 28 percent of the respondents think that the African Union deserves a passing score. These preferences can be explained by cultural and

ethnic proximity. In fact given the overlapping identity maps across countries in Africa, neighboring nations tend to share some cultural communalities, and therefore people still feel relatively more comfortable with their likes even across their national border. They tend to be more negative about organizations far from their neighborhoods, which *de facto* have thinner chances of sharing their ethnic or linguistic identities.

Above all, the biggest concern, and the best shared pattern among all the categories, lies on the huge number – 44.5 percent of the respondents – of people who claim to have no clue about such organizations. Despite the clear divide from region to region in the ways people perceive and appreciate regional organizations, it is true that most nations share the huge burden of misinformed citizens vis-à-vis the importance of cooperation and integration. Here again reasons are multiple and responsibilities are multifaceted.

The most convincing sign – although limited to one country – of support for my hypothesis comes from South Africa. Despite living in the most liberal and expansionist nation of Africa, South Africans are among those who make the smallest efforts to learn about their surroundings. If the decades-old institutions such as OAU and SADC are still unknown to most South Africans, what could be expected about newer organizations such as NEPAD? An answer to this question fully confirmed my data. In fact, according to a survey conducted in 2002 by *Markinor*, “knowledge of NEPAD is very low among the general South African public. Of the 3,500 adults surveyed in urban and rural areas, 80% knew nothing at all about NEPAD.” Worse, “the majority of people polled were

unsure of whether NEPAD could or would benefit them.”⁵¹ Previously, in the first part of my paper, I discovered that and South Africans tend to be more concerned about building one national identity; and this second section confirms the notion that more and more people seem to care less about what goes on on the other sides of their borders. Therefore the recent push for identity cleansing in some South African regions explains these results.

Conclusion

This research gave me the unique opportunity to see and analyze Africa’s problems from a whole new perspective. It has been decades since this continent has been independent – at least some parts of it – and for so long there have been very few signs of improvement of social conditions and no tangible progress on the economic front. For so long conflicts have torn apart any chances of prosperity and no one really seems to know the exact source of perpetual acrimony among Africans; which makes it hard to come up with durable solutions to all the problems. Many factors may play important roles in the everlasting gridlock:

Maybe because the causes of African problems are more complex than we tend to think, and as confusing as *Figure 6 (Appendix)*, because Africans have given a much

⁵¹ Kathryn Sturman, “NEPAD and Civil Society in South Africa: Buying in without selling out,” *Africa Watch* (n.d.), [e-journal] <<http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/13No1/AWSturman.pdf>> (accessed 4 March, 2009).

longer list of the causes than the ones analysts seem to be interested in. Or maybe for so long analysts have seen in the African leaders the sole scapegoats of all the problems the continent is in. Or maybe, we have spent too much time analyzing effects and reporting facts than really digging deeply to find the true roots of the crises. Or maybe some have come to conclude that African problems are innate to Africans and therefore unsolvable. Or just maybe analysts and decision-making bodies have continued to ignore the important role identity can play and does play in most conflicts the continent is undergoing. Experts have indeed focused their full intention so much on the economic and materialistic side of the matter that they have become short-sighted, or that they just choose to explore other possible alternatives.

This continued rationalization of conflicts led some to even see economic reasons in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, where belligerents' intent was more about purging others from their social groups than about taking control of all of the national resources. This rationalization of group conflicts also led many to not see the effects of the social identity theory in the ongoing battles between Muslims/Hausa and Christians/Yoruba in Nigeria. To my view, and according to my findings, no economic reasons could fully explain the destruction of mosques and churches. All conflicts are not rational and social identities must not and should not be ignored when seeking durable solutions.

This rational view finally led some to conclude that the recent xenophobic attacks in South Africa were exclusively caused by job scarcity. No job scarcity can explain language tests foreigners were subjected to, for Zulu is not the only language in the country and not every South African speaks it. Language tests create loophole, because some non-nationals may happen to speak it better than some nationals. In this case, by

assumption, the national would fail his or her test and be forced to leave. This would stop looking like an operation against foreigners, and more like against non-Zulus instead.

By expanding the list of causes, one may finally be able to find a cure to the core one and hence find a more durable solution acceptable to most. The best alternative should be to intensify intergroup dialogues and encourage frank cross-cultural communication likely to help people find what they have in common as human beings, and what differentiates them from one another culturally and that they ought to work to find common grounds for. Indeed, and based on my findings, I have come to conclude that yes material reasons are part of the factors; yes leaders have failed in their responsibility to unite rather than divide; yes colonial legacy and neocolonialism are also to blame; yes the nation-state system is too complex on the continent. Nevertheless, identity-driven enmity is also responsible and must not be ignored.

As far as integration failures are concerned, I was not able to establish an exclusive correlation between xenophobia and failures of integration. This is not to say that there is not any, but rather to show that there are many factors. The problem revolves more around a serious dose of misinformation or a total lack of information. Education is therefore the best recommendation possible to overcome this problem. Nevertheless, if education is necessary for masses to understand, it cannot exclude personal willingness and desire to learn. Countries where regional organizations are least known or heard of on the continent are not necessarily those that lag behind in terms of literacy rate. It takes governments' will to ensure education to all, but for this to succeed, individual input is also necessary. For instance the media are blamed for not

making enough efforts at providing information and that is why people do not know much about the many organizations. Leaders are accused of not teaching their populations about the usefulness and merits of regional and continental organizations. Even though all these accusations are legitimate, those who make them tend to ignore an important factor to the problem.

If the government is able to raise the literacy rate to 85 percent in Lesotho – with expenditures amounting to 13 percent of total GDP⁵², and 85 percent know nothing about African Union or other international organizations, this raises serious questions of personal responsibilities. The beauty about the studies is that people can manage to learn for themselves even after they are no longer students. The African Union holds its summits at different regions of the continent on a regular basis. Extraordinary meetings are held as well and it takes lots of negligence or carelessness to not hear about them.

If 86 percent of South Africans are considered literate⁵³ and one in two citizen chooses to ignore the existence of AU, I think the government should not be solely held responsible. Even in the regions and countries where the literacy rate is relatively lower – such as Cape Verde (77 percent and Mali (46 percent) – people seem more informed about the international institutions than do their southern counterparts. This is to say that it would be misleading to always find evil in the others and not explore all options. There is no doubt that many African leaders ignore the extent of their responsibilities for their constituents. However a much deeper analysis leads me to realize that there is a lot more

⁵² CIA – The World Factbook, “Lesotho,” *The World Factbook Online* [Central Intelligence Agency on-line]; available from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>; Internet; 23 April 2009.

⁵³ CIA – The World Factbook, “South Africa,” *The World Factbook Online* [Central Intelligence Agency on-line]; available from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>; Internet; 23 April 2009.

blaming to go around than what we have been doing so far. In many countries in Africa, classes about AU, ECOWAS, UN and its affiliations and many others are taught starting in the early years of schooling through high school. The role of each student should be not to forget once he or she is out of classroom.

My paper may appear not totally conclusive because it too focuses on one aspect of the causes of African problems. Nevertheless, I have touched two important fields rarely explored before: identity and xenophobia and their link to integration failures. Thanks to what I have come up with through this exercise, I am convinced that we should always consider everything, since it is difficult to tell what factor really matters more than others. This paper is not intended to point the finger to Africans and say that they are responsible of their current misery; it is instead intended to explore other possible solutions to these issues. It is not meant to say Africans are responsible of their underdevelopment, instead it is meant to encourage people for more personal responsibilities.

Appendix




Figure 5: Violent conflicts arising between different groups in the countries (based on survey data from Afrobarometer, 2004)




Figure 6: Causes of violent conflicts between groups in countries (based on survey data by Afrobarometer, 2004)

Table 7: Causes of Violent Conflicts (Source: Afrobarometer, 2004)

%	Botswana	Cape Verde	Ghana	Kenya	Lesotho	Malawi	Mali	Mozam
Politics/Political Leadership	10	12	12	19	16	23	7	17
Resource/Boundaries/Land Disputes	12	<1	20	29	15	7	20	4
Economic Problems/Poverty/Econ. Inequalities	3	11	3	8	4	5	18	25
Ethnic/Tribal Differences	19	<1	5	9	1	9	4	4
Personal Behaviors/Lack of Respect	16	21	6	5	12	9	7	7

Poor Communication/ Disagreements	4	10	12	2	9	14	9	6
Interpersonal/ Family Matters	1	1	6	3	5	6	11	2
Alcohol/ Drugs	2	15	1	1	14	9	0	3
Religion	<1	1	3	1	3	2	1	1
Traditional Leadership Disputes	15	0	16	0	<1	2	<1	<1
Discrimination/ Inequalities	8	8	2	1	<1	2	2	4
Crime	2	4	1	2	9	5	2	5
Animals/ Livestock	<1	0	0	14	2	0	10	0
Other	8	18	13	8	9	7	9	24

Table 8: Causes of Conflicts - Cont'd (Source: *Afrobarometer*, 2004)

	Namibia	Nigeria	Senegal	South Africa	Tanzania	Uganda	Zambia	Afro- Mean
Politics/Political Leadership	7	16	11	20	22	20	18	16
Resource/Boundaries/ Land Disputes	5	21	13	8	12	14	13	15
Economic Problems/Poverty/Econ. Inequalities	13	7	10	9	12	16	8	10
Ethnic/Tribal Differences	8	14	9	9	6	7	11	8
Personal Behaviors/Lack of Respect	13	3	11	3	10	5	9	8
Poor Communication/ Disagreements	8	1	8	7	3	5	5	7
Interpersonal/ Family Matters	7	1	8	4	4	9	5	5
Alcohol/ Drugs	19	<1	<1	3	4	5	4	5
Religion	1	24	2	2	7	3	1	4

Traditional Leadership Disputes	<1	2	<1	1	<1	<1	5	3
Discrimination/ Inequalities	4	2	3	5	3	3	3	3
Crimes	5	<1	3	5	3	3	3	3
Animals/ Livestock	1	<1	0	0	2	1	0	3
Other	10	8	22	26	13	11	16	12

Table 9: Crosstabulation *Identity* and *AU/OAU Effectiveness* (based on data drawn from *Afrobarometer*, 2004)

	Missing	00 = Very Badly	1	2	3	4	5	6
Missing data	10	12	1	9	11	8	20	7
Can't explain	0	0	2	0	2	1	4	7
Language/tribe/ethnic group	1	61	62	110	158	269	559	400
Race	0	10	12	15	27	37	61	34
Region	0	4	0	2	6	4	6	4
Religion	3	49	33	66	120	158	335	184
Occupation	1	124	92	195	289	379	695	438
Class	0	33	28	35	77	104	204	116
Gender	0	10	21	35	67	89	159	86
Individual/personal	0	4	2	3	10	16	19	15
Won't differentiate/National identity	1	51	45	75	105	192	313	197
Traditional leader	0	1	0	0	1	2	1	1

Political party identity	0	3	0	2	1	6	5	2
Age-related	0	3	2	9	11	7	19	10
African/West African/Pan African	0	3	4	5	5	11	23	16
Island	0	1	1	2	1	1	4	2
Portuguese	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1
American	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0
Family/relationship-based (e.g., wife, parent, widow, etc.)	0	1	3	9	9	10	15	5
Marginalized group (e.g., disabled, etc.)	0	1	0	3	1	2	2	1
Other	0	3	2	1	4	4	14	10
Refused to answer	0	2	3	3	6	8	22	23
Don't know	0	7	6	7	16	15	39	16

Table 10: Crosstabulation *Identity* and *AU/OAU Effectiveness* – *Cont'd*

Q54. Identity group		7	8	9	10 = Very Well	Don't know/H aven't heard enough	Total
	Missing data	13	13	8	25	237	374
	Can't explain	3	1	0	1	32	53
	Language/tribe/ethnic group	349	273	120	406	2586	5354
	Race	16	17	14	23	236	502

Region	12	6	0	7	65	116
Religion	180	170	68	258	1397	3021
Occupation	395	305	116	418	2748	6195
Class	111	89	47	136	714	1694
Gender	68	50	20	62	366	1033
Individual/personal	12	8	7	6	100	202
Won't differentiate/National identity	151	110	53	194	1614	3101
Traditional leader	1	2	2	1	15	27
Political party identity	3	1	1	5	16	45
Age-related	15	7	3	5	102	193
African/West African/Pan African	17	15	5	22	102	228
Island	2	1	0	0	30	45

Portuguese	1	3	0	1	8	17
American	0	0	0	0	2	5
Family/relationship-based (e.g., wife, parent, widow, etc.)	12	7	4	3	60	138
Marginalized group (e.g., disabled, etc.)	0	0	2	0	5	17
Other	4	6	2	7	47	104
Refused to answer	14	18	7	22	120	248
Don't know	18	13	13	36	299	485
Total	1397	1115	492	1638	10901	23197

Table 11: Violent Conflicts and Effectiveness of SADC/ECOWAS/EAC (based on survey data of Afrobarometer, 2004)

		Missing	00 = Very Badly	1	2	3	4	5	6
Q71c. Violent conflicts between groups in country	Missing	19.2	0	3.8	7.7	3.8	7.7	7.7	0
	Never	0.1	1.2	0.73	1.5	1.8	2.7	6.4	5.00
	Rarely	0.1	1.4	1.2	2.00	3.3	4.6	8.7	8.4

Sometimes	0	1.3	1.7	2.2	3.2	4.4	9.3	7.4
Often	0	1.8	1.4	2.5	3.1	4.8	8.4	7.4
Always	0.1	3.4	1.6	3.6	3.5	4.5	8.00	8.00
Don't Know	0.2	1.8	0.9	1.2	1.4	2.3	3.00	3.00
Refused	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table 12: Violent Conflicts and Effectiveness of SADC/ECOWAS/EAC – Cont'd

	7	8	9	10 = Very Well	Don't know/Hav en't heard enough	Total
Missing	0	11.5	3.8	3.8	30.8	26
Never	6.2	5.8	5.00	9.9	53.3	6401
Rarely	7.8	7.6	5.8	9.3	39.5	3716
Q71c. Violent conflicts between groups in country Sometimes	8.6	8.00	6.5	9.00	38.2	6907
Often	7.8	8.2	4.7	10.4	29.3	3527
Always	7.7	5.8	4.4	13.4	35.8	1215
Don't Know	3.1	3.4	3.2	6.4	69.7	1404
Refused	100	0	0	0	0	1
Total	7.3	7.00	5.4	9.6	44.5	23197

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