United States economic assistance to Poland since 1957: foreign policy implications for the United States

Why should United States economic assistance to certain Community countries stimulate so much controversy from time to time in the United States? Why should so much emotion be displayed regarding United States foreign policy in this area? It may be because the mere thought of aiding Communist countries puzzles certain people who believe that the Communists are our sworn enemies. It may be because the rigid policy the United States has followed toward the Communist bloc has caused the public to feel that there can be no possible change in the Communist bloc. An "either-or" policy has handcuffed the American public, and the lack of information on United States foreign policy toward the Communist bloc has made the people prone to emotional manipulation. Since the death of Stalin, change has occurred in the Soviet bloc; but here in the United States we were slow to recognize and exploit such change. Rigid legal restrictions enacted in times of Communist expansion curbed the flexibility of United States foreign policy during the latter part of the 1950's. Consequently, a hard line was followed in our foreign policy at a time when it might have been advantageous to employ a flexible policy by granting aid to captive nations who made an attempt to loosen their ties with the Soviet Union. It appears that the events in Poland after the Poznan riots caught the United States off guard. There is a question as to whether the United States really possessed any policy which would have been able to cope with a situation such as occurred in Poland in 1956. There is little doubt that the United States desired to assist Poland, and such assistance was eventually granted, but was it in the best way or by the best possible means? The move to assist Poland was slow when possibly faster action should have been called for. In the following work, the problems of United States assistance to Poland are reviewed in an attempt to determine what part economic assistance might play in challenging the monolithic unity of the Soviet bloc.