U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS IN THE ARMS EMBARGO PERIOD 1974-1980 (UNITED STATES, CYPRUS; INFLUENCE)

The alliance relationship between the United States and Turkey has been beset with difficulties on both sides. This has been especially true since the United States imposed an arms embargo against its NATO ally following the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus in 1974. This study examines the effectiveness of the arms embargo (and by extension, other sanctions and embargos) as a tool of influence in effecting changes in the foreign policy of alliance partners. The literature on alliance theory and use of sanctions is reviewed to develop theoretical tools with which to examine the Turkish arms embargo. Additionally, the study proposes that certain historical factors, notably the Eastern Question and the Capitulations play a major role in Turkish foreign policy attitudes, and that the United States, in the embargo period did not take these factors into account. The evolution of the relationship between the United States and Turkey from the Treaty of 1830 to the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement of 1980 is discussed, with particular attention to the factors involved in the Turkish decision to intervene in Cyprus, and the factors that led the United States to impose the embargo. The Turkish decision to intervene in Cyprus is analyzed in terms of the bureaucratic politics paradigm as applied to a weak parliamentary system. Details are based on the author's experiences in Turkey, and on the Turkish press. The Turkish decision was based on domestic factors, primarily the desire on the part of the Ecevit government to strengthen its position, and the U.S. decision was primarily an outcome of the "Watergate" crisis, with a strong legislature dominating a weakened executive. The conclusion is that a tool of influence, the arms embargo, is widely used by the United States, without regard to the fact that it is ineffective in modifying foreign policy behavior of other states. The embargo does, however, serve some domestic political goals and is therefore likely to continue to be used as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. In the case of the Turkish embargo, the experiences of Turkey with foreign intervention made the embargo not only ineffective, but counterproductive.