To End the War, or to Keep Fighting: When Small Allies Resist the Demands of Great Powers

Why would weaker allies refuse to comply with the great power’s demands even when the latter threatens punishment? The alliance scholarship tells us that the great power's failure to persuade is usually due to a threat that lacks credibility. However, some threats are seen as credible. Thus, the puzzle: why do weaker allies sometimes not comply even when they perceive the great power as capable and likely to impose severe punishment? This dissertation uses historical case studies and process tracing to examine how allied governments conceptualize the consequences of responding to a great power’s pressure for compliance.
This dissertation identifies "saliency of issue" and "saliency of timeframe" as each relevant factor. First, the great power’s threat or inducements might not address the specific issue salient to the targeted ally. Second, the threats or inducements might also not address the specific timeframe related to compliance that is salient to the targeted ally. My dissertation has studied three cases of alliance conflicts primarily over the signing of armistices: the Korean War (1950-1953), the Vietnam War (1964-1973), and the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989). In each case, the superpower demanded an armistice while the ally refused. I argue that the allied government resisted due to the perception that the political threat to its rule would be more severe in case of compliance. I also argue that the noncompliance occurred because the threats and inducements did not coincide with the timeframe when the allied government felt greater security vulnerability. The allied governments in the case studies did “comply” eventually, but after the superpower addressed political concerns and timeframe that were salient to the allied government. This dissertation contributes to the alliance literature by studying intra-alliance conflicts from the weaker allies' perspective to show why weak allies sometimes do not comply and to understand better the gap in the cost perception between the great power and its allies.