The political economy of regime change: A case study of Greece
The subject of this dissertation is the process of change from military to civilian rule in Greece in 1974. My concerns are predominantly conceptual and analytic rather than descriptive. Three civil-military configurations of rule are identified in praetorian societies: a civil-military configuration, whereby both civilian and military actors have autonomous input in politics and where no relation of subordination exists between them; a civil-military configuration of military hegemony and civilian subordination; and a civil-military configuration of civilian hegemony and military subordination. My main concern lies with the analysis of the process of change from military to civilian hegemony. My principal assumption is that regime transitions are marked by uncertainty and structural fluidity. Structural variables define the parameters but do not determine the process or the outcome of regime change. Unlike revolutions, transitions are changes from above that bring about significant political changes but little, if any, immediate socioeconomic change. I conceptualize the process of transition from military to civilian hegemony as a set of strategic games among rational civilian and military actors promoting different transitional strategies. This study's aim is threefold: to explain regime transition in Greece; to suggest generalizations for transitions in other praetorian societies; and to apply game theory to civil-military relations.