The Failures of U.S. Policy in Afghanistan and the Lessons Learned

The stated goal of U.S. policy in Afghanistan is to create a stable and secure country. My thesis aims to prove that U.S. policy has failed to accomplish this because it attempted to do too much in a disorganized and uncoordinated manner and without prioritization. The mission for too long lacked "unity of effort" and failed to determine an all-encompassing end-goal. The varying actors did not coordinate their efforts between themselves, nor did they coordinate with the Afghans themselves. U.S. policy did not adequately prepare Afghanistan to assume responsibility after transition. It failed to build Afghan capacity and has thus failed to create a stable and secure country. My thesis will argue that these are the reasons behind U.S. policy failure in Afghanistan, but will also consider what lessons the international community and the U.S. have learned from them and what improvements in policy have been made since.