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THE DIPLOMATIC CAREER OF ALVEY AUGUSTUS ALAN.  
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE BOXER REBELLION

by

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in Partial Fulfillment of  
the Requirements for the Degree  
of  
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## INTRODUCTION

The work of preparing this thesis has been very interesting. There were two obstacles which had to be ignored or surmounted. First, many persons had thought of doing a biography of Alvey Augustus Adee but became discouraged when told he had burned his papers. Second, since he had been in the Department of State for forty-seven years and in Spain for seven years before that, and since the records of the Department of State for that span of years are very extensive, the time element became a factor. Obviously a limitless amount of time could be spent poring through the official records, to say nothing of the unofficial papers. The first obstacle was ignored, and the second one was practically overcome. Hence, the following chapters, which show how he helped to make our foreign policy, deal only with some of the major issues of the Second Cleveland Administration and with the McKinley-Roosevelt Administrations.

The official records which were examined do not tell the whole story. They show the results of many talks and memoranda which preceded the final notes or instructions. In addition to the materials available in manuscript form, the volumes of the Foreign Relations of the United States have been found useful. But they tell only the final story, and then not all. Numerous documents printed therein have been edited or paraphrased for publication. Of special interest for this paper were the volumes for 1898, 1900, and 1902 - 1905. The index of each volume shows the many documents which went out over Adee's signature. In John

Fassett's Journal of International Law there are five and a half pages of documents sent out by Adee.

The desire to show Adee's role in the formulation of American foreign policy caused the writer to look behind the official documents. How and where to start had to be determined. In Tyler Bennett's John Hay, From Poetry to Politics, there are numerous references to letters to and from Adee. Those letters were the point of departure. Of the greatest value to the writer were the papers in the John Hay and Caleb Cushing collections in the Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress. Those two men, for whom Adee worked, were absent from their posts for extended periods of time. During those periods, Adee kept them daily informed of the events as they occurred, unless he was prevented by sickness or urgently pressing business. The Hay Papers are of additional value because they contain many of Hay's letters to Adee. The Cushing Papers contain copies of some of Cushing's letters to Adee. The completeness of these two collections is easily explained. Mrs. Hay and Henry Adams wrote to Hay's friends and asked for them to return any letters from John Hay, because they were going to publish a book of his letters. Adee evidently sent his back, because they are there. Caleb Cushing has a copy of practically everything he wrote and kept everything he received. Hence, by collecting the Hay letters, and by Cushing's habit of keeping things, the searcher has a very complete picture of the correspondence between Hay and Adee, and Cushing and Adee. The material presented in this thesis is only some of the surface bubbles of what may be found in the cauldron.

"The Diplomatic Career of Alvey Augustus Adee with Special Reference to the Boxer Rebellion" is the result of three years of research in the Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress, the National Archives, and elsewhere. Many persons in each place were very courteous, kind, and helpful in getting materials from the shelves. Doctors C. Percy Powell and Elizabeth G. McPherson of the Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress were especially helpful in suggesting possible sources of information. In the national Archives there was the same spirit of helpfulness from Mrs. Julia Carroll and Mr. Francis Hepner of the State Department Record Group Section. To several members of the American University Faculty especial thanks are due. To Professors Ernst Posner and Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr. for their initial and continued encouragement during the months of research, and to Professor Mary Bradshaw for her kindly and timely counsel. The writer's deep appreciation for the home life glimpses goes to Miss Lucy Amelia Kinnaird Adee and Miss Constance Ellen Tyler. And to all the many friends who gave encouragement anywhere along the line go hearty thanks. To members of the writer's immediate family acknowledgment is due for important help given. My parents repeatedly urged getting on with the work even when the way was not clear. My brother, Warren, gave timely suggestions before his work took him to Brazil. And the good wife, Ruth Stillman Hunsberger, gave the constant encouragement to press on, knowing full well that she would be left at home while the paper was completed.



The conclusions are the writer's. The work is not definitive. Much of the official material has been written up in many books. The purpose of the paper has been to get behind those records and to see how the outcome was reached. If that has been satisfactorily done, then the writer has been successful in his endeavor to show the role of "Adee, Acting" in our foreign policy from 1895 to 1905.

## CHAPTER I

### LIFE AND PREPARATION

#### BACKGROUND

"For Heaven's sake take care of yourself.  
'Princes and Lords may flourish and fade  
A breath can make them as a breath has made;  
But one Adee is all we have in the pantry."<sup>1</sup>

Alvey Augustus Adee, poet, scholar, and diplomat, youngest son of Fleet Surgeon Augustus Alvey Adee, was born in Astoria, Long Island, New York, on November 27, 1822.<sup>2</sup> He was the fifth and youngest son born to Augustus A. and Amelia Kinnaird Graham Adee, and died, after a rich and full life, at the age of 81. His father was graduated from Yale University in 1821, studied medicine with Doctor Mott and, as a surgeon, entered the Navy in 1824.<sup>3</sup> While in the Navy, Doctor Adee went on a cruise that lasted more than two years. Soon after the ship anchored at Norfolk, Virginia, he went home to New York on leave of absence.<sup>4</sup>

Doctor Adee had a sense of humor that was inherited by his youngest son, for there is a vein of humor in his Journal

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<sup>1</sup> Hay to Adee, Aug. 11, 1900. Hay Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress. Hereafter abbreviated to HP.

<sup>2</sup> Record in the family Bible, now in the possession of Miss Lucy A. K. Adee, Washington, D. C.

<sup>3</sup> David Graham Adee, "Contributions to the United Service," 1880-1884, p. 565. This is in the possession of his daughter, Miss Adee.

<sup>4</sup> Augustus A. Adee, Private Journal, p. 50. MSS., L.C.

entries similar to the humor inserted into later directives of "Adee, Acting." One such entry describes the father's marriage:

September 1st 1836 - (I myself) United in Matrimony to Amelia Kinnaird Graham, Second daughter of David Graham Esquire of the City of New York. Ceremony performed at 12 Noon in the House of Mr. Graham No. 753 Broadway by the Reverend Dr. /John/ Knox of the Dutch Reformed Church.

Bridesmaids: Miss Maria J. F. Graham  
Miss Catharine M. Chauncey  
Miss Ann Cheeseman  
Groom's Men: Mr. George T. Adee  
Mr. Thomas Graham  
Mr. Jared P. Adee

None present at the Ceremony except the Relatives of each party.

\*Miss C. M. Chauncey, only daughter of Commodore Isaac Chauncey, departed this life 15th April, 1837, at Washington, D. C.<sup>5</sup>

An entry of interest tells of a trip to New York. While there the Adees had their eldest son baptized by Doctor Knox. The ceremony was performed on the nineteenth of November at the David Graham residence. "The name given him is that of his Grandfather, David Graham, to be written D. Graham Adee, and the boy to be recognised by the middle name, Graham -- unless he should prefer the simple name of the Psalmist when he shall arrive at the years of discretion."<sup>6</sup>

In the family Bible were recorded the birth and death in October, 1839, of twin sons, the birth in December, 1840, and

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<sup>5</sup> Adee, Journal, p. 51.

<sup>6</sup> Adee, Journal, p. 62. In a conversation in June 1951 with Miss Lucy A. K. Adee and Miss Constance Allen Tyler, the writer was told that there was a cup with D. Graham Adee on it, but that they never knew why it was engraved that way, for Miss Adee's father generally used his full name.

death in August, 1842, of another son, and then the birth of Alvey Augustus Adee on November 27, 1842. The joys of this event soon became sorrows, for on February 22, 1844, Doctor Adee passed away, and his widow was left with the two small boys. A life pension was obtained for Mrs. Adee by Hamilton Fish, and with these funds she kept her boys with her.<sup>7</sup> Young Alvey was privately tutored, for he could not attend regular schools because of his impaired hearing. He had had a severe attack of scarlet fever that left him deaf. Then when his mother died in 1864, he and his brother were on their own. However, their relatives helped them to become adjusted to the changed situation. David Graham Adee became a lawyer and author, and Alvey became a student of civil engineering under his Uncle, Charles Kinraid Graham, who was the surveyor of the port of New York.<sup>8</sup>

At an early age Adee had become interested in poetry. Some poems are soul-stirring in their thoughts, and they reveal Adee's able use, at an early age, of the English language. This ability later carried him far in the field of diplomacy. It was into this field that he "stumbled" in 1869. The new United States Minister to Madrid, General Daniel B. Sickles, asked Adee to accompany him as his private secretary.<sup>9</sup> By the time this offer was made Adee had written 42 pieces of verse. One of these, prophetic in nature, was written shortly after the

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<sup>7</sup> David Graham Adee to Fish, Mar. 3, 1874, Fish Papers, MSS., L.C.

<sup>8</sup> OAB. 1:105.

<sup>9</sup> OAB. 1:105.

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assassination of Abraham Lincoln<sup>10</sup>

LINCOLN

Dead! The great heart is still that, through these years,  
Throbb'd with his country's travail. Throbb'd in pain  
Of bitterest anguish when the fields were vain,  
And fruitless battles fed the mourners' tears.  
Throbb'd with the glowing heat of generous pride  
When the storm clouds grew brighter, and the sun  
Came piercing through the mists. When, one by one,  
The dangers of the past were swept aside  
By his unswerving will, and the brave souls  
Life-link'd with him for country and for God.  
Dead! Give us strength to bow beneath Thy rod,  
Father all-wise; and as the death-toll rolls  
Through all the land, be this the nation's cry --  
"Though thou art dead, thy name shall never die!"  
New York, April 16, 1865.

The invitation from Sickles was in some respects a chance one. Charles K. Graham had served under Sickles in the Civil War,<sup>11</sup> and the General was a client of John Graham, the criminal lawyer and uncle of Adee. For this chance invitation Adee was well qualified, having traveled in Europe in 1867-1868, and having acquired as a tourist a large vocabulary in French, German, Italian, and Spanish. Although deaf he was able to speak these languages fluently.<sup>12</sup> Shortly after Sickles and Adee took up their official duties in Spain, the newly appointed Secretary of the Legation, John Hay, arrived there to begin his work.<sup>13</sup> Thus

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<sup>10</sup> Adee, New and Old, p. 76.

<sup>11</sup> Col. Charles K. Graham to Sickles, Jan. 23, 1862, Sickles Papers, M.S., L. C.

<sup>12</sup> DAB. 1:105.

<sup>13</sup> Sickles 2 to Fish, Aug. 10, 1869, Manuscript Despatches from Spain, National Archives, Record Group 59. Vol. 52. Hereafter abbreviated Spain Desp. vol. number.

was early formed a working friendship that continued until 1905 when Hay passed away.

#### IN SPAIN

The new United States Minister to Spain, Daniel E. Sickles, arrived in Madrid with his diplomatic family in July 1869.<sup>14</sup> He presented his credentials on July 29, 1869, to General Serrano, the Regent under the Constitution of June, 1869.<sup>15</sup> For Adee this arrival meant a sojourn in Spain that was to last until August 1877, at which time he returned to the Department of State and took a Clerk Fourth position.<sup>16</sup> Both Sickles and Adee were new at the diplomatic game, but they soon gained a good working knowledge of diplomacy. This skill that was acquired by Adee gave him the tact and diligence, demanded of representatives abroad, that was later to make him the most trusted adviser of secretaries of State.<sup>17</sup>

Adee's role of private secretary lasted a little over a year. Much of this time was used in helping Sickles and Hay keep the official correspondence on a current basis.<sup>18</sup>

From this unavoidable contact with the official papers of the Mission, Adee was able to gain an insight into the problems

<sup>14</sup> The Evening Star, Friday, Jul. 23, 1869, p. 1, col. 7.

<sup>15</sup> The Evening Star, Friday, Jul. 30, 1869, p. 1, col. 6.

<sup>16</sup> U. S. Department of State, History of the Department of State of the United States, 1901, p. 11.

<sup>17</sup> SAB. 1:106. New York Times, Sunday, Jul. 6, 1924, Sec. 1, p. 21, cols. 1, 2.

<sup>18</sup> Sickles 24 to Fish, Oct. 1, 1869, Spain Desp. 52.

confronting the legation almost from the first day of his arrival. This added burden continued and the despatches of this first year are full of translations into English and copied by Adee for the Department's use. The information thus gained by Adee was not lost, for when Hay submitted his resignation on May 1, 1870,<sup>19</sup> Adee was appointed in his place.<sup>20</sup> Thus began the career that was to make history and to fill the Departmental archives with the name "Adee."

Adee had been privately tutored. The writer is sure that the close and intensive instruction he received from his mother and from his professional teachers made an early and lasting impression on him. Adee early showed an ability for putting the English language to work in order to express his thoughts. His poems show that he had a command of words and to that early grasp he kept adding new words throughout his life. In 1870 he wrote a short story entitled "Life's Magnet, A Tale."<sup>21</sup> Hay had given the plot of the story to Adee in fifteen minutes one day, and from that dictation the "little nightmare" resulted. Hay, on reading the result, thought it "better executed than conceived" and "was greatly tickled with it." As to the style Hay wrote: "He makes nice verses too, like Luca Giordano, in everybody's style. He can twitter like young Tennyson, and maunder like old

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<sup>19</sup> John Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary (Washington: printed but not published, 1908, 3 vols.), p. 390.

<sup>20</sup> Fish to Adee, Sep. 12, 1870, Spain Instructions 16:150.

<sup>21</sup> Adee, "Life Magnet, A Tale," Putnam's Magazine, 6:152-162, Aug. 1870.

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Browning in a style it would do your heart good to hear."<sup>22</sup>

After Hay submitted his resignation he asked that it be effective as of October 1, 1870, and that he be granted 60 days leave.<sup>23</sup> This despatch is noted in pencil, "resig. accepted and leave granted." The need for some one to take Hay's place without too much lost time prompted Sickles to ask for the appointment of Adee, for Adee was there and knew what had taken place in the Legation for the past year. In his request, written by Hay, Sickles stated, "This gentleman has been associated with me during the past year in the capacity of Private Secretary and possesses my entire confidence. He will bring to the duties of the office the most essential qualifications, with the advantages of a considerable residence at this Capital, and a knowledge of the language of the country."<sup>24</sup> This request was accepted and Adee was appointed Secretary of the Legation. A few weeks later he thanked Secretary Fish: "Permit me gratefully to express to you and to the President my deep appreciation of the honor thus done me, and to hope that by earnest attention to the duties of my office I may merit your kindly approbation."<sup>25</sup>

Almost immediately after Adee's appointment as Secretary of the Legation, the despatches from Spain to the Department began to be written in the beautiful hand of Adee. Many of these

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<sup>22</sup> Hay to David Gray, Jul. 25, 1870, quoted in Bennett, Hay, p. 200.

<sup>23</sup> Hay to Bancroft Davis, Acting Secretary, Aug. 1, 1870, Spain Desp. 5h.

<sup>24</sup> Sickles 150 to Fish, Aug. 13, 1870, Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Adee to Fish, Oct. 7, 1870, Ibid.



despatches contained English translations as well as the Spanish copies of correspondence with the Spanish Minister of State, and copies of clippings from the newspapers. In addition to the routine translation of these clippings Adee would add explanatory notes unless pressed for time.<sup>26</sup>

Soon after the Senate in January, 1871, confirmed Adee as the Secretary of the Legation, Sickles asked for a leave of absence of ninety days and stated that "the business of the Legation may in my absence be safely entrusted to the Secretary, Mr. Adee."<sup>27</sup> This leave was granted and on June 20, 1871, Adee became Charge d'Affaires ad interim.<sup>28</sup> With this first despatch began the Adee despatches which were to pour from his pen at the rate of one a day for every day he was in charge of the Legation.<sup>29</sup> Adee also wished to know how he would receive his Charge pay and asked for instructions. J. C. Bancroft Davis, the Assistant Secretary of State, answered Adee's question by stating that he was to render an account for the amount due on being relieved as Charge d'Affaires and that a letter of credit for this amount would be forwarded to him.<sup>30</sup>

During Sickles's first leave of absence and Adee's first

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<sup>26</sup> Adee to J. C. Bancroft Davis, Asst. Secy. of State, Oct. 16, 1870, Davis Papers, MSS., L. C.

<sup>27</sup> Sickles 292 to Fish, Feb. 23, 1871, Spain Resp. 56.

<sup>28</sup> Adee 1 to Fish, Jun. 21, 1871, Spain Resp. 57.

<sup>29</sup> DAB. 1:106.

<sup>30</sup> Davis 1 to Adee, Jul. 7, 1871. Spain Instructions  
16:248

Chargeship, Adee notified the Department of an "important discussion in the Chamber of Deputies on the Colonial policy of the Spanish Government. A resume of the debate. Views of the President of the Council and the Minister of the Colonies."<sup>31</sup> On this despatch there is the pencil notation: "acknowledgement and thank him for his interesting account." Adee's fluent Spanish gave him a great advantage in dealing with the Foreign Office in person rather than through interpreters, and his insight into the workings of the Spanish mind was most useful when he gave the Department his views and opinions on the political events as they occurred in Spain, and these views were appreciated by the Department.

All was not work with Adee. He did take time for recreation and relaxation with friends, and he did write letters. A Mrs. William J. Knapp was leaving Spain for France and Adee commended her to Elihu S. Washburne, our Minister to France, saying that she was "the one in particular who has done most to make my exile pleasant...."<sup>32</sup> We note that Adee's social relations were varied and broad, and even his personal belongings were admired by others. Sickles noted the watch Adee carried and was so impressed with its attractiveness and good time-keeping that he asked for one like it for himself and in addition three ladies' watches. In making this known to the jewelers Adee described his watch in detail: "My watch was No. 28463, 18 lines

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<sup>31</sup> Adee 18 to Fish, Jul. 12, 1871, Spain Desp. 57.

<sup>32</sup> Adee to Washburne, Sep. 14, 1871, Washburne Papers, MSS., L.C.

diameter, stemwinder, straight lever escapement, compensated balance 13 jewels, enameled dial, gold hunting case, polished backs, and cost 650 francs...."<sup>33</sup>

Shortly after the watch incident Sickles again went on leave. Adee, in notifying the Department of this fact, stated that he himself had had a severe illness which had confined him to his bed for the previous two weeks, but that he trusted he would soon be able to bring the back work up to date.<sup>34</sup> And in writing to Sickles Adee said, "I am in bed again, and have been for a week past, these boils are painful and I fear growing chronic. Rubio says not, however."<sup>35</sup> Then Minister Layard, from Great Britain, and with whom Adee was on very friendly terms, admonished Adee to take care of himself and to follow the doctor's advice.<sup>36</sup> These illnesses were the beginning of physical aches and pains that plagued Adee all the time he was in Spain. However, he was not too ill to attend a benefit performance for the Chicago Fund given under the patronage of the King, the Cabinet and others, December 4, 1871, and to receive the congratulations of their Majesties.<sup>37</sup> This Fund was for the sufferers in the Chicago Fire, and it was the Spaniards way of lending a helping hand.

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<sup>33</sup> Adee to Messers Patek, Philippe & Co., Geneva, Nov. 12, 1871, Sickles Papers, MSS. Div., N. Y. Public Library.

<sup>34</sup> Adee 82 to Fish, Dec. 20, 1871, Spain Desp. 58.

<sup>35</sup> Adee to Sickles, Jan. 20, 1872, Sickles Papers, MSS., N. Y. Pub. Lib.

<sup>36</sup> Adee 89 to Fish, Appendix A, Jan. 6, 1872, Spain Desp. 58.

<sup>37</sup> Adee 88 to Fish, Dec. 31, 1871, Ibid.

The development of Adee into a capable representative of the United States Government moved along rapidly during these years. Many of his serious as well as his lighter thoughts are recorded in letters to John Russell Young, of the New York Herald, who was reporting European events for the paper. To Young, Adee showed his lighter vein, and this was the avenue he used in later years when the work became confining. Adee was at this time in the great age of growth — 30 through 35. Shortly after Sickles had resumed his official duties, Adee wrote two letters to Young:

June 18, 1872

An old friend of yours, by name General Calusha Pennypacker (Phoebe! what a name!) is in town, and will probably be at the legation about four o'clock, at which time if you make your afternoon call, you might see him.

June 25, 1872

Dear J.R.Y.

Eureka! It has come! Your important letter is herewith respectfully enclosed. It reached Madrid on the 16th. It is endorsed "ne se conoce" (He does not know himself) which means, destination unknown.

There are no papers today. There never are Tuesday.

Yours scribbly,  
Adee.<sup>36</sup>

This friendship with Young was very hearty and Adee deemed it an honor to be asked for a photograph. One such in the Young Papers is dated Madrid October 1872, under Adee's signature on the back. This shows him in a high vest, shaker and vest pin, and velvet on the coat collar. Miss Adee told the writer that this was a style of dress that he continued to use all his life.

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<sup>36</sup> Adee to Young, Jun. 18 and 25, 1872, Young Papers, MSS., L. C. Hereafter abbreviated to YP.

Among Adee's growing list of hobbies was chess. He posed a chess problem for Young to solve.<sup>39</sup> And it was to chess that he turned when matters of grave importance came up. A misunderstanding between Fickles and Adee had arisen, and Adee put a note on the Tycoon's desk one day and then wrote to Young that he would wait a week or so for an answer. "I shall wait even till you come from Seville so as to play a game of chess over this problem."<sup>40</sup> Whatever the misunderstanding was is not revealed. Serious though it may have been at the time, it worked out all right, and in later life Adee never spoke an ill-word about General Fickles.<sup>41</sup>

Two aspects of Adee's private life that merit some notice are his practice of economy and his maintenance of a steady correspondence with his scattered friends. After Young went to Sweden, Adee complained of his loneliness, his illness from summer complaint, and the disruption of their former powows.<sup>42</sup> Charlemagne Tower, Jr. was another friend whom Adee met in Madrid, and when Tower later met Young, Adee was much pleased.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Adee to Young, Mar. 11, 1873, YP.

<sup>40</sup> Adee undated to Young, YP.

<sup>41</sup> This statement was made in the writer's presence by one of a number of newspaper men who knew Adee. Those present were Messrs H. K. Baukhage, commentator; Lowell Mallett, columnist; William D. Hasset, Secretary to President Truman; Maj. Oliver Newman, columnist; Dr. Ernst Correll of the American University, and George S. Humberger.

<sup>42</sup> Adee to Young, May 30, 1873, and Aug. 21, 1873, YP.

<sup>43</sup> Adee to Young and Tower, Feb. 19, 1873, YP.

This Charlemagne Tower was later our Ambassador to Russia under President McKinley, and to Germany under President Roosevelt. But while Adee was bemoaning Young's absence, he had to add Tower's departure for Paris as an additional cause for loneliness, for Tower wrote to Young:

I had a letter from Adee a few days ago in which he sends remembrances to you. He says he is practicing economy now, on account of his recent losses, and has been obliged to give up his subscription at the Opera this Winter. Poor devil, he is so conscientious that he will deprive himself beyond what is really necessary if he thinks he is doing right. He still keeps his horse wagon, I see, for he speaks of driving a mutual friend, (of the ballet-corps) to the Railway Station the other day, on the occasion of her departure from the scenes of her triumphs in Madrid.<sup>44</sup>

Although Adee lamented his loss of friends, he retained his sense of responsibility, and in the Virginus affair to which we now turn he played an important, but not major, role.

Because of the Virginus affair by November, 1873 the diplomatic friction between the United States and Spain had become unbearable, and Fish told Sickles to leave Madrid.<sup>45</sup> The Virginus had been attacked by the Spanish on October 31, 1873, and some of the Americans aboard were removed and shot. The Spanish Government also had not resolved the Cuban revolt to the complete satisfaction of the United States, and our Minister to Spain was ordered out of the country to which he was accredited. Adee drafted a firm statement to the Minister of State and made

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<sup>44</sup> C. Tower, Jr., to Young, Nov. 8, 1873, YP.

<sup>45</sup> Fish tel. to Sickles, Nov. 14, 1873. Spanish Instructions 16:547-548.

this fact known to him.<sup>46</sup> Fortunately, for international peace and security, this note was never delivered.

This Virginian affair frayed diplomatic nerves, but passports were never actually asked for by Sickles. It was Adee who wrote many of the notes in this case and who delivered some of them personally. On November 11, 1873, Adee wrote, for Sickles' signature, the note in which our Government wanted our Consul at Cuba to be able to talk freely with, and to see, any American citizens who might have been aboard the ship. This was to be done according to the "rights and privileges stipulated and guaranteed by the Seventh Article of the Treaty of 1795."<sup>47</sup> Another note protested the brutal slaying of the Captain and 36 crew members.<sup>48</sup> And on November 16 Adee drafted and delivered at 3:50 A. M. our reply to Carvajal's note about the nationality of the Virginian. In stern language we told the Spanish Government that the ship belonged to the United States and that the Foreign Office need not worry any more about that detail.<sup>49</sup>

Later, when Spain agreed to pay a money indemnity and other reparations, as well as to return the ship, this affair subsided almost as rapidly as it arose. In writing about it Young praised the Spanish Minister of State, Emilio Castelar, as

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<sup>46</sup> Sickles to Minister of State, Madrid, November 1873 (no day indicated), Sickles Papers, MSS., L.C. This draft requested safe-conduct for the Minister, the Secretary of Legation, and the household effects and luggage of the General.

<sup>47</sup> Sickles to Minister of State, Nov. 11, 1873, Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Sickles to Minister of State, Nov. 14, 1873, Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Sickles to Minister of State (Castelar), Nov. 16, 1873, Ibid.

being more American than any one in Europe. In the blood-fever that rose over the affair Young was afraid that "in our anger we would lay violent hands on the Republic — and afford to the Monarchies and Kingdoms, the pleasure of a strife that would have been worse than fratricidal. I feel that we have escaped a great responsibility, and perhaps a great crime."<sup>50</sup>

When the United States Government accepted the Spanish offer, Sickles felt that his presence was no longer necessary and tendered his resignation.<sup>51</sup> But before he departed he suggested that some means of secret communication be adopted between Spain and Washington because there was a possibility that the cipher in use was known to outside parties, and that if the Department approved, the cipher which had been prepared by Adee could be used temporarily and until a new cipher could be prepared.<sup>52</sup> Now we find that Adee had become a maker of cipher codes, and the use of this Adee cipher was adopted.<sup>53</sup>

By the time Sickles resigned, the Department must have known that a very capable and talented Secretary of Legation was writing despatches from Madrid. If not, there can be no doubt that the fact was known within the next three months, for first Young and then the retiring Minister of the United States near the Court of Spain wrote very appreciatively of his abilities:

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<sup>50</sup> Young to Davis, Dec. 27, 1873, Davis Papers.

<sup>51</sup> Sickles tel. to Fish, Dec. 20, 1873, 1:00 A. M., Spain Desp. 68.

<sup>52</sup> Sickles 93h to Fish, Dec. 21, 1873, Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Sickles 955 to Fish, acknowledging Fish's Cipher of the twelfth, Jan. 13, 1874, Ibid.



Among the younger men -- none are better than Hoffman and Adee. I look upon these as persons of conspicuous merit, and as to Adee -- regard him as one of the purest and best men I ever knew -- well up in Spanish, French and German, and worthy of promotion. If, as it seems, you mean to make diplomacy a service, you cannot do better than cherish men like these.<sup>54</sup>

Sir:

I have the honor to report that, in conformity with your cable instruction of the 13th ultimo, and as soon as it was possible for Mr. Adee to complete the records of the Legation, I transmitted to Mr. Sagasta my letter of recall addressed to President Castelar. In compliance with my request Mr. Sagasta gave me audience today at three in the afternoon, when I presented Mr. Adee as Charge d'Affaires and took leave of His Excellency with the usual expressions of amity and good-will. The interview was cordial. My visit was promptly returned by Mr. Sagasta, who kindly assured me of his continued friendship and desired me at all times to avail myself of his good offices.

My mission terminated, I desire to bear testimony to the fidelity, diligence and ability with which Mr. Adee has filled the Office of Secretary of Legation. The admirable manner in which he has recorded the business of the Legation will deserve the emulation of his successors. Nor has this been an easy task in addition to the other important duties of his post. The correspondence of the past four years and a half fills thirty-five volumes averaging six hundred pages each, being more than the bound records of my predecessors for the preceding quarter of a century. Besides, all the correspondence with the Department has been engrossed twice and that with the Spanish Government three times. I hazard nothing in the statement that this officer has done more work and kept more office hours during the past four years than any three Secretaries of Legation in Madrid, whilst his compensation has been less than any one of them. It affords me pleasure to add that for the higher responsibilities of diplomatic service Mr. Adee has steadily evinced aptitude and ripening attainments.<sup>55</sup>

Thus Sickles departed, and Adee again assumed charge of the Legation on February 4, 1874.<sup>56</sup> In anticipation of the

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<sup>54</sup> Young to Davis, Dec. 27, 1873, Davis Papers.

<sup>55</sup> Sickles 975 to Fish, (Adee's handwriting), Feb. 4, 1874, Spain Desp. 68.

<sup>56</sup> Adee 173 to Fish, Feb. 4, 1874, Ibid.

event, and pending the arrival of the new minister, Adee wrote to Young and expressed his feelings with much humor and many puns:

For a month or two past this office has been open for the transaction of public business affecting shipping interest and Custom-house matters from 10 A. M. til 2 A. M. and as much later as the service requires. I have written my devoted rear into a state of piles, which reminds me of Amsterdam, and feels like Amsterdamation. I look forward to relief on the arrival of that 'air Cushing. If you hear of the appointment of a new Secretary, pray telegraph me. If it be Perry, or Mackeeham, I shall depart this diplomatic life in calm jey. But if Caleb wishes me to attend to his customs matters, and will not have his corns treated by a professional chiropodist in the Legation in business hours, I will have no objection to staying for a few months, for he is a ripe old man, and will doubtless go off on a summer holiday, and leave me charge, to the replenishment of my Clewed and Habichted pocket.<sup>57</sup>

The appointment of Caleb Cushing as our new Minister to Spain meant a continuation of the previous policies of our Government, for he, too, was an army man. Before Adee and Cushing met, there was an extended correspondence between them. This concerned living quarters, the most comfortable route to Madrid, and Adee's offer to meet the General on the road and to confer with him before he entered Spain.<sup>58</sup> Cushing wired for Adee to meet him at Badajoz, and a second wire asked him to go to Elvas, where they met and conferred.<sup>59</sup>

Adee's trip to Elvas left the Legation unattended. This fact was faithfully reported to Washington: "In anticipation

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<sup>57</sup> Adee to Young, undated except Dec. 1873, 2 A. M. YP. Clewes and Habicht were bankers in London.

<sup>58</sup> Adee to Cushing, Apr. 7, 1874, Cushing Papers, MSS., L. C. Hereafter abbreviated to CP.

<sup>59</sup> Cushing tele. to Adee. May 6, 1874; Cushing lh to Fish, May 15, 1874. CP.

of any emergency arising in this city that might have demanded my personal attention, I maintained daily telegraphic communication with the Reverend Mr. Knapp, an American citizen resident in Madrid, who kindly consented to look after the Legation during my absence; but fortunately no business came up requiring immediate action on his part or mine.<sup>60</sup> After this visit Adee hurried back to Madrid, and Cushing journeyed more leisurely, arriving at the capital on the 14th of May, 1874, but was unable to present his credentials until Saturday the 30th of May, after President Francisco Serrano returned from La Granja, where he had gone for a few days.<sup>61</sup>

From the time Sickles left Spain until Cushing presented his credentials -- a total of 116 days -- Adee served as Charge d'Affaires. In order to have a rest from his confining duties he asked for sixty days leave of absence to visit Switzerland, such leave to begin on August First and subject to the permission of the Minister.<sup>62</sup> Permission was readily granted by Cushing, even though his absence would be felt.<sup>63</sup>

One of the unsettled items on the Sickles's agenda was the

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<sup>60</sup> Adee 220 to Fish, May 15, 1874. Spain Desp. 69.

<sup>61</sup> Adee 220 to Fish, May 15, 1874, Ibid; Claude Fuess, Caleb Cushing, 2:379; Cushing 21 to Fish, Jun. 1, 1874, Spain Desp. 70.

<sup>62</sup> Adee personal to Fish, May 30, 1874, Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Cushing 22 to Fish, Jun. 1, 1874, Ibid. In the Cushing Papers for this period is a list of the diplomats accredited to Madrid, their titles and their whereabouts as of May 30, 1874. Also there are two forms marked "Model", for Cushing's guidance while Adee was on leave.

disposition that was to be made of the Virginus affair. American lives had been taken in cold blood, and we will recall that the Spanish agreed to an indemnity. Just how much this was to be was the task of the Cushing Mission. Preliminary discussions had been held by Cushing and Castro, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Adee brought the material, under review, together in several lists and a memorandum for the claim. These lists showed reputed American citizens, as passengers or crew, either as having been shot or not shot, or a total of twenty-one persons killed and eighteen detained, for which Cushing made a claim of \$98,050.<sup>64</sup>

With the Virginus problems in Cushing's capable hands, Adee was free to depart on leave. He wrote that he had arrived safely in Alicante and might be in Geneva by Saturday. He also stated that he was sending a 9-gallon keg of common Alicante table wine, which he hoped Cushing would accept with his compliments. But the important comment in this letter is the observation made of Burriel, the Spanish trouble maker in Cuba:

The Diario Espanol of last night announces that Brigadier Juan Burriel y Lynch is condecorated with the grand cross of San Hermenegildo -- the highest military honor in Spain. This is worth noting as an illustration of what the Government proposes to do in the direction of his punishment.<sup>65</sup>

It was Burriel who ordered the Virginus seized and some of those on board to be shot, and shot without fair trial.

As Adee continued his journey, he described the route and

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<sup>64</sup> See the compilations in CP.

<sup>65</sup> Adee to Cushing, Aug. 3, 1874, CP.

the shipmates, and was sad at having to forego any mountain climbing. Such a hobby had to be abandoned because of the consequent fatigue and because it would take a month to get in training.<sup>66</sup> These letters reveal his wide control of the English language. In them, as well as others, his observations were made with a large variety of adjectives, and his comments of this period were part of the ground work for later accomplishments. His next letter was mailed in London, whither he had journeyed after Switzerland.

As you see, I am in London, doing my winter shopping. The weather is genuinely English, rain every day, except this, when the sun is shining, like a huge slice of red carrot.

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I have met Col. Forney here. He looks for our cooperation in the Centennial business. He has also had a violent fight with a pigheaded Briton on your behalf -- words -- not blows, ending in an apology from his opponent.

The German news makes me anxious to be back in Spain. I shall leave Paris for Santander, about the 16th instant, and when there shall await your orders.

Mr. Knapp writes me you were to attend the Bulls on the grand inauguration day. I hope you found the entertainment good.

In great haste, and with best wishes, I am....<sup>67</sup>

The Centennial business that Adee mentioned had to do with the one hundredth anniversary of the independence of the United States. The arrangements for that celebration were worked on as early as 1874, at the time Adee was in London. While there he

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<sup>66</sup> Adee to Cushing Aug. 6, 1874, Aug. 10, 1874, Aug. 27, 1874. CP.

<sup>67</sup> Adee to Cushing, Sep. 10, 1874, CP.

met Colonel John W. Forney, one of Cushing's friends, who was working on those arrangements. He described his conversation with Adee:

In conversation with our good friend Adee, who is here, your excellent Secretary of Legation, I was glad to be assured of your continued good health, and also of your unintermitting labors for your country. I am in London working for the Centennial.... England hesitates on account of the Declaration of Independence, and perhaps for other causes .... What have you got to say about Spain? Acting upon the suggestion of Adee, I have written to a gentleman in Madrid -- Daniel Ryan Esquire -- asking his help among the people outside.<sup>68</sup>

Adee concluded his vacation by a trip to Paris and then back to Madrid.<sup>69</sup> The work of the Legation needed Adee's help in addition to the Minister's. He went right to work, and his accomplishments are duly recorded in the official record and in the Cushing Papers. During this time one of his outstanding characteristics became apparent. This was his disregard for personal pleasures when there was work to be done. This has been brought out time and time again in the official and unofficial records. For example, <sup>when</sup> a cipher telegram came to the Legation, Adee wrote to Cushing that he would be up with it as soon as he had it deciphered, even though the day was Sunday.<sup>70</sup> Another of his abilities, for which he later became famous, was the arrange-

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<sup>68</sup> Forney to Cushing, Sep. 12, 1874, CP.

<sup>69</sup> William I. Knapp, undated to Cushing, and he inserted Sep. 18, 1874, CP. Adee to Cushing, Sep. 28, 1874, Spain resp. 71.

<sup>70</sup> Adee to Cushing, Jan. 3, 1875, CP. Other references to this "business before pleasure" attribute will be noted as they occur, chronologically.

ments for dinners and other social functions where diplomats were in attendance. Adee sent tickets to Cushing for a royal performance to which only the Chiefs of Missions were invited and told him he did not have to be in uniform, but that "full dress, white choker and gloves will do."<sup>71</sup>

The one main, unsettled issue that continued to occupy the Legation was the Virginias affair, but that was settled after many talks between the American Minister and the Spanish Foreign Minister, and after much ground-work was covered and re-covered. Much of this paper work was done by Adee. On February 25, 1875, Adee wrote the "Memorandum of officious Agreement between the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America and His Excellency the Minister of State of Spain, signed in Madrid, February 25, 1875." This settlement was for \$80,000.<sup>72</sup> Almost a year and a half after the killing of the passengers and crew of the Virginias the two Governments reached an understanding and arrived at an agreeable figure for the indemnity. Adee took the completed and ratified agreement to London. There he gave it to Benjamin F. Stevens, the United States Despatch Agent, and returned to Madrid after a few days sojourn in Paris.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Adee to Cushing, undated except for Friday, Cushing added Jan. 1875. CP.

<sup>72</sup> Undated memo by Adee in CP. In the Spanish Despatches, Volume 75, Cushing stated, in a telegram, that the agreement was "concluded in conference of the twenty-fifth, but not signed because of my desire to have your previous approval...."

<sup>73</sup> Cushing 31h to Fish, Mar. 11, 1875, Spain Desp. 75; Adee to Cushing, Mar. 17, 1875, CP.

With the Virginus issue successfully concluded, Cushing and Adee could turn to another task of his mission -- an Extradition Treaty between the two countries. There was no such agreement between these two countries, and because this form of treaty was lacking, the United States of America found it difficult to bring criminals to justice when they fled to Spanish territory. The struggles for such a treaty continued throughout Adee's stay in Spain, and were finally concluded in 1877, just prior to the change of Presidents in Washington. The Cushing Papers have many memoranda and notes by Adee on the subject of Extradition for which he did much translating of Spanish articles. One of these is marked by Cushing "Adee's notes on Spanish translation of extradition treaty. 2 January, 1876."

A little later Adee made a "Chronological List of special treaties of Extradition, or general treaties in which Extradition is comprehended, between Spain and other Powers, with reference to the books, if any, in which they may be found." This list covered forty-five different treaties with twenty-seven countries. The earliest was with Portugal in 1499. Spain and Portugal had ten such treaties; with France there were seven in a little over a hundred years; three with Belgium, and the remaining countries had one treaty apiece.<sup>74</sup>

The absence of an Extradition Treaty with Spain almost cost the American people the opportunity of bringing to trial William M. Tweed, or "Boss" Tweed of New York. Tweed had escaped

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<sup>74</sup> Undated list by Adee, CP.



from his jailer in New York, and had fled to Cuba, where he took passage to Spain under the name of William Secor. The Legation at Madrid was alerted, and Cushing obtained the Spanish Government's compliance to our request for Tweed's arrest and return.<sup>75</sup> The United States had earlier done a similar act for Spain, and Cushing reminded the Minister of State of this "by way of presenting the idea that the present extradition would be the payment of a debt by Spain, not the contraction of a new one by the United States."<sup>76</sup>

Ades was largely responsible for the capture of Tweed. Cushing departed on leave on August 17, 1876, and Ades was in charge of the Legation during the next few months during which time Tweed was seized and returned to the United States. Through the efforts of Ades the Spanish officials were able to recognize Tweed when the brig Carmen landed at Vigo. This was done through Ades's friend, Don Bagnino S. Suarez, a patron of Harper's Weekly. The July 1, 1876, issue carried a cartoon which linked Tweed and Samuel J. Tilden, the Democratic candidate for President of the United States. This cartoon was secured from Suarez by Ades and forwarded to the Foreign Office for transmission to the officials at Vigo.<sup>77</sup>

Many possible ports of destination were available to the Carmen, and Ades was aware of that, and also that the port of

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<sup>75</sup> Cushing tel. to Fish, Aug. 5, 1876, Spain Resp. 87.

<sup>76</sup> Cushing 1074 to Fish, Aug. 9, 1876, Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Appendix A of Cushing 1090 to Fish, Aug. 17, 1876, Spain Resp. 87; Dennis Lynch, Boss Tweed, p. 399.

departure was a foul port, under Spain's shipping laws. In view of this he wrote a note to Mr. P. Barca, Subsecretario de la Gobernacion, suggesting that the brig would fall in the first place into the hands of the Sanitary authorities, and should the route of the ship be interrupted or altered, the first information of this would come to the Health Department. In such a case that Department could greatly aid the detention of Tweed.<sup>78</sup> Then to Cushing Adee wrote that nothing had yet been heard of from Tweed, that Barca had inquired what type of ship the Carmen was, and that he would notify the Governors of all the Atlantic provinces as a method to diminish Tweed's bribing the skipper to change the destination. This he would do in cipher, "bien entendu, and under 'la mas estricta reserva.'<sup>79</sup>

A few days later Adee reported that Mr. Calderon spoke very interestedly about the Secor business.<sup>80</sup> Ten days later Adee telegraphed to the Department that the ship had landed and that Tweed and a William Hunt, said to be his nephew, were arrested and their baggage sealed.<sup>81</sup> A later telegram asked for instructions about Hunt, was he to be returned or not?<sup>82</sup> Then to Cushing he noted "Tweed's capture has given me so much to do that I cannot find time to write you my daily budget."<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> Adee to Barca, Aug. 25, 1876, as Appendix B to Adee 238 to Fish, Aug. 26, 1876, Spain Desp. 87.

<sup>79</sup> Adee to Cushing, Aug. 25, 1876, CP.

<sup>80</sup> Adee to Cushing, Aug. 29, 1876, CP.

<sup>81</sup> Adee tel. to Fish, Sep. 7, 1876, Spain Desp. 88.

<sup>82</sup> Adee tel. to Fish, Sep. 8, 1876, Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Adee to Cushing, Sep. 9, 1876, CP.

The Spanish authorities wished to be rid of both men and requested the return of Tweed and Hunt. Also, if Washington desired, these men would be delivered to an American vessel of war.<sup>84</sup> The Department notified Adee that both men should be returned to Cuba and their departure and destination reported to Washington.<sup>85</sup> Before they were returned to Cuba an interview, by a newspaper man, was asked for, but Adee wished the approval of the Department, even though Spain was willing to grant such an interview.<sup>86</sup> In order to push this interview further, J. G. Bennett, of the New York Herald, asked Cushing to intercede and suggest to Adee that the interview be granted.<sup>87</sup> Cushing did this, stating he saw no objection to letting Mr. Knapp talk with Tweed.<sup>88</sup> To which Adee replied: "On receiving your first telegram endeavored to favor Bennett but Estade required assumption /sic/ of responsibility in name of Government. This I had already declined."<sup>89</sup> And then William Hunter's telegram came stating that "The expedience of assenting to an interview of anyone with Secor is too questionable to be sanctioned by us."<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Adee tel. to Fish, Sep. 10, 1876, 11:40 A. M. Spain Resp. 88.

<sup>85</sup> Adee 270 to Fish, Sep. 10, 1876, confirming Hunter's tel. of Sep. 9, 1876, received at 10:00 P. M. Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> Adee tel. to Fish, Sep. 11, 1876, Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Bennett Tel. to Cushing, Sep. 13, 1876, CP.

<sup>88</sup> Cushing tel. to Adee, Sep. 13, 1876, CP.

<sup>89</sup> Adee tel. to Cushing, Sep. 14, 1876, CP.

<sup>90</sup> Adee 284 to Fish, Sep. 18, 1876, confirming Hunter's tel. of Sep. 13, 1876. Spain Resp. 88.

Adee's doubts about granting such an interview were confirmed when the Department refused to permit the talks to take place.

The capture and detention of Tweed were simple in comparison to the problems that cropped up before he was returned to the United States. The Government had authorized a naval vessel to proceed to Vigo to take on Tweed and Hunt for delivery to Santiago, Cuba, and such correspondence from Adee to the Consuls at Gibraltar and Vigo followed, as well as telegrams and despatches to Captain Samuel R. Franklin, commander of the naval vessel. The following note shows us that Adee was well versed in ceremonial procedures:

Please ask Captain Franklin to communicate with Consular Agent on reaching Vigo. He will find there despatches and telegram from me. If he reaches Vigo before my despatches arrive, he had best salute the town on entering port and exchange ceremonious visits with the local authority, going to see him and receiving him on board. In these interviews he can arrange for the reception of Secor and Hunt with their sealed luggage. He may be asked to show his commission as naval captain and give a simple receipt for the two men. I see no objection to this.<sup>91</sup>

The final phase of the Tweed capture, arrest, and return was carried out at Vigo without Adee present because he was in bed with rheumatism in his left knee.<sup>92</sup> With Tweed safely on board an American vessel, the Spanish paper, The Epoca, stated

<sup>91</sup> Adee tel. to Consul Sprague, Gibraltar, Sep. 21, 1876, h. P. M., being Appendix AA of Adee 295 to Fish, Sep. 25, 1876, ibid. This despatch was a bulky one and two of the appendices dropped out. In submitting the missing papers Adee asked Hunter to pardon him if he placed the culprits in his hands for restoration to their proper quarters. Adee to Hunter, Sep. 26, 1876, ibid.

<sup>92</sup> Adee confidential to Franklin. Sep. 26, 1876, being Appendix YF of Adee 295 to Fish, Sep. 25, 1876, ibid.

that the Tweed Case suggested an Extradition Treaty and that articles for such a treaty had been drawn up by Pickles during the reign of King Amadeo.<sup>93</sup> And a week or so later it was reported that Spain would return other criminals to the United States if she had the chance.<sup>94</sup> Adee wanted Cushing to return to Madrid with power to conclude an Extradition Treaty, for such a treaty was being broadly hinted at on all sides.<sup>95</sup>

After Tweed fled from Cuba, it was two months and much correspondence later before Adee notified the Department that Secor and Hunt had been delivered to Captain Franklin on board the frigate Franklin.<sup>96</sup> He was also able to write a long letter to his absent chief. It was the first one since the Tweed business began. Adee had denied Knapp the interview and Cushing had seen no harm that could come of it. In referring to this denial of the visit to Secor, Adee said:

If I have boggled, I trust you will say a kind word for me. Apart from the Herald affair, I think it will have a bad effect in America if the opinion gets around that we have kept, not only Tweed, but also an admittedly innocent man, "Hunt," in close confinement, incommunicado, not even allowing their consular agent to see them, -- a style of imprisonment which, if I mistake not, when applied to murderers and filibusters in Cuba, awakens the profoundest wrath on our part.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> Adee 299 to Fish, Sep. 27, 1876, Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Adee to Cushing, Oct. 5, 1876, CP.

<sup>95</sup> Adee to Cushing, Oct. 12, 1876, CP.

<sup>96</sup> Adee cipher tel. to Fish, Sep. 26, 1876, Spain Resp. 88.

<sup>97</sup> Adee to Cushing, Sep. 27, 1876, CP.

The efforts of the Spanish Government in giving Tweed over to us were not gratis. The bill was submitted to the American Legation and in forwarding it to Washington for approval, Adee remarked, rather dryly, but no doubt with a twinkle in his eye, "I see nothing to object to in the second bill, except perhaps the cigars, as a luxury, and the gin, as a rank poison at that price, 35 cents."<sup>98</sup> The energy and work put forth by Adee were appreciated by Secretary Fish, who commended him by saying "it is due that I should express to you the appreciation which is entertained of your earnest, careful and successful efforts in bringing the whole matter to a successful and simple conclusion. The various steps taken by you display knowledge of the requirements of the case, and your suggestions and arrangements were thoughtful and highly to be commended."<sup>99</sup> Adee was then instructed to thank the Spanish Government for capturing Tweed. This Government did not have an Extradition Treaty with Spain at the time of Tweed's arrest and return. In view of this Fish pointed out the fact that "The United has from time to time carefully avoided making requests for the surrender of criminals, for the reason among others that it might not be possible to reciprocate on such a matter."<sup>100</sup> Adee later thanked Fish for his expressions of approbation and said that they were very

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<sup>98</sup> Adee 348 to Fish, Oct. 1876. Spain Desp. 89.

<sup>99</sup> Fish 450 to Adee, Nov. 3, 1876, Spain Instructions 18:14.

<sup>100</sup> Fish 451 to Adee, Nov. 3, 1876, Ibid., p. 18. See also Moore, Digest of International Law, 4:255.

gratifying to him, "as was natural."<sup>101</sup>

The successful termination of the Tweed business left Adee without any urgently pressing business. He used the time to good advantage, and relaxed, even though work had become his normal condition in the absence of the Minister. He went to a "hop" and "enjoyed the sight of Royalty waltzing with Nobility and enjoying itself to its heart's content," and passed some evenings among the 14,000 volumes in a friend's library.<sup>102</sup>

Later when some urgent family matters took him to the frontier, he left the Legation unattended for sixty-one hours, but nothing important occurred during his absence.<sup>103</sup> In addition he

started to add books on Shakespeare to his own library. At the time of his death he had over 500 volumes of Shakespeariana which were willed to Yale University.<sup>104</sup>

Adee was well-informed on domestic problems here in the United States and was thinking of his own future, for he knew that a change in administration would mean the end of his job. "The political prospect looks bright for Hayes," he wrote before Election Day 1876, "since Vermont and Maine have spoken. I prophesy 20,000 majority for the Republican ticket in Indiana next week."<sup>105</sup> He was asked if he had ever known a Presidential

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<sup>101</sup> Adee L21 to Fish, Nov. 18, 1876. Spain Desp. 90.

<sup>102</sup> Adee to Cushing, Aug. 29, 1876, two letters, Aug. 31, 1876, CP.

<sup>103</sup> Adee to Cushing, Sep. 1, 1876, CP. Adee 256 to Fish, Sep. 4, 1876, Spain Desp. 88.

<sup>104</sup> Adee, Catalogue, 44, entry 504; Adee, Will of., Recorder of Wills office, Washington, D. C.

<sup>105</sup> Adee to Cushing, Sep. 27, 1876, CP.

hopeful who was so thoroughly whipped at the beginning of his campaign as Tilden appeared to be.<sup>106</sup> This letter was forwarded to Cushing in another note from Adee which had more about the elections and himself:

By the time you get this, the Presidential election will be a foregone conclusion if, as I take it, Indiana went Republican day before yesterday. In that event I think I shall ask you to sound the people at home as to the practicability of my getting one of the recently created chargeships, if I cannot aspire to a small mission.<sup>107</sup>

It is possible to infer from this and other letters that Adee was ready to quit Madrid because of the strains and pains he had had to endure there. Miss Adee told the writer that her uncle never once returned to Spain. His next letter, however, is a happy one and one from which we learn a great deal about him.

The memory of your many kindnesses toward me and my family emboldens me to consult you as to the practicability of my obtaining promotion.

As you are aware, I have now been Secretary of this Legation for more than six years, during which time I have been Charge d'Affaires some 16 months. The duties of my post have been onerous and confining, but this has had the good result of giving me experience and knowledge. I am usually regarded as a hard worker. I have become acquainted to a fair extent with the Spanish tongue. French, of course, I already knew, and I can read German, Italian and Portuguese. And lastly, the partial deafness which has afflicted me from birth, does not seem to interfere with the effective discharge of my duties, or to hamper my intercourse with Ministers and all with whom I am brought in business contact.

So much for myself. Recent promotions and transfers in our foreign service, and the growing disposition in favor of an established diplomatic career which has been noticeable of late in the United States, have led me to think of the possibility of obtaining advancement for myself, such for example, as one of the recently reduced South American chargeships, where my knowledge of the language could come into play

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<sup>106</sup> Hancock to Adee, Oct. 2, 1876, CP.

<sup>107</sup> Adee to Cushing, Oct. 5, 1876, CP.



By the time you receive this, the Presidential struggle will be over. If, as I trust, the Republican is successful, I respectfully beg of you to exercise your influence in my behalf with the administration. Should you have the opportunity of conversing with Gen. Cushing while he is in the United States, or with my uncle Mr. George T. Adee, on the subject of my request, I should only be too glad to have you do so.

Pray pardon me the liberty I have taken, and believe me to be, with great respect,

Yours very faithfully  
A. Augustus Adee.<sup>108</sup>

This letter was one of the last ones Adee wrote to any one but Cushing for help. If Tilden won, and Cushing did not return, Adee hoped to be left alone until Tilden took office. But if Hayes won, then Adee wanted Cushing to speak to the Secretary about a South American chargeship.<sup>109</sup> It did not matter to Cushing which candidate won the election, for the General was going to press Adee's claims to promotion with the victorious candidate. If he succeeded, Madrid would need a new Secretary, and if not, Adee was informed that it was Cushing's wish, "as well as your importance to the public service, that you remain at Madrid."<sup>110</sup> Two days later Cushing wrote that Adee had been discussed fully. There was no overseas post available, but there was an eligible place in the Department, from which promotion was

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<sup>108</sup> Adee to Hon. Edwin D. Morgan, N. Y. Oct. 23, 1876, CP. This letter tends to show that he was interested in continuing in the Government and not to return to private life as stated in EAB. 1:106.

<sup>109</sup> Adee to Cushing, Oct. 23, 1876, CP. This is a lengthy letter and expands much of what was written to Senator Morgan, but written in a vein that left no doubt that Adee wanted to stay in the service, but at a less worked post.

<sup>110</sup> Cushing to Adee, Nov. 11, 1876, CP.

possible.<sup>111</sup> A few days later Secretary Fish informed Senator Morgan there were no openings of the type referred to, for Congress had reduced the service. Adee, he continued, "has proven an excellent, efficient, and valuable officer and if we had any system of promotion he would be among the first candidates for such promotion."<sup>112</sup>

The failure to elect a President in 1876 lowered American prestige in Spain considerably. Adee had a keen insight into the feelings of the people with whom he was in official contact, and commented:

Since you wrote, bad has become worse. That grieves me here is the evident disrepute into which this electoral embroilment has brought us. Now cease the Oregon and Vermont squabble to supplement the Southern Returning-boards. The Spaniards all predict trouble -- a future second edition of Mexico. I stand up bravely, and predict a peaceful solution and acquiescence in whatever may be done, on the part of the defeated party -- and as yet every day by telegraphic reports of movements of troops, etc. etc. The simple fact is that our prestige abroad is just now about at its lowest ebb. And, if, as many think, the two Houses shall disagree, and remain in deadlock till March 4th and Grant should hold over until December without summoning the new Congress, those who fail to draw the line very clearly between our republicanism and a centralized dictatorship, will doubtless find much of argument in their favor.

The King yesterday asked me if we had a new President yet. I said that we undoubtedly have one, but I was unable to say whether his name is Hayes or Tilden.

At any rate, I suppose there is nothing to be done but to await the result, -- holding alternative plans in reserve, but doing nothing at present.<sup>113</sup>

In Cushing's absence Adee was faithful to his duties and

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<sup>111</sup> Cushing private to Adee, Nov. 13, 1876, CP.

<sup>112</sup> Fish to Morgan, Nov. 18, 1876, Fish Papers, MSS., L.C.

<sup>113</sup> Adee to Cushing, Nov. 29, 1876, CP.

in informing his absent chief of much that went on, either by personal letters or by copies of his despatches to the Department. In one letter he revealed the extent of his activities and some of his thoughts:

All your letters have been duly received. It is very pleasant to know that you are coming back, for to say the truth, I have very /sic/ lonely at times during the past few months of hard labor, during which I have passed day and night at my desk. I have been, as you used to say, rather "naughty", and have done more despatch writing than was necessary, but I won't do so again. Just now I am trying to write up the record in season for your return, but there are some 200 pages of book yet to write. Mr. Clarke has been helping for three weeks past, and considerable headway has been made. I was at work yesterday at a 22 page report on the relations between Gold & Silver & Spain, for the New York Monetary Committee. Now Mr. Fish wants to know all about the Rinderpest in Spain, but I shall leave that for you, to pay you off for bringing me back a new cipher....

.....

I am at the office now, having put my bed there so as to be near my desk at night. As there will be a good deal to do before March, when we are both likely to go together, I think I will, with your permission, leave my bed where it is, in order to be better able to economize any odd hours to bring up over-due jobs....<sup>llh</sup>

In this letter are pathos and humor. Adee spent his life punning about subjects as they presented themselves to him. Also he spent many a solitary hour in the Department in later years. But he got the work done and earned the praises of his chiefs. And his attention to business in these years at Spain laid a firm foundation on which he was able to build a reputation that has not been dimmed through the years, but has remained in the minds of all who knew him, until now his sayings have become legend throughout the Department. But rest and change were

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<sup>llh</sup> Adee to Cushing, Dec. 18, 1876, CP.

needed in order to keep him going and he was not getting those in Madrid. So that it was easy for him to ask for leave, with the possibility of not returning to Madrid, after Cushing returned to take up the tasks of concluding an Extradition Treaty between the United States and Spain. This intimation was greatly regretted by Cushing, "not merely because of the perfect cordiality of our personal relations, but still more because of the value here of your intelligence and expression to the Government."<sup>115</sup> But he did get away as special courier bearing the draft copy of the Extradition Treaty, as accepted by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs without change except for a proposed addition of some additional crimes. This Treaty was acted on by the Senate, and Cushing was notified of its subsequent approval.<sup>116</sup>

Upon his return to the Legation Adee devoted himself to writing up Cushing's draft of a Protocol on Judicial Procedure. This Protocol of the Conference on January 12, 1877, between Cushing and Senor Don Fernando Calderon y Collantes, the Minister of State, became the basis of a later despatch to the

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<sup>115</sup> Cushing to Adee, Dec. 31, 1876, CP.

<sup>116</sup> Cushing 1104 to Fish, Dec. 31, 1876, Spain Desp. 91; Cushing tel. to Fish, Jan. 5, 1877, *Ibid*; Cushing 1112 to Fish, Jan. 5, 1877, *Ibid*; Cushing 1176 to Fish, confirming Fish cipher tel. to Cushing of Feb. 10, 1877, Feb. 13, 1877, *Ibid*. It can be noted that the Extradition Draft was written by Adee. It is possible to assume that Adee was well versed in Extradition procedures and legalities and that the drafting of this treaty went along smoothly, with an occasional suggestion from Cushing as to the final wording, so that it would conform to the sample Cushing had received from Fish before he returned to Madrid.

Department.<sup>117</sup> But this was not mailed until after Adee had worked late to finish a twenty-eight page despatch on the same subject, and then asked for an hour's grace the next morning.<sup>118</sup>

The conclusion of the Judicial Procedure Protocol brought the serious problems which confronted the Cushing Mission to an end, and the Minister asked for leave of absence in order to report to Washington.<sup>119</sup> In granting this leave Everts instructed Cushing to leave Adee in charge of the Legation.<sup>120</sup> Accordingly Cushing quitted Madrid on April the ninth and Adee assumed charge of the Legation for the fifth and last time.<sup>121</sup> Adee's last months in Spain were spent agreeably among his friends. In letters to Cushing Adee wrote about people they both knew, and told about the social activities he had enjoyed.<sup>122</sup>

Cushing had been gone from Spain a little over ten weeks when Adee received a very valued letter from him stating that a Consular position or a clerkship was open to him and that he would have to decide which he wanted. This letter relieved

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<sup>117</sup> Cushing 1161 to Fish, Feb. 4, 1877, Ibid. See also the copy in the Cushing Papers, on which Cushing has noted: "original draft by Cushing, with Spanish interlined by Adee; and an ink copy made by Adee."

<sup>118</sup> Adee to Cushing, Jan. 20, 1877, 1 A. M., CP. MSS., L. C.; Cushing 1129 to Fish, Jan. 20, 1877, Spain Desp. 91.

<sup>119</sup> Cushing cipher tel. to Everts, Apr. 2, 1877, 9:35 A. M., confirmed in Cushing 1215 to Everts, Apr. 4, 1877, Spain Desp. 92.

<sup>120</sup> Everts tel. to Cushing, Apr. 2, 1877, confirmed in Cushing 1215 to Everts, Apr. 4, 1877, Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> Adee 485 to Everts, Apr. 11, 1877, Ibid.

<sup>122</sup> Adee to Cushing, Apr. 16, 1877, CP. See also Adee to Cushing, Apr. 23, 1877, CP.

Adee's mind and a lengthy letter in reply was written. In his reply we find statements of what he actually desired:

What I have desired... is an appointment with some chance of permanency and promotion; and if that be not immediately attainable, then temporary transfer to some less worked secretaryship of equal or higher grade.

Your letter of the 11th instant indicates that it remains for me to choose between a Consulate and a place in the Department. Under the circumstances I choose the latter as being best for my permanent interests, -- but I would like, if possible, a clerkship of the intermediate grades, the \$1100 or \$1200 class for example. I hardly think it can be one of the lowest, or \$900 class, appointments, for that of course I could not afford to accept after the service of the past seven years.<sup>123</sup>

And in a second letter of the same date he wrote:

Should your hopes be realized, and an appointment, like that you suggest, be tendered to me through you, I would accept it unhesitatingly /sic/ and gratefully, -- merely asking that a brief respite for rest and relaxation be allowed to intervene between my quitting my present post and my entrance upon my new duties, provided that it can be granted without prejudice to the interests of the service.<sup>124</sup>

This suggestion of taking leave before reporting to the Department did not meet with Cushing's approval, for he wrote Adee, "I advise you to come home at once, and above all not to waste the noon of manhood loitering or vagabonding in Europe."<sup>125</sup> This advice was heeded and Adee revised his schedule so as to allow for a few moments in Paris in order to buy a good

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<sup>123</sup> Adee to Cushing, Jun. 27, 1877, CP. This letter shows conclusively that Adee desired to remain in the Department of State and not to resign, or to return to private life, as stated in HAD 1:106.

<sup>124</sup> Adee to Cushing, Jun. 27, 1877, second letter of date, CP.

<sup>125</sup> Cushing confidential to Adee, Jul. 7, 1877, CP.

microscope, and in London in order to purchase some clothes.<sup>126</sup>

The position offered to Adee was that of despatch-writer. When he heard of this from Cushing he was hesitant to accept such a responsible position, but was willing to accept any position the General was able to help procure for him.<sup>127</sup> This was a switch in positions, for Adee took Dwight Reed's place in the Department, and Reed assumed the Secretaryship in Madrid.<sup>128</sup> This change in position was lauded by Fish who thought the Department would find Adee an acquisition and that the position "could not be better filled than it now is."<sup>129</sup>

As a successor to Cushing, President Hayes nominated John Kesson, but his Cuban record caused distrust in Spain and he was not appointed.<sup>130</sup> The President next nominated James Russell Lowell. This selection pleased the Spaniards, and Adee hoped he would arrive before the end of August.<sup>131</sup> The new minister was a man of letters rather than a soldier, as had been his two predecessors. He was bombarded with many requests for Secretary of Legation, but calmly wrote, "If Mr. Adee would stay, I should like that best...."<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> Adee to Cushing, Jul. 27, 1877, CP. This reference to a microscope purchase is interesting because Adee later became an expert in microscopy, especially with diatoms.

<sup>127</sup> Adee to Cushing, Jun. 30, 1877, CP.

<sup>128</sup> W. I. Knapp to Cushing, Jul. 9, 1877, CP.

<sup>129</sup> Fish to Sevallon A. Brown, Jul. 11, 1877, Fish Papers.

<sup>130</sup> Adee to Cushing, Jun. 18, 1877, CP.

<sup>131</sup> Adee to Cushing, May 2, 1877, Jun. 18 and 30, 1877, CP.

<sup>132</sup> Lowell to Evarts, Jun. 29, 1877, Spain Desp. 93.

At Lowell's request Adee went to the frontier to receive him and to confer with him. The two arrived in Madrid on August 14, and the Minister presented his credentials to the King at La Granja on Saturday the eighteenth.<sup>133</sup> When Lowell was accredited, Adee had him inform the Minister of State of the cessation of his own official duties as Secretary of the Legation.<sup>134</sup> Of Lowell's conduct of American affairs in Spain Adee said, "In the Spanish eye he came not to continue the disputes and aggressive policy of Sickles and Cushing, but to revive the amiable traditions of Washington Irving's day."<sup>135</sup>

Thus was terminated the overseas career of Adee. He planned to leave Madrid on the twenty-third of August, sail on the Britannic from England on the thirteenth of September, and to arrive in Washington about the first of October, but would go to Newburyport first to see Cushing, if he were there when the boat arrived.<sup>136</sup> Adee reported for work in the Department in October, 1878, but was not at first given Feed's desk. This, plus several other factors, gave him the idea he was being mentioned for the position vacated by Governor Campbell, who was resigning from the Department to go to Baltimore. He asked for Cushing's aid in this matter.<sup>137</sup> There is no record of a reply from Cushing, and

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<sup>133</sup> Adee 648 to Swarts, Aug. 14, 1877, and Adee 651 to Swarts, Aug. 18, 1877, Spain Deep. 9h.

<sup>134</sup> Adee 651 to Swarts, Aug. 18, 1877, ibid.

<sup>135</sup> Wrenslet, Lowell, p. 168.

<sup>136</sup> Adee to Cushing, Aug. 19, 1877, CP.

<sup>137</sup> Adee to Cushing, Oct. 17, 1877, CP.



this is the last letter found from Adee to Cushing. The General spent his last years in Newburyport, and died early in the year of 1879. Cushing's biographer, Claude Fuess, records Adee as having quoted the General as saying, "reminiscences are generally 'remimisarces'...."<sup>138</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> Fuess, Cushing, 2:419, footnote.

## CHAPTER II

### "THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF ADEE"

Adee had an opportunity in the Department to expand his horizons of diplomacy. After he was more familiar with his new position, he prepared memoranda and made notes on the despatches.<sup>1</sup> The rest of his life in the Department was spent giving similar notes on the despatches and preparing memoranda of his thoughts and recollections of past events or facts. Many of them, it will be shown, became the basis for Departmental instructions, and some of those went out over his signature in his official capacity, or as "Adee, Acting."

He applied himself diligently and used his time wisely and received his first promotion within the Department in 1878. At age 35, he was appointed Chief of the Diplomatic Bureau at \$2100 a year. For this position he was well equipped, having as a background his experiences abroad and, in addition, he was "a man of superlative ability."<sup>2</sup> Soon thereafter, he purchased Roget's Thesaurus of English Words<sup>3</sup> and Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland.<sup>4</sup> These two books were boon companions. From the first he gained knowledge, and from the second he found a

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<sup>1</sup> Lowell 71 to Evarts, Feb. 27, 1878, Spain Desp. 96. Adee memorandum, Apr. 30, 1878, attached to Lowell 83 to Evarts, Apr. 4, 1878, Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> Stuart, The Department of State, pp. 153, 155.

<sup>3</sup> Adee, Catalogue, p. 47.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 55.

reservoir of humor. Then his poem "Philip's Death Cell in the Ascorial" was published.<sup>5</sup> Followed by his character study of Don Emilio Castelar.<sup>6</sup>

### THIRD ASSISTANT SECRETARY

Adee served as Chief of the Diplomatic Bureau for four years until 1882, when he was appointed as Third Assistant Secretary of State by President Chester A. Arthur and Secretary of State Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, to replace Walker Blaine, who had resigned. His salary was then \$3500 a year. But this promotion did not come until after Adee had filled in for Sevellon A. Brown, the Chief Clerk, "with a realizing sense of the variety of the Departmental work."<sup>7</sup> Thus he was indirectly prepared for the promotion to Third Assistant Secretary in July, 1882. Of all the congratulations that came to him only one is preserved, and that is not the original. May telegraphed to his old friend, "God bless you my boy! The country is safe."<sup>8</sup>

During his first years, and as Third Assistant Secretary, he learned more and more about the problems and difficulties that confronted every post abroad. But he was not glued to the Department. May was in town and introduced Mrs. May to Adee, who has recorded this meeting in poetry:

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<sup>5</sup> The Atlantic Monthly, 48:136, Jul. 1881.

<sup>6</sup> Adee, "Reminiscences of Castelar," The Century Magazine, 9:792-794, Mar. 1886.

<sup>7</sup> Adee to Fish, May 10, 1882, Fish Papers.

<sup>8</sup> May tel. to Adee, Jul. 12, 1882, SP.

To Mrs. John Hay

Here in the Nation's capital we meet;  
 You from the fair West lake, where the light rays  
 Play on the gladsome water through the haze,  
 Kissing the prints of the wind-elfin's feet;  
 He from the mighty River, where the fleet  
 Strong current flows, through sleepless nights and days,  
 Channeling for itself its mystic ways,  
 Like his own gift of poesy, -- complete  
 As his rich love for you; I from the shore, --  
 My earliest memory a tide-left shell  
 Guarding within its fold a wailing roar.  
 Our three lives meet, single together, dwell  
 As one great friendship, sundering nevermore,  
 Joining lake, river, sand, in its wide spell.<sup>9</sup>

In addition to the Hays there were other friends in town:

Adee's brother lived with him; Bancroft Davis was in town; he met Mrs. George Bancroft during the party season; Young was within hailing distance some of the time; and with Brown he rented Joaquin Miller's log cabin as a retreat.<sup>10</sup> Besides he wrote several four line ditties and some longer poems, and had one of his earlier poems published. To S.A.B. he wrote a four line ditty congratulating him on fifteen years in the Department.<sup>11</sup> The poem, "Philip's Death Call in the Escorial," published in the Atlantic Monthly, was not printed exactly as the manuscript copy appears. In one line several words are completely changed; in others words are spelled differently, while much of the

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<sup>9</sup> Adee, New and Old, p. 123.

<sup>10</sup> Adee to Davis, Feb. 21, 1878, Davis Papers. In the summer of 1951 Miss Adee told me about the cabin; Adee to Young, May 11, 1880, YP.

<sup>11</sup> Adee, New and Old, pp. 116, 117, 118, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127.

punctuation in the printed version differs from that in the manuscript. The theme and message that Adee wished to convey are there in all their power and dignity, nevertheless.<sup>12</sup> And on top of all that he found time to increase his knowledge about Shakespeare and his works.<sup>13</sup>

In the Department Adee was responsible for seeing that letters and despatches were written. He gave the clue as to what to say and the Diplomatic Bureau did the writing.<sup>14</sup> In addition Adee passed on some of the information which was given to the press. For example, Rollin M. Daggett, our Minister Resident to Hawaii, informed the Department there were no sugar frauds in the Hawaiian sugars shipped hither, and Adee directed that that information be given to the press.<sup>15</sup> From the Hawaiian Islands despatch he turned to the problem of Great Britain's helping the emigration of Irishmen to the United States and North American colonies. In an instruction to James Russell Lowell, then our Minister in London, Adee inserted in the draft copy some sections that suggested caution. He advised against making a formal representation to Lord Granville, the British Foreign Minister, until more specific information was

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<sup>12</sup> Adee, Ibid., p. 66; Adee, "Philips Death Cell in the Escorial," Atlantic Monthly, 48:136, Jul. 1881.

<sup>13</sup> Adee, Catalogue, see entries for 1882-1883; Adee to Davis, Feb. 28, 1883, Davis Papers.

<sup>14</sup> Adee to Dip. Bu., Oct. 25, 1882, Fralinghuysen Letter Book 3; Adee to Brown, Mar. 12, 1883, Ibid., Letter Book 4.

<sup>15</sup> Adee to Brown, Apr. 5, 1883, Ibid.

possessed by this Government.<sup>16</sup> Another subject, that of unpaid Charges, caused him to request a circular draft for the Secretaries of Legations to report their Charge time in 1878-1879 so that a statement could be made to Congress for the extra compensation due.<sup>17</sup> Then to Young, who had been appointed as Minister to China, he expressed his thoughts on Far Eastern problems:

Your long despatch on the Franco Chinese difficulty has had many interested readers in the Department, and gives us a review of the situation with photographic fidelity. Li has my best sympathies in his manifold tribulations -- but, ... /sic/ if Annam were Corea and the question affected our treaty rights there, would we not expect to deal directly with the Chosunese? This is not an indication of profound policy, mind you, but the way it happens to strike me personally as an abstract proposition.

We will put items in the estimates separating the Secretary at Peking (with \$3000 salary) from the interpreter, (who gets the \$5000 half of the cherry thus made two bites of) and I hope we can get it through. But the Democratic House has been bitten by the tarantula of impending success, and we may not succeed in all our recommendations -- unless the committees are astute enough to see in the change room for two hungry patriots hereafter instead of one.<sup>18</sup>

In March 1885, the Democratic Party came into Power with Grover Cleveland as the President, and Thomas F. Bayard as Secretary of State. The latter was quick to recognize Adee's value to the Department. A few months after Bayard took office Adee submitted memoranda which were based on the Diplomatic

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<sup>16</sup> Draft copy of Frelinghuysen to Lowell, noted copies May 16, 1883, Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Adee to G. C. Wing, Jun. 25, 1883, Ibid., Letter Book 5.

<sup>18</sup> Adee to Young, Confidential as usual, Oct. 12, 1883, YP.

Bureau's report on the appointment of Ambassadors abroad. The Law Bureau concurred with Adee's remarks and Bayard observed that Adee's note was "full of good sense and strong facts."<sup>19</sup> The one issue that consumed much of Bayard's time was that of the Canadian fishing privileges. American fishermen wanted the freedom of Canadian waters and land for fishing and for drying nets. Bayard drafted many of his instructions in his own long hand and then sent them to Adee for putting into the proper form. "Pray forgive me," he wrote on one occasion, "for sending you such a lot of hieroglyphics (but the implied compliment to your powers of deciphering must not be overlooked)."<sup>20</sup>

Non-conformity to regulations and instructions was frequently the basis of some of Adee's humor, for with humorous jabs he showed the weak point or where further conformity was necessary. Our Minister to Japan, Richard D. Hubbard, recommended a naturalization convention to grant naturalized citizenship to Japanese, for he felt that the restriction of "white" was opposed to naturalization only for the black or African races. The instruction of the Department in reply to this suggestion was developed from a memorandum by Adee. He found a Japanese to be no more white than a red American Indian, or a copper-colored

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<sup>19</sup> Adee memoranda of Jun. 10, 1885, to Bayard, Law Bureau note of Jun. 11, 1885, to Bayard, and Bayard's note of Jun. 29, 1885, attached to "Report on the Appointment of Ambassador's Abroad." Reports of the Diplomatic Bureau, Vol. 7.

<sup>20</sup> Bayard to Adee, May 9, 1886. Bayard Papers. See Adee to Bayard, May 27, 1886, ibid., for Adee's thoughts on the restrictions imposed on our fishermen.

Malayan and then added, "but -- some courts keep right along naturalizing Japanese and Chinese, altee eanee -- Why? How Can?" This instruction dismissed Hubbard's proposal, and gave no word of approval of his convention suggestion.<sup>21</sup>

#### SECOND ASSISTANT SECRETARY

While Adee was busy absorbing information about diplomatic problems in the world, William Hunter, who had been in the Department since 1829 and who had risen in the ranks to Second Assistant Secretary of State, became ill and died in July 1886. Adee was named as one of the honorary pall-bearers, and Sevellon A. Brown was named as an active pall-bearer.<sup>22</sup> The death of Hunter at first appeared to be an irreparable loss, for he had been in the Department of State for 57 years. The position needed to be filled and there were many political applicants for it. Cleveland, however, had many problems which arose because of the Civil Service reform that took place during his regime. He did not permit a clean sweep, but promoted some promising Republicans. He and Bayard filled the vacancy caused by Hunter's death by promoting Adee, a Republican.<sup>23</sup> His nomination was sent to the Senate on July 29, 1886, and confirmed a week later.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Treat, U. S. and Japan, 2:238.

<sup>22</sup> The Evening Star, Sat., Jul. 24, 1886, p. 1, col. 5.

<sup>23</sup> Nevins, Cleveland, p. 251; Stuart, Department of State, p. 165.

<sup>24</sup> The Evening Star, Thurs., Jul. 29, 1886, p. 1, col. 4, and Thurs. Aug. 5, 1886, p. 1, col. 5.



This promotion did not increase his salary, for the new position was also at \$3500 a year.

The Second Assistant Secretary of State is charged with such duties as may be assigned him by the Secretary of State. He has direct supervision over his immediate office (including the reviewing, coordinating, and mailing branch of the office) and over the Division of Passport Control and the Visa Office. He makes decisions in citizenship and other cases involving complex questions of law and policy. He is consulted by the officers of the Department upon matters of diplomatic procedure, and general questions of international law and policy, particularly when involving the traditional practice of the Department of State.<sup>25</sup>

Such were the duties of Adee's office in 1924. The writer has not seen an earlier statement of Adee's specific duties in the Department. However, the records disclose that he did practically those same things all along, but had fewer persons to help him before World War I. It is known that he had a secretary, Miss Margaret Hanna, and a messenger, Isaac Edwards, but whether he had any other employees delegated to his office or not, is a problem for future research.

By the time Adee became Second Assistant Secretary of State he had been in the Government for almost sixteen years and was in his forty-third year. During these years he made many friends, who congratulated him on his promotion, but only one reply has been found, and that was to Young: "Your cordial congratulations are as welcome to me as any of the bushel or two I have received. I never knew I had so many friends, and the pleasure it gives them touches me. But most of all I am moved by the quiet way my promotion came, wholly unsought, against my

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<sup>25</sup> U. S. Department of State, Register of the Department of State, 1924, p. 23.

known preference even, and accompanied by the kindest utterances of the President and Mr. Bayard."<sup>26</sup>

His promotion had come by hard work and attention to duty. He was able to perform the hard work and to give the long hours required because he kept himself in good physical condition. One of his hobbies was bicycling, and he was an avid bicyclist. In all seasons he could be seen pedaling along the streets of Washington. One day, when Montana was undecided as to the place of her capital, a Washingtonian suggested that the State House be put on wheels and kept in Butte for half the year and in Helena for the rest of the year. The Montanan, to whom the suggestion was made, did not think much of the idea, but the irreverent Washingtonian, who did not think it so bad, said, "There goes our State Department now," and with that saluted a little old gentleman who was passing by on a bicycle.<sup>27</sup>

Adee used his wheel the year round and made an annual bicycle tour of France when he was on vacation. Some of his other hobbies were photography, which he did along with his bicycling, canoeing, stamps, billiards, microscopy, and a farm in Laurel, Maryland, which occupied him for several summers. His study with the microscope was very exacting, and in later years he devoted much time to microscopy. But his greatest hobby was

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<sup>26</sup> Adee to Young, Nov. 18, 1886, Young Papers 18, MSS, L. C. IP.

<sup>27</sup> Winifred Mallon, "The State Department Loses a Skipper," Liberty, 1:46, Aug. 16, 1924.

Shakespeariana.<sup>28</sup>

There was no prototype or understudy for Adee, but there was a precursor -- William Hunter. And when he succeeded to Hunter's chair, Adee objected to the hard cushion that had served Hunter for so long. Therefore he lifted it from the chair. As he did this, there fell to the floor several large sheets of paper with Hunter's well-known handwriting on them. Hunter had put this draft copy of a treaty in a safe hiding place. Even he forgot it. Adee recalled how the building was searched for the document and how Hunter rewrote it. He had forgotten the place, but not the contents. Adee was to live and furnish equally amazing feats of memory during his tenure of office. It has been reported that when a foreign minister went to have his first interview with the President, he forgot his speech and that Adee wrote one for him.<sup>29</sup> At first, then, Adee followed the pattern adopted by Hunter, but soon made an Adee pattern that was adhered to so long as he was responsible for the correspondence. His own pattern was to keep the Secretary of State informed on important events as they came to the Department. In addition he wrote many letters to the Secretaries when they

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<sup>28</sup> The New York Times, Sec. 1, Sun., Jul. 6, 1924, p. 21, cols. 1 and 2; The World, Sun., Jul. 6, 1924, p. 16, col. 7; Nevins, White, 69f; Miss Adee told me that he would come home in the evenings and spread cards on the dining room table. Then without a word would play three games of solitaire. After that he was relaxed enough to enjoy the family life he made for his brother's family. Miss Adee further told me that he was an expert billiard player, and then added that everything he did he did expertly.

<sup>29</sup> Hunt, "The Permanent Assistant Secretary of State," The Outlook, 65:461, Feb. 23, 1907.

were away from Washington. In these personal letters we see Adee as a person. He was always ready to indulge in a pun. Hence we find many of his private letters bubbling over with humor. For instance, when Bayard was out of town in September, 1886, he wrote to Adee from Glen Cove. In reply Adee said he had been at Glen Cove "when it was merely a primitive Quaker settlement — and when Harold's mill-pond was virgin and pictarsequ, not prim and (Luryea's) starch-y, as now."<sup>30</sup>

With all the preparation he had for assuming responsibility, when the time came for him to be "Adee, Acting," he was mindful of the pitfalls into which he might plunge. Governor Porter, the First Assistant Secretary of State, had gone to New York, and with Bayard already out of town, Adee was next in line to act. "I am to act," he reported, "during his (and your) absence — and being mindful of the distressing results of Young Phaeton's attempt to drive the chariot of the sun too ambitiously, I shall keep as far from the sources of heat as possible."<sup>31</sup>

#### OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES

It was during the Bayard Administration of the Department that Adee devoted many hours to Shakespeariana and publications of the plays by that great author. He became a member of the

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<sup>30</sup> Adee personal to Bayard, Sep. 30, 1886, Bayard Papers. It must be pointed out that Adee frequently used brackets in his personal correspondence, whereas parentheses would have done just as well. In order to avoid copying his brackets and then putting /sic/ right after it, I have made all his brackets into parentheses, as in the above instance.

<sup>31</sup> Adee personal to Bayard, Oct. 5, 1886, Ibid.

Shakespeare Society of New York and in a paper read before the Society he asked for uniformity in references to the quartos and folios of Shakespeare's plays.<sup>32</sup> A few years later he published his one great work. That was his "King Lear" in the Bankside Edition of Shakespeare. In it he incorporated the reference system for which he had pleaded.

Also during Bayard's tenure of office Adee was honored by Yale University. At the 1888 Commencement Exercises he was awarded an honorary Master of Arts degree. He thanked Bayard for his congratulations, which he accepted for Mark Twain and himself. "It seems," he continued, "from a letter I receive this morning from the President and Other Fellows of Yale, that the degree is conferred in recognition of my 'ancestral connection with Yale.' So you see I am A.M., in loco parentis."<sup>33</sup>

After the Spanish-American War, The Critic published Adee's "The Chant of the Archangels from 'Faust'," and the next month wrote an article about him.<sup>34</sup> The same month that The Critic carried the article about Adee The Century Magazine published James Russell Lowell's "Impressions of Spain." Adee

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<sup>32</sup> Adee, A Plea...., pp. 1, 2, 28. In a footnote on page 14 is the comment that the Society had published three volumes of the Bankside Edition with the annotation first suggested by Adee in this paper.

<sup>33</sup> Adee to Bayard, Jun. 30, 1888, Bayard Papers. Adee persons who attended Yale before 1888 were: his father, Augustus Alvey, 1821; George A., 1867; Frederick W., 1873; Philip W., 1873; Edwin W. 1881; Ernest R., 1886; in 1895 George T. Adee. He, it might be, was the son of Adee's uncle, George T. Adee. Letter from Reuben A. Holden to the writer, Sep. 24, 1951.

<sup>34</sup> The Critic, 32:267, Oct. 1898; 32:322, Nov. 1898.

wrote a short preface to that article and described the period of Sickles and Cushing. That was the time when Spanish Politics underwent many intricacies of leadership and the years prior to Lowell's Spanish service as Minister of the United States.<sup>35</sup>

So far as the writer knows that is the end of Adee's extracurricular publications and writings. But he did not remain idle. He was an enthusiastic philatelist. Henry White sent him some British Colonial stamps for the collection, and for his farm in Maryland he sent some choice seeds.<sup>36</sup> And he enjoyed his bicycle. His annual jaunts to Europe were well planned trips. Miss Adee said he no sooner got home from one trip than he began planning the next year's outing. He knew where he wanted to travel and the routes which led to those places. The bicycle hobby led to another hobby— photography. Everywhere he went in Europe he took a camera and hundreds of pictures were accumulated by him and then destroyed by him before he died. Only a few are now left and in the possession of his niece.

One year he toured England and Scotland.<sup>37</sup> Major Oliver Newman, a newspaperman who knew Adee, told the writer that one year, when Adee was wheeling along in Scotland, he accidentally met

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<sup>35</sup> Adee, "Prefatory Note on Spanish Politics," in James Russell Lowell's "Impressions of Spain," The Century Magazine, 57:140-142, Nov. 1898. See also Adee's Introduction in James Russell Lowell, Impressions of Spain, compiled by Joseph E. Gilder.

<sup>36</sup> Allen Nevins, Henry White, Thirty Years of American Diplomacy, pp. 69-70.

<sup>37</sup> Adee to Olney, Sep. 10, 1895, OP. Adee to Hay, Nov. 6, 1897, HP.

Woodrow Wilson who was also on a bicycle. After greeting one another they continued their journeys together. That was the background for the little squib in the newspaper after Wilson was inaugurated in 1913: "Alvey Adee's resignation will not be accepted, as he is the only other man in Washington who rides a bicycle."<sup>38</sup>

A few years later, and after the Boxer Rebellion had been put down, David Graham Adee passed away. He had been an invalid for many years,<sup>39</sup> and had lived with his brother ever since he moved to Washington in 1878. To Adee it was an irreparable loss, and May in writing to President McKinley about many matters of official business, ended by saying, "Poor Adee's brother is dead and he is heartbroken. They were like twins in attachment to each other."<sup>40</sup> But Adee had work to do and soon returned from the land of the dead. The official records show his work for that period of grief.

In 1903 he sincerely thanked Mrs. May for her "most acceptable gift" of tea which was one of his cravings,<sup>41</sup> went to Europe on April 16 and covered 1500 miles on his wheel, returned on the Kronprinz,<sup>42</sup> reported for work on schedule on July 1, and

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<sup>38</sup> Washington Post, Saturday, Mar. 8, 1913, p. 6, col. 3.

<sup>39</sup> New York Daily Tribune, Friday, Jan. 11, 1901, p. 4, col. 6.

<sup>40</sup> May to President McKinley, Jan. 10, 1901, McKP.

<sup>41</sup> Adee to Mrs. May, Feb. 24, 1903, MP.

<sup>42</sup> New York Daily Tribune, Wednesday, Jul. 1, 1903, p. 14, Col. 1.

felt "somewhat collar-galled in getting into harness again."<sup>43</sup>  
 That summer, we will recall, the Panama Revolution and the  
 Alaska Boundary problems kept him busy, but not too busy to  
 prevent him from wishing Hay a sunny day and that he would soon  
 see

Each maple a portent of Korab,  
 Aflame with the glory of God.

Those lines, he said, were "from an unpublished (and unfinished)  
 rhyme of" his.<sup>44</sup>

In the Spring of 1910 he sold the Westchester lots. His  
 niece, Constance Adee, who had married Frederick S. Tyler on  
 December 1, 1906, at the Adee home, had accompanied Tyler to New  
 York to dispose of that bit of real estate for Adee, but her  
 expenses had been omitted from the account rendered by Tyler.  
 Adee promptly said he "certainly intended that she should be  
 included in the trip" and sent his check to include her  
 expenses.<sup>45</sup> Then in the Fall he received a copy of Root's  
 address which was delivered at Brown University when the John  
 Hay Library was dedicated. "It was like the grasp of a friendly  
 hand," he wrote after it came, and then added, "our relations  
 were so affectionately intimate, that I can the more value your  
 eloquent tribute."<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Adee to Hay, Jul. 1903, HP.

<sup>44</sup> Adee to Hay, Sep. 10, 1903, HP.

<sup>45</sup> Adee to Tyler, Mar. 30, 1910, Papers of Constance Ellen  
 Tyler, private collection in her possession. Frederick S. Tyler,  
The History and Connection of the Stansbury-Tyler-Adee Families, p.9.

<sup>46</sup> Adee to Root, Nov. 18, 1910, Root Papers.



The next year his grandniece, Constance Ellen Tyler was born. She became, like her mother, an accomplished violinist.<sup>47</sup> And in November that year Edward G. Lowry wrote that Adee had "a temper worthy of his Scottish ancestry." That temper and his peculiar deafness stood him in good stead, Lowry stated one of his biographers had indicated. Adee could hear what he wanted to, and be oblivious to that which he did not want to hear. Lowry wrote of his temper: "when it is calm, he is urbanity exemplified; when it explodes, let those who stand nearest look out for themselves."<sup>48</sup> Lowry also quoted Ray: "Adee would make a good Bible. He can begin at the creation and tell me how everything was done in the past, and wind up by instructing me in my duties as head of this Department. And the beauty of it is that I shan't go far astray if I follow him."<sup>49</sup> Thus it was, that by the time Adee attained his seventieth birthday, his imprint had been so well made that writers found it beneficial to write articles about the man "who by his vast knowledge has made the continuity of the foreign policies of seven successive national administrations."<sup>50</sup>

While those words were being written, war clouds were hovering over Europe in 1914; our Government was having troubles with Mexico, and Gaillard Hunt was writing a history of the

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<sup>47</sup> Tyler, Fifty Years of Yesterdays (1882-1932), p. 28.

<sup>48</sup> Edward George Lowry, "Adee, the Remarkable," Harper's Weekly, 55:9, Nov. 18, 1911.

<sup>49</sup> Log. cit.

<sup>50</sup> The World's Work, 25:244, Jan. 1913.

Department. He dedicated it to Adee because he knew the Department's debt to Adee, "and because there is no one else to whom it can so appropriately be dedicated...."<sup>51</sup> And a month later Adee was chafing to get away to Europe. William Jennings Bryan, Secretary of State in President Wilson's first term of office, wrote to the President about it, for the Mexican situation was ticklish. Bryan was willing for him to go, but thought the President might "think the Mexican situation is such as to justify my asking him to remain."<sup>52</sup> No reply was found to this inquiry, but Adee did get away and was merrily riding along the by-ways of France when he was suddenly de-wheeled and "delegated to attend the Spitzbergen Conference at Christiania, framing a government for No Man's Land." He was sent as a replacement for William K. Collier, who had become ill.<sup>53</sup> While there he sent post cards home, bought a doll dressed in the costume of the midnight sun region, and fretted at not being able to see the far-north of Norway which he had always wanted to do. He enjoyed writing at midnight, but perspired copiously at night, when the city had been baked for eighteen hours by a cloudless sun.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Gaillard Hunt, The Department of State of the United States; its History and Functions, dedication page.

<sup>52</sup> Bryan to President Wilson, May 9, 1914, Bryan Papers. Letter Books 1913-1914, p. 486, MSS., L.C.

<sup>53</sup> New York Times, Sunday, Jun. 28, 1914, Sec. II, p. 10, col. 2.

<sup>54</sup> Adee to Mrs. Tyler, Jul. 17, 1914, Ellen Tyler Papers.

That conference was the only one he ever attended as a delegate. He shied from them because of his deafness. And that one conference irked him. Because of "this penance," he wrote, "I shall ask for a three weeks extension of leave and ride a little before sailing for home."<sup>55</sup> But he never got that extra wheeling time. War broke out in Europe, and his bicycle, which he had left in Paris, was never seen again. Miss Adee said that was the last one he ever owned. The war delayed his return, and "The bottling up continues," he wrote to Tyler. However, he had hopes of getting out of Copenhagen promptly and home by way of South Hampton as soon as possible. And as a returning Delegate, he had a free entry privilege.<sup>56</sup> Later Bainbridge Colby, who had become Secretary of State, commended "him highly for the impress which his learning and remarkable abilities had made upon the Department of State."<sup>57</sup> And President Wilson gave himself "the pleasure of congratulating you on your record and the Government on having possessed so faithful and devoted a servant."<sup>58</sup>

#### OFFICIAL ACTIVITIES

Not only was Adee the master policy draftsman and a sturdy

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<sup>55</sup> loc. cit.

<sup>56</sup> Adee to Tyler, Aug. 7, 1914, Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Stuart, The Department of State, p. 255.

<sup>58</sup> President Wilson to Adee, Sep. 9, 1920, copy. Wilson Papers. Mrs. Woodrow Wilson very graciously gave her permission to the writer to examine the Wilson papers.

pillar in maintaining a continuity in our foreign policy, but he was also a writer of the President's speeches when foreign diplomats were received,<sup>59</sup> "The only man who could write a despatch which President Cleveland would sign without change,"<sup>60</sup> and who was told by Hay to "Appoint yourself a committee on style and change to suit your taste."<sup>61</sup> That he did and had been doing long before Hay became Secretary. His style of writing became the official style of the Department, and he held the Department to it. He knew his English grammar and saw to it that the Department maintained a high standard of correctness in its ever increasing volume of correspondence. Joseph Grew, in his book, Turbulent Era, told of the travels of a telegram in the Department. After having gone through several hands, and a reply having been prepared, it went to Adee, who, Grew said, would change two words and a comma and return it for rewriting.<sup>62</sup> Grew pointed out that that was a little exaggerated, but it does show the rigidity with which Adee administered the correspondence.

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<sup>59</sup> Adee to President Harrison, May 21, 1891, Harrison Papers, MSC., L. C. Adee's "Draft of President's reply to address of Mr. Komura Jutaro, on the occasion of presenting his credentials as E.M. and M.P. of Japan, Nov. 23rd, 1898, 10:30 A.M." Japanese Legation 6 to the Department. Adee to Cortelyou, Aug. 17, 1900, McKP. Adee to President McKinley, Oct. 22, 1900, McKP. Adee to Cortelyou, Oct. 11, 1902, Roosevelt Papers, CP-State, 1901-02 box. Jean Jules Jusserand, What He Did, p. 220. Archie Butt, The Letters of Archie Butt, pp. 212, 214.

<sup>60</sup> Lyman Beecher Stone, "Patriots in the Public Service," The Outlook, 92:722-723, Jul. 24, 1909.

<sup>61</sup> Hay to Adee, Aug. 25, 1901, Bennett Papers on Hay.

<sup>62</sup> Joseph Grew, Turbulent Era, p. 330.

In addition he exerted great efforts to keep "the several bureaus from contradicting each other in their communications to other Departments. I read all the mail I sign, and it is surprising how many changes I have to make."<sup>63</sup> Of the literary style of the diplomatic correspondence, Hunt said it seemed verbose and used many long words, "but the long words always have meaning and shades of meanings which lesser words would not express so well, and the style as a whole has a peculiar adaptability to the purpose for which it is used."<sup>64</sup> And Lowry said that diplomatic notes were supposed to say the same thing either forward or backward "and that is nothing."<sup>65</sup>

Today the Department has an employee charged with performing the social and ceremonial functions so as to cause no diplomatic flare-ups because of an error in seating arrangements, or in other matters where protocol must be observed. But he is third in the line of a trio "who must face those stirrers of strife, the diplomats and their wives."<sup>66</sup> First is the President, who is not very active; second is the Secretary, who meets the diplomats and their wives; and thirdly, the Chief of Protocol who is their adviser. In Adee's day he himself performed that

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<sup>63</sup> Adee to Ray, Aug. 19, 1903, NP.

<sup>64</sup> Hunt, "Permanent Assistant Secretary of State," Ibid., p. 463.

<sup>65</sup> Lowry, loc. cit. Today, however, some people feel that his impress on the correspondence tends to keep the present day notes too wordy and in some instances not readily understood.

<sup>66</sup> Louis Clinton Litch, A History of the Vice-Presidency of the United States (revised 1934), p. 50.

function in addition to his other tasks. So accurate were his decisions that he was called "The Supreme Judge of the Court of Etiquette."<sup>67</sup> In 1905 Adee wrote to Root: "Ambassadors take precedence, in the order of their arrival at the Department over Ministers, Ministers likewise over Charges. A Charge of Embassy is given precedence over a Charge of Mission."<sup>68</sup> And later he wrote that "the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Speaker of the House, and Justices of the Supreme Court, should come after Ambassadors and before Cabinet Secretaries, in the house of a foreign diplomatic officer," but in an American house "the Cabinet Secretaries and Justices of the Supreme Court should be placed after the Foreign Ministers...."<sup>69</sup> "Precedence varies with every ceremonial at the White House," he wrote on another occasion.<sup>70</sup> Thus it was that every official gathering had situations peculiar to itself, especially when a dinner seating arrangement was involved. Before the Department got so huge those seatings were "an easy task if 'you knew and were in the good graces of one certain man.' His name is Adee."<sup>71</sup> And it was he who determined that our Vice President "took precedence

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<sup>67</sup> loc. cit.

<sup>68</sup> Adee to Root, Dec. 7, 1905, Takahira personal to Adee, Dec. 6, 1905, Japanese Legation 9 to the Department. Adee personal to Takahira, Dec. 7, 1905, The Department 2 to Japanese Embassy, pp. 251-252.

<sup>69</sup> Adee personal to Hoki, Dec. 11, 1905, ibid., p. 253.

<sup>70</sup> Adee to Babcock, Dec. 26, 1905 attached to an unsigned and undated memo to Adee, Root Papers.

<sup>71</sup> Lowry, loc. cit.

over a foreign ambassador" because he had "the same social status as the Crown Prince, for he is the heir-apparent to the Presidential Office."<sup>72</sup> At other diplomatic meetings, or social occasions, Adee represented the Secretary, as in the case of the funeral services for Osborne M. Eavanagh in the British Embassy.<sup>73</sup> He wrote letters of condolence and congratulation when deaths, births, or marriages occurred in the personal and official families of Kings, Monarchs, and Presidents. He knew how sorry or how happy the President was and shaded his messages accordingly.<sup>74</sup>

When Elihu Root succeeded John Hay in 1905 as Secretary of State, Adee had another friend as his chief. Root knew Adee from the time he had been Secretary of War. They worked well together. Adee was 63 at that time and still going strong. He had noted in 1896, a fine distinction which the Department "made between a uniform and a court dress conforming to local custom." The court dress was not considered as objectionable to the instructions, given to the diplomatic officers, which forbade them "from wearing any uniform or official costume not previously authorized by Congress."<sup>75</sup> Then in Root's Secretaryship Adee

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<sup>72</sup> Frederick Van Dyne, Our Foreign Service, p. 56.

<sup>73</sup> Sherman 648 to Paunceforte, Dec. 14, 1897, The Department 74 to British Embassy, p. 75.

<sup>74</sup> The Evening Star, Sep. 1, 1904, p. 2, col. 5. Ibid., p. 174. Adee memo to Smith, Aug. 12, 1904, on McCormick tel. to Hay, Russian Dep. 61. Lowry, loc. cit.

<sup>75</sup> Graham H. Stuart, American Diplomatic and Consular Practice, p. 279.

proposed a uniform for American diplomats. This suggestion came at the time the Department was making improvements in the foreign service. He suggested "silk stockings and satin knee breeches, a silk coat with a red satin sash and lace frills." Root did not think too much of the idea and added for improvement "a spray of mistletoe embroidered on the coat tails."<sup>76</sup> That suggestion was then buried in Robert Bacon's desk until he left office.<sup>77</sup> Adee's suggestion was not refused, it simply was just not used. But his talents were put to good use in another direction during Root's term of office. He was one of three who were appointed by Root to constitute "a Board, whose duty it shall be, by appropriate examination, to determine the qualifications of persons selected by the President therefor, to be appointed as Secretaries of embassies or legations...."<sup>78</sup>

To the efforts for improving the foreign service, which were started in 1905, were added the attempts to improve the Department in order to have better working relationship with the diplomats in the field. Regional desks were suggested and the idea was adopted.<sup>79</sup> And in 1909 "the Office of Counselor of the Department of State was established."<sup>80</sup> Another change occurred

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<sup>76</sup> Jessup, Ibid., p. 405.

<sup>77</sup> F. M. Huntington Wilson, Memoirs of an Ex-diplomat, p. 178.

<sup>78</sup> Van Lync, Ibid., p. 209.

<sup>79</sup> Stuart, The Department of State, p. 207.

<sup>80</sup> Bertram C. Eulen, Inside The Department of State, pp. 62-63.



in 1913. The higher officials were classified according to their rank. The Counselor was ranked next to the Secretary, and the Solicitor was third in line, followed by the Assistant Secretaries.<sup>81</sup> Still later, in World War I, the departmental personnel was increased; the work load became overwhelming and Adee could not then "carry the whole machinery of foreign policy under his hat."<sup>82</sup> The Office of Coordination and Review was established by Secretary Lansing on October 17, 1918, and was placed under the supervision of Adee.<sup>83</sup> And the change which put Adee still farther down the line was the Act of Congress of March 1, 1919, which authorized the appointment of an Under Secretary of State.<sup>84</sup> Lastly, the Rogers Act, approved May 24, 1924, removed the numerical titles of the Second and Third Assistant Secretaries. Thereafter they were known as Assistant Secretaries.<sup>85</sup> In that capacity Adee died on July 4, 1924.

#### DEATH

Adee had been in failing health for several months. He had spent his energies in his last years in studying the microscopic bits of earth that are called diatoms. He worked with his devoted friend Albert Mann in these studies, and gave his

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<sup>81</sup> Hunt, The Department of State, p. 247.

<sup>82</sup> Stuart, American Diplomatic and Consular Practice, p. 66.

<sup>83</sup> Stuart, ibid., p. 125.

<sup>84</sup> Stuart, ibid., p. 68.

<sup>85</sup> United States Statutes at Large, 43111, pt. 1, p. 146, Sec. 22.

collection of microscopic preparations to him, with a view to their ultimately being put in the National Museum.<sup>86</sup>

He sought relief from his physical discomforts and had gone to Asbury Park, N. J., "where he vainly sought recuperation."<sup>87</sup> Because of his failing health he had been relieved of his routine duties at the Department for several years prior to his death.<sup>88</sup> He returned to Washington from Asbury Park and went to his office a few days before his death. Miss Adee said his iron will to hold on was so strong that he just kept on going until the last night when he just closed his eyes and passed away at his home on July 4, 1924. After the funeral services his body was buried in Oak Hill Cemetery.

The "Anchor of the State Department" had fulfilled his desire to die in harness, and, as a tribute to his memory, the flag on the State Department Building was displayed at halfstaff. Charles Evans Hughes, the then Secretary of State, paid a fine tribute to his memory: "The death of Alvey A. Adee brings to an end a service which is unparalleled for its length and efficiency in the Department of State.... he was the most trusted adviser of Secretaries of State," and concluded by saying, "It is not too much to say that the Government has never

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<sup>86</sup> Twelfth Bequest in Adee's Will.

<sup>87</sup> The Evening Star, Jul. 5, 1924, p. 1, col. 5; p. 2, col. 2.

<sup>88</sup> Philadelphia Public Ledger, Sunday, Jul. 6, 1924, Sec. 1, p. 3, cols. 1-2.

had a more faithful and competent servant."<sup>89</sup> And a few days later Grew wrote: "Our expressions of sympathy... were heartfelt and genuine for we all loved him. His position was an incense asset to the Department. Indeed it was a great blow to the Department and us all to have him go."<sup>90</sup>

Many international problems confronted the Department during Adee's long association with it. Some were easily solved, while others were so grave that our nation became involved in two wars and several incidents. It is the purpose of the following Chapters to take up some of these more serious international problems and to show therein the diplomatic role that Adee had in them. His role became all the more remarkable, we will show, because of his great friendships in this country and abroad. When he died in 1924, one of his obituary writers stated that he was "Second Assistant Secretary of State since 1886, and up to his recent death at the age of eighty-two /eighty-one/ the greatest living authority on international procedure and diplomatic intercourse."<sup>91</sup> Just how he achieved this exalted position will be shown in the following chapters. However, it is important to bear in mind that he made mistakes, and these will be pointed out as they occurred. Also he was

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<sup>89</sup> The New York Times, Sunday, Jul. 6, 1924, Sec. I, p. 21, cols. 1-2.

<sup>90</sup> Grew to Commander Graham M. Adee, Jul. 18, 1924, Allen Tyler Papers.

<sup>91</sup> Minifred Mallon, loc. cit.

human enough to have a teaser — one of the reasons why he played solitaires at home after the day's work was over.

### CHAPTER III

#### DIPLOMATIC PRELUDES, 1895 - 1905

##### THE VENEZUELA-GUIANA BOUNDARY DISPUTE

It was in the Spring and Summer of 1895, that the United States became seriously involved with Great Britain over her boundary dispute with Venezuela. The instrument behind our entrance into the issue was the Monroe Doctrine, which declared that the United States would not stand by and watch a non-American power take land in the Western Hemisphere for its own use, control and benefit. The Second Cleveland Administration became seriously involved, and if some extremists had had their way, the United States might have gone to war with Britain over the issue. Fortunately, however, the more level headed persons prevailed, and the dispute was eventually submitted to a tribunal for arbitration.

Ever since 1876 Venezuela and British Guiana had been involved in a disagreement over their mutual boundary. Our Government offered its services as mediator on three separate occasions and was refused. Then in 1895, when our Government thought that Great Britain was using the dispute for the purposes of acquiring more territory, Secretary Richard Olney, the successor of Walter Gresham, who had died while the issue was being drawn, sent several sharp notes to Ambassador Bayard in London for transmission to Lord Salisbury, the British Foreign Minister. These notes stated that the United States was bound under the Monroe Doctrine to protect Venezuela's territorial integrity; that our Government was practically sovereign on this

continent and that what it said was law; and that a peaceful arbitration was the only way to settle the boundary dispute.

Behind Olney were two capable career men, Adee and William W. Rockhill. The new Secretary came to the Department from the Attorney Generalship. He usually made his own decisions as to the contents of an instruction and then gave his ideas to Adee or Rockhill "to put into 'the lingo.'" However, the note on the Venezuelan boundary dispute was drafted by Olney while vacationing in New England. He consulted with no one in the Department as to what he put into the despatch, and sent it on to Bayard after having read it to the Cabinet members who were in Washington on July 17, 1895.<sup>1</sup> The Secretary then returned to New England and left Adee in charge of the Department. It was essential that Bayard have some additional information to present to Lord Salisbury at the same time that he presented Olney's long despatch. Consequently, a few days later Adee sent Bayard the following instruction:

In Mr. Olney's instruction No. 804, of the 20th instant, in relation to the Anglo-Venezuelan boundary dispute you will note a reference to the sudden increase of the area claimed for British Guiana, amounting to 33,000 square miles, between 1884 and 1886. This statement is made on the authority of the British publication entitled the Statesman's Year Book.

I add for better information that the same statement is found in the British Colonial Office List, a government publication. In the issue of 1885 the following passage occurs, on page 24, under the head of British Guiana:

"It is impossible to specify the exact area of the colony, as its precise boundaries between Venezuela and

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<sup>1</sup> Olney 804 to Bayard, Jul. 20, 1895, Great Britain Instructions 31:291-310. For. Rel. 1895, 1:545. James, Olney, pp. 111, 298.

Brazil respectively are undetermined, but it has been computed to be 76,000 square miles."

In the issue of the same List for 1886, the same statement occurs, on page 33, with the change of area to "about 109,000 square miles."

The official maps in the two volumes mentioned are identical, so that the increase of 33,000 square miles claimed for British Guiana is not thereby explained, but later Colonial Office List maps show a varying sweep of the boundary westward into what was previously figured as Venezuelan territory, while no change is noted on the Brazilian frontier.<sup>2</sup>

Bayard's long awaited reply reached the Department on August 19, 1895. Adee had the same "typewriter", who had copied Olney's instruction, make copies, one of which he sent on to Olney. The British Foreign Office was not quickly willing to accede to the arguments set forth in Olney's instruction. Adee drew several sections of Bayard's despatch to the attention of the Secretary:

You will note Lord Salisbury's remark "that it was evident the questions raised by the instruction might give rise to a long and difficult discussion and much controversy — but that an answer would be made."

You will note also His Lordship's dismissal of the Statesman's Year Book and the Colonial Office List, as private publications for individual profit. The Colonial Office List has been twice cited by your predecessors as authority for the variable expansion of the British territorial claim and for the silent addition of 33,000 square miles to the area of British Guiana, but no notice was taken of our reference nor was the authority of the publication denied.

Note also the intimation in Mr. Uhl's No. 729 of June 5th that Venezuela's response to our advice that she unconditionally resume diplomatic relations with Great Britain would be seasonably made known to Mr. Bayard. I sent you the Venezuela reply a few days ago, Senor Fulido's note of

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<sup>2</sup> Adee 806 to Bayard, Jul. 24, 1895, Great Britain, Instructions 31:311.

July 10 to Senor Andrade, in which Venezuela interposes as conditions to such resumption, (A) that renewed representation shall be simultaneously effected at London and Caracas, and (B) that Great Britain's disposition to submit the dispute to general arbitration without exclusions shall be assured beforehand. I have not sent this reply to Mr. Bayard, preferring to await your directions, nor have I answered Senor Andrade's note of communication for the same reason.

Note Mr. Bayard's reference to Mr. Phelps' "uncertainty as to the wisdom or expediency of renewing our recommendations for a settlement by arbitration between the two Powers" — as also his expression of a desire to keep such questions "in the atmosphere of serene and elevated effort."<sup>3</sup>

When those notes were made public, the persons who clamored for war read "war" in them. One such person was General Sickles. He agreed with Olney and was glad to know that we had an American policy which the American people would support. He did not "offer his services" for the war was too far off, but he did ask that Adee, "who began his diplomatic career with me in Spain," send him all the published material on the question, for the General was going to speak about it at Union College.<sup>4</sup> The General was recalling the work Adee had done for him while in Spain, and was asking that he be a gatherer and forwarder of all items bearing on a subject, just as he had done when working for Sickles.

In addition to giving his thoughts and opinions to Secretary Olney, Adee submitted copies of the despatches on the boundary dispute to Olney as they came into the Department. Thereby the Secretary was kept currently advised of the official

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<sup>3</sup> Adee to Olney, Aug. 19, 1895, Olney Papers, MSS., L. C. Hereafter abbreviated OP.

<sup>4</sup> Sickles undated to Olney, OP.



opinions on the issues, and Adee's observations on some of them gave the Secretary a clear view of the principal problems to which he would have to reply. In addition Adee helped to have the public accurately informed. His friend, Oscar P. Straus, who had been our envoy to Turkey in the first Cleveland Administration, had been asked to write an article on the Venezuelan question, and sought advice from the Department. Adee told Straus it would be all right, but that "I cannot speak ex cathedra in this matter," and then suggested some historical correspondence for Straus to study and from which he would have to make his own conclusions.<sup>5</sup> Adee later told Straus that the Secretary would be pleased if Straus's article were to emphasize the point that Olney's note, and the position taken by the Government, was "essentially in the interest of peace and good will, and not a bellicose blast of defiance."<sup>6</sup> Adee also suggested that Straus talk to John Bassett Moore, for he could give more accurate figures about arbitrations than Adee was able to supply.<sup>7</sup>

However, the information which Adee did give to Straus was accurate and could be used in the article. Adee's comments and criticisms to Straus caused an accurate view to be given to the public. Adee had insisted that the truth be given out.

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<sup>5</sup> Adee to Straus, Dec. 27, 1895, Straus Papers, MSS., L.C.

<sup>6</sup> Adee personal to Straus, Dec. 28, 1895, ibid. Straus's article was "Lord Lansdowne and the Monroe Doctrine," and was in the Feb. 1896 issue of Forum.

<sup>7</sup> Adee's notes on Straus's article, both enclosed in Adee to Straus, Jan. 15, 1896, Straus Papers.

Thus it was, that Adee gave correct information to Straus so that he could give the public a true picture of the dispute. The published article shows to what extent Adee's comments were used. On the other hand, just how Olney used Adee's views is not so readily discernible, but the Secretary's efforts for a settlement bore results shortly before he left office. A treaty was signed in Washington on February 2, 1897, and ratifications were exchanged on June 14, 1897.<sup>8</sup> Under the terms of the treaty, the dispute was submitted to an arbitral tribunal. That body found most of the British terms valid.

Just exactly what Adee's total role was in this boundary dispute is not clear from the available documents. It is known that he kept the Secretary informed on important matters as they came into the Department, as evidenced by the letters in the Olney Collection. Although the instructions do not appear to have been written by him, it is possible to infer that his thoughts, as written to Olney, bore weight in the Departmental instructions to Great Britain and to Venezuela.

#### THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

Adee's experiences in Spain gave him the background for a subject that he had before him at intervals thereafter until we went to war with Spain in 1898. This subject was Cuba and Spain's treatment of the natives there. The Cubans had revolted in the 1870's, when Adee was in Spain. That uprising had been quelled, but the fires of revolt continued to smolder on for the

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<sup>8</sup> Parliamentary Paper, Treaty Series, No. 5, 1897, OP.

next twenty years, until they again broke out in 1895. At that time President Cleveland was in office and Olney was in the State Department. Spain again was able to subdue the rebels, but this time the Cuban desire for freedom from Spanish domination was stronger than in the earlier struggle.

Efforts were made by the Cleveland Administration to bring peace to the "Pearl of the Antilles," but the yoke of the Spanish control was still upon the Cubans when William McKinley became President in 1897. For his Secretary of State the new President appointed John Sherman, a tired man. Judge William R. Day was appointed First Assistant Secretary, and Adee continued as Second Assistant Secretary. Sherman's mind did not function with the precision and regularity of earlier years, and Day had never been in politics before, therefore the burdens of keeping Departmental policies on an even keel fell upon the shoulders of Adee.

In February, 1898, the period of quiet ended with loud and long explosions. The first was the publication of de Lome's letter to Don Jose Canalejas. In this letter the Spanish Minister had made some "expressions concerning the President of the United States of such character as to end the Minister's utility as a medium for frank and sincere intercourse between this country and Spain."<sup>9</sup> In acknowledging the Department's telegram, quoted above, Woodford added that de Lome's resignation had been accepted before he talked with the Minister of State. In a later

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<sup>9</sup> Woodford 137 to Sherman, Feb. 11, 1898, Spain Desp. 133.

despatch Woodford reported he did not think de Lome's letter would affect diplomatic relations in Madrid, and that the Spanish insisted on their own time to crush the rebellion.<sup>10</sup>

This incident was satisfactorily closed when Spain gave her expressions of regret and repudiation of the letter.<sup>11</sup>

The next explosion was the blowing up of the Maine in Havana Harbor. The Spanish Government regretted the incident and sent her sympathy through the Minister of Marine. Adee approved the report of the sympathetic expressions received from the Spaniards.<sup>12</sup> Many other despatches were noted by Adee to be acknowledged and filed. A third concern was the report from White in London that Spain was attempting to buy war vessels in Europe, especially two at Armstrongs. White was requested to inform our Navy Department that Armstrongs preferred selling to our Government than to Spain at the same price.<sup>13</sup> And a fourth warlike event was reported, this time about a fleet being prepared at Cadis. This was noted by Adee to be reported to the Navy Department.<sup>14</sup>

While the Spanish Government made several moves for peace,

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<sup>10</sup> Woodford 139 to Sherman, Feb. 14, 1898, Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Woodford 150 to Sherman, Feb. 19, 1898, confirming The Department's cipher telegram of the 18th, Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Woodford 142 to Sherman, Feb. 16, 1898, and Adee's notation thereon dated Feb. 28, 1898, Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Adee marked this telegram "Confirm, Confidential, Mar. 1, AAA." White Confidential Telegram to Sherman, Feb. 26, 1898, Great Britain Desp. 190.

<sup>14</sup> Woodford 187 to Sherman, Mar. 17, 1898, and Adee's note thereon, dated Apr. 5, 1898. Spain Desp. 133.

the United States Government became bellicose. Spain did not proclaim the suspension of hostilities as fast as we wanted, but Stewart L. Woodford, our Minister to Spain, soon after reporting the dilatory tactics of the Spaniards was able to notify the Department that an armistice had been granted in Cuba.<sup>15</sup> In the meantime the House of Representatives, by a vote of 324 to 19, passed a resolution which authorized the President to act at once in order to stop the war in Cuba. This action was to be taken with the purpose of securing peace and order in that island. The Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs reported a resolution which declared that the Cubans had a right to be free and independent. In making this known to Woodford, Sherman added that the situation was most critical, and it appeared that the final result would be "direct intervention by force if need be to secure free Cuba...."<sup>16</sup>

The joint resolution was signed by the President on the 20th of April 1898. The Spanish Minister, Luis Polo de Bernabe, asked for his passports, and informed the Department that the French Ambassador and the Austrian-Hungarian Minister would be entrusted with the charge of Spanish interests.<sup>17</sup> And before

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<sup>15</sup> Woodford 211 to Lay, Apr. 8, 1898, and Woodford tel. to Lay, Apr. 9, 1898, deciphered by Adee, Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Woodford 225 to Sherman, Apr. 15, 1898, confirming Sherman tel. to Woodford, Apr. 14, 1898, Ibid. Although this telegram was sent over Sherman's signature, it is quite possible that Adee drafted it, for the language is very much like his style.

<sup>17</sup> de Bernabe to Sherman, Apr. 20, 1898. Spanish Legation 39 to the Department. Adee recorded that this note was received at 11:35 A. M.

Woodford could communicate Sherman's telegram to the Spanish Government, the Minister for Foreign Affairs informed him that diplomatic relations were broken.<sup>18</sup> The despatch, reporting his departure from Madrid, stated that he had left our Legation there in the hands of the British Charge d'Affaires, George Barclay. Adee noted this despatch to be approved and a copy sent to Hay in London.<sup>19</sup>

Soon after Woodford's departure from Madrid, Sherman resigned as Secretary of State. Day was appointed to succeed him, but was out of town and had not taken his oath of office by April 26, 1898. This left Adee as Acting Secretary and it was over his signature that President McKinley's proclamation, which "set forth the rules under which the war would be conducted on the part of the United States," went to our diplomatic posts.<sup>20</sup> Then the non-belligerents promptly declared their neutrality and notified the Department that they would observe the rules and regulations of neutrals in time of war.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Woodford 239 to Sherman, Apr. 21, 1898, Spain Desp. 133.

<sup>19</sup> Woodford 240 to Sherman, Apr. 21, 1898, ibid. "Conflict Sure" was the caption of the article in a newspaper that described the signing of the resolution. After several introductory comments the article stated that several cabinet members greeted the President when he arrived in the Cabinet Room. "Judge Day had been in conference at the State Department with ex-Secretary Foster and Second Assistant Secretary Adee," the article continued, "and the trio had prepared the proposed ultimatum in diplomatic form...." Washington Post, Thursday, Apr. 21, 1898, p. 1, col. 1.

<sup>20</sup> Bemis, American Secretaries of State, 8:96.

<sup>21</sup> Adee to Attorney General, Apr. 27, 1898, Dom. Let. 228:41. Porter 225 to Day, Apr. 27, 1898, French Desp. 115; Adee to Secretary of Navy, Apr. 28, 1898, Dom. Let. 228:89.

After the Department had made known the policies which the United States Government would pursue in the war, there was a desire to obtain authentic texts or any official English versions of any manifesto or circular note that the Spanish Government might have communicated to the powers relative to the existing war. Adee asked Hay to send them promptly, by the next mail in fact, and if important enough, the substance was to be telegraphed.<sup>22</sup> Hay received the Spanish statement just after one pouch had gone, and cabled the substance: "It accuses the United States of constant aggression and support of rebellion, denies their claim of humane motives, and asserts annexation is their real aim."<sup>23</sup>

The war months were few in number, and Adee was the guiding person behind most of the diplomatic notes and instructions from the Department. Many of them appear over Hay's signature or that of the new First Assistant Secretary of State, John Bassett Moore, who came to the State Department on leave of absence from Columbia University. However, there were none over Adee's signature after Moore entered on duty.<sup>24</sup> The policies of the Government were not always clearly understood by our citizens, and when inquiry was made as to the rights of citizens sailing on neutral vessels, it was Adee who signed the letter

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<sup>22</sup> Adee cipher tel. to Hay, Apr. 27, 1898, Great Britain Instructions, 32:474.

<sup>23</sup> Hay tel. to Adee, Apr. 30, 1898, confirmed in Hay confidential 378 to SecState, May 4, 1898, Great Britain Resp. 192.

<sup>24</sup> Bemis, American Secretaries of State, 8:32.

which clearly set forth the policies of our Government:

"According to announcements made both by the United States and Spain, neutral ships are not subject to capture unless for carrying munitions of war, sailing with intent to violate a blockade, or doing some other violative of neutrality."<sup>25</sup>

Although Adee did not foresee a short war, as General Siskles did, such was the case. Spain asked for terms, and the Cabinet met to discuss the reply this Government should make. George B. Cortelyou, the President's Secretary, wrote in his diary that there was no interruption from 10:30 A.M. on Saturday, July 3, 1898, "until 1:15 P.M. when Assistant Secretary Moore came over and took a draft of the reply to the Department of State in order to have a clean copy made." He continued that "later Assistant Secretary Adee came to the Executive Mansion with copies of the American note."<sup>26</sup> It must have been with mingled feelings of joy and pride in a successful culmination of several months of shouldering the diplomatic prosecution of the war that Adee walked over to the President's House with clean copies of the reply we were to make to Spain. Mrs. Ruth B. Shipley, one of Adee's secretaries in later years, has told the writer that President McKinley called the Spanish-American War "Adee's War." This tribute was in recognition of Adee's administrative ability.

Our reply was sent to Spain through Cambon, the French

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<sup>25</sup> Adee to Dudley L. Loonis, Tiffin, Ohio, May 29, 1898, Com. Let. 229:30.

<sup>26</sup> Mecott, William McKinley, p. 65.



Ambassador charged by Spain to seek our terms and report them. The terms were acceptable to Spain and on August 12, 1898, the protocol papers were ready for the signatures of Cambon, for Spain, and Day, for the United States. The signing was done in the library of the White House and was an historic occasion, for no one there could recall that a treaty or protocol had ever been signed at the White House. "At the appointed hour a driving rainstorm prevailed.... Secretary Day came first... accompanied by Assistant Secretary Moore, Second Assistant Secretary Ades, and Third Assistant Secretary Cridler...."<sup>27</sup> This scene was caught and put on canvas. The painting is now in the lower hall of the White House and is one of the first pictures that visitors see when they tour the public rooms of the Executive Mansion.

When the terms of this Government were accepted by Spain, the need for representatives to work out the peace treaty arose. The President appointed Day as chairman of the American representatives on the Commission, and John Bassett Moore as Secretary and Counsel to the Committee. These appointments left the Secretaryship and First Assistant Secretaryship vacant, but not for long. Day accepted the President's offer to become Secretary of State but did not enter into that office until September 30, 1898. One reason for this delay was his wish to present his own letter of recall to Queen Victoria.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Washington Post, Saturday, Aug. 13, 1898, p. 1, col. 3.

<sup>28</sup> Day cipher tel. to Day, Aug. 26, 1898, rec'd 9:10 A.M., Br. Desp. 193. Ades asked that his letter of Recall be prepared for that day's pouch.

The position of Adee during the days before Hay was sworn in as Secretary of State was unique, for the law did not provide for any one to act when the Secretaryship was vacant except the Assistant Secretary, and he, too, had resigned. In order to have our Foreign Affairs functioning smoothly, President McKinley issued a special commission to him, making him Secretary of State ad interim. He served in this capacity for thirteen days, from the 17th to the 29th of September, 1898.<sup>29</sup> And the President also offered the Assistant Secretaryship to the talented Second Assistant Secretary, but the latter begged him to leave that matter open for Hay.<sup>30</sup>

When Hay took his oath as Secretary, Adee ceased to be Acting Secretary. This change did not effect any major issues of diplomacy. The Peace Treaty with Spain had not been ratified; this problem, together with the general problems of the War lingered on for months more. In the aftermath of the war, the insurrection in the Philippines proved to be the longest drawn out problem, but this primarily concerned the War Department, and Adee's role in the issue was, therefore, a minor one.

The Peace Commissioners arrived in Paris on October 10, 1898.<sup>31</sup> Immediately they went to work on the many problems

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<sup>29</sup> U. S. Department of State, Register of the Department of State, Apr. 1, 1950, p. 570; New York Daily Tribune, Sunday, Sep. 25, 1898, part 3, p. 7, col. 3.

<sup>30</sup> Adee to Hay, Sep. 23, 1898, HP.

<sup>31</sup> Porter 345 to Hay, Oct. 10, 1898, French Dep. 116. Adee noted on Oct. 20, 1898 that Porter should be commended for his courteous attention to these men.

which confronted them. Among these problems was the United States demand for the Philippine Islands. As the work of the Commission progressed, the Department was informed of the developments. Adee faithfully deciphered many of the reports and sent copies to the White House.<sup>32</sup> The Commission's work was done efficiently, and the Spanish Government accepted the terms of the Commission on November 14, 1898. Those terms were then reported to the Department.<sup>33</sup>

The Peace Treaty, satisfactory to both the Spanish and American Governments, was signed at 8:50 P.M. on December 10, 1898.<sup>34</sup> On this same day the President sent an autographed photograph to Adee. This act of kindness and generosity moved him deeply, and he thanked President McKinley for his thoughtfulness and Cortelyou for forwarding it. "Not the least agreeable feature of the matter," wrote Adee to Cortelyou, "is that the President's kindly inscription bears the date of the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Spain."<sup>35</sup>

A year later a compilation of President McKinley's role in the Spanish-American War was being made by Appleton's. John Addison Porter, the President's Secretary, referred a copy of the

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<sup>32</sup> Adee to President McKinley, Nov. 11, 1898, enclosing day cipher tels. to Adee, Nov. 3 and 4, 1898, McKP.

<sup>33</sup> Adee note of Nov. 19, 1898, 1:00 A.M. on day and Moore tel. to Adee, Nov. 18, 1898; Montgomery to McKinley, 3:30 A.M., Nov. 19, 1898, McKP.

<sup>34</sup> Day tel. to President McKinley, Dec. 10, 1898, McKP.

<sup>35</sup> Adee to Cortelyou, Dec. 21, 1898, McKP.

sketch to Adee for revision. Any one not familiar with the background information would not have been able to make such keen and pointed revisions in the biographical sketch, as they pertained to the War, let alone to do so in the space of two nights. Adee's reply covered eight pages, which, he hoped, would comply with the President's wish. Adee did not feel qualified to touch the parts that referred to McKinley's personal and political life, and suggested that the War and Navy Departments be asked to verify the military and naval dates. Adee's revisions of the "statements somewhat loosely made by the compiler" need not detain us, save for one. That one had to do with the joint note of the six ambassadors. Adee remarked that it "was one of the most historically important acts preceding the war," but said nothing about his role in that important act. It was he who drafted the penciled reply the President read to the ambassadors.<sup>36</sup> What the President said might have been lost if some one had not rescued from the President's waste-basket the envelope on which Adee hastily wrote his draft, which, when used by the President, became the words of the President and no longer Adee's.

Adee's basic role in the Spanish-American War was as a messenger, code clerk, draftsman, and Second Assistant Secretary. As a messenger, he carried despatches and deciphered telegrams to the White House and to the Secretary of War. As a code clerk, he deciphered many messages, some late at night. He

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<sup>36</sup> H.A.B., 1:107.

had installed a cot in his room and slept there many nights.<sup>37</sup>  
 As a draftsman, he saw to it that the Department gave out correct information to the public, either through the press or in individual letters. As Second Assistant Secretary, he had access to the offices of the Secretaries and to the Office of President McKinley. In these offices he discussed the contents of the incoming messages, and he took the direction of the President as to what reply should be made in each instance. How well he performed his duty is shown in the President's high regard for him in calling the war "Ades's War," and in giving him a large, autographed photograph of himself.

THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII

The war with Spain helped to hasten the annexation legislation whereby the Hawaiian Islands would become a part of the United States. The history of annexation started in 1820, when the first American missionaries and the first American whalers arrived in Hawaii.<sup>38</sup> The value of these islands, commercially and defensively, was soon recognized by officials in Washington, and President Tyler realized that in them lay our defense from a Pacific invasion. He, therefore, in 1841 notified "the world that the American Government was looking

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<sup>37</sup> Ades to Hay, Jun. 23, 1898, HP.

<sup>38</sup> Foster Rees Dulles, America in the Pacific, 141; Willard French, "Hawaii, Our Forgotten Key to the Pacific Ocean," America Across the Seas, pp. 37-47; Ralph S. Kuykendall and A. Grove Day, Hawaii: A History, p. 189.

after Hawaii."<sup>39</sup> Then in 1844, when we, along with Great Britain and France, guaranteed the independence of the islands, our Government became politically interested in the islands, thereby bringing our State Department into the picture. King Kamehameha appealed to the United States for annexation in 1854, but this failed. And Secretary of State Geward's dream of American supremacy in the Pacific died in its infancy after the criticisms and condemnations he received for purchasing Alaska.<sup>40</sup> This was the picture when Adee joined the Department, and this was the picture until 1893 when the attempt of Queen Liliuokalani to re-establish an absolute monarchy met with defeat and dethronement.<sup>41</sup>

By 1891 the situation in the Islands had developed to the point of having three chief factions: the Queen and the reactionaries; the Americans who were pressing for annexation; and the United States Minister, John L. Stevens. These three forces, by their interplay in Hawaiian politics, set the dramatic stage for events concerning the Islands for the next few years.<sup>42</sup> Stevens sent a confidential despatch on the political situation in Hawaii, which Adee noted "as having been read with much interest and attention."<sup>43</sup> But two months later the political

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<sup>39</sup> French, "Hawaii...", p. 38.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Baldwin, Our New Possessions, p. 73.

<sup>42</sup> Muller, Op. cit., p. 170.

<sup>43</sup> Stevens 70 to Foster, Oct. 8, 1892, Hawaii Desp. 25.

situation was abruptly changed. Some of the foreign residents in the Islands had held a mass meeting in January 1893, and proclaimed a state of emergency. The committee of public safety sought the American Minister, Stevens, and asked him to intervene for they were unable to defend themselves without aid. Stevens immediately called for some marines from the Boston for the preservation of law and order. This committee of Public Safety set up a Provisional Government the next day, thereby abrogating the monarchy in Hawaii. After the executive council was appointed the Government buildings were taken over and de facto recognition was asked from Stevens for the new regime. He was eager to see the Islands annexed to the United States, and with an impulsive promptitude accorded the new Government that recognition which it sought.<sup>44</sup>

Adee then turned to the drafting of a Hawaiian treaty. Four different attempts were made before the Department was satisfied. The fourth draft was the revised and amended copy that "served as the basis for the final agreement of the Commissioners and the Secretary of State."<sup>45</sup> This treaty was then sent to the Senate by President Harrison. But before that body gave its consent, the Second Cleveland Administration came

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<sup>44</sup> Lullies, Op. cit., p. 173.

<sup>45</sup> Adee memoranda, Feb. 24, 1893, Hawaiian Legation to the Department.

into office, and Stevens submitted his resignation.<sup>46</sup>

President Cleveland withdrew from the Senate the Hawaiian Treaty his predecessor had submitted, for he did not want his Administration to be held responsible for an act that might have brought discredit to it. He did not like the speedy recognition granted the Provisional Government, nor the speed with which the treaty of annexation was concluded.<sup>47</sup> In order to determine what his Hawaiian policy would be, President Cleveland sent James H. Blount as a special commissioner. Blount was to investigate the situation and submit a report of his findings. The President was not too surprised when Blount's report disclosed Stevens' very active role in the change of Governments. Later the White House nominated Albert S. Willis as our new Minister to Hawaii. He was sent to Honolulu with secret instructions. These were the President's plan to restore the status quo ante by peaceful measures.<sup>48</sup> From this appointment in 1893 until 1895 there were no records of activities by Adee on this topic. The question of annexation was, however, kept alive during the Cleveland Administration. No new attempt to annex the Islands was made until 1897, when William McKinley became the President.

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<sup>46</sup> Adee suggested we either accept his departure from his post as an abandonment and an "accomplished fact -- and appoint new Minister when we get ready to do so," or to accept the resignation and authorize the ex-Minister's departure on May 24th. We would then leave the Legation in care of our Consul General, Mr. Severance. Adee memo of Apr. 22, 1893, attached to Stevens 89 to Urehan, Mar. 7, 1893, Hawaii Dep. 25.

<sup>47</sup> Willis, Op. cit., p. 176.

<sup>48</sup> Loc. cit.



The United States had not thrown the islands away, as Senator Henry Cabot Lodge feared President Cleveland was doing,<sup>49</sup> nor did the Government do anything constructive toward annexation until President McKinley took action in June, 1897. He favored annexation and willingly presented a new treaty to the Senate on June 16, 1897. He thought it a good time for fulfilling Article 32 of the Hawaiian constitution of 1894. The submission of this treaty marked the reversal of the old roles of the Democratic and Republican parties. The Democrats had pushed for annexation in 1844 with "Fifty-Four Forty or Fight" and, in 1896, it was the Republican platform that announced "the Hawaiian Islands should be controlled by the United States and no foreign power should be permitted to interfere with them."<sup>50</sup>

When news of the President's intentions to send an annexation treaty to the Senate reached the islands, there was much rejoicing in Hawaii. That news had the effect of relieving the tension between the Hawaiian Foreign office and the Japanese Legation, and it was hoped the future discussions would thereafter be carried on in a conciliatory spirit. This happy despatch was answered by a telegram and by a confirming instruction drafted by Adee.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Gulles, Op. cit., pp. 188f.

<sup>50</sup> Gulles, Op. cit., p. 189.

<sup>51</sup> Adee note of Jul. 17, 1897, on Sewall 5 to Sherman, Jun. 24, 1897, Hawaii Desp. 29; Sherman tel. to Sewall, Jul. 10, 1897, and Day 9 to Sewall, Jul. 17, 1897, Hawaii Instructions 3:325.

The President's annexation message to Congress had far reaching effects. The London Times wrote an article about it. Adee told Hay it had been read with interest.<sup>52</sup> But from the other side of the world came a protest. The new treaty differed but slightly from the 1893 version which had brought no protest from Japan. But in 1897 she felt obligated to protest because a change in her political geography had taken place in the intervening years. She had been the victor in the 1895 Sino-Japanese War, and as a result "believed that she had a right to have a voice in any political developments in the Pacific."<sup>53</sup> Upon the Department's assurances that the interests of all nationals would be observed, Japan withdrew her protest.<sup>54</sup>

While Adee was in Europe in 1897, the Senate deliberated on the treaty of annexation. That body let the annexation issue drag on into 1898 and then the President was determined to annex Hawaii by following the precedent set in our annexing Texas, hoping thereby to bring the Islands into the Union by a joint resolution of Congress. Such a measure was favorably reported in both houses in March, 1898, one month before we went to war with Spain.<sup>55</sup> As time went on, however, nothing was final in the Congress, and the President prepared to annex the Islands by

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<sup>52</sup> Adee ltr to Hay, Jul. 22, 1897, British Instructions 32:179.

<sup>53</sup> Dulles, op. cit., p. 190.

<sup>54</sup> Murat Halstead, Pictorial History of America's New Possessions, pp. 218f.

<sup>55</sup> Dulles, op. cit., p. 192.

Executive order as a war measure. He declared to his secretary that "We need Hawaii just as much and a good deal more than we did California. It is manifest destiny."<sup>56</sup> But Congress solved the Presidential problems for him. The annexation resolution was passed by both Houses and later approved at the White House on July 7, 1898.<sup>57</sup>

That moment of annexation, for which the islanders had been agitating for forty-four years, was at long last at hand. On August 12, 1898, the same day on which the Protocol for the end of the Spanish-American War was signed, a short and impressive ceremony was held in Honolulu. The U. S. S. Philadelphia joined in the celebration with a twenty-one gun salute; shore batteries added to the holiday atmosphere, and the newspapers shared in the joyous feelings of the islanders. On that memorable day the sovereignty of the Hawaiian Islands was transferred to the United States.<sup>58</sup>

Two years later, the Islands became an incorporated territory of the United States. Although territorial status is a preparation for statehood in our form of Government, Hawaii has not yet achieved this ultimate after a half century as a territory.<sup>59</sup> As an incorporated territory, Hawaii could not

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<sup>56</sup> Dulles, Op. cit., p. 197. Olcott, McKinley, 1:379.

<sup>57</sup> Dulles, loc. cit.

<sup>58</sup> Kuykendall, Hawaii, p. 189. H. G. Pratt, Hawaii, Off-Shore Territory, p. 29.

<sup>59</sup> Kuykendall, Op. cit., p. 193.

solve financial problems with Great Britain by arbitration. The new British Ambassador, Michael H. Herbert, submitted claims of some British subjects against the Hawaiian Government.<sup>60</sup> Hay was not sure just what action should be taken and expressed his doubts when he sent the note to Adee,<sup>61</sup> whose familiarity with the background of this question, enabled him quickly to give Hay an answer that same day:

Instead of a Commission to settle these claims (a plan rejected by the Hawaiian legislature) Lord Lansdowne proposes a single jurist, to be agreed upon by Great Britain and Hawaii. The proposition is virtually the same, with one jurist instead of several. I do not think it need be called an arbitration, but rather a reference. Even under this name it would require the consent of the Hawaiian legislature -- which probably would be refused.

It seems to me, however, that even such a reference would be a risky precedent, in the way of countenancing direct relations between a Territory and a foreign government.

The only solution I can see is a formal arbitration between Great Britain and the United States -- but this would involve the United States having to pay the award. We could not collect it from Hawaii. And Hawaii is perfectly well aware of this. Indeed, the shirking policy of Hawaii is probably mainly prompted by the belief that the United States must eventually shoulder the responsibility of effecting a settlement and footing the bill.

The only thing now to be done is to refer the present proposition to the Governor of Hawaii. When he rejects it -- as he doubtless will, it will be time to consider the next move.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Herbert 136 to Loomis, Jul. 5, 1903, British embassy 139 to the Department.

<sup>61</sup> Hay to Adee, Jul. 11, 1903, attached to Herbert 136 to Loomis, Jul. 5, 1903, ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Adee memo to Hay, Jul. 11, 1903, attached to Herbert 136 to Loomis, Jul. 5, 1903, ibid.

Hay read Adee's comments and at the bottom wrote, "approved -- Refer to Hawaiian Government." By this reference the Secretary approved what his Second Assistant recommended after having reviewed the claims, submitted by Herbert, in the light of what could be done by law or practical diplomacy. It also shows that Adee and Hay were willing to take one step at a time, the second depending on the outcome of the first.

Adee played his role very well. It was he who "briefed" and advised the several Secretaries of State as to the background of the then current discussions. We have found that many of his suggestions were accepted and then became the official policy of the Department. We also saw to it that the several Presidents had correct information on the events as they occurred. Because Adee knew the background of the issues he kept the Department functioning smoothly when the Secretaries of State were changed and when new Presidents were sworn into office. As to the Hawaiian Islands, his role was that of keeping the tiller steady when others wished to rush in and grab them, come what may.

#### THE VENEZUELAN CRISIS OF 1903

In an attempt to force the Government of Venezuela to pay her debts to the citizens of Great Britain and Germany, those two Governments blockaded the Venezuelan ports. Theodore Roosevelt feared that the Monroe Doctrine might be violated and brought diplomatic pressures to bear on the blockading powers. Those pressures were strong enough to cause the Powers to yield to Venezuela's plea and grant an arbitration.

When the President's fears of violation to the Monroe doctrine were known in Central America, William L. Merry, our envoy to Costa Rica, Guatemala, and El Salvador, sent word that the presses had become "more interested in asking where is, than what is, the Monroe doctrine...." To this despatch Adee noted that the Secretary might wish to read the observations made by our Minister.<sup>63</sup>

The pressures which President Roosevelt brought to bear caused the Powers to use tactics which would save face at home. Therefore, the first reaction was to raise the blockade, re-establish it, and to revoke that order a week later.<sup>64</sup> Power-politics continued to be the order of the day until the arbitral board met in February, 1904. And the newspapers did not always report the truth. Mr. Maikes, of the British Embassy asked for clarification of a statement that appeared in London papers as well as papers here. That statement was to the effect that the American Government had asked the Russian Emperor to name three arbitrators, who would compose the Tribunal, to meet at the Hague for the purpose of deciding the "question of preferential treatment submitted to it by the agreements between Venezuela and

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<sup>63</sup> Adee memo to Mr. Secretary, Jan. 29, 1903, attached to Merry 792 to Hay, Jan. 17, 1903, Central American resp. 71.

<sup>64</sup> Cheate 1066 to Hay, Feb. 19, 1903. British Resp. 206 For. Relg. 1903, p. 476. Adee to Herbert, Mar. 8, 1903. The Department 26 to the British Embassy, p. 370. It was in this note that the British Embassy was notified of the reestablishment of the blockade. In Loomis to Herbert, Mar. 13, 1903, The Department 26 to the British Embassy, pp. 375-376, Loomis notified the Embassy of the revocation order.

Great Britain, Germany and Italy," Haikes asked for clarification at the request of Lord Lansdowne, who doubted the accuracy of the statement, for his Lordship believed that the two Governments were in agreement "that the Powers concerned should make the request jointly...."<sup>65</sup>

In order for Haikes to have the correct version Adee asked the Diplomatic Bureau to acknowledge the note in a personal reply, and say that

The United States Government has made no such request. It was made by Venezuela in the first instance. In view of the shortness of time remaining for action, and in the interest of Venezuela, the inquiry was made at St. Petersburg a few days ago as to whether the Russian Government had appointed the arbitrators — or if not, how soon they probably will be named. On receipt of Mr. Middle's reply a telegram was sent to Mr. Choate on the 16th....

Also write a personal note to Baron Sternberg, referring to the inquiry made by Mr. Scheller yesterday afternoon. This Government has not made such request. Give the gist of our telegram to Middle, 13th, and Russian reply, 16th, adding that it is understood that Venezuela deems early action important, inasmuch as under the terms of the protocols the Tribunal should organize at the Hague on September first, and the arbitrators will doubtless need to hold preliminary meetings with a view to such organization.<sup>66</sup>

Although the interested Governments had agreed to submit their grievances to The Hague Tribunal, the appointment of arbitrators to hear the arguments of the Powers concerned was not an easy task. The Danish and Swiss arbitrators could not accept appointment by the Emperor of Russia to act on the Tribunal because their respective Governments had claims against

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<sup>65</sup> Haikes personal to Hay, Jul. 16, 1903. British Embassy 138 to the Department.

<sup>66</sup> Adee to Sidney Y. Smith, Jul. 18, 1903, attached to Haikes personal to Secretary of State, Jul. 16, 1903, Ibid.

Venezuela. Yet the British Government wanted the Tribunal to meet on September 1 so that the provisions of the agreement of May 7, 1903, could be carried out. The Emperor would appoint other arbitrators and they could then meet on September 1 and fulfill that term of the agreement. When Adee was told that our Minister at The Netherlands had been informed by telegram on August 29 of the sense of this note, he wanted Baikes to be answered accordingly.<sup>67</sup>

Our Minister to Caracas, Herbert Bowen, was appointed by the Venezuelan Government to present her claims. In addition two other Americans were appointed by Venezuela, Wayne MacVeagh, our Special Ambassador to London for the coronation of Edward VII, and William L. Penfield, Solicitor of the Department. These three men, seemingly, did not get along too well with one another, and MacVeagh had become disturbed at the delays and inability to get a tribunal organized for the presenting and hearing of the arguments in the dispute. He reported there were too many creditor nations to secure a tribunal; that he had for two weeks tried many concessions in order to secure a tribunal, but without success, and that he felt the cause of arbitration would be helped if the Americans returned home and made a new and practical agreement. On a copy of this telegram Adee asked Cabot to repeat it to Hay and observed that "MacVeagh is a

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<sup>67</sup> Adee note of Sep. 2, 1903, in reply to a note to him from the Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Sep. 29, 1903, attached to Baikes 163 to Louis, Aug. 29, 1903, British Embassy 139 to the Department.



bulky proposition to tackle."<sup>68</sup> A second telegram asked May if he could not induce Russia to ask the remaining arbitrators to meet at once, for Denmark had withdrawn her claims, and that left Mouravieff, Lammasch and de Martens as arbitrators.<sup>69</sup>

MacVeagh's conduct became clear to May when he received a letter from Penfield. May sent it to Adee for his confidential information, and observed:

We cannot withdraw them, nor give them leave to withdraw. They were appointed by Venezuela and most willingly accepted by us. If MacVeagh now wants to "yump his job" we cannot help it, but we certainly cannot sanction it. Neither can we appoint Justice Brewer, as Bowen suggests. If you have already wired Newell, let it go at that. If not, how would it do to say to Newell: "We earnestly hope the Arbitration may not fail and are anxious to do what we can to prevent it. So far as we are concerned we are willing to go on with one Arbitrator, or to wait a reasonable time for the Year to complete the court. The President cannot undertake to appoint other Counsel if Mr. MacVeagh should feel obliged to retire, a decision which we should profoundly regret."<sup>70</sup>

Adee agreed with May and said we had "run up against a tough proposition in MacVeagh" and that our Government greatly desired the business to commence, but that we might have to wait until October first came and went before we would know of any new obstacle which would prevent the Arbitration from proceeding.

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<sup>68</sup> Adee memo to May, Sep. 16, 1903, attached to MacVeagh tel. to May, Sep. 16, 1903, HP. In connection with his official duties Adee had become a fair judge of persons and character. This will again be borne out in later observations.

<sup>69</sup> Adee tel. to May, Sep. 17, 1903, HP 9; see also Adee cipher tel. to John W. Riddle, Charge, Sep. 18, 1903, Russia Instructions 18:475, in which Riddle was instructed to represent to the Foreign Office the desirability of an early meeting of the arbitrators.

<sup>70</sup> May to Adee, Sep. 17, 1903, HP.

Adee felt that another telegram, in the sense nay suggested, would do no harm, "if only to make it clear that MacLeagh's proposed pyrotechnic retirement finds no favor in the sight of the Department."<sup>71</sup> The telegram that would do no harm was sent to Stanford Newell, our minister to The Hague, in the sense of nay's suggested message. Adee concluded by instructing Newell to "continue to act with our people in every possible way toward good understanding and early settlement."<sup>72</sup>

Finally on October 1, 1903, the Tribunal convened and heard the arguments. On February 22, 1904, the award of the arbitrators was rendered and signed at The Hague. The verdict was that the blockading powers were due their money, and that it was satisfactory for Venezuela to set aside 30% of the customs revenues at the ports of Laguayra and Puerto Cabello for payment of those debts.<sup>73</sup>

From the available material it does not appear that Adee had an important role in bringing about this peaceful settlement. His observations to nay and to President Roosevelt were made after the Powers agreed to arbitrate. However, the writer feels sure that Adee's opinions were considered before either the Secretary or the President made a final determination on the various issues involved in the arbitration of Venezuela's debts.

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<sup>71</sup> Adee to nay, Sep. 19, 1903, HP.

<sup>72</sup> Adee cipher tel. to Newell, Sep. 19, 1903, HP.

<sup>73</sup> Award of the Tribunal, Parliamentary Paper (Venezuela No. 1, 1904), enclosed in Choate 1327 to nay, Mar. 23, 1904. British Resp. 209. No where in that award was any specific sum of money mentioned.

## THE PANAMA CANAL

It took a revolution to ease the final way for an Isthmian Canal. Our diplomats had been busy in Washington, London, Bogota, and Central America for a decade and more before the United States had a clear-cut right to build, maintain, and protect a canal that linked the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans in Central America. This was the dominant factor in our Latin American diplomacy when Presidents McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt were in office.<sup>74</sup> Behind the building of the canal were hundreds of despatches, notes, and instructions, as well as personal letters, which reveal how the problem rose and fell in importance until the Panamanians revolted in November 1903. In addition there were four treaties which had been stumbling blocks as the drama unfolded. These were:

I. Treaty of Peace, Amity, Navigation, and Commerce, between the United States and New Granada, establishing the Neutralization of the Isthmus of Panama. Concluded December 12, 1846.

II. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. Concluded April 19, 1850.

III. The Hay-Panamafo Treaty. Concluded April 18, 1901.

IV. Convention between the United States and the Republic of Panama for the Construction of a Ship Canal to connect the Waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Signed at Washington, November 18, 1903.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> Dennis, Adventures, 309.

<sup>75</sup> Harmodio Arias, The Panama Canal, A Study in International Law and Diplomacy (London: P. S. King and Son, 1911), Appendices I, II, IV, and V, pp. 151, 153, 165, and 168. Only 35th article of the Treaty of 1846 is printed here, for that is the one of interest in this study; it is also published in Dennis, Adventures, 312.

Adee's role in the exchange of diplomatic canal correspondence began when he was in Spain. He wrote the despatch "Offer to the United States Government by a Spanish Engineer of information respecting a Canal route across the Isthmus of Panama."<sup>76</sup> Later he bought a copy of Alfred Williams, The Inter-Oceanic Canal, which was published in New York in 1880.<sup>77</sup>

His first contact with the problem after he was in the Department would appear to be in 1886, after he became Second Assistant Secretary.<sup>78</sup> Perhaps, then, Adee had much more to do with the Canal plans than ever will be known.

The first route that was discussed was the one through Nicaragua. This was the favored route until 1901, when the Nicaraguan Government signed a protocol that was in such a form and terms as to make it wholly inadvisable to the United States.<sup>79</sup> Knowing that public opinion leaned toward the route across Nicaragua, Adee sent a despatch from Central America to President Harrison with the following comments:

In view of the circumstance that the promoters of the Nicaragua Canal are likely to represent to you the serious danger to their interests in the menace of the Nicaraguan Government to annul their concession if the company shall not cancel its contract with Costa Rica, I venture to send for your information copy of a despatch lately received from our Minister in Central America, reporting the situation and showing his full appreciation of its importance.<sup>80</sup>

<sup>76</sup> Pickles 353 to Fish, Jan. 1, 1871, Spain - esp. 57.

<sup>77</sup> Adee, Catalogue, entry 42h, p. 37.

<sup>78</sup> Adee personal to Bayard, Sep. 28, 1886, Bayard Papers, 96.

<sup>79</sup> Lennie, Adventures, 311.

<sup>80</sup> Adee to President Harrison, Sep. 1889, Harrison Papers 87. MS., L. C.

In order for the Department and the President to be better informed on the topography of the land along the proposed route in Nicaragua, Admiral John B. Walker's Nicaragua Canal Commission was preparing to visit that country. Mr. W. C. Howland requested permission for a representative of the press to accompany the Commission. The Admiral said that would be inexpedient and Adee, in the absence of Judge Day, ventured "to express the opinion that there is valid objection to granting the permission requested...."<sup>81</sup> A year later, after we fought and won the Spanish-American War, Adee sent to President McKinley a copy of a telegram about a New York syndicate's attempt to "conclude a new Canal contract with Nicaragua and Costa Rica," and observed that

General Foster told me yesterday that you were desirous that he should go to Nicaragua to look after the canal matters. This, of course, would be proper, if he goes as the agent of the Maritime Co., not of the Government. The reason I hesitated about sending Mr. Merry to Managua was twofold, first because he could not separate his private agency from his office, and secondly, because he has not yet been received by Nicaragua, which would render his position anomalous.<sup>82</sup>

On the back of Adee's letter the President made the following note and returned it to his Acting Secretary of State:

Dear Mr. Adee:

Of course Mr. Foster would not go for the Government. I understood he would represent the Maritime Co. If he has a different understanding he should be set right by you. W.M.K.<sup>83</sup>

<sup>81</sup> Adee to John Addison Porter, Oct., 26, 1897, McKinley Papers 9.

<sup>82</sup> Adee confidential to President McKinley, Sep. 18, 1898, HP.

<sup>83</sup> President McKinley to Adee, Sep. 18, 1898, on the back of Adee to President McKinley, Sep. 18, 1898, HP.

From 1898 until 1901 Adee was occupied with many problems. The Alaskan Boundary issue continued to be critical and the Boxer Rebellion caused a real crisis that was met by international cooperation. And the Canal Problem continued to go on. Adee referred many of the despatches from Charles Burdett Hart in Bogota, and William Laurence Merry in the Central American States, to the Isthmian Canal Commission, to Senator J. T. Morgan, President McKinley, and Secretary Hay.<sup>84</sup> In the meantime the Secretary and the British Ambassador had been busy putting together the first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. This would have abrogated the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, which required joint action on any interoceanic canal, and have given sole responsibility to the United States for any canal that was built, but to be neutralized along lines similar to the rules "embodied in the Suez Canal Convention of 1868...."<sup>85</sup> Three amendments at least were made to that treaty. The Foraker, Davis, and Tillman Amendments were not acceptable to Britain, and Choate sent a "Parliamentary Publication (United States, No. 1, 1901)" which set forth the reasons for England's objections.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> See Adee's notes on the following despatches: Hart 285 to Hay, Aug. 22, 1899; Hart 302 to Hay, Oct. 17, 1899, Columbian Desp. 56; Merry 378 to Hay, Jan. 28, 1900; Merry h62 to Hay, Aug. 12, 1900; Merry h67 to Hay, Aug. 28, 1900; Merry h71 to Adee, Sep. 16, 1900, Central American Desp. 66; Hay 345 to Merry, Jul. 7, 1900, Central American Instructions 22:71-22, this instruction was drafted by Adee; Merry h71 to Adee, Sep. 16, 1900, enclosed in Hill to Cortelyou, Sep. 29, 1900, McKinley Papers 64.

<sup>85</sup> Dennis, Adventures, 159.

<sup>86</sup> Choate 532 to Hay, Mar. 26, 1901, British Desp. 201. Attached to this despatch is Senate Document 160, 56th Congress, 1st Session, marked by Adee to show the three amendments.

These amendments aroused May's ire, yet he tried to get acceptance of them by the British Government. Such was not to be, and the Secretary's disappointment was complete when Lordsohams informed Lord Pauncefote that the amendments had been rejected, thereby defeating the treaty.<sup>87</sup>

With the rejection of that treaty a year's efforts went for naught. From that defeat May started again to draft a treaty that would be acceptable to our Senate, and give us the sole right to build a canal. It was at this point that Adee's role became more important. From his broad background of the whole canal issue he drew up a "first sketch of the new Canal convention," and sent it to May with the following observations:

In wrestling with Article IV, I have endeavored first, to give it the sense of Senator Lodge's explanation, made in his statement given to the press December 21, 1900. Second, to reserve silently the right to fortify, to the end of preserving the Canal from attack (by the power with which we might be at war, or from any quarter, Nicaraguan, Costa Rican or what not,) and thus keep it open for innocent use even during a war to which we might be a party.

I have always thought that the greatest danger to the canal may lie in its attempted seizure or destruction by Central American insurgents. This we should guard against.

Suppose the canal had been built, and working in April, 1898, when we went to war with Spain, would not Spain have bribed or stirred up her Central American sympathisers to blow up a lock or otherwise obstruct the canal? The same thing might happen should we ever get into a squabble with Venezuela or Colombia.

I do not think the omission of Article 3 (the guarantee of other powers) is to be regretted by either England or ourselves. The chances are ten to one that Germany, or any power which may sometime clash with us, would not be a party to such a guarantee.

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<sup>87</sup> Dennis, Adventures, 161, 162.

By the way, it is significant that the guarantee of neutrality in Article V of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty could be withdrawn by either or both governments upon six month's notice, for reasons trivial in comparison with those which now shape our course. Think of what might have been the situation had the Fauncefote treaty been accepted with Article 3 in it, and Germany had adhered to it.<sup>88</sup>

The dangers that Adee pointed out were "met by the insertion of the provision that the United States should be at liberty to maintain such 'military police' along the canal as might be necessary to protect it against 'lawlessness and disorder'."<sup>89</sup> Thus the new Hay-Fauncefote treaty was, in many points, based on Adee's comments and suggestions.

In the second paragraph of the above quoted letter Adee said he feared destruction of the canal by insurgents. There was much more behind that statement than meets the eye. He wanted our diplomatic relations with Central Americans carried on in an "urbane but distant manner" and recommended acquaintanceships be restricted "to the barest necessities of official business."<sup>90</sup> This was one of his most firmly fixed notions about all Central Americans. He feared close relationships and any departure from

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<sup>88</sup> Adee to Hay, Apr. 8, 1901, HF 5; Kennett, Hay, 262. The new article IV is as follows: "It is agreed that no change of territorial sovereignty or of international relations of the country or countries traversed by the beforementioned canal shall affect the general principle of neutralization or the obligation of the High contracting parties under the present treaty." Quoted in Dennis, Adventures, 165. It should also be pointed out that Hay, in his second treaty took the leading Senators into his confidence at the outset. This he had not done with the first treaty.

<sup>89</sup> Kennett, Hay, 262.

<sup>90</sup> William F. Vands, Our Jungle Diplomacy (Chapel Hill, S. C.), 42.



the "urbane-distant-manner" for carrying on official business. Should our officials have become too friendly, or let down the barriers when conducting official transactions, Adee was sure they would be "diddled" by the Central American officials.<sup>91</sup> His fixed notions must have colored his talks with the Central American diplomats who called on him in the Department. Perhaps, also, those opinions were known by his superiors and, for that reason, there are no records of any conversations Adee had with the foreign diplomats from Colombia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, or Honduras. Further, Hay and Loomis were not away at the same time for very long stretches and Choate and Paunceforte had talks in London.

Shortly after Adee prepared the draft sketch of a new treaty he went on his vacation. After his return he received two despatches from Merry, one protested our arrangements with Colombia for the Panama Canal, and the other one said the Nicaragua route was clear of all encumbrances.<sup>92</sup> Both were copied to the Canal Commission and number 598 was also copied to Senator Morgan. And later that year Hay thought "it hardly conceivable that any other route than Nicaragua will be chosen."<sup>93</sup> But a younger and more aggressive person had become President when Hay

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<sup>91</sup> Wants, Ibid, 43.

<sup>92</sup> Merry 597 and 598 to Hay, Jul. 13, 1901, and Aug. 2, 1901, Central American Desp. 67.

<sup>93</sup> Hay confidential tel. to Choate, Sep. 29, 1901, Choate Papers on China and Panama in Record Group 59, National Archives.

wrote that telegram, and his full views on the canal route were not fully known. The second Hay-Fauncefote treaty was shaping up satisfactorily and Hay was pleased with the canal outlook. "I am ready," to come to Washington at any moment if you want me. But as I am in constant communication with Adee and everything seems going straight, I should like to stay a week or two longer...."<sup>94</sup>

In London the American Ambassador had been most successful in his talks with Lord Fauncefote on the wording of the new treaty, and on what would be acceptable to the United States and to Great Britain. Afterwards Choate came home on official leave, and set the newspaper men agog, as Adee put it. "The result of the London conference fills me with amazed joy," he wrote to Hay, and then added: "You are too modest about it. We not only accomplish all we set out to do, but have gone several miles beyond the obstinate ultimatum of the Senate."<sup>95</sup> The next day he elaborated a little bit more on the purposes of the new treaty:

Your telegram of today gave me a chance to say to Hood what I had wanted to say all the morning after reading the cabled report of Low's telegram to the Chronicle. I think I have made it clear to him that there has been "no surrender" in the Low sense of the word, and that the two countries, finding the Clayton-Bulwer treaty an obstacle to the accomplishment of a purpose dear to both and to the commercial world, have agreed to sweep it aside and adopt in its place an entirely new and practical device to insure the building of a canal.

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<sup>94</sup> Hay to President Roosevelt, Oct. 2, 1901, Bennett Papers on Hay, MSS., L. C.

<sup>95</sup> Adee to Hay, Oct. 7, 1901, HP 5.

Senator Platt dropped in to see me this morning. He said that if the new treaty was anything like what it is said to be, it would have a unanimous vote, except Wellington. I asked, "How about Tillman?" He replied, "Oh, Tillman has lots of good sense when his pet facts are not touched -- he'll be all right."<sup>96</sup>

While Adee rejoiced in October over the successes achieved in London, he was, two months later, very critical of Merry's two despatches which discussed the Nicaragua Canal (Protocol of December 9, 1901). One of them enclosed the original Spanish copy, with the English translation thereof. On the English copy Adee wrote: "Received with Mr. Merry's #662 of December 28, 1901. This is a new translation from the signed Spanish original text, and its phraseology differs in many respects from the signed English original. The latter remains the record-text. January 9, 1902, AAS." And on both of them Adee indicated that they had been answered on the basis of his draft.<sup>97</sup> Merry had made explanations of some of the features that were in the Protocol and Adee drafted a reply that took apart the omissions and amendments discussed in the despatch:

The result of my examination of the Protocol of December 9, 1901, is to satisfy me that it is as a whole entirely inadmissible. The President instructs me to inform you that the said Protocol is not approved; and I am instructed by him to resume the negotiation at the point where it was left by my presentation of the draft-convention of December 1900.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> Adee to Hay, Oct. 8, 1901, HP 5.

<sup>97</sup> See Adee's notes on Merry 656 and 662 to Hay, Dec. 10 and 28, 1901, Central American Insp. 70.

<sup>98</sup> Hay confidential 435 to Merry, (Adee's draft), Jan. 10 1902. Central American Instructions 22:205, 207, 213.

At the same time Adee received the Minister's despatch about securing a cession from Costa Rica of Port Elena for a Naval Station and asked Mr. Smith to "Copy to Secretary of the Navy for his confidential information. This Department thinks that the Canal treaty should be confined to its express object, but that the lease of Port Elena might be made the subject of a coincident engagement, as part of the general understanding. Request his views as to this."<sup>99</sup> Merry's next despatch on this topic brought forth the following memorandum from Adee:

I think that this should be copied to the Secretary of the Navy for his confidential information, with the comments.

1. That Mr. Merry is not authorized to negotiate the text of the proposed canal treaty with Costa Rica, but is simply directed to ascertain if Costa Rica accepts the draft project prepared in December 1900 with the concurrence of the Costa Rican Minister in Washington.

2. That, in the present light of the matter, this Department does not think /changed to consider/ it expedient to incorporate in the canal project a stipulation of a different nature and for a different purpose, but thinks that coincident negotiation for the suggested Port Elena lease might be advantageously considered in the course of whatever negotiations may be undertaken with Costa Rica for the construction of the canal; and, indeed, might have a favorable influence in shaping the course of the canal negotiation.<sup>100</sup>

After the Secretary had an opportunity to read the despatch and Adee's comments, he noted "Approved" on the memorandum. Adee then sent the whole to Smith to prepare a letter to the Secretary of the Navy for his confidential information.

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<sup>99</sup> Adee memo to Smith, Jan. 9, 1901, attached to Merry 655 to Hay, Dec. 6, 1901, Central American Desp. 70.

<sup>100</sup> Adee memo to Hay, Jan. 10, 1902, on Merry 661 to Hay Dec. 27, 1901, Central American Desp. 70.

Smith had to change a few of Adee's words in order to make his number 2 above become an independent letter. These changes were made right on the memo and show that this opinion of Adee became the official opinion of the Department.

When the Nicaraguan Protocol was rejected, the canal work of a year was wasted, but not lost. Rejection in the Department over Harry's failure did not last long, for the Senate had ratified the Panama Canal Treaty on December 16, 1901, by a vote of 72 to 6.<sup>101</sup> As the scene of interest shifted, it became necessary to arrange with Colombia for the construction of a Canal across the Isthmus of Panama. On a draft treaty, submitted by the Colombian Minister to Washington, Adee made a long memorandum of the points that should be embodied in a treaty for the construction of a Panaman Canal. He submitted the draft treaty and his memo with the following note to Hay:

This draft treaty is weak in many points, notably so as to control of the Canal District and protection of the canal from internal conflicts or external aggressions.

I have noted several points wherein this draft might be improved. But I think our Nicaraguan draft affords a better model in nearly every essential particular.<sup>102</sup>

A few of Adee's comments were good and incorporated into Document K of the 57th Congress, either verbatim or in the same sense. Others that he made were ignored by the Senate in the final version of Document K. But that was as it should be. Adee

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<sup>101</sup> Parliamentary Paper, "United States, No. 1, 1902" p.11, enclosed in White Th6 to Hay, Jan. 17, 1902, British Esp. 204. Dennis, Adventures, 311.

<sup>102</sup> Adee memo to Hay, Mar. 26, 1902, Colombian Legation 10 to the Department.

was the master draftsman of the Department, and his ideas were made to point up the problems and what could or should be done to give relief in a particular situation. And if, after studying the evidence and his memoranda, his superiors chose another way, he had done his duty. Adee suggested that the treaty should call the area for the canal "The Canal District," but Document K used the word "Zone" throughout.<sup>103</sup> Another Article indicated that Colombia would extend the building time beyond the original twelve year limit, in case unforeseen difficulties and obstacles prevented completion within that time. Adee remarked, "This leaves Colombia the sole judge of whether an extension of time may be just and necessary. It is easy to guess what would happen if extension should be asked." In Document K this was made into a positive statement.<sup>104</sup>

Adee's final comment on the draft treaty discussed Article XIII thereon. That Article stated that Colombia would terminate or sever all treaty arrangements, concerning an inter-oceanic canal, which were found to be in favor of a third party. The Second Assistant Secretary observed, "Colombia's engagement to procure modification or amendment of any conflicting existing treaty would not be worth much if the other party should decline to do so. Query, are there any such conflicting treaties? If so,

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<sup>103</sup> See Article eleven and Adee's comment thereon, Memorandum, filed Mar. 26, 1902, Colombian Legation 10 to the Department.

<sup>104</sup> See Article XVIII of the Memorandum and Article XIII in Document K, p. 14. Both in Colombian Legation 10 to the Department.

they should be gotten out of the way before this treaty can be validly binding."<sup>105</sup>

A few days later Jose Vicente Concha, the Colombian Minister, handed May a proposal for a treaty between Colombia and the United States. Adee went right to work on that draft and prepared nine pages of observations which were submitted to the Secretary. He had gone down the draft article by article and made his observations and comments, some favorable and some not in favor. He pointed out where Concha's draft differed from the Walker treaty, that was then before the Senate, and where there were similarities. He objected to Article III which would have granted only the use of a five kilo strip on each side of the canal, instead of the five mile strip that would actually have been granted under the Walker draft. Also Concha wanted the Sanitary and Police control to be by the Joint Commission. Another objection was to Article XVII which reserved "to Colombia the right to use the Canal and its auxiliary railway for its vessels, troops and munitions at all times without paying tolls of any kind." Adee thought it was objectionable as it was phrased, but it was kept in the final treaty. After he finished praising some points, and fearing others, especially Article XI, some of his views were used in Senate Document 1, and others were overlooked.

At the end of this list of observations Adee noted:

On the whole, I think there is nothing in this draft which would prejudice the Senate against further negotiation (the

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<sup>105</sup> Adee note on Article XXI of the Memorandum, Colombian Legation 10 to the Department.

Walker version was before the Senate), if the Concha proposal were communicated to that body with the statement that Colombia submits it, tentatively, not as an ultimatum, and if the Secretary add in his letter of transmittal some reservation as to the objectionable features I have noted.<sup>106</sup>

Canal matters moved along slowly in the spring and summer of 1902. But in July a revolution broke out in Colombia, and she wished to quell it as quickly as possible. One means to that end was to forbid the Nicaraguan Government to ship her own property across the Isthmus. President Zelaya, of Nicaragua, requested that the United States should require the free transit and shipment of Nicaragua's property "in accordance with treaty stipulations."<sup>107</sup> Later, as the revolt continued, our Minister wrote about a fight at Aguas Dulces. That information Adee did not want given to the press.<sup>108</sup>

The revolution tended to delay Colombian action on the canal treaty. The Minister for Foreign Affairs asked for our good offices in order to bring about peace in his country, and added, "not only is the question of humanity involved, but so long as the war lasts Congress will not be convened, and therefore the continuance of the war will delay submission of the Canal matter to the Congress."<sup>109</sup> When Adee got the message, he

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<sup>106</sup> Adee Observations of Apr. 1, 1902, attached to Concha to Hay, Mar. 31, 1902, Colombian Legation 10 to the Department.

<sup>107</sup> Merry 747 to Hay, Jul. 19, 1902, Central American Desp. 70.

<sup>108</sup> Adee note of Aug. 29, 1902, on Merry 756 to Adee, Aug. 20, 1902, Central American Desp. 70.

<sup>109</sup> Hart cipher tel. to Hay, Sep. 11, 1902, rec'd 11:10 P. M. 13th, Colombian Desp. 58.



sent it to the President, suggesting that as Hart cannot work from his inaccessible situation at Bogota, and as Gudge is absent from Panama on leave, the commander of the Cincinnati might be instructed to do what he can. The President approved, and I have conferred with and written to Moody, who will telegraph Captain McLean accordingly. I have so answered Hart, and will cable the Consul at Colon to confer with the Captain and assist him in any proper way.<sup>110</sup>

The next week was a busy one for Adee. He had considerable planning and talking to do. After it was over he summed-up his activities in a letter to his chief:

I think the situation on the Isthmus is so far improved as to hold out hopes of peace when the expected 10,000 titular troops arrive. The greatest difficulty for the first few days was the disposition of the Bureau of Navigation to revert to the strained situation of last year when our commander refused to allow government troops to be conveyed over the road. I have urged the necessity of regarding Colombia's functions and duties as principal under the treaty of 1846, and suggested that, while the transit of troops necessary to the discharge of those duties might be allowable when not involving hostilities, the real test of the expediency of permitting such transit was the danger of provoking hostilities along the line of the road to the consequent interruption of the transit. Mr. Moody's telegram substantially embodies my pencil-memorandum given to Lieut. Winslow. The reply shows that McLean and Salazar have reached a harmonious understanding and suggests that the way is opening for the use of McLean's good offices to bring the hostiles together with a view to making peace as desired by the Colombian government. I trust events will not belie my perhaps too sanguine hopes.<sup>111</sup>

When May received this informative letter, he congratulated his Acting Secretary "on the Colombian matters as set forth in your letter of the 23rd. It could not have been better done."<sup>112</sup>

<sup>110</sup> Adee to May, Sep. 16, 1902, HP 6; Adee cipher tel. to Hart, Colombian Instructions 19:203-204.

<sup>111</sup> Adee to May, Sep. 23, 1902, HP 6.

<sup>112</sup> May to Adee, Sep. 25, 1902, HP 6.

The next few months saw the passage of more time without any achievement. Colombia wished to purchase two small war vessels, for, she claimed, with two more war ships peace would be quickly brought about, the Congress would be assembled, and the canal matter could be gotten on with. However, it was not our policy to sell warships, and our regrets were cabled to Minister Hart.<sup>113</sup> After that the year ended without further incident, and Senor Thomas Herran was appointed to Washington. Shortly thereafter, on the twenty-second of January, 1903, Herran, for Colombia, and Hay, for the United States, signed the Hay-Herran treaty. This act showed the complete reversal of the United States policy. We had gone all out for the Nicaraguan canal but were unable to come to an agreement with that country, so that, of necessity, in order to secure a canal right of way, we signed a convention with Colombia, and later the Senate ratified it.<sup>114</sup>

After the Senate of the United States approved the treaty on March 17, 1903,<sup>115</sup> there was nothing for our government to do until Colombia took action, or the treaty failed because of no action within the time specified for the exchange of ratifications. Even Article IV of the Spooner Act could not be invoked, for that empowered the President to negotiate anew for the Nicaragua Canal only "if he failed to obtain the necessary

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<sup>113</sup> Hart cipher tel. to Hay, Oct. 1, 1902, rec'd Oct. 6, 1902, 9:35 P.M., and thereon is pencilled Hay's regret, and Adee's note that the cable was sent the next day.

<sup>114</sup> Arias, The Panama Canal, p. 57, 58; Dennis, Adventures, p. 316.

<sup>115</sup> Dennis, Adventures, 316.

concessions from Colombia."<sup>116</sup> However, our new Minister to Colombia, Arthur W. Haaspre, who had succeeded Charles Burdett Hart in February 1903, did not stand idly by. He became impatient and carried on a violent diplomacy.<sup>117</sup> He wanted the treaty approved without amendments, but if Colombia proposed an amendment, then the whole matter would have to be reopened. In a long letter to Hay, Adee clearly pointed out the duties of the President and of the Senate as they pertain to the making of treaties:

Mr. Loomis has gone to the Gap for Sunday. I have been busy today. In signing the mail I find that he has sent to Haaspre the telegram emphasizing our objections to any amendment of the Canal treaty, which I submitted to him a few days ago, and which he sent to you. I am glad you take my position that we should refuse to send to the Senate any amendment purporting to make the United States a party to skinning the Canal Co. ten millions.

There seems to be an impression in Colombia (and perhaps in other) quarters that the President is bound to submit to the Senate all amendments proposed by foreign powers to treaties which he (the President) has negotiated. That would be tantamount to making the Senate the treaty-making power, whereas its function is to give advice and consent. That advice the President can seek at any stage of a treaty negotiation, and, per contra, he can drop the negotiation at any stage and refrain from consulting the Senate any further or at all....

In the present case, the President was authorized to conclude a "satisfactory" canal treaty with Colombia. He submitted to the Senate a treaty which was satisfactory to him and the Senate advised and consented to its ratification as it stood. The measure of its satisfactoriness is thus established as it stood. If Colombia is dissatisfied, and proposes an amendment, that act offers to reopen the negotiation in an important particular. It is for the other negotiator — in this case the President, not the Senate, —

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<sup>116</sup> Arias, The Panama Canal, p. 50.

<sup>117</sup> For. Rel. 1903, p. 226.

to decide whether he will negotiate anew, and virtually accept (for himself) the Colombian amendment by submitting it to the Senate for its advice and consent thereto.<sup>118</sup>

As the days drifted by without any definite action, so also the news of what was occurring in the Colombian Senate drifted northward into the ears of the Panaman people. Our Consul General at Panama, H. A. Judger, sent word of the suspension of the El Istmo from publication for six months for its article which favored the independence of the Isthmus. "There is quite a feeling in favor of independence here," he continued, "and it is intensified by the unfavorable reports in regard to the Canal Treaty in Bogota."<sup>119</sup> Adee sent a copy to Hay and commented: "The fathers at Bogota are eating sour grapes, and the teeth of the children at Panama are getting a fine edge on to 'em."<sup>120</sup>

The winds that carried the unfavorable reports from Bogota to Panama were, within days after Judger made his observation, to carry the news of the rejection of the treaty by the Colombian Senate. This unhappy event occurred on the twelfth of August. This news did not reach the Department until the fifteenth, and Beaupre's despatch did not reach us until a month later, at which

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<sup>118</sup> Adee to Hay, Aug. 1, 1903, HP. 8. For the telegram that Adee referred to see Hay tel. to Beaupre, Jul. 31, 1903, For. Rels. 1903, p. 168.

<sup>119</sup> Judger 443 to Loomis, Aug. 8, 1903, Panama Consular Letters 25.

<sup>120</sup> Adee to Hay, Aug. 20, 1903, HP. 6.

time it was copied to President Roosevelt and to Secretary Hay.<sup>121</sup>  
 The news of the rejection was promptly related to both the President and the Secretary. Hay was inclined to report immediately to the President for further instructions, but instead wrote his thoughts and indicated he had written to Adee so that he could get the 1846 treaty up "in all its bearings to have the case ready for me when I go to Washington the last of next week."<sup>122</sup>

From a reading of Hay's letter of August 16 to President Roosevelt, one gets the impression that the Secretary was somewhat upset by the rejection of the treaty. No impression of Adee's feelings could be formed by reading his August 17 letter to Hay. "I am abstaining from any comment further than to say that we cannot have any official cognizance of Colombia's action upon the treaty until formally advised by the Colombian Government," Adee wrote, and then added, "I am swamped with a lot of things about which I have not compared notes. But I am chipper as a mud-lark."<sup>123</sup> But as to his opinions on a possible annexation of Panama, should that state successfully revolt, one immediately gets the attitude of the Department: "Such a scheme could, of course, have no countenance from us -- our policy before the world should stand like Mrs. Caesar, without suspicion. Neither could we undertake to recognize and protect Panama as an

<sup>121</sup> Adee note of Sep. 15, 1903, on Beaupre 105 to Hay, Aug. 1903, Colombian Resp. 60; For. Rels. 1903, 179, 180.

<sup>122</sup> Dennis, Adventures, 343.

<sup>123</sup> Adee to Hay, Sep. 17, 1903, #F. . .

independent state, like a second Texas." He further hoped that the situation would clear up sufficiently so that by the time they reached Washington, the two of them could talk more intelligently, and that he was "like a chess-player, who must try to foresee every possible move of his opponent, however idiotic it may seem. It is human nature to do the idiotic thing sometimes."<sup>124</sup>

The next day Beaupre's despatch of July 11 reached the Department. In submitting it to Hay Adee wrote that it "lends support to my first conjecture of yesterday," which was about the Colombian Senate passing a law similar to the Spooner law. Such an act would give President Harroquin the legal authority to conclude a treaty with the United States. Adee thought the Colombian Senate, after voting down the Hay-Harron treaty, would direct and empower "the Executive to negotiate and sign a new treaty...." Such a treaty would be along prescribed lines and "would be an ingenious device, quite within the reasoning capacities of the anthropoids."<sup>125</sup> This letter was written in the morning.<sup>126</sup> Later that same day he sent a long letter to Newbury, in reply to Hay's letter of the 14th:

I haven't had a chance yet to read the New Granada treaty of 1846 in the light of Beaupre's telegram of August 5th, as you enjoin in your letter of the 14th, but hope to do so

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<sup>124</sup> Adee to Hay, Aug. 18, 1903, HP. 8; Stuart, The Department of State, 199; Jennis, Adventures, 342.

<sup>125</sup> Adee to Hay, Aug. 19, 1903, HP. 8.

<sup>126</sup> Beaupre 78 to Hay, Jul. 11, 1903, Colombian Resp. 59; For Rels. 1903, p. 163.

before you come on the 29th. At first blush I would be inclined to do nothing that would smack of resentment. I would prefer to stand pat on the Spooner law, by which the authority of the President is measured — which authority he has executed, thereby fulfilling the law — and in so fulfilling the law he has established the measure of satisfactoriness of the treaty he has negotiated. He is no longer competent to negotiate on different bases and certainly cannot acquiesce in any new proposals — whether in the form of Colombian amendments to the present treaty or as propositions put forward by way of inviting fresh negotiation — which may depart from the purview of the Spooner law. It does no good to threaten anthropoids — the best way is to take up our position, calmly but inflexibly, and if Colombia cannot conform to our Mediterranean and Persian requirements, why — we are very sorry but really we can't help it if Colombia don't want the canal on our terms.<sup>127</sup>

A third note of the same day was attached to a despatch which enclosed copies of notes between Beaupre and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Colombia, Sr. Luis Carlos Rico. Adee smiled when he read the notes, for he enclosed that correspondence in a memorandum to Hay:

It amuses me to read how Rico and Beaupre alike discuss the question whether Colombia's proposed action would violate the Spooner Act — as if our law were effective upon Colombia. A much neater way of putting it would have been to say that our Executive would violate that law by accepting any amendments contrary to or in excess of the authority conferred upon him by the Spooner Act.<sup>128</sup>

In these two notes may be seen a stern attitude. But, as Adee indicated, our President had fulfilled the conditions of the Spooner Act. The Senate had consented to the treaty he had secured. When that was done, the Executive could do no more until Colombia acted, or the time for action expired by law.

<sup>127</sup> Adee to Hay, Aug. 19, 1903, HP. 8; For. Rels., 1903, p. 171.

<sup>128</sup> Adee memorandum to Hay, Aug. 19, 1903, HP. 8, and enclosing Beaupre 85 to Hay, Jul. 22, 1903, with Rico to Beaupre, Jul. 21, 1903, and Beaupre to Rico, Jul. 22, 1903; see also For. Rels., 1903, 167.

If the Colombian Congress accepted that treaty without change, then the work was completed, and we would have our Canal. If the treaty were subjected to any change, that would be the basis for new negotiations, and President Roosevelt would then have had to decide whether to negotiate anew or to turn to the Nicaraguan route. Those were the issues Adee pointed out, and those were the points the Colombians fretted over, for they wished to make amendments but couldn't without subjecting the whole to more talks which could or could not take place at the pleasure of the President of the United States. Since amendments were not acceptable, and since Colombia did not like the treaty as we had approved it, the whole was rejected on August 12, 1903.<sup>129</sup>

With that rejection the stage was prepared for the final act. In that act two more persons of the "Dramatis Personae" first appeared. They must be introduced in order to complete the picture and to show the interplay of forces which entered into making Panama independent. The first person is William Nelson Cromwell, counsel for the New Panama Canal Company.

Dennis says we can make him the "arch-conspirator" of the final events. The other one is Colonel Philippe Bunau-Varilla.<sup>130</sup> There are additional persons, such as Mr. and Mrs. Amador of Panama, but they did not take up so much of the time of the Department as did Bunau-Varilla and Cromwell. Cromwell informed

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<sup>129</sup> Beaupre tel. to Ray, Aug. 12, 1903, 7:00 P.M., For. Rels., 1903, 179.

<sup>130</sup> Dennis, adventures, 325.



Adee of an action taken in Colombia on August 13, the day after the treaty was rejected. This information had to do with the Senate and House of Representatives of Colombia preparing a bill whereby that Government would be authorized to make a treaty, but in the form previously approved by the Congress. "This confirms the interpretation which I had the honor of giving Assistant Secretary Loomis that action of twelfth was not final. It is evident that the whole subject is open for reasonable adjustment."<sup>131</sup> In this interpretation Cromwell held the same opinion as Beaupre.<sup>132</sup> Beaupre's telegram giving his reasons for believing the action by the Colombian Senate was not final, did not reach the Department until the morning of August 20. "This message has been over seven days on the way," Adee pointed out to Hay. "With such delays and obstructions it is quite impossible for the two governments to get into anything like accord." And since the Department had not heard from Genor Herran, Adee thought he was also in the dark. Accompanying this letter were Beaupre's and Cromwell's telegrams, with the added observation: "Herran and he evidently know nothing of Larroquin's 'plan' -- which may involve a coup-d'etat."<sup>133</sup>

Unofficially, the Department had heard of Colombia's rejection of the treaty. Until we heard officially there was

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<sup>131</sup> Cromwell to Adee, Aug. 19, 1903, HP. 8.

<sup>132</sup> See Beaupre tels. to Hay, Aug. 12, 1903, 7:00 P.M. and 9:00 P.M., For. Rels., 1903, 179.

<sup>133</sup> Adee to Hay, Aug. 20, 1903, 11:20 A.M., HP. 8; Beaupre confidential tel to Hay, Aug. 12, 1903, 10:00 P.M., Colombian Resp. 60; For. Rels., 1903, 180.

nothing to do until the time ran out. The Acting Secretary indicated "The 'reasonable time' of the ' Spooner Act is for the President to determine. He may regard a negotiation de novo (as Colombia seems to wish) as being beyond the time limit."<sup>134</sup> The next day he was convinced Colombia would pass an enabling act along lines similar to the Spooner act, and would ratify in advance a treaty made and signed on the basis of those conditions. "Then," he went on, "Colombia's interpretation of the nature of the perpetual control and jurisdiction to be granted would be advanced and would doubtless be radically different from ours."<sup>135</sup>

Just how correct Adee had been in his conjecturing about the situation was apparent on August 22, a Saturday which he called "dusting and sweeping day," because he used his Saturdays to clean up the accumulations of the week. That day Ferran sent Bico's telegrams, about the rejection of the treaty, to the Department. Ferran, in the telegram of the 13th, had been instructed to communicate it to the European Legations. This he did as well as having informed the press, but had waited for specific instructions before he sent copies to the Department. Adee did not like that kind of diplomacy and told Hay, "I am afraid he is not as frank as we supposed."<sup>136</sup>

<sup>134</sup> Adee to Hay, Aug. 20, 1903, MP. 8.

<sup>135</sup> Adee to Hay, Aug. 21, 1903, MP. 8.

<sup>136</sup> Adee to Hay, Aug. 23, 1903, MP. 8; for a copy of the Bico tel. of Aug. 13 to Ferran, see Ehrman 449 to Lewis, Aug. 17, 1903, Panama Consular Letters 25. Seemingly Adee knew nothing of the actual contents of that message until Aug. 29, a week later, and at which time he noted it should be acknowledged and filed.

After Adee's letter of August 23 there is almost a month before he wrote another letter that has been preserved. In that time several messages were received from Beaupre and Merry. Merry reported a possible revolution on the Isthmus, with secession as the avowed purpose.<sup>137</sup> This was sent to the White House and copied to Hay. Beaupre cabled the conditions under which a new treaty would be approved. Adee gave those conditions to the press.<sup>138</sup> And in submitting to Hay several of the despatches from Bogota, Adee did not see that any good would come from disapproving what Beaupre wrote to Risco, but he did "wish he hadn't dwelt so severely on the unfriendly character of any amendatory action by the Clambanians."<sup>139</sup>

On September 17 Adee received Beaupre's telegram about the unchanging situation in the Colombian Congress over the canal question.<sup>140</sup> And that same day Cromwell's secretary gave Adee the gist of messages he had received from Bogota. Adee seized upon the opportunity to get in another of his puns in his letter describing that visit:

Mr. Cromwell, who is not very well (however cron) sent his secretary to give me the gist of the telegrams which have

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<sup>137</sup> Merry 867 confidential to Loomis, Aug. 30, 1903, Central American Desp. 71.

<sup>138</sup> Beaupre cipher tel. to Hay, Sep. 5, 1903, rec'd Sep. 11, 1903, 10:10 P.M., Colombia Desp. 60; For. Rel., 1903, p. 191.

<sup>139</sup> Adee to Hay, Sep. 10, 1903, WP. 9; Adee to William Loeb, Jr., Sec'y to the President, Sep. 12, 1903, Roosevelt Papers, CF - State, 1903.

<sup>140</sup> Beaupre tel. to Hay, Sep. 17, 1903, For. Rel., 1903, p. 195; Adee to Hay, Sep. 19, 1903, WP. 9.

been received from Bogota. The most important thing in them is an intimation by mail from Crosswell's agent at Bogota that if an amicable arrangement can be made sub-rosa with the company, by which five to eight millions will be paid by the company, the obstacles to the ratification of the Hay-Herran treaty will disappear. I said that I did not see that I was called upon to make any comment on that suggestion. I inferred from what the secretary said that Herran is working in the same direction, but that will require much stirring of stumps if the treaty is to be saved by next Tuesday. Herran has not been to see me at all. <sup>1h1</sup>

To this Hay replied that "Crosswell must not whimper over the ruin of the treaty through the greed of the Colombians and the disinclination of the Canal Company to ratify it. If they were willing to be bled, why not say so at the time. It is a thing we could not share in, nor even decently know."<sup>1h2</sup> While the Secretary was penning those words to his assistant, Adee was busy "pouring loving words and saps" into the ears of the many newspaper men who wished particularly to know what he was going to do at midnight, the time within which Bogota had to act under the Spooner Law. Adee told them he was going home to bed, and continued:

For my part, I don't see how Colombia is in a position to make any intelligent move us-ward until one of three things happens:

- a) the adjournment of the present Colombian congress without doing anything -- an event for which Marroquin and Hayes devoutly pray.
- b) the passage by this congress of a cast-iron act under which Marroquin may offer to open new negotiations to keep the thing going until
- c) Hayes gets up a revolution.

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<sup>1h1</sup> Adee to Hay, Sep. 19, 1903, HP. 9.

<sup>1h2</sup> Hay to Adee, Sep. 21, 1903, HP. 9.

It seems to me that the Colombian cow, having kicked over the pail, says: "See here; if I should kick over this pail, would you give me 'an extension of time' to see what I will do with another pailful tomorrow?"<sup>1h3</sup>

The eventful Twenty-second case and Adee wrote that "nothing has happened so far." Crowwell's man, H. L. Farnham, called on the acting secretary and showed him a telegram received from Bogota. It stated the delay was based on the illness of the committee reporter. Farnham said the Colombians were stalling until the last moment, in the hope that another proposition would be made, either by the Canal Co. or by the United States.<sup>1h4</sup> But that was not the view expressed by Beaupre in his cable that afternoon. "The proposed law concerning the canal treaty has not been discussed since the first reading," he cabled.<sup>1h5</sup> After that cable was in the Department, and Adee had an opportunity to consider that latest news, along with all the other information on that issue, he still felt the Congress would adjourn without having taken any action. Crowwell could be right, he thought, and at the last hour Marroquin would be delegated to make the best terms he could. Such a treaty would have been approved in advance, leaving Marroquin and the legislators to retire to a secluded spot where they could divvy up the Canal Company's millions. Then when Crowwell's man went to see Adee, he was shown Beaupre's telegram. After reading it he "again intimated

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<sup>1h3</sup> Adee to May, Sep. 21, 1903, HP. 9.

<sup>1h4</sup> Adee to May, Sep. 22, 1903, HP. 9.

<sup>1h5</sup> Beaupre cipher tel. to May, Sep. 22, 1903, rec'd 1:36 P.M. 23rd, Colombian Desp. 60; For. Rel. 1903, p. 201.

that the Company was quite willing to pay up a reasonable blackmail upon a certainty that it would do the job. I said that I did not see that I was competent to express any opinion on that point or even to know anything about it." At the end of this letter Adee, buffeted as he had been by the newspaper men, was still able to put a bright side forward and signed himself "Fatiguedly but still chipperly yours."<sup>146</sup>

The canal correspondence, after the time limitation had passed, became very scant. Beaupre cabled no change, and that a second decisive debate would occur in a few days. The substance of this was given to the press September 28.<sup>147</sup> And the Merry tune of August 30, which predicted a Panaman revolt, was changed on October 10 to the statement that a revolt in Panama was no longer possible. How wrong he turned out to have been!<sup>148</sup> That was the last despatch with which Adee had a part to play in the Panaman Revolution before the event occurred. Just what all the factors were that led to that uprising would be difficult to recount, for the official papers of the Department have been published, and the Hay and Roosevelt papers have a great lack of correspondence in the period from October 10 to November 3. However, Hay had pointed out to the President that it was "for

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<sup>146</sup> Adee to Hay, Sep. 23, 1903, HP. 9. Dennis states that Adee "used to sign his almost nightly letters to Secretary Hay" in the above fashion. However, this is the only letter that I saw with this closing. Dennis, Adventures, 322.

<sup>147</sup> Beaupre cipher tel. to Hay, Sep. 27, 1903, rec'd 1:12 P.M. 28th, Colombian Desp. 60; Ver. Sala., 1903, 204.

<sup>148</sup> Merry 875 to Adee, Oct. 10, 1903, Central American Desp. 72.

you to decide whether you will (1) await the results of that movement /a possible insurrection in the Isthmus/, or (2) take a hand in rescuing the Isthmus from anarchy, or (3) treat with Nicaragua." <sup>149</sup>

Since the period from October 10 to November 3 is so silent it need not detain us. Also the history of that period has been well written up. <sup>150</sup> But on November 3, Panama proclaimed her independence, and three days later the United States recognized the de facto Government. <sup>151</sup> Announcement to this effect went out to Beaupre over Hay's signature. However, the wording of that telegram sounds like that of Adee. <sup>152</sup> A copy of that telegram was sent to the Colombian Legation in Washington, and Dr. Herran lost no time in protesting against our official relations with the Colombian rebels in Panama. Adee's directive to Smith as to how to answer the charge, and what to say, was the basis of our note of November 11. His words were copied verbatim into that reply. <sup>153</sup>

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<sup>149</sup> Hay to President Roosevelt, Sep. 13, 1903, Roosevelt Papers, PPF 1901-1909, MSS., L.C. It must be pointed out that I found this letter in the Roosevelt Papers, while in Dennis, Adventures, 339, it is listed as being in the Hay Papers. Perhaps it changed location at the Library of Congress in the intervening years.

<sup>150</sup> Dennis, Adventures, 323-334.

<sup>151</sup> Amador cipher tel. to Hay, Nov. 3, 1903, HP. 9; Arias, The Panama Canal, 66.

<sup>152</sup> For. Rel., 1903, 225; Colombian Instructions 19, 279. The message as published and in the Instructions does not agree with the quotation nor the page citation that Bennett gave in his biography of Hay. See Bennett, Hay, p. 381.

<sup>153</sup> Herran to Hay, Nov. 7, 1903, Adee to Smith, Nov. 10, 1903, Colombian Legation 10 to the Department; Hay 22 to Herran, Nov. 11, 1903, The Department 7 to Colombian Legation, 362; For. Rel., 1903, pp. 243, 244.

Dr. Herran's protest notwithstanding, our Government went forward with its recognition of the Panama Government. Colonel Philippe Bunau-Varilla was appointed the Minister of the new Republic.<sup>154</sup> He presented his credentials to President Roosevelt on Friday, November 13.<sup>155</sup> Shortly after he had become the accredited Minister to Washington he submitted the appointments of Raul Amador and Laman Arias, Jr., as consuls of Panama at New York and San Francisco, respectively. Adee wrote to Hay: "These applications for the recognition of Panama consuls, if granted, constitute a precedent. I see no objection to issuing the exequatur to Amador and granting provisional recognition to Arias. Do you? /Arias's credentials were en route to Washington./" Hay replied that he saw no objection.<sup>156</sup>

The speed with which we had recognized the de jure Government of Panama was to be equaled in the arrangements for a new canal treaty. Such a treaty was drawn up and signed by Bunau and Hay on November 18, five days after we recognized the new Republic.<sup>157</sup> On December 2, less than a month after recognition, it was signed by the Panaman Government.<sup>158</sup> On December

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<sup>154</sup> Bunau to Hay, Nov. 11, 1903, Panaman Legation 1 to the Department.

<sup>155</sup> For. Rels., 1903, p. 245.

<sup>156</sup> Adee to Hay, Nov. 21, 1903, and Hay's penciled reply attached to Bunau to Hay, Nov. 20, 1903, Panaman Legation 1 to the Department.

<sup>157</sup> Bennis, Adventures, p. 334.

<sup>158</sup> Gudgey cipher tel. to Hay, Dec. 2, 1903, Panama Consular Letters 25.



16 Adee informed Bunau-Varilla that the ratified treaty had been received in the Department.<sup>159</sup> Our Senate did not consent to the Treaty until February 23, 1904.<sup>160</sup> When that hurdle was successfully passed, the way for an interoceanic canal was assured, and it was agreed that the United States had the sole right to construct and maintain the canal.

The Colombian Government was so irritated and provoked at us for our speedy recognition of her Panaman rebels that she sent Rafael Reyes to Washington on a Special Mission to find out what our attitude would be if she sent troops to the Isthmus.<sup>161</sup> The exchange of notes that occurred between the Department and the Legation of Colombia on Special Mission did not involve many notes, but those that were written were long ones and took a lot of history into account. After the initial exchange of notes Reyes sent a long list of grievances that his Government had against the United States. Hay asked Adee to have it translated and to send a copy of the translation to the White House.<sup>162</sup> Hay wrote to President Roosevelt that the memorandum was the result of MacVeagh's work and that Reyes concluded "by asking the submission of all pending questions to the Hague." Hay was ill and told the President some one else would have to prepare the reply.

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<sup>159</sup> Adee 10 to Bunau-Varilla, Dec. 16, 1903, The Department 1 to Panaman Legation, 8.

<sup>160</sup> Dennis, Adventures, p. 334.

<sup>161</sup> For. Rel., 1903, p. 279.

<sup>162</sup> Reyes to Hay, Dec. 1903; Hay to Adee, Dec. 23, 1903, Colombian Legation 10 to the Department; For. Rel., 1903, 284-294.

He suggested Adee and Penfield as being able to "make a very good reply," or Root could "do it admirably," if he had the time; or if the President chose to call in John Moore, May knew "no one could do it better than he."<sup>163</sup> Thereupon President Roosevelt thought all four men should work on the reply. The Secretary was not sure of the need for so much man power to be used on the project and told Adee, "I am quite sure that when you, with whatever assistance Penfield may give you, have prepared the reply, it will not be necessary to send it to New York, although it may be submitted to Root pro forma. I know it will suit me, and, after all, that is the principal consideration in this vale of tears."<sup>164</sup> As to who actually wrote the reply the records are silent, but a reading of the long note makes me feel that Adee had a major part in drafting the reply, for the style, the history, and the wording are typically his.<sup>165</sup>

During the time General Hayes and Secretary May were having their exchanges of notes two events occurred as an outgrowth of our recognition of Panama. A Senator Callon had requested a copy of Buma's full powers. May thought that would "be a bad precedent to admit the power of the Senate to pass on the powers of the negotiators," and sent a memorandum to Adee about his views. "Semper Paratus" agreed with his chief and

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<sup>163</sup> May to President Roosevelt, Dec. 24, 1903, Bennett Papers on May, MSS., L. C.

<sup>164</sup> May personal and confidential to Adee, Dec. 25, 1903, HP. 9.

<sup>165</sup> For. Rel., 1903, pp. 294-306.

said it was the duty of the negotiators to satisfy themselves as to the "sufficiency of the other's full powers." He did not feel the Senate had any right to meddle in the constitutional powers of the President, and he "would not like to admit that the Senate's power to advise and consent to the making of a treaty involves the function of negotiation ab initio."<sup>166</sup> The other incident had to do with our aiding the Panaman Government to get a letter to the President of Mexico. That Government had not recognized the new Republic and Hay was asked to send the letter through our Ambassador at Mexico. Sidney Smith asked Adee if there were any objection to doing as Bunau asked, and Adee referred the matter to Babcock for the Secretary:

Please refer this to the Secretary.

1. As I understand, the U. S. has not asked any Government to recognize Panama. All we did was to inform all Governments that we had recognized it. When other governments have taken like action, we have refrained from expressing gratification or doing anything to suggest that we looked on such action as a favor to us.

2. Mr. Clayton's reports show that Mexico is very reluctant to recognize Panama, looking upon the separation of Panama as, possibly, a bad precedent which perhaps may be followed by some of the Mexican states (e.g. Lower California). AAA.

And Hay's reply:

I think you are quite right in saying that we have not asked any Government to recognize Panama, nor thanked anyone for doing so, but I see no objection to asking Clayton to deliver this note to the Mexican Government, saying that he does not know the contents of it and that it is a courtesy extended by us to the Government of Panama, which has no representative in Mexico. Secretary.

Then Adee's reference to Smith:

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<sup>166</sup> Adee to Hay, Jan. 6, 1904, MP. 10.

So instruct Mr. Clayton. Deal the letter. Acknowledge accordingly.<sup>167</sup>

Our recognition of the Republic of Panama, and the ratification of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty brought to a close the diplomatic steps by which our Government secured the sole right to construct and maintain an interoceanic canal. After that it was up to the War Department. But even so, there were many notes and despatches received and instructions sent by the Department which were occasioned by the canal problems and by the secession of Panama. The records show that Adee had a part in answering them. He thought the action Minister John Barrett took toward the Panama-Costa Rica boundary was discreet and suggested that the trouble would be over more rapidly if Hay called the representatives to Washington for a conference.<sup>168</sup> And he also helped to resolve the encroachment by Panama into Colombia's Cauca and Bolivar Departments.<sup>169</sup>

It has been shown that Adee began to familiarize himself with the canal problems soon after he was officially associated with the Department. From that early information he went on and absorbed more information from the notes and despatches sent to the Department, so that, when he was called on to make an

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<sup>167</sup> Adee undated to Smith; Hay to Adee, Jan. 18, 1904; Adee to Babcock, Jan. 15, 1904; Smith to Adee, Jan. 16, 1904; and all attached to Bunau to Hay, Jan. 15, 1904, Panama Legation 1 to the Department.

<sup>168</sup> Adee to Hay, Jul. 25, 1904, HP. 10.

<sup>169</sup> Adee memoranda of Aug. 26, and Sep. 7, 1904, attached to Reyes tel. to Hay, Aug. 25, 1904, Colombian Legation 10 to the Department.

acceptable draft of a treaty to supersede the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, he was able to prepare and submit an acceptable copy to the Secretary. And later Hay looked to Adee for a suitable reply to General Hayes' long list of grievances against the United States Government. In order for one man to do that surely made him a very valuable man to have around. Our policy to a large extent, therefore, was from the creative genius of Adee, who did his work quietly, efficiently, and then withdrew so that Hay or President Roosevelt could conclude the final arrangements. It must be stated that most of Adee's ground-work was done before the young and eager President entered onto the stage of activities. The work of the self-effacing Second Assistant Secretary is in the records, in spite of President Roosevelt's later boast of "I took the Canal Zone," and it was on Adee's basic work that the President's more evident actions were made.<sup>170</sup>

#### THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

The Boxer Rebellion settlement stipulated that all foreign troops were to be removed from China. In 1903 the Russian troops were still in Manchuria. At that time she made some new demands on China which were to be accepted before those troops would be withdrawn from Chinese territory, an event which had been agreed to two years earlier. Edwin H. Conger, the American Minister to China, sent a copy of those pro-Russian terms to the Department, and Adee in turn prepared a copy for President

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<sup>170</sup> Dennis, *Adventures*, 335, has a few words about President Roosevelt's statement made in 1911.

Roosevelt.<sup>171</sup> The President was aggressive and often took the lead in diplomatic affairs, thereby becoming his own Secretary of State. Hence, the Theodore Roosevelt Papers have many official messages which do not appear in the records of the Department of State.

While the Russian troops remained in Manchuria, Japan had become interested in having the Manchurian Province under her control. In the Fall of 1903 and in the early part of 1904, the two Governments endeavored to settle their differences peacefully. Negotiations failed, however, and Japan declared war on Russia on February 10, 1904.<sup>172</sup> A few days later Robert S. McCormick, the American minister in St. Petersburg, informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the United States wished to see China remain neutral and that her administrative entity should be preserved.<sup>173</sup> The phrase "administrative entity" has been credited to Adee.<sup>174</sup> It may be that he suggested its use in the statement of 1904, but it had first been used by John Hay in his Circular Note of July 3, 1900, which had been prepared and despatched while Adee was vacationing in Europe at the time of the Boxer uprising. Credit is due Adee, however, for his ability to refer to an earlier note and to use pertinent data therefrom.

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<sup>171</sup> Memorandum handed to Adee by Takahira, Sep. 12, 1903, Roosevelt Papers. Japanese Legation 8 to the Department. For. Rel. 1903, pp. 617-618.

<sup>172</sup> Takahira 7 to Hay, Feb. 11, 1904, For. Rel. 1904, p. 418.

<sup>173</sup> McCormick 88 to Hay, Feb. 14, 1904, Russia Desp. 60.

<sup>174</sup> New York Herald Tribune, Sunday, Jul. 6, 1924, part 1, p. 15, col. 7.

The one topic in relation to the war, and which took much of the Department's time, was the ship seizures. Many of those problems were discussed by Adee with Hay and the Solicitor, William L. Penfield. Adee's thoughts, as expressed in memoranda to Hay, reveal him as conversant with the many legal aspects of the laws of the sea, navigation laws, and confiscation of contraband without due examination.<sup>175</sup> In one note to the Secretary, Adee reported that he and Penfield disagreed on the application of the Treaty of 1854, and that he himself thought the first paragraph "established the principle of the security of innocent Japanese property on any neutral ship of whatever nationality, and that, as the greater includes the less, the engagement not to capture or confiscate Japanese property on a neutral ship could not give Russia the right to destroy American property in the like case...."<sup>176</sup>

Later, when Hay was in New Hampshire, and Loomis was in Maine, Adee sent some of the ship seizure messages to the President, who was vacationing at Oyster Bay. Included were a despatch from McCormick and Count Lamsdorff's note to the Ambassador. Accompanying those notes was a memorandum from Adee, who had pointed out that "Count Lamsdorff's note seems to show clearly the purpose of the Russian Government to treat all goods destined to Japanese ports as contraband of war," and then continued:

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<sup>175</sup> Adee to Hay, Jul. 26, 1904, HP.

<sup>176</sup> Adee to Hay, Jul. 27, 1904. HP.

The judicial report mentioned is the correct one in all such cases where the principle of law underlying the condemnation is sound and where there is a dispute as to the facts whether the goods seized are within the purview of a correct and sound principle of condemnation. But here the principle is unsound, vicious and untenable, and if consistently enforced by the Russian Government would constitute a war by Russia upon all neutral commerce with Japan.

In view of this authentic statement of the Russian position, you may feel that we should make a strong and definite answer.

I should say, however, that upon telegraphic report from Mr. McCormick regarding the decision of the Prize Court in this case, the Department directed him to protest against the condemnation of the food stuffs as contraband of war. I enclose a copy of that instruction, for your convenient information. We have as yet had no reply.<sup>177</sup>

After the President had a chance to review some of the correspondence which Adee had forwarded, and to which Hay had made some suggested replies, the Acting Secretary was directed to "tell the Navy that they must not interfere in case there is fighting between the Russians and Japanese in a Chinese neutral port."<sup>178</sup> In addition, Adee had the following comments from Oyster Bay:

I thank you for the copy of the notes in the matter of the decision of the Russian Prize Court about the Arabia. I agree with you entirely that the principle announced by Count Lamsdorff is unsound, vicious, and untenable, and that you should make a strong and definite answer that we will not assent to such a view. As a matter of fact, if they tried to enforce it I should put our ships in Yokohama at once. Please communicate with Secretary Hay and have him prepare such a memorandum.<sup>179</sup>

<sup>177</sup> Adee cipher tel. to McCormick, Aug. 23, 1904, Russia Instructions 18:572. For Rel. 1904, p. 759; Adee to President Roosevelt, Aug. 23, 1904, Roosevelt Papers; Adee to Hay, Aug. 23, 1904, HP.

<sup>178</sup> President Roosevelt to Hay, Aug. 23, 1904, HP.

<sup>179</sup> President Roosevelt personal to Adee, Aug. 24, 1903, Roosevelt Papers.



A week later Adee received a more encouraging despatch from McCormick. It concerned the Arabia and the decision of the Russian Prize Court. In forwarding it to Hay, "Old Reliable," as Hay referred to Adee, observed:

The most astounding thing of modern times is the Russian intimation that a neutral ship which has once carried contraband is afterwards liable to seizure wherever found and condemnation as prize. We have no official confirmation of this monstrous claim, for which I suppose poor Martens will be offered up as sponsor. Martens of course must theorise as the Tsar directs.

P.S. The Post says that, whatever happens in the East, the Tsar is holding his own.<sup>180</sup>

Although the ship sinkings took a lot of the Department's time, the one incident which "swamped" Adee,<sup>181</sup> was the arrival of the Russian cruiser Lena in San Francisco. Adee was kept busy telegraphing to Oyster Bay, San Francisco, and to Newbury. Hay wrote that he agreed with anything Adee did in the matter.<sup>182</sup> That was praise indeed, to have a chief approve an act before it occurred. When the initial excitement wore off, it was learned that the ship would need extensive repairs in order to make her seaworthy, and under the neutrality laws, the United States could not and would not permit that to be done during the war. Therefore, she was to be disarmed. Adee set forth the conditions for disarmament. After the President approved those conditions, they were conveyed to Rear Admiral McCalla, Commander of the

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<sup>180</sup> Adee unofficial to Hay, Aug. 31, 1904, HP.

<sup>181</sup> Adee personal to Hay, Sep. 11, 1904, HP.

<sup>182</sup> Hay to Adee, Sep. 13, 1904, Bennett Papers on Hay.

Marine Island Navy Yard, where the ship would be tied up, and to other interested persons.<sup>183</sup>

With the machinery for dismantling the Lena effectively set in motion, Adee sat down and wrote Hay about it,<sup>184</sup> and then turned to other important matters.<sup>185</sup> The Secretary praised Adee for his role in that incident.<sup>186</sup> In acknowledging the Secretary's letter, Adee wrote briefly that he was "too exhausted to say more, except although I say it what shouldn't, I have a stack of telegrams from the President approving my various acts. The Lena was only one of the problems. I am barely alive, and satisfied with having obeyed the promptings of duty...."<sup>187</sup>

In the Spring of 1905, the Russo-Japanese war moved rapidly to an end. The Baltic fleet had gotten to the scene of battle but did not last very long. Meyer cabled that St. Petersburg was really moved for the first time on hearing of the fleet's defeat.<sup>188</sup> A few days later, with Hay absent because of illness, and Adee on vacation, President Roosevelt, who had been acting as

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<sup>183</sup> The Evening Star, Thursday, Sep. 15, 1904, p. 1, col.2; Adee tel. to President Roosevelt, Sep. 15, /1904/, 12:40 P.M., Roosevelt Papers; Morton tel. to President Roosevelt, Sep. 15, 1904, 5:38 P.M., Ibid. Adee to Cassini, Sep. 15, 1904, For. Rel. 1904, p. 787.

<sup>184</sup> Adee to Hay, Sep. 15, 1904, 4:20 P.M. HP.

<sup>185</sup> Adee cipher tel. to McCormick, Sep. 16, 1904, Russia Instructions 18:585-586. For. Rel. 1904, p. 766.

<sup>186</sup> Hay to Adee, Sep. 16, 1904, Bennett Papers on Hay.

<sup>187</sup> Adee to Hay, Sep. 19, 1904, HP.

<sup>188</sup> Meyer cipher tel. to Adee, rec'd Jun. 2, 1905, 8:55 P.M. Russia Resp. 63. Copies to the White House on Jun 3, 1905, Roosevelt Papers.

his own Secretary of State much of the time, took a still more active role in foreign affairs, especially as they concerned the Russo-Japanese war. At the President's direction, Francis W. Loomis, the Assistant Secretary of State, sent a telegram to St. Petersburg, which said in part:

The President feels that the time has come when in the interest of all mankind he must endeavor to see if it is not possible to bring to an end the terrible and lamentable conflict now being waged....<sup>189</sup>

The peace envoys from Russia and Japan met at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and made positive moves for peace. In less than a month they came to an agreement. The Treaty of Peace was signed on September 5, 1905, at 3:00 P. M.,<sup>190</sup> and was confirmed on October 11, at 12:00 Noon.<sup>191</sup>

From the time of the declaration of war to the Treaty of Portsmouth, a span of one and a half years, many lives were lost, many cargoes confiscated, and many warships lost. The numbers of all three categories would have been greater had President Roosevelt not sought to settle the dispute by peaceful means. From an examination of some of the official and personal papers, the writer is sure that the President was led in part to seek a peaceful solution because of the information, official and personal, which Adee submitted to him. Russia's interpretation of contraband goods did not conform to the recognized law

<sup>189</sup> Loomis to Ambassador, St. Petersburg, Jun. 8, 1905, Russia Instructions 19:28. For. Rel. 1905, p. 807.

<sup>190</sup> Takahira to President Roosevelt, Sep. 5, 1905, Roosevelt Papers.

<sup>191</sup> Eddy cipher tel. to Root, Oct. 11, 1905, rec'd. 9:40 A.M., Russia Desp. 64.

of the sea, and in fact, as Adee pointed out, her interpretation was a novel one. And since we did not accept her Prize Court decisions, our shippers sent more goods on more ships, and they, too, were seized as contraband. Adee pointed all that out to the President, who then knew the legal ground on which the United States' stand was taken, and also knew that it was foolish to be legally correct and to continue to let the merchants lose huge sums of money. Further, Adee knew many of the problems which confronted the two Governments, for our Government had agreed to protect Japan's interests in Russia. Much of that information must have been talked over with Hay, who in turn discussed our policy with the President.

It has been shown that Adee was prepared to send a note or an instruction as soon as the approval was received from Hay or President Roosevelt. In many of those instances Adee's draft copies were accepted without change, thereby having his views accepted as the official policy of the Department. To have Hay say he approved what Adee did before he did it was praise indeed. And when the President told him to send a telegram exactly as written, it was additional proof that Adee knew the legal points about neutral asylum, the law of nations, and international law as it pertained to contraband of war. Also he could emphatically tell the belligerent powers that we disagreed with their interpretation, and then at the same time skillfully and tactfully point out to them at what points their interpretations of the law differed from the accepted practice among nations. To do all

that necessitated a person well informed in law, diplomacy, and administration. She filled all requirements.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE BOXER REBELLION

The territorial acquisitions of 1898, in which Adee played a significant role, made the United States a world power. The Hawaiian Islands had been annexed, and by the terms of the Treaty of Paris, signed December 10, 1898, the Spanish Government yielded control of her Caribbean and Far Eastern possessions to the United States. However, the American people had been busy for a hundred years moving West on the Continent, so that they had not given much thought to overseas struggles, nor was the United States diplomatically equipped to handle the new and numerous problems. At the turn of the century America was in her diplomatic infancy.

In 1900 the United States Government was responsible for the lands obtained from Spain by treaty. The supervisory methods used seemed to be inadequate, especially in the Philippines, where an insurrection broke out and lasted for several years. While that incident was taking place, the State Department received several despatches which told of unrest in Peking. Behind that unrest were the missionary activities in China and the grabbing of Chinese ports by European nations. Those treaty ports gave the foreigners privileges which the Chinese did not enjoy, thereby causing resentment among the natives.

Long before the actual shooting occurred in the Boxer Rebellion Adee knew that disturbances and misunderstandings occurred. Some events were of such a serious nature that the

Department was obliged to send instructions to the diplomatic officials in China. The situation reached its climax in the late Spring of 1900 when the foreign diplomats were attacked by the Boxers and were in hourly danger of death. During the attempts to bring peace to the area John Hay was compelled to leave Washington on account of illness and, as the First Assistant Secretary was already out of town, the burdens of carrying on the delicate diplomacy fell to Ades. His background for this crisis was such that he was able to step into the role of acting secretary and handle the situation tactfully without a single blunder at a time when one mistake could have brought death to the representatives in the besieged Legations in Peking.<sup>1</sup>

Who were the Boxers? The I-Ho-Tuan, or the Sacred Harmony Fist, was the society commonly known as the Boxers. It had an avowed objective as a group. That was "the promotion of gymnastic exercises and the cultivation of a patriotic spirit among the people...."<sup>2</sup> It does not seem that its tenets at first were antagonistic to the Christians or the missionaries. But the Chinese Government was under pressure to give the European Powers concessions at her ports. Germany was granted a concession at Kiao-chao. When that happened, the Boxers were given a new impetus, and the conduct of foreigners everywhere was passed in review by the natives, particularly the Boxers.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Hunt, "Permanent Secretary," hGh; Clements, The Boxer Rebellion, 15.

<sup>2</sup> Wilson, China, 347.

<sup>3</sup> Loc. cit.

The earliest contact that Adee had, as found in the official records, was in an instruction to Minister Charles Denby in 1893. Adee stated the Department had received a despatch from Canton which informed our Government that the natives were being incited to outrages by the circulation of mischievous literature and that an attempt had been made to stop the distribution of that information. Adee sent a copy to Denby and told him that "The prompt assurances given by the Viceroy to the Consuls, and the apparently effective measures taken by him to suppress the sale of this mischievous publication, are appreciated."<sup>4</sup> Then in the summer of 1895 more disturbances occurred and Denby was instructed to see to the welfare of the American citizens and to refrain from joining in any action which did not concern the United States, even though it was important to Britain.<sup>5</sup>

The next important instruction to go to Denby was about the anti-missionary riots at Cheng-tu. It was sent the day before Olney's famous instruction of the Venezuela-British Guiana boundary dispute was sent to Bayard in London. Hence our Government was involved in global affairs before the Spanish-American war made us a world power. Adee told Denby to exert an effort to get the truth of the report that the riots were explainable only on the theory there was official connivance, for if that were true, then "stern reprobation and punishment must be expected

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<sup>4</sup> Adee 818 to Denby, Jul. 25, 1893, China Instructions 5:11-12.

<sup>5</sup> Dennis, Adventures, 177.



with due reparation and safeguards for the future."<sup>6</sup> Later Adee instructed the Minister to organize a commission to go to Chang-tu to make the contemplated investigation, and that the Department expected Denby to do all he could to use diligence in complying with the instruction so that there would be no further delay.<sup>7</sup>

Denby was then informed that the Chinese Minister in Washington, Wu Ting Fang, had been told by Adee that the United States would consider as unfriendly a refusal on the part of the Chinese Commissioner to join in that investigation; that our Government might have to use independent measures for redress and protection, and that Denby was to renew his representations. Adee then stated flatly, something he rarely did in official correspondence, that he did "not favor Read as missionary member; might not trustworthy interpreter go instead?" on the commission.<sup>8</sup>

Of the many persons who had dominant roles in the troubles surrounding the Boxer Rebellion, none was more famous than the Chinese leader Li Hung Chang. He was a scholar and a politician with a great reputation in America, but held in China to be the "greatest liar and scoundrel unhung."<sup>9</sup> It was of him and his proposed visit to the United States in 1896 that President Cleveland asked what we should do to entertain him -- shoot firecrackers? But Hay and Adee did not have the same opinion of

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<sup>6</sup> Adee 1113 to Denby, Jul. 19, 1895. China Instructions 5:212.

<sup>7</sup> Adee 1141 to Denby, Sep. 6, 1895, Ibid, 236-239.

<sup>8</sup> Adee cipher tel. to Denby, Sep. 11, 1895, Ibid, 240.

<sup>9</sup> Goodnow 276 to Hay, July 17, 1900, Shanghai Desp. 46.

Li as did the general American public. This will be borne out later, and many of the deeds that Earl Li did during the Rebellion will be later discussed. However, our Government, we must remember, knew the kind of person Li was and the type of man with whom they had to deal.

By the summer of 1897 the anti-foreign riots had become more numerous. Denby was quite concerned with the ill-feeling among the natives and was doing what he could to prevent the killing of Americans. In a despatch on the subject he reported that he had made a strong demand "that the authorities be punished when riots occur in their jurisdiction." Adee marked this "Acknowledge with general approval of ground taken."<sup>10</sup> Denby's demand had effect, for after two German missionaries were murdered, the Emperor ordered the delinquent officials to be punished. It was these murders that led to the German occupation of Kiao-chao as a precautionary measure in addition to giving Germany a stronger hand in the play then going on for spheres of influence by European Powers in the China ports. When that news reached the Department, Adee noted that the despatch should be "Acknowledged with much gratification and anticipating good results from this exemplary action, which in other similar cases affecting American citizens has been so strenuously urged by this Government."<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Adee note on Denby 277h to Sherman, Jul. 10, 1897, China Desp. 103. Such a reply was made in Sherman 1h8h to Denby, Aug. 18, 1897, China Instructions 5h70.

<sup>11</sup> Adee note of Mar. 7, 1898 on Denby 2857 to Sherman, Jan. 18, 1898, China Desp. 103. Kiao-chao was opened as a free port on Sep. 2, 1898. Conger 36 to Day, Sep. 6, 1898, China Desp. 106.

The riots continued, and the Emperor issued an edict on the First of February, 1898, warning the officials in Shantung that they should do what they could to give the missionaries proper protection, and that if any worthless fellows again made trouble, "the local authorities of the place will be held solely responsible. Beware!" This strong edict was something our Government had long been demanding. Adee, accordingly, instructed that the despatch should be acknowledged and that the paragraph telling about the officials being held responsible in Shantung should be quoted "with satisfaction as affording a long-demanded guarantee for the future."<sup>12</sup>

But Adee was wrong. There was no guarantee for the future. Riots broke out sporadically in other cities.<sup>13</sup> And the Empress-Dowager and Emperor issued more edicts for the punishment of the leaders of the riots. But they did nothing to bring about a better understanding between the foreigners and the natives. Instead they attempted to put the blame on the local officials, the natives were incensed to inhuman acts of violence. Conger reported some executions had been ordered by the Empress, and Adee wished to withhold that news from the press. Before he made his wishes known Secretary Hay had

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<sup>12</sup> Adee note of Mar. 19, 1898, on Denby 2861 to Sherman, Feb. 4, 1898, China Desp. 103.

<sup>13</sup> Denby 2888 to Sherman, Mar. 17, 1898; Denby 2893 to Sherman, Mar. 24, 1898; China Desp. 103; Denby 2916 to Sherman, Apr. 20, 1898, China Desp. 104. For a reply that Adee prepared in draft see Day 1592 to Denby, Jul. 6, 1898, China Instructions 5:565-566, Conger 35 to Day, Sep. 1898, China Desp. 105.

already seen the telegram and released the news to the press.<sup>14</sup>  
 A slip-up in directives like this did not occur very often, and  
 it does not appear that any serious error was made in this  
 instance.

Many activities took place in China during this period of  
 the riots. The Empress-Dowager and Emperor issued edicts which  
 seemed to help, but only in local areas, and for specific acts of  
 violence. Then came the Imperial decree that increased the  
 Chinese army. Adee read this report and sent a copy to the  
 Secretary of War for his information.<sup>15</sup> A later decree, Conger  
 explained, was intended to make the various Governors feel and  
 share the responsibilities of settling commercial questions, or  
 missionary problems, as they arose in their districts, and that  
 these should not all be thrust upon the Tsungli Yamen. Adee's  
 observation went to the heart at once: "Appears to divide  
 rather than localize responsibility. Must continue to look to  
 the Yamen as the sole responsible organ of foreign intercourse."<sup>16</sup>

At the same time that the news of the riots reached the  
 Department Adee was working on some black-outs that reminded him  
 "of the shapeless chunks of beechwood from which wooden shoes are  
 shaped," and this draft must have concerned commercial treaties,  
 for he added "The open door paragraph is the most important. It  
 is a pity we have not the text of the treaty article in that

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<sup>14</sup> Adee's note of Oct. 1, 1898, on Conger cipher tel. to  
 Hay, Oct. 1, 1898, China Desp. 105.

<sup>15</sup> Adee note of Feb. 7, 1899 on Conger 112 to Hay, Dec.  
 13, 1898, China Desp. 105.

<sup>16</sup> Adee note of Feb. 28, 1899, on Conger 127 to Hay,  
 Jan. 5, 1899, China Desp. 106.

regard."<sup>17</sup> Thus we see that the phrase "open door", as applied to the Far East, was under discussion by our officials long before it was enunciated as a United States policy, and Adee had a hand in the forming of that policy. Although the basis of our September 6, 1899, circular Note, which asked for adherence to the principle of "the open door," was Rockhill's memorandum of August 28.<sup>18</sup>

The Chinese riots apparently quieted down for the rest of the year 1899, for there are no important notes by Adee on this anti-foreign issue. However, Adee continued to work on many other problems, including the Samoan compact, which he could not take to the office one day because he was confined to his bed as the result of an accident.

My dear Col. Hay,-

While trying to take my daily exercise last evening, I suffered a slight accident, being panned against a curb by an unlighted wagon, turning the corner to the wrong side. Result: dislocated collar-bone on the left side, so I am laid up for a few days under the care of Drs. Van Reyden and Nash. My nephew will hand you the Anglo-Samoan compact, also the key to my desk at the office.

I am smitten with contrition, can you forgive me?

Very faithfully yours,  
Alvey A. Adee.<sup>19</sup>

Then in January, 1900 Conger informed the Department that the Imperial Decree of January 11, 1900, was believed to be a step backward from the severe Decree of the 4th. This new decree was issued as a tranquilizing measure, in which the Boxers

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<sup>17</sup> Adee to Hay, Dec. 13, 1898, HP.

<sup>18</sup> Dennis, Op. Cit. 186-187.

<sup>19</sup> Adee to Hay, Sunday 19th, /Nov.1899/, HP 2. The newspaper account said he had a fall and would be confined to his bed for a fortnight. New York Daily Tribune, Tuesday, Nov. 21, 1899, p. 3, col. 2.

and other secret organizations could find encouragement to continue their marauding. Conger said the German Minister made a protest to the Tsungli Yamen, but that both he and the English Minister would not take any formal action concerning the last Decree, "since we have been so strongly assured that the rebellion would be at once put down, and that General Yuan Shi Kai, the newly appointed Governor, was just the man to do it, I have thought best to presume that they mean what they say, and to let them have a reasonable chance to accomplish it before pressing them further."<sup>20</sup> Two weeks later Conger reported that the decree had made the secret societies bold and that their numbers were increasing daily, with more trouble threatened.<sup>21</sup>

Little did Conger dream that the "more serious trouble" to which he referred would come so dangerously close to him and to all the foreign representatives, and that they would be huddled together, fighting for their lives, within the next six months. "Kill the foreigners -- the missionaries -- the Christians!" became the war cry of the Boxers," who were bent on having the blood of the foreign diplomats, for they were the chiefs of the "foreign devils" and, therefore, most deserving of death."<sup>22</sup> A diary entry of June 1, 1900, informs us that the British Minister was held in contempt by the English community outside his legation and that he would not believe danger was coming.

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<sup>20</sup> Conger 321 to Hay, Jan. 15, 1900, *China Desp.* 107.

<sup>21</sup> Conger 316 to Hay, Jan. 29, 1900, *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> Wilson, *China...*, 351.

The diary goes on to state that "Mr. Conger seconded Sir Claude, .... partly because he believed the government willing and capable of putting down the disorder. Both were suddenly converted when.... the Boxers were reported marching unapposed /six miles away/ upon Peking."<sup>23</sup>

However, the situation did not appear to be so critical in May, 1900, as to deprive Adee of his annual trip to Europe. But it was, and the Department was unaware of the lurking danger. Therefore, when the actual siege of the Legations began in June, 1900, Adee was merrily wheeling his way across France into the Rhine region and the Black Forest of Germany.<sup>24</sup> But Hay was there and he kept the diplomatic wires busy until he rushed out of town in an exhausted state of health. It was at this point that Adee stepped in and carried on without a mistake.

#### HAY'S CIRCULAR NOTE OF JULY 3, 1900

Hay had sent Conger a cabled message as to our policy in China. Our Minister was told to abide by his standing instructions, to see to the protection of American citizens and the Legation, and that there were to be no alliances.<sup>25</sup> That policy was suddenly altered by the Boxer revolt and the attack on the Legations. After word was received that the siege was on, Hay sent a circular telegram to the Powers on July 3, 1900. In this

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<sup>23</sup> Coltman, Beleaguered in Peking, 63.

<sup>24</sup> The Evening Star, Monday, Jul. 2, 1900, p. 1, col. 2.

<sup>25</sup> Conger to Hay, Aug. 24, 1900, confirming Hay tel. to Conger, Jun. 11, 1900, China Desp. 108.

telegram our policy concerning China was clearly announced and then scrupulously followed.<sup>26</sup>

Adee knew the background of the rebellion mainly from the despatches from the Minister in China. He did not normally see the despatches from the Consuls, hence there are very few of his notes on them. Our Consul General at Shanghai, John Goodnow, reported he had not had a word from Peking since the 14th of June.<sup>27</sup> And Cridler thought Adee might be interested in reading some confidential despatches from Consul Robert W. McEade at Canton. In reply Adee noted that he thought "these should be copied to War and Navy. They would particularly interest the Navy Department, and Mr. Root highly appreciates these intelligent continuous narratives with their interspersed telegrams in due sequence. You might send a third copy to the President."<sup>28</sup> It is notes like this one of Adee's that show the role he played -- keeping other departments informed of matters concerning them, and when important enough, to inform the President, in addition to the Secretary of State.

The same day that Hay circularized the Powers, Wu handed him a translation of a telegram he had received from Viceroy Liu Kun-Yih and Chang Chih-Tung, dated Hanking, July 3, 1900. These two men did not want the fighting to spread to their provinces. In order to prevent a spread they asked that the

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<sup>26</sup> For. Rels. 1900, xiv; Choate 356 to Hay, Jul. 7, 1900, Great Britain Desp. 200.

<sup>27</sup> Goodnow tel. to Hay, June 25, 1900, Shanghai Desp. 46.

<sup>28</sup> Adee to Cridler, Aug. 18, 1900, attached to Cridler's undated note to Adee, attached to McEade 18 to Hill, Jun. 26, 1900, Canton Desp. 14.



Foreign Powers agree to send troops to the Yangtze Valley, while they themselves agreed to protect lives and properties of all people according to treaty.<sup>29</sup> But the next day the London Times had a comment to the effect that the edict of June 26 was a declaration of intention to extend the area of anti-foreign operations.<sup>30</sup> Thus it is apparent that the governors in the southern provinces were not in sympathy with the expressed wishes of the emperor.<sup>31</sup>

Minister Wu next handed Hay an Imperial Decree that he had received by a very circuitous route: from the Taotai of Shanghai from the Treasurer of the Chili Province, who had received it from a special courier who came from the War Board, and which board had received it from the Privy Council in Peking. This decree gave a four page account of the outbreak of the fighting and blamed the foreign naval officers, who had ordered the Taku forts to be surrendered within a time limit. The decree claims that this was the cause of the outbreak and that the initiative was not on China's side, but rather on the side of the foreigners.<sup>32</sup>

The devious means by which Wu had received this message were used by Hay to get a message to Conger. Our Minister was

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<sup>29</sup> See copy under date Jul. 3, 1900, in Chinese Legation 4 to the Department.

<sup>30</sup> London Times, Wednesday, Jul. 4, 1900, p. 7, col. 1.

<sup>31</sup> Goodnow 272 to Hay, Jul. 8, 1900, Shanghai Desp. 46. This despatch was later copied for President McKinley's information. Adee to Cortelyou, Aug. 16, 1900, McKP.

<sup>32</sup> Memorandum handed by Wu to Hay, Jul. 11, 1900, 10:30 A.M., Chinese Legation 4 to the Department.

instructed to communicate with the bearer any tidings he had for the Department. Adee received the reply on July 20, promptly decoded it, and was happy to announce that the message indicated Conger was alive, though under continued shot and shell.<sup>33</sup> Wu had received his cablegram at 8:30 A.M. on July 20, and within an hour had handed it to Hay.<sup>34</sup> However, even though Adee was joyous at the news conveyed in Conger's message, he was not sure that a trick had not been played on the Department. He studied the message and even got the original text before he was satisfied that it was genuine. "There is no possible doubt that the telegram was written by Conger July 17," he wrote to Hay.<sup>35</sup> And the Department authorized a statement about the date and genuineness of that message. That statement concluded:

The fact that the authentic text of the original message, as received in Washington on July 20th, agrees literally with Consul Fowler's report of the wording of the original form written by Minister Conger, and bearing the file date of July 17, appears to establish the genuineness of the message and its date beyond doubt.<sup>36</sup>

Adee, however, had a lingering feeling that all was not well in Peking. Goodnow felt the same and reported that the people in Shanghai believed the foreign officials in Peking had been massacred July 2. The Chinese Minister handed Dr. Hill, the Assistant Secretary of State, a cablegram that had been relayed

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<sup>33</sup> Bennett, Hay, 304f.

<sup>34</sup> Cablegram handed to Hay by Wu, Jul. 20, 1900, 9:20 A. M., Chinese Legation 4 to the Department.

<sup>35</sup> Adee to Hay, Aug. 4, 1900, HP.

<sup>36</sup> Undated and unheaded memorandum, bearing Adee's stamp date of Aug. 4, 1900, HP.

to him from London. Wu's version differed from the published version in London. Both texts reported all well and no one harmed except the German Minister. Wu's version then asked, "would fighting cease (on part of foreign troops) if the Ministers could be escorted out of Peking?" Adee thought the London version had been cooked by the Chinese Minister there, for it concluded: "General Yung Lu is going to memorialize the throne to send them all under escort to Tientsin, in the hope that the military operations will then be stopped!" Thus the London version hoped fighting would stop after the Ministers were escorted to Tientsin, while Wu's version suggested to Adee a previous engagement, for his text asked, "would fighting cease.... if the ministers could be escorted out of Tientsin?" He thought that the telegram suggested a trap and did not see how the Department could assent to the removal of the Legationers until full and free communication with them had been restored.<sup>37</sup>

Of the many stories that have continued from the Adee days, one about the troublous days of the Boxer Rebellion deserves re-telling here, for it shows again that Adee was faithful to his trust, and gave out no authorized information, and yet gave an answer. It shows that he could see a humorous side even in the tensest situations. The Secretary had called Wu to his office for an important discussion about the Chinese situation. Reporters were outside his room waiting for a report

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<sup>37</sup> Goodnow 276 to Hay, Jul. 17, 1900, Shanghai Desp. 46; Adee to Hay, Jul. 24, 1900, HP; Dennis, Op. cit., 222.

on what was taking place inside. Adee was the runner for the conference, and was seen to go in and out of the room several times. After the conference Wu was not available, and Hay immediately left Washington. The reporters then turned to Adee for an inkling of what went on between the Minister and the Secretary. He said the talks were unimportant. But the newspaper men insisted that it had some significance, and then with a shrug Adee said, "Oh, no, the Minister talked and talked until the Secretary was Wu-sy; and then the Secretary talked and talked until the Minister was Hay-sy."<sup>38</sup>

"ADEE, ACTING"

After the Hay-Wu conference Hay left for his vacation in New Hampshire. He was worn out and sick, but few persons recognized that he was ill, for he had never been strong. While in New Hampshire Hay carried on a regular correspondence with Adee in Washington. Adee, in turn, kept Hay informed of the changing picture as it went on from day to day, and at times from hour to hour. Assistant Secretary Hill was also away on vacation. Then Adee wrote to Hay:

The first day of solitary grandeur is always a bit trying. Everybody who has seen you or failed to see you for two weeks has come to me to see how his matter gets along.

.....

Wu came to say goodbye until Monday. He gave me a new version of the Tsungli Yamen telegram of July 30, — which of course is not an answer to your telegram of August 1 to Goodnow-Li, much as the newspapermen try to make it out to be.

I got the original Western Union telegram to Wu, July 20, in cipher, and compared it with the copy in cipher which Wu gave you July 20. They agree in beginning, "For one month we have been besieged in British legation by Chinese troops." There is no possible doubt that the telegram was written July 17.<sup>39</sup>

Adee's first day of grandeur, August 4, 1900, was a full one. Wu handed him a cablegram from the Tsungli Yamen of July 30 in which it was reported that the Ministers were all safe and that provisions had been sent to them; also that the plan to get them to Tientsin was being talked over, "But as fighting is going on in Tientsin, it is inexpedient that cipher telegrams should be sent...." Adee, in accepting the cablegram, told Wu:

that it required no comment from us except to say that the announcement forbidding cipher telegrams to be sent to the Ministers in Peking was directly contrary to the President's condition of full and free communication with Mr. Conger, and was, therefore, absolutely inadmissible as far as we were concerned.

Mr. Wu said that this message was a repetition in slightly different language of the despatch received on the third from Mr. Goodnow, and being dated July 30, was, in the rapid march of events, comparatively old.<sup>40</sup>

When Hay left Washington, he was a sick man, and Adee was concerned about his health. Shortly after Hay reached Newbury he reported his safe arrival and his having caught cold, which added to his miseries. Hay was laid up and a reporter broadcast the news that he was dying. Since the Secretary did not want to tell the world the state of his hydraulics, he let the story run.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Adee to Hay, Aug. 4, 1900, HP.

<sup>40</sup> Adee note of Aug. 4, 1900, on Cablegram of July 30 handed to Adee by Wu on the morning of Aug. 4, 1900, Chinese Legation 4 to the Department; for the cablegram see For. Rel. 1900, 202f.

<sup>41</sup> Hay to Adee, no date, but stamped Aug. 9, 1900, by Adee, HP.

Adee thanked Hay for his message and told him there was no news except the fight in which Russia and Japan lost 1200 men.<sup>42</sup> Adee saw humor in Hay's discomfort, and replied to Hay's note "in regard to your passing indisposition. I call it 'passing indisposition' advisedly. I sympathize with you, for I have been there myself."<sup>43</sup>

Not only were Hay and Hill absent from town, but President McKinley was also enjoying a vacation at Canton, Ohio. Numerous messages went between Adee and George B. Cortelyou, Secretary to the President, who was also in Canton. The easiest way to get messages to the President was through the White House, and Adee used that method for secrecy, as well as expediency. "Your message sent through the Executive Mansion received," Cortelyou cabled to Adee. "The President directs me to say in reply that having restated our condition made to the Emperor no additional statement to Mr. Wu at this time would seem to be necessary."<sup>44</sup> And a second telegram from Adee prompted Cortelyou to state that the President would be in Washington on August 18, unless public business required his earlier return.<sup>45</sup>

While all this tension about the situation in China was gripping many people, Adee received two messages that could have caused even deeper concern here at home. These messages, after

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<sup>42</sup> Adee to Hay, Aug. 6, 1900, HP.

<sup>43</sup> Adee to Hay, Aug. 9, 1900, HP.

<sup>44</sup> Cortelyou tel. to Adee, Aug. 4, 1900, McKP.

<sup>45</sup> Cortelyou tel. to Adee, Aug. 4, 1900, second of date, McKP.

being translated, were found to be addressed to the President -- notifying him of his being designated for assassination. Adee copied them to Hay with the statement that

These may interest you. Note that they are posted at the same Post Office Station, only 90 minutes apart.

They are probably fakes, but I sent the translation to Montgomery, and copies privately to the Governor of New Jersey and to Mr. Griggs.

I hesitate to send them to Roosevelt. Shall I.<sup>46</sup>

The Departmental duties kept Adee away from his farm in Laurel, Maryland. In a letter to Hay he summed up his activities very quickly, but the actual work had started at four o'clock on Sunday morning, the fifth of August:

The Chinese thing looked so critical yesterday that I decided to stay in town for a few days and hold on tight to the tiller. It was good that I did so, for I have had to be in telegraphic touch with the President a dozen times since yesterday evening....

There came this morning at four a telegram from Goodnow dated fifth, reporting the receipt by /James W./ Ragsdale, Tientsin, of messages from Conger and Squires, dated July 21st: "All well. No fighting since 16th by agreement. Enough provisions; little ammunition. Hope for speedy relief." Goodnow adds that Sheng on the 5th communicated to him an Imperial edict dated July 30, ordering an escort for the ministers to Tientsin, when the ministers fix the date. The edict says the ministers can receive messages not in cipher, but notwithstanding this some plain messages were returned to the consuls on the fourth.

I telegraphed this to the President, asking if he desired the Consuls to be instructed to protest against any limitation of the right of full and free communication with Minister Conger, and whether he suggested any inquiry of Conger as to the question of coming to Tientsin, -- adding that the British Ambassador had informed us that, in a despatch dated July 21, Sir Claude said that on the 20th they had refused a further demand to leave Peking for Tientsin.

The President promptly replied telling me to instruct the

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<sup>46</sup> Adee memo to Hay, Aug. 5, 1900, HP.

Consuls at Shanghai, Chefoo and Tientsin to protest, adding: "Until such free communication is established, the inquiry as to coming to Tientsin would not be likely to bring us a response upon which we could rely with safety. If, however, the Secretary of War and yourself think any good would come from such an inquiry, there would appear to be no objection to making it. Free communication with Conger is of the first importance."

There was nobody in the War Department on Sunday, but I answered the President (as he asked) saying I had telegraphed to Goodnow, Fowler and Ragsdale in the words of his message, and that I agreed with him that the (censored) response to a plain and probably censored inquiry would not be free from doubt.

Wu has gone to Cape May for two days, and when he returns tomorrow I shall prod him again about free communication. I know he will tell me again that he and the other ministers in Europe have memorialized the Throne to grant it.<sup>47</sup>

A few days later the Department received the edict of August 2 which allowed plain communications with Conger. A second edict permitted cipher messages to go between the Foreign Ministers and their respective governments.<sup>48</sup> The same day that Wu delivered the edict Adee worked on a reply the President had authorized. At 7:30 P. M. he sent for the Chinese Minister and handed the memorandum to him. The last paragraph is of interest to us, for it was that part of the text which troubled Wu.

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We therefore urge upon the Imperial Government that it shall adopt the course suggested in the third clause of the letter of the President to H. M. the Emperor of China, of

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<sup>47</sup> Adee to Hay, Sunday, Aug. 5, 1900, HP 4; Dennis *Op.cit.*, 249, fn. 18; Goodnow tel. to Hay, Aug. 5, 1900, rec'd 4:06 A.M. and given to press Aug. 5, 1900, Shanghai Desp. 47; Adee tel. to McKinley, Aug. 5, 1900, second of date, McKP; McKinley tel. to Adee, Aug. 5, 1900, McKP; Adee tel. to Goodnow, Aug. 5, 1900, Instructions to Consuls 173:570; Adee tel. to McKinley, Aug. 5, 1900, third of date, McKP.

<sup>48</sup> For. Rel. 1900, 283, 300.



July 23, 1900, and enter into communication with the relief expedition, so that the cooperation may be secured between them for the liberation of the legations, the protection of foreigners, and the restoration of order. Such action on the part of the Imperial Government would be a satisfactory demonstration of its friendliness and desire to attain these ends.<sup>49</sup>

Wu pointed to that paragraph and asked:

"But how is this cooperation to be done? What does your Government suggest?" I said: "The way can be found, if your Government acquiesces in the President's desires." He then said: "But I do not know what to tell my Government you want." To this I replied: "If you or your Government acquiesces and asks advice, I will take the President's directions as to answering you." Then he said: "What do you want me to do with this? Telegraph it to my Government?" I said: "This is an official communication from the Government of the United States delivered to you as the representative of the Government of China. You, as the Minister of China, should know what to do with it." He hesitated a moment, and then said: "But I would like to know what you want us to do?" I answered: "The memorandum states our position clearly and says what it wants China to do. I am not authorized to discuss it or say anything more." He then shook hands, and left the room but returned almost immediately and asked: "Have you telegraphed this message to Mr. Conger?" I replied: "No. We do not make an independent communication of this memorandum through Mr. Conger, -- we communicate it through you. The telegram to Mr. Conger is an instruction, to which we await a reply." Then he said: "Have you telegraphed to General Chaffee and told him what you want done?" I answered: "General Chaffee takes his directions from the Secretary of War."

I infer from his last question that he wanted to know whether General Chaffee had been instructed how to act should the Imperial Government seek to enter into communication with the relief expedition.<sup>50</sup>

As soon as the edict permitting cipher messages with Conger was received by Adee, he sent, at the President's direction, a cipher telegram to Conger, asking for full information

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<sup>49</sup> Adee memorandum to Wu, Aug. 8, 1900, HP. The full text is in For. Rel. 1900, 284.

<sup>50</sup> Adee to Montgomery, Aug. 8, 1900, attached to Adee to Hay, Aug. 9, 1900, HP. General Chaffee was the commanding American General in China.

on the following items:

1. Present condition and prospects, American casualties.
2. All evidence participation by Imperial troops in attacks on legation.
3. Substance of all communications between you and Imperial Government during seige.
4. All acts towards you by Imperial Government, or its officers during seige and especially regarding protection, prevention of attacks, supplies of food, assistance in defence communications with this Government giving dates of specific acts.

Relief expedition Major General Chaffee commanding American division towards Peking has reached and captured Peitsang. Consult other Ministers and give opinion as to probable resistance at Peking and suggestions regarding course to be followed and conduct of operations.<sup>51</sup>

At the same time that message was sent to Conger Adee wrote to Hay. From his account Earl Li was not the trustworthy person some took him for. It would appear that he was a man not to be trusted, for, according to Dennis, Adee stated that

In quick succession, as the relief column advanced nearer and nearer to Peking, came repeated suggestions that the foreign troops should be halted before entering Peking. Indeed Li Hung Chang showed that he was playing a double game, for while he urged that the troops should be stopped, he privately informed the Japanese that he hoped the foreign expedition would enter Peking, cut off the retreat of the Imperial authorities, and at the conclusion of peace insist on the full reform of the Chinese government.<sup>52</sup>

It has been pointed out that Adee's three immediate superiors were out of town. This fact greatly added to his work, for he was doing three people's work at the office and communicating regularly with the President. He received the

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<sup>51</sup> Adee tel. to Conger, Aug. 8, 1900, China Instructions 6:94-95; For. Rel. 1900, 158 differs somewhat as to word placing. Adee thought that this telegram was very full and too long. Adee to Hay, Aug. 9, 1900, HP.

<sup>52</sup> Dennis, Op. cit., 224. This is cited as an Adee memorandum to Hay, Aug. 8, 1900, and in the HP. In my examination of the Hay papers this memorandum was not seen.

diplomats on "Diplomatic Day," and gave them copies of our latest demand on the Chinese Government.<sup>53</sup> When he had a few minutes, he prepared a draft of the Department's reply to Germany concerning the proposal of sending Field Marshal Count von Waldersee to command the international army in China. This proposal assumed that military force and intimidation were to be the dominant factors and, therefore, was in direct conflict with the Hay policy declared in the Circular Note of July 3, 1900.<sup>54</sup> Adee and Root worked out a reply to Germany that did not meet the President's approval. He wished it to be more cordial than Adee or Root had made it. The final draft had the President's qualifications in it and also a reference to Hay's note of July 3, 1900.<sup>55</sup>

While this exchange of messages and phone calls was taking place, Hay was about two days behind on the events as they took place. However, he was current enough, with the newspapers and Adee's letters, to recognize that the Chinese situation was nearing its critical stage. In writing this Hay also congratulated Adee on his management of the China case and wished he were in town to help, "but I know that you and Root will handle it better than I should."<sup>56</sup> As these appreciative words were being

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<sup>53</sup> The Evening Star, Thursday, Aug. 9, 1900, p. 1, col. h.

<sup>54</sup> Bennett, Hay, 310.

<sup>55</sup> Bennett, op. cit., footnote cited from Oleott, McKinley, 2:246ff.

<sup>56</sup> Hay to Adee, Aug. 9, 1900, HF.

written by Hay, Adee was busily reviewing the events of his latest twenty-four hours in Washington:

Yesterday was a hard seige, from nine A. M. until ten at night. Root and Griggs worked like Trojans, and the long-distance wire between the White House and Canton grew red hot at times. The papers will have shown you the result. The telegram to Conger was very full, longer than I would have liked, and put all sorts of questions as to the conduct of the Chinese imperial authorities during the seige. I would send you a copy, but I do not like to trust it to the mails. The President sent a personal telegram, also in cipher, expressing the joy of himself and the American people that the legations are still holding out. He has not given it out. I send you the printed correspondence of yesterday with Wu, also a letter to Montgomery relating for the President's information the way in which Wu received the memo.

Tug-a-hair-out called this morning to give me in strict confidence the enclosed copy of a telegram he had just received from the Japanese Minister. It shows Li in the light of playing a double game, his aim being to conserve the imperial power and reinstate it in power through foreign aid. It also contains an important anti-grab declaration by Russia. Root came into my room, and I introduced Take-his-hide-off to him, whereupon they had a long talk about the situation in the light of this confidential telegram.

Hacke came in to tell me that he has confidentially been given the full text of Buelow's despatch from Peking, -- only parts of it having been made public. Hacke made a fearful jumble of translating it for my information, but I gathered that Buelow regards the insistence of the Yamen on the removal of the ministers to Tientsin as a mere bluff to gain time, and that if put to the test they would either not "escort" the ministers, or would lead them to slaughter. Up to August 2, when Buelow wrote, the Chinese had supplied no food, and firing of rifles by the Imperial soldiery continued desultorily. The German legation building was still standing, but one of the others, the Belgian I think, had been destroyed by a mine. The utmost speed in relief was urged.<sup>57</sup>

Before the reply to the proposal, for Walderssee to be in charge of the international forces, was despatched, it was

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<sup>57</sup>Adee to Hay, Aug. 9, 1900, HP; for a copy of the message Takahira handed to Adee, see the copy attached to this letter in HP. It is marked as strictly confidential. Count Hacke was from the German Embassy. "Tug-a-hair-out" and "Take-his-hide-off" were Adee's names for Minister Takahira.

discussed over the phone with the President.<sup>58</sup> Then when the message was on its way to Berlin, the Department received Jackson's cable that Great Britain had accepted Waldersee on the condition that he was accepted generally. It was also in this message that the Department was informed of the German Emperor's suggestion that each nationality should have officers attached to Waldersee's headquarters in order to maintain communication with the national contingent.<sup>59</sup> With that information in hand the Department rescinded the first message about Waldersee. The second telegram stated we were gratified to have the service "of so distinguished and experienced an officer" in order "to attain the purposes declared by this government in the circular note delivered to the powers under date of July third."<sup>60</sup> In accepting the Count it was made clear that his joint command was to be effective only in the Province of Chili. Adee, therefore, suggested to the President that our future correspondence regarding cooperation should distinguish between that Province and all of China. "Such a distinction," he added, "may be convenient for us in future course of events, because affording us greater liberty of action to protect American interests."<sup>61</sup>

The plan to organize the allied troops under one commander was generally accepted as a good one. It did not meet with much

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<sup>58</sup> Olcott, Op. cit., 2:245, 250-252.

<sup>59</sup> Adee to Root, Aug. 10, 1900, enclosing copy of Jackson cipher tel. to Hay, Aug. 10, 1900, rec'd 11:30 A. M., Root Papers, Letter Box 139.

<sup>60</sup> Adee tel. to Jackson, Aug. 10, 1900, second of date, German Instructions 21:211-212.

<sup>61</sup> Adee to President McKinley, Aug. 20, 1900, McKP.

favor in Japan, but was accepted because her Government did not think he would arrive in time.<sup>62</sup> The troops in Peking did not wait for him to reach China and assume charge. They continued toward the Legations, and Lord Pauncefote told the Department that some news, comforting to the rebels, had been published. He suggested, at the request of Lord Salisbury, that information which would be of considerable aid to the rebels, and a detriment to the besieged Legationers, ought to be withheld from the press. He cited a report in the European press that Conger had told the Department there was little ammunition, and that the Italian Minister telegraphed that the British Legation had food for another two weeks.<sup>63</sup> To this Adee replied, "The suggestion is a good one, but I fear that press indiscretions here and in Europe make it rather late to take any effective action. I will, however, take pains to give orders that nothing be given to the press which will prejudice the situation."<sup>64</sup>

He did just that. Only the big and important events were given out after that. However, the newsmen could see the diplomats reporting to the Department, and, by whom they saw, were able to put a few loose ends together. They saw Ministers Wu and Takahira, and Ambassador Pauncefote, go into Adee's office, but did not know all that went on inside. On August 11

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<sup>62</sup> Treat, Diplomatic Relations -- United States and Japan, 1895 - 1905, 97.

<sup>63</sup> Pauncefote private to Adee, Aug. 10, 1900, British Embassy 133 to the Department.

<sup>64</sup> Adee personal to Pauncefote, Aug. 12, 1900, the Department 25 to British Embassy, 284f.

Wu gave Adee a telegram he had received from Nanking. It reported many warships near Shanghai and troops on the way to that city. That caused alarm among the merchants and the Department's good offices were asked for aid to stop the movement. Adee withheld that news from the press,<sup>65</sup> but made a memorandum of his conversation with the Minister. No doubt that record helped Root and the President to frame the reply which was made the next day.

Minister Wu called at 9:45 this morning, and delivered to Mr. Adee the annexed communication in regard to the landing of foreign troops at Shanghai. I told him that I could say nothing on the subject without conferring with the Cabinet officers.

Mr. Wu then asked: "Is it not possible to stop the military column so that the ministers can be delivered?" I said that this appeared to be substantially the same proposition that had been made by Li Hung Chang and answered by Mr. Hay's despatch of August 1st. "But," he said, "I mean to stop this bloodshed so that we can negotiate with the Powers for the delivery of the Ministers." I replied that any such negotiation would only interpose delay; that the President had suggested a more direct way in his letter to the Emperor of July 23rd, namely, that the Chinese authorities should put themselves in communication with the Commanders of the relief expedition so that cooperation may be secured between them for the liberation of the legations, the protection of the foreigners and the restoration of order. Mr. Wu said: "Then it is no use asking the Government here or the European governments at home to treat of negotiations?" I replied: "Li Hung Chang has already made that request. We declined to submit it to the other Governments." Mr. Wu then said: "The conditions of the President's letter have been fulfilled — I mean the first and second." I answered, "Not entirely, the safety of the legations is not assured so long as they are being fired upon by the Imperial troops." To this he rejoined, "They are safe — you see that they are all alive and well." I asked: "How about the sixty killed and 100 wounded?" "That was some time ago," he said, "before the President's letter — before we guaranteed their safety. We guarantee now." Then reverting to the President's condition of cooperation with the relief expedition, he asked, "How can we talk with the commanders? If we make any proposals to them, they will say they have no instructions; that they

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<sup>65</sup> Telegram handed to Adee by Wu, Aug. 11, 1900, 9:45 A.M., Chinese Legation 4 to the Department.

can't stop without directions from their own governments. Have you said anything to General Chaffee?" I said that General Chaffee took his orders from the Secretary of War. Mr. Wu said: "You must tell them what to do." He then added: "It is a pity, a great pity to have all this killing going on when we might settle everything peaceably."<sup>66</sup>

Adee took the message Wu left at the Department, along with the memorandum of the discussion they had had, to Secretary of War Root for guidance in framing a reply. Root prepared a reply, read it to the President, got his approval, and told Adee that the President approved the reading of the Memorandum to Wu, and to give him a copy should he ask for one. Root further indicated to Adee that the President thought we should be guided by circumstances as to whether to make the contents public or not, and this would depend a great deal on what Wu said or did when he received the reply of this Government.<sup>67</sup>

The newsmen also saw Takahira call on Adee that same day. He left two messages. The first informed the Department that Li had informed the Japanese Government of his appointment as Minister Plenipotentiary to negotiate an armistice and peace terms.<sup>68</sup> Adee marked this confidential. The second contained a Japanese suggestion that the Powers should grant an armistice to the Chinese Government for the purpose of having the Chinese

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<sup>66</sup> Adee Memorandum of a visit by Minister Wu on Aug. 11, 1900, Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Root to Adee, Aug. 11, 1900, Root Papers, Letter Book 9, 51; a Memorandum copy is dated Aug. 11, 1900, and in the Root Papers, Letter Book 9, 52, and a record is in the Department 2 to Chinese Legation, 80, under date of Aug. 12, 1900. The records do not state, but it would seem that the President and Secretaries Hay and Root had made the arrangement to have important and urgent notes referred to Root for reply.

<sup>68</sup> Copy of telegram from Viscount Aoki handed to Adee by the Japanese Minister on Aug. 11, 1900, Japanese Legation 6 to the Department.



troops and rebels withdraw until the allied powers could enter Peking unmolested and escort the foreign ministers and residents to Tientsin.<sup>69</sup> Adee promptly referred this to Root who just as promptly prepared a reply, tactfully marked "Suggestion to Mr. Adee." Root felt that we should be very prompt in responding on that subject, and his memorandum was a favorable reply to Viscount Aoki's proposal.<sup>70</sup>

Root had spent much of August 11 on matters concerning the State Department. Some of this was in conversations with Adee and some with the President. After the work of that day was over Root wrote: "The vociferousness of my present occupation is amazing. In the preparation of despatches I first yell at Adee about them.... and then I go to the White House and yell at the President about them over the long distance telephone. I feel as if China had me by the throat."<sup>71</sup> This same day Hay wrote his daily letter to Adee and thanked him for all the burdens he had taken off the Secretary's shoulders. "I cannot tell you how comfy I feel in my mind to know that you are on deck with an intimate knowledge of the tiller...."<sup>72</sup>

The next day Minister Ku handed Adee an edict which informed us of the appointment of Viceroy and Grand Secretary

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<sup>69</sup> Second telegram handed to Adee by the Japanese Minister on Aug. 11, 1900. Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Root to Adee, Aug. 11, 1900, Root Papers, Letter Book II, 51, 53; Jessup, Root, 1:382; Memorandum of Aug. 12, 1900, The Department 2 to Japanese Legation, 77-78.

<sup>71</sup> Jessup, Root, 1:383.

<sup>72</sup> Hay to Adee, Aug. 11, 1900, HP; Bennett, Hay, 201f.

Li Tung Chang as Envoy Plenipotentiary of China to conduct negotiations with the powers. Adee's reply to Wu was circularized to the interested powers. We recognized Li with satisfaction and were ready to negotiate when hostilities ceased, and when a relief expedition could enter Peking to take the foreign ministers and residents back to Tientsin. The last paragraph was almost a verbatim copy of Root's last paragraph in "Suggestion to Mr. Adee" of August 11, 1900.<sup>73</sup> But the War Department had much earlier instructed General Chaffee to aid Li and the Government of China in repressing "outrages and in rescuing Americans and in protecting American citizens and interests, and, wherever Chinese Government fails to render such protection, you will do all in your power to supply it." The position of the United States Government toward negotiating with the Chinese officials, "not concerned in outrages on Americans," was clearly set forth in that message, repeated by Root in his draft of our supplemental reply to Wu.<sup>74</sup>

Our reply did not satisfy the Minister and he returned to the Department for more information and to have more specific instructions sent to Chaffee. Adee told Wu his desire had been anticipated by Root on August 12. The Secretary of War had informed General Chaffee of Li's appointment as Plenipotentiary to discuss an armistice, and had particularly advised him:

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<sup>73</sup> Memorandum, the Department 2 to Chinese Legation, 81; For. Rels. 1900, 301.

<sup>74</sup> Adee to Wu, Aug. 12, 1900, the Department 2 to Chinese Legation, 82-83; Root to Adee, Aug. 12, 1900, Root Papers, Letter Book 9:56. MSS. 1C.

We are ready to enter into an agreement between the Powers and the Chinese Government for a cessation of hostile demonstrations on condition that a sufficient body of the forces composing the relief expedition shall be permitted to enter Peking unmolested, and to escort the foreign Ministers and residents back to Tientsin, this movement being provided for and secured by such arrangements and dispositions of troops as shall be considered satisfactory by the Generals commanding the forces composing the relief expedition.<sup>75</sup>

From this conversation it would appear that Wu had not received any new communication from his Government for a few days and was struggling to give the impression that he was in regular communication with the Taungli Yamen. If this were true, and he had been in close touch with the Foreign Office, the writer feels sure that he would not have done so much discussing of matters that had been communicated to him only a few days before, and that Adee felt obliged to repeat at the time of this conference. This retracing of the same problem could have become tiring after several repetitions, and Adee in a letter to Pauncefoot, did refer to the several occasions that Wu had asked about the instructions sent to General Chaffee. In this same letter the British Ambassador was informed of Adee's formula for replying to the diplomat's inquiries about the reception the Russian proposal, for getting our Ministers out of Peking, had received by our Government:

In a conversation this morning with one of your colleagues on the general subject, I expressed my personal idea that, in the contingency of the commanders of the relief expedition being approached by the Chinese with a view to cooperation for the safe delivery of the ministers and their removal from Peking to a place of security, it might greatly aid their

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<sup>75</sup> Memorandum of conversation with the Chinese Minister, Mr. Wu Ting-Fang, Aug. 14, 1900, 10:00 A. M., signed by Adee, Chinese Legation & to the Department.

consideration of such a proposal if the commanders were advised of the views of their respective governments, which I conjectured would be not far removed from the lines we had indicated, they being in substantial accord with the independent propositions of Russian /sic/ and Japan, and which have, moreover, been acquiesced in by one or two other Powers.<sup>76</sup>

At this point the uniformity of purpose and direction becomes apparent in Adee's dealing with the diplomats. When the German Charge, Baron Speck von Sternberg, handed him a memorandum about the Russian proposal to get the foreign envoys out of Peking under a flag of truce, he replied that that proposal had been anticipated in the third paragraph of the Memorandum given to Wu on August 12. Adee repeated that part in his reply to the Charge.<sup>77</sup>

The next day brought a later word from Conger. He reported the legationers were under fire and imprisoned by the Chinese army, that there was much sickness and that seven marines and Dr. Inglis' baby had been killed, but the report the allied troops were only 40 miles away had given them strong hope.<sup>78</sup> Through Admiral Dewey the Department heard on the same day that the relief column had taken Matoro on the twelfth. This brought them within twenty miles of Peking, with a hard fight, so thought Adee, awaiting them at Ching Chiawan. This slow progress and the

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<sup>76</sup> Adee personal and confidential to Pauncefote, Aug. 14, 1900, The Department 25 to British Embassy, 290-292.

<sup>77</sup> Memorandum to German Embassy, Aug. 13, 1900, The Department 12 to German Embassy, 471. Copy also sent to Thibaut, thereby fulfilling a promise Adee made to the French Charge, see Adee to Thibaut, Aug. 14, 1900, the Department 11 to French Embassy, 78.

<sup>78</sup> Goodnow cipher tel. to Hay, Aug. 15, 1900, rec'd 3:55 P.M., China Desp. 108.

delays in getting word from Peking, was agonizing to Adee. In his letter to Day, after reporting the events of the day, he exclaimed, "God! What a strain this suspense is."<sup>79</sup>

At 9:05 A. M., on the sixteenth of August, 1900, Fu handed Adee a telegram which said the allied forces were approaching Tung Chow, and that Li had asked the Imperial Government for an envoy who would be instructed to negotiate an armistice with the field commanders where they were. Li also asked that the Powers ask their commanders to stop at Tung Chow, for the Ta Ching Empire would be shaken if foreign soldiers entered the city of Peking, and the Empress Dowager and the Emperor would lose face.<sup>80</sup> The Department replied by repeating for Fu two messages which had been sent to our commanding General in China from the Adjutant General's office. The first repeated our Government's willingness to enter into an agreement with Li when the ministers would have been given release by allied troops, who would have been allowed to enter Peking unmolested for that purpose, and to escort them to Tientsin. The second had informed Chaffee that when the Chinese expressed their willingness to deliver the legationers to the relief column at Peking, under conditions which the commanders would decide as safe, he was to assist without referring the matter to Washington. And the question as to where the delivery of the diplomats and persons under their protection would take place was also for the generals to

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<sup>79</sup> Adee to Day, Aug. 15, 1900, HP.

<sup>80</sup> Copy of cablegram from Li Hung Chang delivered by Wu to Adee at 9:05 A. M. on Aug. 16, 1900, Chinese Legation to the Department.

determine. To these instructions Adee added that

We are advised by Minister Conger, that the attacks by Imperial troops upon the legations in Peking have not ceased. While these attacks continue we cannot stop the advance of our forces toward Peking. If such attacks cease, the above quoted instructions will be allowed to stand, and they would seem to provide for all the action required under the circumstances stated by Earl Li in his despatch.<sup>81</sup>

A few minutes later Wu handed another telegram to Adee.

This was from Conger. Hay had doubted the validity of the first reply received in the round-about way through the Chinese Minister and had asked for his sister's name. To which he replied: "Our cipher is safe. May it not be sufficient authenticity," and after telling of the horrors through which the legationers had passed and that five legations had been destroyed, added that "All pretense of aid or protection wholly false. Several attempts made to lead us into ambush."<sup>82</sup> Adee noted that in its complete form the message was confidential and that it had been edited for the press.

That telegram smashed the many fears about the legationers having been massacred or led into ambush. The relief expedition pushed on, to the discomfort of the Hanking Viceroys, who reported that the country was becoming angry, that they had always acted on instructions from the palace, and that they required a guarantee that the victorious allies would not frighten the Empress Dowager and the Emperor, in order to keep the minds of the Southern rulers from being changed. Goodnow

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<sup>81</sup> Adee Memorandum, Aug. 16, 1900, the Department 2 to Chinese Legation, 83-85.

<sup>82</sup> Conger cipher tel. to Hay, Aug. 11, 1900, and handed to Adee by Wu on August 16, 1900 at 9:20 A. M., China Desp. 108.

answered the Viceroys that he had telegraphed to the Department, and then added for the Department's information that English soldiers had landed that day and that French soldiers had sailed from Saigon. Adee later noted that an answer had been sent on the 19th, and that copies of the August 21 conversation with Wu should be sent to Goodnow at the same time the confirmation instruction was sent.<sup>63</sup> Since the Viceroys had asked for an answer within 24 hours, Adee was pushing a reply when G. de Nollant, the Russian Charge, handed him a note about the decision of the Admirals of the allied fleets. They had resolved that Li Hung Chang should not be permitted to communicate with the Chinese authorities in case he reached Taku. The Russian Government did not understand that decision, for to deny communication was to deprive Li of fulfilling his mission as Chinese Plenipotentiary. de Nollant suggested the Powers ought to order the countersigning of the above resolution and asked the views of the United States Government.<sup>64</sup> The Department copied de Nollant's note to our American representatives at the courts of the Powers represented in China. And on the original note, written in French, Adee noted: "The Secretary of Embassy called for an answer at 1 P. M. Aug. 18. I told him Admiral Remy had been cabled to report facts, and, meanwhile, I ask for a copy of the 'resolution' of the Admirals. AAA."

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<sup>63</sup> Adee note of Aug. 23, 1900, on Goodnow tel. to Hay, Aug. 17, 1900, rec'd 2:05 P. M., Shanghai Desp. 47.

<sup>64</sup> G. de Nollant to Adee, Aug. 17, 1900, Russian Embassy 13 to the Department. Copy in M&P.

## CHAPTER V

### RANSOM OF THE LEGATIONS IN PEKING

While Adee was waiting for the "resolution" of the Admirals, there came the happy news that the Japanese soldiers had attacked the city and with other forces entered Peking, surrounded the legations, and found the inmates safe. That joyous news was given to the press by Adee at 10:00 P. M., on August 19, 1900, two hours after it was received by the Department.<sup>1</sup> That report was confirmed in Goodnow's telegram which also reported the Hanking Viceroy's were satisfied with the position the allied governments took concerning the Empress-Dowager and Emperor. Adee withheld this from the press but did send a copy to the President.<sup>2</sup>

The Department had not replied to Goodnow's telegram before he reported the Viceroy's were satisfied with our position. The Consul General had assured them we would do nothing to expand the conflict. That was what satisfied them. While Adee was mulling over our reply, the President returned to Washington, and the news of the capture of Peking had changed the tone of the answer the Department was preparing. Accordingly, Adee submitted the following draft to the White House. When it was returned as approved, he sent it to Goodnow:

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<sup>1</sup> Fowler tel. to Hay, Aug. 19, 1900, rec'd. 7:55 P. M., Chefoo Desp. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Goodnow tel. to Hay, Aug. 18, 1900, rec'd 6:15 A. M., Shanghai Desp. 47; Adee to President McKinley, Aug. 18, 1900, McKP.



Eighteen. Two telegrams relative inquiry Hanking Viceroy received. You will assure them that the announced policy of this Government rests on consideration for the Chinese people not implicated in anti-foreign outrages, and will duly regard high personalities of Emperor and Empress. In circular of July to powers we said

"The policy of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent peace and safety to China and preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity." To this we adhere.

Fortunately Goodnow had sent the complete text of the viceroys' message. The French Consul General had not done so. The French Government repeated the message to Thiebaut for our reaction to the message, and if there was an answer, what the sense of it was.<sup>h</sup> Because the French version was not a good precis, the French Charge was excited by the message and rushed with it over to Adee's house at eight o'clock in the evening. Adee's reply, which calmed the alarmed Frenchman, summed up our reply and then expanded the reasons for that answer.

Mr. Adee said that our policy to keep on terms with the non-hostile authorities of China, and to respect the Imperial power as the responsible national authority with which a settlement must in the end be effected, was explicitly set forth in Mr. Hay's circular of July 3rd and in the President's communication to the Emperor of July 23rd, and that we had seen no occasion to modify our position. To which Mr. Thiebaut replied, "Your policy has been excellent -- the event has shown it." Mr. Adee said that it certainly seemed better to endeavor to confine our quarrel to the disaffected Chinese of the north and not consolidate the whole 400 millions of all China against us.

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<sup>j</sup> Adee tel. to Goodnow, Aug. 18, 1900, Instructions to Consuls 173:691. Adee to President McKinley, Aug. 18, 1900, McKP.

<sup>h</sup> Memorandum handed to Adee by Thiebaut, Aug. 19, 1900, McKP. The original French text, with accompanying translation is in French Embassy 43 to the Department, and Adee noted that an answer had been given orally on the 19th.

Changing the subject, Mr. Thiebaut asked whether the United States intended to land troops at Shanghai if Great Britain did? Mr. Adee said that all that had been reported in regard to the Shanghai question was so confused and conflicting, and tainted besides with the sensationalism of the newspapers, here and in Europe, that it was difficult to form an opinion as to its merits; but it seemed to him, that, so far, nothing suggested any occasion on our part to land troops merely because another power did so. If all the powers felt obliged to land forces there, it would simply divert a large body of troops from effective service elsewhere. The United States, however, had the unquestionable right to send ships to, or land forces at, any port in China where they might be required for the protection of American citizens and interests, and that, as to this, the facts should determine our course. Mr. Thiebaut said: "That is perfectly right." August 19, 1900.

August 20, 1900, A. M. At Mr. Thiebaut's request, Mr. Adee gave him copies of Mr. Goodnow's two telegrams, of August 17 and 18, (omitting last passage of the former.)<sup>5</sup>

From Adee's conversation with Thiebaut it may be seen that the policy of the United States, as stated in Hay's circular note of July third, was faithfully adhered to by him in his dealings with the representatives of other Powers as well as in his instructions to the United States Officers in foreign countries. It was this policy and Adee's adherence to it that evoked the "perfectly right" comment from Thiebaut. And later, when there seemed to be a change in the program of following the set policy, Adee informed Wu that he would lay the matter before the President and take his direction. This change was occasioned by the entrance into Peking and the rescue of the Ministers, which was the declared purpose of the Powers. Li Hung Chang wanted the hostilities to cease at once and the negotiations to

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<sup>5</sup> Adee memorandum of a conversation with the French Charge touching Chinese matters. Aug. 19, 1900, French Embassy 43 to the Department. Copy in McCP under date of Aug. 20, 1900.

commence. Since he had been appointed Envoy to discuss peace terms he now asked that we appoint an envoy plenipotentiary for that purpose.<sup>6</sup>

Ades took the cablegram from Wu and told him that he would lay it before the President and take his direction. In submitting the cable to the President, Ades sent a personal letter along with it. In this letter he reported what he had told the Chinese Minister earlier in the day:

I said that I was not in a position to say anything yet about this proposal, for we were yet without definite information of the conditions at Peking, but that I might suggest his attention to the circumstance that the declarations of the Powers to which Earl Li referred all rested on an understanding being had between the commanders of the cooperating forces and the Chinese authority; that all we now knew showed that this condition had not been brought about but that Chinese resistance had continued to the last and that it had been necessary to overcome it by force in order to effect communication with the legations, so that Earl Li's premises did not seem to me to be sound. Indeed, the attacks upon the allies and continued operations by them to insure the safety of the Legations appeared for the present to be still going on, and I thought that a knowledge of the facts was essential to any consideration of the next steps to be taken. He must understand, however, that I was not in a position to say anything to him officially and would not be until I had taken the President's orders in the matter.<sup>7</sup>

Another visitor who called on Ades, to talk about the Chinese situation, was Count Tarnowski of the Austro-Hungarian Legation. He wanted to know what our Government was going to do about negotiating peace with Earl Li and if we were planning to land troops at Shanghai. Ades told the Count practically the

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<sup>6</sup> Li Hung Chang cablegram to Wu, Aug. 19, 1900, copy handed to Ades at 10:15 A. M. on Aug. 20, 1900, Chinese Legation to the Department; For. Rel. 1900, 299; McKP.

<sup>7</sup> Ades to President McKinley Aug. 20, 1900, McKP.

same thing he told Wu about the Li message, namely that "the safety of the Legations was not yet absolutely assured," and, therefore, that "The President's condition as to the delivery of the legations had not been complied with." To Adee the fact that the allied forces had had to enter Peking after hard fighting made the responsible authorities, with whom the commanders could negotiate for an armistice before the peace terms would be discussed, appear not to be obvious. He dared to think that any discussion about a manner and terms of an adjustment was premature at that time, and that the direction of the commanders would have to be trusted until the time was ready for the next diplomatic steps to be considered. And to his inquiry about landing troops at Shanghai, Adee told Tarnowski practically the same thing that he had told Thiebaut the day before.<sup>5</sup>

A third caller Adee had that same day was from the Japanese Legation. Takahira sent copies of two cablegrams dated the 19th, which he had received from Tokyo, relative to the affairs in China. One of them referred to the reported movements of the Emperor and Empress Dowager, and the other told about the struggle between the Chinese and Japanese for possession of the Imperial Palace. After Adee personally acknowledged receipt of Takahira's letter and the enclosed copies of cablegrams, he had copies sent to the President, the Secretary of War, and others, indicated by "etc. etc." He also noted that

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<sup>5</sup> Adee memorandum of Aug. 20, 1900, of a conversation he had with Count Tarnowski of the Austro-Hungarian Legation, W&EP.

the contents were "Not made public."<sup>9</sup> Accompanying the copy which went to the White House was Adee's letter that said, "This is the latest and most definite tidings we have from Peking. It comes, as usual, from Japanese sources."<sup>10</sup> But the tidings was confirmed that evening by Goodnow. He reported the Express had left Peking for Shenai province. Adee paraphrased that message for the press.<sup>11</sup>

Almost twelve hours after Hu gave Adee the cablegram about the rescue of the Ministers, the Department received Conger's message that the besieged Legationiers were saved. Adee worked over the message and had it deciphered in two hours. He bracketed the part to be kept confidential, and submitted a copy to the President:

Saved. Relief arrived to-day. Entered city with little trouble. Do not yet know where Imperial family is. Except deaths already reported, all Americans alive and well. Desperate effort made last night to exterminate us. Mitchell, American sailor and a Russian and Japanese wounded, German killed. /Confidential: The base treachery and savage brutality of this Chinese Government is unparalleled, none of its members should in future be recognized by any civilized power. Its severe punishment alone can make China safe for foreigners./ Advise "Adjustment," Chicago; Conger Des Moines; Sims, Council Bluffs; Conger, Pasadena; Porter, Paris. Have you instructions for me?<sup>12</sup>

The letter that Adee wrote to the President after this telegram was received indicates several things. First, that

<sup>9</sup> Takahira to Adee, Aug. 20, 1900, Japanese Notes 6 to the Department.

<sup>10</sup> Adee memorandum to President McKinley, Aug. 20, 1900, McKP.

<sup>11</sup> Goodnow tel. to Hay, Aug. 20, 1900, Rec'd 9:20 P. M., Shanghai Desp. 46.

<sup>12</sup> Conger cipher, by Fowler, Chafco, to Hay, undated, Chafco, rec'd Aug. 20, 1900, 9:50 P.M., China Desp. 108.

Adee was at his desk when the message came in, and that he labored over decoding it, and that he would give the press the information outside the bracketed part, unless the President suggested otherwise. Second, that Adee thought Conger was physically not able, at that time, to be our official representative to discuss terms with Earl Li. Thirdly, that Adee's views about keeping troops in Peking were to become the policy of our Government.

I send you my interpretation of Mr. Conger's cipher message received last night. Several groups were blundered in transmission and you might let Col. Montgomery compare it with his version, to see if we agree in the corrections.

I also send a suggestion of the text that might be given to the press, omitting the passages which, I think, might be held secret for the present. If you authorize publicity, in this shape or with such further omission as you may deem good, please let Col. Montgomery advise me by telephone.

This telegram, joined to that which we have so scrupulously held back, shows Mr. Conger's present unfitness to be a plenipotentiary to negotiate a settlement. If Li Hung Chang knew Mr. Conger's feelings toward him and toward the Chinese government, I doubt if he would be so anxious to have him appointed to conduct the negotiation. Conger's mind seems to be unbalanced by the terrible strain and by two month's broodings over his wrongs.

While on this subject, permit me to say that I think the enforced capture of Peking puts the immediate question of our policy in a wholly different position from what we have hitherto contemplated. The removal of the legations and the abandonment of the capital can now hardly be thought of. Occupation of Peking and the retention of foreign representation there seem necessary if the powers are to force China to make a satisfactory and adequate terms. Peking is invaluable as a hostage. While we hold it, we have a grasp on the imperial authority (if there be any now) and on the superstition of the Chinese people, which is worth more to us than fifty pitched battles and military victories could be. I do not see how the powers could safely abandon it and remove the legations without relinquishing an immense moral advantage. We could only quit it when we have restored the imperial authority and reinstated it in its sacred capital.

If I were to answer Mr. Conger's request for instructions I would be disposed to say that when the foreign troops held Peking securely and have dominated the mob, he may have leave of absence to recuperate, leaving Squires at Peking to await Mr. Hockhill's arrival. Mr. Hockhill could then be made a special commissioner with full powers except for negotiating a treaty, for which he would have to be appointed a plenipotentiary, either alone or in conjunction with two other good men, as we thought yesterday. I think the contingency of formal negotiation is remote, for the reestablishment of the responsible imperial power in the capital wherewith to negotiate an effective settlement seems to be a condition precedent.<sup>13</sup>

Adee's opinion about Conger was not fully supported by James Harrison Wilson in his study of Chinese civilization. Conger had been a captain and major in the Civil War, and Sir Claude MacDonald, the British Minister, had been a major of British infantry. This training, Wilson recorded, was foremost in both men when they were subjected to the terrible trials which they endured during the siege, and they were bold and resolute in their actions while the legations were under fire. After the fighting ceased, and the allied forces were able to examine the legation buildings, they were found to have been closely besieged, and the countenances of all reflected the terrible strain which they had endured for two months.<sup>14</sup> However, it must be remembered that Adee made his observation from having worked with Conger for several years before the uprising occurred. He had had to send instructions to him and also to read the

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<sup>13</sup> Adee confidential to Mr. President, Aug. 21, 1900.  
McKP. Colonel Montgomery was military aide to the President.

<sup>14</sup> James Harrison Wilson, China, Travels and Investigations in The Middle Kingdom — A Study of Its Civilization and Possibilities together with an Account of The Boxer War, (N. Y., D. Appleton and Co., 1901, 3rd edition), 369, 385.

despatches from Peking. Familiarity with these records was a good basis for forming an opinion about another person, and Wilson wrote his record from a view of the besieged Legations and, no doubt, after conversations with some of those who had endured the attack. Yet in spite of his personal opinion about Conger, Adee did not let that interfere with his official work, and after the President had an opportunity to study Conger's latest message, asked him if anything, including money, was needed, and that the Department would like to have an expression of his personal desires.<sup>15</sup> This message must have been suggested by the President, for it does not follow the reply Adee said he would make to Conger's inquiry for instructions.

All the time that the Department was endeavoring to bring about a prompt solution to the outbreak of hostilities, two despatches from our Consul at Canton were wending their way to Washington. They concerned conditions as they existed in Canton at the beginning of July, and mentioned the steps which Earl Li, the Viceroy, had taken for protecting the foreigners in that city. When these despatches got to Adee, he forwarded copies to Cortelyou for the information of the President.<sup>16</sup> By the time they got to their destination the information in them was out of date because of the events that had taken place during their trip across the Pacific Ocean. However, they contained information about Earl Li and, for this reason, were a valuable addition to

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<sup>15</sup> Adee tel. to Fowler for transmission to Conger, Aug. 21, 1900, China Instructions 6:88-89.

<sup>16</sup> Adee to Cortelyou, Aug. 21, 1900, W&FP.



the picture of the man with whom the Powers were going to negotiate the peace terms. And the next day a despatch arrived from Puchau. It had been traveling since July 10 and told about the condition at that port, as it was affected by the troubles in Northern China.<sup>17</sup>

A second message about stopping the allied troops from harrying the Empress Dowager and the Emperor came from the Peking Viceroys Liu Kun-Yi and Chang Chih-Tung, and was transmitted to the Chinese Minister at London and then to Yu in Washington. Yu handed it to Adee at 10:30 A. M. on August 21 and Adee noted that the information was not to be given to the press.<sup>18</sup> Adee discussed this latest message with the President and received the President's directions as to the reply he wanted made. On reflection, Adee thought it best to send our answer through Yu, rather than directly to the Viceroys, for that was the manner in which the message had been sent to the Department. He sent to the President a copy of a memorandum he had prepared for Yu, and told him he would send the approved copy to the Chinese Minister that same afternoon. Any changes the President wished to make, would be made in the official copy to Yu.<sup>19</sup> This memorandum stated that Goodnow had sent telegrams of similar content and that the Department had told him "to assure

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<sup>17</sup> Adee to Cortelyou, Aug. 22, 1900, Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Cablegram dated Aug. 19, 1900, handed to Adee by Minister Yu at 10:30 A. M. on Aug. 21, 1900. Chinese Legation h to the Department.

<sup>19</sup> Adee to President McKinley, Aug. 21, 1900, McKP.

the Hanking Viceroy that the announced policy of this Government rests on consideration for the Chinese people not implicated in the anti-foreign outrages and will duly regard the high personalities of the Empress Dowager and the Emperor." The only difference between the copy sent to the President and the copy that went to the Chinese Minister is in the date of the message from the Hanking Viceroy. The copy to Fu gives the date as August 17th, while the copy to the President gives the date of the cablegram as August 19th, which is the correct date.<sup>20</sup>

Liu Kun-Yi's reply to this message of respect for the Empress Dowager and the Emperor was one of appreciation for our friendly intentions. He continued to tell Goodnow that their Majesties had given orders to the Viceroy that the outlaws, who annoyed the foreigners, would be severely dealt with so that a quietus would be over the source of anarchy, and that the Viceroy felt obliged to carry out those commands. "We still hope," he concluded, "that the Government of your Honorable Country will save the situation so that International Peace may be preserved which will be most fortunate. I therefore ask you to oblige me by conveying our thanks to your Government." This reply was not received in the Department until October. By that time Liu Kun-yi had been named as a negotiator, and Adee felt the message was important in view of that appointment, and that copies of Goodnow's despatch should be prepared for Cortelyou, Secretaries Root, Hay, Long, and Mr. Origgs, Dr. Hill, and

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<sup>20</sup> Adee Memorandum, Aug. 21, 1900, McKP, The Department 2 to Chinese Legation, 85; For. Rels. 1900, 289, 290.

Mr. Adee.<sup>21</sup>

Later that day Wu received a cablegram from Kari Li and wanted the Department promptly informed of its contents so that he might receive a reply which could be sent to the Viceroy. However, Wu knew he had already taken one trip to the Department and that a second trip on the same day would set the newspapermen scurrying for the important news that caused the Minister to call twice on the same day. In order to avoid being placed in that unpleasant situation, the Minister had the translation sent to Adee by one of his messengers.<sup>22</sup> Li's message told that there would be no more fighting, for the rebels had been dispersed. He asked for a cessation of hostilities and for the appointment of a plenipotentiary to negotiate a settlement of all questions except the withdrawal of troops, for that question was to be urged separately on the Secretary of State by the Chinese Minister.<sup>23</sup> Li's message was promptly sent to the White House with an accompanying memorandum. This memorandum, though unsigned, is in Adee's style, in the same type as his other typed memoranda; and since the penciled inserts are in his handwriting, it is possible that he prepared it. The views expressed therein are those which this Government adhered to.

The difficulty about suggesting a scheme for bringing about a suspension of hostile demonstrations (on both sides)

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<sup>21</sup> Adee note to Gridler, Oct. 1, 1900, on Goodnow 303 to Gridler, Aug. 25, 1900, Shanghai Desp. 47.

<sup>22</sup> Wu to Adee, Aug. 21, 1900, Chinese Legation 4 to the Department.

<sup>23</sup> Li Hung Chang cable to Wu, Aug. 21, 1900, translation delivered to the Department at 3:17 P.M. Aug. 21, 1900, Chinese Legation 4 to the Department; For. Rel. 1900, 289.

is that it would require the previous assent of the other powers before it could be proposed to Li.

Li's appeal leaves out of sight the existence of hostilities on the Russian border, where, according to Russia, the Chinese are the aggressors. It only seems to contemplate the stoppage of operations by the relief forces, from Taku to Tientsin.

Assuming that we can eliminate the Russian border problem, and confine the present problem to the province of Chi-li, the logical procedure would seem to be:

1. The complete establishment of order in Peking and its maintenance under the guarantee of the foreign forces until the imperial authority can be restored;
2. Suspension of aggressive operations outside of Peking by the foreign forces, reserving the right to resist attack and to preserve order wherever they are already stationed;
3. An arrangement for the reinstatement of the imperial authorities in Peking, as the supreme government of China, under the guarantee of the cooperating Powers, free from duress or personal constraint of the imperial personages;
4. The appointment of commissioners on both sides to arrange terms of settlement;
5. Any punitive or reparative measures to be carried out by the imperial authority, the powers upholding that authority to that end, and pending full satisfaction of their just demands, to maintain a sufficient establishment in China as a necessary guarantee.

These seem to be the essential preliminaries to be agreed upon before negotiations for a final and complete settlement of all questions between China and the interested powers can be set on foot.<sup>24</sup>

Adee toiled over the reply our Government would make to Earl Li's two communications about stopping hostilities and appointing a plenipotentiary. On August 22 Adee called Wu to the Department and handed to him the following memorandum:

While the condition set forth in the memorandum delivered to the Chinese Minister, August 12 /we asked that a force be permitted to escort the legationiers from Peking to Tientsin/ has not been fulfilled, and the Powers have been compelled to rescue their ministers by force of arms unaided by the Chinese Government, still this Government is ready to welcome any overtures for a truce and invite the other Powers to join,

<sup>24</sup> /Adee/ memorandum, Aug. 21, 1900, McKP.

when security is established in the Chinese capital, and the Chinese Government shows its ability and willingness to make on its part an effective suspension of hostilities there and elsewhere in China. When this is done — and we hope it will be done promptly — the United States will be prepared to appoint a representative to join with the representatives of the other similarly interested Powers, and of the authoritative and responsible government of the Chinese Empire to attain the ends declared in our circular to the Powers of July 3, 1900.<sup>25</sup>

After Wu had been informed of our position about appointing an envoy to meet with Earl Li, Adee sent copies to Herdliska and Takahira. He also informed the Japanese Minister that "The purport of Earl Li's telegram, and the text of the reply of this Government have been telegraphed to the representatives of the United States in Austria-Hungary, Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and Russia, with instructions to communicate the correspondence to the governments to which they are accredited."<sup>26</sup> He also sent a copy to Conger and told him he might communicate the contents to his colleagues, for their Governments had received similar proposals from Li, and Adee presumed they would answer similarly. Then Conger was asked if he had any suggestions to make and, if so, he should use the cipher and date his despatches.<sup>27</sup> Adee's statement that the other Powers had received similar proposals was borne out by Herdliska's reply to this memorandum. He told the Department

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<sup>25</sup> Adee Memorandum to Wu, Aug. 22, 1900, The Department 4 to Chinese Legation, 86, 87.

<sup>26</sup> Adee to Takahira, Aug. 22, 1900, The Department 2 to Japanese Legation, 29, 30.

<sup>27</sup> Adee tel. to Fowler for Conger, Aug. 22, 1900, China Instructions 6:89-90.

his Government had received similar communications but did not intend to answer them.<sup>28</sup>

When our Government accepted the notes from Minister Wu that Earl Li was appointed plenipotentiary to discuss an armistice and peace terms, it was done on the premise that such a commission was sufficient to bring about cessation of hostilities. However, the German Government did not see it that way, and the Charge d'Affaires ad interim, Baron Speck von Sternberg, called on Adee and left a Memoranda with him.

Baron Sternberg handed to Mr. Adee a memorandum of the reply of Germany to Earl Li's proposals to negotiate a truce and settlement with the Powers, reading as follows:

"The Chinese Minister in Berlin has been informed that the German Government cannot enter into any negotiations with Li Hung Chang because it is not clear from whom he has received his credentials and what credentials he holds as to negotiations with the Powers." Baron Sternberg asked if the United States recognized Li as holding credentials, and if so, what kind.

Mr. Adee said that the reply of this Government to Earl Li's proposals, was made through the Chinese Minister yesterday and already telegraphed in full to the interested Powers, including Germany, indicated that we had not raised any question as to the sufficiency of Li's commission so far as a preliminary suspension of hostilities was concerned. If and when an effective suspension is made by the Chinese government which would afford, during negotiation, positive security for the lives, property and treaty rights of foreigners throughout the Chinese Empire, it would be time to see about appointing representatives of the Powers and of the authoritative and responsible Government of China to conduct negotiations. Mr. Adee understood that the first steps of the negotiators in such cases is to exhibit their full powers and ascertain that they are in good and due form. The negotiators do that. As for Li's present credentials, it appeared that they were formulated by the Imperial Edict

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<sup>28</sup> Adee circular tel. to Nordliska, Aug. 22, 1900, For. Rel. 1900, 302; Nordliska to Hay, Aug. 25, 1900, Ibid., 303.

of August 8, communicated to us by Minister Wu, Aug. 12th, and reading as follows:

/Then was inserted a printed copy of the edict appointing Li./ The fact of this edict having been received through the accredited minister of China here, and the text of our reply to Minister Wu were telegraphed to our representatives at the capitals of the Powers, including Germany, on the night of the 12th, and they have since been made acquainted in like manner with our farther reply to Earl Li's proposal as given in our response to Minister Wu yesterday.

Baron Sternberg said: "Then you recognize Li's credentials?"

Mr. Adee said: "The correspondence I have cited shows our action. We admit having received through the regular channels an Imperial Edict which in terms confers certain powers upon Earl Li.

The Baron then asked: "Do you recognize the sufficiency of those powers?"

Mr. Adee said: "I think we do for the purpose of opening the way for an agreement to suspend hostilities. But in our communication to Mr. Wu of yesterday, we neither affirm nor question Li's character. We say that we are ready to welcome any overtures for a truce, and to invite the other Powers to join, when security is established in the Chinese capital and the Chinese Government shows its ability and willingness to make on its part an effective suspension of hostilities there and elsewhere in China. When that is done, and not until then, we will be prepared to appoint a representative to negotiate with foreign and Chinese representatives. Any question of the sufficiency of credentials which might arise in any quarter on the meeting of the negotiators would primarily have to be passed upon by the representatives who would have to certify that their powers had been exhibited and found in good and due form.

Baron Sternberg then made some further remarks as to Li's power to effect a suspension of hostilities, to which Mr. Adee replied that our communication to the Chinese Minister yesterday showed that the fact of a secure truce throughout China must appear to us before we would go any further in the way of opening negotiations; we did not propose to accept a promise of such security -- it must be known to exist.

Note: Since the foregoing was written, a telegram has been received from the U. S. Charge in Berlin, reading as follows:

Berlin, Aug. 23, 1900

Secretary of State, Washington  
 Foreign Office states that similar communications have been received here. Verbal reply has alone been made to the effect that, as the German Government does not know whose authority Li Hung Chang has, or whose representative he is, it could not enter into negotiations with him.

Jackson, Charge<sup>29</sup>

From that telegram it would appear that Adee's notion about the other Powers answering Li's messages in a manner similar to ours was a bit hasty, for Germany was the second power that disagreed with our view, Austria-Hungary having agreed to no reply. But our position about dealing with Li was taken because there was "No other authorized channel but Li Hung Chang for communication with the only responsible authority in China."<sup>30</sup> That was why we insisted on his right to talk with the Chinese authorities at Taku. The Admirals there had denied him that privilege, but we, along with Russia, deprecated that decision.<sup>31</sup>

Adee wished the United States views, about Li's talking with the Chinese authorities at Taku, to be understood by the other Powers. This he did by sending identic messages to the capitals of the interested Powers and invited early responses from the Ministers for Foreign Affairs. In addition to the information he had sent to Conger he told the other Powers that

In interests of peace and effective presentation of just demands of all the Powers against China, it seems important

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<sup>29</sup> Adee Memorandum of a conversation with the German Charge d'Affaires at 2:20 P.M., Aug. 23, 1900, German Embassy 29 to the Department.

<sup>30</sup> Adee tel. to Conger, Aug. 24, 1900, China Instructions 6:95-96.

<sup>31</sup> Adee 276 to Conger, Sep. 14, 1900, enclosing Peirce 296 to Hay, Aug. 28, 1900, China Instructions 6:101-102; Adee to Cortelyou, Sep. 14, 1900, MeKP.



that the Chinese Plenipotentiary should be able to communicate with both his own Government and its military commanders, whose action will be necessary to any suspension of hostilities as required in my telegram to you of twenty-second. Chinese Minister here without powers or advice. Li Hung Chang is prima facie authorized by Imperial Decree to negotiate and is the only representative of responsible authority in China so far as we are advised.

We instructed our representatives in China in the spirit of the Russian note. Any misunderstanding or divergent action on this subject by representatives of the Powers in China would be unfortunate and we would be glad to learn from other Powers if there are reasons not known to us which in their judgment should lead to a view different from that which we take.<sup>32</sup>

Our Government's position that Li Hung Chang represented the responsible authority in China was definitely not shared by Germany, where he was "regarded with special suspicion," and by which Government it was maintained that there was "no authoritative Government in China," therefore, there could be no negotiations with Li until it was known whom he represented and what powers he had.<sup>33</sup> Here then, were two of the allied Governments at odds as to who would be accepted as the representative from China. We accepted Li and Germany did not, and this position was later stated in stronger language by the Emperor. He had no confidence in Li and considered that only the Empress Dowager, the Emperor, or some one directly from them, would have unquestionable powers to begin negotiation.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Copy of Adee tel. to Peirce, Aug. 25, 1900, McKP. This copy was not sent to the President until the 14th of September, at which time our Government was preparing the records for the negotiators.

<sup>33</sup> Jackson tel. to Hay, Aug. 25, 1900, rec'd 11:00 A.M., German Desp. 72; Adee noted that copies were given to the President and Secretaries Root and Hay.

<sup>34</sup> Jackson tel. to Hay, Aug. 27, 1900, rec'd 3:20 P. M., German Desp. 72.

As soon as the public knew that the legationers had been saved, some newspapers reported that the United States was planning to withdraw her troops from China. Such a plan had never been considered by our Government, Adee told Sternberg, but in view of the distance between China and Washington, and the supply problem, with winter approaching, it did not seem necessary to increase our forces in China and these troops would be of more use to us in the Philippines. And after the Baron reminded Adee that our troops were being stopped at Nagasaki, Adee told him that the ships were under directions to stop at Nagasaki for orders, which could be adjusted to meet the situation at the time of their arrival, for our Government was "watching events closely, and the facts as they are ascertained determine our course."<sup>35</sup>

The entrance of the allied forces into Peking did not bring a prompt cessation of hostilities all along the line. A massacre took place in Paoing-fu, where some American missionaries were stationed. When word of the attack reached the United States, friends of the missionaries became intensely excited. It was in an attempt to quiet them that Root suggested an effort be made to obtain more definite information about the massacre. He mentioned that there were some survivors who could be queried, or Conger might send a special messenger to obtain facts, for, Root continued, if the Government did not make a special effort, it would be thought indifferent and heartless.<sup>36</sup> However, the

<sup>35</sup> Adee memorandum of a conversation with Sternberg, Aug. 24, 1900, 11:00 A. M. German Embassy 29 to the Department.

<sup>36</sup> Root to Adee, Aug. 25, 1900, Root Papers, Letter Book 9.

President had already asked Adee to gather information about the missionaries in China and to report the findings to him. This Adee did the same day that he received Root's note.<sup>37</sup> A few days later he asked Conger if it were possible to find out what happened to the Americans at Paoing-fu, for the Department had conflicting reports. Adee emphasized that Conger was to consult Chaffee and to inform the Department if relief could be given to any Americans found alive.<sup>38</sup> Conger's reply reported all Americans killed.<sup>39</sup>

The President had also asked Adee to get detailed information from the Mission Boards that had stations in China. Adee copied at least four replies for the information of the President. One Board had no missionaries nor property in China.<sup>40</sup> A second had 71 persons and property valued at \$206,220. This property included 7 Boarding Schools and three hospitals at four different stations.<sup>41</sup> The American Baptist Missionary Union replied that it had four missions in China and then listed four and one-half legal size pages of missionaries and property in China.<sup>42</sup> The fourth reply was from the Reformed Church in

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<sup>37</sup> Memorandum "Showing information in possession of the the Department of State relative to the condition, fate, removal, departure, etc. of missionaries in the respective consular districts since May 1, 1900;" Adee to President McKinley, Aug. 25, 1900, McKP.

<sup>38</sup> Adee tel. to Conger, Aug. 28, 1900, China Instructions 6:96.

<sup>39</sup> Conger h02 to Hay, Sep. 5, 1900, China Deep. 108.

<sup>40</sup> L. T. Chamberlain to Adee, Aug. 26, 1900, McKP.

<sup>41</sup> W. R. Lambeth to Adee, Aug. 28, 1900, McKP.

<sup>42</sup> E. A. Morrian to Adee, Aug. 27, 1900, McKP.

America, and its property consisted of one station in China, with 13 missionaries and three children there. This letter closed with a word of appreciation for the course our Government had pursued in this crisis.<sup>43</sup>

Another Missionary Board, the American Association of China, held a meeting in Shanghai and adopted a resolution "to consider the situation in China." In his reply Adee sent the Secretary of the Board a copy of the Circular Note of July 3 and stated that the policy stated therein was the one we were "earnestly and actively carrying out," and that the capture of Tientsin and Peking was "an auspicious earnest of the realization of the whole policy as outlined."<sup>44</sup> Root's fears, it would appear, were ungrounded, for the President and the Acting Secretary of State had the missionary problems under consideration, and the Mission Boards were appreciative of the efforts our Government had taken to prevent a general uprising against the foreign missionaries.

While Adee was busy attending to the many details of the uprising, he was also watching the big events. To do that better the Department appointed William Woodville Rockhill as a special agent. He knew Chinese customs and was familiar with the Chinese language. He had left the Department on his mission before the Legations had been relieved and was in Yokohama when Adee's memorandum of August 22 was circularized. The Department wished to get his reports rapidly and, therefore, sent a message

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<sup>43</sup> Henry N. Cobb to Adee, Aug. 25, 1900, M&KP.

<sup>44</sup> Adee to V. G. Lyman, Aug. 25, 1900, M&KP.

for him to Consul Bellows in Yokohama. Adee told him to go at once to Peking, to examine the situation there, and to report fully the conditions there and in China generally.<sup>45</sup> And in informing Conger of the Department's action while he was inaccessible, the Department wanted no misunderstanding about what those two men were to do. "Confer fully with him." Conger was instructed, "and together make recommendations as to now and future."<sup>46</sup> Thus it will be seen that the Department wanted these two Chinese experts to examine the situation, to discuss their findings, and then to make recommendations as to actions which the Department should take immediately and at later periods.

When it was shown in chapter one that Adee made summaries of speeches and reports, it was pointed out that he became known for his ability to put a lengthy document into a summarization sentence or less. Now, in the lengthy correspondence of the Boxer Rebellion, that ability was greatly appreciated by his chiefs, who had many other problems to consider. They appreciated his ability to pick out the main sections, or pages, and then drawing their attention to those parts. As the uprising progressed, some of our Consuls in China sent reports regarding the conditions in their consular jurisdictions. These were copied for the information of the President, and on one Adee invited attention "to the full reports of the conference of the Consuls at Canton with Earl Li, and the important declarations

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<sup>45</sup> Adee tel. to Bellows for Rockhill, Aug. 23, 1900, China Instructions 6190.

<sup>46</sup> Adee tel. to Conger, Aug. 26, 1900, Ibid., 92.

made by the Viceroy, which are contained in despatch No. 23 of July 17, 1900, from the Consul at Canton."<sup>47</sup> And after Peking had been entered by the allied forces, Goodnow reported all our Consuls except Martin were at or on their way to their posts, that the French would land a thousand soldiers the next day and that he thought we should have our share. That message was also dutifully sent to the White House.<sup>48</sup>

Another one of Adee's abilities was the summing up of a diplomatic note into a few words of content reference when a reply or a reference was made to the note. With the content paragraphs at the beginning of most of his letters, personal and official, we are frequently able to know what the subject was that Adee was discussing or replying to. Such is the case of a personal note Adee wrote to the President on the 25th of August, 1900. That note was not seen in the research work, but a later letter referred to it, and from that referral, we have an insight as to what the first letter said.

Referring to my personal note to you of the 25th touching an inquiry of Russia as to her purposes at Newchwang, I beg to say that I have just received a telegram from Mr. Hay, dated today, in which he says:

"I think the phrase: — 'in which they have generally acquiesced' might be objected to. Better say: — 'similar purposes having been avowed by all the powers.' Otherwise, all right. Hay."

The phrase referred to is on lines 6 and 7 of the tentative draft embodied in my letter. Mr. Hay's suggestion

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<sup>47</sup> Adee to Cortelyou, Aug. 27, 1900, McKP.

<sup>48</sup> Adee to Cortelyou, Aug. 27, 1900, second letter of date, McKP.

seems to me to be marked with his usual sound common sense.<sup>49</sup>

That letter was written to the President just after Adee had deciphered two telegrams about Karl Li. Peiree said Russia approved his appointment, but he would have to exhibit "satisfactory powers from a de facto government."<sup>50</sup> The other telegram was from Choate. He said Lord Salisbury was not satisfied that Karl Li was the Plenipotentiary of China or that he had the authority to negotiate. The British Government did not care who represented the Chinese Government so long as he was properly accredited, but had not come to the view that Li was.<sup>51</sup> This message brought the news that Great Britain was not ready to go all out and accept Li as the plenipotentiary of the only responsible Government in China, as the United States had done.

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<sup>49</sup> Adee to President McKinley, Aug. 27, 1900, 10:00 P. M., McEP.

<sup>50</sup> Peiree cipher tel. to Hay, Aug. 27, 1900, deciphered by Adee at 9:30 P. M., Russia Desp. 56.

<sup>51</sup> Choate cipher tel. to Hay, Aug. 27, 1900, rec'd 9:20 P.M. and deciphered by Adee at 10:00 P.M., Great Britain Desp. 200.

## CHAPTER VI

### ADEE'S REPLY TO THE RUSSIAN MEMORANDUM

OF AUGUST 28, 1900

While the world was waiting for some action to take place whereby the Powers would be able to negotiate with a Chinese official, Adee was busy trying to bring the several Powers into full agreement on the major points. One such point was that of keeping our representatives in Peking. The Russian Charge told Adee that Russia had no land designs in China, and that as soon as her borders were secure she would withdraw her troops; in the meantime she was occupying New Chwang. De Wollant further told Adee that since the relief of the legations had been accomplished there was no further need for the Russian Minister to remain in Peking, therefore, he was being withdrawn until China would have a representative Government again in Peking, and that Russia hoped the United States held the same opinion. Adee asked if the retirement of the Minister meant the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Peking and was told that it did, for there was no further need to protect him in Peking, for he was not there. Adee told de Wollant that he would bring this statement "to the knowledge of the President and take his directions in regard to it." De Wollant emphasized that so long as the Emperor and the Youngli Yamen were absent from Peking there was no need for Russia's Minister to remain there, but when the Government of China regained control and gave an authority with which the other Powers could deal, then Russia would name her



representative.<sup>1</sup>

In reply to this statement about Russia's purposes in China Adee drafted a long memorandum. He indicated that the Russian views were received "with much satisfaction," that those same purposes had moved our Government, but that we would not remove our Minister from China, "so long as the course of the Powers now operating with us in China shall not prevent our earnest efforts to attain a sound adjustment of all pending questions with the Government of China and the secure and durable establishment of peaceable and friendly relations with the Chinese people," and that Russia would not meet any obstacle from the United States in removing her troops from New Chwang, for her policy was "fixed and has been progressively proclaimed."<sup>2</sup>

The reply this Government wished to make<sup>to</sup> the Russian proposal was considered of such vital importance that it was discussed at a cabinet meeting that same afternoon. Adee attended that meeting as Acting Secretary of State and submitted his draft to the cabinet members. The accepted form of our reply was put on the wires that afternoon and circularized to the foreign representatives in Washington.<sup>3</sup>

That same day Thiebaut handed Adee the French version of the Edict of August 8. That edict appointed Li as plenipotentiary

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<sup>1</sup> Adee Memorandum of a conversation with de Wollant, Aug. 28, 1900, MeKP.

<sup>2</sup> Adee Memorandum, Aug. 28, 1900, MeKP.

<sup>3</sup> Bennett, Hay, 311; Adee cir. tel. to Herdlicka, Aug. 29, 1900; For. Rel. 1900, 304.

of China for the purpose of bringing the hostilities to an end. Adee took the French copy and had a translation made for purposes of comparison. He put the English version, which Wu had handed to him earlier, and the translation of the French version in parallel columns. Copies were then sent to the White House, the War Department, and to Hay.<sup>4</sup> But the copies were not sent until August 31, three days after Adee received the French version. This lapse of time can, perhaps, be accounted for by the press of more urgent business, such as the reply to Russia, and that Adee might have done his own translating of the French text. The writer is inclined to think that he translated the text for himself, for he noted "very material discrepancies between" the two versions. He pointed out to Wu that the Department had proceeded on the assumption that the other Powers had the same "knowledge of the terms of the Edict of August 8th" as we had, but that this did not appear to be the case when the two versions were placed side by side. An explanation of these discrepancies was awaited gladly by Adee.<sup>5</sup> It was not said, but it could be possible, that this difference in the versions was one of the reasons the European Powers did not go along with us in approving Earl Li as the Chinese negotiator.

Minister Wu in reply sent a transcription of the Chinese text as it had been sent to him from the Privy Council at Peking.

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<sup>4</sup> Unsigned note to Adee, Aug. 28, 1900, French Embassy 43 to the Department; Adee to Cortalyou, Aug. 31, 1900, McKP.

<sup>5</sup> Adee to Wu, Sep. 1, 1900, The Department 2 to Chinese Legation, 87-88.

He stated that his translation was the accurate one and that he thought the Chinese text received at Paris was identical, the discrepancies in the translations notwithstanding.<sup>6</sup> This Chinese text was not much good to the Department, a translation was needed and Adee sent the text to Judson Smith of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Congregational House, 14 Beacon St., Boston, Mass., and asked him to help get a translation of it. This was promptly done by the Reverend G. H. Ewing, a missionary back after seven or eight years in the field. His version compared favorably with the general sense of the other two translations, namely that the Empress Dowager and Emperor had appointed Li Hung Chang as envoy plenipotentiary for the purpose of establishing an armistice and then to discuss settling the affairs.<sup>7</sup>

After the Russian note had been discussed, and a reply prepared, Sternberg handed Adee a note which informed us that the Russian Government's reason for evacuating Peking and sending the foreigners to Tientsin under escort was that this "would aid the Chinese in soon establishing peace and order in China." This note evidently did not bring much reaction from Adee for he merely noted that it had been handed to him by Sternberg.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Wa to Hill, Sep. 9, 1900, Chinese Legation L to the Department.

<sup>7</sup> Ewing translation of the Imperial Edict of Aug. 8, 1900, enclosed in Smith to Adee, Sep. 17, 1900, Chinese Legation L to the Department.

<sup>8</sup> See note of Aug. 29, 1900, marked: "Given to Mr. Adee by Baron Sternberg, Aug. 29, 1900, 10:30 A. M., German Embassy 29 to the Department.

Although Adee was not impressed with this bit of information about Russian actions, he was aware of a possible reason, even though from a foreign source.

The phrasing of the note that went out as the Government's reply to the Russian note was considerably different from that of Adee's draft copy. Yet the many changes did not take away the basic thoughts nor the superb wording that Adee was known for. In the final draft it was stated that the fulfilling of the purposes stated in our July 3rd Circular telegram could best be accomplished by a joint occupation of Peking until the Chinese Government was reestablished and able to enter into new treaties, and that this occupation would have to be with an entire harmony of purpose. "Any Power which determines to withdraw its troops from Peking will necessarily proceed thereafter to protect its interests in China by its own method," and Adee thought that this would weaken the whole allied position, and, therefore, a general withdrawal would be in order with the commanders deciding upon the concerted withdrawal just as they had done for the advance.<sup>9</sup> A week later the Japanese Foreign office had not replied to the note from Buck, but the Foreign Minister's views were in accord with ours.<sup>10</sup>

Two days later Buck sent Hay a copy of the Japanese reply to the Russian note received by the Foreign Minister from the Russian Minister in Tokyo. Japan was not ready to withdraw all

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<sup>9</sup> Adee tel. to Buck, confirmed in Buck unsum. to Adee, Sep. 6, 1900, Japan Deep. Th.

<sup>10</sup> Buck unsum. to Hay, Sep. 6, 1900, Japan Deep. Th.

its troops from Peking at that time, but would withdraw all those that had become unnecessary because of tactical reasons so that peace and order could be restored in Chili. Although Japan felt that the Powers should continue to exert military pressure on Chili, she was going to withdraw many of her troops which could, because of her geographical proximity, be despatched to China in such force as the situation may require. But the Japanese Government was willing to go along with the Powers and temporarily withdraw her Legation from Peking, if the others did, and in that way further their common interests.<sup>11</sup> And White in London was informed that the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed to acquaint the Russian Government that Her Majesty's Government did not think it was time to withdraw her forces from Peking.<sup>12</sup>

Before Peires, in Russia, received his copy of the Department's reply, he wrote that he had had an interview with Count Lansdorff, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that the Count said that Russia, along with the other Powers, had not declared war on China, that there was no war, but if the Powers stayed in Peking after the Legations were rescued, that would be an act of war. He then added that the Emperor of Russia hoped "that the Government of the United States would

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<sup>11</sup> Buck tel. to Hay, Sep. 7, 1900, addressed by error to the Secretary of the Navy and rec'd in the Department on Sep. 8, 1900, Japan Desp. 7h.

<sup>12</sup> White cipher tel. to Hay, Sep. 11, 1900, rec'd 11th, 10:55 P. M., and deciphered by Adee, Sep. 12, 1900, 10:00 A. M., Gr. Br. Desp. 200.

respond favorably to the proposition of Russia to withdraw from Peking."<sup>13</sup> This same view about a war was held by Japan. The Japanese Minister wrote a note to Adee and told him that although the papers continued to talk about a declaration of war on China by Japan, Germany, and Russia, there was nothing to it, for Japan felt her acceptance of Earl Li was a clear enough indication that she stuck by her original policy.<sup>14</sup> The next day our Consul at Amoy, Burlingame Johnson, wired to the Department that if annexation was not intended, then the conduct of the Japanese there was unjustifiable, and in order to avoid any conflict with the Japanese, the native troops had been withdrawn. This message Adee noted was "Not given to Press."<sup>15</sup> Thus it appears that Adee received information that disagreed as to Japan's intentions in China.

A little less than an hour after Johnson's cablegram was received the secretary of the Japanese Legation handed Adee a copy of a telegram received from Viscount Aoki, the Foreign Minister. This message informed Adee that the Chinese authorities in Amoy assured the Japanese Consul there that they were ready to do what they could to afford full protection to the foreign residents and their property in that city, and that the Japanese marines had been ordered to withdraw and would withdraw

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<sup>13</sup> Peires 302 to Adee, Aug. 30, 1900, Russia Desp. 56.

<sup>14</sup> Takahira personal to Adee, Aug. 29, 1900, Japanese Embassy 6 to the Department.

<sup>15</sup> Johnson tel. to Hay, Aug. 30, 1900, rec'd 1:45 P. M., Amoy Desp. 14.

as soon as they were "satisfied that the peace and order of the port are assured."<sup>16</sup> Evidently Johnson was not aware of the assurances that the Chinese had given the Japanese Consul, so that his telegram was of the alarming type, and Adee wisely withheld the report from the public.

In the morning of the thirtieth, another busy day for Adee, a message was received from Lockhill. He had received his instructions in a mutilated condition, but made out that he was to go to Peking, and reported that he was leaving for Peking at once, that communication was difficult, that the situation in Shanghai was unsettled, but that there was little danger from the Chinese unless some foreign power did something inconsiderate, that there were 7,000 troops and thirty-three vessels in Shanghai. Of this message Adee gave only the sentence, "Leave at once Peking" to the press. The rest was not made public.<sup>17</sup> Here again was a report that gave unsettled news and publication of it would have caused alarm among Americans with relatives in Shanghai. Adee again wisely did not release the news that would have been disturbing and might possibly have hurt the moves for peace.

Later Adee received an answer from Jackson as to the

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<sup>16</sup> Aeki to Takahira, Aug. 30, 1900, and a copy handed to Adee on Aug. 30, 1900, at 2:25 P.M. MeKP. An interesting note about this telegram is that there does not appear to be a copy in chronological order in the Japanese Legation Notes to the Department, hence the only copy extant seems to be the one in the McKinley Papers.

<sup>17</sup> Lockhill to Hay, Aug. 30, 1900, rec'd 11:45 A. M., China Desp. 108

reaction the Department's reply to the Russian note of August 28 had in the German Foreign Office. Jackson cabled that no definite answer had been given, for Germany wished to consult the Powers for the sake of harmony, but that the prevailing opinion at that time was that a withdrawal of the allied troops would be regarded by the Chinese as a weakness on the part of the allied Powers, and the attacks on the Christians would be renewed as soon as the troops were withdrawn.<sup>18</sup> Still later that evening a corrected translation of a telegram from Jackson was received by Adee and forwarded to President McKinley.<sup>19</sup> A few days later the sense of Germany's reply was communicated to Jackson. That reply expanded the sign of weakness opinion.<sup>20</sup> Somehow that information reached the newspapers and caused an unpleasant impression in Berlin. "Until this publication was made," Jackson wrote, "the German press had been kept in the dark not only as to the nature of Germany's reply to the Russian proposition to withdraw the international troops from Peking, but even as to whether or not any reply had been made at all...." When this despatch reached the Department, Adee indicated that our answer should state that the Department had not given out the information and that these replies from the Powers were regarded as confidential and for information only.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Jackson cipher tel. to Hay, Aug. 30, 1900, rec'd 3:01 P. M., German Desp. 72.

<sup>19</sup> Adee to Cortelyou, Aug. 31, 1900, second letter, McKP.

<sup>20</sup> Jackson cipher tel. to Hay, Sep. 4, 1900, rec'd 3:45 P. M., German Desp. 73.

<sup>21</sup> Jackson 1395 confidential to Hay, Sep. 7, 1900, German Desp. 73.



Almost concurrently with the receipt of Jackson's telegram about the reactions in Germany to our August 28 note, the Department received a note from Thiebaut. His Government also had received word that Li Hung Chang had been appointed the Chinese Plenipotentiary and that he wanted to have the hostilities cease and the negotiations begin. To these propositions Mr. Delcasse had replied that the Chinese Government was not at that time in a position to verify the full powers of Li; and that France could not negotiate so long as full and free communication with her minister in Peking had not been reestablished.<sup>22</sup> That same afternoon, Ambassador Porter cabled he had received Adee's telegram of the 23rd and that France had received similar messages and had replied along the same lines Adee had. As to the report about denying Li free communication with the Chinese officials at Taku, the French Foreign Office had received no information, but would take the view Russia and the United States had taken. Also Mr. Delcasse would be glad to join the other Powers to name a plenipotentiary to meet an authorized Chinese representative to negotiate for peace.<sup>23</sup>

The Department's reply to the Russian note was circularized and made public. As soon as de Tollant had a chance to read the printed text, he notified Adee that there was an error in it, that "instead of 'Russia has directed Russian Minister to retire

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<sup>22</sup> Thiebaut to Adee, Aug. 30, 1900, French Embassy h3 to the Department.

<sup>23</sup> Porter partial cipher tel. to Hay, Aug. 30, 1900, rec'd 1:05 P. M., France Desp. 119.

with his personnel from China,' it must be: from Peking to Tientsin. I remember having corrected it in the copy you prepared on the typewriter and how it slipped in the circular I do not understand."<sup>24</sup> On the bottom of this note Adee wrote that the change had been made in the original memorandum of the conversation of August 28, 1900, and that the note was answered on September 1, 1900. This statement does not clear the record, however, for the official copy read "from China" and that is the way Buck's confirmation read. The next day an anxious telegram brought a reply from Adee that "This Government understood that the Russian proposal related to withdrawal from Peking, and on that understanding framed reply of the twenty-ninth."<sup>25</sup> Thus the record was corrected where it was most essentially needed to be corrected, and one reaction to this policy was that "the United States did wisely in adopting the policy explained in that despatch...."<sup>26</sup> This public acceptance of Adee's policy indicates that the nation as well as the Administration welcomed the cessation of hostilities and this Russian assurance that she would remove her troops from Chinese lands as soon as there were no more threats on the Russian border.

While all the strain of bringing the Boxer crisis to a successful conclusion rested on Adee, the World threatened to

<sup>24</sup> de Wollant to Adee, Aug. 31, 1900, Russian Legation 13 to the Department.

<sup>25</sup> Adee cipher tel. to Peiros, Sep. 1, 1900, Russia Instructions, 18:298.

<sup>26</sup> New York Times, Monday, Sep. 3, 1900, p. 6., cols. 2, 3.

publish a story that Hay was deliberately staying away from Washington because he did not agree with the recent decisions of the Department and the Administration. "I suggest," wrote Hay, "you say to Hood that I have been in daily and hourly communication with the Department by mail and wire and that every step taken in Chinese matter has my full concurrence."<sup>27</sup> Adee must have been very pleased to be able to make that statement to a newspaperman.

By the beginning of September a mistake in our diplomacy could have been disastrous. A possible error could have occurred at Amoy, had we sent troops to that port in order to restore order, which was only upset, and not serious as at Peking. In order to prevent its occurrence Adee sent to the White House a suggested instruction to Goodnow:

American landing only urgent need protect our interest and Chinese impotent. Mere counter demonstration unadvisable. Represent discreetly Japanese consul we abstain anticipating their withdrawing upon restoration order.<sup>28</sup>

This instruction was approved and Adee sent it to Goodnow on the fourth of September.<sup>29</sup> And Adee also asked if he should have Hill, who had returned from his vacation, suggest to the Japanese Minister "that at this time, avoidance of ground for disquietude as to Japanese purposes at Amoy would conduce to easier treatment of the Russian Circular."<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Hay tel. to Adee, Aug. 31, 1900, HP.

<sup>28</sup> Adee memo to Montgomery, Sep. 3, 1900, Shanghai Desp. h7.

<sup>29</sup> Goodnow 312 to Cridler, Sep. 6, 1900, Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Adee to Montgomery, Sep. 3, 1900, Ibid.

In confirming Adee's telegram Goodnow stated that he had talked to the Japanese Consul General in Shanghai and had told him that all the consuls except the Japanese Consul at Amoy were of the opinion that order could be maintained, and that he had indicated in a friendly way that their withdrawal was desired. The Japanese Consul General replied that he was wiring to his Government.<sup>31</sup> Thus Adee's views, as conveyed to the Japanese Consul General in Shanghai and to the Japanese Minister in Washington, became the official opinions of the Department and of the Administration.

In the meantime the several Powers were deciding for themselves as to Li's authority to negotiate, and Secretary Hay was still a very sick man and, therefore, unable to return to his office and resume his duties. He wrote that President McKinley had done twice as much work in the Washington heat as he had ever done, and that Root and Adee were constantly at it. He regretted his shirking his share, for he felt that he added to the President's burdens at a time when he should be helping him.<sup>32</sup> And to Adee he wrote, after instructing the Acting Secretary as to what should be said to Rockhill about a reported interview he had in China, "Thank heaven you are on hand, and, so far, valid."<sup>33</sup> The directed instruction to Rockhill was short and to the point. The Department assumed that Rockhill had not talked with anyone

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<sup>31</sup> Goodnow 312 to Gridler, Sep. 6, 1900, Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Hay "Specially Private" to President McKinley, Sep. 3, 1900, McKP.

<sup>33</sup> Hay to Adee, Sep. 4, 1900. HP.

but the proper officials about public matters, for the Associated Press had reported him as having denounced the Chinese Government and as having set forth the American policy.<sup>34</sup>

Shortly thereafter the report that Hay was sulking away in Newbury had grown into rumors that had Adee letting Hay's policy slip into a pro-Russian policy. Possibly Hay sensed this, for he was disturbed at the injustice such reports did to Adee as well as the harm they might have in London. Hay wrote affectionately to Adee and approved his many actions in bringing the Chinese situation to a successful cessation of hostilities. And Adee, in one of his faithful letters to his chief, referred to the story that the Department had thrown over England and had allied itself with Russia and said:

If you break up a quiet whist party by saying, "Well, I'm going to bed, are you?" and I have to go, the game being spoiled, does it follow that I go home with you and get into your bed? The point is that Russia has invited us and the other Powers to no agreement. She does not propose to submit her action to the chances of a vote of the Powers. We, on the contrary, invite an international accord in the opposite sense, in the hope of persuading Russia to recede, but we are careful to avoid inviting them to join us in an anti-Russian League.<sup>35</sup>

To this statement of Adee's Hay added to Choate, "I believe we shall be the gainers in the end."<sup>36</sup>

Hay's directed instruction had gone out over Dr. Hill's signature, for he had returned to work the day it was telegraphed

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<sup>34</sup> Hill cipher tel. to Rockhill, Sep. 4, 1900, China Instructions 6:99.

<sup>35</sup> Adee to Hay, quoted in Hay to Choate, Sep. 8, 1900, Choate Papers, MSS, LC; Bennett, Hay, 313, 314.

<sup>36</sup> Hay to Choate, Sep. 8, 1900, Choate Papers.

to Rockhill. His return afforded one of the Washington correspondents for the New York Times an opportunity to let off a little steam against Adee. The writer evidently did not like the way things had been run during August, 1900, when some of the weightiest problems of the McKinley Administration had been dealt with, and was glad to have Hill back in Office.

The return of Mr. David J. Hill to his desk in the State Department today put an end to an anomalous state of things which had existed for a month, and gave the department a head....

Dr. Hill, the Assistant Secretary of State, had gone away just before Mr. Hay. This left nobody but Alvey A. Adee, the Second Assistant. Mr. Adee is not a diplomat. He is a man who has been in the State Department so long as to have acquired a complete knowledge of its routine, and is a valuable man in that way, but his work is chiefly clerical. By the absence of Mr. Hay and Dr. Hill he became nominally Acting Secretary of State, but all the important problems that came before the Department were settled by the Secretary of War.

Thus for a month Mr. Root has been the practical head of the Government under the President....

Mr. Adee is a hard worker, and has been at his desk frequently until nearly midnight. He was no more Secretary of State, however, than he was when Mr. Hay was here. In every phase of the crisis it has been an interesting sight to see the nominal Acting Secretary of State go into the office of the Secretary of War twenty times a day to lay something before that official for decision, precisely as he would have gone to Mr. Hay's office if the Secretary had been here.

The notes and other documents signed by Mr. Adee were not drawn up by him. There were several hands in the famous note stating the Russian proposal to the Powers and asking them to join in withdrawing from Peking, but it is understood that the draft was Mr. Root's. It was Mr. Root, too, who drafted the prior note submitting to the powers Russia's protest against the detention of Li Hung Chang, and asking them to respect it.<sup>37</sup>

Many evidences have already been presented to show that

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<sup>37</sup> New York Times, Tuesday, Sep. 4, 1900, p. 7, Cols. 1,2.

several of the statements in this article are false, and now it is only necessary to quote Hay in order to show that such of the defaming of Adee was done in spite. "I must go back," Hay wrote from Newbury, "and take the racket which I am paid for, relieving poor Adee, who is the ablest man in our diplomatic service, bar none, but who does not seem to have corralled the correspondents."<sup>38</sup>

While this newspaper story was being read by the public, Adee was at his office at work as usual. In the course of the daily routine he took time out to write his daily letter to Hay:

All is working well. Mr. Hill has had long talks with the President and Mr. Root, and has been duly primed. He has begun by tranquillizing the newspapermen about the replies to our Russian circular of the 29th, by saying that the Powers are not replying to us, but to Russia, and that as we have communicated our Russian reply to the Powers, they may be expected to acquaint us with their replies to the Czar's government. When we know the attitude of all the Powers, it will be time to consider the next move, meanwhile we will make nothing public.

A Conger despatch fell into Michael's hands this morning—I have already sent it to you. It was dated, in obedience to four different orders I have given since August 8 to do so. Michael instantly put on his owl-like gravity-blink, and told the press-gang that he had a long telegram from Conger dated August 30, but its contents could not be made known. Consequently Hill and I have been made miserable by the reporters all day.

It has been, thank God, a slack day for me, and I actually got off at four o'clock. Hill kept the reporters off me, and they hitherto absorbed about half my working hours. I think I can begin to go out to Yarrow Brae tomorrow.

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I cabled your hint about reticence to Rockhill just as you wrote it, and your Shekib Bey intimation to Griscom as the President softened it. /This referred to Hay's suggestion that a new Turkish Minister would not be welcomed in

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<sup>38</sup> Hay to Whitelaw Reid, Sep. 20, 1900, Bennett Papers on Hay, MSS, LC.

Washington until we were ready to send a new Minister to Turkey.<sup>39</sup>

After a week or ten days in Shanghai Rockhill had had time to talk to some of the missionaries as they came into that city from the outlying provinces. They reported quiet everywhere and that only the four northeast provinces were disturbed. Rockhill reported that he would leave for Taku the next day, using a merchant vessel for transportation.<sup>40</sup> Adee deciphered this at nine in the evening and sent copies to the President, Hay and Root. Rockhill also submitted a list of American protestant missionaries that had been killed or were still missing since the uprising. This list had been prepared by Dr. John H. Hykes, the Secretary of the American Bible Society in China, and could be vouched for. When Adee received that despatch, he sent copies to Cortelyou and Root, and gave the list to the press. It contained 176 names, 69 of these being Americans.<sup>41</sup>

After five tense and nerve-cracking weeks of managing the desks of three people, Adee's nerves were "badly wrung" and he was "almost broken down" from the heat and humidity that had remained constant. "If I were to release the will-power tension for a day," he wrote to Root, "I believe I would collapse."<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Adee to Hay, Sep. 4, 1900, MP.

<sup>40</sup> Rockhill tel. to Hay, Sep. 7, 1900, rec'd 7:35 P. M., China Desp. 108.

<sup>41</sup> Rockhill 7 to Hay, Sep. 7, 1900, China Desp. 108.

<sup>42</sup> Adee to Root, Sep. 10, 1900, Root Papers, Letter Box 139.



Although he felt that his nerves were badly wrung, Ades was not bowed by the responsibilities that continued to be his so long as Hay was away. He continued to decipher messages and to meet the several Ministers and Charges who came to discuss the developments as the situation changed from day to day. After having written to Root and gotten in his say about his ailments, Ades deciphered two messages that came in that evening. The first was from Conger and reported that Prince Ching had called on Conger and told him that he had been appointed, along with Earl Li, with full powers to negotiate the matters at issue, but that the Austrian Minister would insist that Prince Tuan and others be executed before any serious negotiations began. This, Conger said, was almost impossible. He felt that Russia, France, and probably Germany, would use obstructionist tactics to a settlement "in order to compel territorial indemnity and as much possible division of the Empire."<sup>43</sup> The second cablegram was from White in London. He informed the Department that Sir Claude had stated on August 26 that the Boxer movement was not crushed, and that unless some of the individuals were severely punished, a renewal of attacks on Europeans, with the recent crisis opened anew, could be expected.<sup>44</sup>

Conger's notion about the obstructionist tactics that the

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<sup>43</sup> Conger confidential tel. to Hay, Sep. 6, 1900, via Taku, Sep. 10, 1900, rec'd 8:10 P. M. and deciphered by Ades at 9:45 P. M. Sep. 10, 1900, China Desp. 198.

<sup>44</sup> White personal and very confidential tel. to Hay, Sep. 10, 1900, rec'd 6:25 P. M., and deciphered by Ades at 10:00 P. M. Gr. Br. Desp. 200.

French and Russians might have used was without foundation. Adee had received a despatch from Porter at Paris "in which he reports a speech made on the 19th ultimo by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that the policy of the French Government relative to Chinese affairs was to preserve the unity of the Chinese Empire, to restore order therein, and that upon these subjects the Government of France was in entire accord with that of Russia." This despatch was copied and forwarded to Conger in Peking and to the President.<sup>45</sup>

This speech of Mr. Delcasse, in which the French policy in the Far East was outlined, and of which Porter faithfully informed the Department, was well received, and Adee told our Ambassador to France that the Department was pleased with Delcasse's frank declaration "that the policy of his Government is to preserve the unity of the Chinese Empire and restore order therein and to do nothing that would disturb that entente between the Powers which is so necessary at this crisis."<sup>46</sup> The crisis Adee spoke about was the difference of opinion between Secretary Hay and President McKinley as to what the Government should do with our Minister in Peking. Hay's policy, as carried out by Adee, was to keep the legationers in Peking, while the President's thought was to withdraw, as had the Russians.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Adee 275 to Conger, Sep. 14, 1900, enclosing Porter 720 to Hay, Aug. 22, 1900, China Instructions 6:100-101; Adee to Certelyou, Sep. 14, 1900, (second letter), MakP.

<sup>46</sup> Adee 833 to Porter, Sep. 14, 1900, French Instructions 2b:341.

<sup>47</sup> Bennett, Hay, 315.

Two important telegrams, one from Conger, and the other from Chaffee, reached Washington at about the same time and, as Bennett says, "led the President to postpone action in the matter." Hay, it appears, was opposed to President McKinley's policy, and any action that would have been taken from the White House, was deferred when the telegrams were received from China.<sup>48</sup>

September Twelfth. Your telegram containing Russian declaration and your reply is received. Russia is now withdrawing a larger part of her forces. This action, withdrawing minister and landing forces Kow Chwang, indicates purpose to make their settlement in their own way. For the present the restoration of Chinese authority in Peking or order in this province (Chi-li) is impossible. Joint military occupation of Peking is absolutely essential to successful negotiations and should continue until completed. One-third of the present force will be sufficient. From my acquaintance with Prince Ching and Earl Li, I do not believe they can offer any feasible plan. Foreign powers must devise it. Hence the necessity of their early conference and agreement.<sup>49</sup>

Part of the Russian troops ordered Tientsin.... Have fear this movement, if made, will suspend repair railroad to Peking. Inquiring of Russian commander regarding this.... Yet one month's supplies here now. Tents and equipage coming forward. Early notice location of troops for winter important. If Peking is held, probably 10,000 troops sufficient.... Now generally quiet. This time Boxers reported nearly ten miles away. Not aggressive, but fire on scouting and foraging parties. Frequently trouble to ... (telegraph lines. Need?) five thousand to guard communication... (and?) railroad. Completion repair road from Yangtun Peking imperative and should be pressed if my troops remain here. About two thousand force met with.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Log. Cit.

<sup>49</sup> Conger cipher tel. to Hay, Sep. 12, 1900, rec'd Sep. 14, 1900, 3:30 P. M. and deciphered by Adee at 4:00 P. M. SP.

<sup>50</sup> Chaffee cipher tel. to Adj. Gen. War Dept., filed 3:30 P. M., Sep. 11, 1900, rec'd Sep. 14, 1900, forenoon. Received by the Department from War Department Sep. 14, 1900, P. M. Not given to press. The words in parentheses were conjectures made by Adee.

Although Adee had made it clear that it was the responsibility of the negotiators to verify the credentials and to satisfy themselves as to their sufficiency, the Department was pressed for its views on the sufficiency of Li's credentials, not only for negotiating but also for assuring that American lives and property would be respected throughout the Chinese Empire. In an unsigned memorandum, the work of either Hill or Adee, and the style favors Adee, the Department said it did "not feel called upon to express any opinion at this time as to the sufficiency of Li Hung Chang's authority, but hoped that they were full and sufficient for such negotiating and assurance."<sup>51</sup> This information was given to Minister Wu, who promptly cabled it to his Government. In reply he received a cablegram from Earl Li stating that he had the "proper credentials with full and authoritative powers for opening and conducting negotiations with the several powers. The life and property of Americans in China will be respected."<sup>52</sup>

September 14, 1900, was an important day in the progress toward the opening of the negotiations between the Chinese plenipotentiaries and the envoys to be named by the Powers. It was important because the key Administration men were either sick or away from Washington, or both, yet the work went on. Hay was ill in Newbury, Hill had returned to his office, but had gotten sick, and was "quite unwell," as Adee said; Root was having

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<sup>51</sup> Memorandum of Sep. 11, 1900, the Department ? to Chinese Legation, 153.

<sup>52</sup> Li to Wu, Sep. 12, 1900, handed to Hill by Wu on Sep. 13, 1900, 10:00 A.M. Chinese Legation L to the Department.

troubles, as the result of the heat and shirt friction, Adee himself was exhausted but carrying on, and the President was in Canton. However, with all that illness there was one man who felt he was physically able to stand the racket, and that was Cridler.<sup>53</sup> In spite of all this, Adee was still able to keep things moving and, after a busy day of receiving despatches, signing instructions, and sending copies to the White House, wrote a lengthy letter to his chief:

I was very glad to get your letter of the 12th, about Prince Ching's talk with Conger, Conger's suggestion of negotiating at Shanghai, and action upon Chaffee's suggestions.

The whirligig has tumbled over on a new face today, and we are in the throes of another crisis. The President had about made up his mind to Telegraph Chaffee and Conger to withdraw to the seaboard, and I think, seriously contemplated sending Chaffee to Manila and Conger to Shanghai to negotiate at long range — when presto, these two telegrams from Conger and Chaffee arrived, and being telephoned to Canton by Mr. Griggs, changed the whole aspect of affairs. The President is much impressed by Conger's views (which I think are uttered second-hand and from Claude MacDonald and possibly Pichon or the Italian.) He says he will now wait a day or two and see what turn affairs take.

I think, and have steadily thought since August 28 when I drafted the first tentative reply to the Russian declaration, that while enough troops might be withdrawn from Peking to remove the appearance of an occupation or conquest, the legations, or a majority of them, and an adequate mixed military police guard should remain to keep order and guarantee the imperial authority upon its return to the capital, which it should be the purpose and endeavor of the legations to negotiate with Ching and Li, withdrawal outside the walls to follow the restoration of Kwang Hsu to the throne of his fathers. Then the first step of punishment of Tuan and the ring-leaders could be taken, the foreign troops outside the walls standing ready to uphold the Emperor's hand in dealing out justice. Coincidentally with the retirement of the main body of the allied troops to the seaboard, the powers, or some of them, should name as plenipotentiaries

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<sup>53</sup> Adee to Hay, Sep. 14, 1900, HF.

their respective ministers at Peking and one or two associate negotiators to arrange terms of settlement. By doing this, the best possible proof of a disposition to deal fairly with the Emperor would be afforded, and would I think induce his speedy return to Peking, which latter might be made a condition precedent to opening formal peace negotiations. I think it not at all impossible that proposals in somewhat this sense may come in a day or two from Great Britain and perhaps Germany, with Italy and Austria tailing after. During that time which would necessarily elapse before the additional negotiators could reach Peking, the Powers could hold a conference at the Hague or Berns to consider the terms of settlement to be demanded from China. Indeed, whether peace negotiations are to be held at all would depend on the Emperor's preserving order, protecting foreigners and punishing the ringleaders during the interval after his resumption of rule at Peking and before the convening of the peace plenipotentiaries.

I would be glad to have your views about these suggestions. Where all are groping, the first practical formulation of a plan based on common sense may bring the gropers together, all but Russia and perhaps Germany whose real aim is grab.

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Always lovingly yours<sup>54</sup>

This letter clearly shows that Adee had steadily favored keeping troops at Peking.

While Adee was busy making suggestions as to what might be done, Hay had been writing a typical letter to his assistant. In it he approved negotiating with Li Hung Chang even though he knew that the Viceroy was "an unmitigated scoundrel... thoroughly corrupt and treacherous. But he represents China and we must deal with him; and it is certain that it has been, hitherto, to our advantage to deal with him, with Liu-Kun-Yih, and with Chang-Chi-Tung, as if we trusted them."<sup>55</sup> In addition to this opinion of

<sup>54</sup> Adee to Hay, Sep. 14, 1900, HP. For Adee's letters enclosing copies of despatches for the President, see Adee to Cortelyou, Sep. 14, 1900, four letters, #41P.

<sup>55</sup> Hay to Adee, Sep. 14, 1900, HP, and quoted in Bennett, Hay, III.

the Chinese envoys, Hay had some more remarks to make, many of which were in reply to Adee's comments and observations in letters to the Secretary. Hay wrote:

I read every day the Tribune, Times, and Boston Herald. The Tribune stands by us, the Times and Boston Herald, while civil enough, tell us plainly that if we leave Peking we shall be forever infamous. They also say that if we do not take the lead and keep it, McKinley will be beaten in November. It never seems to them that the other Powers may not like the feel of a rope around their necks, and may even want to say something about their interests in China....

The dilemma is clear enough we want to get out at the earliest possible moment. We do not want to have the appearance of being forced out or frightened out, and we must not lose our proper influence in the final arrangement... You have, it seems, grave suspicion of the attitude of Japan. There is, therefore, not a single power we can rely on, for our policy of abstention from plunder, and the Open Door.... The inherent weakness of our position is this; we do not want to rob China ourselves, and our public opinion will not permit us to interfere, with an army, to prevent others from robbing her.

.....

Has the President come to any conclusion as to who shall represent us in negotiating with China? Conger, I take it for granted, will be one. Rockhill might help. If he is to send any one from here, I think very well of /Beth/ Low. I have thought he might like to send John Barrett. /John Bassett/ Moore would be an admirable man, if he could get away.<sup>56</sup>

<sup>56</sup>Hay to Adee, Sep. 14, 1900, HP; the full text is published in Dennis, op. cit., 257k.

An incident that has no relation to the Boxer Rebellion, but which arose because of Hay's thoughts about the Chinese envoys, occurred in 1907. John Hay had passed on from the throes of the Secretaryship, and his papers were being collected by his widow for publication. One of the letters that went into the collection was this letter of Hay to Adee, Sep. 14, 1900. Henry Adams, a personal friend of Hay's, and one who was working in collaboration with Mrs. Hay, wrote Adee about this letter. In reply Adee said:

I have your letter of yesterday and I must confess to being somewhat startled by the freedom of Mr. Hay's letter to me of September 14, 1900.

Mr. Hay's public record in the whole Chinese embroglio won

The Acting Secretary had no sooner read the letter than he had copies made of it. One copy he gave to Dr. Hill and the other one he sent to President McKinley with an accompanying note. This note indicates that some of the comments made by Hay originated with Adee, for instance, the idea of sending Seth Low and of a conference at the Hague.

Personal

I receive this morning a characteristic, hard hitting and sensible but somewhat despondent letter from Col. Hay -- of which I inclose a copy for your personal perusal.

Mr. Hay's conclusions on page 3 are much in the line of what I wrote to him on Saturday night. I went further and suggested that for us to now announce that we name Mr. Conger and some good man from this side the water (Seth Low) as our Commissioners to negotiate would have a good effect -- besides gaining time while the second man is en route to Peking, to formulate our demands and if need be, hold a conference with the other Powers at the Hague to agree on the terms to be demanded from China.<sup>57</sup>

By the time Adee received that hard hitting letter from Hay most of the Powers had expressed their opinions about withdrawing troops from Peking. To do so suddenly and without sufficient explanation would, they had stated, be interpreted as

the admiration and respect of all the Powers because of his impartiality and earnest desire to bring about a peaceable and just settlement. Their estimate of Mr. Hay's sincerity and straightforwardness might possibly be affected by a knowledge of his personal opinions of Russian duplicity and treachery, Japan's doubtful integrity, Germany's brute selfishness, England's dickering with Germany, the robbery of China by the powers and the scoundrelism, corruptness and treachery of Li Hung Chang.

I am sure that upon second thought you will think better of the proposition to print it now. It seems that, following the English rule about confidential state papers, it might well lie mouldering for a century or two.

Adee personal to Henry Adams, Mar. 16, 1907, HP.

<sup>57</sup> Adee holograph to President McKinley, Sep. 17, 1900, MsHP. Olcott, Op. cit., 257.



a sign of weakness on the part of the Powers. Because of this, they felt that they could better work out their purposes by prolonging the international occupation of Peking. When Adee received word from Lewis Morris Iddings that the Italian Government believed as the United States did in this regard, he made the following comment:

I fancy the Italian note is prompted by Germany as a sort of compromise which Germany, so hopelessly committed to the mailed-fist -- and military -- primacy position, could not well advance of her own motion.

I have taken the view I have taken for the last two weeks, that our reply to Russia virtually leaves -- in the event of disagreement among the Powers -- the question of withdrawal from Peking to be determined by military exigencies.<sup>58</sup>

Adee and Hay were not the only ones to carry on a serious correspondence during the Secretary's absence. The President was also in the picture. He wrote to Hay on September 11, and expressed his views about getting out of China. The news in that letter was of such import that the Secretary felt obliged to send a telegraphic message in reply. His inclination was in accordance with the President's views, and he was most anxious to get out of China as soon as possible, but that it would be difficult to withdraw in the face of the news in Conger's despatch of the 12th. Several problems were pointed out as possible points of unpreparedness on the part of the Powers. We were still free to use our judgment as to whether the military situation required our troops in Peking or not, even though the Russians were withdrawn; Conger and Rockhill would have to decide whether Li

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<sup>58</sup> Adee on Iddings cipher tel. to Hay, Sep. 15, 1900, rec'd 11:59 A. M. and deciphered by Adee Sep. 16, 1900, 1:30 P.M., HP. Dennis, Op. cit., 249f.

and Ching had adequate powers, and "to get the Emperor to come to Peking." If reducing our force in Peking would accomplish this, then, Hay commented, "we should use our influence to have this done." And if the Powers were not ready for serious negotiations, as Hay feared they were not, then a conference would have to be called in order to decide the terms that would be presented to the Chinese Government. "All these considerations," Hay continued, "lead me to think we are not yet ready at this moment to withdraw our troops and our Legation from Peking."<sup>59</sup>

While Hay's telegram was on its way to Canton, Ohio, Adee was engaged in three interviews, one with de Wollant, the second with Takahira, and the third with Thiebaut. The replies he gave to each of them were consistent with our policy and to each he gave identical information, thereby giving a continuity and consistency to our foreign policy. De Wollant called on Adee and handed him the following message which Adee called a memorandum:

Has the Federal Government the intention to transfer the residence of the legation from Peking to Tientsin? This step has been recognized as practical and appropriate to the end, even by the Powers which find it necessary to leave troops at Peking. /The United States Government, according to the records, did not so recognize that step./

2) Are the full powers of Prince Ching and Li Hung Chang recognized as sufficient by the Federal Government?

3) Is the Federal Government prepared to charge its representatives to enter without delay upon the preliminary negotiations with the plenipotentiaries of the Emperor of China?<sup>60</sup>

When the Russian Charge handed the Memorandum to Adee, the Second Assistant Secretary read it and asked if it could be left.

<sup>59</sup> Hay tel. to Pres. McKinley, Sep. 17, 1900, HP.

<sup>60</sup> Translation copy of tel. handed to Adee by de Wollant, Sep. 17, 1900, 10:45 A. M., M&P. For Hals. 1900, 379.

After being told that the copy could be left the following discussion occurred:

Mr. Adee said: I am not able to answer any one of these three questions categorically, because the President has not yet determined what course he will pursue, — whether we shall retain our Minister or a part of our troops in Peking or withdraw the Minister and withdraw our troops has not yet been determined. This answers the first inquiry.

Mr. de Wollant: Our Minister is going to retire from Peking.

Mr. Adee: Your Minister has retired? /a sign of Adee's deafness/

Mr. de Wollant: No, not yet.

Mr. Adee: We are awaiting advices from Mr. Conger and from General Chaffee so as to know what they recommend to be done. The second question you ask — whether we have recognized the full powers of Prince Ching and Li Hung Chang as sufficient, cannot be answered now because we are not in possession of the text of the powers. The usual rule in such cases is always for the plenipotentiaries to exhibit to each other their powers when they meet and then determine whether they find them in good and due form. It may be that Li Hung Chang and Prince Ching may object to the full powers of the plenipotentiaries appointed on the other side, or it may be that the other plenipotentiaries may not find the full powers of Li Hung Chang and Prince Ching sufficient. In that case the position would be similar to that recently at Chafee, where Li's first powers were not found sufficient and they were obliged to postpone the conference until he could receive new powers. I do not see that it is incumbent upon the respective Governments to determine in advance whether the powers are sufficient. It might be that this Government would not agree with other Governments in the matter. That would interpose great delay and I do not see that we could determine that fact in advance.

Third, whether the Government of the United States is ready to direct its representative to proceed without delay to the preliminary negotiations: That can not be answered until we have received a reply from Mr. Conger to inquiries which we have made of him. So that I am not in a position now to categorically answer the three inquiries of your Government.

Mr. de Wollant: Can you tell me when you can answer the questions?

Mr. Adee: We have to receive the despatches we are

awaiting from Mr. Conger and from General Chaffee, and I cannot tell when they will come. I will, however, put this in the hands of the President as early as I can today so that he may have all the facts before him; but at the present moment I am not able to say any more.

Mr. de Wollant: I asked in order that I might know whether I should remain in the city or return to Deer Park.

Mr. Adee: I cannot tell when I can give you the answers, but so far as I am concerned, at this moment, it is impossible to give categorical answers to the three questions.

Mr. de Wollant: My present address is Deer Park, Maryland. I will be here in Washington to-day.

Mr. de Wollant then took leave of Mr. Adee.<sup>61</sup>

The second interview that Adee had was with the Japanese Minister, Kogoro Takahira:

Mr. Takahira: There is nothing new from Peking?

Mr. Adee: Nothing, we are waiting.

Mr. Takahira: Li Hung Chang -- his powers are accepted now?

Mr. Adee: I have said a number of times to the press and elsewhere that, the examination of full powers to negotiate a treaty is a thing which is usually done by the plenipotentiaries when they meet. That was the case at Chefoo, and you remember that it was then found that Li's powers were not deemed sufficient and they were obliged to postpone negotiations until he could receive full powers. I do not know that it is customary to endeavor to decide in advance of a meeting. There is very little doubt in my mind that Li has ample powers for a preliminary negotiation for restoration of order but negotiations for settlement is another matter.

Mr. Takahira then took leave of Mr. Adee.<sup>62</sup>

The third interview Adee had that day was with Mr. Eugene Thibaut, Charge d'Affaires of the French Embassy.

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<sup>61</sup> Memorandum of conversation between de Wollant and Adee, Sep. 17, 1900, McKP; also in Russian Embassy 13 to the Department.

<sup>62</sup> Memorandum of interview of Adee with Takahira, Sep. 17, 1900, McKP.

Mr. Thiebaut called at the Department at 12:15 today (September 17, 1900) and held the following conversation with Mr. Adee:

After inquiries concerning Dr. Hill's health, Mr. Thiebaut asked: Have you received any new developments on the situation in China?

Mr. Adee: No, no new developments. We are awaiting additional information from Mr. Conger and from General Chaffee and the matter is in the hands of the President. I am keeping him advised of all that I learn.

Mr. Thiebaut: Have you received lately a telegram from Mr. Conger announcing the arrival of Prince Ching in Peking?

Mr. Adee: We have received telegrams from Peking during the last two or three days — one as late as the 12th of September. Mr. Conger said that Prince Ching had arrived and that he had had a friendly and personal conversation with him.

Mr. Thiebaut: Does not Prince Ching ask for the opening of immediate preliminary negotiations?

Mr. Adee: Mr. Conger does not report. He has not had a formal conference with him. He has only had a personal conversation with him.

Mr. Thiebaut: Do you know at all if any new developments on this subject from Russia have arrived?

Mr. Adee: Nothing at all, except that Russia is withdrawing her minister and, I believe, a part of her troops.

Mr. Thiebaut: But is Russia actually doing it or intending to do it?

Mr. Adee: Mr. Conger said that the Minister was going to leave on the following day — that, I think was last Thursday or Friday, — that the Russian Minister was going to leave Peking.

Mr. Thiebaut: Has anything new come in from Minister Wu?

Mr. Adee: Mr. Wu asks questions, but he has nothing to tell us. He informed me this morning of Prince Ching's appointment to be negotiator with Earl Li with full discretionary powers, but he knows very little.

Mr. Thiebaut: I don't know at all what we shall do. I think from the previous communication I made to Dr. Hill that Mr. Pichon will follow the example of Mr. de Giers very likely and our troops will be withdrawn to Tientsin, leaving

in Peking what necessary guard for the police of the legation quarters.

Mr. Adee: Well, I am not prepared to say what our final decision will be. So much depends upon the discretion of the military commanders themselves, as we said in the reply to Russia that if withdrawal is determined upon it should be after conference and determination of the commanders, precisely the same as they decided on the advance. The military problem is as important as the political problem.

Mr. Thiebaut: O yes! I realize that. Have you any indication of what Japan will do in the premises?

Mr. Adee: Nothing definite. There seem to be pour-parlers among the different governments, but the situation is "in the air."

Mr. Thiebaut then took leave of Mr. Adee.<sup>63</sup>

Although Adee had no answer for the inquiring diplomats on the day they asked for our position, he did have one four days later. That reply was a polished statement of what he had been advocating for several weeks. It was also a verbatim note from a draft reply Adee had submitted to President McKinley and had discussed with Hay in his September 18 letter:

(1) The Government of the United States has not any present intention to withdraw its Legation from Peking.

(2) The Government of the United States accepts the plenipotentiary authority of Earl Li Hung Chang and Prince Ching as prima facie sufficient for the preliminary negotiations looking toward the return of the Imperial Chinese Government and to the resumption of its authority at Peking, and toward the negotiation of a complete settlement by the duly appointed plenipotentiaries of the Powers and of China.

(3) To these ends the United States Minister in Peking will be authorized to enter into relations with Earl Li and Prince Ching as the immediate representatives of the Chinese Emperor.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> Memorandum of conversation of Adee and Thiebaut, Sep. 17, 1900, 12:15 P. M., French Embassy 43 to the Department.

<sup>64</sup> Adee to Hay, Sep. 18, 1900, HP 4; McKinley Papers 64; For. Rel. 1900, 379; the second two paragraphs are in Ibid., 293 and are the Department's reply to Su on the same topic.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE GERMAN "BOMB" NOTE OF

SEPTEMBER 18, 1900

With most of the arrangements for ending the troubles in China in a state of indecision, the Kaiser took things into his own hands, and proposed that, before any preliminary negotiations were begun with the Chinese Government, the "first and real perpetrators of the crime committed in Peking against international law" should be surrendered. "The number of those punished is of less importance than it is to determine their character as principal instigators and leaders," and the representatives of the Powers were to point out the ones whose guilt was without doubt.<sup>1</sup>

That same day our Charge in London had an interview with Lord Salisbury. At the meeting they discussed the world problems, especially the Chinese situation, and the role of the Powers. Although the Kaiser's sine qua non was sent to all the interested cabinets, it is not known whether White and Lord Salisbury discussed the note that fell, as Adee later wrote to Hay, "like a bomb in the allied camp."<sup>2</sup> The idea of personal vengeance, as put forth by the German Government, was not acceptable to us. We were looking for a more friendly way to settle the differences

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<sup>1</sup> Sternberg to Hay, Sep. 18, 1900, rec'd at 9:55 A.M., translated and copies sent to the President, Hay, Root, and Origg. German Embassy 29 to the Department. The Department replied to this on the 21st. See Hill 466 to Sternberg, The Department 12 to German Embassy, 482.

<sup>2</sup> Nevins, White, 174f.

between the Chinese Government and the Powers. Thus the Germans, in one short note, split the allied powers into several camps of differing opinions.

About an hour after the German Charge had left his "Bombshell" a cipher message was received from Berlin. Jackson referred to the note that Sternberg had been instructed to deliver to the Department. He reported the German Government to be most desirous that the other Powers would accept the proposition that their representatives should be instructed to point out the Chinese persons definitely known to have worked against the foreigners in the recent troubles.<sup>3</sup> After this was deciphered copies were sent to the President, Hay, Root, Griggs, and Hill. Soon after Adee had received this telegram he received a letter from Hay. In it were copies of the Secretary's letter of the 14th and telegram of the 17th, both addressed to the President. Adee returned both copies to Newbury and gave his views of the situation as he saw it at that time:

My own views have been expressed pretty precisely in my letter to you of the 14th, and in the tentative draft of a reply to Wu's communication of Prince Ching's appointment which I mailed to you at noon today. I have always distinguished between a preliminary agreement in the nature of an armistice with guaranteed protection of foreigners throughout China (during which armistice to persuade Kwang-hsu to return to Peking) and the ultimate negotiations for a conventional settlement of all questions. For the first I think Li and Ching have ample authority. For the latter, new full powers will be necessary.

The devil of the matter is that Germany's proposal to demand the surrender of the criminal leaders to the Powers for punishment by the Powers upsets much of what we are doing and endeavoring to do. No punishment can be effective toward a permanent settlement which is not decreed and carried out

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<sup>3</sup> Jackson cipher tel. to Hay, Sep. 18, 1900, rec'd 10:50 A. M., German Esp. 73.



by the Emperor. For Walderssee to hang or shoot Tuan would make Tuan a demi-god to the Chinese. It is the imperial degradation that tells -- making the offender anathema marantha.<sup>4</sup>

This opinion of Adee's, that the Emperor would have to order the punishment of Tuan, was favorably received by Hay, and in a telegram Hay said the Government of the United States also wanted the prompt punishment of the chief leaders, but that he felt the Chinese Government was not in a position to fulfill such a demand, even though the Legationers agreed as to who was most deserving of punishment. He further stated that in order to avoid a possible indefinite delay of the negotiations, if punishment were to be insisted upon as a sine qua non, the pour parlers should be begun, as soon as the Chinese credentials were proved genuine and adequate, with a view to full negotiations of the pending questions. Hay's telegram ended with a suggestion that reference be made to the note of July 3rd.<sup>5</sup> This suggested reply to Sternberg was copied to President McKinley and sent to the White House the same day.<sup>6</sup>

The next day the Chinese Minister called at the Department and held the following conversation with the Acting Secretary:

Mr. Wu: Are you in a position to give me an answer to that memorandum of the other day?

Mr. Adee: I think not, until after I learn what the President has to say. He is back now in Washington and the probability is that he will confer with Dr. Hill on pending matters. Dr. Hill will return to the Department today.

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<sup>4</sup> Adee to Hay, Sep. 19, 1900, HP.

<sup>5</sup> Hay tel. to Adee, Sep. 21, 1900, rec'd 1:50 P.M., H&P.

<sup>6</sup> Adee to President McKinley, Sep. 21, 1900, H&P.

Mr. Wu: How about the German Note?

Mr. Adee: I cannot express any opinion about that at all. It is a matter that will have to be considered and very likely it will come up today for consideration by the President and Dr. Hill.

Mr. Wu: I want to tell you my views upon it. I wish you to convey them to the President.... to say that these should be delivered before the negotiations should be commenced is imposing a hardship, an almost impossible condition on the Chinese. I suppose when they say the leaders of this movement must be punished, I suppose they indirectly mean Prince Tuan and the Empress Dowager.

Mr. Adee: They cannot mean the Empress Dowager who is looked upon by the Chinese people as their divine ruler or person. I think it is to be looked upon more as in England, where the Government is a cabinet and parliamentary government, and where the cabinet is responsible for the misdeeds of the Government and not the sovereign.

Mr. Wu: But in this case I am afraid Germany thinks otherwise. And what I want to impress upon your Government is this. You see that these high persons, according to the newspapers, are implicated and no doubt the German Government wants them to be punished. Now, first of all, is it likely that they would deliver themselves up? And, again, in the second place, they ought not to be punished before trial.... if the German Government is sincere in its protestations, it ought to facilitate proceedings for negotiations. At the negotiations they can say anything they like before the high commissioners and then adduce proof. If any persons should be found guilty they could be punished but the German Government should not impose a condition saying we won't hold a conference before these persons are delivered.

Mr. Adee suggested that Mr. Wu say all these things to Dr. Hill who would be at the Department soon and who would like to have the views of the Chinese Minister as he had expressed them to him now.

Mr. Wu then asked if anything had been heard from England.

Mr. Adee said nothing.

Mr. Wu said he saw in the morning papers that England insisted that the Emperor must come back before they begin negotiations. He said: "They should not say that. They should ask all the court to come back and hold the negotiation meantime."

Note: Mr. Wu refers to German note of September 18, 1900.<sup>7</sup>

The next few days were not so full of momentous problems as others had been, and Adee occupied himself with office duties and copying despatches to the President, Hay, Root, and Attorney General Griggs. He sent to the White House a set of the telegrams to and from Conger, except Hay's telegram of the 21st of July, of which he had no copy. He also sent a corrected translation of the Russian note of August 25th. This was the note about withdrawing from Peking. Of this corrected copy Adee remarked that it was Russia's intention to return the Imperial Government to Peking, rather than to set up a Government formed by the Powers, as was suggested in the first version. He was not sure whether Russia meant to reaffirm the Empress Dowager's power, or to have the Imperial authority concentrated in the Emperor, but he did suggest that it might "be prudent to assume that Russia has the latter purpose in view -- as we have."<sup>8</sup> Then on the 24th he made some more observations to Hay. Some of them may have been premature, as the final result would indicate, but at the time he could not predict what the other Powers would do.

The German Expiation Circular was a bomb in the allied camp. We are slowly learning the views of the other Governments. I sent you some telegrams this afternoon.... They may be summed up thus to date:

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<sup>7</sup> Memorandum of conversation between Chinese Minister Wu and Adee, Sep. 19, 1900, 10:30 A. M., Chinese Legation 4 to the Department.

<sup>8</sup> Adee to President McKinley, Sep. 21, 1900, second letter of date, HCKP. Adee sent 35 listed enclosures, ten of which were messages to China over Adee's signature.

1. Japan straddles, but will probably come around to our way of looking at it.<sup>9</sup>

2. England is reflecting, in the brain of Salisbury. He won't advise anything, -- only object.

3. Austria accepts German proposition without reserve.

4. France has not been directly heard from, notwithstanding what the papers say about her flat refusal to listen to the Kaiser, who kindly repeats etc. Jackson's telegram of the 22nd which I sent you on Saturday, says France accepts unconditionally.<sup>10</sup> I think it is very likely, after Delcasse's gory utterances for the past two months. You may remember that Mr. Conger, in his telegram of the 6th, said "The Austrian Minister will insist on execution of Prince Tuan and others before serious negotiations begin, which is practically impossible." The cipher was boggled, and it read "The Ecuadorian Minister." The change of one digit makes it read either "French" or "Austrian" so you have your choice. "French" now seems the most probable.

5. Italy has not yet peeped to us, but as Germany pulls the string of the Italian monkey, I think that what Jackson said of his cable of the 22nd is true and that the amiable creature dances to the tune of the German organ.

6. The Russian reply comes tonight, and I send it herewith. It is somewhat vague as to the German proposal, but as seen through Poiron's eyes it appears to be in complete accord with our view.

So it stands: 4 certain for the German demand (Austria, Italy, France and Germany); two against it (Russia and the United States); one reflecting (England); and one straddling (Japan).

Meanwhile, China, or the Dowager -- which is pretty much the same thing -- has played an unexpected card and appointed Prince Tuan as Grand Secretary besides promoting Yu-Lu. There are 4 Grand Secretaries, any one of whom may be the Imperial mouthpiece. If Li is to take his instructions through Tuan, we can, and I think should, refuse to allow Conger to negotiate with him. I was careful to guard against this contingency by authorizing Conger to enter into relations with Li and Ching as the immediate representatives of the Chinese Emperor. If Tuan is to intervene, our promise becomes ipso facto nul.

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<sup>9</sup> See Buck tel. to Hay, Sep. 22, 1900, Japan Desp. 74.

<sup>10</sup> See Jackson confidential cipher tel. to Hay, Sep. 22, 1900, German Desp. 73.

Conger has not yet been instructed....<sup>11</sup>

Adee's opinion that France supported the German proposal was given a substantial boost a few days later when Porter wired that he had been told "France agreed substantially to German Proposal, with some reservations as to mode of carrying it out..."<sup>12</sup>

"Cæsar Faratus" had been running the Department for almost two months when Hay, though still not well, felt that he should return to Washington. One pleasure the Secretary told Henry Adams he would enjoy was to tell the newspapermen that they did not know so much about the situation as they thought they did. They had stated things had gone to the adversary and that Hay's presence was needed in order to save the State. "But," he went on, "Adee has done nothing I would not have done, and he has more sense than the whole gang of newspapermen and politicians."<sup>13</sup> And to Adee he wrote his thanks for the offer to stay on in Newbury, but replied, "I may as well go to work on my last shift," and that the Times had a fine article which "did justice to the situation, and to the splendid work you have done, under great difficulties." Hay concluded: "There is still plenty of trouble ahead in China, but it is a comfort to feel that thus far there have been no mistakes."<sup>14</sup> Hay appreciated

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<sup>11</sup> Adee to Hay, Sep. 24, 1900, HP.

<sup>12</sup> Porter cipher tel. to Hay, Sep. 28, 1900, rec'd 3:20 P. M., France Desp. 119.

<sup>13</sup> Hay to Adams, Sep. 25, 1900, as quoted in Bennett, Hay, 325f.

<sup>14</sup> Hay to Adee, Sep. 26, 1900, HP.

his Second Assistant Secretary's work and "was foremost in recognizing Adee's admirable and unselfish work."<sup>15</sup>

While Hay was on his way back to the Department, a telegram was on its way from Peking. It stated that five persons, Prince Ching, Earl Li, Jung-lu, and Viceroys Liu Kun-yi and Chang Hsih Tung, were to work together in the peace negotiations. This much of the telegram was made public. The next part was not made public. "No powers have been exhibited or request made to negotiate. Army as active and hostile as ever outside Peking. No visible efforts of Chinese Government to restore order."<sup>16</sup> Adee indicated that copies had been sent to the President, and Secretaries Root, Hong, and Griggs, and that the above should not be made public. The name of Hay did not appear in the list of those to whom copies had been informally sent. He had returned, or was to return that day and there was not much cause to send him a copy. With his return to Washington, the Hay-Adee letters ceased to be so frequent, but the official record has much more in his long hand.

Hay's presence in the Department helped to move correspondence more rapidly, for he received the diplomats, answered their queries orally, and then sent memoranda. This could not be done while he was in New Hampshire. During his absence Adee had talked with the foreign officials, made memoranda of his conversations which were sent to Hay, and then wrote his ideas about

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<sup>15</sup> Dennis, Op. cit., 225.

<sup>16</sup> Peking tel. to Hay, Sep. 27, 1900, through Taku Sep. 30., and deciphered by the Chief Clerk at 9:45 A. M. Oct. 1, 1900. China Desp. 108. For. Rel. 1900, 204.

our replies. Frequently, it has been shown, those views became the official opinions of the Department. But Hay was back at work, and the Second Assistant Secretary returned to his principal duties. Such was the picture when the French Government sent a note to the Department on October 4. That Government had not waited for the Powers to reply in full to the German "bombshell", but issued a note with the following points:

- 1st, The punishment of the guilty parties who may be designated by the representatives of the Powers at Peking;
- 2nd, the continuance of the interdiction against the importation of arms;
- 3rd, equitable indemnities for the governments, corporations and private individuals;
- 4th, the organization in Peking of a permanent guard for the legations;
- 5th, the dismantling of the forts at Taku;
- 6th, the military occupation of two or three points on the road from Tientsin to Peking, which road will thus always be open to the legations to pass to the sea, or to the forces which may go from the sea to the capital.

If presented collectively by the representatives of the Powers and backed up by the presence of the international troops, it seems to the Government of the Republic impossible that these conditions, so legitimate in themselves, should not speedily be accepted by the Chinese Government.<sup>17</sup>

The Department's reply was sent to Thiebaut on October 10. It was signed by Hay but sounds like Adee.<sup>18</sup> In reply the French Government thanked the United States for her "sentiments of sympathy for France which have evidently inspired that reply," and further said that some comments had been made about the points in her note but hoped to discuss them during the negotiations, which, she thought, should have started. Since

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<sup>17</sup> Thiebaut to Hay (translation), Oct. 4, 1900, French Embassy 43 to the Department; For. Rel. 1900, 321, 322.

<sup>18</sup> For. Rel. 1900, 322, 323.

China was willing to negotiate, the note went on, the Powers should show their desires to cooperate, their respect for the integrity of China, and for an independent Chinese Government, but, at the same time, desirous "to obtain the satisfaction to which they have a right." That viewpoint, if made known by the Powers in Peking, or by the head of the Diplomatic corps, would present a united front, which would "have a happy influence upon the determinations of the Emperor of China and of his Government."<sup>19</sup> Hay replied orally to Thiebaut and then sent a written memorandum.<sup>20</sup>

That reply was not immediately made public. Adee wished to send a circular note to the Powers before publishing the latest exchange of notes with Thiebaut. He submitted a draft of a telegram to Hay and asked for approval.<sup>21</sup> The proposed telegram was addressed to Conger:

Your telegram 16th received.<sup>22</sup>

Chinese propositions in the main are acceptable to us with incorporation of your suggestions and of points expressed hereinafter. Does your seventh suggestion mean placing Peking on the footing of a treaty port? If so it is commendable.

French proposition of terms is probably now in your possession. It was communicated to us October 4th. My reply is dated 10th. We accept first article, taking Chinese punishment edict as a starting point, representatives of the Powers to suggest additional names when the

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<sup>19</sup> Memorandum, Thiebaut to Hay, Oct. 17, 1900, French Embassy 43 to the Department; For. Rel. 1900, 323.

<sup>20</sup> The Department 11 to French Embassy, 88-89; For. Rel. 1900, 323-324.

<sup>21</sup> Adee to Hay, Oct. 19, 1900, HP.

<sup>22</sup> For. Rel. 1900, 213-214.



negotiations are begun. Second, interdiction of importation of arms is not understood to be permanent, its duration and regulation proper subject of discussion. Third, equitable indemnity is desired by all the Powers, all positively disclaiming intention of acquiring territory. In case of protracted disagreement as to the amount we would favor Russian suggestion to remit the question to the Hague Arbitration Court. Fourth, the United States, while now maintaining precautionary legation guard, is unable to make permanent engagement without legislative authorization. Fifth, dismantle Taku forts, the President reserves opinion pending further information in regard to the situation in China. Sixth, military occupation on the road from Tientsin; we cannot commit ourselves to participation in this, it would require legislation; but it is desirable that the Powers obtain from the Chinese Government assurance of right to guard legations and have unrestricted accession when required.

We are advised that all the Powers have acquiesced in the French proposition, with more or less reservations which, like ours, are not calculated to embarrass negotiations. French readiness to negotiate by communicating French propositions severally or through dean, without prejudice to the discussion of the points reserved as above. You will confer with your colleagues with a view to doing this. We are anxious to have the negotiations begin as soon as we and the other Powers are satisfied of Emperor's ability and power to deal justly and sternly with the responsible offenders, and the President yesterday so answered an appeal of the Emperor by telegram.

/If there is a prospect of effective negotiations beginning forthwith the President will name you and one or two others as our plenipotentiaries. Confidential. He has Rockhill and General Wilson in mind./ /This paragraph was deleted by Hay and the following substituted./

No opportunity should be lost during the negotiations to safeguard the principle of impartial trade to which all the powers are pledged.

If you have no objection Wilson and Rockhill will be instructed to join you, to act as Commissioners if the other Powers have more than one, otherwise to assist with their counsel.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Adee's draft of a cipher tel. to Conger, Oct. 19, 1900, HP. with Hay's deletion and insertions this was sent on Oct. 19, 1900, For. Rels. 1900, 217-218.

Adee thought strongly about informing the other Powers. He was waiting for Hay's reply, yet at the same time felt that Hay would tell him to talk to the President before making any such move. In order to save time, therefore, he sent a copy of the proposed circular telegram to President McKinley, for the French Memorandum "marks an advance towards early entrance upon negotiations for a settlement of the Chinese questions, and moreover explicitly reaffirms our policy as to the integrity of China and the 'open door'," and because of this Adee wished to "communicate its purport to the other interested Powers and thereafter make it public here in the usual form."<sup>24</sup>

The French note was much discussed here and in other capitals. The Foreign Ministers in Peking even called a meeting in order to discuss it and to get the views of the several interested Powers. The British Minister wished to spell out the types of persons to be held for punishment, and the Chinese who had suffered because of "their connections with the foreigners should be indemnified," and the Powers to fix the method of paying the indemnities to the several Governments. Sir Claude also pointed out that under the fourth and fifth articles of the French proposal, it would be advisable to have legation quarters that were defensible. Several suggestions were made as to additions to the French proposals, all of which were "binding upon nobody." After the Japanese Minister had given that information to the Department in an informal manner and for

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<sup>24</sup> Adee to President McKinley, Oct. 20, 1900, second letter, McKP.

information only, Adee copied it to President McKinley and told Cortelyou that it cleared "up some points in Mr. Conger's telegram of the 16th."<sup>25</sup>

At the same time Takahira left his informal note he also left a formal one. This was "in regard to authorizing the several Ministers in Peking to consult upon the bases to be proposed for negotiations with China."<sup>26</sup> Since the Minister wished to have a reply that same afternoon, Adee prepared a reply which the President approved:

MEMORANDUM touching the communication, made by the Japanese Minister, October 20, 1900, of the suggestions of the Japanese Government, that all demands and proposals which are to form the bases of negotiations with China should, prior to the opening of negotiations, be submitted for collective examination and elaboration to the representatives of the Powers at Peking.

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So far as the action of the Government of the United States is concerned, the suggestion of the Japanese Government has been virtually anticipated by referring to Minister Conger the recent proposals of the French Government, and instructing him to confer with his colleagues with a view to presenting forthwith to the Chinese plenipotentiaries the bases upon which we are all agreed, without prejudice to the later inclusion of the subject reserved by the United States and other Powers subject to discussion in the course of the negotiations.

The Government of the United States thinks that the knowledge and experience gained by the several foreign ministers on the spot will be practically helpful towards an agreement upon the essential points which may hopefully be adopted by the Powers as the bases of formal negotiations,

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<sup>25</sup> Adee memorandum to Cortelyou, Oct. 20, 1900, enclosing Memorandum from Takahira, handed to Adee, Oct. 20, 1900, 11:00 A. M., McKP.

<sup>26</sup> Adee to President McKinley, Oct. 20, 1900, enclosing a memorandum from Takahira, handed to Adee on Oct. 20, 1900, McKP; For. Rel. 1900, 370.

and we would welcome any action by them tending to an early accord whereby such negotiations may be opened without delay.<sup>27</sup>

The next several weeks were silent as to serious action on the Chinese issue. However, activity was going on, in China as well as in Washington and, no doubt, in the capitals of the other Powers. In July, 1900, Consul General Goodnow had notified the Department of the death of two American ladies, Misses Desmond and Manchester. In late November Goodnow cabled that the Chekiang Governor wanted to know our demands on him because of these deaths. When this telegram reached Gridler's desk, he asked Adee if it weren't too early to separate cases, and make demands for them individually. Adee referred the question to Hay, and the Secretary approved the following cipher message, drafted by Adee:

International indemnities, especially for Americans murdered, adjustable by Peking treaty -- cannot divide negotiation by separate local demands. If Governor offer repair local losses by direct arrangement with sufferers you can neither support nor object.<sup>28</sup>

Three weeks later Consul Fowler forwarded a list of Americans in his jurisdiction. This despatch did not reach the Department until February, 1901. Mr. Robert S. Chilton, Jr., Chief of the Consular Bureau, was informed that copies should be sent to Mr. Cortelyou and the Secretary of War, "in continuation of the reports re American residents and missionary interests

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<sup>27</sup> "Draft for the President's consideration." stamped with Adee's stamp, Oct. 20, 1900, McEP. For. Relg. 1900, 370.

<sup>28</sup> Hay undated note "OK" to Adee, on Adee to Hay, Dec. 10, 1900; Gridler undated to Hay; Gridler undated to Adee, attached to Goodnow tel. to Hay, rec'd Nov. 27, 1900, 6145 A. H., Shanghai Desp. 47.

in China." Chilton replied that the despatch from Fowler was only one of a series of reports on the same subject and that the others had not gone. In view of this Adee was asked if he thought it necessary to send just the one. Adee's reply was typical: "I think they should all go. The President and Secretary of War are interested in knowing the extent of our residential interests in China."<sup>29</sup> Although not so stated, if all the consuls lists were checked with the previous list, it would have been possible to find out who was missing from the previous list, and if not accounted for, then possibly those persons had been killed by the Boxers.

It is evident from the dribs and drabs of correspondence discussed above that Adee's role had greatly subsided after the receipt of the French note. They also show that he was well informed on the continuing subject.<sup>30</sup> The negotiators had met, had discussed the peace terms, the amount of the indemnity, and the economic condition of China, for it was on her ability to pay that the United States and Great Britain had thought in terms of 150 millions and 200 millions respectively. However, when the final amount was fixed, it had reached the colossal figure of 330 millions of gold dollars.<sup>31</sup> These commercial and indemnity

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<sup>29</sup> Adee to Chilton, Feb. 11, 1901; Chilton to Adee, Feb. 11, 1901; Adee to Chilton, Feb. 8, 1901, all attached to Fowler 376 to Hill, Dec. 11, 1900, Chafco Desp. 6.

<sup>30</sup> See also Adee note of Jan. 22, 1901 on Conger 459 to Hay, Nov. 26, 1900, China Desp. 109; Lykes 355 to Cridler, Jan 3, 1901, Shanghai Desp. 47.

<sup>31</sup> Dennis, op. cit., 245.

problems arose in January, 1901. By the middle of February the Department had gotten word that claims of land by right of conquest were being made in China by some of the Powers. This land would have been held in reserve for general agreement of the Powers to enlarge the foreign settlements in China. Tower was instructed to inform the Department about those land claims. His reply was dated February 26. Adee directed it to be "acknowledged by subject, in the sense of the annexed memorandum." The "annexed memorandum" was a draft of our reply, written by Adee, and copied verbatim in the Department's instruction on the subject:

The establishments contemplated in the Department's telegram of February 16 are the foreign settlements at the several parts now or in future to be opened by treaty for foreign settlement. The particular occasion for the inquiry and suggestion was the reported military occupation by one or several powers of land for such foreign settlement at Tientsin, under an asserted claim of right of conquest. Our solicitude in this regard had not relation to any question of the creation of new territorial spheres of foreign administration or influence, or the expansion of any such spheres now existing, by means of independent negotiation with the Government of China. As to these latter phases, the views of this Government are set forth in the telegram addressed to you on the 1st instant.<sup>32</sup>

After that there is nothing by Adee on the Boxer issue until after his return in 1901 from his vacation in France, when the Chinese Minister asked the Department what it was going to do with the money that had been taken by American troops from the Salt Tax Lahan in Tientsin. A newspaper had reported that our Government had decided to return the money to China, and Wu

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<sup>32</sup> May 225 to Tower, Mar. 16, 1901, Russia Instructions 18:326. Adee note of Mar. 16, 1901, on Tower 395 to Hay. Feb. 27, 1901, Russia Resp. 57.

wanted to know, if that were true, just how we proposed to return the money.<sup>33</sup> Adee wrote a long note to the Secretary about the history of this case, and, from that long memorandum, a reply was made to Wu a few days later. The long recital by Adee was condensed into a brief note that stated the money had been converted into bills of exchange for collection, "the proceeds to be subject to official check upon the approval of the President," and that although our Government was well-disposed to return the money to China, "the time and manner of so doing remain to be determined by the President."<sup>34</sup>

With a peaceful settlement of the Boxer incident assured, and the details of the apportionment of the indemnity remaining to be worked out, a horrible incident in our history occurred. President McKinley was shot on September 7, 1901. His death transferred the decisions for the final settlement of the Boxer indemnities to the new President, Theodore Roosevelt. But they did not vary much from the direction President McKinley and Secretary Bay had set for them. The Powers, and China, signed the "Final Protocol for the Settlement of the Disturbances of 1900" on September 7, 1901; the "Protocol regarding the Apportionment of the Boxer indemnity" on June 14, 1902; and in July, 1905, an "Exchange of Notes regarding Final Settlement of

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<sup>33</sup> Wu to Bay, July 13, 1901, Chinese Legation 4 to the Department.

<sup>34</sup> Bay personal to Wu, July 18, 1901, The Department 2 to the Chinese Legation 120; Adee to Bay, July 16, 1901, Chinese Legation 4 to The Department.

the question of the Boxer Indemnity" was made.<sup>35</sup> Also, our country had become involved with more important issues than settling the indemnities problems. The young and eager President gave his attention to these more pressing problems, yet the Chinese problems continued down to and into the Russo-Japanese war.

In September, 1902, three months after we signed the protocol for apportioning the indemnity money, Conger reported the Russian evacuation of Manchuria had begun, and "that the territory up to the Liao River will be completely evacuated by October eighth, according to agreement." Adee sent that gratifying news to Hay with the attached observation: "Adam Zed seems to be getting a move on him."<sup>36</sup>

The indemnity which the Powers required from China was set at 433,000,000. Of this amount the United States was awarded \$24,440,700. These amounts were reached after receiving loss statements from persons or organizations which lost property in the uprising, but were not reached until all "suspicion and anxiety as to the possible action of any one power" had been removed, and the Powers were in cordial relations. This cordiality was brought about by four important declarations. These were: 1) Hay's circular note of July 3, 1900; 2) Russia's announcement on August 28, 1900, that she had no land designs in

<sup>35</sup> List of Treaties, Conventions, Exchanges of Notes, and other International Agreements in Force between the United States and China, and Between the United States and Other Powers in Relation to China. (Washington, 1925), 2, 3.

<sup>36</sup> Conger cipher tel. to Hay, Sep. 26, 1902, HP.



China; 3) Germany's "bombshell" of September 18, 1900; and 4) the British-German declaration on October 16, 1900, that they would "preserve the 'open door' in trade, take no advantage of the existing conditions to acquire territory," but at the same time "reserving the right to take another course if any other power attempted to violate the first two policies."<sup>37</sup>

Adee's role in relationship to the first three declarations has been well established. There is little information in the official records to show his role in the fourth. It was Adee who, in the absence of the Secretary of State, kept the "ship of state" in the path set forth in Hay's circular note of July 3, 1900; it was his opinions that were developed into our reply to the Russian note of August 28, 1900. And his ideas about the German note of September 18, 1900, that the guilty persons were not to be punished before the negotiators met, became the Departmental Policy and, in turn, became the accepted views of the Powers.

In carrying out the policies set forth by Hay, Adee had to meet with the representatives of the Powers acting in concert in China. Sometimes the sessions were routine, and sometimes they were occasioned by a new report from the Far East. In all cases, Adee handled the touchy problems so skillfully, and consistently in keeping with our declared policies, that he won the repeated praises of his chief, and the admiration of the foreign diplomats who dealt with him.

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<sup>37</sup> Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient, 425-426.

## CHAPTER VIII

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

#### SUMMARY

Alvey Augustus Adee was the "brains" behind the United States foreign policy between the years 1889 and 1909 and, as Second Assistant Secretary of State, was responsible for the continuing policy for thirty-eight years, beginning in 1886 and ending with his death in 1924. For this long and continuous service Adee received a maximum salary of \$4500. This long continuous service of a top policy maker has never been equaled in this country, and Adee's tenure of office comes closest to a permanent undersecretary that the United States Government has seen. In that capacity Adee was comparable to the British Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a person who continues in office regardless of the party in control.

The Department of State has had only two Second Assistant Secretaries, William Hunter and Alvey Augustus Adee. Hunter entered the Department as a clerk in 1829 and became Chief Clerk several years later. In that capacity he served as Acting Secretary on several occasions. In 1866 Congress created the position of Second Assistant Secretary of State, and Hunter was promoted to the new position. He served in that capacity for twenty years until his death in 1886, at which time Adee was appointed to succeed him. The position was changed in 1924 to Assistant Secretary, with no designating number. Adee, like Hunter, was familiar with American history and the diplomacy of

the Department of State. Both of them insisted on accuracy in the official correspondence, and in them were represented the best traditions of the Department.

When Adee entered the Department of State in 1877, most of the work was performed on a personal contact level. In 1862, when Adee was appointed the Third Assistant Secretary, there were ninety-six employees in the Department. This number gradually increased as the Department grew. This growth was steady after the Spanish-American War made the United States a world power. World War I caused a quick and rapid expansion in the volume of work and of necessity of the personnel. Then the work ceased to be performed on a personal contact level, and more paper work was done. At the time of Adee's death in 1924, he had two assistants, six clerks, and one messenger assigned to his office. One of them, Mrs. Blanche Kule Halla, has pointed out that four of that number were still with the Department of State as late as April, 1953.

Adee could have gone higher in the ranks, but he preferred a more steady position where he could work for the Department he loved. With each change of Administration, Adee dutifully tendered his resignation, and just as regularly it was not accepted by the incoming President. Consequently, he became known as the "Permanent Assistant Secretary of State." By no means was the position permanent, it was Adee who was permanent, for "Presidents ignorant of diplomacy and international law felt reasonably safe in appointing as their chief secretaries gentlemen as ignorant as themselves.... He was the master of both the

language and practices of diplomacy...."<sup>1</sup> Time and again Presidents and Secretaries of State turned to Adee, asking him how to carry out their policies.

Adee was a tower of strength to the twenty-two secretaries under whom he had served. Some of them readily acknowledged their dependence on him. Foremost among that number was Hay. And many times, in the absence of the Secretary and Assistant Secretary, Adee was the Acting Secretary of State. The indices of the Foreign Relations volumes for the years 1886-1909 readily show the many papers signed, "Adee, Acting."

One of Adee's duties was to review the incoming and outgoing mail. Once he told Oscar S. Straus that he opened all the letters face-down in order to save time. On another occasion he wrote to Hay that he had driven his pen steadily but it still took him almost an hour to sign the mail that day. This daily contact with the correspondence helped him to be familiar with many situations as the several problems confronted the Department. Because of this familiarity, Adee occasionally broke with tradition and conservatism in order to express new views on a problem. One such instance occurred during the Russo-Japanese War. Adee wrote some "radical" thoughts about contraband of war and the seizure and detention of neutral ships carrying neutral goods. However, his thoughts were not too radical, for John Bassett Moore approved them as being sound.

Adee had made himself indispensable and "permanent" by his

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<sup>1</sup> Stuart, The Department of State, pp. 194-195, quoted from William R. Thayer, John Hay, 2:187.

abilities and continuous service. Other officers came and went, as the chart in Appendix A shows but Adee was a loyal and faithful servant for fifty-four years and, as shown above, frequently served as the acting secretary. He served the Department of State in one capacity or another from the days of President Grant and Secretary Fish to the days of President Coolidge and Secretary Hughes. During his tenure of office several persons tried to imitate him. Secretary Blaine told one hopeful office seeker that he would lose his job when the administration changed. "Why so?" asked the applicant. "Look at Adee." "Well," said Blaine, slowly, "Adee is -- Adee."<sup>2</sup> "Old Reliable" did all he could to hide his light and methodically disposed of his personal papers so that the trust imposed in him would not be destroyed.

Adee represented "tradition and conservatism, evolution rather than revolution, steady advance rather than hasty action and retreat."<sup>3</sup> This tradition and conservatism were regularly used by the Department during Adee's long association with it. This is especially true of the period after 1909. At that time the office of the Counselor was established. In the ranking of the Departmental officers, this new officer was placed directly under the Secretary, thereby making Adee one more step removed from the Secretary. The position of Counselor was abolished in 1919, at which time the new title of Undersecretary of State was

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<sup>2</sup> Hunt, "The Permanent Assistant Secretary of State," Ibid., p. 461.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 464.

created. Frank L. Polk, then the Counselor, changed his title to Undersecretary, as shown in Appendix A.

Adee's personal life and official life were never mixed up. Miss Adee, who lived with him, has said that her uncle never once talked about the work at the Department, except to exclaim about a split infinitive in an instruction, or some similar minor problem in English. His letters to Hay do not discuss his outside activities. They do discuss official items with much humor and many references mixed in, thereby revealing his extensive outside reading. His grand-niece, Miss Constance Ellen Tyler, told the writer that her uncle always had some books on his desk at home, and that on occasions he would relax and read them.

In the Department of State Adee devoted himself to the work. When events were serious, he slept in the Department in order to be on hand when telegrams came in after the regular work hours. He was on hand in that manner during the Spanish-American War and two years later during the Boxer Rebellion. His role in those two events, especially the latter, has made his name synonymous with the Department for that period. It was during the Boxer rebellion in the Summer of 1900 that Adee stepped in as Acting Secretary and held steadfastly to the policies set forth by Hay. It was Adee who told Wu that free and unalimited communication with the Ministers in Peking had to be an acknowledged fact before the Department would consider stopping the march on Peking. It was Adee who prepared the first draft of the reply to the Russian Memorandum of August 28, 1900, and stated that the United States was not contemplating removing her

Minister from Peking, and that Russia would be able to look after her interests on the Manchurian border without hindrance from the United States Government. It was Adee who stated that his Government could not go along with the demands set forth in the German "Bombshell" note of September 18, 1900. Adee's role in adhering to the policies set forth in Hay's Circular Note of July 3, 1900, and his insistence that those conditions be fulfilled before other terms would be considered, reveal him as consistent in following the directions of the Secretary of State. His role in that crisis shows that Adee was conversant with the many problems of the issue, and if he had not been on friendly terms with the President, the Secretary, and the foreign diplomats, he would not have been able to perform his "Acting Secretary" role with the same ease and finesse.

Two stories which describe Adee's role in American foreign policy, are worth re-telling at this time, because they sum up the trust and dependence the Secretaries of State placed in Alvey Augustus Adee. The first occurred in Philander C. Knox's term of office. The Secretary sent for Adee to help him determine whether the United States would or would not recognize the new government in China. With his ear-trumpet in one hand and a small memorandum with a few dates on it in the other, Adee walked into the Secretary's office, sat down, and started to talk.

Knox gazed upon him in astonishment and looked past him to the door, through which he expected to follow a procession of messengers bearing volumes of reference from the department library. None entered. Mr. Adee proceeded with his subject. He recited in detail the case of Brazil when a provisional government was established. He took up and disposed of the French Revolution, Empire, and Republic, and the policy

established by the action of the United States in relation thereto. He carefully explained every question of the recognition of new governments and states from 1792 up to the case in point and followed up with convincing arguments the suggestions he then offered as the proper course to be pursued.

Convinced of the soundness of Mr. Adee's recommendations, but believing it to be wholly impossible that his memory could retain so many facts, Secretary Knox made a personal study of the matter, only to find that every statement Mr. Adee had made -- they had been taken down by a stenographer -- was correct to the last detail.<sup>4</sup>

The other story, quoted by Stuart from Hulén,<sup>5</sup> was not related accurately in those accounts. Mrs. Ruth B. Shipley, one of Adee's secretaries, told the writer how the event happened. Secretary Hughes had to send a reply about a touchy Anglo-Egyptian problem. He had received several draft copies of replies and had rejected them, for they did not say what Hughes wanted to say in the way he wanted to say it. Mrs. Shipley was then told to have Adee prepare a reply. When she took the papers in to him, he grumbled, "You will bring me a despatch to write when I am dead." But he read the papers and then started to write the reply. "And," Mrs. Shipley said, "he wrote right along and completed the reply without a pause. Then he went back and made one small insertion in his draft." Mrs. Shipley then took Adee's draft to the Secretary. She waited while he read it. When he did not say anything for a few minutes, she thought something was wrong, for Hughes had a photographic mind. Finally he looked up, smiled, and said, "I shall now give myself the pleasure of a second reading."

<sup>4</sup> Mallon, loc. cit.

<sup>5</sup> Stuart, Ibid., pp. 273-274, quoted from Hulén, Ibid., pp. 124-125.



## CONCLUSIONS

In the period from 1886 to 1909 much of the United States foreign policy was first formulated in Adee's mind. During his thirty-eight years of continuous service as one of the makers of that policy he was a tower of strength to the twenty-two secretaries under whom he had served. Especially was this true for the decade 1895 to 1905. When he put his thoughts in writing, the Secretary of State, or the President, or both, adopted many of Adee's views because they adequately presented the problems, gave sound suggestions for our position, and he supported those suggestions with convincing arguments. But just as soon as he had presented his opinions and had them adopted as the official views and opinions, he withdrew and let his chiefs take the credit.

Why did he withdraw? Several reasons may be stated. First, by nature he was a co-worker and became the leader only when circumstances made it necessary. Second, he was self-effacing. When his words were used by the President or the Secretary, those words then became the speaker's words, and Adee was quite satisfied to let it go at that. His work was to help his chiefs to reach an opinion acceptable to the American people at home and to foreign governments abroad. Third, he knew what had to be done, and he went ahead and did it. His satisfaction was a job well done and that he had been faithful to the trust imposed in him.

Adee was a co-worker who understood perfectly his duties and responsibilities. He knew when he was at liberty to release

information to the public or to the inquiring foreign diplomats. The Hay-Vu story illustrates his ability to give an answer and still not reveal any confidential information. His letters to Hay about keeping American troops in Peking are evidence of his opinions being accepted later as the official views of the Department of State.

Adee devoted his life to the Department. He spent many extra hours at his desk when the international problems were critical. He guided the ship of state during several trying periods. His grip on the tiller was firm and port was reached without any wrong turns and without any mistakes. He was able to do that because he was willing to take one step at a time and to let the second step await the outcome of the first one. Having done that, he placed alternatives before his chief, who then made the final decision.

How did Adee perform the various duties delegated to him? By means of many extra hours spent at the office and by extensive reading. Moreover, he remembered what he read and, when necessary, could recall from memory the information he had absorbed. He was, like Hunter, whom he replaced, a close reader of American history. He knew intimately the diplomatic history of his country, as well as the history of foreign countries.

Adee was responsible for the accuracy of the outgoing mail. He saw to it that what he passed on was correct, both as to grammar and facts, as well as to references and quotations. His own style of composition became the official style of the Department, and Adee held the Department of State to correct

grammar and punctuation. But when the work load became too great for him and Miss Hanna, others were brought in to review the correspondence. His insistence on correctness gave a firm foundation to the Correspondence Bureau, which was established during World War I, later abolished and then re-created in 1924. The roots he planted held fast, and his assistants carried on in the tradition of Adee. Today one of his helpers, Mrs. Blanche Mule Halla, is the Chief of the Correspondence Review Staff.

Adee loved his home and the Department of State to which he gave much and from which he sought little in return. He advised many Secretaries of State, and drafted much of their official correspondence. In addition, he wrote many speeches for the several Presidents under whom he served. As Second Assistant Secretary of State, from 1886 to 1924, Adee made the policies of one Administration conform to the traditional policies of the previous Administrations, thereby giving a continuity to the foreign policies of the United States. By his abilities and continuous service he earned and justly deserved the titles "Old Reliable" and "Semper Paratus."

APPENDIX A

THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE DURING THE TERMS OF SERVICE OF ALVY AUGUSTUS ADEA, 1890 - 1894

PRESIDENTS	SECRETARIES	YEARS OF SERVICE	UNDERSECRETARIES	YEARS OF SERVICE	ADVISORS	YEARS OF SERVICE	ASSISTANT SECRETARIES	YEARS OF SERVICE	YEARS OF SERVICE	YEARS OF SERVICE	YEARS OF SERVICE	
LYSSES B. BRYAN Mar. 4, 1865 to Mar. 4, 1877	Hamilton Fish	Mar. 17, 1865 to Mar. 12, 1877	None		None							
							John Chandler Benjamin Davis	Apr. 1, 1868 to Nov. 13, 1871	William Hunter	July 27, 1866 to July 22, 1868	None	
							Charles Hale	Feb. 19, 1872 to Jan. 26, 1873				
							J. C. B. Davis	Jan. 28, 1873 to Jan. 30, 1874				John A. Campbell
Rutherford B. Hayes Mar. 4, 1877 to Mar. 4, 1881	William W. Swarts	Mar. 12, 1877 to Mar. 7, 1881				John L. Ho Caldwell	Jul. 1, 1874 to Mar. 20, 1877				Charles Payson	June 22, 1878 to June 30, 1881
						Frederick W. Bernard	Mar. 21, 1877 to Oct. 21, 1879					
James A. Garfield Mar. 1, 1881 to Sep. 19, 1881	James G. Blaine	Mar. 7, 1881 to Dec. 19, 1881				John Hay	Nov. 1, 1879 to May 8, 1881				Walker Blaine	July 1, 1881 to June 30, 1882
						Robert B. Rice	Aug. 6, 1881 to Dec. 15, 1881					
Chester A. Arthur Sep. 20, 1881 to Mar. 4, 1885	Frederick T. Frelinghuysen	Dec. 19, 1881 to Mar. 6, 1885				J. C. B. Davis	Dec. 20, 1881 to Jul. 7, 1885				Alvey A. Adee	July 15, 1882 to Aug. 5, 1886
						John Davis	Jul. 8, 1882 to Feb. 25, 1886					
Grover Cleveland Mar. 4, 1885 to Mar. 4, 1889	Thomas F. Bayard	Mar. 7, 1885 to Mar. 6, 1889				James D. Porter	Mar. 21, 1885 to Sep. 10, 1887	Alvey A. Adee	Aug. 6, 1886 to June 30, 1886	John B. Moore	Aug. 6, 1886 to June 30, 1891	
						George L. Hives	Nov. 21, 1887 to Mar. 8, 1890					
Benjamin Harrison Mar. 4, 1889 to Mar. 4, 1893	James G. Blaine	Mar. 7, 1889 to June 6, 1890				William F. Wharton	Apr. 11, 1889 to Mar. 20, 1893				William M. Orinwell	Feb. 15, 1892 to Apr. 16, 1893
Grover Cleveland Mar. 4, 1893 to Mar. 4, 1897	Walton Q. Grosvenor	Mar. 7, 1893 to May 10, 1896				Joshua Quincy	Mar. 21, 1893 to Sep. 22, 1893				Edward W. Strobel	Apr. 17, 1893 to Apr. 18, 1894
	Edwin F. Uhl	May 22, 1896 to (ad interim)				Edwin F. Uhl	Nov. 11, 1893 to Feb. 11, 1894				William W. Woodhill	Apr. 17, 1894 to Feb. 13, 1896
	Richard Olney	June 10, 1896 to Mar. 8, 1897				William W. Woodhill	Feb. 14, 1894 to May 20, 1897				William W. Baldwin	Feb. 21, 1896 to Apr. 1, 1897
William McKinley Mar. 4, 1897 to Sep. 14, 1901	John Sherman	Mar. 6, 1897 to Apr. 27, 1898				William H. Day	May 11, 1897 to Apr. 27, 1898				Thomas W. Gridler	Apr. 8, 1897 to Nov. 15, 1901
	William H. Day	Apr. 28, 1898 to Sep. 14, 1898				John B. Moore	Apr. 28, 1898 to Sep. 16, 1898					
	Alvey A. Adee	Sep. 17, 1898 to (ad interim)				David J. Hill	Oct. 25, 1898 to Jan. 28, 1903					
	John Hay	Sep. 20, 1898 to July 1, 1903										
Theodore Roosevelt Sep. 14, 1901 to Mar. 4, 1909	The officers continued from the preceding administration					Francis B. Loonis	Feb. 9, 1903 to Oct. 10, 1906				Herbert H. D. Peirce	Nov. 16, 1901 to Dec. 30, 1902
						Robert Bacon	Oct. 11, 1906 to Jan. 27, 1909				Huntington Wilson	July 2, 1906 to Dec. 30, 1906
						John C. O'Loughlin	Jan. 28, 1909 to Mar. 8, 1909				William Phillips	Jan. 11, 1909 to Oct. 15, 1909
William H. Taft Mar. 4, 1909 to Mar. 4, 1913	Philander C. Knox	Mar. 6, 1909 to Mar. 6, 1913			Henry H. Hoyt	Aug. 27, 1909 to Nov. 20, 1910	Huntington Wilson	Mar. 6, 1909 to Mar. 19, 1913			Chandler Hale	Oct. 14, 1905 to Apr. 21, 1913
					Chandler F. Anderson	Dec. 16, 1910 to Apr. 22, 1913						
Woodrow Wilson Mar. 4, 1913 to Mar. 4, 1921	William J. Bryan	Mar. 6, 1913 to June 6, 1913			John B. Moore	Apr. 22, 1913 to Mar. 4, 1914	John B. Moore	Apr. 21, 1913 to Dec. 14, 1913			Dudley Field Malone	Apr. 22, 1913 to Nov. 21, 1913
	Robert Lansing	June 8, 1913 to June 22, 1913			Robert Lansing	Apr. 1, 1914 to June 22, 1913					William Phillips	Mar. 17, 1914 to Jan. 24, 1917
					Frank L. Polk	Sep. 16, 1913 to June 20, 1919	William Phillips	Jan. 25, 1917 to Mar. 25, 1920			Breckenridge Long	Jan. 25, 1917 to June 5, 1920
Warren G. Harding Mar. 4, 1921 to Aug. 2, 1923	Charles Evans Hughes	Mar. 8, 1921 to Mar. 4, 1923									Van Santvoord Cleremish	June 20, 1920 to Mar. 4, 1921
					None (Reestablished in 1924)	Fred H. Downing	Mar. 18, 1921 to Feb. 28, 1922				Roberts Woodruff Bliss	Mar. 16, 1921 to May 3, 1923
Calvin Coolidge Aug. 2, 1923 to Mar. 4, 1929	The officers continued from the preceding administration					Leland H. Harrison	Apr. 24, 1922 to ---				J. Butler Wright	June 11, 1923 to June 30, 1924
						Alvey A. Adee	July 1, 1924 to July 4, 1924	Title changed to Assistant Secretary July 1, 1924			Title changed to Assistant Secretary July 1, 1924	
					Joseph C. Gow	Apr. 16, 1924 to ---	J. Butler Wright	July 1, 1924 to ---				
						Willbur J. Carr	July 1, 1924 to ---					
						John Van A. MacDermott	Nov. 19, 1924 to ---					

A BIRD IN A BUSH

AMER'S MEMORANDUM OF AUGUST 28, 1900

IN REPLY TO THE RUSSIAN MEMORANDUM

OF AUGUST 28, 1900

**Memorandum**

in response to the Russian Charge's oral communication made to-day to the Acting Secretary of State touching the purposes of Russia in China.

The Government of the United States receives with much satisfaction the repeated and frank declaration that Russia has no designs of territorial acquisition in China; and that, equally with the other Powers now operating in China, Russia has sought the safety of her legation in Peking and to help the Chinese Government to repress the troubles.

The same purposes have moved and continue to move the Government of the United States. As was said in the circular communication to the Powers cooperating in China, our concurrent action is lent "first, in opening up communication with Peking and rescuing the American officials, missionaries and other Americans who are in danger; secondly, in affording all possible protection everywhere in China to American life and property; thirdly, in guarding and protecting all legitimate American interests; and fourthly, in aiding to prevent a spread of the disorders to the other provinces of the Empire."

The first of these purposes has been in great measure accomplished, thanks to the energetic devotion of the brave men, under diverse flags, who have joined in the advance upon and capture of Peking; but it cannot be deemed altogether fulfilled so long as peaceful conditions and orderly government are not restored in the Chinese capital, and so long as the approaches to Peking and the surrounding country are not freed from hostile opposition.

The others remain unfulfilled, as to the United States and to the other conjoined Powers.

We believe for our part that the most essential condition to be accomplished is a secure and orderly administration throughout China by a Government able and willing to make, on its part, an effective suspension of hostilities in Peking and elsewhere in China, which shall ensure during negotiations for a permanent settlement, protection for all plain life, property and interests everywhere in the Empire. We have made this the positive condition of entertaining any proposal to negotiate. If we can aid to this end in anyway, we will do so, sharing Russia's desire to help the Chinese Government to repress the troubles.

If the Russian communication be intended to convey the belief of Russia that with the removal of the Imperial Court from Peking there has disappeared any and all Chinese government with which foreign powers can maintain intercourse and which they may help to repress the troubles, was most frankly dissent from such a view. We are led to believe that, as China is politically constituted, the dynasty and the government are one; and that if given the opportunity, or even upon fit occasion being helped by the Powers, to regain the reins of government, the conditions essential to the security of foreign life, property and interests will be resumed and the way opened for their perpetuation by a just settlement with the Powers, which will command the lasting respect and obedience of the Chinese nation. We desire peace with the Chinese people, and in fact we maintain peaceful relations with the bulk of the people.

We incline to the belief that by strengthening the hands of the Imperial dynasty and, if need be, upholding its power for the infliction of the punishment which we justly demand shall be meted to the authors of the wrongs we and other nations have suffered, we open the door for lasting peace and security.

Holding these views, we doubt the expediency of weakening our power for good by severing the representative tie that still, although now weakened, holds between us and the Imperial Government of China. Through our minister accredited to that Government, we think there exists an avenue of approach to the desired settlement, and would be glad if other Powers shared our views and were disposed to make that still available recourse potential, to the end of helping the Chinese Government to regain the reins of power, to punish the doers of the wrongs which it and we have suffered, and to afford a sure authority with which the Powers can deal. We would view with legitimate apprehension the apparent alternative of a virtual conquest of China, of the assertion of vindictive control therein, and of the erection of a new government there upon the ruins of the long-established dynastic rule. We do not class as an alternative the subjection of China in whole or part to foreign rule, still less the dismemberment and partition of the Empire. The frank declarations of Russia in this regard agree with those made to us by the other Powers, and are in accord with our own fixed policy, as declared in the circular of July 3rd, 1900, "to preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity."

Under the circumstances and for the reasons stated, we are not prepared to remove the United States diplomatic representative from China, so long as the course of the Powers now operating with us in China shall not prevent our earnest efforts to attain a sound adjustment of all pending questions with the Government of China and the secure and



durable establishment of peaceable and friendly relations with the Chinese people.

The Govt of the United States also receives with gratification the assurance given by Russia that the occupation of New Chwang is for military purposes incidental to the necessary steps for the security of the Russian border provinces menaced by the Chinese, and that as soon as order shall be reestablished, Russia will retire her troops from these places, if the action of the other Powers be not an obstacle thereto. Certainly no obstacle in this regard can arise through any action of the United States, whose policy is fixed and has been impressively proclaimed.

UNCLAS

UNPRINTED OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

General Records of the Department of State, National Archives,  
Record Group 59.

Instructions, Despatches, and Notes:

Central American States, 1903  
China, 1895-1905  
France, 1898-1905  
Germany, 1890-1903  
Great Britain, 1890-1905  
Hawaii, 1890-1900  
Japan, 1900-1905  
Nicaragua, 1895-1905  
Panama, 1903-1906  
Russia, 1895-1905  
Spain, 1869-1877 and 1895-1900  
Venezuela, 1890-1905

Consular Letters:

Amy, 1900  
Chefoo, 1900  
Colon, 1903-1906  
Panama, 1903-1906  
Santiago de Cuba, 1898  
Shanghai, 1900

Instructions to Consuls, 1902-1903

Domestic Letters, Vol. 228

Reports of the Diplomatic Bureau, Vol. 7

Choate, Joseph H., File on ... /lost word/s/ China and  
the Panama Canal. (Mostly duplicates and copies of  
the correspondence already in the files.)

MANUSCRIPTS

The papers following are available in the Manuscripts Division of  
the Library of Congress:

Augustus A. Adee. Two or three journal books.  
Thomas Francis Bayard. Good. Some about Samoa and the  
Canadian Fisheries.  
James C. Blaine. Not very helpful.  
William Jennings Bryan. Very little Adee material.  
Zechariah Chandler. One letter by Adee.  
Joseph H. Choate. Insignificant for Adee material.  
Jabez Lamar Monroe Curry. No Adee material, but some  
material about events concerning the Department and  
Adee.

William E. Curtis. Very meagre.  
 Caleb Cushing. Excellent for the Cushing ministry in Spain. Adee's original letters and copies of Cushing replies give a fairly complete correspondence.  
 John Chandler Bancroft Davis. A few letters by Adee.  
 Tyler Bennett. Copies of Hay's letters and some of Adee's replies. Some references to Hay's diary. A few of the copies available here were not seen elsewhere.  
 William West Durant. Unimportant for Adee material.  
 John Ericsson. One unimportant Adee letter.  
 Hamilton Fish. Very extensive collection, but little Adee material.  
 John Watson Foster. The material in this collection deals mainly with the fur seal arbitration.  
 Frederick T. Frelinghuysen. Letter Books only.  
 Walter Q. Gresham. Scanty Adee material.  
 Benjamin Harrison. A few letters.  
 John Hay. The best for Adee material. This is explained by the presence of Hay's original letters, which had been gathered by Mrs. Hay and Henry Adams.  
 Philander C. Knox. A few letters.  
 Breckenridge Long. Mainly copies of official correspondence, and scanty Adee material.  
 William McKinley. Excellent material for the Presidential years, especially the Boxer period.  
 William Henry Moody. Insignificant.  
 Richard Olney. Many Adee letters. Very few of Olney's replies.  
 Theodore Roosevelt. Good Adee material.  
 Elihu Root. This collection is very extensive and poorly assembled to find much Adee material.  
 Daniel Edgar Sickles. Mostly copies of official despatches.  
 Oscar S. Straus. Several Adee letters.  
 Elihu B. Washburne. Insignificant.  
 Henry B. White. Very little Adee material.  
 Woodrow Wilson. Two letters to Adee.  
 John Russell Young. Excellent for the Spanish period. A few letters by Adee after that period.

Jabez Lamar Monroe Curry  
 William E. Curtis  
 Caleb Cushing  
 John Chandler Bancroft Davis  
 Tyler Bennett  
 William West Durant  
 John Ericsson  
 Hamilton Fish  
 John Watson Foster  
 Frederick T. Frelinghuysen  
 Walter Q. Gresham  
 Benjamin Harrison  
 John Hay

Philander C. Knox  
 Breckenridge Long  
 William McKinley  
 William Henry Moody  
 Richard Olney  
 Theodore Roosevelt  
 Daniel Edgar Sickles  
 Oscar S. Straus  
 Elihu S. Washburne  
 Henry White  
 Woodrow Wilson  
 John Russell Young

The papers following are available in the Manuscripts Division of the New York Public Library:

Department of State Manuscripts. One letter by Adee.  
 Miscellaneous File: Alvey Augustus Adee. Two letters.  
 Daniel Edgar Sickles. Press letter books and copies of  
 some despatches for the Spanish period.

Miss Lucy Amelia Kinnaird Adee has a few books from the library of Alvey Augustus Adee, some photographs, and the set of silver he had when in Spain.

Miss Constance Ellen Tyler has two or three letters to her mother and father.

PRINTED OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

United States Department of State, The Department of State of the United States. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1898, 72 pp.

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-----, Diplomatic History of the Panama Canal. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1914, 602 pp. Not of much use for this thesis.

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- \_\_\_\_\_, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, with the annual message of the President. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1874, 1898, 1900, 1902, 1903, 1904, 1905, 1909, 1914. The indices show the many instructions and notes sent by "Adee, Acting."
- \_\_\_\_\_, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939, 2 vols.
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- \_\_\_\_\_, Register of the Department of State. Corrected to October 1, 1884. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1884, 118 pp.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Register of the Department of State. Corrected to November 30, 1886. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1886, 68 pp.
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- \_\_\_\_\_, Register of the Department of State. Corrected to February 9, 1898. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1898, 95 pp.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Register of the Department of State. Corrected to January 30, 1899. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899, 99 pp.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Register of the Department of State. Corrected to February 6, 1900. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1900, 98 pp.

- \_\_\_\_\_, Register of the Department of State. Corrected to January 17, 1901. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901, 108 pp.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Register of the Department of State. Corrected to January 18, 1902. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902, 108 pp.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Register of the Department of State. Corrected to February 28, 1903. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903, 169 pp.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Register of the Department of State. Corrected to January 22, 1904. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904, 121 pp.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Register of the Department of State, January 1, 1924, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924, 326 pp.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Register of the Department of State, January 1, 1925, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1925, 348 pp.
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