TRANSPARENT THEY ENDURE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF FISCAL TRANSPARENCY IN HYBRID REGIMES

This dissertation examines the causes of budget transparency in hybrid regimes and the impact of this transparency on political processes and government accountability in these regimes. Utilizing a mixed-methods approach consisting of cross-national statistical analysis, time-series analysis, and comparative case studies of Turkey, Tunisia, Jordan and Iran, this study focuses on the impact of International Financial Institutions on adoption of fiscal transparency standards in hybrid regimes. Using an original formal index of regime typology, this study identifies two hybrid regime subtypes including hegemonic electoral authoritarian and competitive authoritarian, and shows that among hybrid regimes, competitive authoritarians with higher dependence on assistance from the international community tend to be fiscally more transparent. Examining the impact of such transparency on political processes in hybrid regimes, the second part of this study demonstrates that in general political business cycles (politically motivated manipulation of economic policies during electoral years) are less likely in hybrid regimes which are fiscally more transparent.