THE POSSIBILITY OF THE INTRODUCTION OF TREBLE DAMAGES INTO KOREA: ANY HARM?

Despite the fact that the antitrust laws of Korea intend to protect the fair shares of the economically weak, consumers and small and medium enterprises, the reality does not come up to the goal. This article analyzes the necessity and possibility of the introduction into Korea of treble damages as a means to enhance private enforcement of antitrust laws and thereby accomplishing the goals of antitrust. For the analysis, this dissertation shows that nominal treble damages would be 2.5 times the actual loss of antitrust victims in Korea, accounting for prejudgment interest, the statute of limitations, litigation costs, and other plaintiff costs pursuing the case. Next, the author will predict the result not only of some prospective controversies regarding constitutionality which the introduction of treble damages might cause in Korea but also of counteraction from the courts limiting the scope of treble damages. These controversies and counteraction would not be a decisive obstacle to the introduction. Also, it will be demonstrated that the criticism that treble damages cause overdeterrence, meritless suits and strategic abuse of antitrust suits, and inefficiencies resulting from intentional suffering of injuries lacks reasonable evidence, both in the U.S. and Korea. In all these respects, it is necessary to introduce treble damages into Korea.