THE JOHN ADAMS PRESIDENCY: WAR CRISIS LEADERSHIP IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC

In 1797 citizens of the new American republic looked to the first transition of government with foreboding, questioning the ability of any successor to maintain the public confidence that George Washington had enjoyed. Following the nation's greatest hero in office at a time of grave international crisis, as France began undeclared naval war on the United States, John Adams faced unique problems as the second American president. Elected by a narrow margin, having little patronage to dispense, opposed by a small but powerful clique within his own party, Adams served with an inherited cabinet whose three principal members worked to advance the interests of the president's intra-party adversary, Alexander Hamilton. Although bereft of even the minimal resources available to other early presidents for advancing the executive interest by bargaining and persuasion, Adams conducted a successful administration, an achievement that has been overlooked or downplayed by historians because of the second president's failure to win reelection. In his one term of office Adams established a Navy Department and rapidly expanded the country's embryonic navy. He implemented major foreign policy decisions, securing approachment with France through two diplomatic initiatives, the second effort a bold move made in defiance of Federalist party leaders loyal to Hamilton. By restoring balance to foreign policy and checking Hamilton's attempts to use the army as a vehicle of personal and national aggrandizement, Adams reassured Republican adversaries, defusing a conflict between political parties that held the potential for civil disruption. He left the nation at peace, its defenses secure, internal tranquility restored, thereby paving the way for a successful first transition of party government. Because of Adams's extremely limited resources as president, his administration provides a singular case study for evaluating two opposing interpretations of the basis of presidential power: constitutional authority vs. bargaining and persuasion, advanced by Richard M. Pious, The American Presidency (New York, 1979) and Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (New York: 1960), respectively. Adams demonstrated that in the early period of the nation's history a resourceful chief executive could function effectively in office with little more than his constitutional authority to sustain him.