Sincerity or Strategy: Organizational Responses to Interagency Cooperation

Twenty-first century U.S. foreign policy strives to integrate different instruments of power to address national security concerns. Interagency initiatives are one method used to integrate the capabilities of the Department of Defense and the Department of State. Cooperative ventures give the appearance of interagency cooperation, but further examination reveals government agencies do not always strive to work together. Scholars of organizational theory and bureaucratic politics claim organizations resist cooperation to preserve autonomy and protect organizational equities. These same scholars acknowledge organizations will work together, but contend interagency engagements will not be sincere as the need to protect organizational interests precludes genuine cooperation. In this study I addressed two areas of inquiry; first I examined the outcomes of interagency cooperation and second I assessed whether cooperative outcomes change when there are recurrent requirements to cooperate. I conducted a qualitative case-study comparison of the Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team program, the Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Team program, and interagency cooperation at U.S. Africa Command to investigate the following questions: When is interagency cooperation sincere, strategic, or absent? Do requirements for recurring interagency engagements influence agency responses towards future interactions; and if so, how? Findings revealed that when organizations were tasked to cooperate on mission critical tasks, their participation was not sincere. Instead, partners enacted strategic responses to protect and promote their interests. Evidence also revealed when partners anticipated recurrent requirements to cooperate, they negotiated compromises for cooperation. Compromises delineated organizational authority and enabled partners to work together, but they also limited the degree of interagency cooperation as each agency was able to administer their portion of the venture independently. Results from this study bring further understanding to the factors that drive organizational behavior. Negotiated compromises and incentives encourage agencies to participate in an interagency venture, but sincere cooperation is unlikely to emerge due to organizational equities. Still, if agencies are unable to protect their interests or reap organizational gains when working together, they may avoid participating in the interagency venture altogether.