Reconciling the paradox: Non-intervention and collective action in the OAS

This thesis discusses the inherent paradox in the mandate of the Organization of American States (OAS): while charged with protecting the members' sovereignty; the organization is also entrusted with the duty of promoting democracy and defusing threats to hemispheric peace, even if they spring as a result of a member's internal dynamics. The thesis will first trace the development of these two currents from the early 19th century, up until the establishment of the OAS (1948). Moreover, it will study two instances in which the OAS became involved in the internal affairs of a member in order to curtail a perceived threat to hemispheric peace: the Dominican Intervention of 1965 and the Nicaraguan Crisis of 1978-1979. Finally, the thesis will argue that ultimately the real contradiction afflicting the OAS is that between a rhetorical commitment to collective action and the members' reticence to exercise this authority except in cases where it would directly benefit their national interest.