Planting olive trees: Palestinian nonviolent resistance

This dissertation examines the meaning of nonviolent action and suggests a model for successful nonviolent political resistance. Prescriptive in its theoretical orientation, the model is based on three propositions: (1) The greater the ability of actors to sustain their nonviolent resistance in the face of repression, the greater the likelihood of success. (2) By privileging nonviolent means over ends, political resistance stands a better chance of succeeding. (3) The exercise of power and authority is based on the origins of power which are not intrinsic to rule but which emerge from the "bottom up" and which depends on the consent of those ruled. The model uses a standard set of elements--actors, goals and resources--to give empirical content to the propositions. It is tested by examining the efficacy of Palestinian nonviolent resistance in terms of accomplishing process, achievement and ultimate goals vis-a-vis the occupation authorities on the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the Intifada, or uprising. I argue that nonviolent political resistance and violent political resistance co-exist along the same continuum called political action. I also argue that there is a distinction between those being nonviolent and those having nonviolence, the former using nonviolence as a policy tool, the latter as a creed. The investigation of Palestinian nonviolent behavior confirms this difference although it has also resulted in the addition of a new type of nonviolent action to the model, i.e., civil resistance. I also found that, given the increasing degree of repression accompanying the Intifada, nonviolent resistance did not succeed in attaining ultimate objectives. This indicates that repression should be more fully integrated into the model. The model should treat the effects of repression in a non-linear fashion, i.e., repression can work to the advantage of nonviolent resistors to a point but also can prevent them from achieving their ultimate goals. Further, investigation of the Palestinian case indicates that consent of the governed, as the mainstay of power, is not the independent variable the model suggests it to be. Given the dependent nature of the economy in the Occupied Territories, Palestinians are unable to sustain their nonviolent noncooperation vis-a-vis Israel's civil administration. As such, other resources available to nonviolent political actors condition the efficacy of nonviolent nonconsent.